The Plight of Surovikin and Other Russian Generals Reveals More of What Is Wrong with the Russian Federation Government

A still image from the June 2023 video of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–implorng Wagner Group troops to halt their rebellion. As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion, that according to the common wisdom, nearly sent the regime of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin spiraling down the drain, may have been an effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would be remiss for Putin’s most loyal subordinate, the Russian Federation security services, and possibly Putin himself, not to see the possibilities. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely have been the case that a decision to investigate military officers would have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Here, greatcharlie parses out the circumstances of the detention of several Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services, with an emphasis on handling of Surovikin.

Except for some possible changes in the efficiencies in the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ prosecution of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation).  So much outside of good reason appears to have guided top officials in the Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Ministry) and top commanders of the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff), that hardly anything should be discounted as impossible at this point. For some in the West, that reality props open the door for potential moves that could be made by those same top commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the near future that would be positively unsettling to the government of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. 

The private military organization, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) has fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of the invasion. The organization’s  owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, of poorly conducting the then 16 month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.”

As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts mutually entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Parts 1 and 2)”, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion may have been a hypothetical effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would have been remiss for someone as the most loyal Putin subordinate, the Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, and possibly for Putin, not to see the possibilities. The FSB’s monitoring of responses to Prigohzin’s actions and possible communications with him should have been expected at least. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely be the case that a decision to investigate military officers would likely have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Indeed, in the Russian Federation security services, names have changed and so have technologies, but in the end that old chestnut from the Soviet days of “weeding out reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries” who supposedly pose a never-ending internal threat is apparently at the root and drives many of their activities. History has provided more than enough evidence of how well that turned out.

It is greatcharlie’s purpose here to parse out the circumstances of the detention of Surovikin and other Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services to gain a better understanding of what is truly at the root of the action, what is likely occurring, and why the potential outcome for the Kremlin may very well be against its interests in more ways than one. Apparently suspected from the start of the whole Wagner Group episode was Commander in Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin, the deputy commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on his detention and what surrounds it essentially as a yardstick to consider the plight of others. It is not concealed that greatcharlie believes the detention is a monumental injustice, a fantastic outrage. Human rights are available equitably to all humans, even Russian Federation generals. Hopefully, there will not be too much argument against that among a few readers. Some of what is discussed about the handling of Surovikin is written in the abstract but founded on long-reported treatment experienced by political activists, disfavored officials, and ordinary citizens alike whose interests “did not align with those of the government” and were thereby detained by the Russian Federation security services. It is greatcharlie’s contention that there is no reason to “search” for the truth. The true and pertinent is already known to all following the matter. No alternate facts to those generally reported in the Western newsmedia are revealed. No legal arguments based on Russian Federation law are offered here. Logic and reason are the tools brought to bear on the matter. Security service investigators surely have their “convictions”. Surovikin’s detention is hardly a subject that anyone could expect to discuss rationally with managers of the security services. Still, one might hope that at the top of the Russian Federation government, the light of good reason will eventually shine upon the matter. Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt? (what good are laws when there are no morals?)

On June 24, 2023, a video appeared on Telegram that depicted “talks” between Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and the Deputy Commander of the GRU, Vladimir Alekseyev, at the Southern Military District’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don of which the Wagner Group had taken control. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were made out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories had the less noble aim of rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, an audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. Those outbursts and, even more, the Wagner Group Rebellion, did much to provide such evidence.

Regarding Sedition and Insurrection in the Russian Federation

When asked during an interview broadcasted on CBS News “Face the Nation” in May 2023 what he thought was really behind the very public feud between Prigozhin and both Shoigu and Gerasimov, former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded: “My view is, this is all taking place, with Putin’s approval.” Gates went on to explain the following: “This is- this is Putin, dividing and conquering. Putin, given how badly the war has gone, has to worry, at some point, that his military decides he’s a problem. By giving Prigozhin power and strengthening Prigozhin and letting him criticize the Ministry of Defense, Putin keeps them divided. If the two came together and decided Putin was a problem, then Putin would have a really big problem. So, my view is that- that Putin is sort of orchestrating this to a degree in the sense- or at least letting it go forward, because it serves his interest in keeping these two powerful forces at each other’s throats, rather than potentially beginning to collude against him.”

Imaginably, Gates, forever the consummate intelligence analyst, might appreciate fragments of an alternative perspective in the abstract on the perceptions of Prigozhin and his Wagner Group’s commanders and Russian Federation Armed Forces operations and senior operational commanders of the circumstances in Ukraine. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely out of his concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin was vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, Prigozhin’s decision to have a bit of fun at the expense of elite circles was very much ill-timed. An audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. 

There is a perspective expressed in foreign and national security policy circles in the West that the time for Putin to leave power has come. Indeed, such is the intensity of negative feelings about Putin among many in West that the long-remembered words spoken by Oliver Cromwell in the House of Commons in 1653 concerning his ejection of the remaining members of the *Long Parliament” used famously on other occasions in the United Kingdom’s Parliament, well-expresses their sentiment: ‘You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!” Gates’ comments about the Russian Federation Armed Forces or the Wagner Group or both posing a threat to Putin’s power were nuanced and derive from a depth of understanding on the situation in the Russian Federation externally matched by few, it would fall in line not only with a multitude of mainstream analyses that have explored that possibility, and now feel their assessments were proven on-track with the advent of the Wagner Rebellion. 

It is very important for those thinking along those lines to consider how the insurrection truly end. It did not end with the return of Wagner Group troops to their ans some leaving for Belarus with Prigozhin. That was one stage of the whole show. It ended when Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

With regard to prospective plotters among Russian Federation Armed Forces  commanders, surely they understand that the special military operations’ present outcome was actually due to their failures and those of the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders. Surely, they were aware or should have been aware, just how deficient their forces truly were. This is hard saying for them, but the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders of the conventional forces were and still are inadequately suited to defend their country or to successfully invade a country such as Ukraine, especially when it is receiving robust support from NATO member countries and other countries with an interest in the matter. Due their own colossal failure to consider eventualities of such an enterprise, they did not foresee the deluge of Western military aid and training or what a huge impact it would have on the special military operations course. Strategic failures by Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders and the inability to recognize opportunities for decisive action and turn failure into success continue to the point where its too painful for those concerned with the wastage of human lives to watch. Among the Ukrainian people, whose country the Russian Federation wrongfully and illegally invaded, maybe those failures might be viewed [as a relative blessing from on high. (Yet, what really can ever be called a blessing during a war: survival?) 

If one might believe that what has transpired in Ukraine since February 2022 was all a deliberate act of subversion by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff, the question would then be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous extent in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing upright and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This allegation shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round. 

Certainly, Putin had authority over what transpired but had no expert role in the technical management of any of it. Imaginably, top Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders could still hold Putin accountable for all that has occurred in Ukraine or dare to say such things in public or private, however they should guard against such delusional thinking even in their darkest moments. With the idea of overthrowing Putin being bandied about, doubtlessly, the security services have been very much on the prowl, more so now than ever, watching, listening, and hoping to pick up the trail on anything even slightly out of order. 

Putin (left) and Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, talk along a corridor followed by stout securitymen. From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. The Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow. Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by an a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of the Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the disturbance.

Background on the Russian Federation Security Services

During his July 27, 2023 address at the Kremilin’s Cathedral Square, Putin enumerated the organizations that fall under the heading, the security services of the Russian Federation He included the following: the Federal Security Service; National Guard; Interior Ministry; Federal Guard Service; and, the Defense Ministry.

Federal Security Service

Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) or FSB, is the principal security service of the Russian Federation. The primary responsibilities are within the country and in certain circumstances,, externally,, are: counterintelligence, internal and border security, counterterrorism, surveillance and the investigation all other capitol crimes, violations of federal law violations, and unenumerated and unforeseen national security matters.

The National Guard

Federal’naya sluzhba voysk natsional’noy gvardii Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Service of the Troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation) or Rosgvardiya is the country’s internal military force, comprising an independent agency that reports directly to Putin under his powers as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The National Guard is not an element of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2016, Putin signed a law establishing the federal executive bureaucracy. The stated mission of the National Guard is securing the Russian Federation’s borders, serving as the lead agency on gun control, combating terrorism and organized crime, protecting public order and guarding important federal properties.

Interior Ministry

Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation) or MVD is responsible for law enforcement within the country by performing tasks as described I n the names of its main agencies: the Police of Russia, Migration Affairs, Drugs Control, Traffic Safety, the Centre for Combating Extremism, and the Investigative Department.

Federal Guard Service

Federalnaya sluzhba okhrany (the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation) or FSO, is the federal government agency concerned with the tasks related to the protection of the most senior national officials as mandated by the relevant law, to include Putin. The FSO is also responsibile for the physical security of certain federal properties.

Defense Ministry

With regard to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it is not a security service per se, but technically plays an in security service role, being able to provide supporting ground, air, and navalnavalNaval assets when needed to support the main security organizations. Penultimately, the Defense Minister exercises day-to-day administrative and operational authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Russian Federation General Staff executes the Russian Federation President’s and the Russian Federation Defense Minister’s instructions and orders. Ultimately, the Russian Federation President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and directs the activity of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry.

From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. To all intents and purposes, the Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. (Perhaps that was an expression of his crni humor and it escaped the vast majority of listeners.) In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the “disturbance”.

As greatcharlie noted in its aforementioned August 1, 2023 post, in his June 25, 2023 address to the Russian Federation on the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Putin then fired something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to those similar to “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he described players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. To that extent, it would be expected for the security services to single out examples from the senior ranks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to terrorize them into believing none would be safe from their watchful eyes and protective hands. If even the slightest scent of sedition or insurrection emanated from their direction, the security services would much like a tiger in the jungle at its prey.

As the Wagner Group Rebellion took shape, many officials and observers in the West proffered that Prigozhin and his troops would not have been able to take over military facilities in southern Russia so easily and mount his rapid march on Moscow without collusion with some members of the military’s elite. It is possible that such assessments and even the words of Gates spoken about a possible military insurrection drove top officials into such a frenzy that they became more determined to light on any officer over the slightest suspicion. It is fairly unlikely that the security services could say for certain that any military officers were absolutely involved in the Wagner Group Rebellion or any other apparent plots. Nevertheless, action was expected, and action was taken. The noble pagan of Ancient Rome, the renown statesman and scholar Marcus Tulius Cicero (106 BC to 43 BC), attributed to the Athenian statesman Solon (c. 630 BC to 560 BC), the quote: “Rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, præmio et pœna.” (A state is regulated by two things, reward and punishment.)

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. There was evidently no reason for any of the officers to believe they were guilty of anything. All were apparently devoid of any instant fear. Apparently, not one attempted to act first by using resources available to general officers to take refuge from the security services or evade investigators upon their arrival to detain them. For each, the discovery that they were subjects of an investigation by the security must have come to each as a bolt out of the blue. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release. In Act 2 Scene 1 of William Shakespeare’s tragedy, The Life and Death of Julius Caesar (1599), the character Brutus, considers, in a soliloquy, his reasons for assassinating Caesar on the Ides of March, states words surely pertinent to thinking of the security services regarding the subjects of their investigations ostensibly for treasonous acts though such behavior was unseen: “And therefore think him as a serpent’s egg / Which, hatch’d, would, as his kind, grow mischievous, / And kill him in the shell.” With its own hand, the Russian Federation government is gutting its own military of premium commanders. Que puis-je dire? 

The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to Wagner Group Rebellion. Citing the Wall Street Journal, the Moscow Times stated “The detentions are about cleaning the ranks of those who are believed can’t be trusted anymore.” Indeed, although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release.

Background on Surovikin

Holding the rank of General of the Army, Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin has served as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine from October 8, 2022 to January 11, 2023, during which time helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year. He was replaced as the top commander in January 2023 by Gerasimov but retained influence in running war operations while in command of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone.

He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the medal and title Hero of the Russian Federation and the Order of St. George. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when on November 22, 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces. It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), under one command. 

Surovikin was born in Novosibirsk in Siberia on October 11,1966. He is currently 56, married, and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, unknown to greatcharlie is the degree to which he is observant. After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during the last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency. Fighting in the Afghan War in the latter stages when the US was conducting its covert operation to support the Soviet’s main opponent, the Mujahideen at full-bore was most likely a very challenging experience for Surovikin.

Surovikin discussing the situation in Ukraine during his period of service as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone. The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that , which said Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain and commander of the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. When the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-declared Gosudarstvennyj Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP., orders were sent down by the GKChP requiring Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into the barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. Shortly after that, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, prompted by politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior decided to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RussianFederation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

The security services were surely ready and willing to grab those that both their sister national security bureaucracies and elites as Shoigu and Gerasimov could point a finger at. If some document had been created listing those officers that the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff had doubts about, Surovikin’s name would surely have been placed on the top of that list. For those who might have thoughts of seditious thoughts or considering insurrection, they would surely suggest that Surovikin be their role model: “Dein Vorbild!”

Surovikin (left) proudly receives Order of St. George, 3rd degree, from an apparently satisfied Putin (right). For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. 

How Jealousy and Envy Likely Poisoned the Thinking of Shoigu and Gerasimov on Surovikin

US officials briefed on intelligence concerning Surovikin’s detention have said they do not know if his was actively involved in the Wagner Group plot to abduct Shoigu and Gerasimov. Searching for reasons behind Surovikin’s detention, the Western newsmedia as well as Russia scholars and policy analysts have repeatedly noted that when he was selected as the commander of Russian Aerospace Forces in 2022 and as the Russian Federation’s overall commander in Ukraine, none other than Prigozhin very publicly welcomed his appointment to those posts, calling him a “legendary figure” and “born to serve his motherland”. These quotes and other supportive ones, along with a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin, have fuelled rumors in the West that Surovikin may have been “purged” or put under investigation for his ties to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, even if fuelled by rumor, would indeed be more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into.

Still, despite any perceived ties between Surovikin and Prigozhin, it is more likely the case that he was a fitting target for the security services because he was, and presumably still is, disfavored by Shoigu and Gerasimov for, all of things, possessing a military acumen that surpassed theirs by leaps and bounds. No one could have been more aware of how inept Shoigu and Gerasimov were than Surovikin. No one did more to make the duo’s inadequacies readily apparent just by doing his job right. Rather treasure their subordinate as someone who gets things done in the midst of the Russian Federation’s conundrum in Ukraine, at the nub of their concern over him was very likely jealousy, envy, and insecurity. Shoigu and Gerasimov have respectively demonstrated themselves to be very flawed men in their thinking and actions. It is conceivable that they would go a bit further and prove themselves prone to punish subordinates because of their talents. Que l’enfer est faux avec vous?

When Surovikin was promoted to overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone on October 8, 2022, he began to make moves that brought some positive results and good news for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Surovikin surely understood that leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer, although he may have wanted to do so in many areas. Despite shortcomings of his forces in the field and accepting the situation as it actually was, Surovikin sought to solidify the position of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. Fully in his element in ground warfare, he stepped up better organized localized attacks to have a cumulative effect and push back on advances by Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) at that time. His defensive moves reportedly raised worries among US military officials and officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden that Russia Federation troops might be able to withstand renewed Ukrainian offensives.

Yet Surovikin’s efforts, which were bearing fruit, did not appear to be enough to impress or satisfy his military superiors. One might wonder whether Surovikin was intentionally given a fool’s errand when given overall command in Ukraine. One might speculate it was part of a pre-concerted effort conjured up by his superiors, hoping to brand him with a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission to correct a near Intractable situation before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Readers may recall that it was greatcharlie’s prediction in its October 30, 2023 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, that the situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) According to Thucydides’ own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1 of The History of the Peloponnesian War, he was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because he had “great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland.” However, the renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports that it was firmly under Spartan control were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

It also could have been the case that Surovikin’s ability to establish order from chaos convinced others they could grab glory from his success and claim his successful actions as their own. Surovikin’s replacement as overall commander in Ukraine was none other than Gerasimov. When Gerasimov arrived to take command of the special military operation from him, Surovikin was not dismissed as was the case with Thucydides. He became one of three deputies subordinate to Gerasimov in the Special Military Operation zone, which meant Surovikin’s sound military thinking,  good insights, and reliable intuition would be at his disposal. Further, by keeping Surovikin in the mix, any negative feelings Putin might have developed over a dismissal would be avoided. At that time, he still appreciated Surovikin, and would have unlikely tolerated his dismissal and would likely have responded negatively to efforts to dismiss him. However, if his superiors were truly “gunning for him”, as suggested by greatcharlie, their efforts would hardly end with his demotion. It seems they managed to set up a better aimed second shot at him during the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Surovikin with laser pointer (left) and Shoigu (right). Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, Putin, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk, implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . . ] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, at the meeting with bloggers in Russian Federation on June 23, 2023, Putin implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.” For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. On the face of it, one might have imagined Putin and the general would have a very harmonious relationship, Both were devout servants of the Soviet Union and desired to preserve their erstwhile country. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability became most apparent to Putin through his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded.

The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

A matter that might presumably have caused Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness, particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin needs to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity. Vana quoque ad veros accessit fama timores. (Idle rumors were also added to well-founded fears.)

Surovikin (left) and Gerasimov (right). It would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

By countenancing the detention of Surovikin, Shoigu and Gerasimov would have essentially given their blessing to the actions of the security services. When the guilt of an individual is near assured by such authority, and results are expected at the top, the faculty of thought can often be suspended, even lost every step of the way. By observation–empirical data gleaned from years of newsmedia reporting–this appears true for almost every country, sorry to say. (If this faulty practice at all sound familiar to readers from security services of other countries, change your ways today! (More easily said than done one would suppose.)) Sufficit unum lumen in tenebris. (A single light suffices in the darkness.)

Surovikin appears to have found himself in a pickle with Putin similar to that of Ancient Roman military leader Belisarius (c. 500 AD to 565 AD) with Roman Emperor Justinian I (482 AD to 565 AD). Far more than simply a military commander, Belisarius was one of the greatest of Antiquity. He has been dubbed by historians as “the Last of the Romans.” He conquered the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa in 9 months, then turned to conquer much of Italy. He was victorious against the Vandals at Tricamarum and Ad Decimum. He recaptured the city of Rome for the Empire and held on to it under siege despite the fact that in both seizing the city and defending it, his force was outnumbered. Although subsequently defeated by the Persians at Callinicum, he won a great victory against their forces at Dara. Belisarius repulsed invasion attempts by the Huns at Melantias and by the Persians at Ariminum by causing them to lift the siege of the city. Skilled at using deception in warfare, he led the Persian commander to withdraw without a fight. However, having accomplished all of this and more, in 562 AD, toxic advisers, jealous and envious of Belisarius’ success and favor with Justinian, managed to convince the emperor that his loyal commander was conspiring to overthrow him. He was found guilty at trial, stripped of rank, publicly humiliated, and imprisoned. After reconsidering the matter, Justinian pardoned Belisarius and demanded his release. He restored him to favor at the imperial court. Belisarius died very shortly afterward.

It would seem the security services are very much troubling Surovikin with a lengthy examination. One might imagine if the security services had a clear cut case against the Surovikin, they would have readily thrown a light on all that is dark to everyone about the matter by making some complacent public statement in a very grand way. Certainly, that would happen, albeit only if Putin sanctioned it. Out of sheer curiosity, it would be interesting to hear what sort of ragbag of dissonant trifles the security services have in their possession about Surovikin. In the aggregate, their evidence would unlikely amount to anything managers in any legitimate law enforcement organization elsewhere would find satisfactory or acceptable. Conceivably, any evidence possessed by the security services could hardly be more than circumstantial and unlikely exact, but surely whatever it possesses would be near enough for the security services to believe their case is solid. Each bit of nothing in their minds would presumably rate higher meaning. To that extent, one might assess in the truest sense, the supposed crimes of the suspected officers were featureless ones. Nos hæc novimus esse nihil. (We know that these things are nothing (i.e., mere trifles.)

Snakes are able to unhinge their jaws, which allows them to swallow animals much larger than their heads. After they devour the animal, their jaw hinge goes back into place. Much as with snakes, right or wrong, security service officials, whether in the Russian Federation or governments of freedom loving democracies of the West, will figuratively unhinge their jaws to devour “larger prey” such as Surovikin or any subject of an investigation for whatever recherché rationale or due to an investigator’s some very apparent mental abnormality, highly valued by them. Often too easily given the authority by their superiors who are usually eager to receive results, investigating security service officials are usually reluctant to release the subjects of their investigations even if it requires busting budgets by increasing staff and hours on the beat and increasing the use of technical resources to include contractors to collect evidence that unlikely existed. Errant investigators will continue to clamp down on their victim even when it is clear there are no substantial leads, or trifles, to follow up on. Curiously, superiors in most security service do not appear to  circulate in a way to observe such aggressive investigative practices or hear from subordinates whether anything inordinate is transpiring. Typically, managers in the security services have come up from the same system and are unwilling to push too hard on anything thoroughly. They know the deal! To be sure, the behavior of investigators in the security services can be unhinged not as much in a physical way as with the snake’s jaw, but psychologically. Once its victim is completely figuratively devoured, broken in a real sense, their jaws will return to their original position.

Gerasimov (above) moves through a well-protected bunker to the rear of the frontlines in Ukraine. A matter that might presumably cause Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin wants to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Surely Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity.

On Bullying Surovikin

Turning to the Bard again, in Act 3, scene 3 of Shakespeare’s play Othello, the Moor of Venice (1603), the consummate antagonist, the ensign Iago, acting full bore in a dastardly campaign to destroy the commander, Othello, psychologically, seeks to create doubt in his mind about his wife Desdemona’s fidelity and that she could possibly be in love with his captain, Cassio, his most loyal subordinate. In convincing Othello that it would be a tremendous blow to his reputation if word of what was in reality a nonexistent relationship between the two, became widely known, Iago states the famous passage: Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, / Is the immediate jewel of their souls: / Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; / ‘Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands: / But he that filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not enriches him / And makes me poor indeed.” While likely embarrassed, disheartened and potentially humiliated initially by the public spectacle and dishonor of his detention, the brave soldier, a former spetsnaz officer, will not so easily be driven past hope and into despair despite the worst the security services might be able to dish out. True, the message Surovikin recorded urging the Wagner Group troops to halt their “mutiny” was likely made at the suggestion of the security service which likely had him in their possession at the time. Yet, the possibility is greater than not that Surovikin truly wanted the whole episode with the Wagner Group to end in order to prevent an atrocious “blue on blue” clash, save the lives of much needed troops, and avoid doing anything that would give the Russian Federation’s opponents an advantage. Surovikin likely saw it as one more chance to be a good commander and patriot despite his difficult situation. Doubtlessly in their interrogation of Surovikin, investigators are very likely repeatedly testing every link of their conceivably defective and possibly contaminated chain of evidence. However, no fabricated disclosures or incriminating false confession under duress should be hoped for from Surovikin. A likely denouement would be the general’s call to higher service unless he is released. The security services would of course assure all that Surovikin had met his fate by his own hand if he were to die in their custody. Hopefully, none of that will transpire.

For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars.. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Perhaps every Western capital, as well as the capitals in other regions concerned about Ukraine, was aware of it. Western intelligence appears to have been more fully informed on the details of what was transpiring on the border than the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff and the security services in the aggregate. It brings to mind how difficult it seemed for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services to monitor Prigozhin’s movements between Belarus and the Russian Federation after the rebellion. Time and effort was spent raiding empty homes garnering little more than wigs and some old gag photos, gold bars and automatic weapons, all of which were returned to their owner. In the meantime, Western intelligence had been monitoring every move he made by satellite. One might hazard a guess that the US Intelligence Community knew details such as what he was typically having for breakfast and lunch and how much time he was spending watching television. The juxtaposition of the respective approaches to investigating the two subjects by the security services is almost comical.

Surely, the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services themselves had a more than adequate opportunity to monitor and disrupt any plan of the Wagner Group, to prevent if from assembling and rolling out against the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, and long before the “mutineers” left their line of departure and reached Rostov-on-Don. The reason why they failed to act, robustly or discreetly, is anyone’s guess. The failure of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and security services to interfere with the Wagner Group before the situation took a grave turn was surely a worse act of enabling the rebellion than any other. If Surovikin is being held over any knowledge potentially possessed and withheld by him, he could hardly have concealed anything that everyone did not already know on the matter. As the whole saw how the whole episode played out, one might wonder what sort of special piece of information he could have held back. Recalling the dialogue from the 1979 blockbuster film “Apocalypse Now!”, a portion of a line spoken by the character US Army Captain Benjamin L. Willard is apropos in this case. With that line added on here, one could then state with considerable accuracy that charging anyone with having foreknowledge of the Wagner Group Rebellion would be “like handing out speeding tickets at the Indy 500.”

If Surovikin is being held over some possible errant words spoken by him, then, as suggested earlier, the time has long passed since the security services should have let Putin, the Russian people, and the world know they have got it out. However, such is surely not the case. Everything made publicly known so far points to the likelihood that they have no real case against Surovikin. Perchance the best case for which the security services are actually providing strong evidence is the case proving what an absolute abomination the Russian Federation government is. Some might argue that too is an “open secret”.

Regarding the inadequacies of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services, greatcharlie need not go as far as to call attention to just how wrong their respective pre-invasion conclusions were about the Ukrainian people welcoming invading Russian Federation troops with open arms. One might infer from the quality of their previous work product, in the minds of security service investigators, no matter how implausible or off-kilter their cause for holding Surovikin might be, they believe there is good reason to detain Surovikin. They can “rest assured” that they have got the right man. Again, they have got it out! Complètement folle!

Interestingly, while Russia scholars and policy analysts will never recognize the sovereign territory of Ukraine in the Donbass as Novorossiya, it is supposedly a reality for the Russian Federation government. That being the case, if the Wagner Group on territory that was in the minds of Russian Federation officials now their country’s sovereign territory, whatever the Wagner Group was doing was a matter that fell primarily if not solely within the security services’ province. How inelegant it is for the security services to foist their responsibilities upon commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield who at that moment were swamped, struggling to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from delivering a crushing military blow, sending the entire enterprise in Ukraine from swiftly spiraling downward into a defeat on a scale not seen since World War II. (Undoubtedly, with regard later offensives that have lead to grand defeats, some might call attention to the May 4, 1975 spring offensive (Chiến dịch mùa Xuân 1975), officially known as the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 (Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy mùa Xuân 1975), which was the final North Vietnamese campaign of the Vietnam War that led to the capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the surrender and dissolution of Republic of Vietnam. Others might call attention to the May 2021 offensive of the wretched Taliban in blatant violation of a peace agreement that led to the capture of Kabul, the complete collapse of the internationally backed government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and subsequent dissolution of the robustly supported the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces on August 15 2021.)

Putin (center top) meeting with select members of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Russian Federation security services, and the Security Council during the Wagner Group Rebellion. For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Pitfalls for Military Officers Who Get Too Close to Political Matters

With Prigozhin being a very close associate of the Russian Federation President and, by reports, ostensibly under the control of the GRU and the Russian Federation General Staff, it is not too difficult to imagine Surovikin was most likely reluctant, or strongly desired, to stay out of matters closely concerning Prigozhin’s activities outside of military matters. By doing so, one could only bring unneeded trouble upon oneself. It would be impossible, without all of the facts of what was really the case, what was in play. One of the other aforementioned commanders detained and questioned by the security services, Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of the GRU, military intelligence, certainly would have known prying into whatever the Wagner Group was doing off the battlefield would be counterintuitive. He too would know just getting too close could result in trouble as the situations for Yudin, Alekseyev, and Surovikin clearly demonstrate.

In greatcharlie’s June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, a true picture of the thinking among the Russian people concerning service to the state–to the best understanding of greatcharlie–was outlined with frankness. At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, some citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances even following what could reasonably be called the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. (On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) For certain, laws concerning the people’s well-being can be legislated with some regularity in most countries but justice is very often harder to achieve.

To that extent, greatcharlie supposed that scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would unlikely be quick to assist the Russian Federation government by providing any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. Indeed, there perhaps would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively depicted or impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. It would be enough of a tragedy to simply find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, those among the Russian people who might have something of real value to contribute may decide, or their respective families and friends might advise, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

Putin (left) and Shoigu (right). Behind Putin to the left is Alexei Dyumin, Acting Governor of the Tula Region of the Russian Federation. Behind the pensive Shoigu, to the left, is Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister and State Secretary, General of the Reserve Army, Nikolai Pankov. Dyumin holds the rank of lieutenant general in the Russian Army. He once served as the chief security guard and assistant of Russian Federation President  before Putin promoted him to lead the Russian Federation’s Special Operations Forces which he oversaw during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The following year, he became Deputy Defense Minister. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. It has been suggested within the Western newsmedia that Dyumin would likely replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister if the need arose. Politics at the highest realms of the Russian Federation are complicated and dangerous. Those who really do not have “hold any cards” or are not “covered” politically much as Icarus of Ancient Greek mythology tend to get burned and fall whenever they intentionally or incidentally get too close to the fire.

Beyond being shocked and surprised, Surovikin was likely horrified upon initially discovering that the entire political cabaret of the Wagner Group Rebellion was being launched in the eastern sector of his area of responsibility. If he had not been, he might have supposed the security services, to include the Border Guard and the National Guard, would be in the best position to put the brakes on the matter. He then might have expected the FSB would have the situation “well in hand”, going about interviewing Wagner Group commanders and detaining them if necessary. None of that happened. It turned out none of the security services took on the task of dealing with the Wagner Group. (Still, one might suggest in their own way, FSB managers did have the matter covered alright. They would select suspected, not necessarily guilty, co-conspirators after the fact, and deflect any culpability for their own failures.) One could imagine Surovikin’s facial expression upon hearing from security service investigators. Perhaps he was stoic. 

Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely putting too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his real job, fighting an illegal war initiated by the Kremlin. The security services, however, are unable to see that. They exist in an alternate reality–a cognitive bubble–much as they do in every country. That is something that legislatures and executive authorities in democracies must do far more to guard against.

The mainstream opinion reported in the West generally is that Surovikin is a skilled commander who would likely continue to pose problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The New York Times described Surovikin as a respected military leader who helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year, analysts say. He was replaced as the top commander in January but retained influence in running war operations and remains popular among the troops. Perhaps he is looked upon as something far less formidable by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff on which he served. A common theme heard during the Wagner Group Rebellion was that the action was benefitting the enemies of the Russian Federation. Among the points made in his July 24, 2023 “Address to the Nation” concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin explained that external threats–tacitly understood to be the US and other Western countries–would exploit anything that might provide advantage for them against the Russian Federation. Putin stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history. Putin continued: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Oddly enough, in a dark, cynical twist, Surovikin, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–and propping himself in a chair against a wall in an unmilitary fashion, spoke briefly on a video recording. Surovikin remarked: “We fought together with you, took risks, we won together,” He then entreated:  “We are of the same blood, we are warriors. I urge you to stop.” Surovikin added: “The enemy is just waiting for our internal political situation to deteriorate.” He  then implored the Wagner Group troops: “Before it is too late . . . you must submit to the will and order of the people’s president of the Russian Federation. Stop the columns and return them to their permanent bases.” It is almost certain that when the video was produced, Surovikin was already being held–and likely being roughly handled–by security service investigators.

Readers may compare Surovikin’s typically appearance depicted in this photo (above) with his deportment in the June 24, 2023 video and judge for themselves the general is doing well. In the video broadcasted on June 24, 2023, Surovikin as aforementioned, appears in an unkempt state, unshaven and wearing an unpressed uniform. Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely to put too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his job.

With regard to what the Moscow’s perceived enemies were actually thinking and saying about the Wagner Group Rebellion, the New York Times on June 27, 2023 reported that US officials interviewed, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence, explained concerning Surovikin and the Wagner Group Rebellion that they have avoided discussing what they and their allies know publicly to avoid feeding Putin’s narrative that the unrest was orchestrated by the West.

At the same time, US officials admitted to the New York Times that US has “an interest in pushing out information that undermines the standing of General Surovikin, whom they view as more competent and more ruthless than other members of the command.” Reportedly, they further stated: “His removal would undoubtedly benefit Ukraine, whose Western-backed troops are pushing a new counteroffensive that is meant to try to win back territory seized by Moscow.” This statement alone would hardly serve as striking proof that the secret Western agencies were working around the Russian Federation to sabotage its efforts in Ukraine, efforts on the world stage, and efforts to maintain national unity. Still. destroying Surovikin is viewed as desirable among the Russian Federation’s declared opponents–enemies, then given the Russian Federation security service investigators’ actions, one might ask of them: “Je suis désolée, de quel côté es-tu?”

It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone even near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, if not certainly, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Russian Federation Deputy Defense Ninister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Russian Federation Defense Ministry post. He has since been released. Expectedly, Putin would have insisted upon Prigozhin’s release if he had been quietly detained.  However, that would likely have been late under any circumstances as the Russian Federation security services can do an incredible amount of damage to one’s person in a very short period of time. Prigozhin, a convict in a Soviet prison in the 1980s while in his 20s, likely would have had no desire to experience such treatment in 2023 while in his 60s.

One must also remember that service to Putin, Prigozhin, would do just about anything if Putin told Prigozhin it was part of his plan or simply said that was what he wanted. That would be all he needed to hear. If the choice had to be made between Surovikin’s well-being and Putin’s satisfaction, there would be no contest. Prigozhin’s choice would be to satisfy Putin. Such is the nature of Prigozhin’s relationship with Putin. Prigozhin is dedicated to Putin, No one should make a mistake about that. He is also quite beholden to him for his largess and position within the highest realms of Russian Federation society. Putin likely came to recognize Prigozhin’s rather flattering attachment to him long ago. Absent such dedication, he likely would have shaken Prigozhin well before. It would doubtlessly be a strain for Prigozhin to swallow such an act of betrayal against Surovikin or arduous for him to carry that truth until the end of his days, but surely he will attempt to do it. Thinking about how Prigozhin has been so willing to offer his opinion, his predilection for talking too much, and his penchant for flying off the rails of logic during his fiery ravings, what comes to mind is “Bigmouth Strikes Again”, a 1986 song from the third album of the English rock band The Smiths. Written by Johnny Marr and Morrissey, the lyrics of the refrain are: “Bigmouth [La-la, la, la, la-la!] / Bigmouth [La-la, la, la!] / Bigmouth strikes again / And I’ve got no right to take my place / To the Human race.”

Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin leaving Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Deputy Defense Minister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Defense Ministry post. He has since been released.

No Little Lamb Driven to Slaughter: Surovikin’s Violent Antecedents

Virtus præmium est optimum. Virtus omnibus rebus anteit profecto. Libertas, salus, vita, res, parentes, patria et prognati tutantur, servantur; virtus omnia in se habet; omnia assunt bona, quem penes est virtus. (Virtue is the highest reward. Virtue truly goes before all things. Liberty, safety, life, property, parents, country, and children are protected and preserved. Virtue has all things in herself; he who has virtue has all things that are good attending him) In truth, as an officer in the Russian Federation Armed Forces,, and the Soviet Army before that, Surovikin has by no means comported himself as virtuous man. To be certain, greatcharlie does not want to leave readers with the impression that Surovikin is an innocent lamb being driven to potential slaughter. A number of violent antecedents are associated with his name. Indeed, in Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. 

As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring, where three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders.  In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. During his tours in Syria, Surovikin received the nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” At one time there were supposedly whispers in the Russian Federation that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source. Surely, others following his career more closely could perhaps enumerate more “bumps in the road”.

Who Wins, Who Loses?

While wanting to develop a better picture of Surovikin’s likely treatment, greatcharlie admits without pretension that diving into what might be the “low vibrational” thinking of those holding him is a disquieting and distasteful journey of exploration through the grotesque. Perhaps greatcharlie’s “tirade” in this post on the enormous injustice against Surovikin comes as a result of studying Prigozhin’s videos on Telegram too closely during research for its preceding post. (Can mere association with behavior via video recording breed similarity?) After reviewing what is presented here, a small number of readers might minimize in a well-meaning way as intelligent speculation. In the introduction, greatcharlie admitted there was a small degree of that. Noticeably, there is no effort to predict future events concerning Surovikin’s detention. Those who may believe they have gained by it are surely powerful enough with the system and intent on having their way with him. However, who gains and who loses on the matter perhaps has not been considered in the round by those who have some part in it.

Following his grand victory over the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin’s dominion over the Russian Federation very likely felt more secure to him at least to some satisfactory level. It could be the case that the detentions and dismissals of Russian Federation general officers could reverse that sense of success. Putin may not have considered all of the possible effects of the action taken by the security services upon his situation. Under immense pressures, fending off distractions, Putin is likely to make mistakes, misunderstand situations, ignore his intuition and intimations. This is true despite his considerable knowledge and experience. In fact, Putin would know that. What is overlooked and misread will remain as elements of failure unless time permits successful correction. It might be worth noting that when Nazi Germany’s Fuhrer und Reichkanzler (Leader and Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler, following an assassination attempt in July 1944, feared plots were being made to remove him from power and that the end was near, he had his top henchman Reichführer-SS (Reich Leader-SS) Heinrich Himmler unleash the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) against the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) which resulted in the destruction some of his most capable generals, such as Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge when he needed them most on the battlefield. Parallels, mutatis mutandis, are found between what transpired years ago in Nazi Germany and what is transpiring today in the Russian Federation. Perchance Putin has not considered this.

Tanto est accusare quam defendere, quanto facere quam sanare vulnere, facilius. (It is just so much easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to inflict than to heal a wound.) Putin should be aware that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them. 

.Putin must not act–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–out of fear but confidence in his commanders. His public demand for Surovikin’s return to service would send an extraordinary signal of support to his commanders from the most junior lieutenant to Gerasimov. The positive impact on their psyche would likely be immeasurably positive. Among the Russian people, surely a Solomonesque act of justice would send a signal of unity during the crisis and favorable response–a boom–in terms of his popularity ratings. At the same time, taking such corrective action would not be a matter of becoming, or proving himself to be, a virtuous man. It is really just a matter of putting his house in order. As aforementioned, Justinian I released Belisarius, but a bit too late. By all indications, it is not too late for Putin to order the release of Surovikin. “Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant”

On August 15, 2023, Elisa Braun and Zoya Sheftalovich of Politico reported their discovery of information dated August 13, 2023 on the VChK-OGPU blog–known to closely associated with the Russian Federation security services–explaining on that Surovikin is now “under a kind of house arrest” by which he is restricted to an “apartment” in which he being detained. However, the blog indicated has been permitted visitors, including several of his subordinates. As aforementioned, in response to inquiries from journalists, the Kremlin still has neither made an official public statement concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts nor offered anything more than vague references of “speculations, allegations” about his awareness of the Wagner Group’s plan to revolt as of this writing. 

Putin (above) might consider that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them.

The Way Forward

In the abstract, one might presume the likely accepted wisdom of members of the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies from the most junior military analyst or Ukraine specialist to the most senior military officers and diplomats or state secretaries and ministers, even if only tacitly accepted, is that poor intelligence analysis and deplorable performance by military planners and commanders in the field were the main sources of problems that have hampered the special military operation. However, at the nub of it all is the reality that a country in which so much negative energy could be devoted to destroying its most capable commanders over petty personal biases and grumblings of their superiors, could never muster the dynamic, synergistic, positive power to act in unity and in the case of Ukraine, in a true military fashion, to accomplish what has been asked of it by national authority, Putin, in the Kremlin. The Russian Federation government appears rotten at its core, and that rot contaminates whatever it engages in. In its most important responsibility, providing for national defense–if illegally invading Ukraine could fall under the rubric of national defense–the whole world can see just how rotten it all is. No national government, not even friends in Beijing, Minsk, Pyongyang, New Dehli, Johannesburg, Brasilia, Yerevan, Ashgabat  Tashkent, Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Damascus, Havana, Caracas, or elsewhere would likely say so plainly to Putin just how surprisingly bad the Russian Federation Armed Forces have performed, but they see it and think it nonetheless. What all of this means is that despite how much victory might be wished for in the Kremlin, no matter what gimmicks might be used and shortcuts taken, will never come. That was the case from the start. The greatest opponent the Russian Federation government faces is itself. Destroying its operation in Ukraine will prove to be its greatest victory over itself. On this point, greatcharlie does not believe it is in error. However, surely it would fully accept that if Surovikin were to be immediately released near the time of this writing, error upon it would be proved to some considerable degree. Certainly, greatcharlie, with some trepidation, will publish a more than apologetic retraction of it all once news of Surovikin’s release is reported. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. (For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)

“Official” company photo of veteran Wagner Group troops in Ukraine (above). Was their rebellion about their well-being, the war’s management, or something deeper? The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only neeed to be the possibility for their wishes to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

This post should be considered a continuation of the preceding one

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refer to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

In a photo released by Prigozhin’s Press Service, the Wagner Group owner is seen recording one of several video addresses in Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

The Wagner Group Rebellion

As things moved, on the morning of June 23, 2023, Prigozhin alleged Russian Federation forces had launched a fire mission on Wagner Group troops in Ukraine causing considerable casualties. Prigozhin announced he had launched an armed effort with his Wagner Group to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Wagner Group troops crossed from Ukraine into Russia and entered Rostov, meeting no resistance by border guards. Just after 12:00AM on June 23, 2023, it was reported in the newsmedia that the FSB issued a warrant for Prigozhin’s arrest. 

About 8 hours after that, morning newsmedia reports showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin posts a public announcement by video on Telegram from the captured base to report events. Prigozhin stated: “We are inside the [Russian Army] headquarters, it is 7:30AM. Military sites in Rostov, including an aerodrome, are under control. Prigozhin then issued what amounted to warning and intriguingly foreshadowing certain events by saying: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.” Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee. About 2 hours after that, Putin made a national address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 6 hours after that, Prigozhin is seen in a video widely broadcasted and posted online, discussing a deal to halt the rebellion and withdraw. On the heels of that, reports from the newsmedia indicated that Belarus President, Lukashenko, brokered the deal between the Kremlin and Prigozhin to end the “mutiny”. Wagner Group troops who participated in the rebellion would not be prosecuted, while those who did not join–presumably only those operating in Ukraine and not referring at all to those operating in African countries, in Syria, or elsewhere–would be offered contracts by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would leave the Russian Federation and remain in Belarus. Prigozhin ordered his troops back to their field camps in Ukraine. About 3 hours after that, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had completely withdrawn from Rostov-on-Don. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. In Rostov-on-Don, crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on.

About 48 hours after that, Putin made a late evening address broadcasted and posted online by the Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia concerning the rebellion in which he provided “more detail” regarding his decisionmaking and the “bigger picture.” About 12 hours after that, at an afternoon event held with much fanfare at the Kremlin’s Cathedral Square with some 2,500 members of the military, the security forces, and the National Guard in attendance, Putin expresses his appreciation for the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. Lukashenko’s role did not receive mention on that occasion. He expresses sorrow and praise for the Russian Federation aircrews that lost their lives confronting the “mutineers.” About 2 hours after that, Putin in a smaller setting indoors, again addressed Defense Ministry, National Guard, FSB, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service units who reportedly “ensured law and order during the mutiny.” Putin again thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 48 hours later, in the evening in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan in the Russian Federation, after the totality of the weekend’s events had a chance to settle well in the minds of the Russian people, Putin is shown in a video widely broadcasted in the country’s state-run and independent newsmedia greeting a very excited, sizable cheering crowd. The sense of genuine joy on his face upon engaging with the cheering Russian Federation citizens was most apparent.

Wagner Group troops in a company truck travel from the chaos of the frontlines to the serenity of Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. On the morning of June 24, 2023, newsmedia reports across the Russian Federation showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don, 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation Armed Forces, which was directing a considerable element of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee.

Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

Surely there were relatively significant attendant events in between the key events that occurred within the 24-hour news cycle. For example, the FSB seized the Wagner Group Headquarters. The Russian Federation military without fanfare established a protective posture in the southern portion of Moscow. The commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, who was once the overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine, addressed the rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. The first deputy chief of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev appealed to rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. Shoigu and Gerasimov vanished from public view during the entire period. Perhaps the most chilling moment during the rebellion was when Wagner Group troops actually advanced just 200 kilometers (120 miles) from Moscow, according to Prigozhin. A column Wagner Group troops that reportedly included mounted tanks, armored vehicles, at least one self-propelled rocket launcher and numerous personnel trucks. had reached the Lipetsk province, about 360 kilometers (225 miles) south of Moscow. The downing of six Russian Army helicopters occurred while that column was en route to Moscow and the shoot-down of a Russian Air Force surveillance plane at some point. Surely, under the circumstances, the Russian people were hungry for information on events. The beginning of the day when Prigozhin was seen and when Putin made the first of his appearances during the episode, end of the day, when Putin made second appearance are times when the majority of the Russian people receive their news. Those moments turned out to be main events that did much to signal the direction the story was taking. Yet, the many pieces in-between as the few highlighted here also fit well within what could be characterized as the complex puzzle that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Once Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops agreed on June 24, 2023 to withdraw from Rostov-on-Don, they departed immediately. Crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and speedily returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarusian President AlexanderLukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.

The Narrative Putin Wanted the Russian People To Garner Regarding the Wagner Group Rebellion

Certainly, it never would have been considered sufficient in the eyes of the senior Kremlin officials to allow the Russian people to simply receive a well-paced flow of events on the Wagner Rebellion to decipher in many ways. State-run and independent newsmedia broadcasts did the job of letting them know events were taking place concerning the Wagner Group, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff and the special military operation. What they needed to hear and grasp about those matters would be explained to them by the ultimate source in the country, the Russian Federation President. To that extent, Putin provided four well-crafted addresses, one during and three immediately on the heels of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Given the nature of the lens through which Putin apparently views the world, considering past public addresses, interviews, decisions and actions, his concise and succinct addresses in addition to well-communicating the required facts to the Russian people, had to meet what were his specific priorities. To that extent they reflected his mindset, emotions, state-of-being, reasoning, and intentions. He did not exactly offer water-tight explanations, but there was probably scant concern among Putin and his advisers that the overwhelming majority in the targeted audience would dive too deeply into his explanations or energetically question any aspect of them. Indeed, it was likely expected in the Kremlin that for the audience in the Russian Federation, it would be enough just to have some answers on the rather unique development.

Putin’s First Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 24, 2023

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin emphasized that challenges to the government of any kind would not be tolerated. For the first time, he characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Putin, wearing a solid black suit and black pindot tie, stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.” He added: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Offering a flash of his personal outrage over the rebellion, he went on to say dramatically: “Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.” However, far from eliminating the threat based in Kyiv, the Russian Federation Armed Forces have barely held on to initial gains made since the initial weeks of the war before Ukraine was better armed. The odds of it advancing further into Ukraine now are slim to none. Prigozhin ostensibly was acting in response to what perceived were actions by Shoigu and Gerasimov that would eventually cripple the Russian Federation’s ability to defend itself. Perhaps Putin had not been listening closely to Prigozhin’s tantrums after all.

Ever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events. Putin stated: Any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people. He then said: “A blow like this was dealt to Russia in 1917, when the country was fighting in World War I. But the victory was stolen from it: intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, and the loss of vast territories, ultimately leading to the tragedy of the civil war.” One might argue that the Russian military was a spent force by 1917 and poorly led. At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. The country’s forces were resuscitated to some degree by the Spring of 1915. However, those huge initial  losses essentially knocked Russia out of World War I. As for the 1917 Revolution, it garnered support under the guise of offering the people a better existence, an alternative to penury. Misled and misguided, many followed the revolutionaries.

Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin stated: “The Armed Forces and other government agencies have received the necessary orders. Additional counterterrorism measures are now in effect in Moscow, the Moscow Region and several other regions. Resolute action will also be taken to stabilize the situation in Rostov-on-Don. It remains difficult; in effect, the work of civil and military authorities has been blocked.” These were certainly strong and comforting words for the Russian people. However, Putin’s government to that point had not been successful in handling very apparent threats to the country’s security. Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) had launched several successful drone attacks and helicopter attacks on Russian Federation targets, including on Moscow, and as aforementioned in Part 1, there had been more than one attack on Russian Federation territory by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian militant groups near the border with Ukraine. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin had to emerge unconditionally victorious.

Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Putin stated: “Any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people. Our actions to defend the Fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people.” However, Putin rather than dealing with “rebels” harshly, he directed Wagner Group troops to sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Recognizably, under that arrangement, the Wagner Group, as it once stood in Ukraine, was essentially disbanded. The organization’s troops elsewhere in the world were apparently unaffected by the ruling. Yet, the Wagner Group right before the very eyes of the Russian people were being provided ample means to avoid prosecution and all penalties.

Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Although these remarks may not appear inordinate from Putin given inflamed sentiments of the moment and the fact that under his authoritarian regime, he had established limitless for himself. However, it also could have been something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to others, “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he remarked about players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. It would seem the world has yet to see the regime’s tyranny touch bottom.

Prigozhin went unnamed directly by Putin in his first address. Yet, presumably, even though he was not mentioned, Putin’s words in this first iteration of his addresses nevertheless may have sounded harsh enough to Prigozhin. Certainly, Prigozhin is not a fragile man. However, perhaps these initial words were spoken by Putin, an individual who he clearly holds in very high esteem pinched just a little. “Enjoy the Silence” is a song by English electronic music band Depeche Mode. Recorded in 1989, it was released on their album, Violator (1990). It is pertinent here to the extent that on June 25, 2023,  Putin moved from near complete silence on the spat between Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to a veritable roar in his address to his nation. For Prigozhin, no matter what was altogether transpiring, they must have had their impact. The lyrics of the first verse are: “Words like violence / Break the silence / Come crashing in / Into my little world / Painful to me / Pierce right through me / Can’t you understand?”

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin, for the first time, characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Forever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events.Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits.

Putin’s Second Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 26, 2023

Among the top five points Putin wanted to communicate n his second address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, he wanted to assure the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized that departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters and handling them swiftly and diligently and all other parts continued to perform their functions without interruption. Putin, wearing a solid dark navy blue suit and solid dark navy blue tie, stated: “I will repeat–society and the executive and legislative branches of government at all levels displayed high consolidation. Public organizations, religious denominations, the leading political parties and actually all of Russian society held a firm line, taking an explicit position of supporting constitutional order. The main thing–responsibility for the destiny of the Fatherland–has united everyone, brought our people together.” He said further: “I will emphasize that all necessary decisions to neutralize the emerged threat and protect the constitutional system, the life and security of our citizens were made instantly, from the very beginning of the events.” These comments would be expected of Putin–or any leader in his situation–in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, if his government actually “had been on the case” as he suggests, the Wagner Group Rebellion hardly would have gotten off the ground. The conspirators, as he refers to the Wagner Group leadership, would presumably have been twinkled out and approached for questioning by the security services. 

In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Putin stated: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people. He continued: “It was exactly this outcome, fratricide, that the enemies of Russia–the neo-Nazis in Kiev, their Western patrons and other national traitors–wanted to see. They wanted Russian soldiers to kill each other; they wanted the military and civilians to die; they wanted Russia to lose eventually, and our society to break up and perish in a bloody feud.” All of this was said despite Prigozhin’s earlier expressions indicating the rebellion was an impromptu emotional reaction–originally understood to be the result of an attack on the organization’s camp in Ukraine by Russian Federation troops under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov–Putin in his address alters that narrative by explaining that it was the threat of the cudgel and not good brains that brought the matter to close. That his ever-vigilant government, particularly the work of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services–that allowed the Wagner Group to cross the border into the Russian Federation untouched–crushed the plot. One might consider that plots that are part of false flag operations tend to be the easiest plots to sort out. “Go figure!”

Adding to perceptions that the Wagner Group Rebellion was the opponent, yet at the same time paradoxically weakening the notion that there was anything too deep in the thinking of the “conspirators”, Putin emphasized the reckless nature of the conspirators’ undertaking. Putin stated: “An armed mutiny would have been suppressed in any event. Mutiny plotters, despite the loss of adequacy, were bound to realize that. They understood everything, including the fact that their actions were criminal in nature, aimed at polarizing people and weakening the country, which is currently countering an enormous external threat and unprecedented pressure from the outside. They did this at a time when our comrades are dying on the frontline with the words “Not a step back!” There was irony in this idea as the crux of Prigozhin’s ire for months was the reckless and incompetent manner in which his Wagner Group troops and Russian Federation troops had been used in the special military operation how ironic and bizarre it was for him to undertake such a monumentally reckless and hopeless action as to march on Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from power. If the lives of Russian Federation Armed Forces’ aircrews had not been reportedly lost in the near final stage of the impromptu rebellion, the whole enterprise could be chuckled at for being comical.

Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all Russian lives matter, the indication and implication being  that the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Still, he indicated that his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin stated: “We knew before and know now that the majority of Wagner Group soldiers and commanders are also Russian patriots, loyal to their people and their state. Their courage on the battlefield when liberating Donbass and Novorossiya proves this. An attempt was made to use them without their knowledge against their comrades-in-arms with whom they were fighting shoulder to shoulder for their country and its future.” He went on to explain: “That is why, as soon as these events started to unfold, in keeping with my direct instructions, steps were taken to avoid spilling blood. It required time, among other things, as those who made a mistake had to be given a chance to change their minds, to realize that their actions would be strongly rejected by society, to understand what tragic and devastating consequences for Russia, for our country the reckless attempt they had been drawn into, was leading to.” Despite the fact that Putin, by displaying restraint during the “crisis” did save Russian lives, ironically and incredulously, as a result of his special military operation, astronomical and abominable losses had been suffered by Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine over 16 months to that point in time. One might suppose the careless loss of those troops could be set down as occasional mistakes.

Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

With regard to allowing the Wagner Group troops to move to Belarus, to greatcharlie that seemed a curious decision. Belarus is hands down the Russian Federation’s closest ally. One might call the relationship Putin has established between the two countries as the most successful effort in his quest to bring the former republics of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation’s fold. Putin recently placed several nuclear warheads in storage in Belarus. To that extent, many of the erstwhile Rebel Wagner Group troops possess exquisite special operations capabilities and could pose a threat in terms of potentially capturing those warheads. One might suppose the weapons are secured so well in their new homes that a build up of the Wagner Group troops was nothing to signify. Intriguingly, one might consider that Belarus borders Ukraine and a number of NATO countries. Sending the Wagner Group troops there could have been predicted to cause considerable alarm in the capitals of those bordering countries and in NATO Headquarters. (Interestingly, it is now understood that Wagner Group troops in Belarus, far from a spent force, are providing tactical training to Belarusian troops.) Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his second address.

Among the top five points Putin communicated, he assured the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters, handling them swiftly and diligently, and all other parts continued to function without interruption. In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers, who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He claimed his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin then informed the Russian people about his somewhat remedy for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders.

Putin’s Third Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Seemingly speaking to the newsmedia’s audience, not in attendance physically, Putin, wearing a solid navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: Today, standing here on the historic Cathedral Square of the Moscow Kremlin are the service personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, soldiers and officers of the National Guard, the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Guard Service. They are the ones who, together with their comrades-in-arms, at a time of challenge for the country, threw themselves in the way of trouble which would have inevitably led to chaos. More directly addressing the assembled audience of some 2,500 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard, Putin stated: “You have defended the constitutional order, as well as the life, security and freedom of our citizens, steering our Motherland clear from upheavals and de facto stopping a civil war in its tracks. He continued: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.”

Revealing what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Putin stated: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.” Pointing to exactly what was daunting about their activities that it compelled special praise, Putin explained: “Defense Ministry units, the National Guard, officers of the Interior Ministry and special services ensured reliable operation of all critical decision-making bodies, strategic facilities, including the defense ones, ensured the security of border regions, the rear lines of our Armed Forces, of all combat units which carried on with their heroic frontline operations during that time. We did not have to withdraw any combat troops from the special military operation zone.

Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. Putin stated: “Our comrades-in-arms–pilots–lost their lives while confronting the mutineers. They held their ground and fulfilled their orders and their military duty with honor. I am asking you to observe a minute of silence in tribute to their memory.” silence.” One might say Putin was making an extra effort to get a message across here that was not so easy for the Russian people to accept from him given the events in Ukraine that Russian soldiers’ lives matter.

In his first and second addresses, Putin excoriated the Wagner Group’s leaders, going as far to say in the first address: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people.” That noisome tack was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts. Putin stated: “Your resolve and courage, along with consolidation of Russian society, played an essential and decisive role in bringing the situation back to normal. Those who were drawn into the mutiny saw that the army and the people were not with them.”

Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically. Putin stated: “The swift and well-managed deployment of defense, security and law enforcement units helped prevent the situation in the country from going down a very dangerous road and ensure that there were no civilian casualties. He then remarked: “I extend my gratitude to you and all the personnel of the Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and security services for your service, courage and valor, for your devotion to the people of Russia.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his third address.

