Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert dedicated to Russian servicemen taking part in the military operation in Ukraine on the eve of Defender of Fatherland Day at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, February 22, 2023. There was surely great contrast between the ebullience displayed by Putin at the patriotic event and his thoughts and feelings behind the scenes about what his military commanders are doing in Ukraine and what he can expect from them as the war continues. Many decisions and actions made by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance. In examining this issue, greatcharlie seeks to reinforce somewhat likely conclusions by foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in the US and around the world not just concerning Putin’s control of Russian Federation Armed Forces, and to some degree, his security services as well, but also his culpability for crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as soldiers. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Many decisions and actions taken by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance, a perspective put in plain view during his February 24, 2022 address, broadcasted just as the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) began. With no pretension intended, greatcharlie states the Russian Federation’s handling of its wrongful invasion at all levels has been deplorable. What arouses an interest at this juncture has been Putin’s lack of control over many “big things” during the massive enterprise. Within the boundaries of its faculty, here greatcharlie humbly provides a few insights on how many things have gone wrong for Putin, the colossal issues that now beset him concerning the war, how he might seek to gain firmer control of the situation, and what that might mean going forward. Hopefully, greatcharlie provides new perspectives not just concerning Putin’s control of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces), and to some degree, his security services, but also his culpability for heinous crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as unarmed soldiers. An historic parallel to his lack of control over events in the field is presented. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC) was an Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, born in Athens. At the age of 30, Xenophon led one of the largest Greek mercenary armies of the Achaemenid Empire, the Ten Thousand, that famously attempted to seize Babylon but failed in 401 BC. As a writer, one of his works was Cynegeticus, usually translated as On Hunting or Hunting with Dogs. In discussing his wish that readers would find value in his treatise, Xenophon writes a passage which interestingly parallels greatcharlie’s desires regarding this essay. He states: ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν. οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι τὰ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι: ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὸ ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι:καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. (Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation—philosophers I will not call them —because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set, will say that what is well and methodically written is not well and methodically written—for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres, but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted.) (Regarding the presentation of the Greek text, greatcharlie asks its readers to kindly pardon its indulgence. It is presented here in “private” acknowledgement and celebration of someone of the utmost importance who will begin her undergraduate studies in the Classics in the Fall of 2023!)

I. The Magnitude of the Ukraine Disaster Begins to Take Form within Putin 

Stepping into the realm of conjecture, greatcharlie can imagine Putin, at the time of his decision to launch the special military operation was girded by the belief that his extreme action was necessary to secure a spiritual victory for mankind over the ugly evil of Nazism. However, Putin at the time of this writing may see the situation a bit differently. Clearly, he has plunged his country and the world in a challenging situation by acting on what he doubtlessly would likely still call “certainties” concerning Ukraine, NATO Expansion, and Western threat to the Russian Federation.

Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them.

Putin attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them..

II. Putin’s Actual Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

When there are missing pieces among facts collected in an investigation, a reliable imagination can be very useful. One can imagine what might be happening with another party. That supposition could become a working hypothesis. One then can act upon it, and if lucky, the investment in time and energy will prove justifiable. As alluded to earlier, the received wisdom among many Western military analysts and Russia scholars is that The Kremlin runs the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and in their view “today the Kremlin means Putin.” His military advisers are Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. Evidence offered of his control of the armed forces is the fact that “both generals serve “entirely at the pleasure of Putin” and “the respective predecessor of each was summarily dismissed.” One steps out on an attenuated thread when standing behind such evidence to support arguments regarding Putin’s control of the military. What may be perceived as simple truth, in reality is not so simple.

Over the two plus decades of Putin’s leadership, the record shows that unethical and outright criminal behavior can surely be well concealed under the Russian Federation government system. Certainly long before, in the erstwhile Soviet system, corruption in the armed forces was endemic and lucrative enough for those senior commanders engaged in such who would quietly “grease the palms” of superiors and who were not caught. The sales of military equipment to black marketers was the commonplace betrayal of some commanders. Another example that remains in greatcharlie’s memory from the days of the Cold War was learning that fighter pilots would pay commanders in order to serve in certain top tier squadrons. The military is not the only foreign and national security bureaucracy ham-strung and suffering from corruption. Unimaginable but true, even the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB Alexander Borrnikov, an irreplaceable member of Putin’s piratical crew, was shrewdly deceived by subordinates in the FSB 5th Department foreign intelligence service before the special military operation began. (The matter is discussed in further detail later in this essay. SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” for other insights shared on the matter.)

If one It has been suggested by some experrs that in Ukraine, Putin by his own hand destroyed the armed forces that built up over two decades. Looking at this supposition open-mindedly, one might added that if that is so, he certainly did not do it deliberately. However,,it is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was at the hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did a superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind. On February 24, 2022, they rolled the dice and poured their troops into Ukraine as ordered, hoping somehow that things might fall into place. Things did not go their way. Putin most likely had no idea how much damage was being done by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He could hardly admit even now that he did not know. If he did not need them now as a buffer between himself all the many failures militarily, and all the political drama, and if he had anyone else tied as closely to him that he knew as well and could turn, Putin would have likely sent them to higher service already, as is the pattern. If the Ukraine War were to end in the Russian Federation’s favor, an unlikely outcome, perhaps the two general might face trying times. Putin does not forget or forgive such betrayals. He is not the understanding type.

If one might suggest that it was all a deliberate act of subversion by one or both of the generals, the question would be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous degree in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties.

Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing flat-footed on the ground and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This averment shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round.

Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (right). It is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was atbthe hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did an superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind.

A. Delegation and Disappointment

Further to the preceding point, what did not serve Putin well was any thought that he could delegate matters concerning the special military operation that he typically would have overburdened himself with in the past. It appears to have been a matter of misplaced trust, which is very unusual for Putin. As an executive he made the proper management decision, but given the nature of his regime and its players, it was the wrong choice, at the wrong time, anc the wrong issue to do any delegating over. If Putin had been truly In control of the facts and the moving pieces, greatcharlie goes out on a limb to say he probably would have never gone into Ukraine and as it was, encountered considerable, unexpected resistance or just bad luck. However, if he would have still decided to go in knowing what he knows now, he would very likely have done his homework and to the very best of his ability developed real answers to resolve prospective problems having imagined more than enough possible failures and mishaps that could derail his plans and having most likely rehearsed over and over in his mind more than one way to resolve them. The situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would doubtlessly look a lot different than it does now. Of course, none of that happened.

Power and control are often limited for political authorities, even autocrats, during conventional military operations. That lack of control–along with US experience in Vietnam– is what in part inspired the US Congress to pass the War Powers Act in 1973. Surely, laid bare in Ukraine for Putin is his own lack of control  Certainly many may disagree with this assessment, but those who insist that Putin directly controlled events in Ukraine, even war crimes committed, should look more directly at just how poorly he has controlled aspects of his special military operation. On the four occasions presented here, Putin’s lack of control was self-evident.

1. The First Big Let Down: Russian Federation Intelligence on Ukraine

Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen in the Russian Federation. Far more than just being familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services, in the in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. (Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership.) In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Before becoming Russian Federation President, Putin served as Yeltsin’s Secretary of Sovet bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser. Having those experiences, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, he should known that reporting from them should be examined closely. In a very perplexing way, Putin felt confident enough to appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast announcing the start of the special military operation. Putin said: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” Lastly, he stated: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.”

 As the story goes, the now former head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda and his deputy as well as head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh, reportedly had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. Whatever Putin’s inner voice might have been saying about what he was being told about Ukraine, he closed his ear to it. Putin was apparently so convinced by reporting that Ukrainians were so dissatisfied with the leadership in Kyiv ready to welcome regime change, he attempted to appeal to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to acquiesce to invading Russian Federation forces. Putin seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness to self-interest and to the interest of the Russian Federation. Considering how Putin spoke so boldly in his broadcast to the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) audaciously suggesting they turn on their government, If whole matter were not so grave, it could viewed as Armed Forces comical.

Putin (center) Shoigu (left) and Gerasimov (right) at military exercises 2022. Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin, himself, might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was essentially recognized as a master stroke of military genius. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them.

2. A Study in Contrasts: Acumen Displayed in Zapad, Vostok, and Other Military Exercises and Poor Performance on the Battlefield

Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was a master stroke. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them. 

Despite what may have been choreographed to display a well-trained, well-equipped war machine for Putin’s unknowing eyes, the walls fell down in Ukraine. A poor strategy, faulty planning of the military operation, leaving the door open to supply and resupply of arms, equipment and sustenance, failure to decisively conquer by moving up the River Dneiper to cut off the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, reinforcing the failed operations in the Donbas, in part resulted in a stalled invasion and the epic slaughter of a modern army. Putin counted upon commanders with limited combat experience and no experience who more than anything else displayed negligence, inattentiveness to details large and small, delinquencies, and deficiencies. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. As for the concept of the Combined Arms Army, the formations raised and operated under it were as empty with troops as the concept was with promise.

3, Putin’s Faith in Spetsnaz: “A Weapon Is Only as the Man Who Wields It”

Putin has never hidden his admiration for Russian Federation Special Operations Forces. In foreign and national security policy approaches taken by the Russian Federation, special operations forces have been the go-to hammer to swing when the application of force was deemed required by the Kremlin. Such has also been the case with regard to domestic threats, particularly emanating from the Caucasus. Outside of government structures, Putin’s admiration for commando-type formations has likely played a role in his full acceptance and regular utilization of professional military contractors as the Wagner Group which are teaming with erstwhile spetsnaz members. In the opening days of the special military operation, Putin put his appreciation for the Russian Federation’s special operations forces on display by taking time on  February 27, 2022 to broadcast a message congratulating active military personnel and veterans of their formations on their professional holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day”. More than just a canned speech, Putin laid his heart out bare by stating: “You have demonstrated many times that you are prepared to act with the utmost efficiency and under the harshest conditions to precisely and professionally complete the most difficult and demanding missions. You always perform your military duty to protect your native country and citizens with honor and protect Russia’s national interests. The heroic traditions of the special forces find their roots in the centuries-long history of our army. They were fortified during the Great Patriotic War, matured and grew even stronger in Afghanistan and many hotbeds, as well as during the elimination of terrorists gangs both in the North Caucasus and in Syria. Putin said further: “I know that you undergo exactly this kind of training -comprehensive, all-encompassing and intensive, a real school of warfare. You strive to follow the best paragons of courage and bravery, true patriotism, and you set an example for new generations of defenders of the Fatherland and pass on your experience to young servicemen.” Very likely with reference to former spetsnaz serving in the Wagner Group, Putin remarked: “I want to thank the command and the personnel of the special operations forces as well as special forces veterans for their loyalty to the oath, for their impeccable service to the people of Russia and our great Motherland. My special appreciation goes to those who are performing their duty in the special operation to render assistance to the people’s republics of Donbass.”

Putin’s faith in the spetsnaz to carry out their duties to their utmost abilities was warranted, but aa is the same with special operations soldiers in every country, they were only human and could only do so much. Placing them with their exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, under the control of Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, did not help. Among the classified US national security materials leaked online through the messaging platform in March 2023 were assessments of officials within the foreign and national security bureaucracies on the strength and capabilities of Russian Federation spetsnaz forces. According to those findings, there was such an overreliance on the specialized units on the frontlines that their consequently suffered heavy losses. The decision the use spetsnaz in such a role was purportedly due to skepticism among Russian Federation commanders that their conventional forces’ abilities to achieve objectives set in the invasion plans. Leaked documents also reportedly indicate US officials believe the high casualties of these units should render them less effective not only in Ukraine but also in other parts of the world where Russian forces operate. Evidence of the losses in the spetsnaz units was apparently provided by satellite imagery featured among the leaked materials. Before-and-after imagery of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade’s base in southern Russia allegedly revealed that “all but one of five Russian Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” Materials citing intelligence intercepts, assess the 346th brigade “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.” US intelligence analysts, who monitored the return of spetsnaz units to their respective bases, believe that extremely high losses in the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment “could explain why there is no clear [intelligence] signature of their return to garrison.” The loss of so many among the spetsnaz very likely came as a shock to Putin.

4. Hoping the Wagner Group Will Shift the Fight Moscow’s Way

As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Mentioned earlier was also that fact that Wagner Group fighters are typically retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. From the moment the situation went sour in Ukraine, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is widely known that since July 2022, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. To an extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be the saving grace of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 

However, it was not long before everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops. According to the best statistics available to greatcharlie, since April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As alluded to earlier, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut.

In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin has expressed concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. Surely, Putin maybe somewhat concerned that the Wagner Group’s loses may eventually so great that the organization would not be available to handle other foreign and national security policy matters for some time to come. In a pinch, perhaps Wagner could recruit from among special operations veterans who served in the FSB and Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, but those former operators would for the most part lack the same level of battlefield experience spetsnaz from the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost in Ukraine possessed.

The full list of disappointments for Putin of or pertaining to the Ukraine enterprise is frightfully long and would overload and overwhelm this essay if included. Though, as aforementioned, theories of Putin’s control over the Russian Federation Armed Forces are accepted, it appears that nearly every theory confirming his alleged control cannot figuratively hold water.

Putin (left) and Gerasimov (right) holding a press conference following announcement that Gerasimov had become overall Russian Federation commander in Ukraine. Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

B. The Power to Hire and Fire Generals: What is It Worth?

Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

1. Putin Sacked a Slew of Generals in May 2022

Based on information made public by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, on May 19, 2022, Putin fired two senior commanders Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, who had commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov of the Black Sea Fleet. Osipov was reportedly fired following the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, which was a major embarrassment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Moscow-based media group, RBCreported on June 1, 2022, that on May 30, 2022, Putin issued a decree dismissing senior commanders of the security services. The list of those removed from their posts included: Major General of Police Vasily Kukushkin, who was head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir region; Major General Alexander Laas, deputy head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory; and, Major General Andrey Lipilin, head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region. Major General Alexander Udovenko of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Major General Yuri Instrankin, deputy head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were also among the dismissed. Additionally, Putin reportedly fired Police Colonel Emil Musin, who was the first deputy head of the Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Putin Fired 22 Russian Army Generals in August 2022

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence reported that General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 had been sacked. it was at that time there were the rather quiet, yet widely suspected firings of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was the senior but not overall command of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine and General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine. US officials estimated at the time of these dismissals that more than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured, which represented more than 50% of the number of troops Russia initially deployed in  the special military operation. According to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, at least 10 generals were among those killed.

3. Putin Fires Russian Army Generals for Failed Response to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in September 2022

Based on information from Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Telegraph reported on September 12, 2022 that Putin fired Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in a recent offensive in the east.

4. Putin Replaces Overall Commander in Ukraine in January 2023 and Fires Russian Army General for Vuhledar Fiasco in March 2023

A shift in command well-known among those following events in the Ukraine War was the replacement of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin by Gerasimov as overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”. On or just before March 26, 2023, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, had been removed from his post. Muradov had previously come under criticism for his failure in Vuhledar from Prigozhin who believed its capture was possible and may have had the effect of turning the war in Moscow’s favor. The Moscow Times, described as an independent English- and Russian-language online newspaper with offices in Amsterdam that is currently outlawed in Russia, also reported that Muradov had been suspended, One of the Moscow Times’ sources told the online daily, “Muradov was suspended because he was a crazy idiot who could command soldiers to die. Many complained about him.”

In February 2023, Muradov attacked Vuhledar by sending his soldiers into minefields, right under the artillery fire of the Ukrainians. As a consequence of his actions, reportedly two elite Russian Naval Infantry brigades, one presumed to be the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 103 pieces of equipment were reportedly lost in just three days. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.”

As the record indicates, on every occasion when Putin, usually via his Defense Minister, sacked a group of generals who underperformed, a month or a couple of months later, he was dismissing another group for similar, if not parallel failures. Sacking a general, more than just a punishment, is a very strong form of public embarrassment. By now, everyone interested in Putin has recognized that he rarely reverses his own decisions. (If that were the case, he surely would have reversed his decision to invade Ukraine. Declaring success early on and offering purported measurables among other things would have been the most likely off ramp.) Firing generals from commands whose records he doubtlessly reviewed and gave ultimate approval for top assignments unlikely came easy for him. Perhaps Putin may even be concerned that it reveals that he is not the best judge of people, that he has lost his touch, and worst of all, it confirms for some that he is not infallible. His mistakes with the military have very noticeably begun to pile up. Interestingly, despite being punished, the generals who were sacked will at least live to see another day. The soldiers, some incredibly young, whose lives they carelessly wasted in Ukraine will not have that chance.

There is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide an apology, legal advice, or worst, a legal defense, for Putin over war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Thoee among greatcharlie’s readers who may feel anything of the kind is being offered here to Putin, then it is respectfully suggested they stop reading the commentary at this point for it would surely be unreasonable, unconstructuve to continue with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

Alexander Gardiner’s famous photograph of US President Abraham Lincoln, and Union Army Major General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (right) and Allan Pinkerton (left) at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862. Although many readers, particularly in the US, both technically and perhaps more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America.

C. Another Leader Who Struggled To Control His Commanders During Wartime

Although many readers, particularly in the US both technically, and more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America. The author of the military law was jurist Franz Lieber, a German lawyer, political philosopher, and combat veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Lieber essentially modernized the military law of the 1806 Articles of War to ensure Union Army could prosecute its war against the Confederate States of America with legitimacy.

However, despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the #humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

In fairness to Sherman, it must be noted that he acted in accord with the concept and intent of Lincoln’s Lieber Code when he gave explicit instructions to his troops regarding their conduct while on their march through Georgia, but there were a few deviations. In his Special Field Order No. 120, Sherman out of necessity encouraged foraging and the confiscation of livestock as he left his Army Group’s supply lines behind to travel so deep, so fast, and so furiously into Georgia. Home invasions were off limits. However, if antagonized by Confederate Army soldiers, Union Army officers were granted permission to destroy private and industrial property. Additionally, the field order permitted able-bodied Black laborers to join the march, but commanding officers were instructed to prioritize the distribution of supplies for soldiers of their Army Group. The majority of Union Army soldiers complied with Field Order No. 120, but some dubbed “bummers” roamed the countryside intentionally terrorizing civilians and looting. Although bummers were technically engaging in forbidden activities, the overall psychological impact of their actions on the local population was in sync with the purpose of the march. The greatest damage done by Sherman’s troops was the destruction of Georgia’s railroad lines, both a conveyor for industries and military transportation. Union Army soldiers would rip up and melt down tracks in full view of the demoralized populace.

Union Army troops tearing up railroad tracks in Georgia as Confederate civilians watched in horror (above). Despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

The text of the Lieber Code was arranged to create concordance with the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863) and prohibited racist discrimination against Black soldiers of the Union Army, specifically by Confederate Army troops who denied them the rights and privileges of prisoners of war. The military law clearly had little impact on the treatment of racially segregated Black soldiers of the US Colored Troops (USCT) by their White Union Army comrades in arms. At the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), incredulously yet painfully true, White soldiers of the Union Army’s 1st Division essentially assisted soldiers of the Confederate States Army massacre Black soldiers of the 4th Division (USCT) in the midst of the fighting. (SEE the February 28, 2023 greatcharlie post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”.

On top of that, a succession of commanders failed to meet Lincoln’s expectations during the war. He could insist upon regular consultations on their battle plans, but he could not control what they actually did on the battlefield. He could only remove them. or allow them to resign, but he could not repair the damage they had done to the Union effort, or do anything about the wastage of Union Army soldiers. Very briefly, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, having previously functioned as Commander of the Army and Department of Northeastern Virginia from May 27, 1861 to July 25, 1861, served as a general in the Army of the Potomac until after the Second Battle of Bull Run when he was relieved of command at his own request on September 6, 1862. Major General George “Little Mac” McClellan was appointed Commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, and later, the Army of the Potomac (July 26, 1861 to November 9, 1862). In 1862, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign unraveled after the Seven Days Battles, and he also failed to decisively defeat the forces of General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Frustrated by McClellan’s cautious tactics, Lincoln removed him from command. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside served as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from November 9, 1862 to January 26, 1863. Following his infamous “Mud March”.and the senseless slaughter of his troops during the Union Army’s defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Joseph Hooker served as Commander of the Army and Department of the Potomac from January 26, 1863 to June 28, 1863. Concerned about Hooker were first raised when reports were made that his headquarters doubled as a combination of bar and brothel. Hooker’s timid command performance and grave defects as a commander–he lost mental control of his command in battle–were exposed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Ostensibly recognizing “faults” in his behavior and performance and reportedly sensing the distrust of Lincoln and Union Army General in Chief Major General Henry Halleck, Hooker resigned his command on June 28, 1863, on the eve of battle. Major General George Meade jumped in as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from June 28, 1863 to June 28, 1865. Meade repulsed the forces of the General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg from July 1, 1863 to July 3, 1863 with tactical adroitness; however, he was castigated by some for failing to hotly pursue the remainder of Lee’s forces. He instead allowed them to escape from his immediate reach. Lincoln in duress penned a letter to Meade dated July 14, 1863, relieving him of his command but never sent it. Success was not assured at Gettysburg, but Meade had apparently failed to keep any preconceived follow through firmly in mind in the event of victory.. Although Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, his independence of action was sharply curtailed after March 9, 1864, when General Ulysses S. Grant took control of Union  forces from Halleck and was named Commanding General of the US Army. 

Despite keeping a close eye on them to the point that he nearly micromanaged the war, Lincoln could only possess marginal control over the actions of his most senior commanders. He surely had even less of a chance to control the actions of subordinates well beneath them in the chain of command on the battlefield. A law such as theLieber Code could ar best signal intent. In the end, what was done was done. If unlawful or unethical acts were witnessed, they could at best be reported and adjudicated within the system of military justice, or if egregious enough, reviewed in Congressional hearings. 

Painting of the representatives of 12 countries at the conference held in the Alabama room at Geneva’s Hotel de Ville August 22, 1864 where they adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” (above). The International Committee of the Red Cross while recognising that it is “primarily the duty and responsibility of a nation to safeguard the health and physical well-being of its own people,” knew there would always, especially in times of war, be a “need for voluntary agencies to supplement . . . the official agencies charged with these responsibilities in every country.” To ensure that its mission was widely accepted, it required a body of rules to govern its own activities and those of the involved belligerent parties. A year later, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the US Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. A total of twenty-six delegates from 16 countries came to Geneva. The meeting was presided over by Swiss General Guillaume Henri Dufour. The conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.” Representatives of 12 countries signed the convention at that time.

