Trump Says Putin Means It About Not Meddling: He Also Wants to Make Sure It Does Not Happen Again!

US President Donald Trump (above). After speaking in camera with Putin on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Trump said that he had again asked Putin whether Russia meddled in the 2016 US Presidential Election, but his continued focus on the issue was insulting him. Although Trump faces attacks from critics due to perceived inaction, he has acted in a well-paced manner, taking calibrated steps to assure the defeat of any future election meddling, and make something positive out of a negative situation.

According to a November 11, 2017 New York Times article entitled “Trump Says Putin ‘Means It’ About Not Meddling”, US President Donald Trump expressed the view on Saturday, November 11th that he believed Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin was sincere in his denials of meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. (A version of this article appears in print on November 12, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Putin’s Denials Of Interference Satisfy Trump.) The November 11th New York Times article suggested Trump felt Putin was sincere in his denials of Russia played any role in the US elections, and he called questions about Moscow’s meddling a politically motivated “hit job” that was hindering cooperation with Russia on life-or-death issues. After speaking in camera with Putin on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Trump said that he had again asked whether Russia had meddled in the contest, but that the continued focus on the issue was insulting to Putin. Trump proffered that it was time to move past the issue so that the US and Russia could cooperate on confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea, resolving the Syrian civil war and working together on Ukraine. Trump told reporters traveling with him aboard Air Force One as he flew to Hanoi for more meetings that he asked Putin again about meddling in the US elections. According to Trump, “He said he didn’t meddle.” He went on to state: “You can only ask so many times. I just asked him again. He said he absolutely did not meddle in our election. He did not do what they are saying he did.”

The New York Times reported that Trump did not answer a direct question about whether he believed Putin’s denials in Danang. In response, the New York Times offered the surmisal that Trump indicated he was far more inclined to accept the Putin’s assertions than those of his own intelligence agencies which have concluded the Russian president directed an elaborate effort to interfere in the vote. The article pointed out that the FBI, CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence all determined that Russia meddled in the election. The next day, however, the New York Times explained Trump seemed to walk his comments back a bit, saying that he did not dispute the assessment of the nation’s key intelligence agencies that Russia had intervened in the 2016 presidential election.Trump said at a news conference in Hanoi alongside Vietnam’s president, Tran Dai Quang: “As to whether I believe it or not, I’m with our agencies, especially as currently constituted with their leadership.”  He further stated: “I believe in our agencies. I’ve worked with them very strongly.”

Damnant quod non intellegent. (They condemn what they do not understand.) For critics to insist that Trump is malingering on the issue of Russia’s election meddling because he is not doing what they want him to do, is truly unfair. Trump is doing his job, and it would appear, certainly on foreign policy, that he is doing his job well, with a positive energy, and desire serve the US public. Critics who to demand for Trump to continually reproach and punish Putin over Russia’s election meddling have the luxury to do that away from the fray. They do not have the responsibilities of the president. Further, critics condemn him for having a somewhat nationalistic in tone. Yet, they turn away from the reality that if anyone would feel rage over the idea of another country interfering with the US election process, it would be him. As a responsibility of being US President, Trump must suppress those emotions and consider the issue of Russian meddling in the 2016 election in a way that it best serves US foreign policy. Despite any strong feelings, he must not engage in a vendetta to right a wrong, now past. Critics must accept that Trump does not intend to go to war with Russia over its election meddling. Moreover, he does not intend to pummel Russia with unending waves of sanctions, vengeful behavior which would best match the incessant cries of “foul” and figurative grunts and groans from critics due to the hurt the election meddling caused them. There is a foolhardiness to pursuing something that will lead to nothing. Trump would prefer to deal with the root causes of anger in Putin’s mind, in the minds of other senior Russian officials, that lead to a decision to undertake the risky operation in the first place. Trump understands that the true cure for the meddling problem and others is to develop a good relationship between Putin and himself and greatly improving relations between the US and Russia as a whole. Trump wants to work alongside certain countries, including Russia, to resolve urgent security issues such as North Korea, Syria, and Ukraine. On his recent foreign trip, Trump has kindled or strengthened his relationships with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines and secured deals with their countries to improve trade the conditions of trade with them. When one develops a viewpoint, there is nothing unusual about the individual expatiating on it. Yet, somehow in their world, removed from making actual decisions and taking action, some critics have gone a bit too far. They insist that Trump acted in collusion with Russia achieve a victory he would want to win on his own and could win on his own. The suggestion that there is an authentic, direct link between Trump and Russia concerning the 2016 US Presidential Election will likely prove to have been sheer caprice. It would be appropriate to take a look at what Trump has been doing on the election meddling issue.  Moreover, it also would be fitting to examine possible underlying reasons why critics, in the face of Trump’s rather efficacious efforts, questioning his performance and have been so certain and have behaved so harshly toward him over allegations of actions by him that remain unproven. Id bonum cura quod vetustate fit melius. (Take care of the good since it improves with age.)

Trump (left) and US National Security Adviser US Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster (right). Critics demand for Trump to continually reproach Putin over Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election. If anyone would feel rage over the idea of another country interfering with the US election process, it would be Trump. Yet, as a responsibility of being US President, Trump must suppress those emotions and consider Russia’s election meddling in a way that best serves US foreign policy.

Trump’s Quiet Approach to Defeating Election Meddling by Russia

As a reminder of what the issue of Russia’s election meddling is all about, from June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic officials, which in turn were distributed to the global media by WikiLeaks. Both the CIA and the FBI report the intrusions were intended to undermine the US election. Cyber gives Russia a usable strategic capability. If benefits from its use appear great enough, Moscow may want to risk additional attacks. Indeed, the US Intelligence Community concluded that Moscow will apply lessons learned from its “Putin-ordered campaign” directed at the 2016 US Presidential Election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes. The report of the January 16, 2017 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Election” presents the best publicized assessment by the US Intelligence Community of the Russian cyber attack during the 2016 US Presidential Election. It stated: “Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

The English mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead stated: “The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order.” Trump is doing just that. Although Trump faces attacks from critics due to perceived inaction, he has acted in a well-paced manner, taking calibrated steps, to eliminate the possibility of any future Russian election meddling, and to make something positive out of an extraordinarily negative situation. Trump is aware that there are many lines of approach Russia can take to reach the US public. By examining recent actions by Trump, one can infer what he and his national security team have most likely deemed as “decisive points” to focus on in order to be most effective in impacting Russian behavior and reduce the possibility of future meddling. The following six points are very likely part of a suite of preventative measures employed by the administration.

1. Trump Tries to Sit on Russian Cyber Activities Against the US

Adversus incendiary excubias, nocturnos vigilesque commentus est. (Against the dangers of fires, he conceived of the idea of nightguards and watchmen.) On July 9, 2017, when Trump broached the issue of the Russia’s hacking of the 2016 Presidential Election, Putin apparently became a bit scratchy. Putin’s denial of the facts presented most likely signalled to Trump that he would be engaged in a argument without end on the hacking. Trump had to either move away from the issue or move laterally on it in some way.  Surely, Trump did not want to abandon the matter. As an immediate response to Putin’s denials on the matter, Trump then proposed forming a cyber security unit. According to Reuters on July 9, 2017, Trump wrote in the actual tweet about the cyber security unit: “Putin & I discussed forming an impenetrable Cyber Security unit so that election hacking, & many other negative things, will be guarded and safe.”

The proposal for a joint cyber security unit did not simply materialize from thin air. On the one hand, it likely stemmed from Trump’s experience as a negotiator, his gaining of the conversation with his national security team, and his consideration of all the “what ifs” possible. It was also developed more during an intense discussion between Trump and Putin on how to remit Russian cyber warfare programs directed at the US and perhaps similar US programs aimed at Russia. It may have been the product of brainstorming by the two leaders. Trump’s proposal was never supposed to serve as a form retribution against Russia for its intrusions into the US democratic process. Surely, it was not created to be a final solution to the threat of hacking US election. Immediately after the bilateral meeting in Germany, it was revealed that forming such a joint cyber security unit with Russia was prohibited under US law. Yet, although creating an actual cyber security unit was out of bounds, the concept of bringing US and Russian cyber experts together in some way to talk about some cyber matters was not. Trump’s likely aim with the proposal was to create a situation in which US and Russian officials were talking about hacking. Ostensibly, those conversations would create goodwill, perhaps stimulate a more open discussion about the issue, and promote honest talks about the issue among senior officials. In that way, the proposal would have served as a confidence building measure.

Trump (right) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) in Hamburg. Trump does not intend to pummel Russia with unending waves of sanctions, vengeful behavior which would best match the incessant cries of “foul” and figurative grunts and groans from critics due to the hurt the election meddling caused them. There is a foolhardiness to pursuing something that will lead to nothing. Trump would prefer to deal with the root causes of anger in Putin’s mind that lead to a decision to undertake the operation in the first place.

