To Foster Forward Movement on Denuclearization by Kim, Trump Says there Is No Rush, But His Patience Has Limits

The Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Kim Jong-un (above). The administration of US President Donald Trump hopes that Kim Jong-un sincerely desires peace and are genuinely committed to diplomatic process on denuclearization. To nudge thinking in the right direction, efforts have been made to incentivize North Korea to change its economy to benefit the entire country and not just the elites. Reaching a decision on whether to stay on this new path with the US weighs very heavily upon Kim, now ensconced in Pyongyang.

Military analysts have estimated in recent years that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) possessed an arsenal of 30-60 nuclear weapons. In Washington, great concern had been particularly expressed over the possibility that North Korea would soon construct thermonuclear warhead tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Having successfully tested several ICBMs In 2017, North Korea posed a security threat not only to US allies, such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the Continental US. The Trump administration has absolutely no intention of allowing North Korea retain such an arsenal, and moreover, add to it. In 2017, the administration initiated a “maximum pressure” campaign on Kim’s regime and its supporters, increasing military exercises in coordination with South Korea and Japan, deploying missile defense systems in South Korea with urgency, sending more firepower there, and encouraging the US Congress to enact the strongest sanctions possible against North Korea and its enablers. Eventually, in February 2018, the US imposed a raft of sanctions in an effort to target entities linked to North Korea’s shipping and trade sectors. Trump had also urged China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to assist in reducing tensions by talking frankly with Pyongyang. Yet, to the surprise of all, talks were successfully arranged between US President Donald Trump and the Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un. The decision was precipitated by efforts of the government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in to end rather bellicose verbiage and repeated muscle flexing by the US, Japan and his own country, and weapons testing by North Korea. Following their summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018, Kim Jong-un publicly committed North Korea “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in the broad joint statement issued at the summit. Trump was so confident that North Korea would begin “total denuclearization” right away that he immediately offered to halt the joint military exercises with South Korea, without Kim agreeing to any specific steps and timeline towards the denuclearization. The day after the summit, Trump tweeted, “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Even more, on July 18, 2018, Trump said that there was “no rush” in its negotiations with North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo fully concurred with that position earlier this month. He said negotiations with North Korea are a “decades-long challenge” that involves North Korea making a fundamental shift in its strategic decision making. Pompeo further explained “(North Korea) for decades told their own people that without nuclear weapons their country was at risk of being attacked by the West, by America, by some other country,” Pompeo explained. The job for the US now, he also said, is “to get the entire country to understand that they have that strategically wrong. Chairman Kim told President Trump he understood that. I was there. I saw it.”

Trump appears to reasonably quantify continued progress by the fact that there have not been any North Korean missile or nuclear tests in recent months. Still, although the halt to these tests is a welcome sign, North Korea has made little progress toward “total denuclearization.” Critics as well as some very capable military and foreign policy analysts posit that Kim had no intention of keeping his promise on denuclearization, and has set out to deceive the Trump administration and the rest of world, much as his father and grandfather misled previous US administrations. One cannot be certain that Kim will stay the course and effectuate denuclearization. Using logic and reason, one cannot not know what exactly is on Kim’s mind, know what lies within his heart. What might be inferred from all that is known about Kim is that one would make a huge mistake in placing complete faith in him. While an opportunity has been presented to Kim, he may become froward and revert to old ways or simply retract having been confronted with prospect of such great change. Concerning the former, certainly, the US must not underestimate Kim’s maliciousness and subterfuge. He is following the same strategy deployed by his father and grandfather but with a bigger ambition. Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim will not be satisfied with temporary economic relief through negotiations. He has visited China three times so far this year. Regarding the latter, a retrenchment or retreat by Kim might not be impelled by aggressive thinking or some recurvation programmed into the plan for engagement with US on denuclearization. As important to the process of achieving denuclearization are the personal concerns and feelings about the change. If Kim is not psychologically ready to move forward, the process may breakdown. Protecting his own sense of being, self-image, self-worth, Kim may reject all that is before him. That would consequently cause great pain and harm for himself and the North Korean people.

The diplomatic process between the US and North Korea is still relatively nascent at this stage. Efforts must be made to detect any incongruences in Kim’s actions as they relate to denuclearization and extrapolate and infer from his words what he may be thinking. Doing so will allow the US make needed adjustments in its diplomatic approach. If it appears North Korea might jump to a negative path regarding denuclearization, it would best if the US had already stolen a march or two ahead of him and prepared itself to act. Examined here, from outside the box, are possible intangible motivations that might be a potential causality, among others, for Kim to back away from denuclearization. It takes a brief look a what Kim might be asking himself. Τίς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτῷ πρῶτον εἰπέ: εἶθ’ οὕτως ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς. (First say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do.)

A North Korean Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (above). Military analysts estimate that North Korea possesses an arsenal of 30-60 nuclear weapons. Having successfully tested several intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, North Korea poses a security threat not only to US allies, such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the Continental US. More so, there is concern in the US that North Korea’s may soon construct thermonuclear warhead tipped ICBMs. The Trump administration has absolutely no intention of allowing North Korea retain such an arsenal or add to it.

Trying to Keep Things Right with the Diplomatic Process

Trump administration diplomatic efforts on North Korean denuclearization have been smart, methodical, and well-managed. The purpose of the talks is to find points at which Washington’s thinking touches with that of Pyongyang, and develop mutually satisfying, attainable and sustainable ends. The US must be cautious. Still, the purpose of the talks is not to find fault in the expressions and gestures of the other party, allow suspicions to color thinking, and make the whole process a fruitless, unconstructive exercise. The worst actions and impressions Pyongyang has made in Washington over the years should not be forgotten. However, as there is presently no urgency, no immediate danger of conflict between the parties, every effort should be made to display sangfroid and temperance, temporarily suppressing strong feelings over what has happened in the past. Over time, the intentions of North Korea will be revealed as good or bad. Indeed, one must employ forward thinking of positive progress in resolving matter or improving relations is to be achieved. In meetings with their North Korean counterparts, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other senior officials have done his best to explain and secure US interests, channeling Trump’s thinking. The essence of that thinking is to stop Kim from chasing his destructive dream of developing a large nuclear arsenal capable of striking the US. Tu me’ inquis ‘mones? iam enim te ipse monuisti, iam correxisti? ideo aliorum emendationi vacas?’ Non sum tam improbus ut curationes aeger obeam, sed, tamquam in eodem valetudinario iaceam, de communi tecum malo colloquor et remedia communico. (“What,” say you, “are you giving me advice? Indeed, have you already advised yourself, already corrected your own faults? Is this the reason why you have leisure to reform other men?” No, I am not so shameless as to undertake to cure my fellow-men when I am ill myself. I am, however, discussing with you troubles which concern us both, and sharing the remedy with you, just as if we were lying ill in the same hospital.)

Now away from the grandeur, the luster, the celebrity, and the energy of the Singapore Summit, and the persuasive Trump, Kim seems to be leaning into his own thinking, He may not have a sense that he must even be honor bound by culture to remain obedient to the terms of the agreement with Trump and act consistently in line with them. Kim may no longer have the same sense of trust in Trump. After taking one step away from the intent of the agreement in Singapore, each step becomes easier. One can also usually find ample reasons to do the wrong thing. Kim would be comfortable in the end for the reason it was standard behavior of North Korea. A challenge for the Trump administration from the start has been to satisfactorily reconcile the diplomatic Kim, the open-minded Kim, with concomitant enormities of his authoritarian reign of North Korea. Washington must keep in mind that Kim is a tyrant, ruling with an iron fist. That observation is not outdated. Recent actions concerning the nuclear program or expressions that disparage the US and US officials, have certainly raised greater concern over Kim’s intentions.  Goading the US, snuffing out the positive spirit the remains from Singapore might be an awkward exit strategy from the denuclearization matter. However, Washington has not shown any interest in engaging in a volley of insults with Pyongyang much as a ball in some tennis tournament. The focus of both parties must be diplomacy.There is no desire by the Trump administration to demonstrate superiority over countries by moving forward consistently along a narrow path of attitude and behavior. Washington will not lower itself to the long-practiced tactics of diversion of Pyongyang. Pyongyang will need to rise to the occasion.

Beyond verbiage, there have also been disappointments stemming from actions and inaction by Pyongyang. Imagery analysis of satellite photos indicate Pyongyang has rushed to make improvements to the infrastructure of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, and enriched uranium production for nuclear weapons has increased. The South Korea’s military has collected information indicating that Pyongyang may be developing a new submarine capable of launching nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. North Korea indicated that it would conduct its annual summer military exercise without regard for Trump’s gesture of goodwill in halting a planned joint US and South Korean military exercise. Further, Kim promised the immediate repatriation of identified remains of US POWs in Singapore, but without explanation, Pyongyang has been slow to act. The Defense Department, however, has had to display great patience in the face of the inexplicable deliberate pace taken by Pyongyang on the return of remains. Additionally, North Korea’s handling of Pompeo’s July 6, 2018 visit to Pyongyang was graceless and inelegant. Critics took it as another troubling sign. Pompeo and his team were not provided a schedule of meetings. They were not told in which hotel they would stay. They were never provided a definitive answer on whether they would meet Kim, and in the end, they did not. Pompeo pressed his North Korea counterpart Kim Yong-chol on concrete steps toward denuclearization, but it is unclear whether any were provided. After the visit, Pyongyang played the role of a fretful and peevish innocent party emotionally injured by the stern Pompeo and publicly attacked the US for making “gangster like” demands.

Critics say Pyongyang has displayed this pattern of obfuscation too many times in the last three decades. It has been sardonically called “business as usual” with Pyongyang. Every administration since that of US President Bill Clinton has publicly expressed the belief that it could better handle North Korea than the previous one, and some special deal could be reached to curb or bring down its nuclear program. Yet, they all ended up formulating and implementing unsatisfactory approaches the results of which were being misled the regime. To an extent, Pyongyang developed a record of success in dealing with the US, while the US would walk away with only frustration. Even now, North Korea continues its steadfast march toward becoming an undeniable nuclear power. However, the administration will not moan over the past and recent maladroit and tactless actions.

There is the possibility that Kim agreed to talk to Trump as part of nefarious plan to convince the Seoul that his country’s purpose is peaceful. Success for Kim with such a deceitful purpose would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-led military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with an agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs.

If Kim Had a Nefarious Plan for Singapore, It May Have Been Trumped by Trump!

From what was seen from Kim in the earliest stages of the meeting with Trump, he appeared amiable, yet at the same time self-contained and somewhat obscure as the talks began. An occasional smile could not cloak the fact that his face was hardened, An attendant aspect of his likely effort to conceal himself. He remained silent. He would nod his head. One might theorize that Kim did not want to make it easy for Trump to read him. Kim was likely trained in those mannerism years ago. They may have been designed to create the trompe l’oeil of receptiveness. Yet, if such a thought was guiding Kim’s behavior, it was likely soon commingled with a sense of being overwhelmed by the news media attention, the public adulation outside his hotel, and the gravity of the talks in which he was engaging

The renowned ancient Greek philosopher and scientist, Aristotle, is quoted as saying: “It is the mark of an educated man to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.” It is possible that self-conceit closed Kim’s mind to whatever was said. In believing that he already knew what Trump would say would have served as an effective buffer to Trump’s comments and explanations. Indeed, Kim may have arrived in Singapore as a man on a mission, believing that he could shape events on the Korean Peninsula in his way. Before the talks began, Kim took affirmative steps in support of engagement with the US to include a superficial charm offensive in which he was presented as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. He sought to prove that he no longer the source of dread and terror in Northeast Asia, the Continental US, and everything in between. However, he had already shown enough of his hand to sufficiently convince Trump that his intentions were potentially nefarious. Yet, Trump also likely saw that Kim was facing a dire situation, and wanted to allow him some room to gravitate toward a new tact more satisfying for the US. If everything goes Trump’s way, North Korea will scrap its nuclear weapons and missile programs in a timely manner.

In a previous post, greatcharlie, hinting at its suspicions about Kim, hypothesized that there was the possibility that Kim was directing a duplicitous efforts at Trump but at South Korea. (That possibility was also likely among the “what ifs” considered by the Trump administration before the meeting.) For example, Kim might have sought to talk to Trump in order to better convince the Seoul that his country’s purpose is peaceful. A signal of success with such a deceitful purpose would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-led military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with an agreement to dismantle his country’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. Hopefully, Pyongyang is not engaged in an active strategy to gain control of the Korean Peninsula by convincing South Korea to buy into the fantasy that it too wants to create conditions for peaceful relations. If it does, things certainly have not been moving in favor of it. Mens impudicam facere, non casus, solet. (Impurity is caused by attitude, not events.)

Believing that he could shape events on the Korean Peninsula in his way, Kim, before the Singapore talks began, took affirmative steps in support of engagement with the US to include a superficial charm offensive in which he was presented as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. He sought to prove that he no longer the source of dread and terror in Northeast Asia, the Continental US, and everything in between. However, he had already shown enough of his hand to sufficiently convince Trump that his intentions were potentially nefarious.

Any Nefarious North Korean Plans to Exploit Singapore Likely Stymied by Culture Shock and the Realism of Trump

Culture shock is the feeling of disorientation experienced by someone when they are suddenly thrust into an unfamiliar culture or way of life. The possibility that Kim may have had a bout with culture shock while moving through Singapore should not be discounted. Certainly Kim is familiar with the world outside of North Korea, reportedly having attended the private English-language International School in Gümligen near Bern, Switzerland from 1993 to 1998. It was also reported that Kim attended the Liebefeld Steinhölzli state school in Köniz near Bern under an assumed name from 1998 until 2000. However, Singapore is not a European country. Singapore is one of the four economic tigers of Asia that have consistently maintained high levels of economic growth since the 1960s. That growth was impelled by exports and rapid industrialization. The other tigers include South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In Singapore, Kim saw what a small Asian country could achieve by successfully marshalled the energies of its people to create was the site. It was his dream for North Korea. He undoubtedly though how much he wanted it and despite keeping his mind on the revolutionary path, wondered whether there might be a real possibility of guiding his country to such economic height by working with the US and international community.

Perhaps while in Singapore, he may have considered putting aside any potential nefarious plans and playing things by ear. Indeed, whatever part of Pyongyang’s effort was superficial had to make way for what was authentic: the promise of a bright future for North Korea. The Singapore talks were marked by the very apparent graciousness and humanism displayed by Trump. Even for the most skeptical, the interaction would have been intoxicating. Trump may be difficult for foreign capitals to discern perhaps because there is also the background noise of critics with their varying levels hostility. Among the many things that dissatify  them about Trump is the fact that his approach to nearly everything is not business as usual: decision making based on political expediency. A heavy dose of realism is typically injected into his exchanges. Whatever follow-on steps that are agreed upon will be concrete. It is very likely that even after Singapore, the event lingered in Kim’s psyche, leaving him a condition different from the time before the summit. His old habits and faculties have likely been effected by the event. It is Kim’s choice to either entertain and perhaps pursue all of the new considerations or shun what transpired, erase all traces of it or setting the matter off to the side while proceeding in his ways. Nevertheless, there was little doubt for Trump, who actually negotiated directly with Kim, that Kim understood his exposition in Singapore.

After having opened the eyes of Kim and officials in Pyongyang to the opportunity put before them, a satisfactory, inviting gateway must be created for them to cross through to a new reality, on both nuclear weapons and their country’s future. Although ongoing sanctions are also an incentive and helped get the diplomatic process started, a far more positive way is needed to push Pyongyang up and out from depths in which it has put itself. Trump has apparently reasoned out what course the process will take. Reportedly, he accepted that he needed to be somewhat patient and act intently, with diligence, which naturally mean taking time to make certain things are correct. Trump has an understanding of human nature, and even sympathy for human frailty. He can project empathy. One of Trump’s greatest strengths is his capacity for listening.  Indeed, Trump, via the summit, successfully interviewed Kim. From what he heard and did not hear in their one-on-one session, Trump feels that he better understands Kim’s thinking and intentions. After committing to being patient, a diligent person expects receive fruit from their efforts. Hasty people may receive something transitory, but likely unsatisfactory for the long term.

The state of North Korea’s economy has been atrocious for some time, but it was made several ticks worst once sanctions killed most of its foreign trade. North Korea’s economy necessarily loomed large in the negotiations. Some consideration had to be given to what would happen after sanctions were removed and the subject of the country’s greatest investment had been scrapped. Benefits that would come Kim’s way once denuclearization was complete.were dangled before him to make taking the path to denuclearization more attractive.

Encouragement in the Form of Economic Assistance

The state of North Korea’s economy has been atrocious for some time, but it was made several ticks on the meter worst once sanctions killed most of its foreign trade. North Korea’s economy necessarily loomed large in the negotiations. Some consideration had to be given to what would happen after sanctions were removed and the subject of the country’s greatest investment had been scrapped. Benefits that would come Kim’s way once denuclearization was complete.were dangled before him to make taking the path to denuclearization more attractive. There was even a short video presentation prepared to support that cause. Trump and administration officials indicated that US companies could come to North Korea en masse if relations between the countries improve. Reportedly, at their first summit on April 27, 2018, the South Korean President gave Kim a USB stick that held plans for robust infrastructure investments and a list of South Korean companies that would like to benefit from a de-escalation of tensions.

As mentioned earlier, Kim reportedly would like to develop North Korea’s economy. He stated in 2012 that the North Korean people should “never have to tighten [their] belts again,” and the following year, he launched the “byungjin strategy” for the parallel development of the national economy and nuclear weapons, with equal importance.  Less publicized in the Western news media than the country’s other aspects, Kim’s tenure has seen North Korea’s semi-private market system grow, further experimentation in agricultural management explored, and state-owned enterprises have been granted unprecedented liberties in production planning. Clearly, Kim Jong-un has invested himself and considerable wherewithal into improving economic conditions. On April 20, 2018, Kim declared that North Korea’s primary emphasis will be on economic development from that point onward as the nuclear deterrent was secure. The Trump administration has not missed the fact that exploiting Kim’s economic ambitions could give the diplomatic process a boost. Offering assistance for economic development and directing such assistance to spur the shift of a country in North Korea’s circumstances toward a more market-based economic system, is a tried and true course for the international community to take.

How Kim Might Proceed

Kim was selected by Kim Jong-il, his father, to be his successor as Supreme Leader of North Korea. The short-list of attributes of a national leader respective to North Korea, beyond loyalty to the Communist Workers’ Party of Korea would likely include: to organize the people under the tenets of Marxist-Leninism; promote the general welfare of the people within parameters set by the Workers’ Party of Korea; provide for the safety and security of the people; defend the country’s sovereign territory; and know the value of an iron fist. To the extent that Kim has even slightly deviated from that course, he has implemented some economic reforms as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, he has essentially been piloting the country dead ahead on the course Kim Jong-il and Kim Il sung set it on. Kim hit the ground running upon becoming Supreme Leader. Countless North Korea government images showcase Kim performing his duties with what the Renaissance Italian soldier, diplomat, and courtier, Baldassare Castiglione in his 1528 work, Il Cortegiano (The Book of the Courtier), called “sprezzatura”, a certain nonchalance. It is easy to say that Kim is an educated man who should be able to easily see the benefits short and long term for North Korea once denuclearization is complete. However, reason is based on principle, not the prospect of economic development. Kim may indeed see the benefits of moving along the course set by Trump, but he may not have the moral foundation to know that it would be morally right to take that course. In his formative years, Kim also may not have been sufficiently inculcated with any ideas even in the spirit of Marxist-Leninism which would support a decision move off the set path, and boldly set a new course for his country. Even if Kim tried to capitalize on the opportunity to make things better in North Korea, he might be hindered by well-concealed doubts about his own abilities. He may fear falling short. Indeed, for Kim, the difficulty in engaging with the US to create systemic change in the country’s economic system would not be found in the work of implementing change. The difficulty might be wrapping his head around it all and moving forward with confidence. Kim may know better than anyone else that he will not end up being North Korea’s version of Deng Xiaoping.

Kim will not throw caution to the wind. Kim is undoubtedly very aware of what happened in Russia economically with the help of “Western experts” after the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a complete trust in Trump hardly could have sprouted and blossomed exponentially in Kim during the Singapore meeting. Again as mentioned, some time has passed since Singapore and Kim is some distance away from it all. Any initial second-guessing about Trump could have morphed into considerable apprehension over the US president’s motives. Nestled in Pyongyang, even the mere mental process of drawing closer to the world that Trump presented at Singapore has required Kim to tear away from the only world he and his people have known. Just thinking about a transition in ways of doing things that might lead to the economic transformation of North Korea becomes less attractive and more difficult.