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Among his top five point, he revealed to the Russian people what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. His noisome tack of excoriating Wagner Group leaders was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts.Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically.

Putin’s Fourth Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. He ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. The address would reach the Russian people via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. This final iteration of his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses presented almost immediately following his address in Cathedral Square.

Putin was a bit less formal in thanking those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. Putin began his address by once again expressing his thanks and appreciation for the efforts of the armed forces and security services. Putin, still wearing a navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: “You and your comrades had a special part to play in this. Special words of gratitude go to you. I want us all to understand what happened and what could have happened if you hadn’t done what you did and hadn’t fulfilled your military duty and hadn’t shown loyalty to your oath and the Russian people. As is always the case during such developments – the same thing happens every time and everywhere – armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now.”

Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. Putin stated: “As is always the case during such developments–the same thing happens every time and everywhere–armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now. He went on: “Regrettably, you had to work in difficult circumstances in order to avoid civilian casualties, because you had to work on busy motorways.” Speaking of them and their well-being so often, it would appear that a primary takeaway from the whole episode that Putin wanted the Russian people to garner was that they were always on his mind and that they were what mattered most to him. It could not be missed by any who heard any of his four addresses.

While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Putin stated: “The fact that we have losses is even more regrettable. These are, of course, combat losses. There is no other way to put it. Our comrades died defending the Fatherland. It is not an overstatement or an exaggeration. I want to stress once again that chaos in the country would have been inevitable, and the enemy would have surely taken advantage of it. He continues: “The enemy is trying to do so anyway–I will get to that a little later–but nothing is coming out of it, and, I hope, nothing will come out of it, I am even sure of that. But it is absolutely clear that they would have taken advantage of it. No one knows what would have become of the country in the end, but all the achievements that have been made during the hostilities, many of them, anyway, would have been lost. And you prevented it.” In a way, the shift in whom Putin focused on as the opponent marked the close of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the issue of primacy. For members of the Wagner Group there may have been some sense of relief having suffered his bombardment of obloquy.

What started as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly appeared to become an example of why one should elegantly limit how much one should talk if the goal is to control information. Putin laid out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Perhaps he was in a very transparent way attempting to create a greater schism between the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group by disparaging the latter. Perhaps he wanted to convince members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces that although he liked the Wagner Group troops, they were his favorites. Perhaps he was having a little too much fun with it all. Perhaps Putin was concerned some in the Russian Federation might have imagined the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group colluded on the rebellion. That would be a dangerous idea that he would urgently need to knock down.

Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Surely, it was an odd set of statements to make before a group of military officers and security service members. Gone were the days of plausible deniability for the Russian Federation government with regard to the Wagner Group’s activities worldwide. Yet, more importantly, Putin admits plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord–discussed in some detail in Part 1, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot one day further. These were surely sensitive matters that Putin’s audience of individuals who had successfully moved up in their careers by avoiding did not want to hear or be involved with, especially since it concerned the highest realms of politics in the country. Putin, nevertheless, gave them the details, and likely measured their uneasiness in the process.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About his Wagner Group, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. To be certain, greatcharlie would not attempt to cast aspersions on anyone concerning who among the powerful in the Russian Federation might have been profiting from government payments to Concord or Voentorg. The better prosecutors and litigators in Western courts would surely light on Putin’s statement: “The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address.

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. Among his top five points, he ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter” Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Then Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. While clearly putting Prigozhin in the spotlight, Putin never mentioned his dear friend’s name.

The Wagner Group Rebellion: A Staged Crisis?

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Happy is the one who is able to know the causes of things.) To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in the whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions, many hardly thought through, were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that the Putin regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories, Hopefully it was done due to some internal collective cognition imperative, but possibly under official external influence. Remarkably, it was the same picture of Putin presented by national capitals and many mainstream media outlets of their respective countries that for years have defamed him as some awkward, insecure leader, a throwback from another era. Currently, the perception in the West and much of the world is that the Wagner Group Rebellion marked the beginning of the end for Putin. All of greatcharlie’s instincts are against such an explanation. 

Putin’s Priorities

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Everyone who was able in Rostov-on-Don took a photo with their Wagner Group “occupiers”. To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in a whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that Putin’s regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports from other newsmedia houses seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories.

To discerning eyes, the Wagner Group Rebellion actually had the appearance of a “controlled crash” creating the simulacrum of change without any real change at all. The situation was never so difficult that it had the potential to capsize the regime. Despite predictions have been voiced by those less than clairvoyant on Putin’s downfall, he still sits in the Senate Building of the Kremlin. His government was never genuinely in peril, neither was his person. Putin, himself, was hardly tested. In its June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, greatcharlie suggested observers might expect some recherché, outside the box move by Putin in the midst of everything. The wily and for the most part intuitive Russian Federation President might very well have demonstrated that he has.more than a few tricks to pull from his sleeve. 

Putin is first and foremost the steward of the Russian Federation. However, before Putin could begin to address vicissitudes besetting his country, first and foremost he had to stabilize his own position. That was in greatcharlie’s view the main purpose of this giant artifice perform on the international stage. Often mentioned when suggesting one first ensure their own safety and stability before helping others is the pre-flight safety directions–briefing–given by flight attendants. Among those given is, “In the case of a change in cabin pressure, be sure to place the resulting oxygen mask over your own face first before assisting anyone else, even your own children.” Surely, this runs counter to the “3M principle” of “mission, men me” for military leaders. In order of priority the mission must be the focus of efforts and all must be done to accomplish it. The well-being of one’s soldiers must be kept in mind. They must not be wasted and use them in a way to exploit their optimal effectiveness. Lastly, a leader must consider his or her well-being having covered the essentials, two other priorities. However, a leader must not carelessly place them in mortal danger knowing his or her role is to think through and direct the actions of troops to achieve the objective. (It would be interesting if Putin, having made several flights over the years, found such directions instructive. Perhaps his detractors would insist that for him self-interest has always been his priority and he would only be compelled to act by it.)

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023. During the latter, Putin was able to have a true connection with the people. The tide has begun to come back in and the waters have risen again. Soon enough skewed perspectives expressed of Putin somehow losing ground politically in the Russian Federation following the Wagner Group Rebellion will most likely disintegrate in the face of reality. Certainly, this is a hard saying for some to hear. Hopefully, polls will be conducted on the public response to the Wagner Group Rebellion by independent research groups in the Russian Federation such as the Levada Center, The Chronicle, and The Russian Field that may shed light with regard to any boom in support for Putin.

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023.

For those unfamiliar, Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of the Russian Federation’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it. Putin also served as Sekretar’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser for Yeltsin. A long-time intelligence operator and intelligence manager such as Putin knows many a dodge. To that extent, it would not be too far off to suggest if Putin has actually taken the course suggested by greatcharlie here would fall under the category of maskirovka. 

The Russian term maskirovka or masking originally had military pertinence as it regarded the use of camouflage. However, maskirovka eventually expanded in meaning to concerning battlefield masking through the utilization of smoke and other screening methods. The meaning would evolve further as a reference to the utilization of military deception against an opponent, and expand from there refer to full-scale denial and deception operations. Maskirovka would transcend military operations to refer to the use of a clever gimmick to create ambiguity and uncertainty and to give Russian Federation’s foreign and national security policy actors the freedom of action to achieve their country’s objectives in the diplomatic economic arenas. Further, maskirovka has been used to create a picture of events in the Russian Federation for the outside world.. As it appears to greatcharlie, what transpired from June 23, 2023 to June 26, 2023 resembled maskirovka, and perhaps a bit more than that. One thing for certain, the plan laid out under greatcharlie’s supposition, could not be allowed to fail. Putin’s reputation, his world, his future, hung in the balance. Part 1: The Tragedy of Birlstone in The Valley of Fear, Arthur Conan Doyle’s fourth and final Sherlock Holmes novel published by George H. Doran Company in New York in 1915, the esteemed author has Holmes in Chapter 1, The Warning deliver a notable quote, quite apposite to readers who have grasped what is being suggested about Putin’s actions here. Holmes explains: “Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius.”

Naysayers might point out that events turned out the way they did by happenstance and there was hardly any orchestration of them behind the scenes. If one might choose to stand firm on the idea that the Wagner Group Rebellion was an authentic expression of outrage by the organization and nothing more, greatcharlie says to them that the unlikely must never be confused with the impossible, and would suggest they take a second look. Once reviewed in light of the artifice hypothesized by greatcharlie, but not coloring them with its theory, events of the Wagner Group Rebellion take on greater meaning and quite on their own appropriately to fall into place. To that extent, they arouse suspicion.

For instance, it is interesting how the whole Wagner Group Rebellion went off so relatively cleanly. A starting point for examining that angle would be the Wagner Group’s marshaling of resources on the Russian Federation’s border with Ukraine for some time prior to the start of the rebellion. Reports in the Western newsmedia state the even US intelligence Community managed to collect information indicating that Prigozhin had been assembling his forces near the border with Russia over a period of time. Yet, there was no interference with the Wagner Group’s build up by the Russian Federation government. The Russian Federation Armed Forces, and the FSB, did not take serious interest in or move a jot to reign in the Wagner Group before anything got off the ground, This was the case even though there was concern over all activities on the border given the actions of pro-Ukraine, anti-Putin, ethnic-Russian militias and cross border incursions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The entire event unfolded right before the very eyes of the government. The build up on the border in preparation for the rebellion was surely out of sync with Prigozhin’s claim that the Wagner Group’s Rebellion was in response to an attack on his camps in Ukraine on June 23, 2023 by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Ibit, ibit eo quo vis qui zonam perdidit. (The one who has lost his money belt will go where you wish.) It remains fascinating to greatcharlie is that the Wagner Group troops were still receiving remuneration during their rebellious eastward march. What persistently nags at greatcharlie is how Prigozhin was allowed access to his financial assets to pay them. If the Wagner Group’s financial assets had been frozen by order of the Kremlin, Prigozhin would have found himself in a pickle with those rough men. He had to be able to pay them as guaranteed. 

During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don, were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and made certain all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord –Prigozhin’s billion dollar catering firm discussed in Part 1–has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

The troops of the Wagner Group are not international freedom fighters and revolutionary mercenaries in the mold of the 19th century Italian patriot and soldier Giuseppe Garibaldi (July 4, 1807 to June 2, 1882). They are driven by money not a desire to save the world. During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don. They were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord, which is the billion dollar catering firm owned by Prigozhin–discussed in Part 1, has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

Difficult to understand also is how the Wagner Group, which Prigozhin regularly complained was left short of resources by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, was apparently swimming in such an abundance of petroleum and oil lubricants that it could ostensibly squander those resources to move a number of the organization’s tanks and other vehicles east. 

It is hard to see how Wagner Group troops would have been able to appropriately resupply themselves if they would have become engaged with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services in Moscow even under the most favorable terms for them. If they failed to immediately seize their objective in Moscow, they eventually would have run out of steam and would have had to surrender or fight to the bitter end. Thereby, it would seem that upon all else that was inordinate about their rebellion, one is asked to believe that the Wagner Group troops, individuals who joined the organization to earn money, were knowingly participating in a kamikaze-style action. In a burst of complete illogic during his initial video address from Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin curiously uttered: “After we finish what we started, we will return to the front to defend our Motherland.” That was a moment when Prigozhin was either frighteningly detached from reality or being facetious, adding one more over-the-top absurdity to the hoax that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Reportedly, Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched by Putin. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Russian Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarus President,, Lukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.. Conveniently, Lukashenko was able to put all else aside that weekend and immerse himself in the matter.

Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB (above). Bortnikov sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no initial indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were all but branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Interestingly, only at a late hour during “the crisis” was a very visible effort made in Moscow to prepare for a visit of the Wagner Group by erecting checkpoints with armored vehicles and by positioning troops on the city’s southern edge. About 3,000 Chechen troops were reportedly pulled from fighting in Ukraine and rushed to Moscow on Saturday morning. State television in Chechnya reported that Russian Federation troops armed with machine guns had established checkpoints on Moscow’s southern outskirts, and engineers had dug up sections of highways to slow the Wagner Group’s advance.

The Chechen troops are under the control of Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov, mufti of Chechnya and a colonel general in the Russian Federation Armed Force.the, who publicly condemned the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is interesting how the Chechens, in considerable numbers, arrived in Moscow so much faster than the Wagner Group. Perhaps they used a faster route from Ukraine or special vehicles. What would be truly difficult for greatcharlie to accept is that the Chechens sped past the “rebellious” Wagner Group troops on the same road to Moscow. If there was a quicker route from Ukraine to Moscow which the Chechens were able to take advantage of, it is difficult to see why the Wagner Group, supposedly in a rush to get to Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from their respective posts, conspicuously chose not to travel on it.

The Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin declared Monday, June 26, 2023 a non-working day for most residents as part of the heightened security. Curiously, the declaration, a now seemingly superfluous measure, was allowed to remain in effect even after the total withdrawal of Wagner Group troops was completed. All in all though, there was no significant alteration in the federal government’s course. Certainly, there was an atmosphere–stimmung–in the Russian Federation of everything being under control despite what was visible. Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end )

If one were to take a second look at Putin’s four Wagner Rebellion addresses, as noted earlier, in each address one would discern how he laid out the narrative on events he wanted the Russian people to take from the whole show. Yet, in the context of the suggested artifice, it would have been of the utmost importance for Putin to provide all of the insights the Russian people would need to ruminate upon his handling of on the Wagner Group Rebellion or to exchange in their own discussions with family, friends, classmates, and colleagues on the crisis. In each well-crafted, concise address, each given at what were very likely predetermined points in time, there appeared to be specific issues that Putin wanted to reveal in digestible pieces to the Russian people. For the most part–at least until the fourth address, there was nothing so outré or too complex spoken by him that might have acted as a distraction. To that extent, this aspect of the suggested artifice could be characterized as a preconcerted, well-organized information campaign, carried out predominantly by the Russian Federation’s “Communicator-in-Chief.”

With further regard to his four Wagner Group Rebellion addresses, one might discern that Putin seemed to take pains to ensure his punches at Prigozhin were very heavy even without mentioning his name. Perhaps it was a reflection of his known penchant for engaging in acidulous humor with close associates. He doubtlessly was aware that all of the bombastic rhetoric concerning Prigozhin would definitely reach the ears of his dear friend and other close associates filled in on the artifice. When the words of Putin’s fourth address captured Prigozhin’s attention, as aforementioned, he had no reason to be cheerful, but in the end the Wagner Group owner assumedly would have smiled and would have shaken his head in response to the very noisy overkill, fully understanding that Putin needed to do what he did, needed to say what he said, in accord with the aims of the artifice suggested by greatcharlie here. The greater cause was firming up public opinion about Putin’s presidency, his leadership. Prigozhin would fully recognize and accept that what is best for Putin is best for the Russian Federation and that would surely include himself as a citizen and an ultra-loyal subordinate. Perchance there would even be a considerable reward not too far down the road for his fealty.

Fascinatingly, based upon depictions in both detective fiction and spy fiction literature and film, Putin appears to mimic, mutatis mutandis, an assassin’s method of leaving three to five suicide notes to ensure the victim’s death would be accepted as suicide and not his or her murderous handiwork. Perhaps some might be willing to agree, may be with some reservations, that Putin gave all four addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion with an underlying, surreptitious purpose of furnishing a false clue. The notion may not be too way out.

It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes for use in plain sight, troop movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia. While the news cycle everywhere is 24-hours, it seemed the most important announcements were issued to best serve morning and evening newsmedia readers, listeners, and viewers. Enough time was allowed to lapse between almost everything released for the state-run newsmedia to process and parrot the Kremlin’s well-curated narrative of events and the domestic audience to absorb. That absorption rate would likely have been calculated by Kremlin public information specialists who would have been deeply immersed in the project. Enough time would also be allowed to lapse from one event to the other to convince the independent newsmedia to draw “the right conclusions” and publish surprisingly similar accounts of what was occurring and so on. The whole show was likely set up to transpire on a weekend which meant businesses did not have to be concerned over their weekday commerce being interfered with, and the Russian people generally would be better able to follow events  on what for most were days of leisure, off from work and days for associating with family and friends, and visiting dachas.

The Wagner Group troops rapidly loading up a tank in order to ride out of Rostov-on-Don (above). It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes, movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia.

The Degree to which Wagner Group Troops Were Likely Aware of the Supposed Artifice

If this scenario staked here was at all possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

It would be enough for the Wagner Group troops to follow orders to the letter as they have always done and were paid to do. To that extent, this may account for the downing of six Russian Army helicopters and an electronic warfare plane by Wagner Group troops on their march to Moscow. Those in the Russian Federation Armed Forces who sent the Russian Army helicopters would also unlikely have been aware of what was transpiring. Those aircrews that encountered the Wagner Group could not have known everything was staged and how surprising and threatening their arrival on the scene would be to the Wagner Group troops. The Wagner Group’s, no matter what they may have been told about how “safe” everything would be, were way out on a limb and necessarily quite tense and on the alert, ready to deal with any immediate danger. Prigozhin, negotiating at the time in Rostov-on-Don to end the rebellion, likely had less knowledge of his troops’ actions way up front. Perhaps he was informed about it all after the fact just as everyone else. Still, one might recall what Prigozhin specifically stated on the first video he posted from Rostov-on-Don: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads.

Far be it for greatcharlie to make light of, or denigrate the loss of a soldier in defense of his or her homeland, but it posits that while unlikely, it is possible the helicopters shot down over the Russian Federation during the rebellion were already counted among those lost in the Ukraine fight. One might imagine that far beyond morbid curiosity and within the farthest range of their respective investigative capabilities–seeing how close lipped the Russian Federation Armed Forces are about losses during the Ukraine War or any conflict for that matter and how records of its casualties reported usually appear so out of sync–journalists and military and intelligence analysts may have already examined whether those helicopters and aircrews lost battling the Wagner Group were not already listed as lost during the Ukraine War and may have kept their discoveries confidential. (If there have been funerals for the airmen lost in late June 2023 and an error can be proved upon greatcharlie, it asks the respective families of the fallen for their forgiveness.)

Intriguingly, the Wagner Group doubly proved the concept, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already proven, that the Russian Air Force against a modern force has little to no ability to ensure the survivability of its aircraft and its aircrews. That has not been the only deficiency of the Russian Air Force. Another of many of considerable interest to greatcharlie is that both on the frontlines in Ukraine and during the Wagner Group Rebellion, the indications and implications are that the Russian Air Force planners and air operations officers have given up on, are completely distant to, or positively unaware of the airpower concept of high altitude bombing by strategic air assets to support tactical movements on the ground. That would put the Russian Air Force just short of 80 years behind the times. To that extent, one might consider how easy it should have been for competent air commanders and planners to utilize Russian Federation strategic air assets and tactical air assets to turn the route that the Wagner Group troops were traveling on toward Moscow into a “highway of death”. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops rolled on as if they had little to fear from such a threat. Readers might cast their minds back to an incident in Syria in which Wagner Group troops decided to clash with US Special Forces soldiers. The US Special Forces soldiers called in airpower to lend some support. Things did not turn well at all for the Wagner Group that day.

As aforementioned in Part 1, the Wagner Group employs a semi-international group of fighters. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. One might imagine that of the three main Wagner units, the Rusich unit led the drive eastward. Unless Russian Federation citizenship has quietly become a requirement for or privilege of Wagner Group employment, it would seem legally questionable to charge the international fighters with treason. Other criminal charges might have better fit. The Kremlin officials would know that. Putin would know that.

Even as he lent support to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s move to subordinate all militias serving in Ukraine on its side, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk Putin implied that much of Prigozhin’s criticism of the army had been correct–recognized even in the mainstream US newsmedia as a possible sign Wagner had yet to entirely lose his support. Putin stated: “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly,” He continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

If the artifice suggested by greatcharlie might have at all been possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

Prigozhin Mansion Raid

As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia, posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. One photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed Forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

Prigozhin in many disguises (above). As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia,  posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. A photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

It would appear that despite the importance of matters concerning Prigozhin–after all, according to the Western newsmedia, he led a paramilitary rebellion that knocked the Kremlin back on its heels and accelerated the Putin regime’s downward spiral–the Russian Federation security services and law enforcement organizations in particular failed to keep eye on the mansion. The indications and implications of the heavy use of manpower are that there is such a paucity of technological resources available that Prigozhin and whatever entourage of security that would likely be traveling with him could not be detected. It is very likely that trained K-9s–search dogs–have been utilized to more stealthily locate anyone present in the mansion instead of a police special weapons and tactical teams who observably in the video recording they made, moved through the residence creating a noise worthy of Bedlam. It is remarkable how closely the video and photos  provided on the raid of Prigozhin’s mansion mimicked video recordings released of the raid on the Mar-a-Largo residence of former US President Donald Trump provided by US law enforcement and. released to the newsmedia by the US Department of Justice. Many would likely chalk up the similarities to the fact that parallels exist in foundational law enforcement tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in every country. In this case, the similarity might be better chalked up to sarcasm.

It is difficult to imagine what might be referred to as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,  and in particular, the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations, are so inept that independently or in conjunction, could not keep track of Prigozhin’s location and movements. Indeed, one might have presumed that the Russian Federation Armed Forces and particularly the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations kept themselves well-aware of Prigozhin’s affairs and under current circumstances had gone so deeply into them that they at least collectively should have had a complete handle of all of its details. Nothing should have been so unknown by them respectively that their knowledge would seem at best to equal that of the far from the not so prying mainstream newsmedia in the Russian Federation. One could be convinced that everything is done in the Russian Federation in such an incompetent fashion to convince the world that within it “folly doctor-like controls skill.” How the government managed to keep perfect track of, and come down so hard upon the aforementioned Boris Nemetsov and Alexei Navalny, and other activists such as Anna Politkovskaya is a wonder. Based on newsmedia reporting, greatcharlie proffers that the US Intelligence Community surely has been monitoring Prigozhin’s movements as somewhat of a priority mission. Newsmedia reports indicate they were keeping track of how Prigozhin’s private jets were shuttling back and forth from Belarus to the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous. Dulce est desipere in loco. (It is delightful to play the fool.)

If one might exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation Armed Forces, law enforcement and security services are unable to competently monitor Prigozhin, one might turn to the idea that the raid of one of Prigozhin’s mansion and the bombardment of photos in the newsmedia of Prigozhin was designed to throw inquisitive minds and close observers off his scent for hot minute. Verily, perhaps the raid was one more step to ensure those who might have begun questioning in the aggregate whether the Wagner Group’s rebellion, the nature of the Kremlin’s response, and Prigozhin’s disappearance, were elements of some grand artifice. It all falls into place too well. For an intuitive few following it all very closely, the next set events might very well seem predictable.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous.

Prigozhin: Proceeding with Caution?

After all is said and done, greatcharlie’s recognizes that the veritable sacrificial lamb could prove to be Prigozhin, although it is unlikely. He may very well view himself, in a more dramatic and grander way, as a martyr on the altar of his country. He would forever disagree that he was a patsy. Some might insist that his exile to Belarus was likely one of many negative life ramifications of his behavior to that point. He does carry vile antecedents. Either being frugal with information or simply lacking further information on his disposition, the newsmedia to this point has convinced many that Prigozhin remains exiled in Belarus, under duress, as lonely as a cloud. Regardless of where he may be, recognizably, Prigozhin has bravely borne his fate. He does not appear to have let his nerves run away with him. He is unquestionably as strong as a lion. Leve fit, quod bene fertur, onus. (The load is light if you know how to support it.)

Surely if some artifice had been dramatically acted out the weekend of June 23, 2023 as hypothesized here, Prigozhin had to have been a willing participant in the whole cabaret. Make no mistake, Prigozhin is willing to do just about anything to assist Putin: “Papa.” It was Putin who catapulted him to the highest realms of wealth in the world. Putin has likely shielded him from very dark elements that out of envy, jealousy, ethno-racism, or madness would choose to lash out at him in the Russian Federation and outside. Prigozhin will surely never forget how Putin helped him. Outwardly, he has always demonstrated his appreciation. It would seem that Prigozhin truly dislikes Shoigu and Gerasimov. However, as suggested in Part 1, he would hardly go out of his way, waste his own money, to disrupt Putin’s government. Putin likes both Shoigu and Gerasimov and would not allow anyone to destroy them just as he would protect Prigozhin from a serious threat. Prigozhin knows that. Certainly, the last thing Prigozhin would ever want for himself would be to replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister. Given the situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Defense Minister’s post is surely a heavy yoke he would happily leave for another to bear.

If an artifice was in play, it was not apparent initially whether Prigozhin had been shielded sufficiently or at all from the law or political enemies. Shoigu and Gerasimov now seem so drenched with villainy that it is hard to imagine how they will ever be able shed it. For Putin, such issues are surely secondary, if not tertiary. Likely to him, whether he wants them to continue at their posts or not is all that matters. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that although all three put their trust in Putin, naturally but quietly, all three may be a little uncertain about whether being so trustful was justified. Prigohzin can only hope to remain free and have the opportunity to further serve “Papa.” However, Prigozhin lives by an odd code, perhaps it could be called an archaic one. He will likely take whatever comes from his boss standing upright with his eyes wide open. Perhaps a total victory in Ukraine is the only hope of redemption for Shoigu and Gerasimov. Unfortunately for them, that is very unlikely. An educated guess would be that Putin will not play any tricks with his three subordinates. Amicitia sine fraude. (Friendship without deceit.)

Based on a number newsmedia reports in July 2023, the situation appeared to change a bit faster than most would have expected for Prigozhin. On July 6, 2023, Lukashenko stated that he was not in Belarus, but was in the habit of traveling between St. Petersburg and Moscow as he wished. The Belarusian President also stated that any money and weapons that had been confiscated by Russian Federation authorities had been returned to Prigozhin. To the extent the original agreement to end the Wagner Group Rebellion was intact as it regarded Belarus, Lukashenko explained that the organization’s troops had remained in their camps in his country. According to newsmedia reports, approximately 8,000 Wagner Group troops are currently deployed in Belarus. However, the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, the senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, who was mentioned earlier, stated in an online post republished by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel that 10,000 Wagner Group troops would eventually be deployed in Belarus.

Interestingly, when Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group troops were redeployed in Belarus on June 30, 2023, he also explained that his country could make use of the experience and expertise of the organization’s members through training. By July 2023, the Ministerstva abarony Respubliki Belarus’ (Belarusian Defense Ministry) had announced that “The Armed forces of Belarus continue joint training with the fighters of the Wagner PMC (Private Military Company).” Giving what seemed to amount to a forewarning to neighboring Poland and NATO, on the week of July 20, 2023, the Belarusian Defense Ministry would announce: “During the week, special operations forces units, together with representatives of the Company will work out combat training tasks at the Brest military range.” The Brest military range is 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of the Polish border.

Very compelling is a video posted on Prigozhin’s press service on Telegram depicting the Wagner Group’s owner welcome his organization’s troops to Belarus and discussing the future of the whole enterprise, Prigozhin is heard telling the Wagner Group troops, “We fought honorably.” He goes on to say, “You have done a great deal for Russia. What is going on at the front [in Ukraine] is a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in.” Reportedly, Prigozhin tells his troops that they should behave well towards the locals and directs them to train the Belarusian Army and gather their strength for a “new journey to Africa.” The video on Telegram additionally shows Prigozhin receiving the Wagner Group black flag, decorated with the motto” Blood, Honour, Motherland, and Courage”, brought up to Belarus from the organization’s camp in the Russian Federation’s South. Clearly, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group may be a bit down, but they are not completely out, by the good grace of “Papa” one might say. 

In a most extraordinary turn of events, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.” In the third quatrain of “Sonnet 119” (1609), William Shakespeare writes what appears most apposite, mutatis mutandis, to the evolving state of the relationship between Putin and Prigozhin: “O benefit of ill! now I find true / That better is by evil still made better, / And ruin’d love, when it is built anew, / Grows fairer than first, more strong, far greater.”

Putin in Derbent, Dagestan close-up (above). Putin’s visage says it all. Looking at Putin as he met with the cheering crowd in Derbent, it is very clear that he was very pleased. So rarely has his face expressed such happiness, many were led to believe it was not Putin in photo but a body double. Such impressions were quite singular. Putin was greeted in Derbent as the Russian people’s champion. In the “struggle” with the Wagner Group, he was hands down the victor. At least, that is how the situation appeared to the Russian people. If all that transpired was actually a clever artifice executed to garner their increased political support and ratchet up his popularity, as suggested by greatcharlie–maskirovka, Putin was surely very satisfied with the outcome.

The Way Forward

Of course, greatcharlie is unable to swear by this theory that the whole Wagner Group Rebellion was a clever, well-calibrated artifice devised by Putin and what has come afterward also has been guided by his hand. What greatcharlie does believe will become more apparent as time goes on is that the Wagner Group Rebellion did not accelerate some supposed spiral downward of Putin’s regime. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that to it, the whole cabaret felt simply too contrived from the first day. It is unfortunate any lives were reportedly lost in its implementation. Such is always the risk when thousands of well-armed fighting men are moving about with different purposes and understandings of a situation, and no significant central control and communication exists. Of course, establishing such certainly would have made the hypothesized artifice far easier to detect and to deny.

Sic multa quæ honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta. (Thus many things that seem honorable by their nature are rendered dishonorable by circumstances.) As for the Putin ultra-loyalist Prigozhin, greatcharlie is not completely dismissive of assessments by some Russia scholars and policy analysts that he may still be in trouble with his dear leader and dear friend in the Russian Federation. Even Putin loyalists cannot be too sure what he thinks of them or what plans he has for them at any given time. They can only do their level best to remain in his good standing. In greatcharlie’s aforementioned June 5, 2023 post on the possibility of the Kremlin using insights from analysts outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, it noted that finding scholars and policy analysts willing to assist the regime might be difficult as there might be a tacit understanding that there is a real danger involved with serving it. The same senior officials they might work hard to assist could very well turn against them much as wild animals without rhyme or reason known to the reasonable or the rational. In a similar vein, if Prigozhin actually committed himself and the Wagner Group to some artifice for the sake of strengthening Putin’s position nationally as hypothesized here, he may have been too trusting and may have taken too great a risk. Pitfalls have been something Prigozhin has clearly been able to dodge in various endeavors tied to Putin up to this point, but fate might finally come calling. One wonders whether Prigozhin was at all uneasy when he and 34 of his Wagner Group commanders were graciously invited to the Kremlin to meet with Putin, and one and all were welcomed back into the fold by the Russian Federation President with open arms. 

There is a little more to consider in this drama as it concerns Putin and Prigozhin. As greatcharlie makes this final point–and has a little fun doing so, it hopes readers will stick around as it goes admittedly the long way–albeit maybe a bit too prolix–to provide some background on a story that best promotes discernment of ideas presented in the discussion. From what greatcharlie would usually refer to as banal amusement, a Hollywood film, a deeper understanding of Prigozhin perhaps can be drawn. In this case, greatcharlie says film is art, and art is yeast for intellect. Many readers may already know the storyline of the very intriguing 1977 blockbuster film, “Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope”, but perhaps not in the context in which it is presented here. (It was suggested by a reader that greatcharlie do more to connect with the younger generation by tying points of discussion on foreign and national security policy with popular interests of today. So, greatcharlie, being responsive, reached back to a film that premiered 46 years ago to connect with younger readers. Was kann ich sagen?)

In the film, young Luke Skywalker comes across two “droids”, C-3P0 and R2-D2 on his home planet, Tatooine, with the latter holding a hologram recording of a desperate plea from Princess Leia, a key leader of the Rebellion against the Empire that has an iron grip. Leia, who is being held captive by Darth Vader, a type of galactic Imperium, the right hand of an evil empire that had enslaved the galaxy for help from Obi-Wan Kenobi. Skywalker seeks out Old Ben Kenobi, a neighbor whose name closely resembles the name in the message and discovers they are one in the same. Due to tragic circumstances, Obi-Wan Kenobi must take Skywalker along to rescue Leia. During their time together, Obi-Wan Kenobi sets forth to teach Skywalker about the Force, a positive, spiritual energy by which all existence flows not only in the galaxy, but the universe, and how it allows those with the gift to tap into it, mystical, supernatural abilities. The duo secure the help of blackmarketer Hans Solo and his trusted co-pilot Chewbacca, with the promise of remuneration. Skillfully flying his dilapidated yet considerably advanced and agile Millennium Falcon, Solo manages to evade asteroids, Imperial TIE fighters, and Imperial Star Destroyers. The diverse band of irregulars then come upon and are pulled into the Death Star, a superweapon with a giant planet crushing laser with which the Empire intended to use in eliminating the Rebellion once and for all. It was also where Leia was being held by Vader. The small band rescues Leia and escapes but not without the painful loss of Obi-Wan Kenobi in a duel with Vader, who by the way was the embodiment of the negative side of the force. Yet, after his death, Obi-Wan Kenobi could do more to help Skywalker than ever. With the promise of great reward from Leia, Solo takes the group on to the Rebel base on Yavin IV, which is the next target of the Death Star.

On Yavin IV, information collected by R2-D2 on the Death Star’s defenses and vulnerabilities was reviewed and plans for a small group of fighters to attack and destroy it were formulated. The Rebel mission entailed firing rockets into a small vent along an equatorial trench of the Death Star. Time was of the essence as the Death Star would be moving into position to destroy Yavin IV. Skywalker would join a group of pilots flying small X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters against the Death Star. He implored Solo to join the group but Solo emphasizes that his interests from the start were solely pecuniary and he would never risk himself in a suicide mission, which aptly described the Rebel pilots plan of attack. Skywalker left Solo with Chewbacca, as they stowed in his ship the massive reward Leia promised. Flying with R2-D2, Skywalker and the relatively small group of fighters then left to engage the giant Death Star which had nearly reached Yavin IV. Their mission was monitored by the Rebel command base on the planet. Once in contact, the losses in X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters mounted rapidly as a mass of Imperial TIE fighters intercepted the group. Vader, himself, joined them. With barely a handful of Rebel fighters left, Skywalker led what would be the final assault along the trench to reach the vent. As two X-Wing fighters trying to hold Vader and two TIE fighters off him were defeated and R2-D2 was lost, Skywalker sped to the target. It was then that Skywalker through clairaudience received a message from Obi-Wan Kenobi to rely on the Force to complete the job. Leia and the commanders at the Rebel base were flummoxed as Skywalker, responsive to Obi-Wan Kenobi’s voice, disengaged his computer targeting system. As the Death Star prepared to fire on Yavin IV, and Vader closed on Skywalker, surprisingly Solo arrives with the Millennium Falcon and perfectly disrupts Vader’s pursuit of his young friend, freeing him to hit the target directly and destroy the Death Star just in time.

That moment in the film was frightfully small, but small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph. There is considerable materiality and profundity about it. Solo had often indicated in the film that his interests during the odyssey of the small band were solely pecuniary. However, whether compelled by the Force via telepathy to act in support of Skywalker or impelled by the power of friendship and a sense of responsibility, Solo acted. Risking the loss of his ship, his treasured co-pilot, his grand reward, his hopes and dreams for the future, his life, all that he had, he rushed to the Death Star. It is unclear whether Solo had already left Yavin IV in a direction away from the fighting and reversed back to join Skywalker or whether he had flown directly to the scene from the targeted planet. Solo surely would have understood that  Skywalker and the other Rebel pilots were facing trouble at the Death Star, but he could not have known just how bad the situation might have been until he arrived upon the scene. The small force of Rebel fighters may have been completely destroyed by the time he arrived. His young friend could have been lost already. He may have found himself alone, contending with a swarm of Imperial TIE fighters. Nevertheless, Solo went in. A reason for his valorous action could perhaps be found in a logic intrinsic to comradeship in war. So often, a parent may learn their child was lost in war not knowing that he or she abandoned relative safety to remain beside a friend and together they ran forward against the odds into mortal danger. It is easy and satisfying for some to ascribe a bundle of negatives to create a picture of individuals as Prigozhin. However, among such men, the mind works in mysterious ways. As long as Putin continues to stand with him, publicly or privately, he will most likely continue to stand with Putin. Indeed, no matter how bad things become for Putin, Prigozhin will most likely be there. As long as experts continue to get the relationship between the two so wrong, particularly those in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western countries and other countries interested, there will remain a gap in their understanding of certain events, which Putin, as meditated upon here, will likely seek to exploit in different ways. Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. (A certain friend is seen in an uncertain matter.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the individual at the center of the Wagner Group Rebellion (above). The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refers to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin,and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

Prigozhin arrives with guards at funeral ceremony held in the Troyekurovskoye cemetery in Moscow, Russia, April 8, 2023. In this post, greatcharlie chronicles Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

About Prigozhin

Since Prigozhin, as aforementioned, is at the center of all that has transpired, it seems appropriate to provide some background on the individual who allegedly took on Putin. An account of Prigozhin’s life has been widely circulated in the international newsmedia. Those biographies usually discuss certain elements of his life, typically offering a fragmented picture of Prigozhin story: other than average beginnings; potential as skier lost; imprisonment; release, family support and entry into food service industry; support from friends; entry into restaurant and gambling businesses; elite contacts and growth; Putin ties; catering and opportunities of a lifetime; and, business diversification to include internet business and the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s life had the least promising commencement.  He was born on June 1, 1961 in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in the Soviet Union, the son of a nurse, Violetta Prigozhina, and a mining engineer, Viktor Prigozhin. His father died when Prigozhin was a 9-year-old, leaving his mother to support him and his sick grandmother by working at a local hospital. During his school years, Prigozhin aspired to be a professional cross-country skier. He was trained by his stepfather Samuil Zharkoy, who was an instructor in the sport, and attended a prestigious athletics boarding school from which he graduated in 1977. However, due to an injury, he left the sport. Unfortunately, the criminal culture of St Petersburg drew him in.

There is an old saying directed at youth which greatcharlie paraphrases: “If one is around the wrong kind of people one will likely get involved with the wrong kind of things.” In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution. Id nobis maxime nocet, quod non ad rationis lumen sed ad similitudinem aliorum vivimus. (Is especially ruinous to us, that we shape our lives not by the light of reason, but after the fashion of others.)

In a five-page biography attached to an October 2021 email acquired by the Intercept from Capital Legal Services that appears to have been drafted by his attorneys, it was revealed that Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad, according to Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper known for its critical coverage of the Kremlin. The newspaper also reported that Prigozhin in 1990 studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

Food Service

Prigozhin would next move in a completely different direction which placed his life on an amazing trajectory. He set up a hot-dog stand in Leningrad with his mother and stepfather in the Aprashaka Flea Market. Prigozhin was essentially a street vendor, without much in the way of formal food service training or food service management. Yet, he clearly possessed a considerable knack for preparing and selling food to people. He apparently knew what they liked and knew what was right. He was quoted in an interview with the New York Times as stating: The rubles were piling up faster than his mother could count them.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Prigozhin followed the entrepreneurial spirit of the times and founded or became involved in many new businesses. Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeing that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.)

From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. 


Boris Spektor (above). From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

According to the Guardian, Prigozhin found Tony Gear, a British hotel administrator who had previously worked at the Savoy in London and was now at one of St Petersburg’s few luxury hotels. He employed Gear to manage first a wine shop, then the Old Customs House. Initially, the Old Customs House employed strippers as a way to drum up clientele, but oddly enough the restaurant’s food became the real draw for patrons and stripper operations were suspended. Gear marketed the Old Customs House as the most refined place to eat in a city that was only just discovering fine dining.

On its website, the Old Customs House is described on its website as one of the oldest restaurants in the city. Pop stars and businessmen liked to eat there, as did St Petersburg’s mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who sometimes came with his deputy, Putin. Photographs of Prigozhin in his exclusive St. Petersburg restaurants typically depict him serving the elite of the Russian Federation and standing-by dutifully in the background, ready to respond to his very important patrons’ every need. Prigozhin does not display a scintilla of shyness now, and he was hardly shy during those early years of his restaurant ventures. One might imagine that Prigozhin had a gift for repartee which was most likely greatly appreciated by patrons.

 

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush with their spouses on board the New Island Restaurant. Prigozhin is standing by dutifully, back and to the left of Putin. Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. Prigozhin assistance was clearly an integral part of whatever plan Putin had for foreign dignitaries. To that extent, Prigozhin was integral to Putin’s approach to handling foreign and national security policy issues with his visitors. The degree of Prigozhin’s connection with Putin was undeniable, frightfully apparent. Putin would go on to make use of Prigozhin’s assistance on many matters of the utmost importance to the Russian Federation and utmost importance to him. If greatcharlie is correct, he continues to do so today

During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by Novaya Gazeta that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good friendship. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story.

In 1997, Prigozhin and Ziminov, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. Inspired by waterfront restaurants on the River Seine in Paris, the two created the restaurant by spending $400,000 to remodel a rusting ferry boat on the Vyatka River. Prigozhin told the magazine Elite Society in 2008 that the new restaurant offered Russians something new and different from boring “cutlets with vodka.”

It was no mean feat to create a profitable restaurant in St. Petersburg with a potential clientele that represented a small percentage of the population and managed to get them through the doors every night, let alone open a second based on a concept alien to a good portion of that exclusive clientele. In 1998, he opened the New Island Restaurant on a boat, which one tourism website calls “St. Petersburg’s only floating luxury Restaurant-Ship.” The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city.

In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. 

Putin clearly displayed liking for Prigozhin before everyone. Meduza reported Putin welcomed him as “one of the boys.” To clarify, Prigozhin was neither Chekisty, the son or grandson of a member of the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, an iteration of the security services during World War II, as Putin is, nor was he Siloviki, someone who had served in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB as Putin and most of his close associates had. Current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev, who was an attorney in St.Petersburg when Putin met him, also falls into that “other than Chekisty or Siloviki” category. Prigozhin’s good relations with others among the Russian Federation’s elite also assisted in bring in lucrative catering contracts

Prigozhin attends to Putin during his inspection of a Concord Management and Consulting facility. By 2003, Prigozhin left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. Concord Management and Consulting, a  company founded by Prigozhin in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. He was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with him, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region.

During those early stages of his growth in the business world, Prigozhin was known for being rather strict as a manager. However, he is not remembered as being one to complain about being wronged and suffering losses. He was hardly one who could be characterized as temperamental and thin-skinned. It would appear that any behavior that resembled such was truly left behind in prison. Seemingly, he very likely would have thought dwelling on such matters would have cost him too much time and energy; on the face of it, he likely believed his time would always be best spent on pursuing new, greater ventures. The profits from them surely surpassed any prior losses. Much as water down a stream, when Prigozhin encountered an obstruction, he would work around it rapidly to reach the next profitable objective. Beyond the immediate moment, there was always the potential for more ahead. (The indications and implications from this might be that his complaints concerning the Wagner Group’s treatment in Ukraine have been fostered by the realization that there are no prospects for advancing on to some satisfying new course upon which he could greatly improve his organization’s situation.) Good fortune seemed to stick on Prigozhin’s side. He could provide his family with pleasure and affluence.

Quam sæpe forte temere eveniunt, quæ non audeas optare. (How often things occur by mere chance, for which we dared not even to hope.) Over the course of the 2000s, Prigozhin grew even closer to Putin. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. 

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90 percent of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. Leonid Teyf, former deputy general director of Voentorg (the company charged with contracting caterers for the military), assisted Prigozhin in securing the orders. of Voentorg’s assets related to food supply and army maintenance to Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract signed by Voentorg for 2013-2014 amounted to $999 million. The contract was signed by the director of Voentorg Vladimir Pavlov. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, approximately amounted to $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies.

Prigozhin (center) reaches the top! He stands close to both Putin (left) and current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev (right) During confidential conversation. In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply more than 90 percent of all food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90% of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract for 2013 to 2014 amounted to $999 million. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Defence Ministry, approximately amounted to  $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies. As discussed in Part 2, Putin would oddly lay out the tie between Concord and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry in an address following the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency.

It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

Three “cheerful” photos of Prigozhin (above) on a US Federal Bureau of Investigation “Wanted Poster”. Perhaps in the Russian underworld in which Prigozhin ostensibly has his hands somewhat dipped, the poster is a badge of honor, a sign that he had made it to the top! It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary political opponent then, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin.

Prigozhin and the Wagner Group

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St.. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present).

As explained in some detail in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations”, from the time of the organization’s inception, it was widely believed that the organization was founded, owned and led by Dmitriy Utkin. Utkin is a veteran of the First and Second Chechen Wars. Until 2013, he served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of the 700th Independent Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Detachment) of the 2nd Independent Brigade, a special forces unit of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) or GRU. However, in an August 2017, article in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, the suggestion was made that Utkin was only a figurehead for the company. Fingers pointed at Prigozhin as its true owner. Prigozhin went some distance to deny any ties to the Wagner Group. He even denied any communication with it. Prigozhin actually sued Bellingcat, Meduza, and Echo of Moscow for claiming he had links to the organization. In an interview in December 2018, Putin also denied allegations that Prigozhin had been directing the Wagner Group’s activities. However, in September 2022, Prigozhin relented and admitted to having created the group. Prigozhin claimed, “I cleaned the old weapons myself, sorted out the bulletproof vests myself and found specialists who could help me with this. From that moment, on May 1, 2014, a group of patriots was born, which later came to be called the Wagner Battalion.” As noted earlier, the Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged in the fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts. 

At the organization’s core, Wagner Group troops are predominantly retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are typically aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. However, the Wagner Group also employs an international group of fighters. There are three main fighting units of the organization. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. There is a Serbian unit built upon complement of former members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard–also known as “Arkan’s Tigers”–created by the deceased 1990s ethno-religious nationalist Serbian paramilitary warlord Zeljko Raznatovic’s–also known as Arkan. A relatively new unit in the Wagner Group consists of citizens of Scandinavian countries, particularly from Norway. It participated in the firefights on the Bakhmut front. The unit is referred to as the Níðhöggr“, sometimes also known as Nidhogg.

The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Prigozhin, in a dark blue suit (second from right) attends a meeting involving top Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff and members of Libya’s National Army in Moscow on November 7, 2018. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). The Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged. Fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts.. 

According to initial statistics available after April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As noted, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. The recruitment of prison inmates for service in the Wagner Group is nothing new. The organization reportedly recruited imprisoned UPC rebels in the Central African Republic to fight in Mali and Ukraine. They are reportedly nicknamed the “Black Russians”. It was the Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that suffered high-profile casualties. Callous Russian Federation commanders threw them into battle pell mell. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. 

It would later be revealed by the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, a senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, that  22,000 of the organization’s troops had been killed in action in Ukraine. In his statement, published by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel, Marx further explained that another 40,000 were wounded in action. Of the 78,000 Wagner Group troops who served in what Marx referred to as “the Ukrainian business trip”, 49,000 of them were convicts. The Wagner Group has reportedly halted the practice of recruiting convicts in its ranks. Former convicts in the organization that survived service in Ukraine have been released from their contracts.

Prigozhin surely recognized early on that more than simply suffering under inept leadership of Russian Federation commanders, he and his organization were being pushed toward the precipice of losing everything by individuals seemingly more skilled in finding ways to defeat him than defeating their opponent on the battlefield. He certainly was not going to countenance that. An idea perhaps alien or incomprehensible to many readers is the possibility that Prigozhin was tolerant, at least up to a point, of the unpleasant set of circumstances under which he was caused to operate in an effort to demonstrate his loyalty and support for Putin. Homo antiqua virtute ac fide? (A man of the “ancient” virtue and loyalty?)

Particularly during the months-long battle for the Ukrainian coal-mining town of Bakhmut, senior managers and troops of the Wagner Group surely felt they were being thwarted, from keeping the Russian Federation in the fight, meeting their organization’s longstanding commitment to Putin and the Russian Federation, as well as meeting their personal and emotional promise to Putin not to leave Ukraine until the Russian Federation won the war. It is all very heavy stuff for a group of individuals whose top priority most would likely argue is profit. Based on his public comments, Prigozhin appears to believe victory is still possible under the right military leadership. It was during a crucial stage in the Bakhmut fight that Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose forces the Wagner Group jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would somewhat likely say, “to rescue.” Wagner Group units apparently were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred. (In meditating on Prigozhin’s position, Putin might want take into consideration the terrible outcome of the decision by Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, to use his beloved spetsnaz units with their exquisite military capabilities to perform stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, on the frontlines in conventional roles. the specialized units were over relied upon and consequently suffered devastating losses.)

Well known is the fact that Putin prefers to take as few people as possible into his confidence. Even with those lucky few he is doubtlessly frugal with his thoughts. Conceivably, Putin had spoken quietly with Prigozhin over the very public vocalization of his rage over the fundamental failures and gross mismanagement of the special military operation by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff since its start. Whatever may have been discussed in such a meeting it hardly concerned taking steps against Shoigu and Gerasimov that Prigozhin was insisting upon, but a solution of some kind may have been voiced by Putin that manifested his unique lens on matters. Note, Prigozhin has neither expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He has always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with the most recent events most firmly in mind. 

Prigozhin in Bakhmut (above). The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Reality Check

Non mihi si linguæ centum sint oraque centum, ferrea vox, omnes scelerum comprendere formas omnia pœnarum percurrere nomina possim. (Not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, could I repeat all the types of wickedness, and run over all the names of penal woes.)  The supercharged modality of Prigozhin’s expressions concerning the performance of Shoigu and Gerasimov was by no means been within normal parameters and such reproach and obloquy from anyone toward those immensely powerful government leaders and organizations would never have been expected before the special military operation began. In the Russian Federation, “discrediting the armed forces” carries a maximum 15-year prison sentence. Many of Prigozhin’s public statements about the situation in Ukraine are now famous worldwide.

Some in the mainstream Western newsmedia would lead their audience to believe Prigozhin’s regular public ravings about how the war was being managed was an indication that he may have an unhealthy mind. Res ipsa loquitur!  Bizarre reports of Prigozhin providing information on the positions of the Russian Army in Bakhmut appear equally faulty. They have only evinced a misunderstanding of Prigozhin’s relationship to Putin and what the very active private military contractor means to the Russian Federation President personally. From the moment any claim was made of Prigozhin’s betrayal, at least on the Russian Federation side, it was doubtlessly viewed as a comical yet nonetheless apocryphal rumor ginned up by his opponents. To that extent, it was surely rejected as fast as inane suggestions meant to bias the mind back in March 2022 that the extraordinarily violent and most loyal Putin subordinate, the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, would possibly overthrow his president and take over the government and on a matter outside of the Ukraine War context, the very patriotic and extremely dangerous People’s Republic of China Vice Minister for counterintelligence of the Ministry of State Security, Dong Jingwei, had of all things defected to the US in June 2022. (The Dong Jingwei defection matter is treated in some detail in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”.) These suggests were not clever, but rather crass. One could get the impression that those responsible for the US political warfare effort against the Russian Federation have been soliciting ideas from a group of local junior high school boys for the most immature suggestions possible. Surely, that would count as a bold attempt to exploit thinking from outside the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies. Conscia mens recti famæ mendacia risit. (The mind conscious of integrity scorns the lies of rumor.)

Speaking plainly as he does, Prigozhin’s vocal expressions might at best send a clear signal to Wagner Group troops that they genuinely matter to him, but alone, his words do not appear to have accomplished too much. Prigozhin clearly recognized that as long as his organization’s troops remain in Ukraine, they will be “at the mercy” of what he clearly deems to be careless and inept top officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. That does not bode well for them. If one might toss on top of everything Prigozhin’s contentious relationship with those officials and commanders, it becomes nearly impossible to foresee anything positive coming the way of those troops in the future. Such will likely remain a constant no matter how things fall, one way or another in the midst of Moscow’s Ukraine enterprise. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Prigozhin standing before rows of Wagner Group troops killed in action in Ukraine. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing at the White House, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders.

The limited capabilities of Prigozhin’s organization as a military force also adds to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. As with everything else in which they were delinquent or deficient, the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces moved to utilize the Wagner Group as part of their combat operations during the special military operation doubtlessly with preconceptions in their minds via existing intelligence reporting on how the Ukrainians were situated to fight. To name a few of the deficiencies likely imagined in Moscow, it was surely thought to be short of weapons, short of good leadership, and short of well-trained troops. Through international newsmedia reporting, the whole world was led to believe the same. (Irony of ironies, it was the Russian Federation Armed Forces that actually had shortages of everything, including gear, troops, and especially military acumen.) The Wagner Group, loaded with veteran fighters, was expected to have a multiplier effect on the frontline. They made the questionable choice to utilize their own spetsnaz units in the same way.

Carelessly unforeseen and unimagined by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff was the massive level of assistance that the Ukrainians would eventually receive from the Western powers and other countries. (That matter is examined in some detail in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)  That assistance has made the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Ukrainian Armed Forces), even with its few remaining deficiencies, one of the more formidable military powers in Europe. Far more than just javelin and stinger shoulder fired weapons, small arms, and uniforms, the long list of assistance has included high-tech armaments as Patriot air defense systems and NASAMS (Norwegian (or National) Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) air defense systems, MLRS systems HIMARS systems, mobile and precision long-range artillery, anti-ship rockets, Abrams, Leopard, and Challenger tanks, MiG-29s, F-16s, helicopters, a variety drones, real-time intelligence, and loads of troop training. The Wagner Group could hardly have had a multiplier effect as the one dimensional force that it has been on a battlefield in which its opposition possessed such weapons and capabilities. 

For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated Russian Army trucks was not enough. Additionally, a robust, organic drone capability would be needed particularly for ISR, direct action, and psychological warfare operations to support the more effective planning and execution of missions. Given how the war in Ukraine has progressed, the new ways in which existing technologies are used and new ones are developed and introduced, new efficiencies in warfighting may render these few suggestions outdated. Still, the crux of what is presented here should be readily apparent. (Even the White Russian anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian insurgent groups–the Freedom For Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps used rather pricey Western-made military vehicles to launch their May 2023 raid into Belgorod region of Russian Federation. The vehicles were reportedly supplied by an unknown source. Images appeared on social media allegedly displaying those vehicles. Reporting on the equipment it observed, the Oryx open-source weapons tracking group, stated that the Russian Federation forces captured two International M1224 MaxxPro MRAPs, two 2 M1151 HMMWVs-, and one M1152 HMMWV that was damaged.)

As for procurement, the Wagner Group might have effectively sought out Independent sources of military resources for the company not with regard to its service in Ukraine but more generally to supply itself as a fully autonomous, fully operational professional military contractor. It would be one more step in attenuating its reliance upon the largess of the fickle Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation Armed Forces. All of that being stated, interoperability of armaments procured with those in the Russian Federation inventory would likely be viewed as a requirement by Prigozhin, keeping in mind the possibility of needing to operate in cooperation with the country’s armed forces, especially if asked to do so by Putin. Without variance, any procurement efforts should only be made with a keen eye on working within the parameters of existing international sanctions concerning armaments and the Russian Federation. It would be useful for the Wagner Group to have its own supply of food, water, medical facilities, and petroleum and oil lubricants. As long as these relative inadequacies as well as others persisted, the Wagner Group as noted, would remain poorly situated to optimally serve in support of Russian Federation military operations in Ukraine. As long as they exist, Prigozhin’s demands for greater autonomy will remain something less than legitimate. No statements have been made or actions taken concerning the structure, strength, composition, or rearming of the organization that would indicate the situation would change anytime soon.

It is very possible–actually more likely–that Prigozhin may not have had any interest at all in making great changes to how his organization’s units were structured. To that extent, Prigozhin may have long ago accepted that there would be a strategy-resources mismatch that would prevent the Wagner Group from playing a greater and genuinely effective role in support of Russian Federation military objectives in Ukraine even if it had been given a feerer hand. Given the few actualities presented here and others, one option that evidence suggests clearly arose in the mind of Prigozhin was to mostly withdraw his organization from the field in Ukraine, while keeping a portion available in-country to serve as effectively as possible structured as it is. In that way, Prigozhin could then continue to put the Wagner Group to use elsewhere worldwide where it could serve more effectively and more successfully. Again, that is what Prigozhin appeared to have been doing or at least seemed to be what he wanted to do before the Wagner Group Rebellion “erupted.” (It is not possible for greatcharlie to confirm any of Prigozhin’s burgeoning actions were founded on reasons similar to those expressed here.)

Prigozhin assists his Wagner Group troops load up in trucks moving up to the front in Ukraine. The limited capabilities of his organization as a military force added to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. They possessed diminutive armor, mechanized, and firepower resources. For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated, second-hand, Russian Army trucks was not enough.

