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Obama’s Iran Deal Campaign Amasses Support While Stirring Other Public Concerns

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Above is DigitalGlobe satellite imagery of a suspected Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Parchin analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security. As shown, Iran appears to have used heavy construction equipment to sanitize the site. Such actions may indicate Iran has not been forthright about its nuclear activities. As the Obama administration campaigns for the Iran deal, Tehran may be engaging in activities that could result in the deal’s collapse.

The administration of US President Barack Obama has spoken with great pride and aplomb the administration about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed on July 14, 2015. The White House’s infectious enthusiasm has spread far and wide to reach its Democratic political base around the nation. The deal has received support from academics and Hollywood celebrities who produced a video encouraging support for the deal to grassroots organizations and community activists who have held small rallies on sidewalks, in parks and in shopping malls. As Obama explained in his August 5, 2015 speech, the deal defines how Iran’s nuclear program can proceed. The deal curtails Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity to 3.67 percent and limits its stockpile to 300 kilograms for 15 years, thus increasing the time Iran would need to amass enough weapons grade uranium to make one bomb from 2 or 3 months to a year. Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant will be repurposed and its Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor will be modified to reduce its proliferation potential. Iran will be barred from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring has been put in place to deter Iran from violating the agreement. The international community has also enhanced its capability to detect violations promptly, and if necessary, disrupt efforts by Iran to build nuclear weapons at declared and undeclared sites. Before sanctions relief begins, Iran must take major steps such as removing centrifuges and eliminating its stockpiles.

The Israeli lobby in Washington, and many politically influential individuals and groups from the Jewish community around the US, have been the most vocal critics of the Iran deal and have been alarmed by what they view as its far-reaching concessions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has encouraged their efforts. He believes lifting sanctions without fully halting enrichment and dismantling centrifuges is a terrible mistake. In a riposte to criticism, he recently said, “I don’t oppose the Iran deal because I want war. I oppose the deal because I want to prevent war, and this deal will bring war.” Obama’s Democratic support base may have been infected by the administration’s enthusiasm for the deal, but the US Congress seems inoculated from it. Congress poses the greatest challenge to the Iran deal. The administration believed Congressional Republicans would be ready to vote against it before it was signed. It generally views Republican arguments as specious, used only to support a rejectionist position. It was surprised by a few Congressional Democrats who also indicated they will not support the deal, in defiance of Obama. Many are senior Democratic leaders. Those Members are looked upon as enfants terrible, but have not faced castigation from the White House. Scinditur incertum studia in contraria vulgus. (In wild confusion sways the crowd; each takes a side and all are loud.)

In their messages to Congress, Obama and administration officials have urged Members to take the deal whether they like it or not because it’s the only one the US is going to get. The administration would have one believe that if critics among political opponents were to pick up the figurative palate and brush to create anything similar to its “work of art” would result in the creation of a cartoon. One point emphasized by the administration has been that war would be the only option left if the deal is rejected. The administration has been fairly open about the fact that it is ill-disposed to taking military action. It has gone as far as to say there is nothing that can be done effectively by the military to halt the nuclear program. Military action was once repeatedly threatened and declared on the table by the administration only a couple of years ago. However, perhaps those threats were not genuine. Obama has an apparent aversion toward military action that has become woven into his decision making. It has contaminated thinking coming out of the White House on foreign and defense policy. The Iran deal is in many ways a manifestation of Obama’s discomfort with the US military and its utilization. Administration officials and diplomats, while negotiating the Iran nuclear deal operated with a type of tunnel vision, animated with the idea projected from the White House that reaching a deal would be preferable to walking away, left to make a decision on military action. Real perspective of what was happening was lost. US strength seems to have been somehow negated in the Iran Talks. That is ostensibly evinced by the administration’s capitulation to Iran demands. Negotiating to reach peace at any price will always be a quick step toward appeasement. Moreover, advancing the idea with the US public that the US military cannot effectively demolish the Iranian nuclear program may also have had unintended consequences. In a way, the administration has created the impression that the US can no longer intervene against certain countries of a size and strength approximating Iran’s or greater. That could have a negative impact on the US public’s psyche regarding national security. Pictured here is a US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The results of the Iraq War undoubtedly had a strong effect on US President Barack Obama’s understanding of the limits of US military power. However, the results in Iraq say less about the US military and more about the abilities of US political leaders to utilize it. The US military remains unmatched. Advancing the idea that the US military cannot demolish the Iranian nuclear program could have a negative impact on the US public’s psyche regarding national security.

According to a CNN/ORC International poll released on July 28, 2015, overall, 52 percent of the US public says the US Congress should reject the Iran deal, and only 44 percent saying it should be approved. The US public has tended to look at Iran with scrupulosity ever since the fall of the Shah and the US Embassy takeover in 1979. There is a sense of moral superiority over Iran supported by reports human rights violations in Iran and Tehran’s sponsorship of groups as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Iran was also said to have supported Shi’a elements of the Iraqi insurgency and Taliban factions in Afghanistan that fought US troops. Still, Iran had never been depicted as a threat to the US directly. What the US public would expect to hear from the administration is that the US military could peel Iran like a pear and be justified in doing so if Iran ever threatened to develop or actually developed a nuclear bomb. Instead, the administration has announced to the US public and the world, that even thinking about military action is unreasonable given its assay of how little the US military could accomplish against Iran’s nuclear program. This is not a surprising development. The US public has been served a steady diet of negative information from administration officials about its military. Whereas there was once the notion in the US public that the military represented US power and prestige, and was a source of pride, there is now a sense of impotence associated with the military and a resignation that US is on the wane. It should be expected that many in the US public would begin to wonder if the US, itself, is well-protected.  Similar feelings surfaced in the US public as it watched the ravenous, pagan Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) move with impunity in Iraq and Syria in 2014, brutally murdering anyone in its way. CNN/ORC International poll results released on September 8, 2014 indicated 90 percent of the US public believed ISIS posed a direct threat to the US. Reportedly, 70 percent believed ISIS had the resources to launch an attack against the US.

