Trump Wants Good Relations with Russia, But if New Options on Ukraine Develop, He May Use One

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). To negotiate with Putin, US President Donald Trump and his advisers recognize that it is important to look well beyond his statements and optics and fully grasp what he wants. Putin seems to have Russia sitting on Ukraine and moving at a deliberate pace on the Minsk peace process. Moving slowly on the peace process has given him an upper hand to a degree, as other parties involved are required to respond to his whims. The Trump administration will unlikely tolerate that. New options are likely being developed.

The ideal geopolitical response to the global power crisis is a connection between US, and Russia. In 2017, the foreign policy efforts of the administration of US President Donald Trump evinced a desire not to isolate Russia, or allow engagement with it to fall off. He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. He believes the US and Russia can be good neighbors on the same planet. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the renowned US foreign policy scholar and former US National Security Adviser, stated that sophisticated US leadership is sine qua non of a stable world order. Finding a way to establish an authentic positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would try to find the solution, and explained that he would give it his best effort. However, critics depicted Trump as being a naïve neophyte, outmatched by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. They warned of the dangers of Trump dealing with the sly, experienced Russian leader. Still, there is a greater reality about the entire situation. While the Trump administration remained outwardly positive about working with Putin, it was not in fact overly optimistic about that. Trump and foreign and national security policy officials in his administration were always well-aware of the fact that Putin and his government can more often than not be disingenuous. Yet, Putin is the duly elected president of Russia, and its head of state. Moreover, for now, Putin is the best leader available to keep Russia’s complex society somewhat stable. He has managed to contain extremist political elements that might seek war with Russia’s neighbors, NATO, or the US directly without thinking it through and he has suppressed morally void organized criminal elements that might wreak havoc globally.

One policy issue on which the administration has found Moscow disingenuous is Ukraine. Kiev is committed to a westward orientation. Yet, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has grabbed Crimea and has invested considerable effort in collecting territory in Eastern Ukraine. Some analysts in the West speculate that he might try to take all of Ukraine eventually through conflict. Ukraine in a particularly bad position vis-à-vis Russia  as it sits as metaphoric low hanging fruit in its “near abroad.” In 2014, it moved into Ukraine and grabbed Crimea. The Minsk Agreement, signed in Minsk, Belarus, on February 12, 2015, was supposed to have established a ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine once signed. However, in the many months since its signing, a succession of violations have occurred in both the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces, and consequently Ukrainian soldiers and pro-Russian separatist fighters have been killed. From the view of Washington, Putin has actually been the one who has figuratively dynamiting the peace process on Ukraine with the help of the armed forces of the self-proclaimed, independent, Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic

To negotiate with Putin, it is important to look beyond his statements and observable actions and fully grasp what he wants. On Ukraine, he seems to have Russia simply sitting on its territory as well as distorting the Minsk peace process. Moreover, by taking that approach, Putin has acquired an upper hand on the matter, requiring  other parties in the peace process to respond to his whims. The Trump administration will unlikely tolerate that. New options for Trump to consider may be developing now. Some them would very likely have been anathema in policy discussions on Ukraine in the administration of US President Barack Obama. As greatcharlie explained in a recent post, when Trump acts on an issue, his goal is to exploit success, preserve his freedom of action on immediate matters, and reduce vulnerability from action by his competitors. He acts in a manner designed to gain advantage, surprise, and momentum over his competitors, achieving results that would normally require far more time and would be more costly to the US. If on Ukraine there is daylight, and a chance for open field running via a new option, Trump may give it consideration. He might even use it. In that vein, Russia should not wait around to see what happens next. It might be best for Moscow to insist on some resolution on Ukraine at the negotiation table, using the Minsk Agreement, or even something different, before there are any considerable changes in the situation there. Equidem ad pacem hortari non desino; quae vel iniusta utilior est quam iustissimum bellum cum civibus. (As for one, I cease not to advocate peace. It may be on unjust terms, even so it is more expedient than the justest of civil wars.)
Map of Ukraine (above). Moscow views Ukraine as being part of its sphere of influence, its “near abroad”, and its hope would be to bring it into Russia’s fold, willing or unwilling. The US and other Western powers support Kiev’s desire to be an independent actor. Long before the mass protests in Kiev began in 2014, circles there were quite pro-Western and welcomed entrées from the EU to take a westward path.

Background on the Ukrainian Conflict

Russia views Ukraine as being part of its sphere of influence, its “near abroad”, and its hope would be to bring it into its fold, willing or unwilling. The US and other Western powers want to support Kiev’s desire to be an independent actor. Long before the mass protests in Kiev began, there were circles in Ukraine that were quite pro-Western and welcomed entrées from the EU for their country to take a westward path. Those circles were the foundation for the Orange Revolution of November 2004 to January 2005 after a questionable result of a November 21, 2004 presidential election run-off vote. Protesters engaged in civil resistance, civil disobedience and strike actions, and took control over Kiev’s main square, called the Maidan. They managed to force a revote through which their candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, won. Many government reforms made during Yushchenko’s term were reversed when the pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych took office in 2010. Opposition political elements and a burgeoning civil society, were already engaged in a simmering political dispute with then President Yanukovych when he turned his back on a Western trade pact in 2014. Pro-European protesters once again took control over the Maidan. The peaceful protesters, who called their movement the Euromaidan Revolution, included participants from a wide spectrum of the society, but were all pro-European and anti-corruption. Violent neo-Nazi and ultra nationalist elements that attempted to insinuate themselves into movement. Their activities included blocking streets and attacking peaceful protesters. For three months, the Euromaidan Revolution protesters endured cold weather and murderous police crackdowns. In the third month, Yanukovych fled to Russia. Perhaps anticipating the fall of Yanukovych or simply implementing Russia’s version of a nuclear option on Ukraine, on February 27, 2014, Moscow rushed into Crimea with unidentifiable “green men”, military forces mainly from Vozdushno-desantnye Voyska Rossii ( Russian Airborne Troops) or VDV and the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. They claimed to be Crimeans. In only a matter of days, Crimea was under Russian control. The US and EU took Putin to task for that bold military operation. Harsh sanctions were levied and Russia was cast out of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies. Putin has held on to the territory and has continued to do so in the face of even tougher sanctions against Russian interests. He levied his own sanctions against US and EU products and even began heavily supporting separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine

However, as the US and EU responded to the Russian occupation of Crimea, another crisis arose in the east of Ukraine, in a region known as Donbass. Pro-Russian separatists in its Donetsk and Luhansk provinces took over entire towns and declare the independence of the territory captured. The Kiev government has sent the Ukrainian Army into those region to reclaim its sovereign territory.  The provinces would eventually declare themselves independent states: the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Western officials insist that Russia has actually been controlling both the civil administration of the self-proclaimed countries as well as the fighting. The Minsk Agreement was intended to create a ceasefire, yet thousands of violations were committed by both sides on a daily basis. The combatants have maintained fighting positions too close to one another. Tanks, mortars, artillery, and multiple launch-rocket systems could be found where they should not have been. Civilians living near the fighting have suffered greatly.
Russian Federation “green men” in Crimea, 2014 (above). Soon after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia. Putin, perhaps anticipating his fall or simply implementing Moscow’s version of a nuclear option on Ukraine, rushed into Crimea with unidentifiable “green men”, military forces mainly from the VDV and GRU. They claimed to be Crimeans. In only a matter of days, Crimea was under Russian control.

The Minsk Agreement

Nulla res carius constat quam quae perilous empta est. (Nothing is so expensive as that which you have bought with pleas.) Under the Minsk Agreement, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, France, and Germany on February 11, 2015, agreed to a package of Measures to mitigate and eventually halt the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. It was a follow-on agreement to the unsuccessful Minsk Protocol, which was crafted to halt the war in Eastern Ukraine and was signed by the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic on September 5, 2014 under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Minsk Agreement’s terms included: an immediate ceasefire; a buffer zone separating heavy weapons of both sides, with a minimum buffer zone of 50km for 100mm artillery and up to 140km for rockets; effective verification by the OSCE; amnesty and release of all hostages and illegally detained people; safe access, storage, delivery, and distribution of humanitarian aid to the needy; restoration of government pensions and other welfare payments for civilians in the east; the restoration of Ukrainian control of the banking system in areas affected by the conflict, pull out of all foreign military formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from Ukraine under OSCE monitoring; the disarmament of illegal groups; full Ukrainian control over the eastern border, after local elections under Ukrainian law. There was supposed to be a constitutional deal on the future of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of 2015 but that went nowhere. The direction which the region may turn will be determined either by the US, EU and Ukrainian Government, intent to keep all of the Donbass in Ukraine, albeit with part of its population reluctant to live under Kiev’s control or by Russia and pro-Russian separatists intent on establishing the region’s independence and tying it umbilically to Moscow. From the additional space in Ukraine he holds, Putin can exert his influence in the region.
Map of Fighting in Eastern Ukraine (above).The direction which Eastern Ukraine may turn will be determined either by the US, EU and Ukrainian Government, intent to keep all of it in Ukraine, albeit with part of its population reluctant to live under Kiev’s control or by Russia and pro-Russian separatists intent on establishing the region’s independence and tying it umbilically to Moscow. From the additional space in Ukraine he holds, Putin can exert his influence in the region.

Russia Has a Unique Perspective on Ukraine

While there is one authentic truth, there are usually at least two sides to every story. Russian perspectives and positions on Ukraine differ from those in Kiev and the capitals of the Western powers. In his answers to questions during a Moscow news conference on January 15, 2018, Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov summed up Moscow’s thinking on Ukraine .Lavrov explained that on a political level, Russia respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine but only within the boundaries that were designed after the referendum in Crimea and its reunification with the Russian Federation. He said Russia believes that it has a rightful claim to parts of Ukraine and need to save ethnic-Russian from harm is legitimate. He called attention to the fact that “By virtue of their referendum people in Crimea achieved independence and joined the Russian Federation of their own free will.” Lavrov also made a distinction between the Minsk Agreements and the Crimea issue. He said: “one has nothing to do with the other.”

Concerning the Minsk Agreement, Lavrov stated that “We  [Russia] are ready and interested in full compliance with the Minsk Agreements.” He pointed out that Putin has repeated that the Minsk Agreement must be implemented in full, without any exceptions. However, Lavrov explained that the problem with the Minsk Agreement is that Ukrainian leaders are not being made to perform tasks as required under the agreement. He indicated that Ukrainian leaders have been simply stalling by slowly mulling over how lines of the document should be read. He believes that as the agreement was formalized by the UN Security Council no room was left for quibbling over its terms. He was certain that allowing this behavior now will give Kiev the impetus to drag its feet when it finally came down to fulfilling the agreement. Lavrov explained that US and European officials have taken note of what he described as a “tactic” by Ukrainian leaders. He also alleged that Western officials have confirmed Kiev is trying to provoke the use of force in what he calls a “stand-off” as a means to divert attention away from their failure to perform the Package of Measures under the Minsk Agreement
Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (above). During a Moscow news conference on January 15, 2018, Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov summed up Moscow’s thinking on Ukraine .Lavrov explained that on a political level, Russia respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine but only within the boundaries that were designed after the referendum in Crimea and its reunification with the Russian Federation.

As for the Ukrainian government, Lavrov has explained that its officials have a lack of respect for international law.  He claimed that that lack of respect for international law was manifested in the actions of those same officials when they organized and supported the Euromaidan Revolution, which he called “Maidan”. An example of that disrespect Lavrov offers was the manner in which then opposition leaders, who Lavrov derisively refers to as “putschists”, reached an agreement with Yanukovych as Ukrainian President. Lavrov made clear that although the foreign ministers of Germany, Poland, and France certified the agreement, one day later, the opposition leaders nullified it. Lavrov further complained that EU foreign ministers had engaged in a deception in cooperation with opposition because the agreement they signed provided for the creation of a government of national accord. However, a “government of winners” was formed instead. Expatiating on events that followed, Lavrov noted that a Congress of People’s Deputies of the Southeast [of Ukraine] and Crimea was held in Kharkov. He noted that the deputies were elected in compliance with the Ukrainian Constitution. He explained that they decided to take control of their regions until law and order were restored in Ukraine. He notes that They did not use force against the opposition. He then pointed to a February 23, 2014 language law, that was never actually enacted, but nonetheless approved by the opposition. Lavrov says the law was a manifestation of the anti-Russian, Russophobic thinking of the opposition. Lavrov went on to explain that on February 26, 2014 [the day before the green men arrived in Ukraine], the opposition authorized that use of force by neo-Nazi and ultra-nationalists of the Right Sector, as well as Islamic militants of Hizb ut-Tahrir and a Wahhabite group to take the Crimean Supreme Council building by storm. Lavrov expressed the view that this further distanced Crimeans from illegitimate authorities in Kiev. He noted that of this was also in violation of international law, particularly the Budapest Memorandum, under which the Ukrainian government agreed not to support xenophobic sentiments  Lavrov stated: “I am convinced that the people of Crimea had no option but to defend their identity, their multi-national and multi-confessional culture against such thugs.”

Regarding the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic, Lavrov explained that the Minsk Agreements refer to some districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Speaking about fulfilment of the commitments, he noted that among the Minsk Agreement’s first requirements, once hostilities have ceased and troops have been withdrawn, is the organization of direct consultations between the government of Ukrainian government and representatives of some districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Lavrov indicated that Kiev claims that it never made that commitment. He noted that Kiev has been resorting to various configurations in talks designed to demonstrate that it has not recognized or interacted with them, but only Russia, Germany, France, and the OSCE. Lavrov held out hope that the situation between Ukraine and Russia would not last. He quoted Putin as saying that “Russian-Ukrainian relations will improve once the Donbass issue is resolved.” Undoutedly, that means when it is resolved on Moscow’s terms. Quidem concessum est rhetoribus ementiri in historiis ut aliquid dicere possint argutius. (Indeed rhetoricians are permitted to lie about historical matters so they can speak more subtly.)
Trump (left) and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly (right). Trump and his advisers have not naively underestimated Putin. The possibility that Putin would not make himself available for deals that would lead to resolutions of disputes and contentious issues that would satisfy the administration was undoubtedly among the big “what ifs” administration officials considered and planned for. Trump and those who could be called the “stone hearts” among his officials have not been surprised by anything Putin has done.

The Trump Administration Enters

Praemonitus, praemunitus. (Forewarned, forearmed.) The Trump administration came into office eager to engage Putin in order to improve relations, but did so with its eyes wide open. Trump’s vision and pronouncement of his intention to engage was wrongly viewed as a pro-Putin deference. Critics predicted disaster if Trump attempted to negotiate on things he did not really understand with the cunning, ruthless Russian leader. Trump also received words of caution about Putin from Members of Congress from his own Republican party. The repeated warnings remind of Act II of William Shakespeare’s The Life and Death of Julius Caesar, in which Caesar dismissed information concerning the conspiracy against him. He rebuffed Calpurnia pleas that he “not stir out of his house” on the Ides of March. He rejected augurers’ claim that the discovery that an animal sacrificed as an offering had no heart was a warning sign. In Act III, Caesar ignored a letter from Artemidorus outlining the conspiracy and identifying the conspirators, and a few lines further down, he was assassinated. The possibility that Putin would not make himself available for deals with Trump that would lead to resolutions of disputes and contentious issues that would satisfy the administration was undoubtedly among the big “what ifs” administration officials considered and planned for. Trump and those who could be called the “stone hearts” among his officials have not been surprised by anything Putin has done. They would hardly be naïve and sentimental about any US adversary or competitor, let alone Russia.

Honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur. (Honorable things, not secretive things, are sought by good men.) The jumping off point for attempting to establish better relations with Russia inevitably became getting clarification and reaching some resolution of the issue of Russia’s meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. The Trump administration wanted answers due to its own concerns and wanted to respond to crushing domestic pressures to find out what happened. Putin was approached by Trump about the 2016 US Presidential Election meddling and the the possibility of rebuilding US-Russian relations and possibly creating a new era cooperation. If things had gone well, the stage would have been set, for better or worse, to move along the road from forgiveness,to acceptance, to restoration, and then rejoicing in Washington and Moscow. However, as sure as when the rain falls from the sky it hits the land, Putin would only offer denials about the meddling. Nevertheless, Trump listened very closely to Putin’s positions and ideas, and developed an understanding of his way of thinking. From those face to face contacts, Trump undoubtedly assessed that getting things done with Putin would require discerning misinformation, maneuvering past distractions, and driving to the heart of matters from which opportunities, open doors, could be found..

On Ukraine, the Trump administration clearly understood that provocative actions would have destabilized an already fragile situation. In addition to Trumps talks with Putin, there have been multiple talks between Tillerson and Lavrov during which Ukraine has been discussed in a fulsome way. Trump has left no doubt that he wanted Russia to leave Ukraine alone, and that is the position that the Russians are hearing from him, Tillerson and all other US officials. Trump gave foreign policy speech in Warsaw that made clear his administration’s objectives and principles. The Trump administration reaffirmed its support of Ukraine. Yet, even before that speech, Russian officials had begun to make claims that Trump’s words and actions were the causality for its attitude and behavior toward the new administration.
Trump (right) listening intently to Putin (left). During Trump’s meetings with Putin, there were friendly smiles and jocund pats on the back. It was a welcome change in US-Russian relations in terms of optics. However, Trump also listened carefully to Putin’s positions and ideas, and developed an understanding of his thinking. From those contacts, Trump assessed that getting things done with Putin would require discerning misinformation, maneuvering past distractions, and driving to the heart of matters from which opportunities, open doors, could be found

Russia’s Off-kilter Approach Toward Its Neighbors

Putin is clearly a clever tactician, but it is unclear whether he is equally shrewd strategist on the global stage. He has served as Russia’s leader as president and prime minister, one could discern through his expressed concepts and intentions, as well as his actions, that he may be leading Russia in retrograde toward the past, albeit  In his effort to maintain his grip on Russia, Putin has resurrected the old systems to control the populace with which he grew up with and is most familiar. That has essentially dragged systems in Russia back to a simulacrum of the Soviet-era domestically and Moscow’s sort of neo-Cold War approach geopolitically. Still, while armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons, Russia may no longer have the capability to be flexible militarily and may be unable to be a decisive superpower in the world.

In two earlier posts, “Military Leaders Discuss Plans to Counter ISIS Beyond the Battlefield: While the West Plans, Russia Conquers ISIS in Syria” and “How Russian Special Forces Are Shaping the Fight in Syria: Can the US Policy on Syria Be Gauged by Their Success?”, greatcharlie mistakenly assessed that Russia entered the war in Syria determined  to shape the war on the ground and the war’s ultimate outcome given the military power it brought to bear on the problem and the sense of exigence expressed by Putin when he declared that Russia needed to act. Putin emphasized that Russia would attack ISIS, eventually driving it and other Islamic militant groups from Syria, and restoring Assad’s control over the country. That was not the case. Over time, it became clear that Russia lacked the capability to do that despite appearing to have the capacity. Russia also demonstrated a lack of will or desire  to do more and to increase its presence in Syria to enable its forces to act decisively. Perhaps one could glean much from what has happened in Syria to examine and assess Putin’s efforts in Ukraine. Despite any shortcomings observed in Russia’sees military performance in Syria, there can still be no doubt that it can still effecrively act as a divisive power. To that extent, Putin has tasked the Russian military and other security services with mission of eroding existing and burgeoning democracies wherever they sees them.

Indeed, as the EU and NATO expanded eastward, Putin decided to pull independent countries that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Russia’s orbit. With the help of the military and security services, Putin would create something that did not preexist in many of those countries: ethnic-Russian communities forcefully demanding secession and sovereignty. That process usually begins with contemptuous murmurs against home country’s identity, language, and national symbols and then becomes a “rebel yell” for secession. It was seen in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and more recently in Crimea, the Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine. Each time an ethnic-Russian space was carved out of a country, Putin gained a base from which he can exert his influence in that country. Still, despite the activities and some successes of pro-Russian political elements, in the larger territories of those former Soviet republics occupied by Russian Federation armed forces and elsewhere in the sphere of the former Eastern Bloc, political thinking of the people of those countries has not turned in agreement with Russia.
Russian tanks withdrawing from Ukraine (above). Mistakenly, greatcharlie assessed that Russia entered the war in Syria determined to shape the war on the ground and the war’s outcome given the military of power it brought to bear on the conflict and exigence expressed by Putin when he declared Russia’s need to act. Over time, it became clear that Russia lacked the capability to act decisively, although appearing to have the capacity. Russia also lacked the will or desire to do so. One might infer much from this with regard to Putin’s efforts in Ukraine.

Where is Russia Really Going with Ukraine?

Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeroter tamquam flosculi decidunt nec simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. (True glory strikes root, and even extends itself; all false pretensions fall as do flowers, nor can anything feigned be lasting.) Many Western military analysts have proffered that Putin’s moves in Ukraine would certainly be followed by many more, to reclaim former Soviet republics and more. Along with the capture of Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Putin’s determination to hold on in Eastern Ukraine served to substantiates such concern. From everything observed, Putin wants to make Russia better. Yet, it is unclear how Putin’s approach on Ukraine fits into his plans to make Russia better. It is unclear how Russia’s capture of Donetsk and Luhansk would do for Russia in any real respect. As mentioned earlier, despite his shortcomings, he is the best authentic option available to lead Russia for now.  Putin restored order in his country after the internal chaos of the 1990s. It was perhaps his initial career as an officer in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB, that made reestablishing the power of the state a central part of his efforts. (The KGB was the Soviet agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security.) Putin has been a figurative mother to Russia, nurturing it in the best way he knows how. That idea might face some disapproval from Russian citizens who feel shortchanged of their civil and human rights, as well as opportunities to fulfill their ambitions, and feel burdened by anxieties. Still, whenever, the metaphoric waves have gotten higher, Putin has kept his ship, Russia, right and steady.

Putin and a Moscow seem to be still playing the great power game in Europe, and happy to play it alone. To an extent, that would support assessments by analysts and scholars in the West who believe Putin sees everything in terms of conspiracy. It may be that the Obama administration’s approach to Ukraine and other former Soviet republics irked Putin to the extent the he is now swinging after the bell colloquially. He may be stirring difficulties due to political expediency, soothing hardliners political elements at home. It is not completely clear why rather than seek agreements and what he feel are advantages from contact with the US, Putin seems determined to get into a scrap with the Trump administration.

If Donetsk and Luhansk were left in the hands of pro-Russian elements, it is questionable whether Russia would become stabilizing force in region along with its newly formed, Russia would be taking on a new, difficult situation akin to those in its Southern and North Caucasian provinces. Any resistance, peaceful or violent, would likely be dealt withh eavy handedly by Russia and its allies. Hopefully, Moscow would not assist security elements of the help Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic cleanse their new provinces of “troublemakers” or “non-citizens”.

Reconstruction in the Donetsk People’s Republic or the Luhansk People’s Republic would require a lot from Russia. Donetsk and Luhansk were net consumers of foreign imports and dependent on Russian gas before the conflict began. They sit in a region that is considered a rustbelt, needing to be refitted at the cost of billions of dollars Moscow may never have. Reconstruction in Eastern Ukraine will be another huge hurdle for Russia to overcome if its “pro-Russian allies” seceded and became Moscow’s “partners.”  Lacking any significant resources from the US and the rest of the international community to rebuild, the only viable long-term goal in Moscow would be to convert the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic into versions of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria. It would likely receive the recognition of very few countries, Russia’s allies, but not the US or major powers of Europe. The two quasi-countries would in many ways be shut off from the rest of the world. and may never see a postwar economic upturn. Observing the effects of few months of rain and wind on the ruins of cities and towns, Moscow might recognize that it truly cannot support them in a way that would allow for their rebuilding. An authentic assessment will be left to the economic experts, but there undoubtedly will be a great additional strain on Russia. The situation would only worsen if pressure was placed on Russia over Ukraine through future sanctions.

Ultra posse nemo obligatur. (No one is obliged beyond what he is able to do.) Putin very likely has considered what Russia would be like after he, as one might presume he accepts, is called to heaven. It would seem that now while on Earth, he is doing much to saddle future generations of Russians with two economically impoverished basket cases that they will need to care for, to pay for. Future generations may not appreciate that. In Donetsk and Luhansk, future generations might abandon their homelands for “the other Ukraine” or points further West. They might pour into Russia, for employment, a “better life.” In the future, a Russian leader might very well try to reverse what Putin is attempting in Ukraine due to financial strains caused. Taking on Donetsk and Luhansk might very well be a great miscalculation, another step toward sealing Russia’s fate as a second tier superpower.

Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia out of his reach, not by some fault of his own, but rather because it’s problems are so heavy, may run too deep. He may have run out of real answers to put Russia on real upward trajectory given the capabilities and possibilities of the country using all tools available to him. In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. To that extent, consciously or unconsciously, Putin may simply be procrastinating, postponing an authentic look at the situation.
US Special Operations troops in Syria (above). The success that the US found in rallying the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS and other Islamic militant groups, as well as its success across the border with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Kurdish Peshmerga against ISIS, may convince the US and Western allies to develop plans for a new initiative regarding Ukraine.

Has Putin Overplayed His Hand on Ukraine?

Culpa par odium exigit. (The offense requires a proportional reaction.) The US and European countries no longer appear ambivalent about committing to the requirements of European security, which in many respects can be costly and risky. The success that the US found in rallying the Syrian Democratic Forces against ISIS and other Islamic militant groups, as well as its success avross the border with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Kurdish Peshmerga aainst ISIS, may convince the US and Western allies to develop plans for a new initiative regarding Ukraine. Rather than have talks on the status of Ukraine remain in stalemate at the negotiation table, one could surmise that the US might organize a vigorous overt and covert training and equipping of Armed Forces of Ukraine, particularly the Ukrainian Ground Forces That may in turn give those forces the capability to independently regain territory claimed by the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Kiev may, on its own volition, make use of its new arms and capabilities to do just that with such speed and power that nothing could be done rapidly in reaction. The Ukrainian Air Force could be used in ways to support friendly ground movement that has never witnessed before. Kiev has not recognized the the rebellious movements in Donetsk and Luhansk. It has not recognized the autonomy or the secession of those provinces. As far as Kiev is concerned, the entire territory of the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces are still Ukraine’s sovereign territory. For Kiev, agreeing under the Minsk Agreement that the borders between Donbass and Russia, and border control must be administered by the Ukrainian government reflected its position, its belief. The US has asked Russia to take its forces out of Ukraine and hand Crimea back to Kiev’s full control. The reality is that getting the Russians out of Crimea, at least in the near term, may be impossible. However, getting them out of Eastern Ukraine is another thing altogether.

Moscow may be willing to seek some resolution on Ukraine at the negotiation table to halt the total collapse of the forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic forces and whatever units the Russian Federation might have mixed in with them. Ukraine is delicate issue in the Kremlin, but Putin and his advisers do not appear too far down the road to recurvate on it. It could be hypothesized that the collapse of pro-Russian forces in Ukraine would not play well politically at home. Rather than sit and bemoan the new situation, Putin may have no choice but to respond to it all in a way akin to the US response during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and be willing to invade Eastern Ukraine to retake that territory. Moscow could again use the argument that it must defend ethnic-Russian in Ukraine by request. Putin has abstained from more vigorous moves against Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In response to the collapse of the two pro-Russian states, Putin, taking an asymmetric approach, could lash out against the Baltics. Yet, all this being stated, Russia may not be so certain that it could sufficiently respond militarily, extrapolating from what was observed in Syria.

Again, the modest performance of Russian forces on the ground in Syria, in the aggregate, would seem to support the idea that they are ineffective, that they lack real capabilities in many areas. Nevertheless, committing them, despite deficiencies and possible losses, could still put Moscow in a better position to negotiate a satisfactory settlement ultimately. Nullum bellum suscipi a civitate optima nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute. (A war is never undertaken by the ideal state, except in defense of its honor or its safety.)

Ukrainian Ground Forces (above). Rather than cope with deadlocked talks on Ukraine, one could imagine the US organizing a vigorous overt and covert training and equipping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. That may in turn give those forces the capability to independently, on its own volition, retake most or all of Eastern Ukraine now in the hands of pro-Russian separatists with such tempo and power that nothing could be rapidly done in reaction.

The Way Forward

In Act IV, scene ii of William Shakespeare’s The Life and Death of King John, John has already ordered the death of his nephew Arthur, who Philip, the King of France believes to be the rightful heir to the throne. As the play opens, messenger tells John that Philip insists that he abdicate to open the throne to Arthur or he will go to war with John to attain it for him. John thinks killing Arthur will solve his problems. but two of John’s followers and counselors, Salisbury and Pembroke, believe that killing Arthur would actually compound his problems. They saw no threat posed by Arthur and were concerned with the people’s reaction to killing him. In the scene, Pembroke tells Salisbury: “When workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness; And oftentimes excusing of a fault Doth make the fault the worse by the excuse, As patches set upon a little breach Discredit more in hiding of the fault Than did the fault before it was so patch’d. The US and EU can readily explain that they took Putin to task for that bold military operation. Certainly, one can assign reasons for the effort to include some of the following: to create a wider buffer with the West; to prevent Ukraine’s entry into NATO as no country occupied by Russian Federation armed forces has successfully done so; to secure territory with force in accord with terms of a geopolitical division of Eastern Europe to which NATO agreed in the 1990s; “to rescue” ethnic-Russian space in Donetsk and Luhansk from the violence of Ukrainian nationalists; or to set the stage for a much bigger military move elsewhere in Europe. The list could go on. Yet, regardless of their accuracy or fallaciousness, it is unclear how his current tact, for whatever reason, will genuinely benefit Russia in the long-term. Through both the Minsk peace process and multi level diplomatic efforts, the Trump administration has sought a mutually agreeable, sustainable solution on Ukraine. Still, Putin apparently sees no benefit to these extertions. In fact, he appears to be doubling up on his initial poor decision to make claim to Ukrainian territory. Such behavior was once referred to among US military thinkers as “reinforcing stupidity.”  Cutting closer to the bone, it all seems to be a display of power and pride by the Russian leader. Desire should obey reason, and wisdom for that matter. Being able to swing from the chandeliers, surging with power, is not satisfaction. Power without wisdom invariably collapses beneath its own weight. Kiev’s efforts along with those of the US and Western powers have gone nowhere. Harsh sanctions were levied and Russia was cast out of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies. Putin has held on to the territory and has continued to do so in the face of even tougher sanctions against Russian interests. Putin levied his own sanctions against US and EU products and began more heavily supporting separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine

Putin must realize that he is no longer dealing with Obama. Under Trump, decision making on Ukraine will unlikely linger in the halls of inaction. It is difficult to determine what the US and EU could really achieve or gain from exerting further pressure against Russia over Ukraine through sanctions in the future. Putin is not budging. The hopes of some that a resolution could be found through the Minsk peace process are being shattered by Moscow. The Armed Forces of Ukraine should not be viewed a spent force. New US and EU efforts to train and equip its combat elements could change the equation on the ground dramatically. Kiev may soon be presented with new choices. Not to play into the most paranoid ruminations of some Kremlin officials, Kiev, determined to secure it sovereign territory,  it may take more robust and effective military action. While the opportunity and time exists, preparations and decisions on military movements should yield now to more robust and efficacious diplomatic efforts. Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alternum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. (While there are two ways of contending, one discussion, the other by force, the former belonging properly to a man, the later to beasts, recourse must be had to the latter if there be no opportunity for employing the former.)

Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?

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Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (left) with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (right). Putin wants to keep the Republic of Belarus within his country’s sphere of influence. Yet, due to regional security concerns, Belarus has gained new importance in the West. Lukashenko, once called Europe’s last dictator, is being approached by the EU and US. He has responded by trying to strengthen ties with them. Some Western analysts conclude Putin will not react well to this development. However, Belarus’s ties to the EU could actually enable its ally Russia to circumvent sanctions through a creative trade arrangement.

According to an October 29, 2016 article in the New York Times entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters,” dozens of demonstrators held a gathering in front of the headquarters building of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB in Minsk to commemorate the 1937 execution of over 100 members of the Belarusian intelligentsia under the orders of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Josef Stalin. The demonstrators also protested continuing repression in Belarus.  The demonstration was not authorized, however the police did not interfere. The annual commemoration provides the Belarusian public a rare opportunity to show disapproval for the government led by President Alexander Lukashenko. Nikolai Statkevich ran against Lukashenko in the 2010 Belarusian Presidential Election and was imprisoned for five years afterward. The New York Times article quoted him as stating: The fear of repression haunts Belarus as before. Today’s authorities are ideological heirs of those times.”

The EU and US now seem to be approaching Lukashenko with outstretched arms. Lukashenko, once the target of profound obloquy in the West and whose government was called “Europe’s last dictatorship” in 2005 by then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is now covered with good words to the extent that his past iron fisted actions have nearly been cloaked. Belarus, in response to EU and US overtures, has engaged in a vigorous effort to curry favor and strengthen ties with them. The question of whether Lukashenko can genuinely recurvate westward after being oriented so long toward Russia has been responded to by some EU leaders with rather Delphine statements.

Putin wants Belarus to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. He wants to keep Belarus in the Central Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some Western foreign and defense policy analysts would quickly point out that Lukashenko has never been disposed to completely subordinating the interests of Belarus to that of Russia, or of the West for that matter. Pedictably, those Western analysts have concluded Putin, their bête noire, likely perceives Lukashenko as being disloyal, and suggest that he could react aggressively. Such analyses simply signal a fear of Russian military power. They also signal a fear that when the interests of any country in Russia’s sphere of interest is detectably at odds with those of the Kremlin, a “second Crimea” may be in the making. Crimea happened. Putin acted aggressively. However, Crimea should not be the baseline to gauge Putin’s thinking and actions going forward. Putin does not act impulsively; he acts with purpose. He can well-distinguish between what he wants for the moment and what he wants most. Putin does not want to have Russia defined as a rogue country with a military that is nothing more than an army of conquest. Having built solid relations with Minsk, especially with regard to security, for over a score of years, it is hard to imagine Moscow attempting to militarily intimidate or actually attack Belarus over its contacts with the EU. Extrapolations perpetuating such notions are counterintuitive. In fact, Putin has hardly reacted. He may very well recognize some potential in his ally’s new EU contacts for Russia to circumvent economic sanctions via a creative trade arrangement.

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Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. When Putin took office, he viewed Russia’s relations with Belarus as unsatisfactory and improved them. Belarus’s strategic importance to Russia increased following regional events such as NATO’s creep into the post-Soviet space, and the “Color Revolutions.” Belarus and Russia have had a few political and economic rows. Still, the two countries are staunch allies.

Belarus: In Brief

The Republic of Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. Its capital is Minsk. While the borders of Belarus were set at the end of World War II, they were shaped mostly when some territory of the Second Polish Republic was reintegrated into them after the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. During World War II, Belarus lost about a third of its population and more than half of its economic resources. The Soviet Union redeveloped the republic in the post-war years. On July 27, 1990, the Parliament of the Belarus declared the republic’s sovereignty, and on August 25, 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus declared itself an independent country. Since 1994, Alexander Lukashenko has served as the President of Belarus. His leadership was widely criticized in the West. Lukashenko perpetuated a number of Soviet-era policies, to include state ownership of large sections of the economy. For years, political opposition was violently suppressed. Elections in Belarus were declared rigged by the international community.  The country’s rating under The Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index was the lowest in Europe until 2014. Freedom House assessed Belarus under Lukashenko as “not free.”  It was labelled “repressed” in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. In the Press Freedom Index for 2016 of Reporters Without Borders, it was ranked 157th out of 180 countries.

Belarus’s Ties to Russia

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly formed Russian Federation tried to control the post-Soviet space by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991. However, Belarus, much as other republics in the CIS, began drifting away from Russia, which at that time was attempting to cultivate Western relations and save its broken economy. In the early 1990s, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was concerned that his country’s involvement with Belarus might put its bridge building efforts with the West at risk. Yet, while Russia was fixed on improving relations, Western capitals discerned Russia’s inability to act effectively. NATO began to expand east. Stung and threatened by what he perceived as an effort by the West to isolate it from the European environment by grabbing up Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics, Yeltsin sought to improve ties with Belarus. Relations between the two countries became so congenial that in the mid-1990s, following Lukashenko’s rise to power, Yeltsin concluded Belarus would be an ideal candidate for integration with Russia. After signing the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation with Belarus, Yeltsin declared that “the two nations [had] shared a common historical experience over many centuries.” That, he explained, “created the basis for signing the treaty and other documents on deeper integration of our two countries. Among all CIS countries, Belarus has the greatest rights to such a relationship due to its geographical location, its contacts with Russia, our friendship and the progress of its reforms.” One year after April 2, 1996 when the integration process was launched, the Union of Belarus and Russia was established. It culminated with the founding of the Union State between Belarus and Russia on December 8, 1999. When Putin took office, he determined that the status of the relations with Belarus was unsatisfactory and criticized the Union State Treaty. He sought to put real content into it. He formulated a policy genuinely directed at realizing unification. His proposal was to complete unification either in a federation model which meant that Belarus would join the Russian Federation, or build a union which is similar to the EU. However, Belarus rejected those approaches and there was no change. Still, Putin did not abandon the idea of unification completely. The next goal became integration. The strategic importance of Belarus to Putin increased as a result of international events, to include. NATO’s activity in the post-Soviet space; the decision of many Eastern European countries to orient westward; a US plan to deploy a missile defense system in Poland or the Czech Republic; and, the “Color Revolutions.”

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Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of Belarus’s purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Disagreements over profits and payments from the energy trade led to the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 row, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed Belarus owed Russia $200 million in gas arrears for that year. Belarus demanded transit fees owed by Russia. The matter was resolved and went away.

Considering that integration with Belarus would be costly, it is reported that Moscow sought to maximize gains from it. Its goals became to reduce the economic burden which Belarus laid on its economy, and to take over Belarus’s energy transit infrastructure. That tack spurred many of the political and economic rows. Among those conflicts was a disagreement that arose when Lukashenko accused Russia of offering a $500 million loan to Minsk on the condition that it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lukashenko angrily retorted that the position of Belarus was not for sale. Regarding the close military cooperation between Belarus and Russia, Lukashenko compared Belarus’s population of 10 million people as a human shield for Russia against the West. That service, he said, “was not free.” The Milk War erupted in July 2009 when Russia banned all dairy imports from Belarus, explaining that they did not comply with new regulations. Belarus accused Russia of using the ban for political reasons, but Russia denied that. In a statement presented by his press service, Lukashenko lashed out, stating: “Economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus’s closest CSTO ally is trying . . . to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?” Lukashenko acted by refusing to attend the 2009 CSTO summit in Moscow. The CSTO, Putin’s counterweight to NATO, groups Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in a security arrangement. Shortly afterward, Russia lifted the ban and Belarus resumed importing of dairy products to Russia. Additionally, there were the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 Gas War, a dispute arose over a claim by Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed that Belarus owed $200 million in Russia gas arrears for supplies it had used that year. Belarus then demanded transit fees owed by Russia. A resolution was found and the matter quietly went away.

The EEU is an economic integration bloc of post-Soviet republics. It succeeded the erstwhile Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in January 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU later that year. The bloc coordinates policies of its member states in key industries. In that spirit of coordination, the argument between Belarus and Russia over the price of natural gas was resolved, although the two sides have apparently not yet reached a consensus on the scale of the price discount (if any) or the mechanism of its delivery to Belarus. Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of its purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Of Belarus’s overall exports, 39 percent is directed to Russia. Those imports from Belarus totaled only $10.4 billion. For the most part it sells Russia value-added goods in return. Aside from trucks and industrial machines, Belarus sells processed foods. A network of Belarusian grocery stores operates in major Russian cities.

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Above is an assembly line at the Minsk Motor Plant. Nearly a third of Belarus’s overall trade is with its second largest trading partner, the EU. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU has withdrawn trade preferences for Belarus, the potential to greatly expand trade exists.

The Strong Military Linkage Between Belarus and Russia

Although there have been some setbacks in the political and economic integration of Belarus and Russia, the military-integration process between them has been successful. Cooperation with Belarus fits snuggly within Putin’s vision for geopolitical order in the post–Cold War world. Putin has never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. It was practically guaranteed that Putin would push back against what he might call an intrusion into Russia’s near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. The term was reportedly popularized by former Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s. For centuries, Russia has sought to ensure its physical security through its control over neighboring territory. For Putin, the term represents a concept akin to the Monroe Doctrine.

On February 14, 2013 at a conference entitled “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they conclude the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. The Kremlin has accepted the threat assessment of the the Russian Federation General Staff. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. To rehearse the defense against the West, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced massive strategic military exercises Zapad 2017, scheduled to take place in September 2017. He said that the joint exercise, which would include Russian and Belarusian forces, will be the “main military event of 2017.” Further, the two countries armed forces will cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken.

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Belarus (shaded in green), Russia (shaded in violet), and their neighbors. Providing a glimpse of the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, on February 14, 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, explained the depletion of oil, gas and other natural resources will become an ultimate world crisis by 2030. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade Russia from several directions to grab its land and resources. Lukashenko insists that Belarus will remain part of Russia’s defense.

Ubi concordia, ibi victoria! (Where there is unity, there is victory.) To a great degree, Russian and Belarusian regional security approaches have been harmonized. Lukashenko has pledged that Belarus will be an integral part of the Russian Federation’s defense. Indeed, he has gone as far as to say that the army of Belarus, the modernization of which was nearly completed, was ready to defend Russia’s western border. According to RIA Novosti, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russian western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.” Lukashenko has referred to the Belarus population as 10 million human shields in the defense of Russia. Lukashenko further stated that the Belarusian Army will be able to show resistance to any aggressor.  Prior to those statements, Lukashenko told the Belarus Parliament that he would not allow the country’s opposition to depict Russia in the image of an enemy. Lukashenko declared to the Belarus Parliament: “The Russians are our brothers, with whom we have been living for a very long time.”

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Putin (right) and Russian Federation Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu (left). Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. Shoigu announced that massive military exercises would be held by Russia and Belarus in 2017 to rehearse their joint defense against the West.

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine into law. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. It views Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

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Belarusian troops (above). Following deliberations in Parliament, Lukashenko signed Belarus’s new military doctrine into law. The doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, but it is apparent that NATO is deemed the greatest military threat. Accordingly, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russia western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.”

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

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Belarusian special forces in training (above). In the new Belarusian military doctrine, emphasis is placed on trends associated with the development of the concept of “Color Revolutions,” and methods aimed at provoking internal conflicts to destabilize the country and violate its territorial integrity. A year ahead of the doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko directed his government to further develop special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems: elements best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations.

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. Officials there view Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

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The EU welcomed Lukashenko’s desire to have Belarus play a constructive role in the region by hosting four-party peace negotiations on Ukraine, as well as his decision to maintain political distance from Russia over Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. EU ministers have encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They have held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Still, many wonder if Lukashenko’s efforts are authentic.

Minsk and Brussels: A Rapprochement?

Some experts have said that it was Lukashenko who began making overtures to the West following Russia’s seizure of Crimea, considerable economic troubles in Belarus, and a degree of instability in Eastern Europe. He managed to grab the attention oF EU leaders in a positive way when he decided to free a number of political prisoners and host multiparty mediations in Minsk for the cease-fire in neighboring Ukraine. EU governments, claiming that they based their decision on content and merit of Lukashenko’s efforts, suspended sanctions on Belarus’s leaders in October 2014. In February 2015, EU foreign ministers terminated sanctions, removing asset freezes and travel bans on 170 officials, including Lukashenko. Three Belarusian companies were also taken off the EU blacklist. The EU maintains an arms embargo and sanctions against four people suspected of being involved in the disappearance of dissidents in the 1990s. Lukashenko responded by intensifying fence mending efforts with the West. As of late, Belarusian diplomats have been pouring considerable energy in enhancing their country’s relations with the West, hoping to capitalize on Belarus’ newfound importance for regional stability. Their approach is bicameral. On the one hand, they seek to develop bilateral cooperation with specific EU countries. On the other hand, they want to develop cooperation with the EU as an institution focusing on the Eastern partnership, a dialogue on modernization, and visa issues. Lukashenko’s current perspective of the EU appears to be reflected in his statements in favor of dialogue with it.  On March 5, 2016, Lukashenko explained: “The Europeans . . . are ready to cooperate with us, including for the sake of security in Europe. We say to them that we’re always open to [talking].” EU and US delegations continue to visit Minsk, but results have been thin. The US has expressed hope not only for improved cooperation on trade, but also on non-proliferation and combating human trafficking.

