The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Brief Meditations on Putin and Small Suggestions That May Support Achieving Peace Through Diplomacy

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). in preceding posts, greatcharlie attempted to plunge a little deeper into Putin’s mind to better understand how he thinks and offer not just insights on decisions that he has made, but foresight on decisions he might make in the immediate future and beyond concerning Ukraine. What Western decisionmakers require is some reliable foresight into Putin’s actions. This essay will be too brief to put one in the full picture, even if greatcharlie had that faculty. The hope instead is to present glimmers of light that may stimulate thinking among readers on new lines of thought and provide kernels of ideas on how to proceed for foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmaking.

On February 24, 2022, frightful predictions of a Russian invasion were realized as Russian forces moved into the country from several points, to include attacks from the territory of Belarus. So many had hoped that the possibility of war would remain just a possibility, and good minds in Western capitals would find some solution and reach an agreement with Moscow by which Ukraine, Russia, and NATO, and the West in general would be satisfied. Evidently, in Ukraine, many wanted to avoid war to the extent they acted as if it were an unlikely possibility. With the surprise and shock barely worn off most Ukrainians at the time of this writing, some have scrambled to move West in order to escape the oncoming death and destruction, and others have joined the Ukrainian Armed Forces or have simply taken up arms in order to be part of a planned insurgency. They are ready and regularly giving all in defense of their homeland.

Not unexpectedly, at the center of it all is Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and his mindset. Concerning the Ukraine crisis, the matter with Putin runs deeper, more subtle than it seems many might suppose. One might be aware of this given the multitude of reports on Putin attempting to see reason in his actions. With considerable discomposure, greatcharlie states that many one sided analyses of Putin and the current crisis continue to stifle the advancement of understanding about him. That in turn may be hampering effective action and keeping diplomacy stagnated. One sided analyses fail to genuinely consider the other party’s thoughts and needs. In preceding posts, greatcharlie attempted to plunge a little deeper into Putin’s mind to better understand how he thinks and offer not just insights on decisions he has made but foresight on decisions he might make in the immediate future and beyond. To be effective, top foreign and national security policy decisionmakers need to attain a full understanding of both Putin and new situations as they begin to develop. This essay will be too brief to put one in the full picture, even if greatcharlie had that faculty. The hope instead is to present glimmers of light that may stimulate the thinking of readers on new lines of thought and kernels of ideas on how to proceed mainly for US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers,  but those analysts and decisionmakers of other Western governments, too. The word heart-wrenching marginally describes scenes viewed worldwide on broadcast and online newsmedia of Ukrainians ruined by war. One cannot look without compassion at what is happening there. With emotions about Ukraine running high, greatcharlie approaches the subject of Ukraine with caution. What comes to mind are words of French actor and master of comedy in Western literature, Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, known as Molière. In one of his best-known dramas, “The Misanthrope” or “Le Misanthrope ou l’Atrabilaire Amoureux”, Molière writes the sardonic advisory to which greatcharlie has always paid heed: “That any gentleman should always keep in stern control this writing itch we’re seized with; That he must hold in check the great impatience We feel to give the world these idle pastimes; For, through this eagerness to show our works, ‘Tis likely we shall cut a foolish figure’.”

Putin at press conference following bilateral meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban on February 1, 2022 (above). Putin insists that his government invaded Ukraine for the sake of the Russian people and ethnic-Russians in Ukraine. Surely, Putin doubtlessly believes that everything he does is for the sake of the Russian people. To go a step further, Putin very likely sees himself as a sort of avenger of ethnic-Russians in Ukraine, defender of the people of Russia, and protector of the Russian Orthodox Church and all else that is Russian.

Putin’s Explanation for the War

In his February 24, 2022 televised speech on Ukraine, Putin laid out the reasoning behind his decision to invade Ukraine. Outlining his authority to invade Ukraine, in his own words, Putin explained: “In accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter, with permission of Russia’s Federation Council, and in execution of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22, I made a decision to carry out a special military operation.” As for his reasoning for the invasion, Putin stated: “The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” As for the scope of the special military operation, Putin explained: “It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory. We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force. At the same time, we have been hearing an increasing number of statements coming from the West that there is no need any more to abide by the documents setting forth the outcomes of World War II, as signed by the totalitarian Soviet regime. How can we respond to that?”

Boiled down, Putin stated with conviction that his government invaded Ukraine for the sake of the Russian people and ethnic-Russians in Ukraine. Surely, Putin doubtlessly believes that everything he does is for the sake of the Russian people. To go a step further, Putin very likely sees himself as a sort of avenger for ethnic-Russians in Ukraine, defender of the people of Russia, and protector of the Russian Orthodox Church and all else that is Russia. For almost every other national leader, there is no valid argument to support his choice. Most of the world would likely agree that what he has done is brustschmerzangst, strange and just wrong. In taking this dark, murderous route of invading Ukraine, Putin has sufficiently made the case, once again, that he can be a cruel monster. Few could reasonably deny that Putin cuts the figure of an immoral and cruel ethno-religious nationalist, not exactly steered spiritually by the precepts and strictures of the Russian Orthodox Church, but seemingly by obsession with his own hatred. Hardly any newsmedia commentators in the West, just to stir debate, would go through any pains to single out the points in Putin’s favor. Given choices of whom to alienate on the world stage, Putin has made the top of list. 

In Book X, Section 38 of his Meditations (161 AD-180 AD) the Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (April 26, 121 AD-March 17, 180 AD), stated the following about the inner thinking of individuals: “Remember that what pulls the strings is the force hidden within; there lies the power to persuade, there the life,—there, if one must speak out, the real man.” In continuing its discussion on Putin, greatcharlie recognizes that many readers may not find the discussion immediately following satisfying, but it is asked that readers allow some room for maneuver on the following points.

All that has transpired in Russia since Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared the Russian Federation as a sovereign country, no longer a republic of the collapsed Soviet Union, has been the manifestation of Putin’s vigorous, and yes, masterful mind. Even the criminal mind can be regarded as masterful. Coldly exploring Putin, given his accomplishments despite his atrocious actions, it could be assessed that Putin is indeed a noteworthy individual. (The same might be said of Satan!) Perhaps some might coldly assess that Putin has been somewhat brave in the way that he spoke for what he says he believes in, brave in the way he takes on challenges presented to him and challenges he creates. He is ruled by his passions. if an Russian Orthodox Catholic priest, he would become the Primate. If a musician, he would rule the stage. None of this is not stated out of any respect or deference, but clear-headed consideration.

Within the foreign and national security bureaucracies of Western governments, formulating the best response diplomatically on Ukraine will mean better understanding Putin and how he thinks. Analyses within the US foreign and national security bureaucracies, given their access of analysts to intelligence reports, access to classified information collected by friendly foreign governments, their institutional knowledge and experience, etcetera, are understood to be a cut above that of the mainstream newsmedia. Stating this with no intention to offend, it would seem given outcomes and newsmedia reporting on the matter, that presently despite special sources, greater capabilities, and nuances, those bureaucracies are seemingly producing analyses somewhat similar to what the aforementioned newsmedia has on Putin. As a result, finding answers to cope effectively with Putin has been made far more challenging. It was once common wisdom that significant US involvement alone in earlier times would have had a steading effect. However, it does not appear to have such powers at the present. Neither promises nor “vague” threats from the US could induce Putin to pull back his forces and refrain from invading Ukraine. International law and maintaining international peace and security mean absolutely nothing to Putin any more.

The agreement Moscow signed promising not to invade Ukraine is the Budapest Memorandum. Drawn up in 1994, the Budapest Memorandum essentially states that Ukraine, having agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal which at the time was the third-largest in world, would be assured its sovereignty and territorial integrity by the other countries that signed the deal. Ukraine’s nuclear warheads would be transferred to Russia for decommissioning, and Ukraine would join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. Other than then Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the memorandum was signed by then US President Bill Clinton, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, and the United Kingdom Prime Minister John Major. With regard to assuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Ukraine was only provided a politically binding security assurances to respect its independence and sovereignty which guaranteed its existing borders. The US was unwilling to agree to intervene then should Ukraine’s sovereignty be breached, and it clearly remains unwilling today. The government in Kyiv in 1994 very strangely put Ukraine in a wickedly precarious situation, relying too heavily on the goodwill of other countries. They did not know what the future would bring. Surely, they could not forsee or imagine the present-day Russian invasion. For Ukrainians, the deal reached in Budapest was a very bad one.

Putin interrogating the head of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service on February 21, 2022 during a Security Council meeting the Kremlin. (above). Western analysts have created the impression that they are unable to see Putin straight. CNN on March 1, 2022 reported that the US intelligence community has made evaluating Putin’s state of mind a top priority, seeking to establish how that is affecting his handling of the rapidly escalating Ukraine crisis. Although the US intelligence community has spent many years evaluating Putin, and possesses a considerable institutional knowledge about him, CNN noted that it has “a notoriously poor view into his day-to-day decision-making. The Kremlin remains what intelligence officials call a “hard target”–incredibly difficult to penetrate through traditional espionage.”

The Hopeless Search for a ‘Good Reason” for This War

Concerning the reasons for things,, the renowned “spy novelist” John Le Carre in his blockbuster work Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy (Simon & Schuster, 1972) had his main character explain reason can be founded in three ways: “reason is logic”; “reason is motive”; and, “reason is a way of life.” Among those who examine Putin regularly, some surely would find his recent decision-making very difficult to reconcile within the settled order of nature. To that extent it is worth examining because it is inexplicable. The rational part of greatcharlie insists upon it.

A common theme heard in Western foreign policy circles and newsmedia concerning Putin’s attitude and behavior before and during the first few days of the invasion was that Putin was bent on reestablishing the Soviet Union as it existed before its collapse. Standing in the way of that expansion, was his perception of alleged expansionist aims of NATO. That perceived NATO expansion into Ukraine, which remains a real “threat,” an absolutely horrifying possibility to Putin and his advisers. Boastfully, provokingly Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky amplified the notion of Ukraine joining NATO before and more so right after the invasion. and before the invasion, his words likely stayed with Putin much as a song that would not get out of his head. In the fragile negotiations organized on the initiative of Ukraine and Russia since the invasion began, and endorsed by the US and other Western countries, Zelensky has back tracked on the matter, saying NATO membership is no longer an immutable position of Kyiv. However, that is due to the fact that far greater matters concerning Ukraine’s future, including the retention of its territory, are now at stake. Once a very weighty issue is now a simple bargaining chip of value yet to be fully determined at the negotiating table.

Intriguingly, US intelligence officials have made their assessments that Putin cannot be seen straight. CNN on March 1, 2022 reported that the US intelligence community has made evaluating Putin’s state of mind a top priority, seeking to establish how that is affecting his handling of the rapidly escalating Ukraine crisis. Although the US intelligence community has spent many years evaluating Putin, and possesses a considerable institutional knowledge about him as greatcharlie alluded to earlier when discuss the US foreign and national security bureaucracies, CNN noted that it has “a notoriously poor view into his day-to-day decision-making. The Kremlin remains what intelligence officials call a “hard target”–incredibly difficult to penetrate through traditional espionage.” In fact, CNN reported, based on information from an official source, that there has not been any new comprehensive assessment by the US Intelligence Community that indicates a particular change to Putin’s overall health. (It would appear that Gospodin Vladimir Vladimirovich has been terribly unhelpful concerning US efforts to evaluate him!) The fact that such a gap in knowledge and understanding about aspects of Putin’s life exist should not at all be satisfactory for the US Congress or for executives and managers within the Intelligence Community, itself.

Interestingly enough, there was also no serious discussion of Putin being off-key in the months leading to the invasion or even on February 24, 2022. In preceding posts on Ukraine, greatcharlie noted with curiosity that national leaders in the West, despite declaring Putin a violent, loathsome man, rarely if ever put into question his mental state. Thiere was no discussion of Putin’s mental state as he began the build up of Russian forces near Ukraine in 2021. On March 31, 2021, when the US European Command raised its awareness level to “potential imminent crisis” in response to estimates that over 100,000 Russian troops had been positioned along its border with Ukraine and within Crimea, in addition to its naval forces in the Sea of Azov. Indeed, European Command made it quite clear that there were signs of potential violence. An assessment of Putin’s mental state that greatly called into question his ostensible preparations to blindly inflict harm on the people of Ukraine may have changed everything for top decisionmakers in Western governments..

Observing how Putin was being perceived in Moscow, there was apparently no concern among political leaders about his mental state. indeed,, he was actually provided even greater powers by Russian political leaders to carry out his plans for Ukraine. On February 15, 2022, Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, voted overwhelmingly to ask Putin to formally recognize Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika (Donetsk People’s Republic)or Donetsk and Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika (Lugansk People’s Republic or Luhansk People’s Republic) or Luhansk. Before the invasion, Donetsk and Luhansk were still inhabited by somewhat large populations despite the heavy fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatists within them. According to the World Population Review, in 2021, the population in Donetsk was 899,325 and in Luhansk was 398,505. Fighting in both areas was exceedingly heavy. Eventually both movements declared their provinces independent republics. Putin took the step authorized by the Duma. The greatest concern in the West when Hi did so was the fact that it meant a formal end to Russia’s role in maintaining the integrity of the ceasefire between Ukrainian and separatist forces constructed under the Minsk Agreements. Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said on Telegram after the vote: “Kyiv does not comply with the Minsk agreements. Our citizens and compatriots living in Donbas need help and support,” He went on to state: “In this regard, [Duma lawmakers] believe the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics will create grounds for guaranteeing the security and protection of their inhabitants from external threats.”

Returning more directly to the issue of Western perceptions of Putin’s mental state, surely, there are those among US foreign and national security policy analysts who conversely would assess that his recent actions are consistent with those prior. An example provided in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post entitled, Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help”, Putin would be willing to Russia to challenging and uncertain military operations. The prime example offered was the second on Chechnya by Russian forces in 1999. Russian forces went in depite having been unsuccessful in an operation there three years earlier. Speculation about Putin’s mental health became most popular after his broadcast address on his decision to order a special military operation against Ukraine. Reportedly, the most shocking aspect of the address for top officials was the justification he gave for the invasion. On February 25, 2022, US Senator Marco Rubio relayed on Twitter @marcorubio that Putin “has always been a killer, but his problem now is different & significant,” suggesting he was basing his assessment on intelligence briefings given to him as the vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He tweeted further: “I wish I could share more,but for now I can say it’s pretty obvious to many that something is off with #Putin.” Summing up all that he could say publicly what he gleaned from the briefing Rubio stated: “It would be a mistake to assume this Putin would react the same way he would have 5 years ago.”

CNN on March 1, 2022 noted that following the Congressional briefing that Rubio attended, the floodgates further opened regarding Putin’s mental state. Former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul who served in that post during the administration of US President Barack Obama tweeted that Putin had “changed,” and sounded “completely disconnected from reality” and “unhinged.” Former Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper, who also served under Obama, referred to Putin on CNN as “unhinged” and warned, “I worry about his acuity and balance.”

A photo from the Stasi archives in Dresden picture of Putin (second from the left) standing with a group of senior Soviet and East German military and security officers and officials. There are those who would point to Putin’s service in the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the virtual nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership. Yet, through that service, he certainly would be aware of numerous acts of sacrifice and valor by Ukrainians in the service of the KGB. It would seem remembering those KGB comrades would cause Putin pause and compel him to reflect hard on such a decision to invade Ukraine. Fraternité! However, clearly such thoughts about his KGB service provided no barrier to his actions.

When one moves into the realm of conjecture, one guess is as good as another. What may not make sense to one, might speak volumes to another. Among other, more recherché, even outré, explanations for Putin’s behavior are the following. There are those who would point to Putin’s service in the behemoth Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the virtual nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership. Yet, that same KGB service surely had Putin working alongside Ukrainians who he appreciated and observed serving the service well in what was once East Germany. He certainly would be aware of numerous acts of sacrifice and valor by Ukrainians in the service of the KGB. It would seem remembering those KGB comrades would cause Putin pause and compel him to reflect hard on such a decision to invade Ukraine. Fraternité! However, clearly such thoughts about his KGB service provided no barrier to his actions. Interestingly, as Putin place much concern over the history of Ukraine in his calculus of how to proceed, he conversely would likely say thoughts of his KGB would not be relevant. What is most pertinent are circumstances as they exist today! Hearing his thoughts on the intersection of these matters would surely reveal an intriguing duality. 

Putin himself has played a active deliberate role in glazing over any prospective windows into him with staged scenes for worldwide newsmedia distribution. The truth of the moment is anyone’s guess. Putin likely has a near bottomless bag of tricks. The more recherché his behavior, the greater attention it gets and the greater its chances of retention. In the aforementioned CNN report of March 1, 2022, it is noted that one US official told the newsmedia house that US intelligence officials “have been on guard for the possibility that Putin’s strategy may well be to project instability, in an attempt to push the US and allies to give him what he wants for fear that he could do worse.” Still further, Putin, after all, is a fan of comedy. Supposedly, one of his films was “Ivan Vasilyevich Menyayet Professiyu” (“Ivan Vasilyevich Changes Profession”) (1973), a Soviet comedic film in which Ivan IV “The Terrible” is accidentally transported by time a machine in a apartment building to the present and the apartment building superintendent and a petty thief are sent to the 16th century a try to require themselves as Ivan the Terrible and a duke of his court. Absolute madness ensues. Russian cultural references, dry humor, and crni humor, is found in many of the characters’ lines. What may have tickled Putin about the film is not so much what was unexpected, but those things that were also outré. (When Putin is in a good mood, certainly unlikely the way he is today, one might speak figuratively that even the heavy planet Saturn which symbolizes maturity, responsibility, discipline, and stewardship, would laugh and leap with him. Yet, this is beside the question.) Surely, there is nothing humorous about anything Putin has done in Ukraine, but again concerning the diplomatic front and political warfare front, as mentioned the US Intelligence Community might agree, he is well-aware of the type of impact certain images, some possibly facetious, would most likely have upon Western observers.

Considering Putin’s recent behavior, perhaps it is not so much that Putin has changed, it may be the case that he has just gotten a little older, and that could have been expected. With age everything changes. Without any intention to appear ageist, greatcharlie suggests that this is an idea lost of many under 65. Of course, not every senior is the same. Some individuals actually shine brighter and find their true selves. Some do not change at all, either for the better or for the worse. Yet, perhaps it is very well the case that Putin, at 69, has entered a new era and has lost interest in what he might perceive as shoe-horning himself into Western constructs to gain some sense of attainment, sense of arrival, sense of assuring Russia a place on the world stage, the first tier. Knowing that Russia is a superpower, whether foreigners agree or not, may now be enough for him. Ukraine evinces this suggested mindset well.

While greatcharlie always senses it is moving out on shaky ground when suggesting medical causality for an individual’s behavior, but perchance Putin may have a B1 vitamin deficiency. As an odd symptom of B1 vitamin deficiency, one can become disconnected from reality, not rational, or reasonable. 

Surely, the notion that there may be something supernatural about Putin’s attitude and behavior at this time would offend all reason of most observers and analysts alike. Yet, perhaps Putin may have been put under the control of a dark shaman who has sinister intentions. Hopefully on this point, greatcharlie will not be accused of faulty humor. What would be most supportive of efforts to get to heart of the matter would be an explanation from disciplined reasoning that would be albeit more prosaic, not guesses that boil down to nonsense. As touched upon earlier, claiming that Putin is unstable and behaving irratically is not an answer. It is an expression of symptoms of observed, associates them with actions,  but that information does not explain their cause. To that extent, such assessments presumably unintentionally mask the failure to find real answers, develop useful information. National leaders and policymakers cannot neither develop worthwhile plans nor comfortably base decisions on such.

Watching the West interact with Ukraine since the collapse of the government led by his stern ally former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych following the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, Putin likely felt more and more that  remnants of the former Soviet Empire which he hoped to hold on to were being chipped away by the West, bit by bit. Surely, from his lens, the military dimension of the relationship remains at the forefront as he surely perceives it as an important feature of Western efforts expand eastward toward Russia’s border. Indeed, NATO forces are creeping closer to Russia’s border, and that the government in Kyiv has been pulled far from Moscow’s political reach. Putin might believe any reasonable observer would accept and agree with his thinking about a threat from the West, and that he has logically reached that conclusion. given Western actions.

With further regard to Euromaidan, since then, national administrations in Kyiv that came to power after the exit of Yanukovych have gambled on what they wanted and saw as a sure bet, partnership with the West, which attendantly meant the exclusion of nearly everything from Russia that they could exclude safely, reasonably. Kyiv believed Ukraine, its growing partnership with the West, seemingly formalized with the US-Ukraine Strategic Security Pact along with existing agreements such as the Budapest Memorandum, the Minsk Agreements, meant greater security for Ukraine. Kyiv took a considerable risk taking that approach, and it lost. Although it should not have happened, but nonetheless did happen, Putin responded. He figuratively closed the casino and all the winnings on the tables. By tethering itself to the West, Ukraine surely did not become more secure. Perhaps the real issue is that Putin sees Ukraine as a whole-minus the Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic–traitorous, since Kyiv, under its present leadership, for all intents and purposes, has turned its back to Russia immutably. Ukraine had become the object of Putin’s pain.

One might consider that Putin’s most recent behavior and choices may possibly be part of a pattern of expression and actions seemingly given too little serious attention in not just the run up to the invasion but years before. Indeed, for greatcharlie, an reliable undemanding, uncomplicated way to develop an understanding of Putin’s perspectives on Ukraine would be to thumb through his expressions on the Ukraine matter. There have been numerous reports and transcripts of chief executive level telephone conversations, speeches, statements, and declarations that should not have left anyone in doubt that he was coming for Ukraine at some point if the matter were not addressed in some fulsome way beforehand. A brief sampling of pertinent expressions by Putin, to avoid being “too prolix,” reveals his concerns, sense of vulnerability to the West and that these expressions were both persistent and consistent.

US President Barack Obama during a 90-minute phone call with Putin from Washington on March 2, 2014 (above). One might consider that Putin’s most recent behavior and choices may possibly be part of a pattern of expression and actions seemingly given too little serious attention in not just the run up to the invasion but years before. There have been numerous reports and transcripts of chief executive level telephone conversations, speeches, statements, and declarations that should not have left anyone in doubt that he was coming for Ukraine at some point if the matter were not addressed in some fulsome way beforehand. During their March 2014 call, Putin told Obama that the US-backed interim Ukraine administration was threatening “the lives and health of Russian citizens and the many compatriots” in Crimea. Putin declared, “Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas.”

2014 Telephone Conversation with Obama

Reportedly, during a 90-minute phone call with Putin from Washington on March 2, 2014, Obama warned that Russia could face “serious repercussions” unless it halted military operations in Ukraine. Obama further stated to Putin that his actions were a “clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is a breach of international law.” Obama additionally urged Putin to pursue “direct engagement with the government of Ukraine” and support the “dispatch of international observers under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In a reported statement from the Kremlin, Putin told Obama, bluntly, that the US-backed interim Ukraine administration was threatening “the lives and health of Russian citizens and the many compatriots” in Crimea. Putin reportedly went on to say, “In the case of any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine and Crimea,” and he warned, “Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas.” However, in an official statement from the Kremlin concerning the telephone call Putin had Obama on March 2, 2014, it was declared that “in reply to Obama’s concern over the possibility of the use of Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin drew his attention to the provocative and criminal actions on the part of ultranationalists who are in fact being supported by the current authorities in Kiev.” The Kremlin statement further noted that “The Russian President spoke of a real threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens and the many compatriots who are currently on Ukrainian territory. Vladimir Putin stressed that in case of any further spread of violence to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas.” Themes from the Russian side of that conversation still heard today were the threat of ultranationalists (neo-Nazis) and threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens and compatriots who were in Ukraine. Notably, Putin deliberately describes Ukraine, a sovereign country as a territory. It was a subtle utterance Obama might have missed the significance of.

Putin’s Speech at the State Duma on March 18, 2014

One of Putin’s greatest expressions of vulnerability in his March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In the official Kremlin transcript of that speech, Putin is quoted as stating the following on Ukraine and the rise of ultranationalists: I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day. On the matter of ethnic-Russians in Ukraine, to which Putin refers directly as Russians, he stated: “The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately ‘disciplined’ by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians. One has to admit that the mentors of these current authorities are smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely Ukrainian state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future. Hardly any mention is made of this attempt now, probably on the presumption that people have a short memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II.” Putin would add further in the speech: “Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.” As for the legitimacy of the government in Kyiv and attendantly the sovereignty of Ukraine itself, Putin explained: “It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.” Then, declaring his authority to act of what he perceived as a dangerous situation, Putin stated: “Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.” The same the three elements were repeated in the speech as in the telephone call with tge March 2014 Obama telephone call, Ukraine was a base for neo-Nazis, ethnic-Russians lives were endangered, and Ukraine’s sovereignty was questionable.

Concerning Putin’s sense of vulnerability to the West, it was laid out in the open for all to hear. To summarize, Putin vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating Western actions that fostered his contempt. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he referred to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Doubtlessly, the aggregate of US moves eastward in Europe over time so inflamed Putin’s sense of ardor to respond militarily.

Putin’s July 2021 Essay on Ukraine

During the Summer of 2021 and more so during the run up to the invasion, many passed their eyes over Putin’s July 12, 2021 essay entitled, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” All in all, it is very interesting as a piece of history but has little to do with the present realities in the minds of reasonable thinkers and could hardly be the sort of thing that civilized, technologically advanced, industrial societies would go to war over. In greatcharlie’s view, it is essential to take note of Putin’s understanding of the matter to discern his true mindset lies, how his thinking works on the matter. It will doubtlessly have an impact on how he may settle on the matter as events take shape on the battlefield. 

Although Putin goes as far back as the odyssey of the Ancient Rus, dwells in the history of the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries and moves more expediently through the 17th and 18th centuries, to explain the historical ties and the bond between Ukrainians and Russians, perhaps most relevant to his view of Ukraine’s place as a sovereign country starts with the Bolsheviks. Boiled down what can be gathered by greatcharlie from the essay as concisely as possible, greatcharlie recounts the following highlights from the essay. Putin explains that following the February Revolution, in March 1917, the Central Rada was established in Kiev, intended to become the organ of supreme power. In November 1917, in its Third Universal, it declared the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) as part of Russia. In December 1917, UPR representatives arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where Soviet Russia was negotiating with Germany and its allies. At a meeting on 10 January 1918, the head of the Ukrainian delegation read out a note proclaiming the independence of Ukraine. Subsequently, the Central Rada proclaimed Ukraine independent in its Fourth Universal. Putin then explains that Ukrainians after signing a separate treaty with German bloc countries  Rada delegates signed a separate treaty with the. Germany and Austria-Hungary which needed Ukrainian bread and raw materials. In order to secure large-scale supplies, they obtained consent for sending their troops and technical staff to the UPR. Putin states that in fact, this was used as a pretext for occupation, by 1918, Ukraine was in his view essentially under German protectorate. Following the revolutionary events in Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918, Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) and, in January 1919, announced its unification with the Ukrainian People’s Republic. 

