Food for Thought for US Companies Maintaining Robust Operations in China despite Beijing’s Strained Relations with Washington

The Great Wall of China (above) actually consists of numerous walls built over two millennia across northern China and southern Mongolia. The most extensive version of the wall dates from the Ming dynasty. Despite the Great Wall’s construction, China has always been relatively open to contact and trade with foreigners. The Communist Party of China would explain that due to such openness, in more recent times, China was the victim of Western “imperialist,” “capitalist” countries that reaped huge benefits from it. Many foreign companies currently operate in China, but their host, quite different from the past, is a world power. The Communist Party calls China’s success the vindication of an ancient civilization after a ‘century of humiliation.” China desires to take the title of the dominant power in the world and in its quest has created a challenging situation with the US. US companies in China must closely watch how US-China relations “progress,” and well-consider what prospective outcomes could mean for them.

Many in the US government’s foreign and national security policy bureaucracies and the US Congress with the responsibility to monitor what China is doing apparently do not want to tell too much about its actions and intentions and what its intelligence services are doing against the US, possibly for fear of metaphorically frightening the horses,  the US public. The Communist Party of China has at least demonstrated to itself that it had all the cleverness to outwit, outmaneuver, and surpass some preceding US administrations in its quest to establish the People’s Republic as the world’s dominant power. China’s accomplishments in that direction are now recognized by many policy experts as being far more significant than once realized. Relatively recent, popular books on US-China relations cut to the foundation of that which was perhaps previously satisfying and assuring in US policy circles about Beijing’s actions and intentions. While is far from exhaustive, among list of such books that greatcharlie has read or reread on the matter are: Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (Henry Holt and Company, 2015); Steven Mosher, Bully of Asia: Why China’s Dream is the New Threat to World Order (Regnery Publishing, 2017); Robert Spalding, Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept (Portfolio, 2019); and, Bill Gertz, Deceiving the Sky: Inside Communist China’s Drive for Global Supremacy (Encounter Books, 2019). Those with a keen interest in what has popularly been called “The China Threat” surely possess copies of one or more of these texts and likely have frequently made a long arm for copies in their libraries for reference. Though recognizing their popularity, greatcharlie would not dare hint at some rank or order of them for it would only open the door to judgments of its choices which is beside the matter. For its April 30, 2021 post, greatcharlie reviewed Gertz’s Deceiving the Sky. Of course, a treasure trove of excellent, recent academic books on US-China relations have been presented by university press and think tank publishers, which includes a few greatcharlie has appreciated and recommends: Michael E. O’Hanlon and James Steinberg, A Glass Half Full?: Rebalance, Reassurance, and Resolve in the U.S.-China Strategic Relationship (Brookings Institution Press, 2017); Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the Chinese State (Oxford University Press, 2018); Clyde Prestowitz, The World Turned Upside Down: America, China, and the Struggle for Global Leadership (Yale University Press, 2021); and, Ryan Hass, Stronger: Adapting America’s China Strategy in an Age of Competitive Interdependence (Yale University Press, 2021).

Despite readily discernible differences of each text, their respective discussions harmonize on the point that China is in the midst of implementing a strategy to supplant the US as the world’s dominant power. Some say the deadline for this takeover is 2049, the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic, but others believe it may come earlier. (Some policy circles in the US have assessed dispiritedly that it has happened already.) To that extent, on an additional common point, the authors explain how preceding US administrations, with an apparent tinge of romanticism, misguidedly believed that the US could somehow guide and manage China’s industrialization, trade and overall economic development and thereby impact its political and social development. They also explain how, in some instances, the US government has unwittingly assisted China in achieving its goal of world dominance. In fact, each author essentially declares that China is a national security challenge for the US and its allies. China has made that very clear by building island seabases to secure claims of sovereignty over waters in the South China Sea, conduct overflights of the airspace and naval incursions into the waters of US allies in the region, regularly organize parades of their latest weapon systems, and marches of tens of thousands of men, stupefying to the eyes. The authors by in large suggest that the US should implement a more competitive strategy toward China, as it really is, to get a handle on it, by using all instruments of national power and urging US allies in Asia and outside to do the same. The efforts of the aforementioned authors, and many authors of notable books not discussed here, to expose China for the danger they believe it poses is driven not by antipathy but rather by evidence. There is materiality on the balance of negative probabilities which they have dug up in their research and revealed in their works. 

Given what generally presented, it would appear that China may not be the safest country for US companies to operate in at the present. Being steeped in matters concerning China, and they certainly are, one might presume that senior executives of firms there have already formed positions. Perhaps the best answer for senior executives of US companies is to consider moving their operations to a country that presents no risk or at a minimum, far less risk than China at the moment while the opportunity still exists. Yet, as many US companies are operating robustly in China, clearly moving out is not the course that all senior executives would agree upon. With un fil di voce, greatcharlie, cautiously takes on the task of shining some light on why they would continue operating in China despite problems their firms could face as a result of a collapse in US-China relations or even conflict between the two countries. Some not so subtle changes in attitudes and behaviors of Chinese officials toward the US in recent times are examined to develop insights on specific reactions that should be expected from Beijing. The possibility is considered that Beijing may have plans to make their companies targets of its wrath in the event such dark days come. Simply with the possibility of trouble on the horizon, it would seem their respective companies will soon become targets of China’s public security and intelligence services in very apparent ways. Along with think tank scholars, academics, policy analysts, and military and diplomatic officials, journalists, and students that would hopefully be an interested audience for this essay, greatcharlie would hope that senior executives of US companies with considerable operations in China, might take note as it directly concerns their efforts. Absent from the discussion is any mention of the identities of companies that have placed themselves in, or may have in some way fallen into, a somewhat precarious position in China as greatcharlie believes that information is immaterial, away from the heart of the matter. As for the senior executives of US companies, they are only referred to in the third person as the sole goal here is to touch upon the likely prospective broad range of thinking among them, not to throw the spotlight upon anyone. Make no mistake, greatcharlie is not offering any business advice to anyone. It is stated without pretension that such would be out of its province, and any impressions of the kind caused by this writing should not be given flight. The aim is to provide a look at some important issues from a new angle, provoke thought, and contribute to the greater discourse on the matter at hand. Non enim parum cognosse, sed in parum cognito stulte et diu perseverasse turpe est, propterea quod alterum communi hominum infirmitati alterum singulari cuiusque vitio est attributum. (For it is not having insufficient knowledge, but persisting a long time in insufficient knowledge that is shameful; since the one is assumed to be a disease common to all, but the other is assumed to be a flaw to an individual.)

People’s Liberation Army forces on parade in Beijing (above). In the past, US administrations believed the US could somehow guide and manage China’s industrialization, trade and overall economic development and thereby impact its political and social development. Some scholars assert that in certain instances, the US government unwittingly assisted China in achieving its goal of becoming the world’s dominant power. China is surely a national security challenge for the US and its allies now. It has made that very clear by building island seabases to secure claims of sovereignty over waters in the South China Sea, conduct overflights of the airspace and naval incursions into the waters of US allies in the region, regularly organize, parades of their latest weapon systems, and marches of tens of thousands of men, stupefying to the eyes.

“Perfidious Communist China”

“Perfidious Albion” is the nickname that French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte would use to acidulously refer to his arch rival Great Britain, which he considered to be treacherous in international affairs, distrustful of foreigners, and had a knack for frustrating his plans. Albion is a literary or poetic term most often used for Britain or England of Ancient or historical times. The term, “Le perfid Albion,” was said to have been first used by Augustin-Louis, Marquis de Ximenès, the 18th century French poet and playwright. In the same vain that the term, “Perfidious Albion,” was used by Napoleon, perhaps the term, “Perfidious Communist China,” could be used in Washington in reference to China as US leaders must remain suspicious and distrustful of it. Leaders of the Communist Party of China do not leave any room for doubt that they are determined to bring down the US in order to claim the title of dominant power in the world. Moreover, they are clearly willing to use whatever jiggery-pokery it takes and use, so far within tolerable limits, the aggression needed to achieve that goal. 

Becoming the world’s dominant power may not seem to some as a worthy pursuit for a developed, industrialized country. The US essentially fell into the role and has held it as a matter of events, fate, and necessity, though arguably some political leaders in the early years of the 20th century, such as President Theodore Roosevelt, envisioned the country reaching the top. Many countries and national leaders in the past two centuries that sought the mantle can now be found upon what former US President Ronald Reagan in 1982 referred to as the “ash heap of history.” Yet, it is the Communist Party of China’s pursuit nonetheless, and Beijing seems to be moving inexorably toward that goal. The strategy to reach its objective apparently from the start was far larger in conception than some in US foreign and defense policy and business circles still appear willing to consider. 

The words of the Chinese officials have begun to reflect the Communist Party of China’s unsheathed antipathy toward the US. The Party, itself, might explain the words of the Chinese officials rightfully manifest the tone of a country once victimized, yet not demoralized by Western “imperialist,” “capitalist” countries that reaped benefits from it. (Truth be told, by the late 1800s, China was “carved up like a melon” by foreign powers competing for spheres of influence over trade and territory.)  The Party line is that China’s success is the vindication of an ancient civilization after a “century of humiliation.” Their words have the flavor of officials from a country that has been executing a clearly defined strategy to unseat the US as the world’s dominant power. It often smacks of something personal for members of the Communist Party of China. With regard to the officials and diplomats of the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this behavior was briefly discussed in the June 30, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “Commentary: China’s Coronavirus Tack Includes More Abrupt Officials and Political Warfare; Its Diplomatic Tool Must Endure the Consequences.”

Such qualities in Chinese officials words could be ascribed to those expressed by the People’s Republic of China delegation led by the Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi, and People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Wang Yi at bilateral meeting with a US delegation in Anchorage, Alaska in March 2021. The US delegation led by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan. Blinken, indeed, started the meeting off by telling the delegation from China that the US intended to address “deep concerns” over the treatment of the Chinese citizens in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and the situation with Taiwan. However, Yang responded boldly, taking a bit of time to express sharp criticism of the US over what he described as its struggling democracy, poor treatment of minorities, and over its foreign and trade policies.

Yang’s words of reproach and his demeanor were completely out of character for an opening statement, particularly a very public one, for a bilateral meeting between industrialized powers. If the matter were not so serious and the prospects for improved relations between the two countries so grim, it might have been characterized as satire and marked down as a response. Needless to say concerning the speeches given by the two senior officials of the Chinese delegation in Anchorage, bon mot, they were not! Previously, there was an apparent Chinese doctrine of moderation in talks with other countries. Calmness and authority was once shown not only in diplomacy but in all circumstances by officials. This more assertive approach as of late has pulled Chinese officials from their more traditional conservative, stolid posture.

Overall, Yang, as well as Wang when he spoke immediately after him, comported themselves with an astringency which some critics would agree uncloaked the true nature of the regime. Certainly, as discussed in greatcharlie’s April 30, 2021 post, one could not help but get the impression by the vexatious words used lately by Chinese negotiators that all talks and perhaps the overall situation with the US, something even more is going on with Beijing’s thinking. It may very well be that leaders of the Communist Party of China have been satisfied enough with its accomplishments and ongoing progress towards surpassing the US that they have approved behavior by officials in interactions with foreign counterparts that would indicate the transition of power has already occurred. In the New American Bible, it is written in Luke 6:45: “A good person out of the store of goodness in his heart produces good, but an evil person out of a store of evil produces evil; for from the fullness of the heart the mouth speaks.”

In its April 30, 2021 post, greatcharlie also postulates that the Chinese officials appear to be presenting themselves as symbols of national resistance to US power. The Chinese officials wanted not just the US delegation, but the world to pay heed to their exhortations concerning the US. Such public behavior is part of what is known as united front work under Communist Party of China. During the current rule of the People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping, united front work calls for the never-ending, enthusiastic promotion of the Communust Movement, the Communist Party of China, Xi, and the People’s Republic, and a lot of other things. The Communist Party of China is happy to foster animus toward the US wherever it may be found in the world as well as cause foment over such where it can. James Baldwin, the 20th century US novelist, playwright, essayist, poet, and activist, rightly recognized in his fascinating September 23, 1979 New York Times interview: “The world changes according to the way people see it, and if you alter, even but a millimeter the way people look at reality, then you can change it.”

The future situation is not entirely clear. One might reasonably suspect that while Beijing wants a peaceful resolution to the most stressing geopolitical issues it faces with regard to the US, it is uncertain whether they would even imagine accepting a balanced one. Real success for Beijing may very likely mean achieving some major advantages across issues in contention with the US. Looking at the extreme alternative, measuring what it might lose against what it might gain in some limited use of force, its judgments are likely balanced on perceptions of the will of the US to act and to sacrifice in such a way to actually protect its interests and allies in the region. Another factor included in the forecasts of Beijing’s moves would perhaps be the temperament of Xi. Conflict of any kind would have a dreadful impact on US companies in China. The lead up to any turn for the worse would likely mean problems for their operations and their employees in-country. As would be expected, some US companies have moved out or have expressed plans to move out. Other companies appear to be tiptoeing in the same direction. Still, there are those firms that are not just reluctant, but unwilling to take a new course. 

People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping (above). In an April 30, 2021 post, greatcharlie postulates that the Chinese officials appear to be presenting themselves on the world stage as symbols of national resistance to US power. That was apparent during a bilateral meeting in Anchorage , Alaska in March 2021. Chinese officials wanted not just the US delegation, but the world to pay heed to their exhortations concerning the US. Such public behavior is part of what is known as united front work. Under the current rule of the People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping, Chinese officials appear required to engage in a never-ending, enthusiastic promotion of the Communust Movement, the Communist Party of China, Xi, and the People’s Republic, and a lot of other things.

Do Not Rely on Beijing’s Goodwill!

Knowing what is wrong is not as great as knowing how to fix the problem. Moreover, one must accept there is a problem and be willing to fix it. In his philosophical and autobiographical treatise, “Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences” (1637), the renowned 17th French philosopher René Descartes wrote: “And thus, the actions of life often not allow any delay, it is a truth very certain that, when it is not in our power to determine the most true opinions we ought to follow the most probable.” In the small hours of the morning, one might imagine US executives look within to find the truest answer to how to proceed given all that they have been informed of respectively. 

What greatcharlie has discovered in its own research and the voluminous scholarly sources that support the view that danger lies ahead is that from the aggregate of respective discussions in recent books and other publications in this vein, this idea can be confidently drawn by business executives in question, too! More so, executives sophisticated enough to create a successful space for their companies in China have sufficient information available to them even beyond what outside experts offer, to include reports from the US government, that would allow them to grasp the potential impact of decisions they might make. Undoubtedly, capable and diligent regional specialists in their own companies have collected and presented similar information on the dangers of remaining in China. Everything asserted about the threat Beijing poses to US companies can be substantiated by a history of necessary commiserations between company senior executives and decision-makers of the Communist Party of China.

Yet, while it is most apparent that China’s recent past clearly is not without stain, that fact appears to be by the by to those senior executives of US companies working robustly in China who choose to remain. They will not allow their minds to be biased by theories and suspicions suggested by those who do not have the type of investment at stake in China as their respective companies. They are unwilling to condescend to what they would call fear mongering about the Communist Party of China. China appears to have won many of them and those in that number will hear nothing against it. In this discussion, greatcharlie leaves aside any suggestion that the continued investment by US companies in China is the result of some urge among their senior executives to act in a knowingly dangerous way, l’appel du vide. What those business executives may believe is that in their own assessments of Beijing, they have the advantage of being well informed through what they might characterize as their own most informative, “regular” contacts and “substantive” conversations with officials of Chinese government bureaucracies and leaders of the Communist Party of China. They may believe their relationships with them are strong, bien entretenue. Many appear willing and some comforted by refusing to look beyond what Beijing presents about itself. In that respect, some have become metaphorically tone deaf to warnings concerning all urgent matters now underway. It was expressed by Aristophanes in Clouds (423 BC): “To invoke solely the weaker arguments and yet triumph is a talent worth more than a hundred thousand drachmae.”

As for Beijing’s guile and maneuvering, some of the senior executives even at this point would doubtlessly declare that the evidence that has publicly presented on its malign actions and intentions as something akin to an albeit a peculiar rag bag of singular happenings. Ironically, they might sarcastically note that some new wrinkle of China’s malevolence comes to light practically “every ten seconds” as the 20th century US humorist Sam Levenson might remark to defuse the tension caused by the subject.

In A Mountain of Crumbs: A Memoir (Simon & Schuster, 2010), Elena Gorokhova recounts growing up under the Communist government of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, and tells of her discovery of the hidden truths about adulthood and her country’s profound, brazen lies. Gorokhova recounts: “The rules are simple: they lie to us, we know they’re lying, they know we know they’re lying but they keep lying anyway, and we keep pretending to believe them.” The regime in Communist China operates in a similar deceitful fashion both at home and abroad. There are doubtlessly many more aspects of Beijing’s thinking and behavior that have not as yet been discerned or at least publicly reported. They may become known only after a situation literally blows up. One might state that within the Communist Party of China, the powers of evil are exalted, anything negative is possible. 

The latest word from the US Intelligence Community is that the US supply chain from China now faces real threat. There are a few normal factors that can affect US supply chains, including production shortages, trade disruptions and natural disasters. However, the US National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) has warned that “actions by foreign adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities in US supply chains pose unique counterintelligence and security threats.” According to the NCSC, foreign adversaries are increasingly using companies and trusted suppliers as “attack vectors” against the US for espionage, information theft and sabotage. Officials warned that those actions compromise the products and services that “underpin America’s government and industry” and warned of the effects–“lost intellectual property, jobs, economic advantage, and reduced military strength.”

What is shared by the US government on Beijing’s plans and intention toward companies foreign working in China should be fully heeded by US companies. Beijing would of course become indignant claiming Western arrogance would lead accusers to say an idea was stolen. Perhaps Chinese government spokespersons would rely upon words similar to those of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s fictional character Sherlock Holmes, who in “The Adventure of the Dancing Men,” the third story of 13 in the The Return of Sherlock Holmes (1905), stated: “What one man can invent, another can discover.” 

Simple facts can go some way to explain what might be recognized as a charitable position. To that extent, distortions of truth from Beijing or other trusted or favored sources are far more satisfying as a result of an infatuation with a present preoccupation. In arguments, the business executives will mistakenly grab the nearest evidence to hand that would uniquely support their perspective. What they might characterize as the “stirring of alarm” would likely be inexplicable to those who have not abandoned the idea that China acts in goodwill. They would likely assert that China’s sense of a rivalry between itself and the US is natural given geopolitical, geostrategic, economic considerations alone. Indeed, among those reluctant to accept what present evidence insists upon, one might find that almost every decision to carry on with their current business plans in China is likely founded upon a mix of reality and imagination.

As reported in the Wall Street Journal on March 26, 2021, in the weeks that surrounded the inauguration of President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, Chinese leaders waged an information campaign aimed at the US business community. It included a flurry of speeches, letters and announcements. Of special note was a February 2021 speech by the Communist Party of China’s  foreign policy director, Yang, to a virtual audience of US business leaders and former government officials. Initially laying out a very positive situation for investment and trade opportunities in China, he then offered the stern warning that Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are “red lines” that anyone from the US should remain silent about. He also made the demand that the business community lobby the new Biden-Harris administration to reverse Trump administration policies toward China which he excoriated. 

Without the intent of being folsom, greatcharlie states that there are highly qualified individuals that serve as senior executives at companies. In their respective fields, these professionals are generally known and admired for their astute judgments, being steady and reliable, and having keen minds and the laudable capacity to reason. Finding answers to such situations were what the executives were hired for. Being incommoded by the regulations of China’s bureaucracies would by no means be new to them and they would expect to find a way to work around any problems. Their thoughts would remain focused on optimizing their respective companies’ investments in China. That would be the vintage way of thinking, so to speak.

One might go as far as to suppose that some US business executives may feel that if accomplishing that meant being under some recherché obligation to Beijing, they would accept that. They doubtlessly would expect to gain additional favor from the Communist Party of China through such loyalty. As a bonus of taking such a step, they might believe they would be taking the steps that would allow them to avoid a serious dilemma in the near future. (Such would hardly be a schema Beijing would feel obligated to follow, and indeed, something one should not plan for.) One might expect to occasionally hear expressions of appreciation from US companies to the most senior leaders of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people for their “magnanimity.” In fact, they have been heard. Those companies could do no greater service for Beijing than to take such a course. Those in the US outraged by China’s overall behavior toward the US and its allies would very likely call it a perverse allegiance.

Perhaps conditions for some companies were never idyllic to start, and any new circumstances that arise are just one more hurdle to overcome. One might suppose that for senior executives of US companies in China, navigating any problems that have arisen so far has been a bit similar to white water rafting. It is a challenge, but in the end overall satisfying. To speak more in metaphors, senior executives of most US companies still operating in China likely feel that they successfully managed the disturbed sea of those relations by monitoring essential currents and will achieve further success by navigating them intelligently. Indeed, in many cases having spent years inveigling their way into many meetings with Communist Party of China leaders and government officials they likely feel that have created links with them near equal to those that exist between those same Party leaders and officials that the executives of China’s state-run companies. They are likely confident that as a result of those linkages, their companies’ investments In China are to the greatest extent possible shielded from any possible troubles in relations between Beijing and Washington. In corporate conference rooms and meetings with Communist Party of China or other government officials, any dark imaginings of Beijing’s behavior evaporate fastest. Conceivably, ideas and attitudes expressed In those same conference rooms of US companies are very likely encapsulated with the quip: “I will believe it when I see it.” There may very well be companies planning to simply carry on even under the worst circumstances should it come to that. 

Yet, many have doubtlessly assessed that contrary to the reports of experts, they have so far had no reason to regret, nor do they believe they shall have any reason to regret their speculation in China. Until they are caused to accept anything to the contrary, one could imagine certain senior executives of US companies would happily seek to remain in their offices in China. The claim that Beijing could turn against them in some profound way may simply be a counterfactual. Perchance senior executives still engaged in robust operations in China believe Beijing’s intentions are the best and would refer to all of the negative talk of Beijing’s intentions as slander. Presumably, senior executives of US companies, having minimized in their own minds the danger that China presents, might suggest to other senior executives whose companies are similarly invested in China, that no one should get ahead of oneself in reaction to what they may have heard or observed of those companies that have moved out. Perhaps the retention of that mindset, a certain stubbornness among some, may be a prime obstacle in convincing them to open their eyes. Assuming that all have the best intentions at heart, one might believe that differences in thinking among senior executives of US companies are mostly a matter of clarification 

There are situations in which even the most accomplished business executives might find themselves helpless. No US firm should count upon the goodwill of Beijing to help see them through the storm of greatly deteriorated relations, or the catastrophe of a clash, between the US and China. Beijing time and again has proven that it is unworthy of such trust. Most US companies operating in China or have an extremely close relationship with Party leaders and government officials, they should not expect that they would be able to just carry-on as they have been no matter what. By the mere fact that they are Western companies representing Western capitalism, there would be a fairly good chance that they would fall afoul of the Communist regime in Beijing. That has been a reality all along.

To be as frank as possible, the Communist Party of China has no love for them. Without a shadow of doubt, many Party leaders yearn to reach that day in the future when China can show its true colors, declare broad powers over all foreign companies and severely alter terms of any signed agreements to immensely favor its own interests, if a firm is allowed to remain in China at all. Surely they believe there would be more than one parallel Chinese firm of its respective industry to replace just about every foreign entity, except those as the National Basketball Association (NBA), and could take on their markets even in the US.

Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi (above). In the weeks that surrounded the inauguration of US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris, Chinese leaders waged an information campaign aimed at the US business community. It included a flurry of speeches, letters and announcements. Of special note was a February 2021 speech by the Communist Party of China’s foreign policy director, Yang, to a virtual audience of US business leaders and former government officials. Initially laying out a very positive situation for investment and trade opportunities in China, he then offered the stern warning that Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan are “red lines” that anyone from the US should remain silent about. He also made the demand that the business community lobby the new Biden-Harris administration to reverse Trump administration policies toward China which he excoriated.

Recent Displays of Beijing’s Tactfulness toward Foreign Companies

The renowned English philosopher and physician, John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), wrote: “I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts.” There have been a few  fresh events in China concerning foreign companies operating there over the grave issue of members of China’s Uyghur ethnic minority from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in China’s far west, being used as forced labor in factories. They may provide some clues as to the sort of subterfuge and sophistry senior executives of US companies still operating in China should expect, and perhaps things even more intense. (In citing news articles concerning these events, greatcharlie felt some reluctance given a few US companies are directly mentioned in them and that information is central to understanding the events that occurred. However, to the extent that these incidents were well-supported in the news media, the sense that anything fresh about the firms was being revealed was mitigated.)

In an extensive new report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), a think-tank founded by Australia’s government, between 2017 and 2019, the Chinese government relocated at least 80,000 Uyghurs from Xinjiang in western China to factories across the country where they work “under conditions that strongly suggest forced labour.” The report further explains that the manufacturers using these transported Uyghurs supply at least 83 international companies making everything from footwear to electronics. Regarding the Uyghurs, the Chinese Communist Party is waging a targeted campaign against Uyghur women, men, and children, and members of other Turkic Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. Abuses have included coercive population control through forced abortion, forced sterilization, and involuntary implantation of birth control; the detention of more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in internment camps; forced labor in facilities nearby or affiliated with the internment camps; the destruction and closure of mosques and other religious sites, prevention of youths from participating in religious activities, forced political indoctrination or “re-education.” 

Beijing has denied all of these claims, declaring them to be unjust aspersions. It has stated that rather than running forced labor camps, it is providing vocational training, and that its measures are needed to fight extremism. Recall that Xinjiang was an issue broached by Blinken at the bilateral talks in Anchorage. In January, Washington had banned Xinjiang cotton used widely by clothing producers for Western markets. The US, the European Union, United Kingdom, and Canada have imposed sanctions on Chinese officials for alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang in March 2020. . China retaliated with sanctions on European lawmakers and institutions.

According to a March 27, 2021 Bloomberg report, Hennes & Mauritz AB (H&M), the Swedish multinational, expressed the view in March 2021 statements that it’s “deeply concerned by reports from civil society organizations and media that include accusations of forced labor and discrimination of ethnoreligious minorities.” It was a risky move for H&M given that China is one of the five biggest markets for the company in terms of revenue with 5.2% of the group’s total sales in 2020. The company had opened 505 stores in China as of November 30, 2020. The company’s access to China, the Communist Party of China, and to customers was put on the line. Almost immediately, H&M encountered what was characterized as backlash over its statements from the company concerning issues surrounding Xinjiang. The company quickly removed its statement on Xinjiang from its website, on a separate link on its homepage expressing the same stance on Xinjiang cotton remained active.

Authors of the news story notably recognized that China’s response to H&M was markedly stronger than its previous pushback when foreign brands crossed political lines. Xi had already set a red line on the issue of China’s human rights record, and foreign companies surely understood at that point that addressing the issue in any way would mean picking a side. In a briefing in Beijing, Gao Feng, a spokesman for the Chinese Commerce Ministry, essentially proscribed H&M’s statements as slanderous ravings. He reportedly said: “We can’t tolerate any forces bringing shame on and tarnishing the pure and flawless Xinjiang cotton.” He went on to state: “Chinese consumers have acted in response to the so-called business decisions made by some companies based on false information. We hope the relevant companies will respect market laws, correct wrong practices, and avoid the politicization of commercial issues.”

As would be expected, H&M’s statement was blasted by organizations such as the Communist Youth League and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on social media. However, there was also rising outcry and calls for a boycott on Chinese social media against an undated H&M statement over its website that also expressed concern about reports of forced labor in Xinjiang. At least six stores in the lower-tiered cities of Urumqi, Yinchuan, Changchun and Lianyunang have been shut down by the owners of the properties, according to mall operators in those areas who were contacted by Bloomberg. Local media have reported more closures and pictures showing H&M’s brand billboards being removedThe global clothing retailer’s outlets have also vanished on Apple Maps and Baidu Maps searches.

Adverse effects from the H&M’s statement about forced labor in the contentious region of Xinjiang have spread to other Western brands that have voiced their views on the matter. DW News noted that the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) declared in October 2020 that it was suspending cotton sourced from Xinjiang for the 2020-2021 fashion season, also citing concerns over that region’s human rights. BCI, formed in 2009 and based in Geneva, Switzerland  states that it was formed to make global cotton production better for the people who produce it, better for the environment it grows in and better for the sector’s future. Its goal is to transform cotton production worldwide by developing Better Cotton as a sustainable mainstream commodity. Members include US-based Nike, Germany-based Adidas, Japan-based Fast Retailing, as well as China-based ANTA. Certainly, BCI members would not comment idly on such a grave matter or any matter for that case.

As foreign companies speak out concerning Xinjiang and forced labor, they are being targeted for treatment. China’s government-aligned English language newspaper the Global Times cited Burberry and New Balance as having made “cutting remarks” about Xinjiang cotton two years ago. It also cited the brand Zara as having expressed a “zero-tolerance approach towards forced labor.” ANTA, a Chinese shoe brand announced it was quitting BCI and would continue buying Xinjiang cotton–prompting a spike in its share prices on Hong Kong’s Han Seng Index.

Chinese social media users expressed umbrage against Western sanctions over alleged abuses of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang province by ostracizing further global clothing and footwear brands. DW News quoted one “netizen” as stating: “If you boycott Xinjiang cotton, we’ll boycott you. Either Adidas quits BCI, or get out of China.” Social media posts in China have reportedly also mentioned the Japanese and US brands Uniqlo and Gap but it was unclear whether the people posting messages were private citizens or government plants online. Two popular Chinese television stars, Wang Yibo and Tan Songyun, reportedly said they would end promotional work for Nike over remarks it made in 2020. China’s People’s Daily newspaper began a social media campaign via the microblog Weibo, using a slogan translating as “I support Xinjiang cotton. Citing Reuters, DW News explained many Chinese online users said they would instead support local Asian brands such as Li Ning and ANTA, prompting share price surges in Hong Kong. The US government has called attention to China’s state-run social media campaign and boycott against foreign companies that refuse to use cotton from Xinjiang. State Department deputy spokeswoman Jalina Porter stated that tactic amounts to a state-run “corporate and consumer boycott.”

Taking a closer look at what has been directed at Nike, according Reuters it faces rather a singular social media storm in China over its statement concerning Xinjiang Indeed, anger with Nike reportedly erupted on Chinese social media late immediately after China’s netizens spotted a statement from the sporting goods giant saying it was “concerned” about reports of forced labour in Xinjiang and that it does not use cotton from the region. There is a well-known love affair among the Chinese people and basketball shoes worn by NBA players. It was no small matter. 

Topics around the Nike statement were among the highest trending on China’s Twitter-like social media Weibo the day it was revealed and the social media backlash had a wider fallout. It was in direct response to Nike’s statement concerning Xinjiang and social media criticism on social media, that the agency representing actor Wang Yibo stated on Weibo that he has terminated his contract as a representative for Nike. It was not apparent when exactly Nike had put out the statement. It did not have a date on it. Nike explained in the statement: “We are concerned about reports of forced labor in, and connected to, the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).” It also stated: “Nike does not source products from the XUAR and we have confirmed with our contract suppliers that they are not using textiles or spun yarn from the region.” To prevent further interference, Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of the state-run Global Times urged Western companies to be “highly cautious” and not to “suppress China’s Xinjiang” in a social media post. To do so, Hu anticipated, would “undoubtedly arouse the anger of the Chinese public,” he added. He did not single out any companies.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the 18th century philosopher, writer, and co)mposer of the then independent Calvinist city-state of Geneva, explained in The Social Contract (1762): “Virtue is a state of war, and to live in it we have always to combat with ourselves.” Naturally, foreign companies operating in China will attempt ameliorate and perhaps resolve Xinjiang controversy or any other with Beijing, senior executives of those companies be assured that the Communist Party of China’s memory of even temporary disrespectful acts and what its leaders may perceive as betrayal through declarations of concerns on what are in reality documented human rights abuses, substantiated by Western government sources, will be long.

A heavily secured industrial park in Xinjiang, China (above). In a report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, between 2017 and 2019, the Chinese government relocated at least 80,000 Uyghurs from Xinjiang in western China to factories across the country where they work “under conditions that strongly suggest forced labour.” The report also explains that manufacturers using these transported Uyghurs supply at least 83 international companies making everything from footwear to electronics. The Chinese Communist Party is waging a targeted campaign against Uyghur women, men, and children, and members of other Turkic Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. Abuses have included coercive population control through forced abortion, forced sterilization, and involuntary implantation of birth control; the detention of more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in internment camps. Beijing has denied such claims.

Experience Speaks?

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) As aforementioned, with consideration of a full range of facts on the current situation between the US-China, to include many discussed here, as well as other key business considerations, some US companies have accepted that the risks are too great to remain and rather than wait for a crisis to arise. To the senior executives of those companies, China’s true, malevolent nature appears to be self-evident. Aware of those practices first-hand, they watch likely in horror as other US companies confidently stroll into the Chinese tangles from which they avoided or feel they escaped. Hope undoubtedly remains even among those companies that have already left that Xi and the Communist Party of China are not intending anything tragic. Any positive prospects for their future reinvestment in China surely rest upon what comes next with Xi and the Biden-Harris administration.

Those with a turn of mind to commit themselves to a defense of China’s behavior as a “competitor” of the US, and commit to even greater investment there, may eventually find themselves obliged to be a bit more obedient to Beijing’s wishes if events cause the authoritarian Chinese government to make its true self clear to them. If that day comes, the sense of the scale of its malignant being and purpose will likely be overwhelming. Those dead-enders, though they would hardly see themselves as such, will discover just how masterful Beijing has been at deception, offering satisfying explanations and signing agreements that really had no meaning. 

Some senior executives whose companies remain in China may already fear doing anything to subvert Beijing and incurring its wrath upon their respective interests. Others will perhaps be paralyzed to act in a crisis having been sufficiently instilled with fearfulness over a perception that the Chinese government will become noisy and rough. Even then, reaching a low point but not yet bottom, it would not be too late to accept the loss, as wise business executives sometimes must do, and move out.

Fallaces sunt rerum species. (The appearances of things are deceptive.) The security of US companies, all foreign companies, working in China, is a subject greatcharlie previously broached on the individual employees of those companies might face. Certainly, security offices of any US companies whose executives and staff frequently visit China should have long since arranged opportunities to brief those employees on problems they could possibly face in China. Such briefings might include the discussion of ways to subtly execute defensive measures to defeat Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of State Security (MSS), PLA Joint Staff Department human intelligence groups, and any Communist Party of China intelligence organs (e.g., the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the super secret and malignant International (Liaison) Department, the United Front Work Department, and the Propaganda Department) from capturing information that meets their organizations’ immediate intelligence requirements as well as whatever information that managers of those spy organizations may deem useful otherwise.

What was presented in the discussion of the December 13, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “Meditations and Ruminations on Chinese Intelligence: Revisiting a Lesson on Developing Insights from Four Decades Ago” on security precautions employees of foreign companies must take in China seems worthy of review as background. The discussion is preclosed here. Only the more apposite points are presented.

As discussed, the foreign visitor is always a potential target for province and municipal offices of MPS and MSS. The capability of Chinese authorities to use technological means to keep a close eye on foreigners and detect, apprehend, and deal with those who protest and oppose the government has been enhanced immensely. Two sensational articles in the New York Times, “A Surveillance Net Blankets China’s Cities, Giving Police Vast Powers” dated December 17, 2019, and “Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras,” dated July 8, 2018, well lay out the increased use of technology in MPS and MSS surveillance efforts. Reportedly, as part of Xi’s effort to have the security services take on a greater role in China, he has launched a major upgrade of their surveillance capabilities. China, as a result, has become the world’s largest market for security and surveillance technology. It is reported that almost 300 million cameras have been installed in the country. Government contracts are supporting research and development into technologies that track faces, clothing and even a person’s gait. MPS officers on the beat have been observed using experimental gadgets such as facial-recognition glasses. In Zhengzhou, police and security services can use software to create lists of people. They can create virtual alerts when a targeted  individual approaches a specific location. They can acquire updates on people every hour or every day, and monitor anyone with whom those people have met, particularly if there exists a report that one or both individuals have committed an infraction.  Yet, while the new technology may ostensibly provide police and security services with a way to track criminals, it also improves their means to crack down on sympathizers of the protest movement in Hong Kong, critics of the Communist Party of China, and critics of the police and security services, themselves. Worse, it better enables the police and security services to target migrant workers who travel from the countryside to fill China’s factories and ethnic minority groups as the Uyghurs.

On the street, the surveillance of foreigners will typically be relatively light, calibrated to ensure utilization of an optimal number of officers and informants in the role of surveillance operatives in the field. Doing so also facilitates the monitoring process. The more surveillance one uses the more reports that must be reviewed to find one aggregate picture of what occurred. MPS counterintelligence officers will regularly collect and closely review reports on a foreigner’s behavior via informants among neighbors in the vicinity of their residence and locals among colleagues at work. They would be interested in knowing if they have engaged in behaviors that would make them open to recruitment. Their attitudes toward China and its system would be important. The friendships they have made would be of interest. From the reports of informants and technical surveillance, assessments of what type of temptations could be used, if necessary, to bring them to China’s side based on observations of the foreigner’s lifestyle. 

In its December 13th post, greatcharlie additionally cites Articles 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 15th session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress to explain that for citizens of the People’s Republic of China, the motivations of money ideology, conspiracy, and excitement do not factor in such a decision to come to call of their country’s intelligence services. The law requires them to do so. If any motivations at all could be said to factor in a Chinese citizen’s decision to obey the direction of an intelligence service, expectedly the Communist Party of China would list faith and adherence to the ideals of the Communist Revolution, the Communist Party of China, patriotism, and the homeland. Supposedly, revolutionary zeal drives the heart of China as “one beating heart.”

Since that writing, the NCSC provided, on Twitter, three articles from China’s National Intelligence Law of 2017, Cybersecurity Law of 2016, and, National Security Law of 2015. NCSC explained its aim in doing so was to help those entering an agreement with a company based in China better understand the legal landscape and that Chinese companies will provide data they obtain or information stored on their networks to China’s state security apparatus upon request. More directly, the NCSC wants US citizens to better understand by its message that Chinese companies and citizens are required to assist in intelligence efforts against them by law. Under Article 7 of the PRC’s National Intelligence Law (2017), NCSC cites: “All organizations and citizens SHALL support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts in accordance with the law, and shall protect national work secrets they are aware of.” Under Article 28 of the PRC’s Cybersecurity Law (2016), it cites, “Network operators SHALL provide technical support and assistance to public security and national security organs that are safeguarding and investigating criminal activities in accordance with the law.” Under Article 77 of the PRC’s National Security Law (2015), it cites, “Citizens and organizations SHALL provide the following obligations for safeguarding national security,” and then cites section specifically (5), which instructs: “Provide national security authorities, public security authorities, and military authorities with needed support and assistance.”

The foreign businessman, scientist, engineer, academic or any other type of professional  working closely with a Chinese counterpart in China may not be aware that he or she is being monitored by that same friendly colleague. It should be expected. When told, it may be so emotionally shocking to outsiders  that it may very well be near impossible to believe. Perhaps refusing to accept that reality is the only way a foreigner can continue to function comfortably in China. In any event, it is the responsibility of the Chinese citizen to engage in such activity under the National Security law. To that extent, friendship with Chinese colleagues may never be authentic as there is an element to the interaction between the foreigner and the Chinese citizen that is cloaked. China comes first. The foreigner is inconsequential to that reality. Ordinary people doing a little this and a little that for the MPS as well as the MSS is a norm.

Although it has not as yet become a commonplace problem, if a foreigner visiting China for the purpose of business or tourism, accepts  documents, notebooks, and books, the traveler might discover quite surprisingly that he or she is carrying items that contain sensitive data the possession of which could be considered criminal. Those illicit materials would have been presented to the traveler intentionally, perhaps even by a Chinese citizen with whom the traveler may have a positive personal relationship, almost certainly at the behest of MPS or MSS. It was said somewhere that it is terrible to find an enemy in a friend, but it is much worse not to find a friend in a friend. (Given the uncertainty of what may result from contact with Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence units, ordinary Chinese citizens typically will not seek out contact with them nor independently engage in activity with foreigners outside of the workplace on matters related to their work. They will focus on true personal relationships on personal matters, human interests.)

One must also be very cautious about accepting recording devices or recorded materials, or any devices, thumb drives, dvds, or materials that may include video or audio recordings unless one can be absolutely certain as to their contents. Documents contained in any of these media may prove to be government documents concerning confidential matters, and not any run-of-the-mill confidential matters at that. One must immediately open the documents and read them before those who presented them using a laptop or tablet. The review of the recordings posthaste could be passed off as an affected display of ebullience and appreciation of the gift and wonderment about what it holds. 

As things stand, from year to year, the situation has not gotten better in terms of stability and safety. If troubles between the US and China ever begin to arise with regularity, such as detainments of employees of US companies, one might expect some form of ransom will be discreetly demanded by Chinese officials with a warning not to acknowledge their villainy to the world. More than just an aggressive act, it would be an expression of Beijing’s power over those companies, designed to work in the psyche of the US business executives. If a US companies is resolute about remaining in China, it would to be willing to accept that the situation could change rapidly for the worse, new ground rules could be put in for operating in a flash, and it would know without doubt who is really in charge. They would need to accept that ties back to the US would have little meaning to Beijing. The Communist Party of China would surely delight in exercising such power over Western “capitalist” guests. The door opening in that direction of what is outlined here can already be heard creaking.

President Xi in his People’s Liberation Army uniform on parade (above). It would be more than likely that if a military conflict between the US and China arose on the greater world stage, Beijing would lash out at available US targets right at home such as US companies and their employees. Indeed, when leaders of Communist Party of China are exhausted of tricks and manipulations, they often turn to the cane. If US companies were to face such a situation, the matter would need to be put right by senior executives of those companies at the crisis point, if at all possible.

Prospective Problems Ahead

ata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt. (Fate leads the willing, and drags the unwilling.) As US companies, by their own devices, continue to entangle themselves in meshes with Beijing, they may be grooming themselves to become subject to its machinations. An impregnable collection of evidence already indicates that Beijing’s desire to control Western business communities attitudes and behavior toward nearly anything Chinese. Perhaps one day US companies will awaken to the true character of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government after it is too late. Once any extraordinary conduct is exhibited by Beijing toward one or more US companies  it would be almost impossible for the US government to chuck itself in the mix in a calibrated way that mitigates such steps as opposed to exacerbating the situation.

As it was explained in the 14th century by the English lawyer, author, and statesman, Saint Thomas More, “What is deferred is not avoided.” Caught in such a conundrum, it would be best if US companies had already laid plans to respond to such a contingency well in advance of it. It would be the only way to have a fighting chance of getting some handle on it. Complete consideration of Beijing’s immoral side must be part of that assessment. Exactly how business executives might intend to put the matter right on their side under such circumstances is unknown. In spite of contingency planning, it is hard to see from greatcharlie’s vantage point what cards US business executives could realistically play to sway Beijing in such a crisis. They would be in a weak position to negotiate relief from Beijing. Perhaps it was in the process of planning for such a contingency, that senior executives of such companies along with their security offices recognized that it was time to leave.

Conceivably, the senior executives of some US companies in China might hold the idea that they might serve as “go-betweens,” neutral emissaries, who, while loyal to their US homeland, are also loyal and responsive to their Chinese hosts, and assist in finding some settlement between the US and China during a conflict. The idea would unlikely interest Beijing in wartime. Despite any notions senior executives might have of their ties to China and relationship with leaders of the Communist Party of China, during a war, they would most certainly be tagged as enemy aliens, perhaps dangerous enemy aliens, and handled with due care by MPS and Party security organs. In an atrocious yet very possible scenario, they may be tasked to perform high profile duties against their will for the Party’s Propaganda Department. United Work Department and International Department operatives might force them without compunction to any point resembling a front line of the conflict to demonstrate the senior executives recognition that China was on the correct side of the struggle and any of its actions against the US were righteous. Chinese security services might force them to visit foreign capitals, accompanied of course, to give speeches on how the US allegedly may have wrongfully threatened China’s interest and caused the conflict. One could imagine a hundred possibilities and none of them would be good for the senior executives. At about that point, the business executives will have the truest and fullest understanding of the Communist Party of China.

Interestingly enough, any decision by Beijing  to take steps against one or more US companies would undoubtedly be a measure decided upon in its own contingency planning in the event of a sudden ratcheting up of contentious relations with Washington. To that extent, what might happen to US companies stranded in China in such circumstances would assuredly be a fixed fate. Leaders of the Communist Party of China, under such circumstances, would hardly be inveigled by the platitudes of foreign business executives to be more lenient toward their companies. Any Party leaders would feel both angered and shamed if that perception was created about them within the Party’s membership. It is imaginable that such a bargaining effort would be responded to violently.

Essentially, any breakdown in relations between the US and China, or worse, a military conflict, would have an unfortunate effect upon the position of US companies operating there. More than likely, it would cause Beijing to lash out at available US targets right at home such as those US companies and their employees. Indeed, when the brains of the leadership of Communist Party of China are exhausted of tricks and manipulations, they have often turned to the cane. If US companies were to face such a situation, the matter would need to be put right by senior executives of those companies at the crisis point, if at all possible.

The Way Forward

Aligning the suppositions offered here on thinking over remaining in China with specific senior executives of US companies operating in China undoubtedly would not be too difficult for numerous investigative journalists if they preferred to do so. Yet, as mentioned on the outset of this post, their identities are immaterial with regard to the objective here which was to provide a picture of the challenging circumstances that those business executives face particularly from China’s public security and intelligence services, shed light upon what they are likely discussing among their counsels, and present insights on the decisions they have reached given the paths they have taken.