Praetio prudentia praestat. (Prudence supplies a reward.) Commenting on Belarus, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, remarked, “This is clearly not a rosy or perfect picture . . . but when we see significant, even if limited steps, in what we feel is the right direction, we feel it is right to encourage them.” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke of the “beginnings” of a thaw with Belarus, and concluded, “It’s worth testing in such a situation how much willingness and reciprocity there is on the Belarus side.” Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski told reporters, “This is an experiment.” He went on to state: “As a neighbor of Belarus, we are pleased as we hope this will improve relations with the EU and of course with Poland.” While the EU leaders allege they had no intention of prying Belarus from Putin’s hand, that nonetheless was viewed as possible. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. Indeed, in a statement, the EU ministers encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Lukashenko will take what is offered, but what he really wants from EU countries is financial assistance. Belarus’s international reserves are at the lowest since 2011. Although there has been some direct private investment from the US in Belarus, its development has been relatively slow given the uncertain pace of reform. The US has encouraged Belarus to conclude and adhere to agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the program of macroeconomic stabilization and related reform measures. As of this writing, the International Monetary Fund is still deciding whether it should provide Belarus with a $3 billion, 10-year loan.

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Above are Russian “green men” in Ukraine. In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces, has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations.  Western analysts still insist that Belarus faces the threat of hybrid warfare from Russia. They conclude that Moscow will monitor Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any signs of a serious loosening of ties with Russia.

Are Problems Between Belarus and Russia Becoming Inexorable?

Ad connectendas amicitas, tenacissimum vinculum est morum similitudo. (For cementing friendship, resemblance of manners is the strongest tie.) At the Third Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions on June 9, 2016, Putin explained: “In a collaborative effort, Russia and Belarus work to deepen integration processes in Eurasia. As members of the Union State, we are carrying out about 40 programs and are jointly developing advanced technology programmes, primarily, for the aerospace industry, satellite navigation, geological exploration, and agriculture.” Putin further stated: “We are forming the Eurasian Economic Union’s common market for goods, services, capital, and labour, thereby facilitating sustainable economic growth of the member countries and enhancing the competitiveness of our producers on domestic and foreign markets.”  

Some interesting statements have been made by Belarusian officials concerning their country’s security relationship with Russia. There is the example of Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov, who, speaking on February 23, 2016, stated that security of the country relied also on military cooperation not only with Russia and members of the CSTO. He also underlined Minsk’s “strategic” military cooperation with China and “aspiration to develop a constructive dialogue with NATO in order to strengthen international and regional security.” An interview of Belarus’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei with the Polish daily, Rzeczpospolita, on October 17, 2016, has been called significant because it was titled “We Are Not Dependents of Russia.” In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations. When Shoigu announced that a “joint military organization of the Union State” would be created starting in 2016, including notional unification of the two countries’ armed forces, it appeared Belarus-Russia military ties were further strengthening. Yet, in the West, it was viewed by some analysts as a unilateral statement by Russia, and an effort to save face and show the world that the relationship was still intact. Western analysts note that there was no comment from Belarus on the joint military organization of the Union State. There is a perception in the West that Russia routinely announces joint initiatives with Belarus which have not been endorsed by Minsk. When an announcement of a joint air defence system was made in Russia, Belarus did not comment on it, at least publicly. Reportedly, that same week, Belarus TV broadcasted an extended feature on the country’s Air Defense Troops without once mentioning the new military agreement with Russia. Although the general in charge of the Belarusian Air Force has been nominated as the commander for the “joint system,” Western analysts saw the move simply as a face-saver for Minsk. The lack of reaction by Belarus was said to signal Minsk’s disapproval of the effort by Moscow to control the provision of its security. When Belarus needed to purchase modern fighter aircraft to upgrade its ageing air force, Moscow announced instead that Belarus would be hosting a Russian airbase. Western analysts insist that Moscow pressured Lukashenko for the airbase. However, he insisted upon and arranged the aircraft purchase.

Alter ipso amicus. (A friend is another self.) Some Western analysts have concluded that Russia will observe Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any serious threat to its ties. Yet, that idea conflicts with the reality that Putin considers Belarus to be an integral part of Russia’s geopolitical and cultural space. Moscow has invested heavily in preserving and increasing its influence in the country. Lukashenko has no plans to have Belarus abandon Russia. If some drop in the strength of Belarus’s ties to Russia has occurred, it is negligible.From 2008 to 2010, Putin neither acted violently nor took a hostile tone toward what he perhaps regarded as a recalcitrant, yet typical Lukashenko, with his dalliance toward the West and he has no intentions of reacting aggressively toward Belarus now. Putin knows Lukashenko could never stand by wistfully in the face of Russian decisions impacting Belarus. Putin would never allow Russia to be directed by a foreign capital either. Clashing with Lukashenko is the last thing Putin would want. This may especially be true because Belarus might be able to provide Putin with the possibility to overcome EU sanctions related to Ukraine.

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Moldova, just as Belarus, is not subject to EU sanctions. Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin has proposed that Moldova allow Russia to move its goods into a “European zone” in the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia as a way for Russia to circumvent EU imposed sanctions. As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have the its goods sold to the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions.

Putin’s Possible Move Regarding Belarus?

US and EU sanctions against Russia over Crimea’s annexation will not go away unless Russia returns the region to Ukraine. Russian Federation Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev remarked at a press conference on November 11, 2016, “Our position is that sanctions will remain unchanged.” Just as the Baltic States were never recognized as part of the Soviet Union by the West. Crimea will always be recognized as part of Ukraine, not Russia. As it was explained in the September 30, 2016 greatcharlie.com post entitled “Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action,” Russia is well-aware that cooperation stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of a border by improving conditions for free trade and exchange. Inter-border cooperation is understood to be a prerequisite of broader integration processes and improving relations between neighboring countries. It can serve as a mechanism for coping with the challenges and jolts resulting from the new divisions created between EU and EEU countries.

As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have its goods sold in the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions. Much as with oil and gas pipelines, Belarus would essentially serve as a relay or refining point for Russian goods targeted for Western markets. For that to even become a possibility, it would certainly be in Russia’s interest to see Belarus improve its relations with the EU, particularly with regard to trade and investment. Belarus could be handsomely remunerated with percentages of profits made or perhaps with greater subsidies on imports of Russian resources. There are certainly limits to the level of Russian products Belarus could absorb for sale to the West. Resale of Russian goods at value added prices would murder the project. Russia certainly could not attempt to move goods into EU countries via Belarus at a level equal to anything it might achieve by trading with them directly. Moscow and Minsk would surely set parameters for the bilateral deal. However, the smallest level would surely be far more than Russia could sell as long as sanctions are in place. Trading an EEU partner’s goods externally in this manner may very well be covered in the economic bloc’s trade provisions. Beyond profit, benefits of this trade arrangement would include: the preservation of Belarus’ brotherly relationship with Russia; Lukashenko’s would have no need to be concerned that the sovereignty of Belarus and its interests were not being respected; and, collective arrangements with Russia such as EEU and CSTO will remain intact. Indeed, Belarus would remain in Russia’s sphere of interest. Note that Belarus is among the few states in Europe that has not asked for membership in the EU. While Belarus has strove for better contacts with EU lately, it has simultaneously sought to further its economic and political ties with Russia.

In many ways, this hypothetical trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia would resemble the creative arrangement Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin proposed for trade with Moldova. Moldova is not subject to EU sanctions. Thus, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia and avoid restrictions. A trade arrangement of this type between Belarus and Russia would also resemble the Outward Processing Trade regime that the EU introduced for Belarus. That regime raised import quota amounts for textiles and clothing manufacturers within the EU thus allowing them to produce garments in Belarus that will return to the EU after processing. Additionally, the arrangement would resemble the somewhat awkward way in which some Belarusian firms have been relabelling food from EU countries and selling them in Russia thereby avoiding Russian sanctions. Probae est in segetem sunt deteriorem datae fruges, tamen ipsae suaptae enitent. (A good seed, planted even in poor soil, will bear rich fruit by its own nature.)

What Might Encourage Putin and Lukashenko to Take This Course?

What might encourage Lukashenko and Putin to seek this arrangement is the fact that after Russia, the main trading partner of Belarus is the EU. Nearly, a third of the country’s overall trade is with the EU. That trade could most likely be expanded with a nuanced cultivation. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU withdrew its trade preferences to Belarus under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences in 2007 in response to Belarus’ violations of the core principles of the International Labour Organization, exports from Belarus to the EU did not cease. The decision only required Belarus to pay import tariffs at the standard non-preferential rate. Trade was also promoted through the Outward Processing Trade regime,which was mentioned earlier.

Lukashenko stands on terrain high enough to survey the liabilities involved in moving closer to the West. Voices in the West have indicated that not all are impressed with Lukashenko’s positive words and a perceived unwarranted rapprochement to Belarus. Even when EU ministers decided to lift most sanctions against Belarus in 2015, they said concern remained “with the situation of human rights in Belarus.” Ministers called on Minsk to abolish the death penalty and implement Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) recommendations on democracy before the 2015 Belarusian Parliamentary Elections. An OSCE report said October’s election showed Belarus had a “considerable way go to” on democratic standards, noting the absence of safeguards against multiple voting, limited choice available to voters and the uneven playing field between Lukashenko and his political opponents. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, Mikloś Haraszti, stated after the 2015 Belarusian Presidential Election that he had seen no changes in “the dismal human rights situation.” Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might inadvertently trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

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Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. However, Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

The Way Forward

In William Shakespeare’s comedy, All’s Well That Ends Well, Helena, a physician’s daughter, chooses to marry Bertram, a man of high social position in the French court, but he rejects her love. In response, Helena engages in a plot to wed Bertram by employing what has come to be known as the “Bed Trick.” As she begins to execute her plan in Act 3, Scene 7, Helena states: “Why, then tonight, Let us assay our plot: which, if it speed, Is wicked meaning in lawful act; Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact: But let’s about it.” A trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia as outlined here will likely cause discomfort for those who reasonably demand compliance with imposed sanctions. There is nothing inherently wrong with finding and exploiting a loophole in a regulation, business contract, or sanctions. One must have the will to seize the opportunity.

As the leader of a world power, Putin fully understands that his policies should make the Russian people hopeful for the future, not anxious or intimidated. Negative outlooks only advertise the limits one has. Reacting negatively to growing Euro-Belarus ties would not be useful. Inter-border cooperation has greatly assisted in harmonizing domestic policy priorities and international and regional security issues between Belarus and Russia. Inter-border cooperation between Belarus and Russia, albeit from different perspectives, is a prerequisite for improving the relations of both countries with the EU. (The EU is drawing closer to Belarus due to the nature of its ties to Russia. Russia may move closer to Belarus to exploit its improved ties to the EU.) Belarus is already a priority for Russia’s diplomatic, military, political, and economic resources. If Putin senses that he can, with Lukashenko’s cooperation, exploit the rapprochement between the EU and Belarus to circumvent imposed sanctions, that tack could eventually be accepted by Moscow as a mechanism for coping with problems stemming from the divisions between EU and EEU countries. 

Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action

cq373omweaey4-xA September 16, 2016 Wall Street Journal editorial explained the West should give greater concern to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s intentions in Moldova. It points to a referendum in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria calling for annexation by Russia. That referendum along with recent political unrest and mass protests (as seen above) make Moldova appear ripe for conquest. Russia is trying to create greater ties in Moldova, but its efforts should not be misconstrued as a prelude to hybrid warfare. Western analysts must overcome the predilection of viewing any Russian moves westward as a step toward war.

According to a September 13, 2016 Wall Street Journal editorial entitled “Putin’s Next Target,” while Western attention has been fixed in Ukraine as the field of Russian aggression in Europe, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is turning its attention to Moldova, where Moscow controls a breakaway territory called Transnistria. The editorial explains that a referendum was held in Transnistria on the 10th anniversary of its establishment in which 97.3 percent of residents demanded to be annexed by Russia. Transnistria’s president, Evgeniy Shevchuk further marked the occasion by issuing a decree asking Russia for full annexation, and announcing the formation of a committee to provide a plan for the harmonization of Transnistria law with Russian law by November. The Wall Street Journal editorial says the matter bears attention “less another Russian power play comes to pass.”

While the editorial notes Putin has been reticent about the decree, it also explains Putin has been flexing his military muscles in Transnistria. Drills were conducted by the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping force in Transnistria both in 2015 and 2016. Although Moscow promised in 2002 to remove its contingent of about 1,000 peacekeepers they remained in the territory. The Wall Street Journal surmises that those exercises and Shevchuk’s annexation decree may indicate Putin is testing the climate in the West for a potential next move. In response the Wall Street Journal says US and European leaders must telegraph that any effort to make permanent Russia’s occupation of Transnistria will be treated as an illegal encroachment on Moldovan sovereignty and trigger sanctions.

Evidence may exist within certain parameters to support the view of the Wall Street Journal that Moldova might be ripe for Putin’s taking. Western analysts, who think in line with the Wall Street Journal, have expressed concern that a prospective effort by Russia to take Moldova would come in the form of hybrid warfare—the blend of unidentified troops, propaganda and economic pressure. In addition to maintaining forces on Moldovan territory, for almost a year, pro-Russian political parties who receive support from Moscow, albeit along with considerable support from pro-EU, pro-Romanian parties, helped to organize mass anti-government protests which in 2015 and 2016 have involved tens of thousands of participants. The protests started after the three Molovan banks that had kept social security funds somehow lost $1 billion prior in November 2014. Pro-Russian political parties have also played a part in organization anti-government demonstrations, particularly in 2016. Throw on top everything the fact that Moldova as one of the poorest European countries has to deal with the pressing issues of overwhelming poverty, corruption, an inefficient legal system and widespread workforce migration to Russia and the EU. It may very well be true that Putin senses the West now lacks the determination to forcefully ensure its interests. Perhaps the West is doing less than it should to dissuade Russia from acting wherever it sees fit. Former Soviet republics and new Member States of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe fear the military might of Russia.

There are a number of analysts in the US and EU who have surmised that for the near future Russia will exercise restraint due to its weak economy, isolation from the West, and concerns that it would over-commit its military forces. Still, far more sense they have the advantage over Russia, and express a degree of certainty over what Putin’s intentions are. Concerning Moldova, that may account for what colloquially would be called a knee-jerk response to a more nuanced situation. The predilection of analysts to view any moves by Russia westward to establish greater political, economic, or military ties to a country as a prelude to war must be overcome. That will allow for more rationale policy approaches and more efficacious moves by the US, EU, and NATO. Acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat. (The mind intent upon false appearances refuses to admit better things.)
moldaviaMoldova was carved from Romania’s Bessarabia Province in 1940 by the Soviet Union as a consequence of its non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. After declaring its independence from the Soviet Union, power shifted between the Communist Party which has sought a strong linkage with Russia, and pro-Romanian, pro-European parties which have advocated for EU membership. Since 2009, efforts have been made to move westward, but a final choice on which way to turn has not been made.