Est enim quaedam etiam dolendi voluptas, praesertim si in amici sinu defleas, apud quem lacrimis tuis vel laus sit parata vel venia. (For there is a certain luxury in grief; especially when we pour out our sorrows in the bosom of a friend, who will approve, or, at least, pardon our tears.) It is difficult to say to whom Kim would turn that would genuinely support of move by him toward denuclearization. As noted by greatcharlie in a previous post, Kim apparently holds his sister, Kim Yo Jong, in high regard and seems to take counsel of her on occasions. She led a delegation of North Korean officials to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. It is now apparent publicly that Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol, is another North Korean official that Kim is willing to rely upon to some degree. He is a foreign policy doyen and sacred cow of the intelligence industry in North Korea, met with Pompeo in New York City for talks and then met with Trump in Washington, DC before the Singapore Summit, and the two have met since then. Although Kim Yong-chol’s main purpose may be to engage in high-level talks with the US and to advise Kim on the diplomatic process, he can also use his title, stature, and credibility to interface with the Workers’ Party of Korea and North Korean elites and create some semblance of transparency throughout the diplomatic process for those concerned in Pyongyang. Kim Yong-chol has also exploited the opportunity to better understand the Trump administration through direct contact and not the abstract. That being stated, neither Kim Yo Jong nor Kim Yong-chol appear able to comfortably or confidently, approach Kim and counsel him on denuclearization and economic reform.

All leaders usually sense some degree of isolation at the top. That isolation can potentially be made even more strainful if there is no confidant for a leader to rely upon for honest, supportive counsel beyond the advisement of professional staff on areas of expertise. A leader in Kim’s position faces a particular type of isolation as advice and counsel will unlikely be offered to him freely in an effort to avoid the repercussions of angering him with some mistake. The best option left for Kim would be to turn inward. Uncertain of the outcome of grand steps in different directions, Kim may eventually take a default position, thereby finding his comfort zone. If he could conjure up a path that would only require a relatively small amount of change, it will provide him with some relief and garner praise from like-minded officials at the top of the food chain.

It is very likely that after Singapore, the whole event lingered in Kim’s psyche, leaving him a condition different from the time before the summit. It is Kim’s choice to either entertain and perhaps pursue all of the new considerations or shun what transpired, erase all traces of it or setting the matter off to the side while proceeding with his old habits and faculties. Trump, who actually negotiated with Kim, had no doubt that the North Korean Supreme Leader fully understood his exposition in Singapore.

A Few Possible Scenarios

Rationale enim animal est homo. (Man is a reasoning animal.) With many factors considered, there are a number of scenarios that can be imagined under which Kim might break away from the path of denuclearization. Here are three examples. In one scenario, Kim will maneuver to place North Korea on a path to economic success similar to that which China took. China is a Communist country with a strong economy. It has been accepted nuclear power by the international community. First, along the path China took, it developed its own nuclear capability and capacity. Second, it implemented limited economic reforms while engaging the rest of the world, especially the US through trade and investment, as a result of an opening agreed by Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-Tung  and US President Richard Nixon. It was all done while maintaining a strict one-party rule and hard-line ideological control of Chinese people.

Now that the US, Japan, and South Korea have place their wide array of powerful weapon systems aimed at North Korea on safety, Kim is trying to follow China’s route. He wants the world, particularly the US and South Korea, to help him energize North Korea’s economy by pouring in investment. He hopes to draw them in by seemingly commodifying his country’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, making investment their cost. At the same time, he wants to maintain his iron-fisted, authoritarian control of North Korea and its people. It may very well be that Kim’s heart may very be too hardened, perhaps seared by a belief that the greatest danger to North Korea comes from the US. To that extent, Kim has no intention of giving up nuclear weapons, for he believes they are the only guarantee of his regime’s survival. Falsum est nimirum quod creditur vulgo, testamenta hominum speculum esse morum.(There is certainly no truth in the popular belief, that a man’s will is the mirror of his character.)

In a second scenario, perhaps Kim recognizes that the type of success Kim really wants for North Korea is out of his reach, not by some fault of his own, but rather because the country’s problems are so grave and run too deep. Kim may be incapable of coming up with real answers that would put North Korea on real upward trajectory using all of the tools available to him. In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. To that extent, consciously or unconsciously, Kim may simply be procrastinating. Of course, there are those who would follow him no matter what. Kim knows better than anyone else just how bad things have been in North Korea. It may be to put off a sober, updated look at the situation, and other than implementing a few measures here and there, basically close his eyes to the situation.

To that extent, if Kim were to receive counsel from an “inner voice”, perhaps among the thoughts he might hear are the following three: 1) “Do not chase a gossamer fantasy of developing North Korea into a globally competitive, economically well-heeled country.  There is a danger posed by Trump as part of larger picture of the US, a capitalist adversary seeking conquest, attempting to subordinate your smaller nation.” 2) “You have developed nuclear arsenal to a level that he has the capability and capacity to strike the US. You are genuinely defending your people from that threat.” 3) “You have accomplished what you father and grandfather strove to achieve, but were unable to reach. Honor them, by remaining on the correct path!” Moreover, Kim might consider whether Trump would be willing to follow through on threats of military action given his lack of reaction to the obloquy and invective inflicted upon him by critics. The latest vitriol from critics is the claim that Trump displayed a treasonous level of timidity in the presence of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin at a press conference in Helsinki, Finland. Journalists asked Trump whether he confronted him with evidence from the US Intelligence Community of  the country’s interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election and whether he actually believed that Russia was even engaged in that activity. Overall, Trump’s foreign policy agenda is viewed by critics as something comparable to the l’infame in late-18th century France, the effort to destroy Christian social order as a means to break from the past. In Kim’s mind, surely if Trump were as fierce as he portrays himself, critics would be hesitant to attack him such vigor.

In a third scenario, Kim may have simply lost interest in diplomacy with the US. Kim fully understands that the world is a big place with may countries, with several adversaries and some allies of a sort such as China and the Russian. Yet, in real terms, Kim’s own world, North Korea, is where he is most comfortable. While at home, Kim may have become insulated in the refracted reflection of reality from that Communist country. The values and interests of North Korea may once again become the foundation upon which he will base his actions and reactions to the outside world, the “real world”, and particularly in the diplomatic process on denuclearization. Kim’s mind may not be open to moving further on the denuclearization matter regardless of what Trump is offering.

Kim is now surrounded by all the familiar sights, sounds, and the atmosphere of Pyongyang. The voices of Workers’ Party of Korea officials, generals, security men, business elites, and other are given higher importance in this context as they comfort and encourage him  It is nearly certain that a majority of those supporters also cannot imagine a North Korea other than the one they have known with nuclear weapons and a rigid stand against the US. All of this might be manifested by Kim becoming more guarded in his contact with the outside. Parvolum differt, patiaris adversa an exspectes; nisi quod tamen est dolendi modus, non est timendi. Doleas enim quantum scias accidisse, timeas quantum possit accidere. (There is little difference between expecting misfortune and undergoing it; except that grief has limits, whereas apprehension has none. For we grieve only for what we know has happened; but we fear all that possibly may happen.)

Now nestled in Pyongyang, Kim is surrounded by all of its familiar sights and sounds. He is away from the grandeur, the luster, the celebrity, the energy of the Singapore Summit, and the persuasive Trump. The voices of Workers Party officials, generals, security men, business elites, and others are given greater importance as they comfort and encourage him  It is nearly certain that a majority of those supporters also cannot imagine a North Korea other than the one they know now with nuclear weapons and a tough stand against the US. It all might be manifested by Kim becoming more guarded in his contact with the outside.

A Possible Boost for the US Effort?

Delays and missteps by Pyongyang may create the perception of the optimistic within the Trump camp that some deliberation has been underway within the Workers’ Party of Korea and among other key elites concerning denuclearization. There are undoubtedly many in North Koreans who do not believe that it would be a good path for the country to take For the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the world beyond, greatcharlie also hopes that is the real cause. It is difficult to imagine at what angle Trump administration, itself, might approach Kim to effectually suggest why and how he should proceed in changing his country. It would seem unlikely that Kim would appreciate being told how he should feel at this moment. He would surely be disinterested in hearing anyone from the US attempt to counsel him from the perspective of having been in the same situation themselves, because no US leader or official in recent times has been in Kim’s position. There is the possibility that a third party could be recruited to help usher Kim in the right direction. In a previous post, greatcharlie explained how Mongolia had moved through similar circumstances advancing methodically from a Communist system to more democratic one. With targeted US assistance, has promoted good governance and the rule of law; developed a new generation of democratic leaders; has enjoyed private sector-led growth, economic diversification, and long-term capital investment; and, mitigated transnational criminal activity, to include human trafficking, and reduced domestic violence. Bordered by Russia and China, the Mongolia has had the experience of working positively with their far more powerful neighbors while appreciating the efforts of what it calls its most important “third neighbor”: the US. Mongolia has also invested in North Korea’s oil industry. Most of all, under its present policy, Mongolia desires to see North Korea succeed in its own transition and transformation. (The Mongols could also serve as a figurative thermometer, taking independent readings of the temperature in Pyongyang toward denuclearization and economic development supported by the US and the rest of the international community.) The US State Department is well-aware of the dozens of points at which Mongolia and North Korea touch. Including Mongolia as a partner to include in the diplomatic process may make sense if Ulan Bator is at all interested.

It may very well be that a decision has already been made in Pyongyang not to remain bound to denuclearization. In that case, the Trump administration cannot allow itself to fall into the unpleasant circumstance of relentlessly chases the goal of denuclearization as Pyongyang steadily and methodically moves that possibility farther out of reach. However, nothing stated by him has provided a hint that he has done so. It can only be hoped that he will not make that decision and everything done by the US will foster purposeful  forward movement toward denuclearization. An incorrect decision to divert from the agreed course of denuclearization or to abandon that path altogether may be heralded as a demonstration of Kim’s boldness and fearlessness.  However, that moment of actual failure would more likely be driven by trepidation of the unknown, anxiety toward a future that cannot be foreseen or ever envisioned.

Gaius Musonius Rufus, known as the “Roman Socrates”, was one the foremost Stoic philosophers of the Roman Imperial period. Attributed to Rufus, is the following quote noting that even after the best effort is made, the outcome is really not in our control. He stated: “Of the things that exist, God has put some in our control, others not in our control. In our control he has put the noblest and most excellent part by reason of which He is Himself happy, the power of using our impressions. For when this is correctly used, it means serenity, cheerfulness, constancy; it also means justice and law and self-control and virtue as a whole. But all other things He has not put in our control. Therefore we ought to become of like mind with God and, dividing things in like manner, we ought in every way to lay claim to the things that are in our control, but what is not in our control we ought to entrust to the universe and gladly yield to it whether it asks for our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.”

Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections, Trump must be ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with North Korea cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations believing North Korea wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, trying too hard to understand Kim’s situation.

The Way Forward

In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare’s The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth, King Henry is in his palace at Westminster. It is the middle of the night, and he is working on the paperwork of the ongoing war. Henry halts he work for a moment, and, as a matter of staging convention, breaks the fourth wall by both talking to himself and addressing the audience. He speaks of his newly insomnia, and waxes on how his poorest subjects can sleep at night in their tattered beds, but weighed down by worry, remorse, and anxiety, he, the wealthy king, cannot. He posits that men in power such as him, are less content and insouciant as the needy and ordinary. King Henry states: “How many thousand of my poorest subjects Are at this hour asleep! O sleep, O gentle sleep, Nature’s soft nurse, how have I frighted thee, That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down And steep my senses in forgetfulness? Why rather, sleep, liest thou in smoky cribs, Upon uneasy pallets stretching thee And hush’d with buzzing night-flies to thy slumber, Than in the perfumed chambers of the great, Under the canopies of costly state, And lull’d with sound of sweetest melody? O thou dull god, why liest thou with the vile In loathsome beds, and leavest the kingly couch A watch-case or a common ‘larum-bell? Wilt thou upon the high and giddy mast Seal up the ship-boy’s eyes, and rock his brains In cradle of the rude imperious surge And in the visitation of the winds, Who take the ruffian billows by the top, Curling their monstrous heads and hanging them With deafening clamour in the slippery clouds, That, with the hurly, death itself awakes? Canst thou, O partial sleep, give thy repose To the wet sea-boy in an hour so rude, And in the calmest and most stillest night, With all appliances and means to boot, Deny it to a king? Then happy low, lie down! Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.” Ensconced in Pyongyang, Kim may feel that he is either in a tough spot and under great strain or he is self-assured and feels comfortable knowing he has choices. He may have even reasoned that there is no real need to be fearful of any consequences if he takes one path or another. However, it is most likely that reaching a decision on how to proceed with the US weighs very heavily upon him. Long-practiced tactics of diversion of Pyongyang have raised their head much as a vampire with goal of sabotaging the diplomacy. Yet, that may not be indicative of a choice move away from denuclearization. Perhaps that behavior is driven by inertia and bad habit more than anything else. The Trump administration only wants to take the high road in the diplomatic process. If the desire for peace is sincere, it is hoped by the administration that Kim and his advisers in Pyongyang, will rise to the occasion. To nudge thinking in the right direction, efforts have been made to incentivize North Korea to change its economy to benefit the entire country and not just the elites.

In contemplating what Kim might do, the US must remain vigilant and cautious. The administration cannot afford to become complacent even to the slightest degree. Resources have been dedicated to surveilling developments at North Korean nuclear sites. As many analytical resources as possible should also be dedicated to the discernment of signs of a reversal in Pyongyang. Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections, Trump must be ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with North Korea cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations submitting to the fantasy that North Korea wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success that very likely helped build Kim’s self-confidence in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, trying too hard to understand Kim’s position.

If it becomes clear that his administration’s efforts with North Korea have only been a struggle against the inevitable, everything aggressive that North Korea has done will be taken in the aggregate before a response is chosen. There must not be any doubt that such a conclusion is correct. If a determination is made that Kim has turned his back on what was accomplished at Singapore, only the harshest of consequences should be expected. In Singapore, Kim appeared to understand that Trump did not make a half hearted vow to take military action. Make no mistake, Trump has the requisite will to act. Kim must never believe otherwise. Even if Kim keeps that notion firmly in mind as he continues to engage in the diplomatic process, only time will tell how much that really means to Kim. Arma non servant modum; nec temperari facile nec reprimi potest stricti ensis ira; bella delectat cruor. (Arms observe no bounds; nor can the wrath of the sword, once drawn, be easily checked or stayed; war delights in blood.)

An Open Mind and Direct Talks, Not Reports Developed from Overt US Sources, Will Best Serve Diplomacy with Trump

US President Donald Trump (above). Nearly every government seeks to fill gaps in knowledge and understanding, and verify its on perspectives through its own intelligence efforts. Having a full, compatible understanding of a situation through direct talks by officials, allows leaders and top diplomats to speak correctly and authentically about issues. It also improves the chances for crafting agreements. If countries desire to effectively engage with Trump diplomatically, they must ensure how and what they collect about him and the US is well-considered and accurate.

In the US, the news media serves as a watchdog over government power and political activity. It is a source from which the public can inform itself on the decisions and actions of elected leaders and appointed officials. The news media is at its best when it provides the public with an intimate look inside government bodies and operations. Its role in the society is sacrosanct. “Freedom of the press” is one the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments of the US Constitution listing specific prohibitions on government power. Admonishment can be viewed as a warning, and one may seek to encourage, improve the quality of another’s performance by warning. However, news media criticism of US President Donald Trump appears aimed at bringing his administration down. Trump’s critics also seemingly have the goal of destroying him as a person, reduce him to a demimonde. It has become de rigueur to speak against Trump. All of the negativity catches the eye. Middle of the list journalists have managed to make a place for themselves at the top by presenting anti-Trump stories with reckless abandon. The ranks of his critics actually extend beyond the US news media to include: think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration. Some of Trump’s critics are convinced that Trump does not really want to do well for the US public or the world. They make such assertions being fully aware that the consequence of them might be to harm the trust that many in the US public have in Trump. Indeed, critics may have infiltrated and despoiled the psyche of many US citizens, and perhaps may have even destroyed the possibility for some to have confidence in future US administrations, both Republican and Democratic. When Trump fights back, his comments are very rough and tough, but they unlikely do enough to prevent negative reports and commentaries, all the opprobrium of critics, from sticking.

If one were to consider, for example, the coverage of efforts to organize talks between US President Donald Trump and Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Kim Jung-un, one might recognize that the two leaders were not really given a fair chance to virtually relate as leaders before they met. The atmosphere was poisoned by exceptionally strong negative reports and commentary of expert observers, well-known political foes, critics, and news media pundits. What was actually being said and done in both capitals was being distorted. The main focus of critics was a back and forth on Twitter, a few awkward official statements, and predictions by experts of unconstructive behavior by Kim. What saved the pas de deux was a step by step approach toward North Korea well-managed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Moon met with Kim at the Demilitarized Zone. Pompeo both as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of State met with Kim in Pyongyang. Trump enabled their efforts by expressing a willingness to meet. The US in a way reciprocated on Pompeo’s visits by having the North Korean Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol, meet with Pompeo in New York City for talks and then meet with Trump in Washington, DC. Particularly for the North Koreans, having the chance to get to know Trump and Pompeo, and learning what US thinking in the administration was directly from the US President and Secretary of State was both edifying and important. What the North Koreans learned was certainly far more informative and satisfying than what their intelligence services may have been gleaned in the abstract from US news media sources and free wielding comments of experts in conferences and interviews. The meetings also likely had a stabilizing effect.

Nearly every government seeks to fill gaps in knowledge and understanding, and verify its own perspectives through its own intelligence efforts. Relatively isolated countries can easily become victims of false reports, misleading, politicized commentary. Not knowing what gold is, they often gather pyrite. In the current environment, there is so much to sift through to find the truth. The consequence of using bent intelligence, even if only slightly, could be catastrophic. Having a comparable knowledge and full understanding of the situation through direct talks by officials, allows leaders and top diplomats to speak correctly and authentically about issues. It also improves the chances for the crafting of bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements. If countries desire to effectively engage with Trump diplomatically, how and what they collect about him and the US must be well-considered and accurate. That is the issue discussed here. Oculis de homine non credo, habeo melius et certius lumen quo a falsis uera diiudicem: animi bonum animus inueniat. (I do not trust my eyes to tell me what a man is: I have a better and more trustworthy light by which I can distinguish what is true from what is false: let the mind find out what is good for the mind.)

Chinese President XI Jinping (left) and Trump (right). In general, foreign leaders encounters with Trump are welcoming and friendly. During them, Trump appears at ease, self-possessed. Those who have engaged in conversation with him are usually left with the feeling that he was in the moment with them. He projects an empathy. At the same time, Trump has a strong presence, a bearing of authority, which may be intimidating to some. Trump’s nature is to try while in direct contact with an individual to create a bridge, if not a bond.

The “Authentic” Trump

Boiled down to the bones, open minded, immediate perceptions of Trump from most who have met him, from national leaders to average US citizens, would most likely agree that their encounters with Trump are welcoming and friendly. He is typically at ease, self-possessed with others. Those who have conversed with him are usually left with the feeling that he was in the moment with them. He projects an empathy. At the same time, Trump has a strong presence, a bearing of authority, which may be intimidating to the odd few. Trump’s nature is to try while in direct contact with an individual to create a bridge, if not a bond. Meeting Trump, one must remember that he has expectations from them. Red flags can be detected in his facial expression. Many discerned them too late in a conversation with Trump to repair the damage. Those who plan to create some interaction with Trump in their own way or seek to create some deal or agreement only on their terms, will accomplish nothing but raise his ire. Those simply trying to create some personal linkage alone should avoid overplaying their hand. Trump will let one know what type of relationship that he would prefer to have with one. A barrier will be created once a line is crossed. One should never try to become too familiar with him too fast. If anyone is going to rustle feathers by being a bit extra jovial during an interaction, it would need to be Trump. In such cases, he would invariably still mean well. Following that, he might try to be giving in some way. It would be better not to meet him, if one intends to go as far as breaking the spoken and unspoken rules of civility with him. Those who might use the opportunity to meet Trump in order to play to popular public sentiment at home by displaying irreverence for Trump, displaying their will to challenge him on issues, and create the optics that would confirm some silly notion of fearlessness by taking on the US President will do great disservice to their people and interests of their countries. There would be so much to gain from the opportunity to meet with Trump, and it would all be tossed away.

One should not glean from what has been stated that Trump dislikes developing new relationships. Quite to the contrary, Trump appreciates crafting new things to include new relationships. That desire to create is unquestionably due to the fact that he has the mind, vision, and spirit  of an artist. His successful professional paths as a businessman, land developer, entertainment promoter, and reality television host evinced that. As a businessman, Trump for decades engaged in high stakes negotiations and immersed in the granular details of forging solid, mutually agreeable deals. As a developer, he thoroughly invested himself in the planning, designing, and constructing buildings. In that process he was humble, meticulous, perceptive, and innovative. He could become lost in his art. As a media celebrity, he lived a life of high drama while he entertained and bedazzled. While very public accusations have made of alleged indiscretions, in the aggregate, the greater side of Trump is influenced by a moral center, his faith. He is a Presbyterian, and attends religious services. At the same time, he is respectful, appreciative, and has a good understanding of other religions, and often will attend their services.

On making decisions specifically on foreign policy, Trump will first demand to be read-in on available information and mulling things over, and formulating an approach. (This fact runs counter to what has been drilled in the minds of many through critics statements that Trump is disinterested in reports and briefings.) Trump will typically begin bilateral and multilateral interactions with high hopes that he can well-serve US interests, achieve positive results. While he attempts to craft a mutually satisfying, sustainable agreements, he will put US interests first. He famously stated during his UN General Assembly address: “As President of the United States, I will always put America First. Just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always and should always put your countries first.” He also explained that, “All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.”