Putin goes on to explain that in July 1919, Ukrainian forces were crushed by Polish troops, and the territory of the former WUPR came under the Polish rule. According to Putin, in April 1920, Symon Petliura signed a secret conventions on behalf of the UPR Directorate, giving up–in exchange for military support–Galicia and Western Volhynia lands to Poland. In May 1920, Petliurites entered Kiev in a convoy of Polish military units. Yet, as early as November 1920, following a truce between Poland and Soviet Russia, the remnants of Petliura’s forces surrendered to those same Poles. Putin, however, also reflects back to note that in early 1918, when the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was proclaimed, it asked Moscow to incorporate it into Soviet Russia. This was met with a refusal. During a meeting with the republic’s leaders, Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin insisted that they act as part of the pre-existing Soviet Ukraine. On 15 March 1918, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) directly ordered that delegates be sent to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, including from the Donetsk Basin, and that ”one government for all of Ukraine“ be created at the congress. The territories of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic later formed most of the regions of south-eastern Ukraine. 

Putin explains that under the 1921 Treaty of Riga, concluded between the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland, the western lands of the former Russian Empire were ceded to Poland. However, he reminds that in 1939, the USSR regained the lands earlier seized by Poland. A major portion of these became part of the Soviet Ukraine. In 1940, the Ukrainian SSR incorporated part of Bessarabia, which had been occupied by Romania since 1918, as well as Northern Bukovina. In 1948, Zmeyiniy Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea became part of Ukraine. Imaginably, poignant to Putin was relaying the fact that in 1954, the Crimean Region of the RSFSR was given to the Ukrainian SSR, in gross violation of legal norms that were in force at the time. Putin’s reality on that matter founded his action to capture Crimea in 2014. It may be enough to comment on the this part of essay by quoting the 20th century US financier and statesman, Bernard Baruch, who remarked: “Every man has a right to his opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts.”

As for the Ukrainian identity, Putin explained that “In the 1920’s-1930’s, the Bolsheviks actively promoted the ”localization policy“, which took the form of Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR. Symbolically, as part of this policy and with consent of the Soviet authorities, Mikhail Grushevskiy, former chairman of Central Rada, one of the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism, who at a certain period of time had been supported by Austria-Hungary, was returned to the USSR and was elected member of the Academy of Sciences. Putin emphasized that “The localization policy undoubtedly played a major role in the development and consolidation of the Ukrainian culture, language and identity. At the same time, under the guise of combating the so-called Russian great-power chauvinism, Ukrainization was often imposed on those who did not see themselves as Ukrainians.”

The decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I to allow a separate Ukrainian Orthodox Catholic Church from the Russian Orthodox Church for many in Russia may have oddly validated Putin’s concern that West was using its influence to pull Ukrainians away from their cultural traditions. Putin’s position on the matter has garnered support from thehead of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill. There are not too many issues that could potentially reach the majority of the Russian population on the West’s alleged intention to separate Ukraine from Russia than to create or emphasize a connection between West and the schism from Russian Othodoxy in Ukraine. On that matter, Putin declared: “Our spiritual unity has also been attacked. As in the days of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a new ecclesiastical has been initiated. The secular authorities, making no secret of their political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split, to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They have to destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs.”

Regarding his concern over the alleged welcomed and influential place of neo-Nazis hold in Ukraine, politically, militarily, and socially, Putin expressed: “I think it is also natural that the representatives of Ukraine over and over again vote against the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism. Marches and torchlit processions in honor of remaining war criminals from the SS units take place under the protection of the official authorities. Mazepa, who betrayed everyone, Petliura, who paid for Polish patronage with Ukrainian lands, and Bandera, who collaborated with the Nazis, are ranked as national heroes. Everything is being done to erase from the memory of young generations the names of genuine patriots and victors, who have always been the pride of Ukraine.”

The July 2021 essay presumably was shaped not only for the benefit of future historians but certainly for the present-day domestic audience in Russia and the people of Ukraine. What the Russian public was supposed to take away was a sense the that West was trying to destroy Russia and its actions in that direction, many disguised, have been quite sinister. Putin explained: “Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also to believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. As a result of such a harsh and artificial division of Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundreds of thousands or even millions.” As for the Ukrainians, Putin left them with a choice to atone for their error of turning westward by joining a path he prescribed or face severe consequences, invasion. Likely in his own mind, he “judiciously” stated: “Russia is open to dialogue with Ukraine and ready to discuss the most complex issues. But it is important for us to understand that our partner is defending its national interests but not serving someone else’s, and is not a tool in someone else’s hands to fight against us. We respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe and prosperous. Putin made what was a thinly veiled threat in stating: “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people.” Then given what has transpired in Ukraine since February he made a statement which now could be labelled bizarre: “Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing – Russia has never been and will never be ”anti-Ukraine“. And what Ukraine will be – it is up to its citizens to decide.”

Putin during his February 24, 2022 televised address on Ukraine (above). In his February 24, 2022 televised address, Putin put before his audience a review of his sense of threat to Russia from the West, more specifically the US, and well-serves as a fulsome expression of the accumulation of stress and his sense of vulnerability. In his own words, Putin’s contends that “over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.”

Putin’s February 24, 2022 Televised Address on Ukraine 

While Putin’s February 24, 2022 televised address made just hours before the invasion of Ukraine was not a comprehensive expression of his ideas and theories to include subjects neo-Nazis and Ukrainian sovereignty called attention to here, although in declaring the right to move Russian forces into Ukraine, he indicates that he has does not recognize the sovereign rights of the country. Putin does, however, put before his audience a review of his sense of threat to Russia from the West and an alleged anti-Russia mindset of Western governments. Putin’s contends that “over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.” One Putin’s earliest expressions of resentment, albeit in a nuanced, subtle manner, toward the US was a 1999 essay entitled “‘Russia at the Turn of the Millennium’–A Strategy for Russia’s Revival.” In his February 24th address, he returns to that idea, far more aggressively stating: “As for our country, after the disintegration of the USSR, given the entire unprecedented openness of the new, modern Russia, its readiness to work honestly with the United States and other Western partners, and its practically unilateral disarmament, they immediately tried to put the final squeeze on us, finish us off, and utterly destroy us. This is how it was in the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the so-called collective West was actively supporting separatism and gangs of mercenaries in southern Russia. What victims, what losses we had to sustain and what trials we had to go through at that time before we broke the back of international terrorism in the Caucasus! We remember this and will never forget.” Putin went on to state on the matter: “Properly speaking, the attempts to use us in their own interests never ceased until quite recently: they sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people from within, the attitudes they have been aggressively imposing on their countries, attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature. This is not going to happen. No one has ever succeeded in doing this, nor will they succeed now.” 

Despite the problems Russia has encountered engaging with the West, Putin explained that Moscow tried to reason with Western powers. He noted that in December 2021: “We made yet another attempt to reach agreement with the United States and its allies on the principles of European security and NATO’s non-expansion. Our efforts were in vain. The United States has not changed its position. It does not believe it necessary to agree with Russia on a matter that is critical for us. The United States is pursuing its own objectives, while neglecting our interests.”

Putin moves on to the notion of Russia becoming in way similar to the designation in the children’s game “It” on a forever it, the forever enemy of the West, and NATO would exist as long as there was a Russia. Putin remarked: “Those who aspire to global dominance have publicly designated Russia as their enemy. They did so with impunity. Make no mistake, they had no reason to act this way. It is true that they have considerable financial, scientific, technological, and military capabilities. We are aware of this and have an objective view of the economic threats we have been hearing, just as our ability to counter this brash and never-ending blackmail. Let me reiterate that we have no illusions in this regard and are extremely realistic in our assessments.” Seemingly well-aware of the deficits in the capabilities of his conventional forces and delinquencies of Russian commanders, the consequences of which are full display in Ukraine, Putin placed emphasis Russia’s nuclear forces with regard to the countries’ defense, stating: “As for military affairs, even after the dissolution of the USSR and losing a considerable part of its capabilities, today’s Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states. Moreover, it has a certain advantage in several cutting-edge weapons. In this context, there should be no doubt for anyone that any potential aggressor will face defeat and ominous consequences should it directly attack our country.” Concerning the foreign military presence and build up on Russia’s borders, Putin noted that : “At the same time, technology, including in the defence sector, is changing rapidly. One day there is one leader, and tomorrow another, but a military presence in territories bordering on Russia, if we permit it to go ahead, will stay for decades to come or maybe forever, creating an ever mounting and totally unacceptable threat for Russia. To the extend that relates to NATO expansion, Putin explained: “Even now, with NATO’s eastward expansion the situation for Russia has been becoming worse and more dangerous by the year. Moreover, these past days NATO leadership has been blunt in its statements that they need to accelerate and step up efforts to bring the alliance’s infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders. In other words, they have been toughening their position. We cannot stay idle and passively observe these developments. This would be an absolutely irresponsible thing to do for us. Putin went on to declare: “Any further expansion of the North Atlantic alliance’s infrastructure or the ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold of the Ukrainian territory are unacceptable for us. Of course, the question is not about NATO itself. It merely serves as a tool of US foreign policy. The problem is that in territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile “anti-Russia” is taking shape. Fully controlled from the outside, it is doing everything to attract NATO armed forces and obtain cutting-edge weapons. I have already said that Russia accepted the new geopolitical reality after the dissolution of the USSR. We have been treating all new post-Soviet states with respect and will continue to act this way. We respect and will respect their sovereignty, as proven by the assistance we provided to Kazakhstan when it faced tragic events and a challenge in terms of its statehood and integrity. However, Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today’s Ukraine.”

Noting that his use of military power to resolve the supposed threatening situation in Ukraine was not unprecedented, Putin remarked: “Let me remind you that in 2000–2005 we used our military to push back against terrorists in the Caucasus and stood up for the integrity of our state. We preserved Russia. In 2014, we supported the people of Crimea and Sevastopol. In 2015, we used our Armed Forces to create a reliable shield that prevented terrorists from Syria from penetrating Russia. This was a matter of defending ourselves. We had no other choice.” Indulging what was long nursed reckless and dangerous eccentricity concerning the West, Putin went further to say: “The same is happening today. They did not leave us any other option for defending Russia and our people, other than the one we are forced to use today. In these circumstances, we have to take bold and immediate action. The people’s republics of Donbass have asked Russia for help.” Propter curam meam in perpetuo periculo non eritis. (Because of my care (concern), you will not be in perpetual danger.) Hey-ho!

The “Top Secret” 2013 Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation

Worthwhile to note along with these expressions is a very strong and apposite 2013 Military Statement a response to NATO expansion and Putin’s sense of vulnerability and belief that Russia stands vulnerable to the US “tricks.” In greatcharlie’s November 16, 2016 post entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?”, it was noted that on February 14, 2013 at a conference called “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they conclude the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. The Kremlin accepted the threat assessment of the the Russian Federation General Staff. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. To rehearse the defense against the West, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced massive strategic military exercises Zapad 2017, scheduled to take place in September 2017. He said the joint exercise, which would include Russian and Belarusian forces, will be the “main military event of 2017.” Further, the two countries armed forces will cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken.”

Putin (right) and Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu (left). On February 14, 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they concluded the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources.

Message from the Biden Administration to Putin on Ukraine: “To Hell with You!”

Well before the Ukraine crisis, arguably Washington did not appear willing to approach Moscow with a mind to address in some fruitful way the concerns he broached. That tack has apparently played a role in bringing parties to the conflict to the point where they are today. At the end of 2021, in the face of the aggregate of Putin’s expressed concerns about Ukraine, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba ssigned the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership in Washington, DC on November 10, 2021. Much of the Charter concerned countering Russian aggression, It notes that the US and Ukraine share a vital national interest in a strong, independent, and democratic Ukraine. It recognizes Ukraine’s situation vis-a-vis Russia developing into a near impossible one. “Section II: Security and Countering Russian Aggression” of the Charter explains that the US has offered Ukraine all that it can to prevent further encroachment on its territory and interference in its affairs. To that extent, the Charter says that the US is determined to gird Kyiv’s capabilities to defend itself against threats to its territorial integrity and deepening Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Both are considered “concurrent priorities.” Describing those steps, the Charter states: “The United States and Ukraine intend to continue a range of substantive measures to prevent external direct and hybrid aggression against Ukraine and hold Russia accountable for such aggression and violations of international law, including the seizure and attempted annexation of Crimea and the Russia-led armed conflict in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, as well as its continuing malign behavior. The United States intends to support Ukraine’s efforts to counter armed aggression, economic and energy disruptions, and malicious cyber activity by Russia, including by maintaining sanctions against or related to Russia and applying other relevant measures until restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”

More specifically, on Crimea and the civil conflict in the Donbas stirred by Russia the Charter indicated that the US has no intention of backing away from its position on the matter. Apparently to avoid any ambiguities or misunderstandings in Moscow, the Charter firmly declares the US position on Crimea and the Donbas as following: “The United States does not and will never recognize Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea and reaffirms its full support for international efforts, including in the Normandy Format, aimed at negotiating a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-led armed conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine on the basis of respect for international law, including the UN Charter. The United States supports Ukraine’s efforts to use the Crimea Platform to coordinate international efforts to address the humanitarian and security costs of Russia’s occupation of Crimea, consistent with the Platform’s Joint Declaration.”

As for the way in which the US would tangibly support Ukraine’s defense, there are no warnings of intentions to take extreme measures, to include military action. However, the Charter states: “The United States and Ukraine endorse the 2021 Strategic Defense Framework as the foundation of enhanced Ukraine-US defense and security cooperation and intend to work to advance shared priorities, including implementing defense and defense industry reforms, deepening cooperation in areas such as Black Sea security, cyber defense, and intelligence sharing, and countering Russia’s aggression. The United States and Ukraine are key partners in the broader Black Sea region and will seek to deepen cooperation with Black Sea Allies and partners to ensure freedom of navigation and effectively counter external threats and challenges in all domains. Directly in terms of US military assistance, the Charter explains: “The United States remains committed to assisting Ukraine with ongoing defense and security reforms and to continuing its robust training and exercises. The United States supports Ukraine’s efforts to maximize its status as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner to promote interoperability. Ukraine intends to continue to enhance democratic civilian control of the military, reform its security service, and modernize its defense acquisition processes to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The United States and Ukraine underline the importance of close cooperation within international institutions, including the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and intend to multiply efforts in finding new approaches and developing joint actions in preventing individual states from trying to destroy the rule-based international order and forcefully to revise internationally recognized state borders.” It is precisely this section of the Charter that likely occupied Putin’s mind.

Now that Russia has invaded Ukraine, perhaps one might be better enabled to derive the sense of the vulnerability, mentioned often here, that lies within in Putin, especially toward the US and its allies and how it has been a subtle and profound undercurrent in his decisionmaking and approaches toward them. Imagining Putin’s mindset, he likely firmly believed before the invasion of Ukraine that he had a good understanding of the way many senior foreign and national security policy officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden, many of whom had held senior posts in the Obama administration, would respond to a move toward Ukraine. As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, Putin had experienced considerable dissatisfaction and disappointment in his dealing with Obama administration officials, particularly on Ukraine. As he appeared to have perceived their actions, they found it rather piquant to interact with him as if he were a lesser party, and his positions and concerns were undeserving of consideration. Communications were condescending, actions were often insulting. In an explosion of aggression, doubtlessly in part response to his treatment, he conquered Ukraine and tormented civil war in the Donbass. He engaged in other destabilizing efforts. Apparently, he never forgot. Seeing the appointment of many of those same officials in even higher posts in the Biden administration, Putin viewed everything they did with a sense of their past actions. One might theorize that although he could not conventionally strike directly at those officials, Putin could reach the Ukrainians who, as suggested earlier, he may view as something akin to “defectors”, surely he would view them as “traitorous”. He knew what anguish and loss that would cause those officials and it would cause the same and much for the “Ukrainian followers.” To that extent, perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that given current attitudes and behaviors of Putin, the invasion of Ukraine may also have been in part an opportunity for Putin to have a return engaged, a rematch, with former senior Obama administration officials in the Biden administration and settle scores once and for all. (See greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post for a fuller discussion of its analysis of Putin’s view of the Biden administration officials,)

It is almost certain that Putin planned to move into Ukraine, surely into the Donbas, at some point in the first quarter of 2022. Yet, there was also the chance he would reconsider if the right type of discussions and negotiations were initiated. As it was, Moscow’s talks with Washington before the invasion had reached the doldrums. What Moscow would hear most from Washington were continual statements, alerts that Russia would invade immediately may have struck Putin curious at first, but eventually it would almost create the impression in him that he was being mocked as massed troops near Russia’s border with Ukraine. After a second round of talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, Putin green-lit Macron’s relating of a message to Washington that he was willing to meet Biden. However, he surely viewed such talks as undesirable and pointless after the precondition that he would agree not to invade Ukraine was communicated by Washington. That message from Washington, more than embarrassing, was most likely viewed by Putin as an effort to humiliate him. No one in Russia, out of self-preservation, would ever be so short-sighted as to communicate with the Russian President, particularly in what remains a very intense, highly stressful, period of uncertainty. Quite well-viewed now is the February 21, 2022 exchange at a Security Council meeting in the Kremlin between Putin and Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR. Naryshkin, an absolute Putin loyalist, known for his aggressive anti-western statements, became visibly uncomfortable as Putin interrogated him on Ukraine. One can only imagine the gasps sounded within his foreign, national security, and economic advisers when they discovered that was the response sent to him from Washington. Among his very top advisers, there was likely a palpable sense that fiery sea of anger, rage, and hatred churned violently inside of him. In that situation, none of them could be certain of what might happen in the immediate hours after receipt of the message.

As a crucial diplomatic communique, it was oddly void of subtlety, nuance,  wisdom. It was surely the clearest way to signal one’s side was not being thoughtful. While greatcharlie does not believe this was the intention, some might believe, within a degree of reason given what is known about Putin and given the tense circumstances then, that the message was oddly enough designed to provoke or aggravate him. Looking at the message now, it is doubtful those who constructed it, would recognize thar it could have been perceived as condescending or that it was short-sighted to demand the precondition concerning invasion. One might go as far as to state that demanding Putin accept a precondition–the would fly in the face of everything that he was expressing, negate him as national leader to be reckoned with–so publicly under the circumstances was surely not the best way to respond if a resolution was authentically sought. There were other ways to communicate with the Russian President, some furtively, that more likely would have resulted in an assurance from him concerning invasion. The reply was incautious, unwarranted.

In Book I, Chapter 3, of his masterwork, On War, the renowned Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz explained: “Strength of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one’s balance in spite of them. Even with the violence of emotion, judgment and principle must still function like a ship’s compass, which records the slightest variations however rough the sea.” (See the standard English translation from Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors, Carl Von Clausewitz On War (Princeton University Press, 1976)). Intriguingly, despite what may have been stated here on the nature actions taken toward Putin before the invasion, since it began, the Biden administration has displayed a more calibrated, more disciplined approach to Putin, making better considered decision on when to act and when to observe and evaluate. Chasing Putin up the ladder of escalation will bring nothing good. Imaginably, there is the thought among responsible decisionmakers in Washington that peace will eventually come to Ukraine in some way, likely through negotiation with Moscow. Having apparently taken this approach, the Biden administration as a result has incurred the wrath of news media commentators and political opponents alike. Though many may insist providing more advanced, heavier weapons to Ukraine will provide Ukrainian forces a real chance at endsieg, it is difficult to see how Ukrainian forces will muster power superior to that of the armed forces of Russia and eject Russian force from Ukrainian territory in way in which Moscow would continue to hold back greater, more powerful parts of its arsenal. The way in which a lasting peace might be constructed will depend upon how the environment for it is shaped.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (right). The ongoing death and destruction in Ukraine, the smashing of any sense of international law, peace and security as of this writing, are enough of a catalyst to prompt more than urgent action to get a handle of the matter. Concerns over the likely near term deletorious impact on the global economy have served as a high intensity stimulus. Before the invasion and shortly afterward, there was such a thickness not just between the two parties, but supportive parties involved on both sides, that negotiation had appeared hopeless. It would be most beneficial and virtuous for all parties involved to work together to construct clear agreements, improve ties, and accomplish even more. Just saying there is unity but acting in independent ways obvious to the world bring into question not only unity, but respective aims.

A Glimmer of Hope: Peace through Diplomacy

Quaeritur belli exitus, non causa. (Of war men ask the outcome, not the cause.) The ongoing death and destruction in Ukraine, the smashing of any sense of international law and peace and security as of this writing, are enough of a catalyst to prompt more than urgent action to get a handle of the matter. Concerns over the likely near term deletorious impact on the global economy have also served as a considerable stimulus. Before the invasion and shortly afterward, there was such a thickness not just between the two parties, but supportive parties involved on both sides, that negotiation had appeared hopeless. Any steps in that direction could have been at best described as desultory. It would be most beneficial and virtuous for all parties involved to work together to construct clear agreements, improve ties, and accomplish even more. Just saying there is unity but acting in independent ways obvious to the world bring into question not only unity, but respective aims.

Concerning the US and the rest of the West, they must make the choice to find peace and save lives or go out to slay the dragon, Russia, and let the chips fall where they may. It is clear the West wants to avoid getting itself in a war with Russia. Western leaders say it all the time. However, some words spoken by many Western political leaders might convince observers that the West is moving closer to doing what it has already decided, for good reason, not to do so.

Now that Russian forces are in Ukraine, Putin has made slightly veiled threats concerning nuclear weapons. In response to such threats and the Ukraine crisis in general, some US political leaders have suggested that Putin must be removed from power in Russia. There has been additional talk of encouraging Russian officials and institutions, and the Russian people in general, to move against Putin could hardly be well-considered. Off-the-cuff remarks from US political leaders concerning the next moves must stop, if the US is to accomplish anything remotely leading to a desired, favorable peace. Long gone are the days of “dignified scorn”. The lack of moderation, temperance, could prove to be the source of a downfall. 

While some commentators in the US newsmedia suggest that the invasion signals Putin’s dénouement is drawing much closer, such is not actually the case. Such is the product of fertile imaginations. In point of fact, Putin will very likely manage. Conceivably, he hardly believes he is overmatched by the Ukrainians, the West, or the Russian people. To be sure, as of this writing Putin neither has displayed any apparent intentions nor has he expressed any desire to ride off. There are no big concerns at home from political leadership in power. At the moment, there is no stalking horse who possesses anything near Putin’s “popularity” that would be remotely favorable to the West and could potential displace him. 

For now it seems that Ukraine will unlikely be the issue that brings down Putin’s government. The Russian people have domestic concerns that have primacy. Surely, Putin maintains his appeal to many in Russia, and not just those those buried in the backwaters. Perhaps unimaginably to some promoting regime change is the reality that Putin to many Russians represents order, stability, and there is a certain constancy they feel from him to them through his style, image, and actions as a their leader. There is political opposition and an opposition movement that struggles against his government. There is also a burgeoning antiwar movement. However, the opposition movement, though world renowned, does not pose to great a threat at the moment that he would need to fortify the Kremlin. As for the anti-war movement, while very important, will unlikely gain momentum, size, and strength nationwide.

Interestingly enough, according to the Japan Times, polls and interviews indicate many Russians now accept Putin’s contention that their country is under siege from the West and had no choice but to attack. The Russian public’s endorsement of the war is not attendant to the patriotic groundswell that greeted the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The polls on the matter were conducted by Levada, Russia’s most respected independent pollster. In terms of numbers, its polls revealed Putin’s approval rating reached 83%, up from 69% in January 2022. Around 81% surveyed stated they supported the war, describing the need to protect Russian speakers or ethnic-Russians in Ukraine as its primary justification. (Authors of the Japan Times article cautioned that analysts note “polls in wartime have limited significance, with many Russians fearful of voicing dissent, or even their true opinion, to a stranger at a time when new censorship laws are punishing any deviation from the Kremlin narrative with as much as 15 years in prison.”)

Postea noli rogare quod inpetrare nolueris. (Don’t ask for what you’ll wish you hadn’t got.) Even if Putin were hypothetically moved from power, it is unlikely anyone among policymakers and decisionmakers in Washington would have the slightest idea of what  would likely come next in that circumstance. It is very likely that an undesirable outcome might be the result once again from US incited “regime change” in a foreign land. Indeed, those making statements concerning regime change have no idea what doors they may be opening that would have been best to have kept closed. Ignorance of subject matter does not bother many commentators. If the story of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a tragedy–it has the hallmarks–its players will indoubitably meet respectively with ill-fate. Important for the US and other Western powers, concern primarily with the interests of their countries, is to straddle the line concerning their involvement in all aspects of the conflict, but to avoid crossing over it. Crossing that line would very likely put them on a path leading to some tragic outcome, much both Russia and Ukraine are traveling now. Ce n’est pas la vache qui crie le plus fort qui fait le plus de lait.

There is no good reason to raise Putin’s ire on the “regime change” front between the US and Russia. A tacit modus vivendi, as well as clear cut international law, must be observed to prevent the US and Russia from stumbling on an oblique, tragic path to war. As is the case on many issues concerning US foreign and national security policy decisionmakers, everything must happen immediately. Of course, Ukrainian lives are at the time of this writing being destroyed every second the conflict rages on. Still, respectfully with that dreadful circumstance in mind, one might posit that many of those so willing shoot from the hip, tossing out ideas unrealistic or reckless for the most part when examined in the round one might guess apparently have not been burned or at least singed enough over time to learn how to figuratively sit on a rabbit hole. The ones from the military, intelligence services, law enforcement, and diplomatic corps who have spent considerable time in the field possess the most awareness and experience with such.

