Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess: Unfit for Counter-Trump Narrative, Critics Dismiss Story

A column of the 1st Tank Guards Army at the Borisovsky range during Zapad 2017 (above). During Zapad 2017, a military exercise, Russian Federation forces in Belarus and in Russia near the Baltic region were joined by forces in the Arctic and Far East, the Black Sea, close to Ukraine’s borders and in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, to rehearse defensive tactics against a “terrorist force.” Critics of US President Donald Trump, who have tied anything Russia related to an alleged nefarious link between him and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, hardly reacted to Zapad 2017. Moral relativism seems to be at play in their thinking.

According to an October 1, 2017 New York Times article entitled “Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess”, details were provided on a major military exercise named Zapad 2017, held jointly by the Russian Federation and Belarusian armed forces from September 14 to September 20, 2017. Reportedly, Russian and Belarusian troops in Belarus and Russian troops near Russia’s Baltic region were joined in the exercise by Russian troops in the Arctic and Far East, the Black Sea, close to Ukraine’s borders and in the Abkhazia region of Georgia. Western military officials discerned from the exercise that Russia had made significant strides in their ability to conduct the sort of complex, large-scale operations, using drones and other new technology, that would be part of any all-out war with the US in Europe. The October 1st New York Times article explained that the military exercise, planned for many months, was part of a larger effort by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to showcase Russia’s military prowess as it tries to reassert itself as a world power. Before Zapad started, US and Baltic military officers expressed fears that the maneuvers could be used as a pretext to increase Russia’s military presence in Belarus, a central European nation that borders three critical NATO allies: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The commander of US Army in Europe, US Army Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges was quoted in the article as saying: “Zapad forced us to get smarter about how to share intelligence.”

The October 1, 2017 New York Times article, albeit was one of the few in the mainstream media that recognized that the massive exercise even took place. Synoptic reports about Zapad appeared in the US newsmedia, particularly in print. Many newsmedia houses simply reprinted stories via Reuters and the Associated Press. There was very little mention of Trump in stories. At first blush, one might argue that newsmedia coverage, stories and commentary, should focus upon what sells papers, magazines, and advertising space, what stories can grab interest and gain traction. Stories that support a popular counter-Trump narrative that Trump lacks the competence to be president and with the advent of his administration, tyranny’s bloody banner has been raised, have been selling for a long season. One could hypothesize that most US newsmedia houses believed Zapad 2017 was not a story that would sell, and was not an event of great consequence in the big picture even given the enormity of the seven-day Russian exercise. What makes the tepid coverage or lack of coverage of the exercise especially intriguing is its variance from the the now normal massive US newsmedia coverage of Trump’s alleged ties to Putin and Russia, to include secret back channels to Moscow, to questionable contacts, and worst of all, to secret deals and promises to perform favors for foreign leaders if Trump reached the presidency. The purported rationale for that alleged activity was to lay the foundation for lucrative business deals for Trump’s business concern in Russia as well as to acquire Russia’s help to win the 2016 US Presidential Election. Beyond such efforts to manipulate the 2016 US Presidential Election results, Russia’s armed forces have in recent years captured Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine, deployed troops to Syria, rattled the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with snap exercises, and buzzed NATO planes and ships. The question, ‘What about Russia?”, has been written and spoken countless times when critics have sought to find fault with Trump. The modus operandi has been to look for wrongdoing, some fault, to hover at his elbow once he awakes every morning. On Zapad 2017, critics resembled a referee missing a foul in a championship match. Moreover, Trump, with the goal of stirring things up and ending the status quo, has been tough on NATO Members and creating some grievances among them, one might expect critics would turn the issue, despite Trump’s ostensibly noble intentions, into something akin to  a pocket full of firecrackers.

What appears to have influenced the manner in which critics covered Zapad 2017 was their recognition of the exercise as an incongruency, failing to fit their typical narrative on Trump. Indeed, critics mostly chalked up Zapad 2017 as being outré; outside their vision of the alleged, nefarious lien d’affaire between Trump and Putin. In fact, Zapad 2017 contradicts it. Rather than just label it all brustschmerzangst, strange and just wrong, one could assess from the tame response of critics to Zapad 2017 evinces that a sort of moral relativism is at play in their thinking. That moral relativism has allowed critics to cherry pick matters that solely support what they perceive as “Trump the Bad”, whose thinking and actions are well outside the country’s sensus communis, the society’s basic beliefs and values. In that vein, they have focused so intensely on surmised ties between the Trump administration and Russia. They have argued the existence of those ties with such certitude that they, perhaps unconsciously, ignore the reality that Russia has not fully relaxed its posture militarily toward the US, or the West since Trump was elected. Looking at Zapad 2017 a bit closer reveals alleged illegal foreign contacts and secret deals, real or not, did nothing to temper Moscow’s behavior toward the US. Looking at Zapad 2017 closer one might also be better able to discern that given Moscow’s attitude and behavior toward the administration of US President Barack Obama and the generally acknowledged steps Moscow took to impact the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, only now, with Trump, is there a real possibility to create positive change in the US-Russia relationship as well as ignite an authentic bolstering of European security. Ab actu, ad posse valet illatio. (From what has happened we may infer what will happen.)

Looking at Zapad 2017 closer reveals alleged foreign contacts and secret deals, real or not, did nothing to temper Russia’s behavior toward the US. Rather, looking at Zapad 2017 and matters surrounding it closer, one can discern that given Moscow’s resulting attitude and behavior toward the administration of US President Barack Obama after interaction with it and bold steps apparently taken by Moscow to impact the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, only now, with Trump, is there a real possibility to create positive change in US-Russia relations as well as bolster European security.

The term “moral relativism” is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how one should think about or act towards those with whom one morally disagrees. The most common position is that one should tolerate them. When one is certain of a reality, one abides by its rules. Moral relativism has been said to be on the opposite end of the continuum from moral absolutism, which says that there is always one right answer to any ethical question. There are a variety of philosophical arguments against moral relativism. Aporia for rejecting moral realism include the view that there are some objective moral truths. Other arguments against relativism insist arguments offered in favor of relativism are typically flawed, shortsighted. Various ways of understanding moral relativism exist. Under metaethical moral relativism states that objective grounds for preferring the moral values of one culture over another do not exist. Accordingly, moral choices made by societies are based on their unique beliefs, customs, and practices. There is a tendency for individuals to believe that the “right” moral values are the values that exist in their own culture. Under descriptive moral relativism, often referred to as cultural relativism, it is recognized that moral standards are culturally defined. There may be a few values that seem nearly universal, such as honesty and respect, but many differences appear across cultures when people evaluate moral standards around the world. Normative moral relativism is the idea that all societies should accept each other’s differing moral values, given that there are no universal moral principles. For example, just because political corruption is accepted to a degree in some societies does not mean that other societies cannot rightfully condemn it. Most philosophers disagree with this idea that no universal moral principles exist.

Having taken such a firm stand against Trump, even experienced and reliable observers, journalists, can say things that cannot be. Possibilities are rejected without hearing others. Self-serving explanations, opinions are relied upon. While all of this has suddenly become acceptable with regard to Trump, but it is all actually outside of standard practice and norms within the US society. Critics who have the US public’s’ ear must respect and honor, not abuse, the public trust. Journalists, in particular, including Trump critics among them, should report the truth as they encounter it. When stories such as Zapad 2017, they must still be energetically covered, especially when they cast doubt of their perspectives of Trump. There has been a dearth of such stories so far. The US public is not only reactive to opprobrium, invective, banal amusement, but is also open to eloquence.

Facts Concerning Zapad 2017 Trump’s Critics Ignored Likely Due to Moral Relativism

Zapad 2017 was an exercise that was designed to have a sound educational effect on the Obama administration and a prospective administration of former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. That in itself seems worthy of news media attention at the present. Moscow was very concerned that troubles with Washington would continue with the advent of administration led by former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Indeed, as part of an assessment completed by the US Intelligence Community on the possible effort by Russia to influence the US Presidential Election of 2016, it was concluded that Putin took affirmative steps to avoid the nightmare scenario of Clinton victory by ordering an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s objectives were: to undermine public faith in the US democratic process; to denigrate former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; and, to harm her electability and potential presidency. The US Intelligence Community further assessed that Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for then President-elect Trump. In following, it also assessed Putin and the Russian Government aspired to aid President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. Praetenta mutare non possimus sed futura providere debemos. (We cannot change the past, but we can anticipate the future.)

Zapad fits neatly into the story of US-Russia relations for nearly a decade. The whole matter also looms large in the story of the Obama administration. The genesis of Zapad 2017 was the desire by Moscow to take steps in the midst of a descending spiral of uncongenial relations with the US against Russia’s interests. Indeed, there was nothing ambiguous then or now about Moscow’s approach to the US. Putin has never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. It was practically guaranteed that Putin would push back against what he might call an intrusion by the West into Russia’s near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. The term was reportedly popularized by former Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s. For centuries, Russia has sought to ensure its physical security through its control over neighboring territory. For Putin, the term represents a concept akin to the Monroe Doctrine. Upon returning to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2011, Putin began the process of increasing Russian military manpower by 25 percent to 850,000 between 2011 and mid-2014. Russia supposedly has about 2.5 million active reservists out of a total population of 143 million. It ranks second, behind the US, on the list of countries with conventional warfighting capabilities. Expenditures on defense, and the related category of national security and law enforcement, accounts for 34 percent of Russia’s budget which is more than twice in comparison with 2010. The US only spent 18 percent, or $615 billion of its budget in 2014 on defense and international security. Explaining his concept for achieving this growth, Putin told senior military commanders and defense industry executives at a meeting in Sochi on May 12, 2015, “We can and must do for the defense industry what we did for Sochi.” Putin was referring to the $50 billion spent in to host the 2014 Winter Olympics there. He went on to state, “All questions relating to adequate resource allocation have been resolved.” Putin would seek to exert pressure against the West where and when he felt it would pay dividends.

The Obama administration approached Russia with the idea that the relationship between the two countries could be “reset.” The reset with Russia was one of the administration’s major foreign policy initiatives. Relations with Russian Federation President Dimitry Medvedev were positive. For three years, a relatively smooth and business-like tenor existed in relations with Russia. That contrasted with the contentious relations that followed the Georgian War in 2008 while Putin served as president. It boded well for Obama’s legacy over which White House officials publicly admitted being absorbed. With its Russia policy on track, the administration was comfortable enough to turn toward an even greater priority at the end of 2011 which was referred to as the “pivot to Asia.” Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained it all in an edifying discourse in the October 11, 2011 edition of Foreign Policy magazine. The very substance of the ambitions is merely the shadow of a dream. Putin undoubtedly took great interest in these Europe’s force reductions and the Obama administration’s decision to also make steep reductions in US conventional forces. Those cuts left the US less able to project power, take and hold ground in a non-permissive environment in defense of the interests of the US, its friends, and allies. As noted in the greatcharlie.com post entitled “As World Boils, Fingers Point Obama’s Way; In Putin’s View, Obama’s Doing Just Fine”, in 2013, the US withdrew its last two heavy armored brigades from Germany. Tank units anchored the US military presence on the ground in Europe for 70 years. US military leaders have considered withdrawing the last squadron of F-15C air superiority fighters from England. When Putin received the Obama administration’s proposals in 2013 calling for steep reductions in nuclear forces, he may have discerned that for the Obama administration, the US nuclear arsenal was merely a political bargaining chip, but not a military tool. Putin rejected the administration’s proposals.

Putin (left) and Obama (right). When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the Obama administration responded to him as if he were a neophyte and not a seasoned national leader. Old ills that were part of US-Russian relations resurfaced, and new ones arose. The actions and reactions of the Obama administration to Russia did much to further pollute and obscure what was already a difficult path to travel regarding US-Russia relations. Hell called Hell. One misstep led to another.

Cuiusvis est errare nullius nisi insipientes, in error perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.) Having taken on Putin on the nuclear issue, Obama kept pushing into more troubling waters. His administration moved along the path humiliate him. It was hard for Obama administration staff, perhaps due to their youthful exuberance, to recognize that words cannot return. The administration predominantly staffed with eager, youthful officials who very often displayed an arrogance that seemingly drove them to convince the world they were the center of the cosmos. One should not allow one’s ego to run away from one. One certainly should not make choices with a confused ego. The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. The actions and reactions of the Obama administration to Russia did much to further pollute and obscure what was already a difficult path to travel regarding US-Russia relations. Hell called Hell. One misstep led to another. It all seemed a bit barky. When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the Obama administration responded to him as if he were a neophyte and not a seasoned national leader. Old ills that were part of US-Russian relations resurfaced, and new ones arose. On the world stage, Putin will never allow Russia to be perceived as wilting before what he views as Washington’s effort to establish total dominance. He would resist and counter pressures. One matter to which Putin gave primacy to getting the US and EU to take into account Russia’s interests on Ukraine and other issues.

In Ukraine, Putin insisted that he was only acting in response to Western behavior toward Russia. Speaking at a conference in Moscow on April 16, 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu explained: “The United States and its allies have crossed all possible lines in their drive to bring Kiev into their orbit. That could not have failed to trigger our reaction.” The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov stated at the same conference, “Considering themselves the winners of the Cold War, the United States decided to reshape the world to fit its needs.” He further explained, “It’s clear that measures taken by NATO to strengthen the bloc and increase its military capabilities are far from being defensive.” Nonetheless, nothing Russian officials might say would dissuade most in the US and EU from believing Putin is driving events forward. After alienating Putin by preventing him from further participation in the G-8, and hitting many of his close associates, their business interests, and Russian industries with sanctions, the US and EU expected him to back off of Ukraine and Eastern European states. Yet, those who believed sanctions and other coercive means, and deploying small sets of US forces to the Baltic States and Poland would modify Putin’s behavior were in the cradle intellectually. Sanctions from the US and Europeans, which posed a serious economic threat to Russia despite any heroic claims otherwise by Putin, put relations between Russia and the West, built largely on economic cooperation, at considerable risk. It is unlikely the administration foresaw things would go so badly. It has been proven that humans cannot control events too long. This is not without application to the circumstances examined here. Historia magistra vitae et testris temporum. (History is the teacher, the witness of times.)

A Newsweek map of Russian Federation armed forces deployed against the West (above). By 2015, NATO Members acknowledged that Russia posed a genuine threat to the well-being of their countries. The RAND Corporation prepared a study for the US Department of Defense on the outcome of Russian military move against the Baltic States. The study was based on war games played by US military officers and civilian officials over several months between 2014-2015. The game ended with a disastrous defeat for NATO in a matter of days.

NATO Responds?

NATO Members were flabbergasted by their gross miscalculations about Putin and Russia. By 2015, they were willing to acknowledge that Russia posed a genuine threat to the well-being of their countries. The RAND Corporation prepared a study for the US Department of Defense on a possible Russia move against the Baltic States. The study centered on several tabletop war games played by US military officers and civilian officials over several months between 2014 and 2015. The games incorporated tactics used Russia when it deployed forces into the Crimea. The games ended with a disastrous defeat for NATO in a matter of days. The study found that NATO forces deployed to the Baltics were small, and lacked the vehicles and firepower to take on the Russian juggernaut of heavy tanks and mechanized vehicles opposite them. The study indicated that NATO ground troops lacked anti-aircraft artillery to fend off Russian warplanes in a wartime scenario. More specifically, regarding the outcome reached under the study’s scenario, “By and large, NATO’s infantry found themselves unable even to retreat successfully and were destroyed in place.” Regarding US and allied air power, despite its ability to strike in depth against advancing Russian forces, destroying many in place and disrupting and delaying the attacks of others, US and allied air commanders would need to limit the number of aircraft dedicated to that mission and deploy them to negating the capabilities of Russia’s air defenses and provide air cover against Russian air attacks on rear areas. It was accepted that Russian forces would be able to smash through NATO defenses and drive on to Riga or Tallinn within 36 to 60 hours. The RAND study assessed that US and its allies would be left with three equally unpalatable options. NATO could launch a prolonged counter-offensive to take back the Baltic capitals; NATO could threaten Moscow with direct attack; or NATO could accept the outcome of the Russian lightning strikes and devise a long-term counter-strategy. RAND asserted that options one and two would lead to nuclear war; option three would result in a new Cold War that could eventually go hot. In discussing a possible way forward, it was RAND’s judgement that through “due diligence” and bolstering its defenses, NATO would send “a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all US allies and partners worldwide.”

Initially, Europe’s requests for support from the US to counter a perceived growing threat from Russia were met by mediocre responses by the Obama administration. The world witnessed the vicissitudes that hammered the Obama administration on foreign policy. The situation in the Middle East was particularly dire then. The Obama administration often failed to acknowledge how bad problems really were. It settled upon bromides, with a seductive kind of superficiality, to very challenging situations, which later prove to be shallow entrapments. At the NATO Defense Ministers Meetings on June 24, 2015, participants decided on air, maritime, and special forces components of an enhanced 40,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF). Ministers took measures to speed up political and military decision-making, including authority for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe to prepare troops for action as soon as a political decision is made. Ministers approved a new concept of advance planning. They also finalized details on the six small headquarters being set up in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “They will each consist of around 40 people, and will play a key role in planning, exercises, and assisting potential reinforcement.” Ministers additionally decided to establish a new Joint Logistics Headquarters, to facilitate the rapid movement of forces when necessary.  Directly on Russia, Stoltenberg stated, “We are carefully assessing the implications of what Russia is doing, including its nuclear activities.” He added that NATO is working on how to deal with hybrid threats, including through close cooperation with the European Union. To avoid misperceptions of NATO’s actions, Stoltenberg explained, “We do not seek confrontation, and we do not want a new arms race.” He stressed, “we want to keep our countries safe… this is our job.”

True, increases in defense spending were seen even during the Obama administration in 2016. That year, a majority of delinquent countries spent their required share in the face of Putin’s build-up and enhancement of Russian forces and his operation in Ukraine. Yet, even then, allies agreed to spend only the required 2 percent of economic output on defense every year by 2024 and reverse a trend that saw military research spending in the European Union fall by more than 20 billion euros ($23 billion) since 2006. Still, only four of NATO’s 27 European members–Greece, Britain, Poland and Estonia–met the spending target in 2016. Romania would also do so in 2017, followed by Latvia and Lithuania in 2018.

Troops of the new German Army (above). At a NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in June 2015, in response to Russia’s move into Ukraine, participants decided on air, maritime, and special forces components for an enhanced 40,000 strong NATO Response Force. Ministers took measures to speed up political and military decision-making. Ministers also approved a new concept of advance planning, and finalized details on the six small headquarters being set up in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.

What Is the Zapad Exercise?

Deterrence is created when the doubt of success or fear is generated in the mind of an adversary over a potential response to a attack. In addition to the doubt and fear created, there must be an ample demonstration of the capability to respond efficaciously. The Zapad exercise was first conducted by Russia in 2009, and again in 2013. Traditionally, during Zapad, Russia displays new tactics and technologies. The expressed reason for Zapad 2013 was the rehearsal of Russia’s defense against armed terrorists moving in from the Baltic. The Zapad 2013 exercise was called a counterterrorism training exercise. However, tying Zapad 2013 to counterterrorism was a public relations farce, akin to dressing up a clumsy stumble as a brisé volé. In 2009, the exercise ended with a mock nuclear strike on Sweden. In 2013, the exercise ended with a mock nuclear strike on Poland. In Zapad 2017, ended with the test launch of RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles–two were real, one was an electronic simulation.

However, when Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu announced Zapad 2017 on November 21, 2016, he did not outline it in a way that made it resemble counterterrorism exercise. Indeed, he stated that the joint exercise, which would be the “main military event of 2017.” During Zapad, he stated Russian and Belarusian armed forces would cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken. Shoigu words reflected Putin’s intent of never allowing Russia to be perceived as wilting before what he views as Washington’s effort to establish total dominance. Putin and his advisers were also compelled to resist and counter pressures. He wanted the US and EU to take into account Russia’s interests on Ukraine and other issues. Zapad 2017 would be emblematic of that perspective, full of sound, fury and ferocity that would cause trembling in the capitals of European powers. Interestingly, the raison d’etre settled upon for Zapad 2017, however, was counterterrorism and it was finally labelled as a counterterrorism exercise. Yet, after the inauguration of Trump on January 20, 2017, Zapad 2017 then became an exercise directed at an administration that was already out of power and a prospective administration that never took power. Indeed, the exercise was a response to a feud that has ended. Inevitably, there was a change in thinking in Moscow in response to Trump’s approach of seeking to improve relations with Russia was made. Nevertheless, Moscow was unable to fully discern what the change from Obama to Trump on not only European defense, and redesign Zapad 2017’s to meet immediate circumstances, reduce cost, and the size and scope of the exercise early on. Obama certainly did not leave matters in Europe better than he found them in 2008 or in the best shape possible when Trump entered the White House.

Putin holds binoculars while observing Zapad 2017 exercises with senior commanders (above). The genesis of Zapad 2017 was the desire by Moscow to take steps in the midst of a descending spiral of uncongenial relations with the US. The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. Putin never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. Putin pushed backed against what he viewed as the West’s intrusion into territory surrounding Russia’s borders.

A Brief Review of ZAPAD 2017

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense claimed that around 13,000 service personnel participated in Zapad 2017. However, most observers believed the exercise was quite a bit larger. London’s Royal United Services Institute reported some independent estimate around 70,000 troops were involved. Boiled down to the bones, the drafted drill scenario for Zapad 2017 was a covert, foreign incursion into western Belarus, which some Western military analysts such as Mathieu Boulègue of the Chatham House, say greatly resembled Russia’s tactics in Crimea, while combat involved a series of measures honed in Syria. In the very early stage of Zapad 2017, the aim was to raise combat readiness among the deployed force groupings, moving troops, deploying command-and-control assets, as well as organizing interactions among these forces and affording force protection. Under that scenario, Russian airborne units are sent for reconnaissance and to repel the enemy incursion. Indeed, reportedly, aviation and air-defense units from the 6th Army Air Force and Air Defense in the Western Military District conducted various tactical episodes aimed at repelling “massive air strikes” by a conventional opponent. Pilots also worked on striking ground targets and providing escort for bombers. Operational-tactical and other tactical missiles were used during this process. The Russian Federation Aerospace Forces conducted sorties mainly using Su-27, Su-35, Su-30SM and MiG-31 fighters to destroy enemy aircraft, while Su-34 bombers struck infrastructure, columns of armored vehicles, and enemy command-and-control nodes; an Su-24MR jet was used for reconnaissance to transmit the coordinates of ground targets. Newly observed in this phase of Zapad 2017 was use of a suite of high-tech equipment to support the arrival of paratrooper forces, to include radio and electronic capabilities and the integration of drones. Drones were regularly spotted in the sky during Zapad 2017. The speed and reliability of its own data links and communication systems was tested in a scenario where speed was primary requirement, as opposed to the need in the past for greater forces.