IV. Under the Geneva Convention Military Commanders Are Responsible for What Happens in Field

To the extent the political authorities cannot control events in the field, commanders take on greater responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Under Geneva Convention I , Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129; Geneva Convention  IV, Article 146; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 28; and, Geneva Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87, it is clear that commanders shalll be held criminally responsible under the law if they knew or should have known that subordinates were going to violate the law by committing a war crime, yet failed to take steps to prevent it. Further, commanders would be held liable for failing to punish or report subordinates who have already committed a war crime. To that extent, commanders are viewed as being in control of their troops and being responsible for all that transpires within their commands at all times. That rationale gains support in the following way. When the commander develops a plan of action, necessary is the requirement to assess all factors relevant at the time, such as ground and enemy forces, your own forces, logistics, courses open. (In greatcharlie’s day, it was referred to as the METT+T analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available. Yes, greatcharlie’s editor is that old!) Once the plan is decided, the commander issues orders to subordinates. The next aspect of control is the direction of the engagement,, during which it is expected that the commander take into account the law of armed conflict. 

V. Likely Big Lesson Learned by Putin Concerning Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 

Having learned a very painful lesson with his conventional forces during the special military operation, Putin will ensure that he fully controls the “crown jewels” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: the nuclear triad. That effort to establish that control has been mostly revealed with each public move he has made with regard to the supply, continual redeployments, and drilling of those forces. With regard to to those who command the nuclear forces, as explained in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: What Comes Next for Putin at Home and in Ukraine?: An Assessment One Year After the Start of His Special Military Operation”, just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, literally Strategic Purpose Rocketry Troops) which control land-based ICBMs, the strategic bombers and other nuclear capable airframes of the Voenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force), and satellites of the Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony (Russian Aerospace Defense Forces) without a shadow of doubt would go into action. In addition, commanders of the strategic submarines of the Voyenno-morskoy Flot (Russian Naval Force) in both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would execute their missions. Indeed, commanders who are in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise. Surely, there are more than enough members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces hurting over the nightmare that has befallen their comrades in Ukraine. They more than likely want to dish out some “payback” against those countries that they likely perceive–based on what they surely have been told–created circumstances there, and many can deliver payback in the extreme.

At the Battle of Camarón, an important episode of the Second French Intervention in Mexico (December 8, 1861 to June 27, 1867), the 3rd company of 62 Legionnaires and three Legion officers, led by Captain Jean Danjou was sent to reinforce a French military convoy, transporting 3 million francs in gold bullion, siege guns, and sixty wagons of ammunition. Information was received that the convoy would be ambushed. Before Danjou could reach the convoy, the led elements of a force of 3,000 Mexican Army infantry and cavalry made contact with his unit and he was forced to make a defensive stand at the Hacienda Cameron, in Camarón de Tejeda, Veracruz, Mexico. At the point when he recognized that victory would be absolutely impossible to achieve against the larger Mexican force massed around their defenses, Danjou urged his soldiers to take an oath to fight to the death rather than surrender. He made them swear their fealty on his wooden hand. Danjou then shared his bottle of wine and encouraged his men with has been called  “those noble words that warm one’s heart and makes the final sacrifice less difficult to face.”  When the French Foreign Legion moved to France, Capitain Danjou’s wooden hand was taken to Aubagne, where it remains in the Legion Museum of Memory.  The hand is the most cherished artifact in Legion history.  April 30th is celebrated as “Camerone Day,” an important day for the Legionnaires, when the wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is brought out for display. In 1892, a monument commemorating the battle was erected on the battlefield containing a plaque with the following inscription in French: Ils furent ici moins de soixante / Opposés a toute une armée / Sa masse les écrasa / La vie plutôt que le courage / Abandonna ces soldats Français / Le 30 Avril 1863 / A leur mémoire la patrie éleva ce monument. (Here there were less than sixty opposed to a whole army. Its numbers crushed them. Life rather than courage abandoned these French soldiers on April 30, 1863.  In their memory, the fatherland has erected this monument”) The railing from the Legion grave at Camarone can now be found at the village of Puyloubier near Aix-en-Provence. (The importance of the Battle of Camarón with regard to the history and culture of the French Foreign Legion is discussed in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations.”

Although perhaps willing to accept that Putin is the quintessential “bad actor”, it appears almost impossible for many to believe Putin could decide for the Russian people that as a country the Russian Federation would accept a similar fate, mutantis mutandis, rather accept what he ostensibly would perceive and envision as the nightmare of life under the thumb of Western powers and the near certain invasion of their country in the near future. Indeed, observers might try to consider a scenario in which Putin after observing the Russian Federation Armed Forces lose one decisive battle after another in rapid succession and all had unraveled in Ukraine, would make a nationwide broadcast one evening explaining to the Russian people that the Russian Federation was about to be invaded by the proxy forces of the Western powers, that the special military operation, meant as a pre-emptive action has lifted the curtain on the true nature of the Western powers’ objectives and operations in Ukraine and based on all that has been revealed concerning the actions of the Western powers and the astronomical support of the offensive military activities of their partner in Kyiv, despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin for them not to continue their aggressive activities in the Russian Federation’s near abroad, a state of total war existed between the Russian Federation and the US, its NATO allies, and the EU. He would tell the Russian people that their support, prayers, and courage were needed as his government took its next steps. Putin would likely display sangfroid and equanimity, and speak with the tone of a leader in complete command of a situation.(Readers might cast their minds back to Nazi German Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ February 18, 1943 address at the Berlin Sportpalast following the Wehrmacht’s epic loss at Stalingrad to the Soviet Army, in which he zealously implored the German people to commit anew to an all-out war effort: Totaler Krieg–Kürzester Krieg! (Total War–Shortest War!) From the point of that hypothetical broadcast, it would most likely just be a matter of time before the worst possibility would materialize.

It is greatcharlie’s contention, without pretense, some absurd desire to establish some greater sense of importance, or a ridiculous effort to claim of greater sapience, that Western diplomats would do well to reflect on this assessment and consider how responding to what they might deem as Putin’s misperceptions to open the door to great possibilities.)

The Russian Federation’s Sarmat Intercontinental ballistic missile (above) is a 115 feet (35-meters) tall and has a range of 11,185 miles (18,000km)(). Some estimate this to be higher. It can carry at least 10 multiple targetable re-entry vehicles – each with a nuclear warhead – which can each be aimed at a different target. It can also deliver hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles that can travel further and faster, flying in a variable path to overcome missile defenses. Just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad and supporting organizations would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise.

VI. The Arrest Warrant for Putin

In Paragraph 6 of  the First Oration of his Catalonia Orations, Marcus Tulius Cicero, an excoriation of rival senator Lucius Sergius Catiline, who he alleged sought to overthrow the Roman Senate, he writes: Quamdiu quisquam erit, qui te defendere audea, vives, et vives ita, ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firms praesidiis obsessed, ne commovere te contra rem publicam possis. Multorum te etiam oculi et aures non sentience, sicut adhuc fecerunt, speculabuntur atque custodient. (As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live, but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to.stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall perceive them.) Doubtlessly, with the necessary adjustments, surely this is the fate many in Western governments hope will befall Putin and he would be left in such a depleted state. However, greatcharlie suggests the satisfaction that they seek will unlikely manifest and the cost of any attempt to get their hands on Putin would be far worse than steep. Such attempts to create such a circumstance would inflame Putin’s ardor to a degree one could only reasonably expect the worst.

On March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant of arrest for Putin in the context of the situation in Ukraine. (Indicted along with Putin on that day was Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation since 2021.) As Russian Federation President, Putin has been declared allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” The Pre-Trial Chamber II also stated that “the crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory at least from February 24, 2022.” The Pre-Trial Chamber II further explained that it has reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility “(i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” The alleged war crime as outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber II is horrendous. At the nub of the matter is the issue of Putin’s level of control over the actions of all Russian Federation elements in Ukraine.

So often it has been the case with Putin’s presidency, legal action in response to his behavior on the world stage may have been warranted, but not necessarily required given the context of situations. Prioritizing the furtherance of international peace and security, the leader of Russian Federation with an enormous nuclear arsenal under his control, and members of his coterie, were hit with tongue lashings, finger-wagging, and sanctions. National governments, regional organizations, and international organizations would level economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and national legislatures would pass punishing business and financial laws designed to stifle the ability of the Russian Federation business community, particularly the country’s elite, to maintain and generate within advanced industrialized systems. The Magnitsky Law passed in the US created a considerable degree of pain and aggravation for Putin. Other than that, and a few other other coercive measures, Putin was repeatedly extended a degree of latitude. Putin was surely smart enough to recognize that. (One might posit that he flaunted that latitude allowed to him in the faces of Western powers by invading Ukraine.) In an environment in the West in which political leaders, especially among NATO and EU countries were being hounded over not doing enough to support Ukraine and not enough to decouple and lash out against Putin, the choice of the US-led international community became to exercise legal power over the Russian Federation President. Urging the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, though significant, was seemingly rather trivial in comparison with the greater task of assisting Ukraine in defeating the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, it helped set a path toward what may be a future of even more trying diplomatic efforts with Putin, which to great extent–unless the international community makes another choice, the unthinkable choice of granting Putin whatever he wishes–has put the outcome somewhat out of its rational hands.)

A. Putin Still Minimized as an “Oppositional Adolescent” by the West?

As touched upon in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post, it is difficult to see exactly what end was hoped for when the decision was made to indict Putin. There was likely some ego stroke scored as a result of sticking it to Putin, but not much more was accomplished than that. (How horrifying and disappointing it would be to discover the intent was to goad Putin to react adversely and make mistakes. If such is even remotely accurate, perhaps those who hypothetically were impelled by that thought might not have considered a big mistake Putin might have immediately made–and could still make–could have been to start a nuclear war. “Wishful thinking” is not a form of optimism, it is a euphemistic term for denial.)

Whether it was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

Maybe it would have been far more reasonable and practical to demand Putin confess irresponsibility over leading his country into war with so many criminally minded senior officials and military men unaware that he would not have genuine control of those who would eventually perpetrate heinous acts in Ukraine under orders from unstable authorities far beneath those in the Senate Building at the Kremlin as well as some sort of diabolical control from Hell. The chance of Putin cooperating in either case would doubtlessly be the same: zero! One might wonder what would be the plan of the International Criminal Court to successfully and safely take him into custody. 

Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, an arrest warrant can be issued publicly or under seal when the arrest of the person appears necessary to ensure a person’s appearance at trial. Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, the court may request the cooperation in the arrest and surrender from any State on the territory of which the person may be found. The court has no internal enforcement mechanism which would allow it to arrest persons subject to arrest warrants. In the interest of promoting good interstate relations, diplomacy, and peace and security and simply in the planetary interest, under such trying circumstances, discretion in taking such actions–at least refraining from declaring as criminal a party essential to establishing peace–would be the best choice, the better part of valor. Putin’s accountability and culpability for war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian Federation forces was something which could have been dealt with later. The priority now is ending the war if possible.

B. Actualities Concerning Intelligence and Making Claims against Putin

With regard to providing evidence of Putin’s crimes, one would need to be dismissive of the fact that the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation have sophisticated capabilities. One cannot say for certain what would happen if the Kremlin produced its own classified information confirming Putin plainly stated he would brook no behavior by Russian Federation forces in the field of the kind for which he is accused of having some responsibility. Hypothetically, the Kremlin might be able to produce transcripts of communications between errant commanders demonstrating their deliberate effort to conceal their actions from superiors, making false any suggestion that Putin controlled or ordered their illegal actions. To that extent, it might be proven with a sea of declassified official internal documents by the Kremlin that generally Putin did not impose too much on his commanders and within reason, relied on their reports and advice on the special military operation. Of course, one could expect it to possess a profusion of redactions to give them that ultra official feel and if any documents are authentic, to hide any nitty-gritty. With such evidence at hand, the Kremlin would surely insist it has no need to respond to baseless accusations about the Russian Federation President. 

One could unlikely insist as part of any fair and balanced legal process that Russian Federation classified intelligence is of less veracity and should be distrusted outrightly. Turning to the intelligence of one country–for instance the US, the United Kingdom, or Germany–that can provide information collected through electronic eavesdropping externally on the internal communications of the armed forces and security organizations of another country–for example the Russian Federation–with the aim to refute and discredit said monitored country’s own intelligence on what was being discussed among its military and security officials, would be something better than an act of bias and stand the idea of objective justice on its head. The International Criminal Court is supposed to be an objective tool for the world. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness but having stated the former, it believes that such a chauvinistic step and in the end finding Putin “unhesitatingly and with utter conviction” guilty, perhaps even in absentia, rationally imaginable given how predisposed so many that serve in regional and international bodies are to think unfavorably about him. The thinking of the court is certainly not to be judged by greatcharlie. It is only outlining what it perceives as a likely possibility. (This statement is not intended as apophasis.) If one might take into account anything about Putin’s arrest warrant written here could even remotely have some influence, it would at best be as a cautionary assessment for Western foreign and national security bureaucracies to consider before pursuing the arrest warrant matter any further.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) at the Kremlin on March 8, 2023. Whether the action was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice among powers of great influence in the West, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

VII. Energetic Diplomacy: The Best Chance of Stemming Catastrophe

In the aftermath of everything, historians would likely be forced to choose whether there really was something so peculiar about Putin that makes energetic efforts at diplomacy at this stage so taxing. It may actually be the case that the fault for ineffective diplomatic efforts with lies with the foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders of the many countries that had to deal with him. Perchance it was the fault of both parties for failing to see a true middle ground in things satisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless, it is greatcharlie’s conviction that at the present the West is in grave danger. The source of that danger in the Russian Federation. Ending the Ukraine War on favorable or acceptable terms for all parties is of the utmost importance. However, the priority is to ease the world back from an apparent slow spiral to armageddon.

In its March 30th post, greatcharlie suggeeted that at this point, diplomacy with the Russian Federation on Ukraine has figuratively been knocked off the rails. True, indicting Putin was a step that practically ensured his refusal to negotiate with Kyiv unless he had attained some considerable advantage in Ukraine and his negotiating position would be very strong. However, rather than draw a line there as in March and succumb to despair, here greatcharlie pulls back from the statement that the opportunity for diplomacy has been lost. 

A  Having the Right Answers

Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand, given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made. Putin shall not countenance what he may perceive as a diminution of the great dignity of the Russian Federation. 

Although all countries with an immediate stake in the Ukraine matter should be made aware of the diplomatic effort to achieve an entente with Putin, the new contact may need to be performed discreetly. Perhaps this is best that can be done at this juncture. Hope can be the only thing that comforts people in misery. For Russian people, who are the ones who will decide whether there is a need for change in the direction their country has been moving, hope for that change could be founded through contact between their president and the outside world. Paradoxically, while Putin may indeed enhance his standing among many as they will see the Russian Federation still acting as an important player on the world stage, many others may perceive such diplomacy as proof that the Russian people are viewed as far more than just potential targets for retaliatory nuclear strikes from the the US, the United Kingdom, and France, and written off as nothing to signify. It is suggested by greatcharlie in an opaque way that such a diplomatic effort could even mean far more to the right number of them. In public discussions of the new diplomacy, Western diplomats would do well to emphasize the effort has been undertaken with consideration of the well-being of the Russian people and make other statements of that nature.

There are for certain countless pitfalls that could disrupt or even destroy a new, robust diplomatic effort. What may be most important for Western capitals to recognize are the right answers that will bring a negotiated settlement and peace. There is also the issue of time available. Again, Putin has a large say in how things will turn out and surely has his own timeliness for action. To that extent, until some acceptable path to peace is found, perhaps the greatest danger will remain a decision already made by him to act in some ghastly way.

B. In the Meantime, Will the West Lose Control of Its Junior Partner in Kyiv?

The indications and implications of multiple reporting, to include the Washington Post, of alleged swift action by US foreign and national security policy officials to halt a plan by Ukraine to launch mass strikes against Moscow may be that at least the White House is aware of just how close the world in to a potential nuclear war, it does not want that, and that it now has the extra burden of monitoring the behavior of its “junior partners” in Kyiv. It is uncertain whether the Ukrainian leadership was led to take such a course as result of a lack of wisdom and experience or a complete absorption in self-interest or both. However, if newsmedia stories of this episode are accurate, it would appear that they were blind as beetles to the possibility that their planned assault could have triggered a catastrophic response from the Kremlin to the great detriment of Ukraine, but the whole wide world

If Putin already has a mind and the will to take the most drastic step possible against the West, Kyiv in planning an attack on Moscow could have supplied him with a reason better than anything he could have conjured up. The world moves closer and closer to the edge of the precipice with every errant move as this. It is wonder if there were any other planned Ukrainian actions halted by Western powers that would have brought the world the worst. One wonders how long can this balancing act without a safety net go on without catastrophe.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, (left) and U.S President Joe Biden (right) shake hands during their meeting at the ‘Villa la Grange’ in Geneva, Switzerland in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made.

The Way Forward

Putin watched his predecessors mismanage,  breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating not even a simulacrum of what came before it, despite his best efforts, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down “the wide-world and its fading sweets.” It is a wonder Putin has not gone mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him since the special military operation began and even beforehand. Standing on the precipice of losing everything, it would best for the wide world if Putin can continue to retain his balance. The clear choice for him is either to continue forward or abandon at great personal loss, the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022, and triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West, begun during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Putin has mourned its collapse with considerable grief and disappointment.

Among those who use wisdom and logic, imagination can have value in an investigation. Imagination is a quality many lack, but many also lack wisdom and logic. Often it is the case that a lack of maturity inhibits one ability to reason matters out correctly. Just having an answer, right or wrong, based on some chain of thinking is enough for some. Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is in reality nothing so mysterious about Putin that should lead any national leader to throw the possibility of acceptable relations with the Russian Federation out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Putin’s worst critics will destroy any opportunity for a fruitful course to develop. As noted greatcharlie here ad nauseum, those leaders must consider what their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation mean not only with regard to Ukraine, but in the bigger picture. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the RussianFederation, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover possibilities for getting many things done by just doing things a bit differently. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the Russian Federation and become civilization’s dénouement. positive changes on one issue can often result in great benefits on another. Respice finem (Have regard for the end.)

Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?

A small unit of young Russian Army soldiers being transported to the frontlines in Ukraine (above). While greatcharlie has spoken against the Russian Federation’s wrongful invasion of its once peaceful neighbor, it does not look stony-hearted at the reality that Russian conscripts, dubbed Mobiks, rushed into Ukraine’s frontlines, are victims of the Kremlin’s caprice, too. Using soldiers repeatedly in ways that guarantee massive losses with little gain on the battlefield, as commanders of Russian Federation Armed Forces have, is the worst sort of negligence and points to possible incompetence. If poor acumen is not the case, one is left to imagine what sort of odd line of thought resides in the minds of Russian Federation commanders that would allow them to use their troops so carelessly and callously. Despite the nearly 160 year span that exists between the two circumstances, by briefly examining the Battle of the Crater alongside the Russian Federation’s special military operation in Ukraine, aspects are revealed from which some perspective might be gained.

As a result of the wrongful decision of the Kremlin to invade Ukraine, members of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) have suffered immensely. Interestingly, there is a strange buoyancy and caustic ebullience that seems to have overcome some in the Western newsmedia over the video recorded slaughter of members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. It broadcasted and streamed online by several newsmedia houses without end. (At the time of this writing, one would need to make a serious effort to evade news about Ukraine in the US.) The fact that greatcharlie’s sympathies are with the people of Ukraine has not been concealed. Still, while greatcharlie has spoken against the Russian Federation’s wrongful invasion of its once peaceful neighbor, and wants the war and all its attendant ills to end, it does not look stony-hearted at the reality that Russian conscripts, dubbed Mobiks by the Ukrainians, who have been imprudently, ruthlessly and reportedly in some cases, illegally rushed into Ukraine’s frontlines, are victims of the Kremlin’s caprice, too. Through its often morbid coverage, the newsmedia has done well to cast light on just how bizarrely Russian Federation forces are being handled in the war. Using soldiers repeatedly in ways that guarantee massive losses, estimated at 100,000 by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Army General Mark Milley in November 2022, with little gain on the battlefield is the worst sort of negligence and possibly points to incompetence. If the absence of acumen is not the case, one is left to imagine that some odd line of thought resides in the minds of commanders of Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield that would allow them to use their troops so carelessly and callously.

On first blush, the comparison of wastage of human lives in war that initially comes to mind for greatcharlie is the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), a calamitous episode of the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865), remembered for over 150 years, and well-trodden by historians. So horrifying is the story that for many years it was labeled as fiction by some. Surely, there are countless cases in military history when frightfully high casualties have been suffered in actions on the battlefield that never held hope of accomplishing anything except the destruction of the units sent out to fight. However, the Battle of the Crater stands out as an epic display of a commander’s negligence and inexplicable disregard for his soldiers’ well-being. Despite the nearly 160 year span that exists between the two circumstances, by briefly examining the Battle of the Crater alongside the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) in Ukraine, aspects are revealed from which an image emerges of what it is that leads to such.

Covering this subject, greatcharlie understands there is a thin line between parsing the problem and suggesting a better way forward and subsequently providing advice to the Russian Federation Armed Forces in its effort in Ukraine. Although greatcharlie does not believe that anyone in Moscow would be interested in its scribblings, it nonetheless states unequivocally that nothing which could possibly provide advice or solutions, is offered here. What is provided are a few brief reflections resulting in all truth from greatcharlie’s near daily, unintended contemplations on the Ukraine War. The hope of greatcharlie is that its readers will remain willing to follow along, even stumble along, with its cautious discussion on this subject.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation General Valery Gerasimov. Putin’s singular emotional wants and wishes were the cause of the war. Pursuit of his much desired objective of eliminating the government in Kyiv, repeatedly expressed before the February 24, 2022 invasion and afterward, caused obedient military commanders to put their forces in impossible situations and on occasion at the mercy of their Ukrainian opponents. Well-understood now by most is the fact that everything was organized in a dimidium gluteus maximus way! Much of what was done initially by his top commanders was beyond what was strategically logical and apparently militarily unachievable for the Russian Federation Armed Forces despite their size, strength, and given its quality.