Moldova: In Brief

In 1940, Moldova was carved from Romania’s Bessarabia Province by the Soviet Union as a consequence of its non-aggression agreement with Nazi Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. Since then, Moldova has been home to three main ethnic groups, Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians. When Moldova became an independent country, power shifted between the Communist Party which has as a custom sought a strong linkage with Russia, and pro-European parties that have advocated for EU membership. In 2009, pro-European parties took firm control in Chisinau, and in 2014, Moldova signed of an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade to deepen political ties with Brussels and gradually integrate Moldova into the European Common Market. Exports increased, the economy grew, and, in response to reforms, including improving human rights, Moldovan citizens were entitled to travel visa-free into the EU. However, corrupt politics and a confusing, mazelike, parliamentary structure made it nearly impossible for Chisinau to recurvate in order to meet the requirements of EU ascension. After those initial days of change, little was done after to open up the country’s economy and its institutions. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries. Low incomes cause hundreds of thousands of Moldovans to seek a better life abroad.

Many Moldovans still look to the EU for answers. It accounts for the fact that the majority Moldovan voters in the past three parliamentary elections since 2009 have opted for liberal, pro-Western, and albeit, pro-Romanian governments. In that vein, many officials in Chisinau see Romania as a vital counterweight to Russian influence. Bucharest is generally recognized on the international stage as a representative of Moldova’s interests in the network of international organizations, as well as a source of financial air and the know-how necessary for the implementation of reforms. However, other Moldovans instead believe prosperity lies with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. The gap between social and political forces in the country progressively widened. Both sides seem to have temporarily united in response to the average Moldovans’ resentment toward the elite, the oil oligarchs. The disappearance of $1 billion from the country’s banks stoked that frustration. It well-illustrated the failure of Moldova’s leaders to protect their citizens’ interests. The news spread and caused the depreciation of the local currency, the leu.  Price increases and soaring interest rates were accompanied by the loss of purchasing power of the local population Official sources report that in 2015, the average salary in Moldova was just $250. Public finances were battered by the bail-out required to stabilize the banks. Occasio aegre offertur, facile amittitur. (Opportunity is offered with difficulty, lost with ease.

street_marketMoldovan street vendors (above). In 2009, pro-European parties took firm control. in Chisinau, and in 2014, Moldova signed of an EU Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade to deepen ties with Brussels and integrate Moldova into the European Common Market. Exports increased, the economy grew, and, in response to reforms, including improving human rights, Moldovan citizens were able to travel visa-free into the EU. Yet, after those initial days of change, little more was done to open up the country’s economy and institutions. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries.

In the spring of 2015 citizens already fed up with the disappearance of $1 billion from Moldovan banks, corruption, poverty, and immigration problems for twenty-five years since the breakaway from the Soviet Union, engaged in large-scale protests country-wide. The protests were organized in the Dignity and Truth Platform Party that was established in February 2015, particularly in response to the theft of funds from the banks. Dignity and Truth, has been led by lawyers, journalists, and members of Moldovan civil society. It sharply has criticized the authorities and simultaneously has supported the formation of an authentic pro-EU reformist government and pushing for the country’s EU integration. One protest was attended by over 100,000 citizens. Most recently, in August 2016, tensions boiled over during Moldova’s Independence Day parade.  Protesters clashed with police in the capital. One protester lamented: “We decided to celebrate this day in the manner because we do not at all feel free. People are poor, people leave the country. Those who have recently stolen a billion dollars from us, organize military parades, waste millions from the budget on it, which essentially means from our money in time crisis.”   Protesters also expressed anger against oil oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc’s influence in the government and called for early elections.
_85409796_028900060-1Mass protest in Chisinau, September 2015 (above). In Moldova, citizens already frustrated by corruption, poverty, and immigration problems for twenty-five years since the breakaway from the Soviet Union, engaged in large-scale protests country-wide since the spring of 2015. The protests were organized in the Dignity and Truth Platform Party that was established in February 2015, particularly in response to the theft of $1 billion in funds from the banks. Protests had included as many as 100,000 citizens. Tensions boiled over recently over Moldova’s 2016 Independence Day parade.

Moldova’soon Independent Republis: Transnistria and Gagauzia

Transnistria is located on the eastern side of the Dneister River and 450 miles along the Moldova-Ukraine border. The Slavic element of Russians and Ukrainians constitute nearly 60 percent of Moldova’s population. They speak Russian or Ukrainian or both. When the Moldovan Parliament ruled in 1989 that the official language of the republic was to be Romanian (Moldovan) written in the Latin script, and gave five years for non-Romanian citizens to learn it, Russian and Ukrainian speaking population of Transnistria registered their disapproval There was a sense that pan-Romanian nationalism was on the rise. That was when Transnistria region declared its independence from Moldova. Moldova rejected that declaration and engaged in a two year campaign to retake the territory. What followed was a series of clashes between the sides, culminating with a violent armed conflict into which the Russian Federation 14th Army, based in Moldova, was drawn in on the side of the breakaway republic. Two years later Moldova proved unable to retake the territory in a war that killed 1,500 people The number of war refugees was approximated at 120,000 and 150,000.   Transnistria emerged as a pro-Russian statelet. To maintain peace and security in the territory, a joint command structure and tri-lateral peacekeeping force, comprised of Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian units were established following Transnistria peace settlement on July 21, 1992,  In 1998, 10 Ukrainian observers joined the peacekeeping force. The Russia still maintains 1000 peacekeepers in the territory despite a 2002 promise by Moscow to remove them.. Since 2005, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EU, the US, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Moldova and Transnistria have been engaged in a “5+2” process aimed at bringing the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria to an understanding consistent with Moldova’s territorial integrity while providing a special status for Transnistria

In 1990, fears that Moldova might seek to unify with Romania led the region to declare its independence, calling itself the Gagauz Republic, even before the Transnistria conflict erupted. Moreover, unlike Transnistria, fighting never broke out in Gagauz. A 1994 compromise between Chisinau and authorities in the Gagauzia’s capital, Comrat, led to the creation of the autonomous region of Gagauzia within Moldova. Initially, Moldova’s law on the status of Gagauzia gave the region the right to declare independence should Moldova “lose its sovereignty,” at the same time, meaning seek unification with Romania, but a 2003 amendment to the Moldova constitution abolished that right. declaring Gagauzia a “constituent and integral” part of Moldova. The Gagauz are Orthodox Christian people of Turkic origin who settled in the region nearly 800 years ago and are linguistically, ethically, and culturally distinct from their Moldovan, Romanian, and Ukrainian neighbors. Gagauzia, along with the remaining territory known as Bessarabia, became part of the Russian Empire following the Russo-Turkish War from 1806-1812. While other parts of the eventual Soviet Union saw a decent amount of ethnic integration, over 80 percent of the territory’s population remains Gagauz. Still, it’s population of 160,000 represents about 5 percent of Moldova’s total population. Gagauzia is not actually a congruous region. It includes all areas of Moldova in which the Gaguaz are over half the population, as well as parts of the country that have joined Gagauzia by referendum. Gagauzia’s boundaries have gone through several revisions since 1994. occupying just 5 percent of Moldova’s territory.
moldova-transnistria-gagauzia-mapTransnistria is an unrecognized republic which was declared in 1990. With Rusia’s assistance, it managed to prevent Moldova from reclaiming its territory in the War of Transnistria in 1992. Since the war ended, the Russian Federation has stationed 1000 peacekeepers there. Fighting never broke out in Gagauzia and Russia has no troops there. A 1994 compromise between Chisinau and local authorities in Comrat led to the creation of the autonomous of Gagauzia within Moldova. With a population of 160,000, it is a non-contiguous territory occupying 5 percent of Moldova’s territory.

Moldova’s Neighbors: Romania, Ukraine, and Russia

Since great portions of Moldova’s population are ethnically associated with its neighboring countries, neighboring governments have established lines into Moldova. Besides its traditional goals of consolidating its own position within the EU and NATO and bolstering its partnership with the US, Romania for years has declared that Moldova is a priority of its foreign policy. Romania’s policy aims toward Moldova include reinforcing its neighbor’s position within the system of Western institutions and improving its international linkages. In that vein, Romania has also tried to prevent any attempt to deepen Moldova’s integration in Russian structures, primarily the Eurasian Economic Union. That requires Bucharest to achieve its aims at the political and diplomatic levels, but also by increasing economic ties with Moldova.

Often the notion of Moldovan-Romanian unification is discussed by Romanian political leaders, However, for now, that is unrealistic for political, economic, and social reasons. In Bucharest, politicians would lose power and most would be deprived of career prospects, and established political and business interests would be jeopardized. Romanian policy towards Moldova, and by extension the two countries political relations, are most often shaped, among other factors, political pragmatism resulting from the desire to win the support of the Romanian electorate. Romania has managed to play a generally positive role in drawing Moldova toward Western structures and has been effective in its actions, its effectiveness in other areas of bilateral cooperation has been negligible. The technical support that Bucharest has provided is less than necessary, and infrastructure projects have been seriously delayed as a result of problems in coordinating actions among relevant ministries. This has led to a large breach between Bucharest’s frequent declarations of support for Moldova and actual results. Indeed, Romania has not implemented a coherent strategy toward Moldova. Its policy has essentially been a function of domestic, not foreign policy. Bucharest’s political objectives are often subordinated to rivalry among Romanian political parties.acba38cb4c3725a54cd1663c51b7d537

Moldova (shaded green above) and its neighbors. Romania for years has declared that Moldova is a foreign policy priority. Its policy aims for Moldova include reinforcing its position within Western institutions and improving its international links. Ukraine and Moldova have unresolved bilateral issues include long lasting property issues related to resorts inherited from the Soviet Union, a hydroelectric station, and an issue of border demarcation. Russia views Moldova as an integral part of its geopolitical and cultural space and invests a great deal in preserving and increasing its influence in the country.

For the Ukrainian government, relations with Moldova have been overshadowed by Kiev’s relations of with the US, the EU, and Russia. Chisinau has had to repeatedly deal with Ukrainian officials and experts who have perceived Moldova as being too small to influence regional developments and too weak to shape the agenda of the bilateral relations. However, such an approach has been proven false for a number of reasons. Despite Moldova’s diminutive size, relatively weak economy, and limited influence in the region, the Moldovan government is tough in negotiations. Bilateral issues that remain unresolved between Ukraine and Moldova include long lasting property issues related to resorts inherited from the Soviet Union, a hydroelectric station, and an issue of border demarcation. Left unresolved, these issues could potentially harm joint efforts for European integration, influence the 5+2 (Talks on the Transnistria conflict settlement, and joint participation in the regional projects,

Regarding Transnistria, since 2014, Ukraine has massed heavy weapons on the border with the statelet to deter the launch of a military campaign from it. Kiev gas also imposed limits on the transit of Transnistrian nationals and citizens of Russia, 200,000 of whom currently live in Transnistria. There are 500,000 ethnic Russians in Transnistria. When appointed in June 2015, the Governor of Ukraine’s Odessa Region Mikhail Saakashvili announced plans to reinforce Ukraine’s border with Transnistria. He stated at an Odessa news conference, “We have two major tasks—to reinforce the border and curb corruption. Drugs and weapons trafficking across the border means nothing good.” He also blamed Transnistrian authorities of destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal’s assay of the Russian Federaton’s Moldova policy was correct to the extent that it explained Moscow wants Moldova to remain in its sphere of influence. Putin wants Moldova to join his Eurasian Economic Union and not the EU. He considers Moldova to be an integral part of Russia’s geopolitical and cultural space and has invested heavily in preserving and increasing its influence in the country. It uses elements of soft power to gain control of assets and political opinion support.   Russian authorities can also manipulate Moldova through its dependence on Russian policies on gas supplies. Within the Russian speaking population of Moldova, sentiment has ostensibly been manipulated through the idea of Russkiy Mir (Russian World). True, the Moldovan heritage is not Slav. Still, Sovietization and Russification had an impact on the identity of many Moldovans.
630xnxd78c0b1-zelenye-chelovechki_628x420-jpg-pagespeed-ic_-xxvmhyzuga1“Green men” in Crimea (above). Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the explosion of violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk, exposed the challenge Chisinau faces in maintaining its border and interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions. The Wall Street Journal editorial noted Putin has been flexing his military muscles and testing the climate in the West for a potential next move. Considering this, it would not be completely unreasonable for Chisinau to consider that Moldova might be facing the threat from hybrid warfare.

The Hybrid Warfare “Threat” to Moldova

Accensa domo proxium, tua quoque periclitatur. (When the house of your neighbor is in flames, your own is in danger.) Moldova’s leaders do not speak to Russia with timidity, but they are realists concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two counties, and signal that understanding in their measured actions. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the explosion of violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk, exposed the challenge Chisinau faces in maintaining its border and interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions. The Wall Street Journal editorial noted Putin has been flexing his military muscles and testing the climate in the West for a potential next move. Given these considerations, it would not be completely unreasonable or unwarranted for Chisinau to consider the possibility that Moldova might be facing the threat from subversion and insurgency, characteriistic of hybrid warfare. Elements of the tactic include::

A de-legitimization media campaign:

  1. The population’s preferences are influenced by altering their perceived needs

The political subversion stage:

  1. Front groups are created to gain public credibility
  2. The country’s institutions—particularly military and law enforcement—are infiltrated.
  3. Governmental power is corroded by fomenting riots, staging violent demonstrations, and generally igniting civil unrest.

The final stage:

  1. Legitimate power is replaced by the capture of government buildings by force and local law enforcement and military units are disabled.

Moscow has already punished Moldova for seeking closer ties with the West. Import bans were placed on Moldovan wines in 2013 and agricultural products in 2014, each time over health regulations and each time close to Moldovan EU summits and accords. New restrictions on remittances that Moldovan workers in Russia send home have also hampered economic growth. Remittances represent over 30 percent of Moldova’s GDP and up to 65 percent of them come from Russia. Once the Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement were signed with the EU in June 2014, prices of imported gas from Russia rose. Moldova is heavily dependent on imported energy and the Russian state-owned Gazprom is its main supplier of gas. To reduce Moldova’s dependency on Russian gas, a pipeline was constructed between the Romanian town of Iasi and Moldova town of Ungheni. Although the pipeline was ready for use, Chisinau, seemingly concerned over displeasing Moscow, announced in November 2015 that it had extended its gas contracts with Russia for another year. There are fears that tensions between the pro-Russia population and the pro-Romania Unionist which support reunification with could also make Moldova vulnerable and could provide Russia a plausible justification to intervene. Russian media which is widely available in Moldova, serves as a soft power instrument for wider dissemination of Russian official propaganda and anti-Western messages.
victory-day-transnistria-1-680x365-1Transnistrian troops on parade (above). Transnistria’s leaders in Tiraspol say Moldova and Ukraine have conspired to keep their country under an economic blockade. Russia accuses Moldova and Ukraine of squeezing Transnistria. Kiev denies any systematic actions against Moldova except suspending military cooperation after Moscow annexed Crimea and began supporting rebels in Eastern Ukraine. Still, Kiev has built up its forces on its border with Transnistria. Transnistria has mobilized its army reservists between 18 and 27. Its forces have participated in exercises with Russian Federation forces since 2015.