The Russian Federation Army then prepared for ground attack with aerial and naval support. This type of multidimensional warfighting, tying an artillery-enabled ground assault with air support, is now called Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. A multilayer air-defense bubble, similar to the Russian A2/AD assets used in Syria, was constructed. Russian air-defense systems were forward deployed from their bases in the Western Military District, including S-300s, S-400s and Pantsir-S1s. The simulation that ensued targeted enemy cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft. In Kaliningrad, similar activity among Russian naval assets was reported.. Corvettes in the Baltic Fleet were used to strike aerial, naval and coastal targets, implying an A2/AD mission. In this case, the air attack was simulated by Su-24 attack aircraft alongside Ka-27 anti-submarine-warfare helicopters. Other Russian A2/AD components featured in this phase of Zapad 2017 included the Iskander-M, a nuclear and conventional tactical ballistic missile. Iskander strikes were reported at training ranges, including a 480-kilometer strike against a target at a training range in Kazakhstan from units in the Central Military District, as well as a variety of cruise missiles fired from air, land and sea. The Missile and Artillery Troops, a Branch of Arms in the Ground Forces, serving as the primary means of destroying enemy forces by conventional and nuclear fires, were in action throughout Zapad. Those forces also used the older Tochka-U system, which is in the process of being fully replaced by the Iskander-M. The Iskander’s appearance in Russian exercises is assumed to indicate the rehearsal for a tactical nuclear weapons strike. In Zapad 2017, the Iskander was mainly conventional in its support of A2/AD. Moreover, the Russian missile forces appear to have rehearsed the use of a cruise missile that can be mounted on the Iskander platform, greatly extending the system’s strike range well beyond 500 km. Then, as mentioned, all of these activities during Zapad 2017 were squeezed between 3 test launches of the RS-24.

Russian tanks and BRDM-2s (above). Although Zapad 2017 was called a defense drill and a counterterrorism operation, in a very overt way, the tactics switched into an offensive against a conventional military force on its heels. The ground air operations rehearsed in Zapad 2017 were an expression of Russia’s objective of establishing dominance to prevent long wars, thwart and deter strikes at new points, and avoid escalation. The drill was all about NATO, and it really showed.

Although Zapad 2017 was called a defense drill, in a very overt way, the tactics switched midway into an offensive against a conventional military force on its heels. As mentioned earlier, it was not a counterterrorism operation. The ground air operations rehearsed in Zapad 2017 were an expression of Russia’s objective of establishing dominance to prevent long wars, thwart and deter strikes at new points, and avoid escalation. Boulègue of Chatham House told Newsweek: “The drill was all about NATO, and it really showed.” In the end, the whole cabaret of Zapad 2017 competed for attention of general staff with Al Nusra attack in force in Syria requiring heavy use of Russian air assets. Ironically, that was a more authentic counterterrorism operation.

Where Does All of This Leave Trump?

Clearly, in his last spell of contact with the US, Putin found no joy. The commitment to resources to Zapad 2017 despite the benign intentions expressed, is worthy of note given emphasis made by US newsmedia of how Russia wanted to make Trump look good. The forward movement of Russian Federation armed forces in a westward direction, in a military exercise translated into English means “west”, was of concern for US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, and US National Security Adviser Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, and all other senior members of the Trump administration’s national security team. In September 2017, while Trump’s national security team was heavily immersed on North Korea, supporting partners heavily engaged on the ground in Syria and Iraq, and dealing with the implication of events in Charlottesville, they were also closely watching Zapad 2017. They worked with NATO allies and other European partners on the matter, and conducted significant multinational drills that coincided with the Russian exercise. The October 1st New York Times article explained that US Secretary of Defense James Mattis ordered that a wider array of European partners have access to classified US information during the exercise to simulate conditions during combat. The sangfroid shown by the Trump administration has allowed to engage in sober analysis of Zapad 2017 and all of its elements.

By letting Zapad 2017 come and go from the scene, Trump made it clear that he did not see the need to stoke the fires between the US and Russia that were set during the Obama administration. He preferred to let those fires die out on their own. Trump’s response to Zapad 2017 was also a manifestation of his desire to soften anti-US sentiment in Russia and anti-Russian sentiment in the US. Trump’s believes hope was that normative behavior and positive relations between the US and Russia could be established by working to surmount contentious issues. Trump came into the Oval Office believing the moment had arrived to create positive change in US-Russia relations. Rebus angustis animosus atque fortis appare; sapienter idem contrahes vento nimium secundo turgida vela. (Appear strong and firm in steep affairs; likewise, you will wisely shorten your sails swollen in a too favorable wind.)

Trump (left) and Putin (left) at G20 in July 2017. The sangfroid shown by the Trump administration in response to Zapad 2017 has allowed for a sober analysis of all of its elements. Trump made it clear that he did not see the need to stoke the fires between the US and Russia that were set during the Obama administration. He would prefer to let those fires die out on their own. Trump wants his administration to focus on creating positive change and congenial ties between the US and Russia by surmounting contentious issues.

All of this draws focus to Trump’s intriguing, positive duality on Russia and Europe. Trump fully understands that NATO is absolutely necessary, contrary to the song and dance of wondering if he knew what NATO was and whether he thought it was truly obsolete much as he gestured essentially out of political expedience during the 2016 US Presidential Campaign. Trump wanted to stir things up, draw attention to the issue, and express ideas favorable to his political base, which is what politicians do when campaigning. Once he became US President, Trump’s intended to be constructuve, not destructive via his criticisms about NATO. Trump apparently never intended to truly signal that he did not support for NATO or understand its importance. Though his “constructive criticism”, Trump ostensibly sought to hone thinking among leaders of NATO Member States and encourage the polishing of their best ideas in support of collective defense.

Yet, Trump, before and after becoming US President, also expressed his genuine belief that NATO allies have been “coddled” by the US for too long, causing leaders of NATO allies to feel comfortable repeatedly missing the agreed spending target of 2% GDP on defense. On April 12, 2017, the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with Trump in Washington to discuss his concerns about NATO. Stoltenberg was able to convey that a new spirit of unity and commitment that prevailed among NATO Members. Stoltenberg, in turn, would discover that Trump’s sentiments were noble contrary to what critics were stating. In an hour long meeting in the Oval Office, Trump and Stoltenberg discussed ways in which the NATO Secretary General planned to get member countries to increase military spending to bolster the alliance. Stoltenberg listened to Trump’s concept to accomplish the same, and saw no mysterious elements to Trump’s approach. It was at that Oval Office meeting that Trump explained that NATO was a “bulwark of international peace and security.” He went as far as to say that the alliance was increasing cooperation to stem terror attacks, among other steps. During a news conference with Stoltenberg, Trump added: “I said it [NATO] was obsolete. It is no longer obsolete.”

Rerum concordia discors. (The concord of things through discord.) Invited to the unveiling of a memorial to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US at the new NATO headquarters building in Brussels, on May 24, 2017, Trump intensified his accusations that NATO allies were not spending enough on defense. Trump did say during the ceremony that the US “will never forsake the friends who stood by our side.” However, he focused far more on Europe’s drop in defense spending since the end of the Cold War. Standing before a piece of the wreckage of the World Trade Center, Trump stated: “Twenty-three of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying for their defense.” Trump added before the leaders of other NATO countries: “This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States, and many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years.” Stoltenberg, having previously talked with Trump in Washington, was not surprised by anything Trump said. In fact, Stoltenberg defended Trump, saying that although he was “blunt” he had “a very plain and clear message on the expectations” of allies. Trump had the impact both he and Stoltenberg apparently wanted upon NATO Members. While critics ratcheted up reports and commentaries on how Trump embarrassed himself and was tearing NATO apart, Stoltenberg explained that Trump ignited a new drive in NATO to authentically build up defense.

Trump (right) and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (left). Invited to the unveiling of a memorial to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US at the new NATO headquarters building in Brussels, on May 24, 2017, Trump intensified his accusations that NATO allies were not spending enough on defense. Having met with Trump in Washington, Stoltenberg was not surprised by anything he said. Stoltenberg defended Trump, saying although he was “blunt,” he had “a very plain and clear message on the expectations” of allies.

Speaking in Brussels a month later on June 28, 2017, Stoltenberg explained that 23 of NATO’s 29 allies planned to lift spending that year. He would add that for the first time, NATO governments will produce national plans showing how they would reach the 2024 spending pledge, focusing not just on spending increases but also monitoring troop contributions to missions and acquiring technology such as precision-guided munitions. The new figures were part of a broader rise in military spending in Europe. The US committed billions more in dollars to return troops and heavy weaponry to the continent to deter Russia. The EU sought to do its part by setting up a multi-billion-euro defense fund. Stoltenberg explained: “We have really shifted gears, the trend is up and we intend to keep it up.” On the nature of the force build up, Stoltenberg stated: “It’s more about high-end forces, heavier forces and more ready forces, meaning we need forces that are fully equipped, fully manned and fully trained.” Beyond increasing the levels of heavy weapons and gear for troops in strategically positioned bases and standing watch on NATO’s borders, Stoltenberg further stated that the increase in funds would be spent on more military exercises, training and equipment and to allowing NATO troops to deploy at ever faster notice, as well to pay salaries and pensions. There remained a curiosity for where Trump stood in response to Putin’s attitudes and expressions toward the West. Some confusion and bewilderment resulted particularly from ideas publicly expressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Trump was unwilling to stand with Europe against Russia. While still disagreeing with Trump on some policy areas, Merkel has since expressed far more positive perspectives regarding him and European security. Post proelia praecima. (After the battles came the rewards.)

Trump reiterated his support of NATO on July 6, 2017 in Krasiński Square in Warsaw, the site of the 1944 uprising against the Nazis. In that magnificently melodramatic setting commemorating resistance against a cruel foreign occupier, Trump suggested that a lack of collective resolve could doom the transatlantic alliance which had endured the Cold War. Trump painted a picture of the West facing existential challenges and needed to “defend our civilization” from terrorism, bureaucracy and the erosion of traditions. As an example of resolve, Trump pointed to Poland, which in the last century endured occupations by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union twice. Trump explained: “The story of Poland is the story of a people who have never lost hope, who have never been broken, and who have never forgotten who they are.” It was noted in the European newsmedia that in his speech, Trump for the first time “stood by” Article V of the NATO Charter, a provision requiring NATO Members to come to each others defense once under attack.  Yet, Trump kept up the pressure on those NATO Members who were “failing to meet their full and fair financial obligations on defense spending.” Trump expressed the view that his tough criticism of NATO Members who had not met the target of raising defense spending to 2% of GDP was paying off, with billions more being committed to defense across Europe. In a powerful expression of the need for alliance unity through use of the rhetorical technique of anaphora, Trump stated: “The fundamental question of our time is whether the west has the will to survive. Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to defend our borders? Do we have the desire and courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and destroy it?” What should have been of particular interest to the US newsmedia was Trump’s criticism of Russia. He accused Moscow of “destabilising activities in Ukraine and elsewhere,” and declared that Putin was supporting “hostile regimes including Syria and Iran.” It is worth noting that all of this transpired before Zapad 2017. Trump’s leadership of NATO and his demand for Europe’s vigilance in the face of military threat from Russia is certainly worthy of attention. By ignoring such facts, critics lend credence to the allegation that they display a consistent disregard of genuine facts about Trump’s efforts which are inconsistent with their counter-Trump narrative. Quid enim est stultius quam incerta pro certis habere, falsa pro veris? (What, indeed, is more foolish than to consider uncertainties as certain, falsehoods as truths?)

Trump reiterated his support of NATO on July 6, 2017 in Krasiński Square in Warsaw. In his speech, Trump suggested then that a lack of collective resolve could doom the transatlantic alliance which had endured the Cold War. Trump painted a picture of the West facing existential challenges. Critics noted that in his speech, Trump for the first time “stood by” Article V of the NATO Charter, a provision requiring NATO Members to come to each others defense once under attack.

The Way Forward

In Act II, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play, Othello, Iago, the ensign of the Venetian General Othello, delivers his first soliloquy, declaring his hatred for Othello, his suspicion that Othello has slept with his wife, Emilia, and his determination to destroy him. He lays out his plan to cheat his supposed ally, Roderigo out of his money, to convince Othello that a loyal soldier, Cassio has slept with his wife, Desdemona, and to use Othello’s honest and unsuspecting nature to bring him to his demise. Iago states: “I have told thee often, and I re-tell thee again and again, I hate the Moor: my cause is hearted; thine hath no less reason. Let us be conjunctive in our revenge against him: if thou canst cuckold him, thou dost thyself a pleasure, me a sport. There are many events in the womb of time which will be delivered.” Former US President Jimmy Carter was quoted in the New York Times on October 21, 2017 as saying: “I think the media have been harder on Trump than any other president certainly that I’ve known about.” He added: “I think they feel free to claim that Trump is mentally deranged and everything else without hesitation.” Indeed, at the present, the opportunity to attack Trump is rarely missed by his critics. Their ranks actually extend well beyond the US newsmedia to include: think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration. That has had a multiplier effect when advanced alongside the efforts of journalists among his critics, ensuring that through prose, and even verse, there would be a more than ample stream of bdelygmia. Critics seem determined to throw Trump into loneliness and pain. Yet, they may ultimately discover that Trump has reserves of strength unlike most men which was proven through his business career. Indeed, much as Nebuchadnezzar brought Sgadrach, Meshach, and Abednego from the furnace, stunned by their impunity in the face a tremendous flames, critics may discover in the end, that Trump will endure, survive, and overcome the flames of their best attacks. Trump’s ties to Russia, real and imagined, are a primary focus of attacks by his critics. Yet, Trump’s critics did not try to tie him to Zapad 2017, despite the massive display of Russian military power. Zapad 2017 should have transmitted the idea that Putin is not a new friend of the US, Trump in particular. Regarding Putin, he undoubtedly notices is the atmosphere of pure hatred and rejection propagated by the counter-Trump milieu. He surely recognizes that there is an effort to separate Trump from the US public and create turmoil and frustration which he, for certain, does not have his hand in.

In alio pediculum, intericinum non vides. (You see a louse on someone else but not a tick on yourself.) However, the contradiction that Zapad 2017 presents has not left Trump’s critics figuratively cold and muddled intellectually. Rather, moral relativism seems to be in play. The Catholic priest and theologian Father George Rutler explains that “It does not require genius to sense that all relations in the creation are harmonious. Only because of celestial harmony is there a human intuition that wrong is wrong and right is right. Beyond that intuition one must animate the intellect, use natural law, to parse things out. In classical philosophy, natural law is the universal, practical obligatory judgments of reason, knowable by all men and binding them to do good and avoid evil. The renowned Greek Philosopher Plato considered ignorance and confusion as the opposites of harmony. The goal of the torrent of anger from critics is certainly not bring a happy harmony to a dissonant world. Having promoted themselves figuratively as the defenders of US wisdom. They must find out for themselves who lives within them. Rather than follow the pack and do what is wrong, surmount that impulse and have the courage to do what is right. There appears to be a purpose to Trump which the majority of his many critics do not understand but will ultimately discover. Indeed, by God’s chance, as he toils, performing his duties as president in peace and in war, Trump’s intended course will no longer be a mystery to those who have been bewildered by the counter-Trump milieu.  Opinions expressed by critics about his efforts could also eventually change. In the face of staggering contradiction, an internal discord might obtain within quite a few critics. Many critics may become uncertain as to their true ends. Some may discover that their feelings of indignation and despair over Trump were inauthentic.Consideration may come and whip the offending Adam out of them. All that was said and done by critics may be looked upon curiously as a type of avant-garde expression. Perhaps then critics might finally offer a gesture of goodwill for the moment, and their efforts to hurt may slowly fall off and be replaced by righteous efforts to be constructive. In commenting on self mastery and the good or virtuous life, Aristotle is quoted as stating: “I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies, for the hardest victory is the victory over oneself.”

Trump Backtracks on Cyber Unit With Russia: His Proposal Was Flawed, But His Thinking Is on Target

US President Donald Trump (above). Trump has engaged in negotiations for decades. In his face to face bilateral meeting with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, Trump was allowed the chance to adjust to circumstances, become more fluid in his thinking, more creative in his approach. His proposal for a joint cyber security unit, while scoffed at, and albeit, not viable under US law, appeared to be a product of his willingness to consider the full range of options. Moreover, as a confidence building measure, it may have had a positive impact on Putin.

According to a July 10, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Trump Backtracks on Cyber Unit With Russia After Harsh Criticism”, US President Donald Trump, on July 10, 2017, backtracked on his push for a cyber security unit with Russia, tweeting that he did not think it could happen, hours after his proposal was harshly criticized by Republicans who said Moscow could not be trusted. The New York Times article explained the idea was a political non-starter. It was immediately scorned by several of Trump’s fellow Republicans, who questioned why the US would work with Russia after Moscow’s reported meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. The episode over the proposal unfolded on July 9, 2017 after his bilateral meeting with Putin in Hamburg, Germany during the G-20 Economic Summit. Trump emphasised that he raised allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election with Putin. Reuters reported on July 9, 2017 that Trump stated: “I strongly pressed President Putin twice about Russian meddling in our election. He vehemently denied it. I’ve already given my opinion…..” As an immediate response to Putin’s denials on the matter, Trump then proposed forming a cyber security unit. According to Reuters on July 9, 2017, Trump wrote in the actual tweet about the cyber security unit: “Putin & I discussed forming an impenetrable Cyber Security unit so that election hacking, & many other negative things, will be guarded and safe.”

When Trump broached the the issue of the Russia’s hacking of the 2016 Presidential Election and his discussion with Putin apparently became a bit scratchy. Putin’s denial of the facts presented most likely signalled to Trump that he would be engaged in a argument without end on the hacking. Trump had to either move away from the issue or move laterally on it in some way.  Surely, Trump did not want to abandon the matter. The proposal for a joint cyber security unit apparently stemmed from an intense discussion between Trump and Putin on how to remit Russian cyber warfare programs directed at the US and perhaps similar US programs aimed at Russia. It may have been the product of brainstorming by the two leaders. Trump’s proposal was never supposed to serve as a form retribution against Russia for its intrusions into the US democratic process. Surely, it was not created to be a final solution to the threat of hacking US election. Immediately after the bilateral meeting in Germany, it was revealed that forming such a joint cyber security unit with Russia was prohibited under US law. Yet, although creating an actual cyber security unit was out of bounds, the concept of bringing US and Russian cyber experts together in some way to talk about some cyber matters was not. Trump’s likely aim with the proposal was to create a situation in which US and Russian officials were talking about hacking. Ostensibly, those conversations would create goodwill, perhaps stimulate a more open discussion about the issue, and promote more fulsome, honest talks about the issue among senior officials. In that way, the proposal certainly would have served as an effective confidence building measure.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines an apologist as a person who offers an argument in defense of something controversial. That is not the intent here. The OED defines an analyst as someone who conducts analyses. Foreign policy analysts scrutinize facts and data and interpret them, often in different ways. Given what is publicly known about Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit, the analysis here explains that although flawed, it is the sort of unconventional product that can result from intense negotiations aimed at coping with a seemingly intractable issue. The troublesome issue in this case is Russia’s intrusions into the 2016 US Presidential Election with all of its considerable security and political implications. It is also explained here that Trump’s proposal reveals a bit about his negotiating style. Trump clearly becomes target-oriented in his talks, and will make smaller agreements to build his interlocutor’s trust in him. From congruences Trump discerns in his interlocutor’s thinking and his own, he will try to craft a mutually satisfying agreement that, of course, ensures he will get what he wants. At this stage, Trump is still trying to get answers from Russia about the election issue and mollify the anxieties of various constituencies in the US over the negotiations, while hard at work trying to improve relations with Russia. Using his skills and experience, he seems to be swimming in the right direction. Audacibus annue coeptis. (Look with favor upon a bold beginning.)

Over the past decade, Russia has mounted more than a dozen significant cyber attacks against foreign countries, sometimes to help or harm a specific political candidate, sometimes to sow chaos, but always to project Russian power. From June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic Party officials. Russian officials deny engaging in such operations.  Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence efforts.

Russian Cyber Attacks during the 2016 US Presidential Election

As it was discussed in the July 6, 2017 greatcharlie post entitled “Trump to Meet with Putin at G-20 Gathering: Trump Seeks an Authentic Relationship with Russia”, over the past decade, Russia has mounted more than a dozen significant cyber attacks against foreign countries, sometimes to help or harm a specific political candidate, sometimes to sow chaos, but always to project Russian power. The Russian strategy is typically to pair cyber attacks with online propaganda. That approach has been refined and expanded by Russian intelligence. From June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic officials, which in turn were distributed to the global media by WikiLeaks. Both the CIA and the FBI report the intrusions were intended to undermine the US election. Cyber gives Russia a usable strategic capability. If benefits from its use appear great enough, Moscow may want to risk additional attacks. Russian officials will normally vehemently deny launching cyber attacks. Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence operations. Putin has never publicly discussed them.

The report of the January 16, 2017 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Election” presents the best publicized assessment by the US Intelligence Community of the Russian cyber attack during the 2016 US Presidential Election. The Russian operation to influence the 2016 US Presidential Election demonstrated a marked escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of  Moscow’s longstanding desire and effort to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order. US Intelligence Community assesses that Putin, himself, ordered the influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s objectives were: to undermine public faith in the US democratic process; to denigrate former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; and, to harm her electability and potential presidency.  The US Intelligence Community further assessed that Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for then President-elect Trump. In following, it also assessed Putin and the Russian Government aspired to aid President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. The approach the Russia took to operation reportedly evolved over the course of the campaign given its understanding of the US electoral prospects of the two main candidates. The Intelligence Community concluded that once it appeared to Moscow that Clinton would likely win the election, the Russian operation began to focus more on undermining her future presidency. It was uncovered by Intelligence Community that the influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blended covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.”

The Intelligence Community has declared that much as its Soviet predecessor, Russia has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections, using Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin. Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US were Presidential Election, including targets associated with both major US political parties, were conducted by Russian intelligence services. The Intelligence Community assessed with high confidence that the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data collected in cyber operations publicly, in exclusives to media outlets, and transmitted material to WikiLeaks. Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards. US Department of Homeland Security assessments in the report explain that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying. The Russia’s state-run propaganda machine Russia Today contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.  The US Intelligence Community concluded that Moscow will apply lessons learned from its “Putin-ordered campaign” directed at the 2016 US Presidential Election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes.

Testifying before the US Senate Intelligence Committee on June21, 2017, Jeanette Manfra, the US Department of Homeland Security’s acting deputy Undersecretary of Cyber Security revealed that 21 US state election systems were targeted as part of Russia’s wide-ranging operation to influence the 2016 elections. She explained that a small number state election systems were also breached but there was no evidence any votes were manipulated. Manfra noted that the elections are resilient to hacking in part because they are decentralized and largely operated on the state and local level. Nevertheless, the hacking of state and local election databases in 2016 was more extensive than previously reported. According to Time, there was at least one successful attempt to alter voter information. Reportedly in Illinois, more than 90% of the nearly 90,000 records stolen by Russian state actors contained driver’s’ license numbers, and a quarter contained the last four digits of voters’ Social Security numbers.

According to the US Intelligence Community, 21 US state election systems were targeted as part of Russia’s wide-ranging operation to influence the 2016 elections. A small number state election systems were also breached but there was no evidence any votes were manipulated. However, there was at least one successful attempt to alter voter information.  In Illinois, more than 90% of the nearly 90,000 records stolen by Russian state actors contained driver’s license numbers, and a quarter contained the last four digits of voters’ Social Security numbers.

Reaching Agreements: Easier Said than Done

Before the Trump-Putin bilateral meeting, what had been observed in diplomatic exchanges between the US and Russia is a type of modus vivendi, a way of living, working together, between leaders and chief diplomats. After Putin granted US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson a meeting in Moscow after his talks with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Trump granted Lavrov a meeting in Washington during a visit to meeting with Tillerson. It also indicated a willingness to establish a balance in negotiations or quid pro quo on issues when possible. US State Department and Russian Foreign Ministry officials are also working together to resolve nagging issues that could serve to harm efforts to foster good relations. Such seemingly small steps helped to build confidence in both Washington and Moscow that the prospect for change was real, and it lead to the arrangement of a meeting between presidents. Those small steps also supported an open line of communication between chief diplomats which is all importance as US and Russian military forces work in close proximity in Syria, fighting continues in Ukraine, and aerial and naval intrusions remain constant in skies and waters in NATO, Canadian and US territory. If all went well, there will certainly be more to follow.