Trump was elected US President having never served In political office at the national, state, or local level. He reviewed US foreign policy, it successes and failures in recent years and how his predecessors got things done, and decided to apply lessons he learned in business to make improvement to enhance US policy approaches. He labelled the central concept and intent for making improvements as “America First”. Trump discovered being successful would not simply require transitioning from the role businessman to that of president. In his short period of time in office, his thinking in terms of his duty and responsibilities and also personally, began evolving. In that process of evolution, Trump has not conformed with politics as usual in Washington. Rather, Trump, while keeping the heart of America First, began a process of transformation in which life lessons on getting things done, coalesced with lessons he would learn on the job daily as president. The change that Trump has brought has been most disturbing for critics as well as allies set in their ways, preferring Trump would take buttoned-down, old fashioned approaches to issues. He has pushed back against their insistent voices that he do things their way, seeking instead to find the truth in himself and doing things his way. A very evident part of Trump’s process of evolution are staff changes. He wants advisers that will best allow for the smooth execution of his plans. A very interesting and practical duality in his thinking has also been revealed as Trump has exercised his own magic. On some matters, Trump has found, sometimes the hard way, that conventional ways of doing things are best. When he has turned to unconventional approaches, he has relied upon a shrewd inner voice, intimations of a military commander in battle, all of it honed and polished by decades of human interactions, to help guide his decisionmaking.

The change that Trump has brought to Washington has been disturbing for critics as well as allies set in their ways, preferring that he would take buttoned-down, old fashioned approaches to issues. On some matters, Trump has found that doing things conventional ways are best. When he has turned to unconventional approaches, he has relied upon a shrewd inner voice, intimations akin to those of a military commander in battle, all of it honed and polished by decades of human interactions, to help guide his decisionmaking.

Indeed, when Trump takes a conventional track, he will support approaches that would require initial, relatively small steps perhaps to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. He would also seek to gauge actions and responses from the opposite party. If he discerns a positive way forward, his sense of possibility would broaden and he would open his mind up to more options. In certain circumstances, Trump might promote creativity by breaking problems into smaller components; in doing so, he would build a multi-issue business negotiation out of what may have initially appeared to be a single-issue deal. Using multiple issues allows one to make valuable tradeoffs and facilitate a good-faith negotiation. Trump will collect important information by asking lots of questions and listening carefully to the answers. He usually demonstrates a willingness to be flexible by putting forth several different proposals at the same time. He is usually be willing to contemplate unconventional deal-structuring arrangements to bridge the gap between what the other side wants and what he could accept. He will even explore contingent agreements to help overcome differences in beliefs about future events and outcomes. He may even add on conditions for a deal such as “I’ll do X if you do Y”; and, engaging in “mind games” like brainstorming to facilitate creative problem solving and prompt unexpected solutions. On May 25, 2018, when there was discussion about restoring the summit talks with Kim after they were called off, questions were asked in the news media whether the back and forth between the US and North Korea was part of a strategy, Trump was quoted as saying: “Everybody plays games.”

In an unconventional mode, Trump will appear driven by the idea that bold action can turn situations around in the case he is facing. His goal is to exploit success, preserve his freedom of action on immediate matters, and reduce vulnerability from action by his competitors. He acts in a manner designed to gain advantage, surprise, and momentum over his competitors, achieving results that would normally require far more time and would be more costly to the US. This has been observed repeatedly in his interactions with foreign leaders. Trump’s discernment of events and situations as well as his planning and execution of actions against competitors greatly resembles what military thinkers define as maneuver. He rushes to place himself in superior position in order to overcome and defeat his opponents efforts. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Early in life, Trump was inculcated with a strong sense of duty, honor, and country in secondary school. Trump matriculated for five years at the renowned New York Military Academy (NYMA) at Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, NYMA was the closest thing to a preparation school for the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, which was only a short drive from NYMA’s campus.  Trump excelled at NYMA. Friends and instructors have noted how Trump eventually thrived in military environment. He graduated as one of five captains, the S4 (supply officer) on the Senior Staff. In his senior year, Trump was given command of a composite company of cadets for the 1963 Columbus Day Parade, and led them and rest of marchers to St. Patrick’s Cathedral where he greeted Cardinal Francis Spellman. Among his many other accomplishments, he commanded NYMA’s Honor Guard in both 1963 and 1964. From 1960 to 1964, he was an Honor Cadet and played on the Variety Baseball team. Trump proved throughout his secondary school years that he could consistently perform well both as a student and leader. Given Trump’s successful ascent as a NYMA cadet, it is hard to imagine that within him there was not a desire to attend the West Point. However, that was unlikely his decision to make. His father, Frederick Trump, who Trump would only describe as a builder to fellow cadets, was a well-known New York City real estate developer. His father likely insisted that Trump attend Fordham University where he would educate himself for work in the family business. Trump behaved dutifully and honorably in response to his father’s wishes. What is left for observers to see from that decisive point in Trump’s life is a juxtaposition between his strong military metiér and his dedication to family and a business path. As a leader, Trump is always ready to subordinate what he might want for what he must do.

Trump has undoubtedly recognized that to be a successful president he had to become a living sacrifice for his country, taking on almost limitless duties and burdens he very likely unforsaw as a candidate. The lifestyle that he led as a successful business leader had to be shed. Interests and focuses of his attention and energy, if simply for recreation, have been replaced by his country’s needs. Through visits to Mar-A-Largo, Trump National Golf Club in Bedminster, and Trump Tower, he is able to enjoy fragments of a life he once lived. It will be interesting to see where this evolutionary process will lead Trump. No one is required to say anything about it, but this aspect of Trump is minimized or ignored in reports and commentaries of critics.

Trump’s father, Frederick Trump (left), mother, Mary Anne MacLeod Trump (center), and Trump (right). Trump was inculcated with a strong sense of duty, honor, and country at the New York Military Academy. He proved throughout secondary school that he could perform well consistently both as a student and leader. Given his successful ascent as a cadet, it is hard to imagine that he did not desire to attend the United States Military Academy. However, that would not have been his decision to make. His father clearly had plans for him to work in the family business.

Who Is Watching?

In intelligence services, getting to know what is happening in a country, regarding a particular event or issue requires agents who are in the right place, are articulate, can answer questions, and receive instructions. In Western countries, particularly the US, substantial information is also collected by electronic surveillance, typically obscure, clever ways to collect what is happening over the horizon via satellites and special aircraft from above. Electronic collection, although very costly, has brought many benefits, by allowing for the monitoring of all manner of communications, discovering plans, patterns of activity and locations of targets. Many have grumbled for years in the intelligence industry that increased use of such surveillance and reconnaisance systems has resulted in the disappearance of the sure-fire agent on the ground with his string of spies and informants. When this issue became most apparent in the US in the late 1970s and the 1980s, there were efforts to make adjustments, but it is still posited that human intelligence has taken a back seat in favor of technology.  Illud autem ante omnia memento, demere rebus tumultum ac videre quid in quaque re sit: scies nihil esse in istis terribile nisi ipsum timorem. (Remember, however, before all else, to strip things of all that disturbs and confuses, and to see what each is at bottom; you will then comprehend that they contain nothing fearful except the actual fear.)

When national leaders do not grasp what is happening on an issue and cannot get a handle on a situation in a satisfying way, there is an anxiety, a sense of panic even, that may ensue from lacking intelligence to answer big questions or fill gaps in knowledge, to develop policies, strategies, and nuanced approaches. In some sudden and urgent situations for a country, sources for its intelligence service might be sparse, or nonexistent, and all one might have are bits and pieces from electronic collection, particularly if that capability is rudimentary. When there is no one to approach, When there is nobody present to approach anyone, whatever has been gathered by intelligence professionals from clandestine operations and perhaps electronic collection, may be supplemented and even complemented in the worst case by theories and guesswork. Among the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of many intelligence services of countries of various sizes and power, analytical units will mine through overt sources of intelligence, traditionally newspapers, magazines, books of certain authors, and now websites, blogs, and social media to see what information is out there. That information may also be used to supplement and even complement information that a service already possesses.

Using information from overt sources to confirm things or infer things can be rather dicey as there is no longer assurance that the information is true. Without the means for verifying and confirming whether it is true, intelligence service must proceed with caution. Presently, overt sources can pose nearly as much danger as information that might be dangled before collectors by adversaries. When the wrong information is collected and presented to consumers, things can go terribly wrong. Policy and decision makers demanding intelligence, may not ask or give a cursory look at how and from where the information available was collected. Depending on how bad the situation is, those officials directly advising or supporting key leaders, rather than be palms up due to detected discrepancies, questionable findings, intimations, will pass it along as work product, demonstrating that there some type of understanding of on-going events, some handle on the situation. Consumers receiving that information might be pleased to receive verification of inferred ideas of the leadership. Those inferred ideas, with the support of new data, can often become fact and make its way from consumer to consumer, all the way to the top. In some countries, it has essentially been custom in analytical units of intelligence services covering the US, to use particular sources of intelligence, for example, US newspapers of record, as the New York Times and Washington Post, and watch and listen to NBCNEWS, ABCNEWS, CBS News. on the US. Therein lies the rub.

Then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Pompeo (left) and Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-un (right). Relatively isolated countries can easily become victims of false reports, misleading, politicized commentary. In the current environment, there is much to sift through from overt sources to find the truth. The use of bad information will result in bent intelligence. The consequence of its use, even if slight, could be catastrophic.

Despite an awareness that many reports and commentaries about Trump, particularly from his critics, might be questionable as well as objectionable, and declared by the administration as completely inaccurate, intelligence services in some foreign capitals may not be ready to halt the counterproductive practice of using them. Those intelligence services may not fully understand why US news media houses have surrendered their impartiality in order to proffer negative reports and commentaries about Trump in great volume. They may have observed that critics would be so willing to surrender their credibility in producing reports and commentaries that would be proven wrong in short time. They may have difficulty understanding what would compel critics to attack Trump, speak against his efforts, predict failure, when his successes are successes for the US. They may have discerned that what certain reports and commentaries merely evince a particular political position or preference for a candidate who lost the 2016 Presidential Election, Hillary Clinton, and reject those of the candidate who won, Trump. They may recognize that many critics have behaved figuratively as hammer hoping through relentless pounding to fashion an image of Trump that want the world to see and if possible shape him into what they want him to be. There is said to be a temper of the soul that wants to live in illusion. Still, that alone would not compel most intelligence services to be remiss by continually using suspect information from certain overt sources from the US. A more likely cause for such counterintuitive behavior would be bureaucratic inertia. In nearly every system, there are those who will do their homework, whose trade craft would cause them to do a deeper dive into the information. Raising concerns over such information within some intelligence organizations might be considered blasphemous and those who might suggest there could be issues with standard methods of overt collection may simply be shut down by traditionalist, orthodox voices among bureaucrats who may be managing the intelligence collection process. It would be best to omit information that one does not fully understand. One should not rush to conclusions. Non refert quam multos sed quam bonos habeas. (It is quality rather than quantity that matters.)

A better way to satisfy requirements for collection would be to insist upon and invest time and effort into creating opportunities to meet at some official level with representatives of an adversary or even an ally. It could be done, if necessary, away from the public eye. In such meetings, specific questions could be asked of a foreign counterpart, and information could be provided to ones opposite number to ensure that the genuine position of another government on key matters, not the meditations of pundits or guesswork, would be run through mechanisms for analysis included will prevail in analyses. Depending upon the nature of relations between countries, the relative size of two or more countries, and the urgency or importance of issues between them, direct bilateral or multilateral talks between the most senior officials may not always be possible. For example, one may not officially recognize the sovereignty of another and perhaps visa versa. In the best case for the intelligence services of the respective countries, meetings would be held between senior intelligence officials. There may be the reality that one side may have more power to control the time and place of even such lower level engagements might be an issue for the other side to work through. Still, at whatever level officials might meet, whenever and wherever they might meet, and whether it might be a one shot opportunity, they must come prepared to collect enough information through well-crafted questions, keen listening to words, and skilled observations of behavior to satisfy intelligence requirements and prepare the best possible product for consumers. Interestingly, questions asked also can serve the purpose of informing the other side what one already knows, what one does not know, and what is most important. Questions serve as a curious form of sharing as much as collecting.

Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea Kim Yong-chul with his interpreter. (left), Trump (center), and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (right). For the North Koreans, having the chance to get to know Trump and Pompeo, and learning what thinking in the administration was directly from them was both edifying and important. What the North Koreans learned was certainly far more informative than what their intelligence services may have been gleaned in the abstract from US news media sources and free wielding comments of experts in conferences and interviews.

The US News Media and Trump Critics: Caveat Emptor

The modality of the attacks on Trump from the news media catches the eye. It appears to exceed what few years earlier would have been considered impossible. The media never admired Trump. More seasoned, balanced, critics, have produced reports and commentary explaining that lots of things should be done, omitted, changed, and corrected by Trump. However, many other critics better skilled in “inpleasantry” than bon mot, have deemed Trump unfit for the presidency even before his election victory. The words “not presidential” were heard every time Trump spoke. Efforts by Trump of any kind would elicit a range of reactions by those engaged in the broad, piquant, counter-Trump discourse. (In 2017, greatcharlie frequently used the term, “counter-Trump milieu”, but alas, it failed to gain traction in the foreign policy debate.) There are other critics who apparently have found nothing desirable and everything loathsome about Trump. Trump’s efforts are explained as a cunning deceit, a dark tragedy. He is characterized as just another seductive tyrant, a demagogue. It could be said the US news media has not covered Trump as much as it has attached itself to him. They walk alongside him in order to discomfort and discourage him, increase the power of the blows against him. In the aggregate, they do not want Trump to feel a sense of serenity, calmness, quietness, peace and joy as president for one moment. Apparently, they want Trump to feel a deep-seated frustration, anxiety, worry.  They seem determined to throw Trump into loneliness and pain. Their hope for glory in attacking and defeating Trump walks hand in hand with their own doom for they live in the same country, the civilization that Trump is trying to improve. Ars prima regni est posse invidiam pati. (‘Tis the first art of kings, the power to suffer hate.)

Many critics are at a point in which they simply reject possibilities without hearing others. They rely upon self-serving explanations and surmisal. Critics see their efforts as righteousness, and they see far greater moral authority in themselves than in Trump. Critics analyses of history, of what was spposedly better, is nostalgia at best, myth at worst. Previous administrations would languish in the halls of inaction on a policy issue. They seemed to gain some satisfaction by merely moving from office to office, from conference room to conference room, from building to building, writing one memorandum after another, and declaring that in itself was action. Trump would admit that some mistakes have been made and a number of situations could have been handled differently, particularly on the domestic front. However, Trump has learned lessons. Modifications have been made in the way he makes statements and approaches situations. Nevertheless, critics reject the notion that he has evolved at all, and argue that he will never change. Lacking faith in the president, they surrender all hope that he could accomplish anything good for the US. While one might normally expect some change in behavior or conciliatory attitude from critics as time passes, their civility only seems recede further. There is a Hebrew term, küwl (cool), which means to sustain a hardship, to maintain ones balance in spite of what is happening. Trump has sought to avoid having a wounded spirit, powering away from despair and disappointment. Initially, Trump, in reaction to some critics, would “imitate the action of the tiger, stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, disguise fair nature with hard favor’d rage.” Trump has since become more selective as to when and to whom he will direct his disagreement. Few men could display true sangfroid if stress were assailing them as it has Trump. Some religious leaders would explain that a trial can present an opportunity to persevere under pressure. Moreover, one can grow in the midst of conflict.

Some Discerning Leaders Can Distinguish Perception from Reality Re Trump

Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.) Political and social pressures to conform to a counter-Trump outlook appear to exist in capitals worldwide. However, for any country, relations with the US are too important to allow ties to be damaged by behavior and attitudes displayed by leaders with a skewed understanding of realities about Trump.  As posited here, it would be very easy for intelligence service to provide information with a counter-Trump bent to their leaders thus creating that situation. Perhaps a decision to embrace such information would be the fact that it confirmed individual biases or prejudices those leaders might have about Trump. Many leaders who initially chose to take a stance hostile to Trump recognized that they had done a great disservice to the people and interests of their country. They subtracted such negative thinking and changed their approach to him. Others learned lessons from leaders taking a wrongful counter-Trump tact, and allowed themselves the opportunity to draw their own conclusions about him through direct contacts.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) and a Trump (right). After meetings in Washington with Trump from March 17, 2017 to March 18, 2017, Merkel made the harsh comment that Trump was not a reliable partner Germany and the Continent could depend upon. Her comments expressed her angst. Merkel was personally disappointed that Trump initially declined to publicly endorse NATO’s doctrine of collective defense, or agree to common European positions on global trade, dealing with Russian aggression, and mitigating the effects of climate change.

1. German Chancellor Angela Merkel

Following meetings in Washington with Trump from March 17, 2017 to March 18, 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hailed as Europe’s most influential leader, made the stunning comment that US President Donald Trump is not the reliable partner her country and the Continent can depend upon. She was quoted in a May 28, 2017 New York Times article as stating: “The times in which we could rely fully on others — they are somewhat over,” adding, “This is what I experienced in the last few days.” Merkel went on to state: “We have to know that we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.” Her strong comments represented a potentially seismic shift in trans-Atlantic relations, as she has concluded without reservation that the US is now less willing to intervene overseas. The Times article explains that Merkel was personally disappointed that Trump declined to publicly endorse NATO’s doctrine of collective defense or to agree to common European positions on global trade, dealing with Russian aggression or mitigating the effects of climate change. Merkel’s comments were truly an expression of angst. Her words would lead one to believe that the current period, rather than being of change, and reinvigoration, is languid and dissolute. Yet, as a result of her statement, she may have also stirred concerns in the capitals of other NATO countries over how they will defend themselves against their most likely opponent, Russia, and handle other matters, without the US.

However, at some point after the meeting, Merkel likely recognized that she needed to take inventory of what had transpired so far with the US. She needed to stop moving the relationship in a negative direction.  From what Merkel said after her initial contacts with Trump, it was clear that Merkel felt some personal struggle with him. That was very troubling. Merkel’s responsibilities in meeting Trump was not to express her personal feelings about him. The genuine job at hand for the Chancellor was to do what best served the interest of the German people. Berlin needed to reorient Merkel on the matter. At stake was the relationship of Germany, and to an extent Europe, with the Trump administration. Berlin needed to find ways for Merkel to better respond and engage her country’s most powerful ally and cope with the Trump administration’s approach to policy matters concerning Europe. German policymakers, foreign policy analysts, and diplomats had to find answers. Resources needed to be diverted to that end. Cuiusvis est errare nullius nisi insipientes, in error perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.)

Things changed. While campaigning for her fourth term in office, Merkel stated on August 23, 2017 that Trump must be shown appropriate respect for holding the office of the US president, even if she may differ with him greatly on some policy issues. Merkel, a Trump critic, left no doubt that she was committed transatlantic relationship, and stressed the strength of German relations with the US. The statement was a rebuff to pressure from her Social Democratic Party rivals to resist demands by Trump for NATO members to increase their defense spending. Merkel explained during an interview with the German business daily Handelsblatt: “If you take the president of the United States, whatever differences of opinion there may be, I know he prevailed in a tough election. It wasn’t reserved for him on a silver platter.” She went on to state: “In the end, he won the election under American electoral law and that means he is democratically elected and that this person should be shown the appropriate respect, regardless of how I assess his views.” Merkel did what many US political opponents and allies, friends–full-time and part-time, former US officials, journalists, analysts, and other among his critics refuse to do or at least have not done well. Merkel apparently took inventory, reviewed what had transpired, and reconsidered the direction she wanted her public comments about Trump to take. During her three-hour visit to the White House on April 27, 2018, her exchanges with Trump were very cordial. Merkel discussed but did not emphasize her differences with Trump on steel and aluminium tariffs and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In a joint press conference afterward, they stressed the long-time ties between the US and Germany and the shared goal of a denuclearized North Korea. Trump now insists that he and Merkel have “a great relationship.”

Merkel apparently took inventory, reviewed what had transpired in March 2017, and reconsidered the direction she, as German Chancellor, wanted her interactions with Trump to take. During her three-hour visit to the White House on April 27, 2018, her exchanges with Trump were very cordial. Merkel discussed but did not emphasize her differences with Trump on steel and aluminium tariffs and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In a joint press conference afterward, both stressed the long-time ties between the US and Germany.

2. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari

Some foreign leaders from the get-go fully understand that their focus during meeting with Trump should be their countries’ interests and relating well with the US President. They should not be prompted by the news media to speak or behave in ways that would aid its narrow interest in grabbing headlines to promote readership and viewership, and to fill advertising space and increase their profits. On April 30, 2018, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari had the opportunity to visit Trump at the White House to discuss urgent and important issues concerning his country. Buhari was the first sub-Saharan African leader to be invited for talks with the Trump administration. Trump and Buhari agreed that fighting terrorism is a priority for both administrations. The US sold 12 counterinsurgency aircraft worth $496 million to Nigeria to help in its fight against Boko Haram jihadist insurgents, despite previous refusing to approve the sale due to human rights concerns. Trump let Buhari know that he wanted Nigeria to remove trade barriers and allow imports of US agricultural produce. What was not discussed were disparaging remarks Trump allegedly made concerning African countries on January 11, 2018.

