Monthly Archives: June 2013

When Exactly Will CIA Crack Down on its Own to Stop Leaks?

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On June 26th, the Associated Press reported Director John O. Brennan was launching a new campaign aimed at pressuring Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers to keep the intelligence agency’s secrets secret. The article entitled CIA Cracks Down on Its Own to Stop Leaks, by Kimberley Dozier, discusses a memo written by Brennan to the Agency’s workforce.  Brennan reminded employees of the Agency’s “Honor the Oath” campaign, which was intended to “reinforce our corporate culture of secrecy” through education and training.  He explained in his memo that the campaign stemmed from a review of CIA security launched last summer by former director David Petraeus, and followed what Brennan stated were “several high-profile anonymous leaks and publications by former senior officers.”  Brennan’s memo has arrived on the heels of a number of very recent and fairly significant news reports based on leaks of information on CIA covert operations, particularly in Syria.  Interestingly enough, the very memo, that Associated Press had acquired, was marked unclassified, “for official use only.”

With regard to stories about CIA covert operations, the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and other US newspapers of record have explained that their sources of information on CIA, particularly on its assistance to Turkey and Arab states in arming Syrian opposition fighters, has come from interviews with officials from several countries, accounts from rebel commanders, and air traffic data. Yet, to be fair, CIA officals have reason to be skeptical of this. The information in news reports of CIA operations in Syria is of such granular detail and clarity that it is difficult to imagine anyone except one fully steeped in such an intricate arms supply and training operation, could fully grasp and discuss all of its aspects with such certainty. The information is seemingly flowing week after week to the US news media.  Examples include a June 21st Los Angeles Times report that CIA was using covert training at bases in Jordan and Turkey.

In both countries, CIA operatives and US special operations troops have allegedly been secretly training Syrian opposition insurgents with anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons since late last year. Accoeding to a US official, the training reportedly has involved fighters from the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a loose confederation of insurgent groups that the Obama administration has promised to back with expanded military assistance.  The US official  discussed the effort anonymously because he was not authorized to disclose details.

The number of FSA fighters given US instruction in Jordan and Turkey has not been determined by the Los Angeles Times.  However, an FSA commander cooperating with CIA, leaked that in Jordan, the training involves 20 to 45 fighters at a time. The training, he explained, conducted by US, Jordanian and French operatives, involves rockets and anti-tank and antiaircraft weaponry.  The commander also revealed the training began in November at a new US base in the desert in southwestern Jordan.  To his knowledge, US special operations teams selected the trainees over the last year when the US military set up regional supply lines into Syria to provide the rebels with nonlethal assistance, including uniforms, radios and medical aid.  So far, according to the commander, about 100 FSA fighters from Daraa have attended four courses, and fighters from Damascus, the Syrian capital, have attended three. Between 80 and 100 FSA fighters from all over Syria have gone through the courses in the last month, he said, and training is continuing. Those who complete the course are sent back across the border to rejoin the battle.

The two-week courses include training with Russian-designed 14.5-millimeter antitank rifles, anti-tank missiles and 23-millimeter antiaircraft weapons, according to a FSA commander in Daraa province who helps oversee weapons acquisitions and who asked that his name not be used because the program is secret. Since last year, the weapons sent through the Daraa FSA military council have included four or five Russian-made heavy Concourse antitank missiles, 18 14.5-millimeter guns mounted on the backs of pickup trucks and 30 82-millimeter recoil-less rifles. The weapons are all Russian or Soviet-style models but manufactured in other countries, the commander said. Such weapons allow the FSA fighters to easily use captured munitions from the Syrian army, which has a large arsenal of Russian and Soviet-style arms. While engaged in training activities, CIA officers would sit and interview trainees during breaks from sessions, and afterward they would try to collect specific information on the situation in Syria based on intelligence requirements.

CIA’s covert role in the allied air transport of arms and supplies for delivery in Syria, which many journalists heard rumors about in 2012, was confirmed and fully exposed in the New York Times on March 21st.  It was revealed by a former US official that General David H. Petraeus, CIA director until November 2012, had been instrumental in getting the airlift network moving and had strongly urged various countries to work together on it.

CIA’s role in facilitating the shipments, according to a US official, gave the US a degree of influence over the process, including the opportunity to steer weapons away from Islamist groups and persuading donors to withhold portable antiaircraft missiles that might be used in future terrorist attacks on civilian aircraft. While the operation was alleged to be covert, it was also uncovered that senior White House officials were regularly briefed on the shipments. This has made the operation far less plausibly deniable than US covert operators and policymakers would desire.

The New York Times stated that CIA declined to comment on the shipments or its role in them. However, informants close to CIA officers engaged in these activities have revealed that from offices at secret locations, US intelligence officers have helped the Arab states shop for weapons, including a large procurement from Croatia, and have vetted FSA commanders and groups to determine who should receive the weapons as they arrive, according to US officials speaking on the condition of anonymity. The airlift, which began on a small scale in early 2012 and continued intermittently through last fall, expanded into a steady and much heavier flow late last year.  It has grown to include more than 160 military cargo flights by Jordanian, Saudi Arabian, and Qatari military-style cargo planes landing at Esenboga Airport near Ankara, and, to a lesser degree, at other Turkish and Jordanian airports.

Regarding details of the CIA operation, it was informed that Turkey was relied upon for ovesight of much of the program.  The scale of shipments from Turkey has been very large, according to US officials familiar with the supply route. Transponders were affixed to trucks ferrying the military goods through Turkey which allowed shipments to be monitored as they moved by land into Syria, US officials said.