Overview of the Situation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine

No easy answers are available to Moscow that would allow it to repair or reverse its situation in Ukraine. There is no possibility to put the toothpaste back in the tube. It seems necessary to note, without the intention of delving too deeply on the matter, that Putin’s singular emotional wants and wishes were the cause of the war. Pursuit of his much desired objective of eliminating the government in Kyiv, repeatedly expressed before the February 24, 2022 invasion and afterward, caused obedient military commanders to put their forces in impossible situations and on occasion at the mercy of their Ukrainian opponents. Well-understood now by most is the fact that the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was organized in a dimidium gluteus maximus way! Much of what was done initially by his top commanders was beyond what was strategically logical and was apparently militarily unachievable for the Russian Federation Armed Forces despite their size, strength, and given its quality. Much vaunted once as a titanic war machine, the Russian Federation Armed Forces hardly lived up to that billing. Showing itself as something less than an authentic 21st century fighting force, it unexpectedly collided with two obstructions in Ukraine: reality and Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces), well-assisted by the US, other NATO countries, as well as countries from around the world.

Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end ) Planning the invasion of Ukraine may have actually been beyond the faculty of those deemed to be the best trained, experienced, and informed senior officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces today. Though inconceivable, It is apparent that there were no contingency plans drawn up by senior officers for the invasion of Ukraine, that would have made available a variety of good solutions for possible challenges, all of the what-ifs. Such contingency should have been thoughtful, calibrated, well-calculated for redirecting military resources in a measured way, and possibly creative ways, to achieve more favorable outcomes. Apparently, nothing of the kind was likely kept close at hand by the Russian Federation General Staff. Perchance, the possibility of failure and the need for contingency plans were subjects that could not be openly expressed within the likely tense and certainly authoritarian political environment in which the original plans were developed. (The thought occurs, given what has been observed since the withdrawal from Kyiv; is that some contingency plans have been implemented, but they were all worthless. If one always does what one always did, one will always get what one always got.) Once the poor performance of Russian Federation Armed Forces became undeniable, even Putin was compelled to address the matter of its deficiencies in a December 21, 2022 video message to Russia’s security services. Referring to unspecified problems in the military, Putin said that constructive criticism should be given attention. He stated: “I ask the Ministry of Defense to be attentive to all civilian initiatives, including taking into account criticism and responding correctly, in a timely manner.”

As explained to the Guardian by a United Kingdom intelligence service, Russia’s unprofessional military practices were likely in part to blame for the high casualties.. It is understood by commanders in US Armed Forces, the key to achieving success is the integration of combined arms warfare with air power, electronic warfare, deception, speed, maneuver, and concentration of power. Armored and mechanized systems remain essential tools on today’s battlefield, despite the threat that armed drones can pose to them proven in Ukraine. In a primitive way, Russian Federation commanders continually attempt to overrun Ukrainian positions through the use of masses of troops, ensuring huge losses of troops daily. Yet, in addition to the failed, near criminally incompetent utilization of troops and weapon systems by commanders of Armiya Rossii (Russian Army, hereinafter referred to as such) and Morskaya Pekhota Rossii (Russian Naval Infantry, hereinafter referred to as Russian Naval Troops) in Ukraine, too many other pieces appear to be missing from the Russian Federation Armed Forces prosecution of the war and may likely prevent it from ever being effective. Assuredly, Russian Federation failures on the battlefield have not come merely as a result of some string of miscalculations and mistakes or persistent unfortuitous coincidences in the conduct of a war. When denuded of all political aims, strategy, tactics, science, and so on, at its nub, war amounts to the wastage of human life. As a reality, men and women are certain to die unnaturally during war. Still, it is difficult to comprehend how in the Russian Federation, an ostensibly advanced industrialized country with, to all intents and purposes, a civilized society, apparent profligate decisions concerning the use of soldiers could be made. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that any of it could at all be deemed permissible by top military commanders and, on the face of it, be sanctioned by national authorities. Contra naturam. (Against nature.)

When Russian Federation General of the Army Sergei Surovikin was promoted to overall commander of the special military operation, he began to make moves that brought some positive results and good news for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Surovikin surely understood that leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer, although he may have wanted to do so in many areas. Despite shortcomings of his forces in the field and accepting the situation as it actually was, Surovikin sought to solidify the position of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. His defensive moves reportedly raised worries among US military officials and officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden that Russia Federation troops might be able to withstand renewed Ukrainian offensives. Perhaps his efforts, which were bearing fruit, were not enough to satisfy his superior, or maybe his apparent ability to establish order from chaos, convinced others they could grab glory from his success, claim his success as their own. Either way, Surovikin was replaced on January 11, 2023 after only three months as overall commander in Ukraine by none other than the Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff) Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov. When Gerasimov arrived to take command of the special military operation from him, Surovikin, now one of three deputies to Gerasimov, had begun the process of stepping up better organized localized attacks to have a cumulative effect and push back on recent advances by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. While that tactic continues, it would seem the valve has again been shut on the flow of big ideas from commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One should at best expect a return to the idea of overrunning Ukrainian frontline positions with masses of troops with predictable results in terms of killed and wounded.

Destroyed Russian Federation military vehicles and casualties strewn across a Ukrainian street in 2022 (above). In a primitive way, Russian Federation commanders continually attempt to overrun Ukrainian positions through the use of masses of troops, ensuring huge losses of troops daily. Still, in addition to the failed, near criminally incompetent utilization of troops and weapon systems by Russian Federation Army and Naval Ground Force commanders in Ukraine, too many other pieces appear to be missing from the Russian Federation Armed Forces prosecution of the war and may likely prevent it from ever being effective. Assuredly, Russian Federation failures on the battlefield have not come merely as a result of some string of miscalculations and mistakes or persistent unfortuitous coincidences in the conduct of a war. 

The Battle of the Crater

Military actions of decades ago are often difficult for one to fully understand with certainty when one is so far away from where and when those decisions were made, and how it all fit into the way of life of the period. Examining much of the material concerning the Battle of the Crater in preparation for this work, greatcharlie was astounded by how stirring, nuanced, edifying, illuminating, and instructive the bulk of the work is on that tragic battle and that dreadful war in general. So impressive were the impeccably researched and elegantly written works of Douglas Freeman, Shelby Foote, James McPherson, William Marvel, Drew Faust and lots of others reviewed that greatcharlie at one point was convinced it should halt its attempt to cover the battle, feeling unable to meet their standard. However, as its aspects so readily offered an apposite measure to examine the wasteful use of Russian Federation troops in the Ukraine War, the choice was made to carry on. With that being stated, without pretension, greatcharlie asks that those Civil War scholars among its readers look upon this effort with sympathy. (A few superb academic and state government online sources were used here to ensure readers could quickly follow-up on information provided and would have easily accessible points from they could start their own research on the battle. )

The Plan of Attack

In May 1864, an offensively-minded Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant, who US President Abraham Lincoln had appointed the commander of all Union Armies in March, launched a series of costly battles in an effort to move his forces south. Though little was attained by those battles, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, and, especially, Cold Harbor (collectively known as the Overland Campaign), they would be given greater meaning if Grant could find a way maneuver his forces to cut the Confederate supply and communication lines through Petersburg. If Petersburg fell, so would Richmond. However, Grant was apprehensive about mounting a frontal attack against 9,500 Confederate troops in well-fortified positions even though by late June, he had successfully covered most of the eastern approaches to Petersburg with the 16,500 troops he had available. Interestingly enough, in a rather prescient June 21, 1864 Richmond Examiner commentary, it was suggested that Grant “plunge with his whole force into the crater of the volcano and make an end of it—Let not the campaign linger. All parties are tired of this monotonous slaughter of Yankees.”

Grant was open to suggestions, and came across a recherché proposal from Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants of the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry, in the Union Army’s IX Corps Major General Ambrose Burnside. Pleasants’ regiment was composed of anthracite miners from Schuylkill County. One of his men looked out at the Confederate position from his trench and declared, “We could blow that damned fort out of existence if we could run a mine shaft under it.”  Pleasants’ proposal was passed up the chain of command to Burnside, who (on June 25, 1864, enthusiastically recommended it to Major General George Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Meade reacted with austerity upon learning of Pleasant’s proposal. It was hardly conventional and perhaps the use of the was too alien for Meade’s ears. He already had little faith in Burnside’s military judgment or ability to manage a complex operation. (Burnside’s reputation as a commander had suffered from his 1862 defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg and his under performance earlier in 1864 at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House.) On top of that, Meade and Burnside, as commander and subordinate, had a toxic relationship. Burnside had seniority, and had previously commanded the Army of the Potomac, but lost his command, and Meade had it. Meade’s chief engineer, Major James Duane, dismissed the project as “claptrap and nonsense.” He believed it was impossible to dig a military mine of the proposed length—more than 500 feet from the mine-head behind the front line to the salient opposite. At the same time, even if a breach were created at that point, the ground would remain in the sights of Confederate artillery batteries located north and south of the salient. Yet, still eager to do something, Grant apparently viewed Pleasants’ project as being clear, logical, and plausible, and green-lit it. Aware of the nature of their relationship, Grant issued separate orders to the two commanders in order not to avoid having Burnside receive direct commands from Meade. On Meade’s orders, the miners would receive no support from Army headquarters. Thus, on June 25, 1864, without the help of the Union Army’s professional engineers, his troops began digging, using improvised tools. 

The Picture As Seen From The Top

Despite his ambivalence about the plan, Meade began creating a battle plan with Burnside once orders were given. As Burnside envisioned the attack, on  July 30, 1864, it would be led by his freshest soldiers, the 4th Division USCT, “United States Colored Troops”–Black Union Army soldiers–in two segregated brigades with a strength of 4,300, under Brigadier General Edward Ferrero. (Interestingly, Ferrero was a ballroom dance instructor who, as Meade, was born in Spain.) The 4th Division USCT  would have to pass through or around the crater and the large debris field left by the mine; re-form for attack on the far side; then advance to seize the high ground along the Jerusalem Plank Road against whatever reserves of infantry and artillery the Confederate force might have at that point. Burnside consulted with the 4th Division USCT ’s brigade commanders in planning the assault, and arranged for the regiments that would lead the attack to receive special training in maneuvers required to pass the breach such as using ladders and by fighting around it and storming the high ground. Meade did not think Black soldiers were good enough soldiers, and he feared political repercussions if he gave them such an important and dangerous task. If they failed with heavy casualties, expectedly Radical Republicans in the US Congress would condemn his use of Black soldiers as cannon fodder. Democratic politicians would likely find fault with him no matter what happened. Democrats opposed the recruitment and use of Blacks in combat; the more extreme demanded that those already in service be dismissed. They reportedly sought to stir racial hatred as an aspect of the 1864 US Presidential Campaign. The Democratic Party’s platform, as described by one of its partisans, was “the Constitution as it is, the Union as it was, and the niggers where they are.” Meade consulted with Grant about the 4th Divisions role in the plan of attack. Grant conceded to his wishes, and the day before that attack, he overruled Burnside’s plan to have the 4rh Division lead the assault.

There were three other understrength divisions in the IX Corps. Three other divisions consisted of White troops; but these divisions had been exhausted and demoralized by months of combat and heavy losses. In compliance with his new orders, Burnside asked for one of his three other divisional commanders—James Ledlie of the 1st Division, Robert Potter of the 2nd Division, and Orlando Willcox of the 3rd Division–to step forward and accept the mission. None would volunteer for it, thus the commanders were ordered to draw straws. The short straw went to Ledlie. Ledlie, a New York railroad engineer, was considered the least competent of IX Corps four divisional commanders. He had been accused by some of being drunk during the Battle of North Anna, fought from May 23, 1864 to May 26, 1864. Burnside ordered Ledlie’s 1st Division to charge through the breach made by the detonation, and take the high ground along the Jerusalem Plank Road. By achieving that, they would split the Confederate Army, and Union Army guns would command Petersburg. However, Ledlie never sent such orders to his brigade commanders. He simply instructed them to take and hold the ground around the breach, and wait for the 4th Division USCT to assault the heights. Apparently in the confusion of changing arrangements, Burnside and his staff also failed to detail engineers to accompany the assault troops, to assist them by fortifying the high ground once they had seized it, and to make pathways through the trench lines so that artillery could be sent forward. Absent those arrangements, holding the high ground if reached, would be made more challenging.

Likely presuming all else was being done correctly, Grant sought to assist and exploit the attack following the detonation by negating an apparent Confederate advantage with a tactical ploy. Grant ordered 25,000 infantry and cavalry under his most aggressive commanders, Major General Winfield Hancock and Major General Phillip Sheridan, to attack north of the James River to Deep Bottom on July 28, 1864 and July 29, 1864. Hancock and Sheridan attacked with such strength that General Robert E. Lee, Commander of the Confederate States Army, believed Richmond was in danger, and sent his entire reserve north of the James to defend it. That left the trenches directly opposite Burnside’s 16,000 infantry (IX Corps and a division from X Corps) held by 4,400 soldiers in Confederate States Army Major General Bushrod Johnson’s Division. The only available reserves were three brigades of Confederate States Army Brigadier General William Mahone (approximately 2,300 men), who would need an hour or more to reach Johnson’s front. Once Union Army Intelligence reported that Lee’s reserve had gone north of the James, Grant issued orders for the mine to be blown and for Burnside to launch his attack.

An inset from Alfred Waud’s pencil sketch of the Battle of the Crater (above). The image courtesy of the Library of Congress–shows Union Army soldiers advancing into the breach created when four tons of gunpowder exploded beneath the Confederate lines. Most likely as a result of last minute changes by Union Army Major General George Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac. to a well-planned operation by Union Army’s IX Corps commander, Major General Ambrose Burnside, the attack was doomed from the start.

The Engagement

After a delay of an hour and thirty-five minutes from when the fuse in the mine was lit, at 4:44AM on July 30, 1864. the earth below Confederate States Army Brigadier General Stephen Elliott’s South Carolina brigade reportedly bulged and broke, and an enormous mushroom cloud rose up. As one Union soldier described the scene, the sky was filled with “Earth, stones, timbers, arms, legs, guns unlimbered and bodies unlimbed.” The explosion blasted a crater 130 feet long, 75 feet wide, and 30 feet deep, with sheer walls of jagged clay. The bottom was ‘filled with dust, great blocks of clay, guns, broken carriages, projecting timbers, and men buried in various ways . . . some with their legs kicking in the air, some with the arms only exposed, and some with every bone in their bodies apparently broken.”

An estimated 278 Confederates troops were killed instantly. At the same time, 110 Union Army guns and 54 mortars all opened fire. The delay had actually been to the artillerymen’s benefit; as the dawn allowed them to see what they were firing at. This is the moment when Ledlie’s men were supposed to advance, but just as the surviving Confederate troops, they were briefly paralyzed by the force of the blast. Still, despite creating the breach and inflicting losses upon the Confederate defenders, the effect of the explosion was not what Burnside hoped. The Crater itself was an impassable barrier, and the debris-clogged trenches to either side did not permit swift forward movement. When Ledlie’s soldiers finally reached it, they discovered that the earth that had fallen back into the Crater had become a mash that trapped the men who attempted to march through it. One New Hampshire soldier described his struggling comrades as “a mass of worms crawling over each other.” Ledlle’s soldiers also spent time attempting to rescue Confederate defenders buried in the dirt. 

Although a third of Elliott’s South Carolina brigade, which manned the strongpoint, was destroyed in the blast, behind the main line, Confederate troops rallied in the communication trenches and the ravine half-way up the slope. To reinforce them, Lee ordered the three brigades of Mahone’s Division forward. On the north side of the breach, Elliott’s survivors were joined by units of Confederate States Army Brigadier General Matt Ransom’s North Carolina Brigade, and on the south side by elements of the Virginia Brigade led by Confederate States Army Colonel David Weisinger. Confederate artillery batteries placed heavy cross-fire of canister and case shot that pinned Ledlie’s division in the breach. The Confederate troops fully capitalized on Ledlie’s mistake of advancing the 1st Division through the Crater and his soldiers slow movement.

What had previously been mere glimmers of problems within the Union Army’s command structure began to shine effulgently as the battle commenced. Once the situation began to break down with Union Army troops charging directly into the Crater, there was a need for authentic leadership and necessary corrections. However, the commanding officer of the imperiled soldiers of the 1st Division, Ledlie was well to the rear of the frontlines in a sandbagged bunker, sharing a bottle of rum with Ferrero, commanding officer of the 4th Division USCT. As the situation worsened, Meade and Burnside began trading angry telegrams, with Meade implying that Burnside was not telling him the truth and Burnside accusing Meade of insulting his honor.

At 7:30AM, in an effort to get a handle on the situation, Burnside ordered the 4th Division USCT to charge and carry out its original mission. In order to attack they were required to cross what became a no-man’s-land under fire, then force their way forward through the mass of demoralized 1st Division troops around the Crater. Nevertheless, the assault of the 4th Division USCT accomplished that and far more. Lieutenant Colonel Seymour Hall and Colonel Delavan Bates, commanding the two leading regiments in Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Sigfried’s first brigade, improvised a pincer attack that drove the Confederate troops back, capturing 150 prisoners. The regiments in Colonel Henry Thomas’ second brigade also worked their way through the maul and under heavy artillery fire and tried to advance in conjunction with some 1st Division regiments. Small groups of soldiers from both divisions managed to rally, side-by-side, in the trenches,

The Battle of the Crater was the first combat experience of soldiers of the 4th Division USCT , and reportedly some of them cried as they sensed triumph, “Remember Fort Pillow!”, in reference to an April 1864 battle in Tennessee during which USCT soldiers had been murdered by their Confederate captors. That cheer seemed to almost “summon demons on to the scene” and manifest far greater monstrous behavior during their own battle. US President Jimmy Carter, during a Nobel Lecture, in Oslo, Norway, on December 10, 2002, explained: “War may sometimes be a necessary evil. But no matter how necessary, it is always an evil, never a good. We will not learn how to live together in peace by killing each other’s children.” As events unfolded in the battle, Carter’s words, uttered nearly 150 years later, stand most apposite regarding the Battle of the Crater.

Once two of the three Confederate brigades from Mahone’s Division established themselves at the Crater, they counter-attacked. Though at first, in the morning,, the Union Army soldiers holding the outer berm of the Crater and the trenches around it checked Mahone’s charge, they lacked the strength to mitigate a stronger Confederate push in the afternoon. The Confederate troops displaced the soldiers of the 1st Division and 4th Division USCT. The Union Army soldiers pulled away from the trench line and down towards the Crater with Confederate troops in hot pursuit. With the aid of Confederate artillery, Mahone’s troops kept the Crater under fire. They fired down into the Crater and reportedly in some instances even hurled their muskets with bayonets-fixed at the Union Army soldiers. Except for those soldiers of the 1st Division and 4th Division USCT who at that point were falling back, between 800 and 1,000 soldiers had remained packed at the bottom of the Crater. Most were demoralized, having been trapped in an indefensible position, without food or water, in oven-like heat, unable to fight but vulnerable to mortar-fire. 

Grant, himself, visited the front in the morning, observed and evaluated the situation, and then ordered Burnside to pull everyone back. Grant supposedly stated: “It is slaughter to leave them here.” Amazingly, for whatever reason, Burnside ignored the commanding general’s order. Refusing to admit his attack had failed despite the overwhelming evidence of routed troops and broken organizations, Burnside rode to Meade’s headquarters to demand reinforcements. It was then that the two generals got into a furious argument over the need to retreat and Burnside’s honor. Meade being Burnside’s superior, gave the peremptory order for Union Army units to withdraw in order to avoid further losses. Reportedly, at 10:30AM, Grant and Meade just packed up and left the scene. Instead of developing a plan for withdrawal, Burnside left the matter to his officers struggling in the Crater.

As the battered and tattered Union force retreated, many of the wounded or surrendering Black soldiers of the 4th Division USCT were singled out for murder by Confederate troops wherever they found them. Based on its research of near impeccable sources, Encyclopedia Virginia states that the Confederate troops viewed the deployment of Black soldiers of the 4th Division USCT as an ugly provocation. Reportedly one Virginia officer stated as the Confederate troops charged: “Boys, you have hot work ahead; they are negroes and show no quarter.” At 2:30PM, the Confederates launched their final assault, during which the attackers chanted, “Spare the white man, kill the nigger.” Encyclopedia Virginia further revealed Major Matthew Love of the 25th North Carolina wrote, “such Slaughter I have not witnessed upon any battlefield anywhere. Their men were principally negroes and we shot them down until we got near enough and then run them through with the bayonet . . . we was not very particular whether we captured or killed them, the only thing we did not like to be pestered berrying[sic] the Heathens.” Additionally Encyclopedia Virginia cites Major John Haskell of the Branch Battery (North Carolina) observed, “Our men, who were always made wild by having negroes sent against them . . . were utterly frenzied with rage. Nothing in the war could have exceeded the horrors that followed. No quarter was given, and for what seemed a long time, fearful butchery was carried on.” Some of the officers tried to stop the killing, “but [the men] kept on until they finished up.” Reportedly, 1st Division soldiers witnessed Confederate troops killing wounded or surrendering 4th Division USCT soldiers as they retreated from the berm of the Crater. At the moment the defense at the berm and in the trenches completely collapsed, a number of 1st Division soldiers astoundingly turned against their comrades-in-arms in the 4th Division USCT , shooting or bayonetting them, ostensibly believing, as explained by Encyclopedia Virginia, that Confederate troops would not grant quarter to Blacks in arms, or to White troops serving with them. As one Union Army soldier reportedly stated, “we was not about to be taken prisoner amongst them niggers.” Records indicate the killing went far beyond the excesses that occur in the heat of battle. Many wounded and prisoners of war from the 4th USCT soldiers under escort were shot, bayoneted or clubbed to death as they were moved to the rear. The Confederates would eventually sweep the Union Army units from man-made gully moving from the right side by late afternoon. N’importe qui trouverait cela cruel et sauvage. Peut-être Alexis de Tocqueville ne trouverait guère surprenant. Certains en Amérique diraient: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!” Quel dommage!