2. Enhancing the US Surveillance Capability

US has the ability to monitor activities of Russian Federation intelligence organizations operating on the ground in the US, to include: Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR; the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU; and, the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Undoubtedly, Putin also well aware of this now. This capability was made public by the administration of US President Barack Obama in a June 23, 2017 Washington Post article that included a leaked account of that administration’s reaction to reports about ongoing Russian efforts to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Election. That article indicated that Obama was in a dark mood over the intelligence findings about Russian activities. The approaching transfer of power gave urgency to his National Security Council’s deliberations on how to retaliate against Russia. By mid-December 2016, Obama’s National Security Adviser, Susan Rice, was quoted as saying to senior national security officials: “We’re not talking anymore. We’re acting.” A senior national security official at the time told the Washington Post that Rice challenged them go to the “max of their comfort zones.” Economic sanctions, originally aimed only at the GRU were expanded to include the FSB. Four Russian intelligence officials and three companies with links to those services were also named as targets.

The Washington Post article, as an overt source to intelligences service worldwide, informed that the FBI had long lobbied to close two Russian compounds in the US–one in Maryland and another in New York–on the grounds that both were used for espionage and placed an enormous surveillance burden on the Bureau. The FBI was also responsible for generating a list of Russian operatives, that it had concluded, were working under diplomatic cover to expel, drawn from a roster the Bureau maintains of suspected Russian intelligence agents in the US. In the end, Rice submitted a plan to Obama calling for the seizure of both Russian facilities and the expulsion of 35 suspected spies. Obama signed off on the package and announced the punitive measures on December 29, 2016 while on vacation in Hawaii. Trump has undoubtedly increased FBI electronic and other technical monitoring and surveillance of Russian intelligence activities, and can increase it further. Interviews will invariably be conducted with senior leaders among Russian intelligence officers with official diplomatic cover. To the extent that it does not interfere with counterespionage operations, the FBI will conduct interviews with suspected Russian intelligence operatives working in the US with non-official cover.

3. Trump Seeks to Find Chemistry with Putin to Enhance Communication

Ad connectendas amicitias, tenacissimum vinculum, est morum smilitudo. (For cementing friendship, resemblance of manners is the strongest tie.) One must try to live a life based on a strong moral foundation. In foreign policy and diplomacy there must be some confidence in, some foundation of trust, among opposing parties that they are both trying to do the right thing. Diplomacy will not succeed, and relations will not flourish, if that is not the case. After his bilateral meeting with Putin in Hamburg, Germany during the G-20 Economic Summit, Trump emphasized that he raised allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election with Putin. Reuters reported on July 9, 2017 that Trump stated: “I strongly pressed President Putin twice about Russian meddling in our election. He vehemently denied it. I’ve already given my opinion…..” When Putin denied meddling, a US official at the time said that Trump expressed the view that both countries must agree to disagree on the issue and move on to other topics where they could work together. As mentioned earlier, after Trump spoke privately with Putin on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Trump revealed he again asked Putin whether Russia had meddled in the contest, and that he gotten the impression that the continued focus on the issue was insulting to Putin. When Trump would ask Putin about Russia’s election meddling, he would likely speak to Putin with un voce de fil, a reserved voice, but with a power behind it that allows it be discerned in the balcony. Trump raised contentious issues with Putin, not to confront but show Putin that there was a need for the two to confide in one another about urgent and important issues if relations between the two countries were to transform. In terms of positive actions, this was a maximum effort.

Russian officials will normally vehemently deny launching cyber attacks. Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence operations. Putin has never publicly discussed them. Trump was undoubtedly advised of this fact by his national security team. Perhaps the best way to explain it all is to say that Putin’s denials are routine. Yet, among Trump’s critics, revelations about his response on Russian intelligence activities seems to overwhelm those who learn about it all. When Trump received Putin’s response, he was left with choices. Indeed, both he and Putin were aware of that. He could accept Putin’s denial, or create a hostile exchange by demanding he “tell the truth” as it is known in the US. Surely, there would be no positive or professional end to recreating the communication failures, diplomatic missteps, and delinquencies of the previous administration. Trump would most likely have stoked the same fires that led to a specious struggle of words between Obama and Putin and also ignited a miscalculated decision in Moscow to interfere with 2016 US Presidential Election which the US Intelligence Community assures took place. Actually, engaging in such actions would defy Trump’s own efforts to pull relations in a new direction and the action would best get described as counterintuitive. Trump has no intention of doing so. As the November 11, 2017 New York Times Trump said it was time to move past the issue so that the US and Russia could cooperate on confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea, solving the Syrian civil war and working together on Ukraine.

On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor-in-chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.” While he may not have regrets, Putin may at least be rethinking, reevaluating the operation that stirred so much trouble for the Obama administration and could have potentially destroyed his relations with the new Trump administration before it even started. Trump wants Putin to give that consider. Further, Trump is offering Putin the opportunity to have a unique, intimate relationship with Trump. With Trump, good things are possible if that is what Putin truly wants. Things done together will lead to goodness for both. Opposition, and to an extent, competition, must be replaced by unity. In amicitia nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum, et quidquid est verum et voluntarium. (In friendship there is nothing fictitious, nothing is simulated, and it is in fact true and voluntary.)

Putin (left) with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (right). Russian officials will normally vehemently deny launching cyber attacks. Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence operations. Putin has never publicly discussed them. Trump was undoubtedly advised of this fact by his national security team. Perhaps the best way to explain it all is to say that Putin’s denials are routine.

4. Trump Seeks to Obviate Russia’s Penchant for Being Manipulate

The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. To an extent, it was simply bad chemistry between the two leaders. Trump feels he can find the solution. True, the meeting between Trump and Putin will unlikely be a catalytic moment when opponents of Trump, political or otherwise, will see the method in his madness and appreciate his accomplishment. Moreover, when Russia behaves in ways that tear others from peace, it must still face consequences. However, Trump’s efforts evince his desire not to isolate Russia, or allow engagement with it to fall off. He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. Much as a warrior with power and know-how, and interact with Putin eye-to-eye, head-to-head, brain-to-brain. Through both strength and understanding, Trump believes the US and Russia can be good neighbors on the same planet. Yet, in what seemed to an effort to instigate further troubles for Trump, senior Russian officials provided an alternative account of his meeting with Putin in Danang, Vietnam. Almost mockingly, they asserted that Trump had accepted Putin’s denial of election interference and even said that some in the US were “exaggerating” Moscow’s role without proof. Their efforts at burlesque were in considerable variance with Putin’s response to efforts to connect Russia with the 2016 US election. Putin, sought to avoid the issue altogether, dismissing revelations that Russians had contacts with Trump’s campaign team. After the summit meeting, the Russian news media quoted Putin as saying: “I think that everything connected with the so-called Russian dossier in the United States is a manifestation of a continuing domestic political struggle.”  Putin told reporters in Danang, “It’s important that we find an opportunity, with our teams, to sit down at the level of presidents and talk through our complex relations.” He continued: “Our relations are still in crisis. Russia is ready to turn the page and move on.” Putin also commented that Trump comported himself at meetings “with the highest level of goodwill and correctness,” adding, “He is a cultured person, and comfortable discussing matters related to work.”

Putin’s contacts with the US have certainly not been about shutting the door. Yet, although he may very well have recognized opportunities to create a more positive relationship with the US, his senior advisers seem to be focusing upon the atmosphere of pure hatred and rejection propagated by the “counter-Trump milieu.” (In the US, many journalists, think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration, propagate a cult of ugliness directed at the US presidency. The mass of their combined efforts and the environment they create, is referred to by greatcharlie as the counter-Trump milieu.) They cannot help but recognize that there is an effort to separate Trump from the US public and create turmoil and frustration for him that Russia, for certain, does not have his hand in. They perhaps are suggesting to Putin that he should do nothing that might help Trump restore respect for the US presidency. A rationale for Putin advisers to take such a position is that it fits well with the idea of supporting their leader’s apparent desire of turning Russian into a simulacrum of the Soviet Union into more than a dream. It would accomplished through the capture of former Soviet republics that are now sovereign countries in Russia’s near abroad. The notion that Trump is a neophyte with regard to Washington politics may also be something they believe to be a tangible fact and perhaps even an advantage for Putin’s advisers to develop analyses of Trump’s thinking and action.

Fluctuat nec mergitur. (It is tossed by waves but it does not sink.) The reality is that Trump and his administration are in good nick. Putin might be genuinely engaged in a deliberate process of developing an amicable, constructive relationship with Trump. Trump never had a personal relationship with Putin before  he became US president. It is very clear that Putin is trying to understand his positions and his thinking in a granular way.  Putin’s adviser would do well to engage in a similar effort to develop greater insight on Trump. It would seem they have already run Trump through analyses for an uncongenial, combative relationship, as evinced by given words they expressed Danang. They should dig deeper than the surface, to understand where new linkages can be established. A conscious effort should be made to stay away from distortions propagated from the very emotional, often very irrational, counter-Trump milieu. Trump administration attempts to engage in confidence-building with Moscow should be viewed as perfect opportunities to discuss common ground that exists between the two countries from Moscow’s perspective. Advisers of the two leaders must have ongoing, frank discussions on the timing for presenting initiatives on issues before any bilateral talks. Such discussion would be the best way for them to inform their counterparts of rocky domestic political situations and other political obstacles, that may derail initiatives if not handled with precision. Additionally, discreet matters must be kept discreet. That is a key responsibility of both sides. Resolutions to issues are less likely be found if they are subtly expressed in condescending or patronizing way, even if it is simply an expression of crni humor or some other form of banal amusement. Gaining a perspective akin to that outlined here may demand the development of a duality in the thinking of Putin’s advisers, however, it would unlikely be deleterious to their efforts regarding the US. The more Trump pushes Russia in the right direction, the more Putin may push for better analyses, and better answers concerning the US. The more he pushes, the great chance Putin advisers may decide to see things in a way as discussed here. Intriguingly, although Trump’s approach toward Putin’s advisers is nonviolent, benign in fact, in military terms, it would be akin to “the attack in-depth.”