Malo indisertam prudentiam, quam loquacem stultitiam. (I prefer silent prudence to loquacious folly) No more bad seeds as these need to be planted, that has been the pattern. Enough of that has been done already. Energies should be directed at deescalating, halting, and to the greatest degree possible, reversing the terrible circumstances, working with whatever may be left to salvage and build upon.

Putin (above) at “For A World Without Nazism” rally and concert at Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium on March 18, 2022. A big issue for top officials in the Kremlin to think about in negotiations if the refuse to return territory acquires in the war, whether the fact is recognized or not, whether the situation is desired or not, is how Russia, after Putin either leaves office for good or “shuffles off this mortal coil,” will retain what it tore from Ukraine. Putin would indeed leave a huge problem behind for whoever might follow him as Russian Federation President. That would be his legacy. Just as Putin failed to recognize that the intelligence he was receiving on Ukraine was inaccurate, he may not have considered that the will may not exist to hold on to captured Ukrainian territory among a future generation or two, given the territorial gains were “ill-gotten.”

Thoughts on the Nuance of Diplomacy between the Warring Parties

Much has been torn away from the Ukrainian people, time, life, happiness, as a result of the Russian invasion. Hope to a small degree might spawn from forms of restitution and replenishment from the West. While it may make a difference, it would not make things right. However, with the coming of peace, fighting men and women on both sides will live on their days to age. Neighbors who survived and those who may return will have the chance to each other again. Families may start anew. The lives of some young family members, due to war, have sadly run full compass. Yet, those who may survive the war, albeit not as triumphantly as they might have imagined, must rebuild a new world for themselves and their posterity, stronger, far greater, than the one the lived in before. Cela requerra des efforts importants des deux.

The mounting death toll in Ukraine has forced President Volodymyr Zelensky to consider concessions to Russia in order to bring an end to the devastating conflict, but the specific elements of any peace deal his government may be discussing with Moscow remain a mystery to Western leaders, said US and European officials. At the same time, by mid-March 2022, Zelensky was claiming 14,000 Russian soldiers, naval troops, and airmen had been killed in Ukraine. While his claims if true speak well of the prowess of Ukrainian forces regular and irregular, it will surely influence negotiations for peace. Moscow will hardly be willing to surrender back territory to Ukraine if the cost of its capture was indeed so high. Any stand to retain captured territory could resultantly become an impediment to a satisfactory negotiated peace for Ukraine. In that vein, the very act itself of negotiating with their Russian counterparts is what many would rightly call an act of courage given how they must steel themselves against personal reactions to the loss of so many Ukrainians to Russian arms. The prospects for negotiated peace could be ruined with anger and grief. On the battlefield, such official Ukrainian government claims of massive numbers of Russian troops killed in action, rarely combined with wounded in action estimates and precise numbers captured troops, could very well lead to decisions by rouge Russian units or units of private military companies to take matter into their own hands in terms of settling scores. Hurt people hurt people! Additionally, hiding in almost all armed forces are individuals who capable of monstrous acts and atrocities. On first thought, greatcharlie’s mind harkens back to the series of 82 prints created by 1810 and 1820 by Spanish painter and printmaker Francisco Goya entitled “Los Desastres de la Guerra” (“The Disasters of War”). The works depicted atrocities committed during Spain’s Peninsular War (1808-1814) versus Napoleon and setbacks to the liberals after the Restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy in 1814. Atrocities of any kind would surely poison, if not kill, efforts to secure a negotiated peace by the present-day warring parties in Europe. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Speaking from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Kuleba stated one day before the negotiations held in Turkey on March 29, 2022 that the Ukrainian negotiation delegation was given clear instructions from Zelensky on what he dubbed as the minimum program and the maximum program. The minimum program included talks concerning humanitarian questions, such the well-being of civilians (meaning noncombatants) and humanitarian corridors. The maximum program referred to talks aimed at establishing a stable ceasefire. He also noted that Zelensky gave clear instructions to the Ukrainian delegation not to trade over people, land, or sovereignty. These are not subjects for negotiation. He explained that the Ukrainian position is concrete, and is supported by international law, Ukraine’s Armed Forces, international sanctions that have been applied against Russia, and weapons that have been handed over to Ukraine to defeat Russian forces.

As for Russia, there has been a near endless chain of heavy losses of Russian troops since the invasion began–nearly every new loss being greater than the one proceeding it. If Putin has cornered himself, it may very well be due to his failure to realize that he was receiving bad intelligence on the situation in Ukraine and what to expect there, his own miscalculations, even hubris. No one is infallible. In a self-assessment, he might discover, self-diagnose, that some disturbance, rumples, have his smooth, grounded reasoning, within his normal parameters. Indeed, Putin’s energy appears to have been wrongly circuited. His talents and what has been a reliable intuition seem darkened. It is enough to say It will take having a lot of things go his way at this point for him to turn the situation on the battlefield around and spectacularly win his war. Otherwise, he must find a clean, honorable off ramp, the best being negotiations. However, if Putin might wish to engage authentically in peace negotiations on Ukraine, he must recognize that the biggest adjustments needed to allow for a fruitful process would be the ones he must make within himself. As far as greatcharlie is concerned, negotiations would be Putin’s best route out a worsening situation. 

All flowers must grow through dirt. That aphorism sounds somewhat worthless as aphorisms do under circumstances similar to the one that currently besets Ukraine. Nonetheless, up through dark and thick of sullen earth must peace be given a chance to grow and its growth must be nurtured if this present tragedy is to be brought to an end. Essential will be drawing on energizing minerals scattered in the soil, even if only present in gentle numbers. Both sides must seek an intellectual solution to the problem, not an emotional one. No party should use the negotiation as an alternative ways to settle scores. Rather than emotions, grace and inner strength should be sourced, especially on Ukraine’s side, to overcome challenges. Negotiators must be determined, focused, shrewd, innovative, mutually inspiring without theatrics. Hopefully, no party to the negotiation will have to the inclination to sit on the talks and plan surprise military moves that would doubtlessly end any chance of a negotiated peace. Russia and Ukraine must find a solution that allows both sides to feel secure and protected from attacks from the point of any agreement forward. There must also be a commitment on both sides to leave space the advancement of the societies of the other’s country in a way that allows their people to heal and get beyond the wounds of the war as best as possible. Qui se ultro morti offerant, facilius reperiuntur, quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. (It is easier to find men who will volunteer to die than men who will endure pain with patience.)

As the situation stands now and may likely pan out, “making things right” will be the task of future generations of Ukrainians and Russians. Important now is for the current generation to keep younger generations energized by their strength, positive spirit, or infuse them with the idea that Ukraine must be made whole again by using the right vibes, love and light, not hatred and anger, which could easily find a place in the psyche of those individuals so damaged by war. The younger generations must be encouraged to try working with each other to find real restorative solutions when it is their turn to lead.

Hardly with the intention of offering false praise to Putin or to offend any readers, but greatcharlie acknowledges the fact that the Russian President is a very intelligent man, not just on paper; he earned a doctorate in Economic Sciences from Leningrad State University (now St. Petersburg State University) in 1997, which was not a small academic achievement in his day. He is also a very experienced leader, thoroughly steeped in the entire post-Cold War history of interactions between East and West. Surely, he is aware that younger generations of Ukrainians would insist upon a life-style and future similar to their counterparts in Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland, than those in present-day Russia. As was alluded to in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post entitled “Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help,” the same could be said of younger generations of Russians. Putin would leave a huge problem behind for whoever might follow him as Russian Federation President. That would be his legacy, the legacy of Putin’s Russia. Qui ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit, nequiquam sapit. (A wise man whose wisdom does not serve him is wise in vain.)

Thereby, after all is said and done, the big issue for top officials in the Kremlin to think about in negotiations if the refuse to return territory acquires in the war, whether the fact is recognized or not, whether the situation is desired or not, is how Russia, after Putin either leaves office for good or “shuffles off this mortal coil,” will retain what it tore from Ukraine. Just as Putin failed to recognize that the intelligence he was receiving on Ukraine was inaccurate, he may not have considered that the will may not exist to hold on by future generation or two, given the territorial gains were “ill-gotten.” Putin knows how to weaponize the internet, striking adversaries with cyberattacks, destroying networks, obliterating archives, altering data, collecting confidential information, spreading disinformation, etcetera. Yet, he is of a generation that may not fully grasp the transformative impact of the internet among the young. Using the internet, the young in Russia never needed the permission of the government to travel away from their country to observe, to take in, the world outside of Russia. They likely can do even more than that using the internet. This is not to gloss over the fact that young people in Russia have not lost more pleasure than they have been able to glean using online sites as a result of government censorship and instructions to abstain from viewing certain sites. Yet, they can still see, hear, and communicate with the outside world with a device as meager as an iPhone. The expenditure of effort to disrupt such links to the outside surely far surpasses the actual ability of the government to accomplish that. Perhaps the effort itself has created a false impression of success among those who try so hard to bust things up. Le palais de nos chimères a croulé avec mes illusions. 

Quod bellum oderunt, pro pace cum fide laborabant. (Because they hated war, they were working for peace with fidelity.) As the situation stands now and will likely pan out, making things right will be the task of future generations of Ukrainians and Russians. Important now is for the current generation to keep younger generations energized by their strength, positive spirit, or infuse them with the idea that Ukraine must be made whole again by using the right vibes, love and light, not hatred and anger, which could easily find a place in the psyche of those individuals so damaged by war. The younger generations must be encouraged to try working with each other to find real restorative solutions when it is their turn to lead.

Together, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have already shared a number of technical accomplishments to date. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Moscow had completed two prisoner exchanges with Kyiv since the invasion of Ukraine started. Humanitarian corridors have been established. They must keep trying, segment by segment, to tackle issues that will result in the construction of both a sustainable and enforceable, binding agreement that guarantees security. First, they must think what can physically be done to ensure security for both sides. Second, they must consider what can be done on paper. The scenery of this drama has been set in such a way that external parties may need to be called upon, perhaps the UN with a peacekeeping force of countries neither party may find threatening. That would likely leave the US, other Western countries, particularly EU countries, and NATO Member States out of the mix. No one benefit from an agreement that includes some military response to guarantee its enforcement. At the talks in Istanbul, the Ukrainian delegation presented their Russian counterparts with a framework for peace under which Ukraine would remain neutral and its security would be guaranteed by third-party countries, to include the US, the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Turkey, and China. There would be an arrangement similar to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, under which an attack on one would trigger a joint response by all. Yet, given the likely consequences of Western military action to enforce peace in Ukraine, a nuclear exchange, such a guarantee might end up being something akin to the one the United Kingdom and France provided Poland against possible attack from Nazi Germany in 1938. Ironically, the fear that Putin could act in a way similar to Nazi Germany is the impression, legacy the Putin has created. He actions reflect those of a leader drawn after the reviled German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, the historical nemesis of the Russian people. Putin has failed to follow his own precepts.

Together, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have already shared a number of technical accomplishments to date. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Moscow had completed two prisoner exchanges with Kyiv since the invasion of Ukraine started. Humanitarian corridors have been established. They must keep trying, segment by segment, to tackle issues that will result in the construction of both a sustainable and enforceable, binding agreement that guarantees security.

The Way Forward

Often included in greatcharlie’s posts is a quote from the renowned theoretical physicist Albert Einstein, who said: “Probleme kann man niemals mit derselben Denkweise losen, durch die sie entstanden sind.” (We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used to create them.) Concerning future relations between the US with Russia, without flickering candlelight and romance, diplomats from both the US and Russia, must meet soon enough to establish some framework upon which can be constructed a way to ameliorate tensions between the two countries on reasonable terms. That would mean coming to agreement on issues on which relative positions were unshakable before the killing, maiming, and destruction of property began without spending too much time on finger-wagging at the negotiation table concerning Ukraine. A new way of thinking toward Putin and his government will be the only chance for anything fruitful to come from interactions between the two countries. In the past, especially before the invasion, the failure reach a positive outcome from diplomatic efforts between Washington and Moscow was less a matter of wrong intention–although an argument could be made for that–and wasting time, than it was as a matter of running out of goor ideas. Leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer. However, an infusion of fresh perspectives, fresh ideas, to ignite thinking among the seasoned analysts might help. With no intention to hurtful by broadly accusing analysts or decisionmakers with questionable behavior, greatcharlie is aware that there are a few who simply lift new ideas by mining the writings of those outside of the foreign and national security bureaucracies. It is not just a poor solution, absolutely the wrong answer. That will at best garner bits and pieces that in many cases will be misinterpreted or misapplied. A direct dialogue with those who might display novel ways at looking at issues will better enable the astute to grasp what may on occasion be their recherché line of thinking, which may bring analysts to an understanding, a view to a matter, they had not seen before. Le meilleur moment pour planter un arbre était il y 20 ans, le deuxième meilleur moment c’est maintenant.

On this point, greatcharlie feels compelled to ingeminate the position expressed in the conclusion of its August 31, 2020 greatcharlie post US counterintelligence services should consider hiring individuals from outside the bureaucracy who are already known due to demonstrated interest in the subject matter and recognized as possessing some ability to present what may be unorthodox innovative, forward-looking perspectives. New thinkers can rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. From the inside, one might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outsiders as mere surmisals and suppositions from those perceived lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to an issue. With no intent to condescend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. The purpose of using such perspectives is to have a look at issues from other angles. Thinking outside the bureaucracy would hopefully move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in special cases that may be hard to crack. Indeed, what outsider brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside the box thinker. One could say the length and breadth of that knowledge and experience allowed for an alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been sought through personal study. It may all sound like a mad-capped scheme, but it is hardly such given what is at stake. Leaders of US foreign and national security bureaucracies must turn their minds to the goal of transcending beyond the sort of analyses developed in the past and look inward, tweaking the discourse, elevating the depth of thinking, raising their expectations, and thereby transforming assessments produced into something far better. Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt. (Fate leads the willing, and drags the unwilling.)

Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help

Russian Federation President Vladimir (above) at the International military-technical forum “Army-2021” at the Patriot Congress and Exhibition Centre, Moscow, August 2021. Putin ostensibly wants the US and its allies to understand that their military activities in Ukraine, too near Russia’s borders, are moving very close to a red line for him. Ostensibly to achieve that, he has massively built-up Russia Federation military forces perilously close to the border with Ukraine. Some in the West believe Putin intends to do a lot more than just build up military forces defensively and negotiate. Multiple analyses of Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies have concluded that he plans to invade Ukraine. In that way, the current situation concerning Ukraine has become an inflexion point in US-Russian relations. Still, more appears to be involved here than Putin just being the Putin he has been over four US administrations. If the US is to get a real handle on relations with him, not just a perceived one, a more useful understanding of the man will be required. To that extent, what may lie beneath the surface of Putin, the person, will be briefly scratched a bit here.

Regarding the massive build-up of Russia Federation military forces perilously close to the border of its neighbor, Ukraine, and alarming activities that may indicate those forces will invade it soon, Washington and Moscow continue to wave their fists at each other. Moscow has denied having any intention to attack Ukraine and has explained away its buildup of troops as being a defensive measure. By building up military forces near Ukraine, which is all he has actually done physically at this stage, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin ostensibly would like to cause the US and its allies to understand that their military activities in Ukraine, too near the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as Russia), are moving very close to a red line for him. Putin insists that the US and its allies provide Russia with signed guarantees to refrain from expanding NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia and limiting their military activity near Russia’s borders, particularly in and around Ukraine. However, some in the West believe that Putin intends to do a lot more than just build up military forces defensively and negotiate. Reportedly, multiple analyses of Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies have concluded that he plans to invade Ukraine. In that way, the current situation concerning Ukraine has become an inflexion point in US-Russian relations. Ukraine was a flashpoint during the administration of US President Barack Obama in February and March of 2014. It was then that Crimea, Ukraine, was quietly and orderly captured by Russian troops dubbed “the green men.” The Obama administration was similarly at odds with Russia over Syria, mutants mutandis.

Putin seems to enjoy being seen fighting the good fight against Russia’s old adversaries the US and its allies.On the other side of the coin, dealing with Russian moves, Russian aggression, has become more tiresome for US administrations and Western capitals as much as anything else. Yet, Putin has not challenged the US mainly as a result of some domestic political consideration, or even less likely boredom or some vanity. Putin did not move so many troops to Russia’s western border because that area is more commodious than the locations they were previously based. Assuredly, Putin harbors negative thoughts and feelings toward the US and choices made by decision-makers that concern Russia in a significant way. Asked to bend: retreat back away from a matter, it is unlikely that he would without acquiring “concessions” from the US and its allies. He has issued preconditions concerning an agreement on “NATO expansion” already. (Perhaps he did not issue preconditions before entering any talks because he even realized that would be going a bit too far.) One would imagine he entered into this venture thinking, hoping he could potentially get what he wanted without having Russian forces fire a shot. it does not appear that Putin and his advisers are not too far down the road to change course. However, greatcharlie agrees that he would probably go into Ukraine if at some moment he feels it is, as it likely would have been determined by him along with his advisors and war planners in advance, to be the right time to do so. One would do no more than justice to Putin by presuming he long contemplated his military moves before cutting orders to get them rolling. He is certainly not moving step by step in what might be described as a hot-headed manner. Still, the larger decision to act as he has regarding Ukraine may very well be the result of a miscalculation. It is the unsought, undesirable job of the West to help him see that.

Inquiry into the fruit of things requires consideration of how Putin may view the situation. Russia has been led by Putin and his thinking from the posts of president and prime minister since 2000. A positive relationship with Russia has not been maintained by the US. There are many patterns apparent in his repeated confrontations with the West. Some eyes in the West appear somewhat closed to what may be happening with the Russian Federation President from the inside. What currently plagues the relationship is more than Putin just being the Putin he has been over five US administrations. The threat of the use of force, even mutual destruction, underlies Washington’s diplomacy with Moscow. The idea being that a somewhat expansionist, yet plainly aggressive, Putin can be made to behave as desired by placing a club at the end of the path he is traveling. He is ostensibly put in a position to act reasonably before he reaches it. It would go a long way to explain the somewhat unbroken string of unsuccessful interactions of US administrations with him, if the problem is that no useful perspective of why Putin has responded so aggressively has been developed. If the US is to get a real handle on relations with him, not just a perceived one, a more useful understanding of the man will be required. To that extent, what may lie beneath the surface of the intractable Putin, the man, will be briefly scratched a bit here. New light is shed on the man by using a different lens. There may be something about his inner self repeatedly being manifested and must be looked at from the correct angle. The aim is not to shoot down other analyses, but hopefully to add to them in a way to figuratively help put the reticle of some analysts on the bulls-eye. Offering what may be a few missing links might create an improved understanding of Putin and his actions, lifting thinking on Putin, to a degree, up from the region of the commonplace. Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.)

The Russians are coming! A mixed formation of Russian attack and transport helicopters moving toward their target during the Zapad 2021 military exercise. (above). If Putin decides to go into Ukraine, firepower, astronomically massed, from ground, air, and possibly from sea assets, would likely be used to destroy Ukrainian forces in the field, and in depth as far back as units held in reserve or even on training bases. Relentless fire from air and ground would be utilized to support the movement of forces inside Ukraine. What might have been identified as the front line of Ukraine’s defense would figuratively become a map reference for Hell. Imaginably, the main objective of the deployment of Russian forces would be to create a sufficient buffer in Ukraine between Russian and “ever expanding NATO forces.” In performing this task, Russian forces would ensure territory and forces that might remain in Kyiv’s control would be of less utility to NATO as potential a launching pad for a ground attack on Russia and could not be used as part of a larger strategy to contain Russia at its own border.

The Situation: What Could Russian Forces Do?

From what can be gathered about the situation, the US Intelligence Community has concluded that the Kremlin could be planning a multifront offensive involving up to 175,000 troops. An estimated 100,000 Russian troops have already been deployed near the Russia-Ukraine border. Satellite imagery has revealed a buildup of Russian tanks and artillery as well as other gear near the border, too. Reportedly, online disinformation activity regarding Ukraine also has increased in the way it did in the run-up to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. According to the New York Times, the most evident scenario given the scale of troop movements on the ground is a Russian invasion of Ukraine may not be to conquer the entire country but to rush forces into the breakaway regions around the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, or to drive all the way to the Dnieper River. Purportedly at the Pentagon, “five or six different options” for the extent of a Russian invasion are being examined. Suffice it to say, Moscow calls such assessments of Russia’s intentions slanderous ravings. Russia denies it is planning an invasion and, in turn, accused the West of plotting “provocations” in Ukraine. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who unfortunately does not exactly have a watertight record for tying her statements to reality, laid it on thick in the newsmedia, alleging Western and Ukrainian talk of an imminent Russian attack was a “cover for staging large-scale provocations of their own, including those of military character.” It is really disempowering to put out such a message. 

If Putin decides to go in, firepower, astronomically massed, from ground, air, and possibly the sea assets, would most likely be used to destroy Ukrainian forces in the main battle area and in depth as far back as units held in reserve or even on training bases. Relentless fire from air and ground would be utilized to support the movement of forces inside Ukraine. What might have been identified as the front line of Ukraine’s defense would figuratively become a map reference for Hell. Russian forces would most likely be deployed in a way to prevent the resurrection of Ukrainian forces in areas which Russian forces have captured. As for reinforcements or reserves, the rest of Russia’s armed forces would be right across the border in Russia. Imaginably, the main objective of the deployment of Russian forces would be to create a sufficient buffer in Ukraine between Russian and “ever expanding NATO forces.” In performing this task, Russian forces would ensure territory and forces that might remain in Kyiv’s control would be of less utility to NATO as potential a launching pad for a ground attack on Russia and could not be used as part of a larger strategy to contain Russia at its own border.

A stern fact is that the Ukrainians will hardly receive enough military aid from partners and friends, particularly Javelin handheld anti-tank rockets and Stinger handheld antiaircraft rockets, fast enough in the short-term to check a well-coordinated, rapid advance of heavy Russian forces. In the most favorable assessment, they might be able to supply them with enough to hurt Russian forces and perhaps “tear off an arm.” Having experience in contending with somewhat recent Western efforts to assist Russia’s adversaries and those its allies in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine militarily, perhaps a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things, to: monitor the delivery, stockpiling of Javelins, Stingers and other weapons systems shipped to Ukrainian forces; maintain real-time knowledge of the distribution and location of those weapons; destroy those weapons systems; and, destroy or support actions by other Russian military units to destroy Ukrainian military units to which those weapons were distributed. That hypothetical task force would also likely be tasked to monitor–covertly surveil the intelligence activities and military operations of–Western countries as they relate to supplying Ukraine with special military capabilities. As for an insurgency in captured areas after an invasion, doubtlessly Russian security services have some sinister plan to cope with that contingency that will not be speculated upon here.

Amat victoria curam. (Victory loves preparation. [Victory favors those who take pains.]) As aforementioned, Putin is hardly acting on impulse, making it up as he goes along. Evidently, Putin believed acting now militarily would best serve Russian interests as he perceives them, not knowing whether the opportunity would present itself again. His decision suggests to the mind that events have apparently moved in some way that enough boxes were ticked off to allow a well-thought out plan based on facts, calculations, possible opposition moves, and predicted outcomes, to be green-lit. To that wise, one might presume any and every coercive economic measure possibly levied against Russia by the West would doubtlessly be anticipated by him. One also might presume he has some plan, stratagem, to counter such steps short-term and long-term. Watching the West interact with Ukraine since the collapse of the government led by his stern ally former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 as a result of Euromaidan, the Revolution of Dignity, Putin likely feels more and more that he is being “rock souped.” Surely, from his lens, the military dimension of the relationship remains at the forefront of Western expansion eastward. NATO forces are creeping closer to Russia’s border, and the government in Kyiv is hopelessly pulled further away from Moscow’s reach. Putin might believe any reasonable observer would accept and agree with his thinking about a threat from the West, and that his logically reached perception has actually been fostered by Western actions.

Ukrainian troops training with the FGM-148 Javelin, a handheld, shoulder-fired precision missile system designed to destroy tanks and other armored vehicles, as well as hovering helicopters (above). The Ukrainians would hardly receive military aid from partners and friends fast enough in the short-term to check a well-coordinated, rapid advance of heavy Russian forces. In the most favorable assessment, they might be able to supply them with enough to hurt Russian forces and perhaps “tear off an arm.” Having experience in contending with somewhat recent Western efforts to assist Russia’s adversaries and those its allies in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine militarily, perhaps a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things, to handle all aspects of that matter. As for a post-invasion insurgency, surely Russian security services have some sinister plan to cope with that contingency that will not be speculated upon here.

Admittedly, it is surprising how much Putin has done to signal that he is considering a move into Ukraine. However, there is surely an art that moves Putin’s mind. One might presume that as he initially staked the situation with regard to the US, almost nothing communicated through telephone conversations or bilateral talks alone would be enough to compel the US to act as he wished. The potential use of military force could not exist as an abstraction, being left to the imagination of Western national leaders and their advisers. With a build-up military force, he could illustrate, convince US decisionmakers that the threat of military action was real.

Surely Moscow closely observed events as they developed in the border crisis between India and China. Although it has been repeated as of late that China backed down to India on the matter of the border crisis in which occasional gunfire was exchanged and lives were lost. The common wisdom is that the aggressive moves it made with ease against India placed China in a situation which in the long run would prove too consuming, too difficult to handle and contrary to national interest, particularly such an approach can have an impact economically. There was also too little gain for China both geostrategically or geopolitically as compared to the potential loss suffered from such an investment. 

An odd advantage that Putin has is that the US will act in a fairly predictable fashion. There is less for him to fear of some random, unexpected decision from the US than the US may fear about such a choice made by him. Placed in a trying position, which Putin surely hopes he has done, a certain reality would need to be faced by US decisionmakers. Conceivably, he would expect the top military officers and officials at the Pentagon (US Department of Defense) to see the situation straight. Indeed, he may be hoping the Pentagon would be the voice of reason, the source that will explain that the real possibility exists for the situation to get out of control if the US were to commit itself too heavily to Ukraine’s defense. That would seem especially true if US decisionmakers contemplated having to act if both Russia moved on Ukraine and China moved on Taiwan almost simultaneously. That is a real possibility despite how fanciful it may sound. Tremendous pressure would be placed on the available military resources of the US and its allies. It would seem unlikely to Putin that decisiommakers in Washington would sink themselves deeper into a situation in which only bad choices were left available. C’est comme ça! However, Putin still cannot be absolutely certain that Washington would parse out the situation as he has. He has the task of showing it this perspective and convincing it to acquiesce to at least most of his demands.