The Battle of the Crater was a demoralizing defeat. After eight and a half hours of fighting, Union Army casualties were 3,798 (504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured). Confederate casualties were 1,491 (361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured). The 1st Division was engaged for the entire eight and a half hours and suffered 18% casualties. The 4th Division USCT  was engaged for less than half that time, but lost 31%. Since many of its wounded were murdered, the ratio of killed to wounded was more than double that of any Union Army unit. Meade brought charges against Burnside, and a subsequent court of inquiry censured Burnside along with Ledlie, Ferrero, Willcox, and Colonel Zenas Bliss. Burnside was never again assigned to duty. Although he was as responsible for the defeat as Burnside, Meade escaped immediate censure. However, in early 1865, the US Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War exonerated Burnside and condemned Meade. Although Meade was against the operation, it was recognized by. Congress that he very likely sabotaged it by disturbing carefully laid plans Burnside formulated for it,

What began as a well-planned military operation devolved into a haphazard manifestation of a feud between Meade and Burnside with the soldiers being used as pawns. Burnside lost his head in his struggle with Meade. If he had kept his head, he more likely would have selected his best divisional commander for the assault, ensured that commander understood the concept and intent of the operation and issued him clear orders for the mission. On top of that he could have counseled the divisional commander and his subordinates with suggestions on how to tackle challenges. Ledlie proved to be a worse commander than originally thought. He had little concern for the well-being of the soldiers of his 1st Division or the terrible predicament in which they found themselves. The notion of inspirational leadership in battle was clearly alien to him. The lack of discipline and fratricidal behavior displayed by Ledlie troops also spoke volumes about Ledlie’s leadership. One cannot say Ledlie never gave a thought to his mission as he knew when the fighting would be underway, stationed himself safely away from the shooting, and made the effort to pay no heed to events. Ferrero, never having led his 4th Division USCT in combat, seemed to follow Ledlie’s lead. He, too, remained safe from bullets, bombs, and any sudden shock in Ledlie’s bunker while his soldiers suffered immensely and needed him the most. If Ferrero had observed their advance, he could have made the necessary adjustments. If he had observed what the soldiers of the 1st Division were doing to his men, he may have been able to resolve the matter. The errors are too many to recount in this essay, and one might imagine a possible list of likely and possible challenges the attacking forces would face and solutions for them. However, most may agree that the central problem during actual battle was the failure of those in charge to be leaders and do their jobs.

Photo of the Crater battleground taken in 1864 (above). The Battle of the Crater was a demoralizing defeat. After eight and a half hours of fighting, Union Army casualties were 3,798 (504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured). Confederate casualties were 1,491 (361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured). The 1st Division was engaged for the entire eight and a half hours and suffered 18% casualties. The 4th Division USCT was engaged for less than half that time, lost 31%. Since many of its wounded were murdered, the ratio of killed to wounded was more than double that of any Union Army unit.

Preempting Likely Reactions to the Aforementioned Discussion

True, as alluded to earlier here, throughout history, there have been battles in which losses were far greater than that of the Crater. Attention would very likely be called to the battles of annihilation, usually part of the course of study of the military academic institutions. Among those usually examined are the following.

The Battle of Cannae

At the Battle of Cannae during Second Punic War, a force of Carthaginians and their Libyan, Numidian, Spaniard and Celt mercenaries, all under the command of Hannibal, faced off against a larger Roman and Italian force along the River Aufidus on August 2, 216 B.C., near Cannae in Apulia, Italy. The Roman force was led by both Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Giaus Terentius Varro, who exchanged overall command of the force daily. When Hannibal discovered Varro was the more aggressive commander, he moved his force of 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry into position against the Romans while he was in command. Upon engaging the Romans’ 80,000 troops and 6,000 cavalry, Hannibal had his force feign collapse, anticipating the more aggressive Varro would rush his troops forward. When the Romans reached the appropriate depth Hannibal’s forces proceeded to double-envelop and annihilate the Roman force. An estimated 60,000 to 70,000 Romans were lost.

The Battle of Tannenberg

At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. Consequently, the Russians were essentially knocked out of World War I until the Spring of 1915.

The Minsk-Smolensk Pockets

As the story of the Minsk-Smolensk Pockets during World War II goes, immediately following the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, the German 2nd Panzer Group under Colonel General Heinz Guderian and the 3rd Panzer Group under Colonel General Hermann Hoth destroyed Soviet frontier defenses, received and defeated Soviet attempts to counterattack, and subsequently encircled four Soviet Armies near Bialystock and Minsk by June 30, 1941. By July 9, 1941, Soviet forces within the pocket were decimated, resulting in the loss of 420, 000 troops. Between July 10, 1941 and September 10, 1941, during the second phase of Operation Barbarossa, the German 2nd Panzer Group and the 3rd Panzer Group rapidly advanced on Smolensk. In a pincer movement, mirroring their action at Minsk, encircled the Soviet 16th, 19th and 20th Soviet Armies. Though many troops of the 19th and 20th Soviet Armies exfiltrated the German encirclement successfully, the battle left the Soviet Union’s defenses in the West in tatters a lá Tannenberg.

The Falaise Gap

At the Falaise Gap in World War II, the Allied Armies developed a multi-phase plan to break out of Normandy following their successful landings in France on June 6, 1944. On July 18, 1944, under Operation Goodwood, British and Canadian Armies would attack along the eastern line around Caen. On July 25, 1944, under Operation Cobra, US forces would drive forward into a corridor created by thousands of US heavy and medium bombers on the western end of the German lines around Saint-Lô. Against Goodwood, the German Army responded by committing a large portion of its armored reserves to the defense. Against Cobra, disoriented German defenders could not establish an organized defense. Seizing the opportunity created, the Ground Forces commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe British Army Field Marshal Bernard Mongomery ordered Allied armies in the vicinity of Goodwood to converge on the Falaise–Chambois area to envelop the German 7th Army and 5th Panzer Army of Army Group B. The Germans began to withdraw on August 17, 1944 but the Allied Armies completed the encirclement two days later at Chambois. Although the Germans managed to force through gaps in Allied lines via counterattacks, by the evening of 1 August 21, 1944, the gap was closed. An estimated 50,000 Germans were sealed inside the “Falaise Pocket.”. Remnants of Army Group B outside of the pocket retreated across the Seine.

A portion of the “Corridor of Death” in the Falaise Pocket (above). Seizing the opportunity created while breaking out of Normandy two months after the June 1944 landings, the Ground Forces commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe British Army Field Marshal Bernard Mongomery ordered Allied armies in the vicinity of Goodwood to converge on the Falaise–Chambois area to envelop large elements of the German’s Army Group B. The Germans began to withdraw on August 17, 1944 but the Allied Armies completed the encirclement two days later at Chambois. Although the Germans managed to force through gaps in Allied lines via counterattacks, by the evening of August 21, 1944, the pocket was closed. An estimated 50,000 Germans were trapped inside. Remnants of Army Group B outside of the pocket retreated across the Seine.

Among the commonalities of these battles beyond the successful enveloping of opponent by the victorious commanders, their outcomes were mainly shaped mainly by the well laid plans of the commander on one side allowing for the proper use of resources, information, communication, speed, mobility, terrain, time available, superior maneuver, well-placed fires, decisive action, the exploitation of opponent’s confusion resulting from the fog of war, the friction of battle, and the opponents failure to expect the unexpected and to act accordingly in response to what was unforeseen and unpredictable. More apt parallels to the Battle of the Crater and the Russian Federation special military operation in Ukraine, mutatis mutandis, are battles in which losses are self-inflicted as a result of poor and very often rash decisions made by those in charge of units in a battle. A seemingly never-ending list of battles blaze on the pages of history in which such behavior was at the crux of their tragic outcomes for one side. Among those that come to greatcharlie’s mind most immediately are the following. 

The Charge of the Light Brigade

The Charge of the Light Brigade on October 25, 1854, at the Battle of Balaclava during the Crimean War was a tragic attack by the cavalrymen of charge was made by the Light Brigade of the British Army cavalry, which consisted of the 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 17th Lancers, and the 8th and 11th Hussars commanded by Major General James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan

against an estimated 20 battalions of infantry supported by over 50 artillery pieces under the Russian commander, General Pavel Liprandi. Obedient to orders–ex post facto called a miscommunication–from the overall commander of the British Army Cavalry,General George Bingham, 3rd Earl of Lucan, with whom he had a toxic relationship, Cardigan led a frontal assault with his 670 troops against a Russian force organized in a semi-horseshoe defense of the Russians who enjoyed excellent line of sight over a mile in length and supported on the left and right side sides of the Horseshoe by artillery batteries providing enfilading fire from elevated ground. Although Cardigan’s troops scattered some of the defenders, they were too badly battered and tattered to complete their mission and retreated without any decisive gain at the cost of 110 killed and approximately 161 wounded.

The Battle of the Little Big Horn

The Battle of the Little Big Horn on June 25, 1875, was an engagement of what was known as the “American Indian Wars” during which US Army Colonel George Armstrong Custer of the US 7th Cavalry led his battalion in an attack on the main Sioux Tribe encampment at Little Bighorn. Ignoring the advice of scouts, dividing his force into three parts, and expecting the Sioux to scatter at his approach, Custer, at the head of one element of his divided force, was surprised to encounter a Native American force of 3000 warriors from Lakota Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho Tribes under the dual command of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull. Custer’s element was destroyed, suffering 268 killed and 55 severely wounded, with Custer, himself, among the dead. Native American losses were reported to be 18 killed.

The Second Battle of Ypres

The Second Battle of Ypres fought from April 22, 1915 to May 25, 1915 during World War I was ignited by an diversionary attack by the German Fourth Army against British Second Army, several French divisions and the Belgian Army, planned an attack towards Ypres, not to capture the city, but merely to cover the transfer of German troops to the Eastern Front where Germany had achieved great success in the aforementioned Battle of Tannenberg and Battle of Masurian Lakes. Notably, the diversionary attack was used to test a deadly chlorine gas weapon,secretly installed in chemical tanks across their front line and did so with great effect, collapsing unprotected Allied forces before the German advance. The success of the chemical attack was unexpected, and no reinforcements were made available to exploit it, and the battle ended after only minor territorial gain with 35,000 German troops lost and 60,000 Allied forces lost primarily due to the chlorine gas.

The Battle of the Somme

The Battle of the Somme fought from July 1, 1916 to November 18, 1916 during World War I by the armies of the United Kingdom and France against the Germany was initiated on the upper reaches of the River Somme in France. as a means to reduce Intense German pressure being placed on the French at Verdun. The advance of a force of 11 divisions of the British 4th Army advanced along a 15-mile front north of the River Somme, while five French divisions advanced on an eight-mile front to the south, was preceding by a week-long heavy artillery bombardment, using some 1.75 million shells, which aimed to cut the barbed wire guarding German’s trench defenses and destroy the enemy’s positions. Although German positions, many of which were in trenches deep underground, proved to be stronger than anticipated, and the barbed wire remained intact at many points, British Army Field Marshal Douglas Haig decided to press on with the attack. Along the line, German machine gun and rifle fire cut down thousands of the attacking British troops, many of them caught in “no man’s land” between the two sides, British casualties on the first day numbered over 57,000, of which 19,240 were killed. Over the next 141 days, the British advanced a maximum of seven miles, even after an attack on September 15, 1916 of 12 divisions accompanied by 48 Mark I tanks which made their first-ever appearance on the battlefield. More than three million men fought in the battle, of whom one million were either wounded or killed.

The Schweinfurt Raids

The First Schweinfurt–Regensburg raid on August 17, 1943 was a “double-strike mission” strategic bombing mission during World War II carried out by 376 B-17 heavy bombers of the US Army’s 8th Air Force to cripple German ball bearing production and the German aircraft industry. Without fighter escort for force protection, two large forces of bombers attacked Schweinfurt and Regensburg respectively in order to disperse fighter reaction by the Luftwaffe, but subsequently 60 B-17s out of 376, each crewed with 10 airmen at a minimum, were lost over German-controlled territory, in Switzerland, or ditched at sea, and despite some success at Regensburg, the commander of the 8th Air Force, General Ira Eaker assessed the Schweinfurt raid was a failure. On October 14, 1943, a second long-range unescorted raid on Schweinfurt was launched despite the fact that everyone who flew the mission stressed the importance of the escorts, which were not available, in reducing losses. Another 60 B-17s, this time out of 291, were lost during the attack, resulting in the suspension of deep raids for five months.

Japanese Banzi Attack on Saipan

There were countless wasteful Banzi attacks of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Marines in the Pacific Theater during World War II. After the third week of fighting on Saipan, the 2nd Marine Division, the US Army 27th Infantry Division, and the 4th Marine Division had put the Japanese defenders backs against the wall, driving them into the northern corner of the island. For Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito, the overall commander of Japanese forces on Saipan, the only choice was to order his remaining 4,000-plus troops and all civilians to participate in a final Banzai attack before daybreak on July 7, 1944. The Banzi attack continued for some 12 hours before the Japanese were wiped out. The Japanese had advanced over 1,000 yards before they were stopped. By the evening of July 7th, the soldiers and Marines had regained all of the ground lost during the Japanese attack. A total of 4,311 Japanese troops were killed. US losses were high, too. The first and second battalions of the 105th Regiment od the 27th Division suffered 406 killed and an additional 512 wounded.

The Battle of Arnhem

The Battle of Arnhem fought from September 17, 1944 to September 26, 1944 during World War II was the result of a plan proposed by British Army Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, that an airborne assault would support a single drive north over the branches of the Lower Rhine River,which would  permit the British Second Army to bypass the Siegfried Line and attack the industrial Ruhr. Before the airborne assault, planned as Operation Market Garden, was launched, it was discovered that would likely land on top of two German divisions, the remains of the 9th SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and  the 10th SS Panzer Division “Frundsberg” from the Eastern Front as well as several smaller German units. However, the commanding officer of 21st Army Group dismissed the information. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force upon receiving the information via Ultra intercepts choose to ignore it as well. The mission failed as planned and Allied losses were approximately 1,984 killed, 6,854 captured, while German losses were approx 1,300 killed and 2,000 wounded. (The Battle of Arnhem was recently discussed briefly in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled, “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)

Russian Federation troops in Ukraine appear to have experienced many of the worst aspects of not only the Crater, but every example here, except contending with chlorine gas as in the second Battle of the Somme. Yet, looking over this relatively short list of abysmal actions that compounded tragedies of war in which they occurred, greatcharlie believes that in selecting the Battle of the Crater to focus upon in order to find parallels with the situation of Russian Federation troops in Ukraine given the many choices, it may very well have selected the ugliest of the lot given the blue-on-blue hen house racial murder spree that was part of it.

German troops positioning themselves to engage Allied airborne units at Arnhem in September 1944 (above). Before the Allied airborne assault, planned as Operation Market Garden, was launched on September17, 1944, it was discovered that would likely land on top of two German divisions, the remains of the 9th SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and  the 10th SS Panzer Division “Frundsberg” from the Eastern Front as well as several smaller German units. However, the commanding officer of 21st Army Group dismissed the information. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force upon receiving the information via Ultra intercepts choose to ignore it as well. The mission failed as planned. By September 26, 1944, Allied losses were approximately 1,984 killed, 6,854 captured, while German losses were approx 1,300 killed and 2,000 wounded.

Poor Circumstances of Russian Troops in Ukraine

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Delinquent, seemingly feckless Russian commanders who failed to properly train their troops to face conditions on today’s battlefield for months have looked with shock and awe at the environment in which their soldiers are being slaughtered. Any blame and shame concerning their overall performance falls squarely on the commanders at the top rungs of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. So unaware was the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces of the situation that Russian Federation troops were thrown into since February 24, 2022, that Ukrayinska Pravda, on January 23, 2023, that Gerasimov, seeing for himself how intense the hostilities were, and “being immersed in the newness of it all,” complained the special military operation has put Russian troops in conditions that they have never encountered in the history of modern Russia. Gersaimov was sent down from his perch as Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces by Putin on January 23 2023. Rather examine one of the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ many catastrophic engagements with Ukrainian troops, as done with the Battle of the Crater, a measured picture of the désastre de trés grande ampleur is presented.

Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide

As aforementioned, on November 10, 2022, the US Department of Defense announced an official assessment that over 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action or wounded in Ukraine. Thus, the US Department of Defense figures indicated that during 260 days of fighting to that point, an average of 385 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured each day. The official figure issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in September 2022 put the number of Russian troops killed at 5,937, a figure Western officials said grossly underestimated the country’s losses. Further, the US Department of Defense figure suggested that the daily fighting along the 1000-mile front line that winds around the eastern edges of Ukraine is very intense. A significant part of the struggle is being fought from World War I-style trenches in which soldiers dug into muddy fortifications suffer relentless artillery onslaughts until their units are destroyed or displaced. So apparently horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Captured Russians say their comrades face execution on desertion charges if they don’t keep moving.” Reportedly, some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” The Kyiv Post, citing an Agence France-Presse interview of a Ukrainian soldier, provided the quote: “You shoot them and more come.” The indications and implications of what they say is that even incremental advances achieved through localized attacks begun by Surovikin have come at a high price for the Russian Federation troops.

Disco inferno. (I learn by suffering.) According to Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at Center for Naval Analyses and a fellow at the Center for New American Security, and Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program, in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, conscripts receive most of their training from the units to which they are sent rather than centralized training bases. (The Mobiks are offered only the most basic lessons during a reported short two weeks at their initial training bases.) However, given exigent circumstances, officers and non-commissioned officers that would provide that training in units have mostly been redeployed and in some cases they have likely been used to form additional battalions. Thereby, Russian Army regiments and brigades have unlikely had the personnel in their remain-behind elements available to properly train newly arrived Mobiks. There is apparently no crawl, walk, run training for the Mobiks. Such methods of training that could be used even under the very challenging circumstances they face appear to be alien to Russian unit commanders. It seems that even lessons on what to expect and what not to do are rarely applied in the Mobiks training in their units. At least Burnside initially had a viable plan for the Crater attack and well-prepared the troops that he originally planned to use in the assault for their specific task.

One might imagine that when casualty figures presented by the West reached the ears of those 300,000 Russians mobilized for the Ukraine War surely created a greater sense of uncertainty among troops being mobilized for the Ukraine War long before reaching the battlefield. En tremblant! The likely indications and implications of the figures to most Mobiks were that they would have a small chance of surviving the war unscathed. Once on the battlefield and seeing the realities of the situation, the sense of uncertainty and fear surely increased exponentially and appears by accounts to have put a good number of them in a state of shock. Poorly trained, unable to escape their circumstance, they have only had their commanders with whom to turn. To the misfortune of the Mobiks, that better enabled their commanders to exert influence on them that was strong enough to compel them to charge into death in an instant. For those who have refused to do so, reportedly death threats would serve to coerce them to advance, a positively nightmarish Sylla and Charybdis scenario. Peior est bello timor ipse belli. (Worse than war is the very fear of war.

Mobiks during their brief training at a Russian Army base (above). So horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” 

The Professionals Saw Trouble Coming

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) The received wisdom often heard from military analysts in the West is that what is being observed is the way “Russia conducts a lot of its warfare — by overwhelming the enemy with volume, with people.” Moreover, it is accepted that “The Kremlin view, unfortunately, is that soldiers’ lives are expendable.” In a report from the Institute for the Study of War assessed that Moscow is not properly utilizing the reservists it began calling up last September. As for the cause, it was explained that “Systemic failures in Russia’s force generation apparatus continue to plague personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capacity in Ukraine.”

Yet, professional members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would likely disagree that there has been anything standard or normal about the manner Russian Federation Armed Forces have handled their soldier Marines, airmen, and sailors in Ukraine. As the war reached the 100-day mark, there was evidence that high-level casualties were growing. Professional soldiers in the Russian Army were making public appeals to Putin to investigate battlefield conditions. Units have faced exhausting tours on the frontlines. In a June 7, 2022 article, the Guardian cited two videos, fighters from Russian Federation-controlled east Ukraine complaining about poor conditions and long terms of duty at the front leading to exhaustion. the Guardian quoted one soldier from the Russian-controlled 113th regiment from Donetsk from one of the videos as commenting: “Our personnel have faced hunger and cold,” The soldier was quoted further as saying: “For a significant period, we were without any material, medical or food support.” The soldier reportedly went on to state: “Given our continuous presence and the fact that amongst our personnel there are people with chronic medical issues, people with mental issues, many questions arise that are ignored by the higher-ups at headquarters.”

Another Russian Federation soldier who had fought near Kyiv, Kharkiv, and was now in eastern Ukraine in an interview complained of exhaustion, saying he had even contacted a lawyer and complained that he had not seen his wife for months. He was quoted as saying: “I have been fighting in Ukraine since the start of the war, it has been over three months now.” A soldier from the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade headquartered in Buryatia in Siberia, told the Guardian. “It is exhausting, my whole unit wants a break, but our leadership said they can’t replace us right now.” The soldier continued: “The three months of fighting already feel longer than the four years I spent serving in the army during peacetime.” The soldier boldly admitted: “I have already contacted a lawyer online who told me that by law the general can keep us here until our contract runs out so there isn’t much we can do.” Russian Federation Armed Forces do not have sufficient numbers of troops available to adjust or to rotate forces. Once units became heavily engaged with the Ukrainians, they were usually left in contact with them. 

Meanwhile, casualties among Russian Federation  officers keep mounting. Western officials have said that the Russian Federation’s mid and junior ranking officers have also taken heavy casualties “because they are held to an uncompromising level of responsibility for their units’ performance.” Company grade officers, lieutenants and captains, have had to lead the lowest level tactical actions, as the Russian Army does not staff units with highly trained and empowered noncommissioned officers. Western armies typically have such senior leaders staffed in units who can fulfill that role. At the time those interviews were made, four Russian Army generals were reportedly killed in combat. Professional Russian Army units have been more fortunate than others, particularly those soldiers recruited from the Russian Federation-controlled republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. They say their units were thrown into battle with little training at all. Videos have shown that some fighters have lacked basic gear for combat Kevlar vests and they are armed with older rifles. A soldier allegedly serving in Donetsk’s 107th Regiment complained to the Guardian: “Our mobilization was done unlawfully, without medical certification.” Another soldier from Donetsk said: “Over 70% of those here were previously decommissioned because they physically can’t fight. Over 90% have never fought before and saw a Kalashnikov for the first time. We were thrown on to the frontlines.”

