The Death of Prigozhin: Whether Nature’s Course or a Heinous Crime, It Closed a Trying Chapter of Putin’s Presidency (Part 2)

Yevgeny Prigozhin (above). On August 23, 2023, the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin and nine other passengers were killed in a jet crash north of Moscow. The crash came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the  Russian Federation Defense Minister Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. A deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it was certainly not enough to prove he ordered albeit a not-so-unique form of execution. As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. There remains be much to understand regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s life. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

This essay should be considered a continuation of the preceding greatcharlie post.

On August 23, 2023, a private Embraer jet flying to St. Petersburg crashed north of Moscow killing all 10 passengers onboard. Onboard was the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin, two other top Wagner Group officials, to include Dmitry Utkin, Prigozhin’s four bodyguards and a crew of three. The crash garnered international attention as it came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However, a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid what all sides feared would be the further “shedding Russian blood.” The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow.

Assuredly, if Prigozhin’s deadly jet crash was not accidental and ordered by the highest authorities in the Russian Federation government, the decision was most likely multifactorial. Many opinions have offered by analysts and experts on the Russian Federation on how Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin benefitted from the action were also offered. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it is certainly not enough to prove he ordered such a not-so-unique form of execution in authoririan regimes, also occasionally witnessed in democracies. Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non pœna, perire. (Death claims all things. It is law, not punishment, to die.)

The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood,by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. The 2023 North Korea–Russia summit between Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jung-un was held in Moscow on September 23, 2023. Putin in his first foreign visit after the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest visited Kyrgyzstan on October 12, 2023. Putin then visited People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Bejing on October 17, 2023. Each event provided ample opportunity to further assess Putin’s words and behavior to construct a firmer understanding of the man and his decisionmaking. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. After all, Putin and Prigozhin, at least for a time, were true friends. That was somewhat evident in Putin’s initial public comments on the crash. In many respects, for Putin, the deadly episode amounted to a private tragedy within what seemed a public conflict. Many details will likely remain kept from both the public and the newsmedia. Still, from what has been been presented to the public, there remains be much to gain regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s presidency. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

Unless there is additional information so newsworthy concerning Prigozhin that it cannot be dismised or avoided, greatcharlie believes this will be it last entry on the passed-on Wagner Group owner. Still, as has been the case with its previous posts, greatcharlie hopes this essay will stimulate among readers, particularly students, new lines of thought, even kernels of ideas on how US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other governments might proceed concerning the Russian Federation. Certainly, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Though, for greatcharlie, it would be satisfying enough to have this commentary simply stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy. Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus omnibus est vitæ; sed famam extendere factis, hoc virtutis opus. (Each one has his appointed day; short and irreparable is the brief life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the work of virtue.

Putin in a pensive mood (above). Part 1 of this essay, the discussion revolved around the dynamics of Prigozhin’s personal and professional relationships with Putin. When Putin met Prigozhin, he was already a relatively successful businessman, energized by connects created by a school chum Boris Spektor. After Putin became the Russian Federation President, he presented Prigozhin with lucrative business opportunities, chances of a lifetime. Prigozhin broke with those initial business partners and struck on his own, working primary via Concord Management and Consulting services. From a successful businessman, Prigozhin moved into realm of the country’s oligarchs. That was a circumstance not too unusual in Putin’s Russia. Between Putin and loyal associates, unique professional opportunities were developed on the basis of the quality of their personal relationships with him. Breaks between Putin and associates would more often be the result of personal differences that cropped up, unpredicted and unacceptable. Often those former associates completely vanished, quietly from the scene in the Russian Federation. There are those in the West who would insist that Putin nothing more than a black hearted snake, unable to have lasting, enjoyable relationships with associates. Equally, they would likely proffer that all of his relationships have been based on their utility for him. In that vein, there had to be some advantage gained or there would be no reason to know someone. The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, when it began, was hardly based on utility.

Putin’s Personal Relationships Versus Professional Relationships: Some Nuance

In Part 1 of this essay, the discussion revolved around the dynamics of Prigozhin’s personal and professional relationships with Putin. An acute example of individuals in the Russian Federation with solely professional relationships with Putin are the oligarchs. Oligarchs managed over the years to amass great wealth and great power and influence within the country to the extent possible under the oversight and control of Putin. Their support of regime and its policies is explicit. A number of those who have failed to meet Putin’s expectations, even to the extent of ostensibly posing a political threat to his regime, have found themselves arrested on charges such as fraud, tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, and embezzlement. Trials of such individuals have been very public. Putin’s professional relationships with the oligarchs may be useful and at times convenient, but hardly friendly. PUtin’s relationship with Prigozhin was personal. When Putin met Prigozhin, he was already a relatively successful businessman, energized by connects created by a school chum Boris Spektor. After Putin became the Russian Federation President, he presented Prigozhin with lucrative business opportunities, chances of a lifetime. Prigozhin broke with those initial business partners and struck on his own, working primary via Concord Management and Consulting services. From a successful businessman, Prigozhin moved into realm of the country oligarchs. That was a circumstance not too unusual in Putin’s Russia. Between Putin and loyal associates, unique professional opportunities were developed on the basis of the quality of their personal relationships with him. Breaks between Putin and associates would more often be the result of personal differences that cropped up, unpredicted and unacceptable. Often those former associates completely vanished, quietly from the public scene in the Russian Federation.

There are those in the West who would insist that Putin nothing more than a black hearted snake, unable to have lasting, enjoyable relationships with associates. Equally, they would likely proffer that all of his relationships have been based on their utility for him. In that vein, there had to be some advantage gained or there would be no reason to know someone. The idea is essentially slander. The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, when it began, was hardly based on utility. By the accounts from the majority of observers to include the independent newsmedia and independent research groups as well as the opposition political parties in the Russian Federation, their friendship grew from initial social contacts tied to Putin’s visits to Prigozhin’s restaurants. 

Many long-term personal relationships that have also had professional links to Putin tended to be low profile and given relatively scant newsmedia coverage in the country. Some Russian Federation analysts and experts might point out is Putin’s long-term relationship with Sergei Roldugin.

Sergei Roldugin has been friends with Putin since the late 1970s  Since In those days, Roldugin has affectionately referred to Putin with the diminutive “Volodya”, and still does so today. Putin met Roldugin via his older brother, Yevgeny, who attended the KGB training with Putin. Allegedly it was Roldugin who introduced Putin to his wife Lyudmila. Putin chose Roldugin as the godfather of his first daughter, Maria, born in 1985. Roldugin is known to be a celebrated cellist based in St Petersburg, but he has also been labeled a businessman. The label has some meaning to the extent that Roldugin is a key figure in the covert efforts “to hide Putin’s fortune.”

Due to his low-key presence, some believe Roldugin has actiually been excused from serving Putin in some way financially. However, investigative journalists in the Russian Federation estimate that nearly $2 billion have moved through accounts in his name. With direct concern to the music arts, Roldugin was allowed to open and operate a “Musical House” in an opulent 19th-century palace in St. Petersburg which was not a mean financial feat.

There is also Putìn’s ex-wife, Lyudmila Putina, now remarried and named Lyudmila Ocheretnaya (hereinafter referred to as Lyudmila). Putin married Lyudmila on July 28, 1983. At the time, she was a flight attendant for the Kaliningrad branch of Aeroflot. The couple had two daughters, Maria, aforementioned,  born in Leningrad on April 28, 1985 in Leningrad, and Katerina born on August 31, 1986 in Dresden, East Germany. After 30 years of marriage, Putin and wife publicly announced their divorce publicly before the Russian Federation newsmedia at the State Kremlin Palace during the intermission of a performance by the Kremlin Ballet.

In January 2016, Lyudmila was remarried to Artur Ocheretny. Reportedly Ocheretny, health and fitness expert, owns luxury real estate in Europe. Presumably with blessing of her ex-husband and his support Lyudmila has generated millions through the Centre for the Development of Inter-personal Communications (CDIC) which she created and supports. CDIC’s offices are located in the center of Moscow, on Vozdvizhenka Street in the building previously known as Volkonsky House. Rents in the building wich amount to about $3–4 million are paid to the company Meridian, which is in turn owned by a company known as Intererservis. Intererservis is wholly owned by Lyudmila. The chairman of CDIC’s management board is Lyudmila’s second husband Ocheretny.

As with Prigozhin, there were business transactions and opportunities earn income involved in the relationships between both Sergei Roldugin and Lyudmila Ocheretnaya that only the Russian Federation President could create. To that extent, the difference between a personal and a professional relationship with Putin might appear nonexistent for many observers. However, it does exist. When Putin makes the choice to ask a favor, a special task, of a friend, he imaginably makes the assessment that he can expect a degree of trust and dependability of that individual. For the friend entreated to assist the Russian Federation President, nothing more would expected than to follow Putin’s instructions to the letter. Any rewards, meager or of great magnitude would be for Putin to decide. Suffice to say the offer of “assistance” from Putin would require close friends to walk out on thin ice. The last thing the wise amount them would want to do is disappoint Putin even by happenstance. In particular, one would not want to act on any wherewithal provided from Putin’s largess behind the Russian Federation President’s back, so to speak The consequences would certainly been severe. Their involvement with his enterprises is something to fear. Whether a friend of Putin can, through their own actions, expiate for his or her betrayal of Putin’s trust is unknown to greatcharlie. Perhaps that has hardly been the case. Prigozhin may have been the rare exception on couple of occasions, likely over matters unrelated to the Wagner Group. However, that can only be supposed in the abstract. One might consider the apposite Act V, scene 4 of William Shakespeare’s play The Two Gentlemen of Verona (1589-1593) in which Valentine discovers his best friend Proteus attempted, unsuccessfully, to curry the affections of his beloved, Sylvia. In response to the outrageous act by Proteus, the much wounded Valentine states: “I am sorry I must never trust thee more, / But count the world a stranger for thy sake. / The private wound is deepest: O time most accurst, / ‘Mongst all foes that a friend should be the worst!.” Remarkably, despite what was said, the two men reconcile at the end of the play after Proteus repents and Valentine forgives him. However, Putin once betrayed has hardly been forgiving.

Prigozhin failed to meet Putin’s expectations with regard to the Wagner Group and possibly Concord. Prigozhin did not object or seem to worry about accepting opportunities he surely had never foreseen or handled before. Not so quietly, he amassed a great degree of wealth. Many other professional relationships did not blossom to the size of Prigozhin’s multi-billion dollar empire. It was perhaps a measure of his friendship with Putin. However, a not so apparent or expected development at the time was a considerable degree of control and power Prigozhin chose to exercise over assets Putin made available to him. In this way, Prigozhin’s handling of money from Putin was indeed quite different than theirs. Prigozhin became exceptionally hands-on at the Wagner Group. Seemingly lost upon him was the reality was that everything came from Putin. As aforementioned, Putin went to some pains to explain that he was the engine behind the Wagner Group as well as Prigozhin’s lucrative Concord. Without Putin, the Wagner Group would never have existed, at least in the robust form that it did by 2023. As for his presence in the newsmedia, Prigozhin had far exceeded what could have been called high-profile. His role had become disastrous within the Wagner Group and for the Russian Federation government. As admitted in previous posts and in the introduction of this essay, Prigozhin was largely in the right when he complained about the inept handling of combat operations and the astronomical loss of Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine. 

Putin tried to mitigate matters by regaining control of the professional aspects of his relationship with Prigozhin as they concerned the Wagner Group. Particularly after the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin insisted more than once that Wagner Group troops sign an oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation and contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Rather than cooperate, Prigozhin rejected the idea of signing oaths and agreement as he did when it was first broached in early June 2023. He publicly expressed his concern he would lose control of “his” organization to the Defense Ministry and especially his nemesis Shoigu. He did not view resting formal control of the Wagner Group to the government as a shift of control to Putin. The friendship between Putin and Prigozhin had surely gone off the rails. There was much on Putin’s plate at the time, but his troublles with Prigozhin were doubtlessly frustrating, worrisome, and angering.

As noted earlier in Part 1, Prigozhin had lost perspective completely. By the end, he was out of control. He was not “acting”, putting on a show, which very well may have been part of the image he publicly presented during the Wagner Group Rebellion as discussed in greatcharlie’s July 1, 2023 post entitled “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)”. Prigozhin was being his true self.

Respecting Boundaries

Cuiusvis est errare, nullius nisi insipientes, in errore perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.) There are limits, boundaries in relationships which should not crossed. Normally, among the mature, those boundaries do not need to be put forth. Often there are those seemingly drawn to violate those boundaries, consciously despite knowing the consequences. Those individuals are poor choices for friends. There also those who may violate those boundaries of friendship unconsciously. (In civilized societies, advanced countries, a consequence for the violation of such boundaries of friendship should not be death. That would be unacceptable behavior, unreasonable, and typically against established law.) One or the other may have been the case with Prigozhin. Month after month, he trampled so aggressively on the vineyard of friend both he and Putin nutured for more than two decades. Assuredly, he placed himself on dangerous ground with his barage of publicized statements.

There were many close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. A number of theories have been suggested by greatcharlie in previous posts, particularly Part 1 of this essay, for Putin’s apparent patience. At least publicly, Putin is a devout Russian Orthodox Catholic. At the core of Putin’s faith is the injunction to forgive. Perhaps something about Prigozhin and few others sparked Putin to act to some degree within the stricture of his faith with regard to forgiveness. Perhaps, as suggested in Part 1, the cause for his forgiving nature at times has been his sense of humor. Yet with Prigozhin, specifically, he appeared to display a level of tolerance that even then too many friendly observers appeared against his own self-interests. It was clear to anyone observing worldwide that while Prigozhin rambled on about the special military operation in Ukraine beginning in 2022, Putin would only hold him at arms length.

Perhaps Putin recognized that Prigozhin was too gravely wounded by what transpired in Ukraine that it was beyond his capacity to regulate his behavior on the matter. While greatcharlie has no training or expertise in identifying or diagnosing mental health issues, from its layman’s eye, it appears to have been some prominent symptom from a form of  post traumatic stress Prigozhin was suffering that was left untreated. It is possible that Putin understood early on that Prigozhin was not fully aware, or could not comprehend, the trying situation in which he had placed the Russian Federation President. Even greatcharlie would assess without equivocation that Prigozhin went too far. Putin could forgive him no more. He could not save him. It is in this vein the Putin’s comments concerning Prigozhin’s mistakes, made the day after the jet crash, take on additional meaning. A few of those mistakes were discussed in Part 1 of this essay.

Indeed, in Part 1, Putin broke his silence on Prigozhin’s jet crash on August 24, 2023 during a meeting with the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, in the Kremlin. If readers can cast their minds back to Putin’s initial remarks, they may recall that Putin stated: “First of all, I want to express my sincere condolences to the families of all the victims, this is always a tragedy.” Putin went on to say: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He described him as “a talented man, a talented businessman.”

Putin intriguingly then added: “He was a man of difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results needed both for himself and when I asked him about it–for a common cause, as in these last months.” There were indeed many mistakes that Prigozhin made while ostensibly assisting Putin. Prigozhin had required but had not always warranted Putin’s forgiveness many times. Putin had forgiven much. To that extent, such is not so apparent as Putin mentioned that Prigozhin always did what he asked him to do. Often, Putin had to hold him at arms length. The list of disappointments is far lengthier than one might imagine as it concerned the failure to optimally serve Putin’s interests. It went far beyond Prigozhin’s ramblings about Ukraine. A small number are listed here.

Surely, Prigozhin was aware that in the Russian Federation or anywhere else in the world, he may have chosen to go, without the protection of Putin, he would have had little chance of survival against a considerable number of adversaries. Doing anything to lose Putin’s protection would have been tantamount to suicide. (Of course, if any had decided to harm Prigozhin while he was under Putin’s protection, nothing could have done to change what may have had occurred. However, certainly Putin would have used available resources to retaliate aggressively.) Still, despite the great meaning Putin’s protection as well as financial support meant for Prigozhin’s survival, he bizarrely proceeded to denigrate Putin’s special military operation, and consequently, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff, and ministers and senior generals leading those organizations.

Prigozhin’s ego not intellect very likely convinced him that his attacks upon Shoigu and Gerasimov and the special military operation following the Wagner Group Rebellion were well-nuanced, laser focusing attention those matters. They were not well-nuanced. They were in greatcharlie’s humble judgment, insultingly obvious. To that extent, Prigozhin could not fathom the degree to which he dangerously undermined his dear friend and dear leader. To consider the matter in even more simplistic terms,, maybe in his mind, all Prigozhin was doing was something akin to taking his toys and leaving Ukraine. However, to Putin, and in fact in reality, the Wagner Group and all that Prigozhin possessed belong to him. One might imagine that in Putin’s mind, the successful and wealthy Prigozhin, a Russian oligarchs, was his creation, his Frankenstein.

In a way, through his last moves on the grand stage and certainly through many of his previous “mistakes” as Putin described his fumbles on the national and international scene, Prigozhin was actually exercising power over the Russian Federation President. He squeezed dry all that energized the bond of friendship between the two men. As these situations sometimes go–based on word of rare survivors, it is possible that when Prigozhin found himself hurtling to the ground in his catastrophically disabled lear jet–if he survived the alleged grenade blast, he may had an epiphany. He may have finally realized that he had gone too far with his public, dysregulated behavior. Rules are rules. Everyone in the Russian Federation at his level knew them with regard behavior toward Putin’s interests and he broke them He broke the rules repeatedly.