All of that being stated, the successful formulation and execution of such small steps is a daunting in public. When Putin initially took power on January 1, 2000, the West expected him to give it nothing less than his unequivocal cooperation in a manner similar to his predecessor, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. Western capitals also expected Putin to be a bit wobbly taking on so much responsibility at a relatively early age. Yet, Putin knew his shoulders could bear the burden. He had no desire to be just a man of the moment in Russia. Much as Yeltsin, Putin, too, showed patience toward the West for a while, but he did not procrastinate. He took on the mission of breathing fresh breath into a country that was dying. He pushed ahead with plans “to save” Russia from disintegration and frustrate what he sensed were Western efforts to weaken it. Indeed, Putin did not believe congenial relations with the West were authentic given the many years of geopolitical struggle. Putin believed then, and believes now, that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He believes Western governments are driven to create disorder in Russia and make it dependent of Western technologies. Still, Putin has shown that would prefer to outthink his rivals in the West rather than fight them. That notion has influenced his responses in contentious situations. After the period of a term away from the presidency during which he served as his country’s prime minister, Putin was reelected for a third term on March 4, 2012. He clased repeatedly with US President Barack Obama and seemed to act more aggressively. The Russian military move that stood out was the annexation of the Crimea.

The US and EU took Putin to task for that bold military operation. Harsh sanctions were levied and Russia was cast out of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies. Putin has held on to the territory and has continued to do so in the face of even tougher sanctions against Russian interests. He levied his own sanctions against US and EU products and even began heavily supporting separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. In a March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Putin vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating some Western actions that fostered contempt in Moscow. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he refers to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Ulterius ne tende odiis. (Go no further down the road of hatred.)

Given the many years of geopolitical struggle, Putin was unconvinced congenial relations between Russia and the West could exist authentically. He believed the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. After Putin was reelected for a third term, he clashed repeatedly with US President Barack Obama. Putin became more aggressive; took more military action. After traveling a bumpy road with the Obama administration, Moscow hoped Trump’s approach to Russia in any direction would reflect the desire not just for new deals, but a new US-Russia relationship.

Trump’s Negotiating Style: It’s Similar to the “Harvard Way”

Parva scintilla saepe magnam flamam excitat. (The sparkle often initiates a large flame.) Given Trump’s gift for agile maneuver against opposite parties in negotiations and his ability to mask his approach, if he chooses to do so, his decisions cannot be forecasted with exactitude. Trump, a self-admitted master of the art of the deal.  His negotiating “tactics, techniques, procedures and methods” Trump appears to have used that were likely developed a tad via his graduate business education at the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania along with heavy dose of experience gained after nearly five decades of business negotiations. His concepts appear similar to those promoted by Harvard University’s Program on Negotiation. Such concepts ostensibly guided him in his first “business meeting” with Putin. They include the following: promoting creativity by breaking problems into smaller components; by doing so, you can build a multi-issue business negotiation out of what might appear to be a single-issue deal; using multiple issues to make valuable tradeoffs and facilitate a good-faith negotiation; collecting important information by asking lots of questions and listening carefully to the answers; impressing the other side with your flexibility by putting forth several different proposals at the same time; contemplate unconventional deal-structuring arrangements to bridge the gap between what the seller wants and what the buyer can afford; exploring a contingent contract to help overcome differences in beliefs about future events and outcomes; creating even more value in business negotiations by adding conditions to your deal such as “I’ll do X if you do Y”; and, engaging in “mind games” like brainstorming to facilitate creative problem solving and unexpected solutions.

Trump surely had high hopes before and during his meeting with Putin. He likely would argue then, and would argue now, that bold action, when appropriate, would be the very thing to turn situations around. Ideally, if big agreements were reached, they could help modify Russian behavior, and get relations moving forward. Yet, Trump is also pragmatic and recognizes that plans must fit circumstances and circumstances cannot be created or imagined to fit plans. Trump understood that there would likely need to be initial, relatively small steps perhaps to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. He would also seek to gauge actions and reactions of his interlocutor, Putin. If he discerned a positive way forward, his sense of possibility would broaden and he would open his mind up to more options. When Trump broached the issue of Russian cyber attacks and eventually presented his proposal, his goal was not to mollify Putin, but rather provide an opportunity for all sides to “clear the air” on the issue of Russia’s hacking of 2016 US Presidential Election but he was unable to receive anything other than denials. Trump is not happy about Russia’s interference with the 2016 Presidential Election both as a patriotic citizen and as a candidate in that election. He may not completely agree that Russia’s action greatly impacted his election victory, but he recognizes that the aesthetics of the intrusion over time could diminish his accomplishment in some minds, particularly among his supporters. Trump understood Putin would likely deny Russia had any connection to the election intrusion, but he undoubtedly believed it was worth a try to have him confirm what most in the US believe.

As Trump and Putin did not have a relationship established prior to the meeting, they did not possess the requisite degree of trust that would allow them to relax and explore the territory outside their formal negotiating positions. They could not talk about their assumptions, strategies, and even fears. They had to work in the abstract from reports of others’ observations and analyses about their respective interlocutors.

The ability of Trump in his negotiations with Putin, to restrain the expression of emotion, in this case anger, perhaps even rage, and not to publish to the world by changes of countenance those thoughts and feelings, was critical if relations were to move forward. To exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to recreate oneself endlessly. Admitting errors, missteps, is a sign of maturity and wisdom. One evolves as a result of recognizing ones mistakes. The mature one has moved from the passive voice to the active voice–that is when one stops saying, “It got lost” and begins saying, “I lost it.” The bilateral meeting between Trump and Putin was a promising moment in relations between the US and Russia. In an advanced, mature way of thinking, a presidential way of thinking in 2017, Trump sought some temporary step on the issue of Russia’s intrusion into the 2016 US Presidential Election by taking into consideration the relative strengths of the positions and capabilities of all sides. Trump understands the peace that can be achieved must be the focus. The focus must not be how much each side can destroy the other through cyber warfare but rather how to end cyber as a mutual threat. One cannot solve a problem with the same thinking one used when one created the problem. Mens sibi conscia recti. (A mind conscious of its own rectitude.)

The Flawed Cyber Proposal: A Telling Product of the Negotiation Process

Six building blocks for diplomatic negotiations were superbly outlined by the renowned US statesman, former US Secretary of State James Baker over a decade ago. Baker explained that the building blocks worked well when properly applied through solid preparation and hard work. The building blocks included: 1) Understanding an opponent’s position; 2) Gaining trust through personal relationships; 3) Reciprocal confidence building; 4) Taking a pragmatic approach that does not sacrifice principles; 5) Being aware of timing; and 6) Maintaining a deep respect for the politics of the situation.

As Trump and Putin did not have a relationship established prior to the meeting, they did not possess the requisite degree of trust that would allow them to relax and explore the territory outside their formal negotiating positions. They could not talk about their assumptions, strategies, and even fears. They had to work in the abstract from reports that presented observations and analyses of others about their respective interlocutors. With specific regard to reciprocal confidence building, both leaders demonstrated that they could negotiate. Baker suggested that at the earliest stage, one could arrange a series small negotiations on issues that could be resolved quickly, reasonably, and amicably to assist in developing a dialogue. Baker explained that finding even a minor, common point of agreement, for example on the shape of the negotiating table, can serve to set the tone of the relationship. It also helps develop a dialogue, which is one of the most important aspects of negotiations.

Former US Secretary of State James Baker (above). Six excellent building blocks for diplomatic negotiations were outlined by former US Secretary of State James Baker over a decade ago. Baker explained that they worked well when properly applied through solid preparation and hard work. Included among them were: 1) Understanding an opponent’s position; 2) Gaining trust through personal relationships; 3) Reciprocal confidence building; 4) Taking a pragmatic approach that does not sacrifice principles; 5) Being aware of timing; and 6) Maintaining a deep respect for the politics of the situation.

Confidence Building Measures: In Brief

Perhaps the best definition for confidence building measures was provided by Simon Mason and Siegfried Matthias, in their seminal article, “Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) in Peace Processes” published in Managing Peace Processes: Process Related Questions. A Handbook for AU Practitioners, Volume 1 (African Union and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013). They define confidence building measures as series of actions that are negotiated, agreed, and implemented by parties in a dispute in order to build confidence without specifically focusing on the root causes of the dispute.

Confidence building measures are designed to build confidence. Confidence is a psychological state, whereby actors make themselves vulnerable and ready to take risks based on the expectation of goodwill and positive behavior from a counterpart. Confidence building measures can prevent a dispute or larger problem from escalating even if the negotiating process is to be started in the short term. Preventing escalation has value in itself and may also allow the negotiation process to begin again later on. Mason and Matthias intriguingly note that confidence building measures can prevent parties from escalating even when there is a denial of any problems or tensions that could escalate. Successful negotiations require risk taking by the parties. That is why a minimum degree of confidence is needed for negotiations to even start. For negotiating parties, confidence building measures are attractive because they are seen as a low-cost and low-risk activities, since they can be implemented with limited resources and calculated risks. The negotiating parties, themselves, must craft confidence building measures to fit their specific case. If not, what is agreed to will not be owned by the parties, and will not serve to build trust. Confidence building measures must also be reciprocal in nature. One party should not feel that it is going out on a limb without the other also doing so. To assist in ensuring confidence is sustained and agreements are appropriately implemented, confidence building measures concerning communication should be put in place.

In an incremental approach to confidence building measures, a series of agreements are used to slowly tackle the more difficult core issues later on. Under this approach, confidence building measures become stepping stones or a pathway to greater agreements. Indeed, agreements on confidence building measures early on generally build trust and interest in negotiating more complex agreements at a later stage. In this sense, confidence building measures create opportunities for parties to collaborate on something that is not strategically important to them and, in so doing, build the trust needed to subsequently discuss important strategic issues. Confidence building measures pull parties away from the obstacle they are blocked on. Once confidence exists, it is then easier to address the obstacles. Mason and Matthias use the metaphor of steps of a ladder also highlights the incremental nature of building trust which takes time and an accumulation of small steps. That is referred to by some as the confidence building process.

Mason and Matthias caution parties negotiating confidence building measures that wider constituencies may view a negotiation process with suspicion before, during, and after negotiations, and may not be willing to accept deals made. Individuals from those constituencies typically will not be present at the negotiation or understand how agreements were arrived at. Plans for responding to the wider constituencies’ concerns must be considered. A mutual understanding that one party made need to break away from a confidence building measure must exist. An agreement could be negotiated that allows the parties an amount of time in which they could communicate to one another about the need to break away from a confidence building measure. Working together on such a matter in itself could build confidence, create some degree of trust.

US military personnel in Cyber Command (above). There is no doubt with regard to the legal barriers to Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the US Department of Defense, which is the parent organization of the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, from using any funds for bilateral military cooperation with Russia. However, the mere fact that Trump offered to work jointly with Russia to sort out a cyber matter, and thought of creating an organization for that, seems to have had a positive impact on Putin.

Even though Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit was flawed, the dialogue among US and Russian cyber experts that might have resulted from it could have helped to develop a mutual understanding about the harmful effects of cyber activities and potential consequences, to include proportional asymmetric responses. Experts from the US side in any hypothetical liaison team would have likely been very experienced, highly qualified US personnel from the US National Security Agency and Cyber Command, and perhaps the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State, the primary US agency most major cyber negotiations. They might have caused Russia to halt its cyber operations against the US by helping to establish a modus vivendi, or way both countries could live together while possessing this significant strategic capability. One could speculate even further that talks may have even resulted in the very near-term suspension of any cyber attacks underway, or a reduction in the intensity or tempo of such attacks that have been sourced to Russia and perhaps some that have not as yet been identified as such. Trump’s proposal, encouraging talks, although flawed legally, ideally could have inspired both countries to move forward toward a greater agreement.

A Bad Reaction

As it was explained earlier, wider constituencies represented by negotiating parties may view the process with suspicion. In that vein, political allies and adversaries alike in the US rejected Trump’s proposal for a joint cyber security unit. There was an immediate rebuff from several Republicans, who questioned why the US would work at all with Russia after Moscow’s alleged meddling in the 2016 U.S. election. US Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a Republican, stated on the US Sunday morning news program “Meet the Press”: “It’s not the dumbest idea I have ever heard but it’s pretty close.” On Twitter, US Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, a Republican, immediately criticized Trump’s cyber proposal. Rubio wrote: “While reality and pragmatism requires that we engage Vladimir Putin, he will never be ally or reliable constructive partner.” He further stated: “Partnering with Putin on a ‘Cyber Security Unit’ is akin to partnering with [Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-] Assad on a “Chemical Weapons Unit.” US Senator John McCain of Arizona, a Republican who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, recognized Trump’s desire to move forward with Russia. However , McCain further explained on the US Sunday morning talk show “Face the Nation”: “There has to be a price to pay.” McCain went on to state: “Vladimir Putin … got away with literally trying to change the outcome … of our election.” He also added: “There has been no penalty.” US Representative Adam Schiff, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, told CNN’s Sunday morning program, “State of the Union”, that Russia could not be a credible partner in a cyber security unit. Schiff stated: “If that’s our best election defense, we might as well just mail our ballot boxes to Moscow,” Schiff added. A former US Secretary of Defense in the administration of US President Barack Obama, Ashton Carter, told CNN: “This is like the guy who robbed your house proposing a working group on burglary.”

There is no doubt with regard to the legal barriers to Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the US Department of Defense, which is the parent organization of the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, from using any funds for bilateral military cooperation with Russia. The purpose of the law is avoid providing Moscow with insight into US cyber capabilities. In the US, it has been long-believed that Moscow is averse to revealing any of its cyber capabilities.

Multiple proposals will be presented in the process of improving US-Russian relations. Trump’s cyber proposal was one of many tabled by him during his bilateral meeting with Putin. As Trump tweeted, success was achieved in other areas. For example, Trump and Putin agreed over a ceasefire for southwest Syria that was set to begin on midday, July 9, 2017. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said it showed the US and Russia were able to work together in Syria and that they would continue to do so.

Dumping the Cyber Security Unit Proposal

It was only hours after Trump’s proposal for the joint US-Russian cyber security unit was harshly criticized by Republicans who said Moscow could not be trusted that he backtracked on it. He tweeted: “The fact that President Putin and I discussed a Cyber Security unit doesn’t mean I think it can happen. It can’t.”

Even without being implemented, the fact that Trump offered to work jointly with Russia to sort out a cyber matter, and thought of creating an organization to do so, may have had a positive impact on Putin’s thinking. Putin can choose cautious cooperation or subterfuge, which many in foreign policy circles would call his penchant. In his dealings with Trump, it seems to some degree Putin has chosen cooperation. Indeed, it must be noted that Putin discussed Trump’s proposal and was apparently open to some type of interaction between cyber experts of both countries. Recall also that Trump initially tweeted that Putin entertained the proposal. As Putin has the final say on all foreign policy matters in Russia, he established that Russia at the moment has an interest in reaching an understanding on cyber. Trump’s July 7, 2017 cyber proposal is dead. However, as the process of building relations between the US and Russia, there is a real chance that a new, better crafted proposal on cyber, within bounds legally, may surface, perhaps even from Moscow. Only time will tell.

Multiple proposals will be presented in the process of improving US-Russian relations. Trump’s cyber proposal was one of many tabled by him during his bilateral meeting with Putin. As Trump tweeted, success was achieved in other areas  For example, Trump and Putin agreed over a ceasefire for southwest Syria that started on midday, July 9, 2017. Tillerson said it showed the US and Russia were able to work together in Syria and that they would continue to do so. Tillerson announced some key understandings brokered in the meeting amounted to success. He explained: “We had a very lengthy discussion regarding other areas in Syria that we can continue to work together on to de-escalate the areas and the violence, once we defeat ISIS.” Tillerson also said the US and Russia would “work together towards a political process that will secure the future of the Syrian people.”

The Way Forward

In William Shakespeare’s play, The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth, while King Henry away from the throne, the Duke of York, urged by Warwick, sat on it. Just then, Henry arrives with followers. Henry tells York to step away, but York announces an alleged claim to the crown against the King’s hereditary possession. Henry convinces York to wait to be crowned after he dies. Henry’s nobles are astonished that he disinherited his own son. Queen Margaret arrives and is struck by the news. York, at home, is convinced by Richard’s sons Edward and Richard, and his follower Montague to take the throne right away. A war for succession ensues. After several horrific battles, the opposing sides massed for a final engagement. In Act V, Scene iv of the play, Margaret leading Henry’s supporters gives a final stirring speech, summoning courage and the fighting spirit. On the plains near Teaksbury she states: “Great lords, wise men ne’er sit and wail their loss, but cheerly seek how to redress their harms. What though the mast be now blown overboard, the cable broke, the holding-anchor lost and half our sailors swallow’d in the flood? Yet lives our pilot still. Is’t meet that he should leave the helm and like a fearful lad with tearful eyes add water to the sea and give more strength to that which hath too much, whiles, in his moan, the ship splits on the rock, which industry and courage might have saved? Ah, what a shame! Ah, what a fault were this!” As Trump engages in efforts to improve relations with Putin and Russia, his opponents and a few fellow Republicans seem to feel the US is staring into a dangerous, dark abyss. They place little faith in Trump, and no trust or hope in Putin. Conversely, Trump, in thinking about the potential for improving relations, likely conjures panoramic views of endless vistas. While Trump’s critics would associate the disturbing sound of a dissonant flute with Trump’s effort to rebuild relations with Russia, Trump seeks to create a harmony between the US and Russia that even Johann Sebastian Bach would find sublime. The entire matter seems to enthral him. He remains optimistic and is pushing ahead in the face of considerable obstacles, the majority of which are actually unrelated to his efforts with Putin.

Trump has engaged in negotiations for decades. In his face to face bilateral meeting with Putin, Trump was allowed the chance to adjust to circumstances, become more fluid in his thinking, and more creative in his approach. Trump’s sense of possibilities was broadened. His proposal for a joint cyber security unit, while scoffed at, and, albeit, not viable under US law, undoubtedly resulted from his willingness to consider the full range of options. As a confidence building measure, it may very well have had a positive impact on Putin’s thinking without even being implemented.  Reports about the actual Trump-Putin meeting indicate both leaders had a good sense of one another’s positions but they also sought find out more about one another’s approaches. By doing so, both provided themselves with a better chance of reaching a successful conclusion. Both were attentive to how the other perceived issues, no matter alien that view may have been to their own. They noticed patterns of behavior, some perhaps influenced by history and culture, and recognized political constraints the other faced. Both Trump and Putin tried to crawl into one another’s shoes. As time moves on, that effort may very well assist the two leaders in building a relations that will facilitate the building of ties between the US and Russia. Durate, et vosmet rebus servate secundis. (Endure, and keep yourselves for days of happiness.)

Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump: But Trump Will Not Look Past Europe or NATO

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) made the stunning insinuation after meetings in Europe with US President Donald Trump (right) that he is not a reliable partner on which Germany and the Continent can depend. Months before, Trump’s cabinet members travelled to Europe and stress he is behind Europe and NATO and committed to Article 5, which requires all members to come to the defense of any country in the alliance that is attacked. When it comes to the trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO, any claim that the US cannot be counted upon is fallacious.

According to a May 28, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hailed as Europe’s most influential leader, made the stunning comment after three days of trans-Atlantic meetings that US President Donald Trump is not the reliable partner her country and the Continent can depend upon. The May 28th Times article quotes Merkel’s as stating: “The times in which we could rely fully on others — they are somewhat over,” adding, “This is what I experienced in the last few days.” Merkel went on to state: “We have to know that we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.” Her strong comments represented a potentially seismic shift in trans-Atlantic relations, as she has concluded without reservation that the US is now less willing to intervene overseas. The Times article explains that Merkel was personally disappointed that Trump declined to publicly endorse NATO’s doctrine of collective defense or to agree to common European positions on global trade, dealing with Russian aggression or mitigating the effects of climate change. Supposedly, Merkel had been already somewhat unnerved as a result of her meetings in Washington with Trump March 17-18, 2017. Through her statements, which were made while on the campaign trail in Munich, Merkel seemingly called upon voters to get accustomed to Germany’s more active role in Europe and its greater involvement in crises on the Continent and global ones that can affect Europe’s future. Merkel is seeking a fourth term as Chancellor ahead of parliamentary elections in September 2017. The Times article elaborates that Trump campaigned on a platform of trade protectionism, nationalism and skepticism about multilateralism, and climate change, on which most European leaders disagree with him. The article also notes that Europeans rely upon NATO for their ultimate defense and are more concerned than Trump about an increasingly aggressive Russia.

Merkel’s comments were truly an expression of angst. Her words would lead one to believe that the current period, rather than being of change, and reinvigoration, is languid and dissolute. Yet, as a result of her statement, she may have also stirred concerns in the capitals of other NATO countries over how they will defend themselves against their most likely opponent, Russia, and handle other matters, without the US. They perhaps lack her confidence on how things will proceed. There may even be some speculation over what information Merkel really has on Trump’s commitment to Europe, thereby billowing rumors and suspicion within the alliance.  As the Trump administration is still relatively new, allowance could be made for caution among Merkel and her senior advisers. The advent of misunderstandings in bilateral and regional policy approaches is a recurring motif in burgeoning relations between two countries particularly when long-standing approaches to each other might change a bit and a new political leadership in one or both countries has taken power. However, some of Trump’s officials travelled to Europe months before his visit and stressed that he is fully behind Europe, NATO and committed to Article 5, which requires all members to come to the defense of any country in the alliance that is attacked. Clearly, their efforts were not completely effective. Despite any doubts that have been expressed in Europe, when it comes to NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship, any claims that the US can no longer be counted upon are fallacious.

Merkel should have considered waiting a moment and taking inventory of what has transpired so far instead of turning so quickly in a negative direction. Upon the “heat and flame of her distemper,” Merkel should have “sprinkled cool patience.” Indeed, what has been apparent in Merkel’s contacts with Trump, at least from what she has said, is the existence of a personal struggle between leaders. The genuine job at hand for the Chancellor is to do what best serves the interest of the German people. Berlin should reorient on the matter actually at hand which is the relationship of Germany, and to an extent Europe, with the US. What has been apparent in Merkel’s contacts with Trump, at least from what she has expressed, is the existence of a personal struggle between leaders. Ways must be found for Merkel to respond and engage her country’s most powerful ally and cope with what she may view as the current US administration’s “unconventional” approach to policy matters concerning Europe. German policymakers, foreign policy analysts, and diplomats must find an explanation for these perceived anomalies. It may seem odd to state this about such long-time allies, but confidence-building measures and other efforts to build trust are really needed at this point. Resources should be diverted to that end. There is, in reality, nothing so mysterious about Trump that should have led Merkel to make what was tantamount to a concession statement about her failed efforts to create a linkage with Trump to her satisfaction. Merkel must work with Trump. For her, that may not be easy or pleasant, but it does not have to be. It must be, however, a task performed well. Cuiusvis est errare nullius nisi insipientes, in error perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.)

Reacting to Trump as she did in the end may not provide the satisfying experience Merkel wanted. She may have difficulty with Trump, but that does not mean other leaders might wish to work with him and might appreciate his efforts to rejuvenate NATO. Suggesting the US would no longer be part of the European security structure very likely ignited fears within some NATO countries just west of Russia’s border that interestingly enough form a type of buffer zone between Russia and Germany. They may not feel confident about making a new security arrangement under Berlin’s leadership.