In his speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 13, 2016, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev referred to the political crisis in Moldova as a major threat to European security.  Many nfluential Western politicians are of the same opinion. On August 10, 2015, Thorbjorn Jagland, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, referred to Moldova as “an occupied state” and pointed out that the country could become the next issue for EU security. He stated: “Many in Moldova worry that Transnistria could become the next Crimea, an anxiety that has been further fueled by appeals for Russian protection from some of the province’s civic groups.”  Despite protests from Chisinau, in April 9, 2015, Russian forces conducted a drill in Transnistria. According to Russian news agencies, 400 Russian troops participated in exercises in Transnistria. They fired 100,000 rounds of ammunition. Again, on August 2016, Russian Federation forces stationed in Transnistria held a tank drill in the territory. Some Western analysts went as far as to say such exercises were intended to create the impression that Putin might take more dramatic action to subdue that defiant country. Western analysts also allege Putin was sending a warning to Moldovans to abandon their dreams of Western integration.

Russia accuses Moldova and Ukraine of squeezing Transnistria. Kiev denies any systematic actions against Tiraspol other than the suspension of military cooperation that followed Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and actions in eastern Ukraine. On June 12, 2015, Ukraine moved troops toward its border with Transnistria. Alarmed, Transnistria’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev stated, “the situation here is very bad . . . Economic production is going down, foreign trade is shrinking, the security situation is equally alarming with our Moldovan partners holding military drills with NATO and the Ukrainian pressure mounting everyday.”  Transnistria’s leaders believe Moldova and Ukraine have conspired to keep their country under an economic blockade and have mobilized their republic’s army reservists between 18 and 27.

If Moldova faced Russian military intervention, it would unlikely be able to successfully respond. In terms of preparations by Chisinau, Moldovan forces initially began conducting a series of exercises ostensibly to prepare for a possible Russian attempt to seize its territory following Russian actions in Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk. Those exercises, however, convinced few in Moldova that the country was at all prepared to efficaciously defend itself against hybrid warfare or any other type of attack. Those efforts made seemed more than anything else to be examples of “pokazuhka.”   In the Soviet Union, pokazuhka referred to performances by units designed by military commanders to create the appearance of troop combat readiness to impress superiors and gain commendations. Beyond such  window-dressing style training, Moldovan forces lacked military hardware, spare parts, fuel, munitions, body armor, food supplies, and light anti-tank weapons. The defense budget has been kept at $30 million, hovering between 0.3 and 0.6 GDP for the last several years. What Moldovan forces need to know is how to fight in densely populated urban and rural areas, train in the calibrated use of artillery avoid the self-destructive act of demolishing their own country’s infrastructure, and train to fight in an environment in which their opponent would restablish air superiority.
1026752708To prepare for possible Russian aggression, Moldovan forces initially began conducting a series of unilateral exercises. Those exercises, however, convinced few that Moldova was at all prepared to efficaciously defend itself against hybrid warfare or any other type of attack. Moldova soon received opportunities to train with NATO troops. Still, training and assistance to Moldova will be limited because it is not a full NATO member.

To help Moldova, a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, on July 25, 2015, about 800 troops from Moldova, the US, Romania, Poland, and Georgia took part in a joint military exercise in at the Balti military base in Moldova. The aim of exercise known as Joint Effort 2015 was to test the capabilities of the countries’ armed forces to cooperate. Moldova has since hosted additional military exercises since. Indeed, as part of the on-going cooperation between US and Moldovan defense forces, US, Moldovan, and Romanian troops conducted exercise Fire Shield 2016, a combined small arns, artillery training exercise at the Bulboaca Training Area, Moldova. The purpose of the exercise is to improve interoperability, explore concurrent training opportunities, and conduct safety training. Yet, training as well as assistance to Moldova will be limited because it is not a full-fledged NATO Member State. Moldova might receive some critical non-lethal equipment such as counter-battery radar, secure communications, and tactical drones. NATO could also intensify the training of Moldovan military forces in territorial defense However, none of that will truly make Moldova capable of deterring possible Russian aggression.

Pro-Europe national leaders in Chisinau pray to be part of the EU and NATO, but that possibly will not come right away. Granting Moldova NATO membership now, albeit hardly a possibility, or in the near future, may pose a set of problems that other member states may not ever want to deal with. Some in the West may even oppose arming Moldova, calculating that doing so would only cause Russia to inject more military forces in Transnistria. All of this means Chisinau should not feel certain of the US and EU commitment to help protect Moldova’s sovereignty and rights as an independent country. The administration of US President Barack Obama has indicated that the present and future challenge of US foreign policy is no longer to isolate and defeat an existential foe as Russia. Rather, it is creating a sustainable balance of power that advances the US interests by preserving peace and security and fostering collaboration among geopolitical rivals in addressing global transnational threats. It is difficult to assess how a new US administration will respond over Moldova.

Moldova: A False Positive for Hybrid Warfare Today

A false positive is an error in an evaluation process which leads one to conclude that a given condition has been fulfilled when it actually has not been fulfilled.  Russia certainly has exerted pressure on Moldova, but that may only be part of an effort to strengthen its diplomatic hand, not an overture to war. Russia is well-aware that cooperation stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of a border by improving conditions for free trade and exchange. Russia believes that can be achieved by investment and integrating the region into the communication and transportation networks of its Eurasian Economic Union. Inter-border cooperation is understood to be a prerequisite of broader integration processes and improving relations between neighboring countries. It can serve as a mechanism for coping with the challenges and jolts resulting from the new divisions created between EU and Eurasian Economic Union countries. Domestic policy priorities and international and regional security issues can be harmonized through it. Inter-border cooperation can also serve to promote minority rights.
_87815849_3fc5bfe4-2a04-4658-9538-bea913051fcfIn July 16, 2016, Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip held important meetings with Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin in Moldova. The aim of the meeting was to tackle the bilateral cooperation agenda. Rogozin offered a proposal for invigorated contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol that would allow for normal relations, “above all in economics.” They discussed the division of Moldova into zones of influence,” one looking toward the EU, the other looking toward the Eurasian Economic Union.

Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin made a two-day visit to Moldova on July 6, 2016, during which he had important meetings in Chisinau with Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip. The aim of the meeting was to allow the two officials to tackle the latest developments concerning the main elements on the bilateral cooperation agenda. Reports indicate Rogozin came at the invitation of Filip.  Filip emphasized Moldova’s interest in boosting the trade and investment relations with Russian partners and in particular, in the integration of Moldovan goods export to the Russian market. The Transnistria conflict settlement was also an important issue on the meeting agenda. Rogozin and Filip expressed support for the 5+2 talks, and welcomed the resumption of the discussion in this format. Additionally, the two officials discussed aspects of their countries’ cooperation in the migration sector, as well as in the cultural and humanitarian fields. They recognized the need to promote more governmental programs on developing ties in these cooperative areas.

Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci. ([He] has gained every point who has combined [the useful with the] agreeable.) More detailed reports of the meeting between Rogozin and Filip, however, paint a more intriguing picture Rogozin explained Russia wanted to see invigorated contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol aimed at a return to normal relations, “above all in economics.”   What the two officials most importantly discussed was the de facto division of “zones of influence” one looking toward the West and the EU and one looking toward the East and the Eurasian Economic Union. The formally unrecognized Transnistria and the autonomous Gagauzia would be part of the eastern zone. The arrangement would also allow for the free movement of people and goods between them and to the broader communities of which each is a part. Further, the division of zones of influence would ostensibly spread to all areas of life, including information policy and civic freedoms. Activities that would be perfectly legal in one zone in Moldova could possibly result in arrest in the other.
017627776_30300With regard to trade with Moldova, Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin has presented a proposal to Moldova that would result in a creative arrangement for Russia. As Moldova is not subject to EU sanctions, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via Transnistria and Gagauzia and thus escape restrictions. Simultaneously, the territories would become points for the expansion of the Russian world. Given the need to ensure that those territories remain part of Moldova, Moscow would hardly consider annexing Transnistria or Gagauzia.

With regard to trade with Moldova, Rogozin proposed a creative arrangement. Moldova is not subject to sanctions. Thus, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via Transnistria and Gagauzia and escape restrictions. Simultaneously, the territories would become points for the expansion of the Russian world. Since Russia would need to ensure that those territories remained part of Moldova, Moscow would hardly consider annexing Transnistria or Gagauzia. Interestingly, after meeting with Filip, Rogozin went into Tiraspol without the usual complaints from Chisinau about visits of Russian officials to Transnistria. Rogozin, for his part, did not meet with pro-Russian opposition figures or mention any broader political settlement. For some analysts, this has created the impression that in the course of preliminary meetings, Moscow and Chisinau had firmly agreed about the proposed economic arrangement

Since that visit by Rogozin to Moldova, Chisinau has implored the West to help provide relief from pressure by Moscow.  Filip stated on August 16, 2016, “Through elections and international agreements, we have steadfastly chosen the Euro-Atlantic community as our inspiration and destination, and the current government is dedicated to securing our EU path. Moscow is none too pleased, and that is why we need the help of Washington and other Western capitals to solidify our transition from several decades of communism into a free-market economy.” In coming presidential elections, Moldovans will make a choice whether to stay on the pro-Western path toward the EU or more closer to Russia’s orbit

The Way Forward

In Act II, Scene ii of William Shakespeare’s comedy, Trolius and Cressida, Hector, the Prince of Troy, a fierce warrior, and leader of the Trojan armies, states: “Modest doubt is call’d The beacon of the wise, the tent that searches To the bottom of the worst.” Searching for the worst, one might consider that if things do not go Russia’s way in Moldova’s coming presidential elections, Moscow could begin to quietly provide enhanced economic support to Transnistria and Gagauzia. That aid might take the form of a considerable amount of Russian rubles to encourage greater purchases of Russian goods. That aid might initially be cloaked. It could also continue to provide humanitarian aid using truck convoys. Russia could provide financial support to pro-Russian separatist political organizations. To encourage ethnic-Russians to remain in Transnistria and Gagauzia, Russia may assist directly in the infrastructure improvements in those territories, as well as focus on the construction of new schools, churches, community centers, and infrastructure projects that meet the needs of those communities. At the same time, Russia could enable pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria and Gagauzia as a hedge against any attempts to reverse gains made. Separatists could be enabled to defend themselves with training from Russian military advisers perhaps acting covertly and they could also be provided with new Russian armaments. Russia would unlikely withdraw its forces in Transnistria and could possibly increase the measure of those forces to create the capability to rush into restive Gagauzia if any fighting began there. It is easy to postulate such theories on possible moves by Moscow, they are unlikely to be observed in Moldova.  A decision against Russia’s interests in Moldova will not create an ultimate crisis for Moscow. The wisdom exists to resist war.

Nihil est incertus volgo. (Nothing is more uncertain than the favor of the crowd.) Moldova’s sovereignty is as important an issue in coming elections as the country’s economic future. Paramount in considering Rogozin’s proposal is that it would not only establish the defined interests of Moscow, but would also preserve Moldova’s unity, solvency. Despite imperfections in the proposal, it might best serve Moldova’s interests for the moment. To an extent, Rogozin’s proposal represents an effort at compromise by Moscow. Unable to bring all of Moldova into its Eurasian Economic Union, it seeks to create spheres of interest. It may very well be a signal from Moscow that it intends to stick with diplomacy to resolve its issues with Moldova. Despite veiled threats from some senior Russian Federation officials and apprehension among Moldovan officials, Chisinau signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014. Moldovan officials now appear somewhat concerned over Russia’s reaction to a possible vote by Moldovans to remain on a western track in coming presidential elections. If they vote to go West, it ironically may prove to have been Moscow’s adherence to a diplomatic tack on establishing zones of influence that created enough breathing space for them to feel unafraid to do so.

Russia Gloats, US Worries and France Vents Exasperation over Brexit: Can Obama Bolster EU Unity Despite Russian Pressures?

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin shouts back at cheering troops as he walks with Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during the 2015 Victory Day Parade in Moscow. Russia presented itself at the event as a country on the rise. Part of that rise apparently includes encouraging the fall of the EU and NATO. Russia has been accused of using military, economic, and political means to promote a discordant harmony among countries to undermine EU unity on sanctions and unity as a bloc.

According to a February 20, 2016 article in The Times in the United Kingdom entitled, “Russia Gloats, US Worries and France Vents Exasperation”, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is thought to be privately gleeful at the sight of discord within the EU over the possible decision by the British to exit the EU (Brexit). Indeed, the article states whatever undermines the EU—which Russia accuses of meddling in Ukraine and its former European Soviet satellite state—is good for Moscow. Reportedly, in Washington, the prospect of Brexit has set alarm bells ringing about the United Kingdom’s possible retreat to the European periphery, altering its special relationship with London.

In a January 31, 2016 greatcharlie.com post entitled, “In the State of the Union Address, Obama Confronts Americans’ Fears; They Want to See Success on Foreign Policy”, it was predicted that in 2016, Putin may want to maintain an environment of confrontation for the US and EU leaders. He supports countries behind many of the foreign policy problems that the administration of US President Barack Obama faces. Keeping all European allies unified and resolute could become more difficult as some may fear facing greater problems from him. Putin has looked deeply at the US and Europe, discerning many flaws, weaknesses in the transatlantic bond. He particularly noticed the lack of will among European political leaders to maintain it. The initial response to Putin’s battering rams, to include his moves in Ukraine, hybrid warfare threat to the Baltic States, and military build-up, was to bolster the barricades of Europe particularly in London and Berlin. Since then there have been cracks in the armor, precipitated by Putin’s maneuvers. In most cases, any damage to the European unity would appear self-inflicted by EU and NATO Members. In every case, Putin would be a beneficiary. Any member’s departure from the “Group of 28”, or NATO, would be a step in the wrong direction. The Obama administration is urging the EU not to retreat having achieved so much. Causality for this situation may be found in part in the administration’s plans for a “pivot to Asia”, its delinquency in responding to important issues on European policy, and its disastrous relations with Putin. Despite the challenging political, economic, and security issues with which some EU states are wrestling, the Obama administration can bolster European unity, and by-pass military, economic, and political obstacles Russia may be creating. The examples presented in this discussion provide kernels of some approaches. The Obama administration needs to support Europe in its search for answers to buttress unity. Its assistance should not be a mere search for the bromide of a public relations message. The administration should contribute approaches to effectively promote unity in accordance with the stated needs of European allies.

The migrant crisis in Europe began with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s announcement in the summer of 2015 that Germany would stop expelling Syrian refugees and her agreement with Austria in September 2015 to welcome tens of thousands of migrants who were stuck in Hungary. Hungary rejected their asylum requests. Merkel’s actions were followed by a massive surge in asylum seekers travelling from Turkey to Greece and then up through the Balkans to Hungary, Austria, Germany and northern Europe. The result has been a humanitarian tragedy, and a political, social, and administrative nightmare for capitals created by an external source, but not Putin. Indeed, Putin has said the refugee crisis is “an internal problem of the EU” and added that Russia does not “interfere in these issues.” Given that Russia has had no discernible hand in the matter, the issue is not included in the discussion here.

NATO recently revealed that in 2013, two Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bombers (as above) escorted by four Sukhoi Su-27 jet fighters, came within 24 miles off the island of Gotland, 100 miles from Stockholm, and conducted mock nuclear attacks. The Swedish military was caught completely off-guard causing great concern among Swedish officials.