Trump (right) with Putin (left) in Danang. Trump understands that the true cure for the meddling problem and others is to develop a good relationship between Putin and himself and greatly improving relations between the US and Russia as a whole. Trump wants to work alongside certain countries, including Russia, to resolve urgent security issues such as North Korea, Syria, and Ukraine.

5. Trump Turns Refraining from Meddling into a Matter of Honor for Putin

Long before Putin became the President of the Russian Federation, he revealed that he both engaged in efforts to influence elections in other countries and personally felt the negative impact of election meddling in Russia. Putin outlined his experience influencing elections as a KGB officer in other countries Indeed, in Part 4 of his memoir, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that in East Germany his work was “political intelligence,” which included obtaining information about political figures and the plans of the main opponent: NATO. (See greatcharlie’s book review of First Person.) In a precise statement of his intelligence activities, Putin intriguingly described them as follows: “The usual intelligence activities: recruiting sources of information, obtaining information, analyzing it, and sending it to Moscow. I looked for information about political parties, the tendencies inside those parties, their leaders. I examined today’s leaders and the possible leaders of tomorrow and the promotion of people to certain posts in the parties and the government. It was important to know who was doing what and how, what was going on in the foreign Ministry of a particular country, how they were constructing their policy on certain issues and in various areas of the world, and how our partners would react to disarmament talks. Of course, in order to obtain such information, you need sources. So recruitment of sources, procurement of information, and assessment and analysis were big parts of the job. It was very routine work.”

In Part 6 of First Person, Putin also goes into great detail about his work in the 1992 and 1996 mayoral elections in St. Petersburg following his resignation from the KGB. and a sense is provided of his acumen and instinct for work in the political sphere. In 1992, he played a definitive role in the election of his political mentor, Anatoly Sobchak, as the first popularly elected mayor of the city. Putin explains that as chair of the Leningrad City Council under an older system, Sobchak could have been removed by the council members at any moment. Putin felt Sobchak needed a more stable position. Sobchak finally agreed that the post of mayor had to be introduced. The decision to introduce the post of mayor was passed by the Leningrad City Council, by a margin of a single vote. However, from the experience of arranging Sobchak’s political victory, Putin was able to assess four years later that in order to win re-election, Sobchak would need “professional campaign managers and technicians–not just a guy who could finesse the deputies.” Putin saw that it was a whole new ball game. Campaign plans had to be adjusted to fit circumstances. Putin said that he told Sobchak right off, “You know, you’re on a completely different playing field now. You need specialists.” He agreed, but then he decided that he would conduct his own electoral campaign. He says: “You know, running a campaign, bringing in specialists–all of this costs money. And we didn’t have any. Sobchak had been under investigation for a year and a half on allegations that he had bought an apartment with city funds. But in fact, he did not have any money either for an apartment or for an election campaign. We were not extracting funds from the city budget. It never entered our heads to find the money we needed that way.” However, with regard to Sobchak’s opponent, Vladimir Anatolyevich Yakovlev, the former governor of Leningrad oblast (province), Putin said that he got the funds he needed at Moscow’s expense. He believed Yakovlev was supported by the very same people who orchestrated an ethics campaign against Sobchak. Putin described the critical junture in the campaign in the following way: “During the election campaign, someone sent an inquiry to the Prosecutor General’s office, asking whether Sobchak was involved in any criminal investigations. The very same day, the answer came back: Yes, three were two criminal cases under investigation. Naturally, they didn’t explain that he was a witness, not a suspect, in these cases. The reply from the Prosecutor General’s office was duplicated, and flyers were dropped over the city from a helicopter. The law enforcement agencies were interfering directly in a political contest.” The newly elected mayor of St. Petersburg, Yakovlev did not move Putin out of his office right away; but as soon as the presidential elections were over, he was asked rather harshly to free up the space. By that time, Putin had already turned down Yakolev’s offer to keep his post as deputy mayor. Putin said Yakolev made the offer through his people. Putin explained: “I thought it would be impossible to work with him.” However, Putin said what really made staying on a bad idea were attacks he against Yakolev during the campaign. Putin said: “I don’t remember the context now, but in a television interview, I had called him Judas. The word seemed to fit, and I used it.”

Trump knows Putin has personal experience in attempting to interfere with nation elections of other countries. He presumably knows this not only through First Person, but also reports provided by the US Intelligence Community, knows Putin disfavors such efforts given what happened to his mentor Sobchak. As mentioned earlier, Trump said, “Every time he sees me he says, ‘I didn’t do that,’ and I really believe that when he tells me that, he means it.” Trump added: “I think he is very insulted by it, which is not a good thing for our country.” There are pitfalls to relying on ones own moral barometer in the performance of diplomacy. Trump appears to have courageously taken that tact regarding Putin and the issue of Russia’s election meddling. Trump has not said that he agrees with Putin’s view, nor has he  let Putin off the hook. He will not forget what transpired. Yet, by refusing to publicly reproach Putin for not being more forthcoming over the election meddling in the US when he questioned him, Trump demonstrated that he understands the tough situation Putin is in regarding the meddling, now well-exposed. It would appear that the covert operation of election meddling was supposedly crafted to be plausibly deniable, allowing and, perhaps under Russian codes, requiring Putin to gainsay its existence. Trump appears to be holding out hope that his decision to be tolerant of Putin’s response has appealed to Putin’s sense of honor. Indeed, he likely hopes that it will be a factor in future interactions with Putin. At the same time, however, Trump is actually cutting off Putin from possible equivocation and outright denials. Putin’s future actions would be gauged off of denials of interference. Many in US foreign policy circles have absolutely no faith Putin as an honest broker. Yet, Trump’s expectations appear to manifest his nature as a visionary, his sense of imagination. Along with the sense of expectation is an intuition that what is expected will be more vital than what exists. Trump has no intention of recreating the failures, delinquencies of the previous administration. There is no logical purpose in stoking the fires the led to a childlike struggle of words that also likely ignited an adversarial decision that led to an attempt to interfere with 2016 US Election which the US Intelligence Community has confirmed. 

Trump’s critics have not covered themselves in glory. Their performance, though overwhelming, has been disjointed. It is difficult to imagine how presidential historians will judge how critics’ hammered Trump over the manner in which he is handling Russia’s election meddling, and allegations that Trump worked with Putin to secure Russia’s assistance in winning the 2016 US Presidential Election.

6. Trump Offers Business Opportunities to Mitigate Putin’s Desire to Punish the West

Certainly, Trump cannot know exactly what is in Putin’s heart. Putin is a calculator. Various US policy analysts and academics have hypothesized over the causality for the Russia’s misunderstandings and crises with the West over Eastern Europe during the past 25 years. Putin, himself, explained at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and many times since that former NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner had guaranteed that NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, he has pointed to the statements of German parliamentarian Egon Bahr who explained on June 26, 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” In a Bild interview on January 11, 2016, Putin pointed to what he described as a very concrete suggestion by Bahr on how that danger could be averted: “the USA, the Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structures.” When the Bild interviewer pointed out to Putin that under NATO’s rules and self-understanding it can accept free countries as members if they want to be members and meet certain requirements.  Putin responded, “Nowhere is it written that NATO had to accept certain countries. All that would have been required to refrain from doing so was political will. But people didn’t not want to.” Putin declared the reason for NATO’s lack of restraint was “NATO and the USA wanted complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone.”  

Bis interimitur qui suis armis perit. (He is doubly destroyed who perishes by his own arms.) Putin’s penchant for acting in that direction lead to his capture of territory in Georgia, capture of Crimea, and investment in Eastern Ukraine. Interestingly enough, Georgia and Ukraine are not NATO members, but in 2008 had been explicitly and publicly assured that they would be granted Membership Action Plans. By occupying those countries Putin has assured they would never join NATO in the near term. Indeed, no country will ever join NATO while being partly occupied by Russia. To that extent, part of Putin’s grand strategy entails halting NATO expansion while securing more territory in countries in its near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. Recall that Napoleon Bonaparte, in an effort to unite Europe under his rule, took an inexorable path to destruction. He became morally myopic. To that extent, as Victor Hugo stated: “Napoleon embarrassed God.” For Putin, now is a time for reflection and resolve. This may be the moment to genuinely improve Russia’s relations with the US.