Qatar had denied providing any arms to the rebels. Yet, US officials, as well as FSA commanders, have confirmed that Qatar has been an active arms supplier–so much so that the US became concerned about some of the Islamist groups that Qatar has armed. It was not made clear whether Qatar has purchased and supplied the arms alone or is also providing air transportation service for other donors. The Qatari flights aligned with the tide-turning military campaign by rebel forces in the northern province of Idlib, as their campaign of ambushes, roadside bombs and attacks on isolated outposts began driving Mr. Assad’s military and supporting shabiha militias from parts of the countryside. In November, three Royal Jordanian Air Force C-130s landed in Esenboga, which was the genesis of what would become a robust Jordanian and Saudi role. Within three weeks, two other Jordanian cargo planes began making a round-trip run between Amman, the capital of Jordan, and Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, where, officials from several countries said, the aircraft were picking up a large Saudi Arabian purchase of infantry arms from a Croatian-controlled stockpile. Jordanian Ilyushins, bearing the logo of the Jordanian International Air Cargo firm but flying under Jordanian military call signs, made a combined 36 round-trip flights between Amman and Croatia from December through February.  Jordanian planes made five flights between Amman and Turkey this January.  As the Jordanian flights got under way, the Qatari flights continued.  The Royal Saudi Air Force made at least 30 C-130 flights into Esenboga from mid-February to early March this year.

The most recent information about CIA’s covert train and equip effort in Syria was revealed in the Wall Street Journal on June 26th and concerned the Agency’s movement of weapons to Jordan from a network of secret warehouses and its plans to start arming small groups of vetted FSA fighters within a month. That will expand the US support of moderate forces in the FSA. This information was offered by diplomats and US officials briefed on the plans. The US officials also confirmed that shipments, related training, and a parallel push to mobilize arms deliveries from European and Arab allies, were being timed to help organize a unified offensive by the FSA, starting by early August. Incredibly, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, US officials volunteered details of the new covert plan authorized by President Barack Obama and disclosed earlier this month.  Further, it was revealed that talks are under way with other countries, including France, about pre-positioning European-procured weapons in Jordan. Saudi Arabia is expected to provide manpads, which are shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles, to a small number of handpicked fighters, as few as 20 at first, officials and diplomats explained. To ensure the matter is covered, CIA will try to eliminate the risk that the manpads would be given to Islamist militant groups such as the Al-Nusra Front.  CIA has put in place what officials have described as an “elaborate” vetting procedure for the FSA fighters they train. Yet, officials acknowledged the difficulty of getting reliable information about the backgrounds of individual FSA fighters in a country where CIA has limited intelligence-collection resources.

A few hundred of the FSA fighters will enter Syria under the program each month, starting in August, according to diplomats briefed on CIA plans. At that rate, US officials believe it would take four to five months before there are enough rearmed and trained moderate fighters to make a meaningful difference against the Syrian Armed Forces and their allies, according to diplomats and US officials. To accelerate the effort, CIA is said to be considering placing US special operations units under agency authority to conduct some of the training. CIA is also considering using special operations teams from Jordan and the United Arab Emirates to enhance the training effort, US officials said freely. Sources have informed the Los Angeles Times that such joint operations were already underway.

When newspapers of record present reports on CIA activity, every effort is made by editors to ensure that accurate information is collected from reliable sources.  Online stories from those newspapers are often edited after they are published to ensure that facts reported have the greatest accuracy possible.  For example, a recent New York Times article was edited to reflect the difference in meaning and activities of CIA officers, who are Agency employees, and US intelligence agents, who are contracted by the CIA.  Fortunately for Brennan, he will unlikely need to work too hard to control further leaks from CIA.  Keeping secrets is his organization’s business and individuals determined to work outside Agency regulations are relatively few in number. However, he must act fast to defeat the growing perception that the walls at CIA are falling down.  The US news media will always be open to receiving new stories on CIA.  That being the case, for those who leak, whether over ideology, conspiracy, excitement, self-importance, celebrity, or any reason from among dozens, there will be a place for their stories to be heard.  This has always been a “dilemma” for those running a secret intelligence agency in a free society.

The Extent of US Loyalty to the Syrian Opposition May Be a Lackluster Investment of Arms

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As a result of a finding that concluded the Assad regime used chemical weapons, the US would begin supplying the opposition forces with small arms and ammunition. A classified order was issued directing the Central Intelligence Agency to coordinate arming the rebels in concert with allies.

On Thursday, June 13, 2013, the White House announced that the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime had crossed a “red-line” US President Barack Obama set by using chemical weapons, sarin gas, against Syrian opposition forces, albeit in a limited fashion, on multiple occasions. This declaration was based on a US intelligence community assessment. As a result of the finding that concluded the Assad regime used chemical weapons, the US would begin supplying the opposition forces with small arms and ammunition. The Wall Street Journal reported a classified order was issued directing the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to coordinate arming the rebels in concert with its allies. For General Salim Idriss, commander of the Syrian Military Council (SMC), this news should have inspired his fighters. Finally, US arms were being sent to them. Yet, the Syrian opposition, which includes General Idriss’ SMC, as its military wing, and the Syrian National Council (SNC), as its political wing, apparently already feels quite secure in its position with the international community against Assad’s regime. Moreover, the SNC and SMC behave as if they were an indispensible part of the Syrian issue for the US, the EU, Arab states, as well as with the UN. It would seem that the many problems of the SMC and SNC which are manifested in their attitudes, behavior, and capabilities, would make them far from certain about their standing with their benefactors. The willingness of some in the international community to ignore the opposition groups’ problems and continually reward the SNC and SMC has likely imbued them with such confidence in their situation.  The time may have come for them to stop feeling so certain about their position.  This is true not only because of their relative competencies, but because the Syria conflict seems to be aggravating existing rifts in US-Russia relations. The danger of a potential conflict between these major powers over Syria should cause benfactors of the SNC and SMC to better assess the potential impact of their support. It might be best now for the SNC and SMC, themselves, to consider how they truly fit into the foreign policies and national interests of their friends. Their cause and actions need to be more in sync with those interests. An immediate change toward a more appreciative and responsive approach to the efforts of the US, EU, and Arab states, and an effort to negotiate a settlement, should seen.