Although not directly paralleling the story-line of the erstwhile relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, pertinent conceptually is the plot of Lohengrin a Romantic opera in three acts composed and written in 1848 by Wilhelm Richard Wagner (May 23, 1813 to February 13, 1883). As mentioned previously in Part 1, Wagner  was a German composer, conductor, and ptolemicist, known mainly for his operas. Lohengrin premiered in Weimar, Germany, on August 28, 1850 at the Staatskapelle Weimar under the direction of Franz Liszt, the father-in-law, close friend and early supporter of Wagner. Wagner himself was unable to attend the first performance, having been exiled because of his part in the 1849 May Uprising in Dresden. The story is derived from the Parzival of Wolfram von Eschenbach, a medieval German romance, and its sequel Lohengrin, inspired by the epic of Garin le Loherain. It is part of the Knight of the Swan legend. Set in Antwerp during the first half of the 10th century, the story’s plot revolves around Elsa, the daughter of King Heinrich of the Brabant dynasty. Briefly, in Act I, Elsa has been accused by the evil Ortrud of murdering her own brother, Gottfried, the heir to the dynasty. Ortrud is the wife of Count Telramund, giving her standing to level such an accusation. However, it is revealed that Gottfried was not killed by Elsa but enchanted by Ortrud. When King Heinrich arrives in Antwerp from a journey, he insists upon an explanation for the difficulties that have beset Brabant. Beweeping her outcast state, Elsa dreams of a knight in shining armor who will rescue her. Called to defend herself, she prays and manifests a knight, who arrives in a boat guided by a swan. The knight, Lohengrin, pledges his loyalty to Elsa on the condition that she never questions his name or origin (“Nie sollst du mich befragen, noch Wissens Sorge tragen, woher ich kam der Fahrt, noch wie mein Nam’ und Art!”). Challenged by Telramund, Lohengrin defeats but does not kill him with his sword. Thereby, Elsa’s innocence is established and Lohengrin becomes her defender. In Act II, the malevolent Ortrud and the shamed and banished Telramund conspire to seek revenge. Ortrud tries to sow seeds of doubt in Elsa’s mind, but Elsa responds with innocence and extends friendship to Ortrud. When Lohengrin is named the guardian of Brabant, Telramund in response quietly marshals noblemen to plot against him. In Act III, Elsa and Lohengrin are being wed, but Ortrud and Telramund arrive at the cathedral entrance, seeking to disrupt the wedding. Ortrud alleges that that Lohengrin is an impostor. Telramund accuses him of sorcery. Elsa remains faithful despite the doubts. Afterward, in their bridal chamber, Elsa and Lohengrin express their love, but Elsa’s growing doubts cause her to inquire about her husband’s origins and identity. Suddenly, Telramund and his co-conspirators break in. In the struggle that ensued, Telramund is killed by Lohengrin. Then, returning to Elsa’s inquiry, Lohengrin reveals that his home is the distant temple of the Holy Grail at Monsalvat (“In fernem Land”), that his father is Parsifal, and his name is Lohengrin. Yet, as a result of what has transpired, Lohengrin must return to his sacred home, abandoning Elsa. With prayers, he returns Elsa’s brother, Gottfried, who was actually the swan that led Lohengrin’s boat to human form, and declares him Duke of Brabant. A dove descends from heaven and, taking the place of Gottfried at the head of Lohengrin’s boat and then departs. Ortrud rejoices over Elsa’s betrayal, but meets her demise, sinking into the lake. While calling for her departed husband, Elsa, as Lohengrin forwarned, collapses lifeless, having violated the conditions of his union with her.

Whatever may have actually transpired, much as the aforementioned Lohengrin of Wagner opera sought to protect Elsa from spiritual death, Putin was unable to protect Prigozhin from his indiscretions, from himself. To describe it in a less graceful way,, Prigozhin became a figurative rogue elephant, stomping through the higher realms of Russian Federation foreign and national security policy, trampling on all of working being done by the Kremlin to get a handle on the Ukraine matter.

Prigozhin at Troyekurovskoye cemetary in St. Petersburg in April 2023 (above). Prigozhin was aware that in the Russian Federation or anywhere else in the world, he may have chosen to go, without the protection of Putin, he would have had little chance of survival against a considerable number of adversaries. Doing anything to lose Putin’s protection would have been tantamount to suicide. (Of course, if any had decided to harm Prigozhin while he was under Putin’s protection, nothing could have done to change what may have had occurred. However, certainly Putin would have used available resources to retaliate aggressively.) Still, despite the great meaning Putin’s protection as well as financial support meant for Prigozhin’s survival, he bizarrely proceeded to denigrate Putin’s special military operation, and consequently, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff, and ministers and senior generals leading those organizations. Prigozhin’s ego not intellect very likely convinced him that his attacks upon Shoigu and Gerasimov and the special military operation following the Wagner Group Rebellion were well-nuanced, laser focusing attention those matters. They were not. They were in greatcharlie’s humble judgment, insultingly obvious. To that extent, Prigozhin could not fathom the degree to which he dangerously undermined his dear friend and dear leader. 

Prigozhin’s Denouement

Erat hiems summa. (It was the very depth of winter.) As aforementioned, on the first occasion Putin spoke of Prigozhin’s jet crash, he stated: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He went on to describe him as a “talented businessman” but added that he had “complicated fate.” To many, those remarks were likely perceived at first glance as a small commentary. They may have been easily overlooked. However, the comments were small much as the small movement of the needle of an old style seismogragh would indicate that a great earthquake was occurring. If Putin had anything to do with Prigozhin’s jet crash, taking such a step would hardly have been something he wanted to do. He unlikely would have done anything harsh against him if he thought that he had some alternative. 

Additionally as aforementioned, Putin sought to quell matters by taking control of the professional aspects of his relationship with Prigozhin as they concerned the Wagner Group. The method devised was to have Wagner Group troops sign an oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation and contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, thereby giving his government reigns over organization and giving Prigozhin nothing to complain about. However, the time had passed for anything such as that with him. Other than that tack, the system in the Russian Federation that he spent 25 years to shape provided no alternatives for Prigozhin’s behavior. There could only be one boss.

Putin, being human, is allowed to feel sadness. However, what is churning in his Iinner-self is hardly stuff for public view and consideration. Surely, Putin has a morbid fear of his enemies at home and abroad getting the chance to peek, to gaze within on him. He would likely assess the possibilities of how they could use observations of such to harm him as limitless. Still, there was the crack in his armor, only for a brief moment is his comments on Prigozhin’s jet crash made on August 24, 2023, that spoke volumes about his long-time connection to his former friend.

Of course, Putin has a need to mask any sense in those he directs, those he through force must control, and perhaps those he holds at bay, that he has weaknesses, that he is human. Such that would typically be recognized as virtue in others, would be a liability,, anathema to him, under his circumstances. To that extent, Putin never appears tortured at all about his circumstances. He has never appeared suffocated by decisions that require aggressive act as most national leaders are not so much effected by such.

It may have been decided among the most powerful in Moscow that if Prigozhin had to be “put down”, it would need to be done in a way that would have a sound educational effect on all others whose loyal, even friendship, toward Putin was uncertain. In a CNBC report dated August 24, 2023, former US Navy Admiral James Stavridis, who served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander from 2009 and 2013, said Prigozhin’s death was a dog whistle to those who dissent from Putin’s absolute rule. He added: “He [Putin] needed to demonstrate who really is running the joint.” Stavridis described the attack as a “public execution.” He went on further to state: “No real surprise here, it’s a marker of how lethal, and how deadly and how unscrupulous Vladimir Putin is.”

The same CNBC report included that statement to MSNBC from Ben Rhodes, a tormer deputy national security adviser in the administration of US President barack Obama, explaining that the attack “was not a mysterious accident.” He continued: “This has all the hallmarks of appearing like a military-style takedown,” Rhodes added that Prigozhin’s fate was eminent following a short-lived mutiny about two months ago.

It would seem that missed by Prigozhin was the possability that he may have been brought back from Moscow by the prearrangement of those who would perform the highly clandestine task of terminating him. As greatcharlie is in the dark regarding the truth of the matter, it supposes in the abstract that Prigozhin was much disturbed by whatever information from Moscow that got him to reportedly rapidly board his private jet to get there. One might presume the subject of the communicate concerned the well-being of the Wagner Group. The matter would likely have been made more grave if it had been the case that he was called to meeting of a very senior political authority. Prigozhin being Prigozhin may have rushed to Moscow to demand a meeting with a senior political authority. So far, no mention has been publicly reported on a meeting set between a very senior political authority and Prigozhin, Whether a meeting was set with a considerably senior political authority or an impromptu was insisted upon by Prigozhin would not have been important in this case. Important would have been getting Prigozhin back to his country. Whatever communication was sent to him in Africa managed to get that ball rolling. Patria est ubicumque est bene. (The homeland is where there is good.) Á peine dans ce cas.

One might imagine that those individuals performing the hypothetical heinous task may have been aware through a flight plan or calculations that Prigozhin would leave Moscow in the direction toward St. Petersburg  Yet, in the end, as alluded to earlier, how the murderous task may have been carried out is not important. The ones who ordered the act and, to an extent, those physically committed the act, and why it was done is of greater significance. As of the time of this writing, it seems unlikely that any urgency or any effort at all is being placed into finding answers on those points is underway in the Russian Federation or in Western capitals. 

Mostly lost in the discussion of Prigozhin’s jet crash was the loss of Dmitry Utkin. In the nascent years of the Wagner Group, he was the face of the organization. The military acumen of the decorated former Spetsnaz officer that served to shape the Wagner Group into a formidable force. Utkin, who seldom spoke publicly and offered no notable opinions about the special military operation in Ukraine or the Russian Federation Defense Ministry–at least nothing negative, nonetheless suffered the same fate of Prigozhin. It may have been a case of guilt by association in the truest sense of the term.

Putin, hand on head, taking a moment to think matters through (above). Behind the scenes in the higher realms of politics and power in the Russian Federation there very well could be individuals actually conspiring against not only Prigozhin but Putin in some silent, convoluted way to to seek revenge. There may have been an effort to sow seeds of doubt in Putin’s mind about Prigozhin,  in response to which for the lonest time possible he reject believeing in Prigozhin’s innocence and went a bit further by extends friendship to him after the Wagner Group Rebellion. The somewhat obvious suggestion might be that Shoigu desperate to rid himself of the annoying Prigozhin, slowly but surely wore away at Putin’s trust in him. This idea was initially hinted at in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1).

 Cui Bono?: Flights of Fancy?

As in Act II of the aforementioned Lohengrin, behind the scenes in the higher realms of politics and power in the Russian Federation, mutatis mutandis, there very well could be individuals much as Ortrud and Telramund who were actually conspiring against not only Prigozhin but Putin in some silent, convoluted way to to seek revenge. There may have been an effort to sow seeds of doubt in Putin’s mind about Prigozhin,  in response to which for the lonest time possible he reject believeing in Prigozhin’s innocence and went a bit further by extends friendship to him after the Wagner Group Rebellion. The somewhat obvious suggestion might be that Shoigu desperate to rid himself of the annoying Prigozhin, slowly but surely wore away at Putin’s trust in him. This idea was hinted at in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)”

In national capitals, Shoigu has been known for his equanimity and sangfroid. He has been described in most accounts by analyst, experts, and newsmedia commentators internally and externally as a discreet and reliable confidant of Putin to the extent one could be. He has managed the Russian Federation Defense Ministry for over a decade. Recognizably, given evidence of the challenges of the special military operation his ministry has faced, he has not proven to be the most qualified one in wartime. As explained in Part 1, Shoigu, much as Prigozhin, never received formal military training. He was appointed to the rank of major general in the National Guard by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 toward the end of events associated with the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-proclaimed Gosudárstvenny Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency). Shoigu did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School, the Frunze Military Academy, or the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. Shoigu spent nearly a decade as the Minister of Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM. In November 2012, Putin appointed Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister.

Prigozhin is not the only one who for whatever reason was moved out of the way of Shoigu as they were ostensibly a hindrance to his efforts to achieve success in Ukraine. General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 was sacked in September 2022 He was deemed ineffective. General Aleksandr Dvornikov was labelled the first senior commander but not the overall commander of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine. He was sacked between July and September 2022. Colonel General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine was sacked in September 2022 due to the lack of progress and significant losses in his area. He died suddenly in 2023. Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in its September 2022 offensive in the east. Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, was removed from his post in February 2023. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.” Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin was replaced by Gerasimov as commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”.  Surovikin became Gerasimov’s deputy commander in the Southern “Grouping”. At the start of the Wagner Rebellion on June 23, 2023, Surovikin was detained by the security services and was reportedly released some time in September 2023. Then of course there was Prigozhin.

Given how many Russian Federation senior military commanders have been sacked by Shoigu with Putin’s blessing of have suddenly died away from the battlefield since the special militsry operation began, one might argue that it is uncertain whether he will emerge the winner in his ostensible struggle to stay top and in good stead and uncertain whether he is simply a survivor weaken severely by endless internal maneuvers. With Prigozhin out of the way, Shoigu was made better able to direct the Wagner Group not around the world–a mission that may be maintained–but in Ukraine in a way that satisfies him. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units and possess exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations. Shoigu will likely take the organization’s troops and use them essentially as infantry formation with no greater tasks than those of basic infantry units.

Left with few or no rivals, for the first time, Shoigu stands exposed. He will unlikely be able future mistakes and failures on others. He made find himself stalling Russian Federation forces or creating great difficulties for them against repeated Ukrainian counteroffensives or rapid defeat. It is unlikely that he along with Gerasimov could completely manipulate Putin, get him to move wildly in a new, unplanned direction. Plainly, they lack the faculty to manipulate him or develop any bold plans. It is nearly assured Putin would reject any inordinate plans and see them straight as the .inept leaders they are. He would either warn them off tactfully, or respond ruthlessly to their potential crass subterfuge.

In the abstract, one might consider the possibility that beyond the forward edge of the political battlefield n the Russian Federation are those who sought to separate Prigozhin from Putin. Such powerful individuals, hiding behind the façade of respectability, have considered what the transition from Putin to a new leader might appear. Their number would doubtlessly be kept small as they would surely want to eliminate the possibility of being detected over inordinate levels of communication. With a silent hand, perhaps they have already begun to shape events hoping to ensure any future transition in leadership would favor their interests. To that extent in this hypothetical situation, Prigozhin loyal to Putin and quite formidable, could have potentially posed a threat in response to any plans and audacious moves that they might make at a given time. He certainly no. onger poses any threat to them Such ideas are purely speculative, but not so fanciful that they are unworthy of some modicum of consideration. This is not meant to suggest or hint that such individuals would have carried out or had a hand in the death of Prigozhin. Rather, through their means to influence others and a few subtle efforts, they may have caused the ball to begin to roll in the right direction.

There is the possibility that the cause of Prigozhin’s death was multifactorial, having, involving, or produced by a compound of hostile elements mentioned here, creating a bizarre murderous, synergistic effect. Perhaps one might speculate that Prigozhin did not really have a chance of living beyond August 23, 2023, the fated point of confluence. 

Whatever may have transpired, it seems Putin was unable to protect Prigozhin from himself. He became a figurative rogue elephant, stomping through the higher realms of Russian Federation foreign and national security policy, trampling on all of the work being done by the Kremlin to get a handle on the Ukraine matter.

Putin (left) meeting with Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (1st right) and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander (2nd right) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin. Putin’s inner circle, though one man short, generally seems no worse for wear. Dare one say, the entire environment is quite a bit less noisy as a consequence of Prigozhin’s demise. However, efforts to replace Prigozhin and Utkin and rejuvenate what remains of the Wagner Group will likely pose some problems for the immediate future  Efforts by Putin to reinvigorate the organization in some effective form have been public. Readers may cast their minds back to reports that on September 29, 2023, Putin met with a number of former senior commanders of the Wagner Group ostensibly to discuss how “volunteer units” could best utilized in Ukraine. On state television, Putin was shown meeting Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander known by the cognomen, “Sedoi” (Grey Hair) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin. The trick for Putin’s newly appointed leaders would be to put the pieces of Wagner Group back together again to his satisfaction without Prigozhin’s charisma and special touch, and the force of Utkin’s reputation as a fighting leader. Back in June 2023, the Wagner Group’s troop strength was tens of thousands. As aforementioned, it is widely understood in the Russian Federation that since the Wagner Group Rebellion, that many Wagner Group veterans have joined other private military companies and have returned to Ukraine under individual contracts with Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Some of the Wagner fighters have signed up for service with the Russian Army.

The Impact of Prigozhin’s Loss to the Wagner Group Appears Greater than Putin Estimated

Putin’s inner circle, though one man short, generally seems no worse for wear. Dare one say, the entire environment is quite a bit less noisy as a consequence of Prigozhin’s demise. However, efforts to replace Prigozhin and Utkin and rejuvenate what remains of the Wagner Group will likely pose some problems for the immediate future  Efforts by Putin to reinvigorate the organization in some effective form have been public. Readers may cast their minds back to reports that on September 29, 2023, Putin met with a number of former senior commanders of the Wagner Group ostensibly to discuss how “volunteer units” could best utilized in Ukraine. On state television, Putin was shown meeting Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander known by the cognomen, “Sedoi” (Grey Hair) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin.

Yevkurov, a few months prior to the meeting, had reportedly travelled to several countries where Wagner mercenaries have operated. Troshev, a decorated veteran of Russia’s wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya and a former commander in the SOBR interior ministry rapid reaction force, is from St Petersburg, Putin’s home town. He was awarded Russia’s highest medal, Hero of Russia, in 2016 for the storming of Palmyra in Syria against ISIS militants. Both men were pictured with Putin in the television broadcast.

In the video of the meeting, Putin addresses Troshev stating that they had spoken about how “volunteer units that can perform various combat tasks, above all, of course, in the zone of the special military operation.” He continued: “You yourself have been fighting in such a unit for more than a year,” Putin went further: “You know what it is, how it is done, you know about the issues that need to be resolved in advance so that the combat work goes in the best and most successful way.” Additionally, Putin remarked that he wanted to speak about social support for those involved in the fighting. No comments were heard from Troshev during the broadcast. Following the meeting, Russian Federation Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the Russian Federation’s RIA news agency that Troshev had become a Russian Federation Defense Ministry official. The publicized Kremlin meeting appeared to signal at that juncture that the Wagner Group would be directed by Troshev and Yevkurov.

The trick for Putin’s newly appointed leaders would be to put the pieces of Wagner Group back together again to his satisfaction without Prigozhin’s charisma and special touch and the force of Utkin’s personality and reputation as a fighting leader. Back in June 2023, the Wagner Group’s troop strength was tens of thousands. As mentioned in Part 1, it is widely understood in the Russian Federation that just before and especially after the Wagner Group Rebellion, many Wagner Group veterans reportedly joined other private military companies and have returned to the fight in Ukraine under individual contracts with Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Some of the Wagner fighters signed up for service with the Russian Army. Sources from the United Kingdom’s military intelligence have explained: “The exact status of the redeploying personnel is unclear, but it is likely individuals have transferred to parts of the official Russian Ministry of Defence forces and other PMCs [private military companies].”

What greatcharlie assessed at the time as an extraordinary turn of event, six days after the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses in June 2023, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

Some readers may recall Putin’s rather gracious speech concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion given on June 27, 2023, in which he focused on the future disposition of Wagner Group. He did not indicate at the time that there would be further problems for its members ahead. Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was ostensibly a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

In the minds of the Wagner Group troops, they had already pledged their allegiance to the Russian Federation not only in words but with the shedding of their blood. They watched their Wagner Group comrades die on many battlefields on foreign lands for the Russian Federation. Imaginably, in their minds, they were free and independent fighting men, not longer serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The allegiance of the Wagner Group appeared to be unambiguous to the Kremlin

However, as hinted on in Part 1 of this essay, dealing with Putin often means hearing promises from him that were not sure at all. Putin turned on his promises to merely maintain his trust in the loyalty of Wagner Group troops. Putin made it crystal clear following the death of Prigozhin that he was unwilling to brook further opposition to his will from anyone in the organization.