There are several bargaining chips of differing value to both Trump and Putin. Trump managed to become US president doing what he wanted to do, having truly dominant knowledge of the desires of the majority of the US public and overall US political environment. He knows what he wants and what he can really do. Cooperation on counterterrorism, ISIS, climate change, and poverty may serve as a bargaining chips to get agreements on other issues. However, Greater bargaining chips might include: the return of Russia properties in the US, reconstruction assistance in Syria, peace-enforcement in Syria, making the Group of 7 the Group of 8 again with inclusion of Russia, economic sanctions, closing sanction loopholes, and lifting restrictions on the Exxon-Rosneft agreement through an exemption. Some of these actions may not appear plausible and could have a deleterious effect on the sanctions regime against Russia over it actions in Ukraine and create an uproar among the Europeans. However, Trump undoubtedly believes bold action, when appropriate, may be the very thing to turn situations around, modify Russian behavior, and get relations moving forward. When presidential action could immediately resolve matters, those issues may be hashed out at the table or it could be agreed to allow for  some additional consideration before giving a response. Trump must put “America First” but keep firmly in mind how his decisions and actions regarding Russia might impact European allies and partners. Given domestic political concerns, initial offerings from Putin may appear paltry. There is a real possibility that if he feels secure enough, Putin could offer much, particularly to loosen the US grip on Russia’s figurative economic throat. To date, a degree of good-faith bargaining and compromise between Washington and Moscow has occurred. There have been mutual peace offerings. However, refraining any interference with US elections cannot be part of any peace offering or any quid-pro-quo arrangement. Without any further inquiries about what exactly happened, Russia must stop engaging in such operations. If Russia crosses the line again, everything accomplished will be obliterated and all of the great possibilities will never be realized. Tragically, it would likely once again lock up the diplomatic process. Trump can assume that Putin knows this, too!

Trump (right) and Chinese President XI Jinping (left). On his recent foreign trip to Asia, Trump kindled or strengthened his relationships with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines and secured deals with their countries to improve trade the conditions of trade with them. He helped US companies arrange over $250 billion in business deals while in Beijing.

Causality for Critics’ Relentless Attacks on Trump Despite His Discernable Efforts

For those longing for an end to the Obama administration and the many vicissitudes it faced on foreign policy, were heard shout to the effect of “Blessed be the Trump administration and health to all its parts.” However, many critics deemed Trump unfit for the president even before his election victory. The words “not presidential” were heard every time Trump spoke. Eventually, moves by Trump of any kind would elicit a range of reactions by those engaged in the broad, piquant, counter-Trump discourse.

Custos morum. (Guardian of morals.) Some critics seem to believe that they figurative hammers, designed to shape Trump into the instrument they want. While they may self-declare themselves repositories of the accumulated wisdom on US foreign policy, they are not. Moreover, they are not the stewards of US foreign policy. There other critics who apparently have found nothing desirable and everything loathsome about Trump. Oscillating, moving from one point to the other, critics of Trump have their own relentless logic. Whenever one of Trump’s efforts fail or whenever he makes a mistake, they were over the moon with joy. Short of pushing Trump out of office, it strikes one’s conscience to think that nothing would soothe them than to prescribe plunging Trump forevermore into the boiling cauldrons of Hell from the French playwright Mollière’s, École des femmes. Indeed, they seemed to have let their aggression toward Trump come alive inside of them. At times, admonitions and opprobrium expressed through all manner of writings, created the impression that some giant golem was struggling, fighting to escape their inner souls.

What is truly problematic is the reality that critics may have infiltrated and despoiled the psyche of many in the US, perhaps may have even destroyed the possibility for some to have confidence in future US administrations, both Republican and Democratic. Most of Trump’s critics are individuals with advanced degrees, apt to be eloquent enough on key issues concerning the purported “Trump threat.” The US public is open to eloquence. Further, the precept of being innocent until proven guilty has been forcefully pushed aside in the US newsmedia with regard to all matters related to Trump. Hopefully, in the end, the truth will be revealed to those who are confused and bewildered by it all, both among general the public and Trump’s critics. Certainly there were many personal reasons for critics to harbor such strong, negative opinions of Trump and efforts against him. Their efforts have inflamed passions globally. The administration might explain that concerns expressed about Trump’s approach to the presidency were a manifestation of critics own struggle to accept the change from the traditional to modernity. The old is replaced by Trump’s new way of doing things. It has been said that some attacks on Trump are being used to cultivate critics’ emotions on: US policies, Obama’s departure, and Hillary Clinton’s election loss. There is the possibility that their varied attacks may just be projections of character flaws that critics see in themselves. Even more, there is the notion that Trump’s victory has caused them so much emotional harm that there is a desire to strike back, to take vengeance. That is perhaps the idea most worthy of examination.

Trump (left) and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (right). Through meetings, Trump and Abe have kindled a good relationship. Seldom have Trump’s critics taken public inventory of themselves, and considered whether their thinking and actions are appropriate or representative of their own notions of good character. It would appear that even the most noble among them have not considered the impact of their attacks against Trump on US foreign policy.

Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion

There are many sources for the belief in moral responsibility. Many philosophy scholars today conclude that the deepest roots of our commitment to moral responsibility are found in powerful emotions. In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (MIT Press, 2015), philosopher Bruce Waller at Youngstown State University explains this strike back emotion is one of the main sources of our strong belief in moral responsibility.

Indeed, human beings are a punitive species, and share the strike back emotion with other animals. It has been hypothesized that since humans are social animals, and engage with one another to achieve goals, humans are well-disposed to punish those who seek advantage over themselves and others. Wrongdoing stirs formidable emotions in humans, even when it is done to others. In social groups or in societies, anger and resentment is raised toward those who take benefits to which they are not entitled. It almost universally leads to some form of punishment. Culpam poena, premit comes. (Punishment closely follows crime as its’ companion.)

Revenge can seem sweet, and retribution may bring satisfaction, but those feelings are often short-lived. Moreover, the emotional source of moral responsibility, the strike back desire, can create problems with regard to given other desired ends, such as future safety, reconciliation, and moral formation. Most psychotherapists would explain that vengefulness, itself, generally is the manifestation of a serious pathology. Vengeful desires and behavior can ensnare an individual in a vicious cycle of hatred and prevent any resolution of the original harmful experience. Most vengeful actions are based on the misconception that harm to the self can be undone or at least mitigated by harming the perpetrator, when, in fact, undoing of what has already been done is impossible. Ones injuries, pain, and emotional distress is never relieved or obviated. Rather, vengeful action could cause those hurts to smoulder. Sometimes, when the sense of moral justification is high, and the desire for vengeance becomes strong enough, individuals can become willing to sacrifice, violate laws, sustain injury, or even self-destruct, in order to punish a perpetrator. The only permanent solution is working through those feelings, as well as feelings of powerlessness.

Trump (left) with South Korean President Moon Jae-in (right). Trump knows the truth about his actions. While it should naturally disappoint him to hear critics shed doubt of the legitimacy of his election victory, he welcomes all light to shine brightly upon his campaign and election for the truth is stands in his corner. Trump’s critics at times have offered insufficient, inconsistent, or incongruous data, leaving huge gaps. At the same time, their efforts have inflamed passions globally.

Deciding that someone is responsible for an act, which is taken to be the conclusion of a judgment, is actually part of the process of assessing blame. If we start with a spontaneous negative reaction, then that can lead to hypothesizing that the source of the action is blameworthy and the start of an active desire to blame the perpetrator. That will shape ones interpretations of the available evidence to the extent that they support ones blame hypothesis. Evidence is highlighted that indicates negligence, recklessness, impure motives, or a faulty character. Any evidence that may contradict ones blame hypothesis is ignored. Rather than dispassionately judging whether someone is responsible, the spontaneous reaction of blameworthiness is validated. Trump’s critics display the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, blame, and moral anger toward: the results of the 2016 US Presidential Election; Trump as a person; and the litany of actions in which his campaign allegedly engaged to win the election.

Subjecting Trump to reactive attitudes should only be viewed as righteous and appropriate if Trump was found through Congressional oversight or the justice system to have committed some offense. So far, such evidence does not exist. Critics are only able to use purely backward-looking grounds to say their judgments, attitudes, or treatments are justified. There is a real possibility that critics will never find their legs in their efforts against Trump. In 2014, a set of 5 studies by Cory Clark and his colleagues found that a key factor promoting belief in free will, is a fundamental desire to blame and hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors. In this respect, the many investigations underway in the US Congress, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller, support the critics’ view that Trump is guilty and morally beneath them, and should be subjected to punishment. In the studies reported by Clark, evidence was found to suggest that greater belief in free will, is due to heightened punitive motivations. Interestingly, other researchers have found that ones moral evaluation of whether an action was deliberately done was impacted ones the like or dislike of the outcome of that action. Beyond that, there have also been studies that have found an “asymmetric understanding of the moral nature” of ones own actions and those of others, such that one judges ones own actions and motivations as morally superior to those of the average person. The Dutch philosopher Maureen Sie explained: “In cases of other people acting in morally wrong ways we tend to explain those wrongdoings in terms of the agent’s lack of virtue or morally bad character traits. We focus on those elements that allow us to blame agents for their moral wrongdoings. On the other hand, in cases where we ourselves act in morally reprehensible ways we tend to focus on exceptional elements of our situation, emphasizing the lack of room to do otherwise.” Seldom have Trump critics taken public inventory of themselves, and considered whether their thinking and actions are appropriate or representative of their notions of good character. It would appear that even the most noble among them have not considered the consequences of their attacks against Trump, particularly with regard to foreign policy.