Recent reports on the SNC and SMC point to: disunity and disagreements; demands of preconditions for negotiations; the considerable weakness of the SMC’s force in the field the Free Syrian Army (FSA) relative to the Syrian Armed Forces and its allies on the ground; and, a presence and influence of Islamic militants in its ranks. As Joshua Landis, a professor at the University of Oklahoma and a Syria expert was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as stating, “The extreme fragmentation of the opposition makes it impossible to do business with.” Understanding how the SNC and SMC were ever found by some in the international community to be worthy of an investment in money, personnel, and materiel in support of their struggle with the Assad regime, requires understanding the origins of the Syrian opposition movement. From the start, the international community greatly exaggerated the real potential of the SNC and SMC. This approach was driven by intelligence reports produced in the capitals ot the US, EU, and Arab states indicating that the Syrian conflict would not last long. The German intelligence service, the BND, for example, predicted the Assad regime’s imminent collapse in 2012. Vali Nasr, dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, explained in the Chicago Tribune, at the time, the US believed that Assad would inevitably fall and intervention was not necessary. Despite the fact that there were armed militants in its number, the Syrian opposition movement, originally, was never prepared to overthrow President Assad and his regime through military action as a rebel group. The spiral toward war began in 2011 with protests for reforms and for a halt to violence against prisoners held by the Assad regime. It erupted into armed conflict. There were attempts to stem the violence with referendum on single party rule, but there was little confidence in the regime’s promises in the ever-growing opposition. By the end of summer, the SNC was formed in Istanbul as the main organization of the opposition. The SNC called for the overthrow of Assad’s regime and rejected dialogue. Meanwhile, another organization that formed, the National Coordination Committee, supported talks with the regime believing that bringing down the regime would lead to further chaos and conflict. These organizations included political groups, long-time exiles, grassroots organizers, and armed militants, mostly divided along intellectual, ethnic, and sectarian lines. In December 2011, the organizations were finally “united” against the Assad regime by agreement.

The FSA was cobbled together in 2011 with a curious mix of Syrian retired military, defectors, former reservists, and the movements’ activists, along with Islamic militants and members of the al-Qaeda affiliated groups. Its ranks grew to 15,000 fighters on the ground. Yet, the organization had serious problems. Joshua Landis has explained that “the militia heads on the ground in Syria don’t look up to or obey the civilian opposition leaders.” Even more, the SMC had difficulties establishing real cooperation and coordination during operations. The many groups at best displayed tolerance toward each other. Some Islamic militant groups steadily began functioning more independently. The Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria and the Al-Nusra Front eventually became forces the SMC would have to reckon with. These problems were compounded by the fact that the FSA lacked real military power, in terms of fighters, heavy weapons, the ability to maneuver and authentic military acumen among its commanders. That meant the force would hardly be able to march on Damascus to remove Assad. What it could do is roam the countryside attacking the Syrian Army “guerilla-style” and take control of territory when the odds were in its favor.  However, the Syrian Army, rather than chase the rebels around the countryside, fell back to strongholds in order to minimize casualties and build up its strength with the assistance of its allies.

Western states, allegedly monitoring the situation closely, somehow saw these developments as very positive, and policy and decision makers oddly began to assess the SNC and SMC as a viable core for a new political and military leadership in Syria. Thinking of that type gained momentum, and eventually some states such as Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, began secretly delivering tons of arms to the FSA. When UN and Arab League joint special envoy Kofi Annan effort to create a ceasefire failed, more states, including the US, began to consider ways to support the SMC and FSA on the ground. Military intervention was ruled out in a March 2012 meeting in Cairo by the Arab League, but Assad also was asked to step down and pass his power to his vice-president and it was proposed that the monitoring mission in Syria be increased. Assad rejected all of that, but the SNC and SMC rejected it, too! As a newly formed movement and organization, it should have been considered foolhardy to reject the peace efforts of its benefactors. However, that is exactly what the SNC and SMC did. Despite the positive international response in favor of the SNC and SMC, arguments over policies and approaches among the diverse groups in the SNC became a regular feature of their meetings. It was well-observed in meetings established by the US, EU, and Arab states concerning the delivery of aid to them held in Doha, Qatar, and Tunis, Tunisia. Still, the divisions and shortcomings of the SNC and SMC had no negative impact on international supporters. Rather, at the same time, Qatar, Tunisia, and Morocco recalled their ambassadors from Damascus. Turkey issued a statement declaring it was running out of patience with Assad’s regime. Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sought to create the “Friends of Syria” designated to stand with the people of Syria and not the government. Further, in a Geneva meeting, a UN communiqué was drawn up that agreed to the creation of a transitional government and what it would look like. It would include members of the opposition and former members of the regime based on consent. Most intriguing was the US demand that there would be no place for Assad in the transitional government. That communiqué threw the West firmly behind the burgeoning SNC and SMC.

In addition to the belief that Assad would inevitably fall and intervention was not necessary, international perspectives to the Syrian conflict were biased by the Libya episode. In Libya, a determined rebel force, supported by airpower for the US, EU, and Arab states, defeated the government forces of Muammar Qaddafi. There were also analyses that found the Syrian Armed Forces and the FSA somehow evenly matched, except the FSA lacked high-tech and heavy weapons. The truth could easily dispell this illusion. The opposing forces were not balanced at all, but rather, greatly tilted in the Assad regime’s favor. The Syrian Army has considerable size, strength, and capabilities. While official statistics say the Syrian Army had a strength of 220,000 troops when the war began, the International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that number has fallen to 50,000 loyal forces mainly among Allawite Special Forces, the Republican Guard, and the 3rd and 4th Divisions. However, other analysts have also estimated that when the ranks of the security forces are counted as a whole, including the Mukhabarat or Intelligence organizations, the police, and Shabiha or paramilitaries/street gangs, the number again rises near 200,000.