When weary and weakened, mistakes become more commonplace among  commanders and soldiers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and that has become a significant part of Russia’s problems in Ukraine. Ukrainian commanders have often capitalized on those mistakes, creating even greater losses among Russian Federation troops. At the turn of the new year, on January 4, 2023, Ukrainian Armed Forces claimed a strike upon a vocational school building in Makiivka where hundreds of Russian Federation troops were reportedly clustered carelessly in a building close to the frontline. The Ukrainians claimed that around 400 Russian soldiers of one regiment were killed and around 300 more were wounded. The Russian Federation Armed Forces sought to blame the soldiers for their own deaths. Russian Army Lieutenant General Sergei Sevryukov said in a statement that their phone signals allowed Kyiv’s forces to “determine the coordinates of the location of military personnel” and launch a strike. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry, in a rare admission of losses, initially said the strike killed 63 troops. However, as emergency crews searched the ruins, the death toll mounted. The deputy commander of the regiment struck was among the dead. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence revealed on Twitter: “Given the extent of the damage, there is a realistic possibility that ammunition was being stored near to troop accommodation, which detonated during the strike, creating secondary explosions,” United Kingdom intelligence officials said: “The Russian military has a record of unsafe ammunition storage from well before the current war, but this incident highlights how unprofessional practices contribute to Russia’s high casualty rate.” It would seem that many Russian commanders are made with the same substance as Leslie and Ferrero

In their analysis of the Russian Federation Armed Forces capabilities mentioned earlier, Kofman and Lee also explained that the Russian military is well suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery.” They explained further that “By contrast, it is poorly designed for a sustained occupation, or a grinding war of attrition, that would require a large share of Russia’s ground forces, which is exactly the conflict it has found itself in.” Yet, even troops trained for short, high-intensity actions as the Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, have faced great challenges against the Ukrainian Armed Forces while performing that role. According to reports based on what was observed, the Russian Federation Armed Forces plan of attack against Hostomel Airport included its rapid occupation, with the intention of using it as an assembly area for Kyiv’s encirclement and capture. The airport is a bit over 6 miles north of Kyiv. The Initial February 24, 2022 assault on Hostomel Airport was a success, catching its Ukrainian defenders by surprise apparently due its speed. Mi-35 and Ka-52 attack helicopters operating out of Belarus struck the airport’s defenses and opened a way for helicopter-borne VDV units in Mi-8 transport helicopters that followed. However, despite being caught off guard by the initial assault by the attack helicopters, the attack itself was ineffective as the Ukrainian defenses were left largely intact.  Without any meaningful air support–it was very likely not included in formulation of the attack plan, VDV units on the ground faced counterattacks by Ukrainian forces almost immediately. 

Having secured Hostomel Airport to the extent possible on February 25, 2022, the VDV and Russian Army unit that linked up with them, proceeded to push into the nearby town and then  advance to Bucha and Irpin. Their poorly organized movement encountered ambushes in Hostomel and Bucha which resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment. When those in command decided to hold their positions, digging in on the roadsides, they became sitting ducks to night attacks by special forces units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and  suffered heavy casualties. On March 29, 2022, the order was given for the Russian Federation forces at Hostomel to withdraw from the Kyiv oblast, but they did so under continuous artillery fire from Ukrainian forces. Left with little choice if they were to survive, Russian Federation troops damaged equipment that had to be abandoned and made a break for it. What was supposed to be an organized withdrawal became a hasty retreat.

Russian Federation Airborne Ttroops during their verticle assault on Hostomel Airport (above). The received wisdom expressed is that Russian military is well suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery, and is poorly designed for a sustained occupation, or a grinding war of attrition, that would require a large share of Russia’s ground forces as in Ukraine. Yet, even troops trained for short, high-intensity actions as the Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, have faced great challenges against the Ukrainian Armed Forces while performing that role. The Russian Federation Armed Forces plan of attack against Hostomel Airport, a bit over 6 miles north of Kyiv, nearly became a complete disaster. Professional members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would likely say that there has been anything standard or normal about the manner Russian Federation Armed Forces have handled their soldier Marines, airmen, and sailors in Ukraine. 

The Wagner Group

A most apparent act of archaic wartime callousness is the Russian Federation’s tactic of throwing units from Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) against Ukrainian positions. The Wagner Group is a private military contractor owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a millionaire restaurateur and entrepreneur, nicknamed “Putin’s chef” due to his close ties with the Russian Federation President. Wagner Group units have been deployed to bolster the number of Russian Federation forces in Ukraine. Moscow has used paid fighters to bolster its forces since the start of the special military operation. It was estimated in April 2022 to have initially deployed between 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries, including Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas.

To increase the organization’s strength even further, Prigozhin began to create new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. Much as the Union Army soldiers at the Crater, typically, the penal units are rushed into withering fire by Russian Army commanders perfunctorily without real the goal of attaining true military objectives or even success against their opponents most of the time. To that extent, the Wagner Group troops can rightfully be characterized as mere cannon fodder rather than trained and organized assault units. If there is any “worthwhile” purpose in sending the Wagner Group units to attack Ukrainian positions in such a manner, it is to allow them to identify defenses for Russian Army artillery to bombard. To a degree, this tactic has proven effective, but nonetheless it is a most apparent display of archaic wartime callousness. The Wagner Group troops’ display remarkable courage and obedience to authority, but their acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting hard because they have nothing left to lose. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, More than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut. There have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.

Special Problems of Winter

Weather conditions in eastern and southern Ukraine have been unfriendly to Russian Federation troops since the start of the special military operation. However, in the winter, “troops on the frontlines moved from being cold and wet to frozen and drenched.” They reportedly have inadequate sleeping bags, inadequate clothing and suffering from the cold. but they are kept in fight. Citing an interview of security expert in the United Kingdom, Robert Fox in the Daily Express, FoxNews reported “For the Russian troops, there is now quite significant evidence of ill-equipped, particularly recruits getting . . . even in the training camps, dying of hypothermia.” Fox commented further to the Daily Express: “That is really quite something. Inadequate sleeping bags, inadequate clothing and suffering from the cold. They find it difficult fighting in the cold but the fighting is going on.” Quoting Rebekah Koffler, a former DIA intelligence officer, FoxNews reported: “Russian soldiers dying from hyperthermia in winter is nothing new.” Koffler continued: “This is what happens when you have a fashion designer, such as Valentin Yudashkin [designer for former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s wife Raisa Gorbacheva], develop Russian military uniforms.” Koffler further stated: “Unlike the Soviet Army uniforms that were designed for severe Russian winters, modern Russian military uniform is not optimized for freezing temperatures.” Koffler additionally remarked: “Instead of using natural textiles like cotton, linen, and heavy and coarse wool, synthetic materials were used, which kept the soldiers cold in winter and hot in summer,” and “Bulky and baggy style was replaced with fitted styles.” When Shoigu was appointed Russian Federation Minister of Defense, he halted use of the traditional Russian footwear made of felt, valenki, which was worn by military and civilians for hundreds of years.

Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) fighters pose before rode sign at Bakhmut (above). The Wagner Group is a private military contractor operating in Ukraine that is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, nicknamed “Putin’s chef” due to his close ties with the Russian Federation President. In a clear act of archaic wartime callousness, Russian Army commanders often send the Wagner Group units to attack Ukrainian positions in frontal assaults, allowing them to identify defenses for the artillery to bombard. Wagner Group units have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, More than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut.

Leadership Attributes Seemingly Absent among Russian Federation Commanders 

An important feature that top Russian Federation commanders by all appearances repeatedly walked past in every training exercise, either as vast as Zapad and Vostock or in independent training exercises at the division, brigade, regiment, and battalion levels, prior to February 24, 2022: was the lack of authentic military leadership displayed by officers at the field and company levels. While de rigueur as it may have been for decade, the absolute dependence upon the direction of superiors and voiding officers any freedom to be agile in thinking and flexible in action, to name only two impactful ills from a long list that beset the Russian Federation Armed Forces, would assure the death of fighting force on today’s battlefield. Such ways doubtlessly manifest the overly controlling and strict authoritarian government for which the Russian Federation Armed Forces serve and reflective of the nature of the country’s despotic political leadership.

To outline the attributes and expectations of military officers in a 21st century fighting force, on its face it would seem most efficacious to examine US Army leadership manuals online. (Seeking up-to-date expressions on military leadership, greatcharlie has refrained from using the leadership guides it retained after it military service far more than three decades ago! Wie die Zeit vergeht!). In reviewing materials available, an essay entitled “Eight Essential Characteristics of Officership” posted on a positively enlightening military blog, The Field Grade Leader, caught greatcharlie’s attention as it provides a superb, concise explanation of the pertinent attributes and expectations. Much of the information presented in the essay would very likely be alien to the ears of commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Presumably, there would also unlikely be a point of reference upon which officers in the Union Army or Confederate Army in the US Civil War, would have been able hypothetically to fully comprehend much of it. 

The eight characteristics are paraphrased here: 1) Lead: Being a leader and being in charge are often conflated, but they are really two different things. Beyond knowing where you are, where you want to go, and how you are going to get there, officers must inspire soldiers to take the journey with you. Officers must be prepared to make decisions, move the mission forward, and lead by example, never ordering a subordinate to make a sacrifice that he or she is unwilling to make. All officers no matter what their assignment must be leaders; 2) Listen: As nearly every team will have a resource of experienced senior leaders, officers should listen to their insights and suggestions wi/h an open mind and at times seek their advice. members that are an extremely valuable resource. Stories of their experiences in situations can provide examples of decisionmaking from which one can learn, be guided, and possibly mimic. To that extent, subordinates should not feel they are walking on a knife’s edge when approaching the leader with their ideas, but instead should feel comfortable doing so; 3) Support Your Commander: A leader must have clarity concerning the commander’s concept and intent for a mission. Once a legal and lawful order is issued, it must be executed within the parameters of the authority given. Commanders make decisions and assume the risks. Orders for action from commanders must not be questioned, or worse be disobeyed, but it should be permissible for officers to advise or make recommendations to superiors; 4) Learn and Improve: Officers must be acutely aware of their own strengths and weaknesses. To that extent, they must work hard to build on their strengths and correct their weaknesses. Goals for improvement should be realistic and achievable. Officers should never find comfort in remaining stagnant. Complacency is a fatal leadership flaw in the profession of arms; 5) Require Minimum Supervision: High operational tempo organizations that perform in complex environments suffer when officers within them require constant supervision. Officers in such organizations must understand their responsibilities and execute them without continual oversight. Commanders should not be overly burdened with questions from subordinates that should be able to answer themselves. The time for asking questions about performing tasks is the classroom and training exercises, not the actual battlefield; 6) Counsel Subordinates: Officers must well-communicate expectations and standards to subordinates for doing so provides a baseline for measuring performance and ensures that both the rater and rated officer understand what they should be doing. The most important tool that leaders have at their disposal to accomplish that is counseling; 7) Serve Those You Lead: Officers who take a genuine interest in their subordinates will see their teams achieve exceptional feats. Empathetically listen to what others are saying. Taking such interest must be attendant to counseling. Officers should circulate and be in contact with their soldiers. Getting to know one’s soldiers includes being ready to assist them not only professionally, but personally. Once an officer discovers a soldier’s goals, it is advisable to assist them in developing a course of action to reach them. Taking care of your soldiers leads to them taking care of the mission; and, 8) Be a Student of History: Professional officers must immerse themselves in their profession. Military history is replete with episodes that will relate to nearly every situation in which an officer may be in and offer much for them to learn from. By taking the opportunity in the present to learn from the past, officers can better prepare themselves to respond to situations, expected and unexpected, when they arise in the future. These characteristics must be worked at.

Russian Army commander prepares Mobiks to move to the frontlines (above). The visage of the young commander (center) says it all. There must be a true purpose for the sacrifices soldiers make on the battlefield. Soldiers should know what that purpose is. Any sort of logic that would cause a commander to so absolutely toss aside the sacred duty to care for the welfare of the troops they command, to violate the trust their soldiers have put in them,and throw them without purpose into the terror of the battlefield, is not faulty, but rather daylight madness. Committing them cavalierly to hopeless and meaningless offensives, localized attacks, and counterattacks could at best be attributed to delinquency and incompetence, and at worse, brutality, something very wrong up top, or telepathy from Hell, the despotic intrusion of Satan’s will.

Likely Professional Thinking Behind the Respective Commanders’ Choices at the Crater and in Ukraine

Omnia mala exempla ex rebus bonis orta sunt. (Also, omnia mala exempla orta sunt ex bonis initiis.) (Every bad precedent originated as a justifiable measure.) Available to officers of both the Union Army and Confederate Army before the Battle of the Crater was The Officer’s Manual Napoleon’s Maxims of War. The book provides a translation of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s maxims by Sir George Charles D’Aguilar, British Army officer serving as the Lieutenant Governor of Hong Kong, The entire manual reflects the received wisdom on the conduct of warfare at the time of its publication. The book’s “Recommendation”, included in the text’s first published in the US in 1861, was written by none other than Winfield Scott. Known as the Grand Old Man of the Army for his many years of service, US Army Major General Winfield Scott’s military talent was highly regarded by contemporaries, and viewed by historians as one of the most accomplished generals in US history. In 1855, he received a brevet promotion to the rank of lieutenant general, becoming the first US Army officer to hold that rank since US President George Washington. Scott was popular not only as a soldier among the public, but also as a statesman–in 1859 he resolved the Pig War, peacefully halting the last of a long series of US-United Kingdom border conflicts–and as a politician–a 4-time presidential candidate for the Whig Party. When the Civil War began, Scott, a Virginia native, stayed loyal to the Union, and served as an important adviser to US President Abraham Lincoln during the opening stages of the war. He developed a strategy known as the Anaconda Plan, but retired in late 1861 after Lincoln increasingly relied on General George McClellan for military advice and leadership. In his comments on Napoleon’s Maxim’s of War, Scott wrote: “After refreshing my memory by looking over again, ‘Re Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a circle of maxims deduced from the highest source of military science and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the book can not fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly to their improvement.”

Among the maxims in the work, most apposite to the discussion here is Maxim XV which states: “The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair, while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by the means we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.” Napoleon expressed similar sentiments earlier in the book in Maxim VI in which Napoleon states: At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance, is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skillful the manœuvers in a retreat, it will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and material than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle, the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own–whereas in a retreat, the loss is on your side only.” Napoleon left no doubt in his writings that he believed war was governed by principles. Yet, as with the principles in other fields, no matter how rare they may be, circumstances can arise in war which may pose challenges to strictures developed from its accepted principles.

Fallacies non causae it causae. (Fallacy to accept something as fundamental when it is not.) There are often situations that require more than just barreling ahead regardless of losses. To crack on en masse into oblivion is just madness. In modern armies in 2023, one would imagine commanders in modern armies have trained and fully grasp the need to rely upon one’s training and studies in military philosophy but also one’s talents, practicality, flexibility, creativity, and ingenuity. As discussed in greatcharlie’s  August 31, 2022 post entitled “Would the Ejection of Russian Forces from Ukraine Lead to a Thermonuclear Response by Moscow?: Some Meditations on Putin’s Likely Thinking”, Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another. Most relevant here is the fact that Ukrainian commanders fully comprehend the benefits of  withdrawing their units when conditions are most unfavorable instead of demanding troops hold on to untenable positions until they were forced to retreat in order to survive or surrender.

Remaining dedicated to the unit’s mission and the overall mission of the team as a priority is an idea driven into the minds of all soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers in basic training and throughout their careers. For officers,, in terms of priority, first comes the mission, next the soldiers come, then themselves. It is true a mission can only be achieved through high morale, aggressive action and perseverance. The spirit must be indomitable. Through great displays of such tenacity, battles are won. Fortis est non pertussis in revise asperis. (The strong do not falter in adversity.)

Reputation and honor have also been motivating factors among officers. To display audacity, gallantry before peers has typically been an objective of utmost importance. In accounts of battles in the lyrics military marches, it is most often expressed that the indications and implications of such qualities are of utmost importance. The Régiment de Sambre et Meuse (1870), for example, is a song about a French regiment that fought against the Austrians in 1794 to defend the fledgling Republic. It was written in 1870 to try and boost French patriotic feelings after the rather ignominious defeat against Germany that would deprive France of the Alsace and Lorraine provinces until the end of WWI. Sambre et Meuse is the name of a former French province that is currently part of Belgium. The poignant, pertinent third verse of the march is as follows: “Le choc fut semblable à la foudre / Ce fut un combat de géants / Ivres de gloire, ivres de poudre / Pour mourir, ils serraient les rangs ! / Le régiment par la mitraille / Était assailli de partout, / Pourtant, la vivante muraille / Impassible, restait debout.” (The clash was like a lightning strike, / it was a struggle of giants. / Drunk with glory, drunk with gunpowder, / they closed ranks to perish together! / The regiment was assailed / by a hail of bullets from all sides. / And yet the living wall, / impervious, remained standing.) It seems apropos to make note of a more renowned piece about patriotism, war, and glory also from France, composed by Claude-Joseph Rouget de Lisle in 1792,  that begins as follows: Allons enfant de la patrie / Le jour de gloire est arrivé! (Let’s go children of the fatherland, / The day of glory has arrived!)

Attendant to the preceding, often political leaders and senior commanders have insisted upon the continued astonishing sacrifices of soldiers in a battle, believing the reputation and honor of their armed forces and their country was at stake.

All of that having been stated, at the Crater, Grant saw the horror of it all and ordered Burnside to retreat, but oddly he disobeyed his command. Meade also saw the futility of the attack and refused to reinforce failure by agreeing to Burnside’s request to commit additional troops to it. In one episode in October 2022 in Ukraine, Surovikin made the unpopular decision to pull Russian troops away from Kherson to more stable positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. According to Reuters, Surovikin explained: “I understand that this is a very difficult decision, but at the same time we will preserve the most important thing – the lives of our servicemen and, in general, the combat effectiveness of the group of troops, which it is futile to keep on the right bank in a limited area.” Despite his honorable and noble intentions, Surovikin was at first denigrated by conservative political leaders and by conservative newsmedia outlets as being defeatist and unnecessarily ceding captured territory to the Ukrainians.

There must be a true purpose for the sacrifices soldiers make on the battlefield. Soldiers should know what that purpose is. Any sort of logic that would cause a commander to so absolutely toss aside the sacred duty to care for the welfare of the troops they command, to violate the trust their soldiers have put in them,and throw them without purpose into the terror of the battlefield, is not faulty, but rather daylight madness. Committing them cavalierly to hopeless and meaningless offensives, localized attacks, and counterattacks could at best be attributed to delinquency and incompetence, and at worse, brutality, something very wrong up top, or telepathy from Hell, a despotic intrusion of Satan’s will.

Recognizably, Russian Army commanders are known, expected, and applauded in their organization for displaying sternness or severity of manner or attitude. A feature of Surovikin’s record as he rose as a commander was his behavior in that regard. Some might point to the fact that several Russian Army generals and colonels have lost their lives while serving as inspirational leaders in attacks against Ukrainian positions. However, such efforts, though impressive and admittedly valorous, seemed to be less acts of committed leaders, and more acts of desperation as responsibility for the success or failure of their units’ actions rested on their shoulders. It would appear such actions by generals and level commanders ever did much to change outcomes on the battlefield. The situations of the respective units were rarely made much better after the sacrifices. It would seem fortunate enough for them if the situation remained essentially the same. After their tragic loss, the situation for those units for the most have deteriorated in their absence. The Ukrainian advance has not been effectively slowed or stalled following their actions..The indications and implications of results on the battlefield are that Russian Army commanders reeled in 2022  from effects of their dereliction concerning training and preparing their units. While they may not have expended fuel and petroleum oil lubricants and other resources to training not ordered from above, they could have regularly scheduled sand table and map exercises with officers and noncommissioned officers in their respective units in case something akin to he “special military operation” were launched. Noncommissioned officers could have counseled soldiers on movement technique in the field and reviewed as many “what ifs” as time allowed. The idea of the Russian Federation invading Ukraine was hanging in the air in January and February of 2022. It would be a charitable assumption to say Russian commanders were unaware that action was possible and they needed to begin thinking “even more” about the soldiers’ well-being.

Mobiks in Crimea receiving blessings from a Russian Orthodox priest as part of a departure ceremony In November 2022 (above). In 2023, a young man or woman who volunteers, is conscripted, or is pressed into service via conscription to serve in the armed forces of their country in war has much to reasonably expect from their faithful service. Soldiers of every country should be able to believe their political leaders have concluded that some objective of great value, that is just, will be attained by the selective application of their fighting skills. They should be able to believe when they are sent into harm’s way that the decision was founded on the best advice of senior military leaders. Soldiers must believe they are being utilized by senior commanders in the best possible way to achieve victory in battle. Further, soldiers must feel assured that their commanders, in planning military action, will attempt to increase their chances of survival and minimize, to the greatest degree possible, to potential loss of life.

On Soldiers

As has been the case for centuries, citizens have chosen to serve their countries when at war due to a variety of motivations. Surely, greatcharlie is not breaking any new ground in explaining that. The following list offers a mere handful of 14 likely motivations based on empirical evidence: 1) Exigence circumstance: seeing understanding actual need to protect their families and communities and country; 2) Allegiance: Duty respond to their country’s call, perhaps while uncertain and fearful of outcome; 3) Honor: refusal to avoid the call to serve their country in war regardless of whether most citizens view find the need to fight reasonable and just or based on disagreeable political objectives of their government; 4) Patriotism: a love of country in general and willingness to protect it; 5) Romanticism: rushing off to war with a romanticized view of serving ones country in war based on stories of the past deeds of others on the battlefield; 6) Escape from unpleasant circumstances; the opportunity to serve one’s country at war provides reason to escape an environment or undesirable circumstances an individual may be in; 7) Venal: impelled by monetary gain or promises of other gains no matter how meager; 8) Insecurity: going to war impelled by the feeling one have something to prove to family, community,, or the world, desperately seeking validation in other people’s approval; 9) Excitement: Seeking some personal thrill from wartime experience and the chance to engage in daredevil activities; 10) Obedience to authority: obeying the demand of government to report for service in war due to a fear of reprisal; 11) Nationalism: an excessive or prejudicial support of country’s interests or historic enmity toward another country or other countries, that may lead to the support of expansionist actions as much as, as dictated by political leadership that are to exclusion or detriment of other countries interests; 12) Ethno-religious nationalism an excessive or prejudicial support of country’s interests or historic enmity toward citizens of another country or other countries based primarily on respective ethnic, racial, religious differences that would cause one serve in an expansionist military action against the other country, or support for one’s own ethnic, racial, religious group to the extent that one would be willing to go war to defend or support the expansionist aims of those of one’s group in other countries against an opposing ethnic racial or religious group; 13) Revolutionary zeal: being impelled by a country central revolutionary philosophy to serve in war to defend one’s country thus ensuring the survival of the ideals of one’s country or support one country’s expansionist aims to ensure the propagation of the central revolutionary philosophy of one’s country or group, being certain of the philosophy’s correctness; and, 14) Recherché or outré reasoning, philosophy, or ideate: to welcome the chance to fight in war for anomalous, eccentric, perhaps even unsound, personal reasons.