Merkel’s Decision to Speak Out

It is hard to see how so much discord could have possibly developed between Trump and Merkel given that the two leaders have barely interacted. The best evidence of Merlel’s attitude toward Trump can be found in her statements. Trump has also received glares from her. For his part though, Trump has repeatedly stated that he has had good conversations with the German Chancellor. One could hardly claim such words are traces of a combative dymamic. Merkel’s reaction to Trump could very well have been influenced to some degree by the ubiquitous counter-Trump milieu. That milieu has done much to distort perspectives of many in Europe and the US on Trump. In it, self-defined experts on the US presidency preach of what should be expected from Trump, how he should perform, and why he has done practically everything wrong, everyday. Similarly, self-defined experts on Trump offer false insights concerning his private life and his life as president. Included also in the milieu are sensational stories from the US newsmedia of alleged illegal activities by Trump and almost daily predictions that his administration is on the verge of collapse. The counter-Trump milieu propagates a cult of ugliness directed at Trump and the US. It inflames passions globally, appealing to the lower nature of individuals. Admonishing and castigating Trump, to the point of self-dehumanization, has become a commonplace practice. With many in Europe subsumed by the counter-Trump milieu, it might be expected and expedient for political leaders there to use ideas from that “popular source” in speeches about the US president. However, one must take care to whom one listens. Utilizing ideas and conclusions from that milieu, patronizing and demeaning national and international audiences with that material, resultingly drawing the eye away from the truth, is wrong. Generosus equus non curat canem latrantem. (The well-educated horse ignores the barking dog.)

Certainly, Merkel’s words disappointed many in Washington, as no one there believes the situation between the US and Germany, NATO, or Europe is balanced on a knife’s edge. If Trump were asked whether he thought NATO was necessary, he would say it is. (Relatedly, 80% of the US public supports NATO.) However, if one were to ask him three additional times afterward, he would unlikely give an answer. That is Trump. When Trump offers criticism about NATO, his intent is to be constructive, not destructive; he is not at all signalling that his support for NATO has diminished. A main criticism is Trump’s belief that NATO allies have been “coddled” by the US for too long, leading leaders of some NATO countries to feel comfortable about repeatedly missing the agreed spending target of 2% GDP on defense. Progress was made on that matter by the administration of US President Barack Obama in 2016. That year, a majority of delinquent countries spent their required share. It may very well be that Trump, being cautious with NATO allies, is concerned that efforts by them to pay their fair share may have been a gesture of goodwill for the moment, and efforts might fall off. Ever the businessman, Trump is undoubtedly keeping a ledger on contributions by NATO allies, but he means well.

If Trump were asked whether he thought NATO was necessary, he would say it is. However, if one were to ask him three additional times afterward, he would unlikely give an answer. That is Trump. Trump supports NATO, but he also believes the US has “coddled” it’s allies for too long, causing some to feel comfortable about missing the agreed spending target of 2% GDP on defense. In 2016, progress was made progress on the matter. Yet, Trump may be concerned efforts by allies to pay their fair share may have been a momentary gesture of goodwill and might fall off.

Major ignotarum rerum est terror. (Apprehensions are greater in proportion as things are unknown.) In the midst of a political campaign, Merkel most likely wanted to be heard taking a strong pro-Europe stance and create the optics of being the Continent’s leader by speaking about Trump and the US in such a shocking way. However, promoting the idea that the US under Trump’s leadership is not committed to Europe was a mistake and could have dire consequences. For example, Berlin may be certain of how Germany might respond in terms of its security without the US, but other European countries may not feel as confident about creating a new security arrangement under Berlin’s leadership. Merkel may have difficulty with Trump, but they might wish to work with him and might appreciate his efforts to rejuvenate NATO and members participate fully in the collective defense of Europe with his brand of leadership. Suggesting that the US would no longer be part of the European security structure may very well have ignited fears within some European capitals over the immediate threat they feel from Russian Federation forces. NATO countries just west of Russia’s border form a de facto buffer zone between Russia and Germany. Completely unable to face a massive Russian military juggernaut alone, they want the help of the US. Leaders of those allies would not even consider risking their countries’ security over Merkel’s disappointment and disapproval of Trump. Fear is a powerful emotion. Once generated, it can lead to increased suspicion and even rampant paranoia among NATO allies over Russia’s slightest moves. In the worst case scenario, it could lead to some countries to seek bilateral arrangements with Russia to protect themselves. Hopefully, it will not lead to the militarization of any countries. Germany and those countries that might line up behind It, do not have the equivalent military power of the US and would be unable to respond to Russia. They would unlikely be able to jointly develop such a capability or be very willing to jointly finance it either. The Kremlin is well aware of this. Hopefully, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is not as certain that US support for Europe and NATO is as shaky as Merkel insists.

The Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus was quoted as saying: “Because your own strength is unequal to the task, do not assume that it is beyond the powers of man; but if anything is within the powers and province of man, believe that it is within your own compass also.” Merkel and other European leaders who are concerned about Trump’s plans and the US commitment to Europe will find that they must demand greater patience from themselves at this juncture. Merkel can still take a step back to evaluate the situation and reshape her approach. Berlin should be willing to engage in a deliberate process of developing an amicable, constructive relationship with the new US leader. Merkel and Trump never had a personal relationship before he took office. An initial effort should have been made by Merkel to get to know the new US president better. Indeed, rather than have the Chancellor run up to Trump and begin pressing her positions, she could have simply talked with him in order to understand his positions in a granular way. By doing so, she would have developed greater insight on him. In support of the Chancellor’s efforts with Trump, analysts and policy makers in Berlin must dig deeper than the surface to understand where new linkages can be established. A conscious effort should be made to stay away from distortions brewed up in the counter-Trump milieu. If the Trump administration attempts to engage in confidence-building with Berlin, Merkel and her advisers should view it as an opportunity. Those occasions would be perfect time to discuss the common ground the exists between the two countries from Berlin’s perspective. Advisers of the two leaders must have frank discussions on the timing for presenting initiatives on issues before any bilateral talks. It would be the best way for the advisers to inform their counterparts of relative, sensitive, domestic politics tied to a situation. Very importantly, discreet matters discussed, must be kept discreet. Resolutions to troubling issues are less likely be found if they are contested over publicly. Parva scintilla saepe magnam flamam excitat. (The sparkle often initiates a large flame.)

What Is on Merkel’s Mind?

There is the possibility that Merkel’s response to Trump is a manifestation of not only her disappointment, but an unconscious disapproval of him as well. Merkel apparently feels that her inability to get along with Trump, is due to some flaw in him. To her, Trump is at fault. When she met with Trump, Merkel sought a number of guarantees and held certain expectations for their discussion. Naturally, the goal would be to shape circumstances so they would best favor her positions and Germany’s interests. Merkel has a good reputation for being able to bring foreign leaders and political leaders in her own country to her position using a mix of both straight talk and congeniality. It is a reputation she can truly be proud of. When those guarantees were not received and those expectations were not met, it was likely very disappointing and somewhat hurtful to her. Merkel then rather quickly decided to publicly declare Trump was taking the US in a new direction away from Europe and NATO. With authority, and albeit some vengeance, she sounded the alarm that Europe must be prepared to find its way forward without the US. Other European leaders with a more positive assessment of Trump, or even undecided about him, would somehow need to reconcile with Merkel’s vehement statements. Pride, a sense of self-regard, of self-importance, can cause one to take counsel of the lesser angels of one’s nature. Pride can block the truth. An egocentricity stemming from pride can lead one to believe one is at the center of everyone’s cosmos. One can become bound up with oneself. Not to be impolitic, but one should not make choices using a confused ego.

Although Merkel wanted to take a strong stance and create the optics of leadership, Germany and those countries that might line up behind It, do not have the military power of the US. At best, they would be unable do much successfully against a juggernaut of Russian Federation forces. Russia is well aware of that. Hopefully, Russian Federation Ptesident Vladimir Putin is not as certain that US support for Europe and NATO is as shaky as Merkel insists.

The discussion of Merkel’s decisions and actions regarding Trump here relates well with scientific research on the desire of individuals to retaliate, to punish others’ bad behavior, no matter how mild, and even at personal cost. Research shows how such desires can skew decision making. Current theories suggest there are two dominant systems people use to understand and assess risk: the “analytic system” and the “experiential system.” The “analytic system” involves conscious and deliberate cognitive processes that employ various algorithms and normative rules to produce logical, reason-oriented, behavior. In contrast, the “experiential system” uses past experiences, emotion-related associations, and intuitions when making decisions. The experiential system relies more on unconscious rather than conscious processes. Images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad), are depended upon. The experiential system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it is safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. The independence of cognition and emotion, and the conflict between rational and emotional reasoning is the subject of continuous debate.

Paul Slovic, President of Decision Research and Professor of Psychology at the University of Oregon, suggests that these two systems must work in collaboration in order for the decision-maker to reach a rational decision. Most models of decision-making assume the process to be rational, which would exclude the possibility of emotion playing a role, other than of a hindrance. Other models take the valence-based approach and evaluate negative and positive effects on behavior, without specifying the emotion. This has led to a limited understanding of how specific emotions, especially those present in an individual in risky and uncertain situations, contribute to the decision-making process.

Using scanning devices that measure the brain’s activity, scientists have gotten a glimpse at how the different parts of our brain collaborate and compete when we make decisions. Brian Knutson, a neuroscientist at Stanford University, used a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to watch subjects’ brains as they reacted to the prospect of receiving money in the Ultimatum game, an economic game evaluating decision-making under ambiguous circumstances  In this game, two players have the task of splitting a sum of money. The first player, the “proposer”, makes an offer of how to split the money. The second player, the “responder”, accepts or rejects the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, then the money is split in accordance with the proposal. However, if the “responder” rejects the offer, then neither one wins the game and neither one gets any money. The standard economic solution is that “some money is better than no money, so one should always accept the offer.” In reality, behavioral research has shown that low offers (20% of total) have a 50% chance of being rejected. Based on participant reports, they rejected low offers because of anger (negative emotion) felt due to the unfairness of the offer, and they wanted to punish the other player in some way. The unfair offers induced conflict between the cognitive motive to accept the offer and the emotional motive to reject the offer.

When she met with Trump, Merkel sought a number of guarantees and held certain expectations for their discussion. Naturally, her goal was to shape circumstances so they would best favor her positions and Germany’s interests. When those guarantees were not received and those expectations were not met, it was likely very disappointing and somewhat hurtful to her. Merkel then rather quickly and surprisingly decided to publicly declare Trump was taking the US in a new direction away from Europe and NATO. Her move was not inn the best interests of the West.

Alan Sanfey, a cognitive neuroscientist at the University of Arizona, and colleagues also used fMRI scans to look into people’s brains while they played the same Ultimatum game. Sanfey’s brain scans of people feeling vengeful in these games illustrate how (at least in part) a sense of moral disgust manifests in the brain. Indeed, Sanfey mapped what appeared to be a struggle between emotion and reason as each sought to influence the players’ decisions by tracking the activity of the anterior insula and the prefrontal cortex. As offers became increasingly unfair, the anterior insula, a part of the brain involved in negative emotions including anger and disgust, became more and more active, as if registering growing outrage. Meanwhile, an area of the prefrontal cortex involved in goal orientation–in the case, making money–was also busy assessing the situation. Sanfey’s brain scans indicated that when the disgusted anterior insula was more active than the rational goal-oriented prefrontal cortex—in a sense, when it was shouting louder—the players rejected the offer. When the prefrontal cortex dominated, the players took the money.

University of Zurich researchers Dominique J.F. de Quervain, Ernst Fehr, and colleagues successfully used medical technology twice to catch an engagement between the emotional and reasoning parts of the brain. During an Ultimatum-like game, they examined subjects with a Positron Electron Tomography scanner, a device that employs a radioactive substance used by cells, usually a sugar, to image activity in the brain. The researchers found certain reward circuits in the brain’s striatum activated when players anticipated, and then actually punished, ill-behaved partners. Even more, the greater the activation of the striatum, the greater the subjects’ willingness to incur costs for the opportunity to deliver punishment. At the same time, the researchers saw activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, the deliberative part of the higher brain that is thought to weigh risks and rewards. Interestingly, these same brain regions, the reward-seeking striatum and the deliberative prefrontal cortex, both of which are activated by the pleasing possibility of revenge, also light up when people anticipate giving rewards to partners who cooperate. Though the players’ behaviors are opposite, one set bestowing a reward versus the other set exacting punishment, their brains react in the same way in eager anticipation of a satisfying social experience. Decipimur specte recti. (We are deceived by the appearance of right.)

Reportedly, during his first visit to NATO on March 30, 2017, Tillerson won applause for morning and lunchtime remarks from allied ministers about the need for strength and unity in dealing with Putin. Tillerson statements included: “The US commitment to NATO is strong and this alliance remains the bedrock for trans-Atlantic security.” He also said: “We understand that a threat against one of us is a threat against all of us, and we will respond accordingly.” He added: “The president supports NATO. The US Congress supports NATO.”

Assurances to Europe from High Places

Trump’s Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, and National Security Adviser, H. R. McMaster are undoubtedly dismayed by the expression of doubt by a close ally of the US commitment to European Security and the trans-Atlantic partnership. In only a few short months, they have made numerous statements expressing the administration’s commitment to NATO and commitment Article 5. For the majority of their adult lives, Tillerson, Mattis, and McMaster have spent countless hours considering the status of Europe either militarily or economically. Mattis and McMaster were not only concerned with NATO but worked long and hard to develop ways, and rehearsed plans, to ensure its defense and deterrence of opponents. They have worked alongside NATO allies in it’s European security zone, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They are all aware of the occasional need for the hand holding of allies through tough issues. As life-long leaders, they could accept that bringing allied leaders to understand, despite to the contrary, that they can remain confident over the US commitment to NATO and Article 5 might require an amount of “hand-holding.” In doing so, it can be delicately said they have displayed compassionate empathy for their allies. Training, teaching, coaching, mentoring are skills they have honed to near perfection as business and military leaders. However, as life-long managers, they are also results oriented. After providing assurances of the US commitment to Europe repeatedly over a period of time, they too may become strained by the persistent voices of leaders of a few NATO countries who question it. One must quit drilling once oil has been struck.

Reportedly, during his first visit to NATO on March 30, 2017, Tillerson won applause for lunchtime remarks about the need for strength and unity in dealing with Putin. Tillerson, ever able as a communicator, reached the European ministers, who were skeptical of US intentions beforehand, with statements in the morning session such as: “The US commitment to NATO is strong and this alliance remains the bedrock for transatlantic security.” He went on to say: “The United States is committed to ensuring NATO has the capabilities to support our collective defense.” He added: “We understand that a threat against one of us is a threat against all of us, and we will respond accordingly.” He then definitely stated: “The president supports NATO. The US Congress supports NATO.” However, it was during a lunch that Tillerson received applause. During that session, one minister suggested that a two-tier approach might be taken with Russia, adding that “it takes two to tango.” In response, Tillerson said: “Sure, you can dance with Russia and you might also gain something out of it. But for sure you cannot tango with [Sergei] Lavrov because he is not allowed to dance that one.” The ministers present understood that implied there was only one man in charge in Russia. Explaining how Tillerson was received, one European NATO ambassador said: “With an ovation, I mean it literally. This is not metaphorically speaking. He actually got applause.” NATO Secretar General Jens Stoltenberg indicated Tillerson left no doubt that ties between European NATO members and the US were “rock solid.”

In a special May 28, 2017 CBS News broadcast of “Face the Nation”, US Sevretary of Defense James Mattis (above) was asked about Trump’s thoughts on the value of NATO, Mattis explained that in his initial job interview with the president, he brought up his questions about NATO. Mattis said his response was: “if we didn’t have NATO that he would want to create it because it’s a defense of our values, it’s a defense of democracy.” Mattis said Trump nominated him almost immediately after he spoke profoundly in support of NATO.

On March 21, 2017, Mattis and Stoltenberg met at the Pentagon to discuss the key role the alliance plays in trans-Atlantic security and to review preparations for the special meeting of NATO heads of state and government in May. Before his meeting with Stoltenberg, Mattis said the trans-Atlantic bonds built on a legacy of common commitments and common defense continue to get stronger. During the meeting, Mattis and Stoltenberg reportedly discussed ways to encourage allies to assume a more equitable share of alliance security and defense responsibilities. Stoltenberg expressed his gratitude to Mattis for the secretary’s “strong support for trans-Atlantic unity and trans-Atlantic bond and the NATO alliance.” He also stated: “I think we all understand that in times of turmoil, in times of uncertainty, the need for strong international institutions like NATO is even greater.” He continued: “so therefore we need to adapt, we need to strengthen NATO in response to the challenges and the unpredictability we see surrounding us today.” In a special May 28, 2017 CBS News broadcast of “Face the Nation”, Mattis also discussed NATO. When asked about Trump’s thoughts on the value of NATO, Mattis explained that in his initial interview for his post, Trump asked questions about the alliance him about the alliance. Mattis explained his response was: “if we didn’t have NATO that he would want to create it because it’s a defense of our values, it’s a defense of democracy.” Mattis recognized that Trump was very open to that view. Mattis was intrigued by the fact and said: “Obviously, he [Trump] had to make a decision about whether or not he was going to nominate me to be the Secretary of Defense. And although I immediately showed him that my view on that was rather profoundly in support of NATO, he at that point nominated me.”

At the end of the G-7 Summit in Sicily on May 27, 2017, McMaster explained with certitude that Trump backed NATO’s mutual defense doctrine. McMaster was being pressed by journalists on matter of allied disappointment over Trump failure to  make explicit reference to it during his visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The US newsmedia has emphasized that Trump, during the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, appeared to called Article 5 into question by suggesting that NATO members who did not pay their fair share for the alliance may not deserve to benefit from it. McMaster added: “I think it’s extraordinary that there would be an expectation that the president would have to say explicitly that he supports Article 5. Of course he does.” McMaster then went on to say: “He [Trump] did not make a decision not to say it.” He continued: “It was implicit in the speech. There was no decision to not put it in there. It is a matter of fact that the United States, the president, stands firmly behind our Article 5 commitments under NATO.”

At the end of the G-7 Summit in Sicily, on May 27, 2017, US National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster explained with certitude that Trump backed NATO’s mutual defense doctrine. McMaster added: “I think it’s extraordinary that there would be an expectation that the president would have to say explicitly that he supports Article 5. Of course he does.” He also said: “It is a matter of fact that the United States, the president, stands firmly behind our Article 5 commitments under NATO.”

The Way Forward

In Act 2, Scene iii of William Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago, the Venetian General Othello’s ensign, having expressed hatred for his commander over a promotion, sets out to destroy his reputation and his marriage. He has included a willing young officer, Roderigo, in his plot. Roderigo is supposed to take Othello’s wife, Desdemona, away from him, but begins to doubt his ability to perform that task. Seeking to encourage Roderigo, Iago tells him the following: “How poor are they that have not patience! What wound did ever heal but by degrees? Thou know’st we work by wit, and not by witchcraft; And wit depends on dilatory time.” While Merkel’s statement that the US can no longer be depended upon by Europe may be superficially plausible, it is completely wrong. Surely, leaders in the capitals of all NATO countries do not feel as she does about Trump or the US commitment. Offering negative perspectives and proffering hostile words about both may have served to quench excitement and spirit for some of them about his administration. That was not very sporting of Merkel. There is a long obscured road for Europe to travel between wanting go it alone without the US and actually doing so. Europe may not be able to walk that path with the assured step as Merkel says. A lot of unpredictable and unpleasant incidents in terms of working together and coping with adversaries could occur along the way. The difficulty Merkel and others are having with regard to understanding and accepting that the Trump administration is committed to Europe and NATO calls attention to need for policy statements. They create a cogency and predictability about US intentions for working with allies and its intentions for responding to certain actions by adversaries. (That is something the administration might consider.) From her prism, Merkel may observe puzzling elements of Trump’s approach that are contradictory to her logic. However, all puzzles have their solutions for they are created by man and not true mysteries. No matter what the situation, saying anything that might initiate the erosion of the decades old trans-Atlantic collective defense structure cannot be justified. Videbat esse notitia bona id temporis. (It seemed to be a good idea at the time.)

Certainly, it would have been superb if Trump and Merkel, during their first meeting, had agreed on everything, and relations between the US and Germany moved along swimmingly. However, that did not happen. Merkel must accept working with the circumstances she has and not the circumstances that she would like to have. On the path to improving ties, confidence and trust between the Trump administration and Europe must be established. That work will not require that the two countries start from scratch, but it will be a new beginning. It will be work akin to that in which a product develops over time, albeit not too much time. By adding a good dose of patience from European capitals, faith in the trans-Atlantic partnership, and friendship, success is practically assured.

Book Review: Robert Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (Open Road Media, 2016)

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Above is a publicized image of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s proof-of-concept project for a spy satellite called Membrane Optical Image for Real-Time Exploitation—MOIRE. The satellite would provide real-time images and videos of any place on Earth at any time. In 1975, every aspect of the US spy satellite program was classified top secret. Two treasonous young men stole and sold crucial information concerning the program to the Soviet Union. Their story is told in The Falcon and the Snowman, released as an eBook by Open Road Media.

In The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (Open Road Media, 2016) http://www.books.google.com, Robert Lindsey tells the tragedy of what occurred when Christopher John Boyce held a position monitoring communications related to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) satellite projects at TRW, Inc.’s “Black Vault” in Redondo Beach, California. Motivated by factors well-explained by the author, Boyce decided to become a spy for the Soviet Union. After enlisting the aid of a drug dealing, and drug-abusing, childhood friend, Andrew Daulton Lee, the two self-absorbed, reckless, young men, barely in their 20s, presented several rolls of film containing photographs of documents from the black vault to the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB. Despite some difficulties with Lee, it was a successful operation for the Soviets. Considering the sensitivity of the materials they provided, the two men were remunerated with a mere pittance, and were eventually imprisoned for treason.

As a native Californian, Lindsey was familiar with the lifestyle of the affluent community in which the very privileged Boyce and Lee were raised. After graduating from San Jose State University in 1956, he became a reporter for the San Jose Mercury and later the newspaper’s Aerospace Editor which could account for his ease with the technical data about US spy satellites and cutting edge communications equipment in the book. He joined the New York Times in 1968. In his research for the book, Lindsey drew upon hundreds of interviews with all of the principles involved, letters, and documents from the trial. The Falcon and the Snowman received high praise from both critics and fellow authors. Thomas Thompson, author of Blood and Money (Doubleday, 1976) wrote, “Dynamite! Ranks with the best of le Carre and Deighton—but its all true. I only wish I’d found the incredible story before Robert Kindsey. A very important book.”   Ken Follet author of Eye of the Needle (Arbor House, 1978) and later the renowned On Wings of Eagles (William Morrow, 1983) wrote: “Remarkable . . . A real-life spy story as gripping and full of suspense as anything one could invent . . . . Robert Lindsey tells us everything we want to know about this odd couple. He has done a superb job of research and writing.” The book was developed into a film also entitled “The Falcon and the Snowman.”

In the spirit of full disclosure, Open Road Media solicited greatcharlie.com to write a review of their eBook edition of The Falcon and the Snowman. Open Road Media explained no difference exist in content between the original release and their eBook edition. Its’ rationale for re-releasing books in print on eBook is the changing format allows a new audience to enjoy a classic story. Since 1979, most reviewers of The Falcon and the Snowman have rdiculed Boyce and Lee over the way they stumbled into spying for the Soviet Union and noted how remarkable it was that they achieved any success as spies. The book has also been examined as a statement about the society that produced the duo. Nowhere in The Falcon and the Snowman does Lindsey attempt to color the readers’ view of Boyce and Lee, who he calls “Daulton.” Lindsey provides ample insight into what made these two young men tick. Some of what he states about them, while written in a matter-of-fact style, is impressive. Boyce, in particular was a very bright young man, seldom getting anything less than an A on his school exams and he scored 142 on an I.Q. test. As spies, however, the young men’s exploits were anything but remarkable. For example, Lindsey outlines: how incompetent Boyce and Lee were in handling top secret materials (Removing and returning secret materials from TRW in a camera case used by some staff for liquor runs or hiding documents in potted plants); Lee’s clumsy interactions with the Soviets (Money hungry, Lee threatened the Soviets by stating he would sell Boyce’s secrets to China if payments were not increased.); and, the tragic lack confidence and mutual trust in each other (Boyce sensed Lee was not dividing the Soviet payments equitably. He was right.)