The combat power of that force has been enhanced on the ground by the presence of allies such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian special forces or IRGC-Quds Force, Hezbollah, the National Defense Forces militia, and Iraqi Shi’a militant brigades. Tons of arms and sophisticated weapon systems from Russia, and additional aid from Iran, and China further enhance the force. The size of the Russian military presence has not been specified, but in 2012, the Guardian concluded it was considerable. It is doubtful that the Russians will contribute ground forces for the fight. However, Russian advisers would unlikely move too far from S-300 rocket systems or any other advance weaponry their country allegedly has provided the Assad regime. Reports exist that say Russia will sell MiG-29 fighters to Syria and the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, will soon be stationed in the Mediterranean. Israeli analysts had estimated that 4,000 Iranian officers and men from the IRGC, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and IRGC-Quds Force were on the ground. Iran stated, however, it would deploy 4,000 IRGC troops to Syria. The Iranians would certainly be willing to fight alongside the Syrian Army much as they fought alongside and within the Bosnian and Herzegovina Armija from 1994 to 1995. Indeed, what may eventually be observed is Iranian units folding into Syrian Army units and placed under the command of Syrian Army officers. Hezbollah is already in the fight, with nearly 4,000 fighters in Syria, particularly within provinces bordering Lebanon. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, vowed to propel Assad to victory.

There is no evidence that the SNC and SMC have evolved in any way that would cause one to assess that they were ready to take down Assad. The long-term bickering and in-fighting certainly is disconcerting. However, there are other issues. The commander of the SMC, General Salim Idriss, put his own character into question during a surprise visit to Syria made by US Senator John McCain (R-Arizona). At great personal risk, Senator McCain, a US political icon, went into Syria to observe the operations of the FSA and to enhance his ability to advocate in support for the organization with his colleagues in the US Congress. As the guest of General Idriss, Senator McCain should have been protected from any controversy or problems. Yet, General Idriss allowed Senator McCain to be photographed with Mohammed Nour, commander of the FSA’s Northern Storm Brigade. Nour had been implicated in the kidnapping of Lebanese Shi’a pilgrims in 2012. While denying Nour the opportunity to meet with Senator McCain may have put General Idriss in a difficult political situation with one of his commanders, he did not hesitate to create potential poblems for Senator McCain by doing so. General Idriss displayed an incredible lack of courtesy and respect toward the US Senator, and questionable judgement. Senator McCain, a gentleman, has shrugged off the incident. Yet, many Americans were incensed by his treatment. General Idriss’s behavior becomes a bit more understandable given feelings the FSA’s rank and file have openly expressed about the US. As an FSA member was quoted in the New York Times as stating, “We will accept support even from Satan to finish the Assad regime.” At the same time this was occurring, in Istanbul, the SNC and SMC, once again were engaged in considerable bickering and arguments over issues such as how many seats each group deserved. This was done, despite of the tireless work by US Secretary of State John Kerry to bring the Russians and the Assad regime to the table to talk. Some have called the SNC and SMC failure to respond to Kerry fully as Kerry’s flop. However, nothing could be further from the truth. The problem is not Secretary Kerry and his tireless work to establish a peace agreement. The problem is the SNC and SMC which the US supports, and now arms.

The CIA will have its hands full trying to arm the FSA. Its continued work in support of their cause will likely be met with further ingratitude. Having received arms from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which the CIA helped deliver, General Idriss very publicly complained about the quality of the weapons his forces were receiving. He pleaded for “Western” anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles saying the weapons the FSA had were no match for the Syrian Army’s modern tanks and weapons systems. It was a rebuff to the Qatari, Saudi, and Turkish efforts. Those states were not selling the arms supplied, but giving them to the SMC and FSA. In any event, the present reality regarding military assistance is that the Russians and Iranians, through their military assistance to Assad’s regime, have raised the bar too high and too fast in the past two years in Syria for the US, EU, and Arab states to do anything substantial with high-tech or even heavy weapons at this point. General Idriss, in spite of the revolutionary zeal of his forces, should have been pragmatic enough to have recognized this fact. Perhaps to create some benefit for themselves, SMC leaders seek to collect Western anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles now in order to sell them later on the black market after victory or defeat. This would be one way in which the concern of Russian President Vladimir Putin about the weapons provided possibly surfacing in Europe, might be realized. Certainly, the CIA will successfully carry out the task of delivering US arms as assigned by policy and decision makers. Yet, providing US arms directly to the opposition arms in a way that would dramatically change the situation on ground would just be asking too much. The SMC, General Idriss, and the FSA fighters would still complain vehemently about not getting the right tools to win. (They are already saying small arms from the US will not be enough. Clearly these men, particularly their leaders, are not mature enough, and worldly enough, to understand that the US owes them absolutely nothing.

There is a real “Russian factor” in Syria of which Western capitals and Arab states, soon enough become most apparent. The Russian factor for now should outweigh concerns regarding the opposition. No matter the rationale behind it, the planning for any sort of military intervention could not be conducted without consideration that airstrikes or even a no-fly zone might result in harm to Russian advisers and other personnel. No clash with them should be an outcome of US efforts. The Syria conflict simply does not rise-to-a-level high enough as an issue over which any rational policymaker or decision maker in the US, EU, or Arab state to consider fighting with Russia. While the SNC and SMC may believe that their cause is the only one of real importance and urgency in the world, they need to know that perspective is wholly unrealistic. They would be greatly mistaken if they remotely thought that their situation in Syria warranted placing the security of the US, EU, or another Arab state at stake. For the US, maintaining positive relations with Russia within the parameters of its own national policies, and regarding their respective activities is very important.

As President Obama’s chemical weapons red-line has been crossed, the SNC and SMC will now receive US military aid for its forces. Some policy makers in the Obama administration apparently believe Syria, on the basis of being as a humanitarian crisis, is very worthy of some type of intervention. However, this is not 2011, but 2013, and things have changed in Syria. The FSA lacks the ability to achieve great success against the rejuvenated Syrian Armed Forces with its allies. It is unlikely that FSA capabilities could be ramped up to reach a size and strength great enough in any short period of time to confront the Syrian Armed Forces and allies as they are amassed. Doing anything too substantial with high-tech or heavy weapons shipments to the FSA at this point would be a foolhardy and reckless. Syria is not Libya, where Muammar al-Gaddafi stood alone against the opposition and Western airpower. In Syria, Assad has very powerful allies ready to support him with money and weapons, and fight alongside his forces. A clash with the Russia must be avoided. US Secretary of State John Kerry has sought to have the opposition meet with the Assad regime representatives in Geneva and come to some agreement on a transitional government. Now is the best and, perhaps, final chance for the SNC and SMC to organize representatives and go to Geneva to reach an agreement. The SNC and SMC can eventually lead Syria into the future. The failure to reach an agreement may result in a situation, created through military moves by the Assad regime, which the US, EU and Arab states, might not be in the best position to halt. Those states have dealt with Assad regime for years, and can easily tolerate it a few years more until some truly viable solution to it is found. However, for the SNC and SMC, such military action by Assad’s forces may be something their FSA fighters on the ground may be unable to cope with, and, perhaps, may be unable to live through.