However, when Trump and Buhari held a joint press conference in the White House Rose Garden, the Nigerian President was asked about Trump’s alleged complaints about immigrants coming to the US from Haiti, El Salvador and some African nations. Buhari was very aware of problems between the news media and Trump and aware more so of his duty to serve Nigeria’s interests. He astutely replied: “I’m not sure about, you know, the validity of whether that allegation against the president is true or not.” He added: “So the best thing for me is to keep quiet.

When Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari (left) and Trump (right) met on April 30, 2018, terrorism, human rights, and trade were on the agenda. In a joint press conference, however, reporters asked Buhari about Trump’s alleged complaints about African immigrants. Aware of problems between the news media and Trump and aware of his duty to serve Nigeria’s interests. Buhari astutely replied: “I’m not sure about, you know, the validity of whether that allegation against the president is true or not.” He added: “So the best thing for me is to keep quiet.”

3. French President Emmanuel Macron

When French President Emmanuel Macron visited the US from April 24, 2018 to April 25, 2018, he came with the purpose to bridge differences over the Iran nuclear agreement, encourage Trump not to withdraw so fast from Syria, exempt European countries from then prospective US steel and aluminum tariffs, and discuss the Paris Agreement on climate change and global warming. Indeed, Macron told Trump that France recognized the need for the US and France to work together to defeat terrorism, curtail weapons of mass destruction in North Korea and Iran, and act together on behalf of the planet. At the same time, Macron emphasized the importance of the Franco-American relationship, the commitment and the bond between the two countries, its historic importance and importance for both countries and world into the future.

Trump had already enjoyed very positive interactions with Macron. Trump was Macron’s guest in July 2017 at the annual Bastille Day military parade in Paris. During the visit, Macron and his wife, Brigitte, took Trump and his wife on a tour of Napoleon’s tomb and the Eiffel Tower where they had dinner while overlooking the City of Light. Trump reciprocated during Macron’s visit to Washington with a welcoming ceremony filled with pageantry and ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, that included a 21-gun salute. Macron presented Trump with a thoughtful gift of a tree sampling from ”Devil Dog” fountain at Belleau Wood, where US Marines fought a deadly battle from June 1, 2018 to June 24, 1918, to repel a push by German forces toward Paris during World War I. Devil Dog fountain was a rally point for surviving Marines after they defeated the Germans. The Marines suffered nearly 10,000 casualties. Before an audience of US military personnel and Cabinet officials, Trump explained that the relationship he forged with Macron at the start of his presidency was a testament to the “enduring friendship that binds our two nations.” He thanked the French leader for his “steadfast partnership” in the recent missile strike in response to the chemical attack in Syria. Trump went on to state, “It’s an honor to call you my friend.” He predicted that Macron would be a historic leader of France. In a jovial mood in the Oval Office, Trump displayed some personal chemistry with Macron by feigning to brush off Macron’s suit jacket and saying, “We have a very special relationship; in fact, I’ll get that little piece of dandruff off. We have to make him perfect — he is perfect.” During a toast at a formal state dinner, Trump mentioned the ties between the US and France, saying, “May our friendship grow even deeper, may our kinship grow even stronger and may our sacred liberty never die.”

The next day, at a joint press conference, Macron focused on the relationship between the US and France, Macron said, “History is calling us. It is urging our people to find the fortitude that has guided us in the most difficult of times. France and with it, Europe, and the United States have an appointment with history.” However, through a translator, Macron again got down to business, stating: “Mr. President, please allow me to go back to a number of issues, which are fundamental for not only our relationship, but beyond. The first topic is Iran. You said once again, in front of the press, what your position was during the campaign and as well as the President of the United States.  It’s not a mystery we did not have the same starting positions or stances, and neither you nor I have a habit of changing our stances or going with the wind.” On his last day in Washington, Macron, in flawless English, addressed the US Congress. Although Macron spoke critically to an even greater degree of a number of Trump’s foreign policy, trade and environmental decisions, he did so in a well-considered, methodical way, always leaving real hope that at some point a meeting of minds could be reached.

Critics put off by the congenial interaction between Trump and Macron. Their friendship was derided as “Le Bromance” and critics groaned that there were “exaggerated handshakes and a pair of kisses.” Macron was referred to as a “Trump whisperer” because he converses with Trump often by telephone. Critics seemed to find solace in the belief that Trump’s relationships with other European leaders are more strained. While the idea emphasized, it is not necessarily the case. Critics also noted that Trump ended his first year in office without receiving a foreign leader on a state visit, the first president in nearly 100 years to fail to do so.

French President Emmanuel Macron (left) and Trump (right) When Macron visited the US from April 24, 2018 to April 25, 2018, he hoped to bridge differences with Trump over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, encourage him not to leave quickly from Syria, prevent prospective US steel and aluminum tariffs on European countries, and make headway with Trump on the Paris Agreement on climate change. Macron spoke critically on a number of Trump’s foreign policy, trade and environmental decisions, but did so in a thoughtful way. He also emphasized the importance of the Franco-American relationship and his friendship with Trump.

The Way Forward

In Act I, scene iii, of William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth, Generals Macbeth and Banquo have already defeated the invading armies of Ireland and Norway. As they cross a moor together, they encounter three witches. The witches hail Macbeth as thane of Glamis–his original title–and as thane of Cawdor. The witches also declare that Macbeth will be king one day. They call Banquo “lesser than Macbeth, and greater,” and “not so happy, yet much happier”; then they proffer that he will never be king but his children will sit upon the throne. Once the witches vanish, Macbeth and Banquo stand baffled and speak skeptically of their prophecies. However, two of King Duncan’s men, arrive. One tells Macbeth that the king has made him thane of Cawdor as the witches prophesized. While Macbeth is intrigued that the witches words came true, Banquo warns: “That trusted home Might yet enkindle you unto the crown, Besides the thane of Cawdor But ’tis strange: And oftentimes, to win us to our harm, The instruments of darkness tell us truths, Win us with honest trifles, to betray’s In deepest consequence.” The agendas of foreign governments are usually single-minded. They will try to push the US to use its wherewithal and capabilities in a way that favors their countries positions. Some national leaders have projected a sense of apprehension about approaching Trump to improve their countries’ conditions, enhance military, diplomatic, political situations, or at least maintain the status quo. Some partners, much as competitors, have pushed hard with their respective agendas with the US from a counter-Trump perspective. Both the impetus and confirmation of their thoughts, words, and deeds can usually be sourced from reports and commentaries of Trump’s critics. Naturally, discord has obtained as a consequence of taking such an ill-considered tack. Critics have painted a portrait of Trump, and through it, a personality of Trump is conveyed, but it has always been their version of him and it has never been complimentary. They see no style, grace, creativity or intellect in the ways in which he has addressed foreign policy issues. They insist that a dictatorial mayhem exists in the Trump administration and only the worst foreign policy decisions could possibly flow from it. As explained here, one route such thinking from critics can travel to national leaders is through their countries’ intelligence services. Those services might be willing to allow intelligence reports to be colored with information from overt US sources produced by critics openly hostile toward Trump. That information, in turn, would confirm leader negative views of him. That information could “betray with deepest consequence.”.

Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is, in reality, nothing so mysterious about Trump that should lead any national leader to throw a history of good relations with the US out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Trump’s critics will destroy any opportunity for a new, better, enriching path to develop. Those leaders must consider what their respective countries relationships with the US mean not only on one issue, but in the bigger picture. They should consider what the US really offers. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the US, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover that Trump, in doing things a bit differently, presents possibilities for getting many new, better things done. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the US and become their country’s dénouement concerning Trump. They can still recurvate. Changes on one issue could result in great benefits on another. Sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum, securum; etiam si quid obstat, nubium modo intervenit, quae infra feruntur nec umquam diem vincunt. (Virtue alone affords everlasting and peace-giving joy; even if some obstacle arise, it is but like an intervening cloud, which floats beneath the sun but never prevails against it.)

Commentary: Trump-Kim Talks: Will Desire Obey Reason or Will Force Be Used to Overcome Force?

The Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un (above). When US President Donald Trump and Kim meet, hopefully their conversation will be positive, but an uncongenial exchange is possible, the portent of which may be war, made more horrible by nuclear weapons. Sangfroid, skilled diplomacy, and adjustments in thinking on both sides will be required if a sustainable agreement is to be reached. Trump has allowed Kim room to think it through. He must make the right choice.

On March 8, 2018, it was announced by the US and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), independently, that talks would be arranged between US President Donald Trump and the Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un. The decision was precipitated by efforts of the government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in to end rather bellicose verbiage and repeated muscle flexing by the US, Japan, and his country as well, itself, and halt weapons testing by North Korea. The meeting between Trump and Kim would be the first time leaders of the two countries have ever met. Since the end of the Korean War, previous US administrations had no interest at all in the idea. Indeed, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has remained tense since the end of Korean War during which the US along with forces of the UN fought to eject the forces of North Korea, China, and Soviet Union (who were operating covertly), from sovereign South Korean territory. The very bloody fighting was halted by a July 27, 1953 armistice that established a roughly 160 mile long, 2.5 miles wide, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the 38th Parallel. For 65 years, tens of thousands of troops on both sides of the DMZ have remained heavily armed and on alert in a stand-off. There have been hot and cold periods in relations between the former warring parties. Violent incidents have occurred between them on the ground and in the waters around in the Korean Peninsula. Yet, the armistice has held. While it is hoped that the talks between Trump and Kim will go well, uncongenial talks between them is a real possibility, the portent of which may be a new war, made more horrible, more destructive, by nuclear weapons. Sangfroid, skilled diplomacy, and some big adjustments in thinking on both sides will be required if a new sustainable agreement to end the extremely dangerous situation is to be reached. Here are a few considerations and an outlinng of some elements that may contribute to the forging of such an agreement.

As it was noted in the August 15, 2017 greatcharlie post entitled, “Trump Has Spoken, the Ball Is in Kim Jong-un’s Court, But This Is Not a Game!”, the Trump administration has tried to be reasonable with North Korea. Recall that Trump, with a positive mindset, tried to reach out to Kim. He tried to see the world through King Jong-un’s lens. Trump publicly expressed the view that it must have been difficult for Kim to take on so much responsibility at a relatively early age following his father, Kim Jong-Il. Trump even suggested then that he would be willing to meet with Kim to communicate head to head, brain to brain. A resolution might have been crafted from Kim’s elaborations on what troubles him. It was a sincere search for common ground. Kim did not budge in Trump’s direction. Rather, Trump was with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in Florida on February 11, 2017 when the North Korea fired an intermediate range missile into the Sea of Japan. It became clear that efforts with North Korea have simply become a struggle against the inevitable. Trump had also urged China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to assist in reducing tensions by talking frankly with Pyongyang.  The administration’s contact with China has resulted in a degree of solidarity from it. In August 2017, China voted to place sanctions against North Korean under UN Security Council Resolution 2371. Those sanctions limited North Korean exports of coal, iron, lead, and seafood. Restrictions were placed North Korea’s Trade Bank and prohibited any increase in the number if North Koreans citizens working in other countries. However, that effort initially did not seem to do much to stop Kim. Advancements made by North Korea and an escalation in provocations continued. To get even tougher on North Korea, in September 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2375 was passed, limiting North Korea restricting North Korean crude oil and refined petroleum product imports, banned joint ventures, textile exports, natural gas condensate, and liquid imports, and banned North Koreans citizens from working in other countries. The administration intensified a “maximum pressure” campaign on Kim’s regime and its supporters, increasing military exercises in coordination with South Korea and Japan, deploying missile defense systems in South Korea with urgency, sending more firepower there, and encouraging Congress to enact the strongest sanctions possible against North Korea and its enablers. Eventually, in February 2018, the US imposed a raft of sanctions in an effort to target entities linked to North Korea’s shipping and trade sectors. Those entities included one individual, 27 shipping companies, and 28 vessels  Through such harsh economic sanctions, and the much needed, and very helpful cooperation from China and the Russian Federation, albeit with some reluctance, the entire matter has reached this point.

Trump’s Thinking on North Korea and Talks

In utrumque paratus. (Prepared for either alternative.) Trump has made a number of statements concerning North Korea. However, the best source for understanding his positions on Kim and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs before the talks is perhaps his remarks before the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017. In his remarks, Trump explained that North Korea was a member of a small group of rogue regimes that represented “the scourge of our planet today.” Noting what those countries had in common, he explained that they violated every principle on which the UN is based. He added, “They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries.” Trump declared that North Korea was perhaps the worst aming them, being responsible for the starvation deaths of millions of its citizens and for the imprisonment, torture, killing, and oppression of countless more. Trump reminded that there were a number of very public displays of its outrageous behavior to include the mistreatment of University of Virginia college student Otto Wambier who died only a few days after being returned to the US; the assassination of Kim’s brother with banned nerve agents in an Indonesian international airport; and, the kidnapping of a 13-year-old Japanese girl from a beach in her own country to enslave her as a language tutor for North Korea’s spies. Trump explained that North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was a manifestation of the same depraved mental attitude Kim evinced through his violent acts against foreign visitors, his family members, and citizens on the sovereign territory of their own countries. His work on nuclear weapons and missiles threatened the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life. Trump pointed to the fact that some countries not only trade with North Korea, but arm, supply, and financially support it. Trump insisted that it was not in the interest of any country to see North Korea arm itself with nuclear weapons and missiles. Trump indicated that he felt Kim was “on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”  He declared: “It is time for North Korea to realize that the denuclearization is its only acceptable future.” Trump closed his remarks concerning North Korea by reminding that the US “has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” He added: “The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will not be necessary. “

While his comments at the UN were somewhat severe, Trump has indicated that there is room for a degree of flexibility in his thinking by the mere fact that he has agreed to meet with Kim. More apparently, since those remarks were made, Trump has not launched an attack on North Korea to destroy its nuclear weapons and missile programs most likely hoping Kim can reach an understanding on his own of the dangerous situation in which he has put his country or that the maximum pressure campaign would eventually breakdown the ability of his regime to function because his activities would prove absolutely unprofitable. For the moment, Trump has elected to “give peace a chance.” Time will tell how long he will allow that window of opportunity for North Korea to remain open.

Kim’s Concept on the US and Talks

The emotional response of the North Korean people toward Kim, a near religious belief in him, is similar to that which they held for his father, Kim Jong-il, and his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, before. The people’s fervor for Kim is at the foundation of opinions and actions formulated and implemented by the government in Pyongyang. Anything that could be considered reasonable must flow from Kim’s ruminations, meditations, concepts, ideals, and intentions. Contrary to practices in Western governments, reason and knowledge have little place. Kim’s intuitive, visceral thinking is cherished. As greatcharlie has emphasized in previous posts, wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. However in North Korea, questioning, or worse, challenging a position or notion of the Kim will end badly: imprisonment or death. Given their acceptance of the reality created for them, North Koreans see Trump as a danger, and threat he poses is part of larger picture of the US, a capitalist adversary, seeking conquest, attempting to subordinate their smaller nation. They see Kim as defending them from Trump, from the US threat. They accept that Kim, their Great Leader, has built up the North Korean nuclear arsenal to a level that has given their countrt the capability and capacity to strike the powerful US. Kim’s father and grandfather were unable to achieve that. Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia proprium, semper incipit vivere. (Among other evils, folly has also this special characteristic: it is always beginning to live.)

What the world is hearing from North Korea since the talks were announced is a new Kim whose approach does not emphasize the need to challenge the US with force. North Korea’s official news organization, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), in a March 20, 2018 commentary reported that its country’s “proactive measure and peace-loving proposal” have caused a “dramatic atmosphere for reconciliation” to be “created in relations between the North and the South of Korea, and that there has been a sign of change also in the DPRK-U.S. relations.” KCNA further noted that North Korea had begun a “dialogue peace offensive.” To that extent, it explained: “The great change in the North-South relations is not an accidental one but a noble fruition made thanks to the DPRK’s proactive measure, warm compatriotism and will for defending peace.” KCNA also proffered: “Such an event as today could be possible as the DPRK’s dignity has remarkably risen and it has strong might.” The KCNA commentary strongly criticized current and former officials and experts in the US and Japan, as well as conservatives in South Korea, for claiming Pyongyang was pushed into a corner by sanctions. The commentary responded harshly to calls for sustained pressure on North Korea and to skepticism voice that suggests its “peaceful approach” is a ploy intended to gain time or drive a wedge between the US and South Korea. Additionally, KCNA declared: “The economy of the DPRK is rising,” and added, advances in science and technology around the country are “promising the bright future for the improvement of the people’s living standard.” It emphasized: “The dialogue peace offensive of the DPRK is an expression of self-confidence as it has acquired everything it desires.” Lastly,  KCNA called on all parties involved to act with “prudence, self-control and patience.” North Korea, since agreeing to meeting with Trump has gone a step further by scheduling a meeting between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in for April 27, 2018. While North Korea would have the world believe that a “new Kim” and new North Korea have emerged, one must never forget that Kim is the steward of a tyrannical government, and make no mistake, he rules with an iron fist. The North Korean people live under conditions that no one anywhere would envy. They only know the outside world through Kim’s lies, his deceptions. Only one who might be susceptible to gossamer fantasies could be seduced by Kim’s expedient “charm offensive” to support his supposed position on denuclearization. There is nothing that would lead any reasonable individual to be believe that Kim has a genuine interest in changing his thinking. North Korea has not moved beyond being the moral slum that it was when it emerged from the wreckage of World War II. Truthful assessments expressed in the West about North Korea’s broken society lhave mostly been looked upon by that country’s policy analysts and scholars with bewilderment. Not knowing why anyone would say there was anything wrong with their world, they typically chalk it up to a type of abstruse indignation. Among the more obedient, zealous government officials and other elites, such Western assessments are viewed as a manifestation of arrogance of Western powers which insist that any society or system not designed or created under their philosophies is subordinate in every way. 

What Baker’s Building Blocks Might Require

The building blocks for diplomatic talks and negotiations were well-outlined by former US Secretary of State James Baker over a decade ago. The renowned US statesman explained that his building blocks work well when properly applied through solid preparation, doing ones homework. Included among the building blocks were: 1) Understanding an opponent’s position; 2) Gaining trust through personal relationships; 3) Reciprocal confidence building; 4) Taking a pragmatic approach that does not sacrifice principles; 5) Being aware of timing; and 6) Maintaining a deep respect for the politics of the situation.

1. Understanding an opponent’s position

Amat victoria curam. (Victory favors those who take pains.) For negotiators, much as commanders on a battlefield, a full awareness of the situation is the first step in ensuring that once in contact with an opponent, one will be better prepared to cope with common contingencies as well as the unexpected, the reasonable “what ifs” that may arise. To that extent, the opposite party to talks as much as an opposing commander must be given his due. It must be accepted that he seeks success, and will take creative steps or may act in an unexpected manner, to accomplish that. For a smaller or weaker party or force, the aim would be to overcome the odds that are against them. 

For Trump, the goal of talks would be to initiate a process from which a sustainable agreement to halt North Korea nuclear testing, weapons development, and missile development can be reached. If the matter of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs is to be decided through diplomacy, reaching such an agreement is a immutable goal for Trump. He must be able to safeguard the safety and security of the US, the safety and security of US military forces and US interests in Asia and the Pacific, and the safety and security of US Allies and their interests in the region. However, Trump will not come to the table using some playbook to which he will adhere rigidly.North Korea can rest assured that Trump will come to talks well-informed and well-prepared to deal with Kim. Moreover, with Trump, Kim will face a US leader with an aptitude to find value in all of the information made available to him even at the negotiating table. He will use what he hears to find an opening in a position or argument or beginning planning future actions. Available information also allows Trump to develop thoughts about his opponents likely moves in advance. He studies how his opponent thinks. 

Kim likely hopes that the talks and negotiation process will result in the elimination of the longstanding policy that had the US provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea and Japan, safeguarding them from nuclear attack by promising a nuclear response. Kim would also hope to severely limit, or at best, eliminate annual joint military exercises by the US, South Korea, and Japan. Through other efforts,  such as bilateral talks, Kim hopes to severely weaken, or at best, break the decades long security linkages between US, South Korea, and Japan. If Kim arrives at the table unwilling to discuss his nuclear weapons and missile programs and attempts to give a history lecture or offers positions on denuclearization and unification filled with political hyperbole supportive of the self-inflicted false reality North Korea has lived in for decades, there will be little chance of successful talks. A pragmatic, succinct discussion of the matter at hand will be the only way to move the discussion forward and reach any agreement. It is important for Pyongyang to keep that in mind. 