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Christopher John Boyce was a very bright young man, seldom getting anything less than an A on his school exams and he scored 142 on an I.Q. test. Boyce rejected the suburban indulgences of his Palos Verdes community, but enjoyed falconry and partying. He believed he was fighting against what he perceived as abuses of US power. He ostensibly was using his position at TRW to fight back. While likely viewing himself akin to a “voice in the wilderness,” fighting injustice, but he also was happy to receive money for his efforts.

Duc in altum! (Head into the deep!) Lindsey’s portrayal of the two young men does not match with the usual portrayals of well-polished Cold War spies with their charm, mystique, and various intrigues found in volumes of novels and films. Nevertheless, Boyce and Lee, as Lindsey describes them, represent the realities of spying. Spies are little more than traitors driven by a variety of motivations to betray the trust of those who hired, trained, and often befriended them. Their willingness to violate loyalty statements to keep confidential top secret information they may handle while employed proves they are flawed individuals. Still, readers have far more to gain from The Falcon and the Snowman. A deeper dive into the book would reveal to readers an intriguing record of how Soviet intelligence controlled Boyce and Lee. Correlatively, readers would gain perspective on how Soviet intelligence sought to grab secrets from US firms. (Russian Federation efforts today are not too different.) For readers interested in enjoying The Falcon and the Snowman from that perspective, a head-start is provided here.

To Whom Were Boyce and Lee Selling Their Information?

In The Falcon and the Snowman, the Soviet intelligence officers Boyce and Lee were serving were from the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. Readers unfamiliar with the Cold War history may not know that it was the Soviet agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. Formed in 1954, it was the true, more capable successor to the infamous state security apparatus, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (Peoples Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, which in 1946 was dissolved, resurrected, and repeatedly renamed over eight years. Its internal spy network as well as a sprawling external spy network was filled with well-experienced officers who served in the NKVD in World War II. According to a November 13, 1982 New York Times article entitled “KGB: Feared by Some, Praised by Many,” the KGB was the most widely feared instrument of the government due to its shrewd officers and often brutal methods. The article confirmed that KGB scientific and technical operatives swept countries seeking the latest secret inventions, while its “illegals” tried to penetrate foreign intelligence operations. Until the Cold War’s end, the KGB was in a global struggle with its main rivals, the US CIA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and United Kingdom’s intelligence and counterintelligence organs, MI6 and MI5. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was the point of contact for Boyce and Lee with the KGB. What made it an effective choice by the novice spies was its proximity to their location in California. Mexico City was already known for being a third country operation for all Soviet intelligence operations in the Western US. US officials said they could not effectively surveil KGB activities for they were far outnumbered by its’ agents and those of Eastern Bloc nations that had embassies in Mexico City, including East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Cuba.

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Andrew Daulton Lee achieved little academically or professionally. Spying gave Lee with a chance to prove he was smart and could do big things. Lee was initially in it for the money. Later, he was in it for the excitement of overseas travel, the risk of arrest, and working with KGB officers. The Soviets likely recognized Lee was far more interested in dealing drugs and drug abuse than stealing and selling US secrets to them.

Why US Spy Satellites Were So Important to the Soviets?

US spy satellite information stayed in a windowless building called the TRW’s Satellite Control Facility or “Big Blue Cube” in Sunnyvale, California, which operated the National Reconnaissance Office’s spy satellites. Boyce worked in a 5-foot by 15-foot room that housed equipment to encode secret communications for the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Every day, he would change the cipher on each machine that tapped out messages among the CIA, other ground stations, and US spy satellites. He was one of few having access to highly secret SIGNET satellite projects, Rhyolite and Argus. Lindsey tells us that the rolls of film Boyce and Lee sold to the KGB held data from Rhyolite. Rhyolite satellites, also known as Program 720 and Program 472, reportedly had a mass of 700 kg. The design was dominated by a large unfurlable dish antenna with a diameter of about 20 to 23 meters. The goal was to use a small—originally 9 meter—radio telescope in geostationary orbit to monitor the Soviet Union’s missile tests. This could be done be recording the radio signals, or telemetry, that the missiles transmit so that ground observers can judge their performance. The satellites demonstrated a capability across the whole microwave and VHF spectrum. Rhyolite 1 was launched on June 19, 1970, and was initially positioned at 105 degrees East to monitor both the Baikonur and Sary Shagan test areas. It was regularly repositioned to monitor other areas of interest such as the India-Pakistan War in 1971 or the Vietnam War area. After a second satellite became operational, Rhyolite 1 was dedicated to the China and Vietnam observations on a long-term basis. It operated for at least for five years and was reported still operational in 1975. Rhyolite 2 followed in March 6 1973 and operated initially from 70 degrees East over the Horn of Africa to monitor microwave transmissions from the western Soviet Union and telemetry from Baikonur launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) tests. It remained there for about five years. It is unknown if it ceased operating or relocated to another position. Two additional Rhyolites, renamed Aquacade 4 and Aquacade 5 were launched in the late1970s. There was a replacement program CIA developed for Rhyolite called Argus. The Argus satellite would have a 40 meter antenna. However, the program was cancelled. At that point, the US National Security Agency became interested and developed an advanced Rhyolite, called Argus. Its 40-meter aperture enabled it to eavesdrop on microwave and short-wave communications.

Looking at Boyce and Lee from the Perspective of the KGB: A Head-Start

In Chapter 1, readers learn of Lee’s first contact with the Soviet embassy in Mexico City. Lindsey writes that Lee walked into the embassy, presented himself to the clerk at the reception desk in the guardhouse, threw down the computer programming cards, and said “I have a friend with Socialist leanings who would like you to have some information.” (Note: Unwittingly, Lee presented himself as a “dangle,” an individual who would do everything possible to stir the KGB’s interest in him.) The clerk shook his head and said he did not speak English and left to get someone who did. (Note: In Soviet diplomatic missions, there was a side of the house that dealt strictly with diplomacy and a side that dealt with intelligence. Lower level administrative employees who were not KGB wanted little to do with the intelligence side lest they would unfortunately find themselves involved in mysterious, spooky matters.) Lindsey tells readers that Lee sat in the stark lobby of the building for twenty minutes until he met Vasily Ivanovich Okana. Readers are told that he was listed with Mexican authorities as a vice consul of the Soviet foreign service, but he was in fact a member of the KGB. At that first meeting, Lee was not very impressed by the slender man in the-poorly fitting black suit. Later he had learned that beneath the baggy suit was the muscled physique of a fitness fanatic. “These are interesting,” the 38 year-old KGB agent had said in English as his fingers played with the computer cards, “But what are they?” Lee replied that he was only a courier, but it was his understanding that they had something to do with what people called “spy satellites.” Lindsey moves readers away from Lee’s first contact with the KGB until Chapter 14, where the interview with Okana continues. He starts the chapter with Okana asking Lee, “Who is your friend?” Further describing the contact, Lindsey recounts that the KGB agent studied the stranger with a cautious smile. Lee noted that when Okana was apprehensive or unsure of a situation, as he was now, his charcoal eyebrows tended to bob up and down spontaneously. Lee eventually replied that he could not identify his friend, who had a sensitive job working for the US Government. The friend he said wanted to defect to the Soviet Union but had a wife and two children and did not want to leave them behind. Elaborating on the brief note Boyce had typed, Lee said they had a proposition for the Soviet Union. His friend was motivated by a belief in the future of Socialism, while he was a fugitive of the police on a trumped up charge. They were prepared to deliver US defense secrets to the USSR, but expected to be paid well for them. Lindsey writes, “There was no expression on Okana’s face when Lee finished his short sales pitch.” (Note: What Lee did not know was that the Soviets were familiar with US spy satellite operations, to include ground facilities, and product they delivered in the form of pictures or intercepted signals. The Soviets also knew satellite operations were scrupulously protected by the sensitive compartmentalized information system. That ensured even an accidental revelation of information would not destroy operational secrecy Lee brought the Soviets something that would have been impossible for them to get.) Aut trace aut loquere meliora silentio. (Be quiet or say something better than silence.)

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KGB Headquarters in Moscow during the Cold War (above). In The Falcon and the Snowman, Boyce and Lee served the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. The KGB was responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. The KGB was the most widely feared instrument of the government due to its shrewd officers and often brutal methods. KGB scientific and technical operatives swept countries seeking the latest secret inventions, while its “illegals” penetrated foreign intelligence operations.

Lindsey writes Okana asked Lee if he had any personal identification without demanding it. Lee pulled out his wallet and offered his driver’s license. Okana made a note of his name and address and then handed the license back to him, making a complimentary remark about Southern California. As a friendly gesture, Okana asked Lee, “Would you like vodka?” Lee said he would enjoy it, and Okana left the office where he was conducting the interview and came back a few seconds later. Within a few minutes a male servant brought in two large bottles of vodka and a bowl of iced caviar. The Russian said that he once served in the US and had polished his English there. (Note: KGB officers established nefarious business relationships not friendships. For one to believe an intelligence officer is a friend would be misguided. The duty of the KGB officer was to encourage lying, deception, subterfuge, theft, and betrayal by those who operate for them, known as agents, so they can collect information they require. Perhaps the most important tool of the intelligence officers spy skills tool box, or tradecraft, is the ability to develop and recruit agents with access to information from foreign government offices and businesses they are required to collect by their superiors. It is nuanced work. However, the KGB officer would get lucky and encounter a “walk-in.”   Without any solicitation or prior contact whatsoever, a walk-in would present oneself to a diplomatic mission, diplomatic official, or KGB officer and expresses the desire to provide top secret diplomatic, military, intelligence, and intelligence information for government or private company where they are employed or have some access. Walk-ins, or recruited agents, while often reveling in the glamour that they believe comes with being a spy, are nothing more than traitors willing to betray the trust of those who hired, trained, and often befriended them. Given their willingness to violate any oath or loyalty statements they signed swearing to keep confidential top secret information they encountered, KGB officers remained suspicious of them. The KGB referred to Soviet traitors as “pigs.”)

Lindsey writes that Lee noticed that the bobbing of his eyebrows had subsided somewhat, but there was still an apprehensive look behind his gray eyes. (Note: From an ideological perspective, Western intelligence services during the Cold War viewed employees and officials of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc governments willing to spy for them as individuals who had awoken to the realities of a morally bankrupt Communist system which was built on lies and the Communist Party leadership of the Soviet Union which was bent on world domination. From the perspective of Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence officers, those employees of officials of Western governments willing to spy for them were primarily a manifestation of an ethically bankrupt capitalist system that made profit and wealth the driving force of one’s existence. Boyce and Lee were not Marxist-Leninist, Communists, or Russophiles. Lee was initially in it for the money. Later, he was in it for the excitement of overseas travel, the risk of arrest, and working with KGB officers. Having achieved little academically or professionally, the work also gave Lee with a chance to prove he was smart and could do big things. Boyce rejected the suburban indulgences of his Palos Verdes community. He believed he was fighting against what he perceived as abuses of US power. He ostensibly was using his position at TRW to fight back. While likely viewing himself akin to a “voice in the wilderness,” fighting injustice, he also enjoyed receiving money for his efforts.) Lee said that what he had brought were only samples of the kind of information his friend could make available to the Soviets. He stressed that his friend was personally involved in the operation of spy satellites and had unlimited access to secrets that he was sure the Soviets would want to buy.

Lindsey tells readers Okana excused himself, leaving Lee with a drink in his hand. Taking the computer programming cards and a twelve-inch length of paper tape used in the KG-13 and KW-7 crypto machines that Boyce had given Lee. (Note: KGB officers in the field answered upward to a pyramid of managers, as well as high-level bureaucrats, who demanded results and controlled the purse strings and key resources. Okana most likely left the room to confer with the chief of the KGB station in Mexico City. Given the potential gains that could come from Boyce’s thefts, every step of the case would be managed well above the level of a field agent.) When Okana returned twenty minutes later, Okana carried a piece of note paper in one hand and referring to it, began to probe Lee about reconnaissance satellites. Okana poured another glass of vodka for his guest and invited him to sample more caviar. Lee believed that he could convince Okana that he had more than a casual knowledge of such satellites and the TRW office.  (Note: If an agent managed to convince a KGB officer that he knew more about a subject than he actually did, the officer, as trained, would report the situation to his managers. If his managers were interested in the subject, they would invariably order the officer to press the agent for more information. Once the truth was uncovered, the result was often a dark moment in relationship between a less-patient officer and the agent.) The next time Okana left the room for another conference somewhere else in the embassy, when he returned, he handed Lee an envelope containing $250 in US currency—enough he said to finance a return trip from Los Angeles to Mexico. Lindsey wrote that Okana was warm now and smiling continuously, although the nervous bobbing of his eyebrows reappeared from time to time to distract Lee. Okana said that his associates were very much interested in the proposition made by Lee and his friend, and they looked forward to a mutually profitable enterprise, and then he gave Lee instructions to meet him at a Mexico City restaurant on his next trip, he told him they would use passwords at future meetings. (Note: Okana introduced Lee to a bit of KGB tradecraft.) Lee would be asked: “Do you know the restaurant in San Francisco? And Lee was to reply: “No, but I know the restaurant in Los Angeles.” Okana said they would also use code names to reduce the possibility of detection. Lee, he said, would be known as “Luis,” and Okana would be called “John.” The meeting ended, and Lee and Okana shook hands. “Adios John,” Lee said. “Adios Luis,” Okana said. (Note: The KGB changed agents’ code names often. To thwart Western counterintelligence, some male agents were given female code names and vice-versa.)

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Above is the well-kept entrance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. The Soviet Embassy in Mexico City was the point of contact for Boyce and Lee with the KGB. What made it an effective choice by the novice spies was its proximity to their location in California. Mexico City was already known for being a third country operation for all Soviet intelligence operations in the Western US. US officials could not effectively monitor KGB activities for they were far outnumbered by its’ agents and those of Eastern Bloc nations with Mexico City embassies.

In Chapter 15, readers learn of the April 23rd prearranged meeting between Lee and Okana at a Mexico City restaurant. (Note: It likely was a test run for Lee, an effort to detect surveillance by Western intelligence and see if Lee was fake. Clearly, no surveillance was found.) Lee obeyed instructions to the letter. After exchanging passwords, Okana plainly stated the Soviets were interested in Lee’s offer. (Note: Surely they were pleased Lee’s cards were not old, “shopworn goods,” or distorted, “cooked” data.) Lindsey writes Lee was slightly surprised by the magnitude of Okana’s eagerness. Lee told Okana that he had been in touch with a friend and deliveries of information would begin shortly. (Note: In addition to working with spies who had direct access to required information, KGB officers also worked with individuals who lacked direct access to information, but could pass information and devices from one spy to another known as “cut-outs.” Lee was a chain cut-out, able to pass messages and information between Okana and Boyce, who worked in a space denied to the KGB. He only knew the identity of the person providing information and the person receiving it. He did not know the entire operation.)

Lee’s Meeting with the Soviets in Vienna

In Chapter 28, Lindsey writes Lee traveled to Vienna under instructions of the Soviets. He had arrived earlier than his scheduled meeting schedule for March 16th with the Soviets in order to see some of the city that was “so often the setting of the espionage novels he loved.” Lindsey notes that Lee felt vulnerable so close to Eastern Europe and the Communist Bloc. The reason the Soviets had given for wanting him to make the trip was to meet some Soviet representatives who could not go to Mexico as well as take some specialized training in espionage: “tradecraft” was the term Lee knew from his novels. (Note: The Soviets wanted Lee in a location where they could control events, provide security, and counter surveillance.) Lee told his brother that he feared the Soviets “might try to kidnap him for some motive he couldn’t figure out—why else Vienna?” Lee remained suspicious as he boarded the plane in Los Angeles, but was lured there by the money and the excitement. Lindsey tells: “As Lee walked the streets of the old city, Lee’s fear ebbed and was replaced by a euphoria that reminded him of a high from heroin. The people who glanced at him as he walked through Vienna couldn’t have any idea about the nature of his mission, and this though excited him. And the realization that he was a spy on his way to meet ‘Russian spies’ in an exotic city also excited him.” Boyce kept his promise and gave him a large load for this delivery, although Lee did not know what the nature of the documents he was carrying. As Lindsey writes, “It did not really matter to Lee. It could easily have been a package of heroin. They were merely goods to be marketed, and his only concern was they would turn on the Russians.” In fact Lee had ten rolls of film, each with thirty-six exposures. There were a month’s worth of KW-7 ciphers, scores of Rhyolite messages between TRW, Langley, and Australia, and a long TRW technical report describing plans for the new Argus system.

The evening after arriving in Vienna, Lee took a cab to Donaupark as instructed. He crossed the Danube and got out at the park. A familiar face approached from the darkness. Lee said, “It was my old friend The Colonel with the steely teeth, no code was necessary. He was my mentor.” Lindsey would later identify The Colonel as Mikhail Vasilyevich Muzankov. (Note: Despite the reality of the situation, a KGB officer would hope that an agent, or a mere cut-out in Lee’s case, would believe he was a friend. Officers could be cordial and smile very becoming smiles. Creating a sense of friendship would normally enhance an officers ability to control the agent. Officers kept firmly in mind he fact that interactions with their agents were just business. The officers were defending the Soviet Union. Unlike their agents, KGB officers, generally, were fiercely loyal to their country.)

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Robert Lindsey tells readers that the rolls of film Boyce and Lee sold to the KGB held data from a US Rhyolite spy satellite (above). Rhyolite satellites reportedly had a mass of 700 kg. The design was dominated by a large unfurlable dish antenna with a diameter of about 20 to 23 meters. Its main mission was to remain in geostationary orbit to monitor the Soviet Union’s missile tests. This was done by recording the radio signals, or telemetry, that the missiles transmit so that ground observers can judge their performance. Rhyolite demonstrated a capability across the whole microwave and VHF spectrum.

Commune periculum concordian parit. (Common danger begets unity.) Setting the scene, Lindsey writes that a limousine found the two men as they walked near the river and Lee learned that Soviet chauffeurs in Vienna drove just like the ones in Mexico City. The driver thread in and out of alleys and narrow streets, doubling back, checking his mirror to be sure they weren’t followed. Lee had no idea where they were when the car finally stopped at a low-slung building. It was a KGB safehouse apparently in a Vienna suburb. Lindsey explained Lee’s uneasiness continued to wane in the friendly atmosphere of reunion. In a room at the safehouse, a woman brought the two men caviar and three bottles of vodka, then she brought a stew of beef, potatoes, carrots, and cabbage. The Colonel sent the film to another part of the building to be developed. (Note: Intimate conversations between the KGB officer and the agent or cut-out provides the officer to look into the agents thinking and sense his feelings. The officer would establish a baseline, norms for the agent’s behavior. Everything the agent says or how the agent reacts to statements is important to know. The officers concerned themselves with other things the average person might very well assume was minutiae or too esoteric to matter. Every inflexion, tone, change in the agent’s voice can provide insight as to what is on the individual’s mind. If an officer discerned an agent was being evasive, deceptive, deviating from his normal behavior, it often meant a new, strong, personality, possibly an intelligence officer, had entered the mix. Initial changes noticed might be in vocabulary and, mannerisms perhaps acquired from the new contact. The officer would stage conversations to confirm changes or put the agent in controlled situations to gauge responses. In oculis animus habitat. (In the eyes their character lives.))

Aliquis latet error. (Some trickery lies hidden!) After eating and drinking, Lee got sick and asked for the bathroom. The Soviets had little work for Lee that night and they drove him back to the Inter-Continental Hotel after midnight. (Note: Lee proved that he was undisciplined, unreserved, and unmeasured in his actions. Perhaps Lee’s stew was compromised with a chemical agent to upset his stomach. Placing chemical agents, toxins, in meals was a KGB practice. Perhaps the Soviets wanted to know whether Lee could detect that he had ingested some chemical agent due to its effects and would act to mitigate them. Perhaps the Soviets simply wanted to observe how vulnerable Lee was in general. Lee apparently did not mention to Lindsey whether the Soviets were surprised when he became sick. Perhaps the Soviets had created the chance to demonstrate that they cared for his well-being. Conveniently, Lee was sick just in time to be sent home at a decent hour, go right to sleep, and be prepared the next day for training. The Soviets surely did not want a repeat of his behavior in Mexico City, which included drug abuse and visits to brothels.)

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Critical acclaim for the book led to its development as a film also entitled “The Falcon and the Snowman.” The film which premiered on January 26, 1985 starred Timothy Hutton (right) as Boyce, Sean Penn as Lee (center), David Suchet as their Soviet contact (left), and was directed by John Schlesinger. Film critic Roger Ebert called the film a “meticulously observant record of how naiveté, inexperience, misplaced idealism and greed led to one of the most peculiar cases of treason in American history.”

Lee and the Soviets met in the morning near St. Stephens Cathedral. The Colonel protested after they returned to the safe house that the pictures from the Minox-B he told Lee to give to Boyce were not too good. He explained some of the pictures were decipherable, but others were fogged and out of focus. Editorializing a bit, Lindsey wrote the Soviets seemed to be growing exasperated with his two young “spies” said the author. He then writes that with the condescension of a teacher to his pupil, he said they would have to start again. (Note: Often power, a sense of control comes from having information. When a KGB officer shared information with an agent, his release of it was well-measured. He revealed only what was necessary and harmless to his service’s operations. He shared only enough to build-up the agent’s confidence in him and to convince the agent that he has complete situational awareness.)

The Colonel took a Minox-B—same as the one Boyce was using—out of his pocket and began a long day of lessons in how to photograph documents. The KGB officer presented Lee with a metal chain that he said was precisely 40 centimeters long, and said Boyce must use it to measure the distance from the camera to the documents in order to get sharper pictures. Moreover, The Colonel said the film should be developed in the United States—that way, the Americans could see for themselves if the photographs were of high quality. He taught Lee how to develop the exposed film and went over each detail of the process again and again; they photographed typewritten pages and pages from books, then processed the film. When the lesson was over, The Colonel smiled as if to say, “You see, it’s really not that difficult, is it?” Lindsey writes that The Colonel gave Lee advice on how to avoid being followed, including instructions to change cabs or buses often and to duck into stores or other crowded places and other techniques that he should use to ensure that he wasn’t tailed to their meetings. (Note: The Colonel taught Lee movement technique: how to “dry clean.”)