A Few Oscillating Ruminations on Prigozhin 

Serum est cavendi tempus in mediis malis. (The time for caution is too late when we are in the midst of evils.) It might have been plausible enough for many experts and observers to believe it would have been in the best interest of Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically to ensure that he and his unit commanders will play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities will be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. That might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. In that vein, Prigozhin ostensibly could have made a genuine go at using his considerable political influence with Putin, speak truth to power and so on, and implore him to provide the Wagner Group with a greater say in how it will execute missions in support of Russian Federation Armed Forces. Yet, such a political move would have been tricky or if not a grave blunder. Prigozhin is savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. True, despite the nature of professional relations between Putin and Prigozhin concerning the Wagner Group and military affairs, more important was their personal relationship. That relationship, recall, was at the crux and the apex of Prigozhin’s standing in the regime and in military circles as well as his sense of entitlement to issue criticism of the top military leadership of the Russian Federation and foist his cconvictionsupon everyone on how his organization could best be used in Ukraine.

Putin has shown considerable regard for Prigozhin bbutfor quite some time he has shown even greater regard for Shoigu professionally and personally (privately). Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements. Militarily, a sine qua non for Putin is to possess without doubt, to believe with comfort, that the Russian Federation has the capability to successfully attack and destroy the US and its interests with nuclear weapons.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigozhin was surely well-aware that Putin really did not need at any point, for any reason, and especially during the flailing special military operation would have been an extra problem that from one angle might simply boil down to him as mere in-house bickering between two “closely ranked” associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s preceding June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin is conceivably someone well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him on anything that is not quite an emergency. After all, in the Wagner Group, he has long-demonstrated that effectively dealing with, managing, and understanding strong-spirited and strong-willed men is his forte. A leader must be strong, but also. at the right time, compassionate.

If one might see some plausibility in greatcharlie’s discussion along this line about Prigozhin, one might be been able to accept or at least consider that on his own volition, he very unlikely would have pushed the matter of his struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov to the point where his forces amassed for days in plain view on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation–even the US had then under surveillance by satellite–would after a very public announcement of rebellion, begin a military drive toward their offices. True, that is exactly how things appeared to have happened to many. Still, it was unlikely the case.

To gnaw a bit further on this point, there can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin has greatly concern himself with what Putin has been facing in these very trying times for the Russian Federation following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. What Putin thinks is of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin is the priority. Discussing Prigozhin during an interview, political activist Aleksei Navalny stated: “[Prigozhin] didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In the old-fashioned, out-moded sense, Prigozhin is under obligation to Putin. Yet, as a knock on to all of this, greatcharlie will go out on a limb and state that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever act in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life.

The Platters was one of the most successful vocal groups of the early rock and roll era. Their distinctive sound was a bridge between the pre-rock Tin Pan Alley tradition and the growing new genre. “Only You (And You Alone)” (often shortened to “Only You”) is a pop song composed by Buck Ram. It was originally recorded by The Platters in 1955. In the first verse of this song about true devotion and love which seem to greatcharlie to be befitting Prigozhin’s “frame of mind” on Putin are the words: “Only you can make all this world seem right / Only you can make the darkness bright / Only you and you alone can thrill me like you do / And fill my heart with love for only you.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restaurateur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

One might hazard to suggest that it is Prigozhin’s nourishing side which seeks to sustain his relationship with Putin and give him the support he needs to fortify his regime’s interests abroad. It is the destructive side of Prigozhin that Putin has exploited to achieve the ends of his expressed and secretive foreign and national security policies. Expectedly, some observers might dare say that Prigozhin’s desire to undertake such a morbid venture is part and parcel of some severe pathology. (Of course, similar private military contractors “could hardly thrive” in the socially and technologically advanced industrialized countries of the West.)

Perhaps somewhere at the confluence of the two modes of thinking deep within, there is a conflict. He has stood casually among piles of Wagner Group troops he recruited, many from Russian Federation prisons, piled in bags in storage rooms and laid out in fields. He openly admitted to the loss of 40,000 of those who joined his organization. The potency of it all is readily apparent. Prigozhin is still only human. There must be moments when he wonders what it is all amounting to. The US author Megan Devine provides words that may be apposite in this context in her bestseller, It’s OK That You’re Not OK: Meeting Grief and Loss in a Culture That Doesn’t Understand (Sounds True, 2017): “There are losses that rearrange the world. Deaths that change the way you see everything, grief that tears everything down. Pain that transports you to an entirely different universe, even while everyone else thinks nothing has really changed.”

There are those who would suggest Prigozhin has become bitter and disillusioned about the world around him, the Putin regime; essentially he is feeling jaded. Of course, it was the largesse of Putin’s regime that over the years  allowed him to become a billionaire. On a more specific level, it might be posited that Prigozhin has become jaded with regard to the Ukraine War. There may very well be scope to that idea. He has talked of moving on with his Wagner Group to better things. To that extent there may also be some materiality. It would be questionable to characterize Prigozhin as a cynic who is endlessly expressing his underlying distrust of everything. Yet, far from believing the Russian Federation’s situation in Ukraine cannot become better, Prigozhin appears determined to right wrongs by those he feels have failed Putin and the Russian Federation and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat somehow.

In greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled, “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, it was noted that there have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian Federation units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it went on further to state: “It would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restauranteur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

According to Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2023, a shoot-out allegedly erupted in the settlement of Stanytsia Luhanska (Luhansk Oblast) between Russian Army soldiers and Wagner Group troops concerning which side is to blame for Russia’s failures amid the invasion of Ukraine. Those reports were not substantiated by Kyiv or confirmed by any sources in Moscow. On June 2, 2023, Prigozhin, writing on Telegram, alleged his troops had discovered 12 locations in rear areas where Russian Federation Defense Ministry officials had planted various explosive devices, including hundreds of anti-tank mines. He further reported that when he inquired with Defense Ministry officials as to why the charges had been set, they explained it was an order from their superiors. Prigozhin stated: “It was not necessary to plant these charges in order to deter the enemy, as it [the area in question] is in the rear area. Therefore, we can assume that these charges were intended to meet the advancing units of Wagner.” Prigozhin noted that none of the charges went off and no one was hurt. Still, he added: “We assume this was an attempt at a public flogging.”

The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering?

If Putin had suddenly spoken out on the matter before the rebellion and in Solomonesque fashion, directed Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to work out an amicable plan to resolve their differences on the sustentation and upkeep of the Wagner Group and present their results to him, the respective loyalty and obedience of all three would have been put to the test. Shoigu and Gerasimov pretty much control the whole show which is essentially the problem to which Prigozhin has been calling attention. Under such a scenario, they would unlikely have been willing to brook any serious discussion of making the Wagner Group a stronger and far greater force. Prigozhin would most likely have remained flawlessly obedient to Putin’s orders to hash it out but deep down would hardly have been interested in putting too much time into butting heads with the leadership of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff. Prigozhin would probably see in advance that the most trying part of such a “confrontation” would be not be contending with the disdain of Shoigu and Gerasimov toward him, but their obsolescent preconceptions of military affairs and military science in general, which he might foresee would doubtlessly have caused them to filter his new ideas for the role of his organization through their archaic and prosaic ones. (It is possible that Shoigu and Gerasimov also had viewed the relationship of the Wagner Group to their organization’s as parasitical. Their actions concerning the combat support and combat service support of Wagner give force to that idea.) The only concession Prigozhin might have made under such circumstances would be to agree to keep his Wagner Group troops in Ukraine for the duration of the conflict and maintain its presence in-country at a certain strength. Shoigu and Gerasimov would have needed to make many concessions to satisfy Prigozhin based on past behavior. Still, even if some allegedly practical plans might be worked out and presented to Putin, in this hypothetical, what would be presented might better reflect what is possible than what will be. Nous sommes reconnaissant de votre considération et croyons que vous aurez du plaisir à être partenaire avec nous. Only the emergence of some exigent circumstance could have had the effect of shifting more power to one side or another on the “control” issue. Not to get too far ahead, but it would seem the Wagner Group Rebellion provided just such an emergency.

Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Supreme Economic Eurasian Council at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, May 25, 2023. The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering? Perhaps something deeper was going in his remarkable mind.

Fun and Games, Quicks and Aberrations

As alluded to earlier, Prigozhin’s wailing has not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out. 

Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling many elites of the Russian Federation who find him to be anathema and not a forewarning of things to come. Perhaps making such nettlesome utterances helps to pass the time for those at the top of the food chain in Moscow. Prigozhin, himself, has made his thoughts on a mutual dislike between him and Russian elites living in the luxurious Moscow suburb of Rublyovka very public. Laughing off aforementioned reports that he had offered to reveal Russian troop positions to Ukrainian military intelligence in exchange for Kyiv’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated in an audio message posted on Telegram: “People from Rublyovka” could be behind the allegations.” He went on to state in his unique style: “Of course they will pour as much s*** on me as they can.” La leçon d’elegance de Yevgeny Prigozhin.

If Prigozhin’s original comments concerning a possible revolution in the Russian Federation actually was a manifestation of his brand of acidulous humor directed at antagonizing political and business elite at home, surely they were not appreciated among leaders of the FSB, especially since they came just before raids were launched along the Russian Federation’s borders by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian groups. The eyes of FSB officials should have become strained after watching Prigozhin’s every more at that point. Given their reaction to events concerning the Wagner Group later in June, they would seem to have thrown little more than a few stray glances his way.

Intriguingly, the ultranationalist political figure Igor Girkin has alleged via a string of videos that Prigozhin’s public pronouncements concerning the military campaign in Ukraine as merely “a project” created by an influential group within Putin’s inner circle. Girkin, known among associates by the cognomen “Strelkov” (Shooter) is an anti-semite, and is likely unstable. He is a former officer in Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Girkin gained notice as an operative behind the Russian Federation’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. In the aftermath of the invasion, he became a prominent player in the effort to establish Nova Rossiya (New Russia) on the sovereign territory of Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odessa. Girkin insists Prigozhin efforts are backed by Sergey Kiriyenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the President of the Russian Federation, who Putin has appointed to oversee the occupied Ukrainian lands. Girkin has been quoted as saying: “Kiriyenko is openly at war with Shoigu, which is why Prigozhin attacks the Defense Ministry.” To that extent, Girkin claims Prigozhin is “not just a man whose eyes were suddenly opened and began speaking the truth.”

Girkin asserts further that “Kiriyenko is backed by the Kovalchuk brothers, people who are part of the President’s inner circle.” Yury Kovalchuk is the chairman and the largest shareholder of Rossiya Bank. According to the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), together with his brother Mikhail Kovalchuk, as well as Mikhail Mishustin, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, Andriy Turchak, the Secretary of the General Council of United Russia–Putin’s political party, Prigozhin, and others, he formed the influential Kovalchuk-Kiriyenko group.

It is important to note that Girkin emphasizes that Prigozhin is “not Russian by nationality,” more than insinuating that just as the “majority of Bolsheviks,” he is of Jewish origin and thereby poses a considerable threat to Russia. Ultimately, Girkin and all others similar to him–and there are many similar to him in the Russian Federation–are political figures that Putin must manage, not Prigozhin. Girkin, clearly a creature of the worst kind from the Russian Federation’s Intelligence Community, appears vindictive, passionate, ill-balanced, jealous, envious. The intelligence services of many countries–especially those in the US–have their fair share of Girkins. The utmost should be done to guard against them. That is not always the case: disco inferno!

Interestingly, so intense and focused had been the internecine quarreling between elites in Moscow that rarely heard publicly from them at the time was that old chestnut that the invisible hand of the US and its Western alter egos is behind all that has gone wrong for the Russian Federation and that is all part of a long-term plan destroy their country.

Prigozhin speaking on his media service channel on Telegram. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (center), takes a moment to gather himself while seated between Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Glavnokomanduyushchiy Voyenno-morskoy Flot Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Naval Force or Russian Navy) Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov (right). The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s way; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have had their impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individua he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, a lack of good solutions, options for action when trouble began was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters, his willingness to try novel ideas that make sense, may have changed. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies for insights and options and could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches. That possibility is discussed here.

The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have even had a profound impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individual he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, when trouble began, a lack of good solutions, viable options for alternative actions, was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition to develop better answers. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters may have changed, and there might be a willingness, not to go off the rails, but to try novel ideas that make sense. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to garner ideas, insights and options that could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches unexpected in Western capitals. That possibility is discussed here. In Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies one might expect some well-accepted and well-used approaches to understanding Putin’s decisionmaking and rationalizing Russian Federation action based on what is known about its tactics, techniques, procedures and methods of doing things. Due to this, unexpected changes in his thinking might throw the West off-track to some degree, depending on what on-going approaches he hypothetically might change and how. The implications could be enormous. There remains a place for the bog standard analyses of Putin on some matters. However, with regard to Ukraine,  it is essential to get beyond thinking along well-worn lines and the expected and consider all possible eventualities.

For a over a decade, some of officials of the US foreign and national security policy apparatus have made their intense dislike greatcharlie and disapproval of its plainly innocuous scribblings well known to it. Nevertheless, for others, greatcharlie hopes its efforts here are not value neutral, particularly with regard to students. Although greatcharlie would be satisfied enough to have this commentary stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem. (I should prefer ineloquent good sense to loquacious folly.)

A confident Putin (above) at the February 21, 2023 Security Council meeting regarding Ukraine. Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin, expectations for future fruitful talks would be far lower now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. Facing such trying circumstances daily, Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 24, 2022. Putin has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that he, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster, at least until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

A New Putin?: Transformed by His Circumstances

Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin. there would be far lower expectations of future fruitful talks now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. They might find words from the play Henry the VIII. a collaborative effort between William Shakespeare and John Fletcher  might find most apposite concerning him. In Act IV, scene iii, Katherine, Henry VIII’s ex-wife, reduced to princess dowager, converses to her attendants about the death of Cardinal Wolsey. Wolsey, a once trusted advisor to the king, having failed to secure an annulment of Henry VIII’s first marriage, was removed from government, arrested for treason, grew ill, and died a broken man. Katharine though saying she will speak of him with charity proceeds to characterize him in the following negative way, saying: “His own opinion was his law: i’ the presence / He would say untruths; and be ever double / Both in his words and meaning: he was never, / But where he meant to ruin, pitiful.”

Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 2022. He has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that for, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

It is very likely that even Putin as much as anyone else was surprised by the limited level of control he could exercise over his use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces especially once they were placed on the battlefield in great numbers. Indeed, events have been so far off from anything Putin most likely wanted or foresaw in Ukraine, that one could hardly believe genuinely that he ever had full control of the situation and reasonably make only an attenuated argument in support of that belief. The poor thinking of Russian Federation commanders and the positively horrible outcomes of their actions was most likely another eye-opener for Putin.

Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.) In its preceding post, greatcharlie stated that the Russian Federation would unlikely win the Ukraine War based on the record of performance of Russian Federation commanders to date. However, it must be explained further that the situation they face is not impossible to crack. Military commanders of other countries, such as the US for instance, would more than likely readily see the correct course of action to “breakout” of the Western and Southern fronts. One might hypothesize that a zealous emphasis on Russian military history in the course of studies in the 30 schools of Voyenny uchebno-nauchny tsentr Sukhoputnykh voysk “Obshchevoyskovaya ordenov Lenina i Oktyabr’skoy revolyutsii, Krasnoznamennaya, ordena Suvorova” (The Combined Academies Order of Lenin Order of the October Revolution Red Bannered Order of Suvorov of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation-Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Russian Ground Forces), the equivalent of Western command and general staff schools and Voyennaya akademiya General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), what suffices for Western war colleges, and an apparent failure to encourage student officers to examine in the round the strategy, tactics, and the operational art displayed by other countries armed forces in other wars, has left Russian Federation commanders without the slightest idea of how closely their current situation in Ukraine parallels that of a number of commanders in other larger conflicts of the past. Case studies of such done by student officers that would have familiarized them with those past foreign commanders’ successful combined arms actions that allowed them to maneuver their forces out of trouble and gain and retain the initiative would have likely changed the course of the current war.

Spectemur agendo. (Let us be judged by our acts.) Still, even if Russian Federation commanders hypothetically came upon an historical or novel way to storm through the frontlines of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and put themselves in a position to do some “open field running,” it is hard to conceive of what would be their follow through to exploit success. Given their aberrant moves from the first day of the special military operation, it is difficult to imagine what for them would be priority objectives they would have in mind and why, whether they would intend to conquer all of Ukraine or limit themselves to securing certain useful territory. They surely would know by experience–disco inferno–or at least intimate that the Ukrainians would never tolerate any additional territorial gains in their country and in response to such a loss, build up stronger with the support of their allies, and strike back harder than ever before. Another rapid “dagger thrust” at Kyiv would be counterintuitive. One would expect Putin would have the most say in what to do next. Under this hypothetical situation, he would likely publicly or through classified orders, express his objectives for the next phase of the war, and from that, the concept and intent for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would be established. 

Equally difficult to imagine in this hypothetical circumstance is what could potentially be planned under Putin’s concept and intent, given the likely remaining strength of units in contact with the Ukrainians, shortages in weapons systems, ammunition, other supplies, and authentic forecasts of future casualties and expenditures of military resources. All of that would likely preclude plans to do anything big. To that extent, it is hard to see even under the most favorable circumstances where this whole enterprise is going for Putin. (Discernibly, greatcharlie to a great degree here mimics the worst sort of strict (toxic) instructor. However, no lessons are being offered.)

Assuredly, Putin had influenced some decisions in the field such as the move against Kyiv early on in the invasion. In preceding posts, greatcharlie previously discussed what it felt was his likely role in that fiasco. However, Putin more than likely had no idea what in actual fact needed to be done to succeed, and worse, was completely unaware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces were to successfully perform the mission he gave them. Likely believing everything else had been planned in a proper manner and prepared in the appropriate way, he doubtlessly could not have imagined that any “minimal input” from him on taking Kyiv could have so negatively shaped the entire picture of the operation.

To gnaw a bit further, if Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Maybe Putin could have micromanaged the military if he had earnestly made the effort after becoming Russian Federation President to develop the acumen to act as a quasi strategist and tactician, at least at a level greater than Shoigu and at a proficiency somewhat better than Gerasimov. Perhaps he could have accomplished this in the model of the guerilla fighters, Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi-Minh, or build on the military or paramilitary experiences that he had in government resemblant of US President Franklin Roosevelt, who, for seven years and throughout World Wat I, was an assistant secretary of the Navy, or United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who albeit he was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, a decorated British Army officer, twice served as First Lord of the Admiralty. However, none of that happened for Putin. (Goodness, greatcharlie can only imagine what the backlash of some readers would have been if it had suggested there was some firm comparison of Roosevelt and Churchill with Putin. Á la Berezina!)

Although it is not discussed in this manner much in the newsmedia, it possibly could have been a terrible emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when he has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine to hear that an insider, his fidus Achates Prigozhin, was ready to take his Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) out of Ukraine. The Wagner Group, Putin’s ride or die–as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. As described briefly in greatcharlie’s May 15, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries. The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

A screenshot from a video published on May 5, 2023 depicting Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin (above) announcing the organization’s planned exit from the fierce struggle in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Although it has not been parsed in the round in the international newsmedia, it surely must have been an emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine that Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) was ready to leave Ukraine. The Wagner Group–Putin’s “ride or die”, as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. The organization expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would surely say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

Where Is the Good Advice?

Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual may be facing, often the presumption from the outside is that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his “trauma smile” does its job of hiding what is going inside.. Satisfied with appearances, few would investigate further into the matter with vigor, especially if what might result from that exploration would not “harmonize” with recognized perceptions of said individual at high-levels of management. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. For a deeper dive, one would only need to consider in real terms what the inner conversation must be for the individual in question. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie took a look at what Putin’s inner conversation might have been at the time examining an historical example from Antiquity. (Usually, the potency of works from Antiquity is immediately apparent.) In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3 of The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 B.C. – c. 425 B.C.), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle, Demaratus. 

Herotodus writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.” This passage of The Histories underscores the reality that even in a past age when leaders were viewed as something just short of gods, or actually as gods, there was the recognition that no matter how wise, there were things they could not know, things they could not control. 

The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before. The course of the invasion of Ukraine, the result of which he was certain of, may have left less doubt, if any, on the correctness of this hypothetical hope of his. 

True, Putin could choose to stumble forward against all the odds and eke-out whatever existence life presents after the Ukraine War at great personal loss for himself and the Russian Federation. However, that appears unlikely. If the records can serve as evidence, he will likely continue on the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022. That may mean triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West–that began during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the death of which he mourned with considerable grief.

Putin (above) attends the Collective Security Treaty Organization Leaders Meeting in Yerevan, Armenia on November 23, 2022. If Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have fully recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Unlike the aforementioned Xerxes of Persia, for Putin there is no uncle and general as Demaratus, to put him in the full, genuine picture of what he faces and authentic possibilities for action. Perhaps even more, someone to stimulate genius. Holding its focus upon the Ancient World, greatcharlie is unaware of any equivalents of the Ephors of Sparta to whom Putin can turn. An Ephor (Overseer) discussed in intermittently–yet too often to properly cite here–in the Hellenica (c. 362 BC) by the Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC), was a member of a board of five magistrates in Sparta, annually elected by the body of eligible voting citizens. They were experienced and wise individuals whose advice was worth a king’s ransom. Ephors had an extensive range of judicial, religious, legislative, and military powers, and could shape Sparta’s domestic and foreign affairs. Their primary responsibility, however, was to oversee the actions of Spartan kings. They could critique a ruler’s plans for war,use their extra powers to reel in a ruler, and reproach them for the unsound actions. This had greater necessity and meaning due to the fact that Sparta was ruled by two hereditary kings of the Agiad and Eurypontid families, both supposedly descendants of Heracles and equal in authority, so that one could not act against the power and political enactments of his colleague. In concept, the Ephors’ purpose was akin to that of a US Congressional Oversight Committee, mutatis mutandis, for executives of foreign and national security bureaucracies who must often face withering inquiries on their policy plans or ongoing initiatives, among many other issues. In greatcharlie’s May 15. 2023 post entitled “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, it was briefly mentioned that the US Congress established the War Powers Act of 1973 in the wake of the Vietnam War to gain a better handle on the ability of the US President to intervene with the armed forces. In the Congress, stronger action toward chief executives whose actions were deemed out of bounds by the majority of Representatives has included impeachment proceedings. (Recognizably, Congress unfortunately in more recent times has overreached on simple matters as simple as phone calls preferring to react upon impressions, presumptions, and political and public pressure, than actualities. Perhaps it could be chalked up to human nature, human fallibility.)

The situations presented in the two examples from past and present noted here are quite different from that of Putin. In accord with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President is elected directly by popular vote, is head of state, and chief of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government, headed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President with a legislature’s approval. Legislative power is vested in the two houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, an upper house of appointed representatives from each of Russia’s administrative divisions, and the State Duma, a 450-member popularly elected lower house. Still, it is the President’s office and the government ministries which issue numerous legally binding by-laws. 

All of this being stated, the common wisdom is that Putin is an autocrat who holds near limitless power under the system he created. On foreign and national security policy, he faces no obstructions concerning his decisionmaking on diplomacy and war. Putin has no need to end-run the Federal Assembly, no need to heed advice as precious as that of the Ephors from Senators of the Federal Council of Representatives of the State Duma. He runs the whole show. Managing the internal affairs of the Russian Federation on its own is a colossal task, and surely as a one man show, Putin has made his share of mistakes and is bound to make more mistakes into future. He is not a deity; as aforementioned, he is only human. Taking on not only Ukraine militarily but the wherewithal of nearly every Western country and others, without relinquishing on scintilla of responsibility for normal duties, there would be the likelihood that he would drop an almighty clanger. Perhaps the Ukraine venture could best be described as a blunder of a lifetime.

Beneath the Surface

Alios ego vidi ventos, alias prospexi animo procellas. (I have seen other winds and faced other storms.) Putin may secretly worry that good answers may never be found, not even mere acceptable ones to his problems regarding Ukraine. As already hinted, everything he has, his hopes, his future, the future he has planned for his country, are under the real threat of dissolution. His imagination would not be at work overtime on these points. Indeed, such thoughts may be unfixed, moving about freely in his mind, perhaps billowing up at inconvenient moments. Among ordinary individuals, such thoughts can break through the strongest defense the mind can raise against them. Putin is not outwardly despondent, although there have been public moments when he was not exactly his usual self.

Surely, it would be one thing if Putin had brought disaster and suffering upon himself alone by his actions. That would pain him, but he would almost certainly be able to carry it well.  Casualty lists from Ukraine are likely far more difficult for him to carry. Unless one has faced similar circumstances, one might safely say it is hard to imagine–surely impossible for greatcharlie to imagine–how it all must feel. Perhaps the situation would be made far worse if the Russian people had decided to light on him over the war’s progress, but that has not happened. 

In a poll of Russian Federation citizens on the direct question of whether they supported the war conducted by the independent and well-known research group in the country, the Levada Center, it was found that respondents who said yes fluctuated between 74 and 76 percent in April 2022 and August 2022, declined to about 71 to 74 percent in September 2022 and December 2022, and climbed back to around 75 percent to 77 percent in January 2023 and February 2023. The Levada Center utilizes face-to-face polling. In a poll on support for the war conducted by The Chronicle, a one year-old polling group, it was found that support rose in the first months of the war from 59 to 66 percent. Support then declined to 51 percent, its lowest point, at the end of September 2022. Yet, by February 2023, support rose upward again to 59 percent. The Chronicle conducted its polling by telephone. The Chronicle also offered respondents the option “I do not want to answer” in addition to the usual “undecided” option, which reduced the share of both war supporters and war opponents. The recent polling start-up, The Russian Field, conducted a survey which indicated support for the war rose to nearly 60 percent at its start and then stabilized at about 66–68 percent.  The Russian Field also used the telephone survey method.

Clearly, support for the war is nowhere near overwhelming, yet given its progress it still appears rather high. Any external effort to create the impression that there is no support for the war among Russian Federation citizens or an effort to stir sentiment against Putin would most likely fall flat. There is likely no greater priority for Borrnikov than to make certain that is the case. While considering Putin’s effort to get a hold of his thinking on all that has transpired and what he must do next, the lyrics of singer-songwriter James Taylor’s 1970 hit “Fire and Rain” were brought to mind. The apposite lines are: “Been walking my mind to an easy time / My back turned towards the sun / Lord knows, when the cold wind blows / It’ll turn your head around / Well, there’s hours of time on the telephone line / To talk about things to come / Sweet dreams and flying machines in pieces on the ground.”

A somber Putin (above) attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual has been facing, it is often the presumption from the outside that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his trauma smile does its job of hiding what is going inside them. Satisfied with appearances, few would invest much more into the matter. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside of the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before.

Throwing a Curveball at the West

As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given the Kremlin’s Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. At the same time, individuals as Putin can often have unique reasons for singular choices. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might cause him to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be the state of Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing but nevertheless distressing curveball at the West. 

If only out of academic interest, greatcharlie considers how seeking answers from outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies could potentially be useful to Putin, and what the potential outcome of quietly taking such an unexpected course might assist in fostering new ideas and approaches in the Kremlin. No matter how unorthodox, disagreeable, or round the bend as they might seem, it might behoove some managers in US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to consider it and other possible, albeit recherché, eventualities and apply them in analyzing Putin’s decisionmaking process. Doing so might serve to improve the chances at accurately predicting any “unexpected” moves. (In previous posts concerning the conundrum of the very successful and unhindered Chinese intelligence operations within the US, greatcharlie benignly made the suggestion that US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies make use of those capable of performing analyses of the situation from outside the box.)

Over the years of Putin’s leadership, a small number of organizations in the Russian Federation have been invited to share their views through studies and presentations with the government on foreign and national security policy issues. At the top of the heap are: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Russian International Affairs Council, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Given their size, political contacts, and financial means, these organizations are able to dominate the think tank scene in the Russian Federation. As aptly put by the Atlantic Council in a November 12, 2019 report, they represent albeit from different ideological angles, the rather volatile mainstream. If novel ideas and insights are being developed those organizations, it would seem they are being put forward at glacial speed. Indeed, the indications and implications of what Moscow continues to do are that nothing Putin has received so far from what might suffice for “outside the bureaucracies advice” has had the power to moved events forward Moscow’s way in a manner befitting a power of the size, strength, and prominence in the world–at least from Putin’s lens.

Putin signing documents, including a decree recognizing two Russian-backed breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine as independent entities, during a ceremony in Moscow, Russia, February 21, 2022. As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given their Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might lead Putin to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing, but nevertheless distressing, curveball at the West.

As aforementioned, greatcharlie, without pretension, states that it doubts anyone at the Kremlin is aware of, or would  have the slightest interest in, its scribblings. However, there is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide advice for Putin concerning the prosecution of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. If any readers feel that anything as such is being offered to Putin, then it would surely be unreasonable for them in particular to continue reviewing this commentary with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

A reality about analytical departments of foreign and national security bureaucracies worldwide is that certain dogma insinuates itself in work produced within them, and it can color the thinking of consumers of that product. Supervisors in the analytical departments, knowingly and occasionally unknowingly because it would only be human, may place limitations on what paths, albeit even reasonable and logical ones, that analyses can move along. By using perspectives from outside of the foreign and national security bureaucracies, one could possibly garner a fresh look at issues from other angles. New thinking might rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. Condescendingly, some from the inside Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outside of the bureaucracies thinkers as mere shots in the dark, guesswork, and suppositions, from those perceived as lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to the Ukraine issue. With no intent to offend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. 

One looking for fresh, viable solutions would expect and perhaps want “outside of the bureaucracies” thinking to move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in singular cases such as Ukraine that may be hard to crack. What the outside of the bureaucracies thinker brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies thinker. One might suppose the length and breadth of the outside of the bureaucracies thinkers’ distinctive knowledge and unique life lessons are what found their alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been acquired through personal study. Of course, bog-standard thinking would still have its place in other simpler issues.

Each reason shared here concerning a hypothetical decision by Putin to seek assistance for ideas and insights outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies is suggestive of itself. Together they have a cumulative force. At the same time, one could also conjure more than one reason to doubt this outcome. As mentioned, Putin has not as yet taken any unorthodox approaches in his handling of the Ukraine matter or any other foreign or national security policy matters. Some observers might argue that there are distinct patterns in his decisionmaking. Deviations from his standard course would be as shockingly noticeable, to steal a phrase from one of Arthur Conan Doyle’s 56 Sherlock Holmes short stories, “The Adventure of the Bruce-Partington Plans” (1917): “as if you met a tram-car coming down a country lane.” (One could easily imagine seeing such in a film created by Austrian director Marie Kreutzer.) To double-dunk on Doyle’s work, one might say that Putin has his rails and he runs on them, so to speak. However, perhaps one disappointment after another in Ukraine may not have derailed him, but may have stirred some interest in possibly switching at the points to an alternative rail untravelled by him before. What is being considered here is not just Putin’s attitudes and behaviors in spite of his experiences with Ukraine, but the possibility of some alterations in such because of those experiences. To that extent, one might also argue that the record of his two decades of leadership in the Russian Federation actually shows that Putin’s mind has its quirks, and in that respect it is as individual and curious as any other. As Maurice de Saxe (October 28, 1696-November 20, 1750) the famed military commander of the 18th century stated in the preface of his Mes Rêveries (My Reveries) (1757), “routine and prejudices are . . . a natural consequence of ignorance.”

At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, its citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances following even the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. (Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) 

To that extent, perhaps scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. 

Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. In the end, it would be enough of a tragedy to find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

File photo of Putin as a young KGB officer (above). At an early age, Putin revealed to his parents that he wanted to work in the security services. The genesis of the idea were books and spy movies. Putin says his mother and father, with the help of his martial arts coaches, tried to dissuade him from his career choice given the nature of the work and people within such organizations, but to no avail. A few years later, his dream became a reality. Perhaps today scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing its possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them.  Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

In Part 2, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that at an early age, he wanted to serve in intelligence. His family was dismayed, but not shattered by his decision. His father, given his experience in the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, was painfully aware of the grave nature of work in that field. However, once they became fully apprised of the extreme nature of his ambition to join the intelligence service, his parents sought to discourage him as best they could. When Putin’s martial arts coach, Anatoly Rakhlin, who he fondly called “Semyonovich”, went to see them to say that as an athlete, their son could get into an Institute practically without passing exams, that led his parents to pressure the coach to encourage him to go into an Institute. Putin, however, disagreed with the idea. Semyonovich could not fathom why Putin resisted. Another coach from Putin’s martial arts club, Leonid Ionovich, came to visit, fully informed of his decision to join the intelligence service. As Putin explained it, “He was a clever guy.” Recounting the exchange with Ionovich over his career choice, Putin said the following: “‘Well,’ he [Ionovich] said to me, ‘Where are you going?’ Of course he already knew. He was just acting sly. I said, ‘To university.’ ‘Oh, that’s great, good for you,’ he said. In what department?'” Putin says he only replied, “The law school.” Then, Ionovich roared: “What? To catch people? What are you doing? You’ll be a cop. Do you understand?” Insulted, Putin yelled back, “I’m not going to be a cop.” (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.) Putin would hardly be surprised if very few who truly had much to offer would come forward knowing they were hearing similar things about serving his government that those who cared deeply about him said concerning his interest in getting anywhere near the Soviet intelligence service

Quomodo in perpetua pace salvi et liberi esse poterimus? (How (in what way) will we be able to be safe and free in everlasting (an enduring) peace?) Returning to the idea of seeking answers from analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, on the face of it,  surely it would  be unwise for Putin not to avail himself of their services if they could be of assistance. Additionally mentioned in Book 2, Chapter 4, Section 31, Book 3, Chapter 4, Section 11, and  Book 4, Chapter 5, Section 6 of Xenophon’s Hellenica are the embassies. (The role of the embassies is also discussed in Herodotus (c. 484-c. 425 BC) The Histories (c. 426 BCE-c. 415 BCE) in Book 5, Chapter 49-51 and in Thucydides (c. 460 BC–400 BC) The History of the Peloponnesian War (c. 430 BC) Book 2, Chapter 12, Section I and Book 8, Chapter 5, Section I.)

As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracies thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than a mouse and as solid as Stonehenge. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, ideas and insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. 

Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

Again, this is all hypothetical. It is possible that defeating any hypothetical outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies approaches potentially taken by Moscow would only require the energetic preparation for such a possibility by repeatedly considering and working through all of the “what-ifs”, the possible eventualities, on an appropriate schedule.

Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov (above). As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracy thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than mouse and as solid as Stonehenge, that may help resolve the Ukraine conundrum. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

The Way Forward

It remains to be seen what will come next. In Act II, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play, All’s Well That Ends Well (1623), standing in the King’s Palace, Lafeu, an old lord at the court of France, opens the scene with the comment regard the king’s miraculous recovery: “They say miracles are past; and we have our / philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, / things supernatural and causeless. Hence is it that / we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves / into seeming knowledge, when we should submit / ourselves to an unknown fear.” While greatcharlie has not come across a cogent argument proving that events in Ukraine represent something supernatural or that one should submit to fears of the unknown, there is pertinence in the statement that trifles should not be made of terrors, especially as they regard nuclear war or that feel assured at all about Putin’s next moves. 

What stands near certain is whatever measurable degree of peace and security existed before the invasion of Ukraine will unlikely be restored. Each side in this conflict seems bent upon ensuring the other will not find satisfaction with any agreement that would obviate complete victory. An authentic forecast for the situation could only project a situation worse than before or the worst thing imaginable. When things are very wrong, one must remember they can always be worse. One only needs to imagine the possibilities. At least, there is a clear choice for both sides: take an albeit uncomfortable step toward peace; or, let things play out as they are moving now. Neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quit non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. (There is no one who loves pain itself, who seeks it and wants to have it, simply because it is pain, but because sometimes circumstances arise in such a way that with effort and pain they can obtain some great pleasure.)

Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert dedicated to Russian servicemen taking part in the military operation in Ukraine on the eve of Defender of Fatherland Day at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, February 22, 2023. There was surely great contrast between the ebullience displayed by Putin at the patriotic event and his thoughts and feelings behind the scenes about what his military commanders are doing in Ukraine and what he can expect from them as the war continues. Many decisions and actions made by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance. In examining this issue, greatcharlie seeks to reinforce somewhat likely conclusions by foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in the US and around the world not just concerning Putin’s control of Russian Federation Armed Forces, and to some degree, his security services as well, but also his culpability for crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as soldiers. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Many decisions and actions taken by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance, a perspective put in plain view during his February 24, 2022 address, broadcasted just as the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) began. With no pretension intended, greatcharlie states the Russian Federation’s handling of its wrongful invasion at all levels has been deplorable. What arouses an interest at this juncture has been Putin’s lack of control over many “big things” during the massive enterprise. Within the boundaries of its faculty, here greatcharlie humbly provides a few insights on how many things have gone wrong for Putin, the colossal issues that now beset him concerning the war, how he might seek to gain firmer control of the situation, and what that might mean going forward. Hopefully, greatcharlie provides new perspectives not just concerning Putin’s control of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces), and to some degree, his security services, but also his culpability for heinous crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as unarmed soldiers. An historic parallel to his lack of control over events in the field is presented. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC) was an Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, born in Athens. At the age of 30, Xenophon led one of the largest Greek mercenary armies of the Achaemenid Empire, the Ten Thousand, that famously attempted to seize Babylon but failed in 401 BC. As a writer, one of his works was Cynegeticus, usually translated as On Hunting or Hunting with Dogs. In discussing his wish that readers would find value in his treatise, Xenophon writes a passage which interestingly parallels greatcharlie’s desires regarding this essay. He states: ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν. οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι τὰ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι: ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὸ ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι:καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. (Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation—philosophers I will not call them —because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set, will say that what is well and methodically written is not well and methodically written—for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres, but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted.) (Regarding the presentation of the Greek text, greatcharlie asks its readers to kindly pardon its indulgence. It is presented here in “private” acknowledgement and celebration of someone of the utmost importance who will begin her undergraduate studies in the Classics in the Fall of 2023!)

I. The Magnitude of the Ukraine Disaster Begins to Take Form within Putin 

Stepping into the realm of conjecture, greatcharlie can imagine Putin, at the time of his decision to launch the special military operation was girded by the belief that his extreme action was necessary to secure a spiritual victory for mankind over the ugly evil of Nazism. However, Putin at the time of this writing may see the situation a bit differently. Clearly, he has plunged his country and the world in a challenging situation by acting on what he doubtlessly would likely still call “certainties” concerning Ukraine, NATO Expansion, and Western threat to the Russian Federation.

Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them.

Putin attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them..

II. Putin’s Actual Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

When there are missing pieces among facts collected in an investigation, a reliable imagination can be very useful. One can imagine what might be happening with another party. That supposition could become a working hypothesis. One then can act upon it, and if lucky, the investment in time and energy will prove justifiable. As alluded to earlier, the received wisdom among many Western military analysts and Russia scholars is that The Kremlin runs the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and in their view “today the Kremlin means Putin.” His military advisers are Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. Evidence offered of his control of the armed forces is the fact that “both generals serve “entirely at the pleasure of Putin” and “the respective predecessor of each was summarily dismissed.” One steps out on an attenuated thread when standing behind such evidence to support arguments regarding Putin’s control of the military. What may be perceived as simple truth, in reality is not so simple.

Over the two plus decades of Putin’s leadership, the record shows that unethical and outright criminal behavior can surely be well concealed under the Russian Federation government system. Certainly long before, in the erstwhile Soviet system, corruption in the armed forces was endemic and lucrative enough for those senior commanders engaged in such who would quietly “grease the palms” of superiors and who were not caught. The sales of military equipment to black marketers was the commonplace betrayal of some commanders. Another example that remains in greatcharlie’s memory from the days of the Cold War was learning that fighter pilots would pay commanders in order to serve in certain top tier squadrons. The military is not the only foreign and national security bureaucracy ham-strung and suffering from corruption. Unimaginable but true, even the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB Alexander Borrnikov, an irreplaceable member of Putin’s piratical crew, was shrewdly deceived by subordinates in the FSB 5th Department foreign intelligence service before the special military operation began. (The matter is discussed in further detail later in this essay. SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” for other insights shared on the matter.)

If one It has been suggested by some experrs that in Ukraine, Putin by his own hand destroyed the armed forces that built up over two decades. Looking at this supposition open-mindedly, one might added that if that is so, he certainly did not do it deliberately. However,,it is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was at the hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did a superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind. On February 24, 2022, they rolled the dice and poured their troops into Ukraine as ordered, hoping somehow that things might fall into place. Things did not go their way. Putin most likely had no idea how much damage was being done by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He could hardly admit even now that he did not know. If he did not need them now as a buffer between himself all the many failures militarily, and all the political drama, and if he had anyone else tied as closely to him that he knew as well and could turn, Putin would have likely sent them to higher service already, as is the pattern. If the Ukraine War were to end in the Russian Federation’s favor, an unlikely outcome, perhaps the two general might face trying times. Putin does not forget or forgive such betrayals. He is not the understanding type.

If one might suggest that it was all a deliberate act of subversion by one or both of the generals, the question would be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous degree in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties.

Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing flat-footed on the ground and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This averment shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round.

Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (right). It is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was atbthe hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did an superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind.

A. Delegation and Disappointment

Further to the preceding point, what did not serve Putin well was any thought that he could delegate matters concerning the special military operation that he typically would have overburdened himself with in the past. It appears to have been a matter of misplaced trust, which is very unusual for Putin. As an executive he made the proper management decision, but given the nature of his regime and its players, it was the wrong choice, at the wrong time, anc the wrong issue to do any delegating over. If Putin had been truly In control of the facts and the moving pieces, greatcharlie goes out on a limb to say he probably would have never gone into Ukraine and as it was, encountered considerable, unexpected resistance or just bad luck. However, if he would have still decided to go in knowing what he knows now, he would very likely have done his homework and to the very best of his ability developed real answers to resolve prospective problems having imagined more than enough possible failures and mishaps that could derail his plans and having most likely rehearsed over and over in his mind more than one way to resolve them. The situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would doubtlessly look a lot different than it does now. Of course, none of that happened.

Power and control are often limited for political authorities, even autocrats, during conventional military operations. That lack of control–along with US experience in Vietnam– is what in part inspired the US Congress to pass the War Powers Act in 1973. Surely, laid bare in Ukraine for Putin is his own lack of control  Certainly many may disagree with this assessment, but those who insist that Putin directly controlled events in Ukraine, even war crimes committed, should look more directly at just how poorly he has controlled aspects of his special military operation. On the four occasions presented here, Putin’s lack of control was self-evident.

1. The First Big Let Down: Russian Federation Intelligence on Ukraine

Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen in the Russian Federation. Far more than just being familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services, in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. (Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership.) In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Before becoming Russian Federation President, Putin served as Yeltsin’s Secretary of Sovet bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser. Having those experiences, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, he should have known that reporting from them must be scrutinized. In a very perplexing way, Putin felt confident enough to appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast announcing the start of the special military operation. Putin said: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” Lastly, he stated: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.”

 As the story goes, the now former head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda and his deputy as well as head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh, reportedly had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. Whatever Putin’s inner voice might have been saying about what he was being told about Ukraine, he closed his ear to it. Putin was apparently so convinced by reporting that Ukrainians were so dissatisfied with the leadership in Kyiv ready to welcome regime change, he attempted to appeal to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to acquiesce to invading Russian Federation forces. Putin seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness to self-interest and to the interest of the Russian Federation. Considering how Putin spoke so boldly in his broadcast to the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) audaciously suggesting they turn on their government, If the whole matter were not so grave, it could be viewed as Armed Forces comical.

Putin (center) Shoigu (left) and Gerasimov (right) at military exercises 2022. Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin, himself, might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was essentially recognized as a master stroke of military genius. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them.

2. A Study in Contrasts: Acumen Displayed in Zapad, Vostok, and Other Military Exercises and Poor Performance on the Battlefield

Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was a master stroke. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them. 

Despite what may have been choreographed to display a well-trained, well-equipped war machine for Putin’s unknowing eyes, the walls fell down in Ukraine. A poor strategy, faulty planning of the military operation, leaving the door open to supply and resupply of arms, equipment and sustenance, failure to decisively conquer by moving up the River Dnieper to cut off the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, reinforcing the failed operations in the Donbas, in part resulted in a stalled invasion and the epic slaughter of a modern army. Putin counted upon commanders with limited combat experience and no experience who more than anything else displayed negligence, inattentiveness to details large and small, delinquencies, and deficiencies. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. As for the concept of the Combined Arms Army, the formations raised and operated under it were as empty with troops as the concept was with promise.

3, Putin’s Faith in Spetsnaz: “A Weapon Is Only as the Man Who Wields It”

Putin has never hidden his admiration for Russian Federation Special Operations Forces. In foreign and national security policy approaches taken by the Russian Federation, special operations forces have been the go-to hammer to swing when the application of force was deemed required by the Kremlin. Such has also been the case with regard to domestic threats, particularly emanating from the Caucasus. Outside of government structures, Putin’s admiration for commando-type formations has likely played a role in his full acceptance and regular utilization of professional military contractors as the Wagner Group which are teaming with erstwhile spetsnaz members. In the opening days of the special military operation, Putin put his appreciation for the Russian Federation’s special operations forces on display by taking time on  February 27, 2022 to broadcast a message congratulating active military personnel and veterans of their formations on their professional holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day”. More than just a canned speech, Putin laid his heart out bare by stating: “You have demonstrated many times that you are prepared to act with the utmost efficiency and under the harshest conditions to precisely and professionally complete the most difficult and demanding missions. You always perform your military duty to protect your native country and citizens with honor and protect Russia’s national interests. The heroic traditions of the special forces find their roots in the centuries-long history of our army. They were fortified during the Great Patriotic War, matured and grew even stronger in Afghanistan and many hotbeds, as well as during the elimination of terrorists gangs both in the North Caucasus and in Syria. Putin said further: “I know that you undergo exactly this kind of training -comprehensive, all-encompassing and intensive, a real school of warfare. You strive to follow the best paragons of courage and bravery, true patriotism, and you set an example for new generations of defenders of the Fatherland and pass on your experience to young servicemen.” Very likely with reference to former spetsnaz serving in the Wagner Group, Putin remarked: “I want to thank the command and the personnel of the special operations forces as well as special forces veterans for their loyalty to the oath, for their impeccable service to the people of Russia and our great Motherland. My special appreciation goes to those who are performing their duty in the special operation to render assistance to the people’s republics of Donbass.”

Putin’s faith in the spetsnaz to carry out their duties to their utmost abilities was warranted, but as is the same with special operations soldiers in every country, they were only human and could only do so much. Placing them with their exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, under the control of Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, did not help. Among the classified US national security materials leaked online through the messaging platform in March 2023 were assessments of officials within the foreign and national security bureaucracies on the strength and capabilities of Russian Federation spetsnaz forces. According to those findings, there was such an overreliance on the specialized units on the frontlines that they consequently suffered atrocious losses. Behind the decision to use spetsnaz in such a role purportedly was skepticism among Russian Federation commanders that their conventional forces’ abilities could achieve objectives set in the invasion plans. Leaked documents also reportedly indicate US officials believe the high casualties of these units has rendered them less effective not only in Ukraine but also in other parts of the world where Russian Federation forces operate. Evidence of the losses in the spetsnaz units apparently was provided by satellite imagery featured among the leaked materials. Before-and-after imagery of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade’s base in southern Russia allegedly revealed that “all but one of five Russian Federation Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” Materials citing intelligence intercepts, assess the 346th brigade “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.” US intelligence analysts, who monitored the return of spetsnaz units to their respective bases, believe that extremely high losses in the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment “could explain why there is no clear [intelligence] signature of their return to garrison.” The loss of so many among the spetsnaz very likely came as a shock to Putin.

4. Hoping the Wagner Group Will Shift the Fight Moscow’s Way

As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Mentioned earlier was also that fact that Wagner Group fighters are typically retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. From the moment the situation went sour in Ukraine, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is widely known that since July 2022, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. To an extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be the saving grace of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 

However, it was not long before everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops. According to the best statistics available to greatcharlie, since April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As alluded to earlier, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner Group troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut.

In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin has expressed concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. Surely, Putin maybe somewhat concerned that the Wagner Group’s losses may eventually become so great that the organization would not be available to handle other foreign and national security policy matters for some time to come. In a pinch, perhaps the Wagner Group could recruit from among special operations veterans who served in the FSB and Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, but those former operators would for the most part lack the same level of battlefield experience spetsnaz from the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost in Ukraine possessed.

The full list of disappointments for Putin of or pertaining to the Ukraine enterprise is frightfully long and would overload and overwhelm this essay if included. Though, as aforementioned, theories of Putin’s control over the Russian Federation Armed Forces are accepted, it appears that nearly every theory confirming his alleged control cannot figuratively hold water.

Putin (left) and Gerasimov (right) holding a press conference following announcement that Gerasimov had become overall Russian Federation commander in Ukraine. Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

B. The Power to Hire and Fire Generals: What is It Worth?

Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

1. Putin Sacked a Slew of Generals in May 2022

Based on information made public by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, on May 19, 2022, Putin fired two senior commanders Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, who had commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov of the Black Sea Fleet. Osipov was reportedly fired following the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, which was a major embarrassment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Moscow-based media group, RBCreported on June 1, 2022, that on May 30, 2022, Putin issued a decree dismissing senior commanders of the security services. The list of those removed from their posts included: Major General of Police Vasily Kukushkin, who was head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir region; Major General Alexander Laas, deputy head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory; and, Major General Andrey Lipilin, head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region. Major General Alexander Udovenko of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Major General Yuri Instrankin, deputy head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were also among the dismissed. Additionally, Putin reportedly fired Police Colonel Emil Musin, who was the first deputy head of the Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Putin Fired 22 Russian Army Generals in August 2022

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence reported that General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 had been sacked. it was at that time there were the rather quiet, yet widely suspected firings of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was the senior but not overall command of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine and General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine. US officials estimated at the time of these dismissals that more than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured, which represented more than 50% of the number of troops Russia initially deployed in  the special military operation. According to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, at least 10 generals were among those killed.

3. Putin Fires Russian Army Generals for Failed Response to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in September 2022

Based on information from Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Telegraph reported on September 12, 2022 that Putin fired Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in a recent offensive in the east.

4. Putin Replaces Overall Commander in Ukraine in January 2023 and Fires Russian Army General for Vuhledar Fiasco in March 2023

A shift in command well-known among those following events in the Ukraine War was the replacement of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin by Gerasimov as overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”. On or just before March 26, 2023, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, had been removed from his post. Muradov had previously come under criticism for his failure in Vuhledar from Prigozhin who believed its capture was possible and may have had the effect of turning the war in Moscow’s favor. The Moscow Times, described as an independent English- and Russian-language online newspaper with offices in Amsterdam that is currently outlawed in Russia, also reported that Muradov had been suspended, One of the Moscow Times’ sources told the online daily, “Muradov was suspended because he was a crazy idiot who could command soldiers to die. Many complained about him.”

In February 2023, Muradov attacked Vuhledar by sending his soldiers into minefields, right under the artillery fire of the Ukrainians. As a consequence of his actions, reportedly two elite Russian Naval Infantry brigades, one presumed to be the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 103 pieces of equipment were reportedly lost in just three days. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.”

As the record indicates, on every occasion when Putin, usually via his Defense Minister, sacked a group of generals who underperformed, a month or a couple of months later, he was dismissing another group for similar, if not parallel failures. Sacking a general, more than just a punishment, is a very strong form of public embarrassment. By now, everyone interested in Putin has recognized that he rarely reverses his own decisions. (If that were the case, he surely would have reversed his decision to invade Ukraine. Declaring success early on and offering purported measurables among other things would have been the most likely off ramp.) Firing generals from commands whose records he doubtlessly reviewed and gave ultimate approval for top assignments unlikely came easy for him. Perhaps Putin may even be concerned that it reveals that he is not the best judge of people, that he has lost his touch, and worst of all, it confirms for some that he is not infallible. His mistakes with the military have very noticeably begun to pile up. Interestingly, despite being punished, the generals who were sacked will at least live to see another day. The soldiers, some incredibly young, whose lives they carelessly wasted in Ukraine will not have that chance.

There is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide an apology, legal advice, or worst, a legal defense, for Putin over war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Thoee among greatcharlie’s readers who may feel anything of the kind is being offered here to Putin, then it is respectfully suggested they stop reading the commentary at this point for it would surely be unreasonable, unconstructuve to continue with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

Alexander Gardiner’s famous photograph of US President Abraham Lincoln, and Union Army Major General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (right) and Allan Pinkerton (left) at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862. Although many readers, particularly in the US, both technically and perhaps more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America.

C. Another Leader Who Struggled To Control His Commanders During Wartime

Although many readers, particularly in the US both technically, and more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America. The author of the military law was jurist Franz Lieber, a German lawyer, political philosopher, and combat veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Lieber essentially modernized the military law of the 1806 Articles of War to ensure the Union Army could prosecute its war against the Confederate States of America with legitimacy.

However, despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the #humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

In fairness to Sherman, it must be noted that he acted in accord with the concept and intent of Lincoln’s Lieber Code when he gave explicit instructions to his troops regarding their conduct while on their march through Georgia, but there were a few deviations. In his Special Field Order No. 120, Sherman out of necessity encouraged foraging and the confiscation of livestock as he left his Army Group’s supply lines behind to travel so deep, so fast, and so furiously into Georgia. Home invasions were off limits. However, if antagonized by Confederate Army soldiers, Union Army officers were granted permission to destroy private and industrial property. Additionally, the field order permitted able-bodied Black laborers to join the march, but commanding officers were instructed to prioritize the distribution of supplies for soldiers of their Army Group. The majority of Union Army soldiers complied with Field Order No. 120, but some dubbed “bummers” roamed the countryside intentionally terrorizing civilians and looting. Although bummers were technically engaging in forbidden activities, the overall psychological impact of their actions on the local population was in sync with the purpose of the march. The greatest damage done by Sherman’s troops was the destruction of Georgia’s railroad lines, both a conveyor for industries and military transportation. Union Army soldiers would rip up and melt down tracks in full view of the demoralized populace.

Union Army troops tearing up railroad tracks in Georgia as Confederate civilians watched in horror (above). Despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

The text of the Lieber Code was arranged to create concordance with the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863) and prohibited racist discrimination against Black soldiers of the Union Army, specifically by Confederate Army troops who denied them the rights and privileges of prisoners of war. The military law clearly had little impact on the treatment of racially segregated Black soldiers of the US Colored Troops (USCT) by their White Union Army comrades in arms. At the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), incredulously, yet painfully true, White soldiers of the Union Army’s 1st Division essentially assisted soldiers of the Confederate States Army massacre Black soldiers of the 4th Division (USCT) in the midst of the fighting. (SEE the February 28, 2023 greatcharlie post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”.

On top of that, a succession of commanders failed to meet Lincoln’s expectations during the war. He could insist upon regular consultations on their battle plans, but he could not control what they actually did on the battlefield. He could only remove them. or allow them to resign, but he could not repair the damage they had done to the Union effort, or do anything about the wastage of Union Army soldiers. Very briefly, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, having previously functioned as Commander of the Army and Department of Northeastern Virginia from May 27, 1861 to July 25, 1861, served as a general in the Army of the Potomac until after the Second Battle of Bull Run when he was relieved of command at his own request on September 6, 1862. Major General George “Little Mac” McClellan was appointed Commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, and later, the Army of the Potomac (July 26, 1861 to November 9, 1862). In 1862, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign unraveled after the Seven Days Battles, and he also failed to decisively defeat the forces of General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Frustrated by McClellan’s cautious tactics, Lincoln removed him from command. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside served as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from November 9, 1862 to January 26, 1863. Following his infamous “Mud March”.and the senseless slaughter of his troops during the Union Army’s defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Joseph Hooker served as Commander of the Army and Department of the Potomac from January 26, 1863 to June 28, 1863. Concerned about Hooker were first raised when reports were made that his headquarters doubled as a combination of bar and brothel. Hooker’s timid command performance and grave defects as a commander–he lost mental control of his command in battle–were exposed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Ostensibly recognizing “faults” in his behavior and performance and reportedly sensing the distrust of Lincoln and Union Army General in Chief Major General Henry Halleck, Hooker resigned his command on June 28, 1863, on the eve of battle. Major General George Meade jumped in as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from June 28, 1863 to June 28, 1865. Meade repulsed the forces of the General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg from July 1, 1863 to July 3, 1863 with tactical adroitness; however, he was castigated by some for failing to hotly pursue the remainder of Lee’s forces. He instead allowed them to escape from his immediate reach. Lincoln in duress penned a letter to Meade dated July 14, 1863, relieving him of his command but never sent it. Success was not assured at Gettysburg, but Meade had apparently failed to keep any preconceived follow through firmly in mind in the event of victory.. Although Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, his independence of action was sharply curtailed after March 9, 1864, when General Ulysses S. Grant took control of Union  forces from Halleck and was named Commanding General of the US Army. 

