In a December 1, 2013 article in the New York Times entitled, “Politics and a Ruptured Tendon Don’t Faze Lead Iran Negotiator,” it was reported that US Under Secretary of State, and lead US negotiator with Iran, Wendy Sherman, fell and ruptured a tendon in her finger. She was on her way to brief highly skeptical Members of Congress about the deal she was negotiating in secretive talks with the Iranians. The article explained that Sherman simply packed her finger in ice right after her fall, went into a secure room, and continued her briefing to Congress on uranium enrichment levels and current intelligence on Iran. Only afterward did she go to an emergency room. The White House used the incident as an opportunity to influence perceptions of Sherman in the Congress and in Iran. She was called “focused” and “tenacious.” Deputy National Security Advisor Antony Blinken, who has coordinated Iran strategy, was quoted as saying, “She’s not the kind to pay attention to pain.” While Members of Congress may have been impressed by reports of the very dutiful public servant’s dsiplay of physical toughness, the White House had little chance of using poaitive spin to influence perceptions of Sherman in Iran.
In Iran, Sherman’s injury may very well have fed into a perception that the US government, has become weaker; somewhat frail, and willing to compromise when previous US administrations never would have. A specious notion of the flexibility displayed by the Obama administration in talks with Iran represented a type of frailty appears to have become dogma among hardliners in Tehran. It has compelled many Iranian officials to publicly deride the US government as being indecisive and pliant to Iran’s demands at Geneva. The recently signed interim accord represented nothing less than conquest over the US within certain power centers. Conversely, US officials, particularly US Secretary of State John Kerry, Sherman, and Blinken have remained discreet and have refrained from making many public remarks about Iran and the Geneva talks. Yet, the jabs have been not been one-sided. Political pundits in the US, without much public rebuke or challenge from Obama administration officials, have characterized Iran’s chief negotiator, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, as being humbled by the negotiation process. They have claimed Iran was driven to accept the recent accord constructed in talks with the US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China. (We now know there were also on-going, dual-track, bilateral talks between the US and Iran.)
In his public statements, Zarif has directly challenged the view that Iran caved in to US demands. Moreover, he has made statements that unquestionably play into the sense that Iran “got one over” on the US and the West. He appears extremely confident that he will reach all of Iran’s goals through the negotiation. Nothing Zarif has said varies much from statements made by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps commanders, and hardline political and religious leaders. However, Zarif must be careful not to lean so far to satisfy superiors and hardliners with his public statements that he erodes existing trust Western negotiators have in him. More importantly, he must be careful not to forge ahead, by taking steps shaped by dogma and public boasts. That could lead to unintended consequences for Iran in the near future.
At first Zarif’s remarks seemed to be an attempt to publicly hash out difficult issues in negotiation. Following the initial Geneva meeting between US and Iranian negotiators early in October 2013, Zarif requested a new proposal from the US, dismissing a February proposal from the Obama administration to presented to Iran.to which it did not respond. However, soon afterward, the main concern in Zarif’s public statements became Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Included among them was the “trial balloon” Zarif released of including the provision in the interim agreement by which the P5+1 would not need to recognize Iran’s right to enrich to remedy a stalemate on its language. Zarif told the ISNA news agency, “Not only do we consider that Iran’s tight to enrich is unnegotiable, but we see no need for that to be recognized as ‘a right’. because this right is inalienable and all countires must respect that .”
Once the November 23, 2013 agreement was reached in Geneva, Zarif’s comments seemed more assertive. On Twitter, Zarif insisted that Iran retained its right to enrich despite comments to the contrary from US officials and political pundits. He tweeted, “The right to enrichment emanates from the inalienable right in NPT, defined by 2010 NPT Review Conference to include fuel cycle activities.” He stated that according to the 2010 NPT Review, “each country’s policies and choices with regard to peaceful nuclear energy including its fuel cycle policies should be respected.” He further stated that the “US and all other E3+3 joined the 2010 consensus at the NPT Review Conference. The right was first recognized by consensus in 1978 SSODI [Special Session on Disarmament].” His statement was compelling, nevertheless, that issue was no longer being debated. Iran agreed in the new accord to freeze the expansion of its nuclear activities, and refrain from uranium enrichment above low-level purity, including 20 percent. Zarif appeared to be pointing out that the interim accord was at all not in line with the terms of international agreements Iran to which was already committed on nuclear technology and that Iran did not necessarily need to adhere to the new interim accord.