In the evening after the photography lesson, Lee was introduced to two middle-aged Soviets. From the respect servants paid to them, he gathered that they were important, but he learned little else about the pair of men in the dark suits who seemed so hyperactive that they could have been on amphetamines. They seemed to know all about Lee and his friend. Lindsey writes that he also met a third Soviet named “Boris.” The KGB men interrogated him about TRW. (Note: Through their questions the Soviets outlined a shopping list of requirements.) According to Lindsey, “Again and again, they pressed Lee to provide more technical data about infrared sensors, and photographs of the Rhyolite and Argus payloads. Lee assured his “mentor” that he should not worry, they would get the information. But it would cost $50,000. The Russian emphasized that money would be no object.” Lindsey states “There were more questions for Lee about the means used to transmit messages: shortwave radio, UHF, VHF, telephone circuits, Western Union?” (Note: As mentioned, KGB officers in the field answered upward to a pyramid of managers. In Vienna, Lee could not see that he was meeting the top management. The work of Boyce and Lee was being followed far beyond the KGB station in Mexico City. Direction on them was likely being given from the highest levels at KGB Headquarters and perhaps from the Kremlin. Given the case’s importance, KGB officers from the highest level, likely generals, were sent to observe Lee for themselves. During the Cold War, the worst mistake any service could make would be to recruit an individual who had been dangled before it by a hostile intelligence service. A general principle in intelligence work was to suspect anyone who took the initiative to offer their services to an intelligence officer. According to The Dictionary of Espionage: Spookspeak into English (Stein & Day, 1986) by Henry S. A. Becket, “A KGB manual warns its US based operatives against FBI attempts to dangle supposed recruits. It notes that ‘the person being dangled attempts to interest us in his intelligence potential or he takes the initiative and offers to pass us certain secret materials.’ Such dangles display a disappropriate interest in money . . .’ ” Lee approached the Soviet’s as a walk-in seeking payments for information. The Soviets began to work with Lee, setting caution aside likely because the spy satellite information was worth the risk. After meeting Lee, the two senior officers undoubtedly were completely convinced that he was not a shrewd US intelligence officer trying to penetrate KGB operations.) Lindsey expressed the belief that the Soviets were frustrated by the perplexing Lee and the inability to get more information from him.

Lee on the other hand was enjoying the experience according to Lindsey. He had all but forgotten his fears of being spirited away to Czechoslovakia. Erroneously, Lee slowly began to realize that he not the KGB officers had the upper hand in the game they were playing. According to Lindsey, after a while, Lee began to perceive something he thought was familiar: the intensity of the Russians appeal for information; a hungry look in the stony eyes of the man with the bristle cut, iron-gray hair that he had seen before. It had reminded Lee of someone begging him for dope. Lee had known that hunger for years; he had used it to whittle the niche he had made for himself in life. Lee tried to play on the Soviets dependency; he tried to exploit it; giving a little and promising more. Lee told the author dramatically: “They wanted what I had. I was basically dealing with addicts. But I knew they’d kill to get it too.” (Note: Ignorant of the KGB, Lee did not realize that the KGB officers were in reality assassins as much as gentlemen. The servants’ reaction to the men in dark suits was very likely due more to fear, not deference to rank. With likely bloodstained records of achievement, those men may have been satisfied with snuffing out, “liquidating,” Lee, but sacrifice for the state required accepting his use as a cut-out.)

Lee left Vienna and agreed to a suggestion from The Colonel to apply for a job at TRW or Lockheed. (Note: The Soviets knew the suggestion was absurd. They had no reason to cultivate him. Lee was unqualified for any position requiring secret clearance due to his criminal record, drug abuse, and drug dealing. His education was limited.) The Colonel handed Lee three envelopes full of American money and gave him a handmade rug from the Caucasus that he said was worth more than $10,000. Lee said goodbye not knowing whether he would see him again or not and decided that he would miss the sly old man. (Note: The Colonel convinced Lee he was a friend.)

One can read The Falcon and the Snowman to review the KGB operation, to study the adventures of Boyce and Lee, or to learn about a segment of US society in the 1970s. However, from every perspective, the reader will enjoy a great book on spies, intelligence, satellites, and interesting people. How the whole episode ends for Boyce and Lee is fairly well-known, but that cannot detract from the amazing ride Lindsey takes the reader on from start to finish.  It was a labor of love to read this classic over again. Without a shadow of doubt, greatcharlie.com highly recommends for its readers to read or re-read this great story. Once you complete it, recommend it to a colleague. Let them know The Falcon and the Snowman is now an eBook!

By Mark Edmond Clark

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Under Pressure Over Aleppo Siege, Russia Hints at Seeking Deal with US: Can Either Country Compromise?

US Secretary of State John Kerry (right) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (left) are the central points of diplomatic interaction between the US and Russia. They have worked together on a variety of urgent and important issues concerning their countries. They are now slogging away trying to find a way for the US and Russia to jointly end the Syria War and establish peace. Kerry has proposed US-Russian military coordination with preconditions. However, to secure an agreement on it, Kerry must convince Putin, not Lavrov, to change Russia’s positions.

According to an August 15, 2016 New York Times article entitled, “Under Pressure over Aleppo Siege, Russia Hints at Seeking Deal with US,” Russia suggested that it was close to an agreement on a military collaboration with the US to attack ISIS fighters in Aleppo, Syria as part of a solution to the unfolding humanitarian disaster there. US officials had no immediate comment on that claim. That joint effort would represent a new level of cooperation between the two countries which seek an end to the five-year-old Syria War. They support opposing sides. The New York Times reported foreign policy analysts believe Russia was negotiating in an attempt to avoid the appearance of blocking humanitarian aid to civilians in war-torn Aleppo by its airstrikes in Syria, Russian Federation Foreign Minister noted however, “It is of utmost importance that terrorists would not be getting reinforced with militants, guns, and munition [sic] supplies under the humanitarian aid disguise.” Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was the official who made the statement on the possible agreement. He explained in a measured way: “We are moving step by step closer to a plan—and I’m only talking about Aleppo here—that would really allow us to start fighting together to bring peace so that people can return to their homes in this troubled land.”

Russia and its Syrian, Iranian, and Iranian-led allies have faced significant setbacks on the battlefield as a result of their opponents’ abilities to capitalize on their inadequacies and mistakes. Russia will need to decide whether its actions will remain in the gap between contributing significantly to the efforts of allies fighting in support of the regime of Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-Assad and working with the US to act more effectively and more decisively against mutual Islamic militant opponents. The prospective agreement, to which Shoigu referred, would stem from military talks underway in Geneva. Those talks were set up as a result of a proposal proffered by US Secretary of State John Kerry to share intelligence with Russia and coordinate airstrikes against ISIS and other Islamic militant groups. However, Putin and senior Russian officials seem to view the proposal less from how it will help end the war than how it may present the chance to get compromise from the US on Syria and promote Russia’s immediate objectives there. Kerry’s proposal has been put forward as the administration of US President Barack Obama comes to a close. Still, after eight years of contacts, a inordinate amount of obloquy has recently been hurled back and forth from officials in Washington to Moscow. Failure to get an agreement on coordination will undoubtedly make it more difficult for Russia to get an agreement from the US on reconstruction and peace-enforcement which would be important for Russia to have. Reconstruction in Syria will be a decades-long, very expensive, reconstruction effort. Russia will need to gather partners to help with its costs and its execution. A peace-enforcement mission, perhaps under UN auspices, will likely be needed to ensure that peace would be given a chance to take hold. Russia should keep in mind that the US has proven to be an invaluable partner in such complex reconstruction efforts and peace-enforcement missions worldwide in past years.

The Obama administration may not be enthused about working with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Syria, but it seems to recognize that Russia, with its considerable military investment in Syria, can play an important role in ending the war. Putin must recognize that much could be accomplished with US know-how and resources in both efforts. If he cannot recognize the good that cooperation would bring at first glance or simply refuses to make mutual compromises with the US to gain its assistance, what is left for the US is to get him to understand via diplomacy. US Secretary of State John Kerry has slogged away seeking the right approach to make that possible. A few recommendations are offered here. The Syria War appears to be getting worse. Experience may make US and Russian officials averse to finding compromise on military coordination on Syria. Pride and ego can also harden attitudes. If such influences cannot be set aside, the two sides may remain locked into their relative positions for a long while. Praeterita mutare non possumus, sed futuraprovidere debemos. (We cannot change the past, but we can anticipate the future.)

Often poker faced in talks, US Secretary of State John Kerry, a statesman, speaks in a manner that is easy, comfortable, assuring, and logical. He is an agile thinker who seeks creative solutions to problems, often requiring him to be discreet. He worked well with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the removal of chemical weapons from Syria in 2013. They worked on the same side during the Iran Nuclear Talks during two years of negotiations from 2013 to 2015. He may achieve similar success with Lavrov on Syria.

US Inaction Leads to Russian Action

Obama made it clear from the start that he was skeptical of using US military force in Syria. In a notable August 18, 2011 speech, Obama made the direct statement, “the time has come for President Assad to step aside.” There were many additional declarations, insisting that Assad step down. Yet, having taken that maximalist position, there was an unwillingness to act. Within the Obama administration, it was truly believed that Assad would simply fall away, but that did not occur. That led the Obama administration in 2012 to provide the Syrian Opposition Movement with its support in the hope that Assad could be pressured to the negotiating table by Free Syrian Army advances and eventually agree to step down under a settlement. However, the US effort in Syria was designed and recognized by many as work on the margins. Obama would begrudgingly authorize the creation of a US-led coalition to airstrikes against the ISIS juggernaut that ran through Iraq in 2014. Those operations against ISIS were expanded to include ISIS targets in Syria. Obama sent US special operations forces to Iraq to advise and train Iraqi Security Forces and Iraqi Kurd military formations. Still, there would be no US combat units sent to fight ISIS in Syria.

Putin, however, did what Obama said he never wanted to do in Syria. In September 2015, Putin took the option of solving the conflict in Syria on his terms using a strong military hand. He explained that Russian Federation forces were sent into Syria both to “stabilize the legitimate authority” of Assad and to fight ISIS. He put a limited number of troops on the ground to protect Russia Federation military sites, and to serve as advisers and instructors for Syrian Arab Army units and volunteer units loyal to the regime. He would join Syrian, Iranian, and Iranian-led ground forces in battle against opponents using Russian Federation air power. Putin’s actions were mulled over, well-plotted, and implemented as to apply a calibrated amount of pressure on opponents of the Assad regime using measured amounts of military resources and controlling expenses. He was willing to accept a certain amount of risk in operations and was prepared to contend with some loss of personnel. Russia’s succor has benefitted Syrian, Iranian, and Iranian-led forces fighting on the ground not only in terms of military resources but also through guidance in the use of them.

Russia’s intervention did not mean an end to US-Russia diplomacy on Syria. Russia has supported talks between the Syrian Opposition and the Assad regime. Even before Russia went into Syria, Lavrov engaged in talks with the US to episodically establish a variety of cease-fires, nationwide and in specific provinces and negotiate humanitarian corridors. When Russian Federation military operations began, Moscow initially sought cooperation with Washington on Syria, but it was sought, however, solely on Russia’s terms. Those terms, in line with Putin’s concept for intervening in Syria, included providing diplomatic and military shelter to Assad and attacking, not only ISIS, but Western-backed rebel groups of the Free Syrian Army that oppose the Assad regime. Obama and other Western leaders sought to bring Putin into a US-led coalition. However, that would occur with the understanding that the goal of the coalition was the removal of Assad from power. Given the disparity between their positions, on November 27, 2015, Dmitry Peskov, spokesman for Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin,  played down the idea of cooperation at a Kremlin press conference. That announcement was surprisingly slow in coming given that the Obama administration was unsupportive of Russia’s intervention from the get-go. On September 30, 2015, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter forecasted about Moscow’s military involvement in Syria, “The Russian approach here is doomed to fail.” Obama stated on October 2, 2015: “An attempt by Russia and Iran to prop up Assad and try to pacify the population is just going to get them stuck in a quagmire and it won’t work.” Interestingly, Kerry was still authorized and ordered by Obama to negotiate some arrangement in which the US and Russia would coordinate in the ISIS fight.

Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has prying eyes that rarely turn away.  He has masterfully used diplomacy to turn policy into action in accord with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concepts and intent. At this point, the Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry are well-versed on each other’s idiosyncrasies. They are able to gain insight from every inflexion, tone, and or change in voice.

Kerry-Lavrov Diplomacy

Diplomacy requires finding some middle ground, typically through some compromise, upon which an agreement can be reached and better relations can hopefully be built. Despite a divergence in interests, the US and Russia achieved early diplomatic success on Syria when an agreement was reached on a list of rules to ensure military aircraft from the US and Russia would not mistakenly run into or fire on one another as they conducted airstrikes. However, Kerry and Lavrov are the central points of diplomatic interaction between the US and Russia. Diplomatic success on Syria would eventually be achieved by them. They have worked together on a variety of urgent and important issues concerning their countries. They worked well together on the removal of chemical weapons from Syria in 2013. They worked on the same side during the Iran Nuclear Talks as the P5+1, the UN Security Council’s Permanent Five Members (the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) plus Germany managed to construct an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program after nearly two years of negotiations from 2013 to 2015.   Often poker faced in talks, Kerry, a statesman, speaks in a manner that is easy, comfortable, assuring, and logical. He is an agile thinker who seeks creative solutions to problems, often requiring him to be discreet. Lavrov has prying eyes that rarely turn away.   He has masterfully used diplomacy to turn policy into action in accord with Putin’s concepts and intent. At this point, the two diplomats are well-versed on each other’s idiosyncrasies. They are able to develop insight from every inflexion, tone, and or change in voice. In oculis animus habitat. (In the eyes their character lives.)

A product of efforts by Kerry and Lavrov to find common interests among the warring parties in order to stop the violence in Syria was the December 18, 2015 UN Security Council vote on Resolution 2254 on Syria. It called for a ceasefire and a peace process that held the prospect of ending the Syria War. The resolution was agreed upon unanimously, 15-0, but sharp differences remained between the US and Russian positions. Russia’s key demand was that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad be allowed to remain in power. It is a position also supported by China and Iran. Removing Assad from power in Damascus remained a US requirement. Yet, the resolution made no mention of whether Assad would be able to remain in power or run in any future elections. UN Security Council Resolution on Syria 2254 essentially called for the following: a ceasefire had to be established and formal talks on a political transition had to start in early January 2016; groups seen as “terrorists,” including ISIS and the erstwhile Jabhat al-Nusra were excluded; “offensive and defensive actions” against such groups, referring to US-led and Russia airstrikes, could continue; UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon was asked to report by January 18, 2016 on how to monitor the ceasefire; “credible, inclusive, and non-sectarian governance “ should be established within 6 months; free and fair elections” under UN supervision to be held within 18 months; and, the political transition should be Syrian led.

What followed Resolution 2254 was UN Security Council Resolution 2268, unanimously adopted on February 26, 2016. The new resolution, brokered by Kerry and Lavrov, called for an immediate “cessation of hostilities” in Syria upon which the Assad regime and the Syrian Opposition agreed.  Countries with influence on the parties agreed to press them to adhere to their commitments.. Then, on March 14, 2016, the Geneva Talks resumed. They were the first talks in two years and came at a time when a marked reduction in fighting was perceived. Still, what created real hope that the war might soon end was the surprise announcement by Putin on the same day as the resumption of the peace talks in Geneva that he was “ordering the withdrawal of the main part of our [Russia’s] military contingent” from Syria. Putin explained: “The effective work of our military created the conditions for the start of the peace process.” He continued, “I believe that the task put before the defense ministry and the Russian armed forces has, on the whole, been fulfilled.” Only the day before the announcement, Putin and Obama spoke by telephone, after which the Kremlin said the two leaders “called for an intensification of the process for a political settlement” to the conflict, but Assad’s future was not discussed. Putin’s decision pull his fprces put of Syria seemed to fall in line with that pledge. In addition to the withdrawal announcement, Russian Federation UN Permanent Representative Vitaly Churkin explained “Our diplomacy has received marching orders to intensify our efforts to achieve a political settlement in Syria.” Regarding what lied ahead in Syria for Russian Federation forces, Churkin noted, “Our military presence will continue to be there, it will be directed mostly at making sure that the ceasefire, the cessation of hostilities, is maintained.”

If a feigned retreat by Putin was synchronized with the “cessation of hostilities” and used to manipulate opponents of Russia and its’ allies, the move was effective. Islamic militant groups that were not included in the ceasefire agreement engaged in firefights and fired artillery across battle lines prematurely seeking to better position themselves to exploit expected advantages resulting from Russia’s departure. Ire over the shaky ceasefire and the Assad regime’s violations of it reportedly drove some moderate Opposition fighters over to ISIS and other Islamic militant groups.

Putin’s “Feigned Retreat?”

Russia Federation forces withdrew from Syria, but estimates are that only 10 to 25 percent actually left. Moreover, Russian activity in Syria increased. Reuters reported the “Syrian Express,” the nickname given to the ships that have kept Russian forces supplied via the Black Sea Russian port of Novorossiysk to the Russian naval base at Tartus, Syria. It shipped more supplies, equipment, and munitions into Syria in the two weeks following Putin’s withdrawal announcement than it had two weeks prior. Russian Federation Air Force and the Syrian Arab Air Force continued to destroy the opponent’s units, material, and command, control, communication and intelligence, training facilities, and other targets. The ground forces of Russia’s allies remained active and returned a good portion of Syrian territory back to the Assad regime. Kerry and Lavrov carried on with their diplomatic efforts, but the ceasefire did not hold.

The Obama administration seemed to view Putin’s withdrawal announcement as a type of feigned retreat. The feigned retreat is a military tactic said to have been introduced to the West in the 8th century by the Frankish Duke and Prince Charles Martel. Under it, an army would pretend to withdraw or behave as if it has been routed in order to lure an opponent into a position of vulnerability. It was a difficult tactic to execute, requiring the use of well-trained soldiers. Once the opponent presses into the withdrawing army, undisciplined troops would panic and lose coherence, and the rout would become genuine. Charles Martel used the feigned retreat to defeat the army of Chilperic II and Ragenfrid of Neustria at Ambleve in 716. He attacked their army as they rested midday, he then feigned retreat to draw them from their wooded defensive positions into open ground where the situation was reversed. Charles Martel used the tactic again to draw an invading Islamic army into attacking at Poitiers in 732 by leaving his defenses relatively open. He did not construct pits and other obstacles and positioned his horsemen in a way to convince the Islamic army that it would not be enveloped if it charged in. The feigned retreat reportedly was used with moderate success by William the Conqueror at the Battle of Hastings in 1066.

One might postulate that Putin’s feigned retreat included synchronizing his withdrawal announcement with the resumption of the Geneva talks, and while the “cessation of hostilities” was in effect. In that environment, opponents of Russia and its allies were perhaps considered more apt to be manipulated. The maneuver, if actually executed, appears to have worked. Mainstream opponents of Assad were unable to control the actions of some Islamic militants some of which they were tenuously aligned. Islamic militant groups, not included in the internationally sponsored ceasefire, engaged in firefights and fired artillery across battle lines, apparently seeking to immediately exploit Russia’s departure. Accusations of ceasefire violations were heard from all sides around Syria. Ire over the shaky ceasefire and the Assad regime’s violations of it reportedly drove some moderate Opposition fighters over to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other Islamic militant groups. A coalition of Free Syrian Army units, Islamic militant groups already existed in the form of Jaysh al Fateh. The ceasefire became untenable once Russian Federation Air Force and Syrian Arab Air Force jets provided air support for Syrian Arab Army units and pro-Assad regime allies in those exchanges. Putin’s feigned retreat also ostensibly allowed Syrian, Iranian, and Iranian-led units to rearm and resupply for offensive action toward Palmyra.

The Russian Federation armed forces and intelligence services use their own intelligence tactics, technique, procedures, and methods to meet the needs of Russian Federation commanders and planners. Russian Federation commanders and planners certainly would like believe that by intensifying their own intelligence gathering activities, they can achieve success, particularly by using air power, without US assistance. However, their concern over recent successes of their opponents and their failure to effectively respond to them indicates they are not so certain of their capabilities

Good Thoughts, Good Words, Good Deeds?

The perception of a feigned retreat of Russia from Syria did not make US-Russia diplomacy easier. US officials were already regularly reproaching Russia over its repeated airstrikes upon “moderate” anti-Assad groups while ostensibly seeking to attack ISIS. Obama’s disappointment could be discerned in his statements. On August 6, 2016, Obama admonished Putin over Russia’s actions in Syria by stating: “I’m not confident that we can trust the Russians or Vladimir Putin.” He continued: “Whenever you are trying to broker any kind of deal with an individual like that or a country like that, you have got to go in there with some skepticism.” Timeo danaos atque dana ferentes. (I fear the Greeks even when they bring gifts.)

Obama’s uncongenial words could be characterized as a shot across Russia’s bow and perhaps signaled fatigue over the diplomatic process with Russia had set in. However, in diplomacy, words and behavior matter absolutely. Kerry knows that diplomacy must be handled with a certain amiability and gentleness in order to create the environment for the development of mutual respect and understanding. In talks on Syria, he would hardly omit what some anonymous US officials have called “inconvenient facts” about Russian actions. He surely broaches such matters, but in way that avoids closing any doors and avoids igniting a negative exchange with Putin, Lavrov, or any official of the Russian Federation government. Regardless of any personal feelings he might have over an issue, he must maintain his balance in spite of them.

Russia will not be able to use its military wherewithal alone, at least in a limited way, to secure victory on its terms in Syria and “get out of Dodge.” Enough support exits for Islamic militancy in the world that a struggle over US and Russian interests in Syria is being overshadowed by the continuous rise of Islamic militant groups there. This was evident at Aleppo where Russia’s allies could not maintain their siege. Commanders of Islamic militant groups seem capable of constantly making adjustments and replenishing with fighters (as above) by the hundreds, creating a more vexing situation on the ground.

Kerry remains authorized and ordered to establish cooperation. Obama did indeed say with opprobrium, “The US remains prepared to work with Russia to try to reduce the violence and strengthen our efforts against ISIL [ISIS] and Al-Qaeda in Syria, but so far Russia has failed to take the necessary steps.” Kerry and Lavrov continued their diplomatic efforts, sponsoring the International Syria Support Group, a multinational effort seeking to create the conditions for peace talks. Moreover, remaining on the table was Kerry’s proposal offering to share US intelligence with Russia and coordinate airstrikes against ISIS and other Islamic militant groups, with the precondition that the Syrian Arab Air Force halt its airstrikes against mainstream Opposition military units. As mentioned earlier, senior US and Russian Federation military officials have been negotiating in Geneva over how they would coordinate under Kerry’s proposal as well as restore an overall ceasefire. The Russian Federation armed forces and intelligence services proudly use their own intelligence tactics, technique, procedures, and methods to meet the needs of commanders and planners. Russian Federation commanders and planners would certainly like to believe that by intensifying their own intelligence gathering activities, they can achieve success without US assistance. However, they have unquestionably been unsettled by the recent successes of their opponents and their failure to respond effectively to them. Beyond human intelligence collection—spies, the US gathers continuous signals and geospatial intelligence over Syria. Multiple streams could assist the Russian Federation commanders and planners in pinpointing ISIS and other Islamic militant groups on the ground even if they are dispersed. Air assets of the Russian Federation and its allies could destroy them, disrupt their attacks, and support ground maneuver to defeat them. In support of the proposal, Kerry and Lavrov have already agreed that a map could be drawn up indicating where Islamic militant groups are positioned. They also have agreed that US and Russian military personnel working in the same tactical room would jointly analyze the intelligence and select targets for airstrikes. Est modus in rebus. (There is a middle ground in things.)

Nevertheless, at this juncture, Kerry is not oriented primarily on drawing out compromise from Lavrov, Shoigu, or senior Russian military officials in Geneva. Indeed, Kerry knows he must convince Putin, himself, that it would be in Russia’s interest for him to change his position. Putin hardly believes that US assistance would have significant value to Russia. Regarding Syrian Arab Air Force airstrikes, Putin has said he has no control over what Assad does with his forces and has explained the Syrian leader does not trust the US. Much as Obama has negative impressions of Putin’s actions and intentions, Putin holds certain negative impressions of Obama. Putin may also feel uncertain about making any deals on Syria with one US leader now, only to face another in a few short months. Certainly, at the State Department, Defense Department, and other elements of the US foreign and defense policy establishment, legions of diplomats and officials are working on what was called in Ancient Rome a maremagnum, a complicated issue requiring the efforts of many to solve. As no approach has wangled compromise from Putin so far, new approaches are needed. Some alternative approaches are offered here.