The administration’s concerns over military action against Iran seem more of a manifestation of its understanding of US military power. It was apparent in the first term with regard to decision making of Afghanistan and Iraq and remains present in the remnants of the administration’s second term. The results of the Iraq War, in particular, ostensibly had a strong educational effect on Obama with regard to the limits of US military power in general. Still, those results told less about the US military and more about the relative abilities of US political leaders to effectively utilize it. The US military is a well-crafted tool for warfare. However, as with any instrument, it can only perform as effectively as the skill level of the one handling it will allow. Vis consili expers mole ruit sua. (Force without wisdom falls of its own weight.)

When the US acts in a way that conceals its full capabilities as a great military power, it automatically cuts itself down to a size that an opponent may be able to cope with, even if temporarily, thus raising its costs, possibly prolonging a problem.

Obama administration officials are so rapt with the idea of avoiding military action that it glares out of speeches and official statements on the Iran deal and other foreign policy matters as well. Seeing, they do not see. Hearing, they do not hear. Once the Iranians could discern that US negotiators were driven to get an agreement for the White House and sought to avoid war, conditions were created in which there was little remove for maneuver.  The deal reached truly became the best one that could be constructed. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated in his 2013 inaugural address, “To have interactions with Iran, there should be talks based on an equal position, building mutual trust and respect, and reducing enmity.” Clearly, Iranian negotiators managed to acquire that “requisite” degree of equality. Acceptance of that equality appeared confirmed by the administration when it began to make comparisons between the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program and the Cold War nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. In reality, there is no comparison.

During the Cold War, in the year 1963, to which the administration specifically referenced, the US and the Soviet Union had forces deployed to achieve mutual assured destruction. As war between US and Soviet Union meant annihilation, any desire to declare nuclear war would be nihilistic by its very nature. The US has remained a strong, nuclear armed superpower. Despite what has been said by the current administration, the US is fully capable of acting militarily to defeat Iran’s efforts to establish a nuclear program or potentially doing even greater damage to Iran. Iran, on the other hand, has limited conventional capabilities at best and no defense or response available against the US nuclear arsenal. Iran would not even be able to deter a US military response by having a few rudimentary nuclear devices in its arsenal. The threat to attack US interests internationally or domestically using unconventional forces or clandestine operatives should not be an effective deterrent to US military action. Nescire autem quid quam natus sis accident, id est simper esse puerum. Quid enim est aetas hominis, nisi ea memoria rerum veterum cum superiorum aetate contexitur? (Not to know what happened before you were born is to be a child forever. For what is the time of a man except it be interwoven with that memory of ancient things in a superior age.) The IRGC’s interpretation of heroic flexibility may provide clues on how a dual-track approach may have been created to resolve problems concerning the nuclear issue. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif would engage in diplomacy to gain concessions on sanctions, while unbeknownst to them perhaps, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan and IRGC elements achieved all goals for the nuclear program.

The 19th century Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, was quoted as saying: “The object of war is to impose our will upon the enemy.” In 2013, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared “heroic flexibility” to be a key concept in the conduct of Iran’s foreign and defense policy. The phrase was coined by Khamenei, himself, when translating a book on Imam Hassan. Senior leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) explained that heroic flexibility allows for diplomacy with the US and its Western allies, but requires the protection of Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear energy program. In the words of the Deputy Commander of the IRGC, Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami, “heroic flexibility is an exalted and invaluable concept fully within the goals of the Islamic Republic.” He further explained the concept meant “in no way would Iran retreat from fundamental lines and national and vital interests and this right is something that without [sic] concessions can be exchanged.” That meant that only on issues in which Iran had an interest but no rights, could Iranian concessions be negotiated. He went on to state: “Our fundamental framework is permanent and it is inflexible and our ideal goals will never be reduced.” Specifically on the nuclear issue, Salami elaborated by stating: “For instance, the right to have peaceful nuclear energy according to the criteria that has been secured for us, and this right cannot be modified and there is no flexibility on it, however, within this framework a political flexibility as a tactic is acceptable because we do not want to create a dead end in solving the political issue.” According to this IRGC interpretation, there was no possibility of authentic Iranian concessions on the nuclear issue. However, given the possibility that the US and its Western allies, themselves, might be willing make concessions, particularly on sanctions, the talks would allow them the opportunity to do so. It is possible that the IRGC’s interpretation of heroic flexibility provides clues on how a dual-track approach may have been established to resolve problems over the nuclear issue. Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, would engage in diplomacy to acquire concessions, while Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan and IRGC elements would pursue all goals for the nuclear program. Above is commercial imagery of what Der Spiegel reports is a suspected underground nuclear weapons development site operated by Iran and North Korea west of Qusayr in Syria. The nuclear complexes they initially operated in Syria, located at Kibar near Deir al-Zor, were destroyed by Israeli jets and special operations forces in 2007. Recent tests of nuclear warheads in North Korea may have involved Iranian made warheads or warheads made by North Korea for Iran.

A number of different approaches exist to develop material for nuclear weapons beyond what was negotiated in the Iran Talks. Iran has the technological know-how to attempt them. Iran is known to have experimented with laser enrichment in the past at the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center. Iran might be conducting an effective laser enrichment program in secret. Strides have been made by Dehghan’s Defense Ministry to revamp and enhance advanced defense research programs and strengthen Iran’s defense industrial base.  Iran has already made great strides in satellite technology, drone, and stealth technology.  The application of those new technologies was evident in the reverse engineering of a US stealth drone downed in Iran, the advent of a new anti-ship system and other naval technologies, and Iran’s greatly enhanced cyber capabilities. The administration might say with certitude that Iran has remained in compliance with the agreement. Still, reports of Iran’s effort to sanitize the facility at Parchin prior to the arrival of IAEA inspectors, in a likely attempt to conceal illicit nuclear weapons development there, should be somewhat disconcerting.