Stirring Disunity Militarily

Etiam fortes viros subitis terreri. (Even the bravest men are frightened by sudden terrors.)  Putin is genuinely on a mission to restore Russia’s global power and influence and to bring the independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Russia’s orbit. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Syria, Putin has shown the will to fight, even after red-lines were crossed and stern warnings were given. His threats of military action are not doubted. Russian intrusions into NATO airspace, flyovers and buzzing by military jets, interceptions at sea and other harassing actions in NATO waters, are designed to have a strong educational effect on leaders in Europe.

Sweden

It has been reported by NATO in February 2016 that the Russian Federation Air Force conducted a mock nuclear attack against Sweden during war games. The March 2013 exercise saw Russian aircraft cross the Gulf of Finland and approach Swedish airspace. The NATO report claimed that Russian military drills have now reached levels unseen since the height of the Cold War. During the military exercise on March 20, 2013, two Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bombers escorted by four Sukhoi Su-27 jet fighters came within 24 miles off the island of Gotland, 100 miles from Stockholm. They conducted dummy bombing runs against targets thought to include a military base in southern Sweden and the headquarters of the country’s signals intelligence agency outside Stockholm. The incident caused controversy at the time because the Swedish military was caught unprepared and to rely on Danish Air Force jets operating as part of NATO’s Baltic air policing mission to respond. Sweden has since remilitarized an old Cold War frontier base on the island of Gotland because of the rising threat from Russia. The Obama administration has sought to expand US military spending in Europe four-fold to about $3.4 billion in an effort to reassure allies unsettled by Russia’s military actions. Such efforts affirm the US commitment to Europe. Yet, Sweden and other NATO members must be dissuaded from the view that peace can exist without significant, tangible investment in Europe’s mutual defense. They must work cooperatively with the US to bolster Europe’s defense.

Norway

In its National Threat Assessment presented in February 2016, the Norwegian Police and Security Service (PST) reported that Russia is a threat to Norway. While presenting the report, the Head of PST Marie Benedicte Bjornland explained Russian Federation intelligence services have made targets of Norway’s capabilities in defense, security, and preparedness. Bjornland said, “Our assessment is that the aim of these activities is to facilitate Russian military dispositions in a future security policy scenario.” The PST report explains that such intelligence activities could ultimately threaten key Norwegian interests and the country’s control over its own territory. The report claims that intelligence operatives have been sent to Norway with official covers as diplomats at the embassy or consulates. The main task of those diplomats, as observed by PST, is to establish relations of trust with Norwegian government employees or any other individuals who can provide sensitive information. The PST report explained that such intelligence operatives also make use of other tools such as the extensive use of operations to spread information and propaganda and influence opinion in other countries with a view to weakening confidence in the authorities of the target state or sowing division between difference groups in the society or in different regions. The PST warned that these methods are particularly used during periods of tension concerning security, and Norway should prepare itself to cope with such methods. PST head Bjornland further explained that large scale digital espionage against Norway and Norwegian interests was already underway. Businesses and educational institutions would undoubtedly be targets of such attacks. Crux est si metuas quod vincere neques. (It is tormenting to fear what you can’t overcome.)

Above are Russian “green men” in Crimea in 2014. In its National Threat Assessment presented in February 2016, the Norwegian Police and Security Service (PST) reported that Russian Federation intelligence services have made targets of Norway’s capabilities in defense, security, and preparedness. Fear exists in Oslo that one morning green men may appear in Norway’s streets.

Denmark

In March 21, 2015, Russia went on a public relations offensive on the Baltic. Denmark was warned that if it joined the NATO’s missile defense shield, its navy would become a legitimate target for a Russian nuclear attack. The Russian Federation Ambassador to Denmark, Mikhail Vanin delivered that message during an interview with a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. He was quoted as follows: “Denmark would be part of the threat against Russia. It would be less peaceful and relations with Russia would suffer. It is, of course, your own decision—I just want to remind you that your finances and security will suffer. At the same time Russia has missiles that certainly can penetrate the future global missile defense system.” Denmark’s Foreign minister, Martin Lidegaard, reacted strongly to the comments, calling the Russian ambassador’s statement “unacceptable.” However, Nicolai Wammen, Denmark’s Defense Minister went to pains to calm Russia, saying the move [toward a defense shield] is not targeted toward Russia but at “rogue states, terrorists organizations and others who would have the capacity to fire missiles at Europe and the United States.” Concerning such statements by Russian officials, NATO Supreme Allied Commander US Air Force General Philip Breedlove has already provided some answers which the Obama administration should echo. Breedlove said: NATO must challenge Russia’s current policies and demonstrate that Putin’s current approach will not be allowed to damage security. He further stated the alliance must also deter Russia “by carefully shaping Moscow’s choices and managing Putin’s confidence.” Nord Stream-2 will include two new pipelines that will deliver an additional 44 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland. Germany, the greatest consumer of Russian gas, supports Nord Stream-2. Some EU countries say it contradicts the sanctions policy against Russia, and accuse German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her government of putting their country’s economic needs ahead of collective diplomacy.

Stirring Disunity Economically

Nihil tam muitium quod non expungari pecunia posit. (No fort is so strong that it cannot be taken with money.) Some EU countries have established new deals with Russia, an activity inconsistent with placing sanctions on Moscow over its behavior toward EU or EU-backed countries. Perhaps those states really believe such breakdowns in unity are unavoidable, especially regarding oil and gas. However, regardless of the genuine economic benefits of any deals with Russia, the economic carrots held by Moscow enable it to use EU and NATO members as tools against each other.

Germany

In September 2015, the Russian state owned gas giant, Gazprom, began preparing for the construction of Nord Stream-2. It will include two new pipelines that will deliver an additional 44 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland. Nord Stream-2 doubles the capacity of Nord Stream-1 built in 2011 which passes through Ukraine. Running the new pipeline through Ukraine was viewed unsafe. The new pipeline is especially important to Germany, the greatest consumer of Russian gas. Some EU countries fear the new pipeline will allow Germany to dominate the European gas market, Germany says politics should be left behind in the building of the pipeline. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker echoed that view saying the project should be considered not as a political issue, but as a commercial one. In December 2015, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi was the first to speak out against the pipeline in the context of security saying it contradicted the sanctions policy against Russia. Italy also accused Germany of putting its economic needs ahead of the bloc’s collective diplomacy. (Note Italian firm Eni had large investment in a South Stream gas pipeline from Russia cancelled by Gazprom in 2014) Italian concerns over the Nord Stream-2 have since been quieted. A group of Eastern European countries sent a letter to the European Commission calling for it to block the Nord Stream-2. They are headed by Slovakia and Poland, who are believed to have initiated the campaign, and supported by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Greece. They say Nord Stream-2 goes against the EU energy diversification and security policies. Berlin might explain claims by other EU and NATO countries are small relative to the German commitment to European defense and security and its role as the EU’s economic engine. The Obama administration has not publicly admonished or discouraged Germany on Nord Stream-2. It could insist Germany demonstrate how the gas deal is a matter of energy security, not adverse  with sanctions policy, and maybe assist it in doing so. During the final plenary session at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia on October 22, 2016, Putin seemed to deliberately sow seeds of suspicion regarding the solidarity of two main members the EU with the other 26 members by saying: “I believe that the Federal Chancellor of Germany and the President of France are being sufficiently objective today, and though it is obvious for political reasons they support the current Kiev authorities, in my opinion they have a sufficiently fair assessment of the situation. They already have an understanding that the problems that have accumulated there are not only black and white—it is much more complicated.”

Observing Germany’s moves, other EU countries have rushed to strengthen ties with Russia. During a visit to Moscow in February 3, 2016, Austrian Vice Chancellor Reinhold Mitterlehner confirmed Austria’s commitment to Russia’s Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project to Europe at a meeting with Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev.

Austria

Observing Germany, other states contributing far less to the EU and NATO, have visited Putin, seeking to strengthen their business and economic linkages with Russia. During a visit to Moscow in February 3, 2016, Austrian Vice Chancellor Reinhold Mitterlehner stated that EU sanctions against Russia have made no political progress and brought negative effects to Austria’s economy. Recent statements from Putin support the Vice Chancellor’s claim. Putin explained: “Concerning our possibilities on the international financial markets, the sanctions are severely harming Russia. But the biggest harm is currently caused by the decline of the prices of oil and gas, which we can partly compensate for elsewhere.” Putin added: “The trade balance, however, is still positive.” For Mitterlehner, the low impact of sanctions on Russia and their reverse impact on Austrian firms put the continued implementation of them in question. On that, Mitterlehner complained: “We have over a thousand companies doing business with Russia from Austria, and another 500 Austrian firms working in Russia. 40,000 employees are being affected.” He confirmed Austria’s commitment to Russia’s Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project to Europe at a meeting with Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev.

Hungary

In a press conference at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on February 17, 2016, Putin referred to Hungary as an “old and faithful partner.” Orban returned with similar pleasantries, but contrary to thinking within the EU of which Hungary is a member, Orban also stated that the time for the automatic extension of the sanctions on Russia had passed, and that more EU countries are starting to oppose the restrictions on Moscow. Orban and Putin had signed a number of agreements two years earlier to include the expansion of Paks-2, Hungary’s only active nuclear power plant, built by the Soviet Union. The four Paks reactors are currently producing up to 50 percent of Hungary’s electricity. However, the remaining reactors will go off-line between 2032 and 2037, and Hungary would lose the bulk of its electricity. The €12.5 billion contract, partly aided by Moscow’s €10 billion loans, would add two new 1,200 megawatt reactors to nuclear power plant. The Orban and Putin also agreed to extend a gas deal which will see Russia supply Hungary until the end of 2019. About 85 percent of Hungary’s gas flows from Russia. Orban and Putin already signed a gas agreement in 2015 that replaced a 20 year contract that expired in December 2015. Under the agreement, Budapest is paying only for the gas it actually consumes, as opposed to the volume it contracts, making it a lucrative offer for the low-demand client. Putin said: “We are satisfied even despite a well-known drop in trade turnover. We are content with the nature of our relationship.” In 2015, Orban told Putin “Hungary needs Russia.” In 2014, Orban said Europe “shot itself in the foot” as the sanctions policy pursued by the West “causes more harm to us than to Russia.” Putin said that the Kremlin is convinced that the “normalization of Russia-EU ties will happen sooner or later.”

There is discernible frustration among Georgia’s elites and the public with the slow pace of Western integration. Russian propaganda has influenced Georgia’s disillusioned. Despite tension between Moscow and Tblisi, the prospect exists that Georgia might slow or suspend efforts toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration and abandon closer EU and NATO ties.

Stirring Disunity Politically

What galls the US and EU is the considerable effort they say Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has invested in grabbing territory in what he refers to as Russia’s “near abroad”. Each time an ethnic-Russian space is carved out of a country, Putin is provided with additional space from which he can exert his influence in the home country. In the Crimea and the Donbass in Ukraine, Russia moved in with its forces, under the causality of rescuing ethnic-Russian lives. So far, Russia has refrained from taking military action in other near abroad countries. However, Russia has used state-controlled media outlets to beam programs and reports into near abroad countries attacking the notion of European unity.  News stories on Europe on RT_com and Sputnik in particular are usually negative, designed to stoke cynicism citizens may feel toward their leaders. Eventually, such propaganda will be structured to drive citizens in those countries away from European economic and security structures. Vulpem pilum mutat, non mores. (A fox may change its hair, not its tricks.)

Georgia

In February 2016, US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress that Georgia could reverse its strategic orientation toward the West under Russian pressure. The rethinking of its Euro-Atlantic orientation would be due in part to Russian efforts. According to Clapper, “even as Georgia progresses with reforms, Georgian politics will almost certainly be volatile as political competition increases. Economic challenges are also likely to become a key political vulnerability for the government before the 2016 elections. In 2008, Putin first tested NATO, moving against countries that are part of Russia’s “near abroad.” Pro-Russian separatists in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia, along with Russian Federation troops, fought a war for independence against the Georgian Government. Once peace was established between the warring parties by then-French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Russia occupied the two rebellious regions and continues to do so today. Russia also recognized their independence. There are now nearly 5,000 Russian Federation troops based in South Ossetia and 5,000 based in Abkhazia. There was little Georgia could do then, or can do now, to recover those regions, yet it had the support of the US, and the EU. The big change that has occurred is the growth of a discernible frustration among Georgia’s elites and the public with the slow pace of Western integration. Russian propaganda has also been effective in Georgia and the prospect exists that Tblisi might slow or suspend efforts toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration and abandon closer EU and NATO ties. That could occur despite the fact that tension between Tblisi and Moscow remains high. A similar assessment was made about Georgia in 2015, but the risk is now increasing. At best, Russia could ask Georgia to join a Russia-led customs union and sign up for the Moscow dominated Eurasian Economic Union. That might be countered by increased public visits by senior US and EU officials to hear Tblisi’s ideas on accelerating the pace of integration.

Moldova

In 2008, Putin forced Armenia to break off its agreements with the EU, and Moldova was placed under similar pressure. Moldovans in response elected a pro-EU government in 2009. It was a pro-EU government that in 2014, which against Russia’s wishes, signed an Association Agreement with the EU. However, Moldova entered 2016 without a government and mired in a deep political crisis following a corruption scandal which forced the ruling pro-EU government of Prime Minister Valeriu Strelet to resign in late October. Earlier revelations concerning the same scandal knocked down his predecessor, Chiril Gaburici, in June 2015. The crisis began early 2015 when it was discovered that over $1 billion, equivalent to about 15 percent of the country’s GDP, had disappeared from three Moldovan banks in 2014 following parliamentary elections. When Gaburici’s administration fell,  the question was raised whether leaders in Chisinau would ever be able to enact reforms needed to bring the country in line with EU standards. Despite the fact the a pro-European government was eventually approved by lawmakers, Moldovans engaged in street protests, discontented over its right wing and pro-Romania elements. Officials in power feared that if early elections were called, Moldovans would vote for representatives of the left, who are pro-Russian, and who seek to develop political and economic ties with Russia. In addition to other benefits such as trade, the coming to power of a pro-Russian government in Moldova would be a public relations coup for Moscow. It could claim that Moldova was a state that experienced all of the charms of European integration and decided to return to orient itself toward the tried and proven path toward Russia and long-established Russian markets.