Is the US Public Aware the US Is Said to Plan to Send Weapons to the Syrian Rebels?

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In a June 13, 2013 article entitled, “US Said to Plan to Send Weapons to Syrian Rebels,” The New York Times reports the Obama administration, having concluded the Syrian Armed Forces used chemical weapons, specifically, sarin gas, on numerous occasions against rebel forces in the Syrian civil war, has decided to begin supplying the rebels for the first time with small arms and ammunition. The New York Times explains this has been a long sought goal of Obama administration policymakers advocating a more aggressive US response to the civil war. The assistance, coordinated by the Central Intelligence Agency could include antitank weapons, but not the anti-aircraft weapons rebels commanders say they badly need. However, while the use of sarin gas shocks the conscience and plans for US weapons deliveries to the rebels seem to be well-considered, the bigger issue is what the US involvement in Syria will really mean for the US beyond the region. As the US steps on the path to greater involvement in Syria, the American people need to know the real stakes at hand for them.

Assad’s Army Is Not Just Waiting Around To Lose
Among some analysts, the simple bean-counting of Syrian Armed Forces and the Syrian opposition’s forces in the field the Free Syrian Army (FSA) under the leadership of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), oddly enough results in the conclusion that they are somehow evenly matched, except the FSA lacks high-tech and heavy weapons. However, the true situation can best be understood when the impact that Russian, Iranian, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militia, and Chinese military assistance has had on the Syrian Armed Forces capabilities is given context. The situation is not balanced at all, but rather, greatly tilted in Assad’s favor. The Syrian Army has considerable size, strength, and capabilities. While official statistics say the Syrian Army had a strength of 220,000 troops when the war began, the International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that number has fallen to 50,000 loyal forces mainly among Allawite Special Forces, the Republican Guard, and the 3rd and 4th Divisions. However, other analysts have also estimated that when the ranks of the security forces are counted as a whole, including the Mukhabarat or Intelligence organizations, the police, and Shabeeha or paramilitaries/street gangs, the number again rises near 200, 000.

The combat power of Assad’s forces has been enhanced on the ground by the presence of allies such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian special forces or Quds Force, Hezbollah, the National Defense Forces militia, and Iraqi Shi’a militant brigades. Tons of arms and sophisticated weapon systems from Russia, and additional aid from Iran, and China further enhance the force. The size of the Russian military presence has not been specified, but in 2012, the Guardian concluded it was considerable. It is doubtful that the Russians will contribute ground forces for the fight. However, Russian advisers would unlikely move too far from S-300 or any other advance missile systems it may provide the Syrians. Reports exist of a planned Russian sale of MiG-29 fighters to Syria soon and the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, will soon be stationed in the Mediterranean. Israeli analysts had estimated that 4000 Iranian officers and men from the IRGC, Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Quds Force were on the ground. The Iranians would certainly be willing to fight alongside the Syrian Army much as they fought alongside and within the Bosnian and Herzegovina Armija from 1994 to 1995. Indeed, what may eventually be observed is Iranian units folding into Syrian Army units and placed under the command of Syrian Army officers. The desertions and defections of Syrian Army soldiers and officers, while actually trimming down the army to its more loyal elements, has also opened the door to folding Iranian forces into Syrian fighting units. The leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, freely admits his fighters are present in Syria. Hezbollah is already in the fight, particularly within the Syrian provinces bordering Lebanon.

The Foreign Forces Have Already Had an Impact
The Syrian Army’s operation in the town of Qusayr demonstrated that the Syrian Army not only could bring superior firepower to bear against the FSA, but it possessed the command and control required for such a military operation. Airstrike and artillery fire degraded FSA positions preceded the assault on the town by armor and infantry units. Rocket and airstrike targeted FSA positions in the depth to disrupt and prevent the reinforcement and resupply of the town. It is reported that armor units of the IRGC and regular forces fought alongside the Syrian militia, the National Defense Force, formed with Shabeeha and trained by the Iranian Quds Force. Hezbollah’s role in Qusayr is well reported. It was part of the main assault, and also given the responsibility of mopping up FSA resistance in the town.

This new force under Assad’s control is lethal and dangerous. Although it has not thrown the full weight of it s combat power upon the FSA, it clearly has the capability to degrade its capabilities. Moreover, since Russian, Iranian, Chinese, Shi’a Iraqi money, men and material flowing into Syria for nearly two years, the point may have been reached when nothing short of direct military intervention by the US, EU, or Arab states could significantly change the situation on the ground in favor of the FSA. Short of direct military intervention, it is unlikely that the training and equipping of the FSA at this point could keep pace with the efforts of Assad’s allies.

A Proxy War Become A Real War With the Russians and Iranians?
With huge concentrations of Russian and Iranian advisers and other military personnel on the ground, US military intervention of any kind might result some contact with them. As Russian advisers are on the ground in Syria, and have been for some time, an attack on Syrian military positions that may result in harming Russia advisers must be avoided. Even a no-fly zone may result in US fighters coming in contact with Russian fighters flying from its aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean or flying out of Syrian with Russian advisers training Syrian pilots on MiGs. This creates a terrible potential for an unwanted exchange with the Russians or Iranians. The US can talk with the Russians. There is no need for a struggle. Any conflict between the US and the Russians raises the spectre of nuclear war. Pragmatic leaders at the US State Department and Defense Department may recognize that there has been a dramatic shift in the situation on the ground in Syria since 2011. The SMC and FSA no longer appear to have any real potential to effect change. While the SMC and FSA may believe that their cause is the only one of real importance and urgency in the world, they need to know that perspective is unrealistic. They would be greatly mistaken if they remotely thought that their situation in Syria warranted placing the security of the US at stake. Maintaining positive relations with Russia within the parameters of their national policies and within reason is in their national interests.