It has been reported that Tehran may have taken its nuclear program outside of Iran. One possibility, found in news reports unearthed by Christian Thiels of ARD German TV, is that Iran is working with North Korea in other countries to develop a weapon. The first evidence was their joint operation of nuclear facilities was the complex of structures found at Kibar, just east of Deir al-Zor in Syria. During Operation Orchard, on September 5, 2007, Israeli aircraft, along with special operations forces, attacked and destroyed the facility. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reportedly confirmed that Kibar was a nuclear weapons development site. There is the possibility that other nuclear facilities operated by Iran and Nrth Korea exist in Syria. According to Der Spiegel, there is a suspected underground nuclear weapons development facility west of Qusayr, about 2 km from the Lebanese border. Recent tests of nuclear warheads in North Korea may have involved Iranian made warheads or warheads made by North Korea for Iran.

The Way Forward

Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. (While there are two ways of contending, one by discussion, the other by force, the former belonging properly to man, the latter to beasts, recourse must be had to the latter if there be no opportunity for employing the former.) In a statement on July 14, 2015 regarding the Iran deal, US Secretary of State John Kerry explained, “The President [Obama] has been resolute in insisting from the day he came to office that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, and he has been equally—equally strong in asserting that diplomacy should be given a fair chance to achieve that goal.” Still, dealing with Iran is tricky. To allay concerns that Iran might violate the deal’s terms, the administration explains doing so would be illogical as Tehran has too much to gain from the deal. In the end, a final decision will be made on the deal one way or the other. However, the virtual abandonment of the option to use military power to urge Iran’s compliance was perhaps an error and the administration should reconsider taking this tack. It has raised concerns in the US public. Apparently, it has built up the confidence of many hardliners in Iran. In the Parliament and at Friday Prayers, the chant “Death to America” is regularly heard again.

By any authentic assessment, the US military is unmatched. Yet, it can only be as effective as the commander-in-chief utilizing it will allow. There may be genuine doubt about what the US military can accomplish vis-à-vis Iran in the administration. However, its near predilection toward denigrating US military capabilities to avoid considering military action as an option must be curbed. Fate might soon play a role in that anyway. A response to overseas activities by Iran most likely related to its nuclear program might soon be required. Other than tolerating denials and succumbing to Tehran’s will, there might be little choice but to halt those activities with military action.

Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal: The US Public Must Judge the Deal as Best as Possible

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Seated to the right of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei are Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari, Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi and former Iranian Defense Minister, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Ahmad Vahidi. Seated to Khamenei’s left is IRGC Deputy Commander, Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami. Khamenei will decide whether there will be a final nuclear agreement and whether Iran will fully comply with it.

According to a May 14, 2015 Reuters article entitled, “Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal,” US President Barack Obama, meeting with leaders from Persian (Arabian) Gulf States at Camp David, updated them on international efforts to forge a nuclear deal with Iran. US Deputy National Security Adviser Benjamin Rhodes stated that the US would welcome support from Gulf States for the deal, which many Arab leaders are concerned would empower Iran to work in destabilizing ways in the region. Rhodes indicated that none of the leaders present had signaled they would pursue a nuclear program that would raise concerns.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed on April 2, 2015 met core policy goals of the Obama administration for the nuclear negotiations: potential pathways Iran could take toward a nuclear weapon using highly enriched uranium and plutonium were blocked; and safeguards were established to prevent Iran from conducting a covert nuclear weapons program. With safeguards, the administration believes the framework agreement will cut down Iran’s breakout time capacity to the point that it would take at least 12 months to amass enough uranium enriched to weapons grade for one bomb. The number of centrifuges enriching uranium will be greatly reduced by requiring the removal of its installed but non-operating machines and cutting back the stockpile of enriched uranium gas by 97 percent. Uranium enrichment will be performed only at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The underground facility at Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant will be repurposed for non-uranium research activities. Limits set will require Iran to operate no more than 5060 centrifuges for 10 years. Further measures will ostensibly ensure Iran’s breakout time is markedly reduced before the 10 years lapse. Iran agreed to cap enrichment to reactor-grade (3.67 percent) for 15 years and not to build any new enrichment facilities in that same timeframe. Iran would be required to modify its Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor to greatly reduce its proliferation potential. Iran would be restricted from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring would be set up to help discourage Iran from violating the agreement. If it is found Iran has been in noncompliance, enhanced monitoring will increase the international community’s ability to promptly detect and disrupt future efforts to build nuclear weapons at declared or potential undeclared sites.

Obama will sense ineffable glory if a final agreement is signed on June 30, 2015 and the agreement holds throughout the remainder of his presidency. However, the specter of potential noncompliance of a final agreement looms despite the best efforts of negotiators. The threat that a nuclear armed Iran would present in part drives the negotiation effort of the P5+1 (US, the United Kingdom, France, China Russia and Germany). Prudent US officials and negotiators set what they wanted to accomplish and how to do it in the talks. Yet, securing a perfect agreement with Iran will not be possible. Deterrence is used in response to the threat of a course of action by an opponent. Economic sanctions have all but been declared as the sole consequence to noncompliance with an agreement, but sanctions might not be enough to restrain hardliners determined to build a weapon. Truly controlling a nuclear ambitious Iran may not be possible.

The Iran Talks have not absorbed the national attention of the US public, yet there is support for Obama’s effort. An April 27, 2015 Quinnipiac Poll reported 58 percent of the US public supported the April 2nd agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and 77 percent preferred negotiations to military action against Iran. However, only 35 percent of were very confident or somewhat confident the agreement would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. These statistics are intriguing. Unlike Gulf leaders, when the US public hears senior administration officials speak on Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions in the news media, the matter is oft covered with an artificial mystification. Their words are usually perplexing, and fail to impart any certainty that Iran will comply with the agreement long-term. Accepting what has been achieved by diplomats to reach an agreement so far may create faith that things will work out. Yet, in this case, faith is not a substitute for recognizing the truth. By looking deeper, one may see flaws in the agreement and what it may lack to make it lasting. The mind must process what one sees to surmount what one sees, and animate the intellect in a methodical or formulaic way. Using a simple methodology for examining the Iran Talks will allow those in the US public without professional or specialized knowledge to better evaluate for themselves their progression. The goal would be to reach an objective truth about the talks, not just an opinion.