Trump (left) with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang (right) The New York Times reported that Trump did not answer a direct question about whether he believed Putin’s denials while traveling to Hanoi Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang. Oddly,  the newspaper later offered the surmisal that Trump was far more inclined to accept the Putin’s assertions than those of his own intelligence agencies. There must be more thoughtful assays in their stories on the US president.

The Situation Appears To Be Developing as Trump Hoped

On November 21, 2017, just before leaving the Washington for the Thanksgiving holiday, Trump spoke with Putin by telephone for more than one hour. According to the White House, Trump and Putin affirmed their support for the Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation issued at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit on November 11, 2017. Trump and Putin emphasized the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and supporting the UN-led Geneva Process to peacefully resolve the Syrian civil war, end the humanitarian crisis, allow displaced Syrians to return home, and ensure the stability of a unified Syria free of malign intervention and terrorist safe havens. Both leaders also discussed how to implement a lasting peace in Ukraine, and the need to continue international pressure on North Korea to halt its nuclear weapon and missile programs. Additionally, the two presidents affirmed the importance of fighting terrorism together throughout the Middle East and Central Asia and agreed to explore ways to further cooperate in the fight against ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations. True to the original wish Trump expressed for improving relations with Russia, his engagement with Putin moved beyond talking over again about Russia’s election meddling. It has turned toward positive communication and cooperation.

Trump with his family on the White House lawn (above). On November 21, 2017, just before leaving the Washington for the Thanksgiving holiday, Trump spoke with Putin by telephone for more than one hour. They discussed how US and Russia could cooperate on confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea, resolving the Syrian civil war, and working together on Ukraine. True to the wish he expressed for improving relations with Russia, Trump’s engagement with Putin has moved beyond Russia’s election meddling and is turning more toward cooperation.

The Way Forward

In Act III, Scene i of William Shakespeare’s Life of King Henry VIII, Queen Katherine is in her apartment when the arrival of Cardinal Wolsey and Cardinal Campeius is announced. Wolsey says he has not come to accuse her but to learn her thoughts on the dissolution of her marriage to King Henry and to offer advice. Katharine does not believe that they are on an honorable errand. The cardinals request to speak with her in a private room. However, Katherine lets them know that her the conscience is clear, and she has no problem speaking about the matter in a public room. Katherine states: “Speak it here: There’s nothing I have done yet, o’ my conscience, Deserves a corner: would all other women Could speak this with as free a soul as I do! My lords, I care not, so much I am happy Above a number, if my actions Were tried by every tongue, every eye saw ’em, Envy and base opinion set against ’em, I know my life so even. If your business Seek me out, and that way I am wife in, Out with it boldly: truth loves open dealing. Trump knows the truth about his actions. While it should naturally disappoint him to hear critics shed doubt of the legitimacy of his election victory, he welcomes all light to shine brightly upon his campaign and election for the truth is stands in his corner. Trump’s critics have not covered themselves in glory. Their performance, though overwhelming, has been disjointed. They offer insufficient, inconsistent, or incongruous data, leaving huge gaps. It is difficult to imagine how presidential historians will judge how critics’ hammered Trump over the manner in which he is handling Russia’s election meddling, and allegations that Trump worked with Putin to secure Russia’s assistance in winning the 2016 US Presidential Election. As their attacks take flights of fancy in the face of a contradictory reality, the critics will likely reduce themselves to nothing more than supernumeraries in this drama. One may disagree with the hypothesized impact of the strike back emotion on the attitudes and behavior of critics. Yet, one still can extrapolate from that much that could be useful in understanding the actions of Trump’s critics and in interpreting what impels their efforts. For those with a bent against Trump, it is not too late to modify their efforts. Critics may be able get from where they are with regard to Trump to where they need to be. There must be more thoughtful assays and greater balance in their examinations of the US president. Pride and ego must be subdued. They must subjugate lower passions to a higher reality.

Gloriosum est iniurias oblivisci. (It is glorious to forget the injustice.) Trump has not dismissed the Russian election meddling issue. He has not been delinquent on it. Trump is doing his job. He has been quietly taking calibrated steps to make something positive out of an extraordinarily negative situation. Many of those steps can be discerned. Due in part to the election meddling, Trump’s relationship with Putin is not yet ready to move past its fledgling stage and become cemented. That is perhaps one of the more apparent consequences of the decision in Moscow to interfere. Any belief that Trump’s decision to move on from election meddling in diplomatic talks at least resembles an aggressive display of passivism could not be further from the truth. Trump is unthreatened, and unmoved by notions proffered about Putin to the effect that he serves all things evil.  Putin’s cravings for power and territory could reassert themselves at any moment. If Putin’s ultimate goal is to receive payment in full for a debt he says NATO has owed Russia for nearly three decades and to have the US submit to his will, Trump will not allow that to happen. It is not completely certain, perhaps even a bit unlikely, that Trump has completely forgiven Putin. To forgive is not easy. It is not simple. There is no reason to forgive anyone unless it can be done with enough humility to inspire humility in the one who is forgiven. That is essentially what Trump is hoping for. Putin once mentioned God in discussing how He built his life. Everyone is indebted to God, none of us has enough to pay the debt. God is willing to forgive the debt, but the condition of the absolution is that everyone grant it to those around us.

Book Review: Robert Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (Open Road Media, 2016)

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Above is a publicized image of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s proof-of-concept project for a spy satellite called Membrane Optical Image for Real-Time Exploitation—MOIRE. The satellite would provide real-time images and videos of any place on Earth at any time. In 1975, every aspect of the US spy satellite program was classified top secret. Two treasonous young men stole and sold crucial information concerning the program to the Soviet Union. Their story is told in The Falcon and the Snowman, released as an eBook by Open Road Media.

In The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (Open Road Media, 2016) http://www.books.google.com, Robert Lindsey tells the tragedy of what occurred when Christopher John Boyce held a position monitoring communications related to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) satellite projects at TRW, Inc.’s “Black Vault” in Redondo Beach, California. Motivated by factors well-explained by the author, Boyce decided to become a spy for the Soviet Union. After enlisting the aid of a drug dealing, and drug-abusing, childhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, the two self-absorbed, reckless, young men, barely in their 20s, presented several rolls of film containing photographs of documents from the black vault to the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB. Despite some difficulties with Lee, it was a successful operation for the Soviets. Considering the sensitivity of the materials they provided, the two men were remunerated with a mere pittance, and were eventually imprisoned for treason.

As a native Californian, Lindsey was familiar with the lifestyle of the affluent community in which the very privileged Boyce and Lee were raised. After graduating from San Jose State University in 1956, he became a reporter for the San Jose Mercury and later the newspaper’s Aerospace Editor which could account for his ease with the technical data about US spy satellites and cutting edge communications equipment in the book. He joined the New York Times in 1968. In his research for the book, Lindsey drew upon hundreds of interviews with all of the principles involved, letters, and documents from the trial. The Falcon and the Snowman received high praise from both critics and fellow authors. Thomas Thompson, author of Blood and Money (Doubleday, 1976) wrote, “Dynamite! Ranks with the best of le Carre and Deighton—but its all true. I only wish I’d found the incredible story before Robert Kindsey. A very important book.”   Ken Follet author of Eye of the Needle (Arbor House, 1978) and later the renowned On Wings of Eagles (William Morrow, 1983) wrote: “Remarkable . . . A real-life spy story as gripping and full of suspense as anything one could invent . . . . Robert Lindsey tells us everything we want to know about this odd couple. He has done a superb job of research and writing.” The book was developed into a film also entitled “The Falcon and the Snowman.”

In the spirit of full disclosure, Open Road Media solicited greatcharlie.com to write a review of their eBook edition of The Falcon and the Snowman. Open Road Media explained no difference exist in content between the original release and their eBook edition. Its’ rationale for re-releasing books in print on eBook is the changing format allows a new audience to enjoy a classic story. Since 1979, most reviewers of The Falcon and the Snowman have rdiculed Boyce and Lee over the way they stumbled into spying for the Soviet Union and noted how remarkable it was that they achieved any success as spies. The book has also been examined as a statement about the society that produced the duo. Nowhere in The Falcon and the Snowman does Lindsey attempt to color the readers’ view of Boyce and Lee, who he calls “Daulton.” Lindsey provides ample insight into what made these two young men tick. Some of what he states about them, while written in a matter-of-fact style, is impressive. Boyce, in particular was a very bright young man, seldom getting anything less than an A on his school exams and he scored 142 on an I.Q. test. As spies, however, the young men’s exploits were anything but remarkable. For example, Lindsey outlines: how incompetent Boyce and Lee were in handling top secret materials (Removing and returning secret materials from TRW in a camera case used by some staff for liquor runs or hiding documents in potted plants); Lee’s clumsy interactions with the Soviets (Money hungry, Lee threatened the Soviets by stating he would sell Boyce’s secrets to China if payments were not increased.); and, the tragic lack confidence and mutual trust in each other (Boyce sensed Lee was not dividing the Soviet payments equitably. He was right.)