Whatever the underlying motivation or rationale for their choice, even those of whom reasonable individuals could hardly call noble, those choosing to serve in war are placed under the authority of their respective country’s political leadership, under the control of the military chain of command from the country’s top generals and admirals down to the commanders of their respective organizations and units, and under the complete direction of their immediate organization and unit officers. However, they were not born with an intrinsic purpose to have their lives extinguished, bodies torn to pieces, at their officers’ whims and megrims. In his renowned work New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. by W. J. R. Sproutt (W. W. Norton & Company, 1933), Sigmund Freud, the 20th century Moravian born neurologist and founder of psychoanalysis, explains: “It is asking a great deal of a man, who has learnt to regulate his everyday affairs in accordance with the rules of experience and with due regard to reality, that he should entrust precisely what affects him most nearly to the care of an authority which claims as its prerogative freedom from all the rules of rational thought.” Nevertheless, Herr Doktor, near complete submission to the control of superiors has been an essential, immutable requirement of military service throughout the ages.

In 2023, a young man or woman who volunteers, is conscripted, or is pressed into service via conscription to serve in the armed forces of their country in war has much to reasonably expect from their faithful service. Soldiers of every country should be able to believe their political leaders have concluded that some objective of great value, that is just, will be attained by the selective application of their fighting skills. They should be able to believe when they are sent into harm’s way that the decision was founded on the best advice of senior military leaders. Soldiers must believe they are being utilized by their commanders in the best possible way to achieve victory in battle. Further, soldiers must feel assured that their commanders, in planning military action, will attempt to increase their chances of survival and minimize, to the greatest degree possible, to potential loss of life. Of course, big mistakes can be made even by the most experienced and best prepared commanders in prosecuting a war. Additionally, no commander can possibly promise that none of their soldiers will not be wounded, captured, or killed in war.

Not only will morale suffer, but performance will surely degrade when soldiers are: uncertain of mission if the overall concept of a military action is unjust, invalid by law; uncertain of the purpose of a military action: the political authority’s concept and intent for the action is unclear and their commander’s concept and intent are unclear; uncertain their leadership is dysfunctional: commanders are hamstrung by superiors and confined to parameters of action by political systems or they are simply delinquent and negligent; uncertain of their capabilities versus the opponent–soldiers are provided poor equipment, their force has readily observable vulnerabilities, their opponent possess superior, seemingly invincible, and unlimited supplies of weapon systems; and, uncertain of victory–on a daily basis, soldiers experience heavy losses in equipment, exceedingly high casualties in their ranks, the regular loss of comrades, the influx of untrained replacements, and they sense their sacrifices will prove to be meaningless. Such strains and trauma placed upon soldiers could prove to be irreparable.

One can only imagine thoughts churning within the minds of so many young conscripts, nel massimo dolore, most having barely discovered what life has to offer. Many young soldiers at the Crater and in during other battle in other wars have surely felt the same. What comes to mind are the words of the character Floria Tosca in Act II of Giacomo Puccini’s opera, “Tosca” (1899). The Chief of the secret police, Scarpia, has thrown Tosca’s beloved into prison for treason and tortures him. She vehemently protests. Scarpia tells her she could save him by submitting completely to his ugly amorous advances. Tosca sings “Vissi d’Arte” after avoiding dodging him repeatedly she asks God why has He abandoned her during this terrible time. A portion of the haunting soprano aria is as follows: Vissi d’arte, vissi d’amore, / non feci mai male ad anima viva!… / Con man furtiva / quante miserie conobbi, aiutai… / Sempre con fe’ sincera, / la mia preghiera / ai santi tabernacoli salì. / Sempre con fe’ sincera / diedi fiori agli altar. / alzandosi / Nell’ora del dolore / perché, perché Signore, / perché me ne rimuneri così? (I lived for art. I lived for love: / Never did I harm a living creature! … / Whatever misfortunes I encountered / I sought with secret hand to succour … / Ever in pure faith, / My prayers rose / In the holy chapels. / Ever in pure faith, / I brought flowers to the altars. / In this hour of pain, why, / Why, oh Lord, why / Dost Thou repay me thus?)

The Way Forward

For the Russian Federation, the Ukraine War is a war of conquest. The tissue of lies leaders tell their citizens, and tell themselves about the war, has become further attenuated. With the Russian Federation Armed Forces being exposed for the inefficient forces they truly are conventionally, little is left in the way of words alone for the country’s political leadership to sway any listeners, much less their armed forces. Nevertheless, as they now despotically control their soldiers through threats of reprisals, promise to destroy the whole wide world if the war in Ukraine is lost, they have also turned those techniques upon the global audience, threatening thermonuclear war and encouraging fear mongering, while insisting the Russian Federation is the victim, the country threatened. 

Even before the special military operation began, political leaders, newsmedia political commentators and bloggers touted the prowess of the Russian Federation Armed Forces pointing to the indomitable spirit and durability of its fighters while denying the Ukrainians had any real capabilities to prevent the Russian Federation’s inevitable victory. Yet, they now ironically point to the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against theirs to prove that the US and NATO are the engines behind the Ukraine threat, and prove it is all part of a longstanding US and NATO plan to encroach on Russian Federation with their sights trained on its natural resources, and eventually take full control their country. Hyperbolic to the end, political leaders in Moscow insist that Ukraine, the US, the  EU, and NATO will be destroyed. Flashing a bit of optimism, they view keeping the US directly out of the fight is in itself a victory, and a sign Washington fears the Russian Federation’s true power: its nuclear arsenal. It all seems to have real meaning for them, yet it all rings very hollow. Putin promises to replenish the arsenals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and insists a new era of weapon systems development has been embarked upon during which the world will witness Russian Federation industries produce systems “decades ahead of their foreign counterparts.” To students and scholars familiar with the German Third Reich’s history, Putin’s rhetoric on superweapons–Wunderwaffe–surely sounds terribly familiar. It is all stupefying to the eyes and ears of the reasonable. It would have been “cheaper” for Putin to pay the full price of training and fully equipping his Russian Federation Armed Forces and ordering an orderly mobilization of an additional 100,000 conscripts and preparing them for war in a military fashion. Yet, Russian Federation commanders might even have been the wild card in all of that. It is hard to know if they are really capable of anything impressive or even average militarily, given the shortcomings they have put on display in Ukraine..

Soldiers cannot hold much hope to be treated fairly, for victory, or survival fighting for a country whose political leadership makes fantastic claims about unseen super-weapons and secret military capabilities and regularly makes false statements on the situation in war they are fighting. Naturally, a close eye must be kept on what Putin is saying and doing regarding Ukraine, to include expressions of that kind. Equally naturally, focus must be kept on what will most likely come next. In all honesty, it has become increasingly difficult for greatcharlie to see how this entire episode will end “peacefully” for any country involved.

Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success

Russian Federation General of the Army Sergei Surovikin (above). In an announcement on October 8, 2022, stated: “By the decision of the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Surovikin has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation.” At 56, Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces) in 2017. However, he has been called upon to take on further assignments to include his current one in response to the Russian Federation ever changing national security needs. He has now taken on a great challenge in Ukraine. To better understand this important change in command for Russian Federation forces in Ukraine, one must find out more about Surovikin, and even more, try to understand what is going on in the mind of the individual responsible for the invasion: Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) of 2022 was born of ill will and bad intentions. Whatever sense of certainty Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin may have held concerning the ultimate success, perhaps even expectant of lightning success by  Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii or the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) when he green-lit the invasion has doubtlessly fizzled down from flames to cinders. Clearly, he was dreadfully incognizant of what a discordant harmony of circumstances very likely could and would do his plans and hopes. Since the early days of success after February 24, 2022, nothing has been working well for the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield. At this point, res ad triarios venit, the matter has come to triarii. Triarii were the reserve soldiers of the Roman Army. When it reached the point in a war that they were called upon, most or all the front line troops had fallen. Putin in fact, mobilized all male Russian citizens eligible to serve on the front lines in Ukraine. Their performance has been something better than terrible. 

In other countries at war, facing such circumstances, leaders and their advisers come to recognize that intractable decisions, all very difficult ones, lie ahead. Among the choices, Putin could further escalate, resolve to hold any gains while minimizing further losses, negotiate inequitable peace terms, or simply withdraw. US President Richard Nixon found himself in a similar predicament, mutantis mutandis, regarding the US military operations in Southeast Asia. In the end, his Secretary of State “managed” to negotiate what was referred to as “peace with honor” with the North Vietnamese government. Selecting from the choices mentioned would be fine for other countries, however, Putin’s Russia is not like other countries. Still, finding a solution, given how things have panned out, is not simply a matter of satisfying one man’s thinking. The Kremlin is hearing ever increasing criticism for the abominable losses in Ukraine, particularly from elites with close ties to it. Nationalist and ultranationlist political parties and personalities began reacting to the situation in Ukraine with asperity. They, too, know the truth. The change in commander was ostensibly designed to send the message both inside Russia and worldwide that Russia still intends win and will emerge victorious in Ukraine. The Kremlin might hope to convince its perceived audience that with a few adjustments, albeit major changes, everything will be on track and the Kremlin has found the commander who will make things right. The impact of the change, at least around the world, has been akin to a misspelled placard at a protest. The time and energy in the Kremlin put into appointing Sergei Surovikin to direct the war and promote the change publicly as a new beginning, may have been a wasted effort.

Surely, foreign and national security policy bureaucracies worldwide have parsed out Surovikin’s appointment in the round and using logic, have reached their respective conclusions. Yet, what seems logical is not always right. To best understand this important change in command for Russian Federation forces in Ukraine one must learn more about Surovikin, and even more, try to understand what is going on in the rather unique mind of Putin. Whatever he does he does for  his ownly reason. Whatever he has done, invading Ukraine and suffering heavy losses for example, has never troubled him. Though nearly isolated, he does not appear to beweep Russia’s outcast state. Putin’s decisionmaking and probable moves must remain the subject of indispensable speculations and the development of prospective scenarios. 

As has been the pattern with preceding posts, historical examples are used to demonstrate that no matter how recherché and bizarre events have been in this present-day episode, which hopefully will somehow end diplomatically to the satisfaction of all parties involved, humankind has been beset and strained by parallel issues. Some examples reach back to Antiquity to provide apposite examples of thinking and behavior that most resemble that of Putin and his top acolytes on the Ukraine matter. Additional supportive examples are drawn from the Napoleonic era. In his satirical monthly magazine Les Guêpes (The Wasps), the 19th century French writer Alphonse Karr expressed the apt phrase: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” (The more things change, the more they remain the same.) How often is that the case.

Surovikin’s official Russian Federation Ministry of Defense photo (above). Surovikin has a reputation for being a hard-as-nails, no-nonsense commander who did not suffer subordinates lightly. Any feelings that he might have had, were never allowed to get in the way of his decisionmaking. In his military career, there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. In June 2021, Surovikin reached the rank of Generál Ármii (General of the Army), the second highest military rank in Russia, second only to a marshal. One year later, in June 2022, it was revealed that he was named the commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. Four months later, it was announced that he would be commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine.

Some Background on Surovikin

In an announcement on October 8, 2022, stated: “By the decision of the defense minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Surovikin has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation.” Note the announcement stated the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, not Putin, made the decision. With the announcement, Surovikin became the first overall commander of Russian forces committed to Ukraine. With the aim of providing readers with a decent sense of Surovikin’s experience and expertise, greatcharlie has provided a tour d’horizon of his rather event filled military career.

Surovikin, age 56, was born in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk on October 11,1966. He is married and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, the degree to which he is observant is unknown to greatcharlie. He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the Hero of the Russian Federation. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when in 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces). It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Ministerstvo oborony Rossijskoj Federacii or Minoborony Rossii (the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), were placed under one command. However, he has been called upon to take on further assignments to include his current one in response to the Russian Federation ever changing national security needs.

After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain in the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division in August 1991 when the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-proclaimed Gosudárstvenny Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP. Orders were sent down from the GKChP that would require Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. A short time afterward, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior saw enough potential in him to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

By this point in Surovikin’s career, he had acquired a reputation for being a hard as nails, no nonsense commander who did suffer subordinates lightly. Any feelings that he might have had, were never allowed to get in the way of his decisionmaking. In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. 

In 2004, according to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’s website, Surovikin commanded the 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division stationed in Chechnya. He was the chief of staff of the 20th Guards Army from 2005. In April 2008, he made the meteoric rise to army commander. In November 2008, Surovikin became Chief of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation), essentially the General Staff’s think tank. In January 2010, he became chief of staff of the Volga–Urals Military District, which soon became part of the Central Military District. Reportedly, from November 2011, he headed the working group charged with creation of the Military Police. The Russian newsmedia indicated that Surovikin had already been selected to head the new organization. Though delayed as a result of the intervention of Voyennoy Prokuratury Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the  Russian Federation Military Prosecutor’s Office), apparently, the discussion on the potential creation of the Military Police stirred a parochial struggle between the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Military Prosecutor’s Office, Glavnoye upravleniye voyennoy politsii Minoborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Main Directorate of the Military Police Ministry of Defense Russian Federation) with a strength of 20,000 was stood up. In October 2012, he became the chief of staff of the Eastern Military District. In October 2013, he was appointed commander of the district. On December 13, 2013, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of colonel general. 

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian Federation Group of Forces in Syria and Syrian Arab Army forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In a June 2022 Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper article explained that Surovikin received this unofficial nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” in the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and directing the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

While all of that was transpiring, at the end of November 2017, It was the journal of Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’) Krasnaya Zvezda that reported Surovikin’s appointment to Commander of the Aerospace Forces by a presidential decree of November 22, 2017. Interestingly, TASS made special note of the fact that Surovikin became the first combined-arms commander in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union to be put in charge of the Russian or Soviet Air Forces. According to a report published by RBK Group on November 2, 2017, Surovikin had been appointed Commander of the Aerospace Forces in spite of his initial objections.

From January to April 2019, Surovikin again took command of Russian military forces in Syria. It was during that period Surovikin directed the operation against Idlib which included countless air and ground attacks on civilian objects and infrastructure. A 2020 Human Rights Watch report states that Russian forces under his command struck Syrian “homes, schools, healthcare facilities, and markets – the places where people live, work, and study”.

In June 2021, Surovikin reached the rank of Generál Ármii (General of the Army), the second highest military rank in Russia, second only to a marshal. One year later, in June 2022, it was revealed that he was named the commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. On October 8, 2022, it was announced that he would be commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine.

In Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. As a result of his action, three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders. He was promoted to the rank of major afterwards. In September 1995, while Surovikin attended the Frunze Military Academy, he was sentenced to a year of probation by the Moscow garrison’s military court for illegally selling weapons. However, allegations were made that he had been framed. After an investigation, the conviction was overturned. It was concluded that Surovikin had provided a fellow student a pistol for use in a competition, unaware of its intended purpose. One might speculate that Surovikin either had such connections in very high places who were also benefiting from his sideshow that he was allowed to avoid any severe repercussions beyond a very public arrest or he managed to convince authorities that he was cured of his covetous mind.

On dit, there are supposedly whispers in Russia that that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source.

Surovikin is an emblem to the Russian military for its “prowess.” The same was said to be true of Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who Putin appointed commander of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on April 9, 2022. Russian commanders at different levels have often been made to sound too good to be true, only to have their “gold complexions” dimmed in Ukraine. The latest announcement did not mention Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who Putin appointed commander of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on April 9, 2022. While some Western newsmedia sources insist Russian Army Colonel General Gennady Zhidko.was Surovikin’s predecessor, Moscow had not publicly specified that anyone had been placed in overall control of the operation until the announcement concerning his new command.

Surovikin, much as Dvornikov, had the opportunity to become familiar in Syria with the ways in which the US provides assistance to foreign forces on the battlefield. Moscow’s likely hope in that regard would be better understand how US and other NATO military minds might have special operations forces working in Ukraine, what to expect as a result of their “suggestions to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as to planning and operations,” and how to counter their assistance operations. If that were the case at all, perhaps Dvornikov never really discerned enough in Syria to exploit. He certainly failed grasp the role deception plays in US military operations and that failure played a role in opening captured territory up to rapid liberation by Ukrainian forces via a counteroffensive. Surovikin has the opportunity to demonstrate that he learned quite a bit more.

In March 2017, Surovikin (above) began the first of his two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last only three months and was part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In a June 2022 Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper article explained that Surovikin received this unofficial nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” On December 28, 2017, he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

Surovikin’s Appointment Shows the World Moscow Has a Handle on Ukraine

Fallaces sunt rerum species. (The appearances of things are deceptive.) As alluded to initially here, one could reach the conclusion at first blush that this change in command amounts to a bromide, an unoriginal idea intended to soothe or placate and have the illusion of problem solving. On the other hand, one might imagine the wisdom in putting a former Russian Federation Aerospace Force commander in charge are that air power will be better applied in Ukraine. Many in the Western newsmedia have assessed Surovikin’s appointment may have been an effort by the Kremlin to mitigate criticism from nationalists who have accused the army of mismanaging the war in Ukraine and of failing to use Russian military power overwhelmingly to force the government in Kyiv to submit. To that extent, close Putin ally and leader of Russia’s North Caucasus region of Chechnya, Raman Kadyrov, has publicly demanded that many top generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces be sacked. Reportedly, many pro-Russia military bloggers have harshly criticized the prosecution of the war. 

Perhaps it would be reasonable to suspect that Surovikin came highly recommended for the Ukraine job by the same sort behind the scenes that likely lended him a helping hand whenever he landed himself in trouble in the past. Among Russians who welcomed the appointment of Surovikin was Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group), a private military company and a vocal critic of the military leadership. According to a statement put out by Concord, Prigozhin said publicly: “Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian army.” He called Surovikin a “legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.” He noted: “Having received an order [in 1991], Surovikin was that officer who without hesitation got in his tank and went forward to save his country.” His appointment was also very vocally welcomed by Kadyrov,

However, Putin’s control and his choices and the relative influence of his inner circle was put succinctly in a January 12, 2020 interview in The New Yorker magazine of Masha Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst who has written extensively on Putin’s regime. (The interview came on the heels of Putin’s proposals of Constitutional reforms that ultimately extended his years in power in Russia.) Asked about the degree of Putin’s control in Russia, Lipman responded: “The issue of control is tricky. If one talks about whether government management is efficient in Russia, then no, it is not. And Putin has repeatedly, over his very long time in office, spoken about the need to increase the productivity of labor and quite a few other very important goals. I wouldn’t say he has delivered so well on those. But, if we define control as control over the élite, over making the decisions, of course Putin’s fully in control. And the developments of the past few days are very clear and persuasive evidence of him being in control of making decisions.” Responding to a question about his moves at that time [Constitutional reforms], Lipman said; “This is a demonstration of how Putin is ultimately in charge and how he can make very important decisions by himself in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. We still do not know who was aware of what was in store for the country three or four days ago, and to what extent there is anyone who can actually challenge his decisions, even verbally.” Lipman continued: “Putin rarely consults with anyone, and, even if he does, it is done in a totally opaque way. He’s rarely explicit. Even if he consults with some people in his circle, people leave without having a clear idea of what his goal is and have to guess. Sometimes they guess right. Sometimes they guess wrong. Sometimes they try to curry favor and succeed, sometimes not. At the end of the day he is the ultimate decision-maker. And the strategy and the grand plans that he has for Russia, in their entirety, exist only in his mind.”

Given Lipman’s expert view and  the views that have been expressed by greatcharlie on Putin for quite some time–they may hold water for generous readers, it would only be reasonable to believe Putin naturally has morbid fear of anyone desiring to remove him from power. Equally naturally, he acts aggressively and often eccentricity to potential threats to his power, both real or imagined. No one should hope to get too close. Sometimes holding power too long breeds a familiarity that breeds contempt in many. Envy like fire always makes for the highest points. The Roman historian Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17), known as Livy, provided in Greek, a history of Rome that begins with the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional founding in 753 B.C. through the reign of Emperor Caesar Augustus during his own lifetime. In Book XXXV, section 10 of that history Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), Livy discusses the campaign for consul that pitted Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of Gnaeus, who had recently returned from Spain after performing great deeds, and his brother Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, who had commanded the fleet in Greece. Herodotus writes of the challenges facing Scipio: But the eyes of all men were turned upon Quinctius and Cornelius; for both were patricians, contending for one place, and recently-won military glory lent favor to each. But before all else, the brothers of the candidates11 increased their rivalry, since they were the two most celebrated commanders of their age. The greater fame was Scipio’s, and the greater it was, the more it was exposed to jealousy; that of Quinctius was fresher, inasmuch as he had triumphed that very year. There was also the fact that the other had been for about ten years constantly in the public eye, a fact which renders prominent men less venerated from sheer surfeit of seeing them: he had been consul for the second time after the defeat of Hannibal and censor . . . .”

Admittedly, greatcharlie went the long way about presenting this passage from Ad Urbe Condita. However, Livy admirably presents the depth of thinking that led to the challenge to the well-known, long-serving, heroic leader, Scipio, for a newcomer, who could only offer a list of promises and seem so willing, despite his record of service, to challenge the incumbent leader with no apparent reservations. Surely, if this could be used as any measure. Putin always has much to keep his eye on politically.

Putin launched the Ukraine War lacking a worthwhile strategy and recognition of what Russian Federation forces would come up against. What was seemingly completely missed or misunderstood was the degree of support from the US and NATO Member States that Kyiv would receive. No effort, that was apparent, was made to obviate the ability of the US and its NATO allies to supply Ukraine at will as part of the military strategy. From the start, conquering Kyiv was the focus as if Putin and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were blinded by rage. The door was left wide open between Poland and Ukraine. Such impetuous schemes and boldness are at first sight alluring, but are difficult to handle, and in the result disastrous.

Perhaps the real problem for Putin was not just that he relied on fortune, but was driven by blind ambition. What has likely been a reliable intuition that had served him well along the way and allowed him a leg-up in giving subjects light were darkened with regarding parsing out the many aspects of this massive enterprise in Ukraine. Polybius (c. 204-122 B.C.), the Greek “pragmatic historian,” and intriguingly an eyewitness to the siege and destruction of Carthage accompanying none other than Cornelius Scipio Aficanus as one of his commanders. In his noted work, The Histories, Polybius covers the period from 264 BC to 146 BC, focusing primarily on the years 220 BC to 167 BC, and detailing Ancient Rome’s conquest of Carthage, which allowed it to become the dominant force in the Mediterranean. In his discussion of the causes for the start of the Carthaginian War, the Second Punic War in Book I, section 8, Polybius cites the work of the Roman analyst Quintus Fabius Pictor (born c. 270 BC, fl. c. 215–200 BC) . Reportedly, this choice may have been based more in homage than irrefutability given concerns even in his time that his work on the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) on Carthage was highly partisan towards the Roman Republic, idealizing it as a well-ordered state loyal to its allies. Fabius was the earliest known Roman historian. His writings, presented in Greek and now mostly lost besides some surviving fragments, were highly influential on ancient writers. He participated in introducing Greek historiographical methods to the Roman world.