Make no mistake, the Russians and Iranians are well-positioned in Syria. Vali Nasr, dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, stated in the Chicago Tribune regarding Iran’s efforts in Syria, “If there was once a realistic hope that Syria’s civil war would isolate Iran, the prospect has dimmed.” On Russia, Nasr goes on to state, “By sticking with Assad, Russia projects the image of a steadfast ally that doesn’t bend to international pressure.” The Russians and Iranians early on recognized the opening to secure its interests in Syria while other states talked. They have raised the bar too high and too fast in the past two years in Syria for the US to do anything too substantial with shipments of high-tech or heavy weapons, even anti-aircraft rockets—a weapon system always on the Al-Qaida wish-list–to the FSA at this point. This is not Libya, where Muammar al-Gaddafi stood alone against the opposition and Western airpower. In Syria, Assad has very powerful allies ready to support him with money and weapons, and fight alongside his forces.

Both new and louder voices in the Obama administration, viewing Syria as a humanitarian crisis worthy of military intervention, likely have the ear of President Obama. Yet, Syria simply does not rise-to-a-level high enough as an issue for any rational policymaker or decision maker in the US to consider clashing with Russia over. That reality must be faced. It is not enough to just assume Putin will back down on Syria. The American people deserve some evidence this will remain a regional issue. Bashar al-Assad’s regime was a concern, particularly for the US policymakers, before the opposition began. The Us and other Western governments can take many other paths beyond working with the opposition to pursue Assad on the sarin gas issue or on any issue it chooses.

Without Negotiations, the War in Syria May Not End in the Opposition’s Favor

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Beyond temporary advances, military activity in Syrian conflict has been not been significant enough to lead one to believe the status quo on the ground may change soon. However, the Syrian Armed Forces have been building up not so quietly both in terms of size and capabilities. Facing desertions, defections, battlefield losses, and poor morale, worsened by ethnic as well as sectarian divisions among personnel (akin to the Sunni-Shi’a divide that still plaques the Iraqi armed forces and the divisions that ruptured the Yugoslav National Army in the 1990s.) To compensate for those losses and difficulties, the Syrian Army has reinforced itself with local militias, and elite troops from allied countries and fighters Shi’a militia groups. Given this build up of its power and the relative weakness of the opposition forces, it might be possible for the Syrian Army to launch a major offensive that would lead to victory for the Assad regime.

The Current Situation
In 2011, the National Coalition for the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, though its political wing, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) announced its armed struggle uprising against President Bashar al-Assad and his regime. Throughout that summer, its members were engaged in an accelerated mobilization and arms and equipment were amassed. It was not long before arms and equipment began to flow from Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon to the fighters on the ground, known as the Free Syrian Army.

FSA Strength
The initial objective of the Syrian Army and security forces at that time was to prevent the SNC from achieving any real success. The Supreme Military Council (SMC), and its force in the field, the FSA, although initially capturing significant amounts of territory and acquiring momentum, was denied control of Aleppo and a foothold on Damascus. Syrian Army units along the border were given the task to hold their positions, they did not receive any significant reinforcement. A number of border positions collapsed and fell into FSA hands. Strongholds were created in villages, towns, and cities in the shape of a band stretching nearly 30 to 60 miles wide at points from west to east across Syria, from the Euphrates River and Lake al-Assad to Abu Kamal on the border with Jordan. A shorter, connected band of FSA controlled territory was established. It stretched from east to west, from the Euphrates, nearly 40 to 50 miles wide, abutting the Turkish border from Jarabulus to Madydan Ikbiz. Just south of that band was Aleppo, into which the FSA penetrated and secured territory. There was also FSA territory in Idlib province which included a lip of land reaching the coast. Further, the FSA secured a smaller territory in Homs province near Ar Rastan down to the Lebanese border west of Qusayr and over to Talkalakh. Lastly, in Damascus province, the FSA gained territory abutting the border with Lebanon northwest of Damascus from Az Zabadani to An Nabk.

FSA Weaknesses
While the Syrian Opposition wanted regime change, they were not united on many levels. This became most apparent later as they planned the Geneva negotiations in May 2013. At the political level, the SNC and the SMC were at odds not only on negotiations, but on an approach to removing Assad. Initial momentum created enough inertia to drive the FSA to push for greater territory in Syria. This satisfied the SNC because it gave them control over Syrian territory, renamed and reflagged as “Free Syria” and had the effect of removing Assad’s authority over part of the civilian population. While appearing as a success on the part of the FSA, the reality was that without actually destroying the Syrian Army’s capacity to attack and regain ground, destroy the FSA, or keep the Assad regime in power, they had accomplished little. By establishing strongholds and basing itself in town and villages, the FSA had enabled Syrian Army artillery to daily engage in fire missions using heavy guns, rockets, mortars and tank fire against FSA positions. Syrian Air Force bombed and strafed those positions daily.

Further, the FSA, having been mustered together with a curious mix of Syrian retired military, defectors, former reservists, and the movements’ activists, along with Islamic militants and members of the al-Qaida affiliated group, al-Nusra, had some difficulties establishing real cooperation and coordination during operations. The diverse groups at best displayed tolerance toward each other. That situation, along with the fact that the FSA lacked real military power, in terms of fighters, heavy weapons, and the ability to maneuver, meant the force would not likely be able to mount a conventional defense against a potential large scale offensive launched by the Syrian Army and its allies.

The Syrian Army and Allies
The Syrian Armed Forces and its allies can stand up a force that currently holds over 200,000 troops including, the rearmed and adviser supported Syrian Army, other ground units of the armed forces, Mukhabarat or intelligence organizations, the police, Shabiha or paramilitaries and street gangs, as well as Hezbollah, the National Defense Forces, a militia, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iranian Special Forces or Quds Force, Iraqi Shi’a militia.