Discernment

The Roman dictator Gaius Julius Caesar has been quoted as saying: “Fene libenter homines id quod volunt credunt.” (Men readily believe what they want to believe.) It is also true that illusion is the recipe for heartache. Intelligence agencies have countless methodologies available to assess situations such as Iran’s potential to adhere to a final agreement. Developing accurate assessments would require judging well from a set of facts, actions, or behaviors what is genuine and what is false. That is discernment. According to the Greeks, at the most basic level, two actions must occur in the process of discernment. Anakrino is the process of careful study, evaluation, and judgment. It requires one to scrutinize an issue, looking down to up and down again at it, judging, and making careful observations. One must be honest about what is being observed. One must be certain that a preferred outcome is not being imagined. The integrity of one’s observations must be measured. Diakrino is the process of learning by discrimination.   It requires separating observations thoroughly by comparison. Comparisons must be made with what is known to be counterfeit with what is accepted as genuine. What is discerned as counterfeit should be rejected and what is authentic should be accepted. Applying anakrino and diakrino to analyze information on the Iran Talks can assist laymen in assessing their outcome.

In 2013, hardline elements in Iran sensed that newly elected President Hassan Rouhani could capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Rouhani’s choice as Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, was thought to have the ability to push his Western counterparts toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering Iran’s nuclear rights. Both officials have performed remarkably well at promoting Iran’s interests.

Anakrino

Before the Iran Talks began and initially during the negotiations, Obama and officials in his administration were unambiguous about their willingness to act militarily against Iran over its nuclear program. While denying any link between US threats and their response, Iranian officials seemed to become more vocal in their effort to disabuse Western leaders of the idea that Iran seeks a nuclear weapon. In talks with US negotiators, Iranian officials and diplomats repeatedly expressed the position that Iran did not pose a threat to the US or its interests. Hardline officials in Tehran were ready for a struggle. Draconian economic sanctions as part of as US policy of coercive diplomacy against Iran, the degree to which the US has pressed Iran on its nuclear energy program, the US denial of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, and the US condemnation of Iran for allegedly sponsoring terrorism, previously convinced Iranian leaders that the US is a threat to Iran. Threats of regime change and threats to impose a US form of democracy on Iran from the administration of US President George W. Bush still ring in the ears of Iranian leaders. In 2013, hardline leaders in Tehran sensed that newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani could capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Moreover, there was a sense among Iranian leaders that their new Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, had capabilities as a diplomat and advocate that were superior to his Western counterparts and he would be able to push them toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering Iran’s nuclear rights. While rifts between hard-line elements in Iran with Rouhani and Zarif over the Geneva talks were highlighted in the West, an understanding existed among Iranian leaders of the need to support the negotiations team. Indeed, concerning Zarif and the negotiations team, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari stated: “All must help the negotiations team of our country and the foreign policy apparatus in order to create consensus and public unity at the current time in order to help them demand the fundamental rights of the nation of Iran in the nuclear field and stand against Arrogant [US] blackmail and greed during negotiations.”

As the talks progressed, US officials noted that Iran never failed to comply with all terms of the agreements their negotiators signed on to. In Lausanne, Switzerland on April 2nd, Kerry stated: “It is important to note that Iran, to date, has honored all of the commitments that it made under the Joint Plan of Action that we agreed to in 2013. And I ask you to think about that against the backdrop of those who predicted that it would fail and not get the job done.” That statement mirrored one Kerry made while discussing the November 24, 2014 extension. Kerry said Iran had been living up to its “Joint Plan of Action” commitments. He stated further: “Many were quick to say that the Joint Plan of Action would be violated, it wouldn’t hold up, it would be shredded. Many said Iran would not hold up its end of the bargain. Many said the sanction regime would collapse. But guess what? The interim agreement wasn’t violated, Iran has held up its end of the bargain, and the sanctions regime has remained intact.” Adde parvum parvo magnus acervas erit. (Add a little to a little and there will be a heap.)

Obama administration officials unceasingly heralded progress made on the negotiations. In addition to a successful result, a goal of the administration was to engage in talks that were tactful and decorous and avoid having them turn down a confrontational path. Officials have sought to allay concerns that Iran could not be trusted expressed by political opponents in the US Congress and by media pundits with regular reminders that rigorous monitoring measures will stay in place not just for the time frame of the agreement but even after its core restrictions expire. Any movement toward a nuclear weapon will supposedly be detected early, allowing for decisive intervention to prevent the completion of such efforts. However, things may not have been going as well as Obama administration officials indicated. True, there was an apparent understanding among hardline elements in the Iranian leadership of the need to support the negotiations team, and they have seemingly lent their support for what has been achieved so far. Yet, there is an obtuseness among hardliners regarding the deal. They refuse to succumb to the international community’s demand for Iran to make its nuclear program verifiably peaceful. There is blindness among hardline elements to terms of the agreement requiring Iran to halt aspects of its program for 10 or 15 years. They do not want hear anything that other parties to the talks are saying about it. Factus, tactus, visus in te fallitur. Sed auditu solo tuto creditor. (Taste, and touch, and vision to discern the fail. Faith that comes by hearing pierces the veil.)

Despite months of talks, there is still considerable divergence between perspectives on what has been achieved and projected outcomes. The differences were reflected in the respective reports US and Iranian negotiators prepared on the April 2nd agreement. The Iranian report omits several restrictions and limits that all parties to the talks agreed upon.