Despite keeping a close eye on them to the point that he nearly micromanaged the war, Lincoln could only possess marginal control over the actions of his most senior commanders. He surely had even less of a chance to control the actions of subordinates well beneath them in the chain of command on the battlefield. A law such as theLieber Code could at best signal intent. In the end, what was done was done. If unlawful or unethical acts were witnessed, they could at best be reported and adjudicated within the system of military justice, or if egregious enough, reviewed in Congressional hearings. 

Painting of the representatives of 12 countries at the conference held in the Alabama room at Geneva’s Hotel de Ville August 22, 1864 where they adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” (above). The International Committee of the Red Cross while recognising that it is “primarily the duty and responsibility of a nation to safeguard the health and physical well-being of its own people,” knew there would always, especially in times of war, be a “need for voluntary agencies to supplement . . . the official agencies charged with these responsibilities in every country.” To ensure that its mission was widely accepted, it required a body of rules to govern its own activities and those of the involved belligerent parties. A year later, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the US Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. A total of twenty-six delegates from 16 countries came to Geneva. The meeting was presided over by Swiss General Guillaume Henri Dufour. The conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.” Representatives of 12 countries signed the convention at that time.

IV. Under the Geneva Convention Military Commanders Are Responsible for What Happens in Field

To the extent the political authorities cannot control events in the field, commanders take on greater responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Under Geneva Convention I , Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129; Geneva Convention  IV, Article 146; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 28; and, Geneva Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87, it is clear that commanders shalll be held criminally responsible under the law if they knew or should have known that subordinates were going to violate the law by committing a war crime, yet failed to take steps to prevent it. Further, commanders would be held liable for failing to punish or report subordinates who have already committed a war crime. To that extent, commanders are viewed as being in control of their troops and being responsible for all that transpires within their commands at all times. That rationale gains support in the following way. When the commander develops a plan of action, necessary is the requirement to assess all factors relevant at the time, such as ground and enemy forces, your own forces, logistics, courses open. (In greatcharlie’s day, it was referred to as the METT+T analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available. Yes, greatcharlie’s editor is that old!) Once the plan is decided, the commander issues orders to subordinates. The next aspect of control is the direction of the engagement, during which it is expected that the commander will take into account the law of armed conflict. 

V. Likely Big Lesson Learned by Putin Concerning Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 

Having learned a very painful lesson with his conventional forces during the special military operation, Putin will ensure that he fully controls the “crown jewels” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: the nuclear triad. That effort to establish that control has been mostly revealed with each public move he has made with regard to the supply, continual redeployments, and drilling of those forces. With regard to to those who command the nuclear forces, as explained in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: What Comes Next for Putin at Home and in Ukraine?: An Assessment One Year After the Start of His Special Military Operation”, just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, literally Strategic Purpose Rocketry Troops) which control land-based ICBMs, the strategic bombers and other nuclear capable airframes of the Voenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force), and satellites of the Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony (Russian Aerospace Defense Forces) without a shadow of doubt would go into action. In addition, commanders of the strategic submarines of the Voyenno-morskoy Flot (Russian Naval Force) in both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would execute their missions. Indeed, commanders who are in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise. Surely, there are more than enough members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces hurting over the nightmare that has befallen their comrades in Ukraine. They more than likely want to dish out some “payback” against those countries that they likely perceive–based on what they surely have been told–created circumstances there, and many can deliver payback in the extreme.

At the Battle of Camarón, an important episode of the Second French Intervention in Mexico (December 8, 1861 to June 27, 1867), the 3rd company of 62 Legionnaires and three Legion officers, led by Captain Jean Danjou was sent to reinforce a French military convoy, transporting 3 million francs in gold bullion, siege guns, and sixty wagons of ammunition. Information was received that the convoy would be ambushed. Before Danjou could reach the convoy, the led elements of a force of 3,000 Mexican Army infantry and cavalry made contact with his unit and he was forced to make a defensive stand at the Hacienda Cameron, in Camarón de Tejeda, Veracruz, Mexico. At the point when he recognized that victory would be absolutely impossible to achieve against the larger Mexican force massed around their defenses, Danjou urged his soldiers to take an oath to fight to the death rather than surrender. He made them swear their fealty on his wooden hand. Danjou then shared his bottle of wine and encouraged his men with has been called  “those noble words that warm one’s heart and makes the final sacrifice less difficult to face.”  When the French Foreign Legion moved to France, Capitain Danjou’s wooden hand was taken to Aubagne, where it remains in the Legion Museum of Memory.  The hand is the most cherished artifact in Legion history.  April 30th is celebrated as “Camerone Day,” an important day for the Legionnaires, when the wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is brought out for display. In 1892, a monument commemorating the battle was erected on the battlefield containing a plaque with the following inscription in French: Ils furent ici moins de soixante / Opposés a toute une armée / Sa masse les écrasa / La vie plutôt que le courage / Abandonna ces soldats Français / Le 30 Avril 1863 / A leur mémoire la patrie éleva ce monument. (Here there were less than sixty opposed to a whole army. Its numbers crushed them. Life rather than courage abandoned these French soldiers on April 30, 1863.  In their memory, the fatherland has erected this monument”) The railing from the Legion grave at Camarone can now be found at the village of Puyloubier near Aix-en-Provence. (The importance of the Battle of Camarón with regard to the history and culture of the French Foreign Legion is discussed in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations.”

Although perhaps willing to accept that Putin is the quintessential “bad actor”, it appears almost impossible for many to believe Putin could decide for the Russian people that as a country the Russian Federation would accept a similar fate, mutantis mutandis, rather accept what he ostensibly would perceive and envision as the nightmare of life under the thumb of Western powers and the near certain invasion of their country in the near future. Indeed, observers might try to consider a scenario in which Putin after observing the Russian Federation Armed Forces lose one decisive battle after another in rapid succession and all had unraveled in Ukraine, would make a nationwide broadcast one evening explaining to the Russian people that the Russian Federation was about to be invaded by the proxy forces of the Western powers, that the special military operation, meant as a pre-emptive action has lifted the curtain on the true nature of the Western powers’ objectives and operations in Ukraine and based on all that has been revealed concerning the actions of the Western powers and the astronomical support of the offensive military activities of their partner in Kyiv, despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin for them not to continue their aggressive activities in the Russian Federation’s near abroad, a state of total war existed between the Russian Federation and the US, its NATO allies, and the EU. He would tell the Russian people that their support, prayers, and courage were needed as his government took its next steps. Putin would likely display sangfroid and equanimity, and speak with the tone of a leader in complete command of a situation.(Readers might cast their minds back to Nazi German Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ February 18, 1943 address at the Berlin Sportpalast following the Wehrmacht’s epic loss at Stalingrad to the Soviet Army, in which he zealously implored the German people to commit anew to an all-out war effort: Totaler Krieg–Kürzester Krieg! (Total War–Shortest War!) From the point of that hypothetical broadcast, it would most likely just be a matter of time before the worst possibility would materialize.

It is greatcharlie’s contention, without pretense, some absurd desire to establish some greater sense of importance, or a ridiculous effort to claim of greater sapience, that Western diplomats would do well to reflect on this assessment and consider how responding to what they might deem as Putin’s misperceptions to open the door to great possibilities.)

The Russian Federation’s Sarmat Intercontinental ballistic missile (above) is a 115 feet (35-meters) tall and has a range of 11,185 miles (18,000km)(). Some estimate this to be higher. It can carry at least 10 multiple targetable re-entry vehicles – each with a nuclear warhead – which can each be aimed at a different target. It can also deliver hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles that can travel further and faster, flying in a variable path to overcome missile defenses. Just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad and supporting organizations would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise.

VI. The Arrest Warrant for Putin

In Paragraph 6 of  the First Oration of his Catalonia Orations, Marcus Tulius Cicero, an excoriation of rival senator Lucius Sergius Catiline, who he alleged sought to overthrow the Roman Senate, he writes: Quamdiu quisquam erit, qui te defendere audea, vives, et vives ita, ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firms praesidiis obsessed, ne commovere te contra rem publicam possis. Multorum te etiam oculi et aures non sentience, sicut adhuc fecerunt, speculabuntur atque custodient. (As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live, but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to.stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall perceive them.) Doubtlessly, with the necessary adjustments, surely this is the fate many in Western governments hope will befall Putin and he would be left in such a depleted state. However, greatcharlie suggests the satisfaction that they seek will unlikely manifest and the cost of any attempt to get their hands on Putin would be far worse than steep. Such attempts to create such a circumstance would inflame Putin’s ardor to a degree one could only reasonably expect the worst.

On March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant of arrest for Putin in the context of the situation in Ukraine. (Indicted along with Putin on that day was Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation since 2021.) As Russian Federation President, Putin has been declared allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” The Pre-Trial Chamber II also stated that “the crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory at least from February 24, 2022.” The Pre-Trial Chamber II further explained that it has reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility “(i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” The alleged war crime as outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber II is horrendous. At the nub of the matter is the issue of Putin’s level of control over the actions of all Russian Federation elements in Ukraine.

So often it has been the case with Putin’s presidency, legal action in response to his behavior on the world stage may have been warranted, but not necessarily required given the context of situations. Prioritizing the furtherance of international peace and security, the leader of Russian Federation with an enormous nuclear arsenal under his control, and members of his coterie, were hit with tongue lashings, finger-wagging, and sanctions. National governments, regional organizations, and international organizations would level economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and national legislatures would pass punishing business and financial laws designed to stifle the ability of the Russian Federation business community, particularly the country’s elite, to maintain and generate within advanced industrialized systems. The Magnitsky Law passed in the US created a considerable degree of pain and aggravation for Putin. Other than that, and a few other other coercive measures, Putin was repeatedly extended a degree of latitude. Putin was surely smart enough to recognize that. (One might posit that he flaunted that latitude allowed to him in the faces of Western powers by invading Ukraine.) In an environment in the West in which political leaders, especially among NATO and EU countries were being hounded over not doing enough to support Ukraine and not enough to decouple and lash out against Putin, the choice of the US-led international community became to exercise legal power over the Russian Federation President. Urging the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, though significant, was seemingly rather trivial in comparison with the greater task of assisting Ukraine in defeating the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, it helped set a path toward what may be a future of even more trying diplomatic efforts with Putin, which to great extent–unless the international community makes another choice, the unthinkable choice of granting Putin whatever he wishes–has put the outcome somewhat out of its rational hands.)

A. Putin Still Minimized as an “Oppositional Adolescent” by the West?

As touched upon in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post, it is difficult to see exactly what end was hoped for when the decision was made to indict Putin. There was likely some ego stroke scored as a result of sticking it to Putin, but not much more was accomplished than that. (How horrifying and disappointing it would be to discover the intent was to goad Putin to react adversely and make mistakes. If such is even remotely accurate, perhaps those who hypothetically were impelled by that thought might not have considered a big mistake Putin might have immediately made–and could still make–could have been to start a nuclear war. “Wishful thinking” is not a form of optimism, it is a euphemistic term for denial.)

Whether it was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

Maybe it would have been far more reasonable and practical to demand Putin confess irresponsibility over leading his country into war with so many criminally minded senior officials and military men unaware that he would not have genuine control of those who would eventually perpetrate heinous acts in Ukraine under orders from unstable authorities far beneath those in the Senate Building at the Kremlin as well as some sort of diabolical control from Hell. The chance of Putin cooperating in either case would doubtlessly be the same: zero! One might wonder what would be the plan of the International Criminal Court to successfully and safely take him into custody. 

Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, an arrest warrant can be issued publicly or under seal when the arrest of the person appears necessary to ensure a person’s appearance at trial. Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, the court may request the cooperation in the arrest and surrender from any State on the territory of which the person may be found. The court has no internal enforcement mechanism which would allow it to arrest persons subject to arrest warrants. In the interest of promoting good interstate relations, diplomacy, and peace and security and simply in the planetary interest, under such trying circumstances, discretion in taking such actions–at least refraining from declaring as criminal a party essential to establishing peace–would be the best choice, the better part of valor. Putin’s accountability and culpability for war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian Federation forces was something which could have been dealt with later. The priority now is ending the war if possible.

B. Actualities Concerning Intelligence and Making Claims against Putin

With regard to providing evidence of Putin’s crimes, one would need to be dismissive of the fact that the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation have sophisticated capabilities. One cannot say for certain what would happen if the Kremlin produced its own classified information confirming Putin plainly stated he would brook no behavior by Russian Federation forces in the field of the kind for which he is accused of having some responsibility. Hypothetically, the Kremlin might be able to produce transcripts of communications between errant commanders demonstrating their deliberate effort to conceal their actions from superiors, making false any suggestion that Putin controlled or ordered their illegal actions. To that extent, it might be proven with a sea of declassified official internal documents by the Kremlin that generally Putin did not impose too much on his commanders and within reason, relied on their reports and advice on the special military operation. Of course, one could expect it to possess a profusion of redactions to give them that ultra official feel and if any documents are authentic, to hide any nitty-gritty. With such evidence at hand, the Kremlin would surely insist it has no need to respond to baseless accusations about the Russian Federation President. 

One could unlikely insist as part of any fair and balanced legal process that Russian Federation classified intelligence is of less veracity and should be distrusted outrightly. Turning to the intelligence of one country–for instance the US, the United Kingdom, or Germany–that can provide information collected through electronic eavesdropping externally on the internal communications of the armed forces and security organizations of another country–for example the Russian Federation–with the aim to refute and discredit said monitored country’s own intelligence on what was being discussed among its military and security officials, would be something better than an act of bias and stand the idea of objective justice on its head. The International Criminal Court is supposed to be an objective tool for the world. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness but having stated the former, it believes that such a chauvinistic step and in the end finding Putin “unhesitatingly and with utter conviction” guilty, perhaps even in absentia, rationally imaginable given how predisposed so many that serve in regional and international bodies are to think unfavorably about him. The thinking of the court is certainly not to be judged by greatcharlie. It is only outlining what it perceives as a likely possibility. (This statement is not intended as apophasis.) If one might take into account anything about Putin’s arrest warrant written here could even remotely have some influence, it would at best be as a cautionary assessment for Western foreign and national security bureaucracies to consider before pursuing the arrest warrant matter any further.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) at the Kremlin on March 8, 2023. Whether the action was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice among powers of great influence in the West, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

VII. Energetic Diplomacy: The Best Chance of Stemming Catastrophe

In the aftermath of everything, historians would likely be forced to choose whether there really was something so peculiar about Putin that makes energetic efforts at diplomacy at this stage so taxing. It may actually be the case that the fault for ineffective diplomatic efforts with lies with the foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders of the many countries that had to deal with him. Perchance it was the fault of both parties for failing to see a true middle ground in things satisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless, it is greatcharlie’s conviction that at the present the West is in grave danger. The source of that danger in the Russian Federation. Ending the Ukraine War on favorable or acceptable terms for all parties is of the utmost importance. However, the priority is to ease the world back from an apparent slow spiral to armageddon.

In its March 30th post, greatcharlie suggested that at this point, diplomacy with the Russian Federation on Ukraine has figuratively been knocked off the rails. True, indicting Putin was a step that practically ensured his refusal to negotiate with Kyiv unless he had attained some considerable advantage in Ukraine and his negotiating position would be very strong. However, rather than draw a line there as in March and succumb to despair, here greatcharlie pulls back from the statement that the opportunity for diplomacy has been lost. 

A  Having the Right Answers

Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand, given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made. Putin shall not countenance what he may perceive as a diminution of the great dignity of the Russian Federation. 

Although all countries with an immediate stake in the Ukraine matter should be made aware of the diplomatic effort to achieve an entente with Putin, the new contact may need to be performed discreetly. Perhaps this is best that can be done at this juncture. Hope can be the only thing that comforts people in misery. For Russian people, who are the ones who will decide whether there is a need for change in the direction their country has been moving, hope for that change could be founded through contact between their president and the outside world. Paradoxically, while Putin may indeed enhance his standing among many as they will see the Russian Federation still acting as an important player on the world stage, many others may perceive such diplomacy as proof that the Russian people are viewed as far more than just potential targets for retaliatory nuclear strikes from the the US, the United Kingdom, and France, and written off as nothing to signify. It is suggested by greatcharlie in an opaque way that such a diplomatic effort could even mean far more to the right number of them. In public discussions of the new diplomacy, Western diplomats would do well to emphasize the effort has been undertaken with consideration of the well-being of the Russian people and make other statements of that nature.

There are for certain countless pitfalls that could disrupt or even destroy a new, robust diplomatic effort. What may be most important for Western capitals to recognize are the right answers that will bring a negotiated settlement and peace. There is also the issue of time available. Again, Putin has a large say in how things will turn out and surely has his own timeliness for action. To that extent, until some acceptable path to peace is found, perhaps the greatest danger will remain a decision already made by him to act in some ghastly way.

B. In the Meantime, Will the West Lose Control of Its Junior Partner in Kyiv?

The indications and implications of multiple reporting, to include the Washington Post, of alleged swift action by US foreign and national security policy officials to halt a plan by Ukraine to launch mass strikes against Moscow may be that at least the White House is aware of just how close the world in to a potential nuclear war, it does not want that, and that it now has the extra burden of monitoring the behavior of its “junior partners” in Kyiv. It is uncertain whether the Ukrainian leadership was led to take such a course as result of a lack of wisdom and experience or a complete absorption in self-interest or both. However, if newsmedia stories of this episode are accurate, it would appear that they were blind as beetles to the possibility that their planned assault could have triggered a catastrophic response from the Kremlin to the great detriment of Ukraine, but the whole wide world

If Putin already has a mind and the will to take the most drastic step possible against the West, Kyiv in planning an attack on Moscow could have supplied him with a reason better than anything he could have conjured up. The world moves closer and closer to the edge of the precipice with every errant move as this. It is wonder if there were any other planned Ukrainian actions halted by Western powers that would have brought the world the worst. One wonders how long can this balancing act without a safety net go on without catastrophe.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, (left) and U.S President Joe Biden (right) shake hands during their meeting at the Villa la Grange in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made.

The Way Forward

Putin watched his predecessors mismanage,  breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating not even a simulacrum of what came before it, despite his best efforts, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down “the wide-world and its fading sweets.” It is a wonder Putin has not gone mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him since the special military operation began and even beforehand. Standing on the precipice of losing everything, it would be best for the wide world if Putin can continue to retain his balance. The clear choice for him is either to continue forward or abandon at great personal loss, the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022, and triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West, begun during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Putin has mourned its collapse with considerable grief and disappointment.

Among those who use wisdom and logic, imagination can have value in an investigation. Imagination is a quality many lack, but many also lack wisdom and logic. Often it is the case that a lack of maturity inhibits one ability to reason matters out correctly. Just having an answer, right or wrong, based on some chain of thinking is enough for some. Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is in reality nothing so mysterious about Putin that should lead any national leader to throw the possibility of acceptable relations with the Russian Federation out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Putin’s worst critics will destroy any opportunity for a fruitful course to develop. As noted by greatcharlie here ad nauseum, those leaders must consider what their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation mean not only with regard to Ukraine, but in the bigger picture. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover possibilities for getting many things done by just doing things a bit differently. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the Russian Federation and become civilization’s dénouement. positive changes on one issue can often result in great benefits on another. Respice finem (Have regard for the end.)

A Proposal for the Ukrainian Armed Forces Concerning Russian Federation Prisoners of War That Supports Military Objectives while Sowing Seeds for Peace

A Russian Federation BMP-3 crew signals surrender to Ukrainian troops by placing a white flag in the vehicle’s gun barrel (above). Despite any gains that may be emphasized by Moscow, the slaughter of Russian Federation troops continues in Ukraine. Most Russian Federation units that have taken the field in Ukraine have been battered and tattered to degrees well-beyond what most modern armed forces around the world would find acceptable. One might proffer that Russian Federation commanders do not see anything so odd in what they are doing, but their troops indubitably have vastly disparate views from them concerning the bloodshed. From all of this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces early on recognized an opportunity to exploit the situation in a non-lethal way. That effort actually got underway in 2023 in a very public manner through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program managed by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The program has had its share of successes. However, with a thought to enhance ongoing work, greatcharlie suggests an additional approach be developed within the existing program. Russian Federation troops are currently required to be proactive in the effort to become prisoners of war, but to that extent the process is somewhat one-sided. Under a program proposed here, Russian Federation troops would find some greater comfort and more confidence in following through on any plans they may have to escape the war knowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an enemy who can also serve as a rescuer, would be proactively trying to save them amidst the fighting.

If one the top commanders of Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) were to give an honest assessment of the prospects for Russian forces in Ukraine he would likely reply average, meaning they were worse than the year before but likely better than the year to come. Once much vaunted as a titanic war machine, the Russian Federation Armed Forces hardly lived up with their billing. Showing themselves as something less than an authentic 21st century fighting force, they unexpectedly collided with two obstructions in Ukraine: reality and Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) well-assisted by the US, other NATO countries, as well as countries from around the world. Clearly Russian Federation forces were sent into Ukraine with hardly any idea of what they would face or how they could effectively fight a war, and consequently members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have suffered immensely. There has been little evidence of an awareness among Russian Federation commanders of how to effectively organize forces and what minimum-essential control measures should be in place; as well as the general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for offensive and defensive operations. One is left to wonder what most Russian Federation commanders actually know about the art and science of tactics. As in previous posts, greatcharlie does not feel it can overemphasize just how below average the military acumen of Russian Federation commanders really is. Given the way in which the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was designed, greatcharlie will go out on limb and state the task of rolling Russian Federation military formations into Ukraine could have been performed by logistical managers of a large-sized transport or delivery service company with albeit a modicum of military advice but no military experience as effectively or better than Russian Federation commanders. Amoto quaeramus seria ludo. (Jokes aside, let us turn to serious matters.)

One of the most intriguing and horrifying aspects of Russian Federation commanders’ prosecution of the war, is the manner in which they figuratively slam their troops against the wall of Ukrainian defenders with the hope that if they pound hard enough they will break through. The continued slaughter of their troops may have allowed for not much more than the ego stroke of conquest of less than significant objectives relative to the bigger picture. An implication of this tact is that the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces have practically guaranteed they will not have enough experienced troops left to accomplish anything on a larger scale in Ukraine. There are no indications that there is anything Russian Federation commanders plan to do to reduce casualties among their units. Most Russian Federation units that have taken the field in Ukraine have been battered and tattered to degrees well-beyond what most modern armed forces around the world would find acceptable. One might proffer that Russian Federation commanders do not see anything so odd in what they are doing, but their troops indubitably have vastly disparate views from them concerning the bloodshed. From all of this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces early on recognized an opportunity to exploit the situation in a non-lethal way. That effort actually got underway in 2023 in a very public manner through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program managed by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The program has had its share of successes. The noble program has saved the lives of a number of Russian Federation troops who were able to reason things out and recognize the realities of their overall situation.

However, with a thought to enhance ongoing work in this province, greatcharlie would suggest an additional approach be considered for use by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Similar in some way to the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline, it creates a path for the surrender of Russian Federation troops. The existing program was very publicly announced and advertised. As part of the program, a rationale was provided online for why Russian Federation troops should surrender to survive, and a telephone was provided for them to call to arrange their surrender with staff of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. However, under the existing program, Russian soldiers are required to be proactive in the effort to become prisoners of war. To that extent, the process is rather one-sided. Under a program proposed here, Russian Federation troops would find some greater comfort and more confidence in following through on any plans they may have to escape the war with all of its ills and absurdities knowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an enemy who can also serve as a rescuer, would be proactively trying to save them. What is proposed is a concrete plan of action that would give Russian Federation troops the choice of whether to stay and somewhat likely lose their lives for a lost cause or go and live a full life with the help of Ukraine. Perhaps it could be said that greatcharlie has maintained perspective but at the same time has done quite a bit of what some of its readers have characterized as whining about the Ukraine War since it began. Admittedly, only on a handful of occasions has it “deigned” to offer possible solutions. (Rather than just point out problems, it is more constructive to offer ways to defeat them.) Hopefully, the proposed plan is of sufficient potency to have some immediate value to officials in Ukraine and those of other countries who may advise them on the war. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Recruits listen to a Russian Army instructor showing mobilized troops how to use a man-portable missile during a military training at a firing range in the Rostov-on-Don region in the Russian Federation on October 4, 2022. The Russian Federation called up over 200,000 reservists as part of a partial mobilization. The mobilized troops–Mobiks, as the Ukrainians call them–depicted here are very likely in a mental fog as they assemble in their camp. Their uncertainty and fear is palpable even through the photo. Many upon donning their green uniforms for the first time likely wondered if the countdown to their end had begun at that moment. The Scottish psychiatrist, James A.C. Brown, assessed the use of propaganda by the United Kingdom during World War II with the following observation: “Propaganda is successful only when directed at those who are willing to listen, absorb the information, and if possible, act on it, and this happens only when the other side is in a condition of lowered morale and is already losing the campaign.”

Dire Circumstances of Russian Federation Troops 

To address the dire circumstances of Russian Federation troops, some background on just how bad things have been for them on the battlefield in Ukraine. On November 10, 2022, the US Department of Defense announced an official assessment that over 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action or wounded in Ukraine. Thus, the US Department of Defense figures indicated that during 260 days of fighting to that point, an average of 385 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured each day. The official figure issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in September 2022 put the number of Russian troops killed at 5,937, a figure Western officials said grossly underestimated the country’s losses. Further, the US Department of Defense figure suggested that the daily fighting along the 1000-mile front line that winds around the eastern edges of Ukraine is very intense. A significant part of the struggle is being fought from World War I-style trenches in which soldiers dug into muddy fortifications suffer relentless artillery onslaughts until their units are destroyed or displaced. So apparently horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Captured Russians say their comrades face execution on desertion charges if they don’t keep moving.” Reportedly, some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” The Kyiv Post, citing an Agence France-Presse interview of a Ukrainian soldier, provided the quote: “You shoot them and more come.” The indications and implications of what they say is that even incremental advances achieved through localized attacks have come at a high price for the Russian Federation troops. As explained to the Guardian by a United Kingdom intelligence service, the “unprofessional” military practices of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were likely partly to blame for the high casualties.

As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, when soldiers are: uncertain of mission if the overall concept of a military action is unjust, invalid by law; uncertain of the purpose of a military action: the political authority’s concept and intent for the action is unclear and their commander’s concept and intent are unclear; uncertain their leadership is dysfunctional: commanders are hamstrung by superiors and confined to parameters of action by political systems or they are simply delinquent and negligent; uncertain of their capabilities versus the opponent–soldiers are provided poor equipment, their force has readily observable vulnerabilities, their opponent possess superior, seemingly invincible, and unlimited supplies of weapon systems; and, uncertain of victory–on a daily basis, soldiers experience heavy losses in equipment, exceedingly high casualties in their ranks, the regular loss of comrades, the influx of untrained replacements, and they sense their sacrifices will prove to be meaningless. Such strains and trauma placed upon soldiers could prove to be irreparable. 

Reportedly, no figures are publicly available that tally the number of Russian Federation troops that have simply deserted since the start of the Special military operation. In a November 2022 report based on newsmedia stories from the Russian Federation that was published by analysts from the Institute for the Study of War, it was suggested that hundreds of Russian Federation troops had left their units and were evading capture in no less than 7 locations in Donetsk and Luhansk. The report stated: “The morale and psychological state of Russian forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are exceedingly low.” It further explained: “Significant losses on the battlefield, mobilization to the front lines without proper training, and poor supplies have led to cases of desertion.” The Scottish psychiatrist, James A.C. Brown, assessed the use of propaganda by the United Kingdom during World War II with the following observation: “Propaganda is successful only when directed at those who are willing to listen, absorb the information, and if possible, act on it, and this happens only when the other side is in a condition of lowered morale and is already losing the campaign.”

Igne natura renovatur integra. (Through fire, nature is reborn whole.) Despite the terrifying and intolerable circumstances they have faced Russian Federation troops, an opportunity has been created for both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the beleaguered Russian Federation troops to bring their situations somewhat closer to a favorable end. As alluded to earlier, an ongoing Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program, the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War has been established for Russian Federation military personnel who wish to exit the war by surrender and perhaps by defection. For Russian Federation troops, the move would mean violating federal law, which likely conjures in their minds all of the frightening prospects of being caught in the act. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Armed Forces seem quite willing to help them do that. In addition to Russian Federation troops using the hotline, their relatives can also access the program. To reach the hotlines by Telegram and WhatsApp, they have been told to contact: +380 95 68 86 888; +380 93 68 86 888; and, +380 97 68 86 888. To reach the holiness by phone, contact: +380 44 35 08 917. From Ukrainian phone numbers, one would only need to dial: 688. Reportedly, information is also available in the chatbot in Telegram. The program goes as far as to instruct Russian Federation troops on how to surrender. To surrender as a group or an entire unit, they are told to: stack all weapons in front of you at a distant distance; stand directly in front of the military equipment. Silence it; it should not be in a fighting position; and, choose a negotiator to notify the Ukrainian military of their desire to surrender. This should be an officer or the most senior in rank. With a white flag and no weapons. To surrender individually, they are told to: unbuckle the magazine and hang the weapon on your left shoulder with the barrel down; raise and show your empty hands; hold up the white cloth; shout loudly, “Zdayusʹ!”; approach on command, and comply with the demands of Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine.

It is apparent that the title of the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline has an acidulous tone from the get-go, which also seems to manifest a deep antipathy. Further, the program was really targeted at the psyche of Russian Federation troops on an individual level. Despite the fact that nearly everyone on the frontline, both Russians and Ukrainians, are aware of the “I Want To Live” program’s existence, activities under it are nevertheless performed in a somewhat clandestine way. There are opportunities to exploit with regard to garnering greater numbers of Russian Federation troops to surrender as well as defect. It would appear that far more could be done in that province. 

It is greatcharlie’s suggestion that perhaps at this point the Ukrainian Armed Forces should go step further than its current effort by standing up new military Teams within the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War with a mission to greatly enhance the effort to encourage–lure–greater numbers of Russian Federation to surrender and defect using a mix of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods. Rather than hoping to bring over one or two soldiers at a time or perhaps even a squad, the objective of the proposed Teams would be to trigger surrenders and defections en masse along the frontline, particularly among Mobiks, the Ukrainian term for Russian Federation citizens hastily mobilized in 2022 for the Ukraine War.

Through the suggested program, the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be able to accomplish reductions of enemy opposition that could only be achieved through high intensity fighting with Russian Federation units during which it, too, would likely suffer losses in precious troops and materiel of which it is reliant upon foreign largess. To the extent that might possible, the proposed program could have a multiplier effect on the battlefield and beyond. 

The Provost Teams would act under the direct authority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff. These teams, formed with officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men called Provosts, could operate along active points on the frontline particularly where Mobiks have been tossed into the line and suffering inordinate numbers of casualties. Sections of the frontline where platoons of Provosts would be deployed would come under the command of a Provost Marshal or company commander. As envisioned, the Provosts deployed along the forward edge of the battle area should not tally in excess of a battalion in strength, and led by a battalion commander, the Coordinating Provost Marshal. (Of course, these titles are mere suggestions and the Ukrainian Armed Forces would know best how to designate troops with the Provost Teams’ table of organization.) As shortages in personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot be overstated, the staffing of personnel in the Provost Teams must be economizedi. However, the proposed Provost Teams must be sufficiently staffed ti do their intensive work rapidly, efficiently and successfully. In their mission, time is of the essence.

What follows is a kernel of the proposed program. A variety of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods are suggested for Provosts to use are outlined. Readers may detect that some suggestions appear repetitive, especially as the discussion covers the implementation of the proposed program during both defensive and offensive operations. As all aspects of the proposed program are harmonized to create a synergistic effect, naturally some overlap exists. However, more importantly, where such repetition appears to occur, there are actually subtle, necessary changes in the text. Equally important, by writing in a seemingly repetitive way, readers are enabled to consider all or individual segments of the proposed program without requiring them to move back and forth to recall elements of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods mentioned in the preceding segments–much as with a legal brief.

The Neptune, employed on September 23, 1870, was first balloon used by the French government during the Siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first documented use of manned balloons as carriers of propaganda leaflets, as well as the mail. As Prussian forces surrounded the city of Paris, the Neptune, a balloon deployed from the city dropped French government proclamations of defiance and indomitability over Prussian troops. During World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps initiated the use of leaflets, dropping them over Imperial German trenches and territory in an attempt to induce German troops to surrender. Messages printed on various leaflets included reports of the humane conditions in the British prisoners of war camps, surrender notices, and anti-Kaiser Wilhelm II material. During World War II, efforts with them were made more effective with disillusioned opposition troops when leaflets also served as safe conduct passes and provided instructions on how to feign illness to avoid frontline service. Leaflets were used in wars afterward to include the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Using this tried and true method of communicating with opposition troops, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery.

I. Reaching Ukrainian Lines to Surrender 

A.  During Defensive Operations

One can be assured that learning how ro surrender is not a segment of the brief training program in which Mobiks participate before heading to the frontlines with their units. That instruction must come from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Instructions on how to surrender provided by a variety of means, should essentially mirror, mutantis mutandis, those provided online through the aforementioned “I Want To Live” program should be printed on the initial iterations of leaflets. The nuance would be that instead of surrendering to Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian Federation troops would be surrendering to Provosts. Russian Federation troops should still be directed to drop their weapons, unlatch their utility belts, and other gear and dash toward large trenches or earthworks created in a clandestine way during the 3rd or 4th watch. The trenches must be concealed to the greatest degree possible from Russian Federation lines but open as much as possible to observation by Ukrainian troops both day and night. From the trenches and earthworks, a concealed path, something akin to a long drainage ditch, should be built for the surrendering Russian Federation troops to crawl along in single file, toward awaiting armed Provosts. More than one crawl could be created from the trench. That would depend on time available ultimately shaped by the assault timetable of Russian Federation commanders. Both the prisoner of war trenches, earthworks, and crawl paths should be covered at all times by sharpshooter and machine guns to both protect them, prevent infiltration through their use, and thwart the efforts of those assigned to harm them. The Russian Federation troops could be processed one by one as prisoners of war right off the crawl paths, and moved out of the forward edge of the battle area through separate and concealed lines of communication. Provosts must closely coordinate with Ukrainian commanders in their sector to ensure the prisoner of war operations would in no way interfere with their defensive operations

B. During Offensive Operations

Different from defensive operations, Russian Federation troops facing eminent attack by Ukrainian troops will at least typically be hunkered down in concealed positions. Soon enough, many will run for their lives lacking the wherewithal to resist and motivation to fight. During a previous Ukrainian counteroffensive, A member of a Ukrainian intelligence unit on the front line told The Telegraph that his unit saw the Russian Federation chain of command collapse before their eyes and troops flee without putting up a fight. The panicked Russian Federation troops reportedly abandoned their tanks, weapons and even clothes amid the chaos  as they “literally” ran from their positions. Indeed, it was alleged that many of them rapidly changed into civilian clothes ostensibly to avoid detection by their superiors. A drone operator returning from the front line told The Telegraph during the Ukrainian Armed Forces counteroffensive in September 2022, that the tempo of the operation had even caught Ukrainian troops by surprise. He stated that he observed Ukrainian troops struggling to recover the mountains of abandoned Russian Federation armored vehicles and ammunition. Monitoring Ukrainian assaults from above, the drone operators reportedly watched engagements and heard communications between Russian Federation troops as their units were being destroyed before they had time to identify their enemy.

Convincing Russian Federation troops to leave their trenches and foxholes to run toward Ukrainian troops to surrender would be very difficult. They know doing so would leave them open to extra judicial execution for voluntary surrender and desertion by fire from their own lines. Additionally, it might prove difficult for them to know where to run as Ukrainian units preparing to advance would do everything possible to avoid revealing the locations of their lines of departure. Certainly, there would not be the opportunity or ability to prepare anything similar to earthworks or trenches for surrendering and deserting Russian Federation troops to make a break for and secrete themselves as would hypothetically be the case during defensive operations under the proposed program. Given such, Provost Teams would be required to make efficient use of a combination of leaflets, online messages, and loudspeakers to communicate with Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender or defect. Proper timing in the use of all three approaches would be critical to the survival of Russian Federation troops and the ability of Provosts to provide for their safe conduct in the midst of what to them would most likely be the very confusing circumstances of a high-intensity,  highly-mobile, and very violent Ukrainian Armed Forces’ assault. As during defensive operations, Provosts must coordinate with Ukrainian commanders in their sector to ensure the prisoner of war operations would in no way interfere with their assault.

Becoming a prisoner of war is ordinarily undesirable. Yet, for these Russian Federation troops the fighting is over. They were not killed or gravely wounded on the frontline. They will live to see another day (above). Using a tried and true method of communicating with opposition troops, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery. The messages on leaflets could go as far as to suggest Russian Federation troops abandon their frontline positions or use advances ordered by their commanders to run toward Ukrainian lines. Leaflets could explain, with the aim of connecting with the inner thinking of the Russian Federation troops, that the frontline key offers death. In following, they should be explained that rather than waiting to see if they will make it through unscathed, be gravely wounded or be killed, the best alternative would be to surrender or defect. The leaflets should explain that their rights as prisoners of war will be fully recognized and respected, and that once they surrendered, they would be treated with dignity. Additionally, the leaflets must tell them that they will moved away from the frontlines, out of harm’s way, immediately after they surrender.

Ii. Leaflets

A. During Defensive Operations

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first documented use of manned balloons as carriers of propaganda leaflets, as well as the mail. As Prussian forces surrounded the city of Paris, the Neptune, a balloon deployed from the city dropped leaflets baring forceful French government proclamations of defiance and indomitability over Prussian troops. During World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps initiated the use of leaflets, dropping them over Imperial German trenches and territory in an attempt to induce German troops to surrender. Messages printed on various leaflets included reports of the humane conditions in the British prisoners of war camps, surrender notices, and anti-Kaiser Wilhelm II material. During World War II, efforts with them were made more effective with disillusioned opposition troops when leaflets also served as safe conduct passes and provided instructions on how to feign illness to avoid frontline service. Leaflets were used in wars afterward to include the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In the present Ukraine War, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery. The messages on leaflets could go as far as to suggest Russian Federation troops abandon their frontline positions or use advances ordered by their commanders to run toward Ukrainian lines. Leaflets could explain, with the aim of connecting with the inner thinking of the Russian Federation troops, that the frontline key offers death. In following, they should be told that rather than waiting to see if they will make it through unscathed, be gravely wounded or be killed, the best alternative would be to surrender or defect. The leaflets should explain that their rights as prisoners of war will be fully recognized and respected, and that once they surrendered, they would be treated with dignity. Additionally, the leaflets must tell them that they will be transported away from the frontlines, out of harm’s way, immediately after they surrender. The leaflets should explain that the surrendering and defecting troops received clean water to drink, hot food, warm blankets, and coffee or tea.

Important to add on each leaflet, in type that would stand out, should be the promise to protect Russian Federation troops from unstable commanders who have recklessly thrown them across no man’s land without regard for their lives. They must be told that the whole world knows about their plight. It must be explained that if they so choose, they will be allowed to safely return to the Russian Federation via prisoner of war exchanges negotiated During the war or prisoner of war exchanges after the war. If any Russian Federation troops make the choice to defect, they should be informed in the leaflets that they will be allowed to remain in Ukraine via immigration or be assisted in efforts to immigrate to countries in the West that may be willing to accept them 

As for how to surrender, the leaflets should provide instructions that closely parallel those provided online through the aforementioned “I Want To Live” program. This is especially true with regard to the handling of their weapons. The nuance would be that instead of surrendering to Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian Federation troops would be surrendering to Provosts. (Perhaps Provosts could affix an embroidered badge to their uniforms with Provost Team title on it in both Ukrainian and Russian so that Russian Federation troops could readily identify who they were once in contact. Of course, Russian Federation troops should not be discouraged from surrendering or defecting on any occasion. All military formations and security services would be open to receive them. Those formations should be issued orders to turn all captive Russian Federation troops over to the custody of the Provosts.)

Russian Federation troops must be instructed to retain and present leaflets essentially as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The success of the proposed program would rely in great part on the credibility of the Provost Teams. Their credibility would be best established with Russian Federation troops by their actions. To that extent, the effort must be made to follow through on promises printed on the leaflets without fail. Russian Federation troops must be moved away from the forward edge of the battle area, out of harm’s way immediately after capture. They must be provided with clean water, hot food, warm blankets, and coffee and tea. More than one design of leaflet should be produced. The message akin to a memorandum of understanding concerning safe conduct discussed earlier as a requirement should be printed on every leaflet and perhaps could even be titled as such on the leaflets.

Drones could be used as a way to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions upon which leaflets could be dropped. Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. An organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. If creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. This method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. However, given shortage in pilots and shortages of airframe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Leaflets dropped on Russian Federation troops could also serve a purpose similar to infrared reflective patches, chemlights, VS-17 panels or signal panel markers, and colored smoke typically used by military organizations to mark friendly personnel and locations. Leaflets should provide instructions on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection before their lives are ended or they are gravely wounded as a result of being wastefully slammed against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Online, Russian Federation troops could be told that every effort would be made to spare them from the firepower that would surely be used to halt their respective unit’s assault.

Russian Federation troops must be instructed within the leaflets’ message to collect at least one from among the thousands strewn across their lines and secrete it on themselves or keep it close at hand. As leaflets, dropped in astronomical numbers, would likely be drifting all about Russian Federation lines in great numbers and landing just about everywhere, Russian Federation troops seeking to surrender or defect would be afforded a plausible reason to have leaflets in or near their positions. As a guise, Russian Federation troops could stack the leaflets nearby or in their positions in preparation for their use, yet claim they have done so with the purpose of policing their areas

If not possible during the daytime, at night, Russian Federation troops should place as many leaflets as possible in front of their positions. Russian Federation troops should be instructed even in mild weather conditions to weigh leaflets down with rocks, stones, or branches, or any combination of those materials as made available on the terrain. The objects used to weigh the leaflets down must be placed on the corners of the leaflets

In inclement weather, Leaflets could be weighted down in a crossing pattern on the leaflets with rocks, stones, tree branches, mud, and dirt the terrain provides or with pieces of their military gear. What would be most important for the Russian Federation troops to avoid is obscuring the leaflets with whatever they might use to weigh them down in front of their positions. It would be critical not to obscure the observation of their piles of leaflets from above. Ukrainian sharpshooters along the rapidly shifting frontlines would need to be informed that Russian Federation’s troops might be seen placing piles of leaflets In front of their positions as instructed by Provosts via leaflets online messages and loudspeakers. and they must not be be fired upon. Paradoxically Ukrainian sharpshooters should be directed to provide overwatch for the Russian Federation troops engaged in that activity with the leaflet by firing upon Russian Federation sharpshooters who may be ordered to fire upon their own comrades engaged in placing leaflets in front of their positions as instructed by Provosts.

Russian Federation troops must be told not to be concerned about leaflets gathered coincidentally in clumps in their lines that resemble their own manufactured piles. Such occurrences would be expected if hypothetical leaflets are dropped upon their positions almost daily. It will be important for Provosts or members of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to correctly distinguish between piles of leaflets created from the pollution of paper in Russian Federation lines and the piles constructed by Russian Federation troops.

B.. During Offensive Operations

Using leaflets during offensive operations would likely be a bit trickier for Provosts, but certainly possible. Drones could be used as means to reconnoiter and surveil far forward of Ukrainian frontlines to identify Russian Federation defensive positions upon leaflet could be dropped. Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. As suggested earlier, an organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. If creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. 

As noted with regard to defensive operations, this method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. Yet again, given shortage in pilots and shortages of airframes in the Ukrainian Armed Forces inventory, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Leaflets should be used by Russian Federation troops during offensive operations launched in their direction in a similar way to their proposed use in defensive operations. The concept for the use of leaflets in both cases should parallel the concept behind marker panels. Leaflets should be piled up in front of Russian Federation troops’ defensive positions. Russian Federation troops should be instructed to collect as many leaflets as possible to make certain they will be able to create a visible pile. Leaflets dropped should explain to the greatest extent possible given space available on the sheet made of paper or some other more durable material, how Russian Federation troops could best protect their piles of them from being dismantled or destroyed by weather conditions. Russian Federation troops must be told that every effort would be made to identify their positions through piled up leaflets. It also must be explained that Russian Federation troops emerging from positions marked with leaflets that they will be given every opportunity to surrender or defect safely

Since the frontlines will likely shift constantly with every bound by advancing Ukrainian units during offensive operations, Ukrainian troops will surely come across various iterations of them. To avoid adverse reactions to seeing images they might perceive on leaflets as Russian Federation troops which they are fighting and being killed and injured by, practically being treated as honored guests. In advance of Ukrainian assaults, commanders must explain to their troops on the march about the leaflets they will surely encounter and what they as well as Provosts’ loudspeaker announcements they will hear are all about. Ukrainian troops should be told that it is all part of an important program under the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, why there are so many leaflets, and their possible role in helping bring a faster, favorable end to the war. (It is very likely that while Ukrainian units are in defensive operations, leaflets may drift over to their positions in large numbers. Russian Federation lines will be polluted with leaflets. Winds should be expected to occasionally carry the leaflets in the Ukrainian’s direction. Ukrainian commanders should explain on such occasions what the purpose of the leaflets and loudspeaker announcements are and how they work to their troops advantage.)

A sort of “online leaflet” posted for Russian Federation troops by the Association of Lawyers in Ukraine urging them to surrender and explaining how to do so (above). In conjunction with the production and distribution of leaflets, Provosts could post messages on multiple online sites, perhaps creating new ones each week–perhaps sooner if necessary–to thwart Russian counterintelligence efforts to block access to information that must be provided to support the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops. To ensure Russian Federation troops would receive the messages or at least make certain the messages were available to them could be supported by the capabilities of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As with leaflets, online messages should provide information on alternative ways Russian Federation troops must act and tasks they must perform to ensure their survival and safe conduct to and through Ukrainian lines. Online messages must explain that Russian Federation troops’ rights as prisoners of war will be fully observed once they surrender and that they will be treated with respect. 

III. The Enhancement of Online Efforts

A. During Defensive Operations

In conjunction with the production and distribution of leaflets, Provosts could post messages on multiple online sites, perhaps creating new ones each week–perhaps sooner if necessary–to thwart Russian counterintelligence efforts to block access to information that must be provided to support the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops. To ensure Russian Federation troops would receive the messages or at least make certain the messages were available to them could be supported by the capabilities of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As with leaflets, online messages should provide information on alternative ways Russian Federation troops must act and tasks they must perform to ensure their survival and safe conduct to and through Ukrainian lines. Online messages must explain that Russian Federation troops’ rights as prisoners of war will be fully observed once they surrender and that they will be treated with respect. They must be assured that they will receive clean water, hot food, coffee and tea, and warm blankets. They should be told that immediately after surrender–unless conditions prevent such movement, they will be extracted from the forward edge of the battle area and out of harm’s way well to the rear. They must also be told that they will be protected from the wrath of unstable commanders who have willingly sacrificed their fallen comrades for a questionable military invasion. As with leaflets, online messages should inform the Russian Federation troops that they will be allowed to return to their homeland via prisoner exchanges negotiation during the war or at the end of the war, if they desire to return on the occasion of either. They should also be informed that if they seek to defect, they would be allowed to remain in Ukraine through the process of immigration or be assisted in immigrating to countries in the West that would be willing to accept them either during or after the war. The Ukrainians promise to assist with these matters must be a solemn pledge. All important is the requirement that Russian Federation troops be instructed online to try as best as possible to collect at least one leaflet dropped on their lines. They must be told to retain leaflets and present them as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. To facilitate the collection of leaflets by Russian Federation troops, a regular deluge of leaflets should be dropped on Russian Federation positions 

As the proposed prisoner of war program develops, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, attendant with online messages on the sites should be videos and photographs of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered. Not just for the photo opportunity, Actual Russian Federation prisoners of war could be depicted wearing clean and neat clothes, in safe, hygienic detention centers.. Appropriate videos and photos should depict the Russian Federation prisoners of war engaged in daily activities at detention centers. To that extent, some videos and photos of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered should be posted after their capture, depicting them drinking clean water, tea, and coffee, and wearing clean dry clothes and covered in warm blankets. Authentic videos and photos of those who surrendered in inclement conditions, should also display them a few short hours after capture being held clean dry spaces, well-protected from cold, wind, rain and snow.

Within a couple of weeks after the proposed program might be launched, it might be useful for Provosts to include images of a handful of Russian Federation prisoners of war, with their consent, with vetting, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, might be flown with selected Provosts to European capitals for tours with the support of the respective host countries. The Geneva Convention forbids the public display of prisoners of war. However, foreign travel for tourism could be declared to be recreational and intended to have a therapeutic effect upon war weary Mobiks and as an effort. In genuine travel videos and photographs, the prisoners of war could be shown wearing civilian clothes, uniform in style and color–for example they could all be seen wearing black pants and lavender shirts, sweaters, and gray plaid trench coats–calmly enjoying tourist attractions, museums, and cafes in the daytime, and a bit of the nightlife available. In all videos and photographs,  the faces of the prisoners of war must be obscured. During these tours, the prisoners of war will be under guard of elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. They should coordinate with, and hopefully receive the support of, national, provincial, and local police forces, and the host countries’ security services. True videos and photographs of Russian Federation prisoners of war in such positive circumstances should have an overwhelmingly positive impact on Russian Federation troops still serving under dreadful circumstances on the frontlines.

All online messages, videos, and photos must be produced by Provosts as part of their duties. To that extent, the need to fulfill that task should be taken into account during staffing. Videos and photographs of Prisoners of war at detention centers or traveling to Western capitals, would likely need to be produced by other elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

With regard to communicating messages to Russian Federation troops who want to surrender and defect, a greater amount of space to present information would certainly be available online. Through the websites of the Provosts, more thorough online instructions on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection before their lives are ended or they are gravely wounded as a result of being wastefully slammed against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian Federation troops should be told online that every effort would be made to spare them from the firepower that would surely be used to halt their respective unit’s assault.

Online messages could additionally provide illustrations of where and how Russian Federation troops should place leaflets before their positions. Illustrations posted with online messages could explain how to place leaflets before their position in inclement weather. Further, illustrations could be posted that would explain the necessity of placing leaflets before their positions so that they are visible from the air and how to do so. The message that every effort would be made to identify the positions of Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect should be reinforced online. Added to that, it must be emphasized in messages that Russian Federation troops emerging from positions marked with piles of leaflets shall be given every opportunity to come toward Ukrainian lines and surrender and defect  safely.

B. During Offensive Operations

During offensive operations by Ukrainian units, in one instance, Russian Federation troops should be instructed online to try as best as possible to collect at least one leaflet dropped on their lines. They must be told to retain and present leaflets essentially as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In another instance, in a way paralleling their use during defensive operations, leaflets dropped on Russian Federation troops could be used by them to indicate their intentions to either surrender or defect. Again, given the greater amount of space to present information online, through the websites of the Provosts, more thorough instructions could be provided on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection in the face of a counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Online, Russian Federation troops could be told that every effort would be made to spare them from the onslaught of firepower that would surely be part of an assault.

As during defensive operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, illustrations could be posted online demonstrating for Russian Federation troops where to best place aggregated leaflets in a pile in front of their positions  Illustrations could be posted on multiple websites of the Provost Teams explaining how exactly to aggregate leaflets before their positions. Illustrations on how Russian Federation troops should place leaflets before their positions during inclement weather could be posted. Additionally, illustrations on how Russian Federation troops can ensure that the leaflets in front of their positions can be seen by air should be posted. Positions built up in wooded areas would present some difficulties in creating visible piles of leaflets, but that problem could likely be overcome with ingenuity. By creating enormous patterns collections of leaflets at night only that would not escape detection. If it becomes most apparent to Provosts that the Ukrainian advance would bring units before Russian Federation positions in wooded terrain, leaflets could be modified to bear a reflective material on one side and messages concerning surrender, defection, and using leaflets on the other. The illustrations mentioned should be published only when an assault will soon be launched by Ukrainian forces. Of course, no specified date should be offered.

Instructions for Russian Federation troops on what to do should be reinforced in the field with loudspeakers. It must be explained in the leaflets, online, and through loudspeakers–discussed here later–that every effort will be made to identify the positions of Russian Federation troops no matter how trying the circumstance. It should emphasized the Russian Federation troops who have marked their position will be tracked by observers and given every opportunity to surrender or defect when the Provost move forward to place them in custody

During offensive operations by Ukrainian units, identification of the positions of Russian Federation troops ready to come over to the Ukrainian lines would be critical in order to avoid a tragedy of erroneously placing devastating fire on them and killing and injuring individuals that only wanted to get out of the war and survive. Marked positions must be well-reconnoitered before an attack is launched toward Russian Federation lines. To accomplish that, positions of Russian Federation troops that want to surrender and defect must at a minimum position leaflets to ensure they could be observed clearly from the air. Daytime identification of the positions of such troops would allow Provosts to mark them out and inform commanders of units about to advance that resistance would unlikely come from their point along the Russian Federation and the Provosts would move on foot or in their vehicles to make contact with them and process them as prisoners of war. However, it would also much safer for Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect to place leaflets as markers before their positions and facing Ukrainian lines at night during the 3rd or 4th watch, than put piles of leaflets out in the daytime and risk detection by their commanders, counterintelligence, and by Russian Federation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets flying above the frontlines or any Russian Federation military aircraft operating in their vicinity.

As aforementioned in the segment on leaflets, drones could be used as means to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation defensive positions forward of Ukrainian frontlines to identify locations upon which leaflet could be dropped. (This process of identifying locations and dropping leaflets upon Russian Federation positions should have an unnerving and sound educational effect on the troops within them as it would inform them the Ukrainians knew where they were and could actually strike at them whenever they wished.) Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. An organic capability to perform that task would facilitate operations. If any drones hypothetically operated by Provosts could be provided with a night vision capability, it will facilitate their operations. They would be able more confidently to provide evidence to Ukrainian commanders of the desire of those Russian Federation troops to surrender and formulate plans to move forward to detain those Russian Federation troops.

Again, as noted in the segment on leaflets, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. This method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. Yet, given shortages in pilots and shortages of airframe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be a drain of resources and too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Russian Federation troops in custody immediately after capture. Depicting Russian Federation troops being held in this manner may have value domestically but such images.certainly would not serve the purposes of the proposed program (above). Another aspect of the Provosts duties could be to use loudspeakers to communicate announcements and positive messages to Russian Federation troops along the forward edge of the battle area. Loudspeaker announcements encouraging Russian Federation troops to surrender should be used in coordination with the distribution of leaflets and online messaging. Loudspeaker announcements allow greater flexibility with regard to altering messages to fit an immediate circumstance. Loudspeaker announcements may best serve Provosts’ efforts to encourage the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops when made at night, perhaps most effective at the top of fthe 3rd watch. Other times at which such announcements may be very effective might be holiday celebrations, in the aftermath of artillery fire missions and after Russian Federation advances that have been repulsed. Provosts should exploit information volunteered by Russian Federation prisoners of war such as names of unit commanders and noncommissioned officers. That information should be incorporated in a pertinent way as quickly as possible in loudspeaker messages.

IV. Loudspeakers

A. During Defensive Operations

Another aspect of the Provosts duties could be to use loudspeakers to communicate announcements and positive messages to Russian Federation troops along the forward edge of the battle area. Loudspeaker announcements encouraging Russian Federation troops to surrender should be used in coordination with the distribution of leaflets and online messaging. Loudspeaker announcements allow greater flexibility with regard to altering messages to fit an immediate circumstance. Loudspeaker announcements may best serve Provosts’ efforts to encourage the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops when made at night, perhaps most effective at the top of the 3rd watch. Other times at which such announcements may be very effective might be holiday celebrations, in the aftermath of artillery fire missions and after Russian Federation advances that have been repulsed. Provosts should exploit information volunteered by Russian Federation prisoners of war such as names of unit commanders and noncommissioned officers. That information should be incorporated in a pertinent way as quickly as possible in loudspeaker messages.

Concerning the positioning of loudspeakers, they should be placed away from positions of Ukrainian troops but toward Russian Federation lines. (It is likely a manual has been published by the Ukrainian Armed Forces that provides guidance on the placement of loudspeakers for psychological warfare operations.) If possible, to assist in communicating with Russian Federation troops, actors, both male and female, could be contracted for their talents. The actors would hopefully be able to successfully deliver messages in the correct tone and most effectively to induce weary or newly arrived, terror stricken Russian Federation troops to surrender. If feasible, actors among troops already serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be sought out. They could be considered for transfer to the Provost Teams on a voluntary basis or, out of absolute necessity, under orders.