2. Gaining Trust through Personal Relationships

Trump and Kim have neither met nor have had any interaction by telephone. There is no degree of trust between them that would allow a relaxed exploration of territory outside their formal negotiating positions, nonetheless their assumptions, strategies, and even fears. Both have been working from reports in the abstract that presented observations and analyses of others about each other. For diplomats, positive personal relationships can be fostered by joint efforts in ordinary circumstances. However, only so much could ever have been hope for in terms of building personal relationships between US diplomats and fully indoctrinated North Korean officials. The development of such relations, would certainly be frowned upon by North Korea security elements as turning away from their country’s revolutionary ideals, a loss of patriotic zeal and faith in the Great Leader: in other words, treason. To the extent that Trump and Kim can reach agreements on smaller, common issues, there may be hope that they be able to broach larger ones. Reaching agreements on those smaller issues at an early stage, quickly, reasonably, and amicably, would represent the beginning of a constructive dialogue, which is one of the most important aspects of negotiations. Reaching an agreement on the site of the talks is a relatively small step that could begin the exchange between leaders.

There would be some common requirements insisted upon by protective security elements of the US and North Korea regarding a meeting site. A small sample of those likely required would be: the full consent and support from the leadership of a host country to hold the meeting in their country; the confirmed capability and capacity of security elements of the host country to provide granular security needs, and coordinate with and complement with security units, the efforts of US and North Korean protective security elements if it is anywhere other than the US or North Korea; acceptable facilities for transport of leaders of officials to and from the host country, appropriate accommodations to support leaders and officials traveling to the meeting, an appropriate sized and secure meeting site, whether a official office, hotel, official or historic residence, or some other facility that would appropriately meet the requirements for the meeting. These and other standard requirements must exist if a site even to be considered. Short lists for a meeting site created by both countries might include: the Demilitarized Zone between South Korea and North Korea; Pyongyang,in North Korea; Washington, D.C. in the US; Hawaii in the US; Stockholm or elsewhere in Sweden; Oslo or elsewhere in Norway; Copenhagenor elsewhere in Denmark; Helsinki or elsewhere in Finland; Geneva or elsewhere in Switzerland; Paris or elsewhere in France; Berlin or elsewhere in Germany; Rome or elsewhere in Italy; Beijing or elsewhere in China; Seoul or elsewhere in South Korea; Tokyo or elsewhere in Japan; Manila or elsewhere in the Philippines; Saipan Island in the Pacific; and, Wake Island in the Pacific. Every prospective site would need to meet the basic requirements for security. However, each has some political or emotional significance to both countries that might be an asset or liability to it in the selection process.

Regarding Stockholm, Sweden hosts the US interest section in its Embassy in Pyongyang and as has negotiated as a back channel between the US and North Korea on the release of Otto Wambier and has aided efforts concerning three US citizens now being held in North Korea. However, the matters involved is a presidential summit are different. The Swedish back channel should not be mixed up in the development of a new channel at the presidential level on nuclear weapons. Geneva, as a European site, might have value as a neutral site. It has been the site for the hashing out of issues and the crafting of many agreements in the years since World War II. The biggest issue might be distance for Kim. He might sense he too far away from his center of power. To rule with an iron fist, he must remain relatively close to home and keep his ear to the ground to detect even the slightest “revolutionary movements” by so-called reactionaries. While he has travel as recently as March 2018 to China, hidden adversarial elements could potentially see his scheduled absence as an opportunity to act against him. North Korean officials might also have concerns that most European countries that would qualify to host the summit are not only economic partners, but military allies of the US and willing to support US interests. The DMZ has traditionally been a site for talks between US and North Korean senior military officials since the end of the war. The South Korean President and North Korea’s Kim will meet there in April 2018. As South Korea and North Korea are engaged in separate talks, the issues of the Trump-Kim presidential summit should not be blended with that effort. Further, as the site for the first summit meeting between the US and North Korean leaders it may not be of appropriate stature as it evokes immediate memories of a past war and that may not be conducive to generating forward thinking to reach a sustainable, peace agreement agreement. Traveling to South Korea, away from the DMZ, would be fine for the US, but problematic for the North Koreans who would view Kim’s visit as a loss of dignity, and surrender to the notion that the South is the greater and the true Korea.  Pyongyang would certainly satisfy North Korea, but it might be deemed inappropriate to have a sitting US President visit there. Pyongyang much as the DMZ brings the past war to immediate perception and evokes the memory of United Kingdom Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier traveling to Germany for the disastrous Munich Meeting of September 1938. Trump would likely consider any similarity to that as anathema. For Kim, traveling to Washington, DC would be unacceptable in a similar way. Going there would not be felt as an act of peace, but politically and emotionally, an act of submission to Western authority and power. A meeting in Hawaii would evoke negative memories of the infamous surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Schofield Barracks, and Hickam Field on December 7, 1941. It may likely heighten the idea that handling a rogue threat to the US with nuclear weapons must not languish in talks but be dealt with swiftly and decisively. Beijing or elsewhere in China would unlikely be a desired choice by the US. China, with some coaxing by the US, has put tremendous pressure of North Korea with regard to it nuclear weapons development and missile development. Yet, China remains a political, economic, and military ally of North Korea, not a neutral party to events. In a similar way, Japan and the Philippines are allies of the US, likely obviating the possibility that Tokyo or Manila or any other site in those countries would satisfy North Korea. Japan has more than once faced the threat of North Korean missiles test fired in its direction. Japan might acquiesce to a US request if asked to host the summit, but the decision might cause some domestic political strains. In the Pacific, Saipan Island, might be a possibility. It was the site of a tragic battle between US and imperial Japanese forces during World War II. While remote, it should be close enough to North Korea that Kim would have less anxiety about traveling there for a day by air or sea. However, the North Koreans might view it as a negative given that it is a US Commonwealth and its the history of being a staging area for US covert intelligence operations in North Korea during the Korean War. Wake Island was the site of the historical October 15, 1950 meeting between US President Harry Truman and US Army General Douglas MacArthur on the status of the fighting in Korea and reaching some agreement on its course. It was also the site of a tragic battle between US and imperial Japanese forces during World War II. Much like Saipan, it would be close enough to North Korea that Kim should have less anxiety about traveling there for a day by air or sea. Unlike Saipan, Wake Island is an unincorporated US territory. Still, Wake Island is controlled by the US Army and the US Air Force which might make it undesirable to the North Koreans. Although all of these considerations could remove these cities and countries from consideration as a site for the summit, there is always the strong likelihood, that certain inconveniences will be tolerated by the US or North Korea and one of them will be selected. Reaching a common point of agreement on the site of the talks in a positive fashion might also serve to set the tone for the talks.

One site that may be a long shot, and may not be on the list of either US or North Korea, but certainly worthy of consideration is Mongolia. Mongolia has relatively positive relations with both the US and North Korea. Although Mongolia is bordered solely by the Russian Federation and China, Mongolia has described the US as its most important “third neighbor.” Currently, targeted US assistance has promoted good governance and the rule of law; helped to nurture a new generation of democratic leaders; invigorated private sector-led growth, economic diversification, and long-term capital investment; and mitigated transnational criminal activity, to include human trafficking, and reduced domestic violence, US training and equipment has supported the professionalization of Mongolia’s defense forces and their continued support for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Because of Mongolia’s long and highly porous borders. The US has also assisted Mongolia with its nonproliferation activities. The US and Mongolia have signed a Bilateral Transparency Agreement, an Investment Incentive Agreement, a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. US President George Bush visited Mongolia in November 2005 became the first US President to do so. Mongolian Presidents have visited the US on several occasions. They have also visited North Korea. Mongolia has injected itself in critical matters in Northeast Asia as the abduction issue between Japan and North Korea. It has urged North Korea to consider emulating its post-Cold War transition model, and uphold rule of law and respect human rights of its citizens. North Korea has sought Mongolia’s help in modernizing its economy and industries. Mongolia has invested in North Korea’s oil industry, reached agreements for 5000 North Korean workers to come to Mongolia. Beyond political and economic issues, an intriguing link between Mongolians and North Koreans are “unique ties of blood”. Reportedly, Koreans and Mongolians ethnically belong to the Altaic language family. Many Korean clans are believed to have come from eastern Mongolia. According to some experts, those ties encourage both countries with each other with mutual respect and understand in way unavailable, with the ostensible exception, mutatis mutandis, with South Korea. The most likely location for the meeting in Mongolia would be Ulan Bator, the capital. Certainly, Mongolia can meet basic security requirements. It is close enough for Kim to travel, either by air or by ground in a day.

3. Reciprocal Confidence Building.

Before any talks occur or follow-on negotiations between the two countries begin, there are certain mutual understandings that must exist between the US and North Korea. There must be mutual respect shown and understanding given to participants and positions expressed in negotiations. To that extent, use of respectful language in addressing issues public to support congenial relations and  promote increased exchanges. This has been a considerable problem to date, and some governance must be placed on public verbiage. No precondition of creating parity in status as powers as talks or negotiations begin. There is no need to create a faux levelling of the playing field established, whereas the negotiations could be described as an “exchange between equals.” In reality, the talks concern North Korea’s  survival, not the survival of the US. The result of talks cannot simply be temporary steps, but a verifiable, sustainable agreement to keep peace in Northeast Asia. Parvis componere magna. (To compare great things with small.)

Acts the US could perform  as confidence building measures might include temporarily reducing or halting aerial exercises until negotiations are established, and then a decision on how to proceed from that point forward would be made. More vigorous talks on reducing military forces along the DMZ in a mutually acceptable way could be arranged between senioe military officials of the US, North Korea, and South Korea. It would represent an effort to make the Korean Peninsula safer from conventional war as well as nuclear exchange. (It would be counterintuitive of North Korean officials to expect Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul to accept that with the destructive power of their massive build up of artillery aimed at Seoul that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would make South Korea safer.) These would be talks far beyond, more complex than those that have been occasionally held on the border between South Korea and North Korea at Panmunjom to handle contentious issues. Talks could be initiated by the most senior diplomats of the US and North Korea on crafting a final agreement on ending the Korean War. The US could recommend that a direct line of communication between Washington and Pyongyang at level of Foreign Minister and Secretary of State. There could be discussions arranged between diplomatic officials to mitigate “nagging issues” that have exist ed since the end of p hostilities in 1953. Incentives might be put in place, except financial giveaways, that would allow North Korea to rejuvenate its own society, reinvigorate its own industries. Suggestions could be sought from the North Koreans on what they feel would be helpful to aid the economic conditions in their country. Much as inviting a sizable delegation from Pyongyang to attend the PyeongChang Olympics, and creating a joint Korean Women’s Ice Hockey team allowed them to move from the shadows of the well walled-in, “hermit kingdom” into the light of the rest world. More visits, more congenial openings to the world could be proposed, encouraged to lift the shades, raise the blinds, and open the shutters for light from the outside world to come into North Korea. (It is likely that such openings would be limited by Pyongyang as such contacts with the outside world for too many North Koreans would be considered potentially destabilizing for its controlled society.) The North Koreans should hardly expect any huge giveaways, no Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to result the talks or negotiations that would cover the enormous expenditures made on the nuclear weapons and missile programs so far. There would be no discussion of purchasing the program.

Acts the North Koreans could perform as confidence building measures could include: the release of three US citizens being detained on varied charges in North Korea; the return of any remains of US troops from Korean War collected by the North Korea; make its own recommendation to create a direct line of communication between Washington and Pyongyang at level of Foreign Minister and Secretary of State. A potent step that Kim or North Korean officials could take, but would seem unlikely, is the return of the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence ship captured on January 23, 1968 and converted into a museum. (It is of questionable utility to officials in Pyongyang particularly now as their country is facing potential annihilation.) Kim or North Korean officials, on their own volition could indicate a willingness to pull back artillery aimed at Seoul. If in Pyongyang, taking these steps would represent a loss of dignity, particularly if they took those steps after talks with Trump, Kim or North Korean officials could claim it was more the result of bilateral talks with South Korea. All of this being stated, however, no matter what Kim may agree with at the talks, if he feels once back in Pyongyang, that he has given too much, he would not hesitate to walk-back, through official statements, any undesirable points. Qui cumque turpi fraude semel innotuit, eriemsi verum dicit amittit fides.  (Whoever has once become known for a shameful fraud, is not believed even if he speaks the truth.)

4. Taking a Pragmatic Approach That Does Not Sacrifice Principles

Trump does not intend to turn down a diplomatic detour similar to that taken while trying to build relations with the Russian Federation. Finding a way to establish an authentic positive relationship with Russia was a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would try to find the solution, and explained that he would give it his best effort. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson began with small steps, working groups to settle nagging issues. Although those small steps were supposed to lead to bigger ones, and confidence was supposed to grow that was not the case. Small steps led nowhere. It appears that Russia used then simply as distraction. Seemingly long planned moves in locations such Syria, Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova, the Czech Republic, France, Germany the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, and Montenegro were executed at the same time. No movement on Crimea was even considered or broached in conversations between Tillerson and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as talks between Trump and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Denials regarding Russia’s military presence in Eastern Ukraine continued. Intermediate Range weapons were not removed from Kaliningrad. Incessant cyberattacks were followed by denials from Moscow. Reportedly, Russia continued operations to interfere in US elections process nationwide according to intelligence and law enforcement officials. Finally, Putin rolled out new generations of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that Putin claimed US could not defeat. Included was a presentation of how missile could hit Florida, the location of Trump’s Mar-a-Largo Estate. All of those issues eere topped off by Putin’s unwavering and antagonizing denial that Russia interfered in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. After starting with promise, the effort moved metaphorically, one step forward and two steps back. Tillerson is no longer at State, and Trump intends to repair the situation. Hopefully, North Korea has not found anything instructive in what Russia has done.

Despite the long observed attitudes and behaviors of Kim and bellicose rhetoric of government spokespeople in Pyongyang, it may very well be, as experts declare, that the North Koreans are not suicidal. Understanding that should ostensibly provide some edge for Washington. However, it is difficult to deal with a morally flawed leadership. For national leaders lacking moral guidance, there is a greater chance that a mistake, an uncontrolled impulse will lead to disaster.  Much of what Kim has done so far, invest the North Korean treasury into weapons that in the current environment may only lead to his country’s annihilation, has been both unconstructive and self-destructive. There are intelligence estimates that say Kim has used an exorbitant $300 million of North Korea’s national treasury on weapons development. Estimates are that another $180 million has gone toward the production of 460 statues or monuments glorifying the Kims. Without a doubt, Kim is truly wrapped up in himself. While it may seem unimaginable for Kim to trigger an unbalanced, nuclear exchange would bring satisfaction, the 17th century French philosopher, mathematician, and physicist, Blaise Pascal, offers an interesting thought that might lead one to think otherwise. In Pensées, there is his statement: “All men seek happiness. This is without exception. Whatever different means they employ, they all tend to this end. The cause of some going to war, and others avoiding it, is the same desire in both, attended with different views. The will never takes the least step but to this object. This is the motive of every action of every man, even of those who hang themselves.”

5. Being Aware of Timing

As a political leader, there are no reelection worries for Trump at the moment that would lead North Korean officials to believe his decision making would be impacted by election or other political considerations. Trump’s foreign policy initiatives appear somewhat severed from issues shaping midterm elections for the US Congress . Kim also has no reelection worries for Kim. Kim, after all, rules everything in North Korea. However, while experts deemed would take a short amount of time before North Korea is close to developing a nuclear capability that could pose considerable danger to the US, there is an element of uncertainty in those calculations. Kim may achieve his goals even sooner than anyone might predict. Talks would hopefully quell Kim’s  nuclear ambitions before he reaches all of his development goals.

6. Maintaining a Deep Respect for the Politics of the Situation.

After mourning the death of his father Kim Jong Il on December 17, 2011,  the younger Kim tried to gain momentum during the fifth session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2012, where he was elected Supreme Leader of the country. Much as his father, he is also referred to as the “Great Leader” by the North Korean people. The title Supreme Leader conferred Kim with all power over the Korean Workers’ Party and other political bodies and effectively concluded the power succession. North Korean elites are obedient and terrified of him.

Fama, malum qua non allud velocius ullum. (Rumor, the swiftest of all evils in the world.) North Korean officials, attempting to prepare Kim for his meeting with Trump, invariably have already been mining through overt information about Trump, to try to more fully understand him, albeit in the abstract. They would undoubtedly like to determine how he will likely approach the talks and possible angles from which he might challenge Kim, and how Kim could explain North Korean positions and demands in a plausible, satisfying way. A task for North Korean officials would be to filter out distractive, musings about Trump presented by his critics. If their briefings are filled with reports based on such critiques of Trump, the talks could prove to be useless which would be tragedy for their side. Perhaps the most useful thing for them to know is that the current concept and intent of US foreign and national security policy is develop from Trump’s thinking. Professional, dutiful subordinates can at best offer policies and approaches impelled by the US President. Some journalists, former politicians and political operatives among Trump’s critics, have apparently become so habituated to engaging in narrow thinking and been victimized their own malicious rhetoric and hateful distortions, that they have completely ignored or forgotten this reality.

The Way Forward

In Act V, scene i of William Shakespeare’s play, Titus Andronicus, the Roman general, Titus Andronicus, has returned from ten years of war with only four out of twenty-five sons left. He has captured Tamora, Queen of the Goths, her three sons, and Aaron the Moor. Obedient to Roman rituals, he sacrifices Tamora’s eldest son to his own dead sons, earning him Tamora’s unending hatred. As fate would have it, the new Emperor Saturninus makes Tamora an empress and from her new position, she plots revenge against Titus. She schemes with Aaron to have Titus’s two sons framed and executed for the murder of Bassianus, the emperor’s brother. Unsatisfied, she urges her sons Chiron and Demetrius to rape Titus’s daughter Lavinia, after which they cut off her hands and tongue to prevent her from reporting their crime. Finally,  Lucius, the last son of Titus is banished from Rome. Lucius then seeks an alliance with his sworn enemy, the Goths, in order to attack Rome. Titus, feigning madness, manages to trick Tamora. He captures her sons, kills them, makes pie out of them, and feeds the pie to her. He then kill Tamora and his daughter Lavinia. In Lucius’ camp with the Goths, a Goth soldier who learned the fugitive Aaron, along with his baby, were in an abandoned monastery, brought them back to camp. Lucius’s impulse was to hang the child hang first and have Aaron watch. While in a noose, Aaron makes a bargain with Lucius to save his child in exchange for knowledge of all the horrors that have occurred. Once Lucius agreed to do so, Aaron revealed every violent act directed by Tamora. However, he then tells more about himself, listing other crimes he has committed. He states: “Even now I curse the day–and yet, I think, Few come within the compass of my curse,–Wherein I did not some notorious ill, As kill a man, or else devise his death, Ravish a maid, or plot the way to do it, Accuse some innocent and forswear myself, Set deadly enmity between two friends, Make poor men’s cattle break their necks; Set fire on barns and hay-stacks in the night, And bid the owners quench them with their tears. Oft have I digg’d up dead men from their graves, And set them upright at their dear friends’ doors, Even when their sorrows almost were forgot; And on their skins, as on the bark of trees, Have with my knife carved in Roman letters, ‘Let not your sorrow die, though I am dead.’ Tut, I have done a thousand dreadful things As willingly as one would kill a fly, And nothing grieves me heartily indeed But that I cannot do ten thousand more.” Eventually, Lucius has the unrepentant Aaron buried alive, has Tamora’s corpse thrown to beasts, and he becomes the new emperor of Rome. As Trump alluded to in his September 2017 remarks at the UN, Kim’s regime is extraordinarily violent and he seems to possess a homicidal ideation. South Korea’s main intelligence agency apparently examined the matter in December 2016. Indeed, according to a December 29, 2016 article in Yonhap, the National Intelligence Service (Gukga Jeongbowon), Kim is likely responsible for a record number of purges and executions since fully assuming power. Indeed, the white paper reportedly concluded that in the first five years of his reign, Kim may have dismissed or killed 340 North Koreans, many of them government officials. The white paper additionally explained that the number of purges and executions has also skyrocketed as Kim increased his authoritative grip on the country after he was elected Supreme Leader of the country in April 2012. It was concluded in the white paper that those mass executions of hundreds of high-ranking officials, including the public sentencing of Kim’s uncle-in-law Jang Song Thaek, were part of Kim’s plan to firmly consolidate his inherited power as the third-generation ruler of North Korea. Yonhap quoted the white paper as stating: “There were 3 [purged or executed] in 2012, more than 30 in 2013, greater than 40 in 2014, and more than 60 in 2015.” The white paper added:  “The numbers show a rapid increase.” The white paper further noted that North Korea “temporarily refrained” from mass purges after the sudden execution of Defense Minister Hyon Yong Chol in 2015, but resumed killing senior officials in 2016.

Kim has initiated a charm offensive, presenting himself as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. However, he has already shown enough of his hand for anyone to conclude his intentions are likely  hostile. Trump knows Kim is a predator and simply trying to manage attention the world’s attention, but perhaps he also sees that Kim is in a dire situation. He seems to be allowing him some room to take a new tact. If everything goes the way of the US, North Korea will scrap its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Sadly, the very likely possibility is that Kim is not directing his efforts at Trump but at South Korea. Talking to Trump may serve to convince the South Koreans of their peaceful purpose. Getting an agreement on anything with the US may be inconsequential  to him. A signal of success in the talks for him would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-lead military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with a dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. It all seems to be part of a North Korean strategy of gaining control of the Korean Peninsula by getting South Korea to buy into the fantasy that cooperating with it would create conditions for truly peaceful relations between the Koreas. Subsequently, the region would also be made safer, and the door would be opened to genuine Korean unification. If this sort of scenario has been presented to Kim by officials in Pyongyang mainly to soothe his ego regarding the talks, North Korea may be doomed. Negligentia semper habet inforturnam comiten. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.)