Perhaps the need to satisfy hardliners in Tehran was reflected in how negotiators in the US and Iran prepared their respective reports on the negotiations. In the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs report entitled “A Summary of the Solutions Reached as an Understanding for Reaching a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and the US report entitled “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program”, there is considerable divergence between perspectives on what has been achieved and projected outcomes despite months of talks. The Iranian report omits a dramatic number of provisions which all of the negotiating parties agreed upon and the US duly records in its report. The Iranian report begins by stating the solution reached was not legally binding and only provide conceptual guidelines while the US report explained that the April 2nd agreement was a framework laying out solutions from which the final text of a final agreement would be written. The Iranian report only notes a 10 year period of restriction on uranium enrichment, uranium production, and the construction of new centrifuges after which all activities could resume. No mention is made of Iran’s agreement to curtail enrichment over 3.67 percent for 15 years, to reduce its current stockpile of 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium to 300 kg for 15 years, and not to build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

Further, no mention is made of Iran’s agreement not use the Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant for enrichment for 15 years. The Iranian report claims the restriction is 10 years. The Iranians report they can continue to research and development on new centrifuges while the US report claims a restriction on centrifuge research and development will be in place for 10 years. The Iranian report does not mention Iran’s agreement to adhere to a research and development plan submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian report says that the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor will be redesigned and rebuilt so it will not produce weapons grade plutonium. However, no mention is made of the provision that P5+1 must agree to the design, and that the original core reactor must be destroyed or shipped out of the Iran for the reactors lifetime. Absent also was any mention of Iran’s commitment not the reprocess spent fuel or engage in the research and development in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The Iranian report does not include the provision that grants the IAEA access to suspicious sites or facilities about which allegations might be made of covert enrichment activity, conversion, and yellowcake production anywhere in Iran. That stipulation grants the IAEA inspectors access to military facilities as well. Regarding sanctions, the divergence in positions is huge. The US reports Iran agreed sanctions would be suspended. Iran says it only agreed to their elimination.

IRGC Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari has offered cautious support for Iran’s nuclear negotiations team, but grumblings among his commanders indicate a final deal would not represent their goals. The IRGC would welcome continued opposition and clashes with the West, especially the US.

Diakrino

The value of the promise depends on character of the promiser. By the admission of Obama himself, Iran has a questionable history as a player on the world stage given its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Making comparison with Iran’s past behavior, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action contradicts all that is disordered, all that is dishonest about Iran. Despite the longstanding claim of Iranian leaders that they would never seek a nuclear weapon, for both practical and religious reasons, it is now known those claims were counterfeit. Iran actually conducted activities relevant to weapons development as part of an organized program prior to 2003. The IAEA laid out its allegations regarding those activities in November 2011. The IAEA previously claimed it had made some progress with Iran in the investigation of this matter between November 2013 and August 2014, that process is now stalled. US and European negotiators want Iran to answer the IAEA’s questions and allow access to the individuals and sites necessary to complete the investigation. This delay has occurred even though Iran has only been asked to implement a set of measures to address the IAEA’s outstanding questions.   Moreover, the removal of UN Security Council sanctions will not occur until and unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA investigation and past questions are resolved. Even supporters of the nuclear negotiations do not believe Iran will make any full confession on its previous weapons related work given statements by senior Iranian officials on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear weapons. Iran may very well be concealing a weapons program while negotiating now. Falsus in unis, falsus in omnibus! (False in one thing, false in everything!)

As the negotiations progressed there was also a discernible change in Obama’s attitude toward taking military action against Iran. The threats vanished. Hardliners in Tehran discovered Obama was ill-disposed to using military force. They learned of difficulties his officials and advisers had in getting him to come to terms with proposals for using force in Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq. Sanctions have never been enough to deter Iran. While facing military threats and being walloped by sanctions in the past, Iran advanced its nuclear program so far that Iran now needs to be pushed back from a break out capacity. Perhaps some hardliners feel that they can secure the lifting of sanctions now and even some continued sanctions relief later through more talks if activity restricted under the agreement is completed and the ability to create a weapon is acquired. Evincing a conviction among officials in Tehran that Obama will not use force, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in part, seemed to mock Obama over his previous pronouncements about using military strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei, according to Iranian state television, recently declared Tehran would not take part in nuclear talks to reach a final deal by June 30, 2015 if threatened with military force. Khamenei was quoted as saying by Iran’s English language Press TV as saying: “Holding nuclear talks under the shadow of threat is unacceptable for Iran . . . Our nation will not accept it . . . Military threats will not help the talks.” Khamenei said, “Recently two US officials threatened to take military action against Iran. What does negotiation mean under the shadow of threat.”

According to the Fars News Agency, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami described a hypothetical war against the US as “No big deal.” He went on to explain: “We have prepared ourselves for the most dangerous scenarios and this is no big deal and is simple to digest for us; we welcome war with the US as we do believe that it will be the scene for our success to display the real potentials of our power.” Salami added Iran would set fire to any airbase used by enemies to strike the country, and declared, “We warn their pilots that their first flight [to strike Iran] will be their last one and no one will be allowed to go back safe and sound and they should call their flights as their last flights.” Salami also stated: “When the arrogant powers [US, EU] grow united in different directions to weaken the Islamic community, we should use our different capacities to fight against the enemy, and the Islamic [State of] Iran has gained many experiences in fighting against the enemy so far.” Sounding as if he were expecting an attack over some impending revelation that Iran had violated the terms of agreements signed, Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi, has warned that Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah would respond to attack by Israel on Iran by launching of a firestorm of missiles on Israeli targets. Hezbollah allegedly possesses 80,000 rockets. Iranian State television quoted Safavi as saying: “Iran, with help of Hezbollah and its friends, is capable of destroying Tel Aviv and Haifa in case of military aggression on the part of the Zionists.”

