At greatcharlie.com, we seek to get beyond the “us-them” simplicities of foreign and defense policy issues and attempt to shed light upon the players and ideas that are moving events forward. We collect articles, comments, and speeches, and interpret their meaning, determine their relative value to an issue at hand. We then present our assessments to those who read our blog. On October 25, 2013, I had the opportunity to attend a “not for attribution” presentation of a “top US Syria hand” at a renowned foreign policy think tank and membership organization in New York. He provided advice on the transition process in Syria. He was tapped for that role in the Syria process due to his extensive experience in the US Army, in the Defense Department, and in the State Department handling Middle East issues and his direct experience with Syria itself. The views expressed by the speaker were forthright and at times surprising. They shed light on how and why the negotiation process has reached its current state.
Those attending the presentation by the speaker were informed in advance that the presentation was “not-for-attribution”, and no reference to his identity could be made. (He will be referred to in this post as “the speaker.”) Arresting my urge to reveal the expert’s name has been made more difficult since I sense the perspectives the speaker offered would be more meaningful for our readers. Moreover, it would prevent my report of his perspectives as one more recounting of the views of an anonymous, highly-placed, Obama administration official. It is hoped that the majority of our readers will be able to consider the comments and reflect on the meaning with regard to the US policy on Syria. Indeed, they allow one to conclude that US efforts would unlikely result in a peaceful resolution in Syria and an agreement on a transitional government in Syria that would not include Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. .
The Syrian Civil War
Regarding the Syrian civil War, the speaker noted that the Syrian civil war was appalling in terms of the devastation and humanitarian crisis created. There are over three million refugees residing outside of Syria. According to figures he acquired from the UN, there have been well over 150,000 civilians killed in the fighting. On the ground, a de facto partition status existed. In the western part of Syria, Assad has consolidated power. In the east, localized power centers exist, along with Jihadist linked to Al-Qaida. In the northwest, Kurds have established a relatively autonomous area which is defending itself mostly from Jihadist groups.
The speaker noted that calling the Syrian conflict a civil war is misleading to most because it conjures the idea of a war of military engagements as in the US Civil War (1861-1865). Although there are occasional engagements of military units in combat in urban areas, the speaker made it clear that the Syrian Civil War is in fact a war on civilians. This has led to an enormous humanitarian catastrophe in which ethnic cleansing, extra-judicial executions, detentions, torture, injuries, rape, homelessness, starvation, sanitation, and disease, to name a few problems, were evident.
The speaker explained that a nationalist opposition movement had initiated the protests against the Assad regime and the civil war. The nationalist movement, he point out, adhered to the idea of a Syrian identity based on citizenship, not religion or ethnicity. However, this is no longer heard. According to him, Jihadists have marginalized the nationalist opposition movement that. He reported that the three main Jihadist units, comprised of many foreigners, were concentrating their efforts against Syrian civilians. That has included the detentions, torture, and executions, already mentioned and deprivations of essentials for survival have been Jihadist tactics. Yet, the speaker felt that the Assad’s regime use of lethal military force against civilians has been even more damaging. The speaker explained that the humanitarian crisis was due to the Assad regime’s policy of using fire from artillery, rocket, jets, and helicopters in the midst of civilian areas without targeting. It has been nothing but a terror campaign aimed at civilians. Getting foreign humanitarian aid through to Syrian opposition held territory to deal with the multitude of suffering civilians has been impossible. The regime will not allow this.
The speaker pointed to the fact that Russia and Iran were providing a great deal of support to the Assad regime. However, he pointed to the fact that large sums of money were being providing to the Jihadists from Arab states, especially Kuwait at the moment. Wanting to respond to violence by the Assad against their communities, Syrian men are drawn to opposition units that have sufficient resources to make an impact on the battlefield. Those units are predominantly the Jihadist units.
To arrest the problem of the jihadist units, the US has initiated an effort to arm the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the military wing of the Syrian opposition. Its commander in chief, General Salim Idris, would be the recipient of US funds, arms, and supplies, which he would be responsible for distributing the assistance among moderate, secular and capable Free Syrian Army units. Since that effort began, the speaker noted that 13 Jihadist organizations have declared war on the Syrian National Council, the main political-wing of the opposition. The Jihadists are less engaged against Assad and more involved with establishing Islamist governments ruled under sharia law in areas under their control. Nevertheless, the Obama administration still wants to focus on the SMC, hoping it will provide shares of aid to responsible groups. The speaker felt the results of that effort had been lacking. US officials allegedly revealed to the speaker that it is unknown whether that approach works or will ever have an impact. Yet, the US insists on this approach.
The Syrian chemical weapons agreement was viewed by the speaker as a good thing. He alleged that all parties involved in Syria believed that it was good to see the Assad regime stripped of its inventory. He saw the real challenge as being how to bridge the diplomatic process on chemical weapons agreement to the political process on Syria. The speaker felt, however, that Assad regime’s chemical weapons use and stockpile was the top of an ugly ice berg and as long as the Assad regime remained in place and the large scale slaughter of civilians continued, it was hard to see how the diplomatic process could take hold in Syria.
