US President Donald Trump (left) and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un (right) in Singapore. It has been easy for some even in the US Government to muse over the intentions, concepts, policies, ideals and even personality traits of the leadership DPRK, and then enumerate reasons why the denuclearization process would likely fail. What is more difficult is to gather all information available and put good minds to work at developing ways to cope defeat those problems in order to achieve the President’s goals. Trump is working hard to make denuclearization a reality. Hopefully, Kim is working hard in Pyongyang to do the same.
Regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and denuclearization, US President Donald Trump has pursued what he perceives to be an opportunity for the US to change things for the better. Since his meeting with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un, Trump has expressed the view that relations between the US and DPRK are the best that they have ever been. He explains that is evinced by the fact that: his communication with Kim has been very positive; there has been no nuclear weapons or missile testing; US citizens being held in the DPRK have been returned; and, the US is receiving remains of its soldiers lost in the Korean War. It has been easy for some even in the US Government to muse over the intentions, concepts, policies, ideals and even personality traits of the leadership DPRK, and then enumerate reasons why the denuclearization process would likely fail. What is more difficult is to gather all information available and put good minds to work at developing ways to cope with or even defeat those problems. That is what the Trump is trying to do. Hopefully, Kim is working hard in Pyongyang to do the same. Now is the time to advance toward the actual realization of denuclearization as well as have the US enumerate what it and the rest of the world will actually do for the DPRK.
Naturally, success, while wished for from the second meeting, is not guaranteed. Trump has been acknowledged both directly and obliquely in eloquent phrases on Twitter, speeches, and press conferences. This next meeting must be the inflexion point of the negotiation process on denuclearization. If satisfactory results in the form of guaranteed, concrete steps from Kim are absent, abandoning the effort would be completely in step with Trump’s “America First” concept. The purpose of this rather “lean” essay is to look briefly at some issues both Trump and Kim might be already contemplating before the next meeting, along with other, small thoughts that might also be worth considering. At points, it highlights some impediments that were very likely responsible for decelerating the pace of the negotiation process, and calls attention to those obstructions that could be removed in the second meeting. It is not orotundity to state that it is not greatcharlie’s intention, as the 2020 Presidential Election Campaign begins, to serve as some conseiler isolaté d’un aspirant president from which attacks against the Trump administration could be formed. The hope is to simply contribute in some balanced way to the policy debate on the DPRK and denuclearization. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)
Kim seated during his 2019 New Year’s Address (above). It is very likely that both Trump and Kim will find in that face-to-face encounter that they are respectively not the exactly same as on June 12, 2018. Much as Trump has expected Kim to have evolved somewhat in terms of his thinking on the US and on the potential of his country following their Singapore Meeting, Trump, having gone through much concerning international affairs, has surely evolved since.
Some Things Kim Might Discern about Trump
Trump and Kim have already shared their elaborations of how the other troubled them in Singapore. The connaissance suffisante that they acquired of one another then has served as the basis upon which continued communications between them was comfortably founded. That communication was mainly conducted by using their top officials as envoys and letters. What they truly understand about each other, their chemistry, will be verified by the results their next meeting. It is very likely that they will find in their next face-to-face encounter that they are respectively not the exactly same as in Singapore. Trump already seems to feel Kim has evolved in terms of his thinking on the US and on the possibility of transforming his country. Kim will discover that Trump, having gone through much in the realm of international affairs since, has also evolved.
Objective observers of Trump would say that if one is able to get a sense of Trump’s inner thinking, one would become better able to parse out or simply have better sense of his decisions on foreign and national security policy. Otherwise, he may often appear to be doing nothing when he is actual doing a plethora of things, step by step. In his efforts, Trump does not act as if he were tinkering figurative tools in his political maneuverings and deal making. Rather, he uses certain “instruments” to methodically, and rapidly, tailor a situation, to craft things. The vocal “bang and boom” often heard while he takes action is typically used as distraction and even amusement at times. Within, he approaches matters with a rhythm that is smooth and unbroken, steady and strong. He always has a plan and knows where he is going. His true target is not always one that others would immediately discern. He prefers to accomplish many things at once. When warned about advancing on a matter, Trump may often boldly push ahead. In his current position, much as during business life, Trump will treat important what he intuits on how to proceed. US Government foreign and national security policy professionals may appreciate his ideas, but requirements that they much adhere to regarding diligence will invariably demand that generally refrain including his “gut reactions” in their analyses. Yet this contrast in approach in no way serves as indicia that the relationship between Trump and the US intelligence community has been corrupted.