Signing on to a final nuclear agreement with the P5+1 would become a nightmare for Khamenei if he later felt doing so in some way disrespected or disregarded the sacrifices of martyrs of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Sacred Defense. Regardless of any benefits of sanctions relief, that concern weighs heavily on his mind.

There was once the idea that the suspension of sanctions might lead to investment, opportunities for Iranians, and the strengthening of moderate leaders. Yet, a recent statement from Jafari has dampens hope that gradual political change might occur and a nuclearized Iran might become less likely. Jafari stated the IRGC will be taking on even greater roles in various fields. Sepah News quoted him as saying: “The capacity, quality, and increasing role of the IRGC in various fields in the mission of defending the Islamic Revolution and system is a decisive role—which friends and enemies admit too; also, according to the emphasis which the Supreme Commander in Chief [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei] put on the qualitative and quantitative development of the IRGC and the transformative and internal aspects of it in the better implementation of the missions. Updated services to personnel can play an important role in this regard.”

As for the final agreement, both hardliners and moderates would oppose any provision that would allow the IAEA to inspect Iran’s military facilities. Iran argues “no global authority exists to inspect a country’s military facilities. There is no treaty to do so, and the IAEA is not in a position to carry out such [a] task.” As for sanctions, Iran wants what the US and Europeans will not give: the permanent lifting sanctions. On April 4, 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated, “During the talks, we [both sides] always talked about lifting economic, financial, and banking sanction. We never talked about the suspension of the sanctions, and if that were the case no agreement would form.” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator at the nuclear talks, on April 4th said: “The American fact sheet stipulates that the US and EU suspend sanctions against Iran . . . . [However], the entirety of the economic and financial sanctions, and the [UN] Security Council resolutions, will be removed the first day of the implementation of the agreement. This agreement exists and is the solution that we reached.”

US and European negotiators are well-aware of the great incongruence between their countries’ positions and those of Iran on these issues. To have a final agreement, one side must give way. The IRNA news agency quoted Khamenei as saying, “Our negotiators should continue the talks with respect to our red lines. They should not accept any imposition, humiliation and threat.” Whatever decision Khamenei makes on the final agreement, he must be certain his decision in no way disrespects or disregards the sacrifices of martyrs of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Sacred Defense. Regardless of any benefits from sanctions relief, that concern weighs heavily on his mind.

What Can Be Discerned

It is difficult to surmise where members of the US public might fall on the Iran Talks if they had more facts on it. Assurances of officials speaking from a source, the US government, with all of the information available to it, are hard for the average citizen to judge well or refute. On its face, there is no evidence that the nuclear talks in a type of graveyard spiral now that very difficult issues are being broached. When officials on all sides speak they evince what appears to be a bold curiosity for the adventure ahead. The manner in which officials have presented information about the nuclear talks to the US public has obscured realities. Right now, the distance both sides must travel to reach the same place in the negotiations may be too far to travel. One can hardly believe that Iranian leaders want the same agreement the Obama seeks. US officials have well-outlined how they could discern, or what they might do if they discover, Iran has violated the agreement. The US public should realize, given the chance to use the analysis here, would realize that although Iranian negotiators signed the agreement with Tehran’s authority, US officials can only trust that Iran intends to adhere to all of its aspects for the long-term. Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. (Mountains will be in labor, and a ridiculous mouse will be born.)

Iraq’s Premier Narrows the Divide, but Challenges Loom: Will Abadi Take a Path Being Created by Iran?

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Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (left) is pictured in an October 2014 meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (right) in Tehran. Abadi has been successful in mitigating sectarian tension in Iraq. However, with some prodding from Tehran, Abadi now seems to be leaning toward Iran and challenging the administration of US President Barack Obama on its support and commitment to his government.

According to a December 15, 2014 New York Times article entitled “Iraq’s Premier Narrows the Divide, but Challenges Loom”, in nearly every way, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has so far been a different leader than his predecessor, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, despite their common Shi’a political bloc. Although the obstacles facing his government are considerable and he faces political challenges within his own party, Abadi’s early performance has encouraged many Western officials. In his first months in office, Abadi has already appeared three times before Parliament which Maliki only did twice in eight years. Abadi has fired incompetent and corrupt military commanders appointed by Maliki and rooted out 50,000 so-called ghost soldiers; no-show troops for whom commanders nevertheless collect salaries. The December 15th New York Times article quoted Gyorgy Busztin, the Deputy Special Representative for the United Nations in Iraq, as saying “He [Abadi] is doing all the things we feared he wouldn’t be doing.” While many officials credit Abadi’s conciliatory style for the improved political environment, they say the changes also point to a new sense of urgency in Baghdad that Iraq might finally break apart in the face of the threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).

Abadi’s greatest test to date came when an Iraqi court sentenced a prominent Sunni politician to death. It was panning out to be an unmitigated disaster for the country’s new prime minister. The verdict, on capital murder charges brought by the previous government against the politician, Ahmed al-Alwani, prompted the defendant’s Alwani tribe to threaten the termination of its coordination with the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS. However, Abadi moved quickly to mitigate the problem. He immediately contacted Sunni officials and Alwani tribe members, assuring them that there would be no execution. He urged them to solve the matter by the tribal tradition of paying “blood money” to the families of the two soldiers who were killed in a gun battle when commandos came to arrest Alwani last year.

However, the December 15th New York Times article also explained that Abadi faces constraints from hard-line factions within his own Shi’a constituency. For example, Iraqi Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi said that even though Sunni officials were optimistic about Abadi’s intentions, they remained worried about the “old guard,” a reference to Maliki and his cronies, who many believe are working behind the scenes to undermine Abadi. Maliki had already been accused of inflaming sectarian hostility. It was a made cause for the US push for his removal. His reputation was made worse by his open opposition of a deal to share oil revenue with the Kurds. He called the fall of Mosul to ISIS in June a conspiracy orchestrated by the Kurds. It is believed that ISIS’ march over a vast swath of Iraq has been aided by sectarian hostility which Maliki’s rule inflamed. Maliki warned against arming Sunni tribes to fight ISIS. His lack of support for Abadi has also been evinced by his refusal to vacate his prime minister’s offices and palace in Baghdad’s Green Zone. There is the possibility that Maliki is driven purely by his own political objectives and the hope that he might return to power sometime in 2015.