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Christopher John Boyce was a very bright young man, seldom getting anything less than an A on his school exams and he scored 142 on an I.Q. test. Boyce rejected the suburban indulgences of his Palos Verdes community, but enjoyed falconry and partying. He believed he was fighting against what he perceived as abuses of US power. He ostensibly was using his position at TRW to fight back. While likely viewing himself akin to a “voice in the wilderness,” fighting injustice, but he also was happy to receive money for his efforts.

Duc in altum! (Head into the deep!) Lindsey’s portrayal of the two young men does not match with the usual portrayals of well-polished Cold War spies with their charm, mystique, and various intrigues found in volumes of novels and films. Nevertheless, Boyce and Lee, as Lindsey describes them, represent the realities of spying. Spies are little more than traitors driven by a variety of motivations to betray the trust of those who hired, trained, and often befriended them. Their willingness to violate loyalty statements to keep confidential top secret information they may handle while employed proves they are flawed individuals. Still, readers have far more to gain from The Falcon and the Snowman. A deeper dive into the book would reveal to readers an intriguing record of how Soviet intelligence controlled Boyce and Lee. Correlatively, readers would gain perspective on how Soviet intelligence sought to grab secrets from US firms. (Russian Federation efforts today are not too different.) For readers interested in enjoying The Falcon and the Snowman from that perspective, a head-start is provided here.

To Whom Were Boyce and Lee Selling Their Information?

In The Falcon and the Snowman, the Soviet intelligence officers Boyce and Lee were serving were from the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. Readers unfamiliar with the Cold War history may not know that it was the Soviet agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. Formed in 1954, it was the true, more capable successor to the infamous state security apparatus, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, which in 1946 was dissolved, resurrected, and repeatedly renamed over eight years. Its internal spy network as well as a sprawling external spy network was filled with well-experienced officers who served in the NKVD in World War II. According to a November 13, 1982 New York Times article entitled “KGB: Feared by Some, Praised by Many,” the KGB was the most widely feared instrument of the government due to its shrewd officers and often brutal methods. The article confirmed that KGB scientific and technical operatives swept countries seeking the latest secret inventions, while its “illegals” tried to penetrate foreign intelligence operations. Until the Cold War’s end, the KGB was in a global struggle with its main rivals, the US CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and United Kingdom’s intelligence and counterintelligence organs, MI6 and MI5. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was the point of contact for Boyce and Lee with the KGB. What made it an effective choice by the novice spies was its proximity to their location in California. Mexico City was already known for being a third country operation for all Soviet intelligence operations in the Western US. US officials said they could not effectively surveil KGB activities for they were far outnumbered by its’ agents and those of Eastern Bloc nations that had embassies in Mexico City, including East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Cuba.

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Andrew Daulton Lee achieved little academically or professionally. Spying gave Lee with a chance to prove he was smart and could do big things. Lee was initially in it for the money. Later, he was in it for the excitement of overseas travel, the risk of arrest, and working with KGB officers. The Soviets likely recognized Lee was far more interested in dealing drugs and drug abuse than stealing and selling US secrets to them.

Why US Spy Satellites Were So Important to the Soviets?

US spy satellite information stayed in a windowless building called the TRW’s Satellite Control Facility or “Big Blue Cube” in Sunnyvale, California, which operated the National Reconnaissance Office’s spy satellites. Boyce worked in a 5-foot by 15-foot room that housed equipment to encode secret communications for the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Every day, he would change the cipher on each machine that tapped out messages among the CIA, other ground stations, and US spy satellites. He was one of few having access to highly secret SIGNET satellite projects, Rhyolite and Argus. Lindsey tells us that the rolls of film Boyce and Lee sold to the KGB held data from Rhyolite. Rhyolite satellites, also known as Program 720 and Program 472, reportedly had a mass of 700 kg. The design was dominated by a large unfurlable dish antenna with a diameter of about 20 to 23 meters. The goal was to use a small—originally 9 meter—radio telescope in geostationary orbit to monitor the Soviet Union’s missile tests. This could be done be recording the radio signals, or telemetry, that the missiles transmit so that ground observers can judge their performance. The satellites demonstrated a capability across the whole microwave and VHF spectrum. Rhyolite 1 was launched on June 19, 1970, and was initially positioned at 105 degrees East to monitor both the Baikonur and Sary Shagan test areas. It was regularly repositioned to monitor other areas of interest such as the India-Pakistan War in 1971 or the Vietnam War area. After a second satellite became operational, Rhyolite 1 was dedicated to the China and Vietnam observations on a long-term basis. It operated for at least for five years and was reported still operational in 1975. Rhyolite 2 followed in March 6 1973 and operated initially from 70 degrees East over the Horn of Africa to monitor microwave transmissions from the western Soviet Union and telemetry from Baikonur launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) tests. It remained there for about five years. It is unknown if it ceased operating or relocated to another position. Two additional Rhyolites, renamed Aquacade 4 and Aquacade 5 were launched in the late1970s. There was a replacement program CIA developed for Rhyolite called Argus. The Argus satellite would have a 40 meter antenna. However, the program was cancelled. At that point, the US National Security Agency became interested and developed an advanced Rhyolite, called Argus. Its 40-meter aperture enabled it to eavesdrop on microwave and short-wave communications.

Looking at Boyce and Lee from the Perspective of the KGB: A Head-Start

In Chapter 1, readers learn of Lee’s first contact with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. Lindsey writes that Lee walked into the embassy, presented himself to the clerk at the reception desk in the guardhouse, threw down the computer programming cards, and said “I have a friend with Socialist leanings who would like you to have some information.” (Note: Unwittingly, Lee presented himself as a “dangle,” an individual who would do everything possible to stir the KGB’s interest in him.) The clerk shook his head and said he did not speak English and left to get someone who did. (Note: In Soviet diplomatic missions, there was a side of the house that dealt strictly with diplomacy and a side that dealt with intelligence. Lower level administrative employees who were not KGB wanted little to do with the intelligence side lest they would unfortunately find themselves involved in mysterious, spooky matters.) Lindsey tells readers that Lee sat in the stark lobby of the building for twenty minutes until he met Vasily Ivanovich Okana. Readers are told that he was listed with Mexican authorities as a vice consul of the Soviet foreign service, but he was in fact a member of the KGB. At that first meeting, Lee was not very impressed by the slender man in the-poorly fitting black suit. Later he had learned that beneath the baggy suit was the muscled physique of a fitness fanatic. “These are interesting,” the 38 year-old KGB agent had said in English as his fingers played with the computer cards, “But what are they?” Lee replied that he was only a courier, but it was his understanding that they had something to do with what people called “spy satellites.” Lindsey moves readers away from Lee’s first contact with the KGB until Chapter 14, where the interview with Okana continues. He starts the chapter with Okana asking Lee, “Who is your friend?” Further describing the contact, Lindsey recounts that the KGB agent studied the stranger with a cautious smile. Lee noted that when Okana was apprehensive or unsure of a situation, as he was now, his charcoal eyebrows tended to bob up and down spontaneously. Lee eventually replied that he could not identify his friend, who had a sensitive job working for the US Government. The friend he said wanted to defect to the Soviet Union but had a wife and two children and did not want to leave them behind. Elaborating on the brief note Boyce had typed, Lee said they had a proposition for the Soviet Union. His friend was motivated by a belief in the future of Socialism, while he was a fugitive of the police on a trumped up charge. They were prepared to deliver US defense secrets to the USSR, but expected to be paid well for them. Lindsey writes, “There was no expression on Okana’s face when Lee finished his short sales pitch.” (Note: What Lee did not know was that the Soviets were familiar with US spy satellite operations, to include ground facilities, and product they delivered in the form of pictures or intercepted signals. The Soviets also knew satellite operations were scrupulously protected by the sensitive compartmentalized information system. That ensured even an accidental revelation of information would not destroy operational secrecy Lee brought the Soviets something that would have been impossible for them to get.) Aut trace aut loquere meliora silentio. (Be quiet or say something better than silence.)

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KGB Headquarters in Moscow during the Cold War (above). In The Falcon and the Snowman, Boyce and Lee served the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. The KGB was responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. The KGB was the most widely feared instrument of the government due to its shrewd officers and often brutal methods. KGB scientific and technical operatives swept countries seeking the latest secret inventions, while its “illegals” penetrated foreign intelligence operations.