If credit might be given to their line of thinking of those US business executives resolute about remaining in China, it might be provided by F. Scott Fitzgerald in a February 1936 Esquire magazine essay entitled, “The Crack-Up.” Fitzgerald explains: “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function. One should, for example, be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined to make them otherwise. This philosophy fitted on to my early adult life, when I saw the improbable, the implausible, often the “impossible” come true.” However, it cannot be denied that those executives are placing their respective companies’ interests in a vulnerable position by remaining on the ground in China. Some might call that a calculated risk. 

Worrisome is the possibility that some may be unable to fully grasp the effect of their own actions. If placed in a trying position by external events as a collapse in US-China relations or a military conflict between the two, it is hard to imagine how US business executives would preserve their respective companies’ operations in China or more generally, how they would actually act. They may very well be placing themselves in what could become a serious dilemma. Concerning those executives laser focused on the bottomline–some might say they should be, they might do better to employ their minds on the matter of the well-being of their employees and equities in China before there is some tumultuous event. Perhaps some would say greatcharlie is over-egging the pudding here. However, greatcharlie hopes only to be of some material assistance.

The world exists in an ordered universe and one expects everything to follow that design. There are patterns one can discern that establish order in the human mind. Illusion must never be chosen over fact. Any senior executive of a US firm operating in China should have already been sufficiently aware of how Beijing is acting. Sentiment is a poor substitute for true feeling and fact. Ignorance more often than not dissolves into tragedy. While they are in a position to reexamine the facts, they should do so while there is still time available. Qui ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit, nequiquam sapit. (A wise man whose wisdom does not serve him is wise in vain.)

Book Review: Bill Gertz, Deceiving the Sky: Inside Communist China’s Drive for Global Supremacy (Encounter Books, 2019)

People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping in People’s Liberation Army uniform (above). Successive US administrations, both Democrat and Republican, stuck to a belief that by maintaining good relations with China and conducting trade and other business with it, the Communist regime in Beijing would eventually evolve into a free market, democratic system. However, it is clear now that China has reverted to its Maoist Communist roots. Instead of becoming more moderate and more democratic, China has become a more repressive dictatorship domestically. Internationally, instead of becoming more integrated, China has emerged as a dangerous threat to peace and security as it seeks to become the world’s dominant power. How this all came about and what the US can expect from all of this is elaborated upon in Deceiving the Sky: Inside China’s Drive for Global Supremacy.

In Deceiving the Sky: Inside Communist China’s Drive for Global Supremacy (Encounter Books, 2019), Bill Gertz, the author, directs a flood light on China’s practices that are designed to undermine the US economy, weaken and ultimately defeat the US military, and diminish the global influence of the US. An emphasis of Gertz’s discussion is how US leaders have repeatedly failed to understand the preparations in which Beijing is engaged to ready China for a confrontation with the US in the near future. Gertz also asserts the US leaders have also habitually failed to take appropriate steps to deter and act appropriately in response to Beijing’s threatening moves. An example of how destructive and impactful such delinquencies have been is the US response following Beijing’s use of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to crush the democratic aspirations of thousands of Chinese in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. China was sanctioned. However, Gertz says that far more consideration should have been given to how China would and actually did react to sanctions. Gertz says what China actually did was launch an unbridled campaign over the next three decades to steal and otherwise acquire some of the most valuable technology from the US. The theft has been staggering, estimated to be as much as $600 billion annually in stolen technology and intellectual property. However, in successive US administrations, both Democrat and Republican, there was a wilful blindness toward what was occurring. They stuck to a belief that by maintaining good relations with China and conducting trade and other business with it, the Communist regime in Beijing would eventually evolve into a free market, democratic system. 

Gertz says the outcome of this decades long policy failure by the US has been the emergence of an expansionist, hard line Communist regime headed by a supreme leader, who took power in 2012, with unchecked powers matched only by Mao: People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping. Gertz asserts that Xi has ruled with an iron fist. China has reverted to its Maoist Communist roots. Instead of becoming more moderate and more democratic, China has become a more repressive dictatorship domestically. Fundamental freedoms rights and prosperity for the Chinese people have essentially been eliminated.Internationally, instead of becoming more integrated, China has emerged as an ever more dangerous threat to peace in security as it seeks to become the world’s dominant power. Communist ideology is the centerpiece for that Chinese drive for dominance. How this all came about and what the US can expect from it all is elaborated upon in Deceiving the Sky: Inside China’s Drive for Global Supremacy.

The attention of greatcharlie was drawn to Deceiving the Sky at first upon recognizing the title’s reference to “The Thirty-Six Chinese Strategies.” The Thirty-Six Chinese Strategies or Stratagems are a collection of tactics that can be applied to very different situations. The strategies are derived from military tactics applied during the Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.) or during the Three Kingdom Period (220-265 B.C.). Comparisons are naturally made to other Chinese military texts such as Sun Zu’s Art of War focus on military organization, leadership, and battlefield tactics, the Thirty-Six Strategies, is a unique collection of ancient Chinese proverbs, more apt for the fields of politics, diplomacy, and espionage. The origins of this book are unknown. No author or compiler has ever been mentioned, and no date as to when it may have been written has been ascertained. Deceiving the Sky is the first stratagem of the thirty-six.

Gertz explains in the text that the title Deceiving the Sky comes from an ancient Chinese strategy used by generals to win battles called deceive the Sky to cross the ocean. As the story goes, an Emperor was hesitant to launch a military campaign against neighboring Koguryo, now Korea. In reaction, one of his generals convinced the Emperor to go to dinner at the home of a wealthy peasant. As the Emperor entered the house for a meal, the residence moved. The emperor had been tricked onto a boat ended for battle across the sea. Rather than disembark, he ordered the military campaign to advance, and the battle was won. What is derived from this story is that a leader’s determination to win a war should be so unrelenting that even an Emperor, viewed in Chinese culture as the son of heaven or the Sky, can be deceived. Translated into military precepts, deceiving the sky suggests that a commander: 1) Openly act as if intending to do one thing then do something else; 2) Create false alarms until the opponent no longer takes notice of alarms; 3) Lull the opponent into a sense of false security by appearing innocuous. Then when the opponent ignores you, one can attack at will; and, 4) One can also do the reverse, acting mysteriously and pretending to know things onees do not. Try different things and watch the opponent’s responses. The opponent will react most strongly to that which creates most concern. (See Stefan Verstappen, The Thirty-Six Strategies of Ancient China (China Books and Periodicals, 1999))

As Gertz discusses how China has acted against the US in recent decades, no doubt is left about how pertinent this ancient yet timeless stratagem is to its approach. According to Gertz, the strategy well-reflects the Marxist maxim that the ends justify the means. Beijing practices strategic deception known in the ancient formula as using false objectives to facilitate true objectives. It is another way of describing the Communist strategy of using all means warfare against the US which is the sole obstacle to China crossing the ocean and achieving the rightful place as the most powerful state in the world. Nemo repeite fuit turpissimus. (No suddenly becomes bad.)

So impressed was greatcharlie with Deceiving the Sky, it has sought to allow its readers to gleen enough about the book in a review that they would choose to well-thumb its pages themselves. What greatcharlie can state in all conscience that if one really does not have much time to dig deep into the crisis of Chinese actions and intentions, Gertz’s breakdown of the whole matter is about as accurate and concise a report on the matter as one is going to get. What is most impressive to greatcharlie about the book is the manner in which it stimulates thought on the grave issues concerning China. As greatcharlie has stated in previous reviews, books that can stir a fire inside the reader, and a passion for a subject, are the most memorable and most enjoyable to sit with. The role of reviewer, an unsolicited intermediary between a book’s prospective reader and the author, is a responsibility that greatcharlie takes seriously. Rarely if ever, will greatcharlie read a book then take the time to write a negative review, presenting its judgments on the shortcomings and failures of an author’s toil on a manuscript. It is greatcharlie’s preference to provide reviews of books that readers of blog can enjoy and from which they may edify themselves. Never is harm intended.

Gertz is an award-winning national security journalist and author of eight books, four of which were national bestsellers. He is currently national security correspondent for The Washington Times. On China, he is accepted in both journalistic and foreign and national security policy circles as being an authority. Even more, he is something of a treasury of knowledge on its pursuits versus the US. Confidential sources for years within the US national security bureaucracies have shared what they have reasoned was permissible with Gertz that clarified much about personalities, events, and situations concerning China with all possible precautions concerning national security firmly in mind. Gertz’s considerable standing among federal employees in rather sensitive positions is a reality that the most senior executives in the US government have recognized and have begrudgingly accepted. Gertz has been a guest lecturer at the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Defense University at Fort McNair, and, the Brookings Institution.

The Author

Gertz is an award-winning national security journalist and author of eight books, four of which were national bestsellers. He is currently national security correspondent for The Washington Times. As a journalist, he recognizes his responsibility to speak truth to power. On the issue of China, he is accepted in both journalistic and foreign and national security policy circles as being an authority. Even more, he is something of a treasury of knowledge on its pursuits versus the US. 

Confidential sources for years within the US national security bureaucracies have shared what they have reasoned was permissible with Gertz that clarified much about personalities, events, and situations concerning China with all possible precautions concerning national security firmly in mind. Gertz’s considerable standing among federal employees in rather sensitive positions is a reality that the most senior executives in the US government have recognized and have begrudgingly accepted. In his biography posted by the Harry Walker Agency, a speaker’s bureau, it is noted that former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director R. James Woolsey stated: “When I was DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] Bill used to drive me crazy because I couldn’t figure out where the leaks were coming from. Now that I’ve been outside for two years, I read him religiously to find out what’s going on.” During the 1990s, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson told the author: “We talk about your stories at Cabinet meetings.” Defense Secretary William S. Cohen once remarked to China’s military intelligence chief that Bill “has access to more intelligence information than anyone I know.” Former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld once told him: “You are drilling holes in the Pentagon and sucking out information.”

Gertz has also been a guest lecturer at the FBI National Academy, the CIA, the National Defense University at Fort McNair, the Brookings Institution, and Hillsdale College. He has participated in the National Security Studies Program at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs.

In Deceiving the Sky, Gertz has provided a most discouraging account of how the US has fared in a “struggle” to claim the perch of the dominant power in the world which China has promoted. At the same time, he answers in an admirable way the questions that US policy makers and decision-makers should be asking. To that extent, he has supplied the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies with their deficiencies. An earlier work by Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Targets America (Regnery, 2000), was prescient in assessing Communist China’s goals and intentions. Deceiving the Sky includes new details of the danger and proves his warning was correct. Gertz warns that if nothing significant and lasting is done, it will only get worse.

Gertz digs into the dark roots of Beijing’s plans. Readers will find that the information Gertz provides will prove to ring true on every issue. He demonstrates that there are clearly greater issues hanging from any issue with China than usually appear at first glance. Surely, presenting a full excavation of China’s actions and intentions was unlikely desired or practical given the larger audience Gertz sought to reach. Perchance if Gertz were to write enough works on the matter he will manage to at least touch upon all of its many aspects. Gertz is not a storyteller. His job is not to entertain, despite what his publishers might desire without the ultimate objective of every publisher which is to sell books. As a journalist, he delivers the news, lays out the facts as they are, and to the extent that he may provide analysis, he edifies and enlightens with his insights. Gertz has the power to intellectually stimulate with his words

The present situation between the US and China is recognized by many scholars, academics, policy analysts, and journalists as being unhealthy. Gertz’s reports on Chinese plans and actions have run concurrently to those of other journalists and scholars writing on the subject and the main features of their stories tally. Indeed, a lengthy list of authors have written fine books on the matter and offer similar perspectives. Concerning those other books, greatcharlie would not dare offer even a short-list of them for it would only open the door to judgments on the the selection of them and perhaps their numerical order. As this review is focused on Gertz’s work, all of that would be beside the matter.

It would be difficult to convince greatcharlie that Gertz wrote Deceiving the Sky with the objective of eclipsing the whole of its kind. What he has done is add an invaluable volume to the body of literature that accurately discusses “The China Threat.” He articulates the struggle in a manner that gives all matters that hang from it real meaning. Gertz only asks readers to follow closely what he has written and learn. Some seem disposed to remain content with that situation as long as it lasts. Though he lays it all out impressively before his readers, those not so warm to Gertz’s views will for themselves determine what if anything in the book is essential and what is not. Certainly, one must also accept that not everyone will be attuned to the scream of writers such as Gertz on the real and immediate threat China poses. 

Multi cives aut ea pericula quae imminent non vident aut ea quae vident neglegunt. (Many citizens either do not see those dangers which are threatening or they ignore those that they do see.) To those who seek to find normality and safety in what China is doing in Asia and beyond and see it all as being modest enough, it is likely Deceiving the Sky put their noses are not out of joint. Whether they might be characterized as rejectionists or alarmist in accord with their responses to Gertz, nothing in Deceiving the Sky was apparently intended to harshly cut so deep into the foundations of thinking of proponents of an ascending China that they should find his facts and deductions threatening to their own analyses or interests. He is not on the attack. His goal is to illuminate. He encourages all readers to simply evaluate for themselves how things have actually been moving and where they are actually heading. Not just out of a sense of professional satisfaction but rather the urgency and importance of the matter, he would welcome and wish for an effort by them to test the virtues of what he presents.

Xi and senior decision makers on foreign policy within the Communist Party of China albeit are individuals of an exceptional nature judging from what they have displayed of themselves in challenging the US for the position as the world’s dominant power. That is a desire that they have in abundance. They have shown themselves to be a thoroughly bad lot. Gertz paints an even more sinister picture of Xi in a discussion of historical figures among his role models.

To accept that China would cause the release of COVID-19 through what might be called deliberate negligence would cause one to accept China was capable of any fantastic outrage. Doubtlessly, many already believed that. Gertz would perhaps be among their number. China was frugal with information about COVID-19 enough so that rather than being seen as heroes, they have set themselves up as the antagonist of every Western country, primarily the US, struggling to resolve the COVID-19 pandemic in this all-too real global tragedy. Many in the federal government foreign and national security policy bureaucracies and the US Congress with the responsibility to monitor what China is doing, have refrained from telling too much about its actions and intentions and the full extent of what its intelligence services are doing against the US to the public possibly for fear of figuratively frightening the horses. An unwavering conviction over China’s malign intentions appears to be a luxury that many especially in US foreign policymaking circles sense they cannot afford to have. They understand that one’s political fortune could possibly be balanced against it. That job has really been left to individuals as Gertz.

It appears important to note that in more than one spot in Deceiving the Sky, Gertz’s discussion on US policymaking on China is colored by his political perspective, recognizably conservative. As aforementioned, Gertz is a national security correspondent for the Washington Times, a daily newspaper with a conservative political alignment and was employed in that position at the time he wrote Deceiving the Sky. The book was published in 2019, and Gertz also expressed some satisfaction with the decision-making of the administration of US President Donald Trump under a strategy of competitive engagement. (Readers for whom this will pose some problems have been forewarned.) Not to make a labor of this matter, suffice it to say that such digressions in the text should not distract somber and astute readers from taking into consideration the healthy, accurate, and urgent message Gertz offers exposing the true intentions. That discussion, in greatcharlie’s assessment, is not partisan.

What greatcharlie Found Most Interesting

Deceiving the Sky is 256 pages, portioned in 13 chapters and a titillating conclusion. It presents what could perhaps be called a catalogue of sins by China. The range of Gertz’s coverage of China’s activities in Deceiving the Sky can be readily observed in his descriptive chapter titles. They include: Chapter 1: How Communists Lie: The 2007 ASAT Test; Chapter 2: The East Is Red: Communism with Chinese Characteristics; Chapter 3: China Wars: The Failure of Pro-China Appeasement; Chapter 4: The Coming Space War with China; Chapter 5: Assassin’s Mace in Space; Chapter 6: Seeking Digital Superiority: China’s Cyberattacks; Chapter 7: High-Tech Totalitarianism; Chapter 8: Chinese Intelligence Operations; Chapter 9: Influence Power: Beijing and the Art of Propaganda and Disinformation Warfare; Chapter 10: Financial and Economic Warfare with Chinese Characteristics; Chapter 11: Corporate Communism: Huawei and 5G; Chapter 12: Military Might: World Domination Through the Barrel of a Gun; and, Chapter 13: Flashpoints at Sea and China’s String of Pearls Expansion. He sums up the book with the thought-provoking segment: Conclusion: What Is to Be Done? Declare China an Enemy, Liberate the Chinese People. 

It would be impossible for greatcharlie not to receive the lessons and messages of books as Deceiving the Sky and feel compelled to ruminate upon them. Yet, in this review, greatcharlie’s focus is not turned dutifully and perhaps expectantly toward the fundamental and vital issues of concern such as China’s military growth, military strategy, investment in space platforms, ties to Russia, moves in the South China Sea, threat to Taiwan, and other issues of the utmost importance concerning its expansion and hegemony in its the Far East and ambitions beyond Asia. Regular readers of greatcharlie are aware that the blog’s editor has a keen interest in what author’s offer about what makes those of interest to them tick. For years, such independent analyses by reliable sources have often saved federal bureaucracies an infinity of extra trouble by offering insight on what may very well be on the minds of decision makers in foreign capitals. After examining a sufficient record of an individual’s attitudes and behavior in the aggregate sometimes, their motives may still remain inscrutable and those writing books on their policy making and decision making with little resource may turn to speculation. An additional interest of greatcharlie of late are the activities of Chinese intelligence services in the US.

Four chapters in which Gertz offers insights into the thinking of the leadership of the Communist Party of China at the present and into the future  and Chinese intelligence services that caught greatcharlie’s attention are: Chapter 2: The East Is Red: Communism with Chinese Characteristics; Chapter 3: China Wars: The Failure of Pro-China Appeasement; Chapter 8: Chinese Intelligence Operations. Insights Gertz offers in the book’s close, Conclusion: What Is to Be Done? Declare China an Enemy, Liberate the Chinese People, are also worthy of special note.

According to Gertz, no other Chinese leader since Mao has embraced the rigid orthodox Communist ideology more than Xi Jinping, who came into power in 2012. Soon after, Xi engaged in a ruthless, albeit less viable, ideological cultural revolution of his own, a political purge of thousands of officials, some were among the most powerful players in the system. By 2018, under Xi, the Party once again emerged with Mao-like devotion to the Socialist ideal of creating New Chinese Man. He lays out how Xi has assumed more power than any Chinese leader since Mao.

Chapter 2 The East Is Red

It is in Chapter 2, Gertz’s more fully explains, as mentioned earlier, that no other Chinese leader since Mao has embraced the rigid orthodox Communist ideology more than Xi Jinping, who came into power in 2012. Soon after, Xi engaged in a ruthless, albeit less viable, ideological cultural revolution of his own, a political purge of thousands of officials, some were among the most powerful players in the system, such as regional Communist Party boss Bo Xilai, police, intelligence and security czar, Zhou Yongkang, and former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, General Guo Boxiong. 

Gertz reminds that beginning in the 1980s and over the decades that China noted the post-Mao policy dubbed “reform and opening up,” Gertz has readers cast their minds back to the years when Chinese Communist leaders went to great lengths to hide their ideology. He states that “ideological speeches were reserved for Party meetings and three-hour long recitations on the great works of the Party.” He continues further explaining that propaganda organs deliberately substituted the more-moderate sounding Socialism in place of Chinese Marxist-Leninsm in a strategy designed to win widespread support from non-Communist countries around the world.

Gertz then emphasizes how all of that changed with Xi. By 2018, the Party once again emerged with Mao-like devotion to the Socialist ideal of creating New Chinese Man. He lays out how Xi had assumed more power than any Chinese leaders since Mao. Gertz notes that following the death of Mao, the next leader of China, Chairman Deng Xiaoping, argued that Mao’s fanatic view of the World Communist Revolution needed to be changed. In its place, he adopted a new strategy called “Beyond Ideology and Social Systems” that sought to scale back Maoist ways but not give up Communism. Deng intentions were not benign. Gertz asserts that Deng believed world peace was at hand and that China should find a way to exploit it. To that extent, Gertz writes, Deng put forth China’s pragmatic strategy enabling massive trade and investment with the Capitalist world. As Gertz explains,”Bide our time, build our capabilities” was the Dengist ideology, and when the peace eventually collapsed, China would be ready both economically and militarily to dominate. Interestingly, despite appeasement of China by successive US administrations after Chinese tanks crushed the hopeful democracy movement in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Gertz notes that Beijing continued to harbor the conspiracy theory of US plans to subvert and contain the People’s Republic.

As a very intriguing and instructive point, Gertz explains that “Chinese Communism mimics religion-it presents a version of history with a journey of deliverance played out in chapters written in a chosen language. It boasts its own priesthood–political commissary ubiquitous throughout–and an enforced infallibility of its leadership.” There are prophets and devils, along with a council of senior religious leaders who have the power to change or interpret the Communist historical narrative. Gertz goes on to state that Party loyalty equals morality; doubting history is blasphemy, heresy and treasonous. He then declares: “There is a chosen people, the Chinese, a promised land, China, temples, pilgrimages, faith in the face of contrary facts, deep intrusion into the personal life of each person, and the indoctrination of children into the tenets of Chinese Communism.”

Perhaps a very apparent expression of Chinese Communism as religion is through united front work. To better understand united front work, greatcharlie turns to the expert source for perspective, Peter Mattis. Since leaving the CIA, where he was a highly-regarding analyst on China, Mattis has published a number of superlative essays on Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence. Mattis, along with a former military intelligence officer and diplomat, Matthew Brazil, published a superb book, Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (United States Naval Institute Press, 2019). According to Mattis, the central element to understanding what the Chinese Communist Party is doing and why to shape the world outside the party is united front work. Mao described the purpose of this work as mobilizing the party’s friends to strike at the party’s enemies. In a more specific definition from a paper in the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defined united front work as “a technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-communist masses.” In other words, united front policy addresses the party’s relationship with and guidance of any social group outside the party. To that extent, as Mattis explains, united front work entails shaping those outside the party, and not simply the Chinese people or world outside the People’s Republic of China. United front work must also be a tool of political struggle. It is not confined to activities that we would call propaganda or public diplomacy. It is not limited to covert action. In 1939, Mao wrote: “Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy’s positions. That is how the three are related to each other.” Mao’s outline of united front work within the party’s toolbox remains as the core understanding of it within the Communist Party of China today. United front activities have “aided” the Communist Party of China in resolving several dilemmas of the post-Mao era. That was most apparent following the Tiananmen Square and the death of Deng.

Evaluated on the basis of the united front policy system, the Communist Party of China’s management of political influence operations runs to the very top of the party, involving senior leaders directly. The policy system extends through the party’s hierarchy and spills over into China’s government ministries as well as other state-owned and state-administered organizations. The State Council ministries to include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and many other organizations with a party committee offer unique platforms and capabilities that the united front policy system can draw upon for operational purposes. United front work is conducted wherever the party is present. To that extent, as Mattis explains, united front work is not an “influence operation” or a campaign. It is the day-to-day work of the party. The importance of united front work to the Chinese Communist enterprise is the reason why Xi has repeatedly emphasized the importance of a working organ of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee, the United Front Work Department (UFWD ), to China’s rejuvenation. Among experts on China, UFWD is generally understood to be a Party intelligence organ,

One could only have imagined that foreign policy decision makers at the top of the Communist Party of China were aware that if the COVID-19 disaster was not put right with urgency, it would have had an unfortunate effect on US-China relations. Relative to the enormity of the crisis created, Beijing’s response could not reasonably have been considered apologetic or a recognition of their misstep at all. Overall, the design of the response appeared to be to protect the image and reputation of the Communust Party of China, and leave the impression that it was infallible in its response.

United front work in diplomacy can often be a dominant feature. Diplomacy with leading industrialized Western countries and prominent industrialized countries in their own region is used as a platform to promote the message of the Communist Party of China and bolster its standing. To discern such efforts, one might watch for matters stated publicly that might have little purpose in a more private setting and in fact might be best conveyed on the sideline meeting or during a break in bilateral or multilateral talks.

The reason for this is that the target audience of those comments will not be the party to the negotiation. The target is the people of China and people of underdeveloped and burgeoning industrialized countries who erroneously might see China as having eclipsed the power of leading industrialized countries and directly confronting them. China’s effort to pull countries of the Third World in Asia and Africa and even countries in Eastern Europe, with a particular focus on the Balkans, within its sphere of influence to turn a phrase has the characteristics of a near collection mania. However, the behavior of the Communist Party of China perhaps has had its best results among countries led by tyrants and other potentates who themselves have engaged in the ions old quest for dominance in their region or in the world. Aliquis latet error. (Some trickery lies hidden.)

A tangible demonstration of how China is leading the march to a “better” future for the world, by taking on US power publicly. This was recently done during a two-day bilateral meeting from March 18, 2021 to March 19, 2021 at the Captain Cook Hotel in Anchorage, Alaska. A  US delegation led by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan met with a People’s Republic of China delegation led by the Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi, and People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The two-day meeting got off to a tense start, with a public display of the strained nature relations between the US and China. 

Blinken laid out many of the areas of concern, from economic and military coercion to assaults on basic values. Sullivan made clear that the overriding priority of the US was  to ensure that its approach in the world and approach to China benefits the US public and protects the interests of US allies and partners. Further, he explained further that the US did not seek conflict, but welcomed stiff competition and will always stand up for its principles, for its people and its friends.

Yang responded boldly, taking a bit of time to express sharp criticism of the US. He spoke with great authority. There was an air of ceremony in his reproach. Yet, through his words were evinced the restricted, mental prison of Communism. His statement must be examined in some detail to allow readers to sense the style, tone, rhythm, mood, the expression of indignation, and the recognition that a new world order is on the horizon that will have Chinese characteristics. One can discern a certain flavor in expressions of united front work in diplomacy.

Yang explained: “We believe that it is important for the United States to change its own image and to stop advancing its own democracy in the rest of the world. Many people within the United States actually have little confidence in the democracy of the United States, and they have various views regarding the government of the United States. In China, according to opinion polls, the leaders of China have the wide support of the Chinese people. So no attempt to–the opinion polls conducted in the United States show that the leaders of China have the support of the Chinese people. No attempt to smear China’s social system would get anywhere. Facts have shown that such practices would only lead the Chinese people to rally more closely around the Communist Party of China and work steadily towards the goals that we have set for ourselves.”

In an effort to turn a disadvantage into advantage with mere words, Yang went on to say: “On human rights, we hope that the United States will do better on human rights. China has made steady progress in human rights, and the fact is that there are many problems within the United States regarding human rights, which is admitted by the US itself as well. The United States has also said that countries can’t rely on force in today’s world to resolve the challenges we face. And it is a failure to use various means to topple the so-called authoritarian states. And the challenges facing the United States in human rights are deep-seated. They did not just emerge over the past four years, such as Black Lives Matter. It did not come up only recently. So we do hope that for our two countries, it’s important that we manage our respective affairs well instead of deflecting the blame on somebody else in this world.

Ostensibly speaking on behalf of peoples “oppressed” and formerly oppressed by Western powers as China, itself, once was. Yang was particularly biting, stating: “The United States itself does not represent international public opinion, and neither does the Western world. Whether judged by population scale or the trend of the world, the Western world does not represent the global public opinion. So we hope that when talking about universal values or international public opinion on the part of the United States, we hope the US side will think about whether it feels reassured in saying those things, because the US does not represent the world. It only represents the government of the United States. I don’t think the overwhelming majority of countries in the world would recognize that the universal values advocated by the United States or that the opinion of the United States could represent international public opinion, and those countries would not recognize that the rules made by a small number of people would serve as the basis for the international order.”

No doubt was left as to his loyalty and dutiful nature toward the Communist Party of China as Foreign Minister Wang performed his united front responsibilities expressing the following position: “China certainly in the past has not and in the future will not accept the unwarranted accusations from the US side. In the past several years, China’s legitimate rights and interests have come under outright suppression, plunging the China-US relationship into a period of unprecedented difficulty. This has damaged the interests of our two peoples and taken its toll on world stability and development, and this situation must no longer continue. China urges the US side to fully abandon the hegemonic practice of willfully interfering in China’s internal affairs. This has been a longstanding issue, and it should be changed. It is time for it to change. And in particular, on the 17th of March, the United States escalated its so-called sanctions on China regarding Hong Kong, and the Chinese people are outraged by this gross interference in China’s internal affairs and the Chinese side is firmly opposed to it.”

Latrant et scitis estatint praetesquitantes estis. They bark, so you know that you are in front of them.) One could reasonably presume any genuine negotiations planned by Chinese officials was secondary to what was stated at the outset of the meeting. Nothing stated by them could have led one to believe they were negotiating, seeking to establish common ground and points of agreement on issues and ways to come together on the most nagging ones. The meeting in Anchorage, Alaska provided a grand stage. The target audience of the Chinese officials’ reproaches was not really Blinken and Sullivan who were present in the room, but rather the people of China stand people of underdeveloped and burgeoning industrialized countries who would likely see China directly confront the US through their words. The Chinese officials sought to establish separate warring identities between the US and China. They sought to create the impression that some equipoise of power had already been by China versus the US.

Further, the Chinese officials clearly wanted to establish an image for the world to see of how disassociated China’s worldview was that of the US. They also appeared to want to demonstrate that China’s old view was more closely related with underdeveloped and burgeoning industrialized countries. They wanted to create the impression that there were both positive and negative forces present at the meeting, setting China up as the positive force and the US as the latter. 

Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi in Anchorage, Alaska, March 2021 (center). Gertz explains that in the 21st century, “the US is facing the potential of a new world war by miscalculation involving China that has been quietly and systematically building up what it terms comprehensive national power–military, diplomatic, economic–for what the Chinese Communust leadership believes will be an inevitable showdown in creating a new anti-democratic socialist and communist world order without the US.” In his most acidulous commentary, Gertz declares that “the pro-Beijing hands in and out if government were complicit in these policy crimes that deliberately appeased China through a rigid, establishment view that ignored the reality of the People’s Republic and cast it as a normal nation and not as a nuclear armed Communist dictatorship.” Gertz says that it was not until 2015 that the pro-China view was recognized as being no longer sustainable.

Chapter 3: “China Wars: The Failure of Pro-China Appeasement”

In the four decades after the period of reform and opening up began in 1972, Gertz says that “the vast majority among a relatively small and close knit community of China experts who glowed into government policy positions, intelligence agencies, and the officer corps from universities and think tanks produced one of the most serious failures of foreign and security policy in US history.” Gertz explains again that “forty years of willful blindness about China led to the adoption of disastrous policies toward China that have produced a new era of danger many experts see as analogous to the 1930s,” a period when shortsighted diplomats and policymakers prevented the US military from preparing to meet the threat of the growing power of the Japanese Empire. As that story goes, tabletop war games against Japanese forces were forbidden. The ruling elite feared that “it would create a new Japanese threat where there was none.” Gertz says that similarly, pro-Beijing hands created another strawman argument for the appeasement of China. In the aggregate, the result according to Gertz has been “a devastating run of policies toward Beijing that avoided all reference to China’s illicit activities and behavior from the massacre of unarmed pro-democracy students in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, to China’s role in stealing US secrets on every deployed nuclear weapon in the US arsenal and hastening their spread globally by supplying nuclear warhead design secrets to Pakistan.”

Cuiusvis hominis est errare, nullius nisi insipientis, in errore perseverare. (Any man can make a mistake, only a fool keeps making the same one.) Gertz explains that in the 21st century, “the US is facing the potential of a new world war by miscalculation involving China that has been quietly and systematically building up what it terms comprehensive national power–military, diplomatic, economic–for what the Chinese Communust leadership believes will be an inevitable showdown in creating a new anti-democratic sociakist and communist world order without the US.” In his most acidulous commentary, Gertz declares that “the pro-Beijing hands in and out if government were complicit in these policy crimes that deliberately appeased China through a rigid, establishment view that ignored the reality of the People’s Republic and cast it as a normal nation and not as a nuclear armed Communist dictatorship.” He goes on to state the dominant pro-China community of both officials and non-government experts “inflicted serious damage on US interests by consistently producing biased and misleading assessments on both China’s intentions and capabilities.” Gertz says that it was not until 2015 that the pro-China view was recognized as being no longer sustainable.

As greatcharlie discussed in its March 29, 2021 post entitled, “Listening to and Understanding the Positions of Others: A Requirement for Thoughtful and Fruitful Talks in All Cases,” diplomacy has been defined as the established method of influencing the decisions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples through dialogue, negotiation, and other measures short of war or violence. In its practice, its key for negotiators to ensure the other side is listening and understanding what they are communicating. That necessitates managing negotiations without arousing hostility. Any awkward situations must be handled with tactfulness. 

Although only in office for a few months at the time of this writing, the administration of US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris presumably has used US citizens, individuals with the very best reputations to contact Beijing through so-called back channels. Those individuals would be doyens, men or women of the world with a natural turn for diplomacy, and for discreetly presenting issues of concern and arranging delicate matters as a point of honor for Washington. China appears to commit itself to nothing where the US and Western countries are concerned, or where any other country is concerned for that matter. China’s government is founded on a movement that produced a revolution. It believes it provides a way of living based on Mao’s teachings that should be embraced for all humanity. It will never be satisfied until it puts the rest of the world’s government’s on a solid footing in that direction.

Whether diplomats, intelligence officers, Communist Party of China operatives, or businessmen, they spout the old propaganda line while overseas, “Communism is the wave of the future.” The Biden-Harris administration’s policy makers will have ample opportunity to test theories on how to get the best results from US bilateral relations and economic competition with China. Gertz does not use page space to present readers with exact details of how the US has bargained and negotiated with China, or the tone heard during opportunities in which they communicated bilaterally. The outcomes of such talks speak for themselves. It is one thing to establish a competitor firmly in one’s mind to help drive the effort “to up one’s game.” It is wholly another thing to seek something akin to world domination and to find a way up by stealing from, forcing out, and stepping upon, others. China is attempting to do all of the latter to the US. China will almost always be happy to meet with US officials to negotiate and sign any agreements both to humor themselves, satisfy those among US policy makers and decision makers naive enough to believe there would be any hope of hampering China’s march to dominance, and mollify others who may “fear” the change that Beijing assures is coming.

Qui cumque turpi fraude semel innotuit, eriemsi verum dicit amittit fides.  (Whoever has once become known for a shameful fraud, is not believed even if he speaks the truth.) One could go as far as to say it is delusional to persist in communicating entreaties of that kind to Beijing. This is especially true when it is clear how the troubling behavior in question is associated with China’s quest for dominance. There is no shortage of ambition. One cannot show a tender conscience to Beijing without soon facing a test of will or other undesired effect. The next generation may say preceding ones were dull indeed not to recognize and respond to China’s maneuvers. To go on in partnership with the Chinese, US administrations have forgiven, while not warranted, its worsening behavior. They have forgiven much. Diplomatic outcomes on contentious matters may often be part of larger arrangements, schemes of the Chinese. Indeed, Chinese negotiators will expect that parties to a negotiation will be willing to accept and start with the conditions they initially present. They will strenuously negotiate. If the Chinese can find no flexibility and no further room for satisfactory results from the negotiations they may alter their position more in line with the other party’s terms. The other party may be eager to accept China’s new amiable terms but they may be unaware that there could be a catch. A follow-on malign action, may weaken the benefit of any settlement on the same original matter. An opportunity for the Communist Party of China to test the the virtues of this approach presented itself with the Trump administration when it negotiated and signed a trade agreement in 2020. The Communist Party of China was already aware of the burgeoning COVID-19 crisis at home. It no longer appears Beijing is disposed to negotiating fairly, nobly, on anything. This may appear all the more the case as Beijing may feel it is moving closer and faster to its goal of overcoming the US as the world’s dominant power. After examining this, readers should recall the discussion earlier in this review of the “decieving the sky” strategy ascribed to China’s approach. It is very fitting. Quite so!

By the time the second action is realized by the second party, be it the US or otherwise, it is usually still too unfathomable to imagine that the more malign outcome was sought all along by China. By the time it may be accepted by the second party that every step taken by China was part of one larger scheme, the dye will have long since been cast. In its business of conquest, Beijing almost always does everything completely. China’s efforts in this manner do not seem to have an end.

US political leaders must be willing to do the hard yards to ensure its position is protected. This is not a situation that can be nuanced through talks at the negotiation table. China will not surrender any of its gains or leave what appears to be clear paths to its objective for anything the US might offer, except surrender or capitulation.

However, those US political leaders might also consider the words of Paine, 18th Century American political writer, theorist, and activist of the American Revolution asserted in The Crisis No. V (1778): “To argue with a man who has renounced the use and authority of reason, and whose philosophy consists in holding humanity in contempt, is like administering medicine to the dead, or endeavoring to convert an atheist by scripture.”

Workers in a high-tech facility in China (above). Gertz explains that an expert source in the US Intelligence Community revealed to him that Chinese intelligence operations only began receiving the attention they deserved in the late 2010s after China stopped using more cautious methods and adopted bolder approaches to stealing secrets and recruiting spies. Citing a retired source from the US Intelligence Community, Gertz notes that Chinese intelligence activities are akin to a storm. That Chinese intelligence storm is a secret assault on the US that is without parallel since that mounted by the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s. Gertz explains that current Ministry of State Security recruitment efforts are focused on all US citizens with access to secrets China wants. Those secrets come in two main categories: counterintelligence information about Chinese working for US intelligence, and government secrets and even openly available information that will boost China’s military and civilian modernization and industrialization programs.

Chapter 8: Chinese Intelligence Operations

In Chapter 8 “Chinese Intelligence Operations”, Gertz takes the reader into the arcane world of espionage via the operations of Chinese intelligence services in the US. US counterintelligence services have tried to grapple with the matter of Chinese espionage, however the situation with the activities of Chinese intelligence services nevertheless has become an impossible one for them. The anecdotes that Gertz presents well depict the course of that intelligence struggle. He reconstructs the drama of each case. He does this so clearly, that one would believe that he was present in each case to watch events unfold.

At the core of the chapter’s discussion, Gertz explains that today, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of State Security (MSS), and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intelligence agencies, along with the United Front Work Department, a Communist Party intelligence unit, are the leading forces of China’s intelligence power. Gertz supports the well-established view that the power of those services is focused solely on maintaining and expanding the power of the Communist Party of China in its drive for global domination. At the end of the chapter, Gertz briefly explains that there was ano important reorganization of the PLA intelligence departments has been eliminated. Oversight of the PLA’s technical intelligence capabilities (including cyber, signals, and imagery intelligence) now resides with the new Strategic Support Force under the Central Military Commission. To provide a bit more detail on that transition, the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army, responsible for human intelligence, the Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army, the rough equivalent of the National Security Agency, responsible for cyber operations, and a Signals Intelligence, or a Fourth Department of the People’s Liberation Army, responsible for electronic warfare have been rolled into the new Strategic Support Force. The PLA’s human intelligence operations are managed by the Joint Staff Department, and comes under the Central Military Commission. Surely, Gertz is aware of all of this. However, as the main focus of Deceiving the Sky was shed light on the realities of China’s attitudes and behavior, actions and intent, with regard to the US, it was reasonable for him to preclose where he saw fit in his discussion of the Chinese intelligence services.) As for the United Front Work Department, as mentioned earlier in this review, it is one of four key bodies of the Communist Party of China’s bureaucracy at the central level for building and exercising political influence outside the party, and especially beyond China’s borders. The other three are the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the International (Liaison) Department, and the Propaganda Department.

Regarding MPS, Gertz says that it is the Chinese version of what has been called intelligence led policing that seeks to preempt crime. Yet, unlike the West, where laws limit the activities of police and security services, Gertz says Chinese security operations have few boundaries. One feature of the MPS is a system called “the Big System” that seeks to fuse masses of data from Chinese police and intelligence services into one program. Big intelligence is the intelligence version of the PLA’s drive for “informatization,” a term used for high technology analysis activities. 

Gertz informs that the massive police intelligence apparatus promises to make it more difficult for those seeking democratic political reforms in China to operate. As Gertz puts it, dissidents and enemies of the state as well as actual criminals will find it hard to plan and organize without leaving behind digital breadcrumbs that security services can collect and connect. He notes that theos MPS has also created the Golden Shield, a military style command structure designed to share intelligence throughout China. The systems have created pathways designed to breakthrough bureaucratic obstacles and link data. Golden Shield involves automatic analysis and cloud computing for analyzing masses of data including computerized facial, voice, and gait recognition. While MSS and PLA focus their spying operations on technology acquisition, MPS agents are engaged in spying on Chinese dissidents in the US.

Citing a former CIA director of counterintelligence, Gertz notes that Chinese intelligence activities, lay those of MSS and the PLA, are akin to a storm. That Chinese intelligence storm is a secret assault on the US that is without parallel since that mounted by the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s. Gertz appears absolutely taken by the fact that penetration of US national laboratories has led to the loss of at least six nuclear weapons designs and the enhancement of Chinese offensive and defensive capabilities. Gertz explains that current MSS recruitment efforts are focused on all US citizens with access to secrets China wants. Those secrets come in two main categories: counterintelligence information about Chinese working for US intelligence, and government secrets and even openly available information that will boost China’s military and civilian modernization and industrialization programs. The modus operandi of MSS counterintelligence Includes the recruitment of foreign intelligence officers and their agents for work as double agents. Gertz tries to get to the center of the mystery of how MSS was able to completely destroy the CIA’s networks in China through combination information from an operative within the CIA and communications system breach. An estimated 30 agents were caught of which three were killed.

Beyond its own human intelligence activities, the PLA, particularly what Gertz, as mentioned, still refers to as the 3rd Department of the PLA, has engaged in a cyber campaign which has inflicted considerable damage to include the theft of sensitive government trade and industrial secrets.

Much Gertz explains here, greatcharlie has also observed in previous posts that little progress has been made in halting it or even making a discernible dent in Chinese intelligence operations. Many minds in the US national security bureaucracies are certainly working fiercely on this matter of utmost importance, but too few facts have been collected for them to run on to break new ground or produce anything worthwhile for that matter. Trails of espionage may lead to the MSS and PLA, directly in many instances, but those who commit the devilry of spying on Beijing’s behalf, in the US and from China, are seldom caught. With estimates as high as 25,000 Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants on the loose in the US, it is difficult even the most partisan observers such as greatcharlie to deny China has secured a massive advantage for itself. Publicly, there appears to be not much of anything comparable achieved to knock back Chinese espionage. If US counterintelligence services had ever managed to achieve some significant breakthrough on the Chinese intelligence front, one would hear “singing in the valleys.” US intelligence services, much as those of other countries, abhor the prospect of public scrutiny, but it is too late now to be concerned by such anxiety.

The tide of Chinese espionage has lapped up so much information, eroded so many formerly reliable defenses, that each day the situation moves closer to the tragic and the terrible. Hopefully, among possible dissenters, an interest, not solely due to exigency, will grow on the idea. Chinese intelligence services have hampered the work of US businesses, research and development firms, high-tech firms, academia, and the federal government itself. They have created spy networks within institutions critical to US economic security and defense. They have attempted to inconvenience the US in its efforts to improve bilateral and multilateral relations in under developed, less industrialized countries and even long time friends of the in certain regions, and multilateral institutions that the US actually had a hand in creating.

In Aristophanes’ play, Birds (414 BC), the character Epops states: “The wise can often profit by the lessons of a foe, for caution is the mother of safety. It is just such a thing as one will not learn from a friend and which an enemy compels you to know. To begin with, it’s the foe and not the friend that taught cities to build high walls, to equip long vessels of war; and it’s this knowledge that protects our children, our slaves and our wealth.” Chinese intelligence services, perhaps at one time, expecting to face something out of the ordinary, that US counterintelligence services would have a few tricks up their sleeves, have not been challenged in any way that has halted or deterred their cyberintelligence or human intelligence activities. Chinese intelligence services have unfortunately managed to do their job successfully, collecting mountains of secret and information from the government bureaucracies and research and development sites, private businesses, high-tech firms particularly, academia, and think tanks. Surely there must be an atmosphere of optimism in the halls of the headquarters buildings of the Chinese intelligence services. The Communist Party of China most likely delights that without openly admitting to possessing such intelligence capabilities, at least through perception, it has that power over the US. 

One can imagine that on more than one occasion, resources, energy, and time were squandered following a false scent. (God help those who have been wrongfully suspected and falsely accused by mistaken or errant officers of any of the US counterintelligence service. It happens. No amount of reparation could ever fix the psychological and material damage very likely done to innocent targets and their loss of reputation and honor.)

Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. (If one doesn’t know his mistakes, he won’t want to correct them.) Perhaps US counterintelligence services are applying old ways of thinking to a new type of intelligence struggle that bears little resemblance to previous ones. The key to it all remains out there somewhere. Finding those who would be capable and disposed to sniff it out using traces available would seem to be the real task ahead. One might presume that US counterintelligence services would hardly imagine anyone from outside the bureaucracy would be capable of producing some shred through their amateur study of the matter. Indeed, some senior executives and managers of US counterintelligence services, determined to stand as solid pillars of standard thinking and behavior that will not be blown down by the winds of change, may brook the idea of bringing in outsiders to handle sensitive matters. They may be mistaken. 

The solution to this espionage riddle, at least based on public reports, appears no closer within their reach. If the matter has not indeed already been settled, it may seem to some that it is at least at the edge of the end. The chance for US counterintelligence services to exhale will not come for a while. Chinese intelligence services do intend to let it come at all. US counterintelligence services have not despaired of getting a handle on the situation. Uppermost in the minds of senior executives and managers in US counterintelligence services is whether anyone within the bureaucracy can produce the magic that will allow them the ability to gain and retain the initiative in a cause that appears to be lost. They must press ahead on the forward foot.

A US B-2 bomber and two US F-22 fighter jets fly in formation (above). The rocky nature of US relations with China is a matter of great urgency. Yet, Gertz is not planting seeds of war in a time of peace. Despite how he labels his conclusion, he does not propose war as a solution. He still holds hope that US officials will come across something along the way that might bring a solution to the crisis. Gertz explains that there is a growing bipartisan political consensus that new strategies and policies urgently are needed to deal with China. Ostensibly to assist in that effort, he presents a set of 14 recommendations for a policy of liberation for the Chinese people from the yoke of Marxist-Leninism with Chinese characteristics.