However, it may also be that Maliki’s actions have been driven by Iran. Tehran may be using Maliki both as leverage with Abadi and as a possible replacement, should he take what Iranian leaders in Tehran might view as an overly conciliatory approach toward other sectarian groups in Iraq and move too close to the US. Part of that effort also appears to include having Maliki maintain close linkages with Iran’s Shi’a partners in the region, including groups such as Hezbollah. Abadi must remain concerned with reactions from his Shi’a political base to his bona fides as leader of Iraq’s Shi’a community upon which his political survival depended. Indeed, it appears Iran’s approach is working. True, Iraqi leaders have always visited Iran since the 2003 invasion by the US-led coalition. Yet, recent visits by Abadi and other senior Iraqi officials indicate Iran still holds considerable influence with them. There is palpable feeling in the air that renewed linkages between Iraqi Shi’a political leaders and Tehran has been created. It has been firmed by Iran’s efforts and sacrifice in defense of Iraqi cities, towns, and citizens from ISIS.

Doubts Arise about Abadi in the US

When the ISIS blitzkrieg began in Iraq on June 9, 2014, the response of the administration of the US President Barack Obama included pushing then Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to establish a representative government, to include Sunnis and Kurds. It was seen as an effort to heal the rifts being exploited by the insurgents. The militants captured large parts of the country’s western and northern provinces in their June offensive after Sunni residents threw their support to the group after the Maliki government stopped paying the Sunni tribal fighters who had earlier helped battled the ISIS’s precursor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Obama went as far as to insist that no US military help will be forthcoming unless Iraqis make an effort to bridge their divisions. US Secretary of State John Kerry, in talks with Maliki, tried to make headway on the issue. After a protracted political crisis, the Iraqi Parliament voted to have Maliki step down in August, and Abadi took over with a mandate to establish a new government more representative of Iraq’s ethno-religious groups and gain the trust of Iraq’s disaffected Sunnis so they would fight ISIS rather than support it. His early performance encouraged many US and Iraqi officials.

In support of Abadi’s government, the US deployed 1,700 US troops to Iraq with the mission to help train and reorganize the highly fractured Iraqi Army. It had dwindled to nearly half its size from the 50 brigades it had when the US forces left in 2011. US military troops would also prepare the Iraqi Army for a ground offensive against the ISIS. A fight to retake Mosul was being planned for the spring of 2015. Obama announced in November that the US would send 1,500 additional troops as part of a $1.6 billion effort to train and equip nine Iraqi brigades and three Kurdish brigades for a renewed push against ISIS. Obama also sought to support plans to create as many as three brigades of Iraqi National Guard units drawn from members of Sunni tribes in the Anbar province to fight AQI. Those tribal militias were a vital part of the “Sunni Awakening” that began in August 2006, during which Sunni fighters turned against AQI. The tribal militias cooperated with US troops in killing large numbers of AQI militants and in pushing the group out of its longtime stronghold in Anbar province. ISIS’s June offensive was launched from Anbar, and it has been consolidating its control over the province.

Alistair Baskey, a spokesman for the US National Security Council, stated for the New York Times in an email that Abadi and the Iraqi government “have made clear that Sunni tribal forces are going to have to be a part of the effort to defeat ISIL [ISIS] and for the security of their provinces.” Baskey went on to comment on Abadi’s participation at a December 3, 2014 Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial in Brussels. He stated that Abadi “once again acknowledged that military action alone will not defeat ISIL [ISIS] and that positive steps toward governmental reform, national reconciliation, and economic and social reconstruction will be needed in this fight. This process will take time but it is now underway. The new government is working to integrate tribal fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces.”

However, Abadi, during a December 9, 2014 meeting with US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, reportedly made a strong push for more weapons and expressed doubts about reconciling with Sunni tribes. According to a December 14, 2014 ForeignPolicy.com article, Abadi’s approach caused US and European officials to worry whether the US-led coalition was rushing to train and rebuild Iraq’s military forces without getting a matching commitment from the Iraqi government to make peace with its Sunni tribes. Talk began of holding back the deployment of the additional 1,500 US troops as a way to indicate US displeasure at Abadi. However, it was recognized that any slowdown or hesitation on the part of the US to execute its plan to train and equip the Iraqi military as well as support for the formation of national guard units will have far-reaching consequences. An anonymous US official was quoted in the December 14th ForeignPolicy.com. article as stating if the US waits to deploy additional forces “or if we look like we are starting to wobble in our commitment to Iraq we’ll pay for that inside the coalition and we’ll pay for that with our Arab partners.” Sedit qui timuit ne non succederet! (He who feared he would not succeed sat still!)

Iran Seeks to Guide Abadi’s Way

It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Iran would tolerate any reduction of its influence or surrender its interests in Iraq as a result of the Obama administration’s actions. Knowing that the type of representative government the US sought to construct for Iraq could not be designed easily, Iranian leaders seemed to believe the US would fail to create it. Khamenei, on June 23, 2014, stated: “We vehemently oppose and disapprove the interference of the Americans and others in Iraq’s domestic matters. We believe that Iraq’s government, people, and the senior clergy are capable of ending this sedition. God willing, they will end it.” After some political horse-trading, Maliki was pushed out and Abadi was brought in. However, Iranian leaders did not concede that the US was better able to manage Iraqi politics. In response, Iran committed itself heavily to Iraq expecting to acquire even greater influence in the country and with Abadi.