After August 25, 2023, volunteer fighters working on behalf of the Russian Federation were required to swear an oath to the Russian Federation flag. A decree was signed by Putin on that very day, which was just two days after the death Prigozhin. According to the Kremlin website, the oath applied to groups “contributing to the execution of tasks given to the armed forces”–members of volunteer formations, private military contractors–and territorial defense units. The website went on to state: “Fighters were required to pledge “their loyalty to the Russian Federation . . . strictly follow their commanders and superiors’ orders, and conscientiously fulfill their obligations.” The step was allegedly designed to help in the “forming the spiritual and moral foundations for the defense of the Russian Federation.” Not every volunteer fighter was a Russian Federation citizen, so the oath was a considerable requirement for many. Prigozhin strenuously objected to the idea of a loyalty oath when it was first suggested believeing it would essentially bring about the end of the Wagner Group. When asked about the future of the Wagner Group at the time of the decree was signed, Peskov made the surprising and shocking public statement that: “legally the Wagner private military group does not exist.”

Wagner Group Headquarters in St. Petersburg (above) In the minds of the most Wagner Group troops, they had already pledged their allegiance to the Russian Federation not only in words but with the shedding of their blood. They watched their Wagner Group comrades die on many battlefields on foreign lands for the Russian Federation. Imaginably, in their minds, they were free and independent fighting men, not longer serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The allegiance of the Wagner Group appeared to be unambiguous to the Kremlin. Putin promised as much in speeches and meetings with Wagner Group commanders and officials. However, as hinted on in Part 1 of this essay, dealing with Putin often means hearing promises from him that were not sure at all. Putin turned on his promises to merely maintain his trust in the loyalty of Wagner Group troops. Putin made it crystal clear following the death of Prigozhin that he was unwilling to brook further opposition to his will from anyone in the organization. After August 25, 2023, volunteer fighters working on behalf of the Russian Federation were required to swear an oath to the Russian Federation flag. A decree was signed by Putin on that very day, which was just two days after the death Prigozhin. Prigozhin strenuously objected to the idea of a loyalty oath when it was first suggested believeing it would essentially bring about the end of the Wagner Group. When asked about the future of the Wagner Group at the time of the decree was signed by Putin, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov made the surprising and shocking public statement that: “legally the Wagner private military group does not exist.”

The Way Forward

Western Russian Federation analysts and experts and mainstream newsmedia on commentators on foreign affairs have often been frightfully querulous about Putin’s decisions and actions to the point at which some have more occasionally appeared dysregulated. That has had no constructive impact upon their assays on his management of complex issues in which the Russian Federation is involved. In their public the aforementioned assessments, analysts, experts, and commentators typically include observations of him behaving in ways that are abberant. 

The rather dramatic way in which Putin had distanced himself from staffs and guests at the Kremlin during a following the COVID-19 pandemic–it is uncertain whether Putin still engages in this practice–is popularly pushed out by the Western newsmedia as evidence of some unusual, unhealthy shift in his thinking. On this popular point, greatcharlie conversely suggests there is the real possibility that unbeknownst to all but those closest to Putin that he was successfully poisoned recently, and his extremely cautious behavior has been spurred on by such an unpleasant, perhaps life-threatening, episode. If such a hypothesized event occurred in truth, having his most senior advisers, in photographs and videos of meetings in the Kremlin, sit rather naturally though seated somewhat distant from him would surely be more understandable. Certainly, they would be fully understanding and support his need and efforts to show greater vigilance for his personal safety. Yet, returning to Western perspectives, what makes Putin’s behave appear strange can be viewed as enough to go as far as to conclude he cannot be judged as a trustworthy interlocutor and reliable party to any talks.

The relatively efficient functioning of the Russian Federation government is dependent upon Putin’s strong presence, hands-on management, and dynamic leadership. Surely, no one in Putin’s inner circle would feel too comfortable facing the world without him. (Imaginably, some observers in the West might dismissively and facetiously remark that in Putin’s world, they have little choice to do otherwise.) Additonally, if a life-threatening incident actually occurred sometime recently, it might expected that HIS personal security detail–to the extent that anyone might insist Putin do anything–would insist upon dramatic precautions such as the very seating arrangements in Kremlin that the world has observed.

Without pretension, greatcharlie states that it never presumed that the discussion here would offer the degree of clarity or stimulate a degree of lucidity that would allow readers through insights presented to unravel the truth of the mystery of Prigozhin’s jet crash. Perhaps for some it strangely enough has. However, with regard to Putin In many ways, the course of his relationship with Prigozhin holds up a mirror to the nature of his relationships not only within his inner circle, but with the Russian people and with foreign allies and partners

Putin generally seeks to develop personal bonds among national leaders and greater bilateral ties where there at best can be mutual interests and goals from a position of strength. He will be generous as part of his efforts foster relations at those various levels, but holding superior position always remains paramount.  In that course, Putin will emphasize boundaries .Putin has appeared tolerant of their occasional violation, but ultimately he has acted in response of such. An exception to this course would be China with which the Russian Federation only holds a stronger position due to its nuclear arsenal. That could potentially change in the near future but that remains to seen.. The US is not a friend of the Russian Federation. Under the best circumstances, Putin over the years has sought cordial ties, an entente cordiale with it.

As was the case with Prigozhin, after losing Putin’s “trust”, countries seeking to reach some reasonable and sustainable agreement with him on anything should only expect subterfuge and betrayal. Capitals in the West are not ignorant of this reality. Based on all that has been presented to Moscow by the West, it does not appear that any constructive end state is apparent. To that extent, nothing go is reasonably expected. Moreover, what appears uncertain with them is how far things might go with Putin’s behavior. The danger of the situation is compounded by the fact that Putin doubtlessly views the conflict with Ukraine as a conflict between the Russian Federation with the US and its NATO allies. The conflict may be one fought indirectly by the two sides, the Rubicon has been crossed. The die has been cast. As military theorists and planners in the 20th century, many long departed, calculated decades ago, a conflict of this kind could put the East and West on a collision course in a nuclear way.,The best hope to avoid that would having the reasonable take steps right now. However, it would seem the Russian Federation is not being led by wholly reasonable thinkers. Looking back, their choice to invade Ukraine, and carry out military operations in the way they did, was truly counterintuitive.

While many may rebuff and reject what is stated here, greatcharlie remains firm in its belief that the course of relations between the Russian Federation with the US, the rest of the West, eastern powers other than China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the current vector of policy is toward eventual disaster. The only aspect unknown to all but clairvoyants is the timing of a future conflict. If greatcharlie is in not in error, and the reality of Putin’s attitude and behavior escapes political authorities in the US and its allies following this episode between Putin and Prigozhin discussed here, they are displaying a disregard for their respective countries’ self-interests which is daylight madness. Analysts and forecasters in the foreign and national security bureaucracies in Western countries who find such an outcome too difficult to imagine and would prefer continuing to proffer assessments under which Putin would eventually submits to the will of the US and its allies–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–are simply whistling in the wind. Only realistic thinking and planning on the matter may bring forth viable solutions if any exist. Solum ut inter ista certum sit nihil esse certi. (In these matters the only certainty is that there is nothing certain.)

The Death of Prigozhin: Whether Nature’s Course or a Heinous Crime, It Closed a Trying Chapter of Putin’s Presidency (Part 1)

Photo and roses laid at St. Petersburg gravestie of Yevgeny Prigozhin during his funeral on August 29, 2023. On August 23, 2023, the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known in the Russian Federation as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin and nine other passengers were killed in a jet crash north of Moscow. The crash came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the  Russian Federation Defense Minister Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. A deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it was certainly not enough to prove he ordered albeit a not-so-unique form of execution. As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. There remains be much to understand regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s life. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

On August 23, 2023, a private Embraer jet flying to St. Petersburg crashed north of Moscow killing all ten passengers onboard. Onboard was the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin, two other top Wagner Group officials, to include Dmitry Utkin, Prigozhin’s four bodyguards and a crew of three. The crash garnered international attention as it came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However, a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid what all sides feared would be the further “shedding Russian blood.” The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow. 

Assuredly, if Prigozhin’s deadly jet crash was not accidental and ordered by the highest authorities in the Russian Federation government, the decision was most likely multifactorial. Many opinions have offered by analysts and experts on the Russian Federation on how Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin benefitted from the action were also offered. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it is certainly not enough to prove he ordered such a not-so-unique form of execution in authoririan regimes, also occasionally witnessed in democracies. Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non pœna, perire. (Death claims all things. It is law, not punishment, to die.)

The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. The 2023 North Korea–Russia summit between Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jung-un was held in Moscow on September 23, 2023. Putin in his first foreign visit after the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest visited Kyrgyzstan on October 12, 2023. Putin then visited People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Bejing on October 17, 2023. Each event provided ample opportunity to further assess Putin’s words and behavior to construct a firmer understanding of the man and his decisionmaking. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. After all, Putin and Prigozhin, at least for a time, were true friends. That was somewhat evident in Putin’s initial public comments on the crash. In many respects, for Putin, the deadly episode amounted to a private tragedy within what seemed a public conflict. Many details will likely remain kept from both the public and the newsmedia. Still, from what has been been presented to the public, there remains be much to gain regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s presidency. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior. 

Unless there is additional information so newsworthy concerning Prigozhin that it cannot be dismised or avoided, greatcharlie believes this will be it last entry on the passed-on Wagner Group owner. Still, as has been the case with its previous posts, greatcharlie hopes this essay will stimulate among readers, particularly students, new lines of thought, even kernels of ideas on how US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other governments might proceed concerning the Russian Federation. Certainly, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Though, for greatcharlie, it would be satisfying enough to have this commentary simply stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy. Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus omnibus est vitæ; sed famam extendere factis, hoc virtutis opus. (Each one has his appointed day; short and irreparable is the brief life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the work of virtue.)

Police guard site of crash of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s private jey in the Tver region of the Russia, Feration, August 24, 2023 (above). The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

The Grenade Gambit

(Beware the man who offers answers when no questions are asked, excuses when their is no apparent misstep or error, an alibi when there is no allegation, or a most apparent contrived defense when there is no accusation, as such virtual confessions often indicate the individual is so tormented by the possible discovery of their own errant or surreptitious behavior to the extent they can only see the world from their own anxiously insecure or unrepentantly deceitful mindset, and perhaps seeks to manipulate what they imagine others likely think.) As aforementioned, on October 5, 2023, meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Putin suggested the jet was blown up from inside, basing his comments on a report he received from the head of Russia’s investigative committee a few days before. Putin stated: “Fragments of hand grenades were found in the bodies of those killed in the crash.” He continued: “There was no external impact on the plane–this is already an established fact.” Putin cut short his comments concerning a grenade or grenades that may have been detonated on board. Yet, in support of the idea of any mishandling of ordinance onboard, Putin stated that he thought investigators remiss in failing to perform alcohol and drug tests on the bodies of those who died in the jet crash. Regarding his reason for that concern, Putin noted that in the past, quantities of cocaine had been found in the Wagner Group’s headquarters in St. Petersburg. With regard to Putin’s comments on any external impact, he was apparently rebuffing assertions made by anonymous US sources just after the jet crash suggesting it had been shot down. Russian Federation officials investigating the jet crash have not reported publicly on the cause as of this writing. Ad calamitatem quilibet rumor valet. (Any rumor is sufficient against calamity (i.e., when a disaster happens, every report confirming it obtains ready credence)

With little else to go on, it is assessed by greatcharlie that concerning the grenade fragments being found, Putin may have actually been presenting the truth. In the abstract, surely, such an explanation is not too far from possible. (Surely “evidence” now exists to fully support the Russian Federation President’s statements. It is hard to imagine who would be so daring in the Russian Federation to challenge Putin’s word on what may have transpired.) What remains unclear is why Putin would publicly express such derogatory information on one who was a prominent member of his retinue for some time. Those willing give Putin the benefit of the doubt might accept his negatuve comments as an odd, yet understandable and natural expression of his anxiety. To that extent, the public exposition may have assisted Putin in exercising the ghosts. Maybe they would proffer that it was an effort by Putin to persuade himself that there was some logic in the senseless, troubling circumstance of Prigozhin’s loss. Anger is a stage of grieving. Born Jacques Anatole François Thibault, known as Anatole France (April 16, 1844-October 12, 1924) was a French poet, journalist, and novelist. Considered in his day as the ideal French man of letters. he won the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature in recognition of his literary achievements. In Part II, chapter 4, of The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard (1881), Thibault wrote: Tous les changements, même les plus so ont leur mélancolie, car ce que nous quittons, c’est une partie de nous-mêmes; il faut mourir à une vie pour entrer dans une autre. (All changes, even the most longed for, have their melancholy; for what we leave behind us is a part of ourselves; we must die to one life before we can enter another.)

Under another line of thought, it might be considered that because he is always politically minded, and posturing to present the best picture of himself possible, Putin’s remarks were most likely–doubtlessly–curated, calculated, but mainly so as part of an effort to convince the Russian people that he could not have committed such as heinous act. Indeed, conceivably Putin offered the new facts with the hope of better shaping the Russian people’s conclusions on the incident and opinion of his government. He seems on a quest to create a more favorable image of himself on the matter given so much bad has resulted from his Ukraine enterprise. It is surely an uphill battle. After all, few in the world seemed to doubt that he ordered or members of his regime were complicit in  responsible for the crash of Prigozhin’s jet.

Interestingly enough, if Putin initially believed what he offered in Sochi was logical, he went a long way to make connections that were hardly certain. It would require perhaps too much imagination think senior commanders of the Wagner Group, having traveled together for years without incident, were doing any more than discussing important matters in camera onboard the jet as they made their way in the direction of St. Petersburg. It would require too little imagination to believe Prigozhin’s private jet was nothingless than le bateau iver–the boat of drunks–aboard which passengers werante perhaps in an inebriated state playing “hot potato” with a live grenade and soething went terribly wrong or tempers flared during a heated argument and disregulated party to the exchange well-beyond making a deadly threat, pulled the pin on a grenade. Even that would seem possible if Putin believes the imagination of the Russian people is boundless. Evidently, the passengers had traveled on more than one occasion on similar jets, perhaps the self-same one, without any fatal incidents with ordinance. In any event, Putin apparently does not want to leave the matter for the Russian people to reach their own conclusions on what is true or not.

If in some moment of intense quiet reflection, Putin should conjer any additional insights on the Prigozhin case, one would imagine that he might be less likely to share it publicly it as the story now thoroughly belongs to the past. Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant.

Common Wisdom in the West: The Prigozhin Jet Crash Was a “Mafia Style” Act by Putin

Comparisons with what some in the mainstream Western newsmedia have alleged as Putin’s Mafia act and his behavior as a Mafia Don as often depicted in novels and Hollywood films of the organized crime genre, are too much for greatcharlie to contenance. It acknowledges that it was all most inappropriate given that ten individuals died in a jet crash and not a fictional event. Such thinking is perfectly understandable as nearly everything discussed for mass public consumption is reduced to banal amusement. While this popular explanation of Mafia tactics, technique, procedures, and methods in drawn from the abstract, in most cases, such expertise, expressed with confidence, is drawn from novels and Hollywood films, “The Godfather”, “Goodfellas”, and “The Sopranos.” Then again, perchance some commentators are signalling a desire to reveal even greater information made known to them through unnerving contacts with organized crime groups, but that would be unlikely. Knowing how deadly such organize crime figures can be, they would hardly seek on such a point to reveal confidences of ghastly acts shared with those sadistic individuals.

As of the time of this writing, early October 2023, the return to secondary school–rentrée–is complete. At that level, nothing less could expectedly be heard at the cafeteria tables as students who might have a passing interest in world affairs. Any similar theories of this kind offered by serious analysts, journalists, and newsmedia commentators, could at best be recognized as faulty humor, pretension, or some unfortunate internal response to the cognitive collective imperative rather than investigated facts. Such surmisal could  certainly not be viewed as an informed opinion. It is stated again that there are no publicly reported facts that indicate there was an effort to disable or down Prigozhin’s jet. Even if such existed, there is nothing that would point to Putin as being behind the air tragedy directly or indirectly. There is no proof of orders being issued from Putin or others in the Kremlin. There certainly has been no mea culpa from covert operatives from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the security services, or “contractors”. Furthermore, no offical information released publicly indicates ordinance was detonated onboard the jet.

Putin and Prigozhin as Associates

Wilhelm Richard Wagner (May 23, 1813 to February 13, 1883) was a German composer, conductor, and ptolemicist, known mainly for his operas. He is categorized as part of the 19th century musical movement of nationalism. In his compositions, Wagner would synthesize elements of disciplines such as music, poetry, architecture, painting, and others. Wagner described his inclusive vision in a series of essays published between 1849 and 1852 as the concept of Gesamtkunstwerk, or “total work of art.” Over the years his concept has influenced work in diverse fields to include in some part, intelligence analysis where accepted, in support of the examination of individuals, events, and policy decisionmaking beyond the surface. To that extent, in making use of what it feels is an apropos use–at least a pinch–of the artistic genre of film to conceptualize, greatcharlie takes into consideration the profound remarks of Austrian film director Marie Kreutzer. (It must be noted that no connection at all is implied between the talented and inspiring Kreutzer and Wagner.) As a result researching through history for her films, Kreutzer has stated often, “Every biography is an interpretation of the facts.” Developing a credible character, in the relative in the abstract, she suggests it is paramount to stay true to the personality one reads about than presenting just the facts, not simply ticking historical boxes. Using those available facts and guided by its understanding of the personalities of both Putin and Prigozhin, greatcharlie offers a new analysis, a well-grounded interpretation of their relationship to create pertinent, credible and useful insights, 

The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin began with friendship and cordially, and not at least solely or primarily, a mutual effort to seek respective gain. The two men appreciated each other. During the initial years of his pesidency, Prigozhin was observed often in Putin orbit, but he certainly was not a typical member of his retinue. Prigozhin was neither siloviki, formerly employed in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, nor Chekisty, having a father or grandfather who worked in the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD–an earlier iteration of the security services, famed during World War II and the start of the Cold War–as Putin is. (Surely, not everyone close to Putin today possess such attributes. As time goes on, that will doubtlessly become more the case.) Quite the opposite of possessing security service background, in the 1980s and bit of the 1990s when any of that might have been possible. In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution.  Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad. In 1990, Prigozhin studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

However, from that point, Prigozhin by fate, received the firm support of his family, joining its street food vending business. Having knack for the work he successfully expanded the business and gained some notoriety. From street vending, Prigozhin entered the established food service industry. Next, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. In that realm, he linked up with a school chum, Boris Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St. Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by the Russian Federation independent news source, Novaya Gazeta, that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good acquaintance. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story. In 1997, Prigozhin and a business partner, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city. In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000 when the newly minted Russian Federation President brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003.