The speaker stated that the Geneva process for Syria has presented as problem for the US Secretary of State John Kerry. The aims of the process are to produce a negotiated, mutually consented transitional government in Damascus with full governing powers. Geneva II set for November 23 and 24, 2013 will address transition in Syria. The speaker, who was present at the Geneva conference on Syria on June 2012, revealed that consensus existed for transitional talks. He noted, however, that consensus evaporated soon after that. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad was not mentioned in the June 30, 2012 communiqué of foreign powers among the conference participants. He lamented that this was a critical mistake because in Syria, all powers reside in the person of Assad. No deals could be made unless they had the approval of Assad. As of now, according to the speaker, at Geneva II, Assad’s presidency also will not be on the table. That is problematic because it allows Assad to still hold power. The speaker indicated that without Assad’s leadership on the table, nothing can be accomplished at Geneva II. He was certain that Russia will support the Assad regime’s position. In his opinion, the greatest threat to the Assad regime to date was the threat of US airstrike due to its September 21, 2013 chemical weapons use. However, the Assad regime dodged that threat. He felt that the Assad regime now has no interest in transitioning itself out of power any time soon
Kerry will have trouble getting the Syrian opposition to come to Geneva II according to the speaker. The Syrian opposition sees its constituency pounded by Syrian armed forces. On the battlefield, the speaker observed that the Syrian opposition was losing in real terms. The speaker doubted the Syrian opposition would come to the talks only to hear a lecture from Assad regime representatives. The Assad regime has agreed to send a delegation to the talks led by the Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid Moallem. To remedy this problem, in part, the speaker explained Kerry developed the “London 11.” The London 11 serves to assure the Syrian opposition that the dialogue between its representatives and the Assad regime’s representatives will be about transition. The speaker explained that the purpose of Geneva II must be affirmed by both parties. However, for these reasons, he felt that Geneva II may not happen if the Assad regime does not reaffirm the purpose of the meeting. The speaker noted that the Syrian opposition would meet in Istanbul to discuss the talks. Yet, the Syrian National Council, which the speaker called the main political group of the Syrian opposition, said that it will not attend Geneva II and would not come even if a decision is made in Istanbul for all members of the Syrian opposition to attend. The speaker noted that if the Assad regime shows up without wanting to discuss transition, and if Russia lends its support to the Assad regime’s position, the Geneva talks will fail. The Syrian opposition will be more frustrated than it is now. If diplomacy fails, the Assad regime may continue what it is doing with security assistance from Russia and Iran, as long as it is not using chemical weapons.
Using Military Power
What troubled the speaker about all of this was that the Obama administration was mostly concerned with Syria as an arms control problem which was simply a convenient approach to the issue. The speaker viewed the problem as being much greater. He did not believe that there could be some nuanced escape for Obama on Syria. The speaker believed that Obama was caught in Syria just as US President Harry Truman was caught in Korea in 1950. The speaker stated Obama was skeptical that military force would be useful in the Syrian context. The speaker claimed this has been a fact since the civil war began. According to the speaker, within the Obama administration, it was truly believed that Assad would simply fall away. He explained by pointing to statements often expressed by officials about Assad: “Assad is toast!”; “The winds of change would sweep Assad off the stage!”; and, “Nature would take its course!” In his famous August 16, 2011 speech, Obama a made the direct statement, “Assad must go!” The speaker explained that for the White House, it is important for the president to be on the right side of history. Yet, he notes that there is also a fear to act. There is concern that any sophisticated aid, in significant amounts, might end up in the wrong hands.
According to the speaker, the fact that the US effort in Syria was not in the hands of the Defense Department is telling. The speaker claimed that only the Defense Department could handle the large scale delivery of military assistance to Syrian rebels and their training. He saw the current effort as piecemeal, with only fifteen to twenty rebels being trained at a time.
Further the speaker pointed to the fact that no clear direction exists on Syria. A national security directive providing clear objectives has not been produced. The only objective annunciated so far has been to do whatever may support a decision by Assad to leave. The speaker believed a national security directive would only put the administration on a road toward intervention that it did not want to be on. As a political matter, the Obama administration recognized that winning Syria is not a goal of the US taxpayer. The US needs to formulate alternative responses in Syria that do not put civilians at risk. The speaker believed the best bet for the US on Syria would have been a multifaceted strategy.
The Speaker’s Suggestions on the US Policy on Syria
The Speaker offered five ideas on how to approach the Syria issue. First, he felt Kerry should pursue Geneva II as far as it goes. Kerry must keep his eye on the purpose of Geneva II which is to launch political transition in Syria and put Assad out of business. If Geneva II does not work, the process needs to be abandoned.