Conclusion: What Is to Be Done? Declare China an Enemy, Liberate the Chinese People

Readers might recall the words of the 16th century Italian diplomat and political theorist Niccolo Machiavelli in his famous instruction guide for new princes and royals by The Prince (1532): “There are two ways of contesting, the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the second to beasts.” The rocky nature of US relations with China is a matter of great urgency. Yet, Gertz is not planting seeds of war in a time of peace. Despite how he labels his conclusion, he does not propose war as a solution. Prosing out on that matter, he still holds hope that US officials will come across something along the way that might help them develop a solution to the crisis.

Gertz explains that there is a growing bipartisan political consensus that new strategies and policies urgently are needed to deal with China. He does not believe it will be impacted by what he calls the national predicament, a seeming loss of clarity amid increased political polarization. To assist in finding that solution, he presents a set of 14 recommendations for what he hopes will be a policy of liberation for the Chinese people from the yoke of Marxist-Leninism with Chinese characteristics. Gertz emanates a sense of assurance in his writing that the recommendations he offers in Deceiving the Sky would obtain good results.

Each of the 14 recommendations is sufficiently self-explanatory, some are accompanied here with a précis of his summary on it or greatcharlie’s own comments on it. Together, his recommendations have a cumulative effect. They include: 1) Information: Conduct aggressive competition in the realm of ideas. He proffers that the first step in creating a free and democratic China would be regime change, an effort to peacefully oust Communist Party of China; 2) Reciprocity: Restrict access by China to the US in ways equal to Chinese restrictions. A key measure would be to counter Chinese financial warfare with a US program of economic warfare; 3) Intelligence: Shift the focus and operating methods of American intelligence toward more robust and aggressive operations and more effective analysis. Rather than accept being pushed back on its heels, Gertz recommends that the US Intelligence Community should step up aggressive intelligence and counterintelligence operations against the Communist Party of China and the PLA; 4) Foreign Policy/Diplomacy: Restructure and Reform the diplomatic system. Such reforms would need to be implemented in a way that would allow the US to better confront and counter growing Chinese hegemony; 5) Alliances: Create a pro-freedom, pro-prosperity, and pro-rule of law network in Asia. What was already seen in the Trump administration and still being seen in the Biden-Harris administration is Gertz recommendation that the US develop “a global network of democratic alliances targeting China that will seek to pressure Beijing into abandoning its totalitarian communist system and global designs.”; 6) Cultural/Educational: Severely restrict activities by Chinese nationals in the US who are abusing the American system. Gertz suggests that such activities should be restricted in recognition of the subversion and technology theft threats many unfortunately pose; 7) Counterintelligence: Major strategic counterintelligence operations and analyses should be implemented that focus on aggressively targeting Chinese intelligence and security services; 8) Economic: The US should begin a gradual policy of disengagement from Communist China economically; 9) Financial: Plan and carry out covert financial warfare operations against China; 10) Military Exchanges: The Pentagon and US Military must adopt a new policy that recognizes the Communist Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army as the main enemy; 11) Military Missile Defense: Expand American Regional missile defenses. As part of a strategy of neutralizing China’s massive and growing force of ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles, Gertz says US missile defenses around the world should be expanded; 12) Military Gray-Zone Warfare: Develop asymmetric warfare capabilities designed to negate Chinese military, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities; 13) Political: Create a Parliament in exile. The creation of a “democratic Chinese parliament in exile” that will develop new policies for a free China is an old chestnut.; and, 14) Russia: Play the Russia card. One might call Gertz the suggestion that the US should play the “Russia card” against China by seeking a free and democratic Russia aligned with the free world somewhat fanciful.

Most notable to greatcharlie in the context of this review is Gertz’s recommendation on “Foreign Policy/Diplomacy: Restructure and Reform the diplomatic system.” In his summary of that recommendation, Gertz suggests that US diplomats and foreign service personnel should be retrained in the use of new and innovative diplomatic methods and techniques for the information age that emphasize successfully implementing new strategic objectives toward China that reject the failed diplomacy of the past. The new diplomacy will be rooted in honest assessments and understandings of the true nature of Communist China. A new objective will be to report on and take steps to force an end to the systematic abuse of human rights in China as a high priority. The US should seek to create a new alliance of nations that will seek to isolate China and spur internal democratic political reforms and promotion of freedom and free market systems in the region. Strategic and economic dialogues such as those in the past that produced no results must be ended. New engagement should be limited to conducting bilateral and multilateral talks on concrete, achievable objectives such as verifiable arms limitation and enforceable trade agreements. It certainly would not be velvety going forward if such a course were followed, but perchance US values and interests would be well-served.

In Deceiving the Sky, Gertz’s research sheds an extraordinary side light on the undeniably aggressive thinking of Beijing. While US political leaders are still in a position to reexamine the facts, they should do so. Surely, if any of them were to take the time to look at Gertz’s book with an open mind, it would given them the necessary nudge to begin thinking in that direction. Deceiving the Sky could also lend support to deliberations among colleagues on the matter. 

There are likely quite a few citizens in the US who have heard about China’s aggressive activities. Surely, they would appreciate reading Deceiving the Sky as it would provide them a firm basis for understanding the many issues involved. As greatcharlie has already stated in this review, information from the text that is discussed here only represents a fraction of what the reader will find in Deceiving the Sky. For greatcharlie, the book was both edifying and a pleasure to read. Without hesitation, greatcharlie recommends Deceivibg the Sky to its readers.

By Mark Edmond Clark

Meditations and Ruminations on Chinese Intelligence: Revisiting a Lesson on Developing Insights from Four Decades Ago

A most apparent sign of the presence of Chinese intelligence services in Hong Kong is this plaque outside the People’s Republic of China National Security Office there (above). This essay is as a companion piece to greatcharlie’s proceeding essays on Chinese intelligence services. For the scholar who is a regular reader of greatcharlie, the essay will hopefully be an interesting discussion on the function of intelligence services in China with respect to functions of services in the United Kingdom and the US. However, this essay has the additional purpose of serving as a vehicle to assist students. For students, this essay aims to ignite an inner-conversation of issues reviewed, in this case concerning intelligence, to promote their recognition of additional parallels and the development of further insights. Hopefully, students will evoke thoughts from their respective sources and lessons, but also from personal experience, and worldviews, and produce strong insights.

For a one man shop as greatcharlie, reviewing a voluminous quantity of sources in the preparation of the July 31, 2020 and August 31, 2020 posts entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign Against the US? (Part 1 and 2 respectively), was, to a degree, an exercise in large data processing. Yet, while engaging in that consuming, yet satisfying process, the thoughts of greatcharlie’s founder and editor hearken back to an assignment received as an undergraduate at Columbia College, Columbia University in a course “The Politics of Policymaking.” The course instructor, Roger Hilsman (1919-2014), who was also the student advisor and mentor of greatcharlie’s editor, asked students to construct an essay or, as he dubbed it, a “thinkpiece,” in which they were required to present their “observations, meditations, ruminations, assumptions, and hypotheses” that billowed up after reading a primary or secondary source directly related to a foreign and national security policy topic covered in his class. (The source greatcharlie’s editor used, at the suggestion of Hilsman, was Glenn Paige’s The Korea Decision (June 24-30, 1950) (Macmillan, 1968).) However, Hilsman’s goal with the assignment was to encourage students to move away from simply regurgitating what was studied and writing the derivative college essay. Instead, he wanted students to evoke thoughts from their respective sources and lessons but also from personal experience, and their albeit youthful worldview, and draw from them their best insights on the topics they chose. For Hilsman, a phenomenal educator, the assignment was not founded upon some understanding of the requirements of analytical work in international affairs developed in the abstract, but rather, developed upon substantial experience preparing his own analyses and supervising and mentoring subordinates and colleagues in their analytical work in the US military, intelligence, and diplomatic arenas; real world! More specifically, Hilsman’s background included: studying at US Military Academy; service in Merrill’s Marauders and command of an Office of Strategic Services guerilla warfare battalion in Burma in World War II (Hilsman’s valorous service is superbly related in his memoir, American Guerilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines (Brassey’s, 1990)); his work as a military planner for NATO and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe; service in the administration of US President John Kennedy as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research for the US Department of State; and, service as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the administration of US President Lyndon Johnson.

Hilsman would not only transmit his sagacity through his “The Politics of Policymaking” course, but through discussions on policymaking and analysis that he had with students during seminars held at his residence were marked not only by the inspiration and encouragement he would give to students in their research and career plans, but also by a frankness and realism that would give them a leg up in future endeavors. The reminiscences Hilsman would share directly with greatcharlie’s founder and editor during office hours were from those periods of his life that are perhaps the most intriguing in his biography. During lectures, he would always provide a riveting anecdote from his experiences during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to accompany his “pearls of wisdom.” The student-teacher relationship between Hilsman and greatcharlie’s founder and editor was mentioned in a March 8, 2016 greatcharlie post entitled, “An Look at Stephen Marrin’s ‘Improving Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline’ and Remembering a Professor and Friend, Roger Hilsman.”

For student readers, this essay, divided into three segments, aims to ignite an inner-conversation of issues reviewed, in this case concerning intelligence, to promote their recognition of additional parallels, and to stimulate the development of further insights. Hopefully, by focusing on the topics discussed, students will evoke thoughts from their respective sources and lessons, but also from personal experience, and worldviews, and produce strong insights. The essay also aims to foster conscious critical reading of scholarly works by student readers. Some emphasis is placed on the sources themselves. Hopefully, reading about spies and spying makes this unsolicited bit of mentoring all the more interesting. For scholars who are regular readers of greatcharlie, the aim of the essay is to provide an edifying discussion on the function of intelligence in China relative to intelligence functions in the United Kingdom and the US. This essay also stands as a companion piece to greatcharlie’s preceding essays on Chinese intelligence services. While as a thinkpiece this essay may be limited in scope, greatcharlie surely has not touched bottom of its well of ideas on the subject of Chinese intelligence services. For greatcharlie, this “multipurpose” essay is only a part of its process of worming out the story of Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. Rapiamus, amici, occasionem de die. (Friends, let us seize the opportunity from (of) the day.)

MPS officer finger-wags a warning to photographer in Beijing (above). Except for experienced hands on China policy and the Chinese intelligence services and national security via diplomatic, intelligence, defense, military, or law enforcement work, most in the West have likely never heard of either. MPS is an organization under the State Council in charge of the country’s internal and political security and domestic intelligence. MSS, also under the State Council, is responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security as well.

I. MPS and MSS: Keystones of Chinese Intelligence

Two relatively quiet but absolutely key elements of the Chinese government that impact its foreign and national security policies: the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Except for experienced hands on Chinese foreign and national security policy and Chinese intelligence services via diplomatic, intelligence, defense, military, or law enforcement work, most in the West have likely never heard of either. MPS is an organization under the State Council in charge of the country’s internal and political security and domestic intelligence. MSS, also under the State Council, responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security as well. Their impact stems firstly through providing consumers in Beijing of analyzed information to include the Communist Party of China leadership, the Party’s key organs responsible for foreign and national security policy, government ministers, senior executives of relevant ministries and organizations of the State Council, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with data that may shape their decisions. They additionally share what is collected and analyzed with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At times, that information is also collected and analyzed with the help of the military. The impact of the MPS and MSS is also demonstrated through contacts their officers and operatives respectively have daily with officials and staff of foreign governments as well as personnel at all levels of Chinese and foreign businesses engaged in international trade, high-tech-firms, defense contractors, financial institutions, academia, and organizations from all fields in China and worldwide.

The true foundations for MPS and MSS were laid during the revolutionary period in which the Communist Party of China sought to establish its rule. In the early 1930s, two intelligence services existed. One was centered in Shanghai and the Communist Party, the other was based in the Chinese Communist government that existed in Shaanxi where Mao Zedong established his base after the Long March. The later intelligence service proved to be the stronger of the two. By the late 1930s, it was replaced by a newly created Social Affairs Department (SAD) within the Communist Party. Within the years of struggle against Imperial Japanese forces in China, there was the Yan’an Rectification, from 1942 to 1944, in which Mao consolidated his paramount role in the Communist Party of China. Yan’an was also the part of the ten year period in which: Mao established his premier role in the Party; the Party’s Constitution, endorsing Marxist-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought as its guiding ideologies, was adopted (Mao’s formal  deviation from the Soviet line and his determination to adapt Communism to Chinese conditions); and, the postwar Civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Prior to 1949, the Communust Party of China’s main intelligence institution was the Central Department of Socialism Affairs (CDSA). CDSA was placed under the control of Kang Sheng, a longtime political associate of Mao with a linkage from the past to Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. With the Communist Party’s victory over Chang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces in 1949, a full array of government intelligence organizations were created to supplement Party-based intelligence services such as SAD. CDSA would draw information from foreign news agencies and open sources.

The Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbù (Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China) or MPS was established as China’s principal intelligence service at the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It, too, was placed under the leadership of Kang Sheng. CDSA fell into the hands of Li Kenong, a Deputy Chief of Staff to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Chief of Staff Chou Enlai and a vice minister for foreign affairs. The main role of the MPS, as with all previous Chinese intelligence services, was to serve the interests of the Communist Party of China. According to Xuezhi Guo in China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2012), it took on the role of a security service in a manner based on Soviet and Eastern Bloc models. It eventually received responsibility for all aspects of security, from regular police work to intelligence, counterintelligence, and the suppression of anti-Communist political and social groups. That led to receiving  official jurisdiction over counter subversion, counterintelligence, and the conduct of espionage in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Overseas during the 1950s, most Chinese diplomatic missions accommodated the MPS with an Investigation and Research Office for intelligence collection staffed by CDSA personnel, with analysis performed by the Eighth Bureau, publicly known in 1978 as the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. In 1953, CDSA became the Central Investigation Department (CID). In China, the MPS presence was nearly ubiquitous, as it kept a watchful eye on China’s population. It was energetically engaged in monitoring Chinese who returned from abroad. To cope with what it determined to be errant citizens, MPS ran labor reform camps. MPS personnel were known for behaving harshly among its own citizens. 

MPS made its way through the turbulent 1960s with the Cultural Revolution and dynamic changes in politics in the 1970s with the loss of Mao and the coming of Chairman Deng Xiaoping. By 1983, there was considerable frustration within the Communist Party of China with the high volume of secret information being leaked to the West. This was particularly true with regard to information about debates occurring within the Communist Party and reports of poor economic and social conditions within China. In reaction, counterespionage responsibilities were transferred from the MPS to a new organization known as the Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guójiā Ānquán Bù (Ministry for State Security of the People’s Republic of China) or the MSS. The Communist Party of China’s first big mission for MSS was to place focus on students in both China and abroad. Students had left no doubt that there was reason for the Chinese leaders to hold such concern after the Tiananmen Square protests. Chinese leaders struggled to deal with fallout from it. The sense of danger that students posed to the country was promoted with the announcement by Chinese authorities that some 200 Chinese had been accused of spying for the Soviet Union. When the reorganization of MPS was completed in 1983, it was temporarily left with only traditional police functions. Nevertheless, the change turned out to be quite positive as both organizations were allowed a new beginning so to speak.

In the West, certainly the most significant, largest, and most powerful intelligence services reside in the US. However, the foundational intelligence services that was the model upon which the main US intelligence services have been based–as well as the services of many other countries–are those of the United Kingdom, namely the Security Service, known popularly as MI5, and the Secret Intelligence Service, known popularly as MI6. To provide a common point of reference regarding the type of intelligence services and activities performed by MPS and MSS, greatcharlie, perhaps going out on shaky ground, points to parallels between their roles in China and the roles of the Security Service and Special Intelligence Service MI6 for the United Kingdom. Before going forward with discussion here, it seems appropriate to at least broach some of more apparent distinctions between the services of the two countries. Two prominent works, central to the discussion here, are Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm (Knopf, 2009) and Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (Free Press, 2000). Both scholars undertook Herculean tasks respectively and managed to fulfill them marvelously and masterfully. Both texts respectively hold richly textured accounts of intelligence activities at home and around the world, the British Empire as it still was for a time in the 20th Century. Both are major contributions to the scholarship on intelligence in the United Kingdom.

A clear-cut comparison of MI5 and MI6 side-by-side with MPS and MSS is admittedly not possible. Plainly, there is no moral equivalence between MI5 and MI6 and their opposites, MPS and MSS. What the United Kingdom and Chinese intelligence services would call successful operations based on the respective goals of political authorities are quite disparate. Officers of the respective countries’ intelligence services are certainly not birds of a feather. Additionally, and importantly, MI5 and MI6 are the opponents of MPS and MSS, and visa-versa. Enlarging on the point of the political authorities they obey, the respective societies and political authorities, that the intelligence services of the United Kingdom and China serve, are considerably divergent, and founded on disparate philosophies. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. Despite having the structure, the veneer, of being a multiparty system at the national level, for all intents and purposes, China is a single party, Communist, police state. 

Quaeritur belli exitus, non causa. (Of war men ask the outcome, not the cause.) At a basic level with regard to intelligence services, moral principle and philosophy, in this case whether recognized as being based on Judeo-Christian values, Liberalism, Capitalism, Communism, Socialism, Maoism, or otherwise, is not method. Method is method. Philosophy is philosophy. Moreover, in the intelligence industry, results are what matter most. To that extent, at the basic level, the work of the two services are going to have sufficient likenesses to suggest parallels and comparisons. It is on such a basic level that the parallels and comparisons have been made in the discussion here. With this in mind, hopefully scholars will be open to considerations presented.

Two MPS officers operating high-tech optical equipment in Beijing (above). To provide a common point of reference regarding the type of intelligence services and activities performed by MPS and MSS, greatcharlie, perhaps going out on shaky ground, points to parallels between their roles in China and the roles of the Security Service and Special Intelligence Service MI6 for the United Kingdom. Before going forward with discussion here, it seems appropriate to at least broach some of more apparent distinctions between the services of the two countries. A clear-cut comparison of MI5 and MI6 side-by-side with MPS and MSS is admittedly not possible. at the basic level, the work of the two services are going to have enough likenesses to suggest parallels and comparisons. It is on such a basic level that the parallels and comparisons have been made in the discussion here.

Using MI5 as a Yardstick to Gauge MPS and Its Activities

The Security Service, known informally and hereinafter referred to in this essay as MI5, is the United Kingdom’s government agency assigned with managing the country’s internal security. It is authorized to investigate any person or movement that might threaten the country’s security. Although MI5 is responsible for domestic counterespionage, it has no powers of arrest. MI5’s motto is: Regnum Defende (Defend the Realm). The Secret Intelligence Service, known informally and hereinafter referred to in this essay as MI6, is the United Kingdom’s government agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and appropriate dissemination of foreign intelligence. MI5 has only a few thousand employees. It is headquartered in London, at Thames House. MI5 is a component of a vast intelligence apparatus in the United Kingdom. Reportedly, command and control is directed via no less than four entities: the Central Intelligence Machinery, the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services, the Permanent Secretaries’ Committee on the Intelligence Services, and the Joint Intelligence Committee. Communications intelligence is the responsibility of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which works closely with the Communications Electronics Security Group, while a number of agencies manage military intelligence under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense. Even London’s Metropolitan Police, or Scotland Yard, has its own Special Branch concerned with intelligence.

While MI5 is the agency responsible for the internal security of the United Kingdom, it primarily provides security services and intelligence operations within England and Wales. Its current role was best expressed by the Crown Minister in 1945, with regard to its postwar raison d’être: “The purpose of the Security Service is defense of the Realm and nothing else.” MI5 reports to the Home Secretary of the Home Office. It may be confused as being a domestic law enforcement organization, but it is far from that. To perform the internal security function, MI5’s activities include: domestic counterintelligence; counterespionage; counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and cyber work within the country and protective details for many top government officials. Its officers do not have authority to arrest citizens. When needed, MI5 will work in close cooperation with London’s Metropolitan Police Service (headquartered at New Scotland Yard) and other local police agencies within England and Wales. This is especially when it concerns their efforts to fight domestic terrorism. MI5 may also interface with MI6 when foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence activities intersect.

It cannot be overemphasized that MI5 is a secretive organization. Well back in 1931, the firm instruction to a new employee was: “No one, not even our own families, should be told where we worked or for whom.”  The existence of MI5 was not acknowledged officially until 1979, when Mrs Thatcher unmasked Sir Anthony Blunt as the Fourth Man in a statement to the House of Commons. Its head was publicly named for the first time in 1991. It was also at that time when some previously classified information about MI5, such as the number of its employees and its organizational structure, was made public. During the past three decades, MI5 worked its way through a number of scandals–to include incessant hunts for apparently nonexistent moles–that further tarnished its reputation in many circles. Reflective of British culture, members of the intelligence services, from top to bottom, were unwilling to display any disappointment or hurt and never looked to cry on anyone’s shoulder. They remained reticent about attitudes toward them and placid, straightforward, as they performed their work. Somewhere along the line, a solution was found. The decision was made to release their stories, not to drain themselves out, but let little bit find its ways into the public marketplace to unmask appearances public relations-wise. Through the use of surrogate voices, a sudden fracture in the marble reveals the interior. The inner life. Studies were commissioned to tell their stories, to the extent possible.

Most relevant in Andrew’s Defend the Realm to the examination of MI5 in this essay, are anecdotes loaded with insights on events that were in their time of the utmost importance. Those cases chronicalized, carefully selected from MI5’s storied past, and detailed the complex nature of MI5’s modern day work is revealed. Additionally, from Andrew’s work, one receives a picture of MI5 as a tightly-knit institution, in which many officers keep body and soul together, and others actually thrive, in its atmosphere of secrecy. Based on what has been made public, in an investigation of a threat to the United Kingdom, MI5 officers will usually seek to gather covert intelligence directly. Often, they operate openly and declare themselves as representatives of foreign intelligence services to their host country. The methods used by MI5 officers vary widely, and are often limited only by their ingenuity. Armed with a suite of the latest high-tech tools for surveillance, they will use it to eavesdrop, tap telephone calls and communicate secretly. Normally, MI5 officers will recruit spies to obtain intelligence on their behalf. 

More formally, a spy working for MI5 is known as a “covert human intelligence source,” but in the United Kingdom, spies are more commonly referred to as agents (Interestingly, in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a covert human intelligence source is called an “informant” rather than an “agent.” Such agents have been consistently referred to as operatives by greatcharlie.) MI5 agents will do far more than just inform about people and events. Agents secretly provide private information to which few or no others might have access, as well as classified information to an officer. An agent will probably not be a professional “spy” but an MI5 intelligence officer will usually provide them with some basic instruction in tradecraft, espionage methods. The human relationship between intelligence officers and their agents remains a key element of espionage.

MI5’s earliest precursor was a secret service formed in 1569 by Sir Francis Walsingham, who later became secretary of state to Elizabeth I. What came to be called MI5 was formed in 1909 under the leadership of Vernon Kell, then a captain in the British army, to identify and counteract German spies then working in the United Kingdom. It performed that task with great effect. MI5 originally stood for “Military Intelligence [Department] 5.” (In fact, there were a number of departments within the Directorate of Military Intelligence–MI1 through MI19–which dealt with a range of issues. MI1, for instance, was responsible for code-breaking, and MI2 handled Russian and Scandinavian intelligence. The responsibilities of these departments were either discontinued or absorbed into The War Office, MI5 and MI6 and, later, the Government Communications Headquarters.) After World War I, MI5 remained in place as part of the United Kingdom’s effort to centralize control of intelligence functions. In 1931, MI5 was renamed the Security Service, but was still commonly known as MI5 then as it is today. About the time it was renamed, MI5 was paired with MI6, under the Defence Ministry and functioned with a “combined staff” of only two men. Kell, MI5 founder, remained in charge of the agency until 1940. During World War II, with far more staff, MI5 enjoyed a considerable number of successes. One was the Double-Cross System, which fed disinformation to Nazi Germany. For the most part, however, it is recognizably difficult to measure MI5’s success, since it can only be judged by things which do not happen, such as the prevention of sabotage. 

There was initial period of confusion at the start of World War II as a MI5 was inundated with work and had too few staff at all levels to handle it. Missteps led to “life-saving” reforms with the coming of Sir David Petrie in April 1941. MI5 is better known in the war as having achieved great success in uncovering Nazi agents in the United Kingdom. Captured Nazi records studied after 1945 indicated almost all of the Nazi agents working against the United Kingdom were captured. The exception was ine the committed suicide. MI5 managed to recruit a number of the enemy agents to become counterespionage agents for the service and fed false information to the enemy concerning military strategy during the war. MI5 executed the famous “Double Cross” system which was a deception that supported the success of the D-Day Invasion at Normandy in 1944. A proud episode for MI5 was its defense of Gibraltar from enemy agents and saboteurs throughout the war.

MI5 engaged in a hard fought struggle with Soviet, Eastern Bloc and Chinese espionage efforts in the United Kingdom. The situation was made more difficult was the rise in IRA terrorism during the Troubles. One MI5 renowned victories was its uncovering of Soviet Union’s most valuable agents was exposed. However, MI5’s record during the Cold War, actually was mixed. There were a number of widely publicized blunders during that period. The Soviet Union was found to have deeply penetrated MI5, as well as MI6 which reportedly undermined the public’s confidence in the organization.

Low morale reportedly plagued MI5 after the end of the Cold War and the Good Friday agreement of 1998, which led to massive cutbacks. The agency’s focus would eventually shift after the Cold War from counter-espionage and counter-subversion to counterterrorism. That shift was given greater emphasis following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, and counterterrorism became a role of the utmost importance following the July 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 terrorist bombings in the United Kingdom. MI5’s ranks were filled out rapidly, and within it was a renewed sense of purpose. Today, counterterrorism operations still account for much of MI5’s activities. 

Not all of the anecdotes that Andrew offers spotlight the valor of its officers. There are some of the rather lurid intrigues. They include a cast of cheats, schemers, supplanters, unsavory allegiances, and unimaginable acquaintances. One dare not imagine the sensibilities of the errant individuals behind them. In the discussion of the work done within the analytical shops of MI5, the finer shades of analysis and deduction are spotlighted. Information was looked upon pathologically as the source of motives, clues, indications, and implications. With that analyzed information, MI5 leaders would speak truth other power, whatever it came upon, no matter how offensive, it was told straight.

Zhao Kezhi, State Councilor of the People’s Republic of China and the Minister and Party Committee Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security, with the top police officer rank of Police Commissioner General (above). MPS senior executives are influential members of the Communist Party of China senior ranks, What often compels the Communist Party of China to select requirements and direction for Chinese Intelligence is not necessarily based on Maoist thought as much as political expedience, necessity, and personal interests. As a consequence, finding the truth is not always the main goal of MPS in its intelligence, counterintelligence, or law enforcement pursuits. That is the type of relation that Chinese intelligence services have with the Communist Party from their very beginning.

Intelligence Work of MPS

If one placed the history of Chinese intelligence alongside that of the United Kingdom, one would find that the craft of intelligence was studied in China long before the idea of formally organizing intelligence activity was manifested in 16th century England. The most illustrious expressions of intelligence concepts and methods in China was in Chapter 13 of The Art of War, a treatise dating from the 5th century by the Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. Chapter 13 focused on the importance of developing good information sources, and identified five specific types of intelligence sources along with ways to best manage each. However, the lineage of modern Chinese intelligence services,  as noted earlier, have more recent beginnings in the era of Mao. Similarities between MPS and MI5 exist insomuch that it is the Chinese intelligence service charged with internal security and domestic counterintelligence activities of China. It investigates and acts against any person or movement that might threaten China’s security, but unlike MI5, its officers have the power to arrest. In addition to its performing those standard domestic functions as an intelligence service, MPS is very much tied to the Communist Party of China to maintain control of the population and maintain the Communist order. To that extent, it has remained obedient to the ever shifting requests and requirements the Party issues to it. To be more specific concerning the responsibilities of MPS, they include: preventing, stopping and investigating criminal activities; fighting against terrorist activities; maintaining stability and order; administering to transport, fire fighting and dangerous objects; administering to household registration, identification cards, nationality as well as entry, status and exit of Chinese and foreign nationals; maintaining border security; protecting persons, venues and facilities as designated by the state; managing gatherings, parades and demonstrations; supervising public information networks; supervising security concerning state organizations, social organizations, enterprises, institutions, and large construction sites; and, guiding community security commissions.

The Communist Party of China has hardly proven to be pristine in practicing what it preaches. What often compels the Communist Party of China to select requirements and direction for Chinese Intelligence is not necessarily based on Maoist thought as much as political expedience, necessity, and personal interests. As a consequence, finding the truth is not always the main goal of MPS in its intelligence, counterintelligence, or law enforcement pursuits. Normally, finding the truth is sine qua non among intelligence and counterintelligence services, and law enforcement. To fail to find the truth, well-aware that one holds a paucity of facts, information and data, is to fail oneself. Naturally, being aware of the existence of information that contradicts one’s initial hypothesis and doing nothing to dig deeper is counterintuitive.  Having stated that, in the intelligence industry, the slightest deviation from the course ordered on an investigation to satisfy the requirements of the powers that be throw the rules out of the window. However, when tasked directly by the Communist Party of China, the truth lies in what the Party says the truth is. If MPS officers were to present findings from an investigation that held information contradicting the truth as declared by the Communist Party of China, they would unlikely garner understanding from their respective national provincial, or municipal senior executives and managers. In the best case scenario, the ironic admonition might come from on high to stick with the primary problem instead of rooting around at “extraneous matters.” That is the type of relationship that Chinese intelligence services have with the Communist Party from their very beginning. They are charged with the responsibility for ensuring the tranquility of order. From outside of China, one can freely call the well-experienced intelligence officers who fill the ranks of MPS as tragedians, specializing in a very tragic role for their country.

Manifestations of Political Pushes from Behind in MI5’s Past

In examining MPS, it cannot be stressed enough that it is a political creature of the Communist Party of China. MI5’s circumstances are not remotely similar. MI5 is not an organization designed intrinsically to service the political interests of political authorities. However, there have been occasions when political authorities have misused the vital security arm by using pressure to influence its actions, for purposes that were questionable. Shockingly, the MI5 carried out secret surveillance of the colonial delegations which came to London to discuss terms for independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Andrew gives a disturbing account of the stealthy gathering of intelligence on the delegates attending conferences which negotiated the independence of Cyprus and Kenya. The Home Secretary, Rab Butler, cynically condoned these operations on the grounds that “obviously the product was of great importance and of great value to the government negotiators”.

In most of the British Empire, claims Andrew, MI5 contributed to a smooth transfer of power through the work of its liaison officers. However in Guyana, where United Kingdom Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill wanted to “break the Communist teeth,” a shameful exception was witnessed. MI5 obediently provided support for the United Kingdom and US covert action to oust the democratically-elected Cheddi Jagan from power. Andrew claims that the dominant intelligence agency in the years leading up to Guyana’s independence in 1966 was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). However,  MI5, and thereby the government of the United Kingdom, nevertheless had a hand in the affair. 

In the present day, such outcomes are certainly not intended in MI5, an organization tasked and trusted to protect and serve the United Kingdom. To ensure that remains so, the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services exercises regular ongoing oversight of intelligence activities. Through this committee, the Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Secretary of the Cabinet, exercises authority over the daily operations of the British intelligence and security communities as a whole. The Home Secretary oversees MI5, as well as the National Criminal Intelligence Service and Scotland Yard. To the extent that there is always the need for such a degree of oversight from above, one must never overlook the shadowy side of the business. It is at the core of intelligence work. There is a reality that by doing the dirty work, the people of the United Kingdom are allowed to sleep peacefully at night. When the situation is dire and urgent enough, use has been made of agent provocateurs who may take direct action to maintain their bona fides within their groups for the organization’s purposes.

Today, officers join and serve MI5 with the belief that its work has much to do with the wider good. As the targets of MI5 efforts are the terrorists or the war criminals or the nuclear proliferators. There is an understanding how the need to approach a matter of the utmost importance with the most effective method available can subordinate all else. Whether or not exigent circumstances permit, there at least exists the earnest aim among them to defend the values of the United Kingdom’s liberal democracy. Unlike its counterpart in the Chinese intelligence services, MPS, causing harm to the free people of their own country, who are living within the law, is never the intended purpose of MI5. Indeed, while also ostensibly tasked and trusted to protect and serve the people of their country. MPS keeps a boot not only to the neck of criminals and true threats within China, but of groups of innocent citizens labeled as undesirable by the Communist Party of China, and doing that appalling work at the Party’s behest, to be frank, could be ascribed as an essential part of their raison d’etre.

Other Ugly Truths

As long as humans are involved in an organization and its plans and activities, rarely will outcomes be perfect. It could be expected to be imperfect shaped by mistakes, misjudgments, biases, and emotions. To that extent, there is no purpose here to establish MI5 as a paragon of moral behavior. In its history, mistakes were made. Pointing to them means admitting to the truth. (Interestingly, the historical record indicates the nearly contemporary national intelligence service has suffered from its share of mistakes.) What can be greatly appreciated in Defend the Realm is that Andrew tells the MI5 story straight. The ugly truth as told, creates some disappointment, yet from it, lessons were certainly made available that would allow for the organization’s improvement. According to Andrew, recruitment within MI5 was perhaps the most outward expression of inward thinking in the organization. It was surely not acceptable by today’s standards intellectually, morally, ethically, and professionally. Indeed, within the organization itself, MI5, a public service, did not advertise openly for recruits before 1997. Up to that point, recruitment was based on personal recommendation. This was a narrow social group, many of whom had served in India or elsewhere in the Empire. To that extent, the organization was sure to recruit “from good Anglo-Saxon stock.” Reportedly, male officers listed their recreations as cricket and hunting, while female officers were graduates of elite schools and universities

Right up to the mid-1970s, the post-war Security Service refused to recruit Jews on the grounds that a dual loyalty to both Israel and the United Kingdom might create a conflict of interest. This was “inexcusable,” Andrew rightly observes. There was also a very disturbing attitude taken toward Blacks interested in joining the Security Service. In 1949, then Deputy Director General Guy Liddell told the Joint Intelligence Committee: “It was true that niggers coming here often went to the C[ommunist] P[arty].” That fact that he held such appalling racist views were reinforced when he explained there was no doubt in his mind that “West African natives are wholly unfitted for self-rule.” There was a sour spirit to it all. Yet, that was the spirit of the moment. A sort of “pigs in clover” self-satisfaction influenced and distorted thinking in the world of that past era.

While MI5 was busy keeping some citizens out of its intelligence service, its rank and file was surprised to discover who they had let in. In 1951, as the result of the decrypted telegram of the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, that any of the Cambridge Five–then current or former all MI5 or MI6 employees, who were recruited as spies by the Soviets in the 1930s when they were young misguided Communists at Cambridge University–were identified. The bombshell revelation sent shock waves through the halls of MI5. In response, MI5 initiated an investigation that lasted 30 years in order to get to the bottom of the matter.

Among other unfortunate episodes for MI5 was the “Wilson plot” of the 1970s in which United Kingdom Prime Minister Harold Wilson was accused of being a Soviet agent–the information came from the CIA’s Counterintelligence Division, James Jesus Angleton based on claims of questionable source. MI5 investigated the claims and found them to be false. There was also the “Death on the Rock” case in 1988 in which MI5 with Spanish authorities were alarmed about three members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) Belfast Brigade who travelled to Spain. It was presumed that they planned an attack against British troops in Gibraltar. MI5 intended to capture the IRA members with the assistance of the British Army’s Special Air Service Regiment cooperation of Spanish Authorities, but all three were killed in the process.

Zhao Kezhi, State Councilor of the People’s Republic of China and the Minister and Party Committee Secretary of the Ministry of Public Security, with the top police officer rank of Police Commissioner General (above). MPS senior executives are influential members of the Communist Party of China senior ranks, What often compels the Communist Party of China to select requirements and direction for Chinese Intelligence is not necessarily based on Maoist thought as much as political expedience, necessity, and personal interests. As a consequence, finding the truth is not always the main goal of MPS in its intelligence, counterintelligence, or law enforcement pursuits. That is the type of relation that Chinese intelligence services have with the Communist Party from their very beginning.

The Communist Party of China’s Political Manipulation of the MPS Today

It would appear that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is usually distressed exceedingly when even the mere suggestion is made that some underlying evil is present in the decisions and actions of the Chinese government towards its own people. There is the insistence by the Communist Party of China that it acts only in their best interests and the thinking behind each choice is gifted by what their Western counterparts would call scruple. Thus, when any reports, photos, or videos of the actual treatment of ethnic and religious minorities in China are secreted out of the country and headlined in the West or anywhere else in the world, it is nothing less than an absolute disaster. The belief among Communist Party of China’s leadership and members that China’s Communust society is near perfect and would be best for the world is a belief in a false reality. The prospect of any citizen or any foreigner, unmasking the appearance created by Beijing of China being an advanced industrialized society and superior culture truly seems to terrify the Communist Party of China. Burned rotten by somewhat regular investigative reports and exposé documentaries, written and produced in the West, they, without fail, will attempt to cover their traces rather than spill it out. Government and Party spokespeople will roar about China’s innocence and the false and bizarre nature of what is reported. Trying to figuratively get the toothpaste back into the tube has never worked though. Focusing on what it can control, the Communist Party of China engages continuously in an effort to grease the wheels of citizens thinking to ensure that it always slides in its favor and toward appreciation of the Communist Revolution. To stanch the thickening of misgivings among the Chinese people toward its actions, ever present are warnings to citizens to guard themselves against foreign agents, look upon foreigners with some suspicion, and be cognizant of the possibility of unwittingly giving cause for foreign agents to trace them and spot them as potential recruits as spies and informants through seemingly innocuous contact.

The Communist Party of China has long acknowledged that there is always a threat that could arise from the “unsuccessful” education of Chinese citizens. A symptom of that would be the attraction to materialistic symbols of success for the former bourgeoisie class apparatus of success: business success, homes, cars, things constructed around people. It was what identified them as being above the proletariat, the working class. In China, given its relative prosperity, there exists the fear among leaders of the Communist Party and government bureaucracies that the bourgeoisie existence of the West would insinuate itself in the thinking of Chinese citizens and become a preference in their minds. Any aspiration created for what the West has to offer not under controlled circumstances could figuratively spread among the people much as a virus, infecting the proletariat, potentially creating some mass disaffection toward the system. Perhaps such sensibilities reveal a secret doubt that Chinese citizens could see that so-called ideals of Maoist Thought and Marxist-Leninism had been betrayed or perhaps were simply Utopian, and that they would desire great changes. Communist Party of China leaders determined long ago that the response to this threat needed to be strong enough to match “the severity of the disease.” 

As part of its efforts at population control, the Chinese government insists that the people keep a watchful eye over threats to the new system. It was understood that the reactionary, the counterrevolutionary, most often “hiding in the shadows,” posed the greatest threat and was viewed as anathema. It was in the performance of the mission to discourage, punish and obliterate that threat that the MPS earned a reputation for being the horrifically oppressive cats paw of the authoritarian regime. The MPS has interfered in interactions and relationships between citizens, ordered citizens to spy on their fellow citizens, demanded that they betray one another, regularly performed intrusive and demeaning searches of citizens’ person, homes, and workplaces. There have been arrests of many innocent citizens, accompanied by abusive and endless interrogations. The shadow of sudden death hangs over the head of any individual in MPS custody.

As of late, what should be of greatest concern is the approach the MPS has been taking toward foreign visitors. (The matter is elaborated upon later in this essay.) As a practice, foreigners, especially, Westerners, are closely observed and often investigated by provincial offices and local MPS stations. Under such circumstances, there is always a real possibility that one might be arrested or “briefly” detained for questioning, would be created. Foreign visitors who have faced such treatment have almost immediately become the center of a frightful international incidents, which is actually the goal of Chinese authorities. Regardless of one’s status in the US, it can happen in China. Reportedly, the attempt has been made with some foreigners to persuade with the pressure of interviews, interrogation, and detainment or use certain manipulations to convince them to let themselves go and reveal “the truth.” Telling the truth would mean copping to preconceived ideas held by their interrogators about their alleged wicked missions against the People’s Republic of China. The treatment of Chinese citizens detained by the MPS for even lesser “offenses,” is always decidedly worse.

Multi cives aut ea pericula quae imminent non vident aut ea quae vident neglegunt. (Many citizens either do not see those dangers which are threatening or they ignore those that they see.) Spin concerning the maltreatment of ethnic and religious groups is propagated through narratives in the state-run news media of how much the Communist Party of China is doing to protect China from enemies, domestic and foreign, at the hands of which the Chinese people have suffered for so long. Nevertheless, a good number of Chinese people are aware that one cannot know with certainty what is real from what one hears from the government. However, holding a secret doubt about the system in China can lead to a solitary despair. The secret doubt becomes dissatisfaction with one’s work and one’s situation which can become a full-blown loathing of the system. Soon after may come the rejection of authorities. In response to conditions forced upon them, being subjected to humiliations, Chinese citizens of some ethnic and religious minorities have acted in protest, releasing a sense of frustration. Becoming vocal may relieve his sense of frustration for the moment will only open the door to far greater problems. To Chinese government authorities, it represents nothing less than a social dissembling within those groups.

Loyal Communist Party members can hardly understand that any other citizen’s disillusionment or disappointment in government efforts to respond to their needs could be based in logic. Thereby, the attitudes of those citizens are irrational and reactionary. Surely, those approached by MPS display intense emotions, very likely overwhelmed by great fear and sheer terror, given an expectation the worst will befall them given the organization’s reputation, would avail themselves to be apprehended and held indefinitely as their situation would immediately be converted into a psychiatric issue. After all, any charge will do. The goal is to cull the so-called threatening population by plausibly arresting benign citizens and warehousing them away from their homes. One can only imagine that it would mean for those declared to have psychiatric issues to be placed in the hands of medical professionals linked to the MPS. MPS officers are apparently not timid to draw very false, aberrant, far-fetched inferences from fact collected during investigations. Of course, no professional ethics, no moral principles founded upon religion, and no less spiritually based philosophy of humanism could not obstruct such actions. Ethnic and religious minorities must feel akin to big chickens in a world of foxes.

Tibetans detained by MPS officers facing judgment in court (above). China has long considered Tibet to be part of its historical empire. In 1951, China occupied Tibet and took control of the region. Many Tibetans believe the region was illegally incorporated into China and have pressed for independence. A Tibetan independence movement has been calling for the independence of Tibet and political separation from China. That independence movement is largely supported by the diaspora of ethnic Tibetans worldwide. During periods of repression and martial law in the region, it is believed that the Chinese government has killed thousands of Tibetans. The Chinese government has referred to Tibetans as one of “the five poisons” threatening China’s stability.

A principle is a precise standard, a course of conduct you are committed to, a way of life that you live by. Adherence to principles, has little meaning to the Communist Party of China unless the principles adhered to are those of the Party. Publicly available sources show that Beijing considers Falungong, Tibetans, Uyghur Muslims, democracy activists and pro-independence Taiwanese undesirables as they adhere to principles and a way of life adverse to that insisted upon by the Communist Party of China. They have been named the “five poisons” that constitute the greatest threat to Beijing’s rule. Tibetans, Uyghur Muslims, in particular, are essentially looked upon as vindictive ill-balanced creatures of China’s hinterland.

As noted here MI5 unfortunately has a record of past mistakes and poor judgment, too, and fortunately from that history, lessons have certainly been learned. Yet still, making mistakes and misjudgments is a far cry different from being deliberately bad, acting the name of injustice and engaging in cruelty, based on a contrived motive and without any reasonable provocation. MPS currently engages in activities which, not to apportion wickedness, manifest just how different the two intelligence services really are. MPS, as an organization, espouses great anger about ethnic and religious minorities, dubbing them activists, reactionaries, counterrevolutionaries, and terrorists, and for the sake of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Revolution, has done what it does best, acted aggressively toward such “threats.” If one is of a ethnic group or religious groups at variance with the Communist Party of China, and consequently under the thumb of the MPS, one will have the sense of being in contact with an evil of an exceptional nature. In recent years, egregious abuses have increased through government policies under the pretext and justification of fighting the “three evils” of “ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism.” 

Tibet is an autonomous region in the People’s Republic of China. The region has historically been the home to ethnic Tibetans, among others ethnic groups. It is the spiritual home of Tibetan Buddhism and the traditional seat of the Dalai Lama. China  has long considered Tibet to be part of its historical empire. In 1951, China occupied Tibet and took control of the region. Many Tibetans believe the region was illegally incorporated into China and have pressed for independence. A Tibetan independence movement has been calling for the independence of Tibet and political separation from China. That independence movement is largely supported by the diaspora of ethnic Tibetans worldwide. During periods of repression and martial law in the region, it is believed that the Chinese government has killed thousands of Tibetans. The Chinese government has referred to Tibetans as one of “the five poisons” threatening China’s stability. Omnis enim ex infirmitate feritas est. (All savageness is a sign of weakness.)

Regarding the Uyghurs, the Chinese Communist Party is waging a targeted campaign against Uyghur women, men, and children, and members of other Turkic Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. Abuses have included coercive population control through forced abortion, forced sterilization, and involuntary implantation of birth control; the detention of more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in internment camps; forced labor in facilities nearby or affiliated with the internment camps; the destruction and closure of mosques and other religious sites, prevention of youths from participating in religious activities, forced political indoctrination or “re-education.” A commonality among the homelands of the different ethnic and religious groups in China is the fact that they are depressed regions with unemployment, poor infrastructure and many structures tumbled down. Interdum volgus rectum videt, est ubi peccat. (At times the world sees straight, but many times the world goes astray.) 

Uyghur citizens seated in formation in a detention center (above). Regarding the Uyghurs, the Chinese Communist Party is waging a targeted campaign against Uyghur women, men, and children, and members of other Turkic Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, China. Abuses have included coercive population control through forced abortion, forced sterilization, and involuntary implantation of birth control; the detention of more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority groups in internment camps; forced labor in facilities nearby or affiliated with the internment camps; the destruction and closure of mosques and other religious sites, prevention of youths from participating in religious activities, forced political indoctrination or “re-education.”