The clever bit for Putin would be to determine what military action by NATO, if any, would be taken to physically halt a Russian advance into Ukraine. To that extent, Putin may have assessed that with regard to Ukraine, as well with Taiwan, policies of past eras are no longer viable under current circumstances. The military forces of Russia have been transformed. Insofar as Putin is concerned, unless the US planned to transport the bulk of its armed forces into Ukraine and nearby, any challenge by the US and its allies that included military action would mean recklessly placing some small set of their forces in great peril. Russia would not back down once hostilities were initiated. Again, fighting along its own border would allow Russia countless advantages to bear on its prospective opponent. It would truly be absolute madness for Washington to commit its forces to the fight without some clear way to win or create some acceptable circumstance they could not have achieved without firing a shot. Ironically, in the name of global peace and security, to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, it would need to let its declared partners in Kyiv fall. Even though the US public today is uninterested in starting foreign wars, if the Biden administration commits the US to a fight that would have an uncertain purpose and outcome, it would garner great attention from the public and very likely fail to get its approval. To the extent that these considerations factor in Putin’s calculus, he would most likely find Washington’s stated position on Ukraine to be unrealistic and unreasonable. It only makes sense as long as Moscow does not act.

If efforts at peace fail, it is not completely clear to greatcharlie whether Putin would want all of Ukraine or just some of it: Donetsk and Luhansk for instance. If he wants more, his plans may likely include capturing Kyiv and establishing a new Ukrainian government. That would take up an enormous amount of time, resources, effort, and political capital. Putin seems too shrewd to rush into something as colossal as administering Ukraine. Still, no one is infallible. Putin has been known to miscalculate. It was a gross miscalculation to interfere with the US elections in 2016, an action Putin has repeatedly denied despite the fact that direct proof of Russian meddling has been presented on by US intelligence and law enforcement organizations. If Putin acts militarily in Ukraine and successfully captures enough territory to his content–at least on paper he should be able to with some ease, he would again be looked upon as a shining hero among supporters. The effort by NATO and the West in general to deter him would be depicted as a debacle. If he fails to make gains against the Ukrainians and capture sufficient territory, the failure would be an enormous defeat for Putin. It is possible that the rippling effect of such a prospective defeat would lay the groundwork for his departure as Russia’s leader.

US President Joe Biden (left center) and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (right). As aforementioned, Putin is hardly acting on impulse, making it up as he goes along. Evidently, Putin believed acting now militarily would best serve Russian interests as he perceives them, not knowing whether the opportunity would present itself again. His decision suggests to the mind that events have apparently moved in some way that enough boxes were ticked off to allow a well-thought out plan based on facts, calculations, possible opposition moves, and predicted outcomes, to be green-lit. To that wise, one might presume any and every coercive economic measure possibly levied against Russia by the West would doubtlessly be anticipated by him. One also might presume he has some plan to counter such steps short-term and long-term.

The View from the US

In remarks before meeting with his Infrastructure Implementation Task Force on January 20, 2022, US President Joe Biden laid out his position on a potential invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces. Biden, who would not expect to speak idly on such a grave matter or any matter, for that case, stated: “I’ve been absolutely clear with President Putin.  He has no misunderstanding.  If any–any–assembled Russian units move across the Ukrainian border, that is an invasion.  But–and it would be met with severe and coordinated economic response that I’ve discussed in detail with our allies, as well as laid out very clearly for President Putin. But there is no doubt–let there be no doubt at all that if Putin makes this choice, Russia will pay a heavy price. It is also not the only scenario we need to be prepared for: Russia has a long history of using measures other than overt military action to carry out aggression in paramilitary tactics, so-called “gray-zone” attacks, and actions by Russian soldiers not wearing Russian uniforms. Remember when they moved into the Donbas with “Little Green Men”?  They weren’t–they were dealing with those who were Russian sympathizers and said that Russia had no–nobody in there. Well, that includes “Little Green Men” in uniforms, as well as cyberattack. We have to be ready to respond to these as well–and decisively–in a united way, with a range of tools at our disposal.” Très, très fort!

During a two hour videolink call concerning Ukraine and other disputes on December 21, 2021, Biden also warned Putin that the West would impose “strong economic and other measures” on Russia if it invades Ukraine. Putin complained NATO is attempting to “develop” Ukrainian territory. He demanded guarantees that NATO would not expand farther eastward. Although there were no breakthroughs, the two sides agreed upon continuing communications. In greatcharlie’s December 31, 2021 post entitled, “Infrequently Discussed Issues Regarding Taiwan Likely Influencing Decisions of Communist Party of China Leaders and PLA Commanders,” it was explained that from Washington’s perspective, the door must be left open to type of contrition in diplomacy. Within time perceived to be available as conflict appears to draw near, there must exist an opportunity to amend a position. In theory, there may be an epiphany within logic and reason that leads one side to align itself with a view closely matching the other. Despite expressing concerns that Putin may invade Ukraine at any moment, there may still be some in Washington who assess and intuit, correctly or incorrectly, that since action has not been taken, with all of the tactical benefits such a surprise move would garner, it may not be taken. The delay In smashing into Ukraine may be a true lack of desire on the part of Putin to bear the burden of administering more of that country. There is the off chance that Putin may have some doubts about the military capabilities of Russian forces. The capture of Ukrainian territory may be quick and dirty but may leave unexpected problems in its aftermath. Given the way in which Biden spoke of sanctions, it is possible, despite what greatcharlie has already suggested here on this matter, that Putin may be worried about economic retaliation from the West. (Russia does not have much to shield itself from economic retaliation as compared to China, bound to the West with its products and production capabilities. The energy it provides to Europe and Nord Stream 2 are the more meaningful cards for Moscow to play. With concern to that, during the administration of US President Donald Trump, the US offered Europ a fairly decent alternative source of energy worthy of consideration.)

Putin usually plays his cards close, making it difficult to know whether some resolution might be found through a more open dialogue. No doubt officials in Western capitals are mindful of being too attached to diplomacy in coping with Putin. Each is doubtlessly versed enough in history to hark back to this infamous statement which likely has an expected chilling effect on efforts to work with him: “As long as war has not begun, there is always hope. For the present I ask you to await as calmly as you can the events of the next few days. As long as war has not begun, there is always hope that it may be prevented, and you know that I am going to work for peace to the last moment.” These words were spoken by United Kingdom Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on September 27, 1938, during an address to the British people as concerns of war rose as negotiations between German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and himself. The tragic outcome of that effort is well-known. 

For Washington, Moscow’s actions have far greater implications than the progress of US-Russian relations. As Blinken also explained during his January 8, 2022 CNN appearance: “There are large principles at stake that go to the fundamentals of international peace and security.” He went on to note that the US is joined by international partners “to make it clear to Russia that this aggression will not be accepted, will not be tolerated.” An additional step in knocking down the idea that this crisis stands as a problem between Washington and Moscow has already been taken by the US. On January 9, 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated very clearly on CNN: “It’s hard to see making actual progress, as opposed to talking, in an atmosphere of escalation with a gun to Ukraine’s head. So, if we’re actually going to make progress, we’re going to have to see de-escalation, Russia pulling back from the threat that it currently poses to Ukraine.” In effect, he expressed the view that despite intercession of the US and its allies, this matter remains Kyiv’s problem mainly. Looking at the crisis in that way makes it something akin to Ukraine’s “Reichenbach Falls”, the moment where Arthur Conan Doyle’s great fictional detective character, Sherlock Holmes, from The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, originally published as twelve short stories in the Strand Magazine (1891), was confronted by his archrival Professor James Moriarty after repeatedly disrupting his criminal schemes. As the story initially went, Holmes met his end in combat with him. It was revealed in subsequent installments of the series appearing in the Strand that Holmes survived the fight, his resurrection being demanded of Doyle by the magazine’s editors to satisfy a readership made much distraught over his demise. One might hope fate will allow Ukraine to survive this crisis intact, yet there is nothing fictional about this situation. Moreover, Putin is a far more powerful opponent for Ukraine than Moriarty was to Holmes.

Putin (right) seated in a conference room at the Kremlin during a videolink call with Biden (on screen left). During a two hour videolink concerning Ukraine and other disputes on December 21, 2021, There were no breakthroughs, but the two sides agreed to continue communications. From Washington’s perspective, the door must be left open to type of contrition in diplomacy. Within time perceived to be available as conflict draws near, there must exist an opportunity to amend a position. In theory, there may be an epiphany within logic and reason that leads one side to align itself with a view closely matching the other. There is the off chance Putin may have some doubts as to the military capabilities of Russian forces. The capture of Ukrainian territory may be quick and dirty but may leave unexpected problems in its aftermath. Given the way in which Biden spoke of sanctions, Putin may very well be worried about economic retaliation from the West.

Some Key Issues for Negotiation as the Situation Stands

Washington wants to avoid a conflict in Ukraine. For Washington, success in resolving the Ukraine crisis for the moment would imaginably mean, in brief, crafting an agreement with Russia that will relax tensions, strengthen the sovereignty of Ukraine, enhance the security of Ukraine, and ensure Russia remains committed to whatever agreement is reached. Ukrainians must be allowed to enjoy full control and use of their own territory. Ukraine would retain self-determination as a sovereign state. If Ukraine wants to join NATO that wish will be protected. (Perhaps with some disagreeable yet necessary minor alteration in the short-term.) Russia would need to take action assented to in an agreement that would confirm it has no aggressive intention. Any action that may have prompted accusations by both sides that the other was moving back to the adversarial thinking of the Cold War and the paradigm of East-West spheres of influence of the past must be addressed. Lending some further context for Washington’s efforts to negotiate with Moscow on Ukraine, Blinken, also stated during his January 9, 2022 interview on CNN that, “It’s also not about making concessions. It’s about seeing whether, in the context of dialogue and diplomacy, there are things that both sides, all sides can do to reduce tensions.” 

Recognizably, neither the US nor any government in the West wants to jump through hoops to satisfy Russia. They would all doubtlessly agree they have no reason to give up anything they have. They are not bothering Russia and Russia should not be bothering them. Even if some agreement were constructed with Moscow that they could accept, they would want to know how Russia would be held to the terms of the signed document. They would be skeptical over Russia’s willingness to adhere with anything to which it might be remotely disagreeable in the long-run. Plus ça change! All would likely agree that force should not need to be relied upon to hold Moscow to it. There is the likelihood many NATO allies and neighboring countries to Russia might sign an agreement with Russia, but would be hesitant to do so. If the US sought some collective agreement concerning the situation with Ukraine, those countries may see it as too much to ask or a manifestation of naiveté by leading powers less threatened by Russia. Some capitals would likely respond to the suggestion with reproach. Even more, they may believe the constant struggles with Russia that have created their anxieties among them about negotiating with Moscow. US officials would be up against that sort of reception and more if it sought to create some consensus among the Europeans on constructing a comprehensive agreement with Russia. Perchance if the situation is approached with a degree of gentleness and patience–“with diplomacy”–their efforts may bear fruit.

Yet, given these and other considerations that would shape a diplomatic effort in this crisis, to get a firm handle on this matter, the primary focus, as postulated here, must be placed on Putin. All that has transpired, all of the preconceived management of this crisis from the Russian side, has been the manifestation of his vigorous and masterful mind. Formulating the best response diplomatically will mean better understanding him and how he thinks. For US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators, finding a way, within reason, within acceptable parameters of US values and interests, to satisfy Putin and themselves will be no mean feat.

Putin (center) flanked by Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sergey Shoigu (right) and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (left). Recognizably, neither the US nor any government in the West wants to jump through hoops to satisfy Russia regarding Ukraine. Even if some agreement were constructed with Moscow, all would remain skeptical over Russia’s willingness to adhere with anything to which it might be remotely disagreeable in the long-run. To get a handle on this matter, the primary focus, as postulated here, must be placed on Putin. All that has transpired, all of the preconceived management of this crisis from the Russian side, has been the manifestation of his vigorous and masterful mind. Formulating the best response diplomatically will mean better understanding him and how he thinks. For US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators, finding a way, within reason, within acceptable parameters of US values and interests, to satisfy Putin and themselves will be no mean feat.

Some Common Wisdom Regarding Putin

Many Western political leaders and senior foreign and national security policy officials have claimed to have the ability to look into Putin’s soul. The reviews of their skills have been mixed. US President George Bush provided the following statement on the matter on June 18, 2016: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country. And I appreciated so very much the frank dialogue.” However, given his former work in the intelligence industry, his decades of experience in politics and as a national leader, Putin is the one who has mastered such an art. While he is never publicly vocal with his findings concerning other national leaders he meets, his conclusions are best manifested by the actions he takes as they regard their interests.

Every US official Putin meets likely for him becomes the avatar of Western duplicity. He will always be distrustful, and will simply study the individual seeking to gain a sense from his or her words, the nature of the conversation among the most senior US officials on Ukraine. To this extent, each conversation informs his next move, not due to its content, but due to what he perceives to lie behind their words. In many ways times have changed for Russia, and more dramatically for Putin. Russia can not exactly match the US as a global power. It cannot exactly match the power of the US even militarily. However, its capabilities have increased and it can do more things in the world now than a decade or two ago. It would appear that Putin so badly wants to get that point across.

It was never the case that Putin could have been shaped into the Russian leader Washington wanted. Moreover, Putin was never a man to be trifled with. However, these were among many ideas about Putin perhaps carried over from the tail-end of the Clinton administration, over two decades ago, when the then young president was establishing himself both at home and abroad. Perhaps it accounts for the manner in which those officials in the Obama administration approached Putin, dismissing him to a degree as something akin to a potentate, a footnote in their dealing with a Russia that was a shadow of its former self during the Soviet era in nearly every respect. There is a popular saying among many in the younger generation that “to compete, one must compare.” Officials in the Obama administration saw no comparison between the power Russia had maintained following the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the US which was at the time, and remains, the preeminent power in the world. Putin would likely posit that Washington has done more than enough since the Obama administration to push him to act as he has.

It remains a trend to look at Putin superficially. Interestingly, it allows everyone to have an equal shot at analyzing him and his moves. To that extent, time is spent, near idly, discussing how bad a person he is. (One very senior US official referred to Putin as “a killer” In May 2021.) At the core of even such unremarkable analyses must be something about the whole authentic enough to give it true weight. Yet, aspects of such analyses are often not quite logical. It is fascinating to see how simple facts may go some way to explain what might be recognized at best as a charitable position. As seasoned analysts would tell, if that product is simulated, conclusions that result from it will be inauthentic. What is left to examine amounts to a mere perception of what is going on in Putin’s mind and in his camp as compared to the hard facts. Using conclusions that result from such analyses will never allow policymakers and other senior officials to approach him in the right way. Even logical opinions are not the equivalent of fact. Truth is not an opinion. In the defense of some analysts, adhering to such a limited, official approach to Putin could hardly be described as neglectful. Perhaps considerations outside of what is generally accepted are avoided in fear of being castigated for devoting time and effort to trivialities. There must be something stronger that lends an understanding of his state of mind

Another problem arises when such views, despite all that is wrong about them, are adopted unconsciously by senior policy officials or worm their way into analyses, and even worse, as a possible result of that contamination, more apposite aspects may fail to receive sufficient or any treatment. It is hardly deliberate. They may appear as trifles, made imperceptible by the fact that they are notions, too commonplace in the mind to raise concern. Nonetheless, they are damaging much as the microscopic virus that can fell a world class athlete.

The West’s position on Putin as it stands today is that Putin has a mind to have Russia serve as the follow-on to the Soviet Union and claim its status and glory as a power. The enterprise has faced some rough patches over the years, but has progressed nonetheless. Putin’s actions in countries formerly aligned with the Soviet Union or were under its influence decades ago have been his targets and he has managed to get the attention and response from the West led by the US, the adversary of the erstwhile Soviet Union. It sounds bad enough for his neighbors, the West, and all others interested in maintaining stability and security in their countries, regions, and the world. Yet, in taking that tack, he has to an extent guaranteed Russia would remain stuck, limited to being a only simulacrum of the Soviet Union, a shadow of the past. Granted, Russia may be seen as possessing formidable military forces, with new weapons developments and declarations of the intention to defend its territory and its interests, but not a country that was advancing politically, economically, or socially, seeking to elevate to something better. Not to offend, but perhaps that was the best he could ever expect from his people.

Putin (right) and US President Bill Clinton (left) at the G8 Summit in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, in July 2000. When Putin became Russian Federation President, he took the seat created for Yeltsin at the G8. Perhaps the other G8 leaders felt that it was important to keep Russia in the G8 for the same reasons it was brought in but also hoped that keeping Putin in their circle might stir and help sustain a great desire within him to make Russia a country “like to one more rich in hope.” Other national leaders of the G8 may have thought that Putin would passively acquire an appreciation of their world, imagine the potential of a rejuvenated Russia fitting into their world, and acquire similarities with them. However, their eyes appear to have been closed to what was happening with Putin and Russia and why the move was nearly doomed to fail to ameliorate East-West tension in the long run due to his personality, no offense intended.

Missteps in Responding to Putin Somewhat Downplayed

The formal inclusion of the new Russian Federation in the high realms of international politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union was nobly attempted. A seat in the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council was inherited from the erstwhile Communist state. As important, Russia began to engage in separate meetings with leaders of the intergovernmental group of the leading economic powers, the G7, in 1994 while Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was in office. Russia formally joined the group in 1997 at the invitation of US President Bill Clinton and United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair. This noble step was ostensibly taken in the name of international peace and security. Surely, inviting Russia to join the G7 was more than a friendly gesture and a fresh start. Membership would plug Russia into the international order, forestalling any burgeoning sense that if left isolated, control in Moscow might fall fully into the hands of organized crime groups, and so would Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Russia membership would more importantly plug the G7 countries vis-à-versa into Moscow in a structured way, creating an effective, stable line of communication and political and economic influence.

When Putin became Russian Federation President, he took the seat created for Yeltsin at the G8. Perhaps the other G8 leaders felt that it was important to keep Russia in the G8 for the same reasons it was brought in but also hoped that keeping Putin in their circle might stir and help sustain a great desire within him to make Russia a country “like to one more rich in hope.” Other national leaders of what became the G8 may have thought that Putin would passively acquire an appreciation of their world, imagine the potential of a rejuvenated Russia fitting into their world, and acquire similarities with them. However, their eyes appear to have been closed to what was happening with Putin and Russia and why the move was nearly doomed to fail to ameliorate East-West tension in the long run due to his personality, no offense intended.

At the G8, national leaders would come to the big table committed to having a positive impact in not only economic affairs, but world affairs in general. The existing seven members–the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy, plus the EU–were bound by shared values as open, democratic and outward-looking societies. Russia was not a country completely devoid of desirable things, Russia possessed natural resources, particularly oil and gas which the energy industries of the other powers coveted. Certainly, Russia retained the power to destroy with its nuclear arsenal and the residue of the once powerful Soviet military. However, Russia was hardly developed enough to participate in that way as a member. 

As for Putin, he had not as yet grabbed all reins of power firmly in Russia, much as he tightly grips them today. It is not inconceivable that his political qualities were not fully scrutinized by any member state. However, more pertinently, Putin was unlikely ready to manage Russia’s stake at the G8 when first began participating in leaders’ summits. Looking into Putin’s inner-being, it is possible that Putin, though in his own way appreciating the status G8 membership bestowed Russia and him, he likely felt well-out of his comfort zone and despite his ego, felt somewhere inside that the manner in which Russia acquired G8 membership was counterfeit. For Putin to be satisfied, Russia would need to possess membership on his terms, legitimate terms. Further, within group meetings, Putin presented himself with grace and charm befitting his position. If Putin ever got the idea that Western leaders enjoyed observing him outside of his comfort zone or disrespected him in any way, he would conclude that something akin to a schoolboy prank was being played on him and he would unlikely be able to hide his anger in his countenance. It may seem an odd thought, but it does not appear so fanciful when one considers how he currently perceives NATO. Perchance Putin could imagine, in the abstract, that the other technologically advanced countries used G8 meetings as a stage, and he would be seated before them as they flaunted their economic power and progress while giving the impression in occasional off-handed comments and perhaps unconscious condescending behavior toward him that they imagine everything about Russia being tawdry and slipshod, particularly its goods and services, and would describe its industrial centers resembling a carnival the day after the night before. Perhaps such thinking could be said to have some validity given that such was essentially the case in early post-Soviet Russia. Putin had already brought to the table a sense within himself that Russia remained vulnerable to Western plans and intentions. That sensibility seemed to stick regardless of all else good that came his way through the G8. The whole G8 experience, overall, may have left a bad taste in his mouth. Other group leaders could not have guessed that outcome.

Further reflecting his hot and cold impressions about the other industrial powers, although Russia was suspended from the G8, Russia delayed announcing a decision to permanently withdraw from the G8 until 2017. Surely, Putin had great concerns over the perceptions in Russia and around the world of the decision of the G7 countries. Putin appears to have had a morbid fear that the G7 countries were exercising power over Russia and himself. That would not do. By waiting, Putin retained control of that situation by choosing when Russia would depart and then exist in the substitute reality that his country had not been pushed out of the organization and marginalized. As far as he was concerned, Russia was still a member of the club of the most powerful countries. Despite everything, that recognition remained an aspiration of his. It is an apparent odd duality. Satisfying Putin’s desire for Russia to possess the ability to discuss world problems with the leaders of the most influential countries, was Russia’s continued membership in the G20–the Group of 20, in essence a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 of the world’s largest economies, including those of many developing nations, along with the EU. While the G7 existed for the top-tier industrialized countries, the G20, formed in 1999, provided a forum for the discussion of international financial matters that included those emerging economies which at the time began to represent a larger part of the global economy. The G20’s aim is to promote global economic growth, international trade, and regulation of financial markets. As of 2021 there are 20 members in the group to include Putin’s erstwhile G8 partners, the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and the EU, and also Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and his Russia. To all appearances, as a G20 member, Russia plausibly retains authority in world governance. 

Una idea perplexina. (The idea is strange to us.) Intriguingly,  Putin did not attend the G20 summit in Rome in October 2021, informing the organization that his decision was due to concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. Not to take precaution in these times would be short-sighted, but for Putin to abstain from physically attending a G20 leaders summit could indicate that the organization, for at least that moment, may have less meaning for him. Putin participated in the summit in Rome via videolink, but the optics were hardly favorable. Reportedly, Putin coughed quite a bit during the meeting creating questions in the minds of others about his condition. That seemed unusual for a man who exudes strength and robustness. (Hopefully, Putin was not feeling any real discomfort.) It was a small matter, a trifle, but perhaps it will later be discovered that it was small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph.

One must add to this story the influence of the destructive impact of the West on the Russian economy and the country’s efforts to “build back better” immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union on Putin’s thinking. As discussed in the June 18, 2019 greatcharlie post entitled, “Why Putin Laments the Soviet Union’s Demise and His Renewed “Struggle” with the US: A Response to an Inquiry from Students,” Putin would doubtlessly explain that under Yeltsin, the Russian leadership made the mistake of believing Russia no longer had any enemies. Putin, while ascending to the top in the new Russian Federation, saw how mesmerizing “reforms” recommended to Yeltsin’s government by Western experts unmistakably negatively impacted Russia’s economy in a way referred to somewhat euphemistically by those experts as “shock treatment.” Yeltsin was unaware that Western experts were essentially “experimenting” with approaches to Russia’s economic problems. His rationale for opening Russia up to the resulting painful consequences was not only to fix Russia’s problems but ostensibly to establish comity with the West. The deleterious effects of reform recommended by Western experts’ could be seen not only economically, but socially.  In another statement made while he was acting President in 1999, Putin diplomatically explained the consequences of relying upon foreign experts for assistance. He stated: “The experience of the 90s demonstrates vividly that merely experimenting with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign textbooks cannot assure that our country will achieve genuine renewal without any excessive costs. The mechanical copying of other nations’ experience will not guarantee success, either.” Once fully ensconced as Russia’s leader, he would publicly state that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He also brought that sensibility to the G7 table with him. 

One might go as far as to say apparently none of the negative perspectives, memories that Putin held regarding the West were revealed. He concealed them with sangfroid and equanimity. Yet, he likely thought of them by day and nursed them by night. Inclusion was not enough to stem those feelings or his responses to Western moves albeit in Russia’s direction. Once power changed hands in Ukraine, and a series of measures that enhanced US influence were taken, Putin responded robustly. The promotion of a struggle between ethnic Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk with the fledgling democratic Ukrainian government was followed by the greater step of Russia’s seizing and annexing Crimea, then the sovereign territory of Ukraine. His actions resulted in Russia being placed back into what was supposed to be isolation; it was put out of the G8–now once again the G7–and hit with many punitive economic measures. Both Putin and Russia have seemingly survived it all.

Putin (left) United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron (center) and US President Barack Obama (right) at the G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland in June 2013. Putin was unlikely ready to manage Russia’s stake at the G8 when first began participating in leaders’ summits. Looking into Putin’s inner-being, it is possible that Putin, though appreciating the status G8 membership bestowed Russia and him, he likely felt well-out of his comfort zone and despite his ego, felt somewhere inside that the manner in which Russia acquired G8 membership was counterfeit. Perchance Putin could imagine that the other technologically advanced countries used G8 meetings as a stage, and he would be seated before them as they flaunted their economic power and progress while giving the impression in occasional off-handed comments and perhaps unconscious condescending behavior toward him, He already brought to the table a sense within himself that Russia remained vulnerable to Western plans and intentions. The whole G8 experience may have left a bad taste in his mouth.

Putin from a Different Lens

What one might gather from this part of the story is that more than anxiety and dissatisfaction with US policies and moves, there is apparently a real sense of vulnerability in Putin toward the US and its allies. It has been a subtle and profound undercurrent in his decisionmaking and approaches toward them. Often, that sense of vulnerability has been exacerbated by efforts from Washington to make diplomatic inroads with countries Putin seems to feel belong to Russia. Note how every step taken eastward by the US in Europe, as innocuous as each may have appeared to Washington’s eyes, has led to hyper-vigilance–for example, increased intelligence and surveillance activity and aerial and naval incursions in the territory of NATO Members–and military action by Moscow. Though it has been listened to with skeptical ears in the West, Putin has said that US moves evoke his actions.