Tehran eventually expressed support for Abadi, but it was reserved. It came in the form of congratulations from the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Rear Admiral (Daryābān) Ali Shamkhani. On August 12, 2014, Shamkhani offered congratulations to the Iraqi people and their leaders for choosing Abadi as their new prime minister. He also stated that Iran supported “the legal process for choosing the new Iraqi prime minister.” Yet, the Iranian leadership’s authentic sentiments on the matter were best expressed by Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader and Head of the Expediency Discernment Council Strategic Research Center, Ali Akbar Velayati. On June 19, 2014, Velayati explained, “[Nouri Maliki] is the best figure among existing Iraqi politicians to lead. I say this because I know Iraq. I have cooperated with everyone who is managing Iraq, even before the victory of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.” In following with that sentiment, during Abadi’s first visit to Iran as prime minister on October 20, 2014, Khamenei reservedly expressed appreciation over his formation of the new Iraqi government. Khamenei stated, “Iraq is a big, important, and influential country in the region that can play a (major) role once security and conditions return to normal.” He told Abadi, “We stand by you and will defend your government just as we seriously defended the former administration.” Yet, in Abadi’s presence, Khamenei lauded the performance of Maliki in resolving the problems of the Iraqi people and maintain security in the country. It was not difficult for Abadi to perceive that in Tehran, Maliki’s standing was higher than his own. Press TV reported Khamenei heaped further praise on Maliki when he visited Tehran on November 10, 2014 by saying his approach prevented “chaos” and “instability” in the country. Khamenei rated what he called “Maliki’s approach to help the new government of [prime minister] Haider al Abadi and efforts to establish unity among different Iraqi forces” as “very good.”

By late 2014, Abadi began to publicly lean toward Iran and challenge the US regarding its level of support despite his successes in Iraq. The cause for his change in perspective may have been a combination of weariness from political infighting in Baghdad, the struggle to balance his ties to sectarian groups, pressure from his own Shi’a community, or Iran’s efforts on the battlefield. Abadi may have simply begun to question the Obama administration’s will to engage long-term in the fight against ISIS. His rebellious attitude toward the US was evinced in a December 1, 2014 interview with the Lebanese-based Al-Mayadeen Television. Abadi reportedly stated, “While the United States was hesitant to help Iraqi armed forces amid security threats to Baghdad, Iran was swift to provide assistance to its crisis-torn Arab neighbor.” Abadi went on to express his appreciation to Iran for standing with Iraq in its battle against ISIS. He also explained that Baghdad was determined to maintain friendly relations with Tehran. Abadi stated that the two neighboring nations share common interests, adding Iraq would not sever its relations with the Iran simply because others might ask Baghdad to do so. Given the views he proffered in his December 1st interview, the approach taken by Abadi during his December 9th meeting in Baghdad with Hagel should not have come as a surprise. 

To Abadi, US officials have approached the anti-ISIS fight as a policy issue, but for him that fight is an existential issue. As a neighbor, Iran displays a mutual sense of danger, and its leaders have assured Abadi that as neighbors, they are open to helping his government face many critical issues.

Impact of Iranian Military Support

During a September 25, 2014 meeting with Abadi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated, “Tehran considers Iraq’s security and stability as its own security and stability.” If the Iranians manage to shape the military situation on the ground in Iraq, they will have much to gain.  Iran’s position as the dominant power in the region would be furthered. As Velyati explained, “The majority of [Shi’as and Kurds] and their leaders have very close relationships with Iran. Some Sunni Arabs have cordial relations with us as well. We can therefore make our most effort to gather the aforementioned [individuals].” Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders certainly believe they are close to achieving that goal. The Iranian Students News Agency quoted IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Dovom) Yadollah Javani, the Senior Adviser to the Representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC as stating that the two factors in the successful liberation of Amerli and Mosul were the matjas [religious authorities]’ fatwas, especially that of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He further noted that according to his [Sistani’s] own words, “General [Qassem] Suleimani has exported the culture of the Sacred Defense [Iran-Iraq War].” Javani continued by explaining, “Today in Iraq and Syria, the great banner of General Suleimani has been installed, with the caption beneath it, ‘Savior of Iraq;’ this is a great source of pride.”

Some IRGC boasts have derided US efforts in Iraq. Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi explained that Iran, Syria, and Iraq make up the strongest coalition against ISIS, with millions of people willing to defend sacred shrines. He further stated the US-led anti-ISIS coalition is ineffective and has already failed.

The Way Forward

It has been proffered by US officials anonymously that the Abadi government is still in its nascent stages and the US and its coalition partners need to “resist making major assumptions about the trajectory of the situation in Iraq based on anecdotal information or a few data points.” If the decision is made to wait to see how Abadi will behave before investing further militarily in Iraq, it is believed the Iraqis will most likely delay in organizing their security forces. Soon enough, everyone will be waiting to act except ISIS. That has been referred to as “a losing proposition.” Iran heavily committed itself to Iraq with the expectation that it will acquire even greater influence over it.  With greater control over the Shi’a community and increased influence with the Kurds, not through political operations, but its military efforts, it is difficult to see how Iran would not be able to shape the political, economic, and social situation in Iraq for years.  As for the sectarian struggle, Iran is confident it can handle the matter.

In many places, the Iraqi people have coped with unspeakable sufferings, injustice in violent forms, and corruption among officials. Given Abadi’s progress, hope was created that the light of his success would shine amidst such darkness, and the darkness would not be able to overpower him. Yet, no matter how capable Abadi may appear to be, he cannot be expected to find his way in that darkness without help. Iran is creating a road for Abadi. It may be either a path toward a stable, secure and unified Iraq, with a representation government or a blind alley which will lead to greater sectarian violence. If Iran’s efforts concern the Obama administration, it should consider how the US can create a straight path for Abadi to travel. It is not a matter of simply pushing him from behind with demands. It means leading the way with concrete steps and working closely with Abadi, as a partner, to accomplish all things.