Regarding religious minorities, during the first thirty years of its existence, the Communist Party of China committed itself to making atheist Marxism the fundamental ideology of the country. depriving the Chinese people of their constitutional right of religious liberty. There is a clarity and certainty that comes from being able to know another’s origins. One place to look to identify, research, is to study a the  of culture, history, customs, that may shape the subject’s attitudes and behaviors, worldview. Adherence to religion, culture and identity as well, stiffens resistance to authoritarian pressures and coercion, and girds uncommon perseverance. To that extent, the Communist Party of China surely fears citizens’ adherence to their religions and cultures, and the rejection of Communism. In response to that threat, Beijing has formulated and implemented new policies, regulations, and legislation impacting religious freedom have been created and implemented, particularly since 1979. The idea of it all being to surgically strip citizens of their ethnicity, culture, and religion, thereby smother the individual’s identity, leaving the individual with nothing to grab onto, except Mao’s teachings on Chinese Communism. In the report of the US Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC), 2017 Annual Report 127 (October 5, 2017), it is noted that Chinese authorities commonly prosecute Falun Gong practitioners under article 300 of the People’s Republic of China Criminal Law. That information was found on the official Chinese government “anti-cult website.” In February 2018, a woman in Beijing was convicted of “using cult organizations to obstruct the enforcement of laws” under article 300 of the Criminal Law. The woman was sentenced to one and half years in prison and a fine for publicly advocating “the evil cult Falun Gong.” Falungong, essentially an anti-Communist China spiritual group, was banned by Beijing in 1999, having been labeled an “evil cult.”  In 2014, a leader of the Church of Almighty God, a quasi-Christian group also known as Eastern Lightning, was also convicted of “using cult organizations to obstruct the enforcement of laws” and sentenced to four years in prison. That church is now officially banned.

Reportedly, MPS has detained or otherwise restricted the freedom of Catholic leaders in both the underground and official churches. The government has reportedly pushed for Chinese Catholic bishops to be selected through the patriotic religious organizations and then ordained by Chinese bishops without the involvement of the Holy See. Chinese officials have also reportedly subjected Protestant Christian beliefs and practices to a wide range of restrictions. Beijing reportedly pressured unregistered house churches to join the officially recognized religious organization, the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. Protestant house churches faced raids during church gatherings, eviction from meeting spaces, and official bans on worship. Martin Luther King, Jr. said that “The moral arc of the universe bends toward justice.” While that may be true, it surely has not bent so much in China’s direction yet. Iniqua nunquam regna perpetuo manent. (Unjust rule never abides continually.)

II. The Role of the MSS in China’s National Security Bureaucracy

As aforementioned, Chinese intelligence services, in terms of task and purpose, work within an authoritarian government and must be viewed as a different kettle of fish than the services of the United Kingdom. Having created the space and acquiring the flexibility over the past few decades to allow the service to evolve into the elite, very capable intelligence service the Communist Party of China originally wanted it to be, MSS senior executives and managers have now figuratively declared “game on” to China’s competitors and adversaries. The mission, as originally intended, has not changed much since 1983. Overall, it is now defined as collecting solid intelligence from the inner workings and the very top of foreign military, diplomatic, political, economic, financial, scientific, educational, media, communications, and social institutions. By conventional wisdom, one might proffer those are its priorities. It is surely what Beijing wants now and it is what MSS is chasing after. Its tactics, techniques, procedures and methods are surely more refined than ever before. As previously mentioned, Western intelligence services until recently have habitually underrated the abilities of Chinese intelligence services. That was a mistake. Central to greatcharlie’s understanding of China’s intelligence services and their activities are the writings of Peter Mattis. Since leaving the CIA where he was a highly-regarded analyst on China, Mattis has published a number of superlative essays on Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence. Mattis’ writings evince an appreciation of the depth of thought, organization, and planning Chinese intelligence services have put into building up their organizations and conducting operations in all areas. To that extent, he proffers that the West as of late has been facing very modern, competitive Chinese intelligence services that make use of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods at a level equal and in some cases far more competitive than those of Western intelligence services. As he explained in a September 2012 article in Studies in Intelligence entitled, “The Analytical Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services,” Chinese writings on intelligence bear remarkable similarity to familiar US definitions of intelligence functions and goals. He reminds that Sun Tzu taught that “foreknowledge” (xianzhi) allowed commanders to outmaneuver opponents. However, he notes more modern definitions range from “activating [catalytic] knowledge” (jihuo zhi-shi) to information to protect national security, domestic stability, or corporate interests in a competitive environment. Mattis goes on to state that Chinese military scholars today frame intelligence as a distinct subset of knowledge, defined by its relevance to decision makers and a competitive environment. Specifically, intelligence is transmittable (chuandi xing) and is knowledge that satisfactorily (manzu xing) resolves a specific decisionmaking problem. He further asserts that empirically, Chinese intelligence officers consistently have demonstrated the use of widely practiced professional tradecraft, having successfully exploited for political and military intelligence purposes agents with vulnerabilities familiar to anyone who follows the subject.

The Minister of State Security, Chen Wenqing (above). Chinese intelligence services target a broad range of national security actors, including military forces, defense industrial companies, national security decision makers, and critical infrastructure entities of the United Kingdom, the US, and other advanced industrialized countries. Lately, the chief feature of the intelligence war between those countries and China has been the economic front. Indeed, economic espionage, one might venture to say, holds perhaps a prominent place among the bread and butter activities of the MSS and is best known to industries around the world most of which could easily become one of its corporate victims.

Using MI6 as a Yardstick to Gauge the MSS and Its Activities

Everyone on the outside has their own version of what MI6 is and does. Looking at MI6 as a yardstick to understand the MSS, the two organizations pair up to the degree that both are foreign intelligence services. The United Kingdom’s MI6, formally the Secret Intelligence Service as mentioned previously, is the government agency responsible for the collection, analysis, and appropriate dissemination of foreign intelligence. It is also charged specifically with the conduct of espionage activities outside of the United Kingdom’s territory. The MI6 motto is Semper Occultus (Always Secret), but the organization states as its mission: “We work overseas to help make the UK a safer and more prosperous place.” Much as MI5, MI6 has only a few thousand employees. It is headquartered in London, at Vauxhall Cross. It is a component of the same intelligence apparatus in the United Kingdom as MI5. 

MI6’s four main areas of focus are: countering international terrorism, combating weapons proliferation, supporting stability overseas and securing the United Kingdom’s cyber advantage. Countering international terrorism means exactly that, protecting the United Kingdom from terrorists. Performing that task entails: gathering and assessing intelligence; conducting investigations and disrupting terrorist activity; preventing people from becoming terrorists; and, protecting critical national infrastructure and crowded places. Through gathering intelligence and disrupting operations, MI6 plays an indispensable role in the United Kingdom’s counter weapons proliferation efforts directed at combatting the international proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. Working in cooperation with key national and international partners as the US, MI6 also helps to ensure that the United Kingdom’s weapons exports never fall into the hands of terrorists. Instability and conflict overseas leads to weak governments and poor national security, and nurtures a fertile environment in which terrorists and organized crime groups can thrive. Using agents, the MI6 provides intelligence to government policymakers and decisionmakers and provides early warning indications of potentially hostile threats. Most often that information can lead to early political intervention to prevent prolonged instability. Cyber threats are a key security risk to the United Kingdom, as they have the potential to disastrously impact individuals, organizations and governments. Global and ever becoming increasingly complex, cybercrime has the unusual characteristic of having the potential to rear its ugly head and reach out from anywhere in the world. The MI6 provides secret intelligence to help protect the UK from current and emerging cyber threats across a range of adversaries such as hostile countries, terrorists and criminals. Additionally, MI6 conducts counterintelligence operations via a furtive counterintelligence section, but it is generally understood that the organization shares that work with MI5.

In order to meet the challenges of their work, MI6 officers are highly trained in the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of their profession. Within intelligence services, as noted earlier, it is referred to as tradecraft. High on the list skills learned and honed are espionage techniques and the use of agents. Often MI6 officers may operate openly in their host country, declaring themselves as representatives of the United Kingdom’s foreign intelligence services. Otherwise they will work covertly under the cover of other official positions such as diplomatic staff or trade delegates. Some MI6 officers may operate under non-official cover to conceal the fact that they work for an intelligence service. That usually entails posing as a business person, student or journalist for example. In some cases MI6 officers will operate under “deep cover,” meaning they will use false names and nationalities. In the intelligence industry, such officers operating under such cover are referred to as “illegals.” They operate without any of the protections offered by diplomatic immunity. MI6 officers typically seek to establish networks of agents whom they can use over a sustained period of time, so that they can obtain a reliable flow of information. As it was stated in the aforementioned discussion on MI5 agents, MI6 agents operate by exploiting trusted relationships and positions to obtain sensitive information. They may also look for vulnerabilities among those handling secrets. They may be aware of flaws in their organization’s security that they can exploit. Recruiting agents, both foreign and domestic, who can provide intelligence on terrorist plans and organizations is of the utmost importance to MI6 officers.

MI6 was constituted in its present form in 1912 by Commander (later Sir) Mansfield Cumming as part of the United Kingdom’s attempt to coordinate intelligence activities prior to the outbreak of World War I. In the 1930s and ’40s it was considered the most effective intelligence service in the world. Following the rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany, MI6 conducted espionage operations in Europe, Latin America, and much of Asia. When the US entered World War II, MI6 helped to train personnel of the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS). As mentioned, it was the organization in which Hilsman served. Much of OSS’ foreign intelligence and counterintelligence tradecraft was adopted from MI6. Indeed, the CIA still uses much of it today. Reportedly, many “old boys,” veterans of the OSS are fond  of saying, “The Brits taught us everything that we know, but certainly not everything that they know.” The two organizations worked closely during the war. MI6 has since cooperated extensively with the OSS’s successor, the CIA. MI6 senior executives, managers, and officers refer to the US intelligence organization the “American cousins.” Details of MI6 operations and relationships have rarely appeared in the press. In the mid-1950s, the public reacted with consternation when it was revealed that MI6 had been penetrated by double agents who had served the Soviet Union since the 1930s. It was not until the 1990s, that the head of MI6 was publicly named for the first time. Still, information about MI6 is still much more closely guarded than that about MI5, which carries out internal security and domestic counterintelligence activities. The agency has the power to censor news accounts of its activities through the use of “D” notices under the Official Secrets Act. MI6 reports to the Foreign Office.

Stephen Dorril’s work, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service, is a true reflection of the organization, its people and its history, what it has done and where it has been most influential . Dorril, a meticulous observer and chronicler of the security services, demonstrates an understanding of everything one might have thought about MI6. Through the text, readers learn that MI6’s postwar activities were mired in prewar attitudes and practices. Many in the United Kingdom imagined the foreign policy task dividing up the world with US and other global powers. Instead, the preoccupation was the Soviet Union and the Cold War. In chronicalizing the Cold War segment of MI6’s history, Dorril fills the pages with anecdotes of its most spectacular failures, stirring successes, unsavory plots and bizarre missions, the real-life cloak-and-dagger world is exposed. There is a discussion of Operation Stalin, which exploited the Russian dictator’s paranoia and led to the execution of thousands. There is another about the tunnel MI6 dug beneath the Berlin Wall. During the Cold War, in the intelligence war, it seems that there was no opportunity, in the midst of his work against the Eastern Bloc and more the Soviet Empire, to view matters from a broader or humane perspective. Surely, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to enumerate all of the mistakes, poor choices that were made. By 1992, influence abroad had been lost in the Middle East, most of Africa and large swathes of Asia. The United Kingdom was not exiled and isolated as some might suggest. It was then and remains a key partner to the US with its superpower status, and often takes lead from the US, the main push was to abrogate the world’s resources. In the post-Cold War era, there was once again a sense, particularly in the administration of US President Bill Clinton of the West’s entitlement to the world’s spoils. That rush to take what was available was intensified by the need to get to what was out there before the People’s Republic of China did. Political power seemed to embrace corporate power. As a consequence, there was the appearance that corporate power was supported by government power. MI6, one of the great information-gathering organizations of the world, was put to that task, placing some strains on the service.

The book presents a well of extraordinary characters. As alluded to earlier, the lion’s share of what was told is meat and drink for those who enjoy spy novels, but it is all real. Yet, in addition the book presents the similitudes of the intelligence industry with profoundly human stories. The world of the intelligence officer is often a dank and grey one, visceral, boring at times. There is a drudgery about agent running. Doing chores in the analytical shops can be tedious. One is invited to understand the suffering and sacrifices of MI6 officers. Prerogatives are surrendered, loves, passions, moral ambiguities, moral compromise. Many officers fall off, finding satisfaction in other professions and pursuits, others engaged in betrayal, a few entered the device with the objective of spying. As with MI5, MI6, as a dynamic, intelligence service, operating worldwide, has a history riddled with complexity. Stories of unpleasantness are even found in Dorril’s authorized study, too! The more counterintuitive these acts are from the past, the more puzzling they are. In such an old, but odd profession, if one finds oneself doing odd things, the hope would be to catch oneself out when one is so far out of bounds that nothing good is being accomplished.

The People’s Republic of China Embassy in Washington, DC (above), home to the MSS resident in the US. Much as it was the case during the Cold War with Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence services, it remains a penchant today among the Chinese intelligence services, to troll the émigrés who have made their way out of those countries. They will go as far as to twist their tails to garner their cooperation as operatives and informants. There is almost an insistence that even having left China, the émigrés must accept China’s iron rule. It may appear to be daylight madness, nevertheless, it is happening. In the recent case of an New York City Police Department officer was alleged to be supporting the intelligence activities of the Communist Party of China’s intelligence organ, the United Front Work Department. That case brought to fore the fact that Chinese intelligence services work hard at compelling overseas Chinese to take part in economical and technical espionage, whether through patriotic appeals or simple threats.

Present Day Focus and Operations of MSS

MSS, as well as other Chinese intelligence services, target a broad range of US national security actors, including military forces, defense industrial companies, national security decision makers, and critical infrastructure entities. Lately, the chief feature of a defacto intelligence war between West and China has been the economic front. Indeed, economic espionage, one might venture to say, holds perhaps a prominent place among the bread and butter activities of the MSS and is best known to industries around the world most of which could easily become one of its corporate victims. To understand the intelligence efforts of MSS, one must understand how guIding concepts from Deng Xiaoping led to a decision by Chinese intelligence to make economic espionage an even greater emphasis. Under the Second Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping, China began authentic economic reform partially opening China to the global market. China’s economy grew rapidly soon afterwards. In a five-year economic plan 2006-2010, the Communist Party of China outlined that China must maintain fast and stable economic growth and support the building of a harmonious society. The Communist Party of China’s aim was to raise the country’s gross domestic product by 7.5% annually for the next five years. In order to achieve such rapid economic growth, However, countries such as India and Vietnam had begun competing with China to offer cheap manufacturing bases for Western companies. Further, the increased demand for raw materials such as oil and iron ore, and new environmental and labor laws led to cost increases, making manufacturing in China more expensive which caused some factories to close. China sought to diversify its economy, for example, through the manufacture of better made high end products. However, that diversification of the economy required the Chinese to increase their knowledge of design and manufacturing processes. Espionage has offered a relatively cheap, quick, and easy method to obtain information that could help Chinese companies remain competitive. Many of China’s largest companies are state owned, or have close linkages to the government, and receive intelligence collected by Chinese intelligence services. Those firms have also proved to be capable of engaging in commercial espionage themselves. To get an idea of how well the MSS operates, one only needs to consider its ongoing activities in the US. Without the intention of tarnishing or being beastly toward US intelligence and  counterintelligence services, and law enforcement, they have been unable to prosecute a successful, fruitful, and victorious campaign against Chinese intelligence services operating in the US and against US interests globally. Readers might recall from previous posts on the subject, greatcharlie noted that Western intelligence services until recently have habitually underrated the abilities of Chinese intelligence services. Further, in previous US administrations, particularly in the administration of US President Barack Obama, a somewhat relaxed attitude resulted in policies on China lost in the wilderness that failed to genuinely protect or promote US interests. The delinquency and lethargy of previous administrations also allowed for the steady progress of China versus US power and further advances in technology. The burgeoning threat was apparently not fully discerned or appreciated. 

In response to past US missteps, Chinese intelligence services presumably placed a laser focus upon enhancing and adjusting their approaches to US targets. As a product of their success in recruiting officers and contractors from the US intelligence services, Chinese intelligence services have apparently managed to better understand what the US has been doing to try to recruit Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants is prioritized. To the extent, US intelligence officers and contractors recruited as spies are typically tasked with actions to support Chinese counterintelligence requirements. Doubtlessly, the collection of information on what MSS foreign intelligence has been doing has been insufficiently analyzed in light of information collected on US counterintelligence surveillance strategies and technological capabilities would inspire audits in Chinese intelligence services to better assess how closely its operatives were being monitored and how US counterintelligence managed to see a number of MSS efforts straight. If Chinese intelligence services actually hire hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of officers, operatives and informants, it stands to reason there would be a number of bad apples among them. If not, one must become reconciled with the fact that Chinese spies do not go astray so often.

Foreign Intelligence Operations of MSS

Successful multifaceted activities of Chinese Intelligence services have included: conventional espionage; outright intellectual property theft via corporate and academic institutions worldwide, and cyber attacks. For a good idea of how MSS conducts conventional espionage today, Ryan Clarke, a senior fellow at the East Asia Institute, a Singapore-based think tank, boils it down well in a July 31, 2020 Asia Times article entitled, “The Face of Chinese Spying in Singapore.” Curiously using MSS efforts primarily in the US primarily as an example, Clarke asserts its intelligence operations are highly targeted and tethered to specific state goals. He explains: “These types of operations are quite simple with relatively few moving parts, which is why they are replicable at scale.” To illustrate the variety of targets attacked by MSS, Clarke says: “We’ve seen operations against a range of American targets, from Covid-19 vaccine research to the F-35 fighter jet program.” With regard to the collection effort, Clarke goes on to propound: “The general approach is to establish target priorities and then proceed to collect what appear to be rather innocuous inputs with relatively limited value when viewed in isolation. Sometimes the information may not even be classified. This is done on a massive scale in-country with a parallel synthesis-fusion operation in China itself.” Putting such a massive and energetic effort into perspective, Clarke maintains: “The strategic logic is that, in the aggregate, this massive collection and synthesis-fusion effort will yield unique findings and insights which the Chinese Communist Party can leverage across a range of domains.” The Idea that a massive synthesis-fusion operation exists to mine useful intelligence from piles of information collected was also proferred and the analytical operation was conceptualized in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2020 post entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign Against the US? (Part 2).”

So far as is known publicly, counterintelligence services of the countries Chinese intelligence services have struck, to include the US, have yet to get to the bottom of their business in their countries in order to put an appreciable dent in their work. One might imagine that trying to spot, intercept, neutralize, and recruit significant numbers of Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants has become an exercise in chasing shadows. This has likely left senior executives and managers of many counterintelligence services in a mute frenzy. For the US, in particular, long gone are the opportunities such as the relatively facile recruitment of the MSS officer Yu Zhengsan back in 1985. Then, when MSS was barely up and running for two years, Yu Zhengsan, a mid-level MSS officer from a well-connected political family, was allegedly aided by the CIA allegedly in escaping China and defecting to the US. Once in US hands, Yu provided investigative leads for US counterintelligence services to capture Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a retired CIA language analyst, who had spied for China since the 1940s. If Chinese intelligence services actually hire hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of officers, operatives and informants, it stands to reason there would be a number of bad apples among them. If not, US counterintelligence services must become reconciled with the fact that, today, Chinese spies do not go astray so often. That is, there must be nothing so creative that US counterintelligence services are doing or offering to encourage them to do so.

Prior to the coming of the administration of US President Donald Trump, economic espionage by Chinese intelligence gained real traction. Startled US government officials began to sound the alarm particularly over the destructive impact of Chinese commercial espionage upon US national security. Intrusions by Chinese actors into US companies and other commercial institutions harm both the individual companies and the overall US economy, to the benefit of China. Indeed, in July 2015, Bill Evanina, who was the National Counterintelligence Executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and remains in that position as of this writing, stated point blank, “Economic security is national security.” Nevertheless, the vociferous statements of those tasked with defeating China’s operations had no real effect on the course of the administration of US President Barack Obama and Chinese intelligence activities steadily intensified. In response to counterintelligence and cyber defense missteps, Chinese intelligence services seem to have placed a laser focus upon enhancing and adjusting their approaches to US targets.

It is important to note that much as it was the case during the Cold War with Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence services, it remains a penchant today among the Chinese intelligence services, to troll the émigrés who have made their way out of those countries. They will go as far as to twist their tails to garner their cooperation as operatives and informants. There is almost an insistence that even having left China, the émigrés must accept China’s iron rule. It may appear to be daylight madness. However, while it is madness, it is happening. Clearly, the Communist Party of China must think it makes sense or they would be acting in this way. In the recent case of a New York City Police Department officer was alleged to be supporting the intelligence activities of the Communist Party of China’s intelligence organ, the United Front Work Department. That case brought to fore the fact that Chinese intelligence services work hard at compelling overseas Chinese to take part in economical and technical espionage, whether through patriotic appeals or simple threats. To be more precise, they will twist the tails of émigrés by threading to harm family members still living in China if cooperation was not provided.

The People’s Republic of China National Security Office in Hong Kong (above). MSS counterintelligence certainly would do whatever possible to intercept, neutralize, and recruit foreign intelligence officers, as well as their operatives and informants in China and those working in locations close to, and on matters concerning, Chinese interests in other countries. As with almost any other counterintelligence organization worldwide, necessary attributes must be present to initiate a counterintelligence investigation on a suspected “foreign spy.” The primary means to confirm their identity is through careful study and observation of the subject and thorough research of all available information. It is a process similar to selecting a target for recruitment. Covert audio and video monitoring in the residences, vehicles, offices, hotels frequented and homes of friends of the suspected foreign spy. Passive collection by informants will also be used to eavesdrop on the individual’s conversations.

MSS Counterintelligence

MSS shares the counterintelligence role with MPS. The primary mission of organic MSS counterintelligence elements is the infiltration of all the foreign special service operations: intelligence and counterintelligence services, as well as law enforcement organizations worldwide. Its primary targets hands down are its chief competitor, the US, the bordering Russian Federation, and Australia and New Zealand. The advanced industrialized countries of Western Europe would also fall under its watchful eyes although China has not achieved prominence in their space. Second would come Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Mongolia, and Iran which it trusts up to a point.  China must also measure its national interests, and particularly its national security against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. China has also stepped up intelligence operations throughout Africa to support and facilitate its effort to extend its geopolitical influence and acquire oil, rare Earth minerals, and fish. Africa is estimated to contain 90 percent  of the entire world’s supply of platinum and cobalt, 50 percent of the world’s gold supply, 66 percent of the world’s manganese, and 35 percent of the world’s uranium. Africa accounts for almost 75 percent of the world’s coltan, which is a key mineral required for the construction of electronic devices, including cell phones. Well over 10,000 Chinese firms are operating on the continent with 25 percent located in Nigeria and Angola. China has also expanded its military presence in Africa, rivaling the level of US military equities there.)

A Difficult Comparison with MI6 Counterintelligence

Making a proper comparison between MSS counterintelligence operations and those of MI6 is difficult due to the fact there are only soupçons to go on with regard to that United Kingdom intelligence service. One aspect of that work already noted here is that counterintelligence responsibilities among the United Kingdom’s intelligence services have been divided between MI5 and MI6. In Nigel West’s Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2014), one of his many superlative reference books on the subject of intelligence, not surprisingly one can find at least some reference to the work of MI6 in that province. As explained in the Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence, in the United Kingdom, counterintelligence is the discipline devoted to penetrating the adversary’s intelligence structure and protecting one’s own organization. (This is significant for a number of other intelligence services take a different approach to the matter. In the CIA and the FBI in the US and in the erstwhile Soviet Union’s KGB and the Russian Federation’s Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, for instance, counterespionage operations are organic to the work of their organizations’ counterintelligence sections.)  West notes that during World War II, the MI6 counterintelligence section was designated Section V, the romance numeral five being the cause of considerable misunderstanding and confusion for outsiders.

With regard to counterespionage, in the Historical Dictionary of British Intelligence, West notes that responsibility for such operations lies primarily with MI5, although inevitably the Secret Intelligence Service and Government Communications Headquarters as well occasionally encounter evidence of hostile activity and investigate it. During World War II, counterespionage was acknowledged as an interagency discipline that overlapped different organizations and in 1942, was the motive for an attempt at amalgamation, which was ultimately rejected. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, MI5’s commitments were reevaluated periodically, and the counterespionage branch, designated K in 1968, was absorbed to a new D Branch in 1994 

To elaborate further on MSS counterintelligence, certainly it would do whatever possible to intercept, neutralize, and recruit foreign intelligence officers, as well as their operatives and informants in China and those working in locations close to, and on matters concerning Chinese interests in other countries. As with almost any other counterintelligence organization worldwide, necessary attributes must be present to initiate a counterintelligence investigation on a suspected “foreign spy.” The primary means to confirm their identity is through careful study and observation of the subject and thorough research of all available information. It is a process similar to selecting a target for recruitment. Covert audio and video monitoring in the residences, vehicles, offices, hotels frequented and homes of friends of the suspected foreign spy. Passive collection by informants will also be used to eavesdrop on the individual’s conversations. The surveillance effort may not always be easy going. A foreign intelligence officer’s trade craft may be superb and all of his or her interactions and moves might appear authentic. The foreign intelligence officer’s movement technique could make maintaining surveillance on the subject difficult. For any counterintelligence services, that type of professionalism in an opponent can pose a challenge. Oddly enough though, it will result in increased suspicion among some.

Shifting a bit from United Kingdom intelligence efforts to elaborate more effectively on this point, federal indictments and criminal complaints against MSS foreign intelligence operatives and informants caught in the US indicate that they are generally tasked, as most field operatives and informants of any intelligence service, as intelligence collection requirements demand. As noted in greatcharlie’s August 31, 2020 post entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign Against the US? (Part 2),” from what can be learned from indictments and criminal complaints about such cases that are made public, in almost all of the MSS taskings of those intercepted operatives and informants, certain counterintelligence aspects can be discerned. Those aspects appear aimed at providing ways to assist MSS counterintelligence in identifying and locating foreign intelligence officers, operatives, and informants, particularly in China, or assist in devising ways to intercept, neutralize, and recruit them. Typical counterintelligence aspects in takings that include collecting information on how the US intelligence services communicate with officers, operatives, and informants overseas. In order to develop ways to counter the efforts of US counterintelligence services against MSS foreign intelligence officers, operatives, and informants, MSS counterintelligence would want to know how the organization is set up to confront adversarial networks of spies, who is who, where they are situated, and what exactly are they doing. Understanding the surveillance strategies of US counterintelligence services, particularly the FBI, would inform MSS counterintelligence of what layers of surveillance are usually being pressed on MSS foreign intelligence officers, operatives, and informants in the US and how to devise better ways to defeat them. Technological capabilities would inform MSS counterintelligence whether all along US counterintelligence services have had the capability to monitor its activities or whether they have the capacity and have simply failed to use it effectively. The collection of information on what MSS foreign intelligence has been doing ineffectively in the face of US counterintelligence surveillance strategies and technological capabilities would undoubtedly inspire audits to better assess how closely its operatives were being monitored and how US counterintelligence managed to see a number of MSS efforts straight. (If one were to mine through the US Department of Justice’s very own indictments and criminal complaint against those few Chinese officers, operatives, and informants that have been captured, reading between the lines very closely, one can find to more than few open doors that might lead to successes against existing but well-cloaked Chinese intelligence networks and actors. The particulars of those real possibilities will not be delved into here. Not one case has been a “wilderness of mirrors.” It is hard to know what to make of how things are currently transpiring.)

FBI wanted poster for hackers Zhu Hua (left) and Zhang Shilong (right) of the Advanced Persistent Threats 10 (APT 10 Group) which acted in association with the MSS Tianjin State Security Bureau. In its intelligence campaign against the US, EU Member States, and other advanced industrialized countries, the MSS has taken a multidimensional approach. Three apparent dimensions include: illicit technology procurement, technical collection (cyber attacks), and human intelligence collection. Cyber attacks are perhaps the most prolific type used against industry advanced industrialized countries. This dimension of Chinese intelligence collection is also perhaps the most aggressive. Hackers locate doors that they can rapidly pass through and grab whatever might be within reach. It is by no means a supplemental or mere attendant method of espionage relative to running operatives and informants. It is a full-fledged  dimension of China’s intelligence campaign strategy.

MSS Electronic Intelligence

In its intelligence campaign against the US, EU Member States, and other advanced industrialized countries, the MSS has taken a multidimensional approach. Three apparent dimensions include: illicit technology procurement, technical collection (cyber attacks), and human intelligence collection. Cyber attacks are perhaps the most prolific type used against industry advanced industrialized countries. This dimension of Chinese intelligence collection is also perhaps the most aggressive. Hackers locate doors that they can rapidly pass through and grab whatever might be within reach. It is by no means a supplemental or mere attendant method of espionage relative to running operatives and informants. It is a full-fledged  dimension of China’s intelligence campaign strategy. If human intelligence were the only focus, constraints on manpower resources would always be a big problem to overcome. Cyber collection complements all other forms of attack well. Typically, Chinese spokespersons from the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Communist Party of China, itself, will issue declarations seemingly designed to create the false impression that China was engaged in a lex talionis of allegations with the US on cyber espionage. Perchance the aim in doing so was to distract the world from the reality of its one-way abusive and criminal cyber attacks to obtain classified information from the federal government, intellectual property from private firms, and research from academic institutions in the US.

When GCHQ Was Part of MI6

For a time, MI6 also enjoyed having an organic technical surveillance capability. That technical surveillance capability today resides in an independent intelligence agency known as the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). GCHQ grew out of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS), established in November 1919. During the 1920s and 1930s, GC&CS had considerable success in its efforts to decipher German and Soviet transmissions. Once Nazi Germany acquired the Enigma machine, with its apparently unbreakable ciphers, in the late 1930s, GC&CS greatly stepped up its efforts. In August 1939, just before war broke out in Europe, it moved its headquarters to Bletchley Park outside London. There its cryptanalysts undertook Operation Ultra, the breaking of the Enigma cipher—a project whose details remained classified until the 1970s. Renamed the Government Communications Headquarters in 1942 to conceal its activities, this leading communications intelligence agency of the United Kingdom. Through GCHQ, MI6 enjoyed a number of successes during World War II, most notable among them being the Ultra program to break German Enigma ciphers. Today GCHQ functions similarly to the US National Security Agency (NSA) Working in coordination with the NSA during the Cold War, it greatly escalated its efforts. Reportedly, it participates in the Echelon global surveillance network. Much of what is known about how GCHQ is organized was provided publicly in James Bamford’s famous 1982 book on NSA, The Puzzle Palace (Houghton Miflin Harcourt, 1982). Knowing how GCHQ is organized allows one to infer with at least some degree accuracy, how it functions. According to Bamford, GCHQ at that time had six directorates. Among these were the Composite Signals Organization, dedicated to radio intercepts; the Directorate of Organization and Establishment, whose functions were chiefly administrative; the Directorate of Signals Intelligence Plans, concerned with long-range planning and management; and the Joint Technical Language Service, which intercepted foreign communications. Bamford stated that the largest and most secretive directorate, the Directorate of Signals Intelligence Operations and Requirements oversaw codebreaking activities. 

Returning to the discussion of MSS technical collection, it can include the use of high-tech tools covering phone calls and all forms of messaging to relatively low level actions against electronic equipment such as mobile phones and computer networks. While technical intelligence collection, cyber attacks by Chinese intelligence services upon targets in the US, have been deplorable, the skill displayed and their list of accomplishments has been impressive. What have essentially been standard targets of cyber attacks from Chinese intelligence services in recent years have been those levelled against US national security decision makers and government organizations, particularly during the Obama administration. The objective of that targeting has been to access any classified information they might possess. Through that information, MSS would surely hope to develop insight into highly sensitive US national security decisionmaking processes.

MI6 in the Political Realm: A Bad Mix

There is much beyond the controlled bearing, composure of MI6 officers and the organization itself. From what has been revealed, their efforts have been defined by hard work, establishing solid foundations, diligence and forethought, practicality and organization, determination and dependability, passion and drive. Creativity is combined with thoughtful effort and hard work to manifest positive energies, opportunities and results. 

As aforementioned, the Ministerial Committee on the Intelligence Services exercises regular ongoing oversight of intelligence activities. Through this committee, the Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Secretary of the Cabinet, exercises authority over the daily operations of the British intelligence and security communities as a whole. MI6 answers to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. The Foreign Secretary receives assistance from the Permanent Secretaries’ Committee on the Intelligence Services. Finally, the Joint Intelligence Committee draws up general intelligence needs to be met by MI6. It also prepares National Intelligence Estimates.

As with officers in MI5, speaking truth to power is also the charge entrusted to leaders of MI6. Yet circumstances have often been complicated enough to spoil adherence to that. One might say how MI6 has performed, has really boiled down to leadership. Indeed, the intelligence services may have figuratively been wonderful horses but the chief or key senior executives–no names here–may have been less-than-perfect jockeys in matters of high policy. Admittedly short on specifics of such cases here, yet with all conspiracy theories aside, it may be enough to say the resources and capabilities of MI6 allegedly have reportedly  on certain occasion been used by political leaders to turn a situation that might not necessarily stand in their favor due to interests beyond those urgent and important to the United Kingdom. Some believe it was really seen during the Iraq War when the United Kingdom followed the US into the whole affair which was unfortunately founded on false intentions,  namely weapons of mass destruction were being produced by the regime of the erstwhile Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Tragically, MI6 became the alleged coauthor and signatories to misleading information

When misgivings and disfavor might have been expressed what may have been proposed from the top, it may have been the case that  the powers that be would brook no denial. Those too concerned of their position or being politically indebted, might have seen themselves with little option but to follow orders. Those who see themselves as pragmatists, may explain away a decision to go along thoroughly with a suggestion from on high as an effort to simply adapt in a shifting world. They may not have seen themselves as keepers of some sacred flame. The fatal mistake occurs when the choice is made to play along thoroughly. No proper MI6 or MI5 officer would be expected to shrink at the last. If the organization’s leadership had decided to disappoint the political leadership, they might not only have been forced to surrender the coveted privilege to serve their country in the intelligence services. To many in the intelligence service, that idea would be anathema. Such thoughts likely broke through any defenses their minds raised against them. Additionally, after their departure they might find the whole force of the state on his or her back. L’homme c’est rien—l’oeuvre c’est tout.

Assuredly, Parliament, which provides oversight of MI6, has a process for ascertaining the truth about such matters. The principal oversight committee for British intelligence is the Central Intelligence Machinery, based in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. It oversees the coordination of security and intelligence agencies. It also acts as a mechanism for assessment and accountability, observing and reporting on the performance of specific agencies. Further, it more directly intelligence operations as it is also concerned with tasking and the allocation of resources.

To discuss such issues concerning MI6, even if it is just a part of a mere commentary on MSS, is to walk out on shaky ground given many who may read this post may be invested in maintaining the image of the organization and may have previously been invested heart and soul in its work. While admittedly greatcharlie has sought to be sensitive to the concerns of those readers, doubtlessly, the soupçons discussed here will still be an issue of contention in some quarters and there will surely be those disposed to quarrel most bitterly over it. All the same, what is opined here is only what has been publicly discussed by those familiar with the issue. To that extent, not being aware first-hand of it all, greatcharlie would not like to swear by it.

There is no legal “right to know” what is undertaken abroad in the name of the United Kingdom’s security, what it costs or how it is run. Reportedly, beyond mere concerns exposing any classified information about MI6, to write about MI6, even today, risks harassment and prosecution. Former members and current commentators are fully aware of this and have complied thereby allowing the organization to remain beyond any educated public scrutiny. In the past, any dissident reports of its operations were effectively snuffed out. The agency has the power to censor news accounts of its activities through the use of “D” notices under the Official Secrets Act. As one might imagine, this reality does not sit well with the citizens of the United Kingdom. There is a perception among many in the United Kingdom that such behavior brings the organization more closely in sync with that of MSS, an organ of an authoritarian government, than it should in a free society. Civil rights groups and average citizens argue that the policy of total should be reconsidered and scrapped, should not be disparaged as rubbish in any quarter.

Meeting of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (above). Changes in both competency and necessity have favored an increase in MSS influence in foreign policymaking. One change was the decision of the Communist Party of China wanted MSS looking further abroad than minority groups on China’s periphery. Another change was the expansion of Chinese interests abroad. The real threats to China were no longer seen as coming from traditional internal security concerns but from countries capable of stopping China’s access to trade. By successfully building up its foreign intelligence capabilities to meet this challenge, MSS managed to increase its influence and favor with political authorities. Apparently, it was understood in the Communist Party of China that foreign intentions can best be monitored and resolved with intelligence.

MSS in the Political Realm

MSS was stood up to rectify the deficiencies of the previous iterations of the intelligence function in the Chinese national security apparatus. With its inception, MSS added new dimensions to China’s foreign intelligence scheme while freeing MPS to revamp existing capabilities and explore and adapt a new as well as more technological set of cards to play in the intelligence game so to speak. MSS represented a reimagination of the intelligence collection process abroad and the counterintelligence struggle against outside powers. MSS also represented the tidying up of old ways of conducting its business, and a modernization of Chinese intelligence that was long overdue. The MSS generally appears to have adhered to the non-politicization  of the service. This is not to say that occasionally shifts away from that position by some senior executives has not impacted the organization. MSS elements, particularly at local levels, often have provided protection services for the business dealings of Communist Party of China officials or their well-connected friends. However, the Ministry rarely appears connected to any elite political maneuvering or purges. Since 1983, only the purges of Beijing Party secretary Chen Xitong (1995) and Shanghai Party secretary Chen Liangyu (2006) were rumored to involve the ministry. In the wholesale purges after the fall of Bo Xi laid and Zhou Yongkang, the Beijing State Security Bureau chief Fangfoss Kent and Vice Minister Qiu Jin were ousted precisely because they exploited MSS resources to back particular leaders in their political struggles against each other.

Of course, the foreign policy influence of intelligence services depends on the quality of their inputs and their leadership’s influence with key policymakers. If an intelligence chief is not influential, then his service’s influence depends on performance. The MSS’s role in policymaking could be rising as China’s overseas interests expand. When China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the thought was that there would be an influx of foreign business into China. That was a concern. At the time, the response was to make greater use of MPS. However, changes in both competency and necessity have favored an increase in MSS influence in foreign policymaking. When direct political power is absent, influence usually relates to merit and necessity. Senior foreign policymakers would eventually want the MSS in the room, contributing to the discussion. The Communist Party of China’s leadership wanted an MSS looking further abroad than minority groups on China’s periphery. The MSS’ foreign intelligence service is now more similar to the CIA. Another major change was the expansion of Chinese interests abroad. The real threats to China were no longer seen as coming from traditional internal security concerns but from countries capable of stopping China’s access to trade. Apparently, it was understood in the Communist Party of China that foreign intentions can best be monitored and resolved with intelligence. By successfully building up its foreign intelligence capabilities to meet this challenge, MSS managed to increase its influence and favor with political authorities. Indeed, MSS has managed to move from backstage, second to MPS, to frontstage, up from behind its bureaucratic competitor in internal security.

III. Coming Reality for Visitors to China

For an more efficacious explication, the comparisons in this section of the discussion shift from an examination of United Kingdom and People’s Republic of China intelligence organizations and activities, to mainly comparisons of US counterintelligence and those of both MPS and MSS counterintelligence efforts using informants and the impact a ratcheting up of counterintelligence activities particularly on mainland China will likely be experienced by foreign visitors, particularly those from the West. Indisputably, the Communist Party of China’s line on the coronavirus pandemic clashes with the truth. So far, there has been no grand conversion of the world to its point of view. As touched on earlier, it surely raises a few hackles within the relevant bodies of the Communist Party of China whenever Chinese citizens–scientists and doctors working on the coronavirus for instance–behave as if there is a choice of who they would prefer to alienate, their own Chinese or the US government and worldwide human rights activists. We live in an ordered universe and expect everything to follow that design. 

In The Crisis V, Thomas Payne, the orator and American Revolutionary explained: “To argue with a man who has renounced the use and authority of reason, and whose philosophy consists in holding humanity in contempt, is like administering medicine to the dead, or endeavoring to convert an atheist by scripture.” No matter how the West and particularly the US decided the address matters related to the coronavirus with China, one can be assured that an undesirable situation will be created by the Communist Party of China’s leadership. At least for a period, a very tense atmosphere will exist for employees and members of all types of organizations and private foreigners who travel or reside in China and those outside of China who for whatever reason may have contact with counterparts from China. They should prepare to cope with increased pressures and discomforts.

To expound further on a point raised earlier, what should be of great concern is what approach the MPS may take toward foreign visitors. Foreigners are always closely investigated by the local MPS. Under such unfortunate circumstances as the coronavirus fracas with West, the real possibility that some, including US citizens, might be arrested or “briefly” detained for questioning, having done nothing that ordinarily would hardly warrant such treatment. Indeed, US visitors could regularly become the center of frightful international incidents at the hands of authorities. Regardless of one’s status in the US, it can happen in China. Believing that the Western Capitalist drive for markets is so strong, and desire for profits so considerable, the Communist Party of China would surely be willing to test the theory that the US and other Western firms heavily invested and enjoying business in China would do nothing rash in the face of inordinate investigations, interrogations, and short-term, repeated, detainments of line employees, managers, and executives. Communist Party of China leaders would insist that such foreign companies do more to change the US and other Western government’s stances toward China on the coronavirus and perhaps even trade. Considerable evidence that China is willing to engage in this type of “hostage diplomacy” despite claims of wanting to be the dominant power on the world stage. One can imagine what type of world that would be. In an informative October 20, 2020 Axios article entitled “China Embraces Hostage Diplomacy,” a chilling snapshot is provided of a few publicly known cases in which Beijing has detained foreign citizens unless their home governments acquiesced to its demands.

The Beijing Municipal Public Safety Bureau Office Building (above) MPS counterintelligence officers will regularly collect and closely review reports on a foreigner’s behavior via informants among neighbors in the vicinity of their residence and locals among colleagues at work. They would be interested in knowing if they have engaged in behaviors that would make them open to recruitment. Their attitudes toward China and its system would be important. The friendships they have made would be of interest. Assessments of what type of temptations could be used to bring them to China’s side will be based on observations of the foreigner’s lifestyle. MPS officers have no qualms about exploiting individual weaknesses.

Informants

In domestic intelligence operations, informants are a most valued weapon to use against an adversary’s intelligence operations. In an authoritarian country as China, informants are also a valued weapon for the same reason, but it is also a tried and true way to monitor the population and monitor foreigners. 

In the West

As it stands today, bread and butter operations of Western intelligence services, even in the US, rely heavily upon the work of both agents–or operatives–and informers. As explained previously, agents actually engage in activities on behalf of an intelligence service. Informers, such as those discussed here, are used mainly for surveillance of targets of an investigation. Many US citizens will for the most part give pollices premiere to the intelligence services. (The US in particular has come a long way from the days of the post-Vietnam era and years before when citizens would stand together to question federal government decisions and actions on national security.) To act against a foreigner, is now more typically viewed as a patriotic duty. The foreigner is as the adversary and “the other.” In the US, to surveil another citizen might cause pangs of anxiety for some as there would be the real possibility of violating the 1st Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights of a fellow citizen under the Constitution. However, that can often be mitigated by payments and by assurances that the subject will never know he or she is being surveilled. Moreover, if the fellow citizen who is the subject of the surveillance can be convincingly connected, not necessarily correctly or truthfully, to a foreign intelligence service, usually the informant will accept watching the target as a cause they can get behind. To that extent, it will be reasoned to be a necessary sacrifice of morality. Ethical implications are also raised when the subject of an investigation may be a member of a racial or ethnic minority. Existing biases of the informant can fall into mix. Problems encountered can be overzealousness on the part of the biased informant, even aggressive behavior. For the most part, there is little to no vetting concerning such issues. Problems that arise are largely ignored at least by US counterintelligence services.

There is a romanticized view that many informants hold about working with official men and women, that gives the average citizen a sense of being someone special. Although the bulk of what they may know about spying may be sourced from fiction novels and Hollywood, they view themselves proudly as being part of the secret world. There is a curious type of dignity that secrecy confirms for some. They perceive themselves as being separate from the crowd, and what could be called an ordinary existence. When they talk to family and friends, pass other citizens in the street, they revel in the idea of knowing something they do not. That inflated sense can be exploited to encourage them to do more, behave more aggressively toward the target of their surveillance, than they might have if thinking clearly. It can also lead to a sense of entitlement in wrong headed thinkers, that must be curbed by issuing them strict parameters for behavior while serving in legal terms as “agents” for an intelligence service, even if working through contractors. When being told the plan for surveillance, often in many there is a sensation felt. The larcenous part of the citizens heart is stirred. As noted, informers are paid for their service. The payments can also become an  Since they are usually provided considerable pay for very little work, an eagerness builds for more surveillance work and more easy money. To that extent, surveillance work becomes intoxicating for some. Interestingly enough, payments become a self-generating locus of control that the counterintelligence officer can hold over the informant. 