Lindsey writes Okana asked Lee if he had any personal identification without demanding it. Lee pulled out his wallet and offered his driver’s license. Okana made a note of his name and address and then handed the license back to him, making a complimentary remark about Southern California. As a friendly gesture, Okana asked Lee, “Would you like vodka?” Lee said he would enjoy it, and Okana left the office where he was conducting the interview and came back a few seconds later. Within a few minutes a male servant brought in two large bottles of vodka and a bowl of iced caviar. The Russian said that he once served in the US and had polished his English there. (Note: KGB officers established nefarious business relationships not friendships. For one to believe an intelligence officer is a friend would be misguided. The duty of the KGB officer was to encourage lying, deception, subterfuge, theft, and betrayal by those who operate for them, known as agents, so they can collect information they require. Perhaps the most important tool of the intelligence officers spy skills tool box, or tradecraft, is the ability to develop and recruit agents with access to information from foreign government offices and businesses they are required to collect by their superiors. It is nuanced work. However, the KGB officer would get lucky and encounter a “walk-in.”   Without any solicitation or prior contact whatsoever, a walk-in would present oneself to a diplomatic mission, diplomatic official, or KGB officer and expresses the desire to provide top secret diplomatic, military, intelligence, and intelligence information for government or private company where they are employed or have some access. Walk-ins, or recruited agents, while often reveling in the glamour that they believe comes with being a spy, are nothing more than traitors willing to betray the trust of those who hired, trained, and often befriended them. Given their willingness to violate any oath or loyalty statements they signed swearing to keep confidential top secret information they encountered, KGB officers remained suspicious of them. The KGB referred to Soviet traitors as “pigs.”)

Lindsey writes that Lee noticed that the bobbing of his eyebrows had subsided somewhat, but there was still an apprehensive look behind his gray eyes. (Note: From an ideological perspective, Western intelligence services during the Cold War viewed employees and officials of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc governments willing to spy for them as individuals who had awoken to the realities of a morally bankrupt Communist system which was built on lies and the Communist Party leadership of the Soviet Union which was bent on world domination. From the perspective of Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence officers, those employees of officials of Western governments willing to spy for them were primarily a manifestation of an ethically bankrupt capitalist system that made profit and wealth the driving force of one’s existence. Boyce and Lee were not Marxist-Leninist, Communists, or Russophiles. Lee was initially in it for the money. Later, he was in it for the excitement of overseas travel, the risk of arrest, and working with KGB officers. Having achieved little academically or professionally, the work also gave Lee with a chance to prove he was smart and could do big things. Boyce rejected the suburban indulgences of his Palos Verdes community. He believed he was fighting against what he perceived as abuses of US power. He ostensibly was using his position at TRW to fight back. While likely viewing himself akin to a “voice in the wilderness,” fighting injustice, he also enjoyed receiving money for his efforts.) Lee said that what he had brought were only samples of the kind of information his friend could make available to the Soviets. He stressed that his friend was personally involved in the operation of spy satellites and had unlimited access to secrets that he was sure the Soviets would want to buy.

Lindsey tells readers Okana excused himself, leaving Lee with a drink in his hand. Taking the computer programming cards and a twelve-inch length of paper tape used in the KG-13 and KW-7 crypto machines that Boyce had given Lee. (Note: KGB officers in the field answered upward to a pyramid of managers, as well as high-level bureaucrats, who demanded results and controlled the purse strings and key resources. Okana most likely left the room to confer with the chief of the KGB station in Mexico City. Given the potential gains that could come from Boyce’s thefts, every step of the case would be managed well above the level of a field agent.) When Okana returned twenty minutes later, Okana carried a piece of note paper in one hand and referring to it, began to probe Lee about reconnaissance satellites. Okana poured another glass of vodka for his guest and invited him to sample more caviar. Lee believed that he could convince Okana that he had more than a casual knowledge of such satellites and the TRW office.  (Note: If an agent managed to convince a KGB officer that he knew more about a subject than he actually did, the officer, as trained, would report the situation to his managers. If his managers were interested in the subject, they would invariably order the officer to press the agent for more information. Once the truth was uncovered, the result was often a dark moment in relationship between a less-patient officer and the agent.) The next time Okana left the room for another conference somewhere else in the embassy, when he returned, he handed Lee an envelope containing $250 in US currency—enough he said to finance a return trip from Los Angeles to Mexico. Lindsey wrote that Okana was warm now and smiling continuously, although the nervous bobbing of his eyebrows reappeared from time to time to distract Lee. Okana said that his associates were very much interested in the proposition made by Lee and his friend, and they looked forward to a mutually profitable enterprise, and then he gave Lee instructions to meet him at a Mexico City restaurant on his next trip, he told him they would use passwords at future meetings. (Note: Okana introduced Lee to a bit of KGB tradecraft.) Lee would be asked: “Do you know the restaurant in San Francisco? And Lee was to reply: “No, but I know the restaurant in Los Angeles.” Okana said they would also use code names to reduce the possibility of detection. Lee, he said, would be known as “Luis,” and Okana would be called “John.” The meeting ended, and Lee and Okana shook hands. “Adios John,” Lee said. “Adios Luis,” Okana said. (Note: The KGB changed agents’ code names often. To thwart Western counterintelligence, some male agents were given female code names and vice-versa.)

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Above is the well-kept entrance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was the point of contact for Boyce and Lee with the KGB. What made it an effective choice by the novice spies was its proximity to their location in California. Mexico City was already known for being a third country operation for all Soviet intelligence operations in the Western US. US officials could not effectively monitor KGB activities for they were far outnumbered by its’ agents and those of Eastern Bloc nations with Mexico City embassies.

In Chapter 15, readers learn of the April 23rd prearranged meeting between Lee and Okana at a Mexico City restaurant. (Note: It likely was a test run for Lee, an effort to detect surveillance by Western intelligence and see if Lee was fake. Clearly, no surveillance was found.) Lee obeyed instructions to the letter. After exchanging passwords, Okana plainly stated the Soviets were interested in Lee’s offer. (Note: Surely they were pleased Lee’s cards were not old, “shopworn goods,” or distorted, “cooked” data.) Lindsey writes Lee was slightly surprised by the magnitude of Okana’s eagerness. Lee told Okana that he had been in touch with a friend and deliveries of information would begin shortly. (Note: In addition to working with spies who had direct access to required information, KGB officers also worked with individuals who lacked direct access to information, but could pass information and devices from one spy to another known as “cut-outs.” Lee was a chain cut-out, able to pass messages and information between Okana and Boyce, who worked in a space denied to the KGB. He only knew the identity of the person providing information and the person receiving it. He did not know the entire operation.)

Lee’s Meeting with the Soviets in Vienna

In Chapter 28, Lindsey writes Lee traveled to Vienna under instructions of the Soviets. He had arrived earlier than his scheduled meeting schedule for March 16th with the Soviets in order to see some of the city that was “so often the setting of the espionage novels he loved.” Lindsey notes that Lee felt vulnerable so close to Eastern Europe and the Communist Bloc. The reason the Soviets had given for wanting him to make the trip was to meet some Soviet representatives who could not go to Mexico as well as take some specialized training in espionage: “tradecraft” was the term Lee knew from his novels. (Note: The Soviets wanted Lee in a location where they could control events, provide security, and counter surveillance.) Lee told his brother that he feared the Soviets “might try to kidnap him for some motive he couldn’t figure out—why else Vienna?” Lee remained suspicious as he boarded the plane in Los Angeles, but was lured there by the money and the excitement. Lindsey tells: “As Lee walked the streets of the old city, Lee’s fear ebbed and was replaced by a euphoria that reminded him of a high from heroin. The people who glanced at him as he walked through Vienna couldn’t have any idea about the nature of his mission, and this though excited him. And the realization that he was a spy on his way to meet ‘Russian spies’ in an exotic city also excited him.” Boyce kept his promise and gave him a large load for this delivery, although Lee did not know what the nature of the documents he was carrying. As Lindsey writes, “It did not really matter to Lee. It could easily have been a package of heroin. They were merely goods to be marketed, and his only concern was they would turn on the Russians.” In fact Lee had ten rolls of film, each with thirty-six exposures. There were a month’s worth of KW-7 ciphers, scores of Rhyolite messages between TRW, Langley, and Australia, and a long TRW technical report describing plans for the new Argus system.

The evening after arriving in Vienna, Lee took a cab to Donaupark as instructed. He crossed the Danube and got out at the park. A familiar face approached from the darkness. Lee said, “It was my old friend The Colonel with the steely teeth, no code was necessary. He was my mentor.” Lindsey would later identify The Colonel as Mikhail Vasilyevich Muzankov. (Note: Despite the reality of the situation, a KGB officer would hope that an agent, or a mere cut-out in Lee’s case, would believe he was a friend. Officers could be cordial and smile very becoming smiles. Creating a sense of friendship would normally enhance an officers ability to control the agent. Officers kept firmly in mind he fact that interactions with their agents were just business. The officers were defending the Soviet Union. Unlike their agents, KGB officers, generally, were fiercely loyal to their country.)

rhyolitesigint

Robert Lindsey tells readers that the rolls of film Boyce and Lee sold to the KGB held data from a US Rhyolite spy satellite (above). Rhyolite satellites reportedly had a mass of 700 kg. The design was dominated by a large unfurlable dish antenna with a diameter of about 20 to 23 meters. Its main mission was to remain in geostationary orbit to monitor the Soviet Union’s missile tests. This was done by recording the radio signals, or telemetry, that the missiles transmit so that ground observers can judge their performance. Rhyolite demonstrated a capability across the whole microwave and VHF spectrum.