Just as drones could be utilized to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions to discover the locations of Russian Federation units upon which leaflets could be delivered, drones could potentially be modified to carry loudspeakers that at variable altitudes could effectively broadcast audible messages to Russian Federation troops below them. An organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. To greatcharlie’s knowledge, the utilization of loudspeaker drones is a technique that has not been practiced before. If creating an organic capability to communicate with Russian Federation troops with drones might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing that capability, but that may repeatedly delay urgent action.

B. During Offensive Operations

Placing loudspeakers near Russian Federation positions to enable troops to receive audible messages from the Provost pertaining to their possible surrender or defection would indeed be a dangerous undertaking during offensive operations. Ostensibly, if time were available, Provists could move forward of Ukrainian positions to stealthily place loudspeakers before Russian Federation defenses. Provost would need to do this following every advance of Ukrainian troops that displaced Russian Federation units and soon enough before the next assault. Given how fluid the situation has become on the battlefield during previous counteroffensives, being able to act fast enough might become problematic. To that extent, Provosts may only be able to act when adequate opportunities present themselves. Again, this would be dangerous work. For that reason it understandably may not be authorized. If Provosts are detected, Russian Federation commanders may assess that an advance was coming in their direction and in some way stiffen resistance at those points. Given the devastating impact the work of the Provosts might have upon Russian Federation operations, if they are captured they may face reprisals. This is especially true as the Provosts’ duties require them to encourage Russian Federation troops to violate their country’s federal laws. Show trials should be expected if they are captured. Additionally, as the work of the Provosts requires highly skilled operators, even slight losses of Provosts may have a devastating impact on the Teams’ operations.

With the aim of minimizing the chance for losses among Provosts during challenging infiltration missions, drones could be used as an alternate and safer means to get loudspeaker messages to Russian Federation troops. Albeit with perhaps a somewhat greater chance of loss, drones could move well-forward of Ukrainian frontlines to Russian Federation positions and broadcast messages on surrender and defection. These would be the same hypothetical drones modified to carry loudspeakers and operate at variable altitudes could provide audible messages to Russian Federation troops below them. Again, as in defensive operations, the “loudspeaker drones” would be flown forward only after other drones have reconnoitered and surveilled Russian Federation positions and dropped leaflets upon them. As mentioned earlier, an organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. Again, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations.

Loudspeaker drones flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who have indicated the desire to surrender or defect could be used to issue instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward. That would surely facilitate their capture for processing. Everything would need to be done rather rapidly but in calibrated ways before the frontlines are overcome by the fog of war and in the worst case scenario no one is able to determine “who is who and what is what.”

Again, it would be much safer for Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect to place leaflets as markers before their positions and facing Ukrainian lines at night, than put piles of leaflets out in the daytime and risk detection by their commanders and by Russian Federation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets flying above the frontlines or any Russian Federation military aircraft operating in their vicinity.

Working with Ukrainian commanders and having the best information available, Provost could also more confidently formulate plans to move forward to detain those Russian Federation troops. As aforementioned, if any drones hypothetically operated by Provosts can be provided with night vision optics, it will facilitate their operations. They would truly be better informed of what is happening within Russian Federation lines in real-time much as the commanders, be better enable able to act swiftly, and be enabled to more confidently provide evidence to Ukrainian commanders of the desire of those Russian Federation troops to surrender as those commanders are in the process of planning their assaults. Once Ukrainian commanders have developed their plans, issued orders, and positioned units for an assault it is unlikely that they would willingly alter their plans in response to the Provosts. Ukrainian commanders certainly are focused on fighting to win the war. That is their priority. In that same vein, it would be both expected and prudent for Ukrainian commanders to target Russian Federation positions that Provost may report are holding Russian Federation troops who seek to surrender and defect, and level a devastating blow against them if any aggressive behavior is observed from them. On the other hand, if after coordinating with commanders, leaflets have already been dropped on Russian Federation positions, and Russian Federation troops have begun piling leaflets as instructed, a commander who has developed a plan of attack must take steps to alter it by creating an opportunity for Provosts to bring them in. Any attack on Russian Federation troops who tried to surrender and defect in accord with instructions from the Ukrainian Armed Forces would send a very negative message along Russian Federation frontlines that the Ukrainians cannot be trusted and no faith should be placed in their promises. That could potentially destroy the proposed program no matter how fruitful or far along it might get.

This photograph purports to depict Russian Federation troops in rather neat condition surrendering to Ukrainian troops who are dressed quite immaculately during the wet, muddy, and cold winter fighting (above). Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect must know exactly what to do in the midst of an assault by Ukrainian units. Leaflets could be delivered to Russian Federation troops via artillery canisters and aircraft and loudspeakers stealthily placed nearby and the direction of Russian Federation positions. Most important would be to move rapidly and act effectively. If drones are used to communicate with Russian Federation troops, leaflets should be dropped first. Loudspeaker drones should next be flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who with leaflets have indicated the desire to surrender or defect.  The loudspeaker drones could broadcast messages with instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward.

V. Protecting Surrendering and Defecting Russian Federation Troops

A. During Defensive Operations

Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect must know exactly what to do in the midst of an assault by Ukrainian units. Leaflets could be delivered to Russian Federation troops via artillery canisters and aircraft and loudspeakers stealthily placed nearby and the direction of Russian Federation positions. Most important would be to move rapidly and act effectively. If drones are used to communicate with Russian Federation troops, leaflets should be dropped first. Loudspeaker drones should next be flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who with leaflets have indicated the desire to surrender or defect.  The loudspeaker drones could broadcast messages with instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward.

Russian Federation troops coming over to the Ukrainians must be told by the Provosts through leaflets, online posts, and loudspeakers that they will do their very best to cover their movements toward Ukrainian lines with firepower if their commander might decide to open fire on them. To provide such protection, Provosts should be provided with written authority to direct Ukrainian artillery units and counterbattery systems, not already engaged in fire support missions, to launch artillery and rockets onslaughts to suppress fire directed at surrendering Russian Federation troops or Russian Federation batteries that might be used for that purpose. When processing Russian Federation troops who have surrendered and defected, Provosts should ask each: “How can we improve our program to rescue more guys such as you?” (Sardonically, a few may likely say: “Offer big cash payments in US dollars!”) A more important query inquiry would concern information they might possess on Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets, and heavy machine gun emplacements that could be used to punish surrendering troops. Positions that those troops might identify could be targeted with fire missions by Ukrainian artillery and rocket batteries. 

As noted earlier, drones could also be used during offensive operations by Provosts as means to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions to confirm reported locations of Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets that earmarked for use against surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops. As suggested with regard to leaflets and loudspeakers, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations of mortars, artillery, rockets and heavy machine gun emplacement that might by used the thwart the surrender of Russian Federation troops. If Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets and machine gun emplacements are identified only after striking at surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops, marshals among the Provost Teams at the company and battalion levels must have the immediate, unencumbered ability to call for fire against them. 

If the suppression and destruction of Russian Federation mortars, artillery, rockets and machine gun emplacements could be performed frequently enough along the frontlines, particularly where Mobiks are being slaughtered, it would very likely have a marked, or perhaps even a very considerable impact on Russian Federation troop discipline, unit cohesion, offensive movement, and overall combat operations in Ukraine. The more intense the effort to halt surrenders and defections might become, the greater the Provosts efforts to disrupt and destroy them must become. The response of the Provosts should be of such intensity to the extent that efforts to thwart surrender and defection might very well become so unfruitful and costly that mission itself might be obviated.

B. During Offensive Operations

In addition to dealing with retributive fire from Russian Federation lines directed at punishing, but destroying any surrendering Russian Federation troops, it may be the case that blocking units have been regularly positioned to prevent Russian Federation troops from escaping their ominous fate by retreating. There may be military counterintelligence units operating in the frontlines to monitor the movements of Russian Federation troops. Similarly with Russian Federation firepower assets that might be directed at surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops, once in custody, some might be able to provide detailed, credible information concerning blocking units positioned to prevent Russian Federation troops from retreating, their assistance should be accepted and rewarded.

If Russian Federation blocking units can be identified before a Ukrainian Armed Forces advance, officers among the Provost Teams must be enabled to call for fire against them. If that proves not feasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be directed to support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations of blocking units placed in the rear of advancing Russian Federation troops or those holding defensive positions. Accordingly, officers among the Provost Teams must be enabled to call for fire against them.

In a twist, loudspeaker announcements as well as leaflets could also be used to warn Russian Federation commanders not to try in any way to halt efforts by their troops to surrender and defect. Such announcements should fix in the minds of the Mobiks and any other Russian Federation troops on the frontline that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are the dominant force on the battlefield. It may even have a sound educational effect on those Russian Federation troops, who for a variety of reasons to include patriotism, a sense of duty, and fidelity, at that particular moment, would be unwilling  Popular Western music could also be played toward Russian Federation on loudspeakers to remind them that life for the rest of the world goes on while they are trapped on the frontlines of an absolutely atrocious war.

Loudspeaker announcements as well as leaflets must never reveal the names of Russian Federation prisoners of war.  This will help minimize the possibility that reprisals will be carried out against their family members by the Russian Federation security services under the direction of the Kremlin. There would remain the possibility that Russian Federation troops who might decide to return to their homeland would face reprisals after the war. That situation would be out of the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it is something the Provost Teams proposed here and existing elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War might urge Russian Federation prisoners of war to consider. After World War II ended, reprisals against reprisals against Soviet Army troops for conduct on the battlefield was a practice among the Soviet security services.

A Russian Federation self-propelled 152.4 mm howitzer firing during combat at an undisclosed location in Donetsk region, Ukraine (above). Russian Federation troops coming over to the Ukrainians must be told by the Provosts through leaflets, online posts, and loudspeakers that they will do their very best to cover their movements toward Ukrainian lines with firepower if their commander might decide to open fire on them. To provide such protection, Provosts should be provided with written authority to direct Ukrainian artillery units and counterbattery systems, not already engaged in fire support missions, to launch artillery and rockets onslaughts to suppress fire directed at surrendering Russian Federation troops or Russian Federation batteries that might be used for that purpose. When processing Russian Federation troops who have surrendered and defected, Provosts should ask if they possess information on Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets, and heavy machine gun emplacements that could be used to punish surrendering troops. They do not need to answer under the Geneva Convention. Positions that those troops might identify could be targeted with fire missions by Ukrainian artillery and rocket batteries.

VI. Defeating Likely Russian Federation Countermeasures

The successful implementation of the proposed program would become a profound cause for alarm in Moscow. The ability to favorably impact the will of Russian soldiers to fight would be crucial to the larger objective of causing the Russian Federation to halt its invasion and withdraw its troops from Ukraine. It is greatcharlie’s contention that great numbers of Russian troops may very well be susceptible to an outside force able to suspend the control commanders have over them. The Kremlin seems quite aware of the situation. To that extent, in September 24, 2022, Putin signed the federal law “On Amendments to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses” which greatly enhanced that penalties for desertion during mobilization or wartime. Offenders could face as much as ten years in prison. Conscientious objectors could be subject to 3 years imprisonment. The law signed on September 24th additionally criminalized “voluntary” surrender, making it punishable by sentences up to 15 years. However, law has not deterred Russian Federation troops willing to risk the possibility of criminal charges in order to survive. Among possible stronger actions, already mentioned was retributive mortar, artillery, rocket, and heavy machine gun fire from Russian Federation lines directed at destroying any surrendering Russian Federation troops and blocking units positioned to the rear of Russian Federation units to prevent troops from escaping their ominous fate by retreating. Here are further examples of sort of actions to expect and some hint on how defeat them.

A. Infiltration

Among possible schemes to thwart efforts to cause Russian Federation troops to surrender and defect would almost certainly be implemented by Moscow. One very ordinary approach might be to seed counterintelligence troops within units on the frontlines to collect information on who is planning to surrender or defect and detain those troops. Russian Federation counterintelligence troops,  indeed at great risk, could potentially advance with units and fire on whoever moves toward the Ukrainian lines with their hands up. Russian Federation troops could be directed by loudspeakers to move forward rapidly toward trenches concealed to the greatest degree possible from Russian Federation lines. From there, they could one by one, crawl along a concealed path, something akin to a long drainage ditch, toward awaiting provosts. Both the prisoner of war trenches and paths discussed earlier could be covered at all times by sharpshooter and machine guns to both protect them, prevent infiltration through their use, and thwart the efforts of those assigned to harm them. The Russian Federation troops could be processed one by one as prisoners of war right off the crawl paths, and sent toward the rear through separate and concealed lines of communication.

With the purpose of protecting them from retaliation by their commanders or harm from infiltrators, Russian Federation troops that have surrendered or defected should be asked to assist the Ukrainian troops in protecting them.by identifying those who are newly arrived to their units or not part of their units at all. Captured Russian Federation troops could be asked to assist in monitoring those troops who were not part of their units–not as a job, but to avoid any unpleasant surprises from infiltrators–without becoming aggressive or engaging in physical violence. Provosts should be prepared to respond to any situation that may arise among the prisoners of war by positioning armed guards around the clock by their holding pens in the rear

B. The Potential Weaponization of Prisoner Exchanges and Repatriations

It would never be suggested by greatcharlie that the opportunity to repatriate captured troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should ever be passed up. The impact on morale would surely be deleterious. For Ukrainian commanders it would be anathema. Yet even more, as the promise sent to Russian Federation troops was that they would be protected if they surrendered or defected, it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to send them back to their better than disappointed commanders and very likely the Russian Federation’s security services. Just as the message of the positive treatment of Russian Federation troops would most likely reverberate back in their homeland, the message sent by their return would most likely be shattering, confirming the worst impression of the Russian people about the Ukrainians. If not imprisoned or executed for desertion, the Russian Federation would face the prospect of being sent back to whatever was left of their former units and driven into “no man’s land” toward Ukrainian frontlines. Unless there was a unit deployed at that point on the frontline, they would surely be driven through mortar, rocket, and artillery fire, and withering high-rate machine gun fire. Some effort must be made to hold them safer in some judicious way.

To that extent, prisoners of war who were promoted to surrender or defect due the efforts of the proposed program would be asked whether they wanted to participate in a prisoner exchange. Those who might choose to return, despite the risks, would be included on the list of prisoners of war for exchange. It is presumed by greatcharlie the number of Russian Federation prisoners of war willing to return might be small, although that ,at not be the case. Hoping readers will pardon greatcharlie’s frankness or any perceived indelicacy, it seems appropriate to suggest that to ensure sufficient numbers of Russian Federation troops are available for exchanges, soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, and regular Wagner Group troops should be held in separate prisoner of war camps and that all negotiated changes should limited to them. To that extent, a dedicated effort should be made by the proposed Provosts to recover wounded and abandoned Wagner Group and professional Russian Federation troops from the battlefield. That will help ensure that there would be sufficient numbers of Russian Federation assets to exchange. Performing that task may entail having the Provosts take risks that may in the end be deemed too dangerous, if not unwarranted. However, given the potential benefits this aspect of the proposed program may bring with regard to the bigger picture of diplomacy and postwar relations between the two countries, some consideration of how such duties could be performed at reduced risk should be given. Hopefully, the war will not drag on for so long that prisoner of war exchanges will need to be chalked out into the foreseeable future. That potentiality nevertheless must be planned for.

These captured Russian Federation troops, dressed in layers and lacking any military insignia or patches, are likely mercenaries or contract fighters from the Wagner Group (above). It would never be suggested by greatcharlie that the opportunity to repatriate captured troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should ever be passed up. The impact on morale would surely be deleterious. For Ukrainian commanders it would be anathema. Yet even more, as the promise sent to Russian Federation troops in hypothetical communications under the proposed program would be that they will be protected if they surrendered or defected, it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to send them back to their better than disappointed commanders and very likely the Russian Federation’s security services. Just as the message of the positive treatment of Russian Federation troops would be expected to reverberate back in their homeland, the message sent by handing them over to angered Russian Federation authorities would most likely be shattering, confirming the worst impression of the Russian people about the Ukrainians. If not imprisoned or executed for desertion, the Russian Federation would face the prospect of being sent back to whatever was left of their former units and driven into “no man’s land” toward Ukrainian frontlines.

C. Deceptive Use of Leaflets

One of the oldest tricks one might expect to see is Russian Federation military counterintelligence units feigning as Russian Federation troops who want to surrender or defect. They could closely follow the instructions on leaflets, online, and heard over loudspeakers on how to indicate their desire to come across lines to Ukrainians. However, when Provosts approach their position in offensive operations, the counterintelligence units operating in such a manner would surely attempt to destroy the Provost team. Given this possibility, Provosts, working alongside Ukrainian commanders, must be willing to target all Russian Federation positions with troops expressing the desire to surrender and be willing to destroy their positions if aggressive action is observed. Nothing should be considered settled until the Russian Federation troops are placed themselves in the Provosts’ custody.

To additionally help protect Provosts and advancing Ukrainian troops, any Russian Federation position that via images collected from aerial reconnaissance and surveillance that appear  to have leaflets piled in front of them but also appear to inordinately conceal heavy machine guns or inordinate numbers of shoulder fired rockets or anti tank guns within them images of such positions must be closely analyzed and targeted for attack when the battlefield is being prepared for Ukrainian advances or whenever Ukrainian commanders may deem fit.

As alluded to prior, it may be prudent to direct Ukrainian sharpshooters to provide overwatch for the Russian Federation troops engaged in placing piles of leaflets before their positions  by firing upon Russian Federation sharpshooters who may very likely be ordered  to fire at their own comrades engaged in placing leaflets in front of their positions as instructed by Provosts.

D. Other “What-ifs” Regarding Likely Countermeasures

Those in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who have acquired relatively considerable experience in the management of matters pertaining to prisoners of war would be best able to do the “what ifs” and figuratively billow up with a ladle more potential pitfalls and countermeasures that could be faced in the implementation of the proposed program. At the same time, those same members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be best able to plot ways to avoid those pitfalls and defeat any countermeasures that may be applied. Interestingly, if the Russian Federation commanders could be caused to get thoroughly involved in applying countermeasures against efforts made under the proposed program, the disruptive impact of doing so upon its military operations could potentially have a deleterious effect sufficient enough to create more favorable conditions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield. Omnia conando docilis solertia vincit. (By application a docile shrewdness conquers every difficulty.)

Again, not all Russian Federation troops facing the Ukrainian Armed Forces will respond to efforts under the proposed program. However, if enough do so, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, through mostly non-lethal means, might be able to make their mark in ending the war on mostly better terms and with less negative sentiment of both sides than could be expected in the current environment.  Ironically, Russian Federation troops may in effect be able to assist in ending a war in which they are among those who have suffered most.

Russian Federation prisoners of war being held in dreary cells at a detention center (above). With regard to detention center conditions, every effort must be made to create hygienic, well-maintained centers. Prisoners should be supplied with clean clothes, the opportunity to bath, recreation, and healthy meals. Having reviewed countless videos and photographs made public by the Ukrainian government for the writing of this essay, it became very clear that some Russian Federation prisoners of war are being kept in conditions that are unacceptable. (Ukrainian prisoners of war are probably being held in far worse conditions, but with the hope of promoting higher thinking behind the proposed program, the notion of responding “tit-for-tat” with regard to the treatment of Mobiks is anathema. Any notion of treating Russian Federation prisoners of war with respect and dignity hypothetically promised in messages and advanced in the handling of their capture will simply be washed away. If improvements in conditions at detention centers for Russian Federation prisoners of war are determined to be unwarranted, then the Ukrainian government, right before the world will display its disinterest in an opportunity to improve, in some part, the environment for a sustainable peace with its neighbor. Peace will be reached at some point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Efforts must be made to hasten that day and ensure that peace will be one all parties can live with

VII. Suggestions for Adjustments in Current Methods of Detention

To touch briefly on what is likely a delicate subject, reportedly, Russian Federation prisoners of war held in 500 detention centers in Ukraine. Russian Federation prisoners of war appear to be lumped together regardless of whether they are Mobiks, professional soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, regular Wagner Group troops, Wagner Group penal troops, and mercenaries This practice must end. It is quite deleterious with regard to the proposed program. To a great degree, Mobiks are victims of the unjustified war in Ukraine, too. They should not be held with Russian Federation troops that have volunteered to fight in Ukraine to include the professional Russian Federation troops, the regular Wagner Group troops, and mercenaries apparently from all over the world.

The suggestion was already made here that Mobiks who surrender under the proposed program should not be held with soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops and regular Wagner Group troops with regard to facilitating the aggregation of prisoners for exchanges. In the Russian Federation, Russian Federation troops that voluntarily surrender are deemed as criminals. Even more so, Mobiks among Russian Federation prisoners of war certainly should not be held in cells with confirmed hardened criminals from Wagner Group penal units. True, some Wagner Group penal troops sought to overcome the ills of prison life by going to war in Ukraine. However, there are likely hardened convicts from the depths of Russian Federation prisons among the Wagner Group troops who, when aggregated in detention centers, could make life far worse for Mobiks, the overwhelming majority of whom were literally torn from lives of peace and thrown into an unjustified war which many unlikely supported. The hardened criminals could surely reproduce in detention center cells all of the ills of prison life in the Russian Federation. If the purpose of handling Russian Federation prisoners of war in this manner has been was to intentionally create the potential for some prisoners of war, such as the Mobiks, to be subjected to such ugliness, it must be made clear that such thinking and practices under the proposed program is forbidden, will be tolerated, and must be halted immediately under the threat of punishment. 

With regard to detention center conditions, every effort must be made to create hygienic, well-maintained centers. Prisoners should be supplied with clean clothes, the opportunity to bath, recreation, and healthy meals. Having reviewed countless videos and photographs made public by the Ukrainian government for the writing of this essay, it became very clear that some Russian Federation prisoners of war are being kept in conditions that are unacceptable. (It may very well be the case that Ukrainian prisoners of war are being held in far worse conditions, but with the hope of promoting higher thinking behind the proposed program, the notion of responding “tit-for-tat” with regard to the treatment of Mobiks is anathema. Any notion of treating Russian Federation prisoners of war with respect and dignity hypothetically promised in messages and advanced in the handling of their capture will simply be washed away. If improvements in conditions at detention centers for Russian Federation prisoners of war are determined to be unwarranted, then the Ukrainian government, starkly before the whole wide world, will display its disinterest in a genuine opportunity to improve, in some part, the environment for a sustainable peace with its neighbor. Peace will be reached at some point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Efforts must be made to hasten that day and ensure that peace will be one all parties can live with.

The owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin (right), at Russian Federation prison recruiting civilian inmates for combat service with his organization in Ukraine. To touch briefly on what is likely a delicate subject, reportedly, Russian Federation prisoners of war held in 500 detention centers in Ukraine. Russian Federation prisoners of war appear to be lumped together regardless of whether they are Mobiks, professional soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, regular Wagner Group troops, Wagner Group penal troops, and mercenaries This practice must end. It is quite deleterious with regard to the proposed program. To a great degree, Mobiks are victims of the unjustified war in Ukraine, too. They should not be held with Russian Federation troops that have volunteered to fight in Ukraine to include the professional Russian Federation troops, the regular Wagner Group troops, and mercenaries apparently from all over the world.

VIII. Funding the Proposed Program: A Shot in the Dark

This segment of funding of this proposed program is quite naturally the most brief as, greatcharlie freely admits to knowing less than nothing about the budget of the Ministerstva Oborony Ukrainy (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense) or the budget of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Still, as the program would need a line of support, it has a suggestion that might prove useful or worthless. There may understandably be considerable reluctance in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Armed Forces to divert appropriated resources, that could be used more confidently to support all of the requirements of Ukraine’s Defense in the field right now and keeping Ukrainian troops alive, to a proposed program that would save the lives of Russian Federation troops in the name of peace and stability. That being the likely case, perchance through some singular arrangements made by the national authorities in Kyiv and the Ministry of Defense some hybrid line of funding and supply of special equipment needed by Provosts in the field, such as modified drones, could be provided by friendly foreign governments, foreign businesses, and foreign nongovernmental organizations. Drones might be easier to get a hold of than tanks and fighter jets and could very likely be secured much faster, from completely different sources. Again, this recherché hybrid funding idea is just a shot in the dark and may be completely off the mark.

IX. Pro Mundi Beneficio

Les chefs-d’oeuvre ne sont jamais que des tentatively heureuses. If implemented, at least in some very close form, the program proposed here would figuratively represent an offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces of a different kind, aimed at supporting military success by saving lives and dampening the spirit of evil that supported aggressive action. It would further serve as an additional footing for the foundation upon which a sustainable peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation could be established. The proposal is neither pie in the sky, nor worse, delusion. It has a real chance of promoting peace. This is only a proposal based on evidence available to greatcharlie.  It is not presumed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces or any other government organizations  would have an interest in greatcharlie’s meditations on the subject of prisoners of war. Yet, it is hoped, if anything, that the proposal might serve as a basis for the Ukrainians to further advance their efforts on the matter.

If through the implementation of the proposed program, the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be able achieve some success even in one area of the battlefield, the actions of one unit of troops might influence those of others, creating a cascading effect. There might be a real chance of collecting a huge bag of Prisoners of War before Russian Federation commanders could respond to the situation. Even then, whatever they might decide to do to halt the mass surrenders would be unlikely by thoughtful and surely be heavy-handed. Despite reservations of taking such action, Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders must keep perspective and remember the priority cannot simply be to kill the enemy but winning the war by getting the Russian Federation Armed Forces out of their country through forceful ejection or a withdrawal using every means possible. Everything reasonable that might support that cause should at least be considered, or better, given a try. Difficilius est sarcire concordiam quam rumpere. (It is more difficult to restore harmony than sow dissension.)

As alluded to earlier, this propitious option is not a hodge-podge of novel suggestions, but rather a more effective program of a tried and true methods at drawing in Russian Federation troops who are disposed to surrender and defect. Given that, one might read about this proposed program and respond that it is all very interesting but nothing new. That would be exactly the point. Some of the approaches suggested here are well-known, well-trodden in the history of contemporary warfare. The fact that some of what is proposed was practiced in the past does not obviate their use in the present. The tacit, popular belief that all new approaches must be rooted in high-tech might be characterized as the hobgoblin of the rigid and parochial.

Among those in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who have worked on prisoner of war matters, surely some have demonstrated intrinsic capabilities in the field. Their talents have by now have become well-harnessed by their knowledge and experience. Their use of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods suggested here should prove to be very fruitful. As noted, implemented with nuance injected by members of the existing Ukrainian Armed Forces prisoner of war program, it may support the achievement of military objectives that would have likely come at considerable cost in terms of troops and materiel while paradoxically sowing seeds for peace. The possibility of manifesting those outcomes alone, should be enough to warrant giving it a try. Those who would implement this proposed plan would surely see very difficult days often and deal with very trying moments. However, the rewards may be great enough to overcome those troubling occasions. Their role in creating the opportunity for better ending of the war would potentially be enormous.

Russian prisoners of war constructing garden furniture at a workshop in a Ukrainian Armed Forces detention center. The BBC reportd that the prisoners of war earn some money for their labor which they spend on cigarettes and sweets (above). As the proposed prisoner of war program develops, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, attendant with online messages on the sites should be videos and photographs of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered not just for the photo opportunity, Actual Russian Federation prisoners of war could be depicted wearing clean and neat clothes in safe, hygienic detention centers. Appropriate videos and photos should depict the Russian Federation prisoners of war engaged in daily activities at detention centers. To that extent, some videos and photos of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered should depict them drinking clean water, tea, and coffee, and wearing clean dry clothes and covered in warm blankets should be posted as soon as possible online. Authentic videos and photos of those who surrendered in inclement conditions, should also display them a few short hours later being held clean dry spaces, well-protected from cold, wind, rain and snow.

The Way Forward

There should be little question about the practicality of what is proposed here. Still, given omnidirectional calls for revenge still heard within Ukraine, any effort to enhance the existing prisoner of war program in a way that could potentially save the lives of additional of Russian Federation troops perhaps in the hundreds, even thousands, would hardly be well-received at first blush or after a superficial examination of it. Yet, amidst the anger and rage, the light of reason must be allowed shine through if a path out of this disaster is to be found After the war, if it can come to a rational end, it appears that Ukraine will find itself “leap-frogged” to a place among top tier powers in the world. Its economic, social, political, and military advancements will continue to be nurtured by allies and friends. However, despite all of the sacrifices made during the war there will likely be some further costs, consideration, in terms of engaging in the efforts to promote a lasting peace. Those efforts do not always need to be prompted by allies and friends

If as a result of some reasoning voiced in Kyiv, an operation to encourage the surrender of Russian soldiers cannot be implemented closely resembling the plan proposed here, as alluded to earlier, perhaps what is proposed could still serve as a basis for the development of their own impressions and plans for a similar tact. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. (In every disputation, we should look more to the weight of reason than to the weight of authorities.)

Brief Thoughts from Outside the US Foreign and National Security Policy Bureaucracies on Putin and Facilitating an End to the Ukraine War

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Optimistically, some juncture may soon be reached in the Ukraine matter at which Putin might be presented with the circumstance and space to conclude it is time to stop fighting. This may sound unrealistic. It may appear that nothing lies ahead except more death and destruction. The effort must be made to look at Putin and the Ukraine matter from different angles with the hope discovering an approach that will prove to be fruitful. Novel ways at looking at issues, recognizably up to a point, can better enable the astute to grasp what may on the right occasion be a viable line of thinking. Any thoughtful insight could become more relevant and valuable as conceivably in back rooms of Western countries’ foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, where planning and preparation for the contingency of negotiating with Putin over terms for peace in Ukraine may be underway. It is greatcharlie’s hope that the few insights presented here will have the potential to ignite a new line of analyses. Sometimes the smallest key can open the largest door. 

The opportunity to forge the best possible peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation has long since been passed. That peace could been established before the killing began. However, Kyiv wanted the freedom to decide to join NATO and the EU. It rejected terms that it declare its neutrality. It response was a reasonable, but it could have only led to war with Russia under its current leadership. Much has been lost by both sides already but there remains the opportunity to create the framework for an evolving peace plan that will allow both sides to end hostilities. Optimistically, some juncture may soon be reached in the Ukraine matter at which Putin might be presented with the circumstance and space to conclude it is time to stop fighting. There must be a starting point for Ukrainians to rebuild, rejuvenate their country. This may sound unrealistic. It may appear that nothing lies ahead except more death and destruction. Even so, the effort must be made to look at Putin and the Ukraine matter from different angles with the hope discovering of an approach that will prove to be fruitful. Potiusque sero quam numquam. (It is better to do something late than never.)

Novel ways at looking at issues, recognizably up to a certain point, can better enable the astute to grasp what may on the right occasion be a viable line of thinking. Matters already reviewed and ostensibly settled could potentially be lifted from the region of the commonplace. Thoughtful insights could become more relevant and valuable as conceivably in back rooms of respective Western countries’ foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, where planning and preparation for the contingency of negotiating with Putin over terms for peace in Ukraine may be underway. However, as things are, insights proffered from unapproved sources outside the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies on what Putin “may think” on matter concerning Ukraine, the likely reasons for his choices, and what he sees as the way forward, are more often discounted by practicioners. Such judgments are left to the eye of the beholder. The most available justifications to mark them out are surely concerns quality and disagreement over analyses. Yet, in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in perhaps every country, such appraisals are not completely objective. Additionally, as much of what Putin thinks is typically chalked up by experts as an expression of an ugly chip on his shoulder, his contempt for the West, spending time and effort diving deeper on the matter would likely be viewed upon as wasteful. 

Still, individuals as Putin with often have unique reasons for their choices, and no matter how unorthodox, disagreeable, or round the bend as they might seem, they must be applied in analyzing their decisionmaking process to have a chance at accurately predicting their moves. Perhaps greatcharlie marks itself as old fashioned but it believes even analyses of “unapproved outsiders” on what Putin thinks should not be looked upon as entirely unilluminating. At a minimum, many should be docketed for consideration later in its proper context. 

Later on, they may bring analysts to an understanding of those matters they had not held before. It is greatcharlie’s hope that the few insights presented here will have the potential to ignite a new line of investigation and analysis. It briefly highlights cause and effect, the interesting associations between things, yet avoids making too many charitable assumptions. Sometimes the smallest key can open the largest door. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. (In every disputation, we should look more to the weight of reason than to the weight of authorities )

Putin’s problems with the West began long before the Ukraine crisis and subsequent invasion in February 2022. Although the reality is that Russia has invaded Ukraine, for a second time in less than a decade, and taken a good portion of its sovereign territory, Putin insists Western capitals are the ones with covetous minds. He often points to what the “insidious” way in which the US and its Western friends in the EU rolled up to Russia’s border with NATO in tow despite earlier understandings reached that they would never do so. Within the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western capitals, his singular perspective was likely looked upon casually as one more of Putin’s pretensions. Seeing how the situation stands, with Russian forces controlling Crimea and the Donbas, it would appear that he is grabbing parts of Ukraine to enrich Russia. Except for his two daughters, each woman formidable in her own right, the only real family Putin has in that sense is Russia. Russia is his mother, his father, his home. Perhaps in part for this reason, it should not be so hard to understand why Putin had taken such a maximalist position on Ukraine, the need to invade, the West. and NATO prior to February 24, 2022.

Putin’s Feelings About the West: Brief Meditations

For Russia, the anticipated waltz through Ukraine became a national emergency and some policy analysts and newsmedia commentators began to say the invasion would ultimately be Putin’s last act. The Ukrainians were not supposed have a cat in hell’s chance of “winning” the war.” Yet, if not for lack of just about everything needed high-speed, high-empo, high-intensity maneuver operations except good soldiers and courage, it initially appeared to many after Russia’s Kyiv debacle that Ukrainian forces might have been able to deliver a crippling blow of Napoleonic proportions to their opponent and perhaps forced Moscow to negotiate terms for peace. Putin could not turn back so easily. He certainly cannot afford to lose. Once the situation began to look unsatisfactory for Russia on the ground, one could have gathered from Putin’s statements and actions on Ukraine that he felt he was in a fight for survival for both Russia and himself. He appears to view the fight in Ukraine as a climatic stand, their present-day version of the Malakoff Redoubt, Stalingrad, or the Neva Nickel. 

Luckily for Putin, Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was appointed commander of the special military operation in Ukraine on April 9, 2022, has seemingly orchestrated a regrouping of Russian forces after those relatively disastrous initial weeks of the special military operation. As of this writing, especially in the Donbas, Ukrainian forces have faced retreats, setbacks, and even surrenders as in Mariupol. A land bridge between Crimea and Donbas has been created by Russian forces. It remains to be seen whether Russian forces have truly gained the initiative, and if so  whether they can retain it. From what the international newsmedia mainly reports that with everything taken into consideration, especially military assistance from the US, the war in Ukraine could still end in either side’s favor.

Despite the many challenges encountered as a result of his Ukraine venture, Putin leaves no doubt that he is doing what he feels must done for Russia and he believes he is on the right track. As it was illustrated in greatcharlie’s preceding, May 30, 2022 post entitled, “Putin the Protector of the Russian People or the Despoiler of Ukrainian Resources: A Look at War Causation and Russian Military Priorities in Ukraine” concerning war causation, there is an intellectual foundation to his choices. (There would be plenty of disagreement with that idea among those who loathe Putin as much due to bias than to sound argument.) 

Although the reality is that Russia has invaded Ukraine, for a second time in less than a decade, and taken a good portion of its sovereign territory, Putin insists Western capitals are the ones with covetous minds. He often points to what the “insidious” way in which the US and its Western friends in the EU rolled up to Russia’s border with NATO in tow despite earlier understandings reached that they would never do so. Within the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western capitals, his singular perspective was likely looked upon casually as one more of Putin’s pretensions. Seeing how situation stands, with Russian forces controlling Crimea and the Donbas, it would reasonably appear that he is grabbing parts of Ukraine to enrich Russia. Doubtlessly, that was a planned attendant outcome of each occasion when Russia marched into Ukraine but not Putin’s priority. Except for his two daughters, each woman formidable in her own right, the only real family Putin has in that sense is Russia. Russia is his mother, his father, his home. Perhaps in part for this reason, it should not be so hard to understand why Putin had taken such a maximalist position on Ukraine, the need to invade, the West. and NATO prior to February 24, 2022.

Missteps with Putin

Putin’s problems with the West began long before the Ukraine crisis and subsequent invasion in February 2022. In its January 25, 2022 post entitled, “Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help”, greatcharlie briefly discuss much of what was at the nub of the matter. Portions of that discussion are provided here.

The formal inclusion of the new Russian Federation in the high realms of international politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union was nobly attempted. A seat in the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council was inherited from the erstwhile Communist state. As important, Russia began to engage in separate meetings with leaders of the intergovernmental group of the leading economic powers, the G7, in 1994 while Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was in office. Russia formally joined the group in 1997 at the invitation of US President Bill Clinton and United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair. This noble step was ostensibly taken in the name of international peace and security. Surely, inviting Russia to join the G7 was more than a friendly gesture and a fresh start. Membership would plug Russia into the international order, forestalling any burgeoning sense that if left isolated, control in Moscow might fall fully into the hands of organized crime groups, and so would Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Russia membership would more importantly plug the G7 countries vis-à-versa into Moscow in a structured way, creating an effective, stable line of communication and political and economic influence.

When Putin became Russian Federation President, he took the seat created for Yeltsin at what became the G8. Perhaps the other G8 leaders felt that it was important to keep Russia in the G8 for the same reasons it was brought in but also hoped that keeping Putin in their circle might stir and help sustain a great desire within him to make Russia a country “like to one more rich in hope.” Other national leaders of what became the G8 may have thought that Putin would passively acquire an appreciation of their world, imagine the potential of a rejuvenated Russia fitting into their world, and acquire similarities with them. However, their eyes appear to have been closed to what was happening with Putin and Russia and why the move was nearly doomed to fail to ameliorate East-West tension in the long run especially due to his personality then.

At the G8, national leaders would come to the big table committed to having a positive impact in not only economic affairs, but world affairs in general. The existing seven members–the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy, plus the EU–were bound by shared values as open, democratic and outward-looking societies. Russia was not a country completely devoid of desirable things, Russia possessed natural resources, particularly oil and gas which the energy industries of the other powers coveted. Certainly, Russia retained the power to destroy with its nuclear arsenal and the residue of the once powerful Soviet military. However, Russia was hardly developed enough to participate in that way as a member.

As for Putin, he had not as yet grabbed all reins of power firmly in Russia, much as he tightly grips them today. It is not inconceivable that his political qualities were not fully scrutinized by any member state. However, more pertinently, Putin was unlikely ready to manage Russia’s stake at the G8 when first began participating in leaders’ summits. Looking into Putin’s inner-being, it is possible that Putin, while in his own way appreciating the status G8 membership bestowed Russia and him, felt well-out of his comfort zone and despite his ego, felt that the manner in which Russia acquired G8 membership was counterfeit. For Putin to be satisfied at that time, Russia would need to possess membership on his terms, legitimate terms. Within G8 meetings, Putin presented himself with grace and charm befitting his position. If Putin ever got the idea then that Western leaders enjoyed observing him outside of his comfort zone or disrespected him in any way, he would unlikely be able to hide his anger in his countenance and dwell on lashing out in some big way. Perchance at some point Putin might have imagined that the other technologically advanced countries used G8 meetings as a stage to lampoon Russia. He would be seated before them as they flaunted their economic power and progress while giving the impression in occasional off-handed comments and perhaps in unconscious condescending behavior toward him, that they imagine everything about Russia being tawdry and slipshod, particularly its goods and services, and would describe its industrial centers resembling a carnival the day after the night before. Perhaps such thinking could be said to have some validity given that such was essentially the case in early post-Soviet Russia. Putin had already brought to the table a sense within himself that Russia remained vulnerable to Western plans and intentions. That sensibility seemed to stick regardless of all else good that came his way through the G8. The G8 experience overall may have left a bad taste in his mouth. It is likely other group leaders may not have imagined that would be the outcome.

As a result of Euromaidan, power changed hands in Ukraine, and a series of measures that enhanced Western influence were taken. Putin responded robustly. The escalation of a struggle between ethnic Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk with the fledgling democratic Ukrainian government was followed by the greater step of Russia’s seizing and annexing Crimea, which at time was the sovereign territory of Ukraine and most national capitals say it still is. His actions resulted in Russia being placed back into what was supposed to be isolation; it was put out of the G8 and hit with many punitive economic measures. Both Putin and Russia have seemingly survived it all. Although Russia was suspended from the G8–once again the G7, Russia delayed announcing a decision to permanently withdraw from the group until 2017. Surely, Putin had great concerns over the perceptions in Russia and around the world of the decision of the G7 countries. Putin appears to have had a morbid fear that the G7 countries were exercising power over Russia and himself. That would not do. By waiting, Putin allowed himself to retain a sense of  control over the situation, choosing when Russia would depart. He exist in the substitute reality that his country had not been pushed out of the organization and marginalized. As far as he was concerned, Russia was still a member of the club of the most powerful countries. Despite everything, that recognition remained an aspiration of his at that time. It was an odd duality. Satisfying Putin’s desire then for Russia to possess the ability to discuss world problems with the leaders of the most influential countries, was Russia’s continued membership in the G20. The Group of 20, G20, in essence is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 of the world’s largest economies, including those of many developing nations, along with the EU. While the G7 existed for the top-tier industrialized countries, the G20, formed in 1999, provided a forum for the discussion of international financial matters that included those emerging economies which at the time began to represent a larger part of the global economy. The G20’s aim is to promote global economic growth, international trade, and regulation of financial markets.

Body language can reveal plenty! Putin speaking (top left). Leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the US and United Kingdom meeting at Lough Erne in Northern Ireland for the G8 Summit 17-18 June 2013. Within G8 meetings, Putin presented himself with grace and charm befitting his position. If Putin ever got the idea then that Western leaders enjoyed observing him outside of his comfort zone or disrespected him in any way, he would unlikely be able to hide his anger in his countenance and dwell on lashing out in some big way. Perchance at some point Putin might have imagined that the other technologically advanced countries used G8 meetings as a stage to lampoon Russia. He would be seated before them as they flaunted their economic power and progress while giving the impression in occasional off-handed comments and perhaps in unconscious condescending behavior toward him, that they imagine everything about Russia being tawdry and slipshod, particularly its goods and services, and would describe its industrial centers resembling a carnival the day after the night before.

Intriguingly, Putin did not attend the G20 summit in Rome in October 2021, informing the organization that his decision was due to concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. Not to take precaution in these times would be short-sighted, but for Putin to abstain from physically attending a G20 leaders summit could indicate that the organization, for at least that moment, may have had less meaning to him. Putin participated in the summit in Rome via videolink, but the optics were hardly favorable. Reportedly, Putin coughed quite a bit during the meeting creating questions in the minds of others about his condition. That seemed unusual for a man who exudes strength and robustness.

One must add to this story the influence of the destructive impact of the West on the Russian economy and the country’s efforts to “build back better” immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union on Putin’s thinking. As discussed in the June 18, 2019 greatcharlie post entitled, “Why Putin Laments the Soviet Union’s Demise and His Renewed “Struggle” with the US: A Response to an Inquiry from Students,” Putin would doubtlessly explain that under Yeltsin, the Russian leadership made the mistake of believing Russia no longer had any enemies. Putin, while ascending to the top in the new Russian Federation, saw how mesmerizing “reforms” recommended to Yeltsin’s government by Western experts unmistakably negatively impacted Russia’s economy in a way referred to somewhat euphemistically by those experts as “shock treatment.” Yeltsin was unaware that Western experts were essentially “experimenting” with approaches to Russia’s economic problems. His rationale for opening Russia up to the resulting painful consequences was not only to fix Russia’s problems but ostensibly to establish comity with the West. The deleterious effects of reform recommended by Western experts’ could be seen not only economically, but socially.  In another statement made while he was acting President in 1999, Putin diplomatically explained the consequences of relying upon foreign experts for assistance. He stated: “The experience of the 90s demonstrates vividly that merely experimenting with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign textbooks cannot assure that our country will achieve genuine renewal without any excessive costs. The mechanical copying of other nations’ experience will not guarantee success, either.” Once fully ensconced as Russia’s leader, he would publicly state that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He also brought that sensibility to the G7 table with him. The memoirist, popular poet, and civil rights activist, Maya Angelou for Beautifully Said Magazine (2012) stated: “I’ve learned that people will forget what you said, people will forget what you did, but people will never forget how you made them feel.”

Putin has an excellent memory. Putin believes he was treated badly, and knows he and Russia deserved better. However, at this point, Putin seems less interested in opinions of him in the West or his international audience for that matter. As far as he might be concerned, members of those organizations can have their way. Unlike the past, Putin made certain not leave the West with the ability to derail his plans, or give them the intellectually opening to disturb him. Coercive economic tools at their disposal are illusions of power that Putin would in time disintegrate by shining light on the realities they may have ignored. To that extent, indications are that Putin has instructed his officials not to tolerate any untoward behavior from those in the West with whom they may meet. It would be best for them to just walk away rather than subject themselves to mistreatment and outrageous calumny.

Dangling that which would most content the opposing party in order to compell its good behavior has been a method used to resolve disagreements and conflicts between empires, countries, city-states, and families for seemingly aeons. It can lubricate diplomatic exchanges and create favorable outcomes. It often resulted in sense of mutual tolerance and peace with honor between opposing parties. It all sounds quite transactional, because it is. Western political leaders are well-aware that Putin’s strongest interests lie in the province of developing commerce. As such, that interest could have been used as a lever in a well-considered, calibrated way the gain a handle on the Russian leader. Western powers could lend furtive or mildly acknowledged copious support that would enhance what the Russian President, himself, might recognize as weaknesses in his system in exchange for significant, immediate and long-term cooperation. Again, what would be most important is getting him to go along with whatever plan is developed. (Many might argue that this practice was used without shrewdness, without any real calibration, by the US in the construction of the Joint Comprehensive Plan on Action of 2016 concerning nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.) If lucky enough, the diplomacy of national leaders who would have engaged in such action in the earliest stages of the Ukraine crisis–pre-invasion–would have likely been able to offer a narrative in which they could have been seen as saving the day.

However, instead of any of this, awareness of that commercial interest in Western capitals has led to the targeting of it to cause his hurt, harm, and even pain and resultantly his ire and recalcitrance. (It has also been important for Putin to recognize the West is entitled to its share of ire and recalcitrance, and when a situation is moving favorably, he must also consider his actions with respect to Western reactions. There must be a commitment on all sides, including Russia,to the advancement of negotiations to secure a sustainable agreement. One might get the impression given his record that he has not reflected too much on that in recent times. Then again, perhaps he has.

It is unimaginable that Western political leaders decided to target that commercial interest unaware of its terrible importance personally to Putin, although that possibility cannot be completely dismissed. From what can be gathered, the choice to handle Putin in that way was made a while back. It was most apparent in the US when the US Congress passed the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (the Magnitsky Law) and subsequent Global Magnitsky Act of 2016, which struck a nerve with Putin not only for economic reasons, but domestic political reasons as well. The Magnitsky Law,set precedent with regard to the manner in which the West would act to modify Putin’s behavior as well as that of other Russian officials and private citizens. Omnia mala exempla ex rebus bonis orta sunt. (Also, omnia mala exempla orta sunt ex bonis initiis.) (Every bad precedent originated as a justifiable measure.)

Putin (above) at work in the Kremlin. Western countries have imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia’s corporate and financial system since it sent troops into Ukraine on February 24, 2022. At this stage of the game, however, Russia hardly seems too deprived by coercive sanctions from the West. One might suggest the West’s moves against Putin and Russia became overplayed and predictable, and thereby anticipated and prepared for, to the greatest extent possible. Reportedly, in preparation for the US response to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin drastically curtailed Russia’s use of dollars, and thereby a degree of leverage the US might have had. Enormous currency reserves were stockpiled, and budgets were streamlined to keep the economy and government services going even under isolation. Putin also reoriented trade and sought to replace Western imports.

Western Sanctions in Response to Ukraine’s Invasion

At this stage of the game, however, Russia hardly seems too deprived by coercive sanctions from the West. One might suggest the West’s moves against Putin and Russia became overplayed and predictable, and thereby anticipated and prepared for, to the greatest extent possible. Reportedly, in preparation for the US response to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin drastically curtailed Russia’s use of dollars, and thereby a degree of leverage the US might have had. Enormous currency reserves were stockpiled, and budgets were streamlined to keep the economy and government services going even under isolation. Putin also reoriented trade and sought to replace Western imports. It is not greatcharlie’s intention spoil anyone’s appreciation of this essay by offering a regurgitation on the nuance of steps Putin has taken at home to better shield Russia from the harmful effects of Western sanctions. Economics is not greatcharlie’s area of expertise. Suffice it to say that nothing done by the West just before and following February 24, 2022 unsettled Putin.

Indeed, once the whole Ukraine crisis began in earnest, the West metaphorically began wielding an economic bullwhip of sanctions to back him up. Perhaps from the perspective of the West, all that Putin was being asked to do was to behave as a good chap on Ukraine because be knows he should, given the conventions on international law, international peace and security, and multilateral agreements Russia signed with Ukraine as the Budapest Memorandum design to preserve it from military threat. However, it is hard to see how they could ever have expected to get far with that mindset or that tack. When his invasion began in earnest, the West flailed him harder with the whip. However, no matter how hard the West lashed out, Putin would not respond. He would not even put his demands up for Dutch auction. Putin has recently declared Western sanctions have not had much impact on Russia’s economy and have done more to harm global trade and the international economic system. Putin certainly feels confident his measures to sanction-proof Russia worked to a great degree. Speaking on the state of Russia’s domestic economy on April 18, 2022, Putin explained that inflation was stabilizing and that retail demand in the country had normalzed.

In the past, Putin surely in an unintended way, would very likely have lent a helping hand to Western efforts to subdue Russia. He often allowed pride to overshadow good sense and discretion, and that often led to miscalculation and errors. It was a gross miscalculation to lash out at the US by interfering with the 2016 Presidential Elections. It is an action Putin has repeatedly denied despite the fact that direct proof of Russian meddling has been presented by US intelligence and law enforcement organizations. Going after Kyiv, to knock out the Western oriented and Western supported government, early in the special military operation was an enormous mistake. Troops that would have been invaluable to the more militarily sensible operations of Russian forces in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine were needlessly lost with no gain. The whole world could see Putin had dropped a clanger. 

It is unlikely that Putin will make many more grand mistakes during the Ukraine campaign. Even if a real opportunity is set before Putin–the tiger and the tethered goat by the waterside scenario, he will very likely pass it up. Wrestling with this issue in a preceding post, greatcharlie supposed that at this point, a course has been set, calibrated by Russia’s best military, intelligence, diplomatic, and political minds, with all available and in-coming resources taken into consideration. There is probably little to no room for any sizable deviation from that path. Still, with all that being considered, almost anything is possible when it comes to Putin. All of this withstanding, there must be an answer, a way to initiate fruitful diplomacy even at this stage. One could get the impression given the record that finding a way to work with Putin, by creating some balance with which all would be reasonably satisfied, is just not a cross any Western capital would be unwilling to bear. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. (In every disputation, we should look more to the weight of reason than to the weight of authorities.)

Putin (right) gestures during a press conference with French President Emmanuel Macron (left) in Moscow on February 7, 2022. At the foundation of thinking concerning an international order and international organizations created since the end of World War II is idea that members will be answerable to the group of countries they signed up to deliberate and act collectively with. The fact is Putin does not feel answerable to anyone in the world despite Russia’s multiple membership in international organizations as the UN, where it is Permanent 5 Members of the Security Council, and G20. The easy, less than thoughtful answer might be to eject Russia from the G20 or at least keep him teed up on the idea he will be removed. However, that would more than likely make matters worse. Rather than gain a further grip on Moscow’s behavior, parties insistent on doing such would only travel further along into unknown with Putin.

Likely Impact Recent Contacts with Western Leaders Have Had upon Putin

At the foundation of thinking concerning an international order and international organizations created since the end of World War II is idea that members will be answerable to the group of countries they signed up to deliberate and act collectively with. The fact is Putin does not feel answerable to anyone in the world, despite Russia’s multiple membership in international organizations as the UN, where it is Permanent 5 Members of the Security Council, and G20. The easy, less than thoughtful answer might be to eject Russia from the G20 or at least keep him teed up on the idea he will be removed. However, that would more than likely make matters worse. Rather than gain a further grip on Moscow’s behavior, parties insistent on doing such would only travel further along into unknown with Putin.

In a May 31, 2022 New York Times guest essay entitled “President Biden: What America Will and Will Not Do in Ukraine”, US President Joe Biden reminded that  President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has said, ultimately this war “will only definitively end through diplomacy.” Conceivably, some may believe that with some tacit approval from all allied capitals, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, have spoken with Putin, most recently on May 28, 2022, to reach some confidential arrangement for more fulsome peace talks or establish the basis for a proposa concerning a ceasefirel to present to him during their next contact. Impossible n’est pas français. They would also have likely sought to chinwag with Putin with the hope of finding and exploiting a sociability that lives in Putin that is surely part of human nature. That is what the noble Roman pagan, Tulius Cicero expressed in his discussion of the idea of commonwealth in De Republica (51 BC) with the words: naturalis quaedam hominim quasi congregation. European leaders have gone as far as to aggregate their efforts with Putin not only as a sign of unity but likely also with hope that acting together they might find the right convention, the right phrases to trigger him to respond favorably to an entreaty to talk.

Searching for some advantage by reflex, Putin might assess that the Western leaders, by acting in pairs or groups, even in their visits to Kyiv, are most concerned that if either their counterparts were to travel or make phone contact alone, they would act out of self-interest, placing the needs of their respective countries uppermost. One leader might not trust another to come toward Moscow empty handed. Some special deal particularly concerning energy resources might be sought. On the other end of their possible mutual suspicions, given what transpired with the February 10, 2022 meeting between United Kingdom Foreign Minister Liz Truss and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, there may be a lingering fear that one might pick a fight with Putin, and all would in the end need to contend with the ramifications of that. (One might suppose Truss’ tack was likely agreed upon with United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson and foreign and national security counselors before she left for Moscow. The decision may have been to “pull out all of the stops.” Causa latet: vis est notissima. (The cause is hidden, but the result is known.)

To enlarge on that point, Truss’ heated, emotional outburst before the long-experienced Russian Foreign Minister, could be judged as being particularly inept given the need to develop some influence upon Moscow’s line of thinking during the tinderbox circumstances of the time. By her behavior, she merely advertised the limits she had. Indeed, she likely signalled to Moscow that London did not have any remarkable solutions, no good proposals to offer. She seemed to be revealing an angst that Moscow likely presumed to be prevalent among the United Kingdom’s foreign and national security policy decisionmaking officials. She appeared to express a sense of being trapped as lion in cage by the Ukraine situation. Truss’ behavior may have also indicated to Putin that there may be serious problems besetting Johnson’s Conservative Party as a whole, with cabinet members and Tory Members of Parliament feeling uncertain about their respective political futures. For the external audience, Truss may have amused some, but ultimately she did not enlighten or inspire and dismally failed move events forward in a positive way. No foreign official from any country should ever seek to do any of that in Moscow under any circumstance. Vacuum vas altius pleno vaso resonat. (An empty pot makes a deeper noise than a pot that is full.)

Putin doubtlessly feels that Western countries, other than the US, pose little real threat to Russia despite any noise they might make about the prowess of their respective armed forces. (It must be noted that the United Kingdom possesses an estimated 225 strategic warheads, of which an estimated 120 are deployed and 105 are in storage. Added to that deterrent is a total of four Vanguard-class Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, which together form its exclusively sea-based nuclear deterrent. As of January 2019, France was said to possess approximately 300 nuclear warheads, most of which are designed for delivery by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with the remainder affixed to air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by strategic bombers.) To that extent,, Putin may believe there are many among certain foreign and national security policy circles in Western countries with a desire to emote more than do anything else such as find real answers to get Putin off Ukraine’s back and over to the negotiating table resolve matters.

United Kingdom Foreign Minister Liz Truss (left) and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (right) at their press conference in Moscow on February 10, 2022 moments before Ivanov walked out. Searching for some advantage by reflex, Putin might assess that the Western leaders, by acting in pairs or groups, even in their visits to Kyiv, are most concerned that if either their counterparts were to travel or make phone contact alone, they would act out of self-interest, placing the needs of their respective countries uppermost. One leader might not trust another to come toward Moscow empty handed. Some special deal particularly concerning energy resources might be sought. Additionally, given the torrid exchange that occurred between Truss and Lavrov during their February 10, 2022 meeting, there may be a lingering fear that one leader might pick a fight with Putin for whatever reason, and all would need to contend with the ramifications of that.