The value of US assistance might be increased in Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s mind through a demonstration of US capabilities. The US could also demonstrate how US assistance would have value by using the intelligence resources it proposes to share with Russia in order to target and destroy a number battle positions of ISIS and other Islamic militant groups in Syria, and disrupt and destroy developing attacks and counterattacks against Russia’s allies. Russian Federation officials could also be given a US battle damage assessment.

Recommendations

To help Putin countenance Kerry’s proposal, Kerry could explain that cooperation on intelligence and an airstrikes against Syria will speed the end of the conflict. Russia may not be able to use its military wherewithal alone, at least in a limited way, to secure victory on its terms in Syria and “get out of Dodge.” Enough support exits for Islamic militancy in the world that the struggle by the US and Russian over their respective interests in Syria is practically being overshadowed by the continuous rise of Islamic militant groups there. Commanders of Islamic militant groups seem capable of constantly making adjustments and replenishing with fighters by the hundreds, creating a more vexing situation on the ground. That was evident at Aleppo where Russia’s allies could not maintain their siege. Indeed, Putin could be reminded that on July 28, 2016, after a month of negotiations and immense pressure from Qatari and Turkish representatives, Jabhat al-Nusra announced that it broke with Al-Qaeda and had officially changed its name to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham. Almost immediately, reinforcements for Jabhat Fateh al-Sham began to flow into Syria from the border with Turkey. At least 100 new fighters arrived in Aleppo each day, together with numerous convoys carrying arms, ammunition, and supplies. During the effort to break the siege, Opposition forces and Islamic militant groups were observed fighting side by side under the banner of Jaysh al Fateh. Even after the siege was broken, it was explained in a briefing at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation Lieutenant General Sergei Rudskoi that about 7,000 Jabhat Fateh al-Sham fighters were massing south-west of Aleppo for over a week and still being joined by new fighters. Rudskoi said the fighters had tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery and vehicles with weapons mounted on them. Kerry could explain that the problem will grow exponentially over time as commanders of Islamic militant groups make further adjustments and reinforce by the hundreds, creating a new, more vexing situation on the ground. Kerry could point out that so far, Russian Federation Air Force has barely isolated the battlefield and has failed to deny their opponents reinforcements and supplies needed to win engagements. At best, its efforts could be measured by its contribution to the destruction in Syria to include civilian deaths and the obliteration of nonmilitary structures. As it was discovered after the destruction of the Abbey of Monte Cassino in Italy during World War II, Germans troops were afforded better concealment from Allied airstrikes and ground attacks in the structure’s debris. One might assume senior US military officers are discussing these matters with their Russian Federation counterparts in Geneva. However, these disconcerting facts about Russia’s Syria campaign may not have reached Putin.

To further encourage a change in Putin’s perspective on Kerry’s proposal, the US could increase the value of its assistance through an actual demonstration of US capabilities. That might be accomplished by providing Putin with a complete US military analysis of the setbacks Russia and its allies have faced in Syria, and the relative strengths and weakness versus their Islamic militant opponents. It might be demonstrated exactly how US intelligence resources it proposes to share with Russia and US military resources would have value to Russia by targeting and destroying a number battle positions of ISIS and other Islamic militant groups in Syria, and disrupt and destroy developing attacks and counterattacks against Russia’s allies. Putin could be shown via video how the unique capabilities of US weapons systems could enhance the quality of air strikes. He could also be provided with US military assessments of those attacks.

Kerry might also seek to connect with Putin by reminding him that leaving Syria without at least initiating some complex comprehensive plan for reconstruction and peace-enforcement would be a mistake. That would create ideal conditions for the resurrection of ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, or the establishment of another Islamic militant group to fill the vacuum of power around the country. That was what occurred in Iraq after US forces departed, the problem in Libya with the removal of the regime of Muammar El-Ghaddafi, and it is a growing problem in Afghanistan. Putin must consider that cooperation between the US and Russia in the fight against Islamic militant groups would set the stage for close and effective cooperation between the two countries on a postwar reconstruction and peace-enforcement mission in Syria. Without it, Russia’s investment in Syria might amount to nothing in the end. In discussing postwar Syria, Kerry could give assurances on how the US will respond with regard to certain hot issues. For example, at a UN meeting in Vienna on November 14, 2015, Kerry proposed allowing all Syrians, “including members of the diaspora,” participate in national elections, betting that if Syrians around the world participated in it, Assad would lose. Putin was never going to standby for that and has used force, in addition to the fight against ISIS and other Islamic militant groups, to best shape the situation in Syria to secure Russia’s interests. Mending that fence may require a very hard decision concerning Assad by the Obama administration. Further, Kerry could point to the international reconstruction effort launched in Bosnia in 1995 under the Dayton Peace Agreement and the creation of the multinational peace-enforcement force in support of the agreement’s implementation, I-FOR (Implementation Force). The US and Russia cooperated as members of that force and the follow-on force, S-FOR (Stabilization Force.).

By reaching an agreement now on Syria and conducting effective airstrikes against ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and other Islamic militant group, there would be a greater chance that US-Russian coordination would be preserved by the next US administration. Further, that military cooperation might influence a US decision to assist at some important level in reconstruction and possible peace-enforcement mission in Syria. US participation in those efforts could encourage participation from other countries.

Regarding Russian concerns over the future of US leadership, Kerry could explain that Russia should act quickly now with the assurance that the US will be working directly to destroy ISIS and other Islamic militant groups. An agreement will at least allow for a US-Russian working relationship for few months, putting tremendous pressure on ISIS, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and other Islamic militant groups from the air. Kerry could emphasize the reality that reaching an agreement now on Syria and coordinating effectively under that agreement would increase the possibility that US-Russian coordination at that level would be preserved by the next US administration. Further, that cooperation could greatly influence a US decision to assist at an important level in postwar reconstruction and a possible peace-enforcement mission in Syria. Russia has recently sought stronger ties with Arab countries, bolstering economic ties with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Kuwait and diplomatic overtures with Algeria, Iraq, and Egypt. Russia’s hope is by courting those countries they would become more receptive to its’ calls for a political solution in Syria. It is also hoped those countries would become responsive to an eventual campaign by Russia to gain financial support for Syria’s reconstruction. However, US participation in those efforts may do much to encourage participation from those Arab countries and Western countries as well.

Kerry’s words alone may no longer have any impact on Putin. To provide a new perspective on the proposal, Kerry could try to bring third parties that have some standing with Putin into the negotiation process. There are no national leaders who could serve as independent third party to address Kerry’s proposal with Putin. However, Kerry could perhaps seek assistance from Pope Francis of the Roman Catholic Church or Kirill Patriarch of Moscow and Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church to speak to Putin. They could discuss the need to forgo placing primacy on national interests and focus on the global threat posed by ISIS and other Islamic militant groups, and the tragedy that has befallen the Syrian people. They cannot support war, but they can support collaboration between the US and Russia to halt the evil of Islamic militancy in Syria.

These approaches should not be presented as guesswork on the potential success US assistance may bring. Rather, they should be presented as hard facts to get Putin to see what is possible and change his perspective on cooperation. Finding success from the approaches presented here may be a long-shot. Kerry knows that you miss 100 percent of the shots you do not take.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) and senior Russian officials are apprehensive over US actions and intentions on Syria. However, many US officials have been expressing concerns about coordination with the Russians. They doubt Putin will compromise. They believe that Putin cannot be trusted. On Syria, it may be best for the US and Russia to work as partners. Choice itself is not good. It is the right use of choice that counts. Nothing could be worse than thinking of what might have been if things had been done thusly. Hopefully, that will not be the case for the US or Russia on Syria.

The Way Forward

Tot capita, tot sententiae. (So many heads, so many opinions.) Putin and other Russian officials are quite apprehensive of US actions and intentions on Syria. However, many US officials have been expressing concerns about coordination with the Russians. They doubt Putin will compromise. Moreover, they believe Putin cannot be trusted. Trusting Putin may be difficult for them, but trust us not so relevant in this case. Senior US and Russian military officials would be working together on targeting and sending down missions to unit commanders in a joint operations room. If some shift in Russian behavior, no matter how slight, is discerned by the watchful eyes of senior US military officials, the entire operation could be halted immediately. Under Obama’s concept, what seems most important to him is that a good faith effort at coordination be made. Besides, doing the job of targeting ISIS and groups such as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham will be difficult enough as they are now intermingled with many mainstream Opposition units. Many US officials have expressed concern that sharing intelligence with Russia could result in revealing US intelligence sources, methods, and capabilities. Yet, deciding what to share and reveal is a puzzle that can be resolved. Putin seems attached to the Assad regime. However, given what has been reported on Kerry’s proposal, it does not include a precondition on Assad’s presidency.

The problem of Islamic militancy in Syria emerged during the struggle between Assad and the Opposition and given the international threat it poses, it is an urgent problem. US President Franklin Roosevelt did not easily accept Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union as an ally, but given the threat of Adolf Hitler’s Nazi Germany, the choice was clear. On Syria, it might be best for the US and Russia vraft an agreement to coordinate their efforts. Choice itself is not good. It is the right use of choice that counts. Nothing could be worse than thinking of what might have been if things had been done thusly. Hopefully, that will not be the case for the US or Russia on Syria.

The Pivot to Asia: The Policy Shift That Called Putin’s Attention to Europe’s Unlocked Doors

For the administration of US President Barack Obama, the reset with Russia was a major foreign policy initiative. For three years, a business-like tenor existed in relations, making the administration comfortable enough in 2011 to turn its attention toward Asia under what it called the “pivot to Asia.” Its hopes were dashed when Vladimir Putin returned as Russian Federation president in 2012, seeking to restore Russia’s power and influence. Soon after, there were numerous disagreements between Obama and Putin particularly over Europe. Relations deteriorated, and Europe again faced a threat from Russia.

What is most noticeable about US-Russia relations today is the uncongenial relationship between US President Barack Obama and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. While that relationship may seem in perpetual retrograde, there initially was real potential for positive ties and real progress on a variety of issues if the interests of both countries were considered. The Obama administration approached Russia with the idea that the relationship between the two countries could be “reset.” The reset with Russia was one of the administration’s major foreign policy initiatives. Relations with Russian Federation President Dimitry Medvedev were positive. For three years, a relatively smooth and business-like tenor existed in relations with Russia. That contrasted with the contentious relations that followed the Georgian War in 2008 while Putin served as president. It boded well for Obama’s legacy over which White House officials publicly admitted being absorbed. With its Russia policy on track, the administration was comfortable enough to turn toward an even greater priority at the end of 2011 which was referred to as the “pivot to Asia.” Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained it all in an edifying discourse in the October 11, 2011 edition of Foreign Policy magazine.

In her essay entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” Clinton wrote: “In the next ten years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia Pacific region.” Bringing to memory the historic US commitment to Europe after World War II, Clinton declared: “At a time when the [Asia-Pacific] region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, [the] U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over—and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.” The administration’s plans were ambitious and admirable, but its hopes for a benign pivot to Asia were soon dashed. Europe once again faced a threat from Russia. There were numerous actions and reactions by Obama and Putin particularly concerning Europe. Relations deteriorated. Omnia iam fient quae posse negabam! (Everything which I used to say could not happen, will happen now!)

Candidates in the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, perhaps already considering how to deal with Putin and formulating policy approaches for Russia for their possible administrations, should get beyond us-them simplicities and avoid conceptualizing prospective relations solely on where they are at this moment in time. Rather, the course of the collapse of US-Russia relations and how to repair, and avoid, policy missteps witnessed over the past eight years should be anatomized. Part of that process would entail fully understanding those mistakes. Some of them are reviewed here. Further, it is important to genuinely understand the thinking of Putin and his advisers on Russia’s relations with the US. A truncated analysis, in the abstract, of such thinking inside the Kremlin is also presented here.

Igniting Putin: A New Russian Threat Excites Europe

From 1945 to 1989, US geo-strategists assessed that if a new world war were to occur, the battleground would be Europe. However, in the first term of the Obama administration, it was assessed that Europe had become more tranquil. There was a crisis in the eurozone, but Europe remained the most prosperous and peaceful parts of the world. The threat from China was the new focus of geo-strategists. That threat was ostensibly the underlying rationale for the pivot to Asia. In Europe, the announcement of the pivot to Asia was greeted with ambivalence, even alarm. The Europeans understood the renewed commitment to Asia would come at their expense. Obama administration officials tried to prove that was not the case at the time. However, with planned defense cuts of $500 billion over the next decade and the expressed intent to avoid reducing expenditures in Asia, Europe would be the only place to make cuts. The costs were conceivably higher given the possibility budgetary pressures would increase. Key defense commitments in Europe at the time included a missile defense system being developed with a possible nuclear Iran in mind. The administration had already announced that it intends to withdraw two of the four US Army brigades deployed to Europe—with overall military spending on Europe set to decline by 15 percent. Yet, US Army units stationed in Germany were considered in the context of rotations to the Middle East or Africa, not combat in Europe. There remained the potential threat of a breakdown in relations with Russia which would put Europe’s security at risk, but it was practically considered de minimus, negligible. The Obama administration considered the possibility that if Putin returned to Russia’s presidency, he would seek to exert pressure against the West where and when he felt it would pay dividends. It is unlikely the administration foresaw things would go so badly.

Obama was at ease with Medvedev. He went as far as to declare a new era between the two former Cold War adversaries existed. He seemed to measure all possibilities on relations with Russia on his interactions with him. However, maintaining a constructive relationship with the Russian leader is not a personal matter; it is part of the business of being president. Both the US and Russia possess the unique and mutual capability to annihilate one another, and the world, with their nuclear arsenals. Talks between the leaders of the two countries build confidence, eliminate ambiguities about positions, and prevent guessing over actions, intentions, and motives. Talks allow leaders to “clear the air” regarding any personal concerns they had within their own high-level relationship. A strong personal bond between leaders can develop, but it is not essential. When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the low yield of the reset and the underestimation of Russia as a potential threat became apparent. Putin returned to the Kremlin on a mission to restore Russia’s global power and influence. He was not interested in anything that might diminish or prevent that effort. Perhaps as a consequence of that, old ills that were part of US-Russian relations began to resurface, and new ones arose with frequency. Among them were: Putin’s decision to allow US National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden to reside in Russia; ongoing espionage efforts between Russia and the US, including the activities of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR officer Anna Chapman and other Russian “illegals” captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2010, and the allegations of US spying on Russia revealed by Snowden and Wikileaks; and the US admonishment of Russia on human rights issues. Putin fumed over Operation Unified Protector, during which multinational forces including the US, were placed under NATO command and imposed a no-fly zone and destroyed government forces loyal to then-Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. Putin felt NATO-led forces went beyond UN Security Council Resolution 1973’s mandate by helping local forces overthrow Gaddafi. Gaddafi, who had been a friend of the Soviet Union and Russia, was killed. The world saw how poor the relationship between Obama and Putin was after observing their body language when they met in Northern Ireland on June 17, 2013.

Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Sergei Ivanov (above). Ivanov is an anti-US ideologue. He believes the US has taken a foreign policy course aimed at holding on to US leadership in the world by means of the strategic containment of the growing influence of the Russian Federation and other centers of power.

How Relations with Putin Went Wrong Way

Perhaps the administration did not fully grasp just how poorly things were going with Putin. The Obama administration was confident enough to push agendas for nuclear arms reductions with Russia and EU and NATO expansion in Europe just as the administration of US President George W. Bush, his predecessor had. The administration referred to its effort to attain further nuclear arms cuts before leaving office as a “signature effort.” The reduction of nuclear forces and reductions in conventional forces have been issues US and Russian leaders have dealt with for decades, but Obama was not going to resolve any nuclear issues with Putin. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are not a mere policy issue or bargaining chip for Putin, but a means of survival for Russia. Putin had no intentions of acceding to proposals for deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal repeatedly sent to Moscow by the administration. It was at this point in 2013 that relations with Putin and Russia truly began to collapse, falling to a very low point when the Obama administration cancelled a September summit meeting between Obama and Putin. The cancellation was in retaliation over Putin’s decision to reject the administration’s nuclear proposals. Administration officials lamented that Putin’s decision ended the president’s “signature effort to transform Russian-American relations and potentially dooming his aspirations for further nuclear arms cuts before leaving office.”

There were other very public affronts. The next year, during preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, there was a constant drum beat of doubt expressed by US security experts on the capability of the Russian security services to protect Sochi from terrorism. A leader’s public declaration of his decision not to attend has practically been a tradition among US and Russian leaders during a period of disagreement in international affairs. In addition to the Olympics, Obama would later decide not to attend the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Allies, ending World War II in Europe. The celebration, hosted by Putin, was a time to recall the legacy of cooperation established during the war and a real example of what US-Russian cooperation could be in a common cause. It offered a chance for Obama to privately address his dispute with Putin. It was the best time for him to say that as with the alliance between their countries in World War II, relations between their countries now were important, bigger than both of them. Attending would have required Obama, as Rudyard Kipling would say, to “bite the bullet,” in terms of personal pride, but not in terms of his role as US president. By being absent, that day became one more reminder of the two leaders differences and their uncongenial relationship. Occasio aegre offertur, facile amittitur. (Opportunity is offered with difficulty, lost with ease.)

Between those years, the US and EU took Putin to task for his annexation of the Crimea. Harsh sanctions were levied and Russia was cast out of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies. Even tougher sanctions against Russian interests were threatened by the US if aggression against Ukraine escalated. Putin responded to it all with sanctions against US and EU products. In a March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Putin vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating some Western actions that fostered contempt in Moscow. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he refers to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Incursions of Russian bombers and fighters in NATO airspace and Russian warships in NATO waters were regularized. The only public bright spot in US-Russia relations was diplomacy between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, mainly on Syria and Iran. Still, that activity was more reflective of their countries’ roles on the UN Security Council, not the tenor of relations between Obama and Putin.

Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (above). In response to what Russian officials refer to as “NATO’s preparations along our borders,” Shoigu announced on January 12, 2016 that there would be a major military build-up along its border with Ukraine.

Putin’s Pushes Westward

The poor US relationship with Russia, just as much as the Ukraine crisis, affected Europe’s relationship with Russia concerning business, economics, and security. In the summer of 2013, the EU Council sharply condemned Russia’s mounting pressure on members of the EU Eastern Partnership, countries with association agreements with the EU. In 2012, the EU accounted for 52 percent of Russia’s exports, 68 percent of which consisted of fuel and energy. Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU suspended virtually all cooperation. Still, Putin’s thinking on the EU was not positive even before the Ukraine crisis. Putin saw the EU as a project of deepening integration based on norms of business, law, and administration at variance from those emerging in Russia. Putin was also concerned that EU enlargement would become a means of excluding Russia from its “zones of traditional influence.” Certain Russian actions indicate Moscow actively seeks to encourage members to withdraw from the EU sphere and discourage countries joining it. Joint projects with European countries have allowed Russia to exploit their differences on political, economic and commercial issues creating a discordant harmony in the EU. As much as making money, a goal of such efforts has been to undermine EU unity on sanctions. The Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline, for example, has provided Putin with the means to disrupt, weaken European unity. A murmur exists in Europe that solidarity ends at the frontiers of some countries. Ad mores natura recurrit damnatos fixa et mutari nescia. (Human nature even reverts to its depraved courses, fixed and immutable)

Regarding NATO, in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin provided insight into his thinking then and now. During the interview, Putin quoted West German Parliamentarian Egon Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and EU as having acquitted themselves of ties to promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. He feels historians have ignored the machinations and struggles of people involved. Putin further stated: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have. You can also see this striving for an absolute triumph in the American missile defense plans.” Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Fortunate is he who understands the causes of things.)

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Foreign Policy Adviser Yuri Ushakov (above). Ushakov, much as Ivanov, is not a fan of the US. He was present at former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s meeting with Putin. Kissinger seemed to confirm many of the worst notions Putin and his advisers held on US thinking.

In the years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, many European countries cut their defense spending, allowed their military preparedness to drop, and reduced the NATO footprint in their own territories and in countries east to occasional drills and small exercises with former Warsaw Pact members. They stood unprepared to confront Russia. Some allowed fear and resignation to infiltrate their perceptions of the matter. They sought to veil the fact that they were intimidated by Putin, and seemingly tried to mollify him, speaking skeptically about the clear threat Russia posed. Others seemed to fear signaling a military reaction to Putin. Yet, they signaled insecurity by appearing ambivalent about committing to the costly requirements of collective security despite: the “Crimea-grab”; the Russian push in the Donbass; a looming threat to the Baltic States; Moscow’s threats to use nuclear weapons; and, Russian military air and naval incursions from Britain to Estonia. (It would be unconstructive to name specific countries regarding this point.)

Putin did not stand by while the EU and NATO expanded. He decided to pull independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Russia’s orbit. Accomplishing that required Putin to create something that did not preexist in most near abroad countries: ethnic-Russian communities forcefully demanding secession and sovereignty. That process usually begins with contemptuous murmurs against home country’s identity, language, and national symbols and then becomes a “rebel yell” for secession. It was seen in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and more recently in Crimea, the Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine. Each time an ethnic-Russian space is carved out of a country, Putin gains a base from which he can exert his influence in that country.

Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council Nikolai Patrushev (above). Patrushev is Russia’s most senior intelligence official. He asserts that the US has always sought to have levers of pressure on Russia by making use of NATO on its own terms and using its political and economic pressure to prevent vacillations by allies and partners.

Inside the Kremlin: Putin’s Advisers Speak

Audiatur et altera pars! (Let us hear the opposite side!) In February 2016, a doyen of US foreign policy, archetypal Cold Warrior, and master architect of détente, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, visited Russia in order to speak at the Gorchakov Foundation. While in Moscow, he met at the Kremlin with Putin, the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Sergei Ivanov and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Foreign Policy Adviser, Yuri Ushakov. Ivanov and Ushakov are anti-US ideologues. In his Gorchakov Foundation speech and his meeting at the Kremlin, Kissinger, albeit unintentionally, confirmed many of the worst notions Russian officials held on US thinking. Kissinger stated that “Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily a threat to the United States.” Noting that “divisive issues” existed, Kissinger suggested that rather than establish its own sphere of influence near its border, Russia should share influence in its’ periphery with the West to avoid raising alarms around it. For example, he asserted that “Ukraine needs to be embedded in the structure of European and international security architecture in such a way that it serves as a bridge between Russia and the West rather than an outpost of either side.” To Putin and his advisers, Kissinger’s ideas were hardly acceptable. Enough examples of Moscow’s behavior exist to challenge the suggestion that some sea change in thinking at the Kremlin could occur. Consider the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. In a March 6, 2014, BBC.com article entitled, “Ukraine Crisis: Obama Urges Putin to Pursue Diplomacy,” it was reported Obama told Putin in a phone call that there was a solution available that suited all parties, involving talks between Kiev and Moscow, international monitors in Ukraine, and Russian forces returning to their bases. Yet, Putin would never entertain a solution that would “suit all parties.” What suits Russia in the near abroad was, and remains, Putin’s only concern.

When Kissinger went on to state that there must be a willingness “to move beyond the grievances and sense of victimization . . . ,” Putin and his advisers sat unruffled, but were surely irritated. They likely perceived Kissinger was being dismissive of their strong concerns over EU and NATO expansion eastward. His statement likely supported their perceptions that US officials have an instinctive need to assert moral authority over Russia.

Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev (above). Obama was put at ease when Medvedev was Russia’s president. Obama went as far as declaring a new era existed between the two former Cold War adversaries. Now Medvedev states: “NATO’s policies related to Russia remain unfriendly and opaque—one could go as far as to say we have slid back to a new Cold War.” Medvedev is not a friend of the US. He is Putin’s comrade.