Polybius writes: “Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal’s ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal’s principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer–how opportunity could have better favored the Carthaginians’ wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal’s action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offense, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution–if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal’s decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.”

As an experienced judoka, Putin knows that there are occasions when one competitor is simply outmatched by another. It is hard to accept when one is the outmatched competitor or the competitor’s loyal supporter. Still, no matter how unpleasant, it is a reality that must be faced with level-headedness. It would seem Putin has not reached that conclusion yet.

(From left to right) Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Putin, and Surovikin at a presentation on aerospace weapon systems. On first impression, one might imagine the wisdom in putting the former Russian Federation Aerospace Force commander in charge is that air power will be better applied in Ukraine. Many in the Western newsmedia have assessed Surovikin’s appointment may have been an effort by the Kremlin to mitigate criticism from nationalists who have accused the army of mismanaging the war in Ukraine and of failing to use Russian military power overwhelmingly. In a January 2020 interview in The New Yorker magazine of Masha Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst who has written extensively on Putin’s regime, explained: “At the end of the day he is the ultimate decision-maker. And the strategy and the grand plans that he has for Russia, in their entirety, exist only in his mind.”

Surovikin’s Appointment Provides Putin with Some Relief Personally

Choice of Surovikin may have been made simply to provide some measure of relief for Putin. By appointing an overall commander, something that most senior military and political advisers in Moscow might have urged Putin to do earlier or had begun to do once things went poorly, the move would feel something far different than a bromide. Putin would be acting proactively, putting fresh eyes on the matter and hopefully a more successful line of thinking.

Imaginably, there are many things Surovikin can now do under his new title that he could not do as Commander of the Aerospace Forces or commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. Perhaps it might be more directly the case that they see something in the way in which Surovikin thinks. Much as with the commanders of air, ground, naval, and space components of  armed forces worldwide, one might presume in the abstract that intelligence preparation of the battlefield, providing predictive intelligence at the right time for use in planning and executing operations, has been a critical aspect of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces efforts to deliver information superiority to its chiefs, and wing and squadron commander’s operating forces over Ukraine. Perhaps in strategy sessions of the armed forces general staff on the Ukraine operation, he proved more familiar with the battlespace as it stands than his counterparts and was thereby tapped for the top Ukraine job. So, he was given the job.

Perhaps in a conversation, an opportunity as his interview with Surovikin for the Ukraine job, Putin expressed concerns about the outcome of the war and Surovikin offered words that provided some measure of relief for him. That would be the conversation leaders who were in desperate situations or facing uncertainty have had with commanders for centuries. In The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 BC-c. 425 BC), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period known for that aforementioned masterwork which mainly discusses the struggles between Greece and Persia. In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3, Herotodus reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle,  Demaratus following the king’s conversation with counselors. He writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.”

Surely, Putin is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination cannot coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply iack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Hoping Ukrainian commanders might drop some almighty clanger that will provide an advantage–friction in battle and that sort of thing–would be futile given they are doubtlessly being “advised” by the some of the best military minds that NATO’s 27 Member States can supply respectively. The assistance in terms of weapons systems, training, and gear alone from NATO Member States has been breathtaking. Putin must have accepted by now that the Russian Federation armed forces are just not good enough to successfully execute the special military operation he chose to launch on February 24, 2022. Perhaps he has muttered to himself in private that all the talent is I n the other side. The Russian Army rejoiced in reputation of the post-war and Cold War Soviet Army. it was an illusion. Putin fell for it. It is all very tragic, especially for the soldiers and civilians on both sides caught up in the fighting and dying.

An army can not change overnight. What Russian top commanders can do is ensure that the many parts of the Russian Federation’s Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Naval Forces work to their utmost in harmony to achieve success, but that still might not be enough to change the course of things. One should hardly expect to observe any maneuvers by Russian commanders to represent “an ingenious jesting with [the operational] art.” The Russians unit commanders in Ukraine continue to feign good intentions by ordering the use of overwhelming brute force, incredulously pretending they can muster any approximating power of that kind the field, with the respective objectives of overcoming Ukrainian strength now in what Putin has just recently declared Russian Federation territory. All those commanders are actually doing is sending their troops, the bulk of which are frightfully ill-trained and inexperienced, to near certain defeat. Numerous newsmedia reports in the West, impossible for any following the Ukraine War story to have missed, tell of field grade level commanders, gung-ho on the war and Putin, and eager to make their mark and possibly catch the attention of leaders Moscow, have sent their troops into better than questionable assault on well-armed and well-positioned Ukrainian units. Such assaults are being repulsed at the cost of extraordinarily high tallies of killed and wounded. Some Russian Army companies and battalions have been obliterated in this way. Many of those zealous commanders have ended.up on casualty.lists themselves. Surely such actions may later be found to be a main ingredient of a recipe for what may turn out to be a great military disaster. There may likely be a decisive clash ahead that will mark the end of the Russian presence in Ukraine, and end the myth that Russia is a conventional military power impossible to reckon with, a challenge to the combined forces of NATO.

The situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) As fate would have it, Thucydides was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because, by his own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1, of The History of the Peloponnesian War (hereinafter referred to as the Peloponnesian War):  “He possessed the right of working the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and thus had great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland” He wrote in Book I, chapter 104, section 4: “The general who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day’s sail from Amphipolis” The renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) As it was Thucydides’ fate, one might wonder whether Surovikin has been given a fool’s errand, destined to receive a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission that had become moot before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Whatever Surovikin manages to do, he will have to cut it a bit fine given the rapid progress of Ukrainian forces in reducing Russian gains, and their well-demonstrated ability to do a lot more. Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another, withdrawing their units when conditions were most favorable more often than demanding troops hold on to untenable positions until they were forced to retreat in order to survive or surrender. The ability of Ukrainian commanders to think fast and soundly has been key to their relative success as time is always of the essence. They relentlessly seek to take ground and gain and retain the initiative. More often than not weaker Ukrainian units have been pitted against stronger Russian ones, stronger at least on paper. French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never.” With continued expert advice and robust levels of assistance from the US and NATO, Ukrainian forces could potentially displace and destroy Russian forces at many points before winter sets in proper.

Putin (right) decorating Surovikin (left) with the Hero of the Russian Federation medal for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria. If one might consider the role politics might have played in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation, it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. Unlikely lost on Putin is the fact Surovikin, as a captain commanding an armored unit, was a defender of his beloved Soviet state in the truest sense during the 1991 coup d’état attempt launched by Soviet hardliners, driving through barricades erected by pro-democracy protesters. As noted in the discussion here on his military career, three men were killed in the clash, including one who was crushed.

The Role Played by Political Likes and Dislikes in Surovikin’s Appointment

In greatcharlie’s humble opinion, now is certainly not the best time in Moscow for anyone but Putin to worry about image or petty politics. It is a very odd situation that this persists in the midst of calamity. Even though there is a war going on in which Russia is not performing so well as an invader, image apparently still matters in Moscow. There are ceremonies, speeches in the Kremlin, scholarly foreign and national security policy conferences still being held around Russia all attendended via special invite only. For the elites, it is all more about status than security. The elites still want to improve their relative proximity to Putin and his inner circle. They want to know, who has what title, who is in charge of this or that, who has the lead, who takes orders from whom

To that extent, if one might consider the role of politics might have played in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation, it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. Unlikely lost on Putin is the fact Surovikin, as a captain commanding an armored unit, was a defender of his beloved Soviet state in the truest sense during the 1991 coup d’état attempt launched by Soviet hardliners, driving through barricades erected by pro-democracy protesters. As noted in the discussion here on his military career, three men were killed in the clash, including one who was crushed.

Certainly Surovikin is not starting from scratch, coming in from outside the centers of power. As mentioned, he served as the Commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, a rung few have reached since, as aforementioned, the Russian Air Force, the Air and Missile Forces, and the Space Forces were placed under his responsibility. Few have demonstrated the ability to manage as many operational organizations as he has. Although one might point out that the Russian Air Force at war in Ukraine is the one for which he was responsible for many years. Perhaps its performance has been the least impressive among the armed forces.

The suggestion should not be ignored that Putin may be looking at Surovikin as a possible replacement for Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov as Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff. To find support for that idea, one would only need to look at the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and what the force he has been responsible for has produced in Ukraine. 

Gerasimov could be accused as having underperformed in keeping the armed forces prepared for war. On the eve of the special military operation’s launch, Russian forces situated near Ukraine’s border were still considered quite formidable. This belief was based not just on numbers and their fierce appearance, but on the assumption that Russia had undertaken the same sort of root-and-branch military reform that the US underwent in the 18-year period between Vietnam and its victory in the first Gulf War. Not all,, but many military analysts in the West speculated that the Russian operation would be something akin to a one act drama with an early curtain. The US Intelligence Community concluded that Kyiv would fall in days. Some European officials thought it might just hold out for a few weeks. 

However, starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. As greatcharlie has stated in preceding posts, the Russian Federation General Staff was fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Russian forces were not organized for war with precision. Units were not ready for battle. Soldiers had no idea of what to expect. Ukraine was allowed to use its strengths against Russian weaknesses. Ukraine’s smaller units were able to achieve relative superiority force on force initially in the field. One might have expected that occasionally good fortune would shine upon the relatively lightly-armed Ukrainian forces, and a Russian Army or Russian Naval Troops patrol rolling around or crossing into a danger zone might face ambush, a well-organized ambush, and losses would be suffered. With so many patrol ordered in the different avenues of attack by Russian forces, the greater the chance there would be losses. However, Ukrainian forces outrightly routed Russian units over and over on the battlefield and line of successes would force Russia to adjust its strategy.. The possibility of endsieg, victory against the odds, has become all the more real for the Ukrainians.

As discussed earlier to some extent, Putin surely felt the Russian Federation Armed Forces were well-trained and well-equipped to bring swift victory. To be fair, even to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their actual strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use. Imaginably, the truth was deliberately kept from Putin. No matter what was really going on at Zapad, their true value of the exercises can now be discerned by all. Military commanders simply during each exercise went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. The bigger and better Zapad exercises since 2017, lauded by the leadership of the Russian Federation armed forces, were surely “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” Putin, himself, had regularly observed the Zapad exercises and everything seemed fine enough.

One NATO commander caught on to what had been happening at Zapad and other Russian military and naval exercises before the invasion and could predict Russian military action in Ukraine might prove for Moscow to be catastrophic. When he was commander of American naval forces in Europe and Africa, US Navy Admiral James Foggo had the duty to plan US military exercises recognized that planning the huge Russian exercises were enormous undertakings. As Russia was planning the Vostok exercises in September 2021 in Siberia, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, declared it would be the largest since the Soviet Union’s Zapad exercise of 1981. It would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships. However, Foggo discovered there was quite a bit of deception involved. Rather than actually field large numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, a company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok, for example, was inflated and counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons.

How spectacularly did the illusion created by Russian commanders disintegrate when challenged by reality! It is a sad lesson for commanders in all armies to learn from. Beyond the seemingly deliberate desire to create an illusion of capabilities, the impression left is that the Zapad hoax over the years is that a certain disinvoltura apparently plagued the Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders, that has manifested itself at the worst possible time in the worst possible way. Clearly, Gerasimov was the main one who fed Putin’s illusion concerning the capabilities and  readiness of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Maybe Putin has reached a point at which he could see some benefit in making a change. The easiest way is to bring forward other faces from the Russian Federation General Staff. It is somewhat surprising that in the West, investigative journalists have not gotten the hint that Gerasimov is being slow-walked out the door and have not tried to pick up the scent of blood. Some may have. A good guess would be that Surovikin is being advanced piecemeal by Putin to where he wants him to be. Interestingly, the indications and implications of such would also be that Putin has the sense that he has a future as leader of Russia.

Removing Gerasimov would cause some stir, perhaps both plus and minus, even among Putin’s nationalist and ultranationalist following. He has been viewed as a very loyal Putin acolyte for nearly a decade. However, if Putin is acting in that direction, it would surely be “business as usual in the Kremlin” with regard to military commanders at all levels. Putin has already replaced a number of top commanders in its armed forces. In an October 8, 2022 story, RFE/RL expressed from available public reporting, a list of prominent Russian commanders that have been sacked. Reportedly, the head of Russia’s North Caucasus region of Daghestan, Sergei Melikov, wrote on Telegram on October 7, 2022, that North Caucasus native Lieutenant-General Rustam Muradov had replaced the commander of the Eastern Military District, Colonel-General Aleksandr Chaiko. The RBK news agency on October 7, 2022 cited sources close to the Russian military as saying Muradov replaced Chaiko without giving any details. Much of the Eastern Military District’s personnel are engaged in the special military operation in Ukraine, despite the fact that the district is based in Russia’s Far East. Muradov previously led troops in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, parts of which have been under Russia-backed separatists’ control since 2014. He also commanded Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

An October 3, 2022 RBK report stated that the commander of the Western Military District, Colonel-General Aleksandr Zhuravlyov, had been replaced shortly after dramatic Russian losses in northeastern Ukraine in September and the strategic city of Lyman in the Donetsk region had been recaptured by Ukrainian forces. In September 2022, Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev replaced. General Dmitry Bulgakov as deputy defense minister in charge of logistics.  Curiously, Mizintsev is accused by the European Union of orchestrating a siege of the Ukrainian port of Mariupol early in the special military operation that reportedly killed thousands of civilians. In August 2022, state media outlets in Russia said the commander of the Black Sea fleet had been sacked after Ukraine carried out several successful attacks, including the sinking of Russia’s missile cruiser Moskva and the loss of eight warplanes in an attack on a Russian base in Crimea. As Ukraine continues to liberate settlements in its eastern region from occupying Russian troops, Moscow will likely continue to replace top commanders in its armed forces.

However, Putin apparently appreciates Gerasimov as a grand strategist, a military thinker of some talent. He has well-expressed, in military terms, the imaginings of Putin and his acolytes on the US ambition to conquer Russia for its abundant resources. Worth noting is the very strong and pertinent 2013 military statement which was noted in

noted in greatcharlie’s November 16, 2016 post entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?”. Far more than a military analysis on NATO expansion, the document which was the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, assessed that future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” The basis of that assessment was that the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believed outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. Putin accepted the threat assessment of the Russian Federation General Staff which as aforementioned essentially paralleled his own thinking, and signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The notion that Russian borders were being threatened by the US and NATO and adequate defensive measures needed to be taken has nearly controlled Russian military thinking since the plan was developed. It might be reasonable to conclude that such thinking culminated, at least so far, into Moscow’s great blunder in Ukraine.

Suggestions that Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General of the Army Sergei Shoigu has concerns over General Surovikin would be almost baseless. As Shoigu and Surovikin have interacted on countless occasions while he commanded Russian Federation Aerospace Forces. No friction between them has been publicly reported at least. Many new weapon systems critical to Russia’s strategic defense have been introduced by the Aerospace Forces under his leadership. One might in this case again harken back to 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union to give life to such a suggestion. At the time, Shoigu, fairly senior in the Russian Rescuers Corps, was a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Republic, leading protests against the coup d’etat that forced Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from office. However, the fact that Surovikin and Shoigu were on opposing sides at the time should not hold much significance in an analysis. It 8s very unlikely that Shoigu has borne some grudge against Surovikin over the matter. While greatcharlie cannot swear that Surovikin’s rise is nothing to signify concerning Shoigu’s perch at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, any suggestion that Surovikin’s appointment has meaning in that direction would seem by the by. The reality is that Shoigu’s role in the rise of Putin and his place in the regime is quite firm and rather singular.

One might recall that in 1999, Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia, and his supporters were shifting to the opposition. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party, with a new face, loyal to him: Unity. Shoigu, who was serving as Minister of  Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, and part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996, was named the leader of the pro-president party. He was partnered with Alexander Karelin. Elements of Unity’s economic policy were akin to Thatcherism. It included, for example, the promotion of low inflation, the small state and free markets via tight control of the money supply, and privatization. That said, Unity also supported the reliance on powerful police and security structures and media control. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency.

While Yeltsin called Shoigu “our greatest star,” he chose Putin. Yeltsin first saw promise in Putin when he selected him on July 25, 1998 to serve as head of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Federal Security Service) or FSB. At the time, Putin was an unemployed deputy-mayor from St. Petersburg. He served at the FSB until August 9, 1999, when Yeltsin called him to the post of acting prime minister. Late that same month, there was a bomb blast in a luxury shopping mall by Red Square which was the first in a series of blast resulting in casualties. In September 1999, there were apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, Dagestan, and Volgodonsk, in Rostov. They collectively killed 300 Russian civilians and wounded hundreds more that were reportedly the responsibility of Chechen Islamic militants. Putin acted forcefully against the mall bombing, the apartment immolations, and a bold Islamic militant incursion from Dagestan into Chechnya, led by Shamil Basayev. The first of 100,000 troops were sent to the northern Caucasus within weeks. In a famous September 24, 1999 speech, Putin spoke with determination in explaining his approach to defeating terrorism: “We will pursue the terrorist everywhere. If they are in an airport, then, in an airport, and forgive me, if we catch them in the toilet, then we will waste them in the outhouse . . . The issue has been resolved once and for all.” Putin marked his rise in power by acting viciously against terror. Shoigu’s Unity Party then served as the instrument for Putin’s rise to the presidency. The Unity Party eventually entered into an alliance with the Fatherland-All Russia political bloc. The Party later morphed into United Russia, the country’s current ruling party that rubber stamps Putin’s initiatives in the Duma. Putin has remained in power by confounding insincerity, and he does not suffer fools lightly. Having observed him closely, Putin obviously feels Shoigu well-serves his needs. Shoigu was neither in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB nor worked in St. Petersburg with Putin. He has been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand his leader’s thinking and feelings. An informed guess by greatcharlie is that Shoigu is unlikely going anywhere, anytime too soon.

As remarked earlier, it is not publicly known which particular aspects of Surovikin’s military background, as seen through the singular lenses of his superiors, took on significance in the decision to select him to tackle the “Ukraine conundrum.” Perhaps those aspects would not be those leaders of other countries might seek in an ideal overall commander of a military campaign. Recalling here how Putin acted in Chechnya when brand new to the post of Russian Federation President, it would not be difficult to understand why Surovikin, with his background, would be the commander he would want handling Ukraine.

One might wonder whether Surovikin (above) has been given a fool’s errand, destined to receive a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission that had become moot before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Whatever Surovikin manages to do, he will have to cut it a bit fine given the rapid progress of Ukrainian forces in reducing Russian gains, and their well-demonstrated ability to do a lot more. Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another, They relentlessly seek to take ground and gain and retain the initiative. More often than not weaker Ukrainian units have been pitted against stronger Russian ones, stronger at least on paper.

Surovikin: The Prospective Savior of Russia?

It is very possible that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov, and the others on the Russian Federation General Staff authentically feel there is a real chance that under Surovikin’s command, Russian forces can beat back Ukrainian forces tearing through their lines, gain and retain the initiative, and somehow obviate the effects of US, NATO, and other foreign military assistance to Kyiv. The initial Western newsmedia commentaries of what Surovikin would bring to war as the new joint commander of Russian forces was that he would bring “his violent Syria playbook closer to home.” Reporting focused on a rush of heavy rocket attacks against civilian targets across Ukraine. Naturally, Surovikin’s main challenge in Ukraine, will be to solve the structural problems plaguing the Russian military as it faces fierce Ukrainian forces hell bent on liberating every speck of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Many Western Military experts have expressed that view.

Yet, equally naturally, Surovikin has the grand opportunity to apply his thinking–within the limits of the Russian government system–of what has been done wrong, what has been done right, and what can best be accomplished. As broached in-brief earlier, Surovikin may have expressed a singular interpretation of the battlespace. To be succinct and express it as it might still be taught in military educational institutions at the command and staff level, the battlespace is the mental picture a commander establishes in order to analyze and choose courses of action to apply his military assets in relation to time, tempo, and depth. Perhaps Surovikin’s superiors at this point are hoping that his way of thinking will make a difference on the battlefield and they may be turning to him as a last, best resort. Moreover, it could be that the results of the ongoing Ukrainian drive in fact proved Surovikin’s conceptual view of the situation in what was previously his southern front and his neighboring eastern front were correct. He may have expressed what turned out to be the best understanding of how factors as the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian forces to include new weapon systems being introduced via Western assistance. He may have sounded the alarm that firepower in particular would allow them “the upper hand” on the battlefield. He may have demonstrated a better understanding, reliable intimations, on how, where, and when to apply the combat power of Russian forces. He may have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces and, since their power has dwindled so dramatically, how they could be more effectively and perhaps economically mustered, how those forces could be better protected, and how they might be able to take a stab at making some respectable gains more immediately. Much as noted previously, being commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, since 2017 has perchance allowed Surovikin to gain experience, an expertise in managing multidimensional aspects of warfare to create a harmonious or synergistic whole. To that extent, he conceivably would lend an expertise applicable to managing the multidimensional aspects of air, sea, space, land, and information operations in his planning and execution of military operations.

Concerning Russian Federation Aerospace Forces specifically, more than simply contributing to the Ukraine campaign as the situation stands as of this writing, they could play an effective role, indeed have a multiplier effect. With his experience as Commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, Surovikin presumably would know best how to manage all assets of the force to strike strategically and tactically to make a positive difference in the war effort. Strategically, destroying Ukraine’s ability to construct weapons and disrupting its supply of weapons from external sources would likely be a priority. Tactically, a priority would likely be coordinating efforts by Russian Federation Aerospace Force assets with ground forces currently facing great pressure or extremely challenging situations almost everywhere on the frontlines from well-armed, well-supplied, and highly-motivated Ukrainian forces.