Tyrannical figures have often self-destructed once their power began slipping from their hands. While he speaks one way, consciously, he may be acting unconsciously to a deeper thought that his regime faces inevitable destruction. Unknowingly, he might very well be setting the stage to lash out in a spectacular way before Trump does. He may attempt to use as much of his existing stockpile of nuclear weapons as possible, any way he can. Kim apparently holds his sister, Kim Yo-jong, in high regard and seems to take counsel of her on occasions. She led a delegation of North Korean officials to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. However, there is no public indication that he has a close associate , a friend that he can rely upon consistently, much as Roman Emperor Augustus Caesar relied upon General Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, according him the status of Imperium, holding the power of the Emperor in the Eastern Mediterranean. To that extent, no one in a caring way could comfortably or confidently, approach Kim and counsel him to “Stop chasing your destructive dream of developing a large nuclear arsenal capable of striking the US.” Trump certainly is not a friend of Kim, but it appears that it has been left to him to convince Kim of the truth. Appetitus rationi pareat. (Desire ought to obey reason.)

Trump to Meet With Putin at G-20 Gathering: Trump Seeks an Authentic Relationship with Russia

US President Donald Trump (above). On July 7, 2017 at the Group of 20 economic summit meeting in Hamburg, Trump will have a bilateral meeting with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Finding a way to establish an authentic, positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for decades. Trump feels he can find the solution.Trump does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, remains at risk. He believes the US and Russia can be good neighbors on the same planet.

According to a June 29, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Trump to Meet With Putin at G-20 Gathering Next Week,” it was formally announced by US National Security Adviser US Army Lieutenant General H.R McMaster that US President Donald Trump would meet Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin on July 7, 2017 on the sidelines of the Group of 20 economic summit meeting in Hamburg, Germany. The article noted that the meeting would be the first between the two since Trump took office and would be the focal point of his second international trip. However, a subsequent July 5, 2017 New York Times article explained that a day before Trump was to leave Washington, the White House announced that the meeting with Putin would be a formal bilateral discussion, rather than a quick pull-aside at the economic summit that some had expected. The July 5th New York Times article went on to explain that the bilateral format benefitted both Trump and Putin. It called Putin a canny one-on-one operator who once brought a Labrador to a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel because he knew she was afraid of dogs. The article proffered Trump’s aides sought structure and predictability, and hoped that a formal meeting, with aides present and an agenda, will leave less room for improvisation and put the focus on pressing policy concerns that Trump is eager to address.

Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes viros. (Fire provides proof of gold, misery, proof of strong men.) Both Trump and Putin clearly believe the moment to create positive change in US-Russia relations is now. In the face of all the opprobrium, both have shown a new determination to get on with making things right between the two countries. Trump plans to triumph over his skeptics, putting no power in their words. Of course, that process of building relations between their countries will take time. Still, each step brings the two sides closer together and improving one’s understanding of the other. The bilateral talks with Russia at the Group of 20 economic summit will mark a point of flexure in communications between the US and Russia. Finding a way to establish an authentic, positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a couple of decades. Trump feels he can find the solution. True, the meeting between Trump and Putin will unlikely be a catalytic moment when opponents of Trump, political or otherwise, will see the method in his madness and appreciate his accomplishment. Moreover, when Russia behaves in ways that tear others from peace, it must still face consequences. However, Trump’s efforts evince his desire not to isolate Russia, or allow engagement with it to fall off. He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, remains at risk. He believes the US and Russia can be good neighbors on the same planet. For this he should hardly be faulted. Pars magna bonitatis est veile fieri bonum. (Much of goodness consists in wanting to be good.)

US President Barack Obama and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). The Obama administration’s actions and reactions to Putin obscured what was already a difficult path to travel. The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the Obama administration responded to him as if he were a neophyte and not a seasoned national leader. A war of words and rebuffs emerged between Washington and Moscow.

Background on US and Russia Relations

Infandum, regina, jubes renovare dolorem. (Sorrow too deep to tell, your majesty, you order me to feel and tell once more.) The Obama administration’s actions and reactions to Russia did much to further pollute and obscure what was already a difficult path to travel. The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the Obama administration responded to him as if he were a neophyte and not a seasoned national leader. Old ills that were part of US-Russian relations resurfaced, and new ones arose, to include: Putin’s decision to allow US National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden to reside in Russia; ongoing espionage efforts between Russia and the US, including the activities of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR officer Anna Chapman and other Russian “illegals” captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2010, and the allegations of US spying on Russia revealed by Snowden and Wikileaks; and the US admonishment of Russia on human rights issues. Putin was still fuming over Operation Unified Protector, during which in 2011, multinational forces including the US, were placed under NATO command and imposed a no-fly zone and destroyed government forces loyal to then-Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. Putin felt NATO-led forces went beyond UN Security Council Resolution 1973’s mandate by helping local forces overthrow Gaddafi. Gaddafi had been a friend of the Soviet Union and Russia.

Perhaps the administration did not fully grasp just how poorly things were going with Putin. The Obama administration was confident enough to push agendas for nuclear arms reductions with Russia and the expansion of the EU and NATO just as the administration of US President George W. Bush had. Obama administration officials referred to the effort to attain further nuclear arms cuts before leaving office as a “signature effort.” The reduction of nuclear forces and reductions in conventional forces have been issues US and Russian leaders have dealt with for decades, but Obama was not going to resolve any nuclear issues with Putin. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are not a mere policy issue or bargaining chip for Putin, but a means of survival for Russia. Putin had no intentions of acceding to proposals for deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal repeatedly sent to Moscow by the administration. The insistence of Obama administration officials to take such an aggressive approach in talks with Russia more than anything served to disrupt the US-Russia relationship. Efforts by US officials diplomats and officials to threaten and cajole, as Moscow perceived talks, were more than just displays of a lack of diplomatic tact and maturity, they were viewed as threatening. Relations with Putin and Russia fell to a very low point when the Obama administration cancelled a September summit meeting between Obama and Putin in 2013. The cancellation was in retaliation over Putin’s decision to reject the administration’s nuclear proposals. Administration officials lamented that Putin’s decision ended the president’s “signature effort to transform Russian-American relations and potentially dooming his aspirations for further nuclear arms cuts before leaving office.”

A spate of public rebuffs to Putin sullied ties further. The next year, during preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, there was a constant drum beat of doubt expressed by US security experts on the capability of the Russian security services to protect Sochi from terrorism. A leader’s public declaration of his decision not to attend has practically been a tradition among US and Russian leaders during a period of disagreement in international affairs. In addition to the Olympics, Obama would later decide not to attend the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Allies, ending World War II in Europe. The celebration, hosted by Putin, was a time to recall the legacy of cooperation established during the war and a real example of what US-Russian cooperation could be in a common cause. It offered a chance for Obama to privately address his dispute with Putin. It was the best time for him to say that as with the alliance between their countries in World War II, relations between their countries now were important, bigger than both of them. Attending would have required Obama, as Rudyard Kipling would say, to “bite the bullet,” in terms of personal pride, but not in terms of his role as US president. By being absent, that day became one more reminder of the two leaders differences and their uncongenial relationship. A war of words between US and Russian officials was also problematic. Words of anger, mockery, hate, and aggression, do damage that is often difficult to repair. In the last days of his presidency, Obama ordered the expulsion of 35 Russian suspected spies and imposed sanctions on two Russian intelligence agencies over their involvement in hacking U.S. political groups in the 2016 election.

All of this and more has made for a very rocky road for the Trump administration to travel. Initially, Moscow took the view that the Trump administration’s approach to Russia in any direction must reflect the desire to forge a new relationship, not just hammer out a deal. However, in the nascent days of the Trump administration, Moscow faced the predicament of not having a formal articulation of US foreign policy and immediate approaches from the Trump White House or State Department from which it could work, Moscow’s policy decisions concerning the US were based on assessments developed from the abstract by Russian foreign policy analysts of the Trump administration’s most likely Syria policy or greater Middle East policy. If anything,, Russian analysts might have gleaned and constructed his likely key foreign and national security policy concepts on which his decisions might be based from what Trump has stated. Even without a formal articulation of policy, The Trump administration has tried to be reasonable in its approach to Russia.

Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (left) and US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (right). A decisive point in US-Russian relations came when Tillerson went into Russia on April 12, 2017 to talk with Putin and Lavrov. A significant achievement of those talks was an agreement to establish a working group of US State Department and Russian Federation Foreign Ministry officials charged with addressing smaller issues, which Lavrov called “irritants.” That has allowed Tillerson and Lavrov a freer hand to make progress in stabilizing relations.

The decisive point in relations between the Trump administration and Russia came when Tillerson went into Russia on April 12, 2017 to express concerns over the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and Moscow’s continued insouciance toward Assad’s actions against his own people, non combatants. He wanted to learn firsthand the rationale behind Moscow’s willingness to endure international ridicule and rebuke in response to its friendship with the Assad regime, and what might prompt a decision to end that era. The Kremlin’s attitude toward the situation was manifested by the games played by the Russians before the meetings. For hours after Tillerson’s arrival in Moscow, it was uncertain if Putin would even meet with him because of the tense state of relations. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitri Peskov, held out the possibility of a meeting once Tillerson arrived, saying any meeting would depend on the nature of Tillerson’s talks at the Foreign Ministry. Tillerson, unfazed by any of those developments, went forward with his meeting Lavrov, the metronome of Russian foreign policy and diplomacy.  The meeting lasted for three hours. Tillerson eventually got the call to come meet with Putin, and left the Ritz-Carlton Hotel for Red Square around 5:00PM local time. That meeting lasted for two hours. A significant achievement of those talks was an agreement to establish a working group of US State Department and Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials charged with addressing smaller issues, which Lavrov called “irritants which have dogged our relations over the last couple of years,” and make progress toward stabilizing the relationship. That would allow Tillerson and Lavrov a freer hand to address urgent issues. They agreed to consider further proposals concerning the way forward in Syria; the respective allies and coalition partners of both countries would be consulted on the matter. There would be continued discussions directed at finding a solution to the Syrian conflict. Lavrov said Putin had agreed to reactivate an air-safety agreement, a de-confliction memorandum, concerning Russian Federation and US-led coalition air operations over Syria. Moscow suspended it after the US cruise missile strikes.

On June 18, 2017, a US FA-18 fighter (as above) shot down a Syrian Arab Army Su-22 fighter over Raqqa. After Russia said it would terminate deconfliction activity over the shoot down, Lavrov and Tillerson quelled the matter. Lavrov urged Tillerson to use his influence to prevent “provocations” against Syrian government forces in the conflict. The incident evinced how fickle Russia can be over cooperation. Joint activity can be held hostage to Moscow’s reactions to events. Cooperation must be established with protocols or a modus vivendi.

Is This Is the Moment?

Both Trump and Putin understand that the process of building a new US-Russia relationship will take time. Yet, Trump left little doubt that he is eager to meet Putin when the two visit Hamburg, Germany for the G-20 summit on June 7-8, 2017. Trump’s positive thinking has appeared to broaden his sense of possibility and open his mind up to more options. Trump and some others within his administration sense a great opportunity is being presented by his meeting with Putin and sought from the start to establish a full bilateral meeting. Trump wanted media access and all the typical protocol associated with such sessions. It was allegedly leaked to the US newsmedia that other officials at the State Department and National Security Counci sought to pared down that idea, recommending instead that Trump engage in a brief, informal “pull-aside” on the sidelines of the summit, or that the US and Russian delegations hold “strategic stability talks,” which would not include the presidents. In the end, Trump got what he wanted, a bilateral meeting with the Russians, formally organized. Trump and Putin talked informally by phone. During a May 2, 2017 phone conversation, they agreed to speed up diplomatic efforts designed to end the war in Syria. The White House described the phone call between the two leaders as a “very good one” and said they discussed the possibility of forming safe zones to shelter civilians fleeing the conflict. The US also agreed to send representatives to cease-fire talks the following month. Reportedly, Trump and Putin “agreed that the suffering in Syria has gone on for far too long and that all parties must do all they can to end the violence,” the White House said. It was their first conversation since the US launched a barrage of cruise missiles at a Syrian air base last month in response to a chemical attack that the Trump administration has said was carried out by Syrian forces. It was during the same phone conversation that Putin reportedly offered an olive branch to Trump: Both chief diplomats spoke then about arranging a meeting tied to a Group of 20 summit meeting in Germany this summer, the Kremlin said, according to the Russia-based Interfax news agency.

Both Trump and Putin understand that the process building a new US-Russia relationship will take time.Trump left little doubt that he is eager to meet Putin when the two visit Hamburg, Germany for the G-20 summit on June 7-8, 2017. Trump’s positive thinking has appeared to broaden his sense of possibility and open his mind up to more options. Trump senses he has been presented with a great opportunity. He seized that chance to establish a full bilateral meeting with hope of accomplishing a few things.

Following a May 11, 2017 meeting between Trump and Lavrov at the White House, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, on first face, expressed cautious optimism about the prospects for an improvement in U.S.-Russian, saying: “The conversation itself is extremely positive.” He further explained: “We have a lot of work ahead of us.” Progress seemed to have been derailed when on June 18, 2017, a US FA-18E Super Hornet fighter shot down a Syrian Arab Army Su-22 fighter in the southern Raqqa countryside, with Washington saying the jet had dropped bombs near US-led Coalition-friendly forces in Tabqh. On several occasions in weeks before, US-led Coalition fighter jets also struck pro-government forces to prevent them advancing from a U.S.-controlled garrison in southeastern Syria at a spot where the country’s borders join with Iraq and Jordan. By telephone on May 11, 2017, Lavrov and Tillerson discussed the need to cement the ceasefire regime in Syria, in particular on the basis of peace talks conducted in the Kazakh capital Astana. The Russian Federation Foreign Ministry explained Lavrov had urged Tillerson to use his influence to prevent “provocations” against Syrian government forces in the conflict. Lavrov and Tillerson agreed to continue contacts, particularly with regard to their bilateral agenda.

Putin would eventually fully express his own views on possible face-to-face meeting with Trump. In a call in program, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin” that was broadcast on June15, 2017, Putin offered relatively anodyne statements about the Trump administration and a possible meeting with Trump. It was a big change from the aggressive statements of the past. It seemed that Putin was no longer nursing any wounds resulting from his combative relationship Obama. During the program, Putin responded to a question about engagement with the US on Syria as follows: “On the Syrian problem and the Middle East in general, it is clear to all that no progress will be made without joint constructive work. We hope greatly too for the United States’ constructive role in settling the crisis in southeast Ukraine. A constructive role, as I said. We see then that there are many areas in which we must work together, but this depends not only on us. We see what is happening in the United States today. I have said before and say again now that this is clearly a sign of an increasingly intense domestic political struggle, and there is nothing that we can do here. We cannot influence this process. But we are ready for constructive dialogue.” Putin continued by acknowledging that there were “areas in which we can work together with the United States. This includes, above all, control over non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We are the biggest nuclear powers and so our cooperation in this area is absolutely natural. This is an area of crucial importance and concerns not just the North Korean issue but other regions too.” The call-in program was meant for Russian viewers, however, Putin, seeking to reach international viewers, turned suddenly to the subjects of the Paris Agreement on climate change and poverty, tying them to US-Russian relations and insinuating that he would garner Trump’s cooperation on those issues. Putin explained: “Then there is the fight against poverty, fighting environmental damage and so on. We know the position the current US administration has taken on the Paris Agreement, but President Trump is not rejecting discussion on the issue. Cursing and trading barbs and insults with the US administration would be the worst road to take because we would reach no agreement at all in this case, but it makes no sense to seek agreements without the US, which is one of the biggest emitter countries. We must work together to fight poverty in the world. The number of people earning a minimum income has increased in Russia, but there is a disastrous situation in many parts of the world, and this is one of the sources of radicalism and terrorism, this poverty around the world, and we must decide together how to address this problem. Here, we must work with our other partners too, work with China, India and Europe.”

The aesthetics of Putin’s words on Russian television, welcoming interaction with Trump and expressing to the Russian public that he highly desired such talks, were astounding. Putin’s modus operandi in any exchange is to ensure he is the last man standing. So far, that has not been the case here. The change in temperament and dialogue perhaps  evinces that the desire for positive change in relations among Putin and his cabinet is analogous, mutatis mutandis, with that of the Trump and his administration.

The aesthetics of Putin’s words welcoming interaction with Trump and expressing to the Russian public that he highly desired such talks, were astounding. Putin’s modus operandi in any exchange is to ensure he is the last man standing. So far, that has not been the case here. The change in temperament and dialogue perhaps evinces that the desire for positive change in relations among Putin and his cabinet is analogous, mutatis mutandis, with that of the Trump and his administration. Trump’s positive thinking has appeared to broaden his sense of possibility and open his mind up to more options. Indeed, constructive, successful talks with Putin will allow Trump adjust to circumstances and perhaps become more fluid, more creative in his approach. It will certainly further diplomatic contacts between the US with Russia.

Summit Discussion Topics: A Few Samples (A Few Guesses)

Speaking initially about the planned meeting, McMaster expressed the president’s concept behind his effort which is to establish better relations with Russia by stating: “As the president has made clear, he’d like the United States and the entire West to develop a more constructive relationship with Russia but he has also made clear that we will do what is necessary to confront Russia’s destabilizing behavior.” Former Obama administration officials have offered their opinions about the Trump-Putin meeting. Among the more prominent were comments by Obama’s chief Russia specialist at the National Security Council in 2009 and his Ambassador to the Russian Federation Michael McFaul, in the familiar vein of seeking confrontation with Russia, told the New York Times that the meeting was a vital opportunity for Trump to show strength by calling out Putin sharply for the election meddling and to make it clear he is not fooled by Moscow’s misbehavior. McFaul was quoted as saying: “There is a sense in Moscow that Trump is kind of naïve about these things and just doesn’t understand.” He went on to instruct: “You don’t want your first meeting with Putin to create the appearance that you’re weak and naïve, and with some short, direct talking points, he could correct the record.” Veritatis simplex oratio est. (The language of truth is simple.)

Trump managed to become US president doing what he wanted to do, having truly dominant knowledge of the desires of the US public and overall US political environment. He knows what he wants and what he can really do. Ideally, if agreements are reached, they will be initial steps perhaps to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. Already US State Department and Russian Foreign Ministry officials are working on nagging issues. The two leaders will likely acknowledge good existing agreements and make promises to continue to adhere to them. Where possible, it may be agreed to strengthen those good agreements. What has been observed in diplomatic exchanges so far between the US and Russia is a type of modus vivendi, a way of living, working together, between leaders and chief diplomats. After Putin granted Tillerson a meeting in Moscow after his talks with Lavrov, Trump granted Lavrov a meeting in Washington during a visit to meeting with Tillerson. It also indicated a willingness to establish a balance in negotiations or quid pro quo on issues when possible. Such seemingly small steps have been confidence building measures that have help lead to the meeting between presidents. Those small steps also supported an open line of communication between chief diplomats which is all importance as US and Russian military forces work in close proximity in Syria, Ukraine, and skies and waters in NATO, Canadian and US territory. If all goes well, there will certainly be more to follow. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Use what is yours without harming others.)

Russian Federation Army spetsnaz in Syria (above). Ostensibly, Russia went into Syria both to prop up Assad’s regime and engage in counterterrorism operations against ISIS, Al-Qaeda affiliates, and other Islamic militant groups. Putin has stated regarding Syria and the Middle East in general that progress would not be made without joint constructive work with the US. Genuine cooperation on counterterrorism requires information sharing and joint operations, but again, Russia can be fickle over cooperation.

1. Counterterrorism and a Joint US-Russia Counter ISIS Strategy

On counterterrorism specifically, Moscow apparently wanted to secure a pledge from the Trump administration that it would work directly with Russia to destroy Islamic militant groups in Syria and wherever Russian interests are concerned. Russia claims it has been able to put significant pressure on ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and other Islamic militant groups using its special operations forces–Spetsnaz–and airpower. Russia’s dedication to counterterrorism was demonstrated by the strengthening of its terrorism laws in 2016. Genuine cooperation on counterterrorism requires not only information sharing, but joint operations. Yet, as evinced on military deconfliction in Syria, Russia can be fickle over cooperation. Joint activity has been held hostage to political reactions in Moscow due to other events. Establishing such cooperation must be based on protocols or modus vivendi, shielding it from such reactions.

2. Syria: Assad

In September 2015, Putin took the option of solving the conflict in Syria on his terms using a strong military hand. He explained that Russian Federation forces were sent into Syria both to “stabilize the legitimate authority” of Assad and to fight ISIS. On Syria, relations between the US and Russia are improving. By 2015, Assad appeared to lack the ability to remain in power against ISIS and perhaps US-backed Syrian Opposition forces, but the military situation began to turn after Russia, with the urging of Iran, moved its forces into Syria in September of that year and supported Syrian military operations. Assad can only be useful to Russia as a figurehead, a symbol of resistance to the opposition and ISIS. In time, it may make sense to Moscow to replace him with a leader who would be more acceptable among the Syrians. The transition from Assad regime to new politically inclusive government is the standing US policy. Assad is at Russia’s disposition. A final decision on how to handle him will need to be made soon. Concerns over Russia’s thoughts on Assad and US concerns about the dangers posed by him must be broached.