A scholarly basis for understanding such behavior by citizen informants in a Constitutional Republic as the US is provided by Martha Stout in The Sociopath Next Door (Harmony, 2006). One can easily take from Stout’s work that there are quite a few people given the opportunity, who will routinely act against the common good. She notes that conscience does not exist without an emotional bond to something or someone. There is a desire to make others jump, to be in control of them. (This is quite different from 19th century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept Der Wille zur Macht (The Will to Power), the desire to exercise authority over others was a conscious or unconscious driving force in all humans. Stout limits the desire to some, not all.) which he asserted was The actions that the informant is typically asked to take during a surveillance effort encourages me-first attitudes devoted to the pursuit of domination. There is a refusal to acknowledge responsibility for the decisions they make, or for the outcome of their decisions. There is an inability to understand what a wrongful target of the surveillance effort imagine was very likely feeling. A month before being killed in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp in 1945, Anne Frank wrote in what would be published as The Diary of a Young Girl (Doubleday & Company, 1952): “How noble and good everyone could be if, at the end of each day, they were to review their own behavior and weigh up the rights and wrongs.”

With regard to the motivations of those who undertake the role of informant, some research has been done. In a February 1997 article in Intelligence and National Security entitled, “Cold War Spies: Why Why They Spies and How They Got Caught,” authors Stan A. Taylor and Daniel Snow use the acronym MICE to account for common motives of those US citizens informing for the Soviet Union during the Cold War. MICE is abbreviation formed from money, as noted earlier, ideology, compromise or coercion, and ego. Taylor and Snow added that other influences include excitement and revenge. Crucially, they suggest that: “no human act is ever motivated by a single factor.” The mix of motivations between agents and informers ensures that there will always be individuals who will inform. (In previous posts, greatcharlie has used a slightly different interpretation of the MICE acronym, indicating that it referred to, money , ideology, conspiracy, and excitement. Perhaps much as greatcharlie’s editor, the blog’s interpretation admittedly is a tad rustic.)

It should be noted that during the Cold War the use of human informants to surveil subjects of investigation was increasingly supplemented by technical means of surveillance, particularly electronic eavesdropping tools. Today, informants engaged in surveillance essentially complement or depending on the case, actually supplement collection efforts using electronic tools. Such tools at a basic level can provide a window onto usage of hundreds of millions of computers, routers, fitness trackers, modern automobiles and other networked devices, known collectively as the Internet of Things (IOT). The whole process took a huge step forward following the September 11, 2001 territory attacks in the US, which led to the 2001 USA Patriot Act that opened the door to the acquisition of telephone data by the then new Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies to include: the National Security Agency, FBI, and CIA. The authorization granted federal agencies to intrude on the privacy of citizens under the legislation of the Patriot Act, and continued in the annual National Defense Authorization Act by fate having come into being concurrently with developments in the technology of smartphones, IOT devices, digital circuit board dependent autos, and all the many household devices now with MAC wireless access addresses, meant surveillance could be taken to a level very likely unimaginable to those who drew up those laws in 2001. Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, neural nets everywhere, and massive government data processing power will doubtlessly result in the development of additional surveillance technologies that can only be imagined now. Placing the growing tools of surveillance and the power to use it in possibly the hands of errant US counterintelligence officers and contractors, who could use them to thwart the rights of citizens guaranteed under the US Constitution should be the cause for some alarm.

In China

As mentioned, the foreign visitor is always a potential target for province and municipal offices of MPS and MSS. The capability of Chinese authorities to use technological means to keep a close eye on foreigners and detect, apprehend, and deal with those who protest and oppose the government has recently been enhanced immensely. Two sensational articles in the New York Times, “A Surveillance Net Blankets China’s Cities, Giving Police Vast Powers” dated December 17, 2019, and “Inside China’s Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras” dated July 8, 2018 well lay out the increased use of technology in MPS and MSS surveillance efforts. Reportedly, as part of Xi’s effort to have the security services take on a greater role in China, he has launched a major upgrade of their surveillance capabilities. China, as a result,, has become the world’s largest market for security and surveillance technology. It is reported that almost 300 million cameras have been installed in the country. Government contracts are supporting research and development into technologies that track faces, clothing and even a person’s gait. MPS officers on the beat have been observed using experimental gadgets such as facial-recognition glasses. In Zhengzhou, police and security services can use software to create lists of people. They can create virtual alerts when a targeted  individual approaches a specific location. They can acquire updates on people every hour or every day, and monitor anyone with whom those people have met, particularly if there exists a report that one or both individuals have committed an infraction.  Yet, while the new technology may ostensibly provide police and security services with a way to track criminals, it also improves their means to crack down on sympathizers of the protest movement in Hong Kong, critics of the Communist Party of China, and critics of the police and security services, themselves. Worse, it better enables the police and security services to target migrant workers who travel from the countryside to fill China’s factories and ethnic minority groups as the Uyghurs.

On the street, the surveillance of foreigners will typically be relatively light, calibrated to ensure utilization of an optimal number of officers and informants in the role of surveillance operatives in the field. Doing so also facilitates the monitoring process. The more surveillance one uses the more reports that must be reviewed to find one aggregate picture of what occurred. MPS counterintelligence officers will regularly collect and closely review reports on a foreigner’s behavior via informants among neighbors in the vicinity of their residence and locals among colleagues at work. They would be interested in knowing if they have engaged in behaviors that would make them open to recruitment. Their attitudes toward China and its system would be important. The friendships they have made would be of interest. From the reports of informants and technical surveillance, assessments of what type of temptations could be used, if necessary, to bring them to China’s side based on observations of the foreigner’s lifestyle. 

For citizens of the People’s Republic of China, the motivations of money ideology, conspiracy, and excitement do not factor in such a decision to come to call of their country’s intelligence services. The law requires them to do so. If any motivations at all could be said to factor in a Chinese citizen’s decision to obey the direction of an intelligence service, expectedly the Communist Party of China would list faith and adherence to the ideals of the Communist Revolution, the Communist Party of China, patriotism, and the homeland. Supposedly, revolutionary zeal drives the heart of China as one beating heart so to speak.

The National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 15th session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress declares under Article 9 that in maintenance of national security, priority shall be given to prevention, equal attention shall be paid to temporary and permanent solutions, specialized tasks shall be combined with reliance on the masses, the functions of specialized authorities and other relevant authorities in maintaining national security shall be maximized, and citizens and organizations shall be extensively mobilized to prevent, frustrate, and legally punish any conduct that compromises national security. Article 11 decrees that there will be no tolerance shown for the failure to meet one’s obligation to maintain national security. The article states: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China, state authorities, armed forces, political parties, people’s groups, enterprises, public institutions, and other social organizations shall have the responsibility and obligation to maintain national security.” Authorities in China understand that extraordinary powers are entrusted in the hands of many, such as MSS officers, who work on national security matters. Contractors, and even informants, who might work on their behalf are placed under the same scrutiny. Those who have attempted to cross the Chinese government have faced stiff reprisals. The shadow of sudden death can hang over the head of any individual arrested for such betrayal. As stated under Article 13: “Whoever as an employee of a state authority abuses power, neglects duty, practices favoritism, or makes falsification in national security work or any activity involving national security shall be held liable in accordance with the law.” The article further declares: “Any individual or organization that fails to fulfill the obligation of maintaining national security or conducts any activity compromising national security in violation of this Law or any relevant law shall be held liable in accordance with the law.” The furtive work of Chinese citizens at home and abroad under the direction of the MSS does not need to be without guerdon. As explained under Article 12: “The state shall commend and reward individuals and organizations that have made prominent contributions to maintaining national security. The 19th century philosopher, logician and writer of the United Kingdom, Bertrand Russell, explained: “Neither a man nor a crowd nor a nation can be trusted to act humanely or to think sanely under the influence of great fear.”

The foreign businessman, scientist, engineer, academic or any other type of professional  working closely with a Chinese counterpart in China may not be aware that he or she is being monitored by that same friendly colleague. It should be expected. When told, it may be so emotionally shocking to outsiders  that it may very well be near impossible to believe. Perhaps refusing to accept that reality is the only way a foreigner can continue to function comfortably in China. In any event, it is the responsibility of the Chinese citizen to engage in such activity under the National Security law. To that extent, friendship with Chinese colleagues may never be authentic as there is an element to the interaction between the foreigner and the Chinese citizen that is cloaked. China comes first. The foreigner is inconsequential to that reality. Ordinary people doing a little this and a little that for the MPS as well as the MSS is a  norm.

Although it has not been a commonplace problem, if a foreigner visiting China for the purpose of business or tourism, accepts recording devices or recorded materials without knowing what they contain, the traveler might discover quite surprisingly that he or she is carrying items that contain sensitive data the possession of which could be considered criminal. Without a shadow of doubt, the illicit materials would have been presented to the traveler intentionally, perhaps even by a Chinese citizen with whom the traveler may have a positive personal relationship, almost certainly at the behest of MPS or MSS. (Given the uncertainty of what may result from contact with Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence units, ordinary Chinese citizens typically will not seek out contact with them nor independently engage in activity with foreigners outside of the workplace on matters related to their work. They will focus true personal relationships on personal matters, human interests.)

To defeat this problem, one must also be very cautious about accepting documents, notebooks, and books, or any devices, thumb drives, dvds, or materials that may include video or audio recordings unless one can be absolutely certain as to their contents. Documents contained in any of these media may prove to be state documents concerning confidential matters, and not any run-of-the-mill confidential matters at that. One must immediately open any hard documents and read them or use a laptop or tablet to kindly and respectfully review electronic documents or recordings posthaste in what could be passed off as a display of ebullience and appreciation of the gift and wonderment about what it holds.

The Shanghai Public Security Bureau Office Building (above). The foreign businessman, scientist, engineer, academic or any other type of professional  working closely with a Chinese counterpart in China may not be aware that he or she is being monitored by that same friendly colleague. It should be expected. When told, it may be so emotionally shocking to outsiders  that it may very well be near impossible to believe. Perhaps refusing to accept that reality is the only way a foreigner can continue to function comfortably in China. In any event, it is the responsibility of the Chinese citizen to engage in such activity under the National Security law. To that extent, friendship with Chinese colleagues may never be authentic as there is an element to the interaction between the foreigner and the Chinese citizen that is cloaked. China comes first. The foreigner is inconsequential to that reality. Ordinary people doing a little this and a little that for the MPS as well as the MSS is a norm.

Celebrity tourists, Hollywood actors, athletes, singers, dancers, any other performers, novelists, poets, sculptors, painters, documentary filmmaker, celebrity chefs, as well as any other professionals interested in visiting may often unknowingly be surrounded by throngs of MPS officers and operatives posing as aficionados and curious onlookers. Ordinary citizens observed engaging in an unauthorized display of interest in such personalities by security officials, might be judged as being too appreciative of Western bourgeois amusement, and they could place themselves under suspicion by authorities. For such reasons, the overwhelming majority of Chinese citizens would be extremely hesitant or even more, absolutely avoid being seen behaving that way. (Of course, this does not mean that average Chinese citizens would not harbor very positive thoughts about such Western visitors and that they would not draw their interest.)

One might posit that those types of choreographed mass movements of some likely mix of officers and Chinese citizens recruited impromptu to be surveillance operatives by MPS or MSS managers, helps to create a strong band of security around the foreign visitor. Despite such sanguine, a malign aim of Chinese authorities to create the opportunity to detect any effort by citizens to contact or transfer messages or items of any kind to the foreigners. Oddly enough such mass movements are the envy of some novice, errant US counterintelligence officers. Having been fed a steady diet of film, television, streaming television, Netflix, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram since their youth, many US counterintelligence officers would relish the sensation of directing their own surveillance operatives to create something akin to the Chinese style of mass surveillance, the real draw for them being that it so resembles a fairly common surveillance scene in banal Hollywood spy dramas in which screenwriters and directors depict US intelligence officers wielding such control, such power, that they would convert an everyday happening–crossing the street, ordering coffee in a cafe, or shopping in store–into something exciting or extraordinary. Not to be beastly with the US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement, but in fact, errant US counterintelligence officers, perhaps forgetful of their true purpose, often attempt to accomplish this similarly at street corners, in stores, museums, parks, and other public spaces in the US, even at the risk of spoiling the surveillance. They may here and there have some success with keeping the targets of such stunts completely unaware that they are being surveilled. Still, for those targets who are aware that they are being surveilled, the so-called movement techniques of a mix of counterintelligence officers and ill-trained contract surveillance operatives on the street, will typically seem strange, harassing, and even comical. When made aware that the surveillance that they designed was burned, they would doubtlessly, yet perhaps successfully, conceal the truth from their managers and continue on as if nothing had happened. It is very unlikely that such activity using taxpayer dollars has ever generated the ego boost that errant US counterintelligence officers, who would do such, likely seek. Mi rattrista una si piena cecità! (Such utter blindness grieves me deeply!)  

Intelligence officers and managers of the various Chinese intelligence services operating in the US, observing such activities–rest assured they are always studying “their opponents” and the environment in which they are work–surely gaze stoically in amazement at the extraordinary misuse of personnel, time, energy, finances, and other resources to orchestrate such a “Keystonian” display that is immaterial to their mission, bewildered over their very apparent insouciance for their important jobs and disregard of their duty to country, the absence of a sense of honor, and perhaps wondering what type of mental disorder had befallen US counterintelligence officers executing it. They would very likely wait until they got back to the office, operating base, or back to the main headquarters and have a good chuckle about what they witnessed before beginning a meeting on the tally of technologies MSS operations have acquired from US firms or universities, how many new technologies have been identified for theft, and the unlikelihood that their officers and operatives could be stopped from doing so.

Attempting to defeat the capability of MPS and MSS to provide near blanket surveillance while in China under such circumstances would be extremely difficult if not impossible. Doing so successfully would be akin to hiding from water in the ocean. The fact that its present may aggravate, but as long as it stays light, things should be alright if as mentioned, one takes special care with regard to personal behavior and interactions with professional counterparts. One must make it a point to comport oneself appropriately, cautiously with staff at accommodations, restaurants or locations for recreation.

In addition to guarding against making statements about the Chinese government or details about one’s work to Chinese citizens who are friends or close acquaintances to protect oneself, one must guard against such actions to protect them. Surely, it would put Chinese citizens who are friends or close acquaintances in the dreaded position of reporting your statements or face the danger of not reporting them and later discovering that through some electronic means or citizen surveillance operative passively collecting information, the statements were picked up. They may very well be held accountable for failing to report any foreigner speaking in such ways.

NBA superstar LeBron James (above) enters the arena for a preseason exhibition game in Shanghai between the Los Angeles Lakers and the Brooklyn Nets in 2019. Some official exceptions in Beijing concerning foreign visitors are most often allowed for visiting foreign athletes. A good example of such an exception would be players, coaches, and executives of the National Basketball Association (NBA) from the US. Indeed, NBA players, in addition to being athletic ideal, representing the best in international athletic competition, are welcome due to the very cooperative attitudes and actions of the NBA executives toward the Chinese government and favorable impression visitors from the NBA have created with responsible State Council bureaucracies, the National Party Congress, and especially the Communist Party of China. Still,  such positive attitudes held about NBA personnel among the ruling class in China would not exempt them from continuous surveillance by the MPS and MSS.

Some official exception in Beijing concerning foreign visitors is most often allowed for visiting foreign athletes, particularly superstars in their sports. Sports and international athletic competition are highly endorsed by the Communist Party of China. A good example of such an exception would be players, coaches, and executives of the National Basketball Association (NBA) from the US. Indeed, NBA players, in addition to being athletic ideals, representing the best in international athletic competition, are welcome due to the very cooperative attitudes and actions of the NBA executives toward the Chinese government and favorable impression visitors from the NBA have created with responsible State Council bureaucracies, the National Party Congress, and especially the Communist Party of China. Doubtlessly, reports produced from information collected by their country’s domestic intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement informants have been very pleasing to them. However, such positive attitudes held about NBA personnel among the ruling class in China would not exempt them from continuous surveillance by the MPS and MSS.

The Human Mind and the Incomprehensible

Unusquisque mavult credere quam iudicare. (Everyone prefers to believe than to think.) One might imagine some would find it far easier, less unnerving, to remain blissfully unaware that in traveling to China they would, or have been, immersing themselves in such an environment. Many who may frequently travel to China for business or leisure may insist that they never encountered any problems with surveillance or other intrusions by the Chinese government. Perhaps that could be attributed to the excellent tradecraft of surveillance those individuals have unknowingly encountered. True art is to display no art. However, it more likely may be the result of a total lack of unawareness, intelligence and counterintelligence tactics, techniques, procedures and methods and were figuratively blind to the surveillance activity that may have regularly unfolded all around them. One surely should not look upon the matter with humor. MPS officers take the surveillance of foreign visitors very seriously, and that work is among its main activities aimed at intelligence collection. Suffice it to say the MPS does not equate any of the work to some enthralling battle of wits with foreign visitors, with aim of revealing the superior intellect. That would too much resemble the thinking of lower tier federal intelligence and counterintelligence and law enforcement officers and their contractors engaged in surveillance in the US, who too often approach their work from a personal perspective and with an apparent ax to grind and whose thinking about their work is apparently uncoupled from the greater scheme of US national security.

Security offices of any Western firms whose executives and staff frequently visit China should have long since arranged opportunities to brief those employees on problems they could possibly face in China. Such briefings might include the discussion of ways to subtly execute defensive measures to defeat MPS, MSS, PLA Joint Staff Department human intelligence groups, and any Communist Party of China intelligence organs (e.g., the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the super secret and malignant International (Liaison) Department, the United Front Work Department, and the Propaganda Department) from capturing information that meets their organizations’ immediate intelligence requirements as well as whatever information that managers of those spy organizations may deem useful otherwise. Quemadmodum perniciosior est hostis fugientibus, sic omne fortuitum incommodum magis instat cedenti et averso. (Just as an enemy is more dangerous to a retreating army, so every trouble that fortune brings attacks us all the harder if we yield and turn our backs.)

The Way Forward

As indicated in its introduction, this post serves as an expatiation of a technique learned long ago for directing one’s thoughts upon developing ideas and insights on issues in international affairs and other subjects of interest. Given its subject matter, it hopefully managed to satisfy the experienced scholar, academic, and policy analyst. By showcasing the generation of ideas and insights on subjects, hopefully it satisfied the desire of students to see examples and will become a subject of inquiry for some. 

By their very nature, insights are inherent to the writer, unique in that way. At least, they should be. No truer are the words, “everyone is entitled to an opinion.” The ideas and insights of the novice writer have a right to be aired equal to that of experienced, published authors in the various fields. Note, however, that eccentric, whimsical, and outlandish ideas are seldom useful and never desirable. In some respect, the process of generating ideas and insights is a form of self-exploration. One’s mind must be open to all reasonable considerations and all plausible possibilities. Nontraditional students should try to apply sensibilities shaped by a multitude of experiences. The length and breadth of their knowledge and experience may allow for a broader understanding of humanity. That is what the world will most appreciate reading.

Saepe stilum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sint scripturus. (Often must you turn your pencil to erase, if you hope to write something worth a second reading.) It is perfectly in order to feel a bit timid about drawing inferences and sharing them for others to review. Accept those awkward feelings, but write down all of the ideas and insight that may develop inside anyway. Have at it! To enhance one’s ability to summon up new ideas and insights, study, understand, and consider the deeds of personalities. Ruminate on events in relation to those that proceed them and meditate on what the future may bring. Build on that thinking. Strive to forecast decisions that may shape what might come and proof one’s efforts by watching events unfold in the news. Some of the best ideas and insights may come at inopportune times. Whether one is struck with a coruscating flash of logic, or has a nagging thought on an issue that builds throughout the day, notes must be kept of it all. At one’s earliest convenience, write those ideas and insights down in a notebook, on a pad, or on the back of an envelope. If one can, type them up on an electronic device. Organize them as bullet points if that is easier, however, one must make certain that enough is recorded to ensure that actual ideas are being expressed and that they “feel” compelling. Avoid simply jotting down statements of fact, or worse, simple fragments of your thoughts. State your conclusions about matter! Each expression can be fleshed out and tidied up with editing later. Sticking to this course may not be easy at first. After a time and with honest effort, one should become accustomed to it. Optimally, a writer will effectively generate enough ideas and insights to allow for the selection of more reasoned, potent, and eloquent among them for inclusion in a draft essay. The ability to increase quantity and improve the quality of ideas and insights produced will come with practice. Plus novisti quid faciendum sit. (You have learned more what has to be.)

The Case of a NYPD Officer Allegedly Engaged in Intelligence Activities for China Spotlights the United Front Work Department

The People’s Republic Consulate in New York City (above). According to a US Department of Justice criminal complaint, New York City Police Department officer, Baimadajie Angwang, allegedly acted at the direction and control of officials at the People’s Republic Consulate in New York City.  Specifically, the NYPD officer allegedly reported on the activities of Chinese citizens in the New York area, spotted and assessed potential intelligence sources within the Tibetan community in New York and elsewhere, and provided Chinese officials with access to senior NYPD officials through invitations to official events. One of the Consulate staff members at whose direction Angwang allegedly acted, was an official from the “China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture,” a division of the People’s Republic of China United Front Work Department.

On September 21, 2020, the US Department of Justice filed a criminal complaint against Baimadajie Angwang, a naturalized American citizen who serves as a member of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the US Army Reserve has been charged with acting as an illegal agent of China. The criminal complaint explains that Angwang reportedly acted at the direction and control of officials at the People’s Republic Consulate in New York City.  Specifically, the NYPD officer reported on the activities of Chinese citizens in the New York area, spotted and assessed potential intelligence sources within the Tibetan community in New York and elsewhere, and provided Chinese officials with access to senior NYPD officials through invitations to official events.  One of the Consulate staff members at whose direction Angwang allegedly acted, was an official from the “China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture,” a division of the People’s Republic of China United Front Work Department. That department is responsible for, among other things, neutralizing potential opponents of the Chinese government and co-opting ethnic Chinese individuals living outside China. In their criminal complaint, prosecutors explain that Angwang was explicit about his motivations, telling his Chinese contact that he wanted to get promoted within the NYPD so that he could assist China and bring “glory to China.”  Further, Angwang told his contact that his superiors in Beijing “should be happy . . . because you have stretched your reach into the police.” In addition to being charged for acting as an illegal agent of China, Angwang was also charged with committing wire fraud, making material false statements and obstructing an official proceeding.  Reportedly, as part of his employment with the US Army Reserve, Angwang maintained a “SECRET”-level security clearance.  According to court documents, in 2019, Angwang completed and electronically submitted an SF-86C form for a background investigation.  On the form, Angwang lied by denying that he had contacts with a foreign government or its consulate and by denying that he had close and continuing contacts with foreign nationals, including his family members who live in China, some of whom were affiliated with the Communist Party of China and the People’s Liberation Army. In accord with the charges in the criminal complaint against Angwang, if convicted, he could face a maximum of 55 years imprisonment.

It appears that Angwang’s guilt was never in doubt to the US Department of Justice. It was apparently not an astounding challenge to pursue Angwang, based on what is reported in the US Department of Justice criminal complaint against him. Although a confession covering Angwang’s behavior was captured, enough incriminating evidence used against Angwang for the espionage charge was found in recordings of telephone conversations between him and an official of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. Yet, while on the surface, the case, intriguingly, did not reach some great proportions of espionage, with nefarious entanglements with sinister civilian or military Chinese foreign intelligence officers and daredevil thefts of information of the utmost importance, violent plots, or high speed chases, there is far more to it that meets the eye concerning a very dangerous threat to the national security of the US.

In a reappraisal of the espionage aspect of the case outlined in the US Department of Justice criminal complaint, greatcharlie brings to the fore the fact that case involves the seldom discussed activities of one of Communist Party of China’s largely unnoticed  intelligence organizations. In this particular instance, the organization identified was the United Front Work Department. The discussion of the United Front Work Department and its operations in the criminal complaint is limited.. As such, it does not allow for an understanding of how the United Front Work Department, despite its relative obscurity, has a high place within the Communist Party of China’s hierarchy. It fails to create a picture of the nature and scale of the operations of the organization and the Communist Party of China in general inside the US. From a discussion in the abstract, greatcharlie, provides a somewhat more detailed look at the organization, its intelligence role, and the important place it holds within the large-scale systematic plan of the Communist Party of China to become the world’s dominant power. Using the facts of Angwang’s activities in the criminal charge, greatcharlie then postulates on the possible interplay between Communist Party of China intelligence elements and civilian and military Chinese foreign intelligence services with specific regard to Angwang’s contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. In turn greatcharlie hypothesizes, absent any templates or manuals, on how those intelligence services likely interact on cases in diplomatic posts generally. The acts allegedly performed by Angwang on behalf of the United Front Work Department were not monumentous. However, the course of Angwang’s work as an operative for the organization and the actions of the organization’s official posted at the Consulate in New York with whom he was in contact, as reported in the criminal complaint, allow one to draw insights on the organization’s practices on a case with such circumstances. From those reports and insights, greatcharlie postulates, to a small degree, how the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of “regular” Chinese intelligence services compare and contrast from those of irregular Communist Party of China intelligence organs. Angwang’s case is made even more intriguing due to the many incongruities and outright oddities apparent in the activities of the parties involved in the matter. A number of them are given brief treatment.

Corruptio optimi pessima. (Corruption of the best is the worst.) In a US Department of Justice September 21, 2020 Press Release on the criminal charges leveled on Angwang, the fact that he was a NYPD officer involved in Chinese foreign intelligence activity was looked upon as a new, frightful phenomenon, which should put municipal police departments across the country on alert. However, what has really been put in the spotlight by the case is the reality that the United Front Work Department, essentially an intelligence organization promoted and well-supported by the very top of the Communist Party of China’s leadership, is very present and may eventually become more active in its unique ways in the US. Multi cives aut ea pericula quae imminent non vident aut ea quae vident neglegunt. (Many citizens either do not see those dangers which are threatening or they ignore those that they see.)

Police Officer Angwang in NYPD uniform (above). In a US Department of Justice September 21, 2020 Press Release on the criminal charges leveled on Angwang, it was noted that because he was a NYPD officer involved in Chinese foreign intelligence activity, his case should was looked upon as a possible  new, frightful phenomenon, that should put municipal police departments across the country on alert. However, what has truly been put in the spotlight by his case is the reality that the United Front Work Department, essentially an intelligence organization promoted and well-supported by the very top of the Communist Party of China’s leadership, is present in the US and may eventually become more active in its unique and nefarious ways in the country.

Developing New Perspectives

For greatcharlie, it is an absolute requirement to be careful before imputing reasons why one might engage in certain behavior on a matter without having all the hard facts about the individuals thinking at hand. Certainly, there was no psychological profile of Angwang included in the criminal complaint, and there very well should not have been. One could present multiple possibilities concerning the intent of Angwang’s behavior, each with certain ambiguities. The well-fashioned theory behind the criminal case of the US Department of Justice would be one among them. While prosecutors appear to have confidence in their case, even included in the US Department of Justice Press Release was a clearly explained caveat that the charges in the complaint are merely allegations and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. The NYPD officer’s defense attorneys surely intend to have a great say in how his case goes.

Looking at the whole matter simplistically, one might also make the argument that Angwang’s Consulate contact may have genuinely believed initially that his connection with the NYPD officer may have been simply collegial. Perchance he assumed that contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York had special meaning for Angwang. The may have also thought that for Angwang, interaction with the Consulate stirred a sense of importance or satisfaction within him that was unique to his sensibilities. Further, Consulate official with whom Angwang had the most contact, may have simply been serving as a member of the Consulate who was engaged in outreach activities in the Tibetan community as part of his duties. For the official, It may have initially seemed fortuitous wind fall that an NYPD officer,who metaphorically fell into his lap, was willing to use his own time and energy to help them with his outreach efforts. (He  would hardly view his interaction with Angwang a stroke of luck now.)

Stoicius noster, “Vitium,” in quite, “non est in rebus sed in animo.” (Our Stoic philosopher said, “Vice is not merely in one’s actions but in the mind itself.”) It is hard to discern what Angwang really hoped to achieve by working for the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York while serving as an NYPD officer. Although his antics had escaped detection, at least initially, for the reasonable, there could hardly have been any doubt that he would be caught given the intense scrutiny being placed upon China’s diplomatic stations by US counterintelligence services. As an NYPD officer, working with the Chinese diaspora, one would imagine he would have come across aspects and elements of the federal government’s close watch. One might theorize that for over two years, and during a three year period prior, he may have very well have immaturely believed that he was engaged in an ego-driven battle of wits, leveling his superior intellect upon a loyal servant of China’s Communist regime and his bosses ruling from Beijing. Indeed, Angwang may have believed that by insinuating himself into the Chinese government system, he would put himself in good stead with NYPD officials and top individuals in federal law enforcement and perhaps have value to them as a “counterespionage agent ” Under this scenario, the Angwang presumably would also want to believe that Consulate officials were in the dark about what he might have been cooking up against them. These respective scenarios for both Angwang and the officials of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, with whom he interacted, appear unlikely. Angwang’s legal defense would likely insist that one must not confuse the unlikely with the impossible. In the aggregate, the facts as presented by the US Department of Justice indicate the situation is far more complicated. To examine them, it becomes necessary to better understand the two parties involved in the case:

On Angwang

Laying out what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had collected on Angwang, the criminal complaint reveals that at the time he was charged, he was 33 years old. Angwang is a native of Tibet. Tibet is an autonomous region in the PRC. The region has historically been the home to ethnic Tibetans, among others ethnic groups. It is the spiritual home of Tibetan Buddhism and the traditional seat of the Dalai Lama. China  has long considered Tibet to be part of its historical empire. In 1951, China occupied Tibet and took control of the region. Many Tibetans believe the region was illegally incorporated into China and have pressed for independence. A Tibetan independence movement has been calling for the independence of Tibet and political separation from China. That independence movement is largely supported by the diaspora of ethnic Tibetans worldwide, to include the US. During periods of repression and martial law in the region, it is believed that the Chinese government has killed thousands of Tibetans. The Chinese government has referred to Tibetans as one of “the five poisons” threatening China’s stability. Interdum volgus rectum videt, est ubi peccat. (At times the world sees straight, but many times the world goes astray.)

Angwang initially traveled to the US on a cultural exchange visa. He overstayed a second visa, but eventually applied for asylum in the US on the basis that he had allegedly been arrested and tortured in the China due partly to this Tibetan ethnicity. While arguing against bail, prosecutors suggested in a court filing that Angwang secured his US citizenship under false pretenses. Interestingly enough, Angwang’s father is retired from the People’s Liberation Army and is a member of the Chinese Communist Party. His mother is a retired government official and also a member of the Communist Party. His brother serves as a People’s Liberation Army reservist. All three live in China.

Employed by the NYPD, Angwang reportedly was assigned to the 111th NYPD Precinct in the borough of Queens and worked there during his most recent period of contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. At the 111th Precinct, Angwang served as a patrol officer and member of the precinct’s crime prevention team. His latest assignment was in the community affairs unit in which his duties included serving as a liaison between the NYPD and the community that his precinct served, among other things. The only plausible reason for Angwang to have any connection with People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York as it relates to his work is that the Tibetan community in New York City which predominantly resides within the confines of the 111th NYPD Precinct in which Angwang worked. Angwang is also a member of the US Army Reserve in which he presently holds the rank of Staff Sergeant. He has been assigned to an Airborne Civil Affairs battalion based at Fort Dix, New Jersey. In his job as a Civil Affairs Specialist his duties and responsibilities include advising the command on the tactical and operational deployment of Civil Affairs teams. He also assisted in planning, training, advising and executing civil-military programs. In connection with his role in the US Army Reserve, as mentioned earlier, Angwang holds a “SECRET” level security clearance. Added to this record should have been information provided by the US Army that Angwang served on active duty in the US Marines from 2009 to 2014, and his deployment to Afghanistan from 2013 through 2014.

Angwang’s Consulate Contacts

According to the criminal complaint against Angwang, he received taskings from, and reported back to, officials at the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York via telephone conversations which were recorded by the FBI. Those telephone calls enabled the FBI to identify his most recent Consulate contact as an official from the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture. The criminal complaint explains that the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture is a division of China’s United Front Work Department (“UFWD”). Among the UFWD’s tasks is neutralizing sources of potential opposition to the policies and authority of China. To achieve these goals abroad, the UFWD reportedly seeks to co-opt ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China. UFWD officials often meet with local association groups whose purpose is to, among other things, connect Chinese emigrants from common geographic areas and ethnic backgrounds. Ostensibly, their purpose in meeting with these groups is to secure political, moral and financial support for China and to maintain control over Tibetans and other so-called potentially problematic groups, such as religious and ethnic minorities.

From recorded conversations of Angwang and the UFWD official, a portion the transcripts of which were placed in the criminal complaint, the FBI has determined that Angwang received tasks from, and reported back to him. The FBI, in fact, identified the UFWD official as Angwang’s handler. Even more, FBI’s investigation has revealed that Angwang, while acting at the direction and control of PRC officials, had, among other things, (1) reported on the activities of ethnic Tibetans, and others, in the New York metropolitan area to the Consulate, (2) spotted and assessed potential ethnic Tibetan intelligence sources in the New York metropolitan area and beyond, and (3) used his official position in the NYPD to provide Consulate officials access to senior NYPD officials through invitations to official NYPD events. None of these activities fell within the scope of Angwang’s official duties and responsibilities with either the NYPD or the US Army Reserve. Angwang both called and texted a UFWD official’s cellular telephone on at least 55 occasions in or about and  between June 2018 through March 2020. While performing these activities, Angwang failed to provide the Attorney General with any notification that he was acting as an agent of China by registering as such. The US Department of Justice Foreign Agents Registration Unit has no records associated with Angwang.

Curiously, Angwang also had contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York from August 21, 2014, through August 11, 2017. Those contacts took place apparently without incident or significant interest of US counterintelligence services or the US Army Reserve. It must be reminded that was a period of time prior to his becoming a NYPD officer. It was not an issue for the NYPD. It was imaginably unaware of those contacts, and Angwang apparently did not reveal them. At that time, Angwang reportedly called and texted the cellular telephone of a Consulate official, dubbed PRC [People’s Republic of China] Official-1, on at least 53 occasions. The criminal complaint’s discussion of Angwang’s contacts and activities connected to the Consulate is limited. The period of his contacts with the Consulate from June 2018 through March 2020 is referred to in the criminal complaint as “the relevant time period.” The latest contacts have been severed from Angwang’s nearly three years of initial contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. That is quite intriguing.

A Map of China. Tibet is in the country’s southwest (above).Tibet is an autonomous region in China. The region has historically been the home to ethnic Tibetans, among others ethnic groups. It is the spiritual home of Tibetan Buddhism and the traditional seat of the Dalai Lama. China  has long considered Tibet to be part of its historical empire. In 1951, China occupied Tibet and took control of the region. Many Tibetans believe the region was illegally incorporated into China and have pressed for independence. A Tibetan independence movement has been calling for the independence of Tibet and political separation from China. That independence movement is largely supported by the diaspora of ethnic Tibetans worldwide, to include the US. During periods of repression and martial law in the region, it is believed that the Chinese government has killed thousands of Tibetans.

The narrative on Angwang in the criminal complaint provides a succinct summary of his background, particularly as it relates to his case. However, the narrative on the officials in People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York with whom Angwang was in contact, while making for an intriguing backstory, surely it does not provide the full picture of the organization in which at least one official supposedly worked, the UFWD. Indeed, the description of the UFWD in the criminal complaint is an underestimation of the organization to  a degree that it stands as a singular departure from the real UFWD. Yet, remarkably, what is provided in the criminal complaint is more than one might usually come across on the UFWD. The UFWD has not received an abundance of treatment in scholarly sources. Even those well-informed on Chinese affairs are not so attentive of the inconspicuous organization and its activities. In I.G. Smith’s and Nigel West’s reliable Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012), the UFWD is only briefly and with frightfully scant detail referenced as a branch of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee, responsible for links with non-Communist émigré groups and has been identified by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) as an espionage organization active among Chinese émigrés and engaged in psychological warfare in pursuit of policy goals set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What is left of the reference explains: “According CSIS analyst described the UFD’s [UFWD’s] role as ‘one of the compelling overseas Chinese to take part in economical and technical espionage, whether through patriotic appeals or simple threats.’“ As mentioned in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2020 post entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign Against the US? (Part 1),” central to greatcharlie’s understanding of China’s intelligence services and their activities are the writings of Peter Mattis. Since leaving the Central Intelligence Agency where he was a highly-regarding analyst on China, Mattis has published a number of superlative essays on Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence. Mattis, along with a former military intelligence officer and diplomat, Matthew Brazil, published Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (United States Naval Institute Press, 2019), a book which is nothing less than brilliant. Primarily using sources published by Mattis, an effort is made here to provide a truer picture of the overlooked UFWD.

The Real UFWD

The UFWD holds a high place within the Communist Party of China’s hierarchy as a working organ of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee, which is “the central administrative and decision-making body of leading party, state, and military officials.” The UFWD exerts influence inside and outside of China through sub-official contacts. Within China, the UFWD plays a vital policy development and coordination role, especially for ethnic and religious minorities. Outside of China, the UFWD has had a hand in developing political and business ties with overseas Chinese, bringing investment and research benefits, as well as helping the Communist Party of China shape foreign views of China. People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the UFWD to China’s rejuvenation. That has been evinced by Xi’s repeated urging that the Communist Party of China make use of the UFWD as a “magic weapon” to realize the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People. A bureaucratic reorganization that he has implemented lends further credence to this judgment that it is a tool of the utmost importance.

According to Mattis, the central element to understanding what the Chinese Communist Party is doing and why to shape the world outside the party is united front work. People’s Republic of China Chairman Mao Zedong described the purpose of this work as mobilizing the party’s friends to strike at the party’s enemies. In a more specific definition from a paper in the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defined united front work as “a technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-communist masses.” In other words, united front policy addresses the party’s relationship with and guidance of any social group outside the party. To that extent, as Mattis explains, united front work entails shaping those outside the party, and not simply the Chinese people or world outside the People’s Republic of China. United front work must also be a tool of political struggle. It is not confined to activities that we would call propaganda or public diplomacy. It is not limited to covert action. In 1939, Mao wrote: “Our eighteen years of experience show that the united front and armed struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy’s positions. That is how the three are related to each other.” That outline of united front work within the party’s toolbox by Mao stands as the core understanding within the Communist Party of China today. United front activities have aided the Communist Party of China in resolving several dilemmas of the post-Mao era. That was most apparent following the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the death of Chairman Deng Xiaoping.

The UFWD is the executive and coordinating agency for united front work. The UFWD operates at all levels of the party system from the center to the grassroots. You Quan, the former Communist Party of China secretary of Fujian Province and a member of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, was appointed UFWD head on November 7, 2017.  heads the UFWD, assisted by seven deputy directors. The leadership also includes the leader for the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection for United Front Work Group. The UFWD’s areas of responsibility both at home and abroad include: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan affairs; ethnic and religious affairs; domestic and external propaganda; entrepreneurs and non-party personages; intellectuals; and people-to-people exchanges. There are UFWD subordinate elements at the provincial and local levels. The department also takes the lead in establishing party committees in Chinese and foreign businesses. The UFWD is divided into offices, bureaus, and subordinate units, that is to say, mass organizations. The nine numbered Bureaus each specialize in either a particular facet of united front work or a geographic location. Bureaus three, six and nine, for example, cover Hong Kong, Taiwan, Overseas Chinese, Tibet and Xinjiang. However, it is unclear how different bureaus manage their consequently overlapping responsibilities. For instance, there is no clear guideline on how the Tibet Bureau, responsible for “harmonizing Tibetan socioeconomic development,” interacts with the Ethnic and Religious Work Bureau, and the Economics Bureau.

The UFWD is one of four key bodies of the Communist Party of China’s bureaucracy at the central level for building and exercising political influence outside the party, and especially beyond China’s borders. The other three include the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the super secret and malignant International (Liaison) Department, and the Propaganda Department. According to the organization’s website, the CPPCC is “an organization in the patriotic united front of the Chinese people, an important organ for multiparty cooperation and political consultation.” The advisory body mediates between important social groups and the party apparatus. The CPPCC is the place where all the relevant united front actors inside and outside the party come together: party elders, intelligence officers, diplomats, propagandists, military officers and political commissars, united front workers, academics, and businesspeople. They are gathered to receive instruction in the proper propaganda lines and ways to characterize Beijing’s policies to both domestic and foreign audiences. Many of these individuals, particularly if they hold government positions, are known for their people-handling skills and have reputations for being smooth operators. CPPCC membership offers access to political circles, political protection for business, and minor perquisites like expedited immigration. The CPPCC standing committee includes twenty or so vice chair people who have a protocol rank roughly equivalent to a provincial party secretary. At the central level, the CPPCC includes more than 2,200 members, but the provincial and local levels include another 615,000.

People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping (above). The UFWD holds a high place within the Communist Party of China’s hierarchy as a working organ of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee. Outside of China, the UFWD has had a hand in developing political and business ties with overseas Chinese, bringing investment and research benefits, as well as helping the Communist Party of China shape foreign views of China. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the UFWD to China’s rejuvenation. That has been evinced by Xi’s repeated urging that the Communist Party of China make use of the UFWD as a “magic weapon” to realize the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese People. The bureaucratic reorganization that he has implemented lends further credence to this judgment that it is a tool of the utmost importance.

The International (Liaison) Department, founded in 1951, is the party’s diplomatic arm, handling relationships with more than 600 political parties and organizations as well as individual, primarily political, elites. The department previously handled the Communist Party of China’s relationships between fraternal Communist parties and cultivated splinter factions of Moscow-dominated Communist parties after the Sino-Soviet split. The activist bent of the International Department disappeared as the department began re-establishing itself from 1970 to 1971 following the tumultuous early years of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, in the 1970s, as Anne-Marie Brady explained in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), the International (Liaison) Department’s intelligence efforts often surpassed and even outmatched those of regular Chinese intelligence services. It became deeply involved in inciting and assisting international revolution by moving weapons, financial support, and other critical resources to numerous Communist and non-Communist insurgencies and guerrilla movements worldwide. Interestingly, the department originated as an UFWD bureau before being carved out into an independent entity.

Mundus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur. (The world wants to be deceived so let be deceived.) The Propaganda Department has been a core part of the Communist Party of China since 1924. The official description of its duties includes conducting the party’s theoretical research; guiding public opinion; guiding and coordinating the work of the central news agencies, including Xinhua and the People’s Daily; guiding the propaganda and cultural systems; and administering the Cyberspace Administration of China and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television. Much as the UFWD, the Propaganda Department has subordinate elements at the provincial and local levels. The Propaganda Department cannot be regarded as an entirely internal organization that broadcasts outward to the extent that it is involved in influence-building abroad. For example, China Radio International developed in the 2000s a covert international network of radio stations to hide the Communist Party of China’s direct role in broadcasting Chinese-language propaganda inside target countries. The Propaganda Department presumably also plays a role in the cooptation, intimidation, and purchase of Chinese-language print media outside China.

The State Council ministries and many other organizations with a party committee also conduct united front work. These organizations all offer unique platforms and capabilities that the united front policy system can draw upon for operational purposes. Below are a few of the examples of the organizations outside the party that perform united front work or have united front work departments attached to their party committee: Ministry of State Security; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Civil Affairs; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Culture and Tourism; Chinese Academy of Sciences; China Baowu Steel Group; China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC); and, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). While the Communist Party of China employs many means through which it seeks foreign intelligence, the UFWD is distinct from other organizations in its overt and benign appearance. United Front organizations abroad often operate in the open, some with names that allude to “peaceful reunification” (which is understood to be code for Taiwan work) or include “friendship association.” Included on that list is likely the name “China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture,” the organization in which the UFWD official with whom Angwang interacted “in the relevant time period” was employed.

Evaluated on the basis of the united front policy system, the Communist Party of China’s management of political influence operations runs to the very top of the party, involving senior leaders directly. The policy system extends through the party’s hierarchy and spills over into China’s government ministries as well as other state-owned and state-administered organizations. Indeed, united front work is conducted wherever the party is present. To that extent, as Mattis explains, united front work is not an “influence operation” or a campaign. It is the day-to-day work of the party. At the leadership level, there is a Politburo Standing Committee Member (PBSC) oversees united front work. The senior-most united front official is the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) chairman, who is the fourth-ranking PBSC member. Leaders who have held the CPPCC chairmanship have included Mao and Deng, as well as Zhou Enlai and Li Xiannian. The State Council Vice Premier has a United Front Portfolio. The vice premier position serves as the link between the party center and the State Council ministries. The vice premier provides prestige to the united front system as well as a necessary position of authority to direct and coordinate the ministries’ united front activities. The position often looks as though the portfolio covers education and culture, because of the overlap with united front work. At meetings of the united front policy system, this vice premier appears in protocol order between the CPPCC chairman and the United Front Work Department director. Included are two Members of the Central Secretariat who have united front policy roles. The directors of the UFWD and Propaganda Department serve on both the Politburo and the Secretariat of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Since the Politburo does not meet regularly, the secretariat is empowered to make day-to-day decisions related to policy that has already been settled. This group is also responsible for moving paperwork among the central leaders and coordinating the party’s actions.

The Calibrated Interactions between Angwang and His Alleged UFWD “Handler”

Given what is presented here about the UFWD, and given the official account of the UFWD official’s interactions with Angwang provided in the criminal complaint, the UFWD official certainly suppressed far much more about his organization and its activities in their conversations than he exposed. Even in his discussions with Angwang, the UFWD official never offered specifics as to why his organization would be interested in working with him. He never discussed the names or titles of the UFWD officials over which Angwang probed him. Interestingly, the UFWD official assumedly never offered Angwang many specifics about his job with the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture in the Consulate or its link to UFWD. Moreover, the UFWD official never explained that UFWD was his association’s parent organization and what the larger picture and aims of his parent organization were. It is unknown whether the UFWD official asked Angwang directly about his interest in keeping contact with him. Angwang offered the attenuated explanation about love for his homeland, bringing glory to China, and making the official “look good” in Beijing.