In a December 21, 2021 Washington Post opinion piece entitled, “Putin Wants Us To Negotiate over the Heads of Our Allies. Washington Shouldn’t Fall for It”, the former US Ambassador to the Russian Federation Michael McFaul lists what he identifies as Russian actions and policies undermining European security. McFaul included the following on that list: Russia well-maintains troops and weapons from the territory of the Republic of Moldova; Russia has recognized the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries; Russia caotured and annexed Crimea and well-supports the separatist movements in eastern Ukraine; Russia has deployed SS-26 Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and maintains them in other deployment locations; Russia has placed tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad; Russia has engaged in assassination operations, such as those conducted in the European cities of London, Moscow, Salisbury, Berlin and Tomsk; and, Russia has aided remaining European dictators who kill and arrest Europeans exercising freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. One can only imagine Putin’s inner-dialogue as he took each step.

Cast one’s mind back to Putin’s greatest expression of vulnerability in March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating some Western actions that fostered contempt in Moscow. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he referred to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Conceivably, the aggregate of US moves eastward in Europe over time have truly rattled Putin and could potentially push him over the edge. That must always be considered. If the actual intention is to irritate Putin, then there will be no firm peace ever reached while he runs Russia.

Putin (above) in an office in the Senate Building at the Kremlin. In state-to-state talks between the US and Russia concerning Ukraine a structure has been established in which talks are held in rank order. Biden communicates with Putin, and Blinken communicates with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On both sides, the possibility exists that a set of reactions and responses to the positions and personas have already been formed. It would only be human to color anything truly novel added to the dialogue with considerations of what had already been said. Accordingly, it might be useful to enlist an envoy who could deliver the message that will end Putin’s sense of vulnerability and give immediate legitimacy to a call for multi-party negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on European security. That individual would need to have considerable standing with Putin to deliver that message.

What Might Be Done Regarding Putin To End This Crisis?

More than once has Putin associated himself with the ideas of “West German” Parliamentarian Egon Bahr on East-West competition. Discussing NATO in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin provided insight into his thinking then and now. During the interview, Putin quoted Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and its allies as having broken their promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and doing only what is best for their own interest in the name of all countries. Putin told his interviewer: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have.”

Vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat inchoare longam. (Life’s short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes.) Whatever it is that Putin wants to achieve, he must move faster than time wastes life. Time is not on Putin’s side. National leaders and political figures in power now in the capital of those countries of the former Eastern bloc which Putin so dearly covets to develop Russian influence are individuals of the last generation that even briefly lived while the Soviet Union had considerable influence, sway in their countries. Coming generations will only know the Soviet Union from history books. They will unlikely as a pattern, by inertia, due to insouciance  simply seek as their predecessors seek to connect with Moscow. The benefits of connection to the West will be well understood by them. Relatives who in the past decades who immigrated West would likely have some influence on their understanding of those benefits. Russia simply will not compare, offer anything they would desperately want to invest in their future. Russia itself represents the past, and how bad things were, something no one should reasonably want to be like or be part of.

As greatcharlie ruminated on in its January 18, 2018 post entitled, “Trump Wants Good Relations with Russia, But if New Options on Ukraine Develop, He May Use One,” Putin very likely has considered what Russia would be like after he, as one might presume he accepts, is “called to heaven” or perhaps elsewhere, goodness knows. It would seem that now while on Earth, he is on course regarding Ukraine to saddle future generations of Russians with a country or parts of it that are still economically, socially, and politically challenged that they will need to care for, to pay for. Future generations may not appreciate that. In Donetsk and Luhansk, future generations might abandon their homelands for “the other Ukraine” or points further West. They would unlikely pour into Russia for employment, a “better life.” In the future, a Russian leader might very well try to reverse whatever Putin seems to be attempting in Ukraine due to financial strains caused, or–not to be offensive–out of decency. Taking on Donetsk and Luhansk might very well be viewed in the future as a grave miscalculation, another step toward sealing Russia’s fate as a second tier superpower. It is greatcharlie’s assessment that future generations of Russians will not want to hold on to Ukraine as leaders of Putin’s generation, with an idea to reestablish Russia to resemble the Soviet Union. This reality may have value in negotiations with Putin. 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (right) meeting at Hotel Wilson in Geneva, Switzerland. January 21, 2022. For their next diplomatic step with Moscow, US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators must find a way for the two sides to work together in similar positive ways to create an outcome in which they both have a mutual and balanced influence on the situation. For instance, perhaps ways in which Ukraine could be helped along the way by both the West and Russia in tandem through an agreement that would also promote the maintenance of good neighborly relations and support the establishment of strong, positive relationships overseas without anyone being irritated. Washington and Moscow could engage in an exploratory dialogue during which suggestions could be sought on how the two sides could get from where they are to where they want to be.

A Possible Way Ahead in Diplomacy

For their next diplomatic step with Moscow, US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators must find a way for the two sides to work together in similar positive ways to create an outcome in which they both have a mutual and balanced influence on the situation. For instance, perhaps ways in which Ukraine could be helped along the way by both the West and Russia in tandem through an agreement that would also promote the maintenance of good neighborly relations and support the establishment of strong, positive relationships overseas without anyone being irritated. Engaging in what in essence would be an exploratory dialogue, transparent and frank, between Washington and Moscow on such matters would be the first step. In that dialogue, suggestions could also be sought from Moscow on how the two sides could get from where they are to where they want to be. If the US and Russia can cooperate on matters concerning the International Space Station, surely they can cooperate on an Earthly matter as Ukraine. N’est-ce pas vrai?

In theory, enough compromise might result from the collective talks to result in an agreement that would satisfy hopes and mitigate fears on all sides. Perhaps it would become the paradigm for peace in Europe that would remain until that time a new generation of Russia leadership that would share the values of other open, democratic and outward-looking societies. After the agreement is reached, Putin would need to feel freer and be able to stand upright. The US and its allies, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and especially Ukraine would be on a long list of those who would need to be satisfied with the plan for negotiating with Russia and the resultant argument. Creating consensus and acquiring agreement across the board on everything negotiated with Russia will take time but that course must be taken. Besides, if one is to believe Putin, and accept that he has no plans to invade Ukraine, then there is no real need to rush.

In state-to-state talks between the US and Russia concerning Ukraine a structure has been established in which talks are held in rank order. Biden communicates with Putin, and Blinken communicates with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On both sides, it is possible that a set of reactions and responses to the positions and personas have already been formed. It would only be human to color anything truly novel added to the dialogue with considerations of what had already been said. Accordingly, it might be useful to enlist an envoy who could deliver the message that will end Putin’s sense of vulnerability and give immediate legitimacy to a call for multi-party negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on European security. That individual would need to have considerable standing with Putin to deliver that message. It could be a former US President, German Chancellor, or European President or Prime Minister that Putin seemed to favor. Perhaps a small multinational delegation of doyens rather than a single doyen could meet with Putin. He may appreciate that. The immediate task of whoever meets Putin would be agreement to cease actions threatening Ukraine and publicly making demands for that would require its government to surrender self-determination and freedom to associate with other countries as Kyiv saw fit. The appropriate alternative suggested would be to discuss all issues. Putin would need to be convinced that everything Moscow, he, might deem pertinent could be hashed out at the suggested multi-party talks. The theme of the conversation would essentially be “Let us do everything the right way this time.” Again, Putin may appreciate that.

As for any agreement reached through multi-party talks, if Putin accepts that approach to diplomacy, more than simple guarantees must be insisted upon. Apparently, Lavrov presented a rather one-sided draft treaty to Blinken when they met in Geneva on January 21, 2022. That will not do. It was a rather incommesurate and hasty approach to the situation given its enormity. The effort to maintain Ukraine’s security, Russia’s security, Europe’s security must not only be comprehensive, it must be a dynamic process. Not to get into too much detail,, but as a comprehensive agreement, a new agreement would supersede the existing Minsk Agreement, although its terms could be referenced. Reasonably, terms of a new agreement could be built upon terms of the Minsk Agreement when directly related. Of course, the decision on that, as with everything else, is completely in the hands of the negotiating parties. All issues concerning Crimea and existing sanctions could be disassociated from these talks. Those talks could continue in their current venue. Again, the choice there is completely in the hands of the negotiating parties.

The negotiation process might require parties to take some the following steps, among many others: construct detailed plans of action on every key area as mutually recognized, each issue of contention, must be formulated to ensure greater clarity not confusion; create a security zone could be created within which zero tolerance of isolation of the agreement would be established; create firm timetables for actions as reducing the number of destabilizing forces near border; create a security zone could be created within which zero tolerance of isolation of the agreement would be established; create firm timetables for the suspension for refraining from existing actions such as military exercises; reduce the scope and scale of military exercises near the Russia-Ukraine border despite perceptions of whether they are threatening or benign; establish liaison offices in the security zone on both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian border could be created staffed by Russian and Ukrainian officers and military advisers if desired by either party; organize limited but comprehensive aerial surveillance over the security zone would be organized and appropriately scheduled; establish multiple military and diplomatic committees each with responsibilities in key areas of the agreement and respectively staffed with appropriate expertise and authority could be created to review plans for action in key established under the main agreement or hash out nagging issues could possibly exist; organize and schedule direct Ukraine-Russia talks, in a multiparty forum, at the ministerial level and deputies just below to include NATO Members and non-NATO Members in European countries neighboring Ukraine can be created.

It would be crucial to eliminate all ambiguities at the negotiating table through multilayered agreements if necessary as the process moves along. Pull all loose threads detected at the negotiating table may include using scenarios and hypotheticals. Whether a negotiating path as suggested will create stability in Europe right away, greatly improve Ukraine’s security and remove Russia’s fears, perhaps even through some very creative steps, remains to be seen. Nil sine magno vita labore dedit mortalibus. (Life grants nothing to us mortals without hard work.)

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky (center) visiting his country’s eastern frontline in December 2021 (center). On January 9, 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed the view on CNN that in the end, despite the vigorous efforts of the to correct the situation, this matter is mainly Kyiv’s problem and the Ukrainians have a Russian “gun to their head.” Viewing the crisis in that way makes it something akin to Ukraine’s “Reichenbach Falls”, the moment where Arthur Conan Doyle’s great fictional detective character, Sherlock Holmes was confronted by his archrival Professor James Moriarty after repeatedly disrupting his criminal schemes. As the story initially went, Holmes met his end in combat with him. It was revealed in subsequent installments of the series appearing in the Strand Magazine that Holmes survived the fight, his resurrection being demanded of Doyle by the magazine’s editors to satisfy their readership. One might hope fate will allow Ukraine to survive this crisis intact, yet there is nothing fictional about this situation.

The Way Forward

Non enim parum cognosse, sed in parum cognito stulte et diu perseverasse turpe est, propterea quod alterum communi hominum infirmitati alterum singulari cuiusque vitio est attributum. (For it is not having insufficient knowledge, but persisting a long time in insufficient knowledge that is shameful; since the one is assumed to be a disease common to all, but the other is assumed to be a flaw to an individual.) Putin does not seek to make Russia first in Europe nor match the power and position of the US in the world. Russia lacks the wherewithal, the resources,, and a lot of other things required to accomplish such objectives. However, Putin does want to control what he claims to be in Russia’s “near abroad”: the former Soviet republics on its border. As the US and its European allies become more engaged with them, it becomes less likely that he will be able to accomplish that goal either. If the US and its allies were not enough trouble for Putin, his “friends” in Beijing have been knocking on the doors of those near abroad governments, making enticing, huge offers, which Moscow cannot match, to invest in their economies and support industrial and infrastructure development as a way to enhance ties–albeit perhaps not always in a legitimate way. Unfortunately for Putin, he was unable to shape Russia’s position in the world positively over the past two decades, by transforming the country to be a contributing member as an advanced industrialized, economic power, and present Russia as anything close to an alternative as a partner to its neighbors. Russia remained a country from which villainy of some sort was expected more than anything else. Unable to sway the capitals of bordering former Soviet republics to Russia’s camp, it would seem he made the decision a while back to use brute force. US decision-makers should not simply expect Putin to get a hold of himself, and get a grip concerning the use of greater military force in Ukraine. He already moved on Crimea, so for many, no points could be argued that would convince them that he would not do more. The capture of Crimea may have actually been only the first phase in a plan of far greater conception concerning Ukraine.

Washington wants to avoid a conflict in Ukraine. For Washington, success in resolving the Ukraine crisis would likely mean crafting a sustainable agreement with Russia, within acceptable parameters of US values and interests, and that is the rub. Some national leaders in Europe might go as far as to say aggression simply resides in Putin and it is too late for any worthwhile diplomacy with him. They may need to overcome an anxiety over the history of Russian behavior before altering their thinking on that. Still, at the same time, no responsible party involved in this matter wants war. Given how Putin thinks, more than aggression and dissatisfaction with US policies and moves inform his actions. A real sense of vulnerability in Putin toward the US and its allies has been a subtle and profound undercurrent in his decisionmaking and approaches toward them. That sense of vulnerability is intensified by Washington’s efforts to make diplomatic inroads with countries Putin seems to feel belong to Russia. Putin has actually said that US moves evoke his actions, which thereby are actually reactions. That is hardly something he, or any military commander, would want to admit or to accept.

As suggested here, US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators must find a way for the two sides to work together in similar positive ways to create an outcome in which they both have a mutual and balanced influence on the situation. For instance, perhaps ways in which Ukraine could be helped along the way by both the West and Russia in tandem through an agreement that would also promote the maintenance of good neighborly relations and support the establishment of strong, positive relationships overseas without anyone being irritated. Some, despite everything presented here, albeit in brief, might contend that there is little obvious room for compromise from either side. However, the referee has not yet blown the whistle for full-time. It has always been greatcharlie’s contention that smart people are usually able with the appropriate amount of effort to find answers to problems. A posse ad esse. (From possibility to actuality.)

Book Review: Robert Spalding, Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept (Portfolio, 2019)

A B-2 “Spirit” Stealth Bomber (above). Though Robert Spalding’s Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept bears the name of the exquisite machinery depicted, the book actually concerns something different. Stealth War refers to how China has quietly waged a six-front war on the economy, military, diplomacy, technology, education, and infrastructure of the US, and has been winning. Spalding provides piercing judgments, a novel-like reporting of actual events, and a clarity that allows him to cast a cold eye on China policy analysis and intelligence analysis both past and present. He has interestingly taken his own dissatisfaction, disappointment, and anger over how badly the US has handled China, placed the country in some danger, and safely expressed it on paper, turning it into a positive force to better understand how things have taken shape and how events are unfolding before the eyes of every US citizen.

As of late, there has been an altogether different spring in Beijing’s step. Without a shadow of doubt, Beijing now has a broader attitude towards Asia, a broader attitude towards the world, than it ever had before. Very convinced men and women in China awake each day invigorated with the idea that their country will soon be the dominant power in the world. Some might say it has been a long-standing perspective held among Chinese Communists. However, it would appear this view is being clinged to stronger now than ever. Long ago, Beijing formulated a long-term plan to eventually become the world’s dominant power. That plan has been underway without pause for decades. Few who planned it, lived to see the type satisfying results that have blossomed in recent years. Surely, People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping hopes that under his leadership, the long sought goal of dominance will be achieved. In statements and speeches, he has often assured the Chinese people that the hopes and dreams of the Party and the people will be manifested. Though the idea of China being the world’s dominant power may be a pleasurable thought in Beijing, the moral and ethical implications are remarkably overwhelming. The notion of China achieving that goal is a frightening prospect, terrifying leaders in other countries whether its friend or foe.

US President Joe Biden recently reminded before a Joint Session of the US Congress that “Our greatest strength is the power of our example, not just the example of our power.” Perhaps many Asia observers and analysts would agree that such is not the case for China. Despite having the structure, a perceptible veneer to those unfamiliar with its ways, of being a multiparty system at the national level, for all intents and purposes, China is a single party, Communist, authoritarian state. The course of its leadership of the world might follow the same pattern as China’s censorship approach. Whatever China wanted would be dictated and punishment would closely follow behind its threats to those who disobey Beijing. The dynamics of relationships with cautious allies as the Russian Federation, for instance, would change, as China would likely want it at least to be tacitly understood that it was the “senior partner,” the leader. Discussion about China and its moves toward becoming the dominant world power is no longer outside the realm of even everyday conversation among the US public. If the people were provided with the full facts on China’s rise in competition with the US it would likely take the breath away of many. China stands convinced of the correctness of both its points of view and its actions.

The subject of this review, Robert Spalding’s Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept (Portfolio, 2019), has been promoted as a book which discusses how China has quietly waged a six-front war on America’s economy, military, diplomacy, technology, education, and infrastructure, and has been winning. It might be enough for greatcharlie just to describe Spalding’s exceptional achievement with Stealth War as providing piercing judgments, a novel-like reporting of actual events, and a clarity that allows him to cast a cold eye on China policy analysis and intelligence analysis, both past and present. However, Spalding, even more, has interestingly taken his dissatisfaction, disappointment, and anger over how badly the US has handled China, placed the country in some danger, and safely expressed it on paper, turning it into a positive force to better understand how things have taken shape and how atrocious events are unfolding right before the eyes of every US citizen.

Although packed with excellent suggestions, the book is not about moving from choppy waters to calmer times. It is about preparing the US, using all tools of its power, military, diplomatic, economic, political, and information (media) power, to best handle what is happening with China and the worst that will most likely, or will eventually, come from its direction. Have no doubt that as a retired US Air Force Brigadier General, Spalding is well up on how the US could take on China militarily, and win. Spalding has presented his findings and judgments in such a way to plant good, well-thought out, seeds with the hope they will take root well. It is difficult to see how policy analysts and policymakers in the US, Democrat or Republican, would not recognize that Spalding is largely in the right.

In this review of Stealth War, greatcharlie hopes it can demonstrate how those reading the book for the first time will be provided a full picture on the matter. Hopefully the review will spark their exploration of the book to see what they can draw from Spalding’s meditations. For those who have already read Stealth War, this review hopefully will provide an opportunity to consider perspectives not thought of during their first look. In this review, greatcharlie will not run through Stealth War chapter and verse as it typically has in preceding book reviews. While still offering what it may humbly call its well-considered opinions and commentary, greatcharlie will discuss what it feels is the essence of the work, how Spalding stirs the development of perceptions and insights through the manner in which he presents his facts. Admittedly, being somewhat assiduous over facts in reviews, greatcharlie has often been somewhat prolix. A conscious effort has been made by greatcharlie to avoid again presenting what one reader acidulously, and lyrically, described as “a typical edifying, yet verbose greatcharlie review.” There is no desire to create a challenge for some readers to stay onboard with a post until the end of the ride. (Despite our deeming it necessary to do so, greatcharlie apologies to all readers for severely curtailing the discussion of the text of Stealth War in this review. It is recognized that Stealth War is a book of such quality that some readers might view taking such a step as a sort of malfeasance.)

Acknowledged as the master of the heroic couplet and one of the primary tastemakers of the Augustan age, British writer Alexander Pope was a central figure in the Neoclassical movement of the early 18th century. In “An Essay on Criticism,” a didactic poem first published anonymously in 1711 when the author was 23 years old, in greatcharlie’s humble view superbly gets to heart of the reviewer’s mission, explaining: “But you who seek to give and merit fame, / And justly bear a critic’s noble name, / Be sure your self and your own reach to know, / How far your genius, taste, and learning go; / Launch not beyond your depth, but be discreet, / And mark that point where sense and dulness meet.”

The author of Stealth War, Robert Spalding (above), is by no means an outsider with special access, looking in on the situation. He is an erstwhile insider, who worked within the deepest points, most grave points, of the US military and other national security bureaucracies. It must be noted that being a former US Air Force brigadier general, B-2 Stealth bomber pilot and unit commander, among many other accomplishments, Spalding was a member of an unique, elite caste of military officers who are not quick to speak out, do not lightly show emotion, at least publicly or react because of it, never fret over a perception without the full facts, would hardly speak idly, and whose views when expressed should be taken very seriously. Spalding spoke truth to power at the Pentagon and the White House, and speaks of only what he knows to be the truth in Stealth War. His scruple does him much honor.

The Author

Robert Spalding retired from the US Air Force as a brigadier general after more than 25 years of service. If US Air Force officers were listed by achievements–perhaps they are somewhere in the Pentagon, Spalding would surely be among the luminaries. His Air Force biography provides the best picture of the experience and knowledge he possess. Minus his list of educational accomplishments, it reads as follows: “General Spalding received his commission through Fresno State University’s ROTC program in 1991. He earned his doctorate in economics and mathematics from the University of Missouri at Kansas City in 2007. The general attended undergraduate pilot training in 1993, and was subsequently assigned as a B-52 Stratofortress co-pilot in the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He subsequently transitioned to the B-2 Spirit at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri. In 2001, he was selected as one of three Air Force Olmsted Scholars, and was a distinguished graduate of Mandarin Chinese language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. Afterward, the general attended Tongji University in Shanghai as a graduate research student. He then returned to Whiteman Air Force Base as a B-2 evaluator pilot and assistant director of operations for the 393rd Bomb Squadron. The general was then assigned to the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office as the military assistant for the deputy assistant secretary of defense. During the Iraq surge in 2007, General Spalding deployed to Baghdad and directed the Personal Security Coordination Center. After a stint at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, he was reassigned to the B-2 at Whiteman Air Force Base. While at Whiteman Air Force Base, he was the chief of safety, operations group commander and vice wing commander. He was then selected as a Military Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. General Spalding then served as the chief China strategist for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, Washington DC. His next assignment led him back to China as the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attache to China in Beijing, China. Prior to his current assignment he served at the White House as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council, Washington D.C.”

Spalding is by no means an outsider, with special access, looking in on the situation. He is an erstwhile insider, who worked within the deepest points, most grave points of the US military and other national security bureaucracies. It must be noted that being a former US Air Force brigadier general, B-2 Stealth bomber pilot and unit commander, among his many impressive accomplishments, Spalding was a member of an unique, elite caste of military officers who are not quick to speak out, do not lightly show emotion, at least publicly or react because of it, never fret over a perception without the full facts, would hardly speak idly, and whose views when expressed should be taken very seriously. Spalding spoke truth to power at the Pentagon and the White House, and speaks of only what he knows to be the truth in Stealth War. His scruple does him much honor.

As of this writing, Spalding is set to publish a new book with Sentinel in April 2022, War Without Rules: China’s Playbook for Global Domination. In War Without Rules, readers are again presented with the perspectives and insights on US-China relations through the lens of a man with years of experience on such matters. Resolved that the Communist Party of China’s leaders believe that there is no sector of life outside the realm of war, Spalding illustrates how they have gone about that by use corporate espionage, global pandemics, and trade violations to achieve dominance. The ultimate goal of the Party is world dominance. Spalding provides insight into how US citizens can be made better aware of China’s tactics in order to mitigate its creeping influence.

Polybius (c. 204-122 B.C.), the Greek “pragmatic historian,” and intriguingly an eyewitness to the siege and destruction of Carthage accompanying none other than Cornelius Scipio Aficanus as one of his commanders. In his noted work, The Histories, Polybius covers the period from 264 BC to 146 BC, focusing primarily on the years 220 BC to 167 BC, and detailing Ancient Rome’s conquest of Carthage, which allowed it to become the dominant force in the Mediterranean. Additionally in The Histories, Polybius offered what he believed were the process and traits required of a good historian. Among all things enumerated, he emphasized: “All available evidence must be collected, thoroughly sifted, soberly weighed, and, lastly, the historian must be animated by a sincere love of truth and a calm impartiality.”

Spalding’s book is far from a dispassionate clinical study of US-China relations. Spalding is not presenting Stealth War at any point in the book as an intermedial. If one is looking for a book written by such an author, Stealth War would be the wrong choice. Being that he is in every way a patriot, Spalding’s position concerning the US interests versus China or any other country for that matter is vigorously partisan for the US. Moreover, he is not reluctant to confide his thoughts on such matters either. Readers should expect his relative partisanship to be the dominant tone of the text. However, Spalding’s patriotic tone does not degrade into anything akin to jingoism or chauvinism. His partisanship does not impact the quality of Spalding’s analysis. He is in fact very critical of US decision making on China. To the extent that he vigorously engaged in the process of collecting relevant evidence and sought to present the absolute truth, Spalding demonstrates all of the traits that Polybius would likely agree qualifies him as a solid reporter of past events.

While Spalding puts readers in the full picture, at the same time, he does not attempt to squeeze every issue dry so to speak. What he does present, however, provides enough to leave no doubt as to China’s actions and intentions. It is his book, and his prerogative to preclose as his present the facts as he knows them.

As a read, the book is presented in a way by Spalding as not to be too heavy going. Often, analysis becomes more uncertain as it becomes more sophisticated. His examination admirably allows for safe passage on each occasion to the very heart of the matter. There are no exaggerated claims. There is nothing to debunk. Surely, China would insist and seek to create the impression that statements made by Spalding regarding election interference, cyberattack, espionage, theft of intellectual property are simply Innuendo and insinuation. The notion of a misunderstood China offends all of Spalding’s reasoning.

People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping (above) celebrating the Centennial of the Communist Party of China. Long ago, Beijing formulated a long-term plan to eventually become the world’s dominant power. That plan has been underway without pause for decades. Few who planned it, lived to see the type satisfying results that have blossomed in recent years. Surely, Xi hopes that under his leadership, the long sought goal of dominance will be achieved. In statements and speeches, he has often assured the Chinese people that the hopes and dreams of the Party and the people will be manifested. Though the idea of China being the world’s dominant power may be a pleasurable thought in Beijing, the moral and ethical implications are remarkably overwhelming. The notion of China achieving that goal is a frightening prospect, terrifying leaders in other countries whether friend or foe.

A Courageous Act by Spalding

Spalding speaks independently with his own points of view. It should be reminded that when he published Stealth War in October 2019, few from the ranks of his fellow military commanders with his experience had effectively and successfully reached an audience with such perspectives on China. Much as the man standing on high rock in the painting, Der Wanderer über dem Nebelmeer (The Traveler Contemplating a Sea of ​​Clouds) (1818) by the 19th century German Romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich. The “Dean of Cold War Historians” and Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, John Lewis Gaddis, suggests that the position of the character above the precipice and in front of a tormented landscape is contradictory because “evoking the domination over a landscape but at the same time the insignificance of the individual who is included in it.” In greatcharlie’s interpretation, Spalding could be represented by the man standing as he sees dangers that his country faces at the present and tries to imagine and consider responses to those unknown that it may face in the future. He fiercely desires to mitigate them, and thereby allow the US public to rest more easily. 