Critics and detractors within the US news media and among scholars, policy analysts, political opponents, and leaders of the Democratic Party, have had Trump on the brain continuously from the time he became a Presidential Candidate in 2015. Unfortunately, it seems that some mud brought into the campaign by a few self-interested others, unbeknownst to Trump, was tracked into the White House on the bottom of his shoes. However, it has long since been swept out of the building despite continued efforts to impute upon Trump whatever behaviors in which others were engaged behind his back. Trump is certainly not totally insensitive to his opponents attacks. Admittedly, there is some aggressiveness. The attacks of his critics and detractors should not be underestimated for they surely would have smothered or destroyed other national leaders of less strength and fortitude. In a way undisclosed, Trump still finds space to grow and evolve as president, despite the weight and nature of criticisms levelled against him. It may sound a bit soupy, but the reality is that Trump becomes stronger, vitalized by the adversity he faces; he draws from the potential energy and kinetic energy manifested from the power of his struggles. The Ancient Roman Senator and historian Marcus Porcius Cato, known as Cato the Elder, once expressed: “We cannot control the evil tongues of others; but a good life enables us to disregard them.”
On that basis, an understanding of Trump’s approach to foreign and national security policy can also be founded. A fairly common belief globally, but not always admitted in more recent times, is that the US is the beacon and the ballast for the world. Trump holds to that belief, and knows that it would be a moral failing to be remiss or delinquent in dealing with urgent and important issues However, unlike his predecessors, while he sees all the needs around the world, Trump is not inclined to hand anything to anyone. He would like the other party to demonstrate, through some exchange, of goodwill even, an appreciation for what the US may give. Me rendez-vous heureux?
From what is collected by the intelligence services of both countries, strands must be pulled from what is synthesized to support the requirements of decision makers. That information must also be accurately portrayed. Seeking to collect as much as possible about Trump to prepare Kim for the next meeting, to develop something new, there may be the temptation to infer and extrapolate information from derisive US news media reports of recent events concerning the US President. Reading that might lead Pyongyang to erroneously believe that Trump’s range of action and ability to do big things on foreign and national security policy might be restrained somewhat by his rather curious domestic political struggles. Nothing could be further from the truth. Observing reporters almost instantaneously receive approval from editors and producers in broadcast, published, and online media to pursue stories on the Trump administration only after developing an immediate impression of their veracity shocks the system. The overwhelming nature of its incredulity can even amuse as it is the juxtaposition of two ideas: “all the news that is fit to print” versus “anything goes!” Still, as long as such reporting and commentaries sell advertising space, there most likely will be a lot more of it. Is qui scit plurimum, rumor. (That most knowing of persons: gossip.)
Once Trump has determined what he desires from a matter, he finds a path to get where he wants to be, regardless of how rocky. With the knowledge of how he can successfully proceed firmly in mind, Trump often will initially be patient, allowing an opposite party to try to better understand and find some agreement with his positions. The value of that would be to facilitate any negotiations. Intriguingly, Trump prefers and usually seeks to reach a mutually acceptable agreement through negotiations. Yet, at the same time, Trump will allow the path he charted to develop further. If a deal cannot be reached, he will travel that path to his goal. Interestingly, his clashes with political opponents have underlined that “they do not get Trump.” They seem to have no desire to examine him in an objective way. Kim should avoid the mistakes they have made in negotiating with him.
Most important to know is that what Trump does on one issue may serve to positively shape what he is doing on another. He economically exerts his energy, squeezing the maximum benefit from his decisions. Persistent, iniquitous, coverage of Trump’s handling of the very important political debate on border protection, the border wall, the government shutdown and even the State of the Union Address, obscured the reality that there were other important and urgent matters on his plate. A sampling of what Trump was working on at the same time included: agreeing to a new meeting with Kim on denuclearization, throwing full US support behind the interim president of Venezuela, Juan Guaido, drawing down US troops from Syria, watching peace talks and the US drawdown in Afghanistan, and working in trade with China. National unity and expressions of goodwill in the US were necessary for the world to see, not a partisan battle. By the way, the outcome of that partisan battle on border security, even though it may not be generally accepted, is certainly assured to go Trump’s way.
The Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol (left) hands Trump (right) a letter from Kim. Trump and Kim have already shared their elaborations of how the other troubled them in Singapore. The comfortable level of connaissance suffisante they acquired of one another has served as the basis upon which continued communications between them was founded. That communication was mainly conducted by using their top officials as envoys and letters. What they truly understand about each other will be verified by the results their next meeting.
Some Thoughts Trump May Be Having about Kim
The initial meeting in Singapore allowed Trump and Kim to get a sense for one another, discuss expectations, and essentially figure out whether denuclearization was even feasible with all things considered. In the second meeting, some tangible steps toward denuclearization must result or the entire process will be largely seen as a failure. If a memorandum of understanding, outlining requirements, responsibilities, and time lines for action to which officials from both sides could later add flesh out, that would be very encouraging. If Kim came to the meeting and then left having offered nothing new, he would make a huge mistake. If Trump feels in the end that he has been led down the garden path on denuclearization, and would be left standing before the world with nothing, he would not react well at all.
As discussed in a January 19, 2019 greatcharlie post entitled, “Trump Uses Prior Experience, Flexible Thinking, and Even Empathy, to Make Foreign Policy Decisions Fit for Today’s World”, when mulling over a new approach on a matter in negotiation with another country or countries, the foreign and national security policy machinery of countries as the DPRK will very often move with the same speed as the massive naval dreadnoughts of early and mid-20th century. Wheeling those giant ships port or starboard took real effort. Self-interested bureaucracies will champion their points of view on a matter and guard their turf. Their devotion to ensuring the primacy of their organizations’ partisan interests can even surpass their enthusiasm over the matter at hand. It is more than likely that by now, Kim has dealt with any issues of that nature. Bureaucratic issues concerning denuclearization, if they ever existed, are by now nonexistent in the truest sense of the term. Kim definitely has a strong grip on his government. Political rivals are essentially nonexistent. He most certainly would have been “on his way” after presenting the mere idea of denuclearization to the leadership of the Workers Party of Korea. What is more likely is that Kim may be concerned with being profoundly disappointed by Trump, who is in fact a relative stranger to him and initially an adversary from the US. (One must look from Kim’s perspective, not one’s’ own lens, not one’s’ wishes.)
Given the militaristic culture and security mindset that undergirds the DPRK’s society, Kim naturally may still harbor fears over being outmaneuvered by the US in a way that leads to military invasion. A new window of opportunity has been opened for US-DPRK relations and for the DPRK directly, and the world. Still, due to that, one must not treat the fact that after July 27, 1953 armistice ending a horrific three year war on the Korean Peninsula, tens of thousands of troops on both sides of a Demilitarized Zone remained heavily armed and on alert in a stand-off with less care than it deserves. The 65 years following the war were a time of anger, aggression, deception and betrayal between the US and the DPRK. What emerged from that period within both governments was a vast paranoia. That paranoia eventually hardened, became somewhat ordinary, and seemingly gave rise to intractable negative beliefs and harsh convictions of both nations respective intentions. This defacto bigotry in thinking on both sides colored personal and institutional perceptions, doubtlessly insinuating itself into studies, observations, and varied other reports on both sides. This was particularly so in the military and intelligence and other security services. Having for years regularly diagnosed one another as bad, to be fair, it is now hard for them to turn on a dime because one wants them to do so. Great unease, suspicion would naturally exist.
Having kept the DPRK in isolation, much as his father, Kim Jong-un, and his grandfather, Kim Il-sung had for so long before him, Kim might certainly concern himself with having his society become rapidly “contaminated” by stealthy Western efforts to influence his people or simply by philosophies and lifestyles that loyal members of the Workers’ Party of Korea would consider anathema. With this alone in mind, it would be unreasonable for anyone to complain that a change in the mindset of the DPRK on interacting so closely with the West on denuclearization or any transformative matter should have come more rapidly. Trump did not leave Singapore feeling a need to dictate the tempo of the negatiation process. It has been left to Kim to guide his country across the many figurative intellectual and emotional pickets lines that exist to denuclearization.