A Future Scenario
If an attack were launched, the FSA would very likely face an armored and mechanized assault across a broad front to against the ‘Free Syria territory.” That territory and all lines of communication within it would very likely be cut at five major points in the FSA lines: Abu Kamal, Deir az Zawr, Ar Raqqah, along Lake al-Assad and the Euphrates, and Aleppo. The attacking units would unify, redirect, and be reinforced by Syrian Army units in and around those towns. The objective would then be to encircle defined space including and around those points in FSA territory. The five encirclements would serve as areas of responsibility for commanders in them, yet the encirclements would be linked to each other at specified points. The majority of attacking forces would act as quickly and decisively as possible against the FSA in the encirclements, massing on its strongholds, bases, and training facilities. At the same time, a force of sufficient size and strength would break north, away from each encirclement, toward the Turkish or Jordanian borders, to ensure FSA forces in the encirclements did not receive supplies or reinforcement. Secondary concentric attacks would be made on the edges of the encirclements. All elements of the combat power of the Syrian Armed Forces and its allies would be brought to bare on the FSA in each of the five encirclements.

Outcome
All elements of the FSA infrastructure would likely be removed in the five encirclements. The Syrian security services would very likely attempt to separate the population in the areas from anything connected to the FSA. While attempting to hold on to towns and cities in the encirclements, the FSA would be subjected to the maximum amount of firepower artillery, rockets, mortars, and tanks that the Syrian Army could bring against them. Horribly, the populations of those towns and cities would most likely panic, and chaos and confusion would ensue. Refugees would run from town to town and city to city, increasing the population in each location as they move. That would make mounting a defense at those locations even more difficult for the FSA. As was demonstrated in Qusayr, the FSA is willing to fight to hold down a town knowing the relentless and merciless assaults from the attacking Syrian Army and allied units would terrorize and harm the civilian inhabitants.

Those forces sent beyond the five encirclements, toward the borders of Turkey and Jordan soon would become a blocking force to prevent FSA units to escape to safe havens outside of Syria. They would also likely be driven in that direction under hot pursuit of forces in the surrounded areas. They could very well be trapped moving north or west, displaced from their collapsed defenses and become open to artillery and air attacks travelling on roads or in fields.

Assessment
While it is hoped that the Syrian Army does not launch an offensive and the US and Russia will be able to broker a peace agreement, it is also possible that war will continue. If time is not on the Syrian Army’s side, power certainly is. If the SNC and SMC continue to reject the efforts of the US, Russia, the EU, and Arab States to find a peace, they could create a tragic situation of their own making. There is no popular support or political support within the US or EU for a war with Russia or Iran over Syria. If Russia raises the stakes, the US may not be willing to put its own well-being and interests at stake for amateurs, more interested in posturing and positioning for power, as opposed to ending the killing and behaving as the founding fathers, and mothers, of a reforged nation. Assad is the world’s problem, not just the Syrian opposition’s problem. The world will decide how to deal with him and the world is not reliant or guided by the SNC’s or SMC’s actions. The best suggestion would be for the SNC and SMC to hurry to the negotiation table before it is too late!

Has the Syrian Army Actually Left a Door Open for Peace?

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It is difficult to determine what the thinking is behind the operations of the Syrian Army in the present conflict. The Syrian Army has considerable size, strength, and capabilities, enhanced on the ground by the presence of allies such as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iranian special forces or Quds Force, Hezbollah, the National Defense Forces militia, and Iraqi Shi’a militant brigades. The Syrian Army has far greater combat power available relative to its opponent, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the fighting force of the Syrian oppostion’s military wing, the Syrian Military Council (SMC). It is further enhanced by tons of arms and sophisticated weapon systems from Russia, and additional aid from Iran, and China. Clearly, the Syrian Army is doing very little, with a lot at hand. Just playing it cool! Yet, factors influencing the Syrian Army’s actions, or lack of action, are more likely political than military and perhaps in line with the organization’s culture.

The Syrian Army
While official statistics say the Syrian Army had a strength of 220,000 troops when the war began, the International Institute for Strategic Studies believes that number has fallen to 50,000 loyal forces mainly among Allawite Special Forces, the Republican Guard, and the 3rd and 4th Divisions. However, other analysts have also estimated that when the ranks of the security forces are counted as a whole, including the Mukhabarat or Intelligence organizations, the police, and Shabeeha or paramilitaries/street gangs, the number again rises near 200, 000. The commander in chief of the Syrian Armed Forces is President Bashar al-Assad (the title also includes the rank of field marshal). Day-to-day operations are controlled by Minister of Defense and deputy commander in chief, General Fahd Jassem al-Freij, and chief of general staff of the Army and the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Ali Abdullah Ayyoub. Lieutenant General Ayyoub took direct control of the defense of Aleppo and Damascus. Qusayr was the army’s most robust operation since. However, the operation and its success was followed on all fronts by unimaginative and moderate activity. This has helped to create a confusing picture of Syrian Army commanders’ capabilities.

Qusayr: Not A New Start
In Qusayr, the Syrian Army had specific objectives and initially acted decisively. Qusayr, was Syrian equivalent to Sinjar in Iraq. Qusayr was an entry point for foreign fighters into Syria. (Sinjar was a location determined by the US Joint Special Operations Command to be the entry point for numerous terrorist groups coming into Iraq. US operations in Sinjar had a crippling effect on al-Qaida in Iraq.) The attack on Qusayr was to have a tremedous impact on al-Qaida in Syria. Yet, in addition, by capturing Qusayr, the Syrian Army would cut off Qatari and Saudi Arabian weapons shipments to the FSA coming in covertly from Lebanon It would re-link Damascus to the coast. Further, its capture would mean the beginning of the end for FSA control of Homs province. Weeks before the attack, villages surrounding the town were captured by the army, and units from Hezbollah and the National Defense Forces militia. The town was struck by artillery fire and air sorties the morning before the assault on the town began. Being reported at the same time were Syrian Army advances on other fronts specifically on Halifaya, a town occupied by the terrorist group, the al-Nusra Front and in Damascus, in the Barzeh district. In the following three days, Syrian Army operations lost momentum. The reduction of Qusayr was then taken over by Hezbollah.