At the same time they tried come to some point of understanding with Putin, Western leaders also have publicly mocked him during multilateral gatherings. During the June 2022 G7 Summit in Schloss-Elmau, Germany they did so publicly on June 26th with regard to shirtless photos taken of Putin while horseback riding. One might not expect Western leaders to speak idly concerning Putin when matters concerning him are now so grave. That intriguing juxtaposition of the ideas of arming Putin’s opponents and mocking him yet contacting him hoping to stoke some goodwill and desire for peace is surely not lost upon Putin and his advisers in the Kremlin. Equally intriguing to Putin was the insistence of Western leaders that they committed to resolving the Ukraine conflict with diplomacy, while also arming the Ukrainians to the extent national budgets and the largess of their citizens–their electorates–will allow or tolerate

Putin might believe many of the national leaders with whom he has been dealing so far, will unlikely keep their jobs given what is likely perceived to be the constantly shifting direction of political winds and the fickle nature of the electorate of Western countries. Remaining the flavor de jure amongst fellow parliamentarians and the electorate is becoming more and more difficult for Western leaders to do. Putin may believe that as time marches on, those remaining in office will surely have greater, more pressing domestic issues to be seen working hard on. Conditions on the ground and terms for a diplomatic solution in which Moscow would have confidence at the negotiating table will be determined by Russia alone. Presumably for now, that is how Moscow most likely views the situation. Through Putin’s lens, the actions of Western leaders, in coming to him, might be best described, in the form of a metaphor, in the chorus of Charles Aznavour’s 1962 pop music hit, Les Comédiens”,: Viens voir les comédiens / Voir les musiciens / Voir les magiciens / Qui arrivent. (Come and see the actors, / See the musicians, / See the magicians, / Who are arriving.)

Nam neque quies gentium sine armis, neque arma sine stipendiis, neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt (For the quiet of nations cannot be maintained without arms, nor can arms be maintained without pay, nor pay without taxation.) Whether, the Europeans might be willing to stay the course on Ukraine, Putin might say it remains to be seen. As things begin to settle from the original smash of the war’s opening, the state of the global economy will become clearer, and the Europeans, among many other political factors, may not have the desire to remain so giving if they fail to see any progress by the Ukrainian allies on the ground as they had initially. Supporting Ukraine is one thing. Subordinating ones own country’s superior interests for those of Ukraine is another. On this point, perhaps Putin’s thoughts might be best metaphorically addressed by the final verse to the aforementioned Les Comédiens” sung by Aznavour.  He sings: Les comédiens ont démonté leurs tréteaux / Ils ont ôté leur estrade / Et plié les calicots / Ils laisseront au fond du cœur de chacun / Un peu de la sérénade / Et du bonheur d’Arlequin / Demain matin quand le soleil va se lever / Ils seront loin, et nous croirons avoir rêvé / Mais pour l’instant ils traversent dans la nuit / D’autres villages endormis, les comédiens. (The actors disassembled their boards. / They removed their rostrum / And folded the calicos. / They have left in the bottom of the hearts / A little bit of serenade / And harlequin happiness. / Tomorrow morning, when the sun rises / They will be far away, and we will think it was all a dream. / But for now, the actors are travelling through the night / Across other sleepy villages.)

As for the US specifically, Putin conceivably began the Ukraine enterprise believing he had a good understanding of the way many senior Biden administration foreign and national security policy officials, many of whom had held senior posts in the administration of US President Barack Obama, would respond to a move against Ukraine. Putin had strenuously wrestled with them via diplomacy before and doubtlessly had thought about them considerably since. He possibly intuited that they hold a sense that Crimea was lost on their watch. The nature of his interactions was discussed in greater detail in greatcharlie’s February 4, 2022 post entitled, “Recherché Pieces of the Putin Puzzle That May Serve To Better Enable Engagement with Him as Either an Adversary or a Partner Regarding Ukraine”.

However, what Putin is hearing now from Washington, though far from unnerving him, has unlikely provided him with any comfort. In the same aforementioned May 31, 2022 New York Times commentary, Biden explained that the US does not seek a war between NATO and Russia, will not try to bring about his ouster in Moscow. will not be directly engaged in this conflict, either by sending US troops to fight in Ukraine or by attacking Russian forces, so long as the US or its allies are not attacked, He added: “We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.” He also stated: “The United States will continue to work to strengthen Ukraine and support its efforts to achieve a negotiated end to the conflict.” Having rallied to Ukraine’s side with unprecedented military, humanitarian and financial support, Biden explained: “We want to see a democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine with the means to deter and defend itself against further aggression. Biden further explained: “Every negotiation reflects the facts on the ground. We have moved quickly to send Ukraine a significant amount of weaponry and ammunition so it can fight on the battlefield and be in the strongest possible position at the negotiating table.”

As it would be as true for Russian forces, it would be true for Ukrainian forces that well-planned offensive action by them will determine whether a favorable position for Ukraine can be established. The military principle of offense prescribes that maintaining the initiative is the most effective and decisive way to dominate the battlefield. On the offensive, there must be an emphasis on the commander’s skilled combination of the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and intelligent leadership in a sound operational plan. The initiative must be retained. Moving forward, firepower, the allies’ greatest strength, must be used to its maximum advantage. Firepower can serve maneuver by creating openings in enemy defenses, but also destroy an enemy’s vital cohesion, his ability to fight, and effectively act. Indeed, one of the most important targets is the enemy’s mind. The allies should engage in actions that will sway moves by Russian forces to enhance the opportunities to destroy them.

To that extent, Biden stated: “That’s why I’ve decided that we will provide the Ukrainians with more advanced rocket systems and munitions that will enable them to more precisely strike key targets on the battlefield in Ukraine. Further explaining plans for assisting Ukraine militarily, Biden said: “We will continue cooperating with our allies and partners on Russian sanctions, the toughest ever imposed on a major economy. We will continue providing Ukraine with advanced weaponry, including Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger antiaircraft missiles, powerful artillery and precision rocket systems, radars, unmanned aerial vehicles, Mi-17 helicopters and ammunition. 

Deep strike assets could be provided to Ukraine in order to allow its ground forces to rapidly put direct and indirect fires on Russian armor and mechanized forces inside Russia at their lines of departure, assembly areas, and follow-on units in marshaling yards, and even transport hubs as soon as Russian forces cross the border. They could target equipment and facilities. However, Putin’s commanders have will some say on their impact on the battlefield, especially if Russian forces could begin to move faster to capture territory and bring into Ukraine  systems to defeat any new weapons the US might provide. At Talavera during the Peninsular War (1809) of the Napoleonic Wars, Chestnut Troop Royal Horse Artillery attached to Brigadier General Robert Craufurd’s Light Brigade, which also included the elements of the 43rd Light Infantry, the 52nd Light Infantry and the 95th Rifles. The brigade remarkably traveled 40 miles in 26 hours, crossing mountain and river, to join the camp of then Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of Wellington). Despite their outstanding feat of discipline and endurance, the guns of Chestnut Troop were unable to reach Talavera for the battle. However, even though they had just arrived, the entire Light Brigade had to march for another fifteen hours to secure the Almaraz Bridge, before French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s forces could take it, thereby keeping open communications with Lisbon. US assistance in the form of firepower will certainly improve Ukrainian forces still on the defensive, help them hold on to territory tenaciously, but there is no guarantee such assistance will arrive in time in sufficient quantities to be decisive in ejecting Russian forces from Ukraine.

With regard to Biden’s statements on military assistance overall, the indications and implications of that to Putin would doubtlessly be that the US seeks to establish Ukraine and as well-armed military power on Russia’s borders. For Putin that will never be acceptable. He will work with an untrimmed fervor to prevent that even if it means the unthinkable, the use of nuclear weapons. That is a hard saying.

Putin (right) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (left) in Paris on December 9, 2019. Putin and Zelensky had contact on only one occasion in Paris during a multilateral meeting on December 9, 2019 with French President Emmanuel Macron and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The four leaders discussed what was at that time a six year fight in the Donbas between the Ukrainian government and ethnic-Russian separatists in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts directly supported by Russia. One might wonder if there was anything so singular about their encounter then that may have led Putin to believe Ukraine could be his for the taking militarily.

What Putin Might Have To Say on the “Zelensky Factor”

As the story goes, Samuel Bernstein, the father of Leonard Bernstein who was among the most important conductors of his time. He was also the first conductor from the US to receive international acclaim. Samuel Bernstein actively discouraged his son from pursuing music. He wanted his son to inherit the hair and beauty supply business he had created. However, Leonard Bernstein became a professional musician. A few months following his famous Carnegie Hall last-minute debut on November 14, 1943, which made him famous overnight, a journalist asked Samuel Bernstein if it was true that he had refused to pay for his son’s piano lessons. Sam famously replied: “Well, how was I supposed to know he’d turn out to be Leonard Bernstein?” No one knew Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would turn out to be Volodymyr Zelensky when the comedian and actor took office in May 2019. One might suggest that as an experienced stage artist, performing under pressure in center stage, reaching his audience, capturing their attention, is his metier. Nonetheless, he is burning more refulgently than any could have expected, and to a degree,, displaying the qualities often ascribed to great leaders. Aux innocents les mains pleines.

Indeed, likely due to the conviviality he displayed prior to the Russian invasion, Western officials were apparently caught surprised by the fact that Zelensky would be such a lion of a man, stalwart of the Ukrainian cause, and a force to be reckoned with during the actual invasion. To say the least, Western government officials and news media commentators alike would viewed Zelensky as having galvanized the Ukrainian people to resist Russia’s effort to swallow up their country. Zelensky also impressed with his entreaties to the world to come to the aid of his fellow countrymen in the best ways that they could. One might safely assume that his efforts influenced how countries with the wherewithal to respond to the Ukraine in its time of need, worked with him, and rapidly developed and implemented plans to provide considerable support for his country. Indeed, such positive perceptions of Zelensky, his impact, that brought aid groups, humanitarian volunteers, foreign fighters, helpful weapons, and financial support to Ukraine. Although Zelensky, spelled a variety of ways in the international newsmedia, is his name, it is one that to people around the world now know singularly refers to the resilient leader of Ukraine. To that extent, it has become a mononym similar to but not as familiar as Beyoncé or Adele

What Putin thinks of Zelensky is important just for the fact that it surely has some part in the development of his aims and objectives. Surely,at least in part that opinion shaped his concept and intent for the Ukraine campaign. Certainly understanding how Putin feels about Zelensky would determine how a negotiated peace would reached. Rather than have the two presidents talk one-on-one, as with their previous meeting in 2019, a multiparty approach, with presidents, prime ministers, and chancellors, could be utilized. Stepping out on shaky ground, greatcharlie hypothesizes on how Putin may view Zelensky and what has been dubbed the Zelensky factor. The thoughts of Putin suggested here are constructed in the abstract. There is no acid test for what is theorized. One can only wait to hear what Putin says and see how Putin acts. At the same time, each suggestion should prove to be more than something akin to the top five ideas of a brainstorming session. Each has the quality of being most likely. 

None of what is presented should be taken too much to heart by the Ukrainian government and its supporters. Lest we forget an apposite quote, used by greatcharlie previously, from F. Scott Fitzgerald’s essay, “The Crack-Up”, published in the ”February 1936 edition of Esquire magazine: “Before I go on with this short history let me make a general observation—the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise. This philosophy fitted on to my early adult life, when I saw the improbable, the implausible, often the “impossible” come true.”

Putin and Zelensky are oil and water as leaders of adversarial countries at war, but also oil and water intrinsically as people. Given what is understood about Putin’s thinking, his assessment of this novice adversary would hardly charitable. The world heard a bit of that view in Putin’s February 24, 2022 address on the special military operation when he stated the following: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers. Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people. I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders.” 

It  could not be said that Putin has a penchant for the abstruse. There were many lurid suggestions about Zelensky, with emphasis on his life-style, circulating long before the invasion that likely undecertainlyrlied Putin’s somewhat Delphic remarks with regard to how “the junta” was “humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin may be many things but he is not an anti-Semite. However, at the risk of casting aspersions upon Putin with regard his possible attempt to exploit intolerance toward the LGBTQ+ community in Ukraine, it may be fitting to note that upon taking office,  Zelenskiy promoted a tolerant culture, saying he stands for all people’s equality and freedom. A month after taking office, LGBTQ÷ Community in Ukraine celebrated “Pride Month” on Sunday, June 23, 2022 with a march in Kyiv. That celebration was unlikely widely approved of in Ukraine. According to a survey published six month beforehand by the independent think-tank Democratic Initiatives in which 1,998 people were interviewed, almost 47 percent of Ukrainians think that rights of sexual minorities should be limited while 37.5 percent are against restrictions, and 15.6 percent do not have an opinion. Perhaps Putin had information, maybe simply FSB 5th department pokery-jiggery, that attitudes had not softened or Ukrainians actually had become more intolerant over the last three years.

Interestingly, it was reported first in the Western newsmedia and later in more detail in Russia that much of what Putin was told about Zelensky and the government in Kyiv was the product of fabrications and falsehoods from some the Russian intelligence services, Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, and Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. When asked to provide assessments on the situation there, it would appear some in those services sought to simply placate Putin, responding to his sentiments on Ukraine. In the reports of the FSB foreign intelligence department, the organization’s 5th department, there were allegedly many unproven torrid statements on the nature of Ukrainian society made concerning the destructive impact of the West on the culture, morality, spiritually, self-image of the people, ultranationalists, and the leadership in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian people’s willingness to stand fast against an invasion. Conceivably, the information provided in those reports on Zelensky was so satisfying to Putin that it managed to stick with him. 

Putin and Zelensky had contact on only one occasion on December 9, 2019 in Paris during a multilateral meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The four leaders discussed what was at that time a six year fight in the Donbas between the Ukrainian government and ethnic-Russian separatists in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts directly supported by Russia. One might wonder if there was anything so singular about their encounter then that may have led Putin to believe Ukraine could his for the taking militarily.

Zelensky (on screen) addresses the UN Security Council by video on April 5, 2022. Zelensky has become a bona fide superstar in the West, and as such, the main hope of his Western managers would likely be that his words grip audiences of the powerful and star-studded personalities in their respective societies. After gaining their support for the actions of their respective governments to assist Ukraine, those government would have an easier time convincing ordinary citizens their actions on the matter were all very necessary regardless of expense. Zelensky has moved from one high place to another, the US Congress, the United Kingdom Parliament, the French Parliament, the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the Bundestag along with other European national legislatures. He addressed the NATO Summit, the G7 Summit, the UN Security Council and even venues such as the 75th Cannes Film Festival.

Putin Likely Looked Upon Zelensky’s Recent Effort To Determine What Aid Ukraine Would Recieve with Some Fascination

From Putin’s lens, Zelensky has been allowed the chance by Western powers to be seated, at least temporarily, at their high tables to gain an even firmer handle on Zelensky’s fealty. Putin might say that Zelensky succumbed quickly to trappings of it all much as he would have expected of him. Putin knows the drill all too well as once the effort was made by the West to draw him into such a cabaret. As aforementioned, he was once the dernier cri and darling of Western powers. He at one time was entertained in similar ways as Zelensky by the West. That effort was ultimately unsuccessful.

Zelensky has become a bona fide superstar in the West, and as such, the main hope of his Western managers would likely be that his words grip audiences of the powerful and star-studded personalities in their respective societies. After gaining their support for the actions of their respective governments to assist Ukraine, those government would have an easier time convincing ordinary citizens their actions on the matter were all very necessary regardless of expense. Zelensky has moved from one high place to another, the US Congress, the United Kingdom Parliament, the French Parliament, the Italian Chamber of Deputies, the Bundestag along with other European national legislatures. He addressed the NATO Summit, the G7 Summit, the UN Security Council and even venues such as the 75th Cannes Film Festival. 

Doubtlessly from Putin’s lens, Zelensky behaved as if he had become a new member of the club of Western leaders, and was enjoying every minute of it. Of course, that is exactly how Western capitals want Zelensky to feel. Intriguingly from the start, Ukrainian political leaders oddly expressed an impression that something akin to what young people call a “ride or die” relationship exists between the West and their country. Yet, Putin would likely insist they have erred as the inexperienced would. He would surely suggest that enthusiasm over Zelensky’s popular appeal, interest in Ukraine’s fate, should not be mistaken for some newly established brotherhood between Ukraine and the West, especially now that Russia has made its interests and intentions absolutely clear. If the Russian forces can shape things in their favor, Putin likely believes that will take the shine off Zelensky and Kyiv significantly. Western support of Ukraine continue in considerable measure, but Zelensky, himself, might become quite passé; so Putin would surely predict and hope.

Putin might posit, cynically, that after Zelensky spoke to all of those grand audiences, more support was gained for the Ukrainian cause than might have been achieved without it all. Putin would insist that the West was the true engine behind everything the West had accomplished. He would perhaps say that Zelensky’s heightened image was an aspect of a Western directed, US led, political warfare campaign regarding Ukraine. A Russian intelligence doyen, Putin knows the routine. He doubtlessly could explain forensically exactly how that image by reviewing piles of newsworthy fabrications. some have been exclusives. Moscow has produced its fair share during the war. All in all, Putin would need to accept that if such a political warfare campaign, as he might allege, is being waged by the West, it has been very successful.

Putin could not have missed the fact that Zelensky, more than being just pleased, appeared a bit too confident and too comfortable interacting with Western capitals. There was something to that. When Western leaders deigned to ask him what Ukraine needed–they surely had their own assessments prepared by their respective military, intelligence, diplomatic, and international aid bureaucracies, Zelensky perhaps misconstrued respect and approbation for submissiveness. Recognizably not just to Putin but presumably to all involved at a certain point, Zelensky began behave somewhat spoiled. Most apparently, Zelensky moved a few octaves off the mark and began very publicly offering his “informed” suggestions on what the Western powers should be doing for him then making demands for a line of action to Washington. As part of an effort by officials in Kyiv to be as creative as possible when the war was in its initial stage, two novel ideas were birthed of establishing a no fly zone and obtaining Soviet era MiG-29 fighters from Poland for use by pilots trained to fly them. It is a relatively forgotten issue, but nonetheless very pertinent. The jets would not be excess articles, therefore, to restock the Polish arsenal, the US would provide F-16 fighters. Poland has suggested the re-training of Ukrainian pilots and absorption in their forces would be arranged in Germany. Zelensky’s behavior brings to mind the “Le Misanthrope ou l’Atrabilaire Amoureux” (“The Cantankerous Lover”) (1666), known popularly as The Misanthrope, one of his best-known dramas of 17th century French actor and master of comedy in Western literature, Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, known as Molière. In Act 1 Scene 1, Alceste a disgruntled older aristocrat speaking to his friend Philinte on authenticity, courtesies, and the good of adhering social norms, states: “Non, vous dis-je, on devrait châtier, sans pitié, / Ce commerce honteux de semblants d’amitié. / Je veux que l’on soit homme, et qu’en toute rencontre / Le fond de notre cœur dans nos discours se montre, / Que ce soit lui qui parle, et que nos sentiments / Ne se masquent jamais sous de vains compliments.” (No, I tell you. We ought mercilessly to punish that shameful interchange of hollow facilities. I like a man to be a man, and on all occasions to show depth.of his heart in his words. Let him speak openly and not hide his feelings beneath vain compliments.)

There are certain expectations in interactions, exchanges between countries. Convention requires a certain etiquette. courtesy, expression of respect when asserting ones opinions and beliefs and concerns and priorities. Whatever is discussed must be communicated with the aim of preserving and if possible enhancing the relationship. Zelensky has had learn about such by crash course. He did not have any experience equivalent to working alongside Western capitals at such a level, could hardly had little idea of what was appropriate or what things looked like from their lens or their intentions. Admittedly in the role of apologist in this case, greatcharlie suggests the former comedian and actor, being a novice in politics and on the world stage, had not been up in such rarified air long enough to understand a few important things. His advisers were unlikely much help in that regard. Zelensky could only respond as he knew how. He likely saw nothing but green lights everywhere. 

A tactless approach of a national leader, even of a novice, warrants reproach and rebuff. For Zelensky to believe that he was in any position to determine how other national governments should spend taxpayer dollars, pounds, and euros on Ukraine was daylight madness. Washington doubtlessly recognized that Zelensky has been given attention and has been both supported and admired. However, he should not have felt, as a result of thm respect and courtesies shown to him, entitled to dictate anything to Western governments. Surely, one might say the exigent circumstances that had beset his country made him desperate, even aggressive in his effort to garner as much assistance as possible from those he believed could help. Being 44-years-old at the time, Zelensky was still relatively young. Perhaps he had something to prove to himself or to the Ukrainian people. Interestingly enough, in Molière’s Misanthrope, in the same aforementioned act and scene, Philippe responded to Alceste’s remark by stating: “Il est bien des endroits où la pleine franchise / Deviendrait ridicule et serait peu permise; / Et parfois, n’en déplaise à votre austère honneur, / Il est bon de cacher ce qu’on a dans le cœur. / Serait-il à propos, et de la bienséance / De dire à mille gens tout ce que d’eux on pense? / Ét quand on a quelqu’un qu’on hait on qui déplait, / Lui doit-on déclarer la chose comme elle est?” (There are many circumstances in which plain speaking would become ridiculous, and could hardly be tolerated. And, with all due deference to your austere sense of honour, it is well sometimes to conceal our feelings. Would it be right or becoming to tell thousands of people what we think of them? And when there is somebody whom we hate or who displeased us, must we tell him openly that this is so?)

A couple of Polish Air Force Russian made MiG 29 fighter jets fly above and below two Polish Air Force US made F-16 fighter jets during the Air Show in Radom, Poland, on August 27, 2011 (above). As part of an effort by officials in Kyiv to be as creative as possible when the war was in its initial stage, two novel ideas were birthed of establishing a no fly zone and obtaining Soviet era MiG-29 fighters from Poland for use by pilots trained to fly them. It is a relatively forgotten issue, but nonetheless very pertinent. The jets would not be excess articles so to restock the Polish inventory, the US would provide F-16 fighters. Poland has suggested the re- training of Ukrainian pilots and absorption in their forces would be arranged in Germany. Surely, one might say the exigent circumstances that had beset his country made him desperate, even aggressive in his effort to garner as much assistance as possible from those he believed could help. Zelensky’s comments were not viewed as helpful in Washington.

Perhaps Putin considered Zelensky’s choice to approach the rich and powerful West in such a demanding way was impelled by something bubbling up from his subconscious. He likely Zelensky being what he always has been, a humorist, who by reflex, was making satire of the West and its wherewithal. Putin has a keen eye and taste for dry humor and crni humor. Zelensky may very well have given Putin cause to chuckle in the midst of all the bad that was happening on the ground in Ukraine for Russian forces. Putin probably imagined it all would eventually come to a head sooner than later.

Moreover, Putin perhaps viewed Zelensky’s behavior as being useful, distracting Western capitals, creating the primary narrative concerning Western support for Ukraine while he worked on getting Russian forces away from the horrid meat grinders in Kyiv and Kharkiv in redirected his forces in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Putin would likely go as far as to call Zelensky a convenient nuisance. As far as Putin was likely concerned, any attention and time placed on Zelensky’s behavior was time not spent increasing the strains they were trying to place on Russia. Zelensky, just as Putin, was willing to exploit any advantage he could find at that point. One aspect which is quite noticeable is that Zelensky seems to comfortably expect something for nothing as if it were the norm in this world. (Perchance Zelensky feels his country self-defense against Russia is the something in return for Western munificence.)

Washington surely was not amused at all by Zelensky’s no fly zone idea or his jet swap plan. Clearly, taking Zelensky’s proposed ideas would mean would only result in exchanging one bad situation for a worse one. Options such as Zelensky’s proposed no-fly zone and Polish MiG-29 transfer, supported by Warsaw, looked real, but they were nothing more than illusions. All illusions disintegrate when confronted by the light of reality. The possibility that US Air Force fighter jets might clash with Russia Federation fighters or bombers and invariably shoot down several of them put the whole matter out of court. Zelensky had to know the Biden administration has been emphatic about avoiding any violent exchanges between the US and Russia that could ignite a full-blown shooting war. It was unclear how the jets would enhance the defensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainians already had MiG-29 fighters and others in its possession that were not being effectively utilized. It was unclear what would be the survivability of the MiG-29 over Russian controlled airspace and whether Ukrainian pilots would be able to contend with the Russians. Further any financial resources needed to bring such a plan into reality had already been earmarked for weapon systems that US military experts had determined would better suit Ukraine’s needs. Zelensky is receiving intelligence from the US and other Western powers. That intelligence has had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. It has lent confidence to decisionmaking in Kyiv. Still, Zelensky would never have all the facts, the big picture, to the extent western capitals do.

As experience, acumen, and the interests of the US dictated, Washington apparently moved fast to reign him in a bit via conversations with their respective countries senior officials and certain legislators. On April 24, 2022, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Zelensky in Kyiv. The trip by Blinken and Austin and Blinken was the highest-level US visit to the Ukrainian capital since Russia invaded. In the meeting, Zelensky may have complained about feeling supervised as a president of a sovereign country. In response to such a likely perception and complaint, Austin and Blinken would surely make the greater point that the plans of the US must not be interfered with. Surely, they spoke without savaging him. An indication that Austin and Blinken likely set Zelensky straight was the fact that Zelensky did not engage in similar behavior concerning US assistance afterward. One can only imagine what might have come next from Zelensky if such a likely agreeable exchange might not have taken place.

The mood of Zelensky and his advisers during the visit by Austin and Blinken was doubtlessly uplifted when they were informed that the US would provide more than $300 million in foreign military financing and had approved a $165 million sale of ammunition. Despite the stresses that may have placed on Ukraine’s relationships in the West, he was fortunate none his benefactors handed him his hat, or turned to very blatantly using military assistance and training as a locus of control. Likely given their heavy focus on Putin they did not give up on the partnership, if they ever would have–which was presumably a card Zelensky felt he held. The true focus of the West was Putin and gaining a firm handle on him and his behavior. Zelensky was, and still is, a means to that end.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, left, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, right, meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (center), April 24, 2022, in Kyiv. The juxtaposition between Zelensky’s “Sonny Jim” visage and the smiling faces of Austin and Blinken is stark and seemingly speaks volumes about the nature of the interaction and his attitude toward meeting his very important guests. Washington surely was not amused at all by Zelensky’s no fly zone idea or his jet swap plan. Clearly, taking Zelensky’s proposed ideas would only result in exchanging one bad situation for a worse one. The possibility that US Air Force fighter jets might clash with Russia Federation fighters or bombers and invariably shoot down several of them put the whole matter out of court. Zelensky had to know the Biden administration has been emphatic about avoiding any violent exchanges between the US and Russia that could ignite a full-blown shooting war. It was unclear how the jets would enhance the defensive or offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Putin’s Likely View of Zelensky’s “Popular Appeal” in Ukraine

While Western analysts, officials, and news media commentators express the view that Zelensky has rallied his people despite what Ukainians themselves at best might say, it has worked out okay for Ukraine, Putin might argue that he has not actually gained their admiration. Putin’s statement about Zelensky’s government in his February 24, 2022 address on the special military operation was aforementioned. Still, Putin would need to admit that many Ukrainians appreciate the tireless efforts of Zelensky in the face of what is an existential crisis for their country. He can still distinguish between fact and the fanciful. Yet, with all intention to slight the Ukrainian President, Putin would likely state, and imaginably with some asperity, that the people of Ukraine more so view themselves as masters of their own will, independent and girded by their own sense of patriotism, of course inculcated from preceding decades as a society nurtured under the Soviet system. That sense of patriotism was transferred when they were presented, in Putin’s view errantly, with idea that they were living sovereign country, that  Ukraine was a real country. Further, the essence of their will and the spirit behind their sense to remain and defend what they were told was their country does not reside in one man. Such ideas about Ukraine being a country were repeatedly outlined by Putin well-before the February 24, 2022 address. C’est une idée bizarre, un peu folle.

Putin would possibly note somewhat accurately on this occasion tha in contemporary times, it is more difficult through news media reporting to distinguish popular leadership from celebrity and novel amusement. While Zelensky continues to say the right things–there creative suggestions–and is trying to do the right things for the Ukrainian people, the Russian Federation likely feels only time will tell whether he will take a place among the pantheon of great national leaders. Putin is aware that many men and women similar to Zelensky have fallen short and have already been forgotten.

Breaking Zelensky Down

From what is known publicly, it would not be accurate or appropriate to suggest Zelensky in any way at all has come round the twist. Nevertheless, Putin may be wondering what will be the breaking point for Zelensky. He has likely calculated from observing and intelligence reports ordered prepared by the SVR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how much can the former actor stand and how long can he do his job before succumbing to chronic stress, the pressures and loneliness of leadership, how long he can he live with all that has transpired and the horrors he has witnessed, and how is he coping with the reality that his name is inextricably attached to every order that has resulted in lives being lost in the tens of thousands on both sides. When Zelensky sneezes, the SVR likely counts the decibels. A number of newsmedia outlets have pondered this issue, too, making comparisons between Zelensky and US President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War. 

Though Putin is aware that the prosecution of the war is Zelensky’s priority, there remain countless political, economic, social, and other concerns on the domestic front that require his attention. Many of those concerns may pre-date the war and even transcend it but nevertheless are being impacted by it. Western advice and assistance has doubtlessly helped but it all has a cumulative effect on Zelensky who is harnessed in the seat of the presidency. Putin would certainly know about the many challenging aspects of national leadership as such has been his patch for the most part of two decades. Putin also knows tired presidents can make big mistakes. He might imagine one of Zelensky’s acolytes from the more aggressive security bureaucracies could find advantage in that at some point. An over-wound watch requires repair and Putin may suspect that the West has not been tending to Zelensky with diligence as the focus is on other priorities. Putin perhaps would like to know what he could do to bring him over the line. Maybe he has already been working hard on that front furtively

Despite all of the deficiencies he may very likely detect in Zelensky that make him something in his eyes far less than a force to be reckoned with, Putin would likely admit that it would be better if someone with less of a stage presence ascended to the top in Kyiv. Surely, if Zelensky left the helm in Kyiv, Putin would believe a big hitch would be put in the plans of the West. It was widely reported at one point that Putin sought to have him called to higher service. Perhaps he is still trying, but if so, he must have his people moving at deliberate speed. Ukrainian security services have surely sussing out the tiniest of rumors of a threat. Woe betide those in Ukraine who make a habit of telling the wrong sort of jokes or just uttering negative things about Zelensky. On this matter, there may be some pertinence in Falstaff’s utterance near death in Act 3, scene 3 of William Shakespeare’s play The First Part of Henry the Fourth: “Company, villanous company, hath been the spoil of me.” All of that being said, Putin’s threat to Zelensky’s well-being is a point upon which greatcharlie has no desire to enlarge. Its fervent hope is that this suggestion above all others is unlikely and no plan of the kind outlined is in play. Overall, if what is suggested here about Putin’s larger view of Zelensky proves to be true, one-on-one peace talks between the two leaders would be out of the question. At a minimum, It might be best to include a third party, a leader representing countries able to lend the type of support that could gird an agreement.

Zelensky’s expression (above) is not one of an actor using his talent harnessed by technique. It is the expression of a man managing torment, anguish, fatigue and chronic stress, pushing himself to the utter limit. Though Putin is aware that the prosecution of the war is Zelensky’s priority, there remain countless political, economic, social, and other concerns on the domestic front that require his attention. Many of those concerns may pre-date the war and even transcend it but nevertheless are being impacted by it. Western advice and assistance has doubtlessly helped but it all has a cumulative effect on Zelensky who is harnessed in the seat of the ppresidency. Putin would certainly know about the many challenging aspects of national leadership as such has been his patch for the most part of two decades. An over-wound watch requires repair and Putin may suspect that the West has not been tending to Zelensky with diligence as the focus is on other priorities. Putin perhaps would like to know what he could do to bring him over the line. Maybe he has already been working hard on that front furtively.

The Way Forward

Postea noli rogare quod inpetrare nolueris. (Don’t ask for what you’ll wish you hadn’t got.) Hopefully, political leaders and officials in not one Western capital believe that, if things go their way and fortune goes against Russian forces on the battlefield, Putin will reach out to the West, humble and conciliatory, and seek terms for a full, unconditional withdrawal from Ukraine. Indeed, as a result of defeat, there would not be some gross retardation of Putin’s aggressive instinct. As any form of acquiescence by Putin to Western demands would be very, very unlikely, it becomes more difficult to understand what the genuine objective of the West is in Ukraine. It is hard to imagine what Putin and his advisers–inarguably better aware of Putin’s authentic nature and intentions than anyone outside Russia–make of it all. Suffice it to say, even in the best case scenario for the West in which Ukrainian forces reclaim the overwhelming majority of territory taken by Russian forces, problems of great magnitude will very likely be encountered. This is not a situation that lends itself to the attitude of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”), which was the attitude of the the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army in 1870 which failed to discern and act upon signals that the Prussian Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. 

In Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor (Open Court Publishing, 2002), there is passage by Bertrand Russell that explains: “And all this madness, all this rage, all this flaming death of our civilization and our hopes, has been brought about because a set of official gentlemen, living luxurious lives, mostly stupid, and all without imagination or heart, have chosen that it should occur rather than that any one of them should suffer some infinitesimal rebuff to his country`s pride.” Rebuffing the reality that their time on Earth is inconstant, they seek in conceit to shape it with a view to not just leaving their mark but to transforming the world so its will conform with their idea of what is best. As is the pattern, they would declare that they are using national values and interests as a yardstick. The degree and manner in which those respective national values and interests are applied is dependent on the nature of the officials involved in the drama. In a few years or less, their “high-minded” notions, as they generally appear in contemporary timeshare, are now and then rebuked by the reality of the impermanence of actions taken by them. Their deeds often fail the test of time. They may even hold success for a little moment, but fail ultimately to really change the course of anything as successfully as fate does. After they move on from their high offices, the ascent to which they skillfully navigated over a number of years, more often than not their names are forgotten or rarely spoken anywhere except in seminars and colloquiums at universities and respective family gatherings of their antecedents. It should be enough to do the right thing and appreciate the collateral effects of that. 

Still in all, these aforementioned decisionmakers are indeed only human, and must not be judged by idealistic or super-human standards. Admittedly, harshly judging the competencies of those in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies is the old hobbyhorse of those watching from the outside. Whether this essay for some inside will cause a journey from a lack of clarity or curiosity to knowledge remains to be seen. Harkening back one last time to Molière’s Misanthrope, he writes pertinent to this matter in Act V, scene i: “Si de probité tout était revêtu, / Si tous les cœurs était francs, justes et dociles, / La plupart des vertus nous seraient inutiles, / Puisqu’on en met l’usage à pouvoir sans ennui / Supporter dans nos droits l’injustice d’autrui.” (If everyone were clothed with integrity, / If every heart were just, frank, kindly, / The other virtues would be well-nigh useless, / Since their chief purpose is to make us bear with patience / The injustice of our fellows.) Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

A T80BV tank of the Russian Naval Troops, featuring the distinctive “Z” marking and explosive armor (above), sits on the side of a road after being destroyed by Ukrainian forces in the Luhansk province in February 2022. Due to his confidence in the capabilities of his Russia’s armed forces and intelligence services, Putin unlikely believed Ukrainian forces would pose too much a problem. In a pinch, Putin perhaps believed there might be ingenious maneuvers and techniques that would see Russian forces through and thereby lead Russia to inevitable success. That would hardly be a reasonable schema, and indeed, perhaps the last thing one might consider. However, it may be the case that Putin was not thinking or acting reasonably before the invasion and perhaps he hoped to be covered by some miracle. Through this essay, greatcharlie has sought to briefly consider the thinking within, and actions directed from the top floors of the headquarters of the Russian Federation intelligence services and the general staff of the armed forces before the invasion and during to a degree. It highlights a few of the points at which leaders of those national security bureaucracies served Putin poorly.

While Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s February 24, 2022 televised address made just hours before the invasion of Ukraine was not a comprehensive expression of his ideas and theories to include subjects neo-Nazis and Ukrainian sovereignty called attention to here, although in declaring the right to move Russian forces into Ukraine, he plainly indicated that he did not recognize the sovereign rights of the country. He put before his audience a review of his sense of the threat to Russia from the West, more specifically the threat from the US. Looking back, one might argue that Putin cut a foolish figure, speaking so boldly about the actions and intentions of Russian forces and the notion that Ukrainian forces should lay down their arms. 

Putin surely had too much imagination to expect the Ukrainians not to respond to a Russian invasion the second time around. Certainly, Putin learned long ago that there are patterns one can discern that establish order in the human mind. Awareness of that should have factored into calculations on moving against Ukraine. Placidity should hardly have been expected of Kyiv by anyone thinking clearly in the Kremlin. Allowing Russia to walk into Ukraine the first time in 2014 doubtlessly had tormented leaders in Kyiv since, believing it was a gross error. For Kyiv to allow Russia to walk into Ukraine a second time would surely have been an historical act of gross negligence. Putin was always concerned with Western influence on Ukraine in essays, speeches, and interviews. Perhaps it could be said that Putin had too little imagination to recognize how much the West was involved in correctly preparing the Ukrainians for the possibility of a Russian invasion. In reality, the influence that the West had on Ukraine, something he was so concerned with, likely turned out be far greater than he ever imagined.

In setting unrealistic expectations, one sets oneself up for hurt. Never choose illusion over fact. Illusions disintegrate when confronted by reality, confronted by truth. A leader with unrealistic expectations regarding an enterprise can often be the cause of problems from the start. Presumably due to his confidence in the capabilities of Russia’s armed forces and intelligence services, Putin could not imagine Ukraine would pose too much a problem. In a pinch, Putin perhaps believed there might be ingenious maneuvers and techniques that would see Russian forces through and thus lead Russia to inevitable success. That is hardly a schema, and indeed, perhaps the last thing one might reasonably consider. However, it may be the case that Putin was not thinking or acting reasonably before the invasion. What proved to be truer than anything else was the aphorism that anything which can go wrong will go wrong. That is especially true when the lack of preparedness, readiness, and awareness are stark factors in an undertaking. To bend, to retreat back away from the matter of Ukraine is impossible.

Some questions do not have available answers, and one must learn to live with that. Through this essay, greatcharlie has sought to briefly consider the thinking within, and actions directed from, the top floors of the headquarters of the Russian Federation intelligence services and the general staff of the armed forces before the invasion and somewhat during. It highlights a few of the points at which leaders of those national security bureaucracies served Putin poorly. It hopefully provides readers with insights on what may be the tone within the meeting rooms of those bureaucracies and thinking somewhere deep inside top officials. Many of the latest public sources on prewar thinking in Moscow have been utilized for the discussion. However, much within the essay has been conceptualized in the abstract. In public statements, optimism, the best and most available elixir for defeatism, has been employed liberally. Yet, presumably, senior commanders of Russia’s armed forces and executives in the intelligence services concerned may be feeling a bit stuck and stagmating, clutching at straws, and listening to the wind. Given all that has transpired, perhaps those feelings are well-earned. Some current and former military commanders and military analysts in the West observing Russia’s situation must be able to appreciate the predicament of Russian officials given the experience their armies and national security bureaucracies recently in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Omnia præsumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to have been done duly and in the usual manner.)

Putin (above) in the Kremlin attending a meeting with his advisers. Putin, the final authority on all matters that concerned the invasion, the ultimate decisionmaker, believed assessments on conditions in Ukraine produced by the Russian intelligence services, Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, and Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB augured well with regard to taking military action. Perchance, he never thought that much of it was faulty, perhaps even rubbish.

Blindness Bordering on Madness

In The Civil War, Book III, 68, the Roman Emperor Gaius Julius Caesar writes: Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. (Fortune, which has a great deal of power in other matters but especially in war, can bring about great changes in a situation through very slight forces.) The undeniably disastrous initial results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appear to stem from challenges faced in the planning of the “special military operation.” As noted earlier, Putin, the final authority on all matters that concerned the invasion, the ultimate decisionmaker, believed assessments on conditions in Ukraine produced by the Russian intelligence services, Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, and Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB augured well with regard to taking military action. He never thought that much of it was faulty, perhaps even rubbish. As he should have been aware, in the intelligence industry, the only truth unfortunately is that which those at the top declare it to be.

As for his military forces, Putin surely felt they were well-trained and well-equipped to bring vistory. To be fair, even to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their true strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use. The truth was likely concealed from Putin.

For his own part, he indubitably sought to glean as much as he could about Western actions and intentions by interacting with foreign leaders and officials, and applying that to calculations on probable responses to an invasion of Ukraine. (Without any intention of finger pointing, greatcharlie can only imagine what may have been said in camera and hope nothing uttered off-handedly had no influence in the wrong direction.) Putin was able to not only learn more about but confirm his understanding of what cards the West was holding to use against Russia in case he moved ahead with the invasion. He likely believed at that time that his intelligence services had provided him with a picture of Ukraine that indicated he could proceed with confidence and some assurance. The variable of intelligence seems to have been the weakest link of the chain given ceratin revelations, some discussed here.

The indications and implications of it all for Putin were that he could get all that he wanted. Putin could deal a devastating blow to what he perceived to be the expansionist plans of the US and West.  As important perchance would be having the opportunity to act as a sort of avenging angel of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, a protector of the Russian Orthodox church–a holy warrior, a defender the Russian people and all that is Russian. It is possible that Putin genuinely believes he serves in that role. Putin was so comfortable with the whole matter to the extent he left it to the world to see who he is and what he is doing, and how others might feel or respond was either of no concern or of little real interest to him.

Assumedly, the compounded impact of the intelligence failures and military blunders has doubtlessly had a chilling effect on the thinking of Gospodin Vladimir Vladimirovich with respect to political stimmung at home beyond the Ukraine matter. That likely in turn has added to Western anxieties concerning his mental state.

Putin (left) observes Zapad Exercise alongside Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (right). As for Russia’s military and naval forces, Putin surely felt they were well-trained and well-equipped to bring vistory. To be fair to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces’ effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their true strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use.

The Intelligence Services

Qui ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit, nequiquam sapit. (A wise man whose wisdom does not serve him is wise in vain.) Perhaps Putin would been better of seeking assistance from an intuitive empath, who, allegedly with confidence bolstered by assistance from spirits, likely would have been better able to predict the response of the Ukrainians to a Russian invasion. Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Yet, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, and knowing that reporting from them should be examined with a fine-tooth comb, especially concerning a matter of utmost importance as Ukraine, he seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness. Whatever his inner voice may have saying, he closed his ear to it. 

Of course, there is the possibility that Putin, knowing what he knows, experienced as he is, wanted to be deceived because he so badly wanted to invade Ukraine and needed to show his decision could not be viewed as wreckless, but rather based in reason that would be generally accepted. Conceivably, Putin may have recognized that there would be no need for him to potentially light the fuse of a figurative political bomb by trying to explain why he took the risk of invading Ukraine knowing Russian forces might face considerable challenges where there were self-crafted patsys in the intelligence services that he could “learn” to be the cause for his “miscalculation.” A most trusted aviser could serve to uncover the malfeasance and identify the patsys involved and present the wrongdoer and the report of their crimes to Putin all tied with a neat bow. The many aspects that could potentially be part of such a line of analysis that cannot be broached in this brief essay. Indeed, greatcharlie is not absolutely certain it possesses the faculty to properly parse out, in the abstract, all of intricacies and psychological angles involved in the round. (Sometimes that sort of tricky approach suggested here works, sometimes it does not. Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson, 1st Duke of Bronte, KB, also known simply as Admiral Nelson, the renowned 18th century British flag officer in the Royal Navy is best known for his victory at the Battle of the Trafalgar in 1805. However, he became a national hero long before then due to his prowess as a naval tactician. In 1801, Nelson destroyed the Danish Navy at the Battle of Copenhagen. During the battle he was sent a signal to break off action by the Admiral Sir Hyde Parker. Nelson supposedly put his telescope to his blind eye and told to his Flag Lieutenant, “You know Foley I have only one eye. I have a right to be blind sometimes. I really do not see the signal.” It is unlikely Nelson had a plan for covering himself in case his bit of jiggery-pokery failed.)

When directed by Putin to place greater emphasis on Ukraine, it may very well have been the case that intelligence collected prior to the capture of Crimea in March 2014 was recycled and used as a yardstick to parse out falsehoods on Ukraine. It would not be the first time that a sophisticated intelligence service of an advanced industrialized power engaged in such behavior and subsequently led to a large-scale military action that might have be averted otherwise. That is a hard saying. Perchance many other top officials in the Russian intelligence services never imagined Putin would invade Ukraine full-scale. As is the case, such ignorance often dissolves into tragedy.

Je m’en fiche! When asked to provide assessments on the situation there, they apparently sought to simply placate Putin, responding to his sentiments on Ukraine. The benefit of taking such a risk would be to stay in his good graces. Thus, they substituted what they understood he believed to be true feeling Putin would brook anything else. It is possible that some took this step not out of delicacy toward him but rather due to contempt. To reach a position of such influence in Putin’s government, one would image such a flaw in character would have been twinkled out much earlier. Apparently, none of the intelligence services presented anything to contradict that information to the extent that it caused Putin any pause. Their assessments were illusions without substance, appearances only. The result was a catastrophe for all involved. The problem can by no means eased out of the way. There was no possibility to put the toothpaste back into the ttube. Those left at the top of their respective intelligence services know they serve at the pleasure of Putin and his whims. The best way for them to survive at this point is to look good, focus on the US, find moles, leaks, and seek help that might make a difference from allies as the Chinese. They know that it would be a mistake to show up at any National Security Council meeting in the Kremlin with nothing to say.

Alexander Bortnikov director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Although it is not parsed out here, there is the possibility that Putin, knowing what he knows, experienced as he is, wanted to be deceived because he so badly wanted to invade Ukraine and needed to show his decision could not be viewed as wreckless, but rather based in reason that would be generally accepted. Conceivably, Putin may have recognized that there would be no need for him to potentially light the fuse of a figurative political bomb by trying to explain why he took the risk of invading Ukraine knowing Russian forces might face considerable challenges where there were self-crafted patsys in the intelligence services that he could “learn” to be the cause for his “miscalculation.” A most trusted aviser could serve to uncover the malfeasance and identify the patsys involved and present the wrongdoer and the report of their crimes to Putin all tied with a neat bow.

Carelessness or Conspiracy?

Some intelligence services apparently did more in the direction of providing fabrications than others.. From what can be gathered from newsmedia reports about its findings, the FSB foreign intelligence service seemed to have laid it on thick. There were allegedly many unproven torrid statements on the nature of Ukrainian society made concerning the destructive impact of the West on the culture, morality, spiritually, self-image of the people, ultranationalists, and the leadership in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian people’s willingness to stand fast against an invasion. 

According to Western newsmedia reports, the head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda, was been placed under house arrest. Arrested with Beseda was his deputy and head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Western commentators initially alleged the accusations were made against the officers because there was a search on in Moscow to find scapegoats to blame  for the “poor progress” of the Ukraine invasion. However, as the FSB is under the control of one of Putin’s most faithful and most dangerous officials, Alexander Bortnikov, it is more likely that the FSB head, himself, had determined that there were problems with the intelligence officials’ actions. Indeed, firstly, Beseda and Bolyuhk had been charged with the embezzlement of funds allocated for subversive and undercover work in Ukraine, as well as false information. Embezzlement is an ill that can plague even the most esteemed intelligence service at all levels. Some sardonically call it “creating a second retirement fund.” It was reported secondly that Beseda and Boyuhk had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. The criminal actions by the two intelligence officers were acts of madness. Rather than allowing Bortnikov to handle the matter in his usual fashion, Putin initially chose to have the officials placed under house arrest and allow for a fuller investigation of the matter. He likely wanted to determine the depth of the disloyalty and infidelity of Beseda and Bolyuhk and discover whether were acting on behalf of another country’s foreign intelligence service.

It could have reasonably be expected that within the FSB, some investigation was likely launched to identify any possible intelligence leaks that occurred before the invasion began. Some proposal surely would be made for the broader exploitation of whatever they might have discovered. Such an investigation would very likely start with a discrete look at those who may have put a foot wrong in the intelligence services. Presumably, there was no penetration by the West of a kind that any standard counterintelligence investigation might have the slightest potential to uncover immediately or identify clearly. Nevertheless, if some potential activity might have been discovered under such a hypothetical probe suggested here, it could potentially have been of enough significance to convince Moscow that it had some influence the initial outcome of the invasion and influence follow-on efforts by Russian forces in the field against Ukraine. 

To go a step further, delving into the realm of conjecture, there is the possibility that plans for the Russian invasion were captured by Western intelligence. However, given the performance of Russian forces so far, there was clearly a strategy and resources mismatch. Results in the field have spoken volumes about what Russian forces can and cannot do. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. Of course, the successes and movements of Ukrainian forces will have greater influence on how Russia forces proceed.

In the end regarding the FSB scandal, Putin engaged in the process of elimination in the truest sense of the term. Nearly 150 FSB officers were reportedly dismissed from the service, including Beseda and Bolyuhk who were already under arrest. The head of the department responsible for Ukraine was sent to prison. Gravis ira regum [est] semper. (The wrath of kings is always severe.)

Sergey Beseda, head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th Service. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998 to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Beseda and his deputy Anatoly Bolyuhk had been charged with the embezzlement of funds allocated for subversive and undercover work in Ukraine, as well as false information. It was also reported that Beseda and Bolyukh had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost.

Looking Good Rather Than Being Good: Finding Work To Do

Leading up to the invasion, Washington supposedly plucked a spate of information from classified intelligence on the actions and intentions of Russian forces deployed near the border with Ukraine and inside Belarus and provided to newsmadia houses from reporting and offered in official government statements. By the time the invasion began, real-time reports of movements of Russian forces were being reported daily. The purpose of this step, among others, was to indicate to the world that an invasion was around the corner, Putin was acting aggressively, and the world needed to unite concerning sanctions and all other economic measures to make any action by Putin unprofitable. This schema of using real-time intelligence from exquisite technical collection capabilities of the US Intelligence services to forewarn of what was coming next was declared as a unique and skillful approach to information warfare by US newsmedia commentators friendly to the administration of US President Joe Biden. It ostensibly would serve to stymie the Kremlin’s ability to effectively calculate and establish plans, and stripped Putin of any chance of acting with surprise. The outcome of that effort is now quite clear for all to see.

Tanto est accusare quam defendere, quanto facere quam sanare vulnere, facilius. (It is just so much easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to inflict than to heal a wound.) Readers are asked to indulge greatcharlie as it moves further on this point. Surely, if that US effort had continued, as well as the relative peace, it is likely that the SVR and GRU, much as the FSB, among other things, would have tried to dress-up false pieces of information, chicken feed of a sort, moved it back and forth through channels of communication, through encrypted signals, to determine, off of a long list questions, what the US Intelligence Community and its Western partners are listening to, their preferred source, and what US cryptologists had broken into. Nonetheless, an investigation was doubtlessly launched.

More than that, the Russian intelligence services might look for and discover other secure channels were being monitored from the outside and the encrypted messages of their services were being read. If foreign penetration was not discovered authentically, it might even be fabricated. As alluded to earlier, other Russian intelligence services were apparently reporting nothing prewar that definitively contradicted what the FSB was reporting. Going further down the path of deception might appear counterintuitive. Surely, it is not a prescribed practice in any intelligence service. However, despite the risk, continuing to please Putin would possibly be seen as the best chance for survival. The hope of greatcharlie at this point is that its readers will remain willing to follow along, even stumble along, with its cautious discussion of this novel idea.

The discovery of some penetration, or a bit of fabrication about a penetration, would create the requirement to dig further. Imaginably, the alleged compromised channel or channels would not be shut down immediately. Chicken feed would likely be sent along the channel. Specific movements in the field might be ordered to confirm information was being pick-up on the outside or sent from within. To ensure they would grab attention, the movements ordered would be those of some importance to the overall Russian operation in Ukraine As things have gone, reports of Russian plans to move might appear in the Western newsmedia before they have even begun or have been completed. SVR and GRU counterintelligence services would likely also look at all communications made on particular channels and codes use, and among several Western actions, match them up with Western movements, statements, urgent communications between allies outside of normally scheduled ones, and if the capability actually exists, monitor collection requirements of Western intelligence officers in the field by exploiting counterespionage and counterintelligence successes. Any move by Ukrainian forces which SVR and GRU counterintelligence might discern was likely impacted by an awareness of Russian Federation plans and intentions would also be heavily reviewed. Russian intelligence services would not have been enabled to possibly take such steps if the West had not taken the tack of releasing publicly, freshly collected information and intelligence assessments that normally would have been marked classified. As suggested earlier, perhaps, something disturbing was found. 

On its face, at the full distance of the journeys of exploration by SVR, GRU, and FSB counterintelligence, for Putin it would be unpleasant and disappointing to find that US. Intelligence Community had successfully managed to penetrate the Russian intelligence services at such a high level. However, if SVR, GRU, and FSB counterintelligence hypothetically ran through all the intelligence dumps from the West on Russia’s plans for Ukraine and reviewed the aggregate of past communications sent and actions taken and some network or group of disassociated individuals providing information or making it accessible was uncovered, Putin, himself, would want to roll it up, hide and hair, as well as furtively exploit it for the maximum counterintelligence gain.

More than troubling technical defeat for Russian intelligence services, for Putin, the political implications of the possibility of a US operation to mislead Moscow about Ukraine would be considerable and perhaps work in Russia’s favor. Any US effort to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine was vulnerable to attack would  reveal the intention of the US to dangle the country as low hanging fruit for Russia to grab militarily. Kyiv might be reviled by the idea that the Ukrainian people were used as a goat tethered to a tree along the riverside as the lure for a blood-thirsty Russian tiger. To that extent, Kyiv might conclude that was calculated well-beforehand that if war came, the Ukrainian people would be intentionally used as fodder to wear Russian forces down. As it turned out, the Ukrainians fought admirably as the well-armed, well-trained proxies of the West. They have gnawed voraciously at Russian forces. Still, at the nub of the matter for Putin would be showing the Ukrainian that the war could have been avoided, he would insist that the war was sought by the US, and that there was no true intention by the West to pursue peace. Looking at all the devastation and destruction in the country, Kyiv would hardly be open to much that Putin might say. However, Putin might hope despite everything to a score political warfare victory and convince Kyiv not to stand so closely on the side of West. (Readers should note this partial analysis of the Ukraine war’s causation is not compatible with greatcharlie’s belief at all. The theory was certainly not offered with the intention by greatcharlie to speak against the national interest.)

 

People’s Republic of China Minister of State Security, Chen Wenqing (above). On a closely associated intelligence issue, there is the matter of Washington’s decision to share intelligence with Beijing on preparations by Russian forces for the attack on Ukraine and evidence supporting the likelihood of an attack which Washington shared with Beijing prior to the actual invasion. Washington was clearly groping for alternatives, given it was unable to see any good options. The Chinese would hardly have done anything to influence Russia’s position on the Ukraine as the US wished. The entire schema likely revealed to the Chinese the level of desperation in Washington to find answers to the Russian invasion threat. It may have been the case that Washington’s very apparent pre-invasion fears that Russian forces would rapidly overpower Ukraine stoked Putin’s unwarranted confidence.

Dealing With Beijing

On a closely associated intelligence issue, there is the matter of Washington’s decision to share intelligence with Beijing on preparations by Russian forces for the attack on Ukraine and evidence supporting the likelihood of an attack which Washington shared with Beijing prior to the actual invasion. Washington was clearly groping for alternatives, given it was unable to see any good options. It may have been the case that Washington’s very apparent pre-invasion US fears that Russian forces would rapidly overpower Ukraine stoked Putin’s unwarranted confidence. 