However, what could be legitimately characterized as a resistance and reluctance by Kim to advance toward an agreement may indicate that he may fear an invasion of another sort. He may fear that economic development effort will lead to invasion in the form of multinational corporations which are accountable to no one. Multinational corporations would argue well that they are good global citizens doing much that is not publicized. A general impression in many capitals, however, is that help from them is not really help. They are viewed as operating solely with pecuniary interest in a country. One only needs to recall the experience of Russia following the fall of the Soviet Union a Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin regularly laments. Undoubtedly, Moscow has reminded Kim of that. The massive multinational corporations have budgets greater than the DPRK itself. They are well staffed by very intelligent and capable development professionals who diligently look for what to exploit in weak countries. They can engage in nearly formulaic efforts to self-enrich themselves leading to dreadful damage to societies even if it is unintentional. It can become a plundering of countries struggling to pick themselves up and trying to organize themselves. Kim may believe that opening the DPRK to assistance on economic development may make his country vulnerable to corporate intrusion as it tries to emerge. It is unlikely that the idea of creating linkages between US based multinational corporations and DPRK industries to foster their development, as was done in South Korea many decades ago, will not fly in Pyongyang. The DPRK will most likely want to move along its way without corporate intrusion. If Kim expresses such a concern in the next meeting, Trump will likely guarantee that he would not even hint to any multinational corporation that some right or protection will be provided to seize DPRK resources.
If in the aftermath of the Trump administration, multinationals attempt the move in on the DPRK in well-worn, predictable ways, that will almost guarantee an ugly response in which the multinationals will be most likely be violently forced from the scene. Ultimately, that might lead to the collapse of everything positive achieved. It is highly recommended that Trump should have a solution available to address that likely concern to share with Kim at the negotiation table.
Among the advantages that would supposedly be created by the DPRK’s cooperation with Trump, would be the betterment in the standard of living and ostensibly, through an improved economy, the empowerment of the Workers’ Party of Korea which itself would presumably go through some change. Through its transformation, the DPRK would no longer be “The hermit kingdom”, but rather, find itself invited to the grand table of countries. It too would be able to wield real influence internationally; it, too, would be involved in decisions made on urgent and important matters. Yet, regarding economic development, Kim may reason that the same economic levers that Trump may use to ratchet up the DPRK’s economy and greater industrialization can be used conversely to supplant his government’s freedom of action. It may even be used to undermine Kim’s present unrestricted, authoritarian control his country. If a reliance on the help of the US, or the international community in some collective effort, to subsidise the DPRK’s organization were to develop, the US and others would be able to control the spigot from with the society’s revitalization flows. Kim will be fully responsible for that circumstance, that loss of independence, self-determination, and control.
Realistically, the long-term process of the DPRK’s economic development will go beyond his time in office and the mission of transforming the DPRK would be assigned to future US administrations. Trump should consider Kim’s possible concern that while he has an exceptionally good relationship with him, perchance, relations between himself and another US President soon to follow may be problematic. If that turned out to be the case, rash behavior might once again be seen from Kim. Indeed, the need to break any perceived “chains” of Western economic and financial subjugation, and the need to regain full control of its destiny, may impel the most aggressive responses possible by Pyongyang. A mechanism must established to make sure that the US-DPRK relationship will continue to be handled with empathy and nuance.
Trump displays letter from Kim Jong-un in Cabinet Room of the White House (above). Beyond their communications, Trump might reassure Kim by presenting him with a discussion of concrete, enumerated steps that would be taken to economically energize the DPRK in exchange for denuclearization. A new DPRK, economically viable enough to find a place at the table with other successful economies in the region, may all sound well as part of a prospective process. Nevertheless, Kim, if his intentions are positive, will want to know how it all would actually pan out for him in the real world.