In spite of the plethora of analyses that claimed Qusayr was the start of something new for the Syrian Army. Yet, Qusayr was not part of an effort to win the war. It was an effort to eliminate a “uncomfortable advantage” the FSA had. As US Secretary of State John Kerry explained two days after the assault on Qusayr began, the battlefield advances were “very temporary.” Since then, firefights have occurred in Latakia, Aleppo, Homs, Damascus Rural, Damascus, Aqunaitirah, Deir az Zawr, Dar ‘aa, Homs, and Hama. Daily attacks on the FSA mostly take the form of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire missions against FSA strongholds and suspected bases. There have been also occasional raids and arrests, but no general movement. Rather than the start of something new, Qusayr was not the beginning of anything.

Time and Attrition
President Assad may recognize that the FSA lacks the manpower and weaponry to attack and effectively hold enough territory in Syria to claim control over the state. FSA forces, alone, would never be able to threaten what Assad cares for most, his presidency and his regime. It might be viewed that Assad is fighting the war the Syrian opposition’s political wing, the Syrian National Coalition (SNC) and FSA wants. They desire time to establish a working government in the “Free Syrian Territory.” However, Assad may also feel time is on his side. He may very likely believe that allowing enough time, disunity with the SNC, disunity between the SNC and the FSA, a loss of revolutionary zeal, and a loss of motivation and morale within FSA ranks, the opposition will lose its energy. While plausible, at the moment, that does not appear likely to occur.

“The Gentler Syrian Army”
There is the possibility that the Syrian Army has avoided mass attacks and phased operations against FSA held territory because its commanders want to take a visibly less-aggressive approach in the conflict. The Syrian Army full power and capabilities have not been brought to bare on the FSA. This has given many in the international community the sense that there is no worry that the FSA would be overwhelmed, and there really is no need for emergency action, including the use of force by the US and the EU against Syria. True, the Syrian Army’s activities have been moderate, even though the death toll in Syria is high and grows steadily. (Recent Institute for International Strategic Studies estimates of civilian deaths are around 94,000.) Although the Syrian Army has recklessly fired artillery into towns and villages and Syrian Air Force has bombed civilian targets, recordings of FSA members committing crimes against humanity that were video recorded and viewed worldwide. Supporting this “gentler look” of the Syrian Army, are arguments made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that portray Syria as the victim of European leaders “fuelling the fires of war.”

Foreign Proxies for Syria?
Rather than serve as a party to a proxy war, perhaps Syrian Army commanders hope their foreign benefactors would instead fight for Syria. The French Foreign Minister estimated that 3000 to 4000 Hezbollah fighters were in Syria. Israeli analysts estimate that 4000 Iranian officers and men from the IRGC and Quds Force were on the ground. The Russian military presence has not been specified, but in 2012, the Guardian concluded it was considerable. It is doubtful that the Russians will contribute ground forces for the fight. However, Russian advisers would unlikely move too far from S-300 or any other advance missile systems it may provide the Syrians. Reports exist of a planned Russian sale of MiG-29 fighters to Syria soon. Perhaps Russian pilots will train the Syrians in Syria and fly with them. (It is hard to see how the Syrian Air Force would absorb the weapons fast enough to ensure their use in the near term. Taking two examples from history, Russian pilots flew MiGs and drove tanks in Korea in 1950 covertly and manned anti-aircraft and intermediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962.) The Iranians would certainly be willing to fight alongside the Syrian Army much as they fought alongside the Bosnian and Herzegovina Armija from 1994 to 1995. Hezbollah is already in the fight, particularly within the Syrian provinces bordering Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, Hezbollah has been given the task to mop up FSA resistance in Qusayr. Iraqi Shi’a militia have been steadily arriving in Syria. They have come to fight. However, having its allies fight for Syria might create sovereignty issues for Assad afterward. Some allies might seek to remain in Syria and retain control of territory they might gain. Since those allies are generally more powerful than the Syrians, that could pose a real problem for Assad’s regime if it is not agreeable to such plans.

The Syrian Army’s “Business Culture”
Another factor in Syrian Army commanders’ planning of operations could be Assad’s actions to date. Assad has clearly gone too far. The commanders must realize that once peace is achieved, with the defeat of the FSA or a settlement, the international community will very likely hold those responsible for war crimes accountable. That was the case in Bosnia, where political and military officials, unable to evade justice, found themselves on trial in The Hague. Planning for life after the war, and after their military careers, is foremost in the minds of senior Syrian Army leaders. In Syria, officers receive reasonable pensions, but salaries are supplemented by entrepreneurial exploits. Many officers own hotels and resorts, defense and high-tech firms, agro-businesses and wood product firms, construction and transportation companies, as well as other industries. They form a portion of the business community. (This situation is not unusual among government bureaucrats, diplomats, and military leaders of other states in the region.) The Assad regime’s survival will enable the senior officers to retain their interests and allow them have a place to stay without fear of capture. For them, it is not best to have an all of nothing fight to the finish. They want the war to end with Syria in reasonable shape. They may even be able to retain their ranks and positions in a transitional government. However, they would unlikely have the same degree of protection from international, as well as Syrian, justice. Assad, knowing this, is likely very careful not to push his commanders too hard for big moves and more action.

It seems the presence and influence of allies and Syrian Army’s “business culture” are factors as important in planning operations in war as men and materiel in the field. Under current conditions, it is unlikely the Syrian Army will lose. Whether it would seek to destroy the FSA is unclear. As long as it is not asked to do so, it will not. Due to foreign influences on the Assad regime and a possible “openness” toward a peaceful resolution among senior Syrian Army leaders, US Secretary of State John Kerry’s approach to Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov to create peace, may be far more important to the outcome of the war in Syrian than a meeting in Geneva between the parties in conflict. However, since Syria’s journey toward the future must travelled by the Syrians, they must be present at the start of that journey.