The practice of understanding the competition between powers and the clashes that result in the establishment of a dominant power was well-demonstrated more than two millennia ago by the Athenian historian and general, Thucydides (c 460 – c. 400 BC)  . The primary focus of Thucydides’ studies was the burgeoning competition and eventual clash of Athens and Sparta. Sparta was the superpower in the region, particularly militarily. As the Athenian empire rapidly grew with determination, to Thucydides, it clearly was just a matter of time before the two powers would clash.

In his book, Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge University Press, 1995), Michael Gagarin presents Thucydides explanation for the Peloponnesian War which states the following: “I will first write down an account of the disputes that explain their breaking the Peace, so that no one will ever wonder from what ground so great a war could arise among the Greeks. I believe, however, that the truest reason for the quarrel, though least evident in what was said at the time, was the growth of Athenian power, which put fear into the Spartans and so compelled them into war, while the explanations both sides gave in public for breaking the Peace and starting the war are as follows.” 

There is a sense, a feeling, within the pages of Stealth War that Spalding believes the unwanted crisis, war between the US and China, will come. To that extent, he wants the US to be best prepared to fight that war and to win. There is a definite materiality in what he presents. Specific points of China’s attack on the US and suggestions on responses are clearly laid out by Spalding in the 11 chapters of his book’s 256 pages They are organized and titled as follows: Chapter 1: “Unrestricted Warfare”; Chapter 2: “How We Got Here”; Chapter 3: “Economy”; Chapter 4: “The Military Crisis”; Chapter 5: “The Digital Battlefield”; Chapter 6: “Modern Warrior 5.0: The 5G Future”; Chapter 7: “Politics and Diplomacy”; Chapter 8: “Stealing Intellectual Property”; Chapter 9: “World Domination via Infrastructure”; Chapter 10: “Sino Solutions: How to Combat and Stop China’s Stealth War”; and, Chapter 11: “Beating China at Its Own Game”. In his discussion of each issue, Spalding first looks from within, taking a deeper dive into impressions of the situation that he has developed over years of immersion in all aspects of the matter. His discussion of issues reflects the realist, the pragmatic thinker that he is. 

Support for Spalding’s pragmatic approach to examining China’s behavior vis-a-via the US, and the world, appears to have been provided more than two millennia ago by the aforementioned Thucydides. Thucydides is sometimes credited with founding of what is known as”political realism.” It is unknown to greatcharlie whether Spalding actually does or does not associate himself with the world of political realism, and it would go out on shaky ground to claim either was the case. Yet, Spalding’s discussion of China’s ambitions appears to manifest aspects of that theory. Central to political realism is the assumption that humans, deep down, are selfish, fearful, ambitious, and self-interested. As for countries, they are driven to safeguard national interests. To that extent, the tragic choice to go to war stand as indispensable tools in the management of state affairs and diplomacy: statecraft. As a result, the world has become a place in which each country may find themselves in conflict with competitors with similar interests, ambitions, and goals (targets charted by time).

In his search for a reason, a rationale, a purpose, for the current state of relations with China, Spalding, led by data available to him, explains it was the errant policy positions of former US administrations. At the core of those policies pursued, according to Spalding, was the misguided belief that economic development would lead the way to China’s transformation to a more democratic form of government and away from Communism. Given the manner in which he explains it, readers are left to contemplate how such a horrifying blunder could continue on for so long.

Even when the First Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Mao Zedong (left) was offering his olive branch to US President Richard Nixon (right), he reportedly regarded the US as the enemy, and that Chinese documents “likened it to Hitler.” Spalding notes Pillsbury recounts how People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, during a meeting with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, proclaimed “America is the ba.” The Chinese interpreter rendered this statement as “America is the leader.” That was a blatant mistranslation: “ba,” as used in most political language, means “tyrant.” When the translator was later asked why he softened Zhou’s language to Kissinger, he said, “It would have upset him.” At the time, US policymakers and decisionmakers were too interested in embracing a policy of helping China in order to destabilize the Soviet Union to concern themselves with the Communust Party of China’s hostile attitudes toward their country.

China Well Exploited Pro-China Policies of the Past

Providing some framework for understanding the approach China took toward the situation, Spalding explains that war between countries in the 21st century looks much different than war in the 19th and 20th centuries. He notes that instead of bombs and bullets, it is about “ones and zeros and dollars and cents: economics, finance, data-information, manufacturing, infrastructure and communications.” He insists that today if one controls those fronts, “you can win a war without firing a shot.” Spalding calls it a simple logical strategy that leaders in the West have been very slow to grasp. To provide a taste from the text, Spalding elaborates further on matter in Chapter 1: “Unrestricted Warfare” on page 14: “Military might is only one way to express aggression, only one of many ways to attain power. In China’s view, economic power strengthens all the fields of potential engagement. In other words, money bolsters the military but also bolsters every other sphere of engagement imaginable. It can be used to influence and sway political leaders in foreign countries, silence ideas, and purchase or steal technology. It can be used to manufacture goods at dirt cheap prices and drive competitors out of business, or weaken rival economies. It can be used to create an army of academics, who fan out to gather scientific, technological, and engineering intelligence that can be used to further other goals.” 

To that extent, Spalding goes on to clarify the matter by stating that perhaps one of the most important and revealing documents of the Communist Party of China is a 1999 work entitled Unrestricted Warfare. Written by two senior colonels in the PLA, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, it discloses a number of prospective strategies that could possibly shift the balance of power throughout the world in China’s favor. Spalding insists that Unrestricted Warfare should be required reading for all branches of the US government and for business leaders because it outlines the strategy at the root of China’s policies in the world. He quotes a passage of the document that states: “The new principles of war are no longer ‘using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s will,’ but rather are ‘using all means, including armed force and non-armed force, military and non-military, lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests’.”

Past US Administrations: Blind as Beetles

Given what Spalding reports, it seems at one point, opinion in nearly all foreign policy circles in the US were adverse to the suggestion of an aggressive China that would challenge the US position as a the world’s leader, or as Chinese government spokespersons and Communist Party of China leaders refer to as US dominance in the world. It is to go out on shaky ground to ask readers to remember that sentiment was heard during the 2020 US Presidential Campaign when then Presidential candidate Joe Biden referring to China stated: “I mean, you know, they’re nice folks, folks. But guess what? They’re not competition for us.”

Spalding notes that in The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (Henry Holt and Co, 2015), China observer Michael Pillsbury discloses that even when the First Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Mao Zedong offered his olive branch to US President Richard Nixon, he regarded the US as the enemy, and that Chinese documents “likened it to Hitler.” Spalding notes Pillsbury recounts how People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, during a meeting with US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, proclaimed “America is the ba.” The Chinese interpreter rendered this statement as “America is the leader.” Pillsbury said that was a  blatant mistranslation: “ba,” as used in most political language, means “tyrant.” When the translator was later asked why he softened Zhou’s language to Kissinger, he said, “It would have upset him.” At the time, US policymakers and decisionmakers were too interested in embracing a policy of helping China in order to destabilize the Soviet Union to concern themselves with the Communust Party of China’s hostile attitudes toward their country.

US President Bill Clinton (left) and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin (right). From 1993 and 1998, there were several meetings between Clinton and Jiang. One the surface, US-China relations were mostly positive, a situation Spalding would explain was due to a desire in Washington to satisfy Beijing. Clinton signed a law passed by Congress establishing permanent normal trade relations with China. With the relationship codified, US investor confidence soared, as did business. China’s economy roared forward, too, due to a confluence of events: China was then accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization, Apple unveiled the iPod, and an eruption of digital goods turned into a stampede of international investment. Spalding makes the acidulous remark that many policy makers and business investors then, as well as years before, seemed to assume capitalism has special powers that could melt away authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Yet, despite China’s exponential growth, Spalding notes, as predicted by James Mann in his book, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China, the Communist Party of China only honed its brand of authoritarian capitalism.

Spalding remarks acidulously that many policy makers and business investors of the past seemed to assume capitalism has special powers that could melt away authoritarianism and totalitarianism. He goes on to discuss James Mann’s book, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China (Viking Adult, 2007), in which the author calls the West’s idea that China will morph into a liberal democratic society “the Soothing Scenario,” Mann summarizes the logic this way: “The country’s rapid economic growth will lead to far reaching political change as well. Eventually, increasing trade and prosperity will bring liberalization and democracy to China.” Spalding also points to Mann’s discussion of the opposite of the Soothing Scenario: “The Upheaval Scenario,” in which doubters envision China collapsing as a result of economic chaos or some kind of mass revolution. The result is turmoil and chaos. Spalding explains that Mann was way ahead of the curve when he wrote his book in 2007–a time when China was literally exploding with commerce and manufacturing. Six years earlier, then US President Bill Clinton signed a law passed by Congress establishing permanent normal trade relations with China. With the relationship codified, US investor confidence soared, as did business. China’s economy roared forward, too, due to a confluence of events: China was then accepted as a member of the World Trade Organization, Apple unveiled the iPod, and an eruption of digital goods turned into a stampede of international investment. Yet, despite China’s exponential growth, Spalding notes, Mann did not adhere to either the Soothing or Upheaval scenario. For Mann, all signs indicated that the Communist Party of China would continue to hone its brand of authoritarian capitalism.

There was not simply a gap between a perception of Chinese actions and intentions with a perception exemplar of the political realism school of thought as that of Spalding. Moreover, there appeared to be a gap between perception and reality on China among US political leaders and policy makers. They saw no urgency in responding effectively to what Beijing has been doing. The reality was hardly missed in Beijing that it would not be possible to simply rise to the mantle of the world’s dominant power. In order to possess the title of the world’s dominant power, China had to dispossess the US of it.

Spalding presents the subtle differences between logic and lunacy in expressing the actions of US political leaders and policymakers coddling a China determined to surpass the US, a thought many within policy circles and the general public in the US might still find difficult to wrap their heads around. Yet, Spalding curiously manages to forge an intriguing link for the US public, and imaginably the world at large, to what once quietly resided in the hearts and minds of senior military decision makers on China as well as what may generally reside in them now.

To that extent, the book has become, and will likely remain for some time, a stimulus to the discourse on US-China relations for a broader audience than other books on the subject. As awareness increases on the realities of that relationship, there has been an albeit gradual shift in perspectives on China. In foreign policy circles, it has been a gradual turn. In business circles, it has been an even slower transition, but somewhat steady. As he insists upon immediate change in response to developments, Spalding, himself, notes that “Some critics will accuse me of being alarmist or sensationalist.” Perhaps it will turn out in the end that the necessary change in thinking occurred too slowly.

Though not felt within the society as a whole but more so among a finite set of those in the national security bureaucracies whose responsibility is to keep an eye on China, there is a sense of foreboding similar to that which characterized the Cold War era when it was in full gallop during the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, they are plenty worried. Many are worried enough to express their own concerns, if able, if permissible, in books after leaving the respective services, military, diplomatic, intelligence, sounding the claxson loudly on China’s moves much as Spalding had already done with Stealth War. In Graham Greene’s The Ministry of Fear (Penguin Classics, 2005) is found the line: “He had been frightened and so he had been vehement.”

Indeed, since the time Spalding published Stealth War, more have joined him in shining increased sunlight China’s activities, not just on the coronavirus disaster or in the realm of national security, but a multitude of other actions, all, nonetheless, malign. Included among those actions would be: predatory investment scams directed against trusting governments of often small and less industrialized countries; intrusion of sovereign waters for mass fishing; intellectual property theft from companies and research labs that have invested millions in research and development into that which was stolen; and, demands of censorship insisted upon of those in any arena who have received funding from, or are doing business with, China, concerning anything the Communist Party of China does not want discussed. Beijing must accept that as a result of such actions, impressions of China have not exactly been positive worldwide.

The Key Chapter at the Moment: Chapter 4: “The Military Crisis

Spalding states on page 43 in Chapter 4: “The Military Crisis”, “Fortunately, for the moment, China has no interest in engaging in a ground war, or any kind of war that entails actual violence and physical destruction.” Nevertheless, it is a coming war between the US and its allies against China which haunts the story that Spalding tells and has kept many readers turning the book’s pages to find clues as to why and how it will all come about. Though Spalding admirably discussed the issue of a possible war between the US and China, he explained the situation as it existed at the time he wrote Stealth War. It appears that the problem has metastasized a bit on the diplomatic and economic front since. 

No doubt, the Communist Party of China is not expending enormous financial and material resources only to pose a potential threat to Taiwan’s self-rule and somewhat attenuated sovereignty out of academic interest or worse, some banal amusement; far from it. It is not Spalding’s message, but after aggregating what he explains with more recent events, what becomes clear can be stated in simple words for political leaders in Washington and Taipei: “The Red Chinese are coming!” If this assessment is in error, and upon greatcharlie proved, better news could not be reported for the sake of international peace and security, and humanity itself.

In the top senior policymaking offices of the civilian leadership of US and its Western and Eastern allies, officials surely believe uniformly that a show of force is the most effective option to respond to and deter: China’s territorial ambitions particularly regarding Taiwan and the waters of the Western Pacific, China’s displays of naval and air power and China’s threatening words in rebuff to US leadership and dominance in the region and the world. The most formidable show of force policymakers have used is joint exercises between US Navy aircraft carrier battlegroups and aircraft carriers of its allies and having US warships transit the Taiwan Straits. In addition to being a show of force, such deployments also serve as an excellent opportunity for the US and its allies to project joint power and demonstrate their commitment to collective defense, rehearse cooperation, and particularly allow allies to appreciate the benefits of US leadership. Based on what Spalding explains, some readers might conclude that such displays of force by the US and its allies more satisfy the need for some ostensibly strong action and serve more to soothe international concerns, provide a display of leadership, and domestic consumption. In reality, the aircraft carrier battlegroups, as mighty as they are, present themselves as easy prey for Chinese missiles.

Spalding explains that China has thousands of precision warheads tied to a sophisticated command and control system. He expounds on this by pointing out that the Dong Feng-26 (DF-26) ballistic missile–46 feet long, 44,000 pounds, and built to carry both conventional and nuclear warheads–was designed to obliterate aircraft carriers. The DF-26 has a range of 2,500 miles, which means it can strike US warships in the western Pacific Ocean, including ships based in Japan. In the specific context of defending Taiwan,, he gets across the idea that in order to deploy a carrier’s bombers on a mission in the South China Sea, the carrier would have to come within the range of DF-26 and other missiles that would destroy it. Though noting that the US Navy has SM-6 interceptor missiles, thought to be capable of destroying the DF-26, Spalding leaves no doubt that the sheer amount of smaller, long-range ballistic missiles at China’s disposal and the blazing speed with which these weapons travel–six thousand miles in thirty minutes–pose, at the moment, an enormous threat to US warships. To that extent, he writes: “It is conceivable that an undetected conflict might end in thirty seconds. Game over.” That is a hard saying.

Gnawing on the subject a little bit more, Spalding explains that assessed from an economIc standpoint, the PLA constructed a $1 billion dollar missile system designed to destroy a $30 billion ship. Spalding says that there is no doubt our carriers are valuable and powerful machines. However, in plain English he also states that “their effectiveness in policing the Pacific is now extremely limited.” To that extent, ironically, having US and allied aircraft carriers sail within the range of the DF-26 may repeatedly send the wrong message at an exorbitant cost. In terms of deterring China regarding Taiwan, the move may have repeatedly demonstrated that the US and its allies would be unable to act in a way to halt an assault on the island while at the same time avoiding unacceptable losses. No greater support could be provided to the cluster of expressive hawks the leadership in the Communist Party of China under Xi, clamoring for an assault on Taiwan sooner than later.

China’s Dong Feng-26 (DF-26) ballistic missile (above) was designed to obliterate aircraft carriers. The DF-26 has a range of 2,500 miles, which means it can strike US warships in the western Pacific Ocean, including ships based in Japan. So do the math: in order to deploy a carrier’s bombers on a mission in the South China Sea, the carrier would have to come within the range of DF-26 and other missiles that would destroy it. The sheer amount of smaller, long-range ballistic missiles at China’s disposal under a sophisticated command and control system, and the blazing speed with which these weapons travel–six thousand miles in thirty minutes–pose, at the moment, an enormous threat to our ships. Spalding says It is conceivable that an undetected conflict might end in thirty seconds. Game over. It is a hard saying.

Following up on Spalding’s statement in Chapter 4 that the US cannot fight a ground war with China, he expounds on that point by stating products from China are crucial for the production and operations of much of the US military’s weapon systems and gear. He states directly that “the amount of goods that have been shipped and continue to be shipped from China for military use is mind-boggling.” Spalding goes into detail somewhat by offering examples of the daunting amount of military equipment that contain components made in China. He says the propellant that fires out Hellfire missiles, which are launched from helicopters, jets, and drones, is imported from China. He points the glass in night-vision goggles contains a metal called lanthanum, a large majority of which comes from China. He also points to computers that US military and naval officers write plans and reports and print them on come from China predominantly. Instructional videos are watched on screens made in China.

Spalding reminds that there are laws mandating that the US military buy goods that are made in the US. However, he believes that the US has gone too far with outsourcing and has reached a point where it is unable to defend itself and its interests without Chinese manufacturing and logistical support. If supply lines were cut from China, or even if a trade war broke out with embargoes, Spalding predicts the US military would have a nightmare sourcing its needs and getting them to the battlefield. Spalding quotes a 2015 essay by retired US Army General John Adams which states: “Our almost complete dependence on China and other countries for telecommunications equipment presents potentially catastrophic battlefield vulnerabilities.”

The Nuclear Dimension

On China’s nuclear capabilities, on page 201 in Chapter 10: “Sino Solutions: How to Combat and Stipop China’s Stealth War”, Spalding revealed that his greatest concern was that as the US seeks to balance our economic relationship, the PLA will continue to be left unrestricted. Spalding explains that unfortunately as a consequence, the US needs the threat of its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent. Spalding says the assumption is if course that these bombs will never be used. Nevertheless, he feels that “invoking fear of the unthinkable–the madman or Wildman theory of negotiation–often works.”

Delving a bit into the realm of conjecture, it is conceivable that warplanners in China may assess that they do not have the time to develop nuclear parity with US in order to offset the massive advantage the US has with its nuclear arsenal and that Washington would likely use as leverage to impact China’s choices in a conflict  However, they may have assessed that it might be feasible to create a sufficient nuclear counterbalance to threaten a rapid response retaliatory nuclear strike or sufficient first strike to convince the US that some resolution might be best to avoid incurring unacceptable losses of people and property.

From background to foreground: USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70), (Japanese Maritime Self-Defense) JS Ise (DDH-182), HMS Queen Elizabeth (R08), and USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76). Spalding explained that from an economIc standpoint, the PLA with the DF-26 constructed a $1 billion dollar missile system designed to destroy a $30 billion ship. Spalding says that there is no doubt our carriers are valuable and powerful machines. However, he also states that “their effectiveness in policing the Pacific is now extremely limited.” To that extent, ironically, having US and allied aircraft carriers sail within the range of the DF-26 may repeatedly send the wrong message at an exorbitant cost. Other than providing the US and its allies the opportunity to rehearse cooperation, display joint power, and appreciate benefits of US leadership, in terms of deterring China, the move may have demonstrated that the US and its allies are unable to act in a way to halt an assault on Taiwan while at the same time avoiding unacceptable losses. No greater support could be provided to the cluster of expressive hawks within the Communist Party of China’s leadership, clamoring for an assault on Taiwan sooner than later.

Other Thoughts That Billowed Up in This Reader on Taiwan Via Spalding’s Dialectic Ladle

In the end, central to the argument to take military action to gain and retain control of Taiwan, is what was central to arguments on how the US managed to place itself in such a challenging position with Beijing: the character of US political leaders. That is stated not to put into question the personal qualities of the men and women who have honorably and admirably chosen to dutifully serve the people to the best of their abilities.  Rather, it is to suggest that fighting the type of war that the US might be required to prosecute, defeat China, thwart China’s ambitions, drive it off and forever away from Taiwan might not be characteristic of certain leaders. In taking that course, there would be the potential for millions to die in China, unacceptable losses on the side of the US and its allies, and as grotesque as the thought may be, China could potentially level an unexpected, crippling blow to US naval and air forces could also result. What might be hoped in Beijing to be a limited lighting war launched in the name of protecting China’s sovereignty, could become total war, a war of national survival. The nature of the one who would make the decision in the US on how to respond to China’s aggression will make all of the difference. Perhaps in Washington, a decision has already been made on how to proceed in such a contingency. Perhaps the decisions on the defense of Taiwan have been established as protocols. In defense of its ally, US political leaders may be obliged to comply with them. In the end, it boils down to what the US political leaders want from the situation, a war ending in a type of Pyrrhic victory with losses or a struggle resulting in some acceptable or tolerable new paradigm that allows for an Irenic victory, in which the two opposing sides find some resolution and at least a modicum of satisfaction.

Post factum nullum consilium. (Counsel is of no effect after the fact.) To race well, a jockey and horse must be one animal. The horse must be superbly harnessed. When a horse does not run well, it is typically considered that it may have a poor jockey. On China, military capabilities and resources, state diplomacy to include economic and public diplomacy, and policymaking must also function together as one figurative animal. The expectation is for senior policymakers to master the situation through their management of it. When this is the case, they can often be more precise, to an extent exact, in policy planning , formulation, and implementation. Evidence of that can be found in the fact that their figurative brush strokes will appear finer.

Policies that seem to be too far off from the realities of military capabilities and resources, military power, and awkward diplomatic exchanges and pursuits of inconsequential inroads may evince to competitors and opponents that policymakers are out of touch with the real situation and acting on mere perceptions and perhaps surmisal. Parsing out such concerning the US must be an ongoing process, an obsession, in Beijing at the moment. It would be part of the effort to determine how the US might react when presented with a situation as an assault on Taiwan.

In the US, producing the very best answers to situations is made more difficult because there are a variety of views and interests within the national security bureaucracies that must be balanced when policy is being made. if decisionmaking were directed, controlled by a single source, as in China under the Communist Party of China, under the command of Xi, a magician may seem to be somewhere in the mix who is clearly aware of what to do and how to do it in a way that keeps China a step or more ahead of its main competitor or opponent. Perhaps that is Xi, himself. On the other hand, some policy analysts perceive that for too long there has been a blindness to the best interests of the US that borders on madness. A sense is given off by them–to include Spalding it seems–that it may be too late to really change the course of things by implementing new approaches.

What might be hoped in Beijing to be a limited lighting war launched in the name of protecting China’s sovereignty, could become total war, a war of national survival. The nature of the one who would make the decision in the US on how to respond to China’s aggression will make all of the difference. Perhaps in Washington, a decision has already been made on how to proceed in such a contingency. Perhaps the decisions on the defense of Taiwan have been established as protocols. In defense of its ally, US political leaders may be obliged to comply with them. In the end, it boils down to what the US political leaders want from the situation, a war ending in a type of Pyrrhic victory with losses or a struggle resulting in some acceptable or tolerable new paradigm that allows for an Irenic victory, in which the two opposing sides find some resolution and at least a modicum of satisfaction.

At the outset of the review, greatcharlie explained that the book would not be broken down to the fullest extent possible, but hopefully enough so to raise interest in readers to take a look at the book. There is so much more to discover in Stealth War. The book is a steady flow of information, data, and expressions from beginning to end. Spalding is the purveyor of a foundation upon which an honest discussion can be had on US-China relations or simply the China Threat at all levels, from the senior government policymaker to the average US citizen.

There nothing that greatcharlie appreciates more than a book that stirs the readers curiosity, inquiry into the author’s judgments, greater consideration of their own views on the matter, and elicits fresh insights based on what is presented. That is exactly the type of book that Stealth War is. It is assured that after the first reading Stealth War, one would most likely go back to the book and engage in that stimulating process again and again. There is no telling what insights and how many might be brewed up from within readers after they have had a chance to read through it. Too much pleasure has been lost whilst abstaining from this delightful book. As greatcharlie suggested earlier here, those reading this review who have already read Stealth War would do well to go through the book again. 

Perhaps needless to say but it is nonetheless stated, with absolute conviction and relish, greatcharlie unequivocally recommends Spalding’s Stealth War to its readers.

By Mark Edmond Clark

To Foster Forward Movement on Denuclearization by Kim, Trump Says there Is No Rush, But His Patience Has Limits

The Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Kim Jong-un (above). The administration of US President Donald Trump hopes that Kim Jong-un sincerely desires peace and are genuinely committed to diplomatic process on denuclearization. To nudge thinking in the right direction, efforts have been made to incentivize North Korea to change its economy to benefit the entire country and not just the elites. Reaching a decision on whether to stay on this new path with the US weighs very heavily upon Kim, now ensconced in Pyongyang.

Military analysts have estimated in recent years that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) possessed an arsenal of 30-60 nuclear weapons. In Washington, great concern had been particularly expressed over the possibility that North Korea would soon construct thermonuclear warhead tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Having successfully tested several ICBMs In 2017, North Korea posed a security threat not only to US allies, such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the Continental US. The Trump administration has absolutely no intention of allowing North Korea retain such an arsenal, and moreover, add to it. In 2017, the administration initiated a “maximum pressure” campaign on Kim’s regime and its supporters, increasing military exercises in coordination with South Korea and Japan, deploying missile defense systems in South Korea with urgency, sending more firepower there, and encouraging the US Congress to enact the strongest sanctions possible against North Korea and its enablers. Eventually, in February 2018, the US imposed a raft of sanctions in an effort to target entities linked to North Korea’s shipping and trade sectors. Trump had also urged China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to assist in reducing tensions by talking frankly with Pyongyang. Yet, to the surprise of all, talks were successfully arranged between US President Donald Trump and the Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un. The decision was precipitated by efforts of the government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in to end rather bellicose verbiage and repeated muscle flexing by the US, Japan and his own country, and weapons testing by North Korea. Following their summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018, Kim Jong-un publicly committed North Korea “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in the broad joint statement issued at the summit. Trump was so confident that North Korea would begin “total denuclearization” right away that he immediately offered to halt the joint military exercises with South Korea, without Kim agreeing to any specific steps and timeline towards the denuclearization. The day after the summit, Trump tweeted, “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Even more, on July 18, 2018, Trump said that there was “no rush” in its negotiations with North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo fully concurred with that position earlier this month. He said negotiations with North Korea are a “decades-long challenge” that involves North Korea making a fundamental shift in its strategic decision making. Pompeo further explained “(North Korea) for decades told their own people that without nuclear weapons their country was at risk of being attacked by the West, by America, by some other country,” Pompeo explained. The job for the US now, he also said, is “to get the entire country to understand that they have that strategically wrong. Chairman Kim told President Trump he understood that. I was there. I saw it.”