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (seated left) and Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-Assad (seated right). Currently, Assad is useful to Russia as a figurehead, a symbol of resistance to the opposition and ISIS. In time, it may make sense to Moscow to replace him with a leader who would be more acceptable among the Syrians. The transition from Assad regime to new politically inclusive government is the standing US policy. Assad is at Russia’s disposition.

3. Syria: Deconfliction

After the US launched cruise missile strikes against Assad regime airbase on April 7, 2017 following the regime’s chemical attack on Syrian civilians, Moscow suspended air-safety a de-confliction memorandum. Following Tillerson’s meeting with Lavrov said Putin in April 2017, Russia agreed to reactivate air safety hotline created under the air-safety agreement concerning Russian Federation and US-led coalition air operations over Syria. When a US fighter jet shot down a Syrian fighter over the southern Raqqa countryside, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry said it would halt its use of the incident-prevention hotline. The hotline was established between US officers monitoring the war from an operations center at a base in Qatar and their Russian counterparts operating in Syria has been a lifesaving tool since it was set up soon after Russia entered Syria’s civil war in late 2015 to prop up President Bashar al-Assad. However, as with any prospective joint counterterrorism activity with Russia, deconfliction operations cannot be held hostage to political reactions in Moscow to other events. There must be some protocol or modus vivendi established which shields deconfliction operations to the whims of either country.

4. Syria: Reconstruction, Peace-enforcement, and Peace-building via Negotiations

Reconstruction will be another huge hurdle for Russia to overcome in Syria. Even if a modicum of economic aid were granted from the Western countries and international organizations as the UN, the World Bank, or international Monetary Fund, Syria may never see significant rebuilding or economic improvement. Russia has sought stronger ties with Arab countries, bolstering economic ties with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait and diplomatic overtures with Algeria, Iraq, and Egypt. Russia’s hope is by courting those countries they would become more receptive to its’ calls for a political solution in Syria and responsive to an eventual campaign by Russia to gain financial support for Syria’s reconstruction. However, US participation in those efforts may do much to encourage participation from those Arab countries and Western countries as well. Russia must negotiate US assistance in the reconstruction and peace-enforcement effort.

US Army Rangers moving through Syria (above). Reconstruction will be another huge hurdle for Russia to overcome in Syria. Even if a modicum of economic aid were granted from the Western countries and international organizations as the UN, the World Bank, or international Monetary Fund, Syria may never see significant rebuilding or economic improvement. US participation in those efforts may do much to encourage participation from Arab countries and Western countries as well.

5. Syria: Safe Zones and Immigration

Syrian refugees and the displaced fear returning to a society of arbitrary detentions, beatings, house searches, and robberies.  Most have lost heart that there will ever be a Syria of any good condition to which they can return. Talks between US and Russian special envoys for Syria and other officials are at an early stage of discussing the boundaries of the proposed de-escalation zone in Deraa province, on the border with Jordan, and Quneitra, which borders the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Washington has misgivings about the Astana talks and wants to forge a bilateral understanding with Moscow in an area of strategic interest to the US and its allies, Jordan and Israel. For Washington to back a deal, Russia would need have Iranian-backed militias to leave the area.  It may be difficult for Russia to rein in the growing involvement in the region of Iran and its allies. Russia must weigh that difficulty against US assistance with reconstruction.

6. North Korea

North Korea has vowed to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the US mainland. Most recently it tested what it claimed was an intercontinental ballistic missile. The US has explained to North Korean that it must stop its nuclear activity. The US has no interest in regime change. While the Trump administration has urged countries to downgrade ties with Pyongyang over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, a cross-border ferry service was launched in May 2017 between North Korea and neighboring Russia. Indeed, in recent years, Russia has rebuilt a close relationship with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un. In May, 2014, less than two months after the Crimea annexation and with Western nations seeking to punish Russia, Putin signed away 90 percent of North Korea’s $11 billion debt to Russia, an amount comparable with the debtor state’s GDP. The other 10 percent could be used for joint Russian-North Korean projects. That same year, Russia delivered 50,000 tons of wheat as humanitarian aid to North Korea. Clarification must be sought on Russia’s failure to cooperate with the international community on North Korea. Russia’s cooperation will likely need to be negotiated.

A North Korean missile test (above). North Korea has vowed to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of hitting the US mainland. Most recently it tested what it claimed was an intercontinental ballistic missile. While the Trump administration has urged countries to downgrade ties with Pyongyang over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, Russia has continued to build a close relationship with North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un.

7. Afghanistan: Russia’s Activities

There have been reports from northern Afghanistan that Russia is supporting the Taliban by providing weapons and financing. Russia’s activities in Afghanistan is ostensibly intended to counter the spread of ISIS-affiliated militants in Central Asia and further challenge the US. Still, Russia is aware that the militant group has fought US and international forces since 2001. In April 2017, the commander of the US Central Command US Army General Joseph Votel told Congress that it was “fair to assume” Russia was [militarily] supporting the Taliban. The National Directorate of Security, the Afghan intelligence agency, reports Russian intelligence agents have provided the Taliban with strategic advice, money and arms, including old anti-aircraft rockets. Russian support played a role in the Taliban’s advances in  Kunduz, where they have twice briefly seized the provincial capital. Clarification on Russia’s activity in Afghanistan must be provided. Russia’s cooperation in defeating US adversaries will likely need to be negotiated.

8. Ukraine: Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk

As the EU and NATO expanded eastward, Putin decided to pull independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Russia’s orbit. Accomplishing that required Putin to create something that did not preexist in most near abroad countries: ethnic-Russian communities forcefully demanding secession and sovereignty. That process usually begins with contemptuous murmurs against home country’s identity, language, and national symbols and then becomes a “rebel yell” for secession. It was seen in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and more recently in Crimea, the Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine. Each time an ethnic-Russian space was carved out of a country, Putin gained a base from which he can exert his influence in that country. European countries no longer appear ambivalent about committing to the costly requirements of collective security. The US may be able to influence Russia’s behavior, but Russia will likely want any negotiations to be part of comprehensive talks on Europe between the superpowers.

Satellite imagery of two tanks (125mm caliber) and 12 armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles ostensibly supplied by Russia in the Donetsk region of Ukraine (above). Russia’s annexing of Crimea and deployment of its military forces in Ukraine without Kiev’s consent was in violation of Article IV, paragraph 5 of the treaty. The US, NATO allies, and all other parties to the agreement recognize Crimea as part of Ukraine. The US has also called on Russia to remove its forces and equipment from eastern Ukraine.

9. Ukraine: Sanctions

Sanctions from the US and Europeans have put relations between Russia and the West at considerable risk. Putin rejects the idea that the Trump administration is pushing for additional sanction against Russia and has explained new sanctions are the result of an ongoing domestic political struggle in the US. He has proffered that if it had not been Crimea or some other issue, they would still have come up with some other way to restrain Russia. Putin has admitted that the restrictions do not produce anything good, and he wants to work towards a global economy that functions without these restrictions. However, repetitive threats of further sanctions from the US and EU could prompt Putin to consider means to shift the power equation. He may eventually feel his back is against the wall and may encourage him to act covertly to harm US and Western interests despite denials of doing so. When Russia behaves in ways that tear others from peace, it must still face consequences. However, the modification of that behavior could be rewarded. Sanctions could be used a powerful bargaining chip or a carrot in negotiations.

10. Russian Violations of Open Skies Treaty

The Treaty on Open Skies allows for states party to the treaty to conduct unarmed observation flights over the territory of other states to foster inter-military transparency and cooperation. The US, Canada, and 22 European countries including Russia signed the treaty in Helsinki on March 24, 1992. The US Senate ratified the treaty on November 3, 1993, and it entered into force on January 1, 2002. Today 34 countries are members of the Treaty on Open Skies. Russia has been accused of violating the spirit of the Treaty on Open Skies by restricting access to some sections of its territory. These limits include the denial of overflights over Chechnya or within 10 kilometers of its southern border with Georgia, a limitation on the maximum distances of flights over Kaliningrad, and altitude restrictions over Moscow. Russia has requested to upgrade to certain electro-optical sensors on its surveillance aircraft. The US could threaten to reject Russia’s requests until it again complies with the Open Skies Treaty.

A Russian Federation Tu-214R Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance plane (above). The Treaty on Open Skies allows for countries party to the treaty to conduct unarmed observation flights over the territory of other countries to foster inter-military transparency and cooperation. The US has complied with the treaty. Russia has violated the spirit of the treaty by restricting access to its territory. It has prohibited overflights over Chechnya or within 10 kilometers of its southern border with Georgia, set a limitation on the maximum distances of flights over Kaliningrad, and set altitude restrictions over Moscow.

11. Russian Violations of Conventional Nuclear Forces Treaty

In 2007, Russia suspended its implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Russia has continued to violate its treaty obligations and has made clear that it will not resume implementation of the treaty. On November 22, 2011, the US announced in Vienna, Austria that it was ceasing implementation of certain obligations under the treaty with regard to Russia. Similar announcements were made by NATO’S other members as well as Georgia and Moldova, but it did not impact Russian behavior. Russia continues to station its military forces in Georgia and Moldova without the consent of those countries. Russia’s annexing of Crimea and deployment of its military forces in Ukraine without Kiev’s consent was in violation of Article IV, paragraph 5 of the treaty. The US, NATO allies, and all other parties to the agreement recognize Crimea as part of Ukraine. The US has also called on Russia to remove its forces and equipment from eastern Ukraine. Clarification on Russia’s actions adverse to the treaty must be sought. Any possibility of its future compliance with the treaty can be discussed.

12. Russian Violations of the Intermediiate Nuclear Forces Treaty

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated and prohibits an entire class of missiles: nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The US remains in compliance with the INF. Reportedly, Russia has been developing missile systems in violation of the INF Treaty. As a counter move, the US has positioned weapons systems that are not prohibited by the INF Treaty in Europe. The US Air Force has deployed conventional B-52 and B-1 bombers periodically to Royal Air Force Fairford, a forward airbase in Britain. It has been suggested that Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles could be stockpiled there for potential use by the aircraft. Moscow would not like that. The US Navy could increase the presence of surface ships and submarines carrying conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles in the North Sea and other waters around northern Europe. The US Navy could consider home-porting several sea-launched cruise missile-capable warships at a European port, as it has done with Aegis-class destroyers based in Rota, Spain. The threat from Russian intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles to US allies in Europe and Asia is destabilizing. An effort to negotiate Russia’s return to compliance should be made.

A Russian Federation Iskander-M (SS-26) intermediate range missile (above). The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated and prohibits an entire class of missiles: nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Reportedly, Russia has been developing missile systems in violation of the INF Treaty. The threat from Russian intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles to US allies in Europe and Asia is destabilizing.

13. Nuclear Forces: New Deterrence Systems

The Russian Federation deploys an estimated 307 ICBMs which can carry approximately 1040 warheads. They represent only 40 percent of the country’s total arsenal of thermonuclear warheads. Russia has been developing an upgraded Topol-M variant, the more advanced Topol MR or SR-24 Yars. The Yars, is reportedly fitted with more advanced decoys and countermeasures than the Topol-M, and featuring a higher speed, has been specifically designed to evade Western anti-ballistic missile defense systems.Both Topol-M variants can be deployed from either missile silos or transporter-erector launchers. The more advanced Yars can reportedly be fitted with four to six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.The RS-28 Sarmat is the newest heavy liquid-propelled ICBM under development for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2018, the Sarmat will replace older Soviet R-36M missiles, dubbed “Satan” by NATO, as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear forces.The Sarmat will have a dozen heavy thermonuclear warheads, each individually steerable during reentry. Those warheads are said to have advanced anti-missile countermeasures meant to beat the US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Shield. Both the US and Russia could discuss their intentions regarding nuclear force enhancement.

Russian Federation RT-2PM2 or “Topol-M” intercontinental ballistic missile (above). Russia has been developing an upgraded Topol-M variant, the more advanced Topol MR or SR-24 Yars. The more advanced Yars can evade Western anti-ballistic missile defense systems and can reportedly be fitted with four to six multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. In 2018, the Sarmat will replace older Soviet R-36M (SS-18) missiles as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear forces. The Sarmat will have a dozen heavy thermonuclear warheads, each individually steerable during reentry.

14. Russian Aerial and Naval Intrusions

Among steps taken by Sergei Shoigu upon becoming Russian Federation Defense Minister April 5, 2012, he created a new corps, the Airspace Forces, and ordered and steadily increased Airspace Force bomber flights and Navy combat patrols. As a result, near the Baltic Sea, for example, Russian military aircraft near were intercepted by NATO jets 110 times in 2016. According to NATO, that number was lower than the 160 intercepts recorded in 2015 and the 140 in 2014. Still, this greatly exceeds the number of aerial encounters above the Baltic Sea before Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2013, NATO fighter jets intercepted Russian aircraft 43 times. NATO has explained Russian buzzing of Baltic airspace creates the risk for deadly mistakes. Russian military planes have been flying too close for comfort in Baltic and Nordic skies. The tension created could lead to dangerous accidents or initiate an escalation spiral. Russia must be convinced to halt its provocative aerial and Naval Intrusions as they serve little purpose if its true intent is to move toward peaceful relations with US.

15. Russian Cyber Attacks

In the past decade the Russian government has mounted more than a dozen significant cyber attacks against foreign countries, sometimes to help or harm a specific political candidate, sometimes to sow chaos, but always to project Russian power. The strategy of Russian intelligence, particularly Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR and its military counterpart Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, has been to pair cyber attacks with online propaganda. It has since been refined and expanded by Russian intelligence. From June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic Party officials, which in turn were distributed to the global media by WikiLeaks. Both the CIA and the FBI report the intrusions were intended to undermine the US election. Cyber gives Russia a usable strategic capability for active measures. If Russia sought to weaken NATO or harm US relations with Europe, cyber attacks could be launched. If potential benefits are great enough, the head of Russia’s SVR, Mikhail Naryshkin, may want to take the risk. Inquiries with Russia about cyber attacks will elicit denials. Russia must be convinced that future cyber attacks could derail efforts to build relations and will result in severe retaliation.

The head of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Mikhail Naryshkin (above). In the past decade the Russian government has mounted more than a dozen significant cyber attacks against foreign countries to project Russian power. From June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic officials. Cyber gives Russia a usable strategic capacity. If potential benefits are great enough, Naryshkin may want to take the risk.

16. Russian Interference with US Satellites

Russia is developing the ability to approach, inspect and potentially sabotage or destroy satellites in orbit. For over two years, it has included three mysterious payloads in normal commercial satellite launches. Radar observations by the US Air Force and by amateur hobbyists revealed that after each commercial satellite was deployed, an additional small object would travel far away from the jettisoned rocket booster and later turn around and travel back. Some believe the objects named Kosmos-2491, Kosmos-2499 and Kosmos-2504, may not be a benign program. For years Russia and China have pushed for the ratification of a UN treaty banning space weapons. US officials and outside experts have rejected that treaty as a “disingenuous nonstarter.” The US has supported a European-led initiative to establish norms for appropriate behavior through the creation of a voluntary International Code of Conduct for Outer Space. It would be a first step, to be followed by a binding agreement. Concern over Russia’s development and deployment of capabilities to harm US satellites must be broached. Russia should be invited to sign on to the Code of Conduct for Outer Space or join an effort to develop a new treaty incorporating the most useful aspects of all proposed approaches and additional terms.Russia must be told that it will face consequences if it interferes with US satellites.

17. Russian Arctic Military Build-up

Russia assesses the Arctic is one of the most economically promising regions in the world. The Arctic Circle holds enormous reserves of hydrocarbons and other minerals; the region also provides the shortest path for transporting goods from the Pacific to the Atlantic oceans. Russia claims that under international law norms, a substantial part of the territory in Arctic waters belongs to it. Russia observes that in addition to US Navy and US Air Force units, the US fields three ‘Arctic’ brigades in Alaska and special purpose Marines Corps units can be rapidly deployed to the north. The Canadian Army is viewed by Russia as being well-trained for action in the Arctic. Russia has taken note of Ottawa’s reorganization and reequipping its ranger units responsible for security in the Arctic region, and it recognizes Joint Task Force 2, an elite special operations unit of the Canadian Forces, is also prepared to conduct tasks in the Arctic. Further, Russia views the Norwegian Special Force “Rangers” as being especially honed for action in the Arctic. Russia notes that Oslo recently announced its creation of a new unit of special forces practically on the border with Russia. In response, Russia has deployed and specially equipped the 200th and 80th brigades to the Arctic. In 2015, Russia also opened the refurbished Soviet-era Alakurtti base located near the border with Finland in the Murmansk Region. A number of abandoned Soviet-era bases are being reopened and new one are being built. Russia’s fleet of nuclear-powered icebreaker’s is also being bolstered. Clarification on Russia’s activity in the Arctic must be provided. The Arctic units could be viewed as a maneuver force to support potential operations in northern Europe.

A Russian Federation Arctic units in training (above). Russia assesses the Arctic is one of the most economically promising regions in the world. Russia has deployed and specially equipped the 200th and 80th brigades to the Arctic. In 2015, Russia also opened the refurbished Soviet-era Alakurtti base located near the border with Finland in the Murmansk Region. A number of abandoned Soviet-era bases are being reopened and new one are being built. Russia’s fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers is also being bolstered.

Facilitating Deal Making

Issues on which presidential action could immediately resolve matters may be hashed out at the table or it could be mutually agreed to give some additional consideration such matters before giving a response. Both Trump and Putin could make mutual peace offerings. That certainly does not mean emptying oneself akin to oblation, but to do something to encourage good-faith bargaining and compromise. There are several bargaining chips of differing value to both parties. Cooperation on counterterrorism, ISIS, climate change, and poverty may serve as a bargaining chips to get agreements on other issues. However, greater bargaining chips might include: the return of Russian properties in the US, types of reconstruction assistance in Syria, peace-enforcement in Syria, making the Group of 7 the Group of 8 again with inclusion of Russia, some economic sanctions, leaving sanction loopholes open, and lifting restrictions on the Exxon-Rosneft agreement through an exemption. Some of these actions may not appear plausible and could have a deleterious effect on international consensus on sanctions against Russia over its actions in Ukraine and create an uproar among the Europeans. However, Trump undoubtedly believes bold action may be the very thing that can pump blood into negotiations, modify Russian behavior, and get relations moving forward. Conversely, Putin may offer much, if he feels secure enough, to loosen the US grip on Russia’s figurative economic throat. Perhaps some of this might be left for meetings down the road.

Aliquis latet error. (Some trickery lies hidden.) There are those in the Trump administration that will not welcome a warming of ties with Russia such as US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Marine Corps General James Dunford. They perceive Russia as the “enemy at the gates” and a great concern. They are advocates for vigilance and extreme caution with regard to diplomacy with it. Needless to say, McMaster would not be remiss and let Trump begin the meeting without reviewing the “what ifs” and contingencies resulting from what could possibly be unexpectedly difficult meeting. Trump must be able to recognize when it is definitely time to look for the door. If along with success, there are big questions or complaints, it will important not to “cry foul” or even grunt. That might be perceived as weakness by Putin. If a matter is worthy of review, Tillerson will likely be able to sort it out with Lavrov. Indeed, Trump’s meeting with Putin could be a fulsome discussion of issues or an exchange of views on issues much of which senior diplomats could be tasked resolve over time.

Trump must put “America First” but keep firmly in mind how his decisions and actions regarding Russia might impact European allies and partners.There has been considerable anguish and disappointment over Trump’s prior statements on collective security in European capitals. Some European leaders, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, perhaps unwittingly, have promoted such doubts with statements driven by political expedience. She has expressed the will to remain in a combative mode, promising days before the G-20 Summit to fight for free trade, press on with multilateral efforts to combat climate change and challenge Trump’s “America First” policies. Merkel stated: “These will not be easy talks,” She went further by explaining: “The differences are obvious and it would be wrong to pretend they aren’t there. I simply won’t do this.” Asked by journalists about Merkel’s comments, McMaster remarked that the US relationship with Germany was “as strong as ever” and played down the discord. He also noted: “Of course there are going to be differences in relations with any country, and we’ll talk frankly about those differences. The president enjoys those conversations.” For the moment, many Europeans will likely stand a bit uneasy and apprehensive about US intentions and actions until trust and confidence are eventually rebuilt. Europe is not just an acquaintance of the US. For decades, the US has served as Europe’s defacto guardian, key to its security. While Europe may not be Trump’s primary focus it is a prime concern.