What Might Facilitate Negotiations
Conceivably, more so than less, Kim feels that he can rely on what he might call Trump’s “humanism.” Still, reassurance, most important in negotiations between adversaries, cannot come simply from engaging in more talk with Trump. Trump has already expressed much to exhort Kim to move toward denuclearization. Kim knows very well that Trump now wants to see genuine steps that will complete the dismantling and elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Assuredly, Trump will not present a partial version of himself through which he would intend to deceive Kim. There would not be some sort of “secret world” stuff going on that might possibly be discovered in his words, mannerisms, and attitude. Beyond ongoing communications, Trump might reassure Kim by presenting him with a discussion of concrete, enumerated steps that would be taken to economically energize the DPRK in exchange for denuclearization. A new DPRK, economically viable enough to find a place at the table with other successful economies in the region may all sound well as part of an imaginative prospective process. Nevertheless, Kim will still want to know, if his own intentions are positive, how it all would actually pan out for him in the real world.
Trump must bring tangibles to the negotiation table during the second meeting developed from his own shrewd thinking and knowledge of resources that he can commit to a deal. When mulling over what to present to Kim that would serve as the making of a plan of action, Trump’s aides and advisers likely determined what the relative value of a tangible might be to the other side. It must be useful enough to create some sense of equity, balance, and perhaps if a side is lucky, it might represent some real gain. Many of Trump’s suggestions might be steps that Kim and his aides and advisers in Pyongyang never considered. Despite what may be the wish of Pyongyang, no suggestions that may shift the security framework that exists between the US and its allies in Northeast Asia should be brought to the table with reasonable hope of seeing change. Indeed, Trump certainly must not give up the strengths and equities of its alliances with allies. Although the DPRK would the focus of talks, those ties that bind allies in the region are the same ties that assure unity when dealing with China. Indeed, given the concerns of the US and its allies to China’s actions and intentions in the Asia Pacific region, a reaffirmation of cooperation and commitments on security among them should be expected. Overall, Kim can rest assured that Trump will not offer rotten apples for him to choose from.
Simulatio delet veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. (Pretense obliterates the truth, without which the name of friendship cannot survive.) Kim would do well to focus on his own country’s relations with the US as well as neighbors in the region. If he is negotiating with some pretence of serving certain interests of China at the same time, he will essentially throw away an opportunity as the US and its regional allies would surely detect that effort. Kim must no longer allow his country to remain a prisoner of what most in the world views as an ignoble momentum.
Speculating on what might be offered, there might be some type of Marshall Plan tabled by Trump. Development programs similar to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization must be organized for the DPRK’s many industries. Using its own wisdom, and the external assistance it chooses to receive, the DPRK must in a more efficient way enrich itself with its own natural resources. Improved trade opportunities with other countries worldwide, facilitated by guarantees by the US, could be established following the removal. Rather than to multinational, linkages could be made to the economics departments and business school of specified US colleges and universities. There may be some small-scale variante of the Peace Corps with well-defined parameters encompassing state-run industries and other economic activity within the DPRK, narrow in scope, curated in a way that recognizes the extraordinary internal security concerns of the DPRK. Those concerns will not go away overnight.
Trump is certainly not a political hack being led from the nose by his political party, not a creature of some financial interest due to subsidization, and not a corporate pawn as his enemies portend. or as a number of other US political leaders reportedly have been alleged to be. The potential threat that he could be lobbied or coerced to acquiesce to demands from some external source, political, financial, or corporate, is nonexistent. Nothing of that sort could possibly undermine what might be achieved.
If the second meeting is successful, it would be a dramatic moment. The years of struggle would be about to come to an end. There would need to be the call for collective retreat from hostile thinking if the two countries are to move forward successfully. Thinking and emotions must flow in a new direction. What is read and heard in the public from officials at the highest level on both sides should reflect that. There must be an insistent voice that proclaims the time for change has come. It must be expressed from the top and must be heard repeatedly. If encouraging satisfactory change in the DPRK proves to be insurmountable for Trump, or if there is an unwillingness of the DPRK leadership to be truly open to taking a new path, displaying ambivalence or equivocation in talks, the denuclearization process will most likely collapse. If the DPRK undertakes the effort to transform, it must be dedicated to it completely. Kim is essentially facing a binary choice. If Pyongyang could pardon greatcharlie’s freedom, returning to the unreality that the DPRK has the military wherewithal to take on the a military superpower would be a tragic mistake. Perhaps for him, reason might again be found in the words of Cato the Elder who stated: “Wise men profit from fools than fools from wise men; for the wise men shun the mistakes of fools, but fools do not imitate the successes of the wise.”