Trump appears to reasonably quantify continued progress by the fact that there have not been any North Korean missile or nuclear tests in recent months. Still, although the halt to these tests is a welcome sign, North Korea has made little progress toward “total denuclearization.” Critics as well as some very capable military and foreign policy analysts posit that Kim had no intention of keeping his promise on denuclearization, and has set out to deceive the Trump administration and the rest of world, much as his father and grandfather misled previous US administrations. One cannot be certain that Kim will stay the course and effectuate denuclearization. Using logic and reason, one cannot not know what exactly is on Kim’s mind, know what lies within his heart. What might be inferred from all that is known about Kim is that one would make a huge mistake in placing complete faith in him. While an opportunity has been presented to Kim, he may become froward and revert to old ways or simply retract having been confronted with prospect of such great change. Concerning the former, certainly, the US must not underestimate Kim’s maliciousness and subterfuge. He is following the same strategy deployed by his father and grandfather but with a bigger ambition. Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim will not be satisfied with temporary economic relief through negotiations. He has visited China three times so far this year. Regarding the latter, a retrenchment or retreat by Kim might not be impelled by aggressive thinking or some recurvation programmed into the plan for engagement with US on denuclearization. As important to the process of achieving denuclearization are the personal concerns and feelings about the change. If Kim is not psychologically ready to move forward, the process may breakdown. Protecting his own sense of being, self-image, self-worth, Kim may reject all that is before him. That would consequently cause great pain and harm for himself and the North Korean people.

The diplomatic process between the US and North Korea is still relatively nascent at this stage. Efforts must be made to detect any incongruences in Kim’s actions as they relate to denuclearization and extrapolate and infer from his words what he may be thinking. Doing so will allow the US make needed adjustments in its diplomatic approach. If it appears North Korea might jump to a negative path regarding denuclearization, it would best if the US had already stolen a march or two ahead of him and prepared itself to act. Examined here, from outside the box, are possible intangible motivations that might be a potential causality, among others, for Kim to back away from denuclearization. It takes a brief look a what Kim might be asking himself. Τίς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτῷ πρῶτον εἰπέ: εἶθ’ οὕτως ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς. (First say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do.)

A North Korean Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (above). Military analysts estimate that North Korea possesses an arsenal of 30-60 nuclear weapons. Having successfully tested several intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, North Korea poses a security threat not only to US allies, such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the Continental US. More so, there is concern in the US that North Korea’s may soon construct thermonuclear warhead tipped ICBMs. The Trump administration has absolutely no intention of allowing North Korea retain such an arsenal or add to it.

Trying to Keep Things Right with the Diplomatic Process

Trump administration diplomatic efforts on North Korean denuclearization have been smart, methodical, and well-managed. The purpose of the talks is to find points at which Washington’s thinking touches with that of Pyongyang, and develop mutually satisfying, attainable and sustainable ends. The US must be cautious. Still, the purpose of the talks is not to find fault in the expressions and gestures of the other party, allow suspicions to color thinking, and make the whole process a fruitless, unconstructive exercise. The worst actions and impressions Pyongyang has made in Washington over the years should not be forgotten. However, as there is presently no urgency, no immediate danger of conflict between the parties, every effort should be made to display sangfroid and temperance, temporarily suppressing strong feelings over what has happened in the past. Over time, the intentions of North Korea will be revealed as good or bad. Indeed, one must employ forward thinking of positive progress in resolving matter or improving relations is to be achieved. In meetings with their North Korean counterparts, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other senior officials have done his best to explain and secure US interests, channeling Trump’s thinking. The essence of that thinking is to stop Kim from chasing his destructive dream of developing a large nuclear arsenal capable of striking the US. Tu me’ inquis ‘mones? iam enim te ipse monuisti, iam correxisti? ideo aliorum emendationi vacas?’ Non sum tam improbus ut curationes aeger obeam, sed, tamquam in eodem valetudinario iaceam, de communi tecum malo colloquor et remedia communico. (“What,” say you, “are you giving me advice? Indeed, have you already advised yourself, already corrected your own faults? Is this the reason why you have leisure to reform other men?” No, I am not so shameless as to undertake to cure my fellow-men when I am ill myself. I am, however, discussing with you troubles which concern us both, and sharing the remedy with you, just as if we were lying ill in the same hospital.)

Now away from the grandeur, the luster, the celebrity, and the energy of the Singapore Summit, and the persuasive Trump, Kim seems to be leaning into his own thinking, He may not have a sense that he must even be honor bound by culture to remain obedient to the terms of the agreement with Trump and act consistently in line with them. Kim may no longer have the same sense of trust in Trump. After taking one step away from the intent of the agreement in Singapore, each step becomes easier. One can also usually find ample reasons to do the wrong thing. Kim would be comfortable in the end for the reason it was standard behavior of North Korea. A challenge for the Trump administration from the start has been to satisfactorily reconcile the diplomatic Kim, the open-minded Kim, with concomitant enormities of his authoritarian reign of North Korea. Washington must keep in mind that Kim is a tyrant, ruling with an iron fist. That observation is not outdated. Recent actions concerning the nuclear program or expressions that disparage the US and US officials, have certainly raised greater concern over Kim’s intentions. Goading the US, snuffing out the positive spirit that remains from Singapore might be an awkward exit strategy from the denuclearization matter. However, Washington has not shown any interest in exchanging insults with Pyongyang. The focus of both parties must be diplomacy.There is no desire by the Trump administration to demonstrate superiority over countries by moving forward consistently along a narrow path of attitude and behavior. Washington will not lower itself to the long-practiced tactics of diversion of Pyongyang. Pyongyang will need to rise to the occasion.

Beyond verbiage, there have also been disappointments stemming from actions and inaction by Pyongyang. Imagery analysis of satellite photos indicate Pyongyang has rushed to make improvements to the infrastructure of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, and enriched uranium production for nuclear weapons has increased. The South Korea’s military has collected information indicating that Pyongyang may be developing a new submarine capable of launching nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. North Korea indicated that it would conduct its annual summer military exercise without regard for Trump’s gesture of goodwill in halting a planned joint US and South Korean military exercise. Further, Kim promised the immediate repatriation of identified remains of US POWs in Singapore, but without explanation, Pyongyang has been slow to act. The Defense Department, however, has had to display great patience in the face of the inexplicable deliberate pace taken by Pyongyang on the return of remains. Additionally, North Korea’s handling of Pompeo’s July 6, 2018 visit to Pyongyang was graceless and inelegant. Critics took it as another troubling sign. Pompeo and his team were not provided a schedule of meetings. They were not told in which hotel they would stay. They were never provided a definitive answer on whether they would meet Kim, and in the end, they did not. Pompeo pressed his North Korea counterpart Kim Yong-chol on concrete steps toward denuclearization, but it is unclear whether any were provided. After the visit, Pyongyang played the role of a fretful and peevish innocent party emotionally injured by the stern Pompeo and publicly attacked the US for making “gangster like” demands.

Critics say Pyongyang has displayed this pattern of obfuscation too many times in the last three decades. It has been sardonically called “business as usual” with Pyongyang. Every administration since that of US President Bill Clinton has publicly expressed the belief that it could better handle North Korea than the previous one, and some special deal could be reached to curb or bring down its nuclear program. Yet, they all ended up formulating and implementing unsatisfactory approaches the results of which were being misled the regime. To an extent, Pyongyang developed a record of success in dealing with the US, while the US would walk away with only frustration. Even now, North Korea continues its steadfast march toward becoming an undeniable nuclear power. However, the administration will not moan over the past and recent maladroit and tactless actions.

 

There is the possibility that Kim agreed to talk to Trump as part of nefarious plan to convince the Seoul that his country’s purpose is peaceful. Success for Kim with such a deceitful purpose would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-led military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with an agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs.

If Kim Had a Nefarious Plan for Singapore, It May Have Been Trumped by Trump!

From what was seen from Kim in the earliest stages of the meeting with Trump, he appeared amiable, yet at the same time self-contained and somewhat obscure as the talks began. An occasional smile could not cloak the fact that his face was hardened, An attendant aspect of his likely effort to conceal himself. He remained silent. He would nod his head. One might theorize that Kim did not want to make it easy for Trump to read him. Kim was likely trained in those mannerism years ago. They may have been designed to create the trompe l’oeil of receptiveness. Yet, if such a thought was guiding Kim’s behavior, it was likely soon commingled with a sense of being overwhelmed by the news media attention, the public adulation outside his hotel, and the gravity of the talks in which he was engaging

The renowned ancient Greek philosopher and scientist, Aristotle, is quoted as saying: “It is the mark of an educated man to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.” It is possible that self-conceit closed Kim’s mind to whatever was said. In believing that he already knew what Trump would say would have served as an effective buffer to Trump’s comments and explanations. Indeed, Kim may have arrived in Singapore as a man on a mission, believing that he could shape events on the Korean Peninsula in his way. Before the talks began, Kim took affirmative steps in support of engagement with the US to include a superficial charm offensive in which he was presented as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. He sought to prove that he no longer the source of dread and terror in Northeast Asia, the Continental US, and everything in between. However, he had already shown enough of his hand to sufficiently convince Trump that his intentions were potentially nefarious. Yet, Trump also likely saw that Kim was facing a dire situation, and wanted to allow him some room to gravitate toward a new tact more satisfying for the US. If everything goes Trump’s way, North Korea will scrap its nuclear weapons and missile programs in a timely manner.

In a previous post, greatcharlie, hinting at its suspicions about Kim, hypothesized that there was the possibility that Kim was directing a duplicitous efforts at Trump but at South Korea. (That possibility was also likely among the “what ifs” considered by the Trump administration before the meeting.) For example, Kim might have sought to talk to Trump in order to better convince the Seoul that his country’s purpose is peaceful. A signal of success with such a deceitful purpose would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-led military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with an agreement to dismantle his country’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. Hopefully, Pyongyang is not engaged in an active strategy to gain control of the Korean Peninsula by convincing South Korea to buy into the fantasy that it too wants to create conditions for peaceful relations. If it does, things certainly have not been moving in favor of it. Mens impudicam facere, non casus, solet. (Impurity is caused by attitude, not events.)

Believing that he could shape events on the Korean Peninsula in his way, Kim, before the Singapore talks began, took affirmative steps in support of engagement with the US to include a superficial charm offensive in which he was presented as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. He sought to prove that he no longer the source of dread and terror in Northeast Asia, the Continental US, and everything in between. However, he had already shown enough of his hand to sufficiently convince Trump that his intentions were potentially nefarious.

Any Nefarious North Korean Plans to Exploit Singapore Likely Stymied by Culture Shock and the Realism of Trump

Culture shock is the feeling of disorientation experienced by someone when they are suddenly thrust into an unfamiliar culture or way of life. The possibility that Kim may have had a bout with culture shock while moving through Singapore should not be discounted. Certainly Kim is familiar with the world outside of North Korea, reportedly having attended the private English-language International School in Gümligen near Bern, Switzerland from 1993 to 1998. It was also reported that Kim attended the Liebefeld Steinhölzli state school in Köniz near Bern under an assumed name from 1998 until 2000. However, Singapore is not a European country. Singapore is one of the four economic tigers of Asia that have consistently maintained high levels of economic growth since the 1960s. That growth was impelled by exports and rapid industrialization. The other tigers include South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In Singapore, Kim saw what a small Asian country could achieve by successfully marshalled the energies of its people to create was the site. It was his dream for North Korea. He undoubtedly though how much he wanted it and despite keeping his mind on the revolutionary path, wondered whether there might be a real possibility of guiding his country to such economic height by working with the US and international community.

Perhaps while in Singapore, he may have considered putting aside any potential nefarious plans and playing things by ear. Indeed, whatever part of Pyongyang’s effort was superficial had to make way for what was authentic: the promise of a bright future for North Korea. The Singapore talks were marked by the very apparent graciousness and humanism displayed by Trump. Even for the most skeptical, the interaction would have been intoxicating. Trump may be difficult for foreign capitals to discern perhaps because there is also the background noise of critics with their varying levels hostility. Among the many things that dissatify  them about Trump is the fact that his approach to nearly everything is not business as usual: decision making based on political expediency. A heavy dose of realism is typically injected into his exchanges. Whatever follow-on steps that are agreed upon will be concrete. It is very likely that even after Singapore, the event lingered in Kim’s psyche, leaving him a condition different from the time before the summit. His old habits and faculties have likely been effected by the event. It is Kim’s choice to either entertain and perhaps pursue all of the new considerations or shun what transpired, erase all traces of it or setting the matter off to the side while proceeding in his ways. Nevertheless, there was little doubt for Trump, who actually negotiated directly with Kim, that Kim understood his exposition in Singapore.

After having opened the eyes of Kim and officials in Pyongyang to the opportunity put before them, a satisfactory, inviting gateway must be created for them to cross through to a new reality, on both nuclear weapons and their country’s future. Although ongoing sanctions are also an incentive and helped get the diplomatic process started, a far more positive way is needed to push Pyongyang up and out from depths in which it has put itself. Trump has apparently reasoned out what course the process will take. Reportedly, he accepted that he needed to be somewhat patient and act intently, with diligence, which naturally mean taking time to make certain things are correct. Trump has an understanding of human nature, and even sympathy for human frailty. He can project empathy. One of Trump’s greatest strengths is his capacity for listening.  Indeed, Trump, via the summit, successfully interviewed Kim. From what he heard and did not hear in their one-on-one session, Trump feels that he better understands Kim’s thinking and intentions. After committing to being patient, a diligent person expects receive fruit from their efforts. Hasty people may receive something transitory, but likely unsatisfactory for the long term.

The state of North Korea’s economy has been atrocious for some time, but it was made several ticks worst once sanctions killed most of its foreign trade. North Korea’s economy necessarily loomed large in the negotiations. Some consideration had to be given to what would happen after sanctions were removed and the subject of the country’s greatest investment had been scrapped. Benefits that would come Kim’s way once denuclearization was complete.were dangled before him to make taking the path to denuclearization more attractive.

Encouragement in the Form of Economic Assistance

The state of North Korea’s economy has been atrocious for some time, but it was made several ticks on the meter worst once sanctions killed most of its foreign trade. North Korea’s economy necessarily loomed large in the negotiations. Some consideration had to be given to what would happen after sanctions were removed and the subject of the country’s greatest investment had been scrapped. Benefits that would come Kim’s way once denuclearization was complete.were dangled before him to make taking the path to denuclearization more attractive. There was even a short video presentation prepared to support that cause. Trump and administration officials indicated that US companies could come to North Korea en masse if relations between the countries improve. Reportedly, at their first summit on April 27, 2018, the South Korean President gave Kim a USB stick that held plans for robust infrastructure investments and a list of South Korean companies that would like to benefit from a de-escalation of tensions.

As mentioned earlier, Kim reportedly would like to develop North Korea’s economy. He stated in 2012 that the North Korean people should “never have to tighten [their] belts again,” and the following year, he launched the “byungjin strategy” for the parallel development of the national economy and nuclear weapons, with equal importance.  Less publicized in the Western news media than the country’s other aspects, Kim’s tenure has seen North Korea’s semi-private market system grow, further experimentation in agricultural management explored, and state-owned enterprises have been granted unprecedented liberties in production planning. Clearly, Kim Jong-un has invested himself and considerable wherewithal into improving economic conditions. On April 20, 2018, Kim declared that North Korea’s primary emphasis will be on economic development from that point onward as the nuclear deterrent was secure. The Trump administration has not missed the fact that exploiting Kim’s economic ambitions could give the diplomatic process a boost. Offering assistance for economic development and directing such assistance to spur the shift of a country in North Korea’s circumstances toward a more market-based economic system, is a tried and true course for the international community to take.

How Kim Might Proceed

Kim was selected by Kim Jong-il, his father, to be his successor as Supreme Leader of North Korea. The short-list of attributes of a national leader respective to North Korea, beyond loyalty to the Communist Workers’ Party of Korea would likely include: to organize the people under the tenets of Marxist-Leninism; promote the general welfare of the people within parameters set by the Workers’ Party of Korea; provide for the safety and security of the people; defend the country’s sovereign territory; and know the value of an iron fist. To the extent that Kim has even slightly deviated from that course, he has implemented some economic reforms as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, he has essentially been piloting the country dead ahead on the course Kim Jong-il and Kim Il sung set it on. Kim hit the ground running upon becoming Supreme Leader. Countless North Korea government images showcase Kim performing his duties with what the Renaissance Italian soldier, diplomat, and courtier, Baldassare Castiglione in his 1528 work, Il Cortegiano (The Book of the Courtier), called “sprezzatura”, a certain nonchalance. It is easy to say that Kim is an educated man who should be able to easily see the benefits short and long term for North Korea once denuclearization is complete. However, reason is based on principle, not the prospect of economic development. Kim may indeed see the benefits of moving along the course set by Trump, but he may not have the moral foundation to know that it would be morally right to take that course. In his formative years, Kim also may not have been sufficiently inculcated with any ideas even in the spirit of Marxist-Leninism which would support a decision move off the set path, and boldly set a new course for his country. Even if Kim tried to capitalize on the opportunity to make things better in North Korea, he might be hindered by well-concealed doubts about his own abilities. He may fear falling short. Indeed, for Kim, the difficulty in engaging with the US to create systemic change in the country’s economic system would not be found in the work of implementing change. The difficulty might be wrapping his head around it all and moving forward with confidence. Kim may know better than anyone else that he will not end up being North Korea’s version of Deng Xiaoping.

Kim will not throw caution to the wind. Kim is undoubtedly very aware of what happened in Russia economically with the help of “Western experts” after the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a complete trust in Trump hardly could have sprouted and blossomed exponentially in Kim during the Singapore meeting. Again as mentioned, some time has passed since Singapore and Kim is some distance away from it all. Any initial second-guessing about Trump could have morphed into considerable apprehension over the US president’s motives. Nestled in Pyongyang, even the mere mental process of drawing closer to the world that Trump presented at Singapore has required Kim to tear away from the only world he and his people have known. Just thinking about a transition in ways of doing things that might lead to the economic transformation of North Korea becomes less attractive and more difficult.

Est enim quaedam etiam dolendi voluptas, praesertim si in amici sinu defleas, apud quem lacrimis tuis vel laus sit parata vel venia. (For there is a certain luxury in grief; especially when we pour out our sorrows in the bosom of a friend, who will approve, or, at least, pardon our tears.) It is difficult to say to whom Kim would turn that would genuinely support of move by him toward denuclearization. As noted by greatcharlie in a previous post, Kim apparently holds his sister, Kim Yo Jong, in high regard and seems to take counsel of her on occasions. She led a delegation of North Korean officials to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. It is now apparent publicly that Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol, is another North Korean official that Kim is willing to rely upon to some degree. He is a foreign policy doyen and sacred cow of the intelligence industry in North Korea, met with Pompeo in New York City for talks and then met with Trump in Washington, DC before the Singapore Summit, and the two have met since then. Although Kim Yong-chol’s main purpose may be to engage in high-level talks with the US and to advise Kim on the diplomatic process, he can also use his title, stature, and credibility to interface with the Workers’ Party of Korea and North Korean elites and create some semblance of transparency throughout the diplomatic process for those concerned in Pyongyang. Kim Yong-chol has also exploited the opportunity to better understand the Trump administration through direct contact and not the abstract. That being stated, neither Kim Yo Jong nor Kim Yong-chol appear able to comfortably or confidently, approach Kim and counsel him on denuclearization and economic reform.

All leaders usually sense some degree of isolation at the top. That isolation can potentially be made even more strainful if there is no confidant for a leader to rely upon for honest, supportive counsel beyond the advisement of professional staff on areas of expertise. A leader in Kim’s position faces a particular type of isolation as advice and counsel will unlikely be offered to him freely in an effort to avoid the repercussions of angering him with some mistake. The best option left for Kim would be to turn inward. Uncertain of the outcome of grand steps in different directions, Kim may eventually take a default position, thereby finding his comfort zone. If he could conjure up a path that would only require a relatively small amount of change, it will provide him with some relief and garner praise from like-minded officials at the top of the food chain.

It is very likely that after Singapore, the whole event lingered in Kim’s psyche, leaving him a condition different from the time before the summit. It is Kim’s choice to either entertain and perhaps pursue all of the new considerations or shun what transpired, erase all traces of it or setting the matter off to the side while proceeding with his old habits and faculties. Trump, who actually negotiated with Kim, had no doubt that the North Korean Supreme Leader fully understood his exposition in Singapore.

A Few Possible Scenarios

Rationale enim animal est homo. (Man is a reasoning animal.) With many factors considered, there are a number of scenarios that can be imagined under which Kim might break away from the path of denuclearization. Here are three examples. In one scenario, Kim will maneuver to place North Korea on a path to economic success similar to that which China took. China is a Communist country with a strong economy. It has been accepted nuclear power by the international community. First, along the path China took, it developed its own nuclear capability and capacity. Second, it implemented limited economic reforms while engaging the rest of the world, especially the US through trade and investment, as a result of an opening agreed by Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-Tung  and US President Richard Nixon. It was all done while maintaining a strict one-party rule and hard-line ideological control of Chinese people.

Now that the US, Japan, and South Korea have place their wide array of powerful weapon systems aimed at North Korea on safety, Kim is trying to follow China’s route. He wants the world, particularly the US and South Korea, to help him energize North Korea’s economy by pouring in investment. He hopes to draw them in by seemingly commodifying his country’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, making investment their cost. At the same time, he wants to maintain his iron-fisted, authoritarian control of North Korea and its people. It may very well be that Kim’s heart may very be too hardened, perhaps seared by a belief that the greatest danger to North Korea comes from the US. To that extent, Kim has no intention of giving up nuclear weapons, for he believes they are the only guarantee of his regime’s survival. Falsum est nimirum quod creditur vulgo, testamenta hominum speculum esse morum.(There is certainly no truth in the popular belief, that a man’s will is the mirror of his character.)

In a second scenario, perhaps Kim recognizes that the type of success Kim really wants for North Korea is out of his reach, not by some fault of his own, but rather because the country’s problems are so grave and run too deep. Kim may be incapable of coming up with real answers that would put North Korea on real upward trajectory using all of the tools available to him. In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. To that extent, consciously or unconsciously, Kim may simply be procrastinating. Of course, there are those who would follow him no matter what. Kim knows better than anyone else just how bad things have been in North Korea. It may be to put off a sober, updated look at the situation, and other than implementing a few measures here and there, basically close his eyes to the situation.

To that extent, if Kim were to receive counsel from an “inner voice”, perhaps among the thoughts he might hear are the following three: 1) “Do not chase a gossamer fantasy of developing North Korea into a globally competitive, economically well-heeled country.  There is a danger posed by Trump as part of larger picture of the US, a capitalist adversary seeking conquest, attempting to subordinate your smaller nation.” 2) “You have developed nuclear arsenal to a level that he has the capability and capacity to strike the US. You are genuinely defending your people from that threat.” 3) “You have accomplished what you father and grandfather strove to achieve, but were unable to reach. Honor them, by remaining on the correct path!” Moreover, Kim might consider whether Trump would be willing to follow through on threats of military action given his lack of reaction to the obloquy and invective inflicted upon him by critics. The latest vitriol from critics is the claim that Trump displayed a treasonous level of timidity in the presence of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin at a press conference in Helsinki, Finland. Journalists asked Trump whether he confronted him with evidence from the US Intelligence Community of  the country’s interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election and whether he actually believed that Russia was even engaged in that activity. Overall, Trump’s foreign policy agenda is viewed by critics as something comparable to the l’infame in late-18th century France, the effort to destroy Christian social order as a means to break from the past. In Kim’s mind, surely if Trump were as fierce as he portrays himself, critics would be hesitant to attack him such vigor.

In a third scenario, Kim may have simply lost interest in diplomacy with the US. Kim fully understands that the world is a big place with may countries, with several adversaries and some allies of a sort such as China and the Russian. Yet, in real terms, Kim’s own world, North Korea, is where he is most comfortable. While at home, Kim may have become insulated in the refracted reflection of reality from that Communist country. The values and interests of North Korea may once again become the foundation upon which he will base his actions and reactions to the outside world, the “real world”, and particularly in the diplomatic process on denuclearization. Kim’s mind may not be open to moving further on the denuclearization matter regardless of what Trump is offering.

Kim is now surrounded by all the familiar sights, sounds, and the atmosphere of Pyongyang. The voices of Workers’ Party of Korea officials, generals, security men, business elites, and other are given higher importance in this context as they comfort and encourage him  It is nearly certain that a majority of those supporters also cannot imagine a North Korea other than the one they have known with nuclear weapons and a rigid stand against the US. All of this might be manifested by Kim becoming more guarded in his contact with the outside. Parvolum differt, patiaris adversa an exspectes; nisi quod tamen est dolendi modus, non est timendi. Doleas enim quantum scias accidisse, timeas quantum possit accidere. (There is little difference between expecting misfortune and undergoing it; except that grief has limits, whereas apprehension has none. For we grieve only for what we know has happened; but we fear all that possibly may happen.)

Now nestled in Pyongyang, Kim is surrounded by all of its familiar sights and sounds. He is away from the grandeur, the luster, the celebrity, the energy of the Singapore Summit, and the persuasive Trump. The voices of Workers Party officials, generals, security men, business elites, and others are given greater importance as they comfort and encourage him  It is nearly certain that a majority of those supporters also cannot imagine a North Korea other than the one they know now with nuclear weapons and a tough stand against the US. It all might be manifested by Kim becoming more guarded in his contact with the outside.

A Possible Boost for the US Effort?