The Way Forward

William Shakespeare’s Sonnet XCIV explains that the ability to restrain the expression of emotion, and refrain from revealing to the world via visage one’s authentic thoughts and true feelings were regarded as virtue or at least useful ability in that day. Such persons–often found in positions of leadership–tend to isolate their true selves, but Shakespeare indicates that does not diminish the virtue. Using a flowers sweet scent as a metaphor, he explains it’s scent is still sweet when wasted on the desert air. However, he explains that such virtue when corrupted is far worse than depraved behavior. It reads:

They that have power to hurt and will do none,

That do not do the thing they most do show,

Who, moving others, are themselves as stone,

Unmoved, cold, and to temptation show,

They rightly do inherit heaven’s graces

And husband nature’s riches from expense;

They are the lords and owners of their faces,

Others but stewards of their excellence.

the summer’s flower is to the summer sweet,

Though to itself it only live and die,

But if that flower with base infection meet,

The basest weed outbraves his dignity:

For sweetest things turn sourest by their deeds;

Lilies that fester smell far worse than weeds.

Trump has “advanced in age and wisdom and in grace with God and man.” Much as he may amuse himself through tweets to intemperate younger journalist, who, while projecting venomous comments toward him at the same time more often tickle him with their countenance, he is more than aware of his responsibility as the steward of his country’s security. He wants to establish peace and security for future generations: for his grandchildren and their posterity. Trump wants to do big things for his country, he sought the job of president for that reason. His efforts concerning Russia relations are noble.

Time, words, opportunity are things that in many circumstances come once, and never come back. One must make use of time available. It does not mean rush into things, but to be mindful that limits for preparation and action exist. Words can open doors and lead to resolution but can also damage. Banality and boastfulness so far has been avoided by the two sides. The similitude between the words of engagement used by Trump and Putin indicate there is reason for hope. Both time and words have served to create the opportunity for a positive connection between Trump and Putin. Surely, Trump cannot know what is in Putin’s heart. Putin is a calculator. Yet, Trump is unthreatened, and unmoved by notions proffered that Putin serves all things evil. If the ultimate goal of Moscow is to have the US submit to its will, Trump will not allow that to happen. He transmits no hint of doubt. Conversely, Putin must cope with his own uncertainties about Trump. One’s will acts upon what reason discerns. It is not self-justifying. Will is guided by intellect. To that extent, a genuine effort is being made and both sides appear to have the requisite he will. One would unlikely say everything has been elegantly done so far. However, some things can be smoothed out at the coming meeting, and a few more at all the subsequent ones. Success with Russia will change international affairs globally. Variatio detectat. (There is nothing like change.)

Book Review: Donald P. Gregg, Pot Shards: Fragments of a Life Lived in CIA, the White House, and the Two Koreas (Vellum, 2014)

Pot Shards presents the life and times of Ambassador Donald P. Gregg (above), an individual who contributed greatly to US foreign and national security policy. Readers are taken on a journey through Northeast and Southeast Asia and halls of power in Washington, DC. Readers will discover how much Gregg valued others and his value to humanity.

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) is an independent, non-profit organization that advances the understanding of diplomacy and supports the training of foreign affairs personnel through a variety of programs and activities. As part of its Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, it has prepared thousands of transcripts of interviews recorded with US Foreign Service veterans.  These excellent oral histories present the realities of diplomacy to include thought provoking, sometimes absurd, and often horrifying stories from which valuable lessons can be drawn.  In April 2014, ADST graciously authorized greatcharlie.com to present the oral history of Ambassador Donald P. Gregg, an authentic intelligence professional and consummate diplomat.  In July 2014, Gregg published his extraordinary, must read memoirs entitled, Pot Shards: Fragments of a Life Lived in CIA, the White House, and the Two Koreas (Vellum, 2014).  It is part of ADST-DACOR’s Diplomats and Diplomacy Series. (DACOR is an organization of foreign affairs professionals.)

Donald Gregg was an employee of the US government for forty-three years, working in the fields of intelligence and diplomacy.  Gregg served in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for thirty-one years from 1951 to 1982.  Paramilitary trained and airborne trained, he spent most of his career in assignments overseas and advising the most senior leaders of the CIA.  He was assigned to Japan, Burma, Vietnam, and Korea.  He was special assistant to the Ambassador of Korea from 1973 to 1975.  Gregg also served as a member of the White House National Security Council staff from 1979 to 1982. Upon retirement from CIA, Gregg became National Security Adviser to US Vice President George H.W. Bush from 1982 to 1989, and US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea from 1989 to 1993.  Outside of government, Gregg served as a senior consultant to Goldman Sachs, the chairman and president of The Korea Society in New York, and he currently serves as the chairman of the Pacific Century Institute in Los Angeles.  Gregg was born in New York. He enlisted in the US Army upon graduation from high school in 1945.  He received training as a cryptanalyst and reached the rank of sergeant.  He went on to attend Williams College from 1947 to 1951, majoring in Philosophy.  Gregg has received numerous awards from CIA, the US Department of Defense and the South Korean government and five honorary degrees from American and foreign colleges.  Gregg has visited the North Korea several times and advocates for the normalization of relations between that country and the US.

On its face, Pot Shards is a significant contribution to the record of the US experience in the Far East written by a major player, an intelligence icon.  Pot Shards covers some weighty matters regarding intelligence, diplomacy, and defense policy.  Some of the issues and events discussed by Gregg have never been revealed in other texts. Gregg could have limited the book to the audience of policy scholars, analysts, historians, intelligence professionals and veterans and all those familiar with the subject matter.  However, he presents Pot Shards in a way that everyone can understand and enjoy at some level.  There is much in Pot Shards that would especially thrill those beguiled by spy novels and films and spy craft enthusiasts.  Yet, what makes Pot Shards most exciting is the story of the man: Donald Gregg.  With good humor, he recounts many satisfying exploits, but also reveals vicissitudes and trials he faced.

Individuals that Gregg mentions in Pot Shards are those with whom he had continuous contact as managers, mentors, and friends. Some of are well known, “foreign policy celebrities,” such as Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, Creighton Abrams, Richard Helms, William Colby,  Harold Brown, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Holbrooke, and Richard Allen. Others may be remembered only by a few.  Gregg sheds light on their impact and exactly how their ideas ignited events from the inside. Moreover, Gregg indicates those individuals helped him develop a greater understanding of the world and other ways of thinking, allowing him to become something that he perhaps would not have been without them.

In Cloud of Witnesses, George Rutler examines sixty-six individuals, who have influenced his life, based on what Aristotle would refer to as their ethos (an honest use of talent), logos (an honest use of mind), and pathos (an honest involvement in the suffering of the world).  That would be the best way to examine Gregg’s presentation of his life and career.  At Williams College, Gregg was influenced by the thinking of Professor John William Miller, the head of the Philosophy Department, who taught him the simple definition of morality, “Never treat another human being as an object.”  Gregg explained that he has tried to live by that definition.  Gregg was also influenced by Miller’s interest in people taking action and being defined by, and held responsible for, the actions they took.  Miller taught him that “Man does not have a nature, he has a history,” Gregg recalled Miller urged his students to act upon what they believed in and to “cut behind appearance toward reality.”

It was clear from many anecdotes in Pot Shards that Gregg has had a genuine interest in people.  He has looked beyond differences, avoiding being caught up with race, ethnicity, or other things which had been used particularly in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s to determine how one should relate with another.  For example, when he first came to Washington, he would enjoy going to jazz clubs which catered to African-American patrons.  That was notable because Washington, DC at the time was a segregated city. Serving in the military at a young age, he learned about different men and different behaviors, and witnessed racial and ethnic prejudice which repulsed him.  In Kai Bird’s excellent work, The Good Spy: The Life and Death of Robert Ames, it was indicated that racial and ethnic prejudice was apparent at CIA.  It was manifested in the casual and official discussions of some, and even worse, in decision making.  That was certainly not Gregg’s way.  His type of clearheaded, solid judgments resulting from giving situations and individuals a deeper look, was always needed.  Virtue shines in the presence of vice.

Having served as a cryptanalyst in the US Army, Gregg was sought by the National Security Agency in the middle of his senior year at Williams.  However, the recruiter rather than take Gregg suggested he join CIA.  Gregg knew little of the CIA and what it did.  However, the recruiter, with what Gregg now thinks was a bit of cynicism said, “Oh, they jump out of airplanes and are going to save the world!” That attracted Gregg, and initiated his thirty-one year career with the Agency.  Gregg has provided an incredibly intriguing discussion of his paramilitary training at CIA and the others he met during it. Gregg makes it clear in that discussion though, that so-called “good old days” in CIA were not always so good.  There were crazy events. Some people were not best serving the needs of CIA or their country. Managers who were very most often former OSS officers tried to recreate approaches taken by their former organization in German and Japanese held territory in Europe and Asia.   Often proposals for covert operations were based on questionable judgment and scant research.  Real possibilities for success were not fully considered by decision makers.  They were praised and approved by management as displaying a “Gung-Ho”, “Go Get ’em”, motivated attitude.  Yet, those operations more often resembled suicide missions.  Gregg found himself on such an assignment.

In March 1952, Gregg was assigned to fly to Bangkok, Thailand, where he would pick up a group of North Vietnamese whom he would train in sabotage and small unit tactics at a secret base. Following the completion of the training, Gregg and his team would be parachuted into North Vietnam.  Gregg spoke neither Vietnam nor French, and knew nothing of Vietnam or its history, and he was far from a veteran saboteur or guerilla leader. Gregg discovered an attractive post-debutante in her mid-thirties was the Vietnam plans officer and he had heard her say that her “Vietnam plan” had been accepted.  A cocktail party was given to celebrate the occasion, but Gregg was not invited.  When Gregg met his team, they turned out to be totally untrained Vietnamese with whom he had no way of communicating.  Gregg said they looked childlike.  Later he further learned that they were ethnic-Vietnamese from Thailand and had never set foot in Vietnam.  The potential for disaster was enormous. Gregg had no intention of backing out, but the truth behind the operation eventually revealed, and things worked out for the best. The operation was exposed as a fraud.  It turned out that a corrupt principal agent had hoodwinked CIA officers in Bangkok and had “taken the money and run.”  The mission was cancelled.

However, Pot Shards does not serve as some expression of some longstanding of primal doubt.  Gregg never moved about stating “Something is rotten in the Agency.”  Readers discover that through coping with those problems he learned not only what to do, but more importantly, “how not to do it.”  Gregg could recognize what was good, as good.  Gregg also worked with many in CIA who were true professionals.  He modeled his own management and decision making style in part from theirs. Gregg’s loyalty to his country and conviction toward duty was surpassed by no other.  He is proud of his years in CIA. So much of that experience was central to his personal life.  Through CIA, he met some life-long friends.  Through CIA, he met his wife.

Gregg makes it clear that his wife Margaret (“Meg”) has been central to his life.  A fortuitous encounter while hailing a taxi at Washington, DC’s Union Station set off of chain of interesting events that led to their life-long partnership.  Unbeknownst to Gregg, Meg, fluent in Russian, was actually Gregg’s superior in the Operations branch at CIA when they met.  However, as Gregg makes clear he was irresistibly taken by her combination of beauty, intellect, and charm, which made her something supreme to him.  Whether accompanying him in Japan, Korea, or Burma or remaining back in the US with their three children while Gregg served in Vietnam, she was the rock on which Gregg was able to build a career while raising a family. Relating the course of their marriage, Gregg leaves no doubt that meeting Meg was the best luck he ever had.

As Gregg rose through the ranks at CIA, he saw more clearly how many policies that drove CIA activities were not carefully considered and constructed. Gregg saw how euphonious policy speeches by political officials would often be based on captivating assessments of positive outcomes and capabilities of foreign partners not based in reality. He could see that near desperation on wanting a situation to be certain way led many, even the well-intentioned, to project their thinking on that of senior foreign counterpart, or worse, an adversary.  Only a negative outcome would reveal the error of a flawed approach for some.  In the early years of the US involvement in Vietnam Gregg witnessed this.  Gregg recalled accompanying US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to Vietnam in 1963. McNamara was told by General Paul Harkins, who commanded the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MACV) that “We will be out of here with a military victory in six months.”  McNamara was disturbed by the unrealistic reporting, and told US President Lyndon Johnson that things were really not as good as Harkins’ people seemed to think they were.  Gregg also recalled a war game in 1964 on the use of airpower in the North Vietnam.  He participated with: General Maxwell Taylor, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Earl Wheeler, US Army Chief of Staff; General Curtis LeMay, US Air Force Chief of Staff; John McCone, CIA Director; and, in the presence of McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser.  Gregg, as the CIA representative of the Blue Team, gave CIA’s analysis of the plan to bomb North Vietnam.  Gregg described the rationale of the plan and then proceeded to explain why it would fail.  The rest of that story will not be spoiled here.  One will have to read Pot Shards to discover what the response to Gregg was from the many powerful men in the room.  Gregg’s description of it all makes the moment palpable.

Writing about his second tour in Vietnam, Gregg provides good lessons on how to function effectively as a manager or leader under extremely adverse circumstances.  His lessons hold true for professions beyond intelligence for they primarily concern human nature and the wonders and realities of human interaction.  There were many difficult experiences that were a part of that period.  One evening Gregg received a frantic call from a member of his crew who he described as a gifted and committed paramilitary officer, with several tough tours under his belt.  The officer had married a Vietnamese war widow with children and lived in her Bien Hoa apartment.  He had just returned from a mission to find one of his children “desperately ill.”  Gregg rushed to the officer’s apartment with medical assistance in tow.  Yet, by the time he arrived, he found the tragic scene of a beautiful young girl, eight years old, lying silent and still, with her frightened siblings and anguished mother, who was being comforted by the officer.  The girl was confirmed dead and the officer asked Gregg to take her away.  Gregg picked up the child and walked out.  Doing so reminded him of carrying his own small daughters Lucy and Alison to bed after they had fallen asleep. He searched for an answer on how to handle the situation.  This was a CIA matter and had to be kept confidential.  Gregg eventually decided to bring the child to the emergency room of the US Army hospital at Long Binh, where US Army Military Police told him where to go to have the body cared for.

In this segment of Pot Shards, there are also fascinating stories of Gregg’s exploits in combat.  He was in the thick of things as CIA Regional Officer in Military Region 3 (War Zone D).  There are accounts of Gregg managing paramilitary operations and interrogations of his crew.  He flew with forward controllers, directing fire support for US and allied troops.  He described radio communications from battles, the descriptions of which bring the reader right to the scene.  Gregg’s efforts were appreciated by US and allied commanders he worked with such as: General James Hollingsworth (US);  General John McGiffert (US); General Nguyen Van Minh (South Vietnam); General Jangnai Sohn (Korea); and General Roh Tae-woo (Korea); Colonel Nguyen Cong Vinh (South Vietnam); and, Colonel Bach Van Hien (South Vietnam).

On his second tour, Gregg could still see how different ideas, among policy and decision makers, about what was truly happening in there impacted the decisions being made and the lessons the US military as well as other security organizations as CIA, were learning from the experience.  At the very end of his tour in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams hosted a lunch for Gregg at his MACV Headquarters in Saigon, a place where he had been excoriated in the past.  At lunch, Gregg sat next to Abrams and six or eight of his subordinates.  He felt Abrams was the best of the three commanders the US sent to Vietnam.  Knowing Abrams had been in Vietnam for some time, Gregg asked him how long it had actually been.  Abrams proudly responded, “Six years.”  Gregg then asked him how he kept going, and Abrams stated, “Well, I keep learning things.”  Gregg then politely asked him what he had learned so far, and Abrams replied that just finished reading Bernard Fall’s Hell in a Very Small Place, an account of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Abrams said that he “now” understood Fall’s reasoning as to why the French had failed to reestablish their colonial rule in Vietnam.  When Gregg asked “How did Fall explain it,” Abrams explained, “Fall said that the French lost because they failed to politically organize the terrain.  I think I understand that now, but I would not have understood that a year ago.”  Gregg had no response to that, but explained that when he later saw pictures of heavy US battle tanks, named after Abrams, crashing around Iraq and Afghanistan, he thought of Abrams’ answer.

Through his achievements in Vietnam, Gregg developed a reputation in CIA as a very wise and capable officer.  He knew how to present ideas and concepts to develop agreement or consensus on issues. Bringing his thoughts to precise declarations took skill.  This was one of the many skills that Gregg honed through interactions with a number of accomplished professionals.  One who helped Gregg elevate his capabilities while he served in his next overseas assignment as CIA Station Chief in Seoul, was US Ambassador Philip Habib.  Habib was gruff and outspoken.  However, by Gregg’s account, he understood people well and was an excellent diplomat for whom he developed tremendous respect.  Gregg indicates that it was Habib’s maneuvering that help to save the life of liberal South Korean politician, Kim Dae-jung, after he had been kidnapped from his Tokyo hotel room by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA).  Habib never accused the Korean President Park Chung-hee of ordering the kidnapping but sent a message to him explaining that the US was aware of the action and hoped he could do everything to keep Kim alive.  This allowed Park a chance to avoid direct embarrassment and contrive a story in which he accused rogue elements of the Korean government had alone committed the act, and in which he took credit for saving Kim.  Gregg said Habib’s astute handling of the situation kept Kim alive and allowed Park to save face.  Gregg explained saving face was always a major concern in Asia.  Habib’s actions allowed Washington’s relations with Seoul to improve.

Gregg completed his career at CIA on a high note at the US National Security Council.  He had achieved success maintaining an ethic of his own, a moral code.  There was goodness living inside a good man.  He saw the greater good that would result from his actions against Communism.  Gregg was invited to join the administration of US President Ronald Reagan as the National Security Adviser to then Vice President George H.W. Bush.  His job made use of all of his skills and experience from CIA.  During those six years with Bush, Gregg traveled to 65 countries.  Along with those visits came his attendance at endless formal events.  Gregg recounts some of rather unusual happenings at such gatherings, providing readers with a gift bag of humorous stories.  Yet, while in the Reagan administration, his self-image was put to the test.  Gregg dedicates a chapter to a painful period of that service: IranContra, which was the purported attempt by the administration to sell surplus arms to Iran in exchange for it to ensure the release of US hostages being held in Lebanon.  Claims that Gregg was involved with that matter were invalidated.  Gregg’s account of it all is captivating.

As Ambassador to South Korea in the administration of President George H.W. Bush, Gregg successfully made use of his experience at CIA as well as the White House.  However, Gregg did not tap into his training as an intelligence officer to manipulate Korean officials or simulate closeness with Koreans he met.  There was no deception at all. Gregg was genuine, natural, in his interactions and that is what helped him gain their respect and confidence.  There was a type of communion between Gregg and many of his senior Korean counterparts.  One of the issues Gregg was determined to confront as ambassador was the continuing negative note in US-South Korean relations over the alleged US involvement in the Kwanju Uprising of 1980.  Then Korean President Chun Doo-hwan had brutally cracked down on protests in Kwanju in the wake of the arrest of Kim Dae-jung on charges of treason. At least two hundred Koreans were killed in the streets.  Chun claimed that the US had fully supported his actions.  That was not true, but by the time Gregg arrived in Korea as ambassador, hostility toward the US was still strong in the city.  The US Cultural Center in Kwangju was often attacked with fire bombs by rioters trying to drive the US out.  Gregg after consulting with others, including Kim Dae-jung, went to Kwangju in January 1990.  While there, Gregg met with six leaders of anti-US groups for over three hours.  Gregg explained that he came to Kwangju to lessen the hostility that the people in the city seemed to hold for the US.  Gregg explained to them that the US was not connected at all to the incident, and many of the actions by the US at that time, such as moving an aircraft carrier to Pusan were not a show of support for Chun. That particular move was meant to signal to North Korea not to intervene.  The anti-US protesters believed the US was close to Chun administration, but Gregg let it be known that there was general distaste for it.  In that vein, Gregg explained, that at the time, the Reagan administration had agreed to receive Chun at the White House if Chun agreed to lift the death sentence imposed on Kim Dae-jung, and to release him from prison.  Most important in the conversation was Gregg’s apology over the fact the US had remained silent for so long on the Kwangju issue.  Gregg diffused the hostility toward the US and attacks on the Cultural Center in Kwangju stopped.  Gregg explained his first visit to Kwangju was deeply valuable in showing him how Koreans can hold feelings of han (deep-seated resentment) when they are dealing with events caused by others and which they feel are unjustified, immoral, and unfair.  When Gregg made his first visit to Pyongyang in April 2002, he explains that he encountered the same feelings of han that he had encountered in Kwangju twelve years before.  However, he notes that lessons learned in Kwangju were helpful as he tried to establish a dialogue and some degree of trust between his North Korean hosts and himself.  Ambassador Philip Habib certainly would have been proud of Gregg’s performance.

There is much more in Pot Shards to enjoy!  It is a book one will want to read again and again.

Quam bene vivas referre, non quam diu!  (It is how well you live that matters, not how long!)  There have been a few stories written about Gregg in books, articles, in anecdotal form.  Many were written in the troubled time of the Iran-Contra Affair.  Pot Shards presents the true life and times of Gregg, an individual who contributed greatly to US foreign and national security policy. Readers are taken on a journey through Northeast and Southeast Asia and halls of power in Washington, DC.  Readers will also discover how much Gregg valued others and his value to humanity.  Gregg continues to make a valuable contribution to US foreign and defense policy efforts as a private citizen.  Pot Shards is an absolute pleasure to read.  Without reservation, greatcharlie.com highly recommends Pot Shards to everyone.

By Mark Edmond Clark