After the interim accord was reached, the official IRNA news agency quoted Zarif as saying in Tehran, “Iran will decide the level of enrichment according to its needs for different purposes.” He made it clear that “Only details of the enrichment activities are negotiable” referring to the final accord. According to the Fars news agency, Zarif stated “We have always said we will not allow anyone to determine our needs.” He went on to state “But we are prepared to negotiate about it.” However, the US, Britain, France, and Germany hope the final agreement will scale back Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, which could be redirected at producing highly enrich uranium for creating a nuclear device. Zarif’s statements again indicated that although he helped cobble and sign the interim accord, however the decision on how Iran would proceed on the issues covered by the accord was open to the judgement of Islamic Republic’s leadership. Choppy waters may lie ahead for the Geneva talks given Zarif’s intriguing representations of facts and their ambiguous statements about Iran’s rights after signing the interim accord.
In a letter regarding the Geneva talks from Rouhani to Khamenei published in the Iranian news media, Rouhani stated “The first step advanced an acknowledgement of Iran’s nuclear rights and right to enrich by world powers—who tried to deny them for years—and opened a path for the next steps to protect the technological and economic advances of the country.” Before and after his election, Rouhani insisted that Iran be treated as an equal in its relations with the US. To support the dialogue between nations, the Obama administration approached bilateral talks with Iran based on this notion of equality. In reality, however, thie two states are not equal. In spite of steep cuts ib the size of the US armed forces by the Obama administration and economic woes, the US remains a nuclear armed superpower. As a nation, the US is strong and certainly not a push over. Despite the claims of some political pundits, and Russian President Vladimir Putin, a nuclear weapons program or a few devices will not deter a US attack.
Zarif’s superiors in Tehran want economic sanctions lifted and the ability to use their nuclear program as they choose. However, Zarif, a true diplomat, is astute enough to know that Geneva will not be a “slam dunk.” He must know that significant sanctions relief would be difficult, if not impossible to realize, without a significant and permanent change regarding Iran’s nuclear program. Further, despite what might be thought in Tehran, the true focus of the Geneva process is not sanctions, but Iran’s potential development and use of nuclear weapons. Talks about nuclear weapons concern nuclear war, and for that reason, the talks to some degree regard the very survival of Iran as a nation.
For nearly six decades, the US has been engaged in nuclear talks, initially with the Soviet Union, and with Russia and North Korea since. Those talks have concerned issues such as the size of nuclear forces, production of weapons, and testing. Known better as as arms control talks when concerning the Russians, they have been important enough that summit meetings often become part of the process. Public discussion of furtive aspects of such negotiations is typically negligible. That should also be the case for the Geneva talks.
Perhaps the Obama administration has made significant concessions to reach an historic” agreement. It could very well be that Zarif and the Iranian leadership have scored one on the White House. Yet, the president, his cabinet, and his staff are caretakers of the US government. A new administration will govern in the US in three years. It would be a tragedy for the new administration to discover, after coming to office, that the Geneva negotiations were, as Khamenei indicated, “an artificial maneuver and utilized various methods to achieve various goals and ideals of the Islamic system.” The incoming president’s response to a bad agreement reached now, or breached one, may be severe. Given the list of prospective candidates for the 2016 US presidential election, it is almost certain that the requisite political will to take action will exist. It would be in everyone’s interest for Zarif not to exploit problems he may perceive in the Obama administration, but rather, negotiate unequivocal terms Iran truly intends to keep.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (at right) confers with the Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Ali Akbar Salehi (at left), at the November 25, 2013 IAEO Basij Conference. Salehi was President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s foreign minister. Before taking that post, Salehi served as head of the IAEO for a year. Prior to that, Salehi was Iran’s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both officials know what is at stake in Geneva. Surely, Zarif hopes they will still be able to smile at the end of the negotiations.