Regarding Transnistria–an unrecognized republic which declared independence in 1990 and defended it in the War of Transnistria in 1992. It has been governed since as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, a pro-Russian government in Chisinau could help diffuse the crisis, but very likely in Moscow’s favor. To firm up agreements that ended the war, talks that include the US, EU, and Russia, are underway on the Transnistria Peace Settlement. Chisinau, along with Kiev, has blockaded Transnistria, preventing not only trade but the entry of citizens with Russian passports into its territory. After the War of Transnistria of 1992, the Russian Federation stationed 2,500 troops in the republic. Today, 1000 Russian Federation troops remain there ostensibly as peacekeepers. In 2014, Transnistria announced it hoped Russia would annex its territory into Russia following the Crimea referendum. As a sign of support, in 2015, Moscow had 400 Russian Federation troops there to hold military exercises using armored personnel carriers and live ammunition. Still, Moscow always considers the big picture, and apparently does not believe annexing Transnistria would be advantageous. It does not want the Transnistria issue to negatively impact its efforts to bring Moldova into its Eurasian Economic Union. Discernable steps to bring Moldova closer have included: the courtship of pro-Russian political elements; efforts to create stronger economic ties; and, diplomatic overtures on establishing a new security relationship. If Moldova moved closer to Russia, security risks might increase for Europe, especially with regard to Ukraine and Romania. In a calibrated way, the US and EU might invest directly into Moldovan communities, focusing on schools churches, community centers, and infrastructure projects. Supporting Moldovan economic growth by seeking more international markets for Moldovan goods and services worldwide might take some dtrains off of Chisinau. The US and EU could enable Moldova to better integrate itself militarily with Europe by providing its forces equipment and training from US and European military advisers. Diplomatic efforts could relax pressures on Chisinau from Ukraine and Romania.

It was the United Kingdom that raised European awareness of the importance of interventionist foreign and security policy and has kept the concept alive. United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron has urged Europe to stand up to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine and to potential threats elsewhere on the continent. Nothing would make Putin happier than seeing the United Kingdom give-up on its Western partners.

Brexit

Nothing would make Putin happier than seeing the United Kingdom give-up on its Western partners. It was the United Kingdom that raised European awareness of the importance of interventionist foreign and security policy and has kept the concept alive. United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron has urged Europe to stand up to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine and potential threats elsewhere on the continent. Cameron has been frank in expressing mutual positions of the Western powers to Putin in meetings. It has also been the United Kingdom that has argued for the liberalization of European markets and global free-trade in unison with the US. The Obama administration is agonizing over the possibility of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU on its watch. It would create unsettling changes in the US dynamic with the United Kingdom and EU as well. It was on January 23, 2013 that Cameron made his renowned “Bloomberg speech”, in which he promised an in/out referendum on the United Kingdom’s EU membership. Cameron said the referendum would follow a period of negotiation with other EU countries on the internal working of the EU and the United Kingdom’s relationship to it. Those negotiations occurred, and despite some firm resistance from France, Cameron got most of what he wanted. Four main points sum it up: an opt out from the ambition of an “ever closer union” (The phase appeared in the Treaty of Rome, which the United Kingdom is not a signatory and the non binding preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon.); greater powers for national parliaments block EU legislation; safeguards to ensure the single market cannot be rigged in favor of eurozone members; and, reducing access to social benefits to EU nationals, which is tied to concerns about immigration. Next comes the national referendum on June 23, 2016. “In/out” campaigning is underway. During the Greek, news about the crisis on the Russian state news channel, Russia-24, was accompanied by the graphic declaring “Greece—almost over.” The Russian daily Kosmomolskaya Pravda ran the headline: “Greek tragedy. Divorce already near.” The Greek crisis was perceived then as just the start of the EU’s problems, suggesting Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy could be next if Greece left the eurozone. It should be expected that Russian media houses roll out similar coverage on Brexit.

Obama is counting on Cameron to capture the imagination of the United Kingdom and not let it recede further into the distance. The United Kingdom has been an important intermediary between the US and Europe. It is not near the center of European power, which is now concentrated around Germany and France. The United Kingdom has become weaker militarily and increasingly paralyzed by domestic issues. Washington fears that the United Kingdom is moving out of the international power game. Keeping an active United Kingdom in the EU is central to US efforts to keep Europe united. Obama might visit Cameron at Number 10 Downing Street to signify his support. Obama could ask Cameron then what exactly he can do as the US president to support the campaign to keep the United Kingdom in the EU. Cameron might just accept his offer and present Obama with a laundry list of requests. Nothing on that list should be subject to political bargaining. The special relationship between the US and the United Kingdom is genuine. By supporting Cameron, the Obama administration may leave the most positive legacy regarding US-United Kingdom relations since World War II.

Since Obama supports the campaign to keep the United Kingdom in the EU, perhaps he could visit London, and ask Cameron directly what he could do as the US president to assist him. If Cameron wants his help, he might just provide Obama with a laundry list of requests. Not one item should be subject to bartering. The special US relationship with the United Kingdom is real. By supporting Cameron on Brexit, the Obama administration may leave the most positive legacy regarding US-United Kingdom relations since World War II.

The Way Forward

The Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus was quoted as saying: “Because your own strength is unequal to the task, do not assume that it is beyond the powers of man; but if anything is within the powers and province of man, believe that it is within your own compass also.” It is good the Obama administration in its final year has taken an interest in European unity and pressures from Russia. The administration has clearly indicated that it is not conceding to anything that is difficult, uncertain, and perhaps even disconcerting in international affairs.

Among Europeans in 2015, Obama received strong support, although his ratings dropped slightly over the past seven years. To give an example, he has the confidence of 83 percent of France, 76 percent of the United Kingdom, and 73 percent of Germany. Yet, perhaps there may be less interest in what Obama says at this point. He is, after all, a lame duck president with months left in office.   Europeans may be transfixed on the very interesting candidates of the Election of 2016, pondering who the next US president will be. Perhaps pride may cause them to reject what Obama may offer. Yet, whether Europeans want to hear from Obama or accept his help or not, they must recognize the need to remain united and maintain the Atlantic bridge to the US. Outside of the EU, European countries would have a superficial existence, underestimating their destiny, dignity, and nature. To that extent, a dialogue with Obama about capabilities and possibilities for assisting their countries in 2016 should be sought.

NATO’s New Missions Won’t Solve Ukraine Crisis; A Military Response to “Russia’s Moves” Must Exist, But There Is Still Room for Diplomacy

US soldiers (above) training for combat operations. To respond to possible “Russian moves” against its Member States in Eastern Europe, NATO is organizing a new Rapid Reaction Force that will include US units. Political leaders of all NATO Member States must think deeply about situations that the use of the new force may create.

According to a September 7, 2014 Reuters article entitled, “NATO’s New Missions Won’t Solve Ukraine, Iraq Crises”, NATO leaders emerged from a summit in Wales with a plan to protect eastern members from a resurgent Russia, a pledge to reverse the decline in their defense spending, and a Western coalition to combat Islamic militants in Iraq. Ways were sought to use NATO’s military power to avert additional moves by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin against vulnerable Eastern European Member States. Senior alliance officials sought to reassure those countries that there are teeth behind the pledge (contained in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO’s founding document) that an attack on one Member State will be considered an attack on all. A key decision made at the summit was to create a new NATO Rapid Reaction Force of some 5,000 troops assembled from existing national high-readiness forces based at home. It would eventually be deployable within 48 hours’ notice, instead of up to several weeks now, to deter an aggressor in a crisis. It will be supported with logistics and equipment pre-positioned in Eastern European countries closer to Russia. The new force may also be used for expeditionary missions outside the NATO Treaty area. (Such operations would be subject to a unanimous political decision of the 28-nation NATO Council and to national caveats limiting what troops can do abroad.) A “Readiness Action Plan” was also adopted to shield former Soviet bloc Central and Eastern European countries that joined the alliance in the last 15 years by modernizing military infrastructure, further pre-positioning equipment and supplies, rotating air patrols and holding regular joint exercises on their soil.

Before the NATO Summit, seven NATO allies planned to create a new rapid reaction force of at least 10,000 soldiers as part of plans to boost NATO defenses in response to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The aim was to create a division sized joint expeditionary force for rapid deployment and regular exercises. United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron was expected to announce the creation of the force at the NATO Summit. The United Kingdom-led force would include an air and naval units as well as ground troops. Countries involved include Denmark, Latvia, Estonia, Norway, and the Netherlands—Canada also expressed an interest in taking part. Political leaders of these countries apparently became uncertain and impatient regarding US efforts to mitigate the threat of further Russian advances westward. At the summit, the force’s size was reduced to a level short of what Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania wanted. Yet, after US President Barack Obama spoke in Estonia on the eve of the summit, underlining the US commitment to defend the Baltic States, they were accepting of the change.

Yet, the September 7th Reuters article notes that despite ringing declarations of resolve, the US-led alliance cannot fix the conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists. Questions remain about the allies’ plan to create a Rapid Reaction Force and their aim of raising defense budgets to 2 percent of national output over a decade. Both are subject to political caveats. Most analysts say the main security problems on NATO’s eastern flank lie less in a Russian military threat to its allies than instability in non-aligned former Soviet republics between NATO and Russia. Coping with a Russian military push there, may require more than 5,000 NATO troops.

NATO appears to be in a situation similar to what it faced during the Cold War. Yet, continuous draw downs of Member State forces since that time has left it without robust military capabilities and harmed its ability to transmit, by actions, a message that would deter Russia from further advances. Now that Putin and Russia are on the move, it is not feasible for NATO to create an effective defense through a Rapid Reaction Force, the prepositioning of materials, and exercises that could reestablish a deterrent from the new Rapid Reaction Force now as if before the draw downs never occurred. Nunc pro tunc! (Now for then!)   The United Kingdom and France bolstered Europe’s defense with their own nuclear arsenals. As in the past, the mere consideration of the use of force against Russia brings the world closer to World War III. A diplomatic solution to the current crisis in Europe may exist. It would require NATO Member States, despite all that has transpired to date, to engage in a new process of communicating with Russia through diplomacy, not with sanctions and new plans to use force.

NATO’s New Rapid Reaction Force

As US and NATO officials have tried to quickly respond to the evolving crisis in Ukraine, they have noted an alarming pattern of behavior by Putin. While Putin emerged as the dominant power in Moscow, Russia was hardly realistically judged by the West. Indeed, wishful thinking of NATO Member States’ political leaders of a post-Cold War compliant Russia ruled. At the end of the NATO Summit in 1990, there was even hope of establishing a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia. Caution was not exercised. A reversal of such good fortune was viewed as unlikely. With a sense of near certitude over Russian actions and intentions, they made staggering cuts in their forces and NATO Member States failed to meet defense spending goals.   Political leaders of NATO Member States must accept that their assumptions about Russia were wrong. Any plans of working with Russia were scrubbed in May 2014. (The NATO-Russia Council created in 2002 has not been formally shut-down).

Since Russia annexed Crimea in March, NATO members have taken a number of short-term steps to reinforce the security of allies in Eastern Europe who are worried about Putin’s assertiveness. Putin’s actions have been in line with his vision of a resurgent Russia at the center of an orbit of compliant neighbors. This concept is manifested in his proposal for a “Eurasian Union,” an economic alliance that would include former Soviet Republics such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, most notably, Ukraine. The words of the NATO Summit declaration pulsate for the education of all both West and East. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated that the new Rapid Reaction Force “will ensure that we have the right forces and the right equipment in the right place, at the right time.” Troops would be regularly rotated and equipment and supplies, including weapons, ammunition and fuel, would be pre-positioned in Eastern Europe. Rasmussen explained it would also require command and control and logistics experts, “so this force can travel light but strike hard if needed.” Russia’s “aggressive behavior,” he said, will mean “a more visible NATO presence in the East for as long as required.”

However, much work will be required for NATO to rejuvenate itself. Over the years, several NATO Member States have been nonchalant about failing to meet their defense spending pledges. US outlays on security are three times that of the other 27 partners combined, even though the US gross domestic product (GDP) is smaller than their total GDP, a longstanding US concern about NATO defense spending. This uneven burden threatens NATO’s integrity, cohesion and capability—and ultimately, both European and transatlantic security.   Only four of the NATO partners met their agreed target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense in 2013—Estonia, Greece, the United Kingdom and the US. France, Turkey, and Greece fell just shy of the 2 percent goal, while other major countries such as Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have fallen well behind. The failure of European leaders to invest money and capabilities into their armed forces has left them unable to influence outcomes on issues such as Ukraine.

Longstanding Members of the NATO have cut their military forces dramatically. The United Kingdom and France have reduced warships in their arsenals to the point that they have contemplated sharing a single aircraft carrier. The United Kingdom, traditionally the closest and most reliable US military partner plans to reduce its regular ground forces to just 82,000 troops. Germany is in the process of reducing its armed forces from 250,000 in 2010 to 185,000 active duty planned for in 2017. The Dutch have eliminated their heavy tank forces. Putin undoubtedly took great interest in these force reductions and the Obama administration’s decision to also make steep reductions in US conventional forces. Those cuts have left the US less able to project power, take and hold ground in a non-permissive environment in defense of the interests of the US, its friends, and allies. As noted in the greatcharlie.com post entitled “As World Boils, Fingers Point Obama’s Way; In Putin’s View, Obama’s Doing Just Fine”, in 2013, the US withdrew its last two heavy armored brigades from Germany. Tank units anchored the US military presence on the ground in Europe for 70 years. US military leaders have considered withdrawing the last squadron of F-15C air superiority fighters from England. When Putin received the Obama administration’s proposals in 2013 calling for steep reductions in nuclear forces, he may have discerned that for the Obama administration, the US nuclear arsenal was merely a political bargaining chip, but not a military tool. US Army Chief of Staff, General Ray Odierno, stated “Over the last several years we’ve allowed our capabilities in NATO to slip.” He further explained: “So now we have to rebuild those capabilities. We need to understand where they reside, and what countries have which capabilities. We have to have more military exercises, improved [military] interoperability, and we need to reassure our Eastern partners in NATO that we are serious about [our commitments].”

Lessons from the Past

Throughout the Cold War, the US and its NATO allies stood ready to defend against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces along the Inter-German border dividing the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic Republic as well as Czechoslovakia. In the 1980s, for example, the NATO Alliance filed 750,000 troops of which 200,000 were from the US Army. The objective of the Western defense was to halt any attempt to push westward beyond Germany. It was understood that the Soviets and their partners held a numerical advantage in conventional forces, particularly in heavy armored and mechanized units. Under the attrition-oriented forward defense strategy, NATO forces would use units present and, if possible reinforcements from the US, to fight and defeat the advancing force. If they failed, it was also understood that tactical nuclear weapons would be used to prevent a breakthrough beyond Germany. The threatened use of strategic nuclear forces ostensibly was also used to deter Soviet and Warsaw Pact leaders from believing any successful advance would at all be tolerated and the US was fully committed to Western Europe’s defense. By the 1980s, the introduction of the US AirLand Battle Strategy with its emphasis on greater mobility and maneuver, the use of attacks in depth, and use of weapons systems that served as combat multipliers, greatly enhanced the possibility for Western success against a Soviet and Warsaw Pact advance. The battle would no longer be confined to the Inter-German border, but deep within Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory. Although Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional ground launched ballistic and cruise missiles with intermediate ranges from Europe in the same period, there still existed an understanding that tactical nuclear weapons could be employed by other means to halt a possible breakthrough of advancing Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. (It should be noted the Soviet and Warsaw Pact doctrine called for the use a chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to support their conventional forces.)

Western military theorists of the past hardly could have imagined that against a potentially aggressive Russian force, sufficient highly-mobile armored and mechanized NATO forces would be not be based in Europe to meet it. While 5,000 NATO troops in a Rapid Reaction Force may appear to political leaders at