Delays and missteps by Pyongyang may create the perception of the optimistic within the Trump camp that some deliberation has been underway within the Workers’ Party of Korea and among other key elites concerning denuclearization. There are undoubtedly many in North Koreans who do not believe that it would be a good path for the country to take For the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the world beyond, greatcharlie also hopes that is the real cause. It is difficult to imagine at what angle Trump administration, itself, might approach Kim to effectually suggest why and how he should proceed in changing his country. It would seem unlikely that Kim would appreciate being told how he should feel at this moment. He would surely be disinterested in hearing anyone from the US attempt to counsel him from the perspective of having been in the same situation themselves, because no US leader or official in recent times has been in Kim’s position. There is the possibility that a third party could be recruited to help usher Kim in the right direction. In a previous post, greatcharlie explained how Mongolia had moved through similar circumstances advancing methodically from a Communist system to more democratic one. With targeted US assistance, has promoted good governance and the rule of law; developed a new generation of democratic leaders; has enjoyed private sector-led growth, economic diversification, and long-term capital investment; and, mitigated transnational criminal activity, to include human trafficking, and reduced domestic violence. Bordered by Russia and China, the Mongolia has had the experience of working positively with their far more powerful neighbors while appreciating the efforts of what it calls its most important “third neighbor”: the US. Mongolia has also invested in North Korea’s oil industry. Most of all, under its present policy, Mongolia desires to see North Korea succeed in its own transition and transformation. (The Mongols could also serve as a figurative thermometer, taking independent readings of the temperature in Pyongyang toward denuclearization and economic development supported by the US and the rest of the international community.) The US State Department is well-aware of the dozens of points at which Mongolia and North Korea touch. Including Mongolia as a partner to include in the diplomatic process may make sense if Ulan Bator is at all interested.

It may very well be that a decision has already been made in Pyongyang not to remain bound to denuclearization. In that case, the Trump administration cannot allow itself to fall into the unpleasant circumstance of relentlessly chases the goal of denuclearization as Pyongyang steadily and methodically moves that possibility farther out of reach. However, nothing stated by him has provided a hint that he has done so. It can only be hoped that he will not make that decision and everything done by the US will foster purposeful  forward movement toward denuclearization. An incorrect decision to divert from the agreed course of denuclearization or to abandon that path altogether may be heralded as a demonstration of Kim’s boldness and fearlessness.  However, that moment of actual failure would more likely be driven by trepidation of the unknown, anxiety toward a future that cannot be foreseen or ever envisioned.

Gaius Musonius Rufus, known as the “Roman Socrates”, was one the foremost Stoic philosophers of the Roman Imperial period. Attributed to Rufus, is the following quote noting that even after the best effort is made, the outcome is really not in our control. He stated: “Of the things that exist, God has put some in our control, others not in our control. In our control he has put the noblest and most excellent part by reason of which He is Himself happy, the power of using our impressions. For when this is correctly used, it means serenity, cheerfulness, constancy; it also means justice and law and self-control and virtue as a whole. But all other things He has not put in our control. Therefore we ought to become of like mind with God and, dividing things in like manner, we ought in every way to lay claim to the things that are in our control, but what is not in our control we ought to entrust to the universe and gladly yield to it whether it asks for our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.”

Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections, Trump must be ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with North Korea cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations believing North Korea wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, trying too hard to understand Kim’s situation.

The Way Forward

In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare’s The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth, King Henry is in his palace at Westminster. It is the middle of the night, and he is working on the paperwork of the ongoing war. Henry halts he work for a moment, and, as a matter of staging convention, breaks the fourth wall by both talking to himself and addressing the audience. He speaks of his newly insomnia, and waxes on how his poorest subjects can sleep at night in their tattered beds, but weighed down by worry, remorse, and anxiety, he, the wealthy king, cannot. He posits that men in power such as him, are less content and insouciant as the needy and ordinary. King Henry states: “How many thousand of my poorest subjects Are at this hour asleep! O sleep, O gentle sleep, Nature’s soft nurse, how have I frighted thee, That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down And steep my senses in forgetfulness? Why rather, sleep, liest thou in smoky cribs, Upon uneasy pallets stretching thee And hush’d with buzzing night-flies to thy slumber, Than in the perfumed chambers of the great, Under the canopies of costly state, And lull’d with sound of sweetest melody? O thou dull god, why liest thou with the vile In loathsome beds, and leavest the kingly couch A watch-case or a common ‘larum-bell? Wilt thou upon the high and giddy mast Seal up the ship-boy’s eyes, and rock his brains In cradle of the rude imperious surge And in the visitation of the winds, Who take the ruffian billows by the top, Curling their monstrous heads and hanging them With deafening clamour in the slippery clouds, That, with the hurly, death itself awakes? Canst thou, O partial sleep, give thy repose To the wet sea-boy in an hour so rude, And in the calmest and most stillest night, With all appliances and means to boot, Deny it to a king? Then happy low, lie down! Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.” Ensconced in Pyongyang, Kim may feel that he is either in a tough spot and under great strain or he is self-assured and feels comfortable knowing he has choices. He may have even reasoned that there is no real need to be fearful of any consequences if he takes one path or another. However, it is most likely that reaching a decision on how to proceed with the US weighs very heavily upon him. Long-practiced tactics of diversion of Pyongyang have raised their head much as a vampire with goal of sabotaging the diplomacy. Yet, that may not be indicative of a choice move away from denuclearization. Perhaps that behavior is driven by inertia and bad habit more than anything else. The Trump administration only wants to take the high road in the diplomatic process. If the desire for peace is sincere, it is hoped by the administration that Kim and his advisers in Pyongyang, will rise to the occasion. To nudge thinking in the right direction, efforts have been made to incentivize North Korea to change its economy to benefit the entire country and not just the elites.

In contemplating what Kim might do, the US must remain vigilant and cautious. The administration cannot afford to become complacent even to the slightest degree. Resources have been dedicated to surveilling developments at North Korean nuclear sites. As many analytical resources as possible should also be dedicated to the discernment of signs of a reversal in Pyongyang. Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections, Trump must be ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with North Korea cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations submitting to the fantasy that North Korea wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success that very likely helped build Kim’s self-confidence in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, trying too hard to understand Kim’s position.

If it becomes clear that his administration’s efforts with North Korea have only been a struggle against the inevitable, everything aggressive that North Korea has done will be taken in the aggregate before a response is chosen. There must not be any doubt that such a conclusion is correct. If a determination is made that Kim has turned his back on what was accomplished at Singapore, only the harshest of consequences should be expected. In Singapore, Kim appeared to understand that Trump did not make a half hearted vow to take military action. Make no mistake, Trump has the requisite will to act. Kim must never believe otherwise. Even if Kim keeps that notion firmly in mind as he continues to engage in the diplomatic process, only time will tell how much that really means to Kim. Arma non servant modum; nec temperari facile nec reprimi potest stricti ensis ira; bella delectat cruor. (Arms observe no bounds; nor can the wrath of the sword, once drawn, be easily checked or stayed; war delights in blood.)

Obama: No Military Solution to Iran’s Nuclear Program; Perhaps It Is a Challenge Netanyahu Can Crack

Pictured above is an Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-16I Sufa fighter jet. If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decides to attack Iran’s nuclear program, jets such as this one will fly the mission. While some military analysts may view the prospect of a successful attack against Iran unlikely, IAF planners and pilots may be able to find a handle to problem. Netanyahu and the State of Israel will be counting upon them.

According to a June 1, 2015 Associated Press article entitled “Obama: No Military Solution to Iran’s Nuclear Program”, US President Barack Obama stated in a June 1st interview with Israel’s Channel 2 that military action against Iran would not deter its nuclear ambitions and that a verifiable agreement was the best way forward.  He explained, “I can, I think, demonstrate, not based on any hope but on facts and evidence and analysis, that the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapons is a verifiable, tough agreement.”   Obama emphasized, “A military solution will not fix it. Even if United States participates, it would temporarily slow down an Iranian nuclear program but it will not eliminate it.” The Channel 2 interviewer asked Obama about the possibility of Israel taking military action against Iran without informing the US in advance. Obama responded by stating: “I won’t speculate on that.”

Despite what has been said and done during the nuclear negotiations, Iranian leaders may feel they must do whatever is necessary to ensure the security of their nation and its interests. Support for that perspective comes from the Iranians who in reality were not disinclined to building a nuclear weapon and have not been completely compliant with the international community. There is likely a belief in Tehran that Obama lacks the will to use the type of force necessary to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. However, Iranian leaders must look past the Obama administration to Israel’s possible actions.

The Israelis have been the most vocal critics of the proposed agreement and alarmed by its terms. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu truly believes that a deal lifting sanctions without fully halting enrichment and dismantling centrifuges would be a terrible mistake. Netanyahu speaks as if he has a type of “intimation” based on his “dominant knowledge” of the Middle East, that Iran was engaged in a major deception. Indeed, Netanyahu might decide to take military action with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) due to fears Iran might eventually develop a nuclear weapon. Some Israeli security analysts disagree with Netanyahu’s views and may have found Netanyahu’s behavior to date to be more frightening than desperate. Some may believe taking military action against Iran is Netanyahu’s default state of mind. However, if he attacks Iran, he will believe that his decision was made with prudence. Netanyahu most likely does not feel a need to defend his beliefs, but he has tried hard to get others to understand the danger that Iran poses to Israel. The stewardship of Israel’s security falls mainly on his shoulders.

An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be a daunting task even under the best of circumstances. Russia has agreed to sell Iran its S-300 air defense system which would make the Iranian nuclear program even tougher for Israel or the US to strike. Yet, making it tougher to strike may not be enough to deter Israel from acting. Convinced that taking military action would help to ensure Israel’s security for the present and the future, Netanyahu may gamble that an attack would be successful and may ask Israeli Air Force (IAF) fighter pilots to accept the risk involved. Dum loquimur, fugerit invida aetas: carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero. (While we are talking, envious time is fleeing: seize the day, put not trust in the future.)

Some may believe taking military action against Iran is Netanyahu’s default state of mind. However, if he attacks Iran, he will believe that his decision was made with prudence. Netanyahu unlikely feels a need to defend his beliefs, but he has tried hard to get other leaders, particularly in the US and Europe, to understand his view of the danger Iran poses to Israel. The stewardship of Israel’s security falls mainly on his shoulders.

Prudence

Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir once said a leader who does not hesitate before sending his nation into battle is not fit to be a leader. Will is not self-justifying. It must be guided by the intellect. Prudence is the right use of intellect and the right use of reason. Aristotle defined prudence as recta ratio agibilium: the right reason applied in practice. Through prudence, one establishes what needs to be done and the way to do it. Prudence allows one to be just and justice creates the motive for temperance in decision making, as well as all things. One cannot simply make a decision and then describe it as “prudential judgment.” One must avoid building upon a false idea. Looking deeper will prevent one from succumbing to myopia. There are three stages to an act of prudence: 1) to take counsel carefully with oneself and from others; 2) to judge correctly on the basis of the evidence at hand; and, 3) to direct the rest of one’s activity according to the norms determined after a prudent judgment has been made. Disregarding others who seek to disabuse just by expressing skepticism is correct. Yet, ignoring the advice or warnings of others with a history of good judgment only because their reasoning results in a conflicting assessment, is considered a sign of imprudence. By its definition, prudence requires us to judge correctly.   If consequently ones judgment is proven incorrect, then ones evaluation of the issue at hand was likely counterfeit. However, Golda Meir counsels on this point: “I can honestly say that I was never affected by the question of the success of an undertaking. If I felt it was the right thing to do, I was for it regardless of the possible outcome.”

Advice of Others

No evidence has been presented publicly or hinted at privately that Iran has been concealing a militarized nuclear program. The US intelligence community has recognized Iran has moved closer to having the capability to build a nuclear weapon and that is why a great part of the negotiation effort has been to push them further back from doing so. Yet, US officials always note that Iran has never failed to comply with all terms of agreements its negotiators have signed during the talks. The US has been willing to share with Israel what it knows about technological developments in Iran and the nuclear negotiation’s progress. For example, Haaretz reported on June 9, 2015 that two senior Israeli officials revealed anonymously that the Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John Brennan came to Israel on June 4, 2015 and spoke with the Head of the Intelligence Service (Mossad), Tamir Pardo, and other senior members of Israel’s intelligence community to include the Head of Military Intelligence, IDF Major General Herzl Halevi. The anonymous officials also said Brennan met with Netanyahu and his National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen. No details of what was said in those secret meetings were provided. However, a briefing provided by US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman to Israeli foreign affairs reporters, as reported by Haaretz on April 13, 2015, gives one a sense of the views US officials were sharing with their Israeli counterparts. Sherman told the reporters that despite fears expressed in 2013 that Iran would soon have a nuclear weapon, the US and Israeli intelligence communities concur that Iran is not close to producing one. She went on to state that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made no decision to produce one. Sherman proffered, “They [The Iranians] don’t have enough fissile material and don’t have delivery system or weapon per se.” She also noted, “It would take them a considerable period of time to get all that.” Indeed, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action requires Iran to pare down its capacity to enrich uranium to the point that it would take at least 12 months to amass enough uranium enriched to weapons grade for one bomb. Iran would be required to modify its Arak Heavy Water Reactor to meaningfully reduce its proliferation potential and bar Iran from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring would be put in place that would help to deter Iran from attempting to violate the agreement. If Iran did so, the inspections and monitoring would improve the international community’s ability to detect it promptly and, if necessary, disrupt any efforts to build nuclear weapons, including at potential undeclared sites.

Sherman emphasized during the briefing that the US also shared Israel’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, its involvement in terror around the world and its subversive activities in the Middle East. With regard to Netanyahu’s concerns, Sherman said that they were legitimate and expressed the view, “There is no difference [between the US and Israel] on the concern about the Iranian nuclear program but on the way to deal with it.” Interestingly, the US and its allies have been engaged in efforts in addition to the nuclear negotiations to slow Iran’s progress. They have included: imposing sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, blocking the shipment of necessary technology, introducing defective parts into Iran’s supply chain; and attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities with a super-sophisticated cyber weapon.

At the UN General Assembly in 2012, Netanyahu presented the bomb shaped chart above of the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. The red line close to the top indicated Iran was amassing too much uranium enriched at 20 percent, the enrichment stage just before making weapons-grade material. In accord with the November 2013 Interim Agreement, Iran diluted its reserves of uranium enriched at 20 percent. That did not sway Netanyahu.

Self-Counsel

Netanyahu is not ignoring the Obama administration’s arguments. His case is that the only way to make sure Iran never gets a bomb is to shutdown every enrichment plant and reactor it might use to get one. His position founded on a belief that Iran’s long history of nuclear deception means that any facilities left in place would eventually be put to use. To bolster his case, Netanyahu invoked one of the great failures of US counterproliferation efforts: the diplomatic attempts of President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush to talk North Korea into restrictions to keep the regime from producing nuclear weapons. The North Koreans agreed to disable one of their facilities, but when things went sour with the Obama administration the facility was rebuilt. Within a few years, it got the bomb. In his speech to a joint meeting of US Congress on March 3, 2015, Netanyahu contended that any agreement that leaves Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in place “doesn’t block Iran’s path to the bomb, it paves Iran’s path to the bomb.” Netanyahu would like allies in the US Congress to stop an agreement and halt the negotiations so that greater pressure could be placed on Iran through other means, primarily sanctions. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in 2012, Netanyahu presented a bomb shaped chart of the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. It had a red line close to the top indicating Iran was amassing too much uranium enriched at 20 percent. That is the enrichment stage just before making weapons-grade material.

As a result of the Interim Agreement signed by P5+1 and Iran in November 2013, Iran diluted its reserves of uranium enriched at 20 percent. That did not sway Netanyahu. Despite Iran’s reportedly good behavior during the negotiations and the longstanding claim of Iranian leaders that they would never seek a nuclear weapon for both practical and religious reasons, it is now known that Iran conducted activities relevant to weapons development as part of an organized program prior to 2003. The IAEA laid out its allegations regarding those activities in November 2011. The IAEA previously claimed it had made some progress with Iran in the investigation of this matter between November 2013 and August 2014, that process is now stalled. The P5+1 wants Iran answer the IAEA’s questions and allow access to the individuals and sites necessary to complete the investigation. This delay has occurred even though Iran has only been asked to implement a set of measures to address the IAEA’s outstanding questions.   Moreover, the removal of UN Security Council sanctions will not occur until and unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA investigation and past questions are resolved. Even supporters of the Iran Talks do not believe Iran will make any full confession regarding its past weapons related work, especially given statements by senior Iranian officials on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and the rejection of nuclear weapons. Netanyahu also does not put much into the tacit “mort-gage” that the framework agreement establishes on the lifespan of the religious regime in Tehran and the hope it will be eased out of power within the timeframe of the 10 and 15 year restrictions on centrifuge and uranium enrichment research and development.   Ab actu ad posse valet illatio. (From the past, one can infer the future.)

Back in 2010, Israel’s Channel 2 reported that NetanyahuBack in 2010, Israel’s Channel 2 reported that Netanyahu and his Minister of Defense, Ehud Barack, had given orders for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare to strike Iran within hours if required. However, then Chief of the General Staff of the IDF, Lieutenant General (Rav Aluf) Gabi Ashkenazi, and the Head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, expressed opposition to the idea. Ashkenazi advised that an attack against Iran would be a strategic mistake given the risk of war. Dagan explained to Netanyahu that an attack would be illegal and said a full cabinet decision was needed. Supposedly, Ashkenazi and Dagan got Netanyahu to withdraw the orders to prepare for a strike. In response to questions Channel 2 put to Netanyahu about events surrounding this past order to attack Iran, he responded, “In the final reckoning, the responsibility lies with the prime minister and as long as I am prime minister, Iran will not have the atomic bomb.” He went on to state, “If there’s no other way, Israel is ready to act.”

Pictured above is the S-300PMU-1. Russia decided to bolster Iran’s air defenses with its S-300 surface to air missiles. The S-300 is a mobile system that can strike targets at a distance of 150 km and an altitude of 27,000 meters. As a result of its participation in the Helenic [Greek] Air Force’s INIOXOS-2015 exercises, the IAF collected important data on flying against S-300PMU-1 during simulated attacks on ground targets.

Judging Existing Evidence: Is A Military Strike Realistic?

Former Israeli Prime Minister and former Chief of the General Staff of the IDF, Yitzak Rabin, was quoted as saying “Israel has an important principle: It is only Israel that is responsible for our security.” In 2013, Obama said, “We’ve got Israel’s back” to express his thinking on the defense of Israel. Obama claims the use of military force was implicit in that guarantee. However, as the nuclear negotiations progressed there was a discernible change in Obama’s attitude toward attacking Iran. Threats to use force halted. Tehran began to sense Obama was averse to military action. Netanyahu does. When Sherman spoke to Israeli reporters, she said that the US was totally committed to Israel’s security and is interested in opening a dialogue with Israel’s new government to discuss improving Israel’s security preparedness after the deal with Iran goes into effect. She said such talks are aimed at maintaining the Israeli army’s qualitative edge and ensuring that Israel will be fully capable of defending itself.   She was quoted as saying “Israel’s right to exist and Iran’s actions in the region will be dealt with on a parallel track.” She stated further, “The US will consult Israel on what it needs for its security.”

Directly on the point of US military action against Iran, Sherman told Israeli reporters that a military operation against Iran would not stop its nuclear program. She stated, “A military strike by Israel or the US would only set back the nuclear program by two years.” She said further, “You can’t bomb their nuclear know-how, and they will rebuild everything. The alternatives are there but the best option is a diplomatic negotiated solution.” She noted, “There is no difference [between the US and Israel] on the concern about the Iranian nuclear program but on the way to deal with it.” Despite fears expressed in 2013 that Iran would soon have a nuclear weapons, Sherman explained that the US and Israeli intelligence communities agree Iran is not close to producing one and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made no decision to produce one. Sherman said, “They don’t have enough fissile material and don’t have delivery system or weapon per se.” She proffered, “It would take them a considerable period of time to get all that.”

What many view as a big shift in the military equation between Israel and Iran was Russia’s commitment in April 2015 to sell its S-300 missile system to Iran. Ties between Russia and Iran during the nuclear negotiations did not garner any drum beat of media reports, but links have actually grown between the two countries since the talks began. Russia is a Member of the P5+1 given its status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, yet Russia is a good friend of Iran. With threats of military action having been leveled at Iran, not as much by the US recently but more by Israel, Russia decided to lend support to Iran’s defense. If Iran were to eventually decide not to sign a nuclear deal or decide not to comply with it in the long-run, Iran would not be able to effectively deter a military response from the US or Israel with its current defenses or by developing a few rudimentary nuclear devices for its arsenal. Having its own problems with the Western powers and serving its own economic, business and national security interests, Russia decided to provide Iran with S-300s. The S-300 missile is a mobile surface to air defense system that can strike targets at a distance of 150 km and an altitude of 27,000 meters. The Russians made the point that the S-300 was an entirely defensive system and cannot attack anyone, including Israel. However, the introduction of any version of the S-300 would make attacking Iran by air more difficult. It was already an extremely tough job as much of the Iranian nuclear program is deeply buried. Very powerful bombs would be needed to crack those facilities open. Further, the facilities are scattered country wide. Knowing the number and locations of the S-300s would be critical in an attack. As the S-300 system is mobile, it can be rapidly redeployed. Presumably, with the S-300, Iran can engage in any activities it wants without fear of attack from any country except the US. Aegrescit medendo. (The disease worsens with treatment.)

Directing Activity Based on Judgments

In every conflict since its founding, the IAF has been a decisive factor. Its pilots are nearly regarded as “sky knights,” and hold a special place in the hearts of the Israeli people. Their capabilities are also world-renown. With a modest number of jets, the Israeli Air Force fighter pilots have been able to destroy larger opposing forces in air combat as during the Bekka Valley Air Battle against Syria in June 1982 and carry-out daring bombing raids as Operation Opera, the raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility on June 7, 1981.

According to the Fars News Agency, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami stated Iran would set fire to any airbase used by enemies to strike the country. Salami declared: “We warn their pilots that their first flight [to strike Iran] will be their last one and no one will be allowed to go back safe and sound and they should call their flights as their last flights.” Yet, IAF pilots are completely immune to such boasts. In response to orders to remove what Israel’s political leadership may perceive as an existential threat to their people, IAF pilots would be willing to fly into Iran to destroy its nuclear program to the best of their ability without withering under some thought that they are flying a “suicide mission.” The pilots know their duty to Israel; they are willing to make sacrifices. That is something IAF commanders and IAF pilots’ families know very well. The Spirit of the IDF, a guideline for operations that forms an ethical code for soldiers, officers, units, and corps includes “Tenacity of Purpose in Performing Mission and Drive to Victory” among its values. Those serving in the IDF are required to fight and conduct themselves with courage in the face of all dangers and obstacles. They must persevere in their missions resolutely and thoughtfully even to the point of endangering their lives.

However, in addition to the pilots’ courage, the IAF is assuredly enhancing existing capabilities to create the real possibility that its pilots could successfully attack Iran’s nuclear program. IAF planners develop the concept for an operation using their expertise based on long careers that included a continuous education and training on aerial warfare and considerable war fighting experience. They know the capabilities of specific individuals and units, the effectiveness of their weapons systems, and what would be the real possibility for success of any operation. Reportedly, senior IDF commanders have “cautiously welcomed” a nuclear deal. On the Iranian nuclear threat, one officer anonymously said that by stepping up international inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities and by scaling back uranium enrichment “allow for the supposition that in the coming period of years, this is a threat in decline.” Yet, if Netanyahu asked the IDF to develop a plan for military strikes on Iran, the Chief of the General Staff of the IDF Lieutenant General (Rav Aluf) Gadi Eizenkot, Head of the IDF Planning Directorate Major General Nimrod Sheffer, IAF Commander Major General Amir Eshel, Hertzl of IDF Military Intelligence, and Pardo of Mossad will develop and present a plan for him that displays a high level of military acumen and creativity. In April 2015, the IAF gained experience in coping with the S-300 by deploying 10 F-16I Sufa fighter jets to participate in the annual exercise of the Hellenic [Greek] Air Force entitled INIOXOS-2015. The Hellenic Armed Forces deploys the S-300PMU-1 on the Island of Crete. During the exercise, IAF pilots had the opportunity to prepare for a potential mission in which they may be required to attack Iranian nuclear facilities by flying against those S-300s. The IAF jets came from 4 units: 201 Squadron, “The One” from Ramon Airbase; 253 Squadron, “The Negev” from Ramon Airbase; 107 Squadron, “The Knights of the Orange Tail” from Hatzerim Airbase; and, 119 Squadron “The Bat” from Ramon Airbase. They were accompanied on at least one mission by their commander, Eshel. As a result of its participation in INIOXOS-2015, the IAF collected important data on the intricacies of flying against the S-300. During simulated attacks on ground targets, the IAF pilots successfully tested and modified evasion tactics versus the system. Ad utrumque paratus. (Ready for anything!)

In response to orders to remove what Israel’s political leaders may perceive as an existential threat to their people, IAF pilots would be willing to fly into Iran to destroy its nuclear program to the best of their ability. They will hardly wither under some thought that they are flying a “suicide mission.” The pilots know their duty to Israel; they are willing to make sacrifices. That is something IAF commanders and the pilots’ families know very well.

The Way Forward

In spite of its state sponsorship of terrorism and, Iran is not the sole point source of the world’s evils. (There is also the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, al-Qaeda, North Korea, and others.) Yet, Iran’s mordant behavior on the world stage, as well as its past surreptitious behavior regarding the research and development of military nuclear capability cannot be dismissed. Netanyahu has implored US officials to surmount what they see concerning Iran. His March 3rd speech to the US Congress was designed as a wake-up call to those who do not realize the nuclear negotiations are a sweet illusion that will only lead to heartache. He views actions Iran has taken despite past declarations that it would never build a nuclear bomb as instructive. Netanyahu no doubt would feel indescribable joy to hear the US would engage in military action against Iran with Israel. However, absent any extraordinarily egregious act by Iran against the US, that will not happen.

Regarding military action by Israel, Golda Meir once said, “We don’t thrive on military acts. We do them because we have to, and thank God we are efficient.” Netanyahu responded to statements Obama made during his June 1st Channel 2 interview by warning again that a prospective deal would pave the way for Iran to attain a nuclear arsenal. Netanyahu is experienced enough to know the importance of prudence in decision making. Undoubtedly, in his view, he has used sufficient prudence. He is not the type to engage in an agonizing debate about military action. Netanyahu’s actual intentions are unknown, and this analysis is written in the abstract. Nonetheless, he appears ready to use military force. He has not hesitated to use force against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria. Although the Israeli Prime Minister turned back from military action against Iran in 2010, he will unlikely turn back a second time. Whether a decision by Netanyahu to attack Iran would be right or wrong might only be determined in the skies over Iran. Carpent tua poma nepotes. (Your descendents will pluck your fruit.)