Washington should have understood that leaders of the Communist Party of China and People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials did not come in with yesterday’s rain and would vigorously review the information before doing anything with it. To confirm that the US was truly sharing valuable information–one cannot be so sure that Beijing was not already in possession of it, the Communist Party of China would  involve the best counterintelligence capabilities of the People’s Republic of China PLA Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau and Ministry of State Security. The head of MSS foreign counterintelligence, Dong Jingwei, a favorite of Xi, was once the subject of what his organization likely presumed to be an apparent US counterintelligence effort in which reports were leaked to the newsmedia that he had defected to the US along with his daughter. (See greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax.”) Imaginably, to the MSS foreign counterintelligence service, the potential benefits of the US Intelligence Community from promulgating false information on Dong would be clear. Top officials and managers in Beijing likely would have concluded that a goal could have been the breaking of morale among the alleged 25,000+ Chinese intelligence officers and operatives in the US. Hearing the false report of the MSS counterintelligence head’s defection might have stirred some disgruntled or disillusioned Chinese civilian or military intelligence officers and operatives to do the same. There might have been the presumption that the information was designed to unnerve a specific Chinese intelligence officer or operative that was being targeted by US counterintelligence services. Surely, the use his “good name”, putting his loyalty to China, to the Communist Party of China, and his comrades at MSS in question, enraged the infamous Dong. When the US presented its intelligence information on the build up and activities of Russian forces near Ukraine, Dong surely viewed it with skepticism and viewed the gesture as some ploy. His position on the matter would surely help shape the position the Communist Party of China’s leadership on the matter. The Chinese would hardly have done anything to influence Russia’s position on the Ukraine as the US wished. The entire schema likely revealed to the Chinese the level of desperation felt in Washington to find answers to the Russian invasion threat. 

Additionally, hardline Communist Party of China officials may have viewed the gesture as an effort to impress Beijing with the prowess of US intelligence capabilities, and to that extent issue a subtle warning. In the end, both PLA Major General Chen Guangjun, Chief of CMC Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau and Minister of State Security Chen Wenqing likely recognized the easiest and beneficial way to confirm the validity of the intelligence and enable China to better understand US intelligence human and electronic collection capabilities would be to share the information with their counterparts in Russia’s SVR, GRU, and FSB. Evidently, after the gifted US intelligence moved up through appropriate Communist Party of China channel, People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping green-lit presentation of the information to Moscow. Getting Russian confirmation on the validity of the information would be important. 

Conceivably, Moscow believes that whatever China might have about the US is likely genuine. One might presume, there is some history of intelligence sharing has been established. Perhaps the greatest caveat for the Russians concerning what Beijing had to share would be the knowledge that officials in Communist Chinese foreign and national security bureaucracies absolutely detest the US and conclusions of Chinese intelligence services might very well be colored at certain points by such strong feelings. Yet, as important would be using the opportunity to strengthen China’s position at the intelligence table with its ostensible ally Russia, garner appreciation directly from the Kremlin, and perhaps encourage Moscow to provide a regular stream of information from its human and electronic intelligence sources concerning US military plans and activities in China’s area of interest. It would satisfying for Chinese intelligence to acquire information from Russia that could significantly add to what China already knows and is trying to keep track of. The Chinese also would not mind having the Russians eating out of their hands and the Russians would not put themselves in that position.

The Chinese, knowing what they seem to just know in some way about the daily inner workings of the US Intelligence services– the result of which their intelligence services seemingly operate with impunity and comfortably in the US supposedly in the tens of thousands–would presumably see the Russian intelligence service as just one big leaky ship. Surely, the respective headquarters of the MSS and the PLA’s Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau in Beijing would be hesitant to share anything with headquarters of the SVR Russian civilian foreign intelligence and GRU military intelligence services both based in Yasenevo that might be of the utmost importance to China’s security. One might safely wager that the Chinese were somewhat aware of the deficiencies of foreign intelligence service of the FSB Russia’s domestic security organization given any experiences with it. Beijing, knowing how tense the situation was regarding Ukraine, particularly as it concerned Putin, would have recognized that it would have been counterintuitive to do anything that might stir the pot, muddy the waters with regard to what the Kremlin understood about what the US was doing. Surely, Beijing has strived to avoid playing a part in bringing the world closer the nuclear Armageddon. That would be the rational choice.

The Wagner Group was first called into action on behalf of the Russian Federation government in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. They were among the “green men” who marched in the region unopposed. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group also supported ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine which have have since declared themselves the independent Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Experts in Russian military affairs suggest that the Wagner Group is funded and directed by the GRU. The organization’s base is located in Mol’kino, in Southern Russia, within close proximity to a Russian Army base, perhaps to allow for better control and oversight.

Deflecting: An Possible Effort To Feed Into Kremlin Paranoia About the US

Additionally, it is very likely that some in the Kremlin, perhaps only in private thoughts, may have concluded by now that the Ukrainians could hardly have been so lucky against Russian forces on their own. They may have had intimations, that much of their success was really due to assistance from, and the “handiwork” of, the same well-trained folks who have done among many things, lent significant support to the forces of the late General Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, swept away the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, drove the campaign that destroyed the so-called Islamic Caliphate that cut across Syria and Iraq that was created by the ISIS terrorist organization, and while in that fight destroyed in self-defense, a formation of Russian private military contractors from the infamous Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) in Syria as well. Without direct evidence, however, such imaginings, even in the Kremlin, can only have life in the realm of conjecture. Perchance the Russian Federation General Staff has the GRU investigating that foreign military advisers are covertly on the ground assisting Ukrainian forces, planning operations, controlling maneuvers and supporting attacks. The SVR would also likely reach out to its sources world wide to discover if any evidence or hints exist that such covert operations are underway. If the GRU and SVR are actually studying the matter, their conclusions, either confirming or refuting the possibility, would surely be startle consumers of the information.

The Wagner Group was first called into action on behalf of the Russian Federation government in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. They were among the “green men” who marched in the region unopposed. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group also supported ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine which have have since declared themselves the independent Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Experts in Russian military affairs suggest that the Wagner Group is funded and directed by the GRU. The organization’s base is located in Mol’kino, in Southern Russia, within close proximity to a Russian Army base, perhaps to allow for better control and oversight. Reportedly, just before the invasion of Ukraine, the GRU directed the Wagner Group to conduct false flag operations in Eastern Ukraine to ensure such provocations would be available should Putin want to use one or more as a pretext for an attack on Ukraine. (To the extent that reports concerning an engagement between the Wagner Group and US special operations forces are true, the private military organization may be rushing to get to Ukraine not only for financial gain but with the hope of getting a possible rematch ostensibly with US operators defeated their units in Syria and leveled a severe blow to their egos given any real belief on their part that such US operators are indeed present on the ground. If there is a chance that conditions exist for a clash, it may very well turn out even worse than the first for the Wagner Group.)

“Kamerad, ich komm ja gleich!” On March 31, 2022, several hundred Syrian mercenaries arrived in the country, including soldiers from an army division that worked with Russian officers supporting the Assad regime. Russia has previously deployed Syrian fighters in Ukraine but in smaller numbers. In March 2022, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced that approximately 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East had signed up to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. The same month, the Kyiv Independent reported that Ukrainian intelligence learned Russia had reached an agreement the Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar to recruit mercenaries. Official European sources have gone further to report that along with members of the Wagner Group.fighting in the Donbas, Russia has deployed as many as 20,000 Syrian and Libyan fighters there.

Ostensibly all Russian paramilitary units and foreign fighters operating in Ukraine or anywhere on behalf of the Russian Federation would be the province of the GRU. Indeed, the GRU would likely be responsible for their control, would be their link to Russian commanders and would be responsible for their oversight. much as with the Wagner Group. Handling the Wagner Group and foreign fighters would certainly provide plenty for GRU intelligence chief to report to Putin beyond counterintelligence efforts. Most of the reporting from the field about the Wagner Group and the foreign fighters would be good news, too. The GRU, of course, falls directly under the control of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The headquarters of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU in Yasenevo. On March 31, 2022, several hundred Syrian mercenaries arrived in the country, including soldiers from an army division that worked with Russian officers supporting the Assad regime. Russia has previously deployed Syrian fighters in Ukraine but in smaller numbers. In March 2022, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced that approximately 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East had signed up to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. Ostensibly all Russian paramilitary units and foreign fighters operating in Ukraine or anywhere on behalf of the Russian Federation would be the province of the GRU. Indeed, the GRU would likely be responsible for their control, would be their link to Russian commanders and would be responsible for their oversight much as with the Wagner Group.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Expectations Versus Realities in Ukraine

On the eve of war, Russia’s invasion force was still considered formidable. Reportedly, this belief was based on the assumption that Russia had undertaken the same sort of root-and-branch military reform that America underwent in the 18-year period between its defeat in Vietnam and its victory in the first Gulf War. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many analysts in the West speculated that the Russian operation would be something akin to a one act drama with an early curtain. The US Intelligence Community concluded that Kyiv would fall in days. Some European officials thought it might just hold out for a few weeks. 

However, starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation armed forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. Most wide-eyed observers might conclude that the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) is fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Mea culpa

From what greatcharlie could gather about the situation before the February 24, 2022 invasion, the US Intelligence Community has concluded that the Kremlin could be planning a multifront offensive involving up to 175,000 troops. An estimated 100,000 Russian troops have already been deployed near the Russia-Ukraine border. Satellite imagery has revealed a buildup of Russian tanks and artillery as well as other gear near the border, too. Reportedly, online disinformation activity regarding Ukraine also has increased in the way it did in the run-up to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. According to the New York Times, the most evident scenario given the scale of troop movements on the ground is a Russian invasion of Ukraine may not be to conquer the entire country but to rush forces into the breakaway regions around the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, or to drive all the way to the Dnieper River. Purportedly at the Pentagon, “five or six different options” for the extent of a Russian invasion are being examined. Suffice it to say, Moscow calls such assessments of Russia’s intentions slanderous ravings. Russia denies it is planning an invasion and, in turn, accused the West of plotting “provocations” in Ukraine. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who unfortunately does not exactly have a watertight record for tying her statements to reality, laid it on thick in the newsmedia, alleging Western and Ukrainian talk of an imminent Russian attack was a “cover for staging large-scale provocations of their own, including those of military character.” It is really disempowering to put out such a message. 

In the abstract, greatcharlie also had assessed that If Putin decides to go in, firepower, astronomically massed, from ground, air, and possibly the sea assets, would most likely be used to destroy Ukrainian forces in the field, and in depth as far back as units held in reserve or even on training bases. Relentless fire from air and ground would be utilized to support the movement of forces inside Ukraine. What might have been identified as the front line of Ukraine’s defense would figuratively become a map reference for Hell. Russian forces would most likely be deployed in a way to prevent the resurrection of Ukrainian forces in areas which Russian forces have captured. As for reinforcements or reserves, the rest of Russia’s armed forces would be right across the border in Russia. Imaginably, the main objective of the deployment of Russian forces would be to create a sufficient buffer in Ukraine between Russia and “ever expanding NATO forces.” In performing this task, Russian forces would ensure territory and forces that might remain in Kyiv’s control would be of less utility to NATO as potential a launching pad for a ground attack on Russia and could not be used as part of a larger strategy to contain Russia at its own border.

Highly motivated Ukrainian troops riding a BMP push forward against Russian forces in the Donbas. Starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation armed forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. Most wide-eyed observers might conclude that the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) is fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Delinquency Upon Delinquency

The renowned 19th century Irish poet and playwrite Oscar Wilde explained: “To expect the unexpected shows a thoroughly modern intellect.” Yet, during the Russia’s invasion hardly anything that might have been expected was seen. Russian forces moved oddly. Russian information warfare, technological strengths nowhere. Russian air power was not present where it should have been, for example, flying, over Ukraine preparing the battlefield, providing cover for mobile forces, attacking the opponent in depth. 

Russian forces were not organized for war with precision. Units were not ready for battle. Soldiers had no idea of what to expect. Ukraine was allowed use its strengths against Russian weaknesses. Ukraine’s smaller units was able to achieve relative superiority force on force initially in the field. One might have expected that occasionally good fortune would shine upon the relatively lightly-armed Ukrainian forces, and a Russian Army or Russian Naval Troops patrol rolling around or crossing into a danger zone might face ambush, a well-organized ambush, and losses would be suffered. With so many patrol ordered in the different avenues of attack by Russian forces, the greater the chance there would be losses. However, Ukrainian forces outrightly routed Russian units over and over on the battlefield and that line of successes would force Russia to adjust its strategy. This outcome was surely far greater than most military experts around the world could have imagined before February 24, 2022. The possibility of endsieg, victory against the odds, has become all the more real.

Some observers looking through the lens of history might reason that incurring high losses in attack are an aspect of Russian warfighting. Perhaps they might cite as statement allegedly made by Soviet Army Marshall Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov to US General Dwight Eisenhiwer in 1945 as cited on page 207 in Robert Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (Atheneum, 1976): “If we come to a minefield, our infantry attacks exactly as it were not there.” Some might recall how Russian forces in the 2008 a war with Georgia had faced difficulties against the rather diminutive Georgian forces. True, Russia had achieved the goal of securing Georgia’s sovereign territory to pass on to the breakaway states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The many deficiencies of the Russia Army exposed during the fighting were stark. Russia troops utilized obsolete equipment, struggled to direct counterbattery fire at Georgian artillery, and the command and control of forces was inept. Still, in 2022, expectedly, everything would be done by commanders sending troops out to obviate that possibility, or mitigate it as best as possible by taking every reasonable precaution. The numbers and regularity of successful attacks on Russian troops would rationally lead one to think commanders have been careless.

The concept of fighting in three dimensionally, with ground forces receiving support from the air and ground receiving support from artillery fires and air and artillery, cross-communicating in real time, coordinating attacks to mass fires and airstrike with the objective of maximizing their impact, did not appear to be part of Russian Army battlefield tactics, at least not in practice. Somewhere on paper, something may be written. In modern armies, a those of the US and its allies, a synchronization matrix enables understanding of what everyone is doing at a particular time and which assets will be supporting which unit. Mission analysis identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decision making during preparation and execution. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements. Russian commanders forces clearly did none of this before they attacked. Amat victoria curam. (Victory loves preparation. [Victory favors those who take pains.])

Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sergey Shoigu conducts meeting with commanders of the armed forces. What has been discovered since the invasion began is that Russia had been running its military campaign against Ukraine out of Moscow, with no central commander on the ground to coordinate air, ground and sea units. Reportedly, that tack assists in explaining why the invasion struggled against an unexpectedly stiff Ukrainian resistance, and was plagued by poor logistics and flagging morale. In situations that require fexibility, improvisation, thinking through problems, armies whose unit commanders at the squad, platoon, company, and even battalion levels, advanced armies tend avoid being as unbending as the Russians. The failure and inability to effectively adapt in unfavorable situation once in contact will suffer considerably.

Calamity

Anyone trying to paint a picture of what was happening in the Russian command over the Ukrainian security operation would accurately produce an ugly daub. What has been discovered since the invasion began is that Russia had been running its military campaign against Ukraine out of Moscow, with no central commander on the ground to coordinate air, ground and sea units. Reportedly, that tack assists in explaining why the invasion struggled against an unexpectedly stiff Ukrainian resistance, and was plagued by poor logistics and flagging morale. In situations that require fexibility, improvisation, thinking through problems, armies whose unit commanders at the squad, platoon, company, and even battalion levels–the battalion being the main tactical formation of the a Russian Army–advanced armies tend avoid being as unbending as the Russians. The failure and inability of Russian forces to effectively adapt in unfavorable situation once in contact–since it is not taught and trained into Russian officers and nonconmissioned officers–would result in them suffering considerably. Often commanders of many units handled their troops and equipment as if they were participating in an exercise–parking companies and battalions of T-90 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers on open roads without air cover or organic antiaircraft systems providing security–rather than moving in strength behind enemy lines in a shooting war. Disorganized assaults reportedly also contributed to the deaths of several Russian generals, as high-ranking officers were pushed to the front lines to untangle tactical problems that Western militaries would have left to more junior officers or senior enlisted personnel.

From what can be seen in broadcast and online videos albeit most provided by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, no security was set up for units not in contact with their opposing forces in forward battle areas. There were visibly no pickets for armored and mechanized units while halting on roads, no moving pickets, no flank security, no air defense even watching the skies with heavy machine guns. This was the case despite foreknowledge that Ukrainian tank hunters with javelins and Turkish drones were lurking on the ground and in the air in their vicinities. Javelins and stingers provided to Ukraihian forces by the West were exploited to the point at which they had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. To that extent, a popular feature in the broadcast and online newsmedia on the Ukraine War are videos of formations of Russian T-90s and BMPs being identified and destroyed by Ukrainian drones or being hit by Ukrainian troops using javelins. Highways roads, and even trails were seemingly used as a means to locate Russian armored and mechanized units, which were naturally travelling in the direction toward Ukrainian lines on them. Suffice it to say, practically the whole world via the international newsmedia learned this was the situation in the field. No amount of spin by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense could alter the truth of what was witnessed. Russian commanders at the company and battalion levels virtually sabotaged their units as a result of their repeated delinquencies. 

A term Russian armored and mechanized commanders seemed strangely unfamiliar with is “defilade.” Turning a tank into a static low caliber artillery piece, in a protected position while ostensbly awaiting new orders or resupply, is better than having whole companies travelling on roads much as a convoy of singing ice cream trucks. The lives of tank crewmen and mechanized troops were simply thrown away. There was just too much wrong going on for one even now to fully come to terms with the horror of it all. (Feeling dread over the circumstance of another human being should not be conflated with taking sides between warring parties. That is certainly not the case here. To conclude such about these comments would be wrong.)

Strangely, artillery fires have not been used, at least not effectively or robustly, to support movement by armor and infantry, it has not been used to divert, disrupt, and destroy targets on the axis of advancing units, or used for attacks in depth. Surely, these practices should have been rehearsed in military exercises and regular training. In a very archaic manner, artillery fires have at best been used whereas movement is concerned, to mitigate direct fire from opposing forces which was a regular practice during World War I. It would appear that artillery fires, if any are made available, have been lifted as armor and infantry made contact with the opponent allowing the opponent advantages in defense. Artillery has failed to play a dominant role in the field in Russia’s war. That is baffling. Apparently, Ukrainian forces are using artillery fires to support maneuver in their counterattacks and using them effectively to attack in depth. Counterbattery radar sets must have been left back in garrison by most Russian artillery units as Russian counterbattery fires have been ineffective, practically nonexistent.

To be forthright, greatcharlie senses that whatever was really going on at Zapad, the truth of the value of the exercises has come to the surface. In away not too different the director and deputy director of FSB foreign intelligence, military commanders simply went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. As alluded to earlier, it would seem the bigger and better Zapad exercises since 2017, lauded by the leadership of the Russian Federation armed forces, were simply full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. Putin, himself, had regularly observed the Zapad exercises and everything seemed fine enough, but it was not. In a way not too different the director and deputy director of FSB foreign intelligence, military commanders simply went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. To onlookers at the Zapad exercises, as Putin had regularly been, everything seemed fine enough, but things certain were not.

One NATO commander caught on to what had been happening at Zapad and other Russian military and naval exercises before the invasion and could predict Russian military action in Ukraine might prove for Moscow to be catastrophic. When he was commander of American naval forces in Europe and Africa, US Navy Admiral James Foggo had the duty to plan US military exercises recognized that planning the huge Russian exercises were enormous undertakings. As Russia was planning the Vostok exercises in September 2021 in Siberia, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, declared it would be the largest since the Soviet Union’s Zapad exercise of 1981. It would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships. However, Foggo discovered there was quite a bit of deception involved. Rather than actually field large numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, a company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok, for example, was inflated and counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons. Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.)

How spectacularly did the illusion created by Russian Ground Force commanders disintegrate when challenged by reality! It is a sad lesson for commanders in all armies to learn from. The Russian Army of 2022 appears to mimic, albeit unintentionally, much of the Soviet Army of the 1980s. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that after reviewing what has transpired concerning the failures of Russian forces, for at least a fleeting moment, one might get the impression that Russian commanders want to lose. (Intriguingly, despite all that has been witnessed since February 24, 2022, the US Department of Defense continues to regard Russian Federation Armed Forces as an acute threat the US and its interests.)

Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sergey Shoigu (center) and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (left), and Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov,  who took command of military operation in Ukraine in April 2022 (right) hold a meeting aboard an aircraft. As a part of what the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation called the shift from Plan A and Plan B, it was announced that Russian forces would focus its special security operation in Ukraine on “liberating” the east.” A very folksy aphorism that greatcharlie has come across recently is, “There is no education in the second kick of a mule.” Being aware of past thinking, capabilities, and and practices, it seems almost fallacious to expect any novel maneuvers by Russian forces that may be nuanced or special in such a way to make a great difference in their performance in Ukraine.

Resurrection?

An army can not change over night.What Russian military commanders can do is ensure that the many parts of the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Naval Forces to their utmost in harmony to achieve success is what will change the course of things. Once more, greatcharlie ingeminates a most apposite quote, an old chestnut, from the renowned theoretical physicist Albert Einstein said: “Probleme kann man niemals mit derselben Denkweise losen, durch die sie entstanden sind.” (We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used to create them.)

As a part of a shift from “Plan A” to “Plan B”, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation announced on March 25, 2022 that Russian forces would focus its special security operation in Ukraine on “liberating” the east.” According to the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, head of the General Staff’s main operations administration stated “The main tasks of the first stage of the operation have been carried out.” He further stated: The combat capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces have been substantially reduced, which allows us to concentrate our main efforts on achieving the main goal: the liberation of Donbas.” On April 9, 2022, Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed commander of the special military operation in Ukraine.

This shift from “Plan A” to “Plan B” has left little doubt in the minds of observers outside of Russia that an apparent initial plan to move rapidly to capture major cities in Ukraine and replace the national government had failed or at least had not gone as planned. There was an attempt to spin the matter as a success. As aforementioned, a big part of that was to omit any discussion of the terrible costs in troops, materiél, and treasure for the military’s blunders. The focus of Rudskoy’s spin was an effort to convince that efforts to encircle key Ukrainian cities as Kyiv and making them subjecting them the multiple airstrikes and artillery onslaught was to pin down Ukrainian forces elsewhere in the country in order to allow Russian forces to focus on the east. 

Since the announcement of the new plan of attack was made, Russian forces have met with some greater success in southern Ukraine. Well reported have been itheir efforts to capture towns and cities such as Kherson, Mariupol, Kreminna, and making some gains in the east. Russian troops also displaced Ukrainian forces from Zarichne and Novotoshkivske in Donetsk as well as Velyka Komyshuvakha and Zavody in the Kharkiv region. Following the shift, Moscow announced that 93 percent of the Donbas region of Luhansk had come under the control of Russian-backed separatists. However, over 33.3 percent of the Donbas was already under the control of ethnic-Russian separatist control before the invasion. It is hard to determine just how well things are going for Russian forces by listening to Moscow’s reports. Only 54 percent of Donetsk province of the Donbas is actually under Russia’s control. While achieving some success in the Kharkiv region, Russia made little vigorous progress in capturing Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city. It was essentially the same story witnessed in Kyiv, huge losses and meager results. Ukrainian forces were fighting so well in the region that Russian forces were eventually forced to withdraw from Kharkiv, so close to their own border, in order to protect supply line and Russian territory as well. There was a US assessment in March the stated that Ukraine could recapture Kherson.

A very folksy aphorism that greatcharlie has come across recently is, “There is no education in the second kick of a mule.” Being aware of past thinking, capabilities, and and practices, it seems almost fallacious to expect any novel maneuvers by Russian forces that may be nuanced or special in such a way to make a great difference in their performance in Ukraine.

A test launch of Russia’s Satan-2 (above) on April 20, 2022 at the Kura Missile Test Range in the Russian Federation’s Kamchatka region. While the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has been dubbed Satan 2 by NATO, it is officially known in the Russian armed forces as the RS-26 Sarmat.  The ICBM carries multiple warheads and has an estimated range of 6200 to 11,800 miles. Doubtlessly through Putin’s eyes, Russia, his world, would stand at the edge of doom if “the West” wins the war. If that occurred, in brief, he would be driven to consider the vulnerable position in which he would ostensibly leave Russia by allowing a well-trained, well-experienced, and well-equipped military force remain intact and powerful on its western border. Putin would surely choose to act as violently as possible now to protect Russia’s existence into the future. Additionally and importantly, all forms of conflict would be permissible in Russia’s defense, including the use of thermonuclear weapons. Putin has repeatedly expressed a willingness to use the crown jewels of his defense arsenal.

The Way Forward

As expressed in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2022 post entitled “The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Brief Meditations on Putin and Small Suggestions That May Support Achieving Peace Through Diplomacy”, there are those who speak freely on taking on Russia in the nuclear dimension, and suggest mightily that Moscow be reminded that the US has a formidable thermonuclear arsenal and will respond fiercely with it if Russia uses its weapons. Such thoughts appear to have been expressed with a complete lack of regard for their own self-interests, the interest of the US. It is unlikely that those individuals have steeled themselves against the possible consequences. The possibility of a thermonuclear attack from Russia are actually more real, more likely, than they might imagine. Unusquisque mavult credere quam iudicare. (Everyone prefers to believe than to think.)

Additionally mentioned in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2022 post is the well-viewed exchange between Putin and Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR. Naryshkin, an absolute Putin loyalist, known for his aggressive anti-western statements, became visibly uncomfortable as Putin interrogated him on Ukraine. Among his very top advisers, there was likely a palpable sense that a fiery sea of anger, rage, and hatred was churning violently inside of him. Perhaps Putin’s exchange with Naryshkin might be considered a new context. It is possible the exchange between Putin and Naryshkin may directly relate to a plan Putin may have of far greater conception what has publicly postulated in the West so far.

As the scene was set, Putin was seated at a desk in a grand, columned Kremlin room with his advisers, seemingly socially distanced from him and each other. Putin asked his advisers to step forward to a podium to offer their respective views on recognizing Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic. Putin was being very sharp with his advisers. When Naryshkin was asked to present his views, he appeared uncomfortable even initially as Putin interrogated him. Naryshkin stumbled with his words. Surely noticing his discomfort, Putin exorts Naryshkin to speak more directly. To hear Naryshkin speak, some might immediately be left to believe the matter at hand is far more complicated than the challenging matter of that moment, recognizing the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic.

Putin, impatient and insistent, pushes Naryshkin even further. He tells Naryshkin twice, “Speak directly!” Eventually, when he was able to get the words out, When he spoke, Naryshkin uttered that he supported “the LNR and DNR becoming part of Russia.” Putin told him that wasn’t the subject of the discussion; it was only recognition being weighed up. Naryshkin then stated that he supported attempting negotiations first. Putin responded that the discussion was not about negotiations. Finally, Naryshkin was able to state that he supported Putin’s plans. According to newsmedia reports, some Russia experts have suggested that the whole scene might have been a carefully scripted artifice to demonstrate to the West that other options might be available. However, it is Naryshkin’s genuinely flustered expression that does the most to convince much more might have been involved.

The post of director of the SVR, is not for the faint hearted. Naryshkin is understood to be a srurdy individual and good at his job. He is a Putin loyalist and regularly expresses hardline anti-Western views. It is difficult to fathom why he would be so nervous, clearly under stress, when reporting to Putin. Perhaps he was uncertain how it would all play out. Perhaps as greatcharlie has suggested here, reporting from SVR concerning Ukraine has not been as accurate as it could have been as aforementioned due to delicacy toward Putin and is concerned he will be called out on the quality of his organization’s product. Indeed, maybe he thought that he was being burned by Putin. Perhaps the moment has been scripted to serve Putin’s purposes and Naryshkin is nevertheless concerned things may not pan out as planned. Perhaps he has seen that happen to others.

Rationale enim animal est homo. (Man is a reasoning animal.) At the risk of being obvious, greatcharlie suggests that is unlikely that Putin would not have approved the broadcast of the video of the security council meeting, and particularly “the Naryschkin moment” unless he intended to convey a message. Much as a good attorney in court, he would not ask a question of anyone testifying unless he already knew the answer. So much else, was edited out of the Russian newsmedia coverage. Surely, one might have expected much of that segment, a relative confrontation of the Russian President as compared to other exchanges, would have hit the cutting room floor. The video clip, itself, amounted to something akin to a chamber piece in which the theme–though the notion was brushed of by Putin during the meeting–was thermonuclear war. It was expressed via the subtle reference to it in the exchange between Putin and Naryschkin. Indeed, the message was that thermonuclear war is more than just a potentiality in the security council but a part of planning as it concerns halting NATO expansion and perceived Western plans to push into Russia’s sovereign territory to despoil its riches in natural resources.

To that extent, it might be worthwhile to revisit the notion of Putin’s awareness of the danger of setting unrealistic expectations as well as the notion of Plan A and Plan B as it relates to Russia’s special security operation. He has seen the Russian Federation armed forces in action and likely recognizes there is a real chance he could lose the conventional war with Ukraine. Putin, the central focus West, must consider the mass psychological implications of losing a ground war on its border. That would be the bitter end. Some newsmedia houses in Europe have been willing to promulgate the apocryphal rumor that Putin is suffering from pancreatic cancer. It would be difficult to imagine how those sources would have come upon such information as the US Intelligence Community has indicated that the Kremlin remains what intelligence officials call a “hard target”–incredibly difficult to penetrate through traditional espionage.” CNN reported, based on information from an official source, that there has not been any new comprehensive assessment by the US Intelligence Community that indicates a particular change to Putin’s overall health. That being stated, the follow-on thinking would be that if Putin finds himself in deep trouble in Ukraine, he might take the murder-suicide route on an Apocalyptic scale. However, more realistically, other considerations would likely be involved. 

Doubtlessly through Putin’s eyes, Russia, his world, would stand at the edge of doom if “the West” wins the war. If that occurred, in brief, he would be driven to consider the vulnerable position in which he would ostensibly leave Russia by allowing a well-trained, well-experienced, and well-equipped military force remain intact and powerful on its western border. Perhaps as discussed in the preceding March 31, 2022 post, Putin has indeed considered what will he will leave for future generations of Russians to contend with. Perhaps he believes now is the time to confront not just Ukraine, but the West. He has stated many times that he believes the West wants to destroy Russia and strip it of its natural resources. In greatcharlie’s preceding post, it was also suggested that the next generation of Russians will most likely want a future that reflects their own choices, their own desires, not those of a dark past. Russia never became das land des lächelns under his leadership despite his “best” efforts, and it seems that it will never become so. Critics in the West might say that Putin has achieved nothing except create new forms of the old misery. It could very well be that in Putin’s mind, everything that can be done must be done now to make certain future generations of Russians will not be left with the worst choice possible, to give in to Western demands, or worse, possibly surrender to conventional military threat or action. To that extent, and with a lot more factored in, Putin would surely choose to act as violently as possible now to protect Russia’s existence into the future. Additionally and importantly, all forms of conflict would be permissible in Russia’s defense, including the use of thermonuclear weapons. Putin has repeatedly expressed a willingness to use the crown jewels of his defense arsenal. 

Conceivably, the use of such weapons was considered and plotted out as a contingency by Putin long before the eve of invasion. Perhaps the knowledge of that was being telegraphed through Naryshkin’s body language at the National Security Council meeting before the invasion. A hardliner, yet a thinking man and shrewd individual, it may have troubled Naryshkin to think that the situation was drawing closer to such a dire outcome. Surely, in his possession, as the head of foreign intelligence, were true assessments of what might happen in Ukraine and that possible result may have troubled him greatly given the end state scripted by Putin.

Praemonitus, praemunitus. (Forewarned is forearmed.) It has always been up to the respective masters of thermonuclear weapons to maintain peace and stability or use them to their full terrifying potential as weapons of mass destruction. For Putin, the underlying thought for every step at the moment may very well be that it is now or never. Here, greatcharlie will go out on a slender thread to state that in his position taking everything into the round, that if defeated in a conventional struggle with Ukraine Putin would feel left with no choice but to destroy Russia’s opponent by whatever nonconventional means he might see fit. Everyone does not think the same. Things do not always turn out the way one might hope. It was by any reasonable standard daylight madness for Putin to invade Ukraine. Using thermonuclear weapons, although a far more monstrous transgression, would fit well within the mindset of one who do the former.

Everyone knows how the Cold War ended and who won. The history is clear. This critical episode between the West and Russia will likely be much shorter in duration. At the time of this writing, however, Its outcome is still unclear. Perhaps the legacy of the former struggle, thermonuclear weapons, will play a role and put an end to matters once and for all. If the US and rest of West should begin to threaten Russia with their weapons to reign Putin in it would would unlikely have that impact. As aforementioned, for Putin, the underlying thought for every step may be that it is now or never. He will most likely attack them. Omnia jam fient, fieri quæ posse negabam; et nihil est de quo non sit habenda fides. (All things will now come to pass that I used to think impossible; and there is nothing that we may not hope to see take place.)

Recherché Pieces of the Putin Puzzle That May Serve To Better Enable Engagement with Him as Either an Adversary or a Partner Regarding Ukraine

US President Joe Biden (right) and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (left). “What is your substance, whereof are you made, . . . .” Many Western governments view working with Putin on the Ukraine crisis, which they say he caused, as an undesirable task. Still, like it or not, that is the job at hand, and it can be successfully handled. Putin has some grievances, and says he wants to get them resolved. Standing strong and fast, assured of the correctness of one’s positions, is a fine thing. On the other hand, posturing, pride and ego, do a poor job at concealing insecurities. In this crisis, the elimination of insecurities on both sides will be central to its resolution. What needs to be created is a sustainable balance of power that advances US, United Kingdom, EU, Ukrainian, and the better parts of Russian interests to promote peace and security and foster collaboration. It would be most beneficial and virtuous for all parties involved to work together to construct clear agreements, improve ties, and accomplish even more. Here greatcharlie hopes to assist those in US foreign and national security bureaucracies seeking to get a better handle on the Ukraine crisis, and gain greater clarity about Putin and his thinking.

With imaginable strain upon the national budget, Russian troops for the moment lie snug in the Winter weather in their homeland, still close enough to its border with Ukraine to unnerve those on that side. They are ostensibly the cudgel meant to induce the minds of leaders in Western governments–the US, United Kingdom, and the EU countries–to think Putin’s way on NATO’s “ceaseless” expansion toward its border. Putin’s demand to the West boils down to “Get out of my tree and stay out!” Things have not gone exactly his way so far, but perhaps to his satisfaction he has bathed in the sound of Western government voices and broadcast newsmedia, expressing shear terror and prognosticating war and doom in the meantime. Indeed, most Western governments believe that Putin intends to do a lot more than just build up military forces defensively and induce Western thinking to his like. Reportedly, multiple analyses of Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies have concluded that he will definitely invade Ukraine. 

Surely, this has been a beast of an episode for the relatively fledgling, democratic government in Kyiv. One might posit that Putin’s presidency is the general misfortune of all countries neighboring Russia. The threatening, aggressive atmosphere is intolerable. They must reconcile to the universal order of nature. They have knowingly, comfortably organized middle grade armies to face a first class multidimensional military force, and they have left themselves in a state in which they could never see themselves winning without the US by their side. What beats the brains of decisionmakers in Western capitals is how to mitigate the danger in a sustainable way without disturbing the status quo much or at all. Concerns expressed in conference rooms on the top floors of the US foreign and national security bureaucracies might reasonably be that relaxation of the atmosphere may require taking Putin to the limit hoping he will choose peace and avoid the massive loss that would result from even a successful push into Ukraine. There is also the possibility that relaxation of the contentious atmosphere will not reverse ambitions in Moscow regarding Ukraine. Nevertheless, at some point after applying fears to hopes and hopes to fears, both sides will need to be flexible and to compromise, if either really wants to get anything out of the diplomatic process. New calculations must be made now on both sides if the aim is peace and stability. Qui totum vult totum perdit. (He who wants everything loses everything.)

To possibly assist the efforts of the US, and its allies also, to peer in on the other side to better understand Putin’s actions and intentions concerning Ukraine by stimulating ideas in others, in this essay, greatcharlie offers a few new ideas. They were inspired while preparing greatcharlie’s preceding January 25, 2022 post entitled, “Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help”. That post also offered suggestions for optimizing US-Russia diplomacy regarding the Ukraine crisis that matched the importance, enormity of the situation. Making the effort to stimulate new ideas sometimes requires stepping onto shaky ground. A few thoughts on possible steps and schemes of Putin, the course of things and thinking that may be hidden or most often excluded from analyses, are presented here. They were developed primarily in the abstract from evidence provided by official statements and newsmedia reporting. To an extent, thoughts offered might more aptly be described as intimations. Some facts uncovered and presented may appear odd, recherché, but nevertheless they were all gleaned from credible, often official sources made available to the public. Hopefully, that will not be a distraction for readers. To hold only to existing thinking on Putin is to cut oneself off from roads to understanding him and his decisions that might result through further examination. Facilius per partes in cognitionem totius adducimur. (We are more easily led part by part to an understanding of the whole.)

Putin (left) being interviewed by Le Figaro in the Russian Cultural Center in Paris on May 29, 2017. Reportedly, within the Russian government, there are varied theories held about the level of power US presidents have and theories that US presidents are under the control of groups of individuals in the background, some allege they are shadowy figures. To the extent this relates to US President Joe Biden, some of Putin’s advisers have also apparently been informed by stories from the US that say others act as a hammer to shape him into the instrument they want. During a June 11, 2022 interview in Moscow with NBC News, Putin again referenced, albeit vaguely,, unknown parties who he believes are iInfluencing perspectives of Russia’s bilateral relationships and himself. Putin stated: “Well, I don’t know. Somebody presents it from a certain perspective. Somebody looks at the development of this situation and at yours truly (THROAT CLEARING) in a different manner. All of this is being offered to the public in a way that is found to be expedient for the ruling circles of a certain country.”

Putin’s View of “Who Is in Charge” in Washington

If readers would bear with greatcharlie through these initial points, they will discover there is a method to what on the face of it recognizably appears as madness. Reportedly, within the Russian government, there are varied theories held about the level of power US president have and theories that US presidents are under the control of groups of individuals in the background, some allege they are shadowy figures. To the extent this relates to US President Joe Biden, some of Putin’s advisers have also apparently been informed by stories from the US that say others act as a hammer to shape him into the instrument they want. (That view nearly parallels the impression previous US administrations once held on Putin’s situation in Russia.) Without judgment from greatcharlie, claims of such an arrangement have been proffered by conservative commentators, particularly those appearing on Fox News. Reportedly, Fox News pundits have repeatedly pushed the theory that Biden is president “in name only” and that a group of progressives–initially said to be led by Vice President Kamala Harris and including former US President Barack Obama and former US Attorney General Eric Holder–are actually in control in Washington. How comments so outré expressed on Fox News, as well as others concerning the US administration found on online celebrity gossip magazines, blogs, websites, and YouTube channels, could find acceptance in Moscow is a curious thing. Perhaps the original hope among Russian officials was to sift through them to pick-up faulty scraps of “palace intrigue” with the correct degree of discernment was absent. Once such ideas are caught, despite all that is wrong about them, they often worm their way into analyses. They may appear as trifles, made imperceptible by the fact that they are notions too commonplace in the mind to raise concern. Nonetheless, they are damaging much as the microscopic virus that can fell a person in good health..

Russian theories concerning the power of the US President tend to be equally off-kilter. In an August 1, 2017 article, a journalist for Time, Simon Shuster, who served a stint in Russia, explained that “confusion over the limits on executive authority goes back to the early years of Putin’s presidency, when he established control over the Russian media and began to assume that his Western counterparts could do the same in their countries.” Pointing to the memoir of former US President George W. Bush, Decision Points, Shuster noted that during a discussion at a summit in 2005, Putin refused to believe that the US commander-in-chief does not have the power to muzzle journalists in the US. Bush quotes Putin as saying: “Don’t lecture me about the free press.” Referring to Dan Rather, formerly of CBS News, Putin continued, “Not after you fired that reporter.” Shuster further explained: “In Russian officialdom (and among the public generally) people often assume that the West functions a lot like Russia, with a tame judiciary, a subservient media and a ruling clique that pulls all the strings.”

However, the most shocking theory concerning “shadowy powers the run the US is that the ones who actually run the administration are more than simple advisers in the background receiving federal government salaries supposedly. On the official website of the Kremlin is the transcript of a May 29, 2017 interview Putin provided the French publication Le Figaro. In it, Putin depicts those who, in his view, pull the strings of US presidents. He states: “I have already spoken to three US Presidents. They come and go, but politics stay the same at all times. Do you know why? Because of the powerful bureaucracy. When a person is elected, they may have some ideas. Then people with briefcases arrive, well dressed, wearing dark suits, just like mine, except for the red tie, since they wear black or dark blue ones. These people start explaining how things are done. And instantly, everything changes. This is what happens with every administration.” Putin went on to say concerning US presidents: “Changing things is not easy, and I say this without any irony. It is not that someone does not want to, but because it is a hard thing to do.” During a June 11, 2022 interview in Moscow with NBC News, Putin was told Biden viewed him as a leader of autocrats, who is determined to undermine the liberal democratic order. The interviewer asked Putin if it was true. In response, Putin vaguely referenced unknown parties who he believes are iInfluencing perspectives of Russia’s bilateral relationships and himself. Putin stated: “Well, I don’t know. Somebody presents it from a certain perspective. Somebody looks at the development of this situation and at yours truly (THROAT CLEARING) in a different manner. All of this is being offered to the public in a way that is found to be expedient for the ruling circles of a certain country.”

Concerning thoughts in the West on Russian views of how the US President in handling the Ukraine crisis, there was a considerable uproar heard worldwide, particularly in the newsmedia and expectedly from his political adversaries in the US, over how Putin might perceive and respond to a statement Biden made during his January 19, 2022 press conference at the White House. To many ears, Biden appeared to suggest that the US and its allies may not act strenuously to what he called a “minor incursion” into Ukraine. In fairness to Biden, presented here are comments in some detail to a question concerning the Ukraine crisis and whether the US and its allies were willing to put troops on the line to defend Ukraine, whether the US and its allies can agree on a sanctions package, and whether the threat of new sanctions would give Putin pause. BIden explained: “Well, because he’s never seen sanctions like the ones I promised will be imposed if he moves, number one. Number two, we’re in a situation where Vladimir Putin is about to–we’ve had very frank discussions, Vladimir Putin and I.  And the idea that NATO is not going to be united, I don’t buy.  I’ve spoken to every major NATO leader.  We’ve had the NATO-Russian summit.  We’ve had other–the OSCE has met, et cetera. And so, I think what you’re going to see is that Russia will be held accountable if it invades.  And it depends on what it does.  It’s one thing if it’s a minor incursion and then we end up having a fight about what to do and not do, et cetera. But if they actually do what they’re capable of doing with the forces amassed on the border, it is going to be a disaster for Russia if they further ingra–invade Ukraine, and that our allies and partners are ready to impose severe costs and significant harm on Russia and the Russian economy.

Damnant quod non intellegunt. (They condemn what they do not understand.) It was determined on the face of it that with those words, “It’s one thing if it’s a minor incursion,” Biden opened the door to a Russian incursion into Ukraine. There was alarm over how Putin would react. The newsmedia in the US and worldwide laid it on thick, denouncing and condemning Biden for doing far more than giving away the store. Reporters and commentators put their art of communication into providing drama, much as Rembrandt in his works, to convince that Biden somehow worsened the crisis. That was hardly valid thinking. Their forecasts did not bear out. Russian forces did not move a jot in Ukraine’s direction en masse or piecemeal, nor was the deployment of them dramatically increased. Biden would not speak idly on such a grave matter. Recognizably, Biden erred to the extent that he offered a trifle, a glint from the discussion in the backroom, that turned out to be too much information for a world ready to react with opinions on what most appear to know too little about. Even the most experienced can learn lessons on matters they have known well for a long-time. Yet, in fairness to Biden, he may have had good reason to say what he did.

While satellites and other technical means are providing streams of intelligence on the day-to-day activities of their presumed opposition Ukrainian forces, there have no doubt been occasions when Russian intelligence units have gone on forays into Ukraine to take a good look, a “shifty,” to confirm what is known or find out if anything has not been discern imagery or other information. Special reconnaissance missions are likely being performed by the Generalnogo Shtaba Glavnoje Razvedyvatel’noje Upravlenije (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) or Glavnoje Razvedyvatel’noje Upravlenije (Main Intelligence Directorate) or GRU Spetsnaz (special operations units), Spetsnaz of the 45th Independent Guards Reconnaissance Brigade of the Vozdushno Desantniye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, and even reconnaissance units of Russian Federation Army formations. Special reconnaissance missions typically include penetrating deep behind opposition lines to engage in the covert direction of air and missile attacks, place remotely monitored sensors, and prepared the ground for other special operations troop who might engage in direct action against the opposition and unconventional warfare, to include guerrilla operations and counterinsurgency operations. On special reconnaissance missions in Ukraine, Spetsnaz might be tasked to move a little bit deep into the country to determine what activities are being conducted at certain highly secured military facilities, locate new weapon systems that have been deployed, locate and assess newly constructed defenses, monitor troop movements, locate and monitor foreign military advisers possibly operating in the Donetsk and Luhansk and Ukrainian military officers and other foreign military officials of interest.

Scouts from Russian Federation Army reconnaissance units at a minimum would do the following: investigate the quality and size of enemy units; report on all activities of opposition units observed; report grid coordinates of opposition units. (If opposition units are moving, determine whether they are advancing of withdrawing and what routes they are using; determine which opposition military units or civilians are performing an activity, collecting information on uniforms, patches, any unit designations and features of civilians; report which opposition units were engaged in a particular activities; and, collect specifics about opposition units and their activities, detailed information with descriptions of tactics used, equipment and gear involved and all other noticeable aspects.

As suggested in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, one could conceive that concerning Western military assistance, a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things, to: monitor the delivery, stockpiling of stinger, javelin, and other weapons systems to Ukrainian forces; maintain real-time knowledge of the distribution and location of those weapons; destroy those weapons systems; and, destroy or support actions by other Russian military units to destroy Ukrainian military units to which those weapons were distributed. That hypothetical task force would also likely be tasked to monitor–covertly monitor the intelligence activities and military operations of–Western countries as they relate to supplying Ukraine with special military capabilities.

Russian Federation Army reconnaissance scouts in training in the Western Military District (above). During his January 19, 2022 press conference at the White House. To many ears, Biden appeared to suggest that the US and its allies may not act strenuously to what he called a “minor incursion” into Ukraine. It was determined on the face of it that with those words Biden opened the door to a Russian invasion of Ukraine. There was alarm over how Putin would “react.” There reality is that there have doubtlessly been several occasions when Russian intelligence units have gone on forays into Ukraine to take a good look, a “shifty,” to confirm what is known or find out if anything has not been discern imagery or other information. Special reconnaissance missions are likely being performed by GRU Spetsnaz (special operations units), Spetsnaz of the 45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment, and even reconnaissance units of Russian Federation Army formations. Surely, it was easier for many to launch into hysterics about his words than to think of a technical alternative. If the episode were docketed at all by Putin, he would most likely have done so in recognition of how the matter supported his thinking on the weakness of the US president versus the unseen forces.

Additionally, Russian military advisers are very likely present, “covertly”, in the Donetsk and Luhansk, recognized in Kyiv and by the  majority of governments in the world as the sovereign territory of Ukraine, engaging in a range of military assistance activities to separatist force the two regions to include some of the following: supplying weapon systems; resupply ammunition; provide training on new weapon systems, provide training separatist in small unit tactics and larger unit operations, support the operation of air defense systems; support the operation of intelligence, surveillance systems; support the operation of rocket systems (Interestingly enough, the Minsk Agreement requires Russia to maintain knowledge on all of these types if weapon systems, their capabilities, locations, and numbers deployed.); support air traffic control; support separatist command, control, and communications, supporting separatist operations and strategy; and support the collection of intelligence; and, provide separatist commanders with technical intelligence from Russian sources.

Finally, according to the US and the overwhelming majority of governments in the world, Crimea remains the sovereign territory of Ukraine. There is currently a rather large Russian force on that territory which moves troops and equipment in and out of it daily. The presence of those Russian forces in Crimea is a serious problem, yet the regular movement of troops in and out of the province at this point is a relatively minor matter.

In “Il Penseroso” (1631), published in his Poems (1645), the great John Milton quips: “Where more is meant than meets the ear.” With respect to Biden’s statement, it would appear more was meant than met the ear. The minor movement of Russian military personnel into Ukraine most likely for reasons outlined here would certainly not be worthy of a nuclear confrontation. Still, more pertinent is the fact that Putin, himself, unlikely believed Biden was suggesting hypothetically that Russia could move into Ukraine with a battalion sized force to capture some border territory in Donbass to establish some permanent Russian military presence or even more fanciful, land paratroopers at Kyiv’s Airport, reinforce them with tanks, create a well-defended corridor to the border along the most direct highway. Misunderstanding that says much about what the majority understands about Putin. Surely, it was easier for many to believe that Biden was suggesting such a thing and the launch into hysterics about his words than to think of a technical alternative. There was nothing that Biden or his aides could have said publicly about actual minor incursions by Russian forces into Ukraine as described here without making matters far worse. If the episode were docketed at all by Putin, he would have done so because Biden’s comments indicated the US and its allies were aware of Russian intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities inside Ukraine. He would most likely have docketed the event also in recognition of how the matter supported his thinking on the weakness of the US president versus the “shadowy forces.” 

To make one last point concerning Putin’s view on the relative impotence of the US President versus the unseen power in Washington, one must cast one’s mind back to the time when everything negative imaginable was said about US President Donald Trump in the newsmedia and elsewhere by his detractors and political adversaries. Given the sort of visceral reactions that typically ensue with the mere mention of Trump’s name, greatcharlie feels it is going out on shaky ground to remind how official action was regularly undertaken against him–in the Congress, through multiple hearings on alleged wrongdoings and two impeachment and through the appointment of a Special Counsel. All of that and more was done seemingly with a blindness to the interests of the US as it concerned the presidency as an office and US foreign and national security interests. No matter which side one might fall on this matter, it might be recognized that even to some small degree, on international matters, the new administration is reaping the bitter fruit of those negative efforts.

Conceivably, Putin (above) began the Ukraine enterprise believing he had a good understanding of the way many senior Biden administration foreign and national security policy officials, many of whom had held senior posts in the administration of US President Barack Obama, would respond to a move toward Ukraine, real or feigned. Putin had strenuously wrestled with them via diplomacy before and doubtlessly had thought about them considerably since. He possibly intuited that they hold a sense that Crimea was lost on their watch. It was a move made in tandem with his enhanced support of ethnic Russian separatist movements in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. As an element of his current gambit, Putin may have  urged Russian foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders to deliberately seek to aggravate, frustrate, and provoke US officials by denying a threat to Ukraine. Ostensibly, enough confusion might be created by Russian officials in talks and communications with what Putin may perceive as their overly sensitive US counterparts that they might stoke emotional responses from US decisionmakers on Ukraine, To the degree that they would be led to miss advantages, make big mistakes, Putin could desire an outcome in which US officials might possibly provide a provocation in words and actions that would allow him to green-light an invasion.

A Possible Manipulation of Great Conception

In greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, it is noted how Putin so surprisingly has gone through some lengths to signal that he is considering a move into Ukraine. Everything done to date appears designed to ensure the US and its allies know exactly what Russian forces are doing. Putin’s experiences as an intelligence officer in the field, political leader, and national leader have no doubt given him a mighty understanding of human nature and human interactions. However, equally pertinent is the fact that he is a judoka and well-experienced tournament competitor. In this respect, he is an expert in assessing competitors’ responses and reactions to forced falls and defeat. 

Conceivably, Putin began the Ukraine enterprise believing he had a good understanding of the way many senior Biden administration foreign and national security policy officials, many of whom had held senior posts in the administration of US President Barack Obama, would respond to a move toward Ukraine, real or feigned. Putin had strenuously wrestled with them via diplomacy before and doubtlessly had thought about them considerably since. He possibly intuited that they hold a sense that Crimea was lost on their watch. They were caught flat-footed when Russian forces moved in by the thousands. They were dubbed the “green men.” It was a move made in tandem with supporting ethnic Russian separatist movements in Donetsk and Luhansk, oblasts (provinces) which border Russia. Donetsk and Luhansk are still inhabited by somewhat large populations despite the heavy fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatists within them. According to the World Population Review, in 2021, the population in Donetsk was 899,325 and in Luhansk was 398,505. Fighting in both areas was exceedingly heavy. Eventually both movements declared their provinces independent, sovereign republics. 

Despite their best efforts short of military action, Obama administration officials could not put together a response that could pry Russia out. Bonjour les dégâts! Not to offend those in power now, but on Crimea,  as on a few other issues, senior Obama administration officials would habitually underestimate Putin. Putin then added figurative insult to injury by formally annexing Crimea. His latest build up of forces, several miles distant, yet near enough to the border of Ukraine, has caused sufficient anxiety in Washington and teasingly offer the opportunity for former senior Obama administration officials in the Biden administration to have a return engagement with him, and as he might hope, an opportunity to settle an old score. Perhaps in such a way Putin, too, might be revealing his desire too for a return engagement in which he could get even more of what he wants from Ukraine. Consuetudinis magna vis est. (The force of habit is great.)

Surely, in Washington, officials would claim what happened in the past with Russia on Crimea has not colored their new reactions on Ukraine. Subconsciously, perhaps it is a different story. As Putin had strenuously wrestled with them via diplomacy before and doubtlessly had thought about them considerably since. To that extent, Putin may feel he has seen them straight, and seek, possibly as a side project, to stimulate their attitudes and behavior and calculate, even influence their moves successfully. As an element of his current gambit, Putin may have  urged Russian foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders to deliberately seek to aggravate, frustrate, and provoke US officials by denying a threat to Ukraine. Through their statements, it is clear that US administration officials believe the threat of Russian invasion is real. To enhance that sense of alarm, Putin would intermittently move a modicum of his forces in very observable ways, guaranteed to catch the attention of the US and its allies and heighten the sense of alarm, even though nothing  significant was really happening. As for the Ukrainians, every movement would hopefully serve to emphasize the defenseless condition in which the US and its allies have left them in. Putin might hope that would stir a sense of extreme vulnerability and anxiety, anguish and despair, among them. Ostensibly, enough confusion might be created by Russian officials in talks and communications with what Putin may perceive as their overly sensitive US counterparts and panic among the Ukrainians that an emotional response might be stoked from US decisionmakers on Ukraine, to the degree that they might make big mistakes or even miss considerable advantages that are right before them.

To enlarge on this point on forced mistakes, Putin could desire an outcome in which US officials might provide a provocation in words and actions that would allow him to green-light an invasion. Alternatively, depending how the wind blows, he would seek to check US decisionmakers, leaving them without any good options that would allow the successful support of US interests and only holding the choice to make compromises, even furtively, on his main demands, that  would allow Ukrainians to live in peace in some satisfactory way. No one is infallible. As Putin knows, logic sometimes fails us. Reacting out of emotions rather than logic and wisdom could only result in missteps. Perhaps US decisionmakers might not even recognize any errors were made until they witnessed Putin exploiting their choices to the fullest. This may all sound like a mad-capped scheme, However, it is all hardly beyond Putin. His thinking in formulating such a scheme would likely be informed, bolstered by the aforementioned shambolic US pull-out from Afghanistan in 2021.

Without any intention to be offensive, greatcharlie states that one top US official that Putin would seek to influence most by his actions would be the Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Putin is quite familiar with Blinken as he played a prominent role in all of the rather rough approaches taken toward him and Russia during the Obama administration–he was Obama’s National Security Adviser. He likely sees him as a real foe. Blinken is a professional, with experience in the high realms of government in the Obama administration, surely seeks only to be unwavering in his pursuit of US interests and not to be distracted by emotions toward Ukraine and its people. He is absolutely loyal and patriotic to the highest degree possible as his country’s top diplomat. In addition to being handsome and débonnaire, Blinken has a strong intellect and is strong-minded. Yet, he is mindful and very appreciative of his ethnic Ukrainian heritage. One might imagine that in a very human way, he would hope to make the land of his parents, grandparents, and ancestors very proud of his intercession in Ukraine’s time of crisis. On May 5, 2021, Blinken made his first visit to Ukraine as Secretary of State. Blinken visited Ukraine numerous times as a senior official in the Obama administration. Blinken’s great-grandfather, Meir Blinken, emigrated from Kyiv in 1904. He was accompanied by his wife Hanna and sons Solomon and Maurice Henry, Blinken’s grandfather. For Blinken, it was a cracking visit, during which his Ukrainian heritage was emphasized. At events, he often spoke the national language as taught to him by his family.

Etiam sapientibus cupido gloriae novissima exuitur. (The desire for glory is the last infirmity to be cast off even by the wise.) A shark can smell blood a mile off when he is hungry. That first Ukraine visit as Secretary of State in May 2021 meant much personally to Blinken. That visit very likely meant much to Putin, too! He no doubt, closely analyzed moments of it, to better understand Blinken and to uncover some advantages gleaned from it all. Exploiting someone’s meaningful personal event in some dark way is an unprincipled, reprehensible business, and a practice that was polished and honed within the erstwhile intelligence organization in which Putin spent his first career, the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. Needless to say, intelligence work was his metier. 