In those initial halcion years of their burgeoning friendship, Prigozhin been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand Putin’s thinking and feelings. Beyond just liking Prigozhin, Putin displayed his feelings for his friend before everyone. The Russian Federation independent newsmedia source Meduza reported Putin welcomed Prigozhin as “one of the boys.” The five-act grand opera composed originally in French by Giuseppe Verdi “Don Carlos” is based on the dramatic play Don Karlos, Infant von Spanien (Don Carlos, Infante of Spain) by Friedrich Schiller. Verdi additionally borrowed portions of Eugène Cormon’s 1846 play Philippe II, Roi d’Espagne. In Act I, Carlos’ dear friend Rodrigue, Marquis of Posa, who has just arrived from the oppressed land of Flanders, enters. The two greet each other joyfully with the aria: “J’étais en Flandres”. Posa asks for Carlos’ aid on behalf of the suffering people there. Carlos reveals that he loves his stepmother. Posa is first shocked, but then sympathetic. He encourages Carlos to leave Spain and go to Flanders, and to forget his pain by focusing on political activity there. The two men through a tenor/baritone duet swear eternal friendship in French titled, “Dieu, tu semas dans nos âmes”, and in Italian titled, “Dio, che nell’alma infondere”. The lyrics of the duet in Italian are: “Dieu, qui de nos coeurs sincères / As fait les coeurs de deux frères, / Accepte notre serment! / Nous mourrons en nous aimant! / Ah! Dieu, tu semas dans nos âmes, etc” (“God, who of our sincere hearts / has made the hearts of two brothers, / receive our vow! / We will die loving each other! / Ah! God, you scattered in our souls, etc.”)

A reasonable assessment by experts or an informed guess by any keen observer before the special military operation began in 2022 would have been that Prigozhin would unlikely be separated from Putin anytime too soon. Having observed Prigozhin closely during their earliest interactions, Putin obviously concluded that he could well-serve his needs. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. They were opportunities of a lifetime. Bien mal acquis ne profite jamais.

Putin (center) visits Prigozhin (right) at a Concord Management and Consulting facility in 2010. In the initial halcion period of their burgeoning friendship in the early 2000s, Prigozhin been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand Putin’s thinking and feelings. Beyond just liking Prigozhin, Putin displayed his feelings for his friend before everyone. The Russian Federation newsmedia source Meduza reported Putin welcomed Prigozhin as “one of the boys.” A reasonable assessment by experts or an informed guess by any keen observer before the special military operation began in 2022 would have been that Prigozhin would unlikely be separated from Putin anytime too soon. Having observed Prigozhin closely during their earliest interactions, Putin obviously concluded that he could well-serve his needs. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. They were opportunities of a lifetime.

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. Сonсord received multiple contracts under that program. Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin was linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry were alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. It has been suggested that Prigozhin was advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, was a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. 

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera–the Wagner Group. Although private military companies were not permitted under law in the Russian Federation at the time, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Concerning the special military operation in Ukraine or any matter in which both men’s interests were concerned, Prigozhin never publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He hHd always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with recent events most firmly in mind. Yet, as aforementioned, Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow.

Prigozhin should have been savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. Putin showed considerable regard for Prigozhin but even greater regard for Shoigu both professionally and privately for a longer time. Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements.

It might have been plausible enough for Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically in advance of committing his Wagner Group troops to ensure that he and his unit commanders would play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities would be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. His démarche might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed on the ground, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. Apparently nothing of  the kind happened.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigohzin likely knew that Putin really did not need at any point during the flailing special military operation was an extra problem that from one angle might boil down to him, at least initially, as mere in-house bickering between two close associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin was someone seemingly well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin was always the priority. What Putin thought was of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. There can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin greatly concerned himself with the trying times Putin had been facing following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. Going out on a limb, greatcharlie states that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever intentionally acted in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life. That being stated, he was not always on target when it came to understanding Putin’s perspective. It appears that the more complex a situation was, the less effective Prigozhin’s “foresight” and “intuition” became. It seems something went terribly wrong around the time of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Le bon critique est celui qui raconte les aventures de son âme au milieu des chefs-d’œuvre. Ernst Julius Günther Röhm (November 28, 1887-July 1, 1934) was a close friend and early ally of Adolf Hitler, A former military officer and senior member of the Röhm co-founded and led the Sturmabteilung (SA), thel paramilitary wing of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  (National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party) , from 1931 to 1934. The SA played a key part in Hitler’s ascension. The are many intriguing parallels, mutatis mutandis, concerning the two relationships between the two national leader and two  paramilitary heads, to the extent that much as Prigozhin fell out with Putin, Rõhm fell out with Hitler. In 1919, Röhm joined the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Workers’ Party), the precursor of the Nazi Party formed in 1920, and became a close associate of Adolf Hitler. When he joined the German Workers Party, Röhm had already begun using his military ties to develop paramilitary groups across Germany in service of Hitler. Leading the most prominent group, the SA,  Röhm participated in Hitler’s failed 1925 Munich Beer Hall Putsch aimed at seizing governmental power. Röhm was arrested but received a suspended prison sentence. Afterward Röhm became a Reichstag deputy, but broke with Hitler in 1925 over the future direction of the Nazi Party. Resigning from all positions Rõhm traveled to Bolivia to serve as an advisor to the Bolivian Army. However, at Hitler’s insistence, Röhm returned to Germany in 1930 and was officially appointed Chief of Staff of the SA in 1931. The organization then numbering over a million members, waa reorganized by Röhm. Its mission remained the same, engaging in campaigns of political violence against Communists, rival political parties, Jewish communities, and other groups. Despite praise from the party for his efforts with the SA, as public knowledge of his homosexuality gradually increased via the newsmedia, opposition to Röhm grew. Note that there was no issue with regard to homosexuality–essentially a crime in the Russian Federation–concerning Prigozhin. Yet, what has surfaced is an issue concerning him and narcotics abuse. Röhm maintained Hitler’s trust to the extent that once Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, he made Röhm Reichsleiter, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party, and appointed him to the Reich Cabinet as a Reichsminister without portfolio. However, more problems arose from Röhm. In the years 1933 and 1934 when the Nazi government was consolidating it power,  Röhm engaged in noisy rhetoric, calling for a “second revolution” that would transform german society that worried Hitler’s industrial allies. Further, Röhm  continually demanded more power for the SA. The Reichswehr (German Armed Forces) saw the SA as a growing threat to its position. Hitler eventually saw his long-time friend as a threat to everything he was building and a potential political rival. Under Hitler’s orders, Reichfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler and the Deputy Reichfuhrer-SS and Director of Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) Reinhard Heydrich purged the entire SA leadership during the infamous Night of the Long Knives on June  30,1934. Röhm was reportedly executed in a Munich prison on July 1, 1934

Prigozhin’s Mistakes

Putin broke his silence on Prigozhin’s jet crash on August 24, 2023 during a meeting with the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, in the Kremlin. If readers can cast their minds back to Putin’s initial remarks, they may recall that Putin stated: “First of all, I want to express my sincere condolences to the families of all the victims, this is always a tragedy.” Putin went on to say: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He described him as “a talented man, a talented businessman.” Most relevant, Putin intriguingly added: “He was a man of difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results needed both for himself and when I asked him about it–for a common cause, as in these last months.” There were indeed many mistakes that Prigozhin made while ostensibly assisting Putin. Prigozhin had required but had not always warranted Putin’s forgiveness many times. Putin had forgiven much. To that extent, such is not so apparent as Putin mentioned that Prigozhin always did what he asked him to do. Often, Putin had to hold him at arms length. The list of disappointments is far lengthier than one might imagine as it concerned the failure to optimally serve Putin’s interests. It went far beyond Prigozhin’s ramblings about Ukraine. A small number are listed here.

Food Poisoning of Schoolchildren

As aforementioned, in 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

Fumbled Effort To Interfere with the 2016 US Elections.

By 2016, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. As noted earlier, a portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

In November 2017, Putin surely went to Hanoi G20 Summit within interest in discussing with the new US President, Donald Trump, a variety of issues to include, very important to him, the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (The Magnitsky Law), which had a devastating impact on the ability of oligarchs and other business leaders to operate in the US and alongside US businesses. Yet, as a consequence of the foul-up of Prigozhin’s organization in its effort to impact national elections in the US in 2016, Trump reportedly bombarded Putin with questions about the Russian Federation’s interference in Hanoi. It was to a degree, an embarrassment for Putin. As with other Western newsmedia sources, on November 11, 2017, in Agence France-Presse, it was headlined that Putin and Trump talk Syria, election meddling at their brief meeting. No mention was made of the Magnitsky issue

US President Donald Trump (right) speaks with Putin (left) during a stroll  in Hanoi Vietnam on November 11, 2017. By  2016, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry were alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, was a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 was offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. In November 2017, Putin surely went to Hanoi G20 Summit with an interest in discussing with the new US President, Donald Trump, a variety of issues to include, very important to him, the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (The Magnitsky Law), which had a devastating impact on the ability of oligarchs and other business leaders to operate in the US and alongside US businesses. Yet, as a consequence of the foul-up of Prigozhin’s organization in its effort to impact national elections in the US in 2016, Trump reportedly bombarded Putin with questions about the Russian Federation’s interference in Hanoi. It was to a great degree, an embarrassment for Putin.

Wagner Group Attrocities in Bucha, Ukraine

The Kremlin could barely suggest that it had acted in the interest of international peace and security when it invaded  Ukraine or took previously in just about any other intervention externally during Putin’s era of leadership. Nonetheless, it made every effort to sell its case, pressing its narrative on Ukraine. The last thing the Kremlin wanted to contend with were reported large scale atrocities, with evidence alleged caught by Western newsmedia cameras. That was the circumstance Prigozhin created, after the Wagner Group left the town of Bucha. 

Via the Agence France-Presse on April 7, 2022, the Times of Israel published a report that German intelligence services intercepted radio traffic of Russian soldiers discussing the killings of civilians in Bucha. The Agence France-Presse used the renowned German newmedia source, Der Spiegel, which cited a closed-door briefing given by Germany’s foreign intelligence service BND. In the Bundestag. Der Spiegel reported that the audio files ofthe BND gleaned at the Bundestag briefing provided evidence of the Wagner mercenary group’s role in the atrocities. Der Spiegel said the audio files intercepted by the BND also provide evidence of the Wagner mercenary group’s role in the atrocities. The German government said its satellite images from last month from the period of March 10, 2022 to March 18, 2022, and reliable evidence showed that Russian Federation forces and security units were deployed in this area from March 7, 2022 until March 30, 2022. The Kremlin denied the accusations of mass killings. It claimed that the images emerging from Bucha were “fakes” or that the deaths occurred after Russian Federation troops withdrew from the town.

In the West, Putin’s regime is looked upon as one in which the powers of evil are exalted. Under the leadership of Prigozhin, the Wagner Group in Bucha helped to hammer in that idea with the West and much of the world. Prigozhin did not help the Kremlin’s situation.

Prigozhin’s Refusal To Have the Wagner Group Sign an Oath of Allegiance and Contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry 

Before the Wagner Group Rebellion transpired, seemingly many of the organization’s troops sensed big trouble ahead. That sense stemmed from controversy stirred over an order from the Federation Defense Minister on June 10, 2023 requiring all “volunteer detachments” to sign contracts with his ministry by the end of that month. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry explained that order was given by Shoigu in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of “volunteer detachments”, all such units–or their men–would have to sign a contract with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry by July 1, 2023. The order did not mention the Wagner Group by name. However, it was understood then that it routinely referred to the organization as “volunteer assault detachments”. As for the rationale behind the order, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry claimed“This will give the volunteer formations the necessary legal status, create unified approaches to the organisation of comprehensive provision and fulfilment of their tasks. Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov shared: “These measures will increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the armed forces and their volunteer detachments.”

The following day, Prigozhin publicly stated that his Wagner Group troops would not sign any contract with Shoigu. Prigozhin viewed the order as an attempt by Shoigu to take control of the Wagner Group.  Prigozhin suggested that the Defense Ministry might use the failure to comply with the order as a reason to deprive Wagner of supplies. Prigozhin stated: “What could happen after this order is that they will not give us weapons and ammunition. We will figure it out, as they say.” He went on to say: “But when the thunder breaks, they will come running and bring weapons and ammunition with a request to help.” The entire episode created a further rift between Shoigu and Prigozhin. It surely caused Putin additional distress. Most of the Wagner Group troops did not sign the Defense Ministry contracts then. However, some in a bid to distance themselves from the dangerous controversy, left the Wagner Group, moving away from the situation, and signed the contracts in order to ply their trade with other private military companies and the Defense Ministry, too. Chacun voit midi à sa porte.

Prigozhin’s Bizarre Video Recordings from Rostov-on-Don during the Wagner Group Rebellion 

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have beenmay very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Still, there were also unnecessary ad-libs Prigozhin made on video recordings from Rostov-on-Don broadcast and posted online during the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some were dangerously threatening and perceivably seditious. As the matter continued,which naturally appeared grave, Prigozhin’s continued comments dipped into the realm of the absolute absurd. Well over the top were his remarks on video on the morning of June 24, 2023 from Roostov-on-Don in which he rashly stated: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.”  He went further off the mark when he bizarrely declared: “Once again I’m warning everyone: we will … destroy everything around us. You can’t destroy us. We have goals. We are all ready to die. All 25,000 of us.”

Prigozhin was putting his unique “golden touch” on the whole matter likely creating some concern and considerable stress among many in the Kremlin as to whether everything would come together as planned. that stress was doubtlessly felt by Putin at the time. If Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would have had hypothetically driven into Moscow and would have taken control of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the outcome for them would not have reminded anyone who would have observed their march much as the renowned final stands of glory such the The Alamo (1836 )in what was then the Texas Territory or the Battle of Camerone (1863) in Mexico. It most likely would have closely resembled something akin to Colonel Armstrong Custer’s Last Stand at the Battle of Little Big Horn (1876), a complete massacre with no appreciable positive ououtcome. With his words, he had what his troops could not have, a damaging psychological impact on the psyche of the Russian people. He made the government appear vulnerable.

The Appearance of Complicity with Russian Federation General Sergei Surovikin.

A real tragedy that cropped from Prigozhin’s position as owner of the Wagner Group was his seemingly unfettered engagement with the general staff and other senior generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces due to his close association with Putin more so than his ownership of the organization. Such a political association in the Russian Federation and just about any country is very tricky business for a senior military commander. It must be handled tactfully and delicately. If not, a fine career can easily be shipwrecked. One association which Prigozhin spoke of often was that with the Commander-in-Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin. During the invasion of Ukraine, Surovikin who was once commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone later became Deputy commander in the Southern “Grouping” of the Special Military Operation zone where the Wagner Group operated and has bases. Surovikin had also worked with the Wagner Group while serving two tour in Syria in 2017. Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. On June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. Among Russians who welcomed the appointment of Surovikin when he took command in Ukraine was Prigozhin. In a statement put out at the time by Concord, Prigozhin said: “Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian Army.” He called Surovikin a “legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.” He noted: “Having received an order [in 1991], Surovikin was that officer who without hesitation got in his tank and went forward to save his country.”

However, beyond being a friend of Putin and owner of Wagner Group which often operated with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, there were no personal reasons and perhaps no reasons for to be a close associate of Surovikin or any general. Prigozhin was not a professional soldier. He owned the Wagner Group just short of 10 years and training as it’s commander was on the job and surely limited. Unlike Surovikin, Prigozhin did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School. He did not begin his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. He did not graduate from the renowned Frunze Military Academy.. He did not graduate from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Discussions with him on military matters must be somewhat trying at times. Surovikin certainly was not a billionaire oligarch much as Prigozhin. From what was known publicly, he had no obvious prospect of ever becoming one. Prigohzin could not make him one. The relationship between Prigozhin and Surovikin was likely superficial for the most part. Yet, because it was enough that the two were talking at all was enough to cause sufficient suspicion on Surovikin with regard to Prigozhin’s thinking during the Wagner Group Rebellion. To that extent, Surovikin was to suffer as a result of guilt by association. Indeed, ostensibly in great part due to a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin that fuelled rumors of the general’s alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, there was apparently more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into. There was also the fact the Wagner Group Rebellion was unluckily launched from Surovikin’s Southern sector in Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Surovikin was detained by the security services on June 23, 2023. It was the starting date of the Wagner Group Rebellion. Reports of Surovikin’s release from detention surfaced in the newsmedia in the West on September 4, 2023. It was reported at the same time that his service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces was terminated.

Prigozhin created an “unsafe” environment for Surovikin, politically. Perhaps Putin had a good idea of how and why the general had gotten entangled with Prigozhin and the Wagner Group Rebellion. However, he did not stop what transpired, at least not right away. Putin did not take any chances. The regime still worked against the general–particularly with endless “interviews”–in the way that is does. Being heavy-handed as they typically, no thought was likely given the dynamics of the relationship between Prigozhin, a friend of Putin, and Surovikin. No consideration given to that fact that Surovikin was already swamped by the need to handle an on-coming counteroffensive of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and could not dedicate any real time Prigozhin’s puzzle. No concern was likely given to the significant gap between Surovikin’s military knowledge, experience and education, with Prigozhin, who relatively was lacking on the subject. There could not have been any great discussion between the two on dealing with Shoigu–who also never receive formal military training and education–and Gerasimov or the Russian Federation’s struggle in Ukraine in general. Based on information from various sources, the newspaper of record in the US, the New York Times, reported on September 4, 2023, the security services seemed to open their eyes wide enough to notice there was reason, not even a good imaginary one, for Surovikin to remain in detention. The Russian Federation security services released him.

Prigozhin looks over maps of the tactical situation in Bakhmut, Ukraine in 2023 (above). A real tragedy that cropped from Prigozhin’s position as owner of the Wagner Group was his seemingly unfettered engagement with the general staff and other senior generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces due to his close association with Putin more so than his ownership of the organization. Such a political association was very tricky business for a senior military commander in a regime such as Putin’s, and had to handled tactfully and delicately. Beyond being a friend of Putin and owner of Wagner Group which often operated with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, there were no personal reasons and perhaps no reasons for to be a close associate of any general. Prigozhin was not a professional soldier. He had owned the Wagner Group for just short of 10 years and his training as its commander was “on the job” and surely limited. Unlike Surovikin, Prigozhin did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School. He did not begin his career serving in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. He did not graduate from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. He did not graduate from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Discussions with him on military matters must be somewhat trying for senior military officers at times.

Embezzlement at Concord or the Wagner Group Specifically?

There may very well have been issues aggravating Putin concerning the skimming of profits from government payment to the Wagner Group for its contract services. Putin oddly hinted at this possibility in a speech, but did not offer much evidence on the villainy. For him to even broach to matter publicly was a powerful act in itself. On June 27, 2023, Putin’s fourth of four major addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion, initially he spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry,.However, as explained in greatcharlie’s August 1, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)”, what began as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly became an effort by Putin to lay out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Putin explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Putin admitted plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. In its operations, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot farther.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About “his Wagner Group”, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. If the allegations of Embezzlement were true, the implications were tremendous. There would ne punishment. Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address. Looking at the speech today, there was no pretension. Nothing good was in the making by that time.

Prigozhin’s Final Mistake?

It remains possible that there was some new mistake, some new transgression, unknown to the public, over which Putin reached his peak. Conceivably, in the not so distant future, that hypothesized mistake might be made known by Putin, himself. In all honesty, greatcharlie believes that is somewhat unlikely for as it was suggested earlier, Putin surely wants the matter of Prigozhin to remain closed forever. He will unlikely be the one to dredge it up again. Perhaps such any imaginable that independent newsmedia houses may hear whisper about some new and final mistake by Prigozhin. Such whisper might very well become a popular topic of among journalists and well-known Kremlin watchers in the Russian Federation. It might also become known those in the opposition movement, the fount of all juicy rumor and gossip about Putin. Yet, then again, it may be the case that they, too, have had their fill on the Prigozhin matter. Prigozhin and his men were engaged in a dark, dangerous business, in which the deaths of others and monetary gain were the only “rewards.” He and his commanders met their fate while engaged in that work, and perhaps only a precious few in the independent newsmedia as well as in opposition political circles in Russian Federation might be moved enough to shed tears for them. 

More likely, however,  the last on the possible list of mistakes are actions by Prigozhin that could only have left Putin better than annoyed with him.  Indeed, in the abstract, greatcharlie can only presume Putin was particularly displeased with Prigozhin’s continued counter messaging on Ukraine well after the Wagner Group Rebellion. He suggested Africa was where the Wagner Group should direct its talents. He declared that Africa should be the Wagner Group’s priority. Prigozhin publicly stated that he wanted to recruit Bogatyrs-rough men–for Africa. He expressed no desire to have his organization serve in Ukraine. He made it clear that Ukraine was a non-issue for the Wagner Group. It is possible that he believed in speaking this way, he was very apparently lashing out at Shoigu and Gerasimov and not Putin’s government or Putin, himself. Yet, at this point, Putin unlikely wanted to hear too much more about the Wagner Group and what it could not do for him. After all, the Wagner Group Rebellion was settled.

When meeting with Prigozhin after the Wagner Group Rebellion,, Putin most likely made it clear to Prigozhin that he want he wanted no more negative, noisy talk on Ukraine. it would have been delinquent for him to do otherwise. One might imagine that Putin warned that there would be no second chance as too much was at stake. There was indeed a line that could not be crossed and it might be said by observers, inside and outside the Russian Federation, that Prigozhin had already crossed it more than once. Putin’s likely issuance of a warning to Prigozhin takes greatcharlie’s thought to the fateful discussion between the Great Shawnee Tribe Chief, Tecumseh and the Governor Willian Tyler in 1811 concerning White settlers further westward expansion into Native controlled land. Beginning in 1808, the Shawnee leader Tecumseh travelled throughout the US gathering supporters and allies to form a native confederacy that could resist westward expansion by white settlers. In August 1811, Tecumseh met with Governor William Henry Harrison to discuss the recent treaties, land purchases, and violence throughout the Indiana territories. At their meeting, Tecumseh spoke for a large group of natives along the Great Lakes, and told Harrison, “that piece of land, we do not wish you to take it,” indicating that his allies wanted “the present boundary line to continue.” Should the whites continue their expansion into the region, Tecumseh warned, “I assure you it will be productive of bad consequences.”

Putin is no longer a young president filled with thoughts and excitement about a bold future ahead. He has accomplished much. There were close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. Perhaps the cause for that in part has been Putin’s sense of humor. In the case of Prigozhin, however, there was every indication that any further association with him had to end. His behavior could have potentially marred all that the Russian Federation President created and was creating. Putin may have logically concluded that all he had achieved and surely wanted to complete before his end was being put in some jeopardy by Prigozhin.  Far more was at stake than friendship and nostalgia. At stake for Putin and others operating at the highest levels of government  were the Russian Federation’s interests and aims, its survival. There was every indication that any continued association with Prigozhin or any attempt to further countenance of his behavior might potentially have been further disruptive, if not destructive.

To be sure, the impact of Prigozhin’s final verbal blows, albeit unintended to harm Putin, were certainly felt by the Russian Federation President. Surely behind the Kremlin’s walls, it was likely apparent that Prigozhin was out of control. Perhaps all elites with real influence in Moscow could see that and were flummoxed by events since February 24, 2022, the starting date of the special military operation.

It seems that by the time Prigozhin was going off on further tangents following the Wagner Group Rebellion, telling his troops to focus on Africa and the need for the organization to recruit bogatyrs for Africa, he had likely passed everyones point of no return except Putin. Putin being Putin, however,, was not going to be forever disposed to hang on a knife’s edge over what fantastic outrage Prigozhin would utter or engage in next. Putin needed the Russian people to support the special military operation, the invasion of Ukraine. Casting doubt about the special military operation for any selfish reason, for any reason, particularly after the Wagner Group Rebellion was over, was unacceptable to him. Putin was not going to wait to find out if new, greater damage was being done by Prigozhin’s declarations on Ukraine and disparagement of the war effort.

Annum iam tertium et vicesimum regnat. (He has been reigning for twenty-three years.) To gnaw a bit further on the matter, Putin, is no longer a young president filled with the thoughts and excitement about the future ahead. He has accomplished much. There were close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. Perhaps the cause for that in part has been Putin’s sense of humor. In the case of Prigozhin, however, there was every indication that any further association with him had to end. His behavior could have potentially marred all that the Russian Federation President created and was creating. Putin may have logically concluded that all he had achieved and surely wanted to complete before his end was being put in some jeopardy by Prigozhin.  Far more was at stake than friendship and nostalgia. At stake for Putin and others operating at the highest levels of government  were the Russian Federation’s interests and aims, its survival. There was every indication that any continued association with Prigozhin or any attempt to further countenance of his behavior might potentially have been further disruptive, if not destructive. Order must be maintained in the Russian Federation. Prigozhin managed to become a strain that he could no longer tolerate. He could not allow the special military operation to flounder as result of Prigozhin’s problems with Shoigu and Gerasimov and simply his continued stupidities. There was nothing even slightly humorous about any of it.

Putin could no longer hope to save his friend. He could only go one direction on the matter. That did not necessarily mean Prigozhin had to be killed. Perhaps it would be enough to state fate stepped in.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

A Russian Threat on Two Fronts: A New Understanding of Putin, Not Inadequate Old Ones, Will Allow the Best Response

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Putin, himself, appears to be the cause for difficulties that  the Trump administration has encountered in improve relations between the US and Russia. One might accuse Putin of playing a cat and mouse game with Trump. Why Putin would act in this manner is uncertain. An assay of Putin from outside the box may provide a framework from which the Russian President’s complexities can be better understood.

According to a March 3, 2018 New York Times article entitled, “A Russian Threat on Two Fronts Meets an American Strategic Void”, US President Donald Trump has remained silent about his vision to contain Russian power, and has not expressed hope of luring Moscow into new rounds of negotiations to prevent a recurrent arms race. Indeed, the article, largely critical of the Trump administration, explains that “most talk of restraint has been cast to the wind” over the past few months. What purportedly envelopes Washington now is a strategic vacuum captured by “Russian muscle-flexing and US hand-wringing.” A cyberchallenge has enhanced the degree of tension between the two countries. The article reports that top US intelligence officials have conceded that Trump has yet to discuss strategies with them to prevent the Russians from interfering in the midterm elections in 2018. In striking testimony on February 27, 2018 on Capitol Hill, the director of both the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, US Navy Admiral Michael Rogers explained that when he took command of his agencies, one of his goals was to assure that US adversaries would “pay a price” for their cyberactions against the US that would “far outweigh the benefit” derived from hacking. Rogers conceded in his testimony that his goal had not been met. He dismissed sanctions that the US Congress approved last year and those that Trump had not imposed as planned would not have been enough to change “the calculus or the behavior” of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

What was reported by the March 3rd New York Times article presaged a shaky future for US-Russian relations. At the start of the Trump administration, Putin convincingly projected an interest in working toward better relations through diplomacy. Areas of agreement and a degree of mutual respect between Trump and Putin have been found. Yet, agreements reached should have served to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. Putin appears to be the causality for a figurative draw on the scorecard one year into the Trump administration’s exceptionally pellucid, well-meaning effort. Putin seems to be playing a cat and mouse game with Trump–constant pursuit, near capture, and repeated escapes. It appears to have been a distraction, allowing him to engage in other actions. While engaged in diplomacy, the Trump administration has observed hostile Russian moves such as continued interference n US elections, as well as other countries, and efforts to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to tighten Moscow’s grip Crimea and the Donbass. Those actions greatly diverge with US policies on Syria and Ukraine. Putin and his officials have shown their hand too completely over time for anyone in Washington to allow themselves to be seduced by Putin’s guise of wanting to improve ties. In the recent greatcharlie post, it was explained that Trump and foreign and national security policy officials in his administration, who were good-naturedly referred to as “stone hearts”, were well-aware from the get-go that Putin and his government could more often than not be disingenuous.  If Putin truly does not want positive to change in relations, the Trump administration’s diplomatic project with Russia is likely moribund. If there were some touch that Trump could put on the situation right now that would knock the project in the right direction, he certainly would. At the moment, however, the environment is not right even for his type of creativity and impressive skills as a negotiator. For now, there may very well be no power in the tongue of man to alter Putin. Since no changes in relations are likely in the near future, it would be ideal if Putin would avoid exacerbating the situation between the US and Russia by suddenly halting any ongoing election meddling. The whole matter should have been tied-off and left inert in files in the Kremlin and offices in the Russian Federation intelligence and security services. However, Putin seems to going in the opposite direction. The threat exists that Putin, seeing opportunity where there is none, will engage in more aggressive election meddling, and will also rush to accomplish things in its near abroad, via hybrid attacks at a level short of all out war, with the idea that there is time left on the clock before the US responds with a severe move and relations with the Trump administration turn thoroughly sour. That possibility becomes greater if the Kremlin is extrapolating information to assess Trump’s will to respond from the US newsmedia.

Putin’s desire, will, and ability to act in an aggressive manner against the US, EU, and their interests must be regularly assessed in the light of new events, recent declarations,  and attitudes and behaviors most recently observed by Western leaders and other officials during face to face meetings with him. Undoubtedly, Trump is thoroughly examining Putin, trying to understand him better, mulling through the capabilities and capacity of the US and its allies to respond to both new moves and things he has already done. Since Trump is among the few Western leaders who have recently met with Putin–in fact he has met with him a number of times, there might be little unction for him to be concerned himself with meditations on the Russian President made in the abstract. Nevertheless, an assay of Putin from outside the box may provide a framework from which the Russian President’s complexities can be better understood. Parsing out elements such as Putin’s interests and instincts, habits and idiosyncrasies, and the values that might guide his conscious and unconscious judgments would be the best approavh.to take. A psychological work up of that type on Putin is beyond greatcharlie’s remit. However, what can be offered is a limited presentation, with some delicacy, of a few ruminations on Putin’s interior-self, by looking at his faith, pride, ego; countenance, and other shadows of his soul. What is presented is hardly as precise as Euclid’s Elements, but hopefully, it might be useful to those examining Putin and contribute to the policy debate on Russia as well. Credula vitam spes fovet et melius cras fore semper dicit. (Credulous hope supports our life, and always says that tomorrow will be better.)

Putin has publicly declared his faith and has been an observant member of the Russian Orthodox Church. By discussing his faith, Putin has developed considerable political capital among certain segments of the Russian public. Putin’s political opponents and other critics at home, however, would question where faith has its influence on him given some of his policy and political decision, particularly concerning territorial grabs, overseas election meddling, and reported human and civil rights violations in his own country.

Faith

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines faith as complete trust or confidence; a strong belief in a religion, based on spiritual conviction rather than proof. Faith guides the mind. It helps the mind conclude things. Simple faith, involves trusting in people and things. Communists mocked faith in the church, but still had faith in Marx. In that vein, faith allows for the acceptance of the word of another, trusting that one knows what one is saying and that one is telling the truth. The authority being trusted must have real knowledge of what he or she is talking about, and no intention to deceive. Faith is referred to as divine faith when the one believed is God. In discussing Putin’s divine faith, greatcharlie recognizes that to convey a sense of religiousness makes oneself spooky to some. Writing publicly, one of course opens oneself up to constructive criticism at best and obloquy at worst. Still, a discussion tied to faith might be feared by readers on its face as being one more expression of neurotic religiosity, an absurdity. That presents a real challenge. Nonetheless, the effort is made here.

Putin has publicly declared his faith on many occasions. He has been an observant member of the Russian Orthodox Church. Putin was introduced, to religion, faiith, and the church early in his life. In Part 1 of Putin’s 2000 memoir, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that his mother, Mariya Ivanovna Shelomova, attended church and had him baptized when he was born. She kept his baptism a secret from his father, who was Communist Party member and secretary of a party organization in his factory shop. Putin relates a story concerning her faith as well as his own in Part 1’s final paragraph. He explains: “In 1993, when I worked on the Leningrad City Council, I went to Israel as part of an official delegation. Mama gave me my baptismal cross to get it blessed at the Lord’s Tomb. I did as she said and then put the cross around my neck. I have never taken it off since.” Religious formation must start at childhood discussing ideas as being kind, obedient, and loving. They must be told of the world visible and invisible. Children are buffeted by many aggressive, strange, harmful ideas, and must able to surmount them by knowing what is right and doing what is right. Children tend to gravitate toward prayer, which strengthens their faith and helps their devotion grow. One tends to resemble those in which one is in regular conversation, and prayer helps bring children closer to God. The very brief life God bestows to one on Earth is lived more fully with faith. On his death bed, the renowned French philosopher, playwright, novelist, and political activist, Jean Paul Sartre, stated: ”I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured. In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here, and this idea of a creating hand refers to God.” Est autem fides credere quod nondum vides; cuius fidei merces est videoed quod credis. (Faith is to believe what you do not see the reward of this faith is to see what you believe.)

Faith does not replace the intellect, it guides the mind. Whether Putin’s faith has shaped his views or his Ideology is unclear. By discussing his faith, Putin has developed considerable political capital among certain segments of the Russian public. It has allowed Putin to cloak him in something very positive, very healthy, and would provide citizens with a good reason to doubt and dismiss negative rumors and reports about his actions. Many Russian citizens have responded to Putin’s introduction of faith to the dialogue about his presidency by coming home to the Orthodox Church. Perhaps that is a positive aspect that can be found in it all. Members of Russia’s opposition movement and other critics at home, however, would question where faith has its influence on him given some of his policy and political decision, particularly concerning territorial grabs, overseas election meddling, and reported human and civil rights violations in his own country. They would claim that rather than shaping his policy decisions in office, his faith is shaped by politics. They would doubt that he would ever leverage influence resulting from his revelations about his faith in a beneficial way for the Russian people or any positive way in general. They could only view Putin’s declaration of divine worship as false, and that he is only encouraging the superficial worship of himself among the intellectually inmature who may be impressed or obsessed with his power, wealth, lifestyle, and celebrity.

Putin commemorates baptism of Jesus Christ in blessed water (above). On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor in chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.”

Putin is certain that his faith has provided a moral backing for his decisions and actions as Russian President. On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor in chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.”

Having humility means to be honest about ones gifts and defects. The true source, the real hand in ones accomplishments, is God. Once one recognizes this, one can be honest about the need for God’s assistance. Putin’s, to a degree, seems to indicate that he has humility and appears assured that he has been placed in his current circumstances, and has given him the ability to do all that he has done, as the result of God’s will. However, Putin should keep in mind that evil can quiet all suspicions, making everything appear normal and natural to those with the best intentions. To that extent, his decision and actions could truly be the augur of his soul, but perhaps not in a positive way. Evil can go into the souls without faith, into souls that are empty. Once evil insinuates itself in one’s life, there is chaos, one becomes bewildered, confused about life, about who one is. Due to the threat of evil influence one must be willing to look deeper at oneself to discern flaws, to see what is lacking. Having a sense of balance in this world necessitates having an authentic knowledge of oneself, the acceptance of daily humiliations, avoidance of even the least self-complacency, and humble acknowledgement of ones faults. The virtue of temperance allows one to give oneself a good look. Once one gets oneself right, then one can get God right. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. (No one is born without faults.)

Putin seemingly surmises that he is satisfying God through his religious observance and by obeying religious obligations. Yet, one cannot approach God simply on the basis of one’s “good deeds.” Indeed, simply doing the right things, for example, following the law does, not grant you salvation. It does not give you guidance. Approval, recognition, obligation, and guilt are also reasons for doing good. The motive behind your actions is more important than your actions. To simply believe also does not put one in a position to receive. Your heart must be right.

Putin celebrating Christmas in St Petersburg (above). Wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. Putin’s conscience should be able to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong. It should urge him to do that which he recognizes to be right. It should restrain him from what he recognizes to be wrong. Ones conscience passes judgment on our actions and executes that judgment on the soul.

All those who have worked for Putin, and those who have come up against him, would likely agree that he has a wonderful brain, and his intellect must be respected. His talents were first dedicated to his initial career as an officer in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. The job took root in him. As a skilled KGB officer, he was proficient at lying, manipulation and deception. It was perhaps his métier.  Putin would likely say he engaged in such behavior for all the right reasons, as a loyal foot soldier. Subsequently, he would serve in a succession of political positions in the intelligence industry that were thrust upon him. In 1997, he served as head of the Main Control Directorate. In 1998, he was ordered to serve as director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Later that same year, he was named Secretary of the Security Council. Through those positions, he was educated thoroughly on the insecurity of the world. It was a world in which things in life were transient. He discovered the width of the spectrum of human behavior. Putin applies that knowledge of humankind, sizing-up, and very often intimidating interlocutors, both allies and adversaries alike. The 16th century English statesman and philosopher, Sir Francis Bacon said that “knowledge itself is power,” but Intellect without wisdom is powerless. One matures intellectually when one moves from seeking to understand the how of things to understanding the why of things. Through the conquest of pride can one move from the how to the why. One can only pray for the wisdom to do so. In The New Testament, Saint Paul explains: “Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that by testing you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect. For by the grace given to me I say to everyone among you not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to think with sober judgment, each according to the measure of faith that God has assigned. Beatus attempt esse sine virtute nemo potest. (No one can be happy without virtue.).”

The Catechism of the Catholic Church explains that the inclination toward sin and evil is called “concupiscence”. Baptism erases original sin and turns a man back towards God. However, the inclination toward sin and evil persists, and the man must continue to struggle against concupiscence. Sin leads to sin. Acts of sin tend to perpetuate themselves and result in additional acts of sin. Sin can become a way of life if it goes unchecked. When Putin approaches the altar of the Russian Orthodox Church, his purpose should be to expiate sin.

Wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. Putin’s conscience should be able to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong. It should urge him to do that which he recognizes to be right. It should restrain him from what he recognizes to be wrong. For the spiritual, conscience is formed by God’s truth. God’s truth creates order. In addition to knowing God’s truth, one must embody His truth which is inspired by love. The truth is a great treasure, a satisfactory explanation of the world and heaven that should speak to the individual. One should love God, love one’s neighbor, and remain virtuous by choice because it is the right thing to do. The reason for ones existence is best understood once one connects with the Creator of life. One can be happy with what makes God happy. Sub specie aeternitatis. (Under the aspect of eternity.)

Ones conscience passes judgment on our actions and executes that judgment on the soul. One should not do things that do not fit one. Conscience will send warning signals ahead of time. One should not ignore ones conscience. One should not violate it. The conscience should serve as Putin’s protection. Despite everything, it could very well be that Putin has a seared conscience. A less sensitive conscience will often fail an individual. Perhaps his conscience is dead. In following, his ability to know what is right may be dead. Putin declared his faith. He did not declare that he was a moral paragon. Quodsi ea mihi maxime inpenderet tamen hoc animo fui semper, ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem. (I have always been of the opinion that infamy earned by doing what is right is not infamy at all, but glory.).

Putin at the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade (above). Putin would likely be delighted to know there was a general understanding that his pride and patriotism go hand in hand. To that extent, all of his moves are ostensibly made in the name of restoring Russia’s greatness, to save it from outsiders who have done great harm to the country and would do more without his efforts. Some Russian citizens actually see Putin as ‘the Savior of Russia.”

Pride

Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae. (If the world should break and fall on him, it would strike him fearless.) The OED defines pride as a feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived from achievements, qualities or possessions that do one credit, or something which causes this; consciousness of one’s own dignity or the quality of having an excessively high opinion of oneself. Pride has been classified as a self-conscious emotion revolving around self and as social emotion concerning ones relationship to others. It can be self-inflating and distance one from others.

In terms of being conscious of the qualities, the positive nature of one’s country, surely national leaders must have a cognitive pride, an attitude of pride in their countries, their administrations, and missions. They will express their pride with dignity, regardles of how big or small, powerful or weak, that their countries are. Putin insists that all Russian have pride in their country. Putin wants all Russian citizens to be part of their country’s rise to greatness. Divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion and origin hinder that. It is worth repeating from the greatcharlie post, “Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion: Does Shoigu’s Involvement Assure Success for Putin?”, that much as the orator, poet, and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero, concluded about his Ancient Rome, Putin believes that loyalty to the Russian Federation must take precedence over any other collectivity: social, cultural, political, or otherwise. As noted by Clifford Ando in Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (University of California Press, 2013), in the hierarchy of allegiances outlined by Cicero, “loyalty toward Rome occupied a superordinate position: her laws and her culture provided the normative fabric that would, to borrow a phrase of Rutilius Namatianus [Poet, Imperial Rome, 5th Century], ‘create from distinct and separate nations a single fatherland’.” Likewise, Russia’s laws and culture provide the normative fabric from which a united country is created from diverse peoples. Possession of citizenship should be the basis to cause individuals to identify with the concerns of others in widely disparate populations among Russia’s republics. Putin wants Russians to be in a “Russian state of mind,” a mental state created when diversity, creativity, and optimism coalesce. A citizen’s attitude, perspective, outlook, approach, mood, disposition, and mindset should stand positively Russian.

From a theological perspective, the prideful individual acts as if their talents, possessions, or achievements are not the result of God’s goodness and grace but their own efforts. When pride is carried to the extent that one is unwilling to acknowledge dependence on God and refuses to submit ones will to God or lawful authority, it is a grave sin. While not all sins source from pride, it can lead to all sorts of sins, notably presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, hypocrisy, strife, and disobedience. In that vein, pride is really striving for a type of perverse excellence. That type of pride can be embedded deeply in ones being. 

1. Patriotism

Putin’s emotional pride is also expressed in the form of profound patriotism. Patriotism is defined as having or expressing devotion to and vigorous support for ones country. In reading Part 1 of Putin’s First Person, one can begin to understand why patriotism permeates everything Putin does. Given the rich history of his family’s service to the homeland gleaned from his parents and grandparents, it is hard to imagine how he would think any other way. It was gleaned because according to Putin, much of what he learned about his family was caught by him and not taught directly to him. Indeed, he explains: “My parents didn’t talk much about the past, either. People generally didn’t, back then. But when relatives would come to visit them in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), there would be long chats around the table, and I would catch some snatches, so many fragments of the conversation.” Putin’s grandfather, Spiridon Ivanovich Putin, was a cook. However, after World War I he was offered a job in The Hills district on the outskirts of Moscow, where Vladimir Lenin and the whole Ulynov family lived. When Lenin died, his grandfather was transferred to one of Josef Stalin’s dachas. He worked there for a long period. It is assumed by many that due to his close proximity to Stalin, he was a member of the infamous state security apparatus, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD. Putin notes that his grandfather came through the purges unscathed unlike most who spent much time around Stalin. Putin also notes that his grandfather outlived Stalin, and in his later, retirement years, he was a cook at the Moscow City Party Committee sanatorium in Ilinskoye. As for Putin’s mother, she refused to leave Leningrad as the Germans were blockading it. When it became impossible for her to remain, her brother, under gunfire and bombs, took her out along with her baby, Albert, Putin’s brother, to Smolny.  Afterward, she put the baby in a shelter for children, which is where he came down with diphtheria and died. (Note that in the 1930s, Putin’s mother lost another son, Viktor, a few months after birth.) Putin’s mother nearly died from starvation. In fact, when she fainted from hunger, people thought she had died, and laid her out with the corpses. With God’s grace, she awoke and began moaning. She managed to live through the entire blockade of Leningrad.

Putin at the War Panorama Museum in St. Petersburg (above). Patriotism is defined as having or expressing devotion to and vigorous support for ones country. Patriotism permeates everything Putin does. Given the rich history of his family’s service to the homeland gleaned from his parents and grandparents, it is hard to imagine how he would think any other way.

As for Putin’s father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, he was on the battlefield, serving in a NKVD demolitions battalion, engaged in sabotage behind the German lines. There were 28 members in his group. Recounting a couple of experiences during the war that his father shared with him, Putin explains that on one occasion after being dropped into Kingisepp, engaging in reconnaissance, and blowing up a munitions depot, the unit was surrounded by Germans. According to Putin, a small group that included his father, managed to break out. The Germans pursued the fighters and more men were lost. The remaining men decided to split up. When the Germans neared Putin’s father, he jumped into a swamp over his head and breathed through a hollow reed until the dogs had passed by. Only 4 of the 28 men in his NKVD unit returned home. Upon his return, Putin’s father was ordered right back into combat. He was sent to the Neva Nickel. Putin says the mall, circular area can be seen, “If you stand with your back to Lake Ladroga, it’s on the left bank of the Neva River.” In his account of the fight, Putin said German forces had seized everything except for this small plot of land, and Russian forces had managed to hold on to that plot of land during the long blockade. He suggests the Russians believed it would play a role in the final breakthrough. As the Germans kept trying to capture it, a fantastic number of bombs were dropped on nearly every part of Neva Nickel, resulting in a “monstrous massacre.” That considered, Putin explains that the Neva Nickel played an important role in the end.

That sense of pride and spirit Putin seeks to instill in all Russians echoes the powerful lyrics of Sergei Mikhalkov in the National Anthem of the Russian Federation. They are not just words to Putin, they are his reality. As if the vision in Verse 3 could have been written by Putin, himself, it reads: “Ot yuzhykh morei do poliarnogo kraia Raskinulis nashi lesa i polia. Odna ty na svete! Odna ty takaia – Khranimaia Bogom rodnaia zemlia! (Wide expanse for dreams and for living Are opened for us by the coming years Our loyalty to the Fatherland gives us strength. So it was, so it is, and so it always will be!) Putin would likely be delighted to know that there was a general understanding that his pride and patriotism go hand in hand. To that extent, all of his moves are ostensibly made in the name of restoring Russia’s greatness, to save it from outsiders who have done great harm to the country and would do more without his efforts. Some Russian citizens actually see Putin as “the Savior of Russia.”

2. Self-esteem

Pride can cause an individual to possess an inordinate level of self-esteem. They may hold themselves superior to others or disdain them because they lack equal capabilities or possessions. They often seek to magnify the defects of others or dwell on them. The Western country that has been the focus of Putin’s disdain, far more than others, is the US. An manifestation of that prideful attitude was Putin’s response to the idea of “American Exceptionalism” as expressed by US President Barack Obama. In his September 11, 2013 New York Times op-ed, Putin expressed his umbrage over the idea. So important was his need to rebuff the notion of “American exceptionalism”, that he sabotaged his own overt effort to sway the US public with his negative comments about it. The op-ed was made even less effective by his discouraging words concerning US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would not be his last effort to sway the US public on important matters, nor the last one to backfire. Putin is not thrilled by the Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again,” or the concept “America First.” He has expressed his umbrage in speeches and in public discussions. Subordinates such as Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Federation Presidential Spokesperson Dimitry Peskov, using florid rhetoric, have amplified Putin’s views on the matter.

As an officer in the KGB, the main adversary of Western intelligence and security services during the Cold War, Putin would naturally harbor negative sentiment toward his past, now present, opponents. Perhaps if there were some peace dividend at the end of the Cold War that Russia might have appreciated, and his ears were filled by Donna Nobis Pacem (Give US Peace), his attitude may have been different. In fact, the world might never have known Putin, or would known a different one. However, that was not the case. Putin did not inherit an ideal situation in Russia when he became president. While on his way to the top of the political heap, Putin saw how mesmerising “reforms” recommended to Yeltsin’s government by Western experts drastically impacted Russia’s economy in a way referred to somewhat euphemistically by those experts as “shock treatment.” Yeltsin was unaware that Western experts were essentially “experimenting” with approaches to Russia’s economic problems. His rationale for opening Russia up to the resulting painful consequences was not only to fix Russia’s problems but ostensibly to establish comity with the West. The deleterious effects of reforms recommended by Western experts’ could be seen not only economically, but socially. In the West, alarming statistics were reported for example on the rise of alcoholism, drug addiction, birth defects, HIV/AIDS, a decreased birth rate, and citizens living below the poverty line. Russia’s second war in Chechnya which was brutal, and at times seemed unwinnable, had its own negative impact on the Russian psyche. As Russia’s hardships were publicized internationally, perceptions of Russia changed for the worst worldwide. However, Putin saw no need for Russia to lose any pride or surrender its dignity as a result of its large step backward. Putin believed Russia would rise again, and that some acceptable substitute for the Soviet Union might be created, and never lacked faith about that. Putin was loyal and obedient while he served Yeltsin, but saw him tarry too long as Russia strained in a state of collapse.

US President Donald Trump (left) and Putin (right). Intelligence professionals might say that the correct and expected move in response to a covert operation that has failed very publicly, so miserably, would be to “tie it off”. Instead, as reported by US Intelligence agencies and the White House, Russia’s effort to meddle in the US elections has become recursive. Putin declined to be upfront with Trump about the matter. Russia must exit any roads that could lead to disaster.

Putin has not hesitated to use force when he believed there would be some benefit in doing so. Still, he has shown that he would prefer to outthink his rivals in the West rather than fight them. That notion may in part have influenced his responses in contentious situations. It may also account for the sustained peace with the US that Russia has enjoyed under his stewardship. However, it may be possible that this line of thinking was born out of necessity rather than by choice. Except for its long-held, unquestioned ability to engage in a nuclear war with the US, Russia has lacked the capability and capacity to do other big, superpower-type things successfully for nearly three decades. True, Moscow’s Crimea-grab and moves in Eastern Ukraine were swiftly accomplished and significant. Russian Federation military operations in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia garnered the full attention of the West. However, both moves, though important, actually caused more disappointment than create a sense of threat to the interests of the US and EU. To that extent, the US, EU, and NATO were not convinced that there was a need for direct military moves in Ukraine to confront Russia, no positioning of NATO troops in Crimea or Eastern Ukraine to counter Russia’s moves, to make things harder for Moscow. To go a step further, there is no apparent balance between Russia’s self-declared role as a superpower and the somewhat moderate military, diplomatic, economic, political, and communication tools available to it. The more territory Moscow acquires through conquest, the less capable it is to care for territory already under its control as well as tend to Russia’s own needs. In particular, greater economic pressures will be placed on Russia’s already fragile economy. Despite his efforts to make things right in Russia, Putin must spend an inordinate amount of time mitigating existing hardships and the effects of malfunctions across the board in Russia’s government system and its society.

3. Chasing the Unattainable

Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia is unattainable, not by some fault of his own, but rather because its problems are too great, run too deep. He may have run out of answers to put Russia on real upward trajectory given the capabilities and possibilities of the country. Not being remiss, he has used all tools available to him, yet big improvements have not been seen. Putin’s pride may have been a bit marred by this reality. He, better than anyone, knows what Russia is and what it is not. For all that he has done, he has not led Russia, to use a phrase from John Le Carré, “out of the darkness into an age reason.” In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. It would seem, consciously or unconsciously, Putin may simply be moving at a deliberate speed or even procrastinating a bit. When he cannot swim forward, he would prefer to tread water than sink. By continually displaying the strength, and the will, to keep his head above water in tough situations, Putin has become an inspiration to those around him. Most senior Russian officials are unwilling or are unable to take a complete look at the situation. Rather, they seem enamored with Putin, and would likely follow him no matter what. Knowing that has perhaps fed into his sense of accomplishment and confidence

Putin once said that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He believes Western governments are driven to create disorder in Russia and seek to make it dependent of Western technologies. Theories propagated by Moscow that the struggle between East and West is ongoing have been energized by the whirlwind of anger and aggressive verbiage concerning the 2016 US Election meddling issue. The story of the meddling, confirmed and revealed by US intelligence community and political leaders on the national level, has been propelled by a strong, steady drum beat of reports in the US news media. Perhaps the election meddling, a black operation, should have been considered an unsurprising move by Putin. Perhaps due to his experience in the the intelligence industry, hseems to lead him to turn to comfortable tactics, technique, procedures, and methods from it when confronting his adversaries. The Kremlin vehemently denies any interference in the US elections. That may simply be protocal. Russian officials, such as Lavrov and Peskov, have gone as far as to say that insistence of various US sources that the meddling took place is a manifestation of some mild form of hysteria or paranoia. Yet, the Kremlin must be aware that such denials are implausible, and in fact, unreasonable. To respond in such a brazenly disingenuous manner in itself raises questions not just about the conduct Russia’s foreign and national security policy, but the true motives and intent behind Moscow’s moves. It appears that Putin’s personality and feelings influence policy as much as well-considered judgments.

Putin, better than anyone, knows what Russia is and what it is not. Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia is out of reach, unattainable, not by some fault of his own, but rather because it’s problems are too great, run too deep. He may have run out of answers to put Russia on a true upward trajectory. His pride may have been a bit marred by this reality. Despite his aptitude as a leader, he has failed to lead Russia, as a whole, “out of the darkness into an age reason.”

4. Tying-off the Election Meddling

Intelligence professionals might say that the correct and expected move in response to a covert operation that has failed very publicly, so miserably, would be to “tie it off”. Instead, as reported by US Intelligence agencies and the White House, Russia’s effort to meddle in the US elections has become recursive. This would mean that Putin, himself, wants it to continue. Although the meddling operation has been almost completely exposed, and one would expect that those responsible for it would feel some embarrassment over it, Moscow seems gratified about how that matter has served as a dazzling display of Russian boldness and capabilities. To that extent, the carnival-like approach of some US news media houses to the issue well-serves Moscow. Perhaps Putin has assessed that successive meddling efforts will last only for so long until US cyber countermeasures, awareness programs, retaliatory actions, and other steps eventually blunt their impact or render such efforts completely ineffective. Thus, he may feel that he has no need to stop the operation, as the US will most likely do it for him. Still, continued efforts to interfere in US elections may not end well. Russia must exit any roads that could lead to disaster.

Putin at 2018 campaign rally (above). Putin can be proud of his many accomplishments, of his rise to the most senior levels of power in Russia, eventually reaching the presidency, and of being able to make full use of his capabilities as Russia’s President. Yet, having an excessively high opinion of oneself or ones importance, is not conducive to authentic introspection for a busy leader. Putin’s unwillingness or inability to look deeply into himself has likely had some impact upon his decisions on matters such as Russia’s meddling in US elections.

Ego

The OED defines ego as a person’s sense of self-esteem or self-importance; in psychoanalysis, it is the part of the mind that mediates between the conscious and the unconscious mind, and is responsible for reality testing and a sense of personal identity. Ego, as first defined in the OED, can be useful in calibrated doses. A bit of an ego is needed in order for one to believe that new or far-reaching objectives can reached and tough, difficult things can be achieved. When it gets beyond that, problems tend to ensue. The ego is the voice inside an individual that really serves one purpose, and that is to make one feel better about whom one is, to lift oneself up. It will do whatever it needs to do to make that happen. The ego is also the voice inside of an individual that may drive one to kick another when he or she is down, causing them to feel bad about themselves. An example of Putin’s ego pushing beyond what some experts might call the normal parameters was the October 7, 2015 celebration of his 63rd birthday. Putin participated in a gala hockey game in Sochi, Russia, alongside former NHL stars and state officials. Putin’s team reportedly included several world-renowned players, such as Pavel Bure, formerly a member of the National Hockey League’s Vancouver Canucks. Putin’s team won the match 15-10. Putin scored 7 of his team’s 15 goals!

From a theological  perspective, ego, much as pride, separates one from God. s the work of the devil, it is his tool that is used to separate us from God. The ego (Edging-God-Out) is considered the most powerful tool the devil has. It is deceiving in its ways, and makes one feel that one is serving others, when in reality one is serving oneself. Ego has no home is God’s creation. It is a distractive, impure thought, that leads to the destruction of self and others.

Putin can  proud, in the ordinary sense, of his many accomplishments, of his rise to the most senior levels of power in Russia eventually reaching the presidency, and of being able to make full use of his capabilities as Russia’s President. With no intention of expressing sentimentality, it can be said that Putin went from a working class to middle class background in the Soviet Union to very top of Russia’s elite. As he recounts in First Person, and as his critics in the West remind without fail, Putin spent his spare time as a child hunting rats in the hallways of the apartment building where his family lived. To a degree, he was an upstart who alone, with the legacy of honorable and valorous service of his father and grandfather in the intelligence industry only available to inspire him, struggled to the highest level of the newly established Russian society. The arc of his story is that the professional and personal transformation of his life came with the fall of the Soviet Union. That event created the circumstances for his life to be that put him on the path to his true destiny. All of that being stated, humility would require that Putin recognize that his achievements are the result of God’s goodness and grace, not simply his own efforts. Ego would urge him not to think that way.

Perhaps Putin would be better able to understand the source of all good things in his life if he engaged in true introspection, a look within from the context of his faith. It appears that Putin’s unwillingness or inability to look deeply in himself has allowed him to develop an excessively high opinion of himself, a potent confidence that he alone is responsible for all positive outcomes. Holding a distorted sense of self-importance certainly would not facilitate introspection by a busy leader. His attitude of pride has also likely influenced his responses in contentious situations. All of this should not be used to conclude that Putin’s declarations about his faith have been counterfeit. Rather, there appears to be an imbalance between the influence of faith, particularly the restraining virtue of humility and the influence of a willful pride, an seemingly unruly desire for personal greatness. In time, a through his faith, he may find his value in God alone. God can work in mysterious ways.

Often, moves by Putin against the West resemble responses in a sport where there are challenges made and the challenger gains points when able to stand fast against his opponent’s counter moves and gains points based on the ability to knock the challenger back. In that vein, Russia’s move into Ukraine appeared to represent a dramatic victory. There was no military effort to push back against his move. There was no available capability among Western countries to defeat Russia’s challenge in Ukraine short of starting a war. Putin remains adamant about the correctness of that action. His position was amply expressed in his March 14, 2014 speech, declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He noted that Russia’s economic collapse was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple his country.  However, Putin’s moves in Ukraine likely brought him only limited satisfaction. He still has been unable to shape circumstances to his liking. He would particularly like to  knock back moves by the West that he thinks were designed to demean Russia such as: the Magnitsky law, NATO Expansion (NATO Encroachment as dubbed by Moscow), the impact of years of uncongenial relations with Obama, and US and EU economic sanctions. His inability to change those things, and some others, has most likely left his ego a bit wounded.

An example of Putin’s ego pushing beyond what some experts might call the normal parameters was the October 7, 2015 celebration of his 63rd birthday. Putin participated in a gala hockey game in Sochi, Russia, alongside former NHL stars and state officials. Putin’s team reportedly included several world-renowned players. Putin’s team won the match 15-10. Putin scored 7 of his team’s 15 goals.

1. Magnitsky

In the West, particularly the US, there is a belief that in recent years, Putin has simply been reactive to the Magnitsky Act. It was not only a punitive measure aimed at Russia’s economy and business community, but struck at the heart of Putin’s ego. Through Magnitsky law, the West was interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs, good or bad, as if it were some second or third tier country, not as a global superpower with a nuclear arsenal. In retaliation, he would do the best he could to harm Western interests, even those of the US, not just over Magnitsky but a lot of other things. Counter sanctions would be the first step. Suffice it to say, election meddling took that retaliation to a new level. The Magnitsky Act, the official title of which is the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, is named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer and auditor who in 2008 untangled a dense web of tax fraud and graft involving 23 companies and a total of $230 million linked to the Kremlin and individuals close to the government. Due to his efforts, Magnitsky became the target of investigations in Russia. When Magnitsky sued the Russian state for this alleged fraud, he was arrested at home in front of his kids, and kept in prison without charges, in filthy conditions, for nearly a year until he developed pancreatitis and gallstones. In November 2009, Magnitsky, at 37 years old, was found dead in his cell just days before his possible release. The Magnitsky Act was signed into law by Obama in December 2012 in response to the human rights abuses suffered by Magnitsky. The Magnitsky law at first blocked 18 Russian government officials and businessmen from entering the US froze any assets held by US banks, and banned their future use of US banking systems. The Act was expanded in 2016, and now sanctions apply to 44 suspected human rights abusers worldwide. William Browder, a US hedge fund manager, who at one time the largest foreign investor in Russia and hired Magnitsky for the corruption investigation that eventually led to his death, was a central figure in the bill’s passage. Two weeks after Obama signed the Magnitsky Act, Putin signed a bill that blocked adoption of Russian children by parents in the US. Russia then also imposed sanctions on Browder and found Magnitsky posthumously guilty of crimes. Supporters of the bill at the time cited mistreatment of Russian children by adoptive US parents as the reason for its passage. What made Russian officials so mad about the Magnitsky Act is that it was the first time that there was an obstacle to collecting profits from illegal activities home. Money acquired by rogue Russian officials through raids, extortion, forgery, and other illegal means was typically moved out of Russia were it was safe. Magnitsky froze those funds and made it difficult for them to enjoy their ill-gotten gains. The situation was made worse for some officials and businessmen close to Putin who had sanctions placed on them that froze their assets. All news media reports indicate that getting a handle on Magnitsky, killing it, has been an ongoing project of Russian Federation intelligence agencies.

2. NATO

Regarding NATO, in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin essentially explained that he felt betrayed by the actions taken in Eastern Europe by the US, EU, and NATO at the end of the Cold War. Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and EU as having acquitted themselves of ties to promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. He feels historians have ignored the machinations and struggles of people involved. Putn further stated in the Bild interview: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have. You can also see this striving for an absolute triumph in the American missile defense plans.” Putin also quoted West German Parliamentarian Egon Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin’s view has not changed much since the interview. However, despite Putin’s certainty on this position, no former-Soviet republic wants to return to Russia or Moscow’s sphere of influence. Putin appears unwilling to accept today’s more complex reality. Pro-Russian movements and political circles in former Soviet republics do not represent the modern day trend.

Putin with binoculars at Zapad 2017 Military Exercises (above). Putin perceives the US and EU as having turned their backs on promises made to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. Despite Putin’s certainty of the West’s intrusive behavior, actually, no former-Soviet republic wants to return to Russia or Moscow’s sphere of influence. Putin appears unwilling to accept today’s more complex reality.

3. The EU

Putin has always viewed the EU as a project of deepening integration based on norms of business, law, and administration at variance from those emerging in Russia. Putin was also concerned that EU enlargement would become a means of excluding Russia from its “zones of traditional influence.” Even today, certain Russian actions indicate Moscow actively seeks to encourage members to withdraw from the EU sphere and discourage countries from joining it. Joint projects with European countries have allowed Russia to exploit their differences on political, economic and commercial issues creating a discordant harmony in the EU. A goal of such efforts has also been to undermine EU unity on sanctions. Even away from the former Soviet republics, Russia has engaged in efforts to undermine democratic processes in European countries. One method, confirmed by security experts, has been meddling in elections in a similar way to that widely reported to have occurred in the US.

4. Obama-Putin

Poor US-Russia relations were exacerbated by the uncongenial relationship between Putin and Obama. Indeed, Putin clashed repeatedly with the US President. Sensing a palpable weakness and timidity from Obama, Putin seemed to act more aggressively. The Russian military move that stood out was the capture of the Crimea and movement of troops into Eastern Ukraine to support pro-Russia separatists. There was nothing to encourage Putin to even try to negotiate beyond Magnitsky after Crimea. There was no room for him to turn back with ease or he would be unable to maintain his sense of dignity in doing so. Crimea would prove to be a useless chip to use in bartering a deal on Magnitsky. The US still views Magnitsky and Crimea as separate issues. Putin recognized from the attitudes and behavior of Obama administration officials that even the extreme measure of using subtle threats with nuclear weapons would not be emphatic enough to elicit a desired response from Washington because Obama administration officials would unlikely accept that such weapons could ever be used by Russia which was a projection of a view, a mental attitude, from their side. The Obama administration insisted that Putin negotiate them in the summer of 2013 and when he refused to do so, the administration cancelled a September 2013 summit meeting in Moscow between Putin and Obama. From that point forward, there was always “blood in water” that seemed to ignite Putin’s drive to make the Obama administration, and de facto the US, as uncomfortable and as unhappy as possible short of military confrontation.

5. US and EU Sanctions

As far as Putin sees it, painful sanctions from the US and EU, on top of the Magnitsky law, have damned relations between Russia and the West. Putin rejects the idea that the Trump administration is pushing for additional sanction against Russia and has explained new sanctions are the result of an ongoing domestic political struggle in the US. He has proffered that if it had not been Crimea or some other issue, they would still have come up with some other way to restrain Russia. Putin has admitted that the restrictions do not produce anything good, and he wants to work towards a global economy that functions without these restrictions. However, repetitive threats of further sanctions from the US and EU will place additional pressure on Putin’s ego and prompt him to consider means to shift the power equation. Feeling his back was against the wall, he has previously acted covertly to harm US and EU interests. A very apparent example of such action was his efforts to meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election process. The US and EU must be ready to cope with a suite of actions he has planned and is prepared to use.

Convinced his behavior was an expression of ego, some Western experts believe that Putin may have succumbed to the vanity of his metaphoric crown. In effect, to them, Putin has been overwhelmed by his sense of the great power that he wields in Russia, and that he wants to convince other countries that he can wield power over them, too!

6. Succumbing to the Vanity of “His Crown”

Convinced his behavior is an expression of ego, some Western experts believe that Putin may have succumbed to the vanity of his metaphoric crown. To that extent, Putin has been overwhelmed by his sense for the great power that he wields in Russia, and wants to convince other countries that he can wield power over them, too! If Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces were snatched from Kiev and fell firmly under the control of pro-Russian quasi-states of those entities and Russia, perhaps Putin would erect a statue of himself somewhere there or in Crimea much as one was erected of Zeus in Jerusalem by the Greek ruler of Syria, Antiochus IV. As for the people of those territories, and others in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, they may become the 21st century version of the malgré-nous, with many perhaps serving in the military against their will under the control of Russia. These scenarios are viewed by greatcharlie as long shots. It would surely raise Putin’s ire if he ever heard it. Although he is a dominant leader, he would likely prefer that his power was accepted, understood, and feared if need be, than depicted in such a monstrous or preposterous fashion. Yet, Putin may have behaved in a similar way recently when he announced an array of new “invincible” nuclear weapons.

On February 27, 2018  in a Moscow conference hall, with the back drop of a full-stage-sized screen protecting the Russian Federation flag, Putin gave one of his most bellicose, militaristic speeches since his March 14, 2014 regarding Crimea’s annexation. He told an audience of Russia’s elites that among weapons either in development or ready was a new intercontinental ballistic missile “with a practically unlimited range” able to attack via the North and South Poles and bypass any missile defense systems. Putin also spoke of a small nuclear-powered engine that could be fitted to what he said were low-flying, highly maneuverable cruise missiles, giving them a practically unlimited range. The new engine meant Russia was able to make a new type of weapon, nuclear missiles powered by nuclear rather than conventional fuel. Other new super weapons he listed included underwater nuclear drones, a supersonic weapon and a laser weapon. Putin backed his rhetoric by projecting video clips of what he said were some of the new missiles onto the giant screen behind him. Referring to the West, Putin stated, “They have not succeeded in holding Russia back,” which he said had ignored Moscow in the past, but would now have to sit up and listen. He further stated, “Now they need to take account of a new reality and understand that everything I have said today is not a bluff.”

Putin was speaking ahead of the March 18, 2018 Russian Federation Presidential Election. He has often used such harsh rhetoric to mobilize voter support and strengthen his narrative that Russia is under siege from the West. Yet, oddly enough, Putin emphasized that the new weapons systems could evade an Obama-era missile shield, which was designed to protect European allies from attacks by a specific rogue country in the Middle East and possibly terrorist groups, not Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal. He spoke about Moscow being ignored which was really a problem he had with the Obama administration. Indeed, most of what Putin said seemed to evince that lingering pains were still being felt from harsh exchanges with Obama. With Obama off the scene, and apparently developing military responses to cope with a follow on US presidency under former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Putin simply projected all of his anger toward Trump. Metaphorically, Putin seemed to “swinging after the bell.” So hurt was his ego that he has acted by building Russia’s nuclear arsenal up in a way the no US leader could ever deny the threat to US security that Russia poses. Being able to make that statement likely soothed his ego somewhat.

Religious scholars might state that Putin’s strong, perceptible ego contradicts his declaration of faith. The ego does not allow for the presence of God in ones life. Many have self-destructed as a result of their veneration of self. The ego needs to be overcome and removed from ones heart in order to allow God to fill that space.

In the form of Putin’s face can be found much that is telling about the Russian leader. As of late, its countenance has been far from serene and kindly. The countenance of ones face, smiling or frowning, can effortlessly communicate to others how one is feeling, thinking. Photos of Putin’s face more often reveal a deep, piercing, consuming stare, reflecting the strong, self-assured, authoritative, no nonsense personality, of a conscientious, assertive, and aggressive leader.

Putin’s Countenance

Imago animi vultus est, indices occuli. (The countenance is the portrait of the soul, and the eyes mark its intentions.) In the form of Putin face can be found much that is telling about the Russian leader. As of late, its countenance has been far from serene and kindly. The countenance of ones face, smiling or frowning, can effortlessly communicate to others how one is feeling, thinking. The face can also convey essential characteristics that make individuals who they are. In photos of President Putin in 2000, his eyes appear similar to those of the very best students of a fine university, watching and peering, learning and discerning constantly in order to best prepare himself to lead Russia into the future. It was before he had the eyes of an experienced, battle-scarred leader. Now, photos of Putin’s face more often reveal a deep, piercing, consuming stare, reflecting the strong, self-assured, authoritative, no nonsense personality, of a conscientious, assertive, and aggressive leader. Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae. (If the world should break and fall on him, it would strike him fearless.)

1. The Conscientious Leader

The inner voice of individuals meeting with Putin may not sound an alarm immediately. After all, if Putin is anything, he is a conscientious leader and one would expect to see it reflected in Putin’s face. Conscientiousness is the personality trait of being careful, or vigilant. It implies a desire to do a task well, and to take obligations to others seriously. Conscientious people tend to be efficient and organized as opposed to easy-going and disorderly. They exhibit a tendency to show self-discipline, act dutifully, and aim for achievement; they display planned rather than spontaneous behavior; and they are generally dependable. It is manifested in characteristic behaviors such as being neat and systematic; also including such elements as carefulness, thoroughness, and deliberation. The absence of apprehension, even anxiety, among some who meet with Putin is understandable, reasonable given that in social, as well as business situations, one can usually assume interlocutors mean what they say, are also personally invested in their interactions, and will display certain of manners, in some cases by protocol. Wanting to think well of others, wanting to connect with them, appearance, facial expressions, are looked upon benignly. Responding in this way is also a defense mechanism. Given his reputation, earned or not, aggression discerned in Putin’s face likely becomes sensate among his more worldly interlocutors. He might even be perceived through his countenance as being physically threatening without actually using any other part of his body to make gestures that could reasonably be identified as aggressive.

Somewhere in between, Putin can often appear to be what might be casually called “poker faced”, seemingly unresponsive to events swirling around him. During those moments, he is most likely evaluating everything and everyone, but keeping all his thinking and assessments locked inside himself. He may also be looking beyond the moment, considering what his next steps would be. Interlocutors will typically respond with faces of puzzlement and sometimes terror. Having the confidence to “face” foreign leaders in such a manner is a reflection of Putin’s assertiveness. (In the case of Trump, the response was likely disappointment, which masked a cauldron of intense rage. That should concern Putin and will become something to which he will need to find an answer.)

Putin gestures to a reporter at a press conference (above). Given his reputation, earned or not, aggression discerned in Putin’s face likely becomes sensate among his more worldly interlocutors. He might even be perceived as being physically threatening without actually making any aggressive gestures.

2. Putin’s “Assertiveness”

According to Fredric Neuman, Director of the Anxiety and Phobia Center at White Plains Hospital, being assertive means behaving in a way that is most likely to achieve one’s purpose. Under that definition, most successfully assertive individuals will have a suite of ways to act in given circumstances. Neuman explains that there are times when the right thing to do is to be conciliatory, and other times when resistance is appropriate. When one is actually attacked, verbally or otherwise, it may be appropriate to respond by resisting forcibly. Surely, there is a balance in Putin’s behavior in situations, but he has never been a wilting flower before anyone. A KGB colleague would say about Putin: “His hands did not tremble; he remained as cool as a mountain lake. He was no stranger to handling grave matters. He was expert at reading and manipulating people, and unfazed by violence.” Many foreign policy and human rights analysts in the West, and members of Russia’s opposition movement would say that Putin has amply demonstrated that he has no concern over sacrificing the well-being of Russians to further his geopolitical schemes and the avarice of colleagues. They report that he regularly persecutes those who protest. All of this runs contrary to image of Putin as a patriot. Those who study Putin would also point to the deaths of the statesman, politician, journalist, and opposition political leader, Boris Nemtsov; journalist Anna Politkovskaya; and, former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko.  Attention might also be directed to the deaths of 36 generals and admirals from 2001 to 2016. In the majority of cases, the causes of death listed were listed as suicides, heart attacks, or unknown. Among those who died are former Russian Federation National Security Adviser and Army Major General Vladimir Lebed and the Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Russian Federation Army Colonel-General Igor Sergun.

3. Putin the Predator

Certainly, Putin prepares for his meetings or any other official contacts in advance, by mining available information about his scheduled interlocutors and by considering all possible angles of how they might challenge him and how he would explain himself in a plausible, satisfying way. Such is the nature of politics as well as diplomacy. However, there are reportedly times when Putin, after considering information available, will simply declare his superior position relative to his interlocutor and let them know that they must accept what he says. His success in a meeting relies heavily upon how well he does his homework. Clearly, individuals as Putin can have a different context for learning about people. When Putin asks about an interlocutor’s family, home, office, even capabilities, it not small talk or the result of friendly interest. Rather, he may be signalling, warning, that he has already evaluated an interlocutor as a potential target. He may be confirming information or collecting more. He may also be testing ones vulnerability to falsehoods or how one might respond to unpleasant information. He is creating a perceptual framework for his interlocutor. Such tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods truly match those of a predator. “Human predators” often use deflection, social miscues, and misinformation to provide cover for themselves. They can use a contrived persona of charm and success to falsely engender trust. They have an exit plan in place, and are confident with regard to the outcome of their actions. Boiled down, they accomplish their deception using three steps: setting a goal; making a plan; and, compartmentalizing. By setting a goal, they know what they want and what it will take to get it or achieve it. They have no inhibitions about causing damage or harm. They stay focused. By making a plan, they not only determine ways to get what they want, but also develop exits if needed. By compartmentalizing, they detach themselves emotionally from attachments that might be embarrassed or be an annoyance if caught. They train themselves to give off no such tells, so they can pivot easily into a different persona. While some might acquire this skill as Putin through training and experience in the intelligence industry, others may simply lack any sense of remorse.

When immobilized or in a controlled “silence,” Putin’s face can also manifest a type of ambush predation in his thinking. He may be attempting to conceal his preparation to strike against a “troublesome or even threatening” party, if not at that moment, eventually. Ambush predators are carnivorous animals or other organisms, that capture or trap prey by stealth or by strategy, rather than by speed or by strength.

When immobilized or in a controlled “silence,” Putin’s face can also manifest a type of ambush predation in his thinking. He may be attempting to conceal his preparation to strike against a “troublesome or even threatening” party. Ambush predators or sit-and-wait predators are carnivorous animals or other organisms, that capture or trap prey by stealth or by strategy, rather than by speed or by strength. In animals and humans, ambush predation is characterized by an animal scanning the environment from a concealed position and then rapidly executing a surprise attack. Animal ambush predators usually remain motionless,  sometimes concealed, and wait for prey to come within ambush distance before pouncing. Ambush predators are often camouflaged, and may be solitary animals. This mode of predation may be less risky for the predator because lying-in-wait reduces exposure to its own predators. If the prey can move faster than the predator, it has a bit of an advantage over the ambush predator; however, if the active predator’s velocity increases, its advantage increases sharply.

There is a Christian religious allegory warning of the inner spiritual decay manifested by an outer physical decay presented in a historical framework that includes Leonardo da Vinci. As told, when Leonardo da Vinci was painting “The Last Supper”, he selected a young man, Pietri Bandinelli by name as the person to sit for the character of the Christ. Bandinelli was connected with the Milan Cathedral as chorister. Several years passed before Da Vinci’s masterpiece painting was complete. When he discovered that the character of Judas Iscariot was wanting, Da Vinci noticed a man in the streets of Rome who would serve as a perfect model. With shoulders far bent toward the ground, having an expression of cold, hardened, evil, saturnine, the man’s countenance was true to Da Vinci’s conception of Judas. In Da Vinci’s studio, the model began to look around, as if recalling incidents of years gone by. He then turned and with a look half-sad, yet one which told how hard it was to realize the change which had taken place, he stated, “Maestro, I was in this studio twenty-five years ago. I, then, sat for Christ.”

Perhaps Putin is simply making the most of what is. Putin may just be living life and doing the most he can for his country and the Russian people, no matter how limited. Satisfaction might come in the fact that he firmly believes things in Russia are better than they would be under the control of anyone else.

Other Shadows of Putin’s Interior

Nam libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio, cumque nihil impedit, quo minus id quo maxime placeat facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda est, omnis dolor repellendus. Temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae. Itaque earum rerum hic. Tenetur a sapiente delectus, ut aut reciendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequator aut preferendis dolorbus asperiores repellat. (In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain circumstances and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.) Although thngs may go wrong, Putin knows that disappointments in life are inevitable. Putin does not become discouraged or depressed nor does he withdraw from the action. Putin knows he must remain in control of himself as one of his duties as president, and as a duty to himself.

1. Risky Moves

As mentioned earlier, Putin may very well be simpy making the most of what is. Putin may just be living life and doing the most he can for his country and the Russian people, no matter how limited. Some satisfaction might come with the fact that he firmly believes things in Russia are better than they would be under the control of anyone else. Despite his optimism and confidence in his abilities, Putin must be careful of risky moves, creating new situations that may lead to discord, disharmony. For example, interfering in Ukraine was a move that felt he could keep a handle on. Regardless of how positive, professional, and genuine Trump administration efforts have been to build better relations between the US and Russia, it would seem Putin has decided that entering into a new relationship with US would have too many unknowns and possible pitfalls. Putin knows that the consequences of missteps can be severe. He has the memory of what former Russian President Boris Yeltsin experienced in the 1990s to guide him. 

Although he holds power, Putin must always labor with the loneliness of leadership, the anxiety of decision making, and an awareness of threats to his well-being. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that there can be any real happiness for one who is under threat, in a country riddle with corrupt officials and a somewhat fragile system of law and order.

2. Dionysius and Damocles

Although he holds power, Putin must always labor with the loneliness of leadership, the anxiety of decision making, and an awareness of threats to his well-being. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that there can be any real happiness for one who is under constant threat, in a country riddle with corrupt officials and a somewhat fragile system of law and order. The ancient parable of Dionysius and Damocles, later known in Medieval literature, and the phrase “Sword of Damocles”, responds to this issue of leaders living under such apprehension. The parable was popularized by Cicero in his 45 B.C. book Tusculan Disputations. Cicero’s version of the tale centers on Dionysius II, a tyrannical king who once ruled over the Sicilian city of Syracuse during the 4th and 5th centuries B.C. Though wealthy and powerful, Dionysius was supremely unhappy. As a result of his iron-fisted rule, he had created many enemies. He was tormented by fears of assassination—so much so that he slept in a bedchamber surrounded by a moat and only trusted his daughters to shave his beard with a razor. Dionysius’ dissatisfaction came to a head one day after a court flatterer named Damocles showered him with compliments and remarked how blissful his life must be. “Since this life delights you,” an annoyed Dionysius replied, “do you wish to taste it yourself and make a trial of my good fortune?” When Damocles agreed, Dionysius seated him on a golden couch and ordered a host of servants wait on him. He was treated to succulent cuts of meat and lavished with scented perfumes and ointments. Damocles could not believe his luck, but just as he was starting to enjoy the life of a king, he noticed that Dionysius had also hung a razor-sharp sword from the ceiling. It was positioned over Damocles’ head, suspended only by a single strand of horsehair. From then on, the courtier’s fear for his life made it impossible for him to savor the opulence of the feast or enjoy the servants. After casting several nervous glances at the blade dangling above him, he asked to be excused, saying he no longer wished to be so fortunate.

Having so much hanging over his head, Putin has no time or desire to tolerate distractions. He does not suffer fools lightly. Putin’s ability to confound insincerity has been key to his ability to remain power. Early on as president, Putin effectively dealt with challenges posed by ultra-nationalists who were unable to temper their bigoted zeal, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the extreme right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party of Russia. The challenges posed by them lessened every year afterward. To the extent that such elements, and those far worse in Russia, could potentially react more aggressively to Putin’s efforts to maintain order, he most remain ever vigilant. Putin has also become skilled in implementing what critics have called “charm offensives,” explaining his ideas and actions in a manner that is easy, comfortable, assuring, and logical. Still, such moves are sometimes not enough. Indeed, during significant crises, it is very important for Putin to have advisers who fully understand his needs. For an overburdened, embattled leader, the encouragement of another, a paraclete, may often prove comforting.

Putin undoubtedly strives for a gesamtkunstwerk: a harmonious work environment. At the present, Putin is probably working with the best cabinet he has ever crafted both in terms of the quality of their work and chemistry. They may occasionally antagonize the overworked leader with a report not crafted to Putin’s liking, or worse, report on a setback. On such occasions, in contrast to his usual equanimity, Putin allegedly has become spectacularly incandescent.

Putin has sought to take on qualified ministers, directors, and other officials to handle specialties. That effort was hampered to an extent during Putin’s early years in power given the need to respond to the wishes of certain patrons. Yet, Putin never hesitated to fire those foisted upon him or his handpicked hires, whether former KGB or not, when they failed to perform. Putin has known what advice, prognostication, and proposals to accept in order to promote his efforts at home and internationally and develop a coherent set of policies. Since he brings his “A-game” to his office everyday, striving for perfection and hungering for improvement, and he expects the same from his cabinet. There are never any spectators, passengers along for the ride. All must be able to answer the who, what, when, where, why, and how of issues they cover, because that is what Putin will demand. Among his advisers, Putin undoubtedly strives for a gesamtkunstwerk: a harmonious work environment. At the present, Putin is probably working with the best cabinet he has ever crafted both in terms of the quality of their work and chemistry. They may occasionally antagonize the overworked leader with a report not crafted to Putin’s liking, or worse, report on a setback. On such occasions, in contrast to his usual equanimity, Putin allegedly has become spectacularly incandescent with them.

When speaking about what is important to him, Putin does not use throw away lines. He is straightforward and to the point. When he was declared the winner of the 2012 Russian Federation Presidential Election, Putin publicly wept. It is impossible to know what was happening inside Putin to bring that on, but his emotional expression was clearly genuine. To that extent, Putin is not a man without emotion or innermost feelings.

3. Breathing Space

Every now and then Putin stops to take a rest to regroup, and probably to take inventory of his life, determine what he wants, and consider where things are headed. Speculation over Putin’s whereabouts for 10 days in March 2015 became a major news story worldwide. Some sources argued Putin was likely the subject of a coup. Others claimed that his girlfriend had given birth in Switzerland. There were even reports suggesting he had health problems. Putin good-naturedly dismissed it all. Putin’s main outlet for relaxation is sports of all kinds, particular judo and ice hockey. Since the days of his youth, Putin’s involvement in the martial arts, sports in general, had a strong influence on him, impacting his lifestyle. Sports provided Putin with a chance “to prove himself.”However, when he wants, Putin can also display an enjoyment of life and good times, and be quite gregarious, outwardly happy, full of smiles.

Putin, an experienced judoka, displays an element of his nage-waza (throwing technique) with a sparring partner (above). Since the days of his youth, Putin has been involved in the martial arts. Sports of all kinds have been Putin’s main outlet for relaxation. Sports have also provided Putin with a chance “to prove himself.”

When he wants, Putin can also display an enjoyment of life and good times, and be quite gregarious, outwardly happy, full of smiles. Putin undoubtedly understands the importance of having a sense of humor despite any difficulties he may face. Humor is beneficial for ones physical and emotional health. It reinforces ones relationships with family, friends, and colleagues. Physically, laughter can improve resistance to diseases by declining the stress hormones and increasing infection-fighting antibodies in the human body according to some research. Laughter can ease physical tension­ and help muscles relax. Emotionally, humor helps you to release stress and to keep an optimistic attitude. When one feels anxious or sad, a good laugh can lighten ones mood. The positive feelings emitted when one laughs will increase energy for the brain and body. That allows for greater focus and will allow one to look at the problems from less frightening perspectives. Humor helps one remain optimistic and humor communication boosts the emotional connection that will bring people closer together and increases happiness as well. Sharing a good-hearted laugh may serve in part to smooth out rough times. Putin’s sense of humor is evinced when he tells jokes. Putin told the following joke publicly in response to a question about the economic crisis in Russia.: Two friends meet up, and one, Person A, asks the other, Person B: “How are things?” Person B says, “Well, things right now are like stripes, you see, black and white.” Person A asks, “Well, how are things right now?” Person B says, “Black!” Half a year passes before they meet again. Person a asks Person B, “Well, how are you – wait, I remember, like stripes, how are things right now?” Person B says, “Right now, they’re black.” Person A says, “But back then it was also black!” Person B says, “Nope, it turns out it was white back then.” Putin has also often told a joke from the Soviet-era that humorously depicts the KGB’s bureaucracy. The joke goes as follows: “A spy goes to Lubyanka, KGB Headquarters, and says: “I’m a spy, I want to turn myself in.” He is asked, “Who do you work for?” The spy says, “America.” He is told, “OK, go to room 5.” He goes to room 5 and says: “I’m an American spy. I want to turn myself in.” He is asked, “Are you armed?” The spy says, “Yes, I’m armed.” He is told, “Go to room 7, please.” He goes to room 7 and says: “I am an American spy, I’m armed, I want to turn myself in.” He is told, “Go to room 10.” He goes to room 10 and says: “I’m a spy, I want to turn myself in!” He is asked, “Do you have any communication with the Americans?” The spy says, “Yes!” He is told, “Go to room 20.” He goes to room 20 and says: “I’m a spy, I’m armed, I’m in communication with America and I want to turn myself in.” He is asked, “Have you been sent on a mission?” The spy says, “Yes!” He is then told, “Well, get out and go do it! Stop bothering people while they’re working!”

Putin undoubtedly understands the importance of having a sense of humor despite any difficulties he may face. Humor is beneficial for ones physical and emotional health. It reinforces ones relationships with family, friends, and colleagues. Putin’s sense of humor is evinced when he tells jokes. When he wants, Putin can also display an enjoyment of life and good times, and be quite gregarious, outwardly happy, full of smiles.

The Way Forward

In Act II, scene i, of William Shakespeare’s play, A Comedy of Errors, Adriana, the wife of Antipholus of Ephesus, and, Luciana, her sister, wait at home for him to return for dinner. Antipholus of Ephesus, a prosperous Ephesus citizen, is lost the twin brother of Antipholus of Syracuse who coincidentally has been searching worldwide for him and his mother, is in Ephesus. Even more of a coincidence, the father of both men, Egeon, a merchant of Syracuse, is condemned to death in Ephesus for violating the ban against travel between the two rival cities. He avoids execution after telling the Ephesian Duke that he came to Syracuse in search of his wife and one of his twin sons, both lost 25 years ago. While waiting, Adriana and Luciana have an exchange. Luciana proffers that men are freer than women because their work and responsibilities take them out of the home, and she thinks Adriana should just wait patiently for her husband to return and understand that she cannot control him. Adriana, chastising Luciana for preaching patience and servitude when she has not experienced marriage, declares: “A wretched soul, bruised with adversity, We bid be quiet when we hear it cry; But were we burdened with like weight of pain, As much or more would we ourselves complain:.” If Trump could have unwound the labyrinthian Putin and found success in improving relations with Russia, it would have been sublime. As a complex leader himself, self-reflection would naturally lead him to consider that the key to working with Putin would be to get to know him from the inside. It has been a bold effort, given failed attempts of previous US administrations, and brave, considering the degree in which the effort would open himself up to further attacks by critics. The benefits of improved relations with Russia would have been enormous. It would also be a magnificent diplomatic achievement by the Trump administration. It was Jean-Paul Sartre who said, “Only the guy who isn’t rowing has time to rock the boat.” For the most part, Trump’s critics find nothing desirable and everything loathsome about Putin, and impute upon him a lust for power and the intent to acquire greater territory and control in Russia’s near abroad. They consequently claim that Trump has a somnolent conscience when it comes to Putin. It is a segment of an ugly picture critics have painted of Trump fumbling on Russia and issues concerning the rest of the world. Their view of Trump is a far cry from reality. As it was explained in the recent greatcharlie post, Trump and his experienced foreign and national security policy officials had reservations about the whole matter. Faster than a canary in a coal mine, they were able to detect what was wrong and disingenuous about Putin’s approach. Putin’s lack of desire for that change is perhaps best evinced by Russia’s persistent efforts to meddle in US elections. If that unconstructive behavior continues, there will be little reason left than to recognize and deal with him not just as an adversary, but as an anathema. There is always hope. After all, along with all the bad, hope was also an element released from Pandora’s Box. However, US foreign policy cannot be simply based on hope and the unverifiable. It must be based on pragmatic choices with the expectation of certain outcomes. At this juncture, only an exceptional optimist among Trump’s most ardent supporters would hope with aplomb that he might be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat by having a few more ideas that might create real prospects for success.

Putin may feel some degree of temporary satisfaction over the arguable accomplishment of ensnaring previous US administrations in artificial diplomatic efforts by feigning interest in improving relations, by offering little steps that are nothing more than bromides. (Perhaps the Obama administration was an exception. Putin displayed little interest in working with it to achieve anything.) Taking that course has required a delicate balance of actions, and so far Putin has managed to avoid creating a greater danger for civilization. (In a way, meddling in US elections has brought things to the edge of the envelope of safety.) Putin unlikely vehemently desires to build up Russia’s nuclear arsenal especially considering costs involved and the likely impact on Russia’s economy. The new weapons announced systems reflected highly of the efforts of his country’s advanced defense research, but even more, provided notice to world that  Russia still has “deterrent” power. Further, it appears that through that announcement, Putin has denied any interest in, and signal his rejection of, genuine efforts to rebuild US-Russia relations. Looking at Putin from the inside, as was attempted here, it would appear that pride had much to do with that choice as he has tied the entire matter to Russia’s dignity, as much as his own. By placing himself in a position of control, being able to reject US diplomatic efforts, he undoubtedly temporarily satisfied his ego, building himself up a bit. Putin would unlikely be interested in the ministrations of greatcharlie on what Putin should be doing with his presidency. However, it would certainly be serendipitous if Putin would move beyond derivative thinking on US-Russian relations. For anyone settled in certain ways, that would require an epiphany of a sort, a degree of  personal growth: from insecurity to complete confidence over Russia’s place in the world. With future generations of Russians in mind, it is hard to image how keeping it separate from the rest of the world would be to their benefit. Much as the conservative US President Richard Nixon opened relations with Communist China, only under Putin will ties with the US reality take shape, could it be made sustainable. Russia would certainly remain strong, competitive, and self-sufficient. Looking at the hypothetical decision holistically, nothing would be lost. To use a sports metaphor, the ball is really in Putin’s court. For now, Trump appears to be available for talks. Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. (For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it confirms the determination of nature and of truth.)