Major ignotarum rerum est terror. (Apprehensions are greater in proportion as things are unknown.) Out of abundance of caution, the first impression of Angwang that the UFWD official might reasonably have been more negative than positive. In the US, it is understood that the majority of the members of the Tibetan diaspora harbor unfavorable, even hostile attitudes toward China. As a native Tibetan who reached a position of relative authority in New York as an NYPD officer, his intentions for reestablishing contact with him could not be accepted on face value. (Little is offered in the criminal complaint on his first contact.) Given the harm done to countless Tibetan families in China, it would be fair to assume Angwang could have held some idée fixe against Chinese government and was in some odd way seeking revenge. In fact, according to the criminal complaint, when Angwang first traveled from China to the US on a cultural exchange visa, he later sought asylum, claiming that he had been arrested and tortured in mainland China because of his Tibetan ethnicity. (That story apparently cannot be confirmed, and the US Department of Justice says it is doubtful.) As an NYPD officer, he would have the training and access to tools that allowed him to pose a considerable threat to the UFWD official and other staff at the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. After the UFWD official maintained contact with Angwang for a time, possible concerns about him may have been relaxed.

Based on his own words, as recorded by the FBI, Angwang fully intended on, and was satisfied with, establishing contact with the UFWD official to support China’s intelligence efforts in the US. He approached the UFWD official under the veneer of being an important, well-placed, and well-connected officer in the NYPD, but it was likely discerned by the UFWD official that Angwang was somewhat isolated. The presumption could plausibly have been made by the UFWD official that Angwang’s conversations and contacts with the officials at the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York surely transgressed the NYPD’s code of behavior. An NYPD officer under normal circumstances, surely would not have been allowed such a long leash as to be able to negatively influence, harm US relations with China. The fact that his activities escaped the curiosity of onlookers perhaps misled Angwang into believing that he was free and clear of scrutiny. He possibly could not have imagined at the onset the upheaval that would eventually derailed him. Yet, he was under investigation by the FBI and apparently was blissfully unaware that his contacts and conversations with Chinese officials were being monitored. There was a display of flurried ambition and energy in Angwang’s actions, all of which was misdirected. To that extent, on first blush, UFWD official may have considered whether Angwang was excited by his own actions, and thereby may have assessed whether he was a sensation seeker.

A ruthless disregard of anything but self-interest is a common trait among individuals involved in espionage cases. However, Angwang seemed to strain in his effort to demonstrate that he was not focused on self-interest and to gain approval. Apparently, in a further effort to prove that he was focused on the well-being and success of the Consulate officials in which he was in contact, the Consulate, and China, Angwang made statements seemingly in an effort to prove that he knew all the ends and outs, the inside baseball of the Chinese government. In an account of a telephone conversation on or about October 30, 2018 between Angwang and the UFWD official, again dubbed as “PRC Official-2,” that was only recounted by the FBI in the criminal complaint, the UFWD official reportedly told Angwang that he was busy writing mandatory year-end reports. Angwang replied that UFWD official had done great work and, accordingly, there should be a lot to write in the report. Prying, Angwang also inquired if the reports written by officials within the Consulate were the same type of reports written by China based officials, to which the UFWD official stated that they were. Reportedly, Angwang stated that he was familiar with these reports because his mother used to write similar reports in China.

Perhaps going a bit too far in direction demonstrating what he knew, Angwang was willing to offer a judgment on every aspect of the Consulate staff member’s community outreach work, and he severely judged it at that. Boiled down, it appeared at point that Angwang was communicating: “You do not know your job as well as I do. Let me show you. I can help you do your job so much better that your superiors in Beijing will be impressed and reward you!” Reportedly, on or about November 19, 2018, UFWD official, dubbed “PRC Official-2” in the criminal complaint, called Angwang. (It is unknown whether he was actually returning a call from Angwang.) During the call, as recounted by the FBI, Angwang asked the UFWD official whether he wanted to attend NYPD events “to raise our country’s soft power” and also elevate the official’s position within the People’s Republic of China community. It was additionally recounted and interpreted by the FBI that the UFWD official expressed interest. Angwang then offered: “The Consulate does not know too clearly the workings and operations within the police department. And then because of the sensitivity of a diplomat’s position . . . then this, now, if it’s like this, I’m thinking of how to, how to use this opportunity, to use our er . . . one is to let the consulate to feel like us before . . . the wishes are the same as my wishes.” As interpreted by the FBI, Angwang was informing the UFWD official that he could provide non-public information regarding the internal operations of the NYPD. In the same call, it is reported in the criminal complaint that Angwang indicated that he wanted UFWD official to advance to a position of prominence.

Curiously, from what is available in the transcripts included in the criminal complaint, Angwang would never humble himself. When the Consulate official humbled himself, Angwang seemed to view it as an occasion to seek greater dominance in the conversation and in the relationship. During certain telephone contacts, he appeared to demand that the UFWD official humble himself to him. Angwang did not seem to recognize or respond to the fact that UFWD official was likely making an effort to remain tolerant of his repeated overstep of cultural and professional boundaries. He just seemed to want to have control. On or about October 30, 2018, Angwang called the UFWD official, again, dubbed as PRC Official-2 in the criminal complaint. During that call, as recounted by the FBI, Angwang advised UFWD official about a new Tibetan community center located in Queens. Angwang suggested that he and the UFWD official should visit the community center together. As recounted by the FBI, the UFWD expressed concern, but Angwang stated, “if it’s good or not, you need to know about this for your work’s sake. They are the biggest venue for activities right now. If they are involved with politics, then in the future more than half of the meetings might take place there.”

It is very possible that taking what was an abrupt, energetic approach, was an odd way for Angwang to gain the UFWD official’s approval. He perhaps was attempting to  show them how knowledgeable he was about the inner workings of their system. Moreover, he likely sought to bedazzle the UFWD official. In his mind, he may have believed the UFWD official was a flutter at his every word. Yet, it was rarely the case that anything Angwang said appeared to enlighten the UFWD official in any appreciable way. Veritatis simplex oratio est. (The language of truth is simple.)

Even beyond the issue of his contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, it is generally mistake for one, as an outsider, to try to convince those inside an organization, particularly a tight-knit organization, that one knows more about its inner workings and activities, than one actually does. Those inside will generally become suspicious of the outsider’s intentions which would most likely confound any effort to build confidence and establish trust. For whatever reasons he had, the attitude and behavior displayed by Angwang, in part, may have played a role in the undoing of his efforts. If the NYPD officer authentically wanted to connect with the UFWD official and his superiors in Beijing, then all efforts made presumably in the direction of impressing any of them in this manner could be judged as a grand blunder.

With specific regard to Angwang’s oft uttered remark that he wanted to make the UFWD official look good before his superiors in Beijing, that faux pax actually betrayed his misunderstanding of how the Chinese system worked. Those selected for deployment to those posts are usually from the top of a short list of the most qualified officials in a particular organization. if the UFWD official has not already proved himself to his superiors, he would not have received the privilege of being posted to the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. it is likely that Angwang may have appeared to him to be dramatic and theatrical, yet at the same time boorish. With no intent to insult, nothing displayed in the transcripts provided would have left the impression that Angwang was a masterful thinker. It may have very well been the case that the UFWD official’s intellectual powers far surpassed the opportunities in which he was presented to use them in New York. His encounters with Angwang might serve as evidence of that. Yet, while he was likely studying and judging Angwang, and surely masquerading as an august representative of the People’s Republic of China, the UFWD official was in reality a functionary of an organization that would certainly be willing to burn down the rest of world if it meant promoting the interests and goals of the Communist Party of China.

You Quan, head of the UFWD (above). You Quan was appointed United Front Work Department (UFWD) head on November 7, 2017. You directs the UFWD, assisted by seven deputy directors. The leadership also includes the leader for the Central Commission on Discipline Inspection for United Front Work Group. The UFWD is divided into offices, bureaus, and subordinate units, that is to say, mass organizations. The nine numbered Bureaus each specialize in either a particular facet of united front work or a geographic location. While the Communist Party of China employs many means through which it seeks foreign intelligence, the UFWD is distinct from other organizations in its overt and benign appearance. United Front organizations abroad often operate in the open, some with names that allude to “peaceful reunification” or include “friendship association.” Surely included on that list is the “China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture.”

As it concerned his UFWD mission in New York, the UFWD official’s opinion of Angwang  was not as relevant as those of his superiors in Beijing. If they wanted him to work with Angwang, that is what he would do. Senior executives and managers of the UFWD in Beijing would collate and validate intelligence, evaluating the reliability of sources and credibility of information, use various analytical techniques to assess and interpret any intelligence data, and liaise and collaborate with colleagues to gather further information, which may help to piece together the whole picture. They would determine whether a target had genuine potential to be an operative. As it so happened, It appears that in Beijing, approval of him was likely lukewarm. To the extent that might be accurate, it might be the reason why the UFWD official appeared to keep his relationship with Angwang limited in scope. The fact that they spoke on the phone and did not appear to meet in person may be an indication that the UFWD official was likely keeping Angwang at arms length. After two years, Angwang was figuratively treading water. He was never able to cement a solid link to the UFWD official that would lead to additional contacts with UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing. Angwang’s true value, despite his decent background of accomplishments as a Tibetan émigré, may have been viewed as very low by the UFWD official as everything that he offered to provide could very likely have been collected at far less risk and anxiety from other sources.

Looking at the matter more carefully, the whole notion of Angwang providing access to top NYPD officials not only failed to make sense or seem plausible, it would appear to be something the UFWD offical would not find desirable. It is very hard to imagine how any top officials of the NYPD, to whom Angwang claimed to have had the ability to provide access, would be of any use to the UFWD official. The Consul General and his top subordinates in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York had sufficient ways to communicate with the NYPD in a manner officially approved by Beijing. The UFWD official would surely have been well out of his lane if he had met with such NYPD higher ups from his position, and more than likely disturb the bigger picture of People’s Republic of China Consular affairs in New York. It is hard to image why the UFWD official would want to have contact with NYPD officials with far more experience than Angwang, make them very aware of his presence in the Consulate and the city, and bring to bear their impressions of himself, the UFWD, and Angwang’s odd history of contacts with the Consulate and with him. They would surely see the UFWD official straight. Unlike Angwang, who jumped in twice to have contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, top officials in the NYPD, possessing far more experience and being undoubtedly more mature and savvy than him–Angwang had scarcely marked two years of service in the department–would more than likely have concluded that becoming entangled with the Consulate and especially getting involved with a UFWD official, would neither be wise nor sound. They very likely would have become terribly alarmed by the request. Using good sense, they may have demanded that Angwang, himself, break all contact. Then, they might have thrown a huge spotlight on the UFWD official and informed not only their superiors and the NYPD Intelligence Division, but also US counterintelligence services about his presence and the direct attempt via Angwang to contact them. As for Angwang, his NYPD career would very likely have seen dark times. Additionally, no matter what level of relationship and confidence any top NYPD official might have had in Angwang that might have led the neophyte NYPD officer to reason that he could arrange some one-on-one interaction between that official and his UFWD contact, the reality is that, even for personal reasons, no top NYPD official would ever put his or her career at risk with any unofficial, unauthorized contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York and the UFWD. Top NYPD officials often retire from the department and acquire very rewarding senior positions in the corporate world. To errantly follow Angwang’s recommendation and put themselves in contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York and the UFWD, could have very likely blemished their records, making any future corporate position unattainable. Given their rather neat situations, doing anything Angwang might have suggested would have been a singular act of stupidity.

One might go as far as to theorize that by all appearances Angwang may have actually been rejected by UFWD. Relative to what the UFWD may have asked of someone they might have been eager to work with, his contacts were rather prosaic. He was a volunteer of his own making, no training in tradecraft, no direct instructions. For “the relevant time period,” there is no word of payments, no mention of recompense in the form of gifts. Apparently, there was nothing asked for in trade. Angwang was not encouraged, yet not discouraged from continuing on with his volunteer work. It is not clear cut that the UFWD official never insisted that Angwang do anything. If it ever appeared that he was giving him any directions, it took the form of giving a begrudging nod to something Angwang had both suggested and volunteered to do. Nothing that Angwang did was of any momentous consequence in the end. Whatever efforts Angwang made, were activities well-off on the margins, having a diminutive impact on the UFWD mission and the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York’s overall mission. In fact, his activities actually fell somewhat outside of the primary purpose of UFWD activities.

As explained in greatcharlie’s discussion of UFWD here, unlike Chinese intelligence services as the Ministry of State Security and the PLA’s Joint Staff Department, the organization is not as interested in those who can do a little this and a little that for the Communist Party of China. The UFWD is most interested in finding agitators and destroyers, who could open the way for the organization to shape the political picture in the targeted country, and eventually ease the way for the Communist Party of China then level its influence full bore and pull the country in China’s direction. As aforementioned, that is what united front work is all about. In part, through that method, China hopes to become the dominant power in the world. Even pushing out the Communist Party of China-line is not as important for an operative recruited by UFWD as being a disruptive force in his society, or having the ability to facilitate the destructive activities of radicals and anarchists. To that extent, Angwang inherently would not have much value to the organization as a member of the NYPD. It is hard to imagine any radicals or anarchists making the leap to trust a NYPD officer. If Angwang had revealed some oddly arrived at ties to such organizations or suggested ways to support them, he would have been far more valuable to the UFWD. As for being a native Tibetan relating to an Chinese official in an organization ostensibly concerning Tibet, it was nearly irrelevant in this situation.

It may have also been the case that Angwang was ignored by the Ministry of State Security, the People’s Liberation Army, or other Communist Party of China intelligence services that potentially could have been lurking about in the Consulate. Perchance the thinking at UFWD and other Chinese intelligence services was in harmony as it pertained to his case. Perhaps all on the Chinese side would have been satisfied to see Angwang wear himself out and fall away quietly.

Angwang’s UFWD Linkage May Have Concerned Intelligence, but Was Espionage Actually Involved?

Angwang’s “renewed” contact with the Consulate was indeed a dangerous undertaking from all sides, He eventually discovered that. With the advantage of hindsight, one might make the argument that Angwang foolishly entered into a milieu in which was completely unknown to him, yet he perilously travelled down a path that was his undoing. As mentioned initially, among the charges made against Angwang by the US Department of Justice, he reported about the activity of Chinese citizens located in the New York region, identified and gauged possible intelligence sources in the Tibetan community and made access to NYPD officials via invitations to events available to his UFWD contact at the New York Consulate. Angwang’s attorneys will no doubt argue that charging Angwang with anything close to espionage was somewhat of a liberty. However, they would have some difficulty arguing in defense of Angwang’s actions.

In Henry S. A. Becket, The Dictionary of Espionage: Spookspeak into English (Stein & Day, 1986), “Persons who volunteer themselves to an espionage agency” are defined as “walk-ins.” A quote from a former CIA officer added to the definition that explains: “’It’s the walk-in trade that keeps the shop open’ is one of the first bits of operation wisdom that is impressed on newcomers to the business.” (While the author of The Dictionary of Espionage, published under the pseudonym “Henry S. A. Beckett,” was revealed as Joseph Goulden, and the book was republished in April 2013  by the under the authors true identity name by the Courier Corporation, greatcharlie prefers to use the original text published during the 1980s Cold War and intelligence agencies worldwide struggled to solve the puzzle of the author’s name.)

When Angwang went into the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, he reportedly did so, in his own words to help his “motherland achieve glory.” He was a walk-in. Angwang did not say outrightly that he wanted to spy according to the criminal complaint, however, the document indicates that it was Angwang in an October 30, 2018 telephone call who broached the idea in conversation with the the UFWD official at the Consulate that he might have some value, as the FBI interpreted his words, with regard to intelligence.

Added to his legal defense’s problems is the fact that, as mentioned earlier, UFWD is an organization that engages in intelligence work. The UFWD is absolutely one of the tools the Communist Party of China employs to engage in foreign intelligence. The UFWD is distinct from regular civilian and military Chinese foreign intelligence services, given its overt and benign appearance. As was also mentioned earlier, UFWD organizations abroad often operate in the open, using names as the “China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture.”

By directing his comments to the UFWD official, the indications and the implications for one line of thinking, particularly that of the FBI, are that Angwang likely believed that he was a foreign intelligence officer or that he could put him in contact with an intelligence officer from the Chinese foreign intelligence services. By offering to provide services in support of the intelligence work of  Chinese intelligence services, as the FBI suggests, Angwang opened himself up to accusations of espionage. Cast one’s mind back to Angwang’s November 19, 2018 telephone conversation with UFWD official during which he suggested to the UFWD official that they should visit a  community center together. The FBI assessed that the purpose of a proposed visit to the community center was twofold: (1) Angwang  was advising UFWD official to visit the community center in order to maintain visibility on the activities of ethnic Tibetans in the New York area; and (2) Angwang was advising the UFWD official that visiting the community center would assist in spotting and assessing potential intelligence recruits or sources within the Tibetan community.

Certainly, in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, it would hardly be the case that the foreign intelligence officers, on one side of the house, if they were in fact there, would be unaware of what diplomats and officials on the other side of the house, were doing, especially when it concerned a contact as unusual as one  with an NYPD official of any rank. The behavior of this particular NYPD officer, Angwang, was so unusual that it could have drawn the attention of officers of any of the civilian and military Chinese intelligence services posted within the Consulate. Officers of those Chinese intelligence services might have been expected to take some interest in Angwang, particularly given his position, alleged capabilities to reach into the Tibetan community, and access to senior NYPD officials. Recall also that he had been in contact with the Consulate before and they likely possessed a dossier on him. Still, in a possible scenario, nothing might have led civilian and military Chinese foreign intelligence service officers assumedly posted in the Consulate to find interest in Angwang for their purposes and on the outset they might have decided not to become involved with him. Beijing, too, may have received reports about Angwang, yet no great urgency may have been generated by what they read. Angwang may have been viewed not as a walk-in with potential, but merely an unsolicited contact, albeit a local police officer and “a son of the motherland” who had a familial connection to Tibet.

While they probably had a good chance to look Angwang over during his first flap of contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, in his second go around with the diplomatic post, Chinese counterintelligence services presumably there would surely be concerned that the unusual contact with the NYPD officer might be an effort to compel the UFWD officer to defect, and even worse, engage in espionage on behalf of US foreign intelligence services.

Additionally, having a member of the Consulate staff fall into a US counterintelligence trap would have spelled disaster for UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the all of the officials working in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. They would not want anything to transpire that might have embarrassed the Communist Party of China and people of China. They also wanted to avoid anything that might put their situations in jeopardy as well. Once the Communist Party of China leadership in Beijing got wind of the troubles, they would become difficult to console. The UFWD official and others in the Consulate could have been sacked and called home or their records would have been severely damaged at the very least. The decision was most likely made from the start to contain the NYPD officer’s attempts to connect with the UFWD official. To that extent, although he remained in contact with Angwang for two years, the UFWD official, according to the portion of the transcripts of recorded conversations placed in the criminal complaint, appeared to be a methodical individual, taking every precaution with the NYPD officer, measuring every statement and response, not knowing how events might turn.

As of this writing, Angwang, is the one who now faces possible punishment from the US Department of Justice and the NYPD. The names of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York officials involved with him, to include the UFWD official, were not mentioned in the criminal complaint, which is the norm in a federal espionage case.

Detained Tibetan Bhuddist monks paraded while wearing demeaning placards (above). Officers of Chinese intelligence services might have been expected to take some interest in Angwang, particularly given his position, alleged capabilities to reach into the Tibetan community, and access to senior officials in the NYPD. Still, in a possible scenario, nothing might have led civilian and military Chinese foreign intelligence service officers assumedly posted in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York to find interest in Angwang for their purposes and on the outset they might have decided not to become involved with him. Beijing, too, may have received reports about Angwang, yet no great urgency may have been generated by what they read. Angwang may have been viewed not as a walk-in with potential, but merely an unsolicited contact, albeit a local police officer and “a son of the motherland” who had a familial connection to Tibet.

If Chinese Intelligence Services Had an Interest in Angwang, What Could It Have Been?

Recall from the initial discussion of the UFWD here that some State Council ministries and many other organizations with a party committee also conduct united front work. These organizations all offer unique platforms and capabilities that the united front policy system can draw upon for operational purposes. The Ministry of State Security, although outside of the Communist Party of China, is one of those organizations. Attached to its party committee is a united front work department. Its resources and personnel of the Ministry of State Security can be called upon to perform united front work. One can imagine the interplay between UFWD officials and Ministry of State Security foreign intelligence officers in overseas diplomatic posts. However, standard civilian or military Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers possibly posted to the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, just as those of every country, had the understanding drummed into their heads by trainers and managers was to avoid traps of all kind and to thoroughly evaluate a potential target first with the guidance of Beijing or in the case of the MSS departments and bureau, back to provincial or local from which they were deployed.

Chinese intelligence services, hypothetically characterizing Angwang as a walk-in in this scenario, might have reasoned that he should be allowed to do a little this and little that in the interests of China. However, it would also seem logical that senior executives and managers, much as the UFWD, may have believed that for the most part, Angwang should be kept figuratively on ice to see how events surrounding him would develop.  would be the best tack. If that theory were actually the case, then the US Department of Justice could very well have acted a bit impatiently to indict him. If one could progress in thinking to a follow on theory, one might also be willing to suppose that Angwang, much as Chinese counterintelligence officers were likely to believe, may have actually been serving as a counterespionage operative for US counterintelligence. Theoretically, the objective of that work would have been to insinuate himself within any active foreign intelligence network of China in New York he might come upon.

Alternatively, in following the theory of the US Department of Justice, that Angwang was under the firm control of Chinese intelligence, it is possible that Chinese intelligence services may have actually been considering him for handling by non resident foreign intelligence officers in New York. However, no proof of this has been made public.

Lastly, it is possible that other elements of the Communist Party of China, similar to the UFWD, such as the furtive yet prodiguous International (Liaison) Department and the Propaganda Department, might have been closely monitoring activities of what it would “dangerous influences” abroad concerning Tibet, and thereby may have taken at least a passive interest in the Angwang situation that never materialised into anything.

Radix malorum est cupiditas. (Greed is the root of evil.) There were a number of aspects of Angwangs’ approach to the UFWD official that would have made Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers very likely in the Consulate or senior executives and managers in Beijing that would make them highly suspicious of unsolicited contacts in the current environment. First and foremost, quite different from the majority of federal criminal cases against US citizens incepted while engaging in espionage for China, Angwang was apparently driven by the spirit of grab and greed. Angwang certainly never created that impression. As it was already mentioned in the discussion here, according to what was reported in the criminal complaint, the issue of payments for the work done was never broached by the Consulate staff member. Even more unusual, the matter of payments was never broached by Angwang either. Chinese counterintelligence, if involved, would have believed that US counterintelligence services were well aware that no money had been exchanged because if the UFWD officer had raised the matter of payments, it absolutely would have been in the criminal complaint. Interestingly, according to that document, Angwang, in 2016, wired a total of $150,000 to accounts in China controlled by his brother and another individual. It was also emphasized that Angwang had “also received multiple substantial wire transfers from the PRC [People’s Republic of China].” The matter was explained in the criminal complaint using examples in the following manner: “On or about May 23, 2016, a US bank account held in Angwang’s name received $49,985 from an account held in the name of Angwang’s brother in China Moreover, on or about January 29, 2014, a US bank account jointly held in the name of Angwang and Angwang’s wife received separate credits of $50,000 and $20,000 from an account held in the name of an individual at the Bank of China in New York.” None of this banking activity was said to have occurred during “the relevant time period.”

The matter of payments takes on even higher meaning with regard to counterintelligence. Chinese counterintelligence officers, in particular, would recognize that profit gives an act such as espionage purpose. Rarely will one come across an act of espionage that is purposeless. Without an exchange of money, payments, it is hard to see what was the purpose of Angwang’s desire to work for the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, and why anyone might insist the UFWD official was directing Angwang without any apparent means to encourage or reward activity. Savvy counterintelligence officers know that clever operatives may attempt to put investigators off the scent by laying out their actions with cunning and plausibility. Counterintelligence officers, as part of their tradecraft, look for consistency. Where there is a want of it, one must suspect deception. If an imaginable “virtual profit” were to be gained on the side of Angwang, in the minds of Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers possibly in the Consulate or senior executives and managers in Beijing it would have been to lay the groundwork to potentially initiate a counterintelligence case against the UFWD official and presumably seek to infiltrate his imaginable organization to bag officers and other operatives in the what may have been theorized by US counterintelligence to be an espionage network.

Unusquisque mavult credere quam iudicare. (Everyone prefers to believe than to think.) According to the criminal complaint, on or about February 13, 2019, Angwang called the UFWD official, dubbed as “PRC Official-2,” and greeted him as “Boss.” Using that term “boss,” would indicate to some that the UFWD official was in some capacity had Angwang in his employ, albeit as an intelligence operative in this case. On November 14, 2019, Angwang called the UFWD official, and in addition to referring to the UFWD official as “boss” again, Angwang sought permission from him to participate in an interview with New Tang Dynasty Television. (New Tang Dynasty Television is run by the Falungong, an anti-PRC spiritual group that China banned in 1999 and declared an “evil cult.”)  In almost a protective way, recognizing Angwang’s desire to be connected with China, the UFWD told Angwang during their telephone exchange, “I think you absolutely shouldn’t do it.” Angwang responded: “It’s is better to avoid it, right?” The UFWD official, beginning to explain himself uttered: “This message this . . . the cost is too high.” Angwang seemingly pleased to respond to his inquiry stated, “Yes, yes. However, in further explaining the reason for his opinion, the UFWD, further stated: “Because NTD [New Tang Dynasty Television], China is totally against it. Angwang seemingly urging further comment said: “Yes, yes.” The UFWD beginning to offer more stated: “Their people [unintelligible] on the list.” Angwang then interjects, “Yes, yes,” but the UFWD official continues: “In the future, if you want to go back or something, it will have an enormous impact.” Thus, he was warning Angwang that by going on New Tang Dynasty Television, he would hurt his chances of ever traveling back to China again, but he did not command him not to go forward with the idea from a position of employer to an employee, although some may conclude that was such. Chinese counterintelligence officers, hypothetically observing the contact with Angwang develop, would likely recognize that it was completely possible that US counterintelligence services would portray these interactions as proof that the UFWD official was providing directing Angwang. To the extent that it is at all possible, such Chinese counterintelligence officers would likely be satisfied as the criminal complaint actually evinces, that there was no indication word for word that any instructions for action were issued to Angwang. What Angwang really did on this matter was advertise the limits he had. He should have been able to discern the liabilities of such an action on his own.

Chinese counterintelligence officers, hypothetically observing the contact with Angwang develop, would also likely be satisfied by the fact that throughout his contacts with Angwang, the UFWD official simply collected what he shared with him and accepted services as if they were benign gifts. It may very well be that in missing segments of the transcripts, the UFWD officer could be found explicitly giving instructions to Angwang to act on the Consulate’s behalf. Chinese counterintelligence officers would likely be convinced no espionage charge could possibly be leveled against the UFWD official because Angwang, would be seen in their eyes, as operating under a type of self-management on his own time and at his own expense.

Senior Executives and Managers of UFWD and Chinese Intelligence Services Were Likely Shaken but Not Stirred by Angwang

Interestingly, in one of Angwang’s conversations with the UFWD official about November 19, 2018, Angwang said that he wanted him, as aforementioned dubbed as “PRC Official-2” in the criminal complaint, to advance to a position of prominence “in Beijing” and that he would “wait for your [the UFWD official’s] invitation.” Angwang reiterated: “It’s true. In the future–in the future, after you get a whatever position in Beijing, I will wait for your invitation.” However, the UFWD official demurred stating, “Beijing, that place is too awesome.” Pushing further, Angwang confidently stated: “You, you do well here, gradually, gradually you will move up, when the time comes. The UFWD official responded: “It’s not that easy. Beijing, that place, smart people there indeed.” It must be reiterated here that in selecting diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Liberation Army Military Liaison officers, Ministry of State Security foreign intelligence officers and officials of front organizations for Communist Party of China intelligence groups such as China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture, only the very best are selected. China puts its best foot forward. While it appears the UFWD official had some difficulty verbalizing what he wanted to say in English, his intellect would still shine through his words. The indications and implications of that last statement made by the UFWD official may have been that Angwang should not be so confident that anything more than collegial contacts would be permitted. In that Delphic statement, the UFWD official may have possibly been expressing to Angwang that there may be some concerns in Beijing about him that his case was being considered by experienced and cautious senior executives and managers would be able sort out whether he was legitimate or not. Further, in that same statement, UFWD official also seemed to blandly express to Angwang that he was not giving Beijing much credit for its singular faculties of deduction and logical synthesis. At the same time, he may have possibly been having a little fun with Angwang, knowing it was very likely that he could not decipher what was being hinted at.

In an assessment of Angwang for possible recruitment, senior executives and managers in the Chinese intelligence services would surely look for what might be beneficial for them in order to twinkle out what was right. His contact was presumably regularly reviewed and assessed. It may very well be that much about Angwang was found to be questionable early on, and there was little interest afterward to exploit anything he might have had to offer. To work with an operative, there must be some assurance of behavior and desired outcomes of tasking. Given Angwang’s discordant behavior, in the long run, one could only imagine random results from his work. Expectation otherwise from such characters based on optimism typical walk hand in hand with an intelligence officer’s doom.

Seemingly none the wiser to such a possibility, Angwang continued to market himself to UFWD official. According to the criminal complaint, in an October 30, 2018 telephone call, the fact that Angwang was being assessed appeared to have been revealed. In the conversation with Angwang, the UFWD official, dubbed PRC Official-2 in the criminal complaint, complimented him concerning his promotion within the NYPD. Angwang informed UFWD official that he was preparing to take a promotional exam and that he was “taking [the exam] . . . for the people back home.” The UFWD official reportedly agreed and then made a very Dadealian yet telling remark  that “there’s a whole bunch of people looking at you.” Curiously, Angwang simply spoke past that weighty statement and went on to state rather egotistically that his position within the NYPD was valuable to China because from it, he could provide NYPD information to the Consulate.

French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.” Reading federal indictments, criminal complaints, and judgments of those caught engaging in espionage for MSS over the past decade, one develops a picture of US counterintelligence while having some success intercepting Chinese intelligence officers, operatives and informants, it is usually only after they had for years delivered a considerable amount of classified information concerning US national security equities, projects, strategies, operations, and policies, US tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods and US defenses against foreign intelligence penetration, and of course, cutting-edge technologies had been put in MSS officers’ hands. According to what was reported in the criminal complaint, one could hypothesize that Angwang seemingly sought to fit the mold of individuals spotted and recruited to be Chinese foreign intelligence operatives and informants who had been intercepted by US counterintelligence. The traits and aspects of the individual spotted and recruited to work for Chinese foreign intelligence services were surely better understood from those cases. If Angwang had been operating under the direction of US counterintelligence services as Beijing may have presumed, the information from any cases would likely have been used to assist Angwang in shaping himself to become as attractive a target possible for recruitment. (Not to go too far out on shaky ground, but it appears, intriguingly, that everything Angwang offered, or claimed to have access to, essentially mirrored what the UFWD would supposedly desire in support of its activities and he, himself, ostensibly matched the sort that UFWD would likely have a proclivity to recruit based on the FBI’s description of the organization in the criminal complaint.)

Yet, all in all, it appears that the risks were too high for regular civilian or military Chinese intelligence officers to approach him, especially knowing the priority given to US counterintelligence to score victories against Chinese foreign intelligence services. Chinese spy networks have run roughshod through political, economic, military, diplomatic, intelligence, academic, social, mass communications industries in the US, seemingly stealing information with impunity.

Chinese Intelligence Services Have Been Doing Well Enough That They Could Pass on Angwang

Under the circumstances alleged in the criminal complaint of the US Department of Justice, if there was interest in recruiting Angwang, Beijing was going to reason with the facts, not odd suppositions that might be primed by Angwang’s statements. If there were any doubts about the bona fides or the authenticity of anything Angwang was saying, the matter had to be studied.

Omne ignotum pro magnifico est. (We have great notions of everything unknown.) Senior executives and managers of Chinese intelligence services observing from Beijing when considering the big picture surely took into consideration the predicament in which US counterintelligence services found themselves. They imaginably recognized that US counterintelligence services surely want to accomplish a lot against them, but they have had great difficulty in devising ways to deter, disrupt, and destroy the intelligence efforts of Chinese intelligence services. When they achieve any victories against a Chinese intelligence operative or informant, and the occasional intelligence officer, they come only after massive amounts of secret government information of the utmost importance or intellectual property of private firms and academic institutions that is the product of intense and gifted research and development work has been stolen. US counterintelligence services would prefer that Chinese foreign intelligence recruitment efforts would lead over and over to traps. Information stolen should only that which is cooked and valueless. They would like to regularly penetrate Chinese intelligence networks and roll them up in waves at times and places of their choosing. They would like to infiltrate ongoing and developing Chinese intelligence operations and use them as conduits to push disinformation back to China. Doubtlessly, they wish they had a way to identify all Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants and at least intercept, neutralize, and recruit a few as counterespionage agents.

To the extent any of that is plausible, Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers, hypothetically may have looked upon Angwang as a potential counterespionage agent of the US, they would have most likely classified him as a dangle. As defined more specifically in the earlier referenced Dictionary of Espionage, a dangle is “a person who approaches an intelligence agency in such a manner that he is asking to be recruited as an agent to spy against his own country.” It is further explained that in some cases a dangle will engage in efforts to interest an intelligence service in his or her intelligence potential, or actually begin to provide services on his or her own initiative. Accordingly, senior executives and managers of Chinese intelligence services observing from Beijing may have suspected Angwang was being dangled before the UFWD official with the hope that he would in turn be passed on to Chinese foreign intelligence officers in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York and consequently gobbled up. With regard to that, Chinese intelligence services are not so desperate at the moment that they would have jumped at the odd native Tibetan NYPD officer dropped at their Consulate door step teeming with the right bona fides, attempting to say all the right words. As aforementioned, senior executives and managers in all of the  Chinese intelligence services know that their opposite numbers in US counterintelligence services are the desperate ones. Attempting to ensnare officers Chinese foreign intelligence services–or a UFWD official in this case–with such an over the top lure may have been presumed to be more of a reflection of the desperation of US counterintelligence services. To that extent, it could be viewed as a projection of their own concerns and anxieties.

With no intention by greatcharlie to be insulting or impolitic, but quite frankly, repeating what was mentioned a bit before, there was truly very little authentically impressive about Angwang as a potential espionage operative for any Chinese foreign intelligence service to consider. Chinese foreign intelligence services have actually been doing well enough so far at spotting their own targets, recruiting their own way, and running their operatives and informants with their tactics, techniques, procedures and methods. It is estimated that their 25,000 officers on the ground in the US show little fear as they steal US technologies and secret information and data of all kinds. Again, with things going so well for Chinese intelligence services in the US so far, that would be a catastrophe.

If a decision had been made to place Angwang under the control of Chinese intelligence services, the last thing China would want would be to see its whole US enterprise come crashing down, much as a wall. Attendantly, Chinese intelligence services would not  want to see a resident intelligence officer or a member of his team hypothetically posted to the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York caught under the debris or associated in any way with the problem. They could be certain that US counterintelligence services would make a disturbance greater than bedlam if they could make a case against them.

It is highly unlikely that the UFWD official with whom Angwang was in contact, was an foreign intelligence officer from the Ministry of State Security who was simply using the UFWD’s creature, the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture as a cover. He failed to tick enough required boxes to even be considered such. In describing Chinese foreign intelligence officers, the renowned expert on the subject, Mattis, explained in a July 9, 2017 article in the National Interest entitled “Everything We Know about China’s Secretive State Security Bureau And it’s not much,” there are apparent signs that one is dealing with genuine officer of the Ministry of State Security. A Chinese diplomatic official who wears a tailored suit and speaks  with idiomatic English is one sign. A businessman working from a sketchy consulting outfit, with a few faked LinkedIn profiles, that does not own the domain it claims, is another. Reviewing the word-for word conversations, the UFWD official could only converse with Angwang, to use the vernacular, in “broken English.”

Maintaining a low profile means preventing one’s activities from becoming anything passively noticeable, inquired about by the suspicious, reported to authorities by the dutiful, and written about by reporters. As part of their tradecraft, Ministry of State Security officers would prefer hole-in-corner meetings with prospective recruits in small, quiet locations such as cozy, dimly lit establishments, conversing over coffee or tea, perhaps a dash of brandy or even a bite to eat. Such would be a far better site for a furtive discussion than some crowded establishment or a spot nearby some busy thoroughfare. Other sites usually selected are hotel rooms, gardens, and parks. Most of Angwang’s contacts with the UFWD official and another Consulate official were by telephone.

Further with regard to the telephone calls, unless they had worked out some elaborate code for communicating, nothing was hidden. The UFWD official surely had received more than one security briefing about telephone conversations in the US and the likelihood of being monitored by US counterintelligence. Chinese intelligence services have been aware of such capabilities for some time. In public statements, Chinese officials have expressed concerns about US capabilities to intercept telephone conversations of its government personnel. In the end, the telephone conversations were intercepted and declared by the FBI as the means used by the UFWD official to issue instruction to Angwang.

Equally, even if the UFWD officer, in the very unlikely case, was completely free from anything nefarious and not involved at all in any standard united front work, doubtlessly he would still be very aware and concerned that his conversations with Angwang were being monitored and assessed by Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers. His career would be put on the line with every word he spoke even though it was his job to speak to contacts in the Tibetan community as Angwang.

Learning by Observation

In his novel, Siddhartha (1922), the German born Swiss poet, novelist, and painter, Hermann Hesse, the words are written: “I have always believed, and I still believe, that whatever good or bad fortune may come our way we can always give it meaning and transform it into something of value.” It is possible that after a period of contact with Angwang, senior executives and managers of the UFWD in Beijing, in akin to the judgment of senior executives and managers of civilian and military Chinese intelligence services, as greatcharlie hypothesized, may have instructed their official in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York to observe him for his reactions in response to statements he should make under their direction. Using reports from the UFWD official in the Consulate, they might hypothetically choose to  study Angwang much as a rat in a Skinner box. Whatever might have been of interest in his comments and inquiries was mined potentially to help create a template for how US counterintelligence operatives might respond when placed in certain situations. Most certainly from the get-go, the UFWD official would most likely have been weaponized with questions to ask Angwang and instructions on how to relate to him so that Beijing could be better gauge him for potential recruitment.

Incongruities

Multum in parvo. (Much in little. (Small but significant.)) Closely reviewing the criminal complaint, Angwang’s case is made even more intriguing given the many incongruities and outright oddities apparent in the activities of the parties involved in the matter. Each fact is suggestive of itself. Together, they have a cumulative force.

It is hard to imagine, but not exactly improbable, that in selecting an official of the UFWD, to send to New York as a representative of the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture,  UFWD senior executive and managers would choose someone who lacked proficiency in English. It would be doubly hard to imagine that of all the choices, Beijing would send someone who was also not proficient in Tibetan. After all, it even noted in the criminal complaint, among the department’s tasks is to engage with ethnic Chinese individuals and communities living outside China. Without proficiency in Tibetan, the UFWD official could not possibly have been expected to converse in the native language of the community in which he was ostensibly assigned to engage in outreach. Lacking proficiency in Tibetan would also mean vacuously surrendering the opportunity to establish an immediate basis of commonality with those in the Tibetan diaspora in New York who might have been willing to interact with him. (Perhaps some would say his walk-in NYPD informant defied that reality.) It would be counterintuitive to do so.  Standard Tibetan, along with Mandarin Chinese, is an official language of the Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China. Some schools in Tibet teach all subjects in Chinese, especially in areas where most students are ethnic Chinese. As Standard Tibetan is a widely spoken form of the Tibetic languages that has many commonalities with the speech of Lhasa, an Ü-Tsang (Central Tibetan) dialect. Standard Tibetan is often referred to as Lhasa Tibetan.

According to the criminal complaint, Angwang and both UFWD officials conversed in English, although presumably at least Angwang and the UFWD official could comfortably speak in Tibetan. Tibetan is in fact Angwang’s native language, but he repeatedly spoke with the UFWD official in English. He continued to do so, despite what could be inferred from the transcript segments in the criminal complaint, the difficulty that he was having in verbalizing what he wanted to say. It was, indeed, one more instance in which Angwang failed to humble himself, and actually a moment when he was decidedly rude.

The failure of Angwang to avail himself of the opportunity to speak in Tibetan may have raised eyebrows of UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing who were very likely monitoring the progress of the contact. To them, the odds would stand against this being a coincidence. Indeed, Angwang who professed a love of his motherland, China, preferred to speak English rather than speak his native language. As a Communist Party of China loyalist might express it, Angwang further “subordinated” himself and their conversation to the language of a foreign land and an adversary. Culturally, Angwang may have been criticized in Beijing for failing to be humble and display respect for before an official, albeit low level, of the People’s Republic of China. It may have very well been viewed in Beijing also as ungracious and shameful. One might speculate that some grumblings might have even been heard in the meetings of UFWD senior executives and managers about Angwang that perhaps it was really a manifestation of his true mental attitude to his homeland.

Angwang’s repeated efforts to speak with the UFWD official in English, hypothetically may have led UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing monitoring the contact to theorize that if US counterintelligence services were using their would be informant as an clandestine operative against the UFWD official, having Angwang discuss everything in English would serve to ensure that any direct, incriminating statements made by the Consulate staff member would be taken exactly as stated and his statements would not be later declared as part of a legal defense as having been subject to poor translation or completely misconstrued due to misinterpretation.

UFWD senior executives and managers of Chinese intelligence services observing from Beijing may have made the assumption that If US counterintelligence services were operating against the UFWD official posted to the Consulate, they could have potentially insisted that their operative, who they would imaginably could have assumed Angwang was, spoke in English as a manifestation of poor tradecraft. It would be a dreadful missed opportunity to enhance the comfort zone between their operative and the target, in this case the UFWD official, and establish more firmly establish a commonality between them. (To that extent, the criminal complaint does not indicate that the UFWD official had suggested to Angwang that he speak English.

Further, UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing as well as  Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers possibly working out of the New York Consulate who were experienced with the modus operandi of US counterintelligence, might have presumed Angwang’s unwillingness to speak to native language of the motherland that he claimed to have loved so much as possible act of laziness by US counterintelligence service, who might have insisted that their operative spoke English in order to avoid having to later engage in the extra step of translating transcripts of their conversations, as witnessed in previous cases.

Lastly on the language issue, Angwang desire to speak in English with the UFWD official may have also raised concerns among UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing monitoring the contact because Madarin was also langyage in which both men could converse. Relatedly, in a December 11, 2019 telephone conversation, reported in the criminal complaint, with the UFWD official, dubbed PRC Official-2 within, Angwang asked for advice on the creation of his official NYPD business cards. Angwang stated that the card should indicate that he spoke Chinese. To that end, Angwang asked the UFWD official if his business card should state that he speaks “Chinese,” or more specifically the Mandarin dialect. The UFWD official responded that the card should read “Chinese.” Later in the call, Angwang and the UFWD official mutually decided that the card should reflect his fluency in “Chinese, Tibetan.”

Tibetans detained by Chinese security forces (above). It is possible that after a period of contact with Angwang, senior executives and managers of the UFWD in Beijing may have instructed their official in the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York to observe him for his reactions in response to statements he should make under their direction. Using reports from the UFWD official in the Consulate, they might hypothetically choose to  study Angwang much as a rat in a Skinner box. Whatever might have been of interest in his comments and inquiries was mined potentially to help create a template for how suspected US counterintelligence operatives might respond when placed in certain situations. Most certainly from the get-go, the UFWD official would most likely have been weaponized with questions to ask Angwang and instructions on how to relate to him so that Beijing could better gauge him for potential recruitment.

Oddities

According to a September 21, 2020 CNBC report, the US Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, in a detention memo, said that an investigation found that “Angwang has traveled back to the PRC [People’s Republic of China] on numerous occasions since his asylum application was granted.” UFWD senior executives and managers closely following from Beijing Angwang’s moves, may have found it curious that Angwang’s oft professed love of his motherland had not already led him to request help from the UFWD official in securing a visit to China, to meet with the managers and colleagues of the official, to see his family, and “examine conditions in Tibet,” as part of a government sponsored cultural program. True, in a November 19, 2018 telephone conversation, he mentioned that he would wait for an invitation from the UFWD official to presumably go to Beijing once the official attained some position of influence there. However, he otherwise showed no interest in speaking with other officials at the Consulate, with the imprimatur of the UFWD official, who would have the ability to facilitate his travel to China, perhaps even on a state sponsored visit. All Angwang seemed interested concerning Beijing, was urging the UFWD official to verbalize some linkage back to his superiors there or to reveal some business or personal contact with senior executives of his organization, or otherwise, senior members of the Communist Party of China who were associated with it. As mentioned earlier, the criminal complaint clearly indicates that the UFWD official never even creeped in that direction in conversations. Angwang seemed determined to ignite a discussion with the UFWD official on his  impressions of his superiors in Beijing and their hopes of what he might achieve from his post. He repeated his inquiries similar to a skipping compact disc. Angwang also seemed to have a strong interest in what would satisfy the UFWD official’s Beijing superiors in terms of the collection of information and activities in which he, Angwang, might engage.

In a large, populous city as New York City, with so much activity tied to the diverse cultures of its many diaspora communities, contacts by NYPD community liaison officers with diplomatic representatives of the home countries from which one of the diverse communities of citizens and residents originate, would likely be given scarce attention. With regard to the officers actions as an official representative of the NYPD and City of New York, and the decidedly aberrant nature of his behavior, it is hard to understand how NYPD senior executives and managers had not been made aware of the errant behavior of the officer. One might think that his repeated contacts would have roused some suspicion or the curiosity of a single fellow officer. If NYPD senior executives and managers were aware of what he was doing, given how odd it was, he should have been ordered to cease and desist and to break contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York immediately. Based on the absence of anything to the contrary in the criminal complaint, one must presume this was the case. It appears that no heed was paid by the NYPD to his two year long perilous entanglement with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York and the UFWD.