Second, the speaker suggested de-escalation as a possible partial remedy to Syria. De-escalation was proposed before the peace process began. It was among the preconditions Kofi Annan, the initial UN special envoy to the Syrian peace process, required the parties meet on the ground before a negotiation process could begin. Those precondition also included mutual disengagement (ceasefire); no mass terror; and, news media access. De-escalation was also mentioned in the communiqué of the London 11.
Third, while the speaker believed a political solution should be sought in Syria which included Assad’s removal from power. He noted that Russian President Vladimir Putin wanted Assad to preside in office for reasons that transcend Syria. Assad managed to dodge his fall when airstrikes were averted by the Russians. Russians have pushed the view that Assad did not launch chemical attacks, but the Jihadists in the Syrian opposition were responsible. Once the US military strikes in response to the August 21st chemical attacks did not occur, Assad felt he would never have to leave. The point Putin is trying to make is that Russia is on the rise again. Russia wants to be seen as supporting a friend to the end. The world is asked to compare and contrast this approach with that of the US, with particular reference to former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. The Iranians allegedly confided that to the speaker that they believed Assad used chemical weapons. The speaker claimed that he had a positive relationship with Iran due to his two-track work with Iran on other issues. The Iranians allegedly told the speaker they were especially dismayed by this because of the terrible experience Iran had with chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War. Nonetheless, for the Iranians, Syria provides a land bridge from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s missiles are an important part of Iran’s response to Israel, if it acts aggressively toward Iran.
Fourth, the speaker believed military power could have a positive impact in Syria. Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime believe there is a military solution in Syria. Assad feels that he can hold out militarily with Russian and Iranian support. However, the speaker admitted, the US believes that there is no politically acceptable military solution in Syria and that belief would be difficult to overcome. He believes that military force could be useful to the extent that it could create a new military balance on the ground. Apparently, some US officials sense it might be too late.
Fifth, the speaker believed that an effort needed to be made to prepare the Syrian opposition to govern in Syria. The speaker explained that while the Syrian opposition has been recognized, no effort at all has been made to prepare it to govern in Syria. They do not stand as an alternative to the regime. Until this is done, millions of Syrians will stay with Assad regime. The speaker revealed that the Syrian opposition as the incoming leaders of the Syrian government in order to support the meeting in Morocco of the then new “Friends of Syria.” No new attempt to do anything with the Syrian opposition has occurred since. At the time the speaker made his presentation and for nearly three years, the current government in Damascus led by Assad is fully recognized by the US and the UN. All power in Syria resides with Assad.
Given the speaker’s comments, it seems the US is not fully committed on Syria. The removal of Assad and his regime have been the expressed desire of the Obama administration, but it has not been established as part of a national security directive. The administration’s efforts to date have demonstrated a lack of interest in Syria’s outcome relative to efforts of Russia and Iran. That lack of interest not only exists in the executive branch, but also in the legislative branch as evinced in the US Congressional debate on military strikes in Syria in early September 2013.
The US has recognized the Assad regime to this date, and has never hinted that it would withdraw its recognition of it while Assad was in power. The Syrian opposition, among many of its problems, was never politically astute, and could not fully appreciate the limited extent of the US commitment. The Syrian opposition, with all of its infighting and shortcomings, is not prepared to take power in Syria. No shadow government has been formed. It takes weeks for the group simply to organize its meetings in Istanbul, to which members often refuse to attend. The Syrian National Council, itself, has threatened not to come to the nest meeting in Istanbul.
At times, the Syria effort by the US, EU, and Arab states has appeared more like an effort to hassle the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran. Assad was forced to surrender his chemical weapons stockpile. However, it was done with international consensus. Russia, Iran, and China were just as happy as the US to get chemical weapons out of Assad’s hands. Assad’s main concern perhaps is no longer US intervention, but the Jihadist’s hold of Syrian territory. If there is a break down in the Geneva talks, Iranian generals in Syria, led by General (Sharlashkar) Qassem Suleimani, may ramp up their efforts. With more sophisticated and determined support from Russia, the Assad regime may be able to keep pace with Iranian forces present and change not only the military balance, but the entire situation on the ground. (The reduction of Jihadist forces in Syria may be an effort to which Western powers may eventually be willing to lend their support.)
Given all that the speaker said, it appears that Obama administration stands willing to let the entire Syrian episode pass, while continuing a small, questionable assistance effort. It is somewhat unlikely the administration would ever broach the use military force in Syria again. The situation in Syria may very well just be allowed to linger until the end of the Obama administration. A new US administration may implement a policy in which the US is more invested in Syria. That might be the only chance for the Syrian opposition would see the robust US support it wants so badly. With regard to nature taking its course on Assad, it appears that course has not force him out of Damascus, but rathr, has allowed him to remain in power.
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ Quds Force Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Qassem Suleimani (above). He directs Iran’s efforts in Syria from Damascus, coordinating with the heads of the Syrian armed forces, and Hezbollah and Iraqi Shi’a militia commanders. The failure of the Geneva II talks would present Suleimani with the opportunity to use all the military power available to him to destroy the Free Syrian Army and Jihadist units without the threat of US military intervention.