During the final plenary session at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia on October 22, 2015, Putin mentioned the 1973 comedy, science-fiction film from the Soviet Union, “Ivan Vasilyevich Changes Profession.” Putin quoted one of the film’s characters as saying to another: “How am I supposed to understand what you’re saying if you don’t say anything?” Senior Russian political leaders and foreign and defense policy officials have recently made some unambiguous public statements about US, EU and Russian relations. Clearly, their statements were biased by the view that US holds an unyielding hostility toward Russia which is manifested in its policies and actions. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 13, 2016, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, Putin’s political comrade, accused NATO of restarting the Cold War amid increased military maneuvers and troop deployments to Russia’s neighbors. Medvedev told the meeting of national leaders, senior defense officials, and top diplomats that sanctions imposed after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and new moves by NATO “only aggravate tensions.” He argued: “NATO’s policies related to Russia remain unfriendly and opaque—one could go as far as to say we have slid back to a new Cold War.” He went on to state: “On an almost daily basis, we’re called one of the most terrible threats either to NATO as a whole, or Europe, or to the United States.” Medvedev called for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia concerning Crimea, saying they are “a road that leads nowhere.” He suggested the West would only harm itself if it did not lift the sanctions soon. He warned: “The longer the sanctions continue, the more chances fade for Europeans to keep their positions in Russian markets as investors and suppliers.”

In his meeting with Putin, Ivanov, and Ushakov, Kissinger stated that Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium concerning what he dubbed “divisive issues” such as Ukraine. He suggested Russia should share influence in its declared near abroad with the West. He also explained there must be a willingness to move beyond grievances and sense of victimization. Putin and his advisers sat unruffled, but were surely irritated by his statements.

In an interview with the official government newspaper, Rossiskaya Gazeta, the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, one of Putin’s most important advisers and most senior intelligence official, Nikolai Patrushev, proffered: “. . . Washington has always sought to have levers of pressure on Russia. Thus, in 1974 the famous Jackson-Vanik Amendment was adopted, restricting trade relations with our country. It appeared to have completely lost its relevance immediately after the breakup of the USSR, but it was still in force right up to 2012, when the so-called “Magnitsky List” was promptly adopted in its place.” Referring to current US and EU sanctions against Russia, Patrushev explained: “The current sanctions are in the same category. The US administration’s activity in the Ukrainian sphere is taking place within the framework of an updated White House foreign policy course aimed at holding on to American leadership in the world by means of the strategic containment of the growing influence of the Russian Federation and other centers of power. In this context Washington is actively making use, on its own terms, of NATO’s potential, seeking to use political and economic pressure to prevent vacillations on the part of its allies and partners.”

In response to what Russian officials refer to as “NATO’s preparations along our borders,” on January 12, 2016, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that there would be a major military build-up along its border with Ukraine. Shoigu reportedly stated: “the task of utmost importance for us this year is to form three new military divisions in the western direction.” Shoigu stressed that it was not only a necessity not just to form the bases but also to re-equip locations for permanent deployment, create appropriate training grounds, storage space for equipment and accommodations for personnel. Shoigu further explained that “special attention should be paid to monitoring and analysis of the military-political situation in the world, as well as timely responses to its changes.” One base is being constructed in the town of Boguchar in the Voronezh region, located 45 kilometers from the border of Ukraine’s Luhansk province, now the self-declared, independent Luhansk People’s Republic. The base would accommodate at least 5,000 troops and would be able to house 1,300 pieces of military equipment. A similar base will be constructed near the settlement of Valuiki in the Belgorod region, approximately 20 kilometers from Luhansk.

For the Obama administration, the end is closer than the beginning. Only so much can be done in the amount of time left to halt the trend downward, much less, turn things around with Putin or its Russia policy. The challenge of improving US-Russia relations will likely be left to the next US President. O si sic omnia. (Oh, would that all had been done or said thus.)

The Way Forward

A little more than four years after Clinton provided her 2011 discourse on the pivot to Asia, General Breedlove essentially assessed the path had not been paved for Europe to go without a US presence, US leadership, and significant US support. In the US European Command Posture Statement 2016 presented on February 25, 2016, Breedlove explained: “I cannot emphasize how important European nations, in particular our NATO Allies and Non-NATO Partners, are to ensuring America’s security and safety. Many of our most capable and willing allies and partners are in Europe, playing an essential role in promoting our vital interests and executing a full range of military missions . . . Europe is not the same continent it was when I took command, as new threats and challenges continue to emerge.” The grand notion of pivoting away from Europe to focus more on Asia withered once the clashes between Putin and Obama began. Some may parse out the collision of Obama and Putin as representing the natural balance of things as their worldviews are so divergent. Even if true, some syncretistic existence should have been established for the benefit of their countries and their people. Authentic geopolitical thinking was subsumed by a satisfying substitute for reality concerning long-term US-Russia relations. Indeed, decisions in the Obama administration on Putin and Russia were based on relations with Medvedev early-on and what was best for Obama’s legacy. That got the administration into trouble with Putin from the get-go. Relations languished in misunderstanding.

Discord obtains when things get mixed up. One might speculate, with levity, that Russia experts at the State Department, the Defense Department, and CIA, who understood Putin, were seemingly exiled to isolated garrets on the top floors of their headquarters buildings by the administration to keep their impressions out of the way. Hopefully, there is not an irreversible trend downward for US-Russia relations. Yet, the end is closer than the beginning for the Obama administration. Only so much can be done with time available to halt the slide, much less, turn things around. Improving US-Russia relations will be a challenge left for the next US administration. Kissinger suggested Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium. However, creating that global equilibrium will be tough as Russia will likely remain intransigent over its interests in what Putin calls the near abroad. Some recognition of Russia’s positions would be required to improve relations (although creating an arrangement in Europe that would satisfy Russia may not be possible at this point). Resetting relations would also require a new administration to recognize the limits of US power projection. How much the US will be able to handle in its sphere of influence in the future must be determined through a hard-headed assessment of possibilities based on capabilities both available and in development.

Iran, Powers Make Limited Progress at Nuclear Talks; Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Remains Focus, But Lasers May Bring Iran the Bomb

The construction of new facilities at the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center, once an undeclared laser uranium enrichment site, has allowed Iran to engage in more advanced laser work. The notated Google Earth photo of Lashkar Ab’ad, above, is from the Institute for Science and International Security. Laser uranium enrichment is a subtle aspect of the nuclear talks. Iran has pledged to forgo laser enrichment activity, but if it is still engaged in that work secretly, detecting it will be difficult.

According to a January 18, 2015 Reuters article entitled, “Iran, Powers Make ‘Limited’ Progress at Nuclear Talks, To Meet in February”, five days of diplomacy in Geneva and Paris between the P5+1 (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia China, and Germany) and Iran ended without an agreement. It included meetings between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Hope remains among diplomats that a political understanding can be reached by the end of March and a comprehensive deal can be reached by June 30, 2015. Reuters quoted Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and negotiator Abbas Araqchi stated the discussions were “good” and “extensive.” French negotiator Nicholas de la Riviere was quoted as saying “the mood was good,” but he also said, “I do not think we made a lot of progress.”

The later view expressed by de la Riviere perhaps best described the situation. The January meeting’s outcome was disappointing given hopes raised in December 2014 that the talks would progress faster and more smoothly. In December, negotiators even created a catalog outlining areas of potential accord and differing approaches to remaining disputes. Among the catalog’s requirements, much of Iran’s enriched uranium would be shipped out of the country. The administration of US President Barack Obama wanted to reduce Tehran’s ability to make nuclear arms by committing it to ship to Russia much of the enriched uranium needed for weapons. However, diplomats are now debating how much enriched uranium to leave Iran. Iran has a stockpile for several bombs, and the US wants cuts well below that level. Other issues being debated apparently include the size of Iran’s future enrichment output. The US wants it cut in half, leaving Tehran with about 4,500 of its existing uranium enrichment centrifuges, or less if it replaces them with advanced models. Tehran is ready for a reduction of around 20%, or about 8,000 machines. Issues remaining to be resolved include action on Iran’s underground Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant and its incomplete Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40). The P5+1 wants Fordow repurposed to a non-enrichment function. Fordow is allegedly impervious to airstrikes. The P5+1 wants Arak re-engineered from a model by which it could yearly produce plutonium for several nuclear bombs to a less proliferation-prone one.

In the meantime, Iran is still complying with restrictions on research and development required under the November 24, 2014 extension. According to documents outlining the extension, these provisions are designed to resolve ambiguities regarding permitted and prohibited research activities, and especially “limit research and development on advanced centrifuges that move the machines to the next level of development.” Iran agreed not to test the IR-5 centrifuge with uranium hexafluoride gas. Iran also agreed not to pursue testing of the IR-6 centrifuge on a cascade level with uranium gas, or semi-industrial scale testing of the IR-2M. Iran also agreed not to complete installation of the IR-8 centrifuge, which is only partially installed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The IAEA will also have greater access to Iran’s centrifuge production sites under the extension. According to the terms, the agency’s inspections visits will double and be conducted with very little notice. The goal of limiting research and development and creating regular access to monitor centrifuge production facilities was to prevent Iran from refining and mass-producing efficient machines that would allow it to rapidly enrich material for bombs.

Discussing the November 24, 2014 extension, US Secretary of State John Kerry said “We would be fools to walk away from a situation where the breakout time [for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon] has already been expanded rather than narrowed and the world is safer because the program is in place.” He noted skeptics who predicted the interim agreement [Joint Plan of Action] would collapse and Iran would break its promises were proven wrong. He further stated “Guess what? The interim agreement wasn’t violated, Iran has held up its end of the bargain, and the sanctions regime has remained intact.” Through the nuclear negotiation process, the US and its P5+1 partners have focused most on centrifuge uranium enrichment. However, Iran’s nuclear program does not fit into a single, very clear and well defined picture of centrifuge enrichment. Iran has the technological know-how and the human resources to take its nuclear program in many different directions. It puts into the question the choice not to give added attention to other paths to uranium enrichment. Iran has a proven capability to engage in uranium enrichment using laser isotope separation. If Iran’s work with lasers is not properly addressed before the end of the negotiation process, the world may soon face a very advanced, nuclear capable Iran.

On Centrifugal Uranium Enrichment, Iran Is Compliant

What best supports the argument proffered by Kerry and others that Tehran’s intentions on the nuclear issue may be positive is the significant effort Iran has made to comply with its agreements on centrifugal uranium enrichment. Reviewing that compliance, one would discover that the January 20, 2014 IAEA Report stated Iran halted production of near-20% enriched uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) and ceased operating its interconnected centrifuges that were enriching to 20% UF6. The February 20, 2014 IAEA Report said Iran was using the four cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to only 5%. Regarding its stockpile of enriched uranium, in the July 20, 2014 IAEA Report, it was explained Iran completed the process of converting half of its stockpile of 20% enriched UF6 gas (~104 kg) to uranium oxide powder. Iran’s dilution of half of its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium was confirmed in the April 2014 IAEA Report.

With respect to research and development, in the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report, it was verified that Iran was continuing its safeguarded research and development practices at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and was not using the research to accumulate uranium as it tested advanced models. Iran submitted details on site selection for 16 nuclear power plants to the IAEA, its initial plans for 10 future enrichment sites, and a light water reactor. Those plans included: descriptions of buildings located on nuclear sites, the scale of operations for each location, and information on uranium mines and mills.

On source materials, a May 23, 2014 IAEA Report explained that Iran granted the agency access to the Gchine Mine, the Saghand Mine and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant. Iran provided the IAEA with information about source material on April 20, according to the May 23, 2014 IAEA Report. Iran also submitted an updated Design Information Questionnaire for the reactor at Arak (IR-40) on February 12, 2014, according to the IAEA’s February 20, 2014 Report. On May 5, 2014, IAEA and Iranian officials met to discuss a safeguards approach with the IAEA for the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor, and according to the IAEA’s June 20, 2014 Report, Iran reached an agreement with the agency on the safeguards.

Regarding IAEA access and monitoring, the requirement for Iran was to allow daily IAEA inspector access at Fordow and Natanz, including scheduled and unannounced inspections and access to surveillance information daily. As of its February 20, 2014 Report, the IAEA installed surveillance measures at Natanz and Fordow to facilitate daily monitoring and reached an agreement on facilitating daily access. (Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA had visited Fordow on a weekly basis, and Natanz on a biweekly basis.) The February 20, 2014 Report noted the IAEA made its first monthly visit to the Arak Heavy Water Reactor on February 12, 2014. It visited Arak between February 3, 2014 and February 7, 2014, to inspect the centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production and workshops, and storage facilities.

Issues concerning mines and mills were covered by May 23, 2014 IAEA Report. It explained that Iran granted the IAEA access to the Gchine and Saghand Uranium Mines and the Arkadan Milling Facility. While Iran was required to provide figures that would allow the IAEA to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines, the IAEA was granted access to Iran’s centrifuge workshops and facilities, allowing it to collect such data firsthand. Regarding the capping of Iran’s 5% enriched UF6 stockpile, the November 24, 2014 IAEA Report on implementation of the Joint Plan of Action indicated that Iran’s stockpile of UF6 gas was 7,400 kg, below January’s level of 7,560 kg.

Iran has complied with agreements to refrain from certain actions with its program. In a January 18, 2014 letter to the IAEA, Iran pledged not to engage in reprocessing or build a reprocessing facility over the six months of the deal. Then, the January 20, 2014 IAEA Report confirmed reprocessing was not taking place at the Tehran Research Reactor or the Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility). The January 20, 2014 IAEA Report confirmed Iran also has not installed a reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide powder to 20% UF6.

With regard to Natanz, Iran has refrained from making any further advances of its activities there. According to a February 20, 2014 IAEA Report, Iran had not installed any new centrifuges and was not feeding UF6 into the roughly half the centrifuges at Natanz that were already installed but were not engaged in uranium enrichment.

Concerning Fordow, Iran has also refrained from further advancing the plant’s activities. The February 20, 2014 IAEA verified that Iran has not installed any new centrifuges, and is not feeding UF6 into the three quarters at Fordow that have also been installed but not engaged in uranium enrichment. Additionally, the cascades have not been interconnected. To the extent Iran has replaced centrifuges, the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report indicated that Iran limited itself to replacing existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. The report made clear that surveillance has been set up to monitor any changes.

On Arak, the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report said Iran had not commissioned the reactor and had not conducted any activities to further it. Iran, as promised, according to the report, has refrained from transferring fuel or heavy water to the Arak reactor. Iran has also refrained from testing additional fuel or producing more fuel. Indeed, the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report said that Iran had not manufactured or tested any reactor fuel, and the number of fuel rods produced remains at 11. Iran has refrained from installing any additional reactor components at the Arak site. Centrifuge production has been limited to those needed to replace damaged machines. That has been confirmed by the IAEA’s regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops.

Regarding the construction of any new locations for enrichment, in a January 18, 2014 letter to the IAEA, Tehran said it would not pursue any new uranium enrichment sites during the six months of the agreement which has now been extended. Iran also agreed to forgo uranium enrichment using other methods, including laser enrichment. While it is unlikely that Iran could move quickly to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels using these alternative methods, the commitment to refrain from testing any of these methods is positive and should mitigate concerns about covert enrichment activities involving such technologies. Iran is known to have experimented with laser enrichment in the past, and as part of its agreement to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation into inconsistencies with its nuclear declaration and alleged activities with past military dimensions, Iran provided the agency with information about its laser enrichment activities. Iran also gave the IAEA access to the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center on March 12, 2014.

Laser Uranium Enrichment: A Genuine Concern

A number of laser enrichment processes have been developed. One process is molecular laser isotope separation, conceived at Los Alamos Laboratories in 1971. Under that process, carefully formed photons, from an infra-red laser system, operating near the 16mm wavelength, irradiate UF6. The lasers selectively excite the molecules of 235 UF6, not the molecules of 238 UF6. The molecules of the excited 235 UF6 then become easier to differentiate from those of the 238 UF6. Photons from a second laser system selectively dissociates the excited 235 UF6 to form 235 UF5 and free fluorine atoms. The 235 UF5 formed from the dissociation precipitates from the gas as a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream. An advanced laser enrichment technology known as separation of isotopes by laser excitation (SILEX) was developed in Australia by Michael Goldsworthy and Horst Struve. Details of SILEX are classified under the US Atomic Energy Act. In 2006, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy signed an agreement with Silex Systems Ltd. Of Australia and eventually built a SILEX demonstration loop. In September 2012, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board granted GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) a license to build a first-of-its-kind laser enrichment facility in Wilmington, North Carolina. The license allows GLE to produce up to 6 million single work units per year. Silex has completed the Phase 1 Test Loop Program the facility. GLE promotes laser enrichment as a less costly, less energy-intensive enrichment process.

Nonproliferation analysts and specialists for year have expressed concern over the proliferation threat posed by laser enrichment. If properly engineered, it has the potential to dramatically advance the capabilities of countries to secretly enrich uranium. Princeton University atomic expert Scott Kemp noted that a number of countries already have a workforce specialized in laser technologies. He stated further, “That expertise does not exist for centrifuges, which are a bit esoteric.” Although enriching uranium with lasers on a production-scale appears extremely complicated, laser uranium enrichment is as a potential way for a country to acquire significant quantities of highly enriched uranium. A covert laser uranium enrichment facility might escape detection by the IAEA and Western intelligence agencies because of the relatively small size and few external indicators of such plants. Further, several required research and development activities of laser uranium enrichment can be conducted under a non-nuclear cover.

While visiting an exhibition sponsored by Iran’s National Center for Laser Science and Technology in February 2010, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (center) made a public statement about Iran’s laser uranium enrichment capability that troubled the international community. Ahmadinejad indicated that Iran possessed an advanced and effective laser uranium enrichment capability. Since then, the IAEA has sought data on Iran’s laser work.

Iran has far more than a pilot laser enrichment program. It has developed advanced lasers suitable for isotope separation and highly enriched uranium production. In February 2010, then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a public statement about Iran’s laser uranium enrichment capability. At an exhibition sponsored by Iran’s National Center for Laser Science and Technology, Ahmadinejad stated “Today, we are capable of enriching uranium with lasers. It is now possible to do this using the same devices which are on display here at the exhibition” and that “using the laser technology for enriching uranium would lead to carrying out the enrichment process with higher quality, accuracy, and speed.” He further stated “Iranian scientists have acquired the laser-operating, uranium enrichment know-how, but would put the technology on the shelf for now.” New facilities recently constructed at the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center, once undeclared as a laser enrichment site, have supported Iran’s advanced laser efforts.

The IAEA, itself, has displayed concern over Iran’s laser enrichment capability. On February 8 and 9, 2014, the IAEA and Iran held technical meetings under the terms of the November 2013 Framework for Cooperation. As a result, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement on seven practical measures that Iran had to implement by May 15, 2014, including one provision where Iran agreed to provide “mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center.” That agreement reinforced the terms of the Framework for Cooperation in November 2013. Iran agreed to further clarify Ahmadinejad’s 2010 statement on laser enrichment also, but the February 2014 IAEA Report stated Iran only partially explained it.

Would Iran Seek Breakout Capacity Through Laser Enrichment?

Many US allies still fear Iran’s diplomatic initiative is a delaying tactic designed to allow other Iranian government elements to bring the nuclear program to breakout capacity, which means acquiring the knowledge and means to develop a nuclear weapon without actually doing so.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the idea that Iran’s diplomatic efforts were legitimate, and rebuffed Obama for even entertaining Iranian overtures.  When the talks began, the Wall Street Journal quoted Israel’s Minister of Intelligence and International Affairs, Yuval Steinitz, as saying, “Israel is interested in a diplomatic solution, like anyone else. But we don’t want to cheat ourselves.” Steinitz went on to state, “Some people are willing to be cheated.”

To put into perspective the possibility that Iran might be conducting an effective laser enrichment program in secret, consider strides made by Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan to revamp and enhance Iran’s advanced defense research programs and strengthen Iranian defense industrial base will greatly enhance Iran’s warfighting capabilities presently and into the future.  Iran has already made great strides in satellite technology, drone, and stealth technology.  The application of those new technologies was evident in the reverse engineering of a US stealth drone, the advent of a new anti-ship system and other naval technologies, and Iran’s greatly enhanced cyber capabilities. Per aspera ad astra! (Through difficulties to the stars!)

Dehghan is an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Air Force brigadier general (Sartip). He is fearless, devout, dedicated to the Islamic Revolution and sworn to defend the Islamic Republic. His efforts on the Expediency Council helped it best advise Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on conventional and unconventional ways Iran could use its military to accomplish political goals in the face of US and Western opposition. Dehghan’s descent to Rouhani’s cabinet, after serving as a committee secretary on the Expediency Council, did not occur because his administrative skills were sorely needed in the Defense Ministry.  Rather, Dehghan was selected in order to manage projects of such importance to Iran’s security that only someone as capable and reliable as him could be counted on to direct.

On January 7, 2015, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, made it clear he was no longer concerned about ending sanctions through the nuclear talks, and warned the government that “efforts must be made to immunize Iran against the sanctions” so that “the people will not be hurt.”

Maintaining the nuclear program and the right to enrich was the requirement Khamenei gave to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani when he released him to engage in a dialogue with the US and Western powers on economic sanctions, and consequently, Iran’s nuclear program.  Khamenei saw the negotiation process primarily as an opportunity to counter economic sanctions while progressing in the area of nuclear technology. While occasionally supportive of government efforts in the nuclear talks, he often expressed some skepticism about them. On January 7, 2014, Khamenei made it clear that he was no longer as concerned about ending sanctions through the nuclear talks, and warned the government that “efforts must be made to immunize Iran against the sanctions” so that “the people will not be hurt.”  He went on to state: “No one should imagine that the enemy may stop its enmity and maliciousness.” He then said, “Once you forget and trust the enemy, then the enemy finds the chance to pursue his goals in the country. But if you identify the enemy and you are strong, ready, arrogance [US] will inevitably stop its enmity.”

The Way Forward

The first successful attempt at gas centrifuge process of uranium enrichment, over which the P5+1 and Iran have primarily been negotiating, was performed in 1934 at the University of Virginia. The work was based on a 1919 proposal. Two chlorine isotopes were separated through a vacuum ultracentrifuge. It was the first process utilized in the renowned Manhattan Project of World War II, but abandoned because the process would unlikely allow for the production of material for a bomb rapidly enough. Electromagnetic separation, initiated at the Oak Ridge, Tennessee facility and eventually, gaseous diffusion, were pursued instead. The Soviet Union successfully used the gas centrifuge process in its nuclear program and during the Cold War, it was the most effective supplier of enriched uranium. Since those years, the gas centrifuge has been considered an economical means for separating uranium-235 from uranium-238 compared to gaseous diffusion. To achieve high degrees of separation of these isotopes, several individual centrifuges must be arranged in cascade to achieve higher concentrations.

Although little is said about it publicly, it sounds exotic, and details on it are relatively obscure, laser enrichment is certainly real. The details are not embellished here. Over eighty years after the first successful attempt gas separation by centrifuge, laser separation has become a viable means for countries to engage in uranium enrichment. It is also a less costly and less energy-intensive process for enriching uranium to fuel atomic energy reactors and making nuclear bombs. Iran’s scientific and technological prowess makes cogent the idea that Iran might be engaged in an advanced laser enrichment effort while negotiating over centrifuges. When decision was made to keep Iran away from nuclear weapons, the international community believed that it would monitor and eventually halt Iran’s centrifugal uranium enrichment, the path taken by countries that had already acquired a nuclear capability. It now appears that line of thinking is driven more by nostalgia than realism. While none of the current nuclear powers may have reached their nuclear capability with lasers, Iran certainly could. Visionaries might be able to provide hints about what Iran is doing. Only divine vision knows for sure.