Trump feels unfettered by what was not accomplished in the past, or what has been called impossible. He has the vision and spirit to achieve news things. In this case, it is denuclearization and the DPRK. He knows how to support its industrial development, and usher it to a positive place in the international order. What drives Trump to get this deal is not his purported tendencies toward social ambition and aggressiveness. This is actually Trump putting his best foot forward. Although the values and interests of the US will be satisfied, it is predominantly about doing what is right for both the people of the US and the DPRK as well.
The Way Forward
In Act 1 scene 3 of William Shakespeare’s play The Taming of the Shrew, a story in the story of tinker abused as part of a local lord’s practical joke upon a poor tinker, Christopher Sly. He is convinced that he is a lord, and troupe of actors performs a play before him which makes up the main story of The Taming of the Shrew. Their play takes place in Italian city of Padua, a rich young man named Lucentio there to attend university, instantly falls in love with Bianca, a beautiful, mild young woman. However she already has two suitors, Hortensio and Gremio, and Bianca’s father has declared that no one may court Bianca until first her older sister, Katherine, an ill-tempered is married. That problem is ostensibly resolved when Hortensio’s friend Petruchio, a audacious young man from Verona, arrives in Padua seeking a wealthy woman to marry. Believing he has found what he was looking for, he agrees to marry Katherine sight unseen. Several characters add to the warnings Petruchio hears about her. However, rather than back away, he views marrying her as a challenge, not just a money making opportunity. He explains that living with Katherine could not possibly be worse than the hardships he endured in war and at sea. Petruchio exhorts: “Think you a little din can daunt mine ears? / Have I not in my time heard lions roar? / Have I not heard the sea puff’d up with winds / Rage like an angry boar chafed with sweat? / Have I not heard great ordnance in the field, / And heaven’s artillery thunder in the skies? / Have I not in a pitched battle heard / Loud ‘larums, neighing steeds, and trumpets’ clang?” In the same vein as young Petruchio, Trump feels unfettered by what was not accomplished in the past, or what has been called impossible. (By the way Shakespeare’s Petruchio proved his capabilities and eventually became happily married to Katherine.) the vision and spirit to achieve news things. In this case, it is denuclearization and the DPRK. He knows how to support its industrial development, and usher it to a positive place in the international order.
What drives Trump to get this deal is not his purported tendencies toward social ambition and aggressiveness. There is the real possibility that Kim’s aides and advisers might associate with that notion in their reports to their Chairman as it is one of the more popular analyses propagated about Trump worldwide. Yet, rather, this is actually Trump putting his best foot forward. He has acquitted himself exceedingly well. The better angels of Trump’s nature, so to speak, are guiding him on this matter. Rather than do what Trump is doing, other political leaders, some vying for the highest office in 2020, would perhaps be content to allow a long time adversary that they no answers for dealing with, drown in economic destitution under a continued “maximum pressure campaign” of sanctions. Although ultimately the values and interests of the US will be satisfied through the present process to establish a sustainable peace, it is predominantly about doing what is right for both the people of the US and the DPRK as well. An optimal way to confirm veracity of both sides at the moment, as the noncommissioned officers likely would have said at the New York Military Academy when Trump was a cadet, is to “snap to it!” Again, words alone simply will not do the trick on this second occasion. Both leaders, mens sana in corpore sano, must come through by constructing a draft upon which a sustainable agreement can be rooted. Ornat haec magnitudo animi, quae nihil ad ostentationem, omnia ad conscientiam refert recteque facti non ex populi sermone mercedem, sed ex facto petit. (To all this, his illustrious mind reflects the noblest ornament; he places no part of his happiness in ostentation, but refers the whole of it to conscience; and seeks the reward of a virtuous action, not in the applauses of the world, but in the action itself.)