Nimia illæc licentia profecto evadet in aliquod magnum malum. (This excessive license will most certainly eventuate in some great evil.) Being aware of that and the dangers security-wise that interactions with People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York would pose for an officer who might come in contact which such “dark elements” there, one might expect Angwang’s immediate superiors in the Community Liaison Department or at the 111th Precinct  would put some impetus into getting the officer as far away from that place. In the end, he became mixed up with the UFWD, which in many ways might be considered a far worse outcome than running into any in house spies.  have been  especially given the type of exchanges with a Consulate staff member in which he was engaged. If Angwang had been forewarned about being in contact with the Consulate by his superiors, yet then persisted in maintaining contact with officials there, the circumstances would be completely different.

After Angwang was charged, among his fellow police officers, there may very well be some grumblings to the effect that if at higher levels in the NYPD, there was an awareness of the dangerous waters was sailing into not simply by being in contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, and worse being contact with an acknowledged official of the UFWD, consideration should have been to perhaps given to providing Angwang with the opportunity to jump to safety. That opportunity could have taken the form of a stern warning or even a reprimand with regard to those contacts as well as his activities from a supervisor. Sometimes one needs to hear the perspective of others to understand how far off course one has traveled. It is unimaginable that anyone kindly mentoring the NYPD officer was encouraging his interactions with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. Imaginably, the NYPD Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA), the police officers’ union, may have something to say about how things panned out, too! Although the matter is now laden with national security implications and it is a federal criminal case, imaginably the PBA might have had something to say about how far the NYPD allowed the officer to stay if his superiors actually had been made aware of what he was doing. However, a PBA spokesman said the union would not be representing Angwang in the criminal case. It is stated with no interest insult or to condescend, that the majority of NYPD officers are neither steeped in international affairs and US foreign policy nor familiar enough with diplomatic arts to fully understand the implications of such contact with the local Chinese diplomatic post that garners great attention from the US Intelligence Community.

In view of how Angwang was operating with an extraordinary amount of autonomy with regard to contacts-as a local government employee–with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. Experienced senior executives and managers in UFWD might have wondered whether the NYPD officer was being supervised and whether he was reporting any of his contacts with, and activities on behalf of, the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. Senior executives and managers in UFWD would want to know why no superior officer in the errant officer’s precinct chain of command did not order him to break contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York. One might assume that the Consulate had a fully complemented suite of foreign intelligence officers, likely from more than one service, to include Communist Party of China intelligence elements.

Once Angwang’s activities were discovered, one might have expected senior executive from the NYPD, out of an abundance of caution, to approach the Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in New York and inform the official that it was not the interest or intent of the NYPD to have its community liaison officers probe Consulate officials about the inner workings of their government. Further, one might expect that the NYPD would make it clear that it was not permissible to allow its officers, essentially in the role of agents, to perform community liaison tasks for their Consulate or any foreign government Consulate for that matter.

Interesting Behavior by the Chinese Government

On the other side of the coin, the People’s Republic of China Consul General of New York did not contact the NYPD about the probing, officer with his telephone calls, comments concerning evaluations of Consulate staff by senior officials in the Chinese government, and his efforts to insinuate himself in the activities of Consulate staff member by engaging, by his own admission, in a self-managed efforts promote a staff member with superiors in Beijing. As aforementioned, the officer’s pushy, boorish nature and peculiar efforts were hardly what a Consulate official from any country would want to cope with under normal circumstances.

What compelled the Consulate to actually let it all continue is difficult to discern. That decision surely has leaves the door open to consider the decision from a different angle than simply engaging in typical Consulate activities such as supporting China’s diplomacy with the US, handle legal matters, and foster business, educational, cultural, travel, social, and community relations in the New York Metropolitan Area and to that extent, the US. There are many possibilities.

As for the response of the Chinese government, a People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, stated at a daily briefing on September 22, 2020: “The relevant accusations made by the US side are pure fabrication.” Interestingly using the word “plot,” he explained: “The US plot to discredit the Chinese consulate and personnel in the United States will not succeed.” Wenbin continued by curiously stating that the indictment against Angwang was full of hedging terms such as “seems” and “possibly,” giving the appearance that prosecutors were straining to make their case. From this particular statement, one can get a better sense of how, as postulated in the discussion here, Communist Party of China organs involved in this case, that publicly being the UFWD, and Chinese government bureaucracies interested in it, that being the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, surely examined the criminal complaint against Angwang closely. Both bureaucracies have the responsibility to support united front work. As presumed in this discussion also, certainly all information pertaining to Angwang’s contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York was carefully scrutinized by them. Perchance, as hypothesized by greatcharlie, for responsible senior executives and managers of the UFWD and also most likely among interested Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Ministry of State Security, sufficient indicia existed to suspect that Angwang’s second set of contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York and the UFWD official were most likely inauthentic.

To that extent and without a great leap of thought, it becomes more likely the case that the two year period of Angwang’s second contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York, which included numerous contacts with the UFWD official, was used in a curious way by UFWD senior executives and managers in Beijing to study, from arms length and with sufficient safety measures in place, the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services. They would seek to better understand and prepare for expectant future attempts to covertly insinuate operatives into the Chinese foreign and national security apparatus, including particularly both the clandestine posts and covert networks of civilian and military Chinese intelligence services and Communist Party of China organs operating overseas, as UFWD. As aforementioned, they doubtlessly understand the situation the US Intelligence Community has faced, scoring few victories and suffering many defeats in the intelligence struggle with China, and they very likely recognize that US foreign intelligence and services are anxious to turn the situation around and get some things going. Whether there is any merit to this theory that in Beijing relevant Communist Party of China elements and government bureaucracies viewed the whole matter in this way, remains to be seen. Given the peculiarities of the world of intelligence, this analysis should not be deemed too extravagant.

Angwang in his Community Affairs role (above). Communist Party of China organs involved in this case, that publicly being the UFWD, and Chinese government bureaucracies interested in it, that being the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, surely examined the criminal complaint against Angwang closely. As presumed in this discussion also, certainly all information pertaining to Angwang’s contact with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York was carefully scrutinized by them. Perchance, for responsible senior executives and managers of the UFWD and also most likely among interested Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services of the Ministry of State Security, sufficient indicia existed to conclude that Angwang’s second set of contacts with the People’s Republic of China Consulate in New York and the UFWD official were most likely inauthentic.

The Way Forward

There is no intention to remotely question the actions of the US Department of Justice on the Angwang matter. With an interest in better understanding the counterintelligence case that resulted in Angwang’s indictment, greatcharlie has taken a deeper dive into facts made available. Along these lines, it has provided a reappraisal based on what it has found. It is greatcharlie’s hope that if given some attention, perhaps in some small way it might assist those who work on matters of gravity in this province improve their approach to defeating and displacing adversarial foreign intelligence services operating against the US.

John Milton, the renowned English poet, polemicist, man of letters, and a civil servant for the Commonwealth of England under Oliver Cromwell, wrote in Comus (1634): “He that has light within his own clear breast May sit in the centre, and enjoy bright day: But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts Benighted walks under the mid-day sun; Himself his own dungeon.” Angwang’s behavior might only be explained by some mystery in his life. Left unknown to the public, it is possible to say. What stands out from the criminal complaint is that whenever Angwang involved himself in things, to include immigration, the US Army Reserve, and the NYPD, he has displayed an inclination to approach them in a way that was usually a bit off-kilter. For that reason, perhaps it can be estimated that Angwang’s aberrant and purportedly illicit choices in this case were the result of long habit. Indeed, this episode may be one more, but perhaps the most unfortunate, of a collection of odd instances in his life. To the degree that he was involved with a UFWD official, as laid out clearly in the criminal complaint, Angwang had provided him services, albeit seemingly voluntarily and arguably without direct instructions from that contact. He left no doubt that he wanted to promote what he apparently believed were the goals of UFWD official and his organization. When individuals turn their brains to misanthropy and wrongdoing, the world becomes more wicked. For certain, the FBI interprets Angwang’s services for the UFWD official as being aimed at supporting intelligence activities. As of this writing, the public has yet to hear a recounting of Angwang’s experiences in this case in his own words.

Angwang may very well be an isolated phenomenon within the NYPD ranks, and among municipal police departments around the US. However, the presence and activities of the array of Chinese intelligence services both of the government and the Communist Party of China must not be underestimated. It appears to be growing in intensity. Keen observers of China policy must appreciate the predicament of US counterintelligence services as Chinese intelligence services seek to further exploit it. There is a handle. As suggested in previous greatcharlie posts, new thinkers, from outside of the bureaucracy, may rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. They would surely look at issues from other angles, moving away from the usual track, and thereby most likely peel back surface layers, figuratively, to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. What outsider brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that in some cases might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside thinker.

Hiring such outside thinkers could be done with delicacy. There should be an exactness about the selection process. Those sought should be already known and possess the ability to present what may be unorthodox innovative, forward-looking perspectives. The projects on which such individuals would work on would be very compartmentalized and limited in scope and duration. Their attention could be directed to  special cases that may be exceptionally difficult to crack. Some senior executives and managers of US counterintelligence services, determined to stand as solid pillars of conventional thinking and behavior that will not be blown down by the winds of change, may not brook the idea of bringing in outsiders to handle sensitive matters. However, the tide of Chinese espionage has lapped up so much information, eroded so many formerly reliable defenses, that each day the situation moves closer to the tragic and the terrible. Hopefully, among those possible dissenters, an interest, not solely due to exigency, might grow on the idea. Ratio et consilium propriae ducis arte. (Reason and deliberation are the proper skills of a general.)

Commentary: China’s Coronavirus Tack Includes More Abrupt Officials and Political Warfare; Its Diplomatic Tool Must Endure the Consequences

Communist Party of China Headquarters (above). The Communist Party of China’s line on the coronavirus pandemic has been thoroughly questioned in the West, especially in the US. Beijing’s finger wagging in response has not resulted in some grand conversion of anyone in the US or anyone in the world to China’s point of view. If Beijing stays on its current course, activities in support of the Party-line will surely intensify. Political warfare units and officers overseas of the Chinese intelligence services possess the know-how to propagate the Party-line and are being relied upon. A quiet sense of resentment has likely risen among Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomats and professionals who seem to be increasingly tasked with making right turns on the truth and have watched as their legitimate work, to promote China’s policy interests, is regularly supplanted by intelligence efforts.

From the moment the coronavirus outbreak began, the People’s Republic of China was not able to overcome and resolve all challenges that beset it. Facing that reality appears to have shaken the psychological foundations of China’s Communist Movement to its core. Under the somewhat mechanical guiding principles of the Communist Movement reinvented by Chairman Mao Zedong insist that China must be forever driving upward and making progress. All efforts should be directed at pushing China to meet its destiny of taking a dominant position in the world. If China did not reach the top, it would remain a sheep not a shepherd. The volumes of collected concepts and quotes could not offer answers for Beijing to quickly and effectively contain the coronavirus, Having failed to meet the needs of its people, Beijing then failed to prevent a coronavirus outbreak worldwide which it must have come to term with by now. Thereby, any sense of failure has likely been intensified. Yet, Beijing has refused to give up the ghost and has continued to extol the virtues of its medical, scientific, and advanced technological capabilities. The identity of the Party is dependent on a certain worldview concerning the Communist Movement, the teachings of Mao, China’s greatness, and China’s world dominance in the future. When that worldview was threatened, the Party would only hold even more tightly to it and potentially double-down on that line of thinking. That possibility of doubling-down most likely led to the decision by Beijing to contain the virus in China as robustly as possible and contain any information just how bad the situation was. Certain medical approaches were approved and taken. Concern over what might have happened outside China was not given equal importance. and few real steps, if any, were taken that related to a concern over an outbreak. No alternative ideas concerning an almost certain outbreak from the discerning and wise in Beijing–academics, scientific scholars, any with relevant expertise–were investigated or allowed any light. Controversies were to be avoided. Those few who said anything contrary to the Communist Party of China line were effectively silenced.

Indisputably, the Communist Party of China’s line on the coronavirus pandemic clashes with the truth. It has been questioned in the West, especially in the US. Although finger wagging at the US in response may seem morally invigorating, it has not resulted in some grand conversion of anyone in the US or anyone in the world to China’s point of view. It certainly has not improved relations with the US. In China, the Communist Party of China, the National Party Congress, and the State Council of China are the immediate sources of all the daily needs of the Chinese people, that certainly would include information. The government would like to convince the Chinese people that international affairs, it says what it has to say, does what it has to do, to lay up a future of world dominance for China. Given this, perchance Beijing has continued this course because it believes the rebuke of the US has served to assure the Chinese public that there is no ambiguity in what the Communist Party of China has determined are the facts. Beijing may believe it is helping Chinese citizens live their lives fully and clear because they are provided “the truth.” By now, though, a good number of Chinese citizens are aware that one cannot know with certainty what is real from what one hears from the government.

In hac re ratio habenda est ut montio acerbitate. (Reason should be held to (applied) in this matter so that the admonition may be without harshness.) While greatcharlie would prefer to avoid being seen as providing advice to Beijing–which in reality would most likely have no interest in its meditations on the matter. Nonetheless, one might say out of academic interest, greatcharlie has sought to conceptualize what Beijing could have done on the world stage when the coronavirus epidemic began in China and offers some thoughts on what it could still do today to recurvate better present itself as “a leader” on the world stage. Related to that, greatcharlie also takes a brief look in the abstract at why any immediate change in the attitudes and behavior may not occur so quickly as its diplomatic tool, the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), has been going through a type of transition contrary to its purpose of building better relations with other countries.

As a net result of its ongoing tack concerning the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing has thoroughly encased itself in the dreadful mistakes it made by unintendedly, yet repeatedly, shining light on what it did not do right and by its continuous attempts to muscle its way out a disastrous situation with words and actions cobbled together inconsistently in an unsuitable emergency public relations campaign. It would seem that in undertaking its current course, not one appropriate contingency has been considered.

If one were to allow Beijing a bit of latitude, purely out of academic interest, its response to the Western, particularly the US, may be the sense that Chinese leaders might have seared into their psyches over decades about Western perceptions of China. That sense might be informed by utterances of identifiable relics of bigotry from a bygone era to the effect that China is nothing for the West to worry about and the Chinese lack the intellectual power and scientific and technological know-how to ever match US capabilities. That was the case when former US Vice President Joe Biden stated: “I mean, you know, they’re nice folks, folks. But guess what? They’re not competition for us.” To that extent, Chinese leaders view their country a being wronged for too long and they endeavor to right that wrong. (Interestingly, in the administration of US President Barack Obama from which political leaders who have made such statements mostly emerge, a laissez faire attitude resulted in policies on China lost in the wilderness that failed to genuinely protect or promote US interests. The delinquency and lethargy of previous administrations also allowed for the steady progress of China versus US power and further advances in technology.)

Certainly, the moment for immediate action has passed. However, a better course than the one taken, to be brief, would have been to accept the reality of their situation, listening to those in their own country who presented the truth about the virus, and fully acknowledging all of the different developments as they happened, the good, the bad, and the ugly. Most important would have been to be the very party that sounded the global alarm, proactively suggesting constructive precautions to all countries, interacting closely with those leading industrial powers which could have a real impact in stemming the problem worldwide while there was still at least a modicum of time for all countries to act, not just China. Beijing could have worked strenuously with international organizations to include the UN Security Council, fully alerting them that the threat that global pandemic may be in the making. Within those institutions, practical and promising forward-looking recommendations to forge a synergistic international response could have been formulated and promoted by China. The flurry of positive action, that would most noticeably include Beijing’s humble recognition of its errors, would have been an astonishing, powerful display of international leadership by Beijing, albeit over a crisis it caused. The fact that something akin to this approach was not undertaken, and perhaps not even considered, has been a sticking point for Trump.

If it so chose at this stage, Beijing could still direct energy and resources at pecking away at the shell in which they trapped themselves much as a chick breaking out an egg. Nuanced approaches requiring positive action by all relevant bureaucracies across the government to create a positive image and firm, favorable picture that a sanguine China is taking all affirmative steps possible should need to be developed. They would need to be finessed, reshaped continuously, to maximize impact upon viable opportunities to break out its self-inflicted shell the country’s earlier missteps. It would also require more humble cooperation with the rest of the world, not reckless antagonistic verbiage that has so far only triggered the never previously considered process of genuinely isolating China from the international community, international trade and political economy, that is slowly gaining momentum. Rather than experiment with anything new, thoughtful, and inspired, Beijing simply turned to the derivative tactics of locking down and concealing less-desirable and outright unpleasant developments. Disappointingly, the leadership of China appears to lack the reflexes, sensibilities, and sadly, the sophistication, to turn toward the more advanced notions required for positive cooperation. Perhaps, brooding leaders of the Communist Party of China have managed to convince themselves that the main front in all of this is a battle of wits between East and West, in which two disparate political and economic systems compete for dominance.

If no erosion of its current positions occurs, and Beijing stays on its current course, one can expect activities in support of them to intensify. Seemingly, the quondam Cold War era, in which such thinking held prominence is apparently not dead, at least not in the foreign affairs parlors of the Communist Party of China, as well as the Chinese intelligence services, particularly the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and to an extent, departments of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and intelligence elements of the Communist Party of China. The MSS, a civilian intelligence agency, comparable to some degree to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is the embodiment of the logic that created the Chinese system’s intimidating, authoritarian order. Since 1983, it has choreographed events to accomplish the Communist Party’s purposes worldwide. With regard to China’s coronavirus crisis, MSS possesses the know-how through specially trained personnel in political warfare units and officers overseas who could engage in active measures, propagating the line of the Communist Party of China. So far, the apparent political warfare attack against the US, has not been the smashing success leaders of the Communist Party of China were hoping for. However, its effects are doubtlessly being felt throughout the foreign and national security policy apparatus of the Chinese government. With regard to the MFA, large swathes of activities concerning China’s foreign relations with other countries have been taken out of the hands of the diplomats and other professionals at the MFA and put in the hands of the intelligence services.

Materiam superabat opus. (The workmanship excelled the materials.) In the offices of the MFA, there is very likely a very quiet sense of resentment among professionals having chosen to represent China and promote its policy interests worldwide only to have their legitimate activities regularly superseded and supplanted by the machinations of the Chinese intelligence services at the behest of Communist Party of China. After decades of proudly engaging in complex, meaningful diplomatic work, mostly behind the scenes, with the goal of having China respected and reckoned as a power that can have a significant impact in international affairs by the international community, it is surely difficult for MFA diplomats and other professionals to watch as China, instead of further establishing its place among dominant powers, is now earning a reputation as an international pariah.

The purpose of diplomacy should be to prevent war. Bilateral and multilateral contacts with other countries, statements, press releases, and other messaging should not have the aim of antagonizing and raising the ire of leaders and other decisionmakers in foreign capitals. MFA diplomats and professionals would surely prefer to avoid a tit-for-tat situation with the US in which one act of retribution would lead to another from China. With every new act, the chance that a serious outbreak of violence increases.

As mentioned, MFA is ostensibly the primary government agency with a portfolio of implementing the foreign policy and managing diplomatic affairs of China, however the ministry now finds its diplomatic efforts with the US being increasingly supplanted by MSS efforts to conduct active measures such having journalist, academics, and other policy scholars promote the Communist Party of China’s hardline and by intensifying its efforts to steal a wide variety of technologies from US companies and universities. More recently, that nefarious work has included efforts to steal the fruits of money, time, and research into therapies and vaccines for the coronavirus. MFA diplomats may find themselves more and more dragged into MSS operations and those of other Chinese intelligence services as their efforts intensify. In a recent incident, it was discovered that a biology researcher at the University of California-Davis lied about her ties to the PLA. After being interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, she sought refuge in China’s San Francisco consulate. While it has not been definitively established that she was engaged in intelligence work in the US, there is a high probability she was. The PLA would not knowingly deploy an officer to the US without tasking her with some intelligence function. MFA is a consumer of information from cloak and dagger work, and it’s diplomats would prefer not to be sacked into the business of obtaining it.

One might suppose that it was already enough for MFA diplomats to tolerate a policy generally understood to be in effect that has MSS personnel assigned to China’s embassies and other permanent diplomatic missions overseas for up to six years, with a few remaining in post for 10 years if required. Reportedly, in the US, there are seven permanent Chinese diplomatic missions staffed with intelligence personnel. When the accommodations to the MSS aforementioned are added to this, it most assuredly piles on to a heap of discontent that has been long standing.

To enlarge on the point of how MFA is intriguingly being utilized in the larger more belligerent approach of China toward the US, recall how early into the coronavirus crisis, the world witnessed the Department of Information of the MFA using a far sharper tone. As time moved on, it seemingly devolved into being simply a direct mouthpiece for the Communist Party of China, providing some cover for the Party’s own offices. What was being declared about the US has been far from plausible, and apparently manifested anxieties, fears, over outcomes of grave errors made within China. Press briefings amplified those statements online with a bit more vigor. Spokespersons propagating the stronger line were abrupt in what is the approved Party fashion. Indeed, all MFA officials comported themselves publicly with an astringency which some regime critics would say uncloaked the true nature of the regime. Disinformation was also being spread from MFA sources through posts on Twitter. Those who are following this matter closely will hardly forget the shocking and incredulous tweet from Zhao Lijian, the Director of the Information Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he tried to direct blame at US for the coronavirus epidemic in China. From @zlj517 on March 12, 2000, at 10:37 AM, Zhao wrote: “2 CDC was caught on the spot. When did patient zero begin in US? How many people are infected? What are the names of the hospitals? It might be US army who brought the epidemic to Wuhan. Be transparent! Make public your data! US owe us an explanation!”

The hallowed diplomatic doctrine of the MFA has been moderation in all things. Calmness and authority must be shown not only in diplomacy but in all circumstances. The more recent assertive approach has pulled MFA officials from their more traditional conservative, stolid posture. Reportedly, the transition in approach is due to something called “Wolf-Warrior diplomacy.” The name derives from high grossing, action films, “Wolf Warrior” and “Wolf Warrior II,” that feature Chinese special operations forces in battle against China’s adversaries. While the films present a false reality, the nationalistic ideas and ideals they  promote apparently cross-polinated with thinking of China’s leadership on real foreign and national security issues.

Res ipsa repperi facilitate nihil esse homini melius neque clementia. (I have learned by experience that nothing is more advantageous to a person than courtesy and compassion.) With good reason, somber and astute foreign policy analysts worldwide have found it difficult to believe that MFA diplomats and professionals are pleased to adhere to a policy that is named after and centered upon a banal amusement. There is some indication that the Wolf Warrior diplomacy is not novel, but rather has been in effect for a decade. However, the requirement that MFA diplomats and even officials of other government ministries take on a “fighting spirit” has really been something insisted upon by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Wolf Warrior diplomacy is all seen is a response by Beijing to highly biased perceptions of China presented especially in Western media. Recall, that notion was touched upon earlier here. Biases heard from overseas by China are often perceived not only as ideological but racist. There is also a prevalent perception in China that as the country has become more powerful on the world stage, other countries increasingly sense that it poses a threat to their respective interests.

The official position on the impact of Wolf Warrior diplomacy on Chinese diplomats and professionals is that it has raised their morale and encouraged a more assertive style. Yet more plausibly, MFA diplomats and professionals feel Wolf Warrior diplomacy is a load of bollocks, and they could mercilessly dissect the shortcomings of that diplomacy and anything produced under it. Intriguingly, expressions of traditional Chinese diplomacy and professionalism have been heard here and there. Comments of that nature made by the People’s Republic of China Ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai about the anti-US declarations from Beijing were highlighted in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2020 post entitled, “Commentary: Beijing’s Failed Political Warfare Effort Against US: A Manifestation of Its Denial Over Igniting the Coronavirus Pandemic”. Reportedly, Cui told the HBO news program “Axios on HBO” that he stands by his belief that it’s “crazy” to spread rumors about the coronavirus originating from a military laboratory in the US. Cui even called this exact conspiracy theory “crazy” more than a month ago on the CBS News program, “Face the Nation.” well before the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs first began publicly promoting the conspiracy. However, despite such coruscating flashes of what could be called true MFA sensibilities, strong disagreements felt by diplomats and professionals are generally left at the door of their office buildings. At best a very cautious demarche should be attempted in house by the most secure diplomats in the face of decisions and policies of the leadership in an authoritarian, and arguably totalitarian, Communist state. That demarche should never be looked upon by outside observers as a fuite du courage, as much as a pragmatic, existential necessity.

Perchance, more MFA diplomats and professionals disagree with Communist Party of China line policies than one could imagine. No one hoping for the best for China would want to see good thinking officials engage in some une enterprise désespérée that could result in having them brutally weeded out of the system. At least for the time being, nothing that could relatively “bring down the house” should be uttered. Having been directed to promote policies based on the attributes of a fictitious character from an action film, MFA diplomats and professionals have done so without question both overseas and at home. The Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle stated: “It is the mark of an educated man to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.”

At one time, the MFA had a clear cut choice between being a mediator and an enforcer of China’s foreign policy. Its diplomats displayed a certain style and nuance as they made offers and discussed the proposals to resolve issues with other countries. Wolf Warrior requires a hardline stand every time. Insights will not advance efforts, dogma will. In following, as time passes, the MFA will likely be forced to make half turns away from the truth, ensuring that it is never on the correct side of issues. As the MFA is used more and more as a tool to proclaim the aggressive message of the Communist Party of China, it places into question whether the ministry will even keep its main job of making peaceful entreaties with foreign governments. While diplomats might meet with the foreign diplomatic counterparts, there would be superficiality to those contacts. It would be diplomacy after a fashion, albeit in an unsatisfactory way. The work of MFA diplomats, as it once was, would be finished. Maliuolum solacii genus est turba miserorum. (A crowd of fellow suffers is miserable kind of comfort.)

The fact that the Chinese government initiated the ongoing coronavirus disaster cannot be credibly truthfully argued against. Sadly, Beijing so far has not demonstrated any interest in acting appropriately concerning the present matter of the coronavirus. It will most likely attempt to continue to assail the global media with waves of distortions. Nevertheless, despite that having transpired, it is not too late to turn the situation around. China can put the present time to good use. The US, as the true dominant power in the world must maintain its poise. It must not react. It must act in a measured way using effective means, at a time and place of its choosing. Despite all the dissatisfaction and disappointment felt toward China, the US must interact as amiably as possible. Surely, the two countries are not at a point yet when the dark waters of despair have overwhelmed their leaders. When diplomats from both sides meet, they must approach each other with a certain buoyancy and hope. Consilio melius contendere atque vincere possumus quam ira. (We can compete and prevail better through wisdom than through anger.)

Amplifying the Truth about the Denuclearization Diplomacy to Counter Flawed Interpretations and Negative Expectations: A Response to Readers’ Comments

US President Donald Trump (left) and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un (right) at Panmunjom in June 2019. It is important to hear from our readers, and necessary to directly address their latest comments, especially when: they concern an issue much of our effort has been dedicated to in the past couple of years, in this case the US-North Korea denuclearization diplomacy. Although the diplomatic process has been long and there have been no big results yet, looking at the denuclearization issue, one notices a lot that is positive washes up on its shores. No reason has yet been found to subscribe to the idea that the diplomatic process is over. Hoping to provide greater clarity as to greatcharlie’s stand on the issue, a tour d’horizon from our prism is provided here.

Following the publishing of our December 12, 2019 post, “Commentary: A US-North Korea Denuclearization Agreement, If Reached, Must Not Be Left Open to Destruction by Others “, greatcharlie received a number of comments concerning its analyses of the US-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) diplomatic process on denuclearization. Perhaps the top five among those comments would be: discussions in posts are overly optimistic about the negotiations; discussions in posts are too supportive US President Donald Trump; discussions in posts are too understanding of North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un; discussions in posts fail to provide enough information about what is going on inside North Korean foreign and national security policy institutions (a rather immoderate expectation); and, discussions in posts are too critical of using overt sources, specifically US news media broadcasts, publications, and online posts, to draw inferences about the Trump administration’s future actions. All comments on greatcharlie’s work product, with the exception of the churlish few, are welcome. It is important to hear from our readers. It is especially necessary to directly address the latest comments, especially when: they concern an issue to which several of our posts have been dedicated in the past couple of years (in this case, US-North Korea denuclearization diplomacy); they question the blog’s outlook; and, their comments arrive in considerable volume. Under the best circumstances, greatcharlie would like to be known for being a voice of common sense. The hope of greatcharlie is to earn its readers through the quality of our work. The hope also is to successfully act as a virtual listening post for our readers, discerning foibles from inside of governments, while being remote from it.

It stands to reason that many observers would have serious reservations about what is happening with the diplomacy on denuclearization and whether there is a genuine path to success under current circumstances. One could say there has been a lack of progress. Each summit between Trump and Kim, to include Hanoi, has been a “nearly but not quite” moment. Kim at first offered real hope that something positive could be constructed, it would be reasonable for some to sense now that he will provide in the end what he been best known for providing: disappointment and pain. To go further, one might presume that the North Koreans were never fully vested in the diplomacy and had not even tried to fully grasp the immense responsibility they shared with their US counterparts at this important point in their country’s history. One might be convinced that they simply sensed some prospect of exploiting, in some way, an opportunity that they still do not fully understand. (If they have surreptitiously taken that path, their greatest test may come soon enough when they must know what to say or do to prevent a war with an unbeatable opponent.) It has been said that a gentleman should know when to leave a party. Nonetheless, looking at the denuclearization issue, one notices a lot that is positive washes up on its shores. Struck by that, greatcharlie has not as yet found reason to subscribe to the idea that the diplomatic process is over. Optimism allows one to believe that there may still be some sort of eclectic masonry that Trump can build to create a link between the two countries. (Perchance this is the sort of optimism that some readers find so unsettling.) With the aim of providing greater clarity as to greatcharlie’s stand on the issue, a tour d’horizon from our prism is provided here. Dicamus bona verba. (Let us speak words of good omen.)

Kim (center) gesticulating as he talks with North Korean officials. On the diplomatic process on denuclearization, surely the rational and reasonable could recognize the benefits of what Trump has proposed. The clear choice for Pyongyang should be to accept his proposal in some form hashed out at the negotiation table. Pyongyang’s oscillation upward with Kim’s positive nature and relative openness toward Trump, downward to the rejectionist attitudes toward US proposals by the North Korean Foreign Ministry and negotiation team, and then upward again when Kim speaks measuredly or displays relative restraint (at least to discerning eyes), has been tedious. Wittingly or unwittingly, the North Koreans have been portraying themselves as lower tier players.

North Korean Diplomacy: Something Fairly Different from the Norm

On the diplomatic process on denuclearization, the rational and reasonable should surely recognize  the benefits of what Trump has proposed. The clear choice for Pyongyang should be to accept them in some form, hashed out at the negotiation table. Trump’s proposal would have positive implications for the North Korean people for generations. Kim’s delay in recognizing what could be gained is somewhat perplexing. There have not been mixed messages from US, or anything that could reasonably be interpreted as such, to confuse the North Koreans or throw them off their game. Pyongyang’s oscillation upward from Kim’s positive nature and relative openness toward Trump then downward to the rejectionist attitudes toward US proposals by the North Korean Foreign Ministry and negotiation team, then upward again when Kim speaks measuredly or displays relative restraint (at least to discerning eyes), has been positively tedious. If Pypngyang could forgive greatcharlie’s frankness, wittingly or unwittingly, the North Koreans have been portraying themselves, by all reasonable and accepted international diplomatic standards, as lower tier, Mickey Mouse players. Without knowing for certain, it would be wrongful to ascribe what is at the professional core of the North Korean negotiators and their managers in Pyongyang that might be the cause for what they have been doing in the diplomatic process. Parsing out their words and deeds, greatcharlie has been able to draw inferences as to why they have been acting in eccentric ways. (Perhaps policymakers in North Korea would be better labelled policy transmitters for Kim is the only policymaker in North Korea.)

Dissimilar to their US counterparts, who may likely be morally centered by a particular religion, Pyongyang’s policymakers and diplomats are centered by the official ideology of North Korea, that in a way mimics theology, known as juche. Translated from Korean, juche means “independent status of a subject” or simply “independence.” The concept was founded in the 1950s by Chairman Kim Il-sung, Kim’s grandfather, on the idea that Korea suffered for hundreds of years under foreign, specifically Chinese control, and it is determine forever into the future remain independent. To that extent, it will remain independent, North Korea, in nuanced ways has sought to distance itself from the influence of big Socialist powers, at one time, the Soviet Union and China still. Among the nuanced aspects of juche was the promotion of the cult of personality of the “quasi-divine” ruling Kim dynasty ensuring a monolithic leadership. That was officially adopted as the leader doctrine in 1980. Indeed, starting in their early years, North Koreans have been taught  to fanatically cling to the party line of Workers’ Party of Korea and place their faith in the party chairman, the Supreme leader, above all things. Ethnonationalism is also an aspect of juche. There is an emphasis maintaining and celebrating the purity and superiority of North Koreans. There are several other aspects, some equally disconcerting. While so much has been done to distinguish juche from Communists and Socialism, the underpinnings of those political ideologies in its system is clear. Despite any displeasure this comment might cause in Pyongyang, it could be said juche is essentially an avant-garde or disjointed simulacrum of a Communist or Socialist system as intended under the ideas of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. (To the disapproval and exasperation of many Northeast Asia regional experts and Korea scholars, in previous commentaries on North Korea, greatcharlie has simply labelled the country as being Communist. To clarify, the purpose for doing that was to provide an immediate point of reference to our readers to allow them to better understand how its bureaucracy operates. Further, leaving everything stated here about juche aside, the country that would develop from Kim Il-sung’s movement, North Korea, was originally girded by the sweat, blood, wherewithal, and guidance of Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao Tse-tung’s People’s Republic of China. To that extent, far more similarities to both of those Communists countries still exist than differences. The intent of stating any of this is neither to extenuate greatcharlie’s choice, nor  offer a mea culpa.)

All members of the society are true believers in juche, and every move they make is colored by the precepts of juche. That certainly holds true for North Korean policymakers and diplomats working on the denuclearization diplomacy. For them, participating in the negotiations has been more than a job. It has been a grand opportunity to faithfully serve Kim and the Workers’ Party of Korea and vehemently support and defend North Korean political ideals. Making certain that their performances in the negotiations immaculately adhered to national ideals has very likely been a measure of success for North Korean diplomats. That being the case, likely ever present among them is the stress of potentially making an error politically. Avoiding that means always making certain there is no possibility for the misinterpretation of their actions. Looking toward the North Korean policymakers and diplomats to introduce an ingenious idea to propel the diplomatic process forward would be misguided. What one might expect from the North Korean policymakers and diplomats at best would be a spirited reflex defense of party ideals and expressions of a decades old hostile national bias against the US. As fate would have it, this is essentially what has been observed. Stirred in has been a heavy portion of negative sentiment and caprice toward the US in the public statements of the North Koreans. As much as part of a larger negotiation stratagem, periods of indignant silence from the North Koreans also appears to be a manifestation of the daily travail of officials not to say or do anything that might remotely skirt the party line of the Workers’ Party of Korea. When confronted with either behavior, their US counterparts, as expected, have exhibited classic diplomatic sangfroid and patience. Audi vide, tace, si vis vivere in pace. (Use your ears and eyes, but hold your tongue, if you would live in peace.)

There are issues of competence at play in the North Korean’s actions, too! They lack experience in authentically working with other diplomats or simply conversing with a diverse group of interlocutors Indeed, their limited range of diplomatic skill reflects the fact that they come out of a society alienated from the rest of the world, the so-called hermit kingdom. Diplomats of its UN Mission in New York might have opportunities to interact with their counterparts of other UN member states’ missions in committees. Diplomats in North Korea’s 25 embassies situated in as many countries have opportunities to interact with the outside world. However, they may seldom have the opportunity to authentically practice core skills such as confidence building and give and take in negotiations. Even their contacts with diplomats of a handful of friendly countries, while congenial and business-like, would expectedly be superficial as all important decisions have been normally been made directly between the capitals of those countries and Pyongyang. That being the case, having the experience of interacting with US diplomats has undoubtedly been a learning experience for the North Korean negotiating team whether they admit it or not.

Mindful that all authority to make foreign policy decisions resides in Kim, the North Korean negotiation team likely has no leeway to negotiate anything innovative at the table with the US. As that very likely is the case, the performance of North Korean officials and diplomats becomes kind of akin to cabaret. Feeling duty bound to do something even with imposed limitations, a certain amount of pretense might expectedly be reflected in their moves. (Hopefully, that pretense does not belie any artificial intentions of Pyongyang in the diplomacy on denuclearization in general.) In an odd way, that bit of pretense could be what in a way liberates them to act uncoventionally. It is not easy to know what is genuine with the North Koreans. It never has been. A pitfall of being frivolous, though, could be that their inexperience may not allow them to judge just how far off from what is decent they can go. There is a thin line between chaos and order. Potentially, the North Korean negotiators could spoil the entire diplomatic process, albeit unintentionally. Instances in which they seemed to have moved a bit far off the mark might be those occasions when North Korean negotiators have reportedly made platitudinous objections to US proposals. There have also been occasions when doses of pronounced immaturity, crudeness, and impertinence were included in official statements from the North Korean Foreign Ministry.

In North Korea, the government insists upon keeping a watchful eye over threats to its system and society. It is understood that the reactionary, the counterrevolutionary, most often “hiding in the shadows,” posed the greatest threat and was viewed as anathema. Given human nature there was always the threat that could arise from the unsuccessful education of citizens. The security services use techniques to create fear that rival those of the Erinyes in the poems of Aeschylus and are forever hunting for those who may fall short of what is expected or may be “foreign spies.” Citizens live as if plugged into an electric outlet, terrified of crossing the line. To that extent, North Korean policy approaches have been forged by analysts in an environment of fear, and implemented by terror stricken diplomats who in addition to adhering to the precepts of juche, are simply trying to stay around. Although well aware of the danger posed by their own government’s security services, it causes one to wonder why false promises from North Korean diplomats have been commonplace during their past 25 plus years of negotiations with the US. Perhaps it was the human element. Their egos got the best of them and they wandered off toward a bridge too far in the heat of the negotiations. There has not been any of that in the current process. One can be certain  that if something is stated at the negotiation table that billows up the slightest ire in Pyongyang, it will be walked back immediately. Quam multa injusta ac prava fiunt moribus! (How many unjust and improper things are authorized by custom!)

Under ordinary circumstances, one thinking in ordinary ways might expect that North Korean policy makers and diplomats would eventually recognize that there is a need for them to become climatized to a true international environment. The clear choice would be to try to tidy things up and to transition to a new line of not political, but professional thinking. However, expecting the North Koreans to catch the Holy Ghost and see the error in their ways would be out of court. Except for Kim, North Koreans, at least officially, do not engage introspection. The government believes it has provided them with a clear path to follow.

Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong (center), stands with the North Korean foreign policy officials at Panmunjom in June 2019. Mindful that all authority to make foreign policy decisions resides in Kim, the North Korean negotiations team likely has no leeway to negotiate anything innovative at the negotiating table with the US. As that very likely is the case, the performance of North Korean officials and diplomats becomes a bit akin to a cabaret. Feeling duty bound to do something even with imposed limitations, a certain amount of pretense might expectedly be reflected in their moves. Indeed, that bit of pretense could be what liberates them to act uncoventionally.

How North Korean Attitudes and Behavior Are Perceived

Surely interpretations of the antics displayed by the North Koreans have shaped perceptions of US officials on the denuclearization diplomacy. To some in the West, Pyongyang approaches have resembled some huge masquerade, performed as a way to avoid engaging in the authentic diplomacy of give and take. The North Korean’s aspiration appears instead to be wearing the Trump administration down and compel its acquiescence to a default agreement under which all key North Korean goals would be attained. Those goals would include retaining their nuclear weapons and delivery systems at level of their choosing and ending the economically devastating sanctions imposed by the US. There are likely others in the Washington who believe Pyongyang’s attitudes and behaviors have been quite predictable. To them, the same show that had been running for so many decades after the Korean War continues its run in the background in Pyongyang. Thoughts and deeds emanating from Pyongyang appear at best to be tinged by an anti-US bigotry and at worse scorched by it. (Those feelings seem well evinced by the hostile countenance of North Korean negotiators’ faces in the few publicly available photos of them. As opposed to concealing any gesture of internal thought, their faces betray an almost immeasurable anger that can barely be contained. One might also be led to believe that the North Korean negotiation team’s sullen and stoic faces might be the result of having had the Hell posted out of them at some point.)

Presumably, North Korean policy makers and diplomats could not care less about what their US counterparts think of their style. That is not exactly a perspective conducive to building confidence and forging a fruitful working relationship. If the North Koreans were to give it a moment’s thought, they would likely discover that far from being beguiled by their behavior, US negotiators on the other side of the table find coping with the whole cabaret they have been putting on during diplomatic process very unsatisfying to say the least. One might go as far as state that US negotiators may personally feel the process may no longer be worth the candle. Yet, being well-trained, imbued with true diplomatic acumen, exceptionally experienced, and just plain professional, they will remain figuratively strapped in place. They certainly will not walk away from the drawn out process that has featured dismal interactions with the North Koreans.

Pyongyang apparently never read, and accordingly never had the chance to heed, greatcharlie’s advisement not become distracted by the rants and ramblings on Trump’s foreign and national security policy in the US news media. It appears that this us precisely what they have done. From the North Korean’s repertoire verbal attacks against the US, one can discern similarities with US news media’s favorite criticisms of Trump administration. A top US news media criticism of the Trump administration’s effort at denuclearization diplomacy is that a well-thought out, reasonable negotiating strategy is absent. A parallel to that would be the statement of North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Myong Gil that whether Pyongyang breaks its self-imposed moratorium on nuclear and missile testing “entirely depends on the stance of the United States.” Perhaps a misplace patrician aesthetic has founded that absolutely absurd idea, endlessly presented by the US news media, is that in diplomatic settings, Trump is unaware of etiquette and unable to properly present himself as President of the US. Moreover, it is also frequently posited that Trump has displayed an alleged barbaric, “gangster mentality”, that has tainted his personal interactions and diplomatic efforts with European allies at G7, G20, and NATO summits. Echoing these preposterous sentiments, have been official statements emanating from the North Korean Foreign Ministry referring to the denuclearization diplomacy as the “sickening negotiations” and threats that talks will not be resumed unless Washington takes measures to ensure a “complete and irreversible withdrawal of the hostile policy toward the DPRK.” Additionally, what has become rather kitsch reaction is the US news media insistence upon declaring anything Trump is doing as being solely directed at supporting his reelection or personal gain. Not thinking, but simply mimicking that ludicrous idea, the North Korean Foreign Ministry accused Washington of “abusing the DPRK-U.S. dialogue for its domestic political events.” Quis nescit primam esse historic legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat?; deinde ne quid veri non audeat? (Who does not know that it is the first law of history not to dare to say anything that is false?; and, the second not to dare say anything that is not true?)

Group photo of Kim (center) and his leadership team in Pyongyang. Surely interpretations of the antics displayed by the North Koreans have shaped perceptions of US officials on the denuclearization diplomacy. To some in Washington, Pyongyang’s attitudes and behaviors have been quite predictable. To them, the same show that had been running for so many decades after the Korean War continues its run in the background in Pyongyang. Thoughts and deeds emanating from Pyongyang appear at best to be tinged by an anti-US bigotry and at worse scorched by it.

Pyongyang’s Perceptions of Where Washington Is Headed

In news US media outlets today, bits of news about the efforts of an administration in office is highlighted or hidden by reporters depending upon whether they fit the narrative, positive or negative, that the outlet holds of that administration. To that extent, the news, as opposed to being reported in a fair and balanced way, is decidedly curated. As a staunch proponent of the right of freedom of speech as entitled under the First Amendment of the US Constitution, greatcharlie certainly believes critics of US government activities, particularly the press, the Fourth Estate, should have free hand to express themselves.  However, along with that right of free express comes a reasonable expectation that news media outlets, particularly in the arena of international affairs, will act prudently in presenting information. Professional ethics alone should guide behavior in news media outlets with regard to presenting information that is known to be false or cannot be substantiated. Even more, presenting questionable information that may have an undesirable, deleterious, and even destructive impact on their own country’s success must be avoided. Critics of Trump in the US news media, who, to be more forthright, are actually his adversaries, never fail to curate information that they make available to the public to fit their negative narrative on Trump. They also never fail to propagate commentary about him that may be based on conjecture at best or presumption at worse. Assuredly it has been done with a goal to bully and cause harm. It has been a problem from the first year minus one of his presidency.

Ex falsis, ut ab ipsis didicimus, verum effici non protest. (From the false, as they have themselves taught us, we can obtain nothing true.) Trump’s adversaries seem to feel a compulsive need to express from a soapbox overly simplistic views about him and his administration’s efforts to the point of extravagance. What was one of the worst direct allegations made by his adversaries in the news media was the shameful declaration that “Trump is a Russian spy.” For those willing to submit to reality, the final report of the Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, Robert Mueller, known as the the Mueller Report, should have knocked down any concerns the fantastic allegation might be true. Anyone who understood what that falsehood would have entailed to be true would hardly have uttered such complete nonsense without feeling foolish or guilty. At the same time, many at very high levels inside and outside of government, most of whom had albeit possessed an untutored expertise in the subject matter, clearly believed it all. Strangely, it appears that vacuous pronouncements about “Trump’s espionage” were rooted in “facts” on how the “spy world” works from productions of the entertainment industry. Trying to make any sense of it, one might believe that instead of being concerned with foreign and national security policy, his adversaries were writing spy novels or novels of political intrigue. (Perhaps the intent among some of them is to publish a roman à clef on this period at some point down the line.)