Dediscit animus sero quod didicit diu. (The mind is slow in unlearning what it has been long learning.) For many, it might understandably be difficult to conceive exactly how under the same leadership, with an additional title, the situation could be altered for its better. With specific regard to the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, large scale exercises of recent years appear to have been nothing more than staged acts, performances that presented illusions about the capabilities of its different branches. Indeed, those performances were full of sound and fury, but reality signified nothing. In the Ukraine campaign, the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces so far have had little impact to the degree that they were present. The Russian Federation Aerospace Forces have been near nonexistent relative to its size, supposed power, and the expectations of military analysts worldwide. Its best fighters and fighter-bombers have been regularly blasted out of the skies by Ukrainian forces using both pricey sophisticated air defense weapons systems gifted to Kyiv by Western powers and shoulder fired rockets operated by individual soldiers in the field. Russian Federation Ground Forces could be assessed as fighting much as one of a third tier power, seemingly lacking sophisticated aircraft and possessing no close air support assets, and they have resultantly suffered losses the same as an trained observer might expect of a type of third tier force against a high-tech force of a military superpower. In this case, it would appear that with the combined support of the US, the United Kingdom, EU, and NATO member countries, Ukraine, to a degree, is fighting much as that very sort of military superpower described. As greatcharlie has stated in preceding posts, one could only imagine the loss Russian Federation forces would have suffered if they had clashed directly with US forces. If any units sent into battle under that scenario would have been spared, it would have been purely a matter of happenstance.

Still, Putin would unlikely put all of his hopes in the hands of these military men. To go a bit further with the hypothetical, perhaps during one of his summit meetings and bilateral talks with Putin, People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping diplomatically and encouragingly shared the suggestion that he might adopt “a new way of thinking about warfare.” Perhaps he discussed the concept of combined warfare without boundaries emphasizing that a complementary level of energy be placed on matters that could not only greatly influence, but even more, have a decisive impact on its outcome. While it may also include the use of armed force, under the concept of combined warfare without boundaries prioritizes the use of non-military forms of warfare: psychological, media, information, technology, cyber, financial, political, social, and espionage. The aim of combined warfare without boundaries is to weaken the US internally and to exploit its vulnerabilities. Since under combined warfare without boundaries the battlefield is everywhere, everything can be weaponized. On a short list of things weaponized, Xi could have told Putin in this hypothetical situation that, optimistically, there still was time to put things right, but certainly there was no time to waste. It is all hypothetical, imagined from the abstract.

In the past, the activities undertaken as part of combined warfare without boundaries would have fallen under the category of intelligence. Perhaps, they still do. Intelligence services engage in open and clandestine, and covert activities, using appropriate tools and available resources, to create or exploit opportunities to act in support of the policies and the interests of their countries. As part of those activities, the everyday can often become weaponized. Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen around today having served in the KGB and as head of the FSB. He would very likely see value and potential in that tack, and would surely have a stream of ideas on what he could do away from the battlefield in a robust way. 

Under such a scenario, one could reasonably expect his mind to harken back to the heady days of the Cold War when he served as an officer in the KGB in the former Deutsche Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, also known as GDR or East Germany). Putin and his KGB comrades cooperated–“oversaw”–the work of their HVA counterparts who were infiltrating West Germany and countries beyond in the West to not only collect intelligence but to a great extent prepare as best as possible for a likely conflict between Warsaw Pact forces and NATO Member States in Central Europe. For 34 years, Generaloberst Markus Wolf was the very successful head of GDR’s foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA. With frightening efficiency, he developed an array of tactics, techniques, procedures and methods for operating against his Western opponents in advance of any eventual conflict in Europe between East and West, or to break down the societies of opponents of the Eastern Bloc. Throughout the Cold War, his agents poured into West Germany and when possible countries beyond, secured positions, reported about, and influenced the activities of a multitude of organizations in a broad spectrum of areas, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational. (For those interested in more on Wolf and the HVA, see the November 13 2019 greatcharlie post entitled Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997) for a bit more detail on the matter.)

With a dearth of good ideas, some interest could possibly arise in mining benefit from what might seem as an outre thought on first impression. If such a hypothetical exchange on the matter of combined warfare without boundaries were at all true, and under such a scenario, Putin might have put any thought into the matter, he would likely have begun to think beyond the battlefield in a big way. Some might suggest that Putin already was engaged in such activities as observed in Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks in Europe which began in 2014.

Hybrid warfare has been associated with Gerasimov who developed what has been dubbed the Gerasimov doctrine. The Gerasimov Doctrine, an operational concept for Russia’s confrontation with the West, is also a whole-of-government concept that combines military power and soft power across many domains, transcending boundaries between peace and war. However, there is a distinction between combined warfare without boundaries and the Gerasimov Doctrine. When combined warfare without boundaries is applied, the purpose is not to prepare or support the use of force. What is accomplished by non-military means should offset the use of force. To that extent in Ukraine, what is transpiring on the battlefield should not be looked upon as determining the final outcome of the confrontation. 

In a robust application of some simulacrum of combined warfare without boundaries, alterations in a few aspects of Russia’s behavior would likely signal the change. There would likely be greater emphasis on garnering assistance from allies with the wherewithal to contribute assets of high value. That list of allies would likely include: China, Belarus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and perhaps Cuba. Applying combined warfare without boundaries, top diplomats of Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del Rossijskoj Federacii (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation) would approach each to secure the maximum level of assistance. Reports surfaced in September 2022, that Russia was in the process of buying millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea to use in Ukraine. That information was reportedly sourced from the US Department of Defense. In August 2022, US officials disclosed that Russia received shipments of Iranian-produced drones. 

Top diplomats would also be tasked with keeping the negotiations door open without leaning too far that way as to encourage bolder action on the battlefield by Kyiv and its NATO backers. It may be the case that when Western representatives approach Putin about peace, he may very well get the sense that he is slowly wearing down their countries and Ukraine. Thereby, his resolve to fight on may be strengthened.

As part of Putin’s twist on an hypothetical implementation by him of a combined warfare without limits strategy similar to that of China might be to green-light direct action of a calibrated nature in a top tier Western country whose foreign and national security bureaucracies surely will not be expecting but actually should have been prepared for once the Ukraine war ignited over some preposterous reasoning began.

Russian Federation intelligence services would be called upon to collect all they can on the level of will Western countries possess on investing in the war: concerns expressed in capitals on capping assistance expenditures, Ukraine’s use of all forms of assistance, and the effects of Moscow’s nuclear threats. Sweet to the ear of Putin would surely be any true Intelligence collected that shows some decay in the united front of the NATO Member States. As the situation stands now, it would seem illusory for the Kremlin to put hope in some deterioration of Western unity or loss of will or concern over the drain funding the war has had on national budgets or an actual pull back of support for Kyiv. Further, if the Russian Federation could hastily organize and task Its respective intelligence services to impact Western countries lined against it in some significant way as to influence events in Ukraine, there would unlikely be enough time to get any operations going before events on the battlefield rendered their fruits meaningless.

As for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, they would still be implored to hold on territory gained. However, in the use of their weapon systems, they would need to be a bit more creative. In the May 30, 2022 greatcharlie post entitled, “Putin the Protector of the Russian People or the Despoiler of Ukrainian Resources: A Look at War Causation and Russian Military Priorities in Ukraine”, it was suggested that ideally for Putin, inhabitants of Ukrainian cities and towns will be displaced due to Russian attacks at such a level that the cities and towns themselves would more or less resemble the southern portion of the city of Famagusta in Cyprus or the village of Oradour-sur-Glane in France. (Given results, it almost seems as if Russian engineering officers, artillery officers, air power officers, and ordnance officers, have drawn up plans for the systematic demolition of Ukrainian cities and towns, district by district, block by block, using ordnance fired from a variety of weapon systems.) The intermittent attacks on populated areas may indeed have some psychological warfare, punitive, or perhaps even a tactical purpose. Yet, something of far greater conception may be behind them. Perchance Russian commanders, as part of a preconceived plan, seek to displace Ukrainians from their homes, out of the cities and town through “massive evacuations” to make them easier to “manage,” easier to control. Surely, Putin would appreciate having the West finance and supply for their care on the other side of the Dnieper River. Destroying certain parts of cities and towns would also make them far less desirable. At the time of this writing, UN estimates are that over 4.1 million Ukrainians have moved into other countries. When Ukrainians move west, the better things become concerning Putin’s likely plans for Ukraine. In that same May 30, 2022 post, it was imagined that following the capture of Ukrainian cities and towns, “There might be the chance that citizens of the Russian homeland would be ‘invited’ to relocate and settle in those cities and towns to participate in their reconstruction and, particularly in the southeast, reside in cities and towns in order to reconstruct and work at ports on the Azov Sea and in the many mineral mines. Veterans of the military operation who were so inclined could be invited to relocate to the cities and towns they ‘liberated,’ in effect to enjoy the spoils of the war.”

Hypothetically under an overarching combined warfare without boundaries concept insisted upon by the Kremlin, Russian forces would act more directly to break the will of the Ukrainians throughout the country. While propaganda would likely have limited effect, there would be the possibility of attempting to break the morale of the Ukrainian people and as important, their will to fight on. To that extent, Ukrainian civilian infrastructure would be targeted with the purpose of terrorism the population, albeit the of terrorizing civilians in this manner would be a war crime. As of this writing, Russian forces reportedly have been bombing Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, to include energy facilities. As put by Amnesty International, the intent of these attacks–somewhat in line of combined warfare without boundaries–is “to undermine industrial production, disrupt transportation, sow fear and despair, and deprive civilians in Ukraine of heat, electricity and water as the cold grip of winter approaches.”

Surovikin (center), Gerasimov (left), and Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (right). It is very possible that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov, and the others on the Russian Federation General Staff authentically feel there is a real chance that under Surovikin’s command, Russian forces can beat back Ukrainian forces tearing through their lines, gain and retain the initiative, and somehow obviate the effects of US, NATO, and other foreign military assistance to Kyiv. It could be that the results of the ongoing Ukrainian drive in fact proved Surovikin’s conceptual view of the situation in what was previously his southern front and his neighboring eastern front were correct. He may have expressed what turned out to be the best understanding of how factors as the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian forces to include new weapon systems being introduced via Western assistance. He may have sounded the alarm that firepower in particular would allow them “the upper hand” on the battlefield. He may have demonstrated all along a better understanding, reliable intimations, on how, where, and when to apply the combat power of Russian forces. He may have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces and, since their power has dwindled so dramatically, how they could be more effectively and perhaps economically mustered, how those forces could be better protected, and how they might be able to take a stab at making some respectable gains more immediately.

Surovikin: The Invaluable Multilateral Operations Expert

The renowned 19th century Irish poet and playwright Oscar Wilde explained: “To expect the unexpected shows a thoroughly modern intellect.” Surovikin surely gained experience with multilateral operations as a result of his experience in Syria. Ukraine has doubtlessly put him in contact with operational commanders of allies assisting Russia in various ways. Given the DPRK’s arms shipment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and persistent murmurs of its troops assisting the Russian with the deployment of their troops, the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff, with the permission of DPRK Chairman Kim Jung-un, by now surely has observers on the ground in Ukraine, examining everyday of the conflict and gleaning every lesson possible. Surely, those lessons learned will manifest in alterations of DPRK armed forces tactics, perhaps even the configuration of certain units, and use of their weapon systems to create whatever advantages they could possibly muster as well as mitigate any apparent weaknesses across the board. That might also include any structural changes their system of government might allow. From the Russian side, the work entailed in establishing interoperability with DPRK ordnance might be developed as a foundation for further areas and levels of cooperation. 

It was suggested at the time when the situation for the Russian forces in the Donbass began to seriously deteriorate that Kim might send 100,000 troops  of the KPA to Ukraine. On first impression, one might view such talk as part of Russia’s political warfare operations. If their suggested deployment should occur, the DPRK expeditionary force could potentially accomplish enough to offset the somewhat grandiose plans of Kyiv to raise a force of 1,000,000 soldiers to eradicate Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, to include the liberation of Crimea. The DPRK’s military is reported to be the world’s fourth largest, with nearly 1.3 million active personnel, and an additional 600,000 serve as reserve soldiers. Noteworthy is the fact that the DPRK has also offered to send over 1,000 workers to assist Russia in rebuilding postwar Ukraine. It has also been reported that Moscow would provide energy and grain in return for the deployment of DPRK troops. According to UN Resolution 2375, passed in 2017, countries are prohibited from supplying the DPRK all condensates and natural gas liquids (paragraph 13). UN Resolution 2397, passed in 2017, limits the annual amount of crude and refined petroleum that can be provided to North Korea (paragraphs 4 and 5). The former resolution also precludes any joint ventures or cooperative entities with North Korea (paragraph 18). The latter resolution reiterates the prohibition of any DPRK national from earning income in other states (paragraph 8). At this point, it would be unreasonable to think that such UN Resolutions have any meaning. Russian forces in Ukraine are already receiving the DPRK weapons shipments. As for prohibitions on the DPRK regarding arms shipments, its military assistance to Russia would also violate UN resolutions. UN Resolution 1718, passed in 2006, prohibits North Korean exports of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and missiles, and requires UN member states to prevent their transfer (paragraph 8). UN Resolution 1874 (paragraph 9), passed in 2009, and UN Resolution 2270 (paragraph 6), passed in 2016, expanded the export ban to include all DPRK arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as “technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel.” Further, under UN Resolution 2270, paragraph 8), the DPRK is also prohibited from any military exports that “support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State.” Pyongyang has established a record of totally disregarding UN Resolutions.

Napoleon is quoted as saying: “Unity of command is essential to the economy of time. Warfare in the field was like a siege: by directing all one’s force to a single point a breach might be made, and the equilibrium of opposition destroyed.” If DPRK troops, conceivably a combined arms force, were deployed to Ukraine, they would likely be applied as a decisive unified force on the battlefield, rather than separating them into individual units and dole them out as replacements for battered and tattered Russian battalions  Under the latter scenario, the likely command, control, and communications problems might be enormous. Further, the fact that Russian and DPRK have not trained together, at least in recent years, in such great numbers, surely would almost immediately become apparent despite Surovikin’s best efforts. How he would manage that would likely require summoning up answers from the depths of his knowledge, experience and talent. Perhaps the common wisdom is that if Surovikin is hoping to make any decisive moves, they would be planned for the Spring of 2023. However, there is the possibility that he plans to act in the mid-to-late Winter when weather conditions might obviate advantages provided to Ukrainian forces through the use of drones. Astonishingly, Russian forces seem to lack the appropriate equipment to monitor the skies electronically or a frightful lack of competence to do so.

One might recall weather was a key factor in the planning of Germany’ Oberkommando der Wehrmacht for its Ardennes Offensive that was launched on December 16, 1944. As the attack was envisioned, a heavy winter storm would prevent Allied attempts to provide air support and resupply to beleaguered US troops caught head on in the German armored and mechanized rampage through Belgium and Luxembourg, determined to reach the sea at Antwerp. For several days during the offensive, considerable progress was made, causing a huge bulge westward on the US frontlines. The battle was thereby given the name the “Battle of the Bulge.” Eventually, the winter storm that was vital to the German advance cleared enough for Allied air assets to fly in and have a devastating impact against the German attackers. They also managed to deliver much needed supplies–manna from heaven–to US troops. Certainly, it is possible that the drone technology Ukrainian forces possess might be able to overcome any challenges caused by weather conditions. If not, such technologically equipped drones could perhaps be rapidly supplied to them by Western powers

Though DPRK troops hypothetically sent into Ukraine would certainly be prepared to do business and make a good showing on behalf of their Dear Respected Comrade [Kim], it is possible that the hypothesized DPRK force could unexpectedly find themselves caught in a situation with Ukrainian forces similar to what their Russian comrades had in Kyiv and Kharkiv. After all, this hypothetical DPRK expeditionary force, imaginably combined arms,  could hardly expect more close air support from the Russian Federation Aerospace Force than Russian troops have received. They might deploy their own fighters and attack helicopters and fly them out of Crimea or even the Donbas only to find the skies over Ukraine no safer than the Russian pilots had. A disastrous assistance effort to support an ally that comes to mind is that of the British Army which sent a force under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore into Spain to support the United Kingdom’s Spanish allies against the forces of Napoleon in 1809 during the Peninsular War. The French campaign, initially led by Napoleon himself, defeated the Spanish armies. Moore attempted to attack the French force, a corps under Marshal of the Empire Jean de Dieu Soult with the objective of diverting it. The strength of Moore’s forces was 16,000, which included 15,000 infantry and 9 to 12 guns. Soult’s corps in near parity included 16,000 troops, of which 12,000 were infantry, 3,200 were cavalry. He also had 20 guns

When the plan as conceived failed. Moore withdrew his force, but Soult’s corps relentlessly pursued it. The British retreat, under harsh winter conditions, took Moore’s force across northern Spain while their rearguard fought off repeated French attacks. Both the British and French troops suffered from the severe weather. With the exception of the elite Light Brigade under Robert Craufurd, much of the British force suffered from a loss of order and discipline during the retreat. Having managed against tremendous odds to reach the port of Corunna on the northern coast of Galicia in Spain, a few days ahead of the French, Moore’s troops found their transport ships had not arrived. When the fleet arrived a couple of days later, Soult’s forces also arrived and launched an attack on the British who were embarking. The British had no choice but to fight another battle before leaving Spain, the Battle of Corunna. In the fight which took place on January 16, 1809. Moore’s force repeatedly repulsed attacks from Soult’s force until nightfall, when both sides disengaged. However, during the battle, Moore was mortally wounded, but he died after learning that his men had successfully repelled the French attacks. That night, British forces resumed their embarkation. The last troops sailed away in the morning under French cannon fire. Soult would capture the port cities of Corunna and Ferrol. The outcome of the withdrawal of British forces from Galicia was the fall of northern Spain to the French.

Perchance General Surovikin would also has the solution to avoid a similar catastrophe. Perhaps the hypothetical intervention by DPRK troops would more resemble that of the Prussians at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815. As it is fairly well-known, during the battle, over 30,000 Prussians under General Der Infanterie Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr Graf Bulow von Dennewitz and General-Leutnant Otto Karl Lorenz von Pirch shaped the outcome at the Battle of Waterloo. The Prussians desperately sought to capture the strategic point of Plancenoit on the right flank of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Army. Much of the Prussian’s fight against the 10,000 French defenders in Plancenoit was in the streets of the town itself. Though the battle at Plancenoit was to be hard fought, the Prussians eventually overran the French right, causing the French army to turn and flee. Their success sealed the fate of Napoleon. The Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Army, Generalfeldmarschall Gerhard Leberecht von Blücher was famously to meet British Army Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington on the battlefield between 9:00PM and 10:00PM, close to the Belle-Alliance farm, where history records, the Prussian general conjured up in French: “Quelle affaire !” Given the battering the Allied army had received throughout the day, the relatively fresh Prussian troops were to take the lead in pursuing the fleeing French troops. The Prussians had neverthless lost 7,000 men. Napoleon’s carriage was to be seized by Prussian cavalry at Gemappes, and the routed French were to be given no quarter by the furious Prussian pursuit. Blücher’s advance guard was finally to reach the outskirts of Paris on June 29, 1815. With Napoleon’s abdication on June 22, 1815, the war would officially end upon the signature of the Convention of St-Cloud on July 3, 1815.  Surely, this would be the sort of outcome that Moscow and Pyongyang would be hoping for.

Surovikin (left), Shoigu (seated right), and Russian Federation Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy (center). Surovikin gained considerable experience with multilateral operations as a result of his experience in Syria. Ukraine has doubtlessly put him in contact with operational commanders of allies assisting Russia in various ways. Given the DPRK’s arms shipment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and persistent murmurs of its troops assisting the Russian with the deployment of their troops, the DPRK General Staff, with the permission of Kim, by now surely has observers on the ground in Ukraine, examining everyday of the conflict and gleaning every lesson possible. Surely, those lessons learned would manifest in alterations of DPRK armed forces tactics, perhaps even the configuration of certain units, and use of their weapon systems to create whatever advantages they could possibly muster as well as mitigate any apparent weaknesses across the board. That might also include any structural changes their system of government might allow. From the Russian side, the work entailed in establishing interoperability with DPRK ordnance might be developed as a foundation for further areas and levels of cooperation. It was suggested at the time when the situation for the Russian forces in Ukraine began to seriously deteriorate that Kim might send 100,000 DPRK troops to Ukraine. Surely, Surovikin would be best suited to manage a multilateral effort with the DPRK.

The Way Forward

Ultimately, it was Putin who created the Ukraine War. Still, commanders are responsible for what was happening to young soldiers in the field. Surovikin expectedly understands the situation in Ukraine. He has been part of the military decisionmaking on the special military operation from its inception. The loss in troops and materiel in Ukraine even to the of top Russian Federation commanders’ eyes must also be absolutely astounding. They are after all only human. All of the ills of the forces they have led have been exposed to the world. The walls have come down. 

Included among root causes for troubles that have surfaced, with which Surovikin or anyone who might come after him must contend, are extremely poor soldier discipline and terrible fieldcraft. Training has likely been lax for decades. Leadership has likely been poor at the lower level leadership for just as long. It is unlikely that senior leaders were circulating or doing so in a meaningful way. One might presume there was a lack of standards particularly among the ground forces and very low morale. If morale was not low in the past, it is surely low now. Russian military technology appears crude as well as corroded in some cases. The world is not discovering how capable NATO has been to confront what was formally understood to be a Russian military juggernaut. Indeed, the world is seeing just how corroded the Russian system is and how that corroded system likely for years had grabbed hold of and mangled the armed forces. What has been manifested from that system in Ukraine has been a longtime in development. Weapons systems which are designed for US military and naval personnel to go to war and win must be robust. This approach is in stark contrast to that of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. An army that operates under the archaic notion that troops are expendable and can be casually sacrificed to achieve objectives will be overcome and overrun in the present era. No one should knowingly be sent to war without being given every chance with regard to their survival and the performance of their equipment.

The above are symptoms of an affliction of corruption that has beset and poisoned authoritarian regimes throughout history. Embezzlement becomes ubiquitous, the powerful feel entitled to spoils befitting their rise. And their countries are bled dry strength and wherewithal stealthily and it is all uncovered in unexpected crises. In every way, the Russian Federation Armed Forces appear to have all along been a paper tiger, emblematic of the very flawed government they serve. William Shakespeare, in Sonnet 66 (1609), provides a short list of ingredients that best describe the realities of authoritarian regimes so appropos concerning the thinly veiled current one of Russian Federation. In the third quatrain, he writes: “And art made tongue-tied by authority, / And folly, doctor-like, controlling skill, / And simple truth miscalled simplicity, / And captive good attending captain ill.”