Commune periculum concordian parit. (Common danger begets unity.) Setting the scene, Lindsey writes that a limousine found the two men as they walked near the river and Lee learned that Soviet chauffeurs in Vienna drove just like the ones in Mexico City. The driver thread in and out of alleys and narrow streets, doubling back, checking his mirror to be sure they weren’t followed. Lee had no idea where they were when the car finally stopped at a low-slung building. It was a KGB safehouse apparently in a Vienna suburb. Lindsey explained Lee’s uneasiness continued to wane in the friendly atmosphere of reunion. In a room at the safehouse, a woman brought the two men caviar and three bottles of vodka, then she brought a stew of beef, potatoes, carrots, and cabbage. The Colonel sent the film to another part of the building to be developed. (Note: Intimate conversations between the KGB officer and the agent or cut-out provides the officer to look into the agents thinking and sense his feelings. The officer would establish a baseline, norms for the agent’s behavior. Everything the agent says or how the agent reacts to statements is important to know. The officers concerned themselves with other things the average person might very well assume was minutiae or too esoteric to matter. Every inflexion, tone, change in the agent’s voice can provide insight as to what is on the individual’s mind. If an officer discerned an agent was being evasive, deceptive, deviating from his normal behavior, it often meant a new, strong, personality, possibly an intelligence officer, had entered the mix. Initial changes noticed might be in vocabulary and, mannerisms perhaps acquired from the new contact. The officer would stage conversations to confirm changes or put the agent in controlled situations to gauge responses. In oculis animus habitat. (In the eyes their character lives.))

Aliquis latet error. (Some trickery lies hidden!) After eating and drinking, Lee got sick and asked for the bathroom. The Soviets had little work for Lee that night and they drove him back to the Inter-Continental Hotel after midnight. (Note: Lee proved that he was undisciplined, unreserved, and unmeasured in his actions. Perhaps Lee’s stew was compromised with a chemical agent to upset his stomach. Placing chemical agents, toxins, in meals was a KGB practice. Perhaps the Soviets wanted to know whether Lee could detect that he had ingested some chemical agent due to its effects and would act to mitigate them. Perhaps the Soviets simply wanted to observe how vulnerable Lee was in general. Lee apparently did not mention to Lindsey whether the Soviets were surprised when he became sick. Perhaps the Soviets had created the chance to demonstrate that they cared for his well-being. Conveniently, Lee was sick just in time to be sent home at a decent hour, go right to sleep, and be prepared the next day for training. The Soviets surely did not want a repeat of his behavior in Mexico City, which included drug abuse and visits to brothels.)

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Critical acclaim for the book led to its development as a film also entitled “The Falcon and the Snowman.” The film which premiered on January 26, 1985 starred Timothy Hutton (right) as Boyce, Sean Penn as Lee (center), David Suchet as their Soviet contact (left), and was directed by John Schlesinger. Film critic Roger Ebert called the film a “meticulously observant record of how naiveté, inexperience, misplaced idealism and greed led to one of the most peculiar cases of treason in American history.”

Lee and the Soviets met in the morning near St. Stephens Cathedral. The Colonel protested after they returned to the safe house that the pictures from the Minox-B he told Lee to give to Boyce were not too good. He explained some of the pictures were decipherable, but others were fogged and out of focus. Editorializing a bit, Lindsey wrote the Soviets seemed to be growing exasperated with his two young “spies” said the author. He then writes that with the condescension of a teacher to his pupil, he said they would have to start again. (Note: Often power, a sense of control comes from having information. When a KGB officer shared information with an agent, his release of it was well-measured. He revealed only what was necessary and harmless to his service’s operations. He shared only enough to build-up the agent’s confidence in him and to convince the agent that he has complete situational awareness.)

The Colonel took a Minox-B—same as the one Boyce was using—out of his pocket and began a long day of lessons in how to photograph documents. The KGB officer presented Lee with a metal chain that he said was precisely 40 centimeters long, and said Boyce must use it to measure the distance from the camera to the documents in order to get sharper pictures. Moreover, The Colonel said the film should be developed in the United States—that way, the Americans could see for themselves if the photographs were of high quality. He taught Lee how to develop the exposed film and went over each detail of the process again and again; they photographed typewritten pages and pages from books, then processed the film. When the lesson was over, The Colonel smiled as if to say, “You see, it’s really not that difficult, is it?” Lindsey writes that The Colonel gave Lee advice on how to avoid being followed, including instructions to change cabs or buses often and to duck into stores or other crowded places and other techniques that he should use to ensure that he wasn’t tailed to their meetings. (Note: The Colonel taught Lee movement technique: how to “dry clean.”)

In the evening after the photography lesson, Lee was introduced to two middle-aged Soviets. From the respect servants paid to them, he gathered that they were important, but he learned little else about the pair of men in the dark suits who seemed so hyperactive that they could have been on amphetamines. They seemed to know all about Lee and his friend. Lindsey writes that he also met a third Soviet named “Boris.” The KGB men interrogated him about TRW. (Note: Through their questions the Soviets outlined a shopping list of requirements.) According to Lindsey, “Again and again, they pressed Lee to provide more technical data about infrared sensors, and photographs of the Rhyolite and Argus payloads. Lee assured his “mentor” that he should not worry, they would get the information. But it would cost $50,000. The Russian emphasized that money would be no object.” Lindsey states “There were more questions for Lee about the means used to transmit messages: shortwave radio, UHF, VHF, telephone circuits, Western Union?” (Note: As mentioned, KGB officers in the field answered upward to a pyramid of managers. In Vienna, Lee could not see that he was meeting the top management. The work of Boyce and Lee was being followed far beyond the KGB station in Mexico City. Direction on them was likely being given from the highest levels at KGB Headquarters and perhaps from the Kremlin. Given the case’s importance, KGB officers from the highest level, likely generals, were sent to observe Lee for themselves. During the Cold War, the worst mistake any service could make would be to recruit an individual who had been dangled before it by a hostile intelligence service. A general principle in intelligence work was to suspect anyone who took the initiative to offer their services to an intelligence officer. According to The Dictionary of Espionage: Spookspeak into English (Stein & Day, 1986) by Henry S. A. Becket, “A KGB manual warns its US based operatives against FBI attempts to dangle supposed recruits. It notes that ‘the person being dangled attempts to interest us in his intelligence potential or he takes the initiative and offers to pass us certain secret materials.’ Such dangles display a disappropriate interest in money . . .’ ” Lee approached the Soviet’s as a walk-in seeking payments for information. The Soviets began to work with Lee, setting caution aside likely because the spy satellite information was worth the risk. After meeting Lee, the two senior officers undoubtedly were completely convinced that he was not a shrewd US intelligence officer trying to penetrate KGB operations.) Lindsey expressed the belief that the Soviets were frustrated by the perplexing Lee and the inability to get more information from him.

Lee on the other hand was enjoying the experience according to Lindsey. He had all but forgotten his fears of being spirited away to Czechoslovakia. Erroneously, Lee slowly began to realize that he not the KGB officers had the upper hand in the game they were playing. According to Lindsey, after a while, Lee began to perceive something he thought was familiar: the intensity of the Russians appeal for information; a hungry look in the stony eyes of the man with the bristle cut, iron-gray hair that he had seen before. It had reminded Lee of someone begging him for dope. Lee had known that hunger for years; he had used it to whittle the niche he had made for himself in life. Lee tried to play on the Soviets dependency; he tried to exploit it; giving a little and promising more. Lee told the author dramatically: “They wanted what I had. I was basically dealing with addicts. But I knew they’d kill to get it too.” (Note: Ignorant of the KGB, Lee did not realize that the KGB officers were in reality assassins as much as gentlemen. The servants’ reaction to the men in dark suits was very likely due more to fear, not deference to rank. With likely bloodstained records of achievement, those men may have been satisfied with snuffing out, “liquidating,” Lee, but sacrifice for the state required accepting his use as a cut-out.)

Lee left Vienna and agreed to a suggestion from The Colonel to apply for a job at TRW or Lockheed. (Note: The Soviets knew the suggestion was absurd. They had no reason to cultivate him. Lee was unqualified for any position requiring secret clearance due to his criminal record, drug abuse, and drug dealing. His education was limited.) The Colonel handed Lee three envelopes full of American money and gave him a handmade rug from the Caucasus that he said was worth more than $10,000. Lee said goodbye not knowing whether he would see him again or not and decided that he would miss the sly old man. (Note: The Colonel convinced Lee he was a friend.)

One can read The Falcon and the Snowman to review the KGB operation, to study the adventures of Boyce and Lee, or to learn about a segment of US society in the 1970s. However, from every perspective, the reader will enjoy a great book on spies, intelligence, satellites, and interesting people. How the whole episode ends for Boyce and Lee is fairly well-known, but that cannot detract from the amazing ride Lindsey takes the reader on from start to finish.  It was a labor of love to read this classic over again. Without a shadow of doubt, greatcharlie.com highly recommends for its readers to read or re-read this great story. Once you complete it, recommend it to a colleague. Let them know The Falcon and the Snowman is now an eBook!

By Mark Edmond Clark

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