Vigorous as ever are the endless exertions that Trump has done this or that lurid or generally inappropriate thing. Those pundits with the gumption to state such things publicly seem to have been provided an open invitation to flood broadcast, print, and online news media with their breathtaking, multi-layered rumors, cluttered with ambiguities and contradictions. To be blunt, one should always suspect that the stories they hear in the US news media are lies. Perchance, such views expressed on Trump reveal the limits of their intellectual power, and more sadly, the sensibilities of the times, banal and tasteless. Added to all of that, Trump clearly makes a satisfying target for the misguided passion of reporters and pundits. For those who can recall the degree of professionalism and intellectual acuity that journalists of those same news media outlets once displayed in an era not so long ago, it all becomes too heartbreaking to watch. Current journalists from those outlets now seem so completely estranged from that high-level of performance.

Trump’s adversaries have yet to learn the lesson that is dangerous to throw ugly rhetoric around. An international audience devours such information and has a penchant for reaching endless incorrect conclusions from the tiniest morsel. Some countries based their policy decisions on the many absurdities about Trump found in the US news media enough so that they brought their relations with the US perilously close to ruin. As aforementioned, questionable information from the news media has surely provided the push from behind to both flawed and completely incorrect inferences and judgments made in Pyongyang. To that extent, the US news media  has undoubtedly played a role in making efforts of the US negotiation team to establish an intimate relationship with the North Koreans more difficult.

Trump at his inauguration on January 20, 2017. Critics of Trump in the US news media, who are actually his adversaries, never fail to curate information that they make available to the public to fit their negative narrative on Trump. They also never fail to propagate commentary about him based on conjecture at best or presumption at worse. Assuredly it has been done with a goal to bully and cause harm. It has been a problem from the first year minus one of his presidency. Trump’s adversaries have yet to learn how dangerous it is to throw ugly rhetoric around. An international audience devours such information and has a penchant for reaching incorrect conclusions from the tiniest morsel.

Nodum in scirpo quærere. (To look for a knot in the rushes (I.e., to look for difficulty where none exists.) Trump’s political adversaries, Members of the Democratic Party who hold the majority in the US House of Representatives, aggressively lashed out against him, conducting a truncated process of investigation and hastily approving two malicious articles of impeachment against him. Their premise was that during a phone call that Trump had on July 5, 2019 with the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Trump sought to coerce him to initiate an investigation of an election opponent in return for the release of military aid he was withholding. It was very unusual interpretation of the phone call given the official transcript of the call released by Trump indicated nothing of the sort. It was all initiated by claims of an alleged whistle blower who never heard the phone conversation. Supposed fact-finding hearings insisted upon by House Democrats lifted the veil on nothing but hearsay and alarmist presumptions. (Res ipsa loquitor! If they truly do not understand that the world does not work in that way, how apparent it becomes that some officials from the US intelligence services, through their briefings, have failed to provide Members of Congress with a thorough understanding of intelligence work, particularly tradecraft.) Observing events, greatcharlie admittedly hoped that the smallest spark of decency would have caused House Democrats to find some way to stop moving down their destructive path. Instead, they pushed through the two articles, accusing him of betraying the country for his own political benefit and obstructing a Congressional investigation into his actions. That drastic step taken was more about House Democrats feelings about Trump than about his actual actions. Democrats in Congress, through their legislative action, have memorialized the schism between themselves and Trump.

To the extent that the behavior of House Democrats relates to the denuclearization diplomacy, it may indicate to observers in foreign capitals that Trump does not have Congressional support for his foreign policy initiatives. It may have already led some foreign capitals to consider whether it would be worth the candle to work with Trump on anything big. However, what observers in foreign capitals should actually note is that there are two chambers of Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate. The US Senate, which also has a say in how US foreign policy is conducted, is controlled by Trump’s Republican Party which has fully supported his efforts and can continue to achieve much to support the US President without their Democrat counterparts in House. Those observers in foreign capitals should further note that Trump has actually acquired a remarkable record of success on a plethora of foreign policy issues. Still, most importantly, observers in foreign capitals should note that House Democrats, have not as yet recognized or acquiesced to the truth that they may have all been useful idiots in a larger, darker plan of dishonorable individuals within the government, and some outside, to force Trump from office. The true nature of the very apparent criminal conspiracy is currently under investigation by the highest ranking law enforcement officials in the US. They will twinkle out the conspirators of this abominable enterprise–hidden most likely within the intelligence services–and reveal the full nature of their heinous plans. More than just tge House Democrats, the news will undoubtedly perplex and unravel all those individuals who have been so certain of Trump’s guilt in all of the nonsense propagated. (There will most likely be a tidal wave excessive emotional outbursts, likely be akin to those unsightly ones seen in the camp of Hilary Clinton when was announced that she had lost the 2016 US Presidential Election.)

Trump’s political adversaries, Members of the Democratic Party, who currently hold the majority in the US House of Representatives, aggressively lashed out against him, conducting a truncated process of investigation and hastily approving two malicious articles of impeachment against him. To the extent that the behavior of House Democrats relates to the denuclearization diplomacy, it may indicate to observers in foreign capitals that Trump does not have Congressional support for his foreign policy initiatives. It may have already led some foreign capitals to consider whether it would be worth the candle to work with Trump on anything big.

Getting an Improved Grip on the Situation

Unlike a mystery, all challenges, much as puzzles, have solutions. They simply need to be found. As outlined earlier here, there are political, professional, and personal issues that doubtlessly preoccupy the North Koreans and stand as obstacles to constructive negotiations. However, there may indeed be a way make interactions between negotiating teams rewarding and thereby potentially useful to Kim in moving the diplomatic process on denuclearization forward. Right now the negotiations, ironically, have been a tool that has allowed Pyongyang to stall it, intentionally or unintentionally. If an issue takes one into deep waters, one must often dive deeper into it in order to develop a sound theory, to find solutions. Sometimes that can be done by making connections between a matter at hand with similar yet remote issues that already have answers. If Pyongyang can again forgive greatcharlie’s honesty, it must be stated that dealing with its foreign policy apparatus, and particularly its Foreign Ministry, seems akin to trying to interact with a young adult, just beginning to understand his or her place in the world.

The young adult, teenager to be more precise, may typically spend time and exert energy strongly protesting vehemently complaining, and tearfully fretting and frowning about one thing or another. However, whatever may actually be at the root of what irritating or pressuring them more often will not be articulated. The teenager will expect a responsible adult, to whom they may choose to express their feelings, to supernaturally possess some understanding of not only what is disturbing them, but it’s cause. Failure to do so will elicit the words that nearly every teenager may have stated or thought at some point, “You don’t get me!”

In order to get to the root of the problem means creating conversation, talking it out. That will usually responsible adult to try to hear them out while ignoring criticism and accusations mostly without merit. It would not be the proper time for ordinary repartee. When opportunities arise to get a word in edgewise, the adult can discuss similar situations from experience, and say things that will draw questions from the teenager. Discussing situations from which commonalities of  experiences can be recognized will also support communication. A conscious effort should be made by the adult to supply a vocabulary that the teenagers can incorporate to express their experiences thus supporting a more productive exchange. Further, by taking these steps, a figurative bridge might be constructed which may support other fruitful exchanges with the teenager in the future. Notably, if teenagers are not correctly mentored in a way that is right and proper by caring adults, they can very well fall prey to their contemporaries and other adult who will not have their best interests at heart. In a similar way, North Korea could fall prey to its northern neighbors, the Russian Federation and China, which only seek to promote their respective interests.

Conceptualizing along such lines, an approach might be developed that might potentially provide US negotiators with a way to work more effectively with the North Koreans. Of course, the North Koreans, themselves, must be open to any approach in the end. However, if US negotiators could convince them to share, without pretension, their bedrock concerns, things could really get started. Certainly, the North Koreans’ laser focus during negotiations will remain pursuing specific goals as instructed by Pyongyang. However, other than an all or nothing frontal assault, they may not have considered better ways to pursue those goals via talks. Demonstrating to the North Koreans at the negotiation table that there are alternative ways to mutually satisfy the aims of both countries may resonate with them. It could very well provide them with work product that they might be pleased to report back home. Virtus est vitium fugere, et sapienta prima stultitia caruisse. (To flee vice is the beginning of virtue, and the beginning of wisdom is to have gotten rid of folly.)

It is important to note that what is presented here does not infantilize the North Korean policymakers and diplomats. That is far from its intent. What is presented here acknowledges a pattern of behavior, identifies an instance of similar behavior unrelated to foreign policy from which an understanding of it can be furthered, and provides a starting point from which strategy for working constructively under such conditions might be more easily conceptualized. (One might muse lightheartedly on how much easier it would be for Washington to interact with Pyongyang, if US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo could staff the US negotiation team with clairvoyants and precognitive empaths!)

Some critics will likely interpret what is presented here as further evidence that it is the “vocation” of greatcharlie to evangelize for the Trump administration. True, greatcharlie supports the foreign policy efforts of the US President and wishes him well. However, greatcharlie does not subscribe to the view that expressing goodwill, siding with truth, and choosing what is universally right over wrong can be judged as a partisan political exercise. The purpose of greatcharlie’s efforts on the denuclearization diplomacy has been to bring the truth to the public by providing an accurate rendering of what is happening. Without affectation, greatcharlie believes it has been doing that job right.

The Way Forward

Confessedly, greatcharlie feels a certain piquancy about receiving comments for they serve as proof positive that readers take a real interest in what is posted on the blog. Equally pleasing is the thought that prior posts have stirred debate on the issue of diplomacy on denuclearization to some degree. Still, it remains a tad troubling to know that some critics will likely interpret what is presented here as further evidence that it is the “vocation” of greatcharlie to evangelize for the Trump administration. True, greatcharlie supports the foreign policy efforts of the US President and wishes him well. However, greatcharlie will never subscribe to the view that expressing goodwill, siding with truth, and choosing what is universally right over wrong can be judged as a partisan political exercise. The purpose of greatcharlie’s efforts on the denuclearization diplomacy has been to bring the truth to the public by providing an accurate rendering of what is happening with regard to the diplomacy of denuclearization. Without affectation, greatcharlie believes it has been doing that job right. Our intent is to keep gnawing at the subject of diplomacy on denuclearization. The hope is that our readers will continue to give our posts the concentration that is sought from them.

In composing this precis of greatcharlie’s thinking on the diplomatic process on denuclearization in response to readers’ comments, it became very clear that our readers have a fairly sophisticated understanding of the issue. Interestingly though, us-them arguments and hints of the rhetoric of good versus evil were common features of their responses. Questions were also frequently raised as to why the US would even want to negotiate with Pyongyang given its disobliging stance. Perhaps the best response to all of that would be that Trump did not stumble into the diplomatic process on denuclearization. He knew the history of US-North Korea relations and jumped in knowing that there would be a lot of hard work entailed without an immediate solution. The work may be challenging, but the prize of success is greater peace and security in Northeast Asia, and greater degree of peace and security in the world. That is certainly worth pursuing. Prudens futuri temporis exitum caliginosa nocte premit Deus; ridetque, si mortalis ultra fas trepidat. (God in His wisdom veils in darkness of night the events of the future; and smiles if a mortal is unduly solicitous about what he is not permitted to know.)

To Foster Forward Movement on Denuclearization by Kim, Trump Says there Is No Rush, But His Patience Has Limits

The Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Kim Jong-un (above). The administration of US President Donald Trump hopes that Kim Jong-un sincerely desires peace and are genuinely committed to diplomatic process on denuclearization. To nudge thinking in the right direction, efforts have been made to incentivize North Korea to change its economy to benefit the entire country and not just the elites. Reaching a decision on whether to stay on this new path with the US weighs very heavily upon Kim, now ensconced in Pyongyang.

Military analysts have estimated in recent years that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) possessed an arsenal of 30-60 nuclear weapons. In Washington, great concern had been particularly expressed over the possibility that North Korea would soon construct thermonuclear warhead tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Having successfully tested several ICBMs In 2017, North Korea posed a security threat not only to US allies, such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the Continental US. The Trump administration has absolutely no intention of allowing North Korea retain such an arsenal, and moreover, add to it. In 2017, the administration initiated a “maximum pressure” campaign on Kim’s regime and its supporters, increasing military exercises in coordination with South Korea and Japan, deploying missile defense systems in South Korea with urgency, sending more firepower there, and encouraging the US Congress to enact the strongest sanctions possible against North Korea and its enablers. Eventually, in February 2018, the US imposed a raft of sanctions in an effort to target entities linked to North Korea’s shipping and trade sectors. Trump had also urged China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to assist in reducing tensions by talking frankly with Pyongyang. Yet, to the surprise of all, talks were successfully arranged between US President Donald Trump and the Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un. The decision was precipitated by efforts of the government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in to end rather bellicose verbiage and repeated muscle flexing by the US, Japan and his own country, and weapons testing by North Korea. Following their summit in Singapore on June 12, 2018, Kim Jong-un publicly committed North Korea “to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in the broad joint statement issued at the summit. Trump was so confident that North Korea would begin “total denuclearization” right away that he immediately offered to halt the joint military exercises with South Korea, without Kim agreeing to any specific steps and timeline towards the denuclearization. The day after the summit, Trump tweeted, “There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea.” Even more, on July 18, 2018, Trump said that there was “no rush” in its negotiations with North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo fully concurred with that position earlier this month. He said negotiations with North Korea are a “decades-long challenge” that involves North Korea making a fundamental shift in its strategic decision making. Pompeo further explained “(North Korea) for decades told their own people that without nuclear weapons their country was at risk of being attacked by the West, by America, by some other country,” Pompeo explained. The job for the US now, he also said, is “to get the entire country to understand that they have that strategically wrong. Chairman Kim told President Trump he understood that. I was there. I saw it.”

Trump appears to reasonably quantify continued progress by the fact that there have not been any North Korean missile or nuclear tests in recent months. Still, although the halt to these tests is a welcome sign, North Korea has made little progress toward “total denuclearization.” Critics as well as some very capable military and foreign policy analysts posit that Kim had no intention of keeping his promise on denuclearization, and has set out to deceive the Trump administration and the rest of world, much as his father and grandfather misled previous US administrations. One cannot be certain that Kim will stay the course and effectuate denuclearization. Using logic and reason, one cannot not know what exactly is on Kim’s mind, know what lies within his heart. What might be inferred from all that is known about Kim is that one would make a huge mistake in placing complete faith in him. While an opportunity has been presented to Kim, he may become froward and revert to old ways or simply retract having been confronted with prospect of such great change. Concerning the former, certainly, the US must not underestimate Kim’s maliciousness and subterfuge. He is following the same strategy deployed by his father and grandfather but with a bigger ambition. Unlike his father and grandfather, Kim will not be satisfied with temporary economic relief through negotiations. He has visited China three times so far this year. Regarding the latter, a retrenchment or retreat by Kim might not be impelled by aggressive thinking or some recurvation programmed into the plan for engagement with US on denuclearization. As important to the process of achieving denuclearization are the personal concerns and feelings about the change. If Kim is not psychologically ready to move forward, the process may breakdown. Protecting his own sense of being, self-image, self-worth, Kim may reject all that is before him. That would consequently cause great pain and harm for himself and the North Korean people.

The diplomatic process between the US and North Korea is still relatively nascent at this stage. Efforts must be made to detect any incongruences in Kim’s actions as they relate to denuclearization and extrapolate and infer from his words what he may be thinking. Doing so will allow the US make needed adjustments in its diplomatic approach. If it appears North Korea might jump to a negative path regarding denuclearization, it would best if the US had already stolen a march or two ahead of him and prepared itself to act. Examined here, from outside the box, are possible intangible motivations that might be a potential causality, among others, for Kim to back away from denuclearization. It takes a brief look a what Kim might be asking himself. Τίς εἶναι θέλεις, σαυτῷ πρῶτον εἰπέ: εἶθ’ οὕτως ποίει ἃ ποιεῖς. (First say to yourself what you would be; and then do what you have to do.)

A North Korean Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (above). Military analysts estimate that North Korea possesses an arsenal of 30-60 nuclear weapons. Having successfully tested several intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in 2017, North Korea poses a security threat not only to US allies, such as South Korea and Japan, but also to the Continental US. More so, there is concern in the US that North Korea’s may soon construct thermonuclear warhead tipped ICBMs. The Trump administration has absolutely no intention of allowing North Korea retain such an arsenal or add to it.

Trying to Keep Things Right with the Diplomatic Process

Trump administration diplomatic efforts on North Korean denuclearization have been smart, methodical, and well-managed. The purpose of the talks is to find points at which Washington’s thinking touches with that of Pyongyang, and develop mutually satisfying, attainable and sustainable ends. The US must be cautious. Still, the purpose of the talks is not to find fault in the expressions and gestures of the other party, allow suspicions to color thinking, and make the whole process a fruitless, unconstructive exercise. The worst actions and impressions Pyongyang has made in Washington over the years should not be forgotten. However, as there is presently no urgency, no immediate danger of conflict between the parties, every effort should be made to display sangfroid and temperance, temporarily suppressing strong feelings over what has happened in the past. Over time, the intentions of North Korea will be revealed as good or bad. Indeed, one must employ forward thinking of positive progress in resolving matter or improving relations is to be achieved. In meetings with their North Korean counterparts, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and other senior officials have done his best to explain and secure US interests, channeling Trump’s thinking. The essence of that thinking is to stop Kim from chasing his destructive dream of developing a large nuclear arsenal capable of striking the US. Tu me’ inquis ‘mones? iam enim te ipse monuisti, iam correxisti? ideo aliorum emendationi vacas?’ Non sum tam improbus ut curationes aeger obeam, sed, tamquam in eodem valetudinario iaceam, de communi tecum malo colloquor et remedia communico. (“What,” say you, “are you giving me advice? Indeed, have you already advised yourself, already corrected your own faults? Is this the reason why you have leisure to reform other men?” No, I am not so shameless as to undertake to cure my fellow-men when I am ill myself. I am, however, discussing with you troubles which concern us both, and sharing the remedy with you, just as if we were lying ill in the same hospital.)

Now away from the grandeur, the luster, the celebrity, and the energy of the Singapore Summit, and the persuasive Trump, Kim seems to be leaning into his own thinking, He may not have a sense that he must even be honor bound by culture to remain obedient to the terms of the agreement with Trump and act consistently in line with them. Kim may no longer have the same sense of trust in Trump. After taking one step away from the intent of the agreement in Singapore, each step becomes easier. One can also usually find ample reasons to do the wrong thing. Kim would be comfortable in the end for the reason it was standard behavior of North Korea. A challenge for the Trump administration from the start has been to satisfactorily reconcile the diplomatic Kim, the open-minded Kim, with concomitant enormities of his authoritarian reign of North Korea. Washington must keep in mind that Kim is a tyrant, ruling with an iron fist. That observation is not outdated. Recent actions concerning the nuclear program or expressions that disparage the US and US officials, have certainly raised greater concern over Kim’s intentions. Goading the US, snuffing out the positive spirit that remains from Singapore might be an awkward exit strategy from the denuclearization matter. However, Washington has not shown any interest in exchanging insults with Pyongyang. The focus of both parties must be diplomacy.There is no desire by the Trump administration to demonstrate superiority over countries by moving forward consistently along a narrow path of attitude and behavior. Washington will not lower itself to the long-practiced tactics of diversion of Pyongyang. Pyongyang will need to rise to the occasion.

Beyond verbiage, there have also been disappointments stemming from actions and inaction by Pyongyang. Imagery analysis of satellite photos indicate Pyongyang has rushed to make improvements to the infrastructure of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, and enriched uranium production for nuclear weapons has increased. The South Korea’s military has collected information indicating that Pyongyang may be developing a new submarine capable of launching nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. North Korea indicated that it would conduct its annual summer military exercise without regard for Trump’s gesture of goodwill in halting a planned joint US and South Korean military exercise. Further, Kim promised the immediate repatriation of identified remains of US POWs in Singapore, but without explanation, Pyongyang has been slow to act. The Defense Department, however, has had to display great patience in the face of the inexplicable deliberate pace taken by Pyongyang on the return of remains. Additionally, North Korea’s handling of Pompeo’s July 6, 2018 visit to Pyongyang was graceless and inelegant. Critics took it as another troubling sign. Pompeo and his team were not provided a schedule of meetings. They were not told in which hotel they would stay. They were never provided a definitive answer on whether they would meet Kim, and in the end, they did not. Pompeo pressed his North Korea counterpart Kim Yong-chol on concrete steps toward denuclearization, but it is unclear whether any were provided. After the visit, Pyongyang played the role of a fretful and peevish innocent party emotionally injured by the stern Pompeo and publicly attacked the US for making “gangster like” demands.

Critics say Pyongyang has displayed this pattern of obfuscation too many times in the last three decades. It has been sardonically called “business as usual” with Pyongyang. Every administration since that of US President Bill Clinton has publicly expressed the belief that it could better handle North Korea than the previous one, and some special deal could be reached to curb or bring down its nuclear program. Yet, they all ended up formulating and implementing unsatisfactory approaches the results of which were being misled the regime. To an extent, Pyongyang developed a record of success in dealing with the US, while the US would walk away with only frustration. Even now, North Korea continues its steadfast march toward becoming an undeniable nuclear power. However, the administration will not moan over the past and recent maladroit and tactless actions.

 

There is the possibility that Kim agreed to talk to Trump as part of nefarious plan to convince the Seoul that his country’s purpose is peaceful. Success for Kim with such a deceitful purpose would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-led military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with an agreement to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs.

If Kim Had a Nefarious Plan for Singapore, It May Have Been Trumped by Trump!

From what was seen from Kim in the earliest stages of the meeting with Trump, he appeared amiable, yet at the same time self-contained and somewhat obscure as the talks began. An occasional smile could not cloak the fact that his face was hardened, An attendant aspect of his likely effort to conceal himself. He remained silent. He would nod his head. One might theorize that Kim did not want to make it easy for Trump to read him. Kim was likely trained in those mannerism years ago. They may have been designed to create the trompe l’oeil of receptiveness. Yet, if such a thought was guiding Kim’s behavior, it was likely soon commingled with a sense of being overwhelmed by the news media attention, the public adulation outside his hotel, and the gravity of the talks in which he was engaging

The renowned ancient Greek philosopher and scientist, Aristotle, is quoted as saying: “It is the mark of an educated man to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.” It is possible that self-conceit closed Kim’s mind to whatever was said. In believing that he already knew what Trump would say would have served as an effective buffer to Trump’s comments and explanations. Indeed, Kim may have arrived in Singapore as a man on a mission, believing that he could shape events on the Korean Peninsula in his way. Before the talks began, Kim took affirmative steps in support of engagement with the US to include a superficial charm offensive in which he was presented as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. He sought to prove that he no longer the source of dread and terror in Northeast Asia, the Continental US, and everything in between. However, he had already shown enough of his hand to sufficiently convince Trump that his intentions were potentially nefarious. Yet, Trump also likely saw that Kim was facing a dire situation, and wanted to allow him some room to gravitate toward a new tact more satisfying for the US. If everything goes Trump’s way, North Korea will scrap its nuclear weapons and missile programs in a timely manner.

In a previous post, greatcharlie, hinting at its suspicions about Kim, hypothesized that there was the possibility that Kim was directing a duplicitous efforts at Trump but at South Korea. (That possibility was also likely among the “what ifs” considered by the Trump administration before the meeting.) For example, Kim might have sought to talk to Trump in order to better convince the Seoul that his country’s purpose is peaceful. A signal of success with such a deceitful purpose would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-led military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with an agreement to dismantle his country’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. Hopefully, Pyongyang is not engaged in an active strategy to gain control of the Korean Peninsula by convincing South Korea to buy into the fantasy that it too wants to create conditions for peaceful relations. If it does, things certainly have not been moving in favor of it. Mens impudicam facere, non casus, solet. (Impurity is caused by attitude, not events.)

Believing that he could shape events on the Korean Peninsula in his way, Kim, before the Singapore talks began, took affirmative steps in support of engagement with the US to include a superficial charm offensive in which he was presented as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. He sought to prove that he no longer the source of dread and terror in Northeast Asia, the Continental US, and everything in between. However, he had already shown enough of his hand to sufficiently convince Trump that his intentions were potentially nefarious.

Any Nefarious North Korean Plans to Exploit Singapore Likely Stymied by Culture Shock and the Realism of Trump

Culture shock is the feeling of disorientation experienced by someone when they are suddenly thrust into an unfamiliar culture or way of life. The possibility that Kim may have had a bout with culture shock while moving through Singapore should not be discounted. Certainly Kim is familiar with the world outside of North Korea, reportedly having attended the private English-language International School in Gümligen near Bern, Switzerland from 1993 to 1998. It was also reported that Kim attended the Liebefeld Steinhölzli state school in Köniz near Bern under an assumed name from 1998 until 2000. However, Singapore is not a European country. Singapore is one of the four economic tigers of Asia that have consistently maintained high levels of economic growth since the 1960s. That growth was impelled by exports and rapid industrialization. The other tigers include South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In Singapore, Kim saw what a small Asian country could achieve by successfully marshalled the energies of its people to create was the site. It was his dream for North Korea. He undoubtedly though how much he wanted it and despite keeping his mind on the revolutionary path, wondered whether there might be a real possibility of guiding his country to such economic height by working with the US and international community.

Perhaps while in Singapore, he may have considered putting aside any potential nefarious plans and playing things by ear. Indeed, whatever part of Pyongyang’s effort was superficial had to make way for what was authentic: the promise of a bright future for North Korea. The Singapore talks were marked by the very apparent graciousness and humanism displayed by Trump. Even for the most skeptical, the interaction would have been intoxicating. Trump may be difficult for foreign capitals to discern perhaps because there is also the background noise of critics with their varying levels hostility. Among the many things that dissatify  them about Trump is the fact that his approach to nearly everything is not business as usual: decision making based on political expediency. A heavy dose of realism is typically injected into his exchanges. Whatever follow-on steps that are agreed upon will be concrete. It is very likely that even after Singapore, the event lingered in Kim’s psyche, leaving him a condition different from the time before the summit. His old habits and faculties have likely been effected by the event. It is Kim’s choice to either entertain and perhaps pursue all of the new considerations or shun what transpired, erase all traces of it or setting the matter off to the side while proceeding in his ways. Nevertheless, there was little doubt for Trump, who actually negotiated directly with Kim, that Kim understood his exposition in Singapore.

After having opened the eyes of Kim and officials in Pyongyang to the opportunity put before them, a satisfactory, inviting gateway must be created for them to cross through to a new reality, on both nuclear weapons and their country’s future. Although ongoing sanctions are also an incentive and helped get the diplomatic process started, a far more positive way is needed to push Pyongyang up and out from depths in which it has put itself. Trump has apparently reasoned out what course the process will take. Reportedly, he accepted that he needed to be somewhat patient and act intently, with diligence, which naturally mean taking time to make certain things are correct. Trump has an understanding of human nature, and even sympathy for human frailty. He can project empathy. One of Trump’s greatest strengths is his capacity for listening.  Indeed, Trump, via the summit, successfully interviewed Kim. From what he heard and did not hear in their one-on-one session, Trump feels that he better understands Kim’s thinking and intentions. After committing to being patient, a diligent person expects receive fruit from their efforts. Hasty people may receive something transitory, but likely unsatisfactory for the long term.

The state of North Korea’s economy has been atrocious for some time, but it was made several ticks worst once sanctions killed most of its foreign trade. North Korea’s economy necessarily loomed large in the negotiations. Some consideration had to be given to what would happen after sanctions were removed and the subject of the country’s greatest investment had been scrapped. Benefits that would come Kim’s way once denuclearization was complete.were dangled before him to make taking the path to denuclearization more attractive.

Encouragement in the Form of Economic Assistance

The state of North Korea’s economy has been atrocious for some time, but it was made several ticks on the meter worst once sanctions killed most of its foreign trade. North Korea’s economy necessarily loomed large in the negotiations. Some consideration had to be given to what would happen after sanctions were removed and the subject of the country’s greatest investment had been scrapped. Benefits that would come Kim’s way once denuclearization was complete.were dangled before him to make taking the path to denuclearization more attractive. There was even a short video presentation prepared to support that cause. Trump and administration officials indicated that US companies could come to North Korea en masse if relations between the countries improve. Reportedly, at their first summit on April 27, 2018, the South Korean President gave Kim a USB stick that held plans for robust infrastructure investments and a list of South Korean companies that would like to benefit from a de-escalation of tensions.

As mentioned earlier, Kim reportedly would like to develop North Korea’s economy. He stated in 2012 that the North Korean people should “never have to tighten [their] belts again,” and the following year, he launched the “byungjin strategy” for the parallel development of the national economy and nuclear weapons, with equal importance.  Less publicized in the Western news media than the country’s other aspects, Kim’s tenure has seen North Korea’s semi-private market system grow, further experimentation in agricultural management explored, and state-owned enterprises have been granted unprecedented liberties in production planning. Clearly, Kim Jong-un has invested himself and considerable wherewithal into improving economic conditions. On April 20, 2018, Kim declared that North Korea’s primary emphasis will be on economic development from that point onward as the nuclear deterrent was secure. The Trump administration has not missed the fact that exploiting Kim’s economic ambitions could give the diplomatic process a boost. Offering assistance for economic development and directing such assistance to spur the shift of a country in North Korea’s circumstances toward a more market-based economic system, is a tried and true course for the international community to take.

How Kim Might Proceed

Kim was selected by Kim Jong-il, his father, to be his successor as Supreme Leader of North Korea. The short-list of attributes of a national leader respective to North Korea, beyond loyalty to the Communist Workers’ Party of Korea would likely include: to organize the people under the tenets of Marxist-Leninism; promote the general welfare of the people within parameters set by the Workers’ Party of Korea; provide for the safety and security of the people; defend the country’s sovereign territory; and know the value of an iron fist. To the extent that Kim has even slightly deviated from that course, he has implemented some economic reforms as mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, he has essentially been piloting the country dead ahead on the course Kim Jong-il and Kim Il sung set it on. Kim hit the ground running upon becoming Supreme Leader. Countless North Korea government images showcase Kim performing his duties with what the Renaissance Italian soldier, diplomat, and courtier, Baldassare Castiglione in his 1528 work, Il Cortegiano (The Book of the Courtier), called “sprezzatura”, a certain nonchalance. It is easy to say that Kim is an educated man who should be able to easily see the benefits short and long term for North Korea once denuclearization is complete. However, reason is based on principle, not the prospect of economic development. Kim may indeed see the benefits of moving along the course set by Trump, but he may not have the moral foundation to know that it would be morally right to take that course. In his formative years, Kim also may not have been sufficiently inculcated with any ideas even in the spirit of Marxist-Leninism which would support a decision move off the set path, and boldly set a new course for his country. Even if Kim tried to capitalize on the opportunity to make things better in North Korea, he might be hindered by well-concealed doubts about his own abilities. He may fear falling short. Indeed, for Kim, the difficulty in engaging with the US to create systemic change in the country’s economic system would not be found in the work of implementing change. The difficulty might be wrapping his head around it all and moving forward with confidence. Kim may know better than anyone else that he will not end up being North Korea’s version of Deng Xiaoping.

Kim will not throw caution to the wind. Kim is undoubtedly very aware of what happened in Russia economically with the help of “Western experts” after the fall of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a complete trust in Trump hardly could have sprouted and blossomed exponentially in Kim during the Singapore meeting. Again as mentioned, some time has passed since Singapore and Kim is some distance away from it all. Any initial second-guessing about Trump could have morphed into considerable apprehension over the US president’s motives. Nestled in Pyongyang, even the mere mental process of drawing closer to the world that Trump presented at Singapore has required Kim to tear away from the only world he and his people have known. Just thinking about a transition in ways of doing things that might lead to the economic transformation of North Korea becomes less attractive and more difficult.

Est enim quaedam etiam dolendi voluptas, praesertim si in amici sinu defleas, apud quem lacrimis tuis vel laus sit parata vel venia. (For there is a certain luxury in grief; especially when we pour out our sorrows in the bosom of a friend, who will approve, or, at least, pardon our tears.) It is difficult to say to whom Kim would turn that would genuinely support of move by him toward denuclearization. As noted by greatcharlie in a previous post, Kim apparently holds his sister, Kim Yo Jong, in high regard and seems to take counsel of her on occasions. She led a delegation of North Korean officials to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. It is now apparent publicly that Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol, is another North Korean official that Kim is willing to rely upon to some degree. He is a foreign policy doyen and sacred cow of the intelligence industry in North Korea, met with Pompeo in New York City for talks and then met with Trump in Washington, DC before the Singapore Summit, and the two have met since then. Although Kim Yong-chol’s main purpose may be to engage in high-level talks with the US and to advise Kim on the diplomatic process, he can also use his title, stature, and credibility to interface with the Workers’ Party of Korea and North Korean elites and create some semblance of transparency throughout the diplomatic process for those concerned in Pyongyang. Kim Yong-chol has also exploited the opportunity to better understand the Trump administration through direct contact and not the abstract. That being stated, neither Kim Yo Jong nor Kim Yong-chol appear able to comfortably or confidently, approach Kim and counsel him on denuclearization and economic reform.

All leaders usually sense some degree of isolation at the top. That isolation can potentially be made even more strainful if there is no confidant for a leader to rely upon for honest, supportive counsel beyond the advisement of professional staff on areas of expertise. A leader in Kim’s position faces a particular type of isolation as advice and counsel will unlikely be offered to him freely in an effort to avoid the repercussions of angering him with some mistake. The best option left for Kim would be to turn inward. Uncertain of the outcome of grand steps in different directions, Kim may eventually take a default position, thereby finding his comfort zone. If he could conjure up a path that would only require a relatively small amount of change, it will provide him with some relief and garner praise from like-minded officials at the top of the food chain.

It is very likely that after Singapore, the whole event lingered in Kim’s psyche, leaving him a condition different from the time before the summit. It is Kim’s choice to either entertain and perhaps pursue all of the new considerations or shun what transpired, erase all traces of it or setting the matter off to the side while proceeding with his old habits and faculties. Trump, who actually negotiated with Kim, had no doubt that the North Korean Supreme Leader fully understood his exposition in Singapore.

A Few Possible Scenarios

Rationale enim animal est homo. (Man is a reasoning animal.) With many factors considered, there are a number of scenarios that can be imagined under which Kim might break away from the path of denuclearization. Here are three examples. In one scenario, Kim will maneuver to place North Korea on a path to economic success similar to that which China took. China is a Communist country with a strong economy. It has been accepted nuclear power by the international community. First, along the path China took, it developed its own nuclear capability and capacity. Second, it implemented limited economic reforms while engaging the rest of the world, especially the US through trade and investment, as a result of an opening agreed by Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-Tung  and US President Richard Nixon. It was all done while maintaining a strict one-party rule and hard-line ideological control of Chinese people.

Now that the US, Japan, and South Korea have place their wide array of powerful weapon systems aimed at North Korea on safety, Kim is trying to follow China’s route. He wants the world, particularly the US and South Korea, to help him energize North Korea’s economy by pouring in investment. He hopes to draw them in by seemingly commodifying his country’s nuclear weapons and missile programs, making investment their cost. At the same time, he wants to maintain his iron-fisted, authoritarian control of North Korea and its people. It may very well be that Kim’s heart may very be too hardened, perhaps seared by a belief that the greatest danger to North Korea comes from the US. To that extent, Kim has no intention of giving up nuclear weapons, for he believes they are the only guarantee of his regime’s survival. Falsum est nimirum quod creditur vulgo, testamenta hominum speculum esse morum.(There is certainly no truth in the popular belief, that a man’s will is the mirror of his character.)

In a second scenario, perhaps Kim recognizes that the type of success Kim really wants for North Korea is out of his reach, not by some fault of his own, but rather because the country’s problems are so grave and run too deep. Kim may be incapable of coming up with real answers that would put North Korea on real upward trajectory using all of the tools available to him. In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. To that extent, consciously or unconsciously, Kim may simply be procrastinating. Of course, there are those who would follow him no matter what. Kim knows better than anyone else just how bad things have been in North Korea. It may be to put off a sober, updated look at the situation, and other than implementing a few measures here and there, basically close his eyes to the situation.

To that extent, if Kim were to receive counsel from an “inner voice”, perhaps among the thoughts he might hear are the following three: 1) “Do not chase a gossamer fantasy of developing North Korea into a globally competitive, economically well-heeled country.  There is a danger posed by Trump as part of larger picture of the US, a capitalist adversary seeking conquest, attempting to subordinate your smaller nation.” 2) “You have developed nuclear arsenal to a level that he has the capability and capacity to strike the US. You are genuinely defending your people from that threat.” 3) “You have accomplished what you father and grandfather strove to achieve, but were unable to reach. Honor them, by remaining on the correct path!” Moreover, Kim might consider whether Trump would be willing to follow through on threats of military action given his lack of reaction to the obloquy and invective inflicted upon him by critics. The latest vitriol from critics is the claim that Trump displayed a treasonous level of timidity in the presence of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin at a press conference in Helsinki, Finland. Journalists asked Trump whether he confronted him with evidence from the US Intelligence Community of  the country’s interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election and whether he actually believed that Russia was even engaged in that activity. Overall, Trump’s foreign policy agenda is viewed by critics as something comparable to the l’infame in late-18th century France, the effort to destroy Christian social order as a means to break from the past. In Kim’s mind, surely if Trump were as fierce as he portrays himself, critics would be hesitant to attack him such vigor.

In a third scenario, Kim may have simply lost interest in diplomacy with the US. Kim fully understands that the world is a big place with may countries, with several adversaries and some allies of a sort such as China and the Russian. Yet, in real terms, Kim’s own world, North Korea, is where he is most comfortable. While at home, Kim may have become insulated in the refracted reflection of reality from that Communist country. The values and interests of North Korea may once again become the foundation upon which he will base his actions and reactions to the outside world, the “real world”, and particularly in the diplomatic process on denuclearization. Kim’s mind may not be open to moving further on the denuclearization matter regardless of what Trump is offering.

Kim is now surrounded by all the familiar sights, sounds, and the atmosphere of Pyongyang. The voices of Workers’ Party of Korea officials, generals, security men, business elites, and other are given higher importance in this context as they comfort and encourage him  It is nearly certain that a majority of those supporters also cannot imagine a North Korea other than the one they have known with nuclear weapons and a rigid stand against the US. All of this might be manifested by Kim becoming more guarded in his contact with the outside. Parvolum differt, patiaris adversa an exspectes; nisi quod tamen est dolendi modus, non est timendi. Doleas enim quantum scias accidisse, timeas quantum possit accidere. (There is little difference between expecting misfortune and undergoing it; except that grief has limits, whereas apprehension has none. For we grieve only for what we know has happened; but we fear all that possibly may happen.)

Now nestled in Pyongyang, Kim is surrounded by all of its familiar sights and sounds. He is away from the grandeur, the luster, the celebrity, the energy of the Singapore Summit, and the persuasive Trump. The voices of Workers Party officials, generals, security men, business elites, and others are given greater importance as they comfort and encourage him  It is nearly certain that a majority of those supporters also cannot imagine a North Korea other than the one they know now with nuclear weapons and a tough stand against the US. It all might be manifested by Kim becoming more guarded in his contact with the outside.

A Possible Boost for the US Effort?

Delays and missteps by Pyongyang may create the perception of the optimistic within the Trump camp that some deliberation has been underway within the Workers’ Party of Korea and among other key elites concerning denuclearization. There are undoubtedly many in North Koreans who do not believe that it would be a good path for the country to take For the sake of peace and security in Northeast Asia and the world beyond, greatcharlie also hopes that is the real cause. It is difficult to imagine at what angle Trump administration, itself, might approach Kim to effectually suggest why and how he should proceed in changing his country. It would seem unlikely that Kim would appreciate being told how he should feel at this moment. He would surely be disinterested in hearing anyone from the US attempt to counsel him from the perspective of having been in the same situation themselves, because no US leader or official in recent times has been in Kim’s position. There is the possibility that a third party could be recruited to help usher Kim in the right direction. In a previous post, greatcharlie explained how Mongolia had moved through similar circumstances advancing methodically from a Communist system to more democratic one. With targeted US assistance, has promoted good governance and the rule of law; developed a new generation of democratic leaders; has enjoyed private sector-led growth, economic diversification, and long-term capital investment; and, mitigated transnational criminal activity, to include human trafficking, and reduced domestic violence. Bordered by Russia and China, the Mongolia has had the experience of working positively with their far more powerful neighbors while appreciating the efforts of what it calls its most important “third neighbor”: the US. Mongolia has also invested in North Korea’s oil industry. Most of all, under its present policy, Mongolia desires to see North Korea succeed in its own transition and transformation. (The Mongols could also serve as a figurative thermometer, taking independent readings of the temperature in Pyongyang toward denuclearization and economic development supported by the US and the rest of the international community.) The US State Department is well-aware of the dozens of points at which Mongolia and North Korea touch. Including Mongolia as a partner to include in the diplomatic process may make sense if Ulan Bator is at all interested.

It may very well be that a decision has already been made in Pyongyang not to remain bound to denuclearization. In that case, the Trump administration cannot allow itself to fall into the unpleasant circumstance of relentlessly chases the goal of denuclearization as Pyongyang steadily and methodically moves that possibility farther out of reach. However, nothing stated by him has provided a hint that he has done so. It can only be hoped that he will not make that decision and everything done by the US will foster purposeful  forward movement toward denuclearization. An incorrect decision to divert from the agreed course of denuclearization or to abandon that path altogether may be heralded as a demonstration of Kim’s boldness and fearlessness.  However, that moment of actual failure would more likely be driven by trepidation of the unknown, anxiety toward a future that cannot be foreseen or ever envisioned.

Gaius Musonius Rufus, known as the “Roman Socrates”, was one the foremost Stoic philosophers of the Roman Imperial period. Attributed to Rufus, is the following quote noting that even after the best effort is made, the outcome is really not in our control. He stated: “Of the things that exist, God has put some in our control, others not in our control. In our control he has put the noblest and most excellent part by reason of which He is Himself happy, the power of using our impressions. For when this is correctly used, it means serenity, cheerfulness, constancy; it also means justice and law and self-control and virtue as a whole. But all other things He has not put in our control. Therefore we ought to become of like mind with God and, dividing things in like manner, we ought in every way to lay claim to the things that are in our control, but what is not in our control we ought to entrust to the universe and gladly yield to it whether it asks for our children, our country, our body, or anything whatsoever.”

Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections, Trump must be ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with North Korea cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations believing North Korea wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, trying too hard to understand Kim’s situation.

The Way Forward

In Act III, Scene I of William Shakespeare’s The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth, King Henry is in his palace at Westminster. It is the middle of the night, and he is working on the paperwork of the ongoing war. Henry halts he work for a moment, and, as a matter of staging convention, breaks the fourth wall by both talking to himself and addressing the audience. He speaks of his newly insomnia, and waxes on how his poorest subjects can sleep at night in their tattered beds, but weighed down by worry, remorse, and anxiety, he, the wealthy king, cannot. He posits that men in power such as him, are less content and insouciant as the needy and ordinary. King Henry states: “How many thousand of my poorest subjects Are at this hour asleep! O sleep, O gentle sleep, Nature’s soft nurse, how have I frighted thee, That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down And steep my senses in forgetfulness? Why rather, sleep, liest thou in smoky cribs, Upon uneasy pallets stretching thee And hush’d with buzzing night-flies to thy slumber, Than in the perfumed chambers of the great, Under the canopies of costly state, And lull’d with sound of sweetest melody? O thou dull god, why liest thou with the vile In loathsome beds, and leavest the kingly couch A watch-case or a common ‘larum-bell? Wilt thou upon the high and giddy mast Seal up the ship-boy’s eyes, and rock his brains In cradle of the rude imperious surge And in the visitation of the winds, Who take the ruffian billows by the top, Curling their monstrous heads and hanging them With deafening clamour in the slippery clouds, That, with the hurly, death itself awakes? Canst thou, O partial sleep, give thy repose To the wet sea-boy in an hour so rude, And in the calmest and most stillest night, With all appliances and means to boot, Deny it to a king? Then happy low, lie down! Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.” Ensconced in Pyongyang, Kim may feel that he is either in a tough spot and under great strain or he is self-assured and feels comfortable knowing he has choices. He may have even reasoned that there is no real need to be fearful of any consequences if he takes one path or another. However, it is most likely that reaching a decision on how to proceed with the US weighs very heavily upon him. Long-practiced tactics of diversion of Pyongyang have raised their head much as a vampire with goal of sabotaging the diplomacy. Yet, that may not be indicative of a choice move away from denuclearization. Perhaps that behavior is driven by inertia and bad habit more than anything else. The Trump administration only wants to take the high road in the diplomatic process. If the desire for peace is sincere, it is hoped by the administration that Kim and his advisers in Pyongyang, will rise to the occasion. To nudge thinking in the right direction, efforts have been made to incentivize North Korea to change its economy to benefit the entire country and not just the elites.

In contemplating what Kim might do, the US must remain vigilant and cautious. The administration cannot afford to become complacent even to the slightest degree. Resources have been dedicated to surveilling developments at North Korean nuclear sites. As many analytical resources as possible should also be dedicated to the discernment of signs of a reversal in Pyongyang. Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections, Trump must be ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with North Korea cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations submitting to the fantasy that North Korea wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success that very likely helped build Kim’s self-confidence in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, trying too hard to understand Kim’s position.

If it becomes clear that his administration’s efforts with North Korea have only been a struggle against the inevitable, everything aggressive that North Korea has done will be taken in the aggregate before a response is chosen. There must not be any doubt that such a conclusion is correct. If a determination is made that Kim has turned his back on what was accomplished at Singapore, only the harshest of consequences should be expected. In Singapore, Kim appeared to understand that Trump did not make a half hearted vow to take military action. Make no mistake, Trump has the requisite will to act. Kim must never believe otherwise. Even if Kim keeps that notion firmly in mind as he continues to engage in the diplomatic process, only time will tell how much that really means to Kim. Arma non servant modum; nec temperari facile nec reprimi potest stricti ensis ira; bella delectat cruor. (Arms observe no bounds; nor can the wrath of the sword, once drawn, be easily checked or stayed; war delights in blood.)