To go a little further on this point, also as explained in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2018 post, individuals as Putin can have a different context for learning about people. When Putin asks about an interlocutor’s family, home, office, even capabilities, it is not small talk or the result of friendly interest. Rather, he may be signalling, warning, that he has already evaluated an interlocutor as a potential target. He may be confirming information or collecting more. He may also be testing one’s vulnerability to falsehoods or how one might respond to unpleasant information. He is creating a perceptual framework for his interlocutor. Such tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods truly match those of a predator. Predators often use deflection, social miscues, and misinformation to provide cover for themselves. “Predatory humans” can use a contrived persona of charm and success to falsely engender trust. They have an exit plan in place, and are confident with regard to the outcome of their actions. Boiled down, they accomplish their deception using three steps: setting a goal; making a plan; and, compartmentalizing. By setting a goal, they know what they want and what it will take to get it or achieve it. They have no inhibitions about causing damage or harm. They stay focused. By making a plan, they not only determine ways to get what they want, but also develop exits if needed. By compartmentalizing, they detach themselves emotionally from attachments that might be embarrassing or be a liability if their plans are found out. They train themselves to give off no tells, so they can pivot easily into a different persona. While some might acquire this skill as Putin likely had while working in the intelligence industry, others may not have any natural sense of remorse.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (right) meeting in Geneva in January 2022. It is possible that as an element of his current gambit, Putin and Russian Foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders would likely deliberately seek to aggravate, frustrate, and provoke US officials by denying a threat to Ukraine. Through their statements, the US administration believes the threat is real. One top US official that Putin would seek to influence most by his actions would be the Secretary of State Antony Blinken. He played a prominent role in all of the rather rough approaches taken toward him and Russia during the Obama administration. Without being present, it is impossible to know if Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, perhaps obedient to possible directions from Putin, may have tried to push Blinken’s buttons so to speak in the way aforementioned. The likely consonance of Lavrov claiming there was no intent to drive Russian troops into Ukraine, yet lacking any authority to guarantee that his superior, Putin, would not order such, would imaginably be unsettling for Blinken. Perchance Lavrov would use his diplomatic acumen to artfully speak in a way to hint at compromise, to thoroughly turn Blinken’s ear in his direction, and then make a half-turn away from the correct side enough to frustrate, to perturb. In the end, it was revealed publicly that Lavrov doubled down on the demand for guarantees on NATO expansion.

Revenons à nos moutons. Without being present, it is impossible to know if Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, perhaps obedient to some possible directions from Putin, may have tried to push Blinken’s buttons so to speak in the way aforementioned. The likely consonance of Lavrov claiming there was no intent to drive Russian troops into Ukraine, yet lacking any authority to guarantee that his superior, Putin, would not order such, would imaginably be unsettling for Blinken. Perchance Lavrov would use his diplomatic acumen to artfully speak in a way to hint at compromise, to thoroughly turn Blinken’s ear in his direction, and then make a half-turn away from the correct side enough to frustrate, to perturb. In the end, Lavrov doubled down on the demand for guarantees on NATO expansion. Deeper and more subtle than what is on the surface for Blinken in such a circumstance would likely be the thought that Ukrainians at the end of all his diplomatic effort could find Russian troops sitting their laps. For him, that will not do. No prospective thought of Blinken on the whole matter would likely be more offensive than that to the extent US military units would not be involved on the ground. Ira furor brevis est; animum rege. (Anger is a brief madness; govern your soul)

Although the vicissitudes of fortune in foreign affairs and war–friction in battle–have been described many times and in many ways by statesman, commanders, and scholars over millennia, greatcharlie chooses to quote Polybius (c. 204-122 B.C.), the Greek “pragmatic historian.” As presented in Book II, Ch. 4 of The General History of Polybius [Books 1-17] Tr. by Mr. Hampton 5th Ed. (TheClassics.us, 2013), he states: “In all human affairs, and especially in those that relate to war, . . . leave always some room to fortune, and to accidents which cannot be foreseen.” Whatever position Blinken may have developed concerning his ancestral homeland’s protection, perhaps its current citizens might be seeking to recast it a bit in what they deem would be a more helpful way. During a televised speech to the nation on January 25, 2022, Zelensky urged Ukrainians not to panic. It was the second such speech on the crisis in two days. The speeches were not only in response to the situation the country faced, but also in response to what Zelensky appears to perceive as ad nauseum and unhelpful comments about an imminent threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine heard from US and other Western officials. Depicting a very trying situation facing Ukraine in a graceful way, he told Ukrainians, “We are strong enough to keep everything under control and derail any attempts at destabilization.” 

Zelensky also explained that the decision by the US, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and Canada to withdraw some of their diplomats and dependents from Kyiv “doesn’t necessarily signal an inevitable escalation and is part of a complex diplomatic game.” He went on to say tactfully, “We are working together with our partners as a single team.” Speaking in the Ukrainian Parliament also on January 25th, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that, “as of today, there are no grounds to believe” that Russia is preparing to invade imminently, noting that its troops have not formed what he called a battle group that could force its way across the border. He sought to comfort the parliamentarians by stating: “Don’t worry–sleep well,” He continued by sardonically saying: “No need to have your bags packed.” 

The indications and implications of these statements for Blinken may have been that repeatedly sounding the alarm that the “Russians are coming,” more than stoking fears of invasion among Ukrainians, was garnering considerable disfavor and rebuke from them. In this wise, it clearly appears to be the preference of his ancestral homeland to counter and handle Putin by stimulating an authentic atmosphere of cooperation. To that extent, the Ukrainian officials would surely like to douse the “madding fever” consuming its proud son over Russian moves with a bucket of ice cold water. Faber est suae quisque fortunae. (Every man is the artisan of his own fortune.) (Note as aforementioned, thoughts as these are intimations, developed in the abstract from evidence provided by official statements and newsmedia reporting.)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (left) and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (right). During a televised speech to the nation on January 25, 2022, Zelensky urged Ukrainians not to panic. It was the second such speech on the crisis in two days. The speeches were not only in response to the situation the country faced, but also in response to what Zelensky appears to perceive as ad nauseum and unhelpful comments about an imminent threat of a Russian invasion of Ukraine heard from US and other Western officials. Depicting a very trying situation facing Ukraine in a graceful way, he told Ukrainians, “We are strong enough to keep everything under control and derail any attempts at destabilization.” The indications and implications of these statements for Blinken may have been that repeatedly sounding the alarm that the “Russians are coming,” more than stoking fears of invasion among Ukrainians, was garnering disfavor and rebuke from them. On this wise, it would surely be the preference of the people leading his ancestral homeland to counter and handle Putin by stimulating an authentic atmosphere of cooperation.

Putin’s Understanding of “the US Within”

In his parsing of US policy construction before engaging in the current Ukraine enterprise, Putin doubtlessly concluded societal attitudes in the US toward himself, Russia, and military action must be considered. He likely would assess that Ukraine is a country unimportant or of no-account in their day-to-day lives. He may further assess the true level of investment with what is the vague goal of halting Russia from taking control over territory in a distant country who most would not be able to locate on a map is unknown to the US public.  With regard to the more pertinent matter of committing the US in strenuous ways to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression, support from the US public would reasonably be decidedly low. Most apposite, there would certainly be no drum roll for  committing US troops for that purpose either. If this parsing of Putin’s line of thinking at all hits the mark, certainly polling, would support any of the analysis hypothesized as being held by him. According to a Pew Research poll published on January 26, 2022 overall, 49% of US adults perceive Russia a competitor of the US. Only 41% view it is an enemy, and oddly 7% see Russia as a partner of the US. Despite evidence of increased political polarization in recent years, Republicans and Democrats apparently hold similar views of Russia’s bilateral relationship to the US. Among Republicans and Republican-leaning independents, about 50% believe Russia as a competitor to the US, and 39% call it an enemy. About 9% of Republicans feel Russia is a partner of the US. Among Democrats and Democratic leaning independents, 49% see Russia as a competitor, while 43% view it as an enemy. About 6% of Democrats say Russia is a partner of the US.

Putin would also conceivably posit that at best what is known in the US public as the great East-West geopolitical struggle begun long-ago during postwar years and the unstemmed, unsatiated predilection of dividing up the world and deciding which country stands in which bloc, for most part is the stuff of school studies where the average Joe was concerned. If anything, they are viewed as matters in the province of government officials, policy officials. The January 26, 2022 Pew Research poll also finds that about 26% in the US public perceive the Russian military buildup near Ukraine to be a major threat to US interests. Only 33% in the US public believe Russia is a minor threat to US interests. About 7% of those polled say it is not a threat at all. As it is hypothesized here about Putin’s likely assessment, 33% of the public, a noticeably large share, are unsure whether Russian actions toward Ukraine affect US interests. Impressions of Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine also do not differ much by political affiliation. Republicans 27% of Republicans consider Russia a major threat to US interests, while 36% of Republicans view it as a minor threat in that regard. A somewhat large portion, 28% of Republicans, say they are unsure how the military buildup will have an impact. Among Democrats, 26% consider Russia’s build-up a major threat to US interests, while a greater 33% view it as a minor one, despite the position of the current Democrat-led US administration. Surprisingly, despite numerous public statements made about Ukraine by the administration, about 34% of Democrats stand slightly unsure how Russia’s military buildup will affect US interests. It would seem that for the US public, Ukraine is nothing to signify. They would do nothing to discover more about the situation. Even for those somewhat interested, doing so would hardly be worth the candle.

In his parsing of US policy construction before engaging in the current Ukraine enterprise, Putin (above) doubtlessly concluded societal attitudes in the US toward himself, Russia, and military action must be considered. He likely would assess that Ukraine is a country unimportant or of no-account in their day-to-day lives. He may further assess the true level of investment with what is the vague goal of halting Russia from taking control over territory in a distant country who most would not be able to locate on a map is unknown to the US public. With regard to the more pertinent matter of committing the US in strenuous ways to Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression, support from the US public would reasonably be decidedly low. Most apposite, there would certainly be no drum roll for committing US troops for that purpose either.

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) Perhaps the worst episode of his experiences with State Department diplomats during the Obama administration was over Ukraine. Some diplomats stationed in Kyiv–names purposely excluded here–had made some very disturbing statements concerning Putin and Russia that likely seared a negative impression of State Department officials upon the Russian President. From that, one might imagine that still today, Putin may judge US foreign and national security policy officials as seeing the world strictly through the filter of their comfort. They take a high and mighty attitude toward all others. Publicly they tell the world how their interests are amplified by their values, and express concern over human rights, diversity, and global warming. Yet, privately, they are most frantic about US power and prestige, economic power foremost, and the aesthetics of its power in the world which translates into its geopolitical stance. Putin would expect them to put the US national interest first and foremost, but he may feel they take that tack with a blindness to the interests of others. On Ukraine and Taiwan, Putin hopes it will lead them down blind alleys to deadends.

To enlarge on this point, as it would concern US public opinion, State Department officials in Putin’s view, act in a world of their own, and drag the US public in directions that they for the most part are unaware of, and may disagree with, if ever consulted. As far as Putin might see, there are types in the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies who look upon members of the US public as “Hottentots,” who could hardly fathom the complexity of the policy issues, situations their high offices contend with. Putin might imagine they would hardly believe the US public could understand what kind of skill and experience is required to maneuver against, to supplant, and to negate the interests of other countries and secure that of their own. That would closely equate to what Putin might project of his sense of the condescending attitude and behavior taken toward him during the Obama administration.

Surely, Putin would enjoy aggravating any gap between what the current US administration is doing on Ukraine and what the US public presently knows about it. If the US position could be better defined for the US public, Putin would want to be the one to do that. What would lead Putin to believe he would have a chance now at Influencing US public opinion would be his likely assessment that the Biden administration, as he may perceive has been pattern in the US administrations he has dealt with over two decades, would not want the US public to be fully aware of what is happening, what is being done about Ukraine ostensibly in their interests. Putin would certainly be following polls of the US public, too. Data directly on the point of public attention in the US to the Ukraine crisis from the January 26, 2022 Pew Research poll confirms that public interest has been very limited. While 23% of those from the US public surveyed say they have heard a lot about the deployment of Russian troops near Ukraine, a greater 45% have heard a little about the military build up, and 32% say they have heard nothing about it.

Using whatever medium might be made available and capitalizing on any popularity he may retain as an international figure, he may again seek to pitch his facts, his perception of the realities of the Ukraine matter to the US public. To be a bit more specific, Putin might express why Russia feels as it does about the situation, and what it feels it must do without security guarantees. Surely, it would be loaded with history from the Russian perspective, that any citizen living in Russia would dare not disagree with. Putin would hold out hope that the right choices will be made by the political leaders in the US. His hope would be that he will, using a diplomatic tone and soft phrases, stealthily scare the US public straight and make a lasting impression upon them, albeit a decidedly frightening one. Responding in a manner that he would doubtlessly suggest in his communication, he would hope the public will contact their Congressional Representatives and Senators, and repeat the facts and views he would have supplied them with. The ultimate hope for Putin would be to have encouraged Members of Congress to contact the White House and State Department to suggest “a better course” to Biden and top foreign and national security policy officials.

Recall that Putin attempted to reach the US public to shape opinions on Russia more than once. In a September 13, 2013 New York Times editorial entitled “A Plea for Caution,” Putin reached out to the US public concerning what he then perceived as the problematic nature of Washington’s policy approach to Syria and problems that could have been expected or possibly might have been avoided if a better path would have been chosen. He apparently believed then,  as very likely does now, that because of a perceived disinterest and disregard of public opinion in the US in foreign affairs, there was space for him to jump in to insinuate his views among the people. Misreading or miscalculation, he actually made the attempt. (See greatcharlie’s August 31, 2014 post which analyzes Putin’s 2013 editorial.) Prior to that editorial, Putin published November 14, 1999 op-ed in the New York Times, justifying Russia’s military action in Chechnya which at great cost re-established government control of the breakaway province. Putin was so concerned with shaping opinions in the US that doing so apparently in part impelled his efforts to interfere with the 2016 US Presidential Election. 

When he became Russian Federation President in 2000, he was mistakenly viewed in the West as shy, self-effacing despite his willingness to give interviews, make speeches, and publish writings, including a book entitled, First Person. An experienced national leader and well-practiced speaker, he seems more eager than ever to offer his views in public. Data directly on the point of public attention in the US to the Ukraine crisis from a January 26, 2022 Pew Research poll confirms that public interest has been very limited. While 23% of those from the US public surveyed say they have heard a lot about the deployment of Russian troops near Ukraine, a greater 45% have heard a little about the military build up, and 32% say they have heard nothing about it. Surely, Putin would enjoy aggravating any gap between what the current US administration is doing on Ukraine and what the US public knows about it. If the US position could be better defined for the US public, surely Putin would like to be the one to do that.

The Way Forward

Ita durus eras ut neque amore neque precibus molliri posses. (You were so unfeeling that you could be softened neither by love nor by prayers.) No senior Western official has publicly made the argument that Putin has lost his mind, nor has any provided evidence, even circumstantial evidence, that would lead one to believe some dramatic change in his mental health has occurred. To that extent, one might conclude no matter how disagreeable, deplorable his actions may be, it is accepted that he is behaving in a logical, quite sane manner. Moving comfortably in the reality of a leader as Putin is no mean feat. Few national leaders have had an authentic, natural rapport with him. That was not a shortcoming on their part, simply a reality as a result of their respective life experiences. Many Western governments view working with Putin on the Ukraine crisis, which they say he caused, as an undesirable task. Still, like it or not, that is the job at hand, and it can be successfully handled. Putin has some grievances, and says he wants to get them resolved. 

Standing strong and fast, assured of the correctness of one’s positions, one’s righteousness, is a good thing. On the other hand, posturing, pride and ego do a poor job at concealing insecurities. In this particular crisis, the elimination of insecurities on both sides will be central to its resolution. 

What needs to be created is a sustainable balance of power that advances US, United Kingdom, EU, Ukrainian, and the better parts of Russian interests to promote peace and security and foster collaboration. It would be most beneficial and virtuous for all parties involved to work together to construct clear agreements, improve ties, and accomplish even more. Superficial approaches to achieving an agreement, mere appearances of taking action that lack materiality, that are elaborate and useless, must be avoided. Such fruitless efforts will end up aggravating the situation. This episode may have actually opened the door to healing wounds, to solving problems that have only been bandaged to this point. Opportunity is not easily offered, but it is easily and easily lost. Hopefully, the parties involved will make the most of this opportunity. Casus ubique valet, semper tibi pendeat hamus. Quo minime credas gurgite piscis erit. (There is scope for chance everywhere, let your hook be always ready. In the eddies where you least expect it, there will be a fish.)

Commentary: A US-North Korea Denuclearization Agreement, if Reached, Must Not Be Left Open to Destruction by Others

North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un with his country’s future, its children, at youth rally (above). Resolution of the decades long face-off between North Korea and the US, South Korea, and Japan may not assure peace Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s northern neighbors might react poorly to a denuclearization agreement. More specifically, the Russian Federation might view the new link between North Korea and the US as a troubling manipulation of Pyongyang, leading to a US encroachment toward its borders. Hypothetically in response, Moscow might create a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and the Korean Peninsula by grabbing North Korean territory. Without deterrent power, Pyongyang may not be able to prevent that. Those engaged in the denuclearization negotiations should give consideration to this possibility as such a scenario could bust everything they might achieve.

What US President Donald Trump wants from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) is the same end product that was at the root of his decision to talk with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un in 2018: denuclearization, the end of long-range missile development, the continued return of US remains from the Korean War, and dependability. In exchange, Kim would be assured the mitigation of economic pressure, to include draconian sanctions implemented under a maximum pressure campaign, that has had a considerable deleterious effect not only upon North Korea’s economy but its existence. Additionally, Trump has assured that the prospective partnership with the US would be a long-term and a robust path toward economic vitalization, backed by the experience of Trump and the largess of the US. Indeed, the US would be prepared to support the economic transformation of North Korea, supporting not only the growth of its industrial capabilities and capacity, but introduce North Korean firms to new techniques and technologies for efficient and high quality production. Further, the US would encourage new investment in North Korea from other industrialized countries, to include its neighbors, South Korea and Japan, both of whom it currently views as adversaries. What is being presented to North Korea is the choice to be something other than a stranger, or worse, an outcast, to the rest of the world. Even so, throughout 2019, demurs and objections were heard from senior officials of the North Korean Foreign Ministry. Their comments appeared to echo a speech by Kim at the 1st Meeting of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, on April 12, 2019, during which he indicated a willingness to negotiate “on the condition that [the US] has the right attitude and seeks a solution that we can share.” Kim further stated at the Supreme People’s Assembly that he would “wait patiently until the end of the year for the United States to make a bold decision.” Kim’s words were uttered long before he and Trump met impromptu at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Panmunjom on June 30, 2019, but they nevertheless seem to have stuck within the North Korean foreign policy apparatus. In Washington, it all rings bells, reminding of the past and raising questions whether Pyongyang’s ways of thinking and doing things are trapped in amber. For the sake of the negotiations and their potential for enhancing global peace and security, one should hope that is not the case.

Resolution of the decades long face-off between North Korea and the US, South Korea, and Japan, however, may not assure peace on Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s neighbors immediately to its north, China and the Russian Federation, may not react well in the wake of a denuclearization agreement. Based on what it has declared to be its strategic interests, the Russian Federation in particular, might view the new link between North Korea and the US as a threat, and that Washington was simply manipulating Pyongyang in order to move closer to the Russian Federation’s borders. Hypothetically, Moscow might decide to create a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and the Korean Peninsula by grabbing North Korea’s sovereign territory to halt any perceived encroachment by the US. Without deterrent power, it is hard to see how Pyongyang on its own could keep the Russian Federation off its land. Under President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation has displayed a propensity for maligned behavior. There is still a chance fate will bring a denuclearization agreement as envisioned by Trump, all of North Korea’s neighbors will put down the shutters and accept the new development, and the Russian Federation, in particular, will show restraint. That would be ineffable. Nevertheless, if there is a chance that everything might not land quietly and gracefully, requisite caution must be shown now by the negotiating parties. Trump must be on guard.

This is the ninth in a line of occasional commentaries concerning the Trump-Kim diplomacy on denuclearization published by greatcharlie since August 2017. An enchantment on the matter and support and enthusiasm for the effort has stimulated the preoccupation. Through its commentaries, greatcharlie has sought to put together the arithmetic of what both sides, the US and North Korea, are doing on the matter. In this commentary, greatcharlie emphasizes that realism must be a key ingredient to the diplomatic process on denuclearization. Nothing discussed here should sound extravagant in today’s world. Together the US and North Korea must open the figurative box from which all the essential qualities and ingredients for a longstanding, sustainable peace are released, and at the same time avoid releasing the makings of conflict from another direction. Both sides must really look at the situation diligently, not dismissing unpleasant possibilities, to ensure negotiators do not construct an agreement that may not serve either side’s purposes in the long-run. Through such a reflective approach, greater unity of purpose and action can grow between the negotiating parties, and the viable and sustainable peace sought more likely will be found. Certum est quod certum reddi potest. (It is certain, whatever can be rendered certain.)Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (right). China and the Russian Federation for the moment may reasonably assured that they can cause Kim to shy away from a denuclearization agreement with the US would not pose difficulties. From what has been seen from the surface so far In terms of its economic well-being, Pyongyang has displayed a curious sort of faith in Beijing and Moscow. Despite sanctions, embargoed financial, energy, and other industrial resources mainly come into the country through various schemes set up by Kim’s Chinese and Russian friends. Putin and Xi control North Korea’s links to the outside world to the extent that its people’s very survival already rests in their hands. Kim can allow that to go on, or seek a better path for his country.

A Concern from Outside the Box or from Left Field?

One might conclude that there is an almost inherent connection, a natural affinity, between North Korea, China, and the Russian Federation. The defunct Soviet Union, the original, unholy bastion of Communism, Marxist-Leninism, and Socialism, was the model from which North Korea structured its government. As it is the first and largest Communist government in Asia, there is much that North Korea has mirrored in a cultural sense from China. In support of Kim’s grandfather and hero, Kim Il-sung, the Soviet Union provided not only weapons, equipment and training for North Korean forces during the Korean War, but also provided Soviet soldiers and airmen to engage covertly in combat operations. The Russian Federation, a former Soviet republic, was at the center of the collapsed superpower, and to a degree has taken on from the Soviet Union the image of caretaker for North Korea. Nevertheless, China’s commitment to its North Korean ally during the war was even greater than that of the Soviet Union in terms of blood and treasure. China has really been the country’s steward and economic lifeline.

Alieno more vivendum est mihi. (I must live according to another’s whim.) China and the Russian Federation for the moment may reasonably assured that it would not pose difficulties to cause Kim to shy away from a denuclearization agreement with the US. Indeed, If Kim possesses any doubts that an agreement would not lead to North Korea moving up and away from the status quo, one might assume the two countries can quietly interfere and exert influence on Kim. From what has been seen from the surface so far In terms of its well-being economically, Pyongyang has shown a curious sort of faith in both Beijing and Moscow. Despite sanctions, embargoed financial, energy, and other industrial resources apparently can still slip into the country through various schemes set up by Kim’s Chinese and Russian friends. Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping control North Korea’s links to the outside world to the extent that its people’s very survival pretty much rests in their hands. Kim can allow things to go on as they are and bend to the will of China and the Russian Federation, or seek a far better path for his country. It would reasonable for him to prefer the later. Having ambition is not an offense.

To the extent that officials in China and the Russian Federation feel North Korea is their ball to play with, an agreement that would create firm, lasting ties of friendship between the US and North Korea would likely stick in their throats. If unable to disrupt, divert, and displace Trump’s efforts with Kim before an agreement is signed, one or both may decide to pose a threat to the agreement afterward. China may just desire to make things a bit more difficult for Kim if he moves alongside the US. However, Beijing knows where to draw the line. The Russian Federation might do far more, which is the point of interest here. As alluded to earlier, at some point, Putin might order Russian Federation forces to move into North Korea’s sovereign territory with the objective of creating a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and the Korean Peninsula. The goal would be to set a limit to the likely perceived encroachment by the US. After its nuclear arsenal might potentially be evacuated under the terms of a denuclearization agreement. North Korea would lack the deterrent power to scare away a Russuan Federation move onto its territory, and could become the victim of just that. A conventional response might also be less feasible as the bulk of North Korea’s conventional forces may continue to face south near the DMZ for a while even after a denuclearization agreement is reached. Korean People’s Army forces of sufficient power are not presently deployed north in a manner to fend off an attempted land grab by the Russian Federation.

The prospective area that might be targeted by Putin for capture is the Hamgyöng Bukto (North Hamgyong) Province. It borders the Russian Federation along approximately 29 kilometers of the Tumen River. The province borders China to its northwest and to its east is the Sea of Japan. A rocket launching site is located at Musudan-ri. The Hoeryong concentration camp is also located in the province. It has some value as a line of access by rail to Russia. However, since no customs area exists there, most bilateral trade between North Korea and the Russian Federation moves first through China, raising costs. Ironically, the border with the Russian Federation, having no huge benefit to Pyongyang for years, could become a liability as a point from which hostile forces could seize the province. The Russian Federation Navy could land significant numbers of forces at Chongjin. The capability and capacity of the Russian Federation armed forces to conduct such an operation was well-demonstrated during their Zapad 2017, Vostok 2018, and Tsentr 2019 exercises.Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Observing Washington getting cozy with Pyongyang has doubtlessly stirred a some sense of trepidation in the Kremlin. Putin has already demonstrated how he responds when he feels a country formerly in the Soviet orbit, is being entertained by the West.  Putin does not want any country friendly with US sharing the Russian Federation’s border without creating some type of buffer zone within that country, if it can. It does not seem too far off from a truism to state that Putin has a penchant for placing Russian Federation forces in other countries, even without welcome. Considering the possibility of an extreme reaction, a military incursion by the Russian Federation into North Korea, would not be out of court.

The View from Russia

Observing Washington getting cozy with Pyongyang has doubtlessly stirred a some sense of trepidation in the Kremlin. If Pyongyang turned toward Washington, Putin might feel Moscow had been figuratively stabbed in the back after having provided North Korea with assistance and support for decades. In terms of his personal relationship with Kim, Putin may feel a deep sense of betrayal. Putin has shown how he will respond when he feels a country formerly in the Soviet orbit, is being pulled toward the West.  Putin does not want any country friendly with US either sharing, or even touching the Russian Federation’s border without creating some type of buffer zone within that country, if it can. (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are lucky that NATO got on top of their situation right away!) Kim and the Workers’ Party of Korea would have the North Korean people believe that their country is a fortress from south to north. A robust, whirlwind of an attack by Russian Federation forces by air, land, and sea, would very likely be able to rapidly displace or destroy any North Korean forces much as a whirlwind has the ability to uproot the staunchest oak tree. On the other hand, if Russian Federation forces are able to act with sufficient stealth and surprise, and–as was the case with Crimea–without any “bang and boom”, they may be able to capture North Hamgyong Province without a struggle. As with Crimea, they may be able to “accommodate” Korean People’s Army troops deployed in the province, perhaps even taking them back to the Russian Federation “to ensure their safety.” Mala mens, malus animus! (Bad mind, bad designs!)

Putin would likely offer some pretense that would “legitimize” the hypothetical incursion. For example, he could conceivably declare that North Hamgyong Province is the territory of the Russian Federation granted by some long-held document signed by Kim Il-sung that was sitting inert in some Russian Federation Foreign Ministry file. Alternatively, Putin might outline how records indicate a monumental, decades old debt is owed to the Russian Federation by North Korea. Alternatively, by entering North Hamgyong, Putin may claim the Russian Federation has taken an in-kind repayment territory of what it calculates should cover the outstanding balance. Then again, Putin might attempt to claim a Russian Federation incursion into the area was executed for humanitarian reasons, shocked by what was being said by former detainees in Moscow about atrocities taking place in the infamous Hoeryong concentration camp. If former detainees are not available, Moscow would find some. Under the second and third scenarios, Putin could leave the door open as to whether the Russian Federation land grab was temporary or permanent.

Long before Trump declared his intent to campaign for the US Presidency, the Russian Federation was concerned with the figurative noose being placed around it by US bilateral relationship building with countries on its borders. That thinking is reflective of the Russian Federation’s defense doctrine as articulated by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov. Recall that on February 14, 2013 at a conference entitled “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” Gerasimov provided the first glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The clever boots on the Russian Federation General Staff assessed that future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.”  Indeed, they concluded the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders proffered that outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may actually invade the Russian Federation from different directions to physically grab its territory and resources. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. That plan, and later variations of it, have guided Russia’s thinking on defense and defense spending since 2016, during which it exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, and on other national security related and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. Further, the 2016 plan has guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine. The Russian Federation’s Syria operation is also part of that picture.The prospective area that might be targeted by Putin for capture is the Hamgyöng Bukto (North Hamgyong) Province. Enlarging the map above, one can see the province in the northeast corner of North Korea. It borders the Russian Federation along 18 miles of the Tumen River. The province borders China to its northwest and the Sea of Japan to its east. The border with the Russian Federation could become a key point from which Russian Federation forces could seize the province. The Russian Federation Navy could also land significant numbers of troops at Chongjin. The Russian Federation armed forces’ capability to conduct such an operation was demonstrated by their Zapad 2017, Vostok 2018, and Tsentr 2019 exercises.

Putin Will Take Risks

The hypothetical offered here should have a realistic feel because history has been used as a guide to develop it. Rational inferences are made from what Putin has been saying and doing. For example, with regard to Ukraine, what cannot be forgotten is the text of a lengthy call that Putin had with US President Barack Obama on March 6, 2014, Putin said Ukraine’s government came to power as the result of an “unconstitutional coup” and was “imposing an entirely illegitimate decision onto Crimea and the eastern and southeastern regions of Ukraine. Russia cannot ignore calls for help on this matter and is responding accordingly in full compliance with international law.“ On another occasion, Putin insisted that he was only acting in response to Western behavior toward Russia. When speaking about Ukraine at a conference in Moscow on April 16, 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu explained: “The United States and its allies have crossed all possible lines in their drive to bring Kiev into their orbit. That could not have failed to trigger our reaction.” It does not seem too far off from a truism to state that Putin has a penchant for placing Russian Federation forces in other countries, even without welcome. For that reason, despite the drain on its defense budget, the Russian Federation currently has its troops sitting in the sovereign territory of others, to include: Armenia; Belarus; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Moldova; Syria; Tajikistan; Vietnam; and, at least a far as Kiev is concerned, Ukraine. Among the countries on that list who have reluctantly accepted the Russian presence or who have very publicly and vigorously demanded that Russia leave their territory are: Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Belarus has grumbled about its Russian “guests”. Thereby, as denuclearization agreement would mean Pyongyang was moving closer to Washington, North Korea could definitely meet the same fate as the countries mentioned. Thus, conceptualizing a possible military incursion into North Korea by the Russian Federation is not out of court.

The Russian Federation is not the only country that has insisted upon placing its troops in another country without welcome in order to shape the situation within it. Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan had a near ravenous desire to carve out a 32 kilometer deep and 480 kilometers wide buffer zone along the entire Turkish border with Syria. Through Operation Peace Spring, Erdogan hoped to establish a safe area in his planned buffer zone for millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey. He also planned in undertaking what he declared to be a counterterrorism operation. Once Turkish forces moved into the autonomous Kurdish territory in Syria, understanding that there would be heavy fighting with the Syrian Kurd People’s Protection Units, militias affiliated with the sworn enemy of the Turkish government, the Kurdistan Workers Party which has been at war with Turkey for decades. Turkey amassed nearly 15,000 Turkish forces along with 14,000 fighters of the Syrian National Army attacked Syria on October 9, 2019. Recall that on December 19  2003, then Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi agreed to voluntarily eliminate his country’s weapons of mass destruction programs, to include its nuclear weapons program which was initiated in 1969 when he took control of Libya’s government. He also agreed to limit Libyan missiles to range no greater than 300 kilometers. US President George Bush stated at the time: “With today’s announcement by its leader, Libya has begun the process of rejoining the community of nations. And Colonel Gaddafi knows the way forward Libya should carry out the commitments announced today.” However, from March 19, 2011 to October 31, 2011, under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973, the Obama administration led NATO forces and those other countries under Operation Unified Protector against Gaddafi regime. The multinational force imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and destroyed government forces loyal to Gaddafi in support local fighters that eventually overthrew Gaddafi and killed him on October 20, 2011 alongside a road. (In just mentioning Libya’s elimination of its nuclear weapons, greatcharlie feels it is stepping out on shaky ground. On May 13, 2018, the matter was publicly discussed by the former US National Security Adviser John Bolton while details of the June 12, 2018 Trump and Kim Singapore Summit were still being negotiated by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Indeed, Bolton made the unhelpful suggestion that the “Libya model” of denuclearization could be applied to North Korea, which would require it to eliminate all of its nuclear weapons before it receives economic sanctions relief and other support for it economic vitalization. Much to the dismay of Trump, Bolton’s public suggestion placed the summit in jeopardy somewhat.)

Without reservation, greatcharlie believes that nuclear nonproliferation is the correct direction in which the world should move. Having stated that, and with no intention of being whimsical about the matter, perhaps if Gaddafi had hypothetically retained his nuclear program, even at the aspiring stage it was in when he surrendered it, he would still be alive and in power in Tripoli. In that same vein, one might let oneself go and suggest if Kiev by chance had kept nuclear weapons under its control, Crimea would unlikely have fallen and the Donbass would be less of a mess. Outlining how hypothetically Ukraine could have plausibly retained those weapons would require adding a complicated coda to this section, completely unsuited in size for this commentary. What actually occurred is Ukraine agreed to divest itself of all nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure in accord with the Lisbon Protocol In 1992, along with considerable diplomatic effort and political maneuvering, By 1996, Ukraine had returned all of its nuclear warheads to Russia in exchange for economic aid and security assurances, and it became a non-nuclear weapon state party to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The last strategic nuclear delivery vehicle in Ukraine was eliminated in 2001 under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. At the time it declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine held the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, including an estimated 1,800 strategic warheads, 176 long-range ballistic missiles, and 42 strategic bombers.A transit map of North Korea’s North Hamgyong Province (above). In a scenario involving a Russian Federation land grab, Kim might turn toward Beijing to encourage Moscow to withdraw and initiate diplomacy on the matter. However, China would unlikely want to tear itself away from peace over a situation facing North Korea. Indeed, China would likely insist that Pyongyang created the hypothetical situation with Moscow by establishing a relationship with the US. China may not be tied to any strategic alliance with the Russian Federation, but it still has a defense and security partnership of a sort with it. Although that cooperation may not be tied to fixed shared interests, in this hypothetical instance, what is good for the Russian Federation–keeping the US off its border and knocking down the denuclearization agreement–would be good for China, too!

Preparing for the Worst

Kim has always had much to worry about from Putin. It stands out a mile. For that reason, North Korea and its prospective US partner should at least consider the potential of a very aggressive Russian Federation reaction as an important “what if”. The matter merits treatment. Ways to prevent it from happening should be considered, and plans should be developed on how to use means available in response. The lack of right discernment on this hypothetical matter could lead to untold suffering. Unless greatcharlie is extremely mistaken, as far as Pyongyang might be concerned, the most plausible way to cope with the matter, would likely be to maintain some level of deterrent nuclear capability. Washington would hardly want to hear anything of the kind. Nevertheless, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and medium-range nuclear capable missiles alone are military equities it possesses that Moscow may want no part of. Readying those systems for launch could coincide with any discernible build up of Russian Federation forces near or along the northern border. That may have a deterrent effect. If some means to make a Russian incursion impossible or unprofitable is not available, attempting to respond before or after an attack has begun will unlikely amount to much

As has been witnessed, the best available option for the US after the fact in response to the Russian Federation’s incursion into Ukraine has been to train Ukrainian government forces and equip them with a limited set of weapons, mainly anti-tank javelin systems. That effort could only attenuate the considerable tactical advantages that Donetsk and Luhansk secessionist forces possessed as a result of being fully supported by Russia. Indeed, the tank-busting javelins along with tactical training from both US and European military advisers may have enhanced the chances of survival for the Ukraine government forces on the battlefield, but they have not allowed Kiev to successfully defeat or eject Russian and Russian-backed forces from the Donbass. Crimea remains firmly in the Russian Federation’s hands.

There is the possibility that preemptive diplomacy, right now, could successfully assuage concerns about a potential Russian Federation military incursion into response to a denuclearization agreement. That would not mean including Moscow in the diplomatic process of denuclearization to prevent it from engaging in malicious behavior. Although there is plenty available from which one can make inferences, Moscow has not as yet said or done anything directly that would indicate an intention to move into North Korea and create a hypothetical buffer zone across their mutual border. In fact, Russia may never do anything of the sort in the end. Still, there is no reason to wait and see on a matter that could potentially keep an agreement from being fully realized. Accordingly, as a reasonable precaution, Washington may want to broach the matter with Moscow, explaining that its concerns stemmed from its past actions.

The US-North Korea relationship might very well grow into something very special. Still, it is unlikely that in a time soon after the signing of a prospective denuclearization agreement that the Communist regime in Pyongyang, with its self-reliant identity, would seek recourse from Trump and the US to find the answer to a hypothetical Russian Federation military incursion into North Hamgyong. On a personal level, Trump undoubtedly would want to see Kim through his troubles. However, if North Korea is unable to fend off a land grab north, it is unclear what exactly the US could do effectively to repair the situation after the fact. Attempting to drive Russia out of North Korea with economic sanctions in response to a hypothetical incursion may not prove fruitful. That tack has not worked most obviously with its incursion into Ukraine. Pointing out what is obvious, a decision by the US to go toe to toe with Russia with thermonuclear weapons over North Korea would be daylight madness. That would hardly be a genuine option. The chance that any US President would alternatively throw US forces into a conventional fight with the Russian Federation over North Korea’s North Hamgyong Province is less than zero.Imagery of the Russian Federation-North Korea border along the Tumen River with an area of detail showing a railroad bridge across the river (above). Conceivably, Putin may find reason to declare North Hamgyong Province is the territory of the Russian Federation as granted by some document signed by Kim Il-sung that was sitting inert in some Russian Federation Foreign Ministry file. Alternatively, Putin might outline how records indicate a decades old debt is owed by North Korea to the Russian Federation. Putin may claim by entering North Hamgyong, Moscow had taken an in-kind repayment in territory of what it calculates should cover the outstanding balance. Then again, Putin might also attempt to claim an incursion into the area was for humanitarian reasons, given the infamous Hoeryong concentration camp is located in the province.

For Kim, a scenario involving a Russian Federation land grab would be a nightmare. It would also likely be the first occasion when Kim would have a palpable sense of separation from Moscow, and plenty of anxiety would come with that. Kim would never consider capitulation to whom would then be an erstwhile ally. However, dazed and confused by an inundation of likely negative reports about the situation in North Hamgyong, Kim may initially run toward what is familiar. Kim might turn toward Beijing and press it to encourage Moscow to withdraw and initiate diplomacy on the matter. Under such a scenario, China certainly would not want to tear itself away from peace over a situation facing North Korea. Indeed, Beijing would likely take the position that Pyongyang created the hypothetical situation with Moscow by establishing a historic, new relationship with the US. Thus, unwilling to knock on Putin’s door on behalf of its close ally, Beijing’s advice to Pyongyang would likely be “Talk to Moscow!” China may not be tied to any strategic alliance with the Russian Federation, but it still has a defense and security partnership of a sort with it. Although that cooperation may not be tied to fixed shared interests, in this hypothetical instance, what is good for the Russian Federation–keeping the US off its border and knocking down the denuclearization agreement–would be good for China, too! Understanding Putin, Beijing would likely have parsed out the whole matter early on, imagining Putin getting his nose out of joint about a denuclearization agreement, and never ruling out a military incursion. China would likely find it quite imaginable under such a hypothetical that Moscow would expect Pyongyang to rush to the negotiation table despite any fighting that may be underway. To prevent an unanticipated response from China, in such a hypothetical scenario, Moscow presumably would quietly inform Beijing of its planned action and intentions just before any prospective military operation began. Beijing would also undoubtedly place the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Liberation Air Force units near North Korea’s North Hamgyong Province on alert just in case Moscow’s operation went beyond its expressed purpose and scope. From those who have proven to be false one can rarely obtain anything true.

Tu si hic sis, aliter sentias. (If you were in my place, you would think differently.) Pyongyang would hardly be concerned with keeping any prospective new US-North Korea relationship intact if the most senior officials there were convinced the denuclearization agreement was the fillip for a Russian Federation attack. Indeed, a possible consequence of a Russian Federation incursion might be that Pyongyang would turn its back on the US. Under tremendous stress and not thinking clearly, Kim may very likely wonder whether Trump had considered the contingency. Moreover, Kim might conclude that Trump may have actually predicted what would issue with Putin following a denuclearization agreement and sought the agreement knowing North Korea would eventually be left open to attack. If that were to become his mindset, potentially, Kim might even begin to behave once again in a belligerent manner toward Trump, and might once again begin using over-the-top language. That would most likely signal the point at which Kim will have made the decision to negotiate with Moscow on terms for the withdrawal of Russian Federation forces from North Korea’s northern province. With a dodgy leader as Kim, anything might be possible in such a situation.

One could imagine under the hypothetical here that Putin might plan to use force only temporarily in order to drive officials in Pyongyang to quickly resolve the matter to the negotiating table. At the table, Putin’s goal would be to thoroughly destroy the denuclearization agreement and have North Korea make amends for its sin by cutting the cord with the US. Perchance as an artifice, Putin may insist upon a multilateral effort to deal with the North Korean nuclear program. That would likely mean putting the matter before the UN Security Council. Note that using military force to drive countries to the negotiating table was also a favored stratagem of the Obama administration. If Moscow and Pyongyang might have an inkling that they could get away with it, to quell international condemnation of the Russian Federation over a hypothetical military incursion, they might offer a story about some mix-up in timing occurred over a movement by Russian Federation troops to North Korea for a planned joint exercise. They would deny any disharmony existed. In that vein, Pyongyang would probably keep the North Korean people in the dark about the hypothetical incursion. Pyongyang would very likely refrain from making any official reports of the embarrassing episode, hoping it could resolve the matter quickly, and make the whole thing go away.

One could imagine further, under the hypothetical put forward here, that Putin, the maestro himself, might calculate an incursion into North Hamgyong would create political confusion and disarray in Pyongyang. Prospective talks with Moscow in such a situation might take place with or without Kim at the helm in Pyongyang. Kim might even have the courage or insanity to throw the Korean People’s Army into fight with Russian Federation forces. Nevertheless, likely being incapable of ejecting the invaders from the sovereign territory of North Korea, Kim would live under a frightful cloud. He would unlikely be absolved of responsibility for the possible crisis. He could possibly be seen within the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea as inciting the Russian Federation’s action with his denuclearization agreement. A scenario can be imagined in which Kim would no longer be considered fit to serve as the North Korean Communist Movement’s figurative lodestar. The Workers’ Party of Korea might decide to replace him. That would be harder to conceal, but if they did so, they would try to present a plausible reason for the change. Surely there are those in Pyongyang with designs on Kim’s spot. (Note that no matter how things fall, war, peace, or a leadership change, both the Russian Federation and China would be beneficiaries of the success of the US in getting North Korea to denuclearize.)Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Unable to do anything to rectify the hypothetical situation proffered here, Pyongyang would hardly be concerned with keeping any prospective new US-North Korea relationship intact if it indeed was the cause for a Russian Federation attack. One could imagine under the hypothetical proffered here that Putin might plan to use of force only temporarily in order to drive officials in Pyongyang to quickly resolve the matter to the negotiating table. At the table, the goal would be to thoroughly destroy the denuclearization agreement with the US. Perhaps as an artifice, Putin may insist upon a multilateral effort to deal with the North Korean nuclear program.

Matters Pyongyang Should Address in the Diplomatic Process on Denuclearization

Abundans cautela non nocet. (Abundant caution does not harm.) Policymakers and negotiators from the US and North Korea can use available time to think through what to do in such a hypothetical North Hamgyong-grab by Russia. It would seem akin to daylight madness to ignore what might very well knock down whatever might be constructed. Pyongyang supposedly understands Moscow. Therefore, it surely understands that Moscow only sees it as a junior partner, not equal to it. If Pyongyang truly intends to move in the direction of the US, it is hard to imagine North Korean officials would not expect some problems from Moscow. It is unknown to greatcharlie whether North Korea has broached the possibility of a military incursion by the Russian Federation at the table with US negotiators or Pompeo. There has not been any news media reporting concerning the matter. If they have not broached such an important issue, the indications and implications may be that Pyongyang was being disingenuous about its interest in denuclearization and North Korea’s economic vitalization. What their real intentions are, might be put into question. On the other hand, it is imaginable that North Korean foreign and national security officials possibly may not be cleared to discuss what may very well be a sensitive matter for Pyongyang: the Russian Federation’s reaction to a denuclearization agreement! It may be a matter, a secret, only for the purview of Kim and members of the Central Committee. The thing about secrets is that outsiders very rarely know what they are. If US negotiators are not willing to broach and fully address this matter with their North Korean counterparts, they may be setting the stage for failure, taking a huge gamble with something extremely important. There would exist an element of superficiality to the negotiations. If the North Koreans clam up in response to their inquiry, US negotiators could respectfully request that their counterparts seek clarification and instructions on the matter from Pyongyang. It may turn out that the matter would need to be broached at the highest level: Trump and Kim.

If ever North Korean negotiators are queried about their country’s concerns over an aggressive Russian Federation reaction to Kim signing a denuclearization agreement with the US, and they are willing to respond, common sense would demand that they completely outline security concerns Pyongyang feels the new situation might create. It would be the best time to explain any concerns that voiding themselves of nuclear weapons to the point in which they would not have any deterrent nuclear power at all would inherently dangerous, having China and the Russian Federation as neighbors. At that point, US negotiators must be able to offer real solutions to mitigate the North Koreans concerns. If North Korean negotiators, once queried, fail to speak forthrightly, and answer “Who is this Putin fellow to whom you keep referring?” or something to that effect, US negotiators would be provided with a real sense of Pyongyang’s genuineness. North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un observes weapons test (above). If Pyongyang truly intends to move in the direction of the US, it is hard to imagine North Korean officials would not expect some problems from Putin. It is unknown to greatcharlie whether North Korea has broached the possibility of a military incursion by the Russian Federation at the table with US negotiators or Pompeo. There has not been any news media reporting concerning the matter. Policymakers and negotiators from the US and North Korea can use available time to think through what to do in such a hypothetical North Hamgyong-grab by Russia. It would be daylight madness to ignore what could knock down whatever might be constructed.

Suggestions

Quoniam id fieri quod visit non potest, velis id quod possit. (As that which you wish cannot be effected, you should wish for that which may be obtained.) A desire by Kim to retain the ability to deter any sudden, rogue moves by China or Russia, would be the most plausible reason he could offer for retaining his existing nuclear arsenal. If maintaining a portion of its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent becomes a sticking point, one option may be to allow a phased reduction of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal that will eventually result in its complete elimination. (The immediate elimination of North Korea’s long-range missile program must remain a US stipulation.) At the same time, an alternate means for North Korea to secure its northern border could be phased in place. A demonstration of unity might include an offer to have US, South Korean, and Japanese forces of sufficient size and capability to participate in a type of “peace force” that would accompany Korean People’s Army on patrols North Korea’s northern border. While the international troops may not serve as a deterrent to a Russian Federation incursion, they would make a swift, stealthy move far more difficult. Alternatively, Washington could reach an agreement with Pyongyang, under which it would share intelligence on any developments in the Russian Federation that may indicate some ominous military and naval deployments were under way. That alternative would most likely be far more palatable to the North Koreans. While that would be happening, some US and South Korean in phases and at a deliberate pace, could move away from the DMZ, much as Russian Federation forces withdrew from Germany after reunification. US forces could be reallocated to other points in South Korea from which they could continue to reassure allies of the US commitment to their defense and continue to effectively preserve Northeast Asian peace and security.

As aforementioned, nuclear nonproliferation is the correct way for the world to go. Another option that may be very off-putting to US officials would be to allow North Korea to retain a portion of its nuclear arsenal after a phased reduction to serve as a deterrent. That deterrent power must be specified publicly to ensure that the small number of weapons retained would have a deterrent effect. In Washington, there would likely be a political backlash over walking back from the initial demand for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in North Korea. To ameliorate concerns about that in a practical way, some additional specific steps that could be taken. If the North Koreans could put their suspicions and distrust aside, on-site joint US, North Korean, South Korean, and Japanese inspection teams could be deployed where the nuclear deterrent would be kept in North Korea. As part of the larger denuclearization agreement, military liaison offices could be created in North Korea, South Korea, and Japan for military officers of all countries involved in maintaining peace and security on the Korea Peninsula which would facilitate the deployment of those inspection teams. The prospective North Korean military liaison officers would also have the right to make escorted visits to one another’s bases in the region. An open skies arrangement with regard to flyovers by aerial reconnaissance and surveillance satellites of all sides should be agreed to in additional to physical inspections by prospective military liaison officers. As suggested in the first option, it could also be proposed that US, South Korean, and Japanese forces of sufficient size and capability  serve as a type of “peace force” to patrol the North Korea’s northern border in cooperation with the Korean People’s Army. As an alternative here too, Washington could reach an agreement with Pyongyang, under which it would share intelligence on any developments in the Russian Federation that may indicate some odd, threatening military and naval deployments were under way. With high expectations about their inventiveness, negotiators could certainly devise additional steps to create a more secure situation.

A third option might be for the US to provide Pyongyang with an assessment of the likelihood that the Russian Federation might seek to establish a buffer zone on North Korean territory in reaction to a denuclearization agreement. In following, the suggestion might also be made to Pyongyang that in conjunction with eliminating nuclear weapons from its arsenal, military equities once organized to defend against an attack from the south should be moved north. It was stated in a publicly available portion of 1995 US Defense Intelligence Agency report published by the Federation of American Scientists that North Korea has deployed over 10,000 artillery systems (mostly multiple rocket launchers and self-propelled artillery systems) near the DMZ.  They most likely have many more deployed now. Once those forces begin moving north, they could be kept in cantonments, while fighting positions could be constructed where they could be immediately deployed in an emergency on the northern border. Of course, under this hypothetical scenario, Moscow may declare the redeployment of Korean People’s Army forces as threatening. In response, North Korea could make clear diplomatically that the redeployment is part of comprehensive change in its national defense strategy. It might appear impolitic but it would be truthful for Pyongyang to declare the redeployment as necessary given the Moscow’s pattern of creating buffer zones in its neighbors’ sovereign territory to provide a theoretical bulwark against US and European encroachment toward its border. Moscow may also decide to deploy its own forces near or on the northern border under such a scenario. However, if the North Koreans bring sufficient power to bear, the threat of a possible Russian Federation attack aimed at grabbing territory should be stemmed. While that is happening, some US and South Korean forces could be redeployed to other points in South Korea from which they could continue to preserve Northeast Asian peace and security vis-a-vis China and Russia, who would ostensibly remain as regional adversaries. With Tokyo’s consent, there could potentially be some redeployments to Japan. The DMZ, North Korea-South Korea relations, and the whole unification issue would left to bilateral talks between the two countries. The US could play a supporting role, if asked. Pyongyang may view the proposed assessment and suggestion to redeploy its forces as a manipulation, a ploy to have it drop its defenses south and open the door to a joint US and South Korean invasion. It would be the task of US negotiators to convince their North Korean counterparts by words and deeds that such is not the case.US, South Korean, and North Korean troops handling a US soldier’s remains from the Korean War (above). If maintaining a portion of its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent becomes a sticking point, one option may be to allow a phased reduction weapons that will eventually result in its complete elimination. In tandem with that, an alternate means for North Korea to secure its northern border could be put in place. A demonstration of support and unity might include an offer to have US, South Korean, and Japanese forces of sufficient size and capability to participate in a type of “peace force” that would accompany the Korean People’s Army on patrols of North Korea’s northern border. While the international troops may not be a deterrent to an incursion, they would make a swift, stealthy move far more difficult.

After reaching a denuclearization agreement, North Korea should no longer think solely about directing its military equities at the US, South Korea, and Japan. Pyongyang must be assured and understand that their military equities would be directed at North Korea. As explained here, the sizable and capable armed forces of China and the Russian Federation would still pose threats to their security, and possibly North Korean security. Training exercises and testing of weapons for self-defense is a right and even necessity that should not simply be stripped from any country in the region. One must also consider practical issues, for example, the metal of armored and mechanized weapons tends to fatigue when sitting idle. However, the agreement might support a move away from extempore tests and exercises and toward greater transparency among military forces. Countries in the region could agree to engage in limited exercises and testing during scheduled dates and times determined via discussions among senior military and diplomatic officials. Critical to maintaining peace and security following a prospective agreement would be the construction of some means for the US, South Korea, Japan, and North Korea to monitor developments, tests, deployments, and other activities as partners to ensure peace.

To create firm channels of communication that will strengthen confidence and dissipate distrust, there must be regular interactions between non-military government officials working on North Korea’s economic vitalization. Interactions should move from likely being stolid and officious to more personable yet still professional. Advisory teams from all governments could interact very closely to guarantee internationals in North Korea are well-informed of the laws under which they must operate, and informed of culturally expected behavior by guests in North Korea. This will help eliminate mysteries about the country which was mostly closed to outsiders, and allow visiting officials and businessmen proceed with their work with confidence and walk with an assured step. The influx of well-trained and acculturated business people, experts on North Korea, will hopefully facilitate that. Success might be measured empirically by the number of congenial linkages created between US and North Korean firms. Eventually, US firms might receive contracts to provide supplies and perform services.US President Donald Trump (left) and Chairman Kim Jong-un (right) at the DMZ. The entire diplomatic process on denuclearization might seem much as a rabbit hole to Kim, given the many facets and angles that he needs to keep track of and consider as they evolve, One might have expected Kim at some point might have thrown his hands up over the whole denuclearization matter because it was all too rich for his blood. Again, Trump must be given credit for providing strength, confidence, and friendship, and assuring Kim that he will standby him before and after any denuclearization agreement is reached. Further, he assured Kim that he will go as far as he can to buttress the economic vitalization of North Korea. The situation is challenging, but it has a handle.

The Way Forward

It is burdensome to hold on a hope that has not yet been fulfilled. Impatience, however, can poison diplomacy, and is rarely viewed as sensible by those in foreign services worldwide who instead extol statesmanship and sangfroid. To that extent, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and US negotiators have responded to maximalist North Korean demands and cavilling with anodyne statements. In seeking to create a sustainable peace in Northeast Asia, Trump has demonstrated once again that he is willing to take on situations that are not easy. While negotiations appear to still be moving through the confidence building stage between negotiating parties, defusing old animus, the fact that everything has actually reached this point must be credited to Trump. With the many facets and angles that Kim needs to keep track of and consider as they evolve, the entire denuclearization process might seem much as a rabbit hole to him. One might have expected Kim at some point might have thrown his hands up over the whole denuclearization matter because it was all too rich for his blood. Again, Trump must be given credit for providing strength, confidence, and friendship, and assuring Kim that he will standby him before and after any denuclearization agreement is reached. Further, he assured Kim that he will go as far as he can to buttress the economic vitalization of North Korea. The situation is challenging, but it has a handle.

What has been presented here are aspects of a hypothetical scenario in which a denuclearization agreement could ironically open another door to a conflict on Korean Peninsula. In that struggle, North Korea would not be pitted against the US, South Korea, and Japan. Rather, North Korea might find itself struggling against its longtime companion, the Russian Federation. Policymakers and negotiators on both sides must consider the situation on the Korean Peninsula both as it is now and how it might appear after an agreement is reached. Likely threats to a prospective denuclearization agreement must be sorted out with a similar level of interest as sanctions relief is for one party and the drawdown of the nuclear arsenal and long-range missiles is for the other. While impatience may poison for diplomacy, superficiality is its bane. Policymakers and negotiation teams may need to take a new, diligent look across all aspects of the situation, paying as close attention as possible to potential unpleasant developments that may arise once an agreement is reached. If a denuclearization agreement that is genuinely viable and sustainable cannot be found due to new wrinkles, perhaps an agreement somewhat short of what was originally sought, could be considered. In the extreme, the undesirable and regrettable decision to stop seeking an agreement altogether may need to be made. The collapse of the process would not at all be a blot on Trump’s escutcheon. However, the curtain has not fallen yet. Hopefully, both sides can come up with a smart solution for this important issue. Omnia prius experiri, quam armis, sapientem decet. (It becomes a wise man to try all methods before having recourse to arms.)