Obama: No Military Solution to Iran’s Nuclear Program; Perhaps It Is a Challenge Netanyahu Can Crack

Pictured above is an Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-16I Sufa fighter jet. If Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decides to attack Iran’s nuclear program, jets such as this one will fly the mission. While some military analysts may view the prospect of a successful attack against Iran unlikely, IAF planners and pilots may be able to find a handle to problem. Netanyahu and the State of Israel will be counting upon them.

According to a June 1, 2015 Associated Press article entitled “Obama: No Military Solution to Iran’s Nuclear Program”, US President Barack Obama stated in a June 1st interview with Israel’s Channel 2 that military action against Iran would not deter its nuclear ambitions and that a verifiable agreement was the best way forward.  He explained, “I can, I think, demonstrate, not based on any hope but on facts and evidence and analysis, that the best way to prevent Iran from having a nuclear weapons is a verifiable, tough agreement.”   Obama emphasized, “A military solution will not fix it. Even if United States participates, it would temporarily slow down an Iranian nuclear program but it will not eliminate it.” The Channel 2 interviewer asked Obama about the possibility of Israel taking military action against Iran without informing the US in advance. Obama responded by stating: “I won’t speculate on that.”

Despite what has been said and done during the nuclear negotiations, Iranian leaders may feel they must do whatever is necessary to ensure the security of their nation and its interests. Support for that perspective comes from the Iranians who in reality were not disinclined to building a nuclear weapon and have not been completely compliant with the international community. There is likely a belief in Tehran that Obama lacks the will to use the type of force necessary to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. However, Iranian leaders must look past the Obama administration to Israel’s possible actions.

The Israelis have been the most vocal critics of the proposed agreement and alarmed by its terms. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu truly believes that a deal lifting sanctions without fully halting enrichment and dismantling centrifuges would be a terrible mistake. Netanyahu speaks as if he has a type of “intimation” based on his “dominant knowledge” of the Middle East, that Iran was engaged in a major deception. Indeed, Netanyahu might decide to take military action with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) due to fears Iran might eventually develop a nuclear weapon. Some Israeli security analysts disagree with Netanyahu’s views and may have found Netanyahu’s behavior to date to be more frightening than desperate. Some may believe taking military action against Iran is Netanyahu’s default state of mind. However, if he attacks Iran, he will believe that his decision was made with prudence. Netanyahu most likely does not feel a need to defend his beliefs, but he has tried hard to get others to understand the danger that Iran poses to Israel. The stewardship of Israel’s security falls mainly on his shoulders.

An attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be a daunting task even under the best of circumstances. Russia has agreed to sell Iran its S-300 air defense system which would make the Iranian nuclear program even tougher for Israel or the US to strike. Yet, making it tougher to strike may not be enough to deter Israel from acting. Convinced that taking military action would help to ensure Israel’s security for the present and the future, Netanyahu may gamble that an attack would be successful and may ask Israeli Air Force (IAF) fighter pilots to accept the risk involved. Dum loquimur, fugerit invida aetas: carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero. (While we are talking, envious time is fleeing: seize the day, put not trust in the future.)

Some may believe taking military action against Iran is Netanyahu’s default state of mind. However, if he attacks Iran, he will believe that his decision was made with prudence. Netanyahu unlikely feels a need to defend his beliefs, but he has tried hard to get other leaders, particularly in the US and Europe, to understand his view of the danger Iran poses to Israel. The stewardship of Israel’s security falls mainly on his shoulders.

Prudence

Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir once said a leader who does not hesitate before sending his nation into battle is not fit to be a leader. Will is not self-justifying. It must be guided by the intellect. Prudence is the right use of intellect and the right use of reason. Aristotle defined prudence as recta ratio agibilium: the right reason applied in practice. Through prudence, one establishes what needs to be done and the way to do it. Prudence allows one to be just and justice creates the motive for temperance in decision making, as well as all things. One cannot simply make a decision and then describe it as “prudential judgment.” One must avoid building upon a false idea. Looking deeper will prevent one from succumbing to myopia. There are three stages to an act of prudence: 1) to take counsel carefully with oneself and from others; 2) to judge correctly on the basis of the evidence at hand; and, 3) to direct the rest of one’s activity according to the norms determined after a prudent judgment has been made. Disregarding others who seek to disabuse just by expressing skepticism is correct. Yet, ignoring the advice or warnings of others with a history of good judgment only because their reasoning results in a conflicting assessment, is considered a sign of imprudence. By its definition, prudence requires us to judge correctly.   If consequently ones judgment is proven incorrect, then ones evaluation of the issue at hand was likely counterfeit. However, Golda Meir counsels on this point: “I can honestly say that I was never affected by the question of the success of an undertaking. If I felt it was the right thing to do, I was for it regardless of the possible outcome.”

Advice of Others

No evidence has been presented publicly or hinted at privately that Iran has been concealing a militarized nuclear program. The US intelligence community has recognized Iran has moved closer to having the capability to build a nuclear weapon and that is why a great part of the negotiation effort has been to push them further back from doing so. Yet, US officials always note that Iran has never failed to comply with all terms of agreements its negotiators have signed during the talks. The US has been willing to share with Israel what it knows about technological developments in Iran and the nuclear negotiation’s progress. For example, Haaretz reported on June 9, 2015 that two senior Israeli officials revealed anonymously that the Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) John Brennan came to Israel on June 4, 2015 and spoke with the Head of the Intelligence Service (Mossad), Tamir Pardo, and other senior members of Israel’s intelligence community to include the Head of Military Intelligence, IDF Major General Herzl Halevi. The anonymous officials also said Brennan met with Netanyahu and his National Security Adviser Yossi Cohen. No details of what was said in those secret meetings were provided. However, a briefing provided by US Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman to Israeli foreign affairs reporters, as reported by Haaretz on April 13, 2015, gives one a sense of the views US officials were sharing with their Israeli counterparts. Sherman told the reporters that despite fears expressed in 2013 that Iran would soon have a nuclear weapon, the US and Israeli intelligence communities concur that Iran is not close to producing one. She went on to state that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made no decision to produce one. Sherman proffered, “They [The Iranians] don’t have enough fissile material and don’t have delivery system or weapon per se.” She also noted, “It would take them a considerable period of time to get all that.” Indeed, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action requires Iran to pare down its capacity to enrich uranium to the point that it would take at least 12 months to amass enough uranium enriched to weapons grade for one bomb. Iran would be required to modify its Arak Heavy Water Reactor to meaningfully reduce its proliferation potential and bar Iran from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring would be put in place that would help to deter Iran from attempting to violate the agreement. If Iran did so, the inspections and monitoring would improve the international community’s ability to detect it promptly and, if necessary, disrupt any efforts to build nuclear weapons, including at potential undeclared sites.

Sherman emphasized during the briefing that the US also shared Israel’s concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program, its involvement in terror around the world and its subversive activities in the Middle East. With regard to Netanyahu’s concerns, Sherman said that they were legitimate and expressed the view, “There is no difference [between the US and Israel] on the concern about the Iranian nuclear program but on the way to deal with it.” Interestingly, the US and its allies have been engaged in efforts in addition to the nuclear negotiations to slow Iran’s progress. They have included: imposing sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, blocking the shipment of necessary technology, introducing defective parts into Iran’s supply chain; and attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities with a super-sophisticated cyber weapon.

At the UN General Assembly in 2012, Netanyahu presented the bomb shaped chart above of the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. The red line close to the top indicated Iran was amassing too much uranium enriched at 20 percent, the enrichment stage just before making weapons-grade material. In accord with the November 2013 Interim Agreement, Iran diluted its reserves of uranium enriched at 20 percent. That did not sway Netanyahu.

Self-Counsel

Netanyahu is not ignoring the Obama administration’s arguments. His case is that the only way to make sure Iran never gets a bomb is to shutdown every enrichment plant and reactor it might use to get one. His position founded on a belief that Iran’s long history of nuclear deception means that any facilities left in place would eventually be put to use. To bolster his case, Netanyahu invoked one of the great failures of US counterproliferation efforts: the diplomatic attempts of President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush to talk North Korea into restrictions to keep the regime from producing nuclear weapons. The North Koreans agreed to disable one of their facilities, but when things went sour with the Obama administration the facility was rebuilt. Within a few years, it got the bomb. In his speech to a joint meeting of US Congress on March 3, 2015, Netanyahu contended that any agreement that leaves Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in place “doesn’t block Iran’s path to the bomb, it paves Iran’s path to the bomb.” Netanyahu would like allies in the US Congress to stop an agreement and halt the negotiations so that greater pressure could be placed on Iran through other means, primarily sanctions. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in 2012, Netanyahu presented a bomb shaped chart of the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. It had a red line close to the top indicating Iran was amassing too much uranium enriched at 20 percent. That is the enrichment stage just before making weapons-grade material.

As a result of the Interim Agreement signed by P5+1 and Iran in November 2013, Iran diluted its reserves of uranium enriched at 20 percent. That did not sway Netanyahu. Despite Iran’s reportedly good behavior during the negotiations and the longstanding claim of Iranian leaders that they would never seek a nuclear weapon for both practical and religious reasons, it is now known that Iran conducted activities relevant to weapons development as part of an organized program prior to 2003. The IAEA laid out its allegations regarding those activities in November 2011. The IAEA previously claimed it had made some progress with Iran in the investigation of this matter between November 2013 and August 2014, that process is now stalled. The P5+1 wants Iran answer the IAEA’s questions and allow access to the individuals and sites necessary to complete the investigation. This delay has occurred even though Iran has only been asked to implement a set of measures to address the IAEA’s outstanding questions.   Moreover, the removal of UN Security Council sanctions will not occur until and unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA investigation and past questions are resolved. Even supporters of the Iran Talks do not believe Iran will make any full confession regarding its past weapons related work, especially given statements by senior Iranian officials on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and the rejection of nuclear weapons. Netanyahu also does not put much into the tacit “mort-gage” that the framework agreement establishes on the lifespan of the religious regime in Tehran and the hope it will be eased out of power within the timeframe of the 10 and 15 year restrictions on centrifuge and uranium enrichment research and development.   Ab actu ad posse valet illatio. (From the past, one can infer the future.)

Back in 2010, Israel’s Channel 2 reported that NetanyahuBack in 2010, Israel’s Channel 2 reported that Netanyahu and his Minister of Defense, Ehud Barack, had given orders for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to prepare to strike Iran within hours if required. However, then Chief of the General Staff of the IDF, Lieutenant General (Rav Aluf) Gabi Ashkenazi, and the Head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, expressed opposition to the idea. Ashkenazi advised that an attack against Iran would be a strategic mistake given the risk of war. Dagan explained to Netanyahu that an attack would be illegal and said a full cabinet decision was needed. Supposedly, Ashkenazi and Dagan got Netanyahu to withdraw the orders to prepare for a strike. In response to questions Channel 2 put to Netanyahu about events surrounding this past order to attack Iran, he responded, “In the final reckoning, the responsibility lies with the prime minister and as long as I am prime minister, Iran will not have the atomic bomb.” He went on to state, “If there’s no other way, Israel is ready to act.”

Pictured above is the S-300PMU-1. Russia decided to bolster Iran’s air defenses with its S-300 surface to air missiles. The S-300 is a mobile system that can strike targets at a distance of 150 km and an altitude of 27,000 meters. As a result of its participation in the Helenic [Greek] Air Force’s INIOXOS-2015 exercises, the IAF collected important data on flying against S-300PMU-1 during simulated attacks on ground targets.

Judging Existing Evidence: Is A Military Strike Realistic?

Former Israeli Prime Minister and former Chief of the General Staff of the IDF, Yitzak Rabin, was quoted as saying “Israel has an important principle: It is only Israel that is responsible for our security.” In 2013, Obama said, “We’ve got Israel’s back” to express his thinking on the defense of Israel. Obama claims the use of military force was implicit in that guarantee. However, as the nuclear negotiations progressed there was a discernible change in Obama’s attitude toward attacking Iran. Threats to use force halted. Tehran began to sense Obama was averse to military action. Netanyahu does. When Sherman spoke to Israeli reporters, she said that the US was totally committed to Israel’s security and is interested in opening a dialogue with Israel’s new government to discuss improving Israel’s security preparedness after the deal with Iran goes into effect. She said such talks are aimed at maintaining the Israeli army’s qualitative edge and ensuring that Israel will be fully capable of defending itself.   She was quoted as saying “Israel’s right to exist and Iran’s actions in the region will be dealt with on a parallel track.” She stated further, “The US will consult Israel on what it needs for its security.”

Directly on the point of US military action against Iran, Sherman told Israeli reporters that a military operation against Iran would not stop its nuclear program. She stated, “A military strike by Israel or the US would only set back the nuclear program by two years.” She said further, “You can’t bomb their nuclear know-how, and they will rebuild everything. The alternatives are there but the best option is a diplomatic negotiated solution.” She noted, “There is no difference [between the US and Israel] on the concern about the Iranian nuclear program but on the way to deal with it.” Despite fears expressed in 2013 that Iran would soon have a nuclear weapons, Sherman explained that the US and Israeli intelligence communities agree Iran is not close to producing one and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has made no decision to produce one. Sherman said, “They don’t have enough fissile material and don’t have delivery system or weapon per se.” She proffered, “It would take them a considerable period of time to get all that.”

What many view as a big shift in the military equation between Israel and Iran was Russia’s commitment in April 2015 to sell its S-300 missile system to Iran. Ties between Russia and Iran during the nuclear negotiations did not garner any drum beat of media reports, but links have actually grown between the two countries since the talks began. Russia is a Member of the P5+1 given its status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, yet Russia is a good friend of Iran. With threats of military action having been leveled at Iran, not as much by the US recently but more by Israel, Russia decided to lend support to Iran’s defense. If Iran were to eventually decide not to sign a nuclear deal or decide not to comply with it in the long-run, Iran would not be able to effectively deter a military response from the US or Israel with its current defenses or by developing a few rudimentary nuclear devices for its arsenal. Having its own problems with the Western powers and serving its own economic, business and national security interests, Russia decided to provide Iran with S-300s. The S-300 missile is a mobile surface to air defense system that can strike targets at a distance of 150 km and an altitude of 27,000 meters. The Russians made the point that the S-300 was an entirely defensive system and cannot attack anyone, including Israel. However, the introduction of any version of the S-300 would make attacking Iran by air more difficult. It was already an extremely tough job as much of the Iranian nuclear program is deeply buried. Very powerful bombs would be needed to crack those facilities open. Further, the facilities are scattered country wide. Knowing the number and locations of the S-300s would be critical in an attack. As the S-300 system is mobile, it can be rapidly redeployed. Presumably, with the S-300, Iran can engage in any activities it wants without fear of attack from any country except the US. Aegrescit medendo. (The disease worsens with treatment.)

Directing Activity Based on Judgments

In every conflict since its founding, the IAF has been a decisive factor. Its pilots are nearly regarded as “sky knights,” and hold a special place in the hearts of the Israeli people. Their capabilities are also world-renown. With a modest number of jets, the Israeli Air Force fighter pilots have been able to destroy larger opposing forces in air combat as during the Bekka Valley Air Battle against Syria in June 1982 and carry-out daring bombing raids as Operation Opera, the raid on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear facility on June 7, 1981.

According to the Fars News Agency, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami stated Iran would set fire to any airbase used by enemies to strike the country. Salami declared: “We warn their pilots that their first flight [to strike Iran] will be their last one and no one will be allowed to go back safe and sound and they should call their flights as their last flights.” Yet, IAF pilots are completely immune to such boasts. In response to orders to remove what Israel’s political leadership may perceive as an existential threat to their people, IAF pilots would be willing to fly into Iran to destroy its nuclear program to the best of their ability without withering under some thought that they are flying a “suicide mission.” The pilots know their duty to Israel; they are willing to make sacrifices. That is something IAF commanders and IAF pilots’ families know very well. The Spirit of the IDF, a guideline for operations that forms an ethical code for soldiers, officers, units, and corps includes “Tenacity of Purpose in Performing Mission and Drive to Victory” among its values. Those serving in the IDF are required to fight and conduct themselves with courage in the face of all dangers and obstacles. They must persevere in their missions resolutely and thoughtfully even to the point of endangering their lives.

However, in addition to the pilots’ courage, the IAF is assuredly enhancing existing capabilities to create the real possibility that its pilots could successfully attack Iran’s nuclear program. IAF planners develop the concept for an operation using their expertise based on long careers that included a continuous education and training on aerial warfare and considerable war fighting experience. They know the capabilities of specific individuals and units, the effectiveness of their weapons systems, and what would be the real possibility for success of any operation. Reportedly, senior IDF commanders have “cautiously welcomed” a nuclear deal. On the Iranian nuclear threat, one officer anonymously said that by stepping up international inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities and by scaling back uranium enrichment “allow for the supposition that in the coming period of years, this is a threat in decline.” Yet, if Netanyahu asked the IDF to develop a plan for military strikes on Iran, the Chief of the General Staff of the IDF Lieutenant General (Rav Aluf) Gadi Eizenkot, Head of the IDF Planning Directorate Major General Nimrod Sheffer, IAF Commander Major General Amir Eshel, Hertzl of IDF Military Intelligence, and Pardo of Mossad will develop and present a plan for him that displays a high level of military acumen and creativity. In April 2015, the IAF gained experience in coping with the S-300 by deploying 10 F-16I Sufa fighter jets to participate in the annual exercise of the Hellenic [Greek] Air Force entitled INIOXOS-2015. The Hellenic Armed Forces deploys the S-300PMU-1 on the Island of Crete. During the exercise, IAF pilots had the opportunity to prepare for a potential mission in which they may be required to attack Iranian nuclear facilities by flying against those S-300s. The IAF jets came from 4 units: 201 Squadron, “The One” from Ramon Airbase; 253 Squadron, “The Negev” from Ramon Airbase; 107 Squadron, “The Knights of the Orange Tail” from Hatzerim Airbase; and, 119 Squadron “The Bat” from Ramon Airbase. They were accompanied on at least one mission by their commander, Eshel. As a result of its participation in INIOXOS-2015, the IAF collected important data on the intricacies of flying against the S-300. During simulated attacks on ground targets, the IAF pilots successfully tested and modified evasion tactics versus the system. Ad utrumque paratus. (Ready for anything!)

In response to orders to remove what Israel’s political leaders may perceive as an existential threat to their people, IAF pilots would be willing to fly into Iran to destroy its nuclear program to the best of their ability. They will hardly wither under some thought that they are flying a “suicide mission.” The pilots know their duty to Israel; they are willing to make sacrifices. That is something IAF commanders and the pilots’ families know very well.

The Way Forward

In spite of its state sponsorship of terrorism and, Iran is not the sole point source of the world’s evils. (There is also the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria, al-Qaeda, North Korea, and others.) Yet, Iran’s mordant behavior on the world stage, as well as its past surreptitious behavior regarding the research and development of military nuclear capability cannot be dismissed. Netanyahu has implored US officials to surmount what they see concerning Iran. His March 3rd speech to the US Congress was designed as a wake-up call to those who do not realize the nuclear negotiations are a sweet illusion that will only lead to heartache. He views actions Iran has taken despite past declarations that it would never build a nuclear bomb as instructive. Netanyahu no doubt would feel indescribable joy to hear the US would engage in military action against Iran with Israel. However, absent any extraordinarily egregious act by Iran against the US, that will not happen.

Regarding military action by Israel, Golda Meir once said, “We don’t thrive on military acts. We do them because we have to, and thank God we are efficient.” Netanyahu responded to statements Obama made during his June 1st Channel 2 interview by warning again that a prospective deal would pave the way for Iran to attain a nuclear arsenal. Netanyahu is experienced enough to know the importance of prudence in decision making. Undoubtedly, in his view, he has used sufficient prudence. He is not the type to engage in an agonizing debate about military action. Netanyahu’s actual intentions are unknown, and this analysis is written in the abstract. Nonetheless, he appears ready to use military force. He has not hesitated to use force against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria. Although the Israeli Prime Minister turned back from military action against Iran in 2010, he will unlikely turn back a second time. Whether a decision by Netanyahu to attack Iran would be right or wrong might only be determined in the skies over Iran. Carpent tua poma nepotes. (Your descendents will pluck your fruit.)

Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal: The US Public Must Judge the Deal as Best as Possible

Seated to the right of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei are Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari, Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi and former Iranian Defense Minister, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Ahmad Vahidi. Seated to Khamenei’s left is IRGC Deputy Commander, Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami. Khamenei will decide whether there will be a final nuclear agreement and whether Iran will fully comply with it.

According to a May 14, 2015 Reuters article entitled, “Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal,” US President Barack Obama, meeting with leaders from Persian (Arabian) Gulf States at Camp David, updated them on international efforts to forge a nuclear deal with Iran. US Deputy National Security Adviser Benjamin Rhodes stated that the US would welcome support from Gulf States for the deal, which many Arab leaders are concerned would empower Iran to work in destabilizing ways in the region. Rhodes indicated that none of the leaders present had signaled they would pursue a nuclear program that would raise concerns.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed on April 2, 2015 met core policy goals of the Obama administration for the nuclear negotiations: potential pathways Iran could take toward a nuclear weapon using highly enriched uranium and plutonium were blocked; and safeguards were established to prevent Iran from conducting a covert nuclear weapons program. With safeguards, the administration believes the framework agreement will cut down Iran’s breakout time capacity to the point that it would take at least 12 months to amass enough uranium enriched to weapons grade for one bomb. The number of centrifuges enriching uranium will be greatly reduced by requiring the removal of its installed but non-operating machines and cutting back the stockpile of enriched uranium gas by 97 percent. Uranium enrichment will be performed only at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The underground facility at Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant will be repurposed for non-uranium research activities. Limits set will require Iran to operate no more than 5060 centrifuges for 10 years. Further measures will ostensibly ensure Iran’s breakout time is markedly reduced before the 10 years lapse. Iran agreed to cap enrichment to reactor-grade (3.67 percent) for 15 years and not to build any new enrichment facilities in that same timeframe. Iran would be required to modify its Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor to greatly reduce its proliferation potential. Iran would be restricted from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring would be set up to help discourage Iran from violating the agreement. If it is found Iran has been in noncompliance, enhanced monitoring will increase the international community’s ability to promptly detect and disrupt future efforts to build nuclear weapons at declared or potential undeclared sites.

Obama will sense ineffable glory if a final agreement is signed on June 30, 2015 and the agreement holds throughout the remainder of his presidency. However, the specter of potential noncompliance of a final agreement looms despite the best efforts of negotiators. The threat that a nuclear armed Iran would present in part drives the negotiation effort of the P5+1 (US, the United Kingdom, France, China Russia and Germany). Prudent US officials and negotiators set what they wanted to accomplish and how to do it in the talks. Yet, securing a perfect agreement with Iran will not be possible. Deterrence is used in response to the threat of a course of action by an opponent. Economic sanctions have all but been declared as the sole consequence to noncompliance with an agreement, but sanctions might not be enough to restrain hardliners determined to build a weapon. Truly controlling a nuclear ambitious Iran may not be possible.

The Iran Talks have not absorbed the national attention of the US public, yet there is support for Obama’s effort. An April 27, 2015 Quinnipiac Poll reported 58 percent of the US public supported the April 2nd agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and 77 percent preferred negotiations to military action against Iran. However, only 35 percent of were very confident or somewhat confident the agreement would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. These statistics are intriguing. Unlike Gulf leaders, when the US public hears senior administration officials speak on Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions in the news media, the matter is oft covered with an artificial mystification. Their words are usually perplexing, and fail to impart any certainty that Iran will comply with the agreement long-term. Accepting what has been achieved by diplomats to reach an agreement so far may create faith that things will work out. Yet, in this case, faith is not a substitute for recognizing the truth. By looking deeper, one may see flaws in the agreement and what it may lack to make it lasting. The mind must process what one sees to surmount what one sees, and animate the intellect in a methodical or formulaic way. Using a simple methodology for examining the Iran Talks will allow those in the US public without professional or specialized knowledge to better evaluate for themselves their progression. The goal would be to reach an objective truth about the talks, not just an opinion.

Discernment

The Roman dictator Gaius Julius Caesar has been quoted as saying: “Fene libenter homines id quod volunt credunt.” (Men readily believe what they want to believe.) It is also true that illusion is the recipe for heartache. Intelligence agencies have countless methodologies available to assess situations such as Iran’s potential to adhere to a final agreement. Developing accurate assessments would require judging well from a set of facts, actions, or behaviors what is genuine and what is false. That is discernment. According to the Greeks, at the most basic level, two actions must occur in the process of discernment. Anakrino is the process of careful study, evaluation, and judgment. It requires one to scrutinize an issue, looking down to up and down again at it, judging, and making careful observations. One must be honest about what is being observed. One must be certain that a preferred outcome is not being imagined. The integrity of one’s observations must be measured. Diakrino is the process of learning by discrimination.   It requires separating observations thoroughly by comparison. Comparisons must be made with what is known to be counterfeit with what is accepted as genuine. What is discerned as counterfeit should be rejected and what is authentic should be accepted. Applying anakrino and diakrino to analyze information on the Iran Talks can assist laymen in assessing their outcome.

In 2013, hardline elements in Iran sensed that newly elected President Hassan Rouhani could capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Rouhani’s choice as Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, was thought to have the ability to push his Western counterparts toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering Iran’s nuclear rights. Both officials have performed remarkably well at promoting Iran’s interests.

Anakrino

Before the Iran Talks began and initially during the negotiations, Obama and officials in his administration were unambiguous about their willingness to act militarily against Iran over its nuclear program. While denying any link between US threats and their response, Iranian officials seemed to become more vocal in their effort to disabuse Western leaders of the idea that Iran seeks a nuclear weapon. In talks with US negotiators, Iranian officials and diplomats repeatedly expressed the position that Iran did not pose a threat to the US or its interests. Hardline officials in Tehran were ready for a struggle. Draconian economic sanctions as part of as US policy of coercive diplomacy against Iran, the degree to which the US has pressed Iran on its nuclear energy program, the US denial of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, and the US condemnation of Iran for allegedly sponsoring terrorism, previously convinced Iranian leaders that the US is a threat to Iran. Threats of regime change and threats to impose a US form of democracy on Iran from the administration of US President George W. Bush still ring in the ears of Iranian leaders. In 2013, hardline leaders in Tehran sensed that newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani could capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Moreover, there was a sense among Iranian leaders that their new Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, had capabilities as a diplomat and advocate that were superior to his Western counterparts and he would be able to push them toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering Iran’s nuclear rights. While rifts between hard-line elements in Iran with Rouhani and Zarif over the Geneva talks were highlighted in the West, an understanding existed among Iranian leaders of the need to support the negotiations team. Indeed, concerning Zarif and the negotiations team, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari stated: “All must help the negotiations team of our country and the foreign policy apparatus in order to create consensus and public unity at the current time in order to help them demand the fundamental rights of the nation of Iran in the nuclear field and stand against Arrogant [US] blackmail and greed during negotiations.”

As the talks progressed, US officials noted that Iran never failed to comply with all terms of the agreements their negotiators signed on to. In Lausanne, Switzerland on April 2nd, Kerry stated: “It is important to note that Iran, to date, has honored all of the commitments that it made under the Joint Plan of Action that we agreed to in 2013. And I ask you to think about that against the backdrop of those who predicted that it would fail and not get the job done.” That statement mirrored one Kerry made while discussing the November 24, 2014 extension. Kerry said Iran had been living up to its “Joint Plan of Action” commitments. He stated further: “Many were quick to say that the Joint Plan of Action would be violated, it wouldn’t hold up, it would be shredded. Many said Iran would not hold up its end of the bargain. Many said the sanction regime would collapse. But guess what? The interim agreement wasn’t violated, Iran has held up its end of the bargain, and the sanctions regime has remained intact.” Adde parvum parvo magnus acervas erit. (Add a little to a little and there will be a heap.)

Obama administration officials unceasingly heralded progress made on the negotiations. In addition to a successful result, a goal of the administration was to engage in talks that were tactful and decorous and avoid having them turn down a confrontational path. Officials have sought to allay concerns that Iran could not be trusted expressed by political opponents in the US Congress and by media pundits with regular reminders that rigorous monitoring measures will stay in place not just for the time frame of the agreement but even after its core restrictions expire. Any movement toward a nuclear weapon will supposedly be detected early, allowing for decisive intervention to prevent the completion of such efforts. However, things may not have been going as well as Obama administration officials indicated. True, there was an apparent understanding among hardline elements in the Iranian leadership of the need to support the negotiations team, and they have seemingly lent their support for what has been achieved so far. Yet, there is an obtuseness among hardliners regarding the deal. They refuse to succumb to the international community’s demand for Iran to make its nuclear program verifiably peaceful. There is blindness among hardline elements to terms of the agreement requiring Iran to halt aspects of its program for 10 or 15 years. They do not want hear anything that other parties to the talks are saying about it. Factus, tactus, visus in te fallitur. Sed auditu solo tuto creditor. (Taste, and touch, and vision to discern the fail. Faith that comes by hearing pierces the veil.)

Despite months of talks, there is still considerable divergence between perspectives on what has been achieved and projected outcomes. The differences were reflected in the respective reports US and Iranian negotiators prepared on the April 2nd agreement. The Iranian report omits several restrictions and limits that all parties to the talks agreed upon.

Perhaps the need to satisfy hardliners in Tehran was reflected in how negotiators in the US and Iran prepared their respective reports on the negotiations. In the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs report entitled “A Summary of the Solutions Reached as an Understanding for Reaching a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and the US report entitled “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program”, there is considerable divergence between perspectives on what has been achieved and projected outcomes despite months of talks. The Iranian report omits a dramatic number of provisions which all of the negotiating parties agreed upon and the US duly records in its report. The Iranian report begins by stating the solution reached was not legally binding and only provide conceptual guidelines while the US report explained that the April 2nd agreement was a framework laying out solutions from which the final text of a final agreement would be written. The Iranian report only notes a 10 year period of restriction on uranium enrichment, uranium production, and the construction of new centrifuges after which all activities could resume. No mention is made of Iran’s agreement to curtail enrichment over 3.67 percent for 15 years, to reduce its current stockpile of 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium to 300 kg for 15 years, and not to build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

Further, no mention is made of Iran’s agreement not use the Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant for enrichment for 15 years. The Iranian report claims the restriction is 10 years. The Iranians report they can continue to research and development on new centrifuges while the US report claims a restriction on centrifuge research and development will be in place for 10 years. The Iranian report does not mention Iran’s agreement to adhere to a research and development plan submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian report says that the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor will be redesigned and rebuilt so it will not produce weapons grade plutonium. However, no mention is made of the provision that P5+1 must agree to the design, and that the original core reactor must be destroyed or shipped out of the Iran for the reactors lifetime. Absent also was any mention of Iran’s commitment not the reprocess spent fuel or engage in the research and development in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The Iranian report does not include the provision that grants the IAEA access to suspicious sites or facilities about which allegations might be made of covert enrichment activity, conversion, and yellowcake production anywhere in Iran. That stipulation grants the IAEA inspectors access to military facilities as well. Regarding sanctions, the divergence in positions is huge. The US reports Iran agreed sanctions would be suspended. Iran says it only agreed to their elimination.

IRGC Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari has offered cautious support for Iran’s nuclear negotiations team, but grumblings among his commanders indicate a final deal would not represent their goals. The IRGC would welcome continued opposition and clashes with the West, especially the US.

Diakrino

The value of the promise depends on character of the promiser. By the admission of Obama himself, Iran has a questionable history as a player on the world stage given its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Making comparison with Iran’s past behavior, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action contradicts all that is disordered, all that is dishonest about Iran. Despite the longstanding claim of Iranian leaders that they would never seek a nuclear weapon, for both practical and religious reasons, it is now known those claims were counterfeit. Iran actually conducted activities relevant to weapons development as part of an organized program prior to 2003. The IAEA laid out its allegations regarding those activities in November 2011. The IAEA previously claimed it had made some progress with Iran in the investigation of this matter between November 2013 and August 2014, that process is now stalled. US and European negotiators want Iran to answer the IAEA’s questions and allow access to the individuals and sites necessary to complete the investigation. This delay has occurred even though Iran has only been asked to implement a set of measures to address the IAEA’s outstanding questions.   Moreover, the removal of UN Security Council sanctions will not occur until and unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA investigation and past questions are resolved. Even supporters of the nuclear negotiations do not believe Iran will make any full confession on its previous weapons related work given statements by senior Iranian officials on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear weapons. Iran may very well be concealing a weapons program while negotiating now. Falsus in unis, falsus in omnibus! (False in one thing, false in everything!)

As the negotiations progressed there was also a discernible change in Obama’s attitude toward taking military action against Iran. The threats vanished. Hardliners in Tehran discovered Obama was ill-disposed to using military force. They learned of difficulties his officials and advisers had in getting him to come to terms with proposals for using force in Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq. Sanctions have never been enough to deter Iran. While facing military threats and being walloped by sanctions in the past, Iran advanced its nuclear program so far that Iran now needs to be pushed back from a break out capacity. Perhaps some hardliners feel that they can secure the lifting of sanctions now and even some continued sanctions relief later through more talks if activity restricted under the agreement is completed and the ability to create a weapon is acquired. Evincing a conviction among officials in Tehran that Obama will not use force, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in part, seemed to mock Obama over his previous pronouncements about using military strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei, according to Iranian state television, recently declared Tehran would not take part in nuclear talks to reach a final deal by June 30, 2015 if threatened with military force. Khamenei was quoted as saying by Iran’s English language Press TV as saying: “Holding nuclear talks under the shadow of threat is unacceptable for Iran . . . Our nation will not accept it . . . Military threats will not help the talks.” Khamenei said, “Recently two US officials threatened to take military action against Iran. What does negotiation mean under the shadow of threat.”

According to the Fars News Agency, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami described a hypothetical war against the US as “No big deal.” He went on to explain: “We have prepared ourselves for the most dangerous scenarios and this is no big deal and is simple to digest for us; we welcome war with the US as we do believe that it will be the scene for our success to display the real potentials of our power.” Salami added Iran would set fire to any airbase used by enemies to strike the country, and declared, “We warn their pilots that their first flight [to strike Iran] will be their last one and no one will be allowed to go back safe and sound and they should call their flights as their last flights.” Salami also stated: “When the arrogant powers [US, EU] grow united in different directions to weaken the Islamic community, we should use our different capacities to fight against the enemy, and the Islamic [State of] Iran has gained many experiences in fighting against the enemy so far.” Sounding as if he were expecting an attack over some impending revelation that Iran had violated the terms of agreements signed, Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi, has warned that Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah would respond to attack by Israel on Iran by launching of a firestorm of missiles on Israeli targets. Hezbollah allegedly possesses 80,000 rockets. Iranian State television quoted Safavi as saying: “Iran, with help of Hezbollah and its friends, is capable of destroying Tel Aviv and Haifa in case of military aggression on the part of the Zionists.”

Signing on to a final nuclear agreement with the P5+1 would become a nightmare for Khamenei if he later felt doing so in some way disrespected or disregarded the sacrifices of martyrs of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Sacred Defense. Regardless of any benefits of sanctions relief, that concern weighs heavily on his mind.

There was once the idea that the suspension of sanctions might lead to investment, opportunities for Iranians, and the strengthening of moderate leaders. Yet, a recent statement from Jafari has dampens hope that gradual political change might occur and a nuclearized Iran might become less likely. Jafari stated the IRGC will be taking on even greater roles in various fields. Sepah News quoted him as saying: “The capacity, quality, and increasing role of the IRGC in various fields in the mission of defending the Islamic Revolution and system is a decisive role—which friends and enemies admit too; also, according to the emphasis which the Supreme Commander in Chief [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei] put on the qualitative and quantitative development of the IRGC and the transformative and internal aspects of it in the better implementation of the missions. Updated services to personnel can play an important role in this regard.”

As for the final agreement, both hardliners and moderates would oppose any provision that would allow the IAEA to inspect Iran’s military facilities. Iran argues “no global authority exists to inspect a country’s military facilities. There is no treaty to do so, and the IAEA is not in a position to carry out such [a] task.” As for sanctions, Iran wants what the US and Europeans will not give: the permanent lifting sanctions. On April 4, 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated, “During the talks, we [both sides] always talked about lifting economic, financial, and banking sanction. We never talked about the suspension of the sanctions, and if that were the case no agreement would form.” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator at the nuclear talks, on April 4th said: “The American fact sheet stipulates that the US and EU suspend sanctions against Iran . . . . [However], the entirety of the economic and financial sanctions, and the [UN] Security Council resolutions, will be removed the first day of the implementation of the agreement. This agreement exists and is the solution that we reached.”

US and European negotiators are well-aware of the great incongruence between their countries’ positions and those of Iran on these issues. To have a final agreement, one side must give way. The IRNA news agency quoted Khamenei as saying, “Our negotiators should continue the talks with respect to our red lines. They should not accept any imposition, humiliation and threat.” Whatever decision Khamenei makes on the final agreement, he must be certain his decision in no way disrespects or disregards the sacrifices of martyrs of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Sacred Defense. Regardless of any benefits from sanctions relief, that concern weighs heavily on his mind.

What Can Be Discerned

It is difficult to surmise where members of the US public might fall on the Iran Talks if they had more facts on it. Assurances of officials speaking from a source, the US government, with all of the information available to it, are hard for the average citizen to judge well or refute. On its face, there is no evidence that the nuclear talks in a type of graveyard spiral now that very difficult issues are being broached. When officials on all sides speak they evince what appears to be a bold curiosity for the adventure ahead. The manner in which officials have presented information about the nuclear talks to the US public has obscured realities. Right now, the distance both sides must travel to reach the same place in the negotiations may be too far to travel. One can hardly believe that Iranian leaders want the same agreement the Obama seeks. US officials have well-outlined how they could discern, or what they might do if they discover, Iran has violated the agreement. The US public should realize, given the chance to use the analysis here, would realize that although Iranian negotiators signed the agreement with Tehran’s authority, US officials can only trust that Iran intends to adhere to all of its aspects for the long-term. Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. (Mountains will be in labor, and a ridiculous mouse will be born.)

Iran Readies Plant Needed to Fulfill Nuclear Pact with Powers; Despite All That Has Been Achieved, a Final Deal Remains Uncertain

Above are Basiji (paramilitary volunteer militia) attending a meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, in November 2013.  Devoted to Shi’a Islam, dedicated to the Islamic Revolution, and adoring of Khamanei, the Basij are among hard line elements in Iran who have little interest in a nuclear deal.  Khamanei will have the final say.

According to a May 27, 2014 Reuters article entitled “Iran Readies Plant Needed to Fulfill Nuclear Pact with Powers,” a report from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows Iran appears to be finalizing a plant to convert a large amount of low-enriched uranium gas into an oxide form following months of delays. In oxide form, the low enriched uranium gas would be less suitable for processing into nuclear bomb material.  Under the interim deal it with the P5+1 (the Permanent Five Member States of the UN Security Council—US, Britain, France, Russia, and China—plus Germany), Iran needs to take action to limit its stockpile of uranium gas refined to a fissile concentration of up to 5 percent by late July.  To be able to meet this particular term of the interim deal, Iran has been building a facility, named Enriched UO2 Powder Plant (EUPP), near the central city of Isfahan for turning the gas into powder.  The IAEA report explained the facility’s commissioning had now begun. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said Iran had transferred 4.3 tons of low-grade uranium gas to the site from its Natanz enrichment plant.  The report did not say when conversion into oxide would get under way. While it was expected that Iran would have completed this process by late last year, satisfaction is found among world powers that the IAEA is reporting that Iran is meeting this requirement, and has also met all other requirements under the interim agreement.  Ostensibly, the P5+1 negotiated the six-month deal with Iran to garner more time for talks on a final settlement that would remove the risk of a new Middle East war over Iran’s nuclear aspirations.  Those talks began in February. The next round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 will be held in Vienna from June 16th to 20th.

However, there have been a few snags.  The IAEA also reports that the conversion facility’s delay, the low-grade uranium stockpile has grown to nearly 8.5 tons in May from 7.6 tons in February.  The longer it takes to launch EUPP, the more Iran will have to process to meet the target by the deadline in less than two months’ time.  The P5+1 wants to significantly scale back Iran’s capacity to produce low-enriched uranium in order to further lengthen the time required to produce enough material for a bomb.  Iran has fired back saying it needs to expand its enrichment capacity to make fuel for future atomic energy plants.  Experts believe Iran potentially has enough uranium gas for a few nuclear weapons if refined much further.  Limiting Iran’s overall enrichment capacity is expected be one of the thorniest issues in the negotiations for a long-term deal.  Other issues include gaining an agreement from Iran to scale back other proliferation-prone nuclear activity and to accept tougher UN inspections to deny it any capability of quickly producing atomic bombs, in exchange for an end to economic sanctions.

During the process, there have been expressions of disagreement and disappointment by parties to the negotiations in the news media and certain parties seemingly insisted on negotiating publicly, but until recently the process has been characterized as fruitful.  Compromises have been made and deals have been reached at the negotiating table and through backchannel talks by officials.  However, the process has reached a new stage.    What is negotiated now matters most. In the capitals of the negotiating parties, commitments must be made that will result in a sustainable, satisfactory agreement or possibly war.  New issues have surfaced that warrant thorough deliberation by negotiators.  Those issues could become real impediments to the talks’ completion. Mutual suspicions have risen again.  The leader of each country has the free will to choose continued negotiation or withdrawal.  The final choice will be determined by the way in which they govern that free will.

Terms Iran Might Not Be Able To Live With

Recently, Seyed Hossein Naghavi Hosseini, spokeman for the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee—a right-wing body that has taken a hard line on the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1—discussed the progress of the latest nuclear talks with the Tasmin News Agency.  He explained that there were several points of contention concerning the talks.  Among those enumerated by Hosseini included the following: 1) the West discussed our defense systems and our missiles, while from the beginning we said that this is not negotiable, but they are still insisting on this point; 2) the West has “issues with the number and quality of our centrifuges and even has issues with the number of centrifuges at each site. . . .;” 3) the West even has problems with our research and development; 4) the West did not want to immediately lift the sanctions but wanted to do so gradually after the final agreement was signed. (Hosseini said, “They say that after the agreement, we have to prove our goodwill. They will then remove sanctions one by one. Their position is that if their demands are guaranteed, and the Islamic Republic lifts its hands from its red lines, Iran will be turned into a normal country.”); 5) the West even presented a plan that would lift the sanctions gradually over a 10-year process; 6) the West said that not all of the sanctions are related to the nuclear program and that they must first distinguish which sanctions are for that issue and which are over human rights, the missile program, terrorism or regional issues. (Hosseini Naghavi Hosseini said that Iran expects all of the sanctions to be lifted upon signing the agreement. He called this segmentation of the sanctions “a dangerous game” and “part of the intense disagreements” between the two sides.); 7) the West would not accept 20% enrichment for Iran, but added that the West would be willing to sell Iran 20% enriched fuel for the Tehran reactor; the West demands other enrichment sites in Iran would be allowed only 3.5% enrichment; 8) the West also wants to determine the amount of enriched fuel that is reserved, a red line for Iran that would limit its research and development capacities; 9) there were also differences over “who would determine Iran’s [enrichment] needs; and, 10) the West wants to determine whether the West would they allow the Islamic Republic to produce, or would others produce it for them; and, the West did not see the Arak heavy water reactor as being necessary for Iran. (When asked if the issue is a heavy water reactor or the production of plutonium, Hosseini responded that it was the latter.). Hosseini made it clear that these terms were against “all of Iran’s achievements.”

In a further development, Ismail Kowsari, a Member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee (NSFP), spoke to the Tasnim News Agency on May 22nd about the latest developments in the negotiations.  Kowsari revealed after the [interim] agreement, the file returned back to the Supreme National Security Council, and the chairman of the NSFP, Alaeddin Borujerdi, was added to the nuclear negotiation team. Kowsari’s statements would indicate that although Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif will lead the negotiations on behalf of Iran, there will be more supervision and coordination with different bodies in Tehran.  Kowsari also added that Borujerdi was added to the nuclear negotiation team at the request of parliament speaker Ali Larijani.

Has An Iranian Weaponization Program Been Uncovered?

In a joint statement with the IAEA, Iran pledged to apprise the agency of what wss allegedly the most secretive dimension of its nuclear program: “the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.” This is a reference to weaponization.  According to a May 27, 2014 Wall Street Journal article, the fact that the IAEA and the Western powers are now turning to the weaponization question is a sign of how far the Iranian nuclear-weapons program has progressed.  Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center was quoted in the May 27th article as saying, “a concern about weaponization followed by testing and use is the moral hazard when you don’t pay attention to fissile-material production.”  The article explained this meant once Iran was granted the right to enrich and was permitted to develop an advanced enrichment capability, the West was left with preventing weaponization as the final barrier against a nuclear-capable Iran.

The article further stated Western intelligence agencies discovered Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear device dated back to the late 1980s at a Defense Ministry-linked physics research center in Tehran.  According to the IAEA, Iran consolidated its weaponization researchers in the 1990s under an initiative called the “AMAD Plan,” headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a Ph.D. nuclear engineer and senior member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).  The AMAD Plan was charged with procuring dual-use technologies, developing nuclear detonators and conducting high-explosive experiments associated with compressing fissile material, according to Western intelligence agencies.  The AMAD Plan’s most intense period of activity was in 2002-03, according to the IAEA, when Rouhani was Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.  The May 27th article asserts Fakhrizadeh has continued to oversee these disparate and highly compartmentalized activities, now under the auspices of Iran’s new Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, known by its Persian acronym, SPND.

The May 27th article confirms much of what greatcharlie.com had stated in a September 26, 2013 post entitled “Hossein Dehghan’s Concealed Hand in Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policy Efforts.”  Dehghan’s descent to the Rouhani’s cabinet after serving as a committee secretary on the Expediency Council did not occur because his administration skills were sorely needed in the Defense Ministry.  Rather, Dehghan was selected to take command of the day to day activities of Iran’s fighting forces and to manage projects of such importance to Iran’s security that only someone with his experience, capabilities, and reliability could be counted upon to direct.  Dehghan, who spent his career in the IRGC, is inextricably tied to that organization.  It was asserted by hreatcharlie.com that given his decades of devotion to the IRGC, there can be no doubt that precious little difference between Dehghan’s views and those espoused by the organization.  A key concept proclaimed by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei on the conduct of Iran’s foreign and defense policy is “heroic flexibility.”  The phrase was coined by Khamenei, himself, when translating a book on Imam Hassan.  As understood by his close compatriots in the IRGC, heroic flexibility allows for diplomacy with the US and its Western allies, but requires the protection of Iran’s right pursue and nuclear energy program.  In the words of the Deputy Commander of the IRGC, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, (translated into English and published by Arash Karami on the blog, Iran Pulse) “heroic inflexibility is an exalted and invaluable concept fully within the goals of the Islamic Republic.”  He further explained the concept meant “in no way would Iran retreat from fundamental lines and national and vital interests and this right is something that without [sic] concessions can be exchanged.”  That essentially means that only on issues in which Iran had an interest but no rights, could Iranian concessions be negotiated.  He went on to state: “Our fundamental framework is permanent and it is inflexible and our ideal goals will never be reduced.”  Specifically on the nuclear issue, Salami explained: “For instance, the right to have peaceful nuclear energy according to the criteria that has been secured for us, and this right cannot be modified and there is no flexibility on it, however, within this framework a political flexibility as a tactic is acceptable because we do not want to create a dead end in solving the political issue.”  Therefore, for the IRGC on the nuclear issue, there was never any possibility of Iranian concessions, however, there was a possibility that the US and its Western allies might be willing make concessions to reach a compromise.  The talks would give them a chance to do so.

Using the IRGC’s interpretation of heroic flexibility, it appears that Iran seeks to engage in a dual-track approach to resolve problems over the nuclear issue with the US and its Western partners.  Under that approach, Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Ministry would take the path of diplomacy to acquire concessions, while Dehghan and elements of the IRGC would take a path to accomplish the goals set for Iran’s nuclear energy program.  Placing the development of Iran’s nuclear energy program in Dehghan’s purview would seem reasonable given the credible military threat posed to it by the US and Israel.  Moreover, as Defense Minister, his responsibilities have included promoting Iran’s defense industry capabilities in meeting strategic requirements, placing an emphasis on passive defense in compliance with the requirements of development projects and land use planning, and linking knowledge, power, and strategy in industry and in Defense Ministry missions.  As greatcharlie.com concluded, if Dehghan and his IRGC compatriots remained obedient to Khamenei’s concept of heroic flexibility, as the IRGC interprets it, then they would very likely engaged in a dual-track approach guided by that concept. A statement provided by the IRGC back in mid-2013 provided a rationale for the dual-track approach.  It declared: “Historical experiences make it necessary for the diplomatic apparatus of our country to carefully and skeptically monitor the behavior of WH officials so that the righteous demands of our nation are recognized and respected by those who favor interaction.”  This indicated that thinking with the IRGC was influenced by Iran’s past negative interactions with the West, and a bicameral approach would assure the protection of Iran’s rights.

The Way Forward

Leaders of Iran and the P5+1 face hard choices regarding the nuclear negotiations.  The success or failure of the effort will fall squarely on their shoulders. Neither side wants to absolve the other of past transgressions.  Suggesting that would be a platitudinous appeal to those who feel they have been harmed.  The decision has not been made easier given positions recently established in the West.  They have been accompanied by public statements by officials in the administration of US President Barack Obama that imply the US decision to negotiate rather than take military action against Iran was an act of mercy which can be reversed.  Sanctions relief promised in return for a deal almost appears superficial.  While Iran has called allegations of Iranian weaponization efforts fabrications, if such allegations are true, any possibility of creating a deal based on mutual trust has likely been lost.  It would serve to confirm the West’s worst fears that the negotiation process was an opportunity for Iran to exploit Western generosity. It gives credence to early declarations of Iran’s hard line elements suggesting its diplomats were engaged in a counterfeit negotiation effort.

As a practical matter, decision making on a final nuclear deal must be guided by political positions and national security directives, along with revolutionary ideals in Iran’s case. IRGC Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari, has been quoted as saying, “Anti-Westernism is the principle characteristic of the Islamic Republic.” Yet, when these old and seductive courses have been taken in the past, the results for those desiring an agreement have been unsatisfactory.  Unfortunately, it is far easier to unleash anger and treachery than unleash approbation and goodwill. A final choice can also be based on free will, effectively governed by moral accountability.  In the stewardship of their countries’ national security, particularly on this tricky nuclear issue, moral accountability must also guide leaders’ assessments and decision making.  Moral accountability is dependent upon the moral character of the leadership.  With political and other pressures at work at the same time as considerations of the moral implications of a decision, deliberations on how to proceed would become a delicate dance between virtue and vice.  Leaders must recognize what would be in their citizens’ interest and the national interest for the long-term and determining what would be the best course to take to secure those interests.  For Iran, going to war would hardly meet that criterion. For the West, accepting an agreement that could lead to disastrous consequences for themselves and their its allies would be a mistake.  Perspective must be maintained.  As a concept, parties must think of themselves as taking a gamble by casting a wide net, beyond the horizon, via the nuclear negotiations.  They must gather from their catch what is good and workable, then sift out the bad. In the end, what will be in their basket hopefully will be enough to develop suitable agreement.

Hossein Dehghan’s Concealed Hand in Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policy Efforts

According to a September 23, 2013, New York Times article entitled, “Netanyahu Is Said to View Iran Deal as a Possible Trap,” Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu intended to step up his effort to blunt a diplomatic offensive by Iran, and planned to warn the UN that a nuclear deal with Iran could be a trap similar to the one set by North Korea eight years ago.  The White House reportedly sought to allay the fears of Israeli officials, assuring them that US President Barack Obama will judge Iranian President Hassan Rouhani by his actions, not his words, and that the US is not planning to prematurely ease the economic sanctions against Iran that have hurt Iran’s economy.  However, Rouhani’s words and actions may not be the key ones for the Obama administration to watch in Iran.  Attention certainly must be given to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the source of Rouhani’s authority to act.  Khamenei’s decisions, often presented in public statements, determine the course of Iran’s foreign and defense policy.  Yet, the official, whose position and history of engaging in security activities of great consequence to Iran makes him certainly worthy of attention from the US and its Western partners, is Iran’s new Minister of Defense, Hossein Dehghan.

Although Rouhani served as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Dehghan, until his confirmation as defense minister, he served as Secretary of the Political, Defense, and Security Committee of Iran’s Expediency Council.  The  Expediency Council is an advisory body that is appointed by, and serves, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  The prominent religious, social, and political figures on that council have supervisory powers over all branches of government.  The Expediency Council is often called the “voice” of the Iranian Revolution.  Given the power and prominence the Council’s members have in Iran’s government, it seemed a rather peculiar for an official to leave such a venerable post to accept a cabinet position.

Rouhani has expressed the desire to engage in a dialogue with the US and its Western partners, hoping to tackle issues that have led to Iran’s international isolation and economic pressure, and especially reach a compromise on the nuclear issue. To some degree, it has already been initiated with US through an exchange of messages between Obama and Rouhani.  Washington and Western capitals have been eager to accept the opportunity to revolve the nuclear issue might be at hand and an acceptable entreaty could be drawn.  Yet, Rouhani’s role may only be one part of larger plan being implemented by Iran.  Much as US and other Western analysts have suspected, Iran’s leaders may very likely have decided that while Rouhani is heroically negotiating with the US and its Western partners or even after he might reach an understanding with them on the nuclear issue, under the auspices of Dehghan and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), away from Rouhani’s purview, they would secretly continue efforts on Iran’s nuclear energy program, until all goals of the nuclear program are reached.  It has been assessed by the same analysts that Iran is already close to breakout capacity when it will be able to finish a device in a matter of weeks, without technically testing or possessing a bomb. Turning back now, after getting so close may very likely be viewed by Iran’s leaders as counterproductive and counterintuitive.   If this is truly the case, rather than focus on Rouhani’s words and deeds, Dehghan, now in full control of the daily activities of Iran’s military forces, would be the one to watch as a better way to discern how Iran is actually proceeding on the nuclear issue.

Dehghan’s Reputation For Handling Iran’s Most Difficult Tasks

Dehghan was first discussed by greatcharlie.com in the August 23, 2013 post entitled, “Iran’s Parliament Grills, but Mostly Confirms, Rouhani’s Cabinet: Hossein Dehghan Faced No Battles.”  Dehghan joined the IRGC in 1979 and rose quickly through the ranks, becoming IRGC commander in Tehran and former acting IRGC commander of Isfahan.  He was sent to Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in 1982 to help establish a military-wing for Hezbollah.  By 1983, Dehghan was appointed commander of IRGC forces in Lebanon.  Allegedly, while in that command, Dehghan received instructions from Tehran to attack peacekeepers of the Multinational Force in Lebanon.  It is further alleged that Dehghan, after providing them with IRGC funding and operational training, directed Hezbollah operatives, along with their leader, Imad Mughniyah, the commander of Hezbollah’s military-wing, to engage in martyrdom operations against the US Marine Corps barracks and French paratrooper barracks in Beirut.  The operative detonated a truck bomb at the Marine barracks, destroying the building that housed them and tragically killing 341 and wounding several others, most of whom were asleep at the time.  In coordination with that attack, a truck bomb was used by another Hezbollah operative against the French paratroopers barracks, killing 58 soldiers.  Later Dehghan would become commander of District 1 of Sarallah and Sarallah Operations Headquarters, commander of the IRGC Air Force, commander of the IRGC Air Force, acting chairman of the joint headquarters of the IRGC, and general manager of the Cooperatives Foundation of the IRGC.  As an IRGC commander, Dehghan was a fearless, devout and dedicated to the Islamic Revolution and sworn to defend the Islamic Republic.  What he undoubtedly did best on the Expediency Council was to advise Khamenei on conventional and unconventional ways Iran could use its military as a means to accomplish its political goals in the face of US and Western opposition.  Dehghan’s descent to Rouhani’s cabinet, after serving as a committee secretary on the Expediency Council, did not occur because his skills as an administrator were sorely needed in the Defense Ministry.  Rather, Dehghan was most likely selected in order to take command of the day to day activities of Iran’s fighting forces and to manage projects of such importance to Iran’s security that only someone with his experience, capabilities, and reliability could be counted upon to direct.

“Heroic Flexibility” and Dehghan’s Likely Marching Orders on the Nuclear Issue

Dehghan, who spent his career in the IRGC,  is inextricably tied to that organization.  In one of the earliest photos of Dehghan while Defense Minister, he is appears in his IRGC uniform, sitting with other cabinet members in a meeting with Khamenei.  Dehghan has been a conspicuously quiet member of Rouhani’s cabinet, virtually absent in the media and rarely providing public statements or holding press conferences.  This is rather unusual particularly since he is responsible for Iran’s military forces.  In Iran, top commanders typically are highly visible, very often making very passionate declarations of their determination to defend Iran’s interests.  Such avowals by military officials are an accepted way to assure the Iranian people that the country can promote and protect its interests, and deter opponents from attacks against it.  During his confirmation process for defense minister, Dehghan explained to the Parliament that he wanted to engage in soft power enhancement, by means of increased visibility and promote the image of the armed forces.  Dehghan apparently did not mean to include himself in that effort.  The reticent Dehghan even has a lower profile than Major General Qassem Suleimani, the leader of Iran’s secretive, elite IRGC unit, the Quds Force.

Given his decades of devotion to the IRGC, there can be no doubt that precious little difference between Dehghan’s views and those espoused by the organization.  To that extent, Dehghan would most likely agree with an IRGC statement (translated into English in a September 22, 2013 article in Turkey’s Hurriyet Daily News), which explained the IRGC “would support initiatives that were in line with national interests and strategies set forth by the theocratic leader and highest authority, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.”  According to this, Dehghan and the commanders of the 125,000 IRGC force who are hand-picked by Khamenei, will act only under the concept and intent proffered by Supreme Leader.

A key concept recently proclaimed by Khamenei on the conduct of Iran’s foreign and defense policy is “heroic flexibility.”  The phrase was coined by Khamenei, himself, when translating a book on Imam Hassan.  As is characteristic of Dehghan, but perhaps unusual for a Defense Minister, he has not offered his own interpretation of heroic flexibility and how it would guide his ministry’s activities.  Yet, as understood by his close compatriots in the IRGC, heroic flexibility allows for diplomacy with the US and its Western partners, but requires the protection of Iran’s right pursue and nuclear energy program.  In the words of the Deputy Commander of the IRGC, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, translated into English and published by Arash Karami on the blog, Iran Pulse, “heroic inflexibility is an exalted and invaluable concept fully within the goals of the Islamic Republic.”  He further explained the concept meant “in no way would Iran retreat from fundamental lines and national and vital interests and this right is something that without [sic] concessions can be exchanged.”  That essentially means that only on issues in which Iran had an interest but no rights, could Iranian concessions be negotiated.  He went on to state: “Our fundamental framework is permanent and it is inflexible and our ideal goals will never be reduced.”  Specifically on the nuclear issue, Salami explained: “For instance, the right to have peaceful nuclear energy according to the criteria that has been secured for us, and this right cannot be modified and there is no flexibility on it, however, within this framework a political flexibility as a tactic is acceptable because we do not want to create a dead end in solving the political issue.”  Therefore, for the IRGC on the nuclear issue, there is no possibility of Iranian concessions, however, given the possibility that the US and its Western partners, themselves, might be willing make concessions to reach a compromise, talks must take place to give them a chance to do so.

An appraisal to this using the IRGC’s interpretation of heroic flexibility may be that Iran needs to engage in a dual-track approach to resolve problems over the nuclear issue with the US and its Western partners. Under that approach, Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Ministry would take the path of diplomacy to acquire concessions, while Dehghan and elements of the IRGC would take a path to accomplish the goals set for Iran’s nuclear energy program.  Placing the development of Iran’s nuclear energy program in Dehghan’s purview is reasonable given the credible military threat posed to it by the US and Israel.  Moreover, as Defense Minister, his responsibilities include promoting Iran’s defense industry capabilities in meeting strategic requirements, placing an emphasis on passive defense in compliance with the requirements of development projects and land use planning, and linking knowledge, power, and strategy in industry and Defense Ministry missions.  Assuredly, Dehghan and his IRGC compatriots are currently guided by Khamenei’s concept of heroic flexibility, under the IRGC’s interpretation of it.  That being the case, it is very likely they are presently engaged in a dual-track approach.  A statement provided by the IRGC appears to provide a rationale for the dual-track approach.  It declares: “Historical experiences make it necessary for the diplomatic apparatus of our country to carefully and skeptically monitor the behavior of WH officials so that the righteous demands of our nation are recognized and respected by those who favor interaction.”  This quote would indicate that IRGC thinking is influenced by what its commanders view were past negative interactions with the West, and a dual-track approach will assure the protection of Iran’s rights.

What Would Convince the IRGC That a Dual-Track Approach Would Work?

When Dehghan was a committee secretary on the Expediency Council, he was already part of the process by which Iran developed a way to quietly take steps in opposition to the US in order to reach its goals.  Long before Khamenei’s declaration of his heroic flexibility concept, approaches and methods, derived from ideas very similar to his idea, were already being on Syria and on the nuclear issue.  As discussed in the August 3, 2013 greatcharlie.com post entitled “President-Elect Stirs Optimism in the West, But Talks with Iran Will Likely Be Influenced by the Syrian War,” initially, the Iranians consider in advance how its opponents might attempt to defeat or disrupt US efforts.  Plans are rapidly implemented to avoid detection and a possible response.  Every moment of time is viewed in itself as an opportunity to shape a situation.  This is how the initial Quds Force commander in Syria, IRGC Brigadier General Hassan Shateri, operated with all Iranian forces from 2011 until his death there in 2013.  He managed the rapid deployment of Iranian forces, Hezbollah, and Iraqi shi’a militiamen into Syria, and shaped-up Syrian Armed Forces as needed, quickly trained, and armed the Syrian shabiha or paramilitaries and organized them into a fighting force, the National Defense Front.  IRGC Major General Qassem Suleimani, who took over for Shateri as Iran’s commander in Syria, has taken the same tact.  Political leaders and policymakers in the US are perceived in Tehran as willing to make the assumption that every situation in foreign policy can be favorably altered with money or the application of military force later.  Delays in proposed and threatened military action would usually be due to some domestic political consideration such as presidential elections and mid-term Congressional elections  Concerning the nuclear issue, the same success using this approach can be observed.  Regardless of the state of negotiations between the US and its Western partners and Iran over the years, and the ferocity of the US threats, progress continued to be made on the nuclear energy program.  Iran is aware that once a sufficient level of competence with nuclear technology is successfully acquired and tested, the genie will be out of the bottle, and a new situation immediately exists.  At that point, Iran may calculate that further sanctions or threats of action against Iran, except among some of its neighbors, would unlikely be viewed as constructive or acceptable internationally.  Further, Iran, again, would know that it would be less likely to face any consequences if that type of achievement occurs when for example, mid-term elections next year, have greater meaning to US political leaders.

Events surrounding the US response to the Assad regime’s August 21, 2013, use of chemical weapons provide the latest yardstick by which Iran can measure the prospect for attaining its goals under Khamenei’s heroic flexibility concept.  US delays left the door open for Assad to secure his interests.  Obama appeared to agonize over the decision to take military action and delayed doing so.  The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, indicated he was reluctant to take action, uncertain as to its possible impact upon the Syrian civil war’s outcome.  The majority of the US Congress prepared to withhold their support for military action, concerned mostly by the possibility that as a consequence, rogue Islamic militants would be in a better position on the ground.  While that transpired, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad managed, through a Russian proposal, to avoid military action for the time being, by declaring its chemical stockpiles, surrendering them for destruction to the UN, and becoming a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention.  Assad even managed to acquire the spotlight on the world stage.  He even received praise from some states for coming clean about chemical stockpile, while never confessing to carrying out the gas attacks.

Assessment

Iran is still a long way from getting the US and its Western partners to compromise.  For Iran, such demands would mean more than just modifying its program, but keeping it intact.  For Iran, compromise may actually equate to an act of surrender.  Iran would most likely be required to: cease all enrichment of uranium and agree to the removal of all enriched uranium from its territory; dismantle its nuclear facility hidden in a mountain near Qum; dismantle its newest generation of centrifuges at Natanz; and, stop construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak.  The request itself would come to Khamenei and other with seniority in the Iranian government as an effort to humiliate the Islamic Republic.

The US and its Western partners have been impressed and inspired by Rouhani’s words and his deeds so far.  Small steps have been taken by the US and Iran to build confidence and trust.  However, the relationship between the two sides has been less than congenial for some time.  The ease at which Rouhani has approached the entire matter perhaps should have been cause for immediate pause. Focusing on his efforts avoids the need for officials in Washington and other Western capitals to look more in-depth at what the Iranians are doing despite claims of being vigilant.  Yet, as discussed here, whether Rouhani very efficiently and effectively pursues a peaceful solution, or falters, may not be relevant in the long run.  Potentially, his efforts may be overcome by Dehghan’s effort to reach the goals of the nuclear energy program.  Iran is so close to breakout capacity at this point that it perhaps would make little sense to turn back.  If not careful, the US and its Western partners may find the next step will not require deciding whether Iran’s nuclear program can continue.  Instead, the next step might actually require deciding on whether a nuclear weapon in the hands of Iran is something that they can accept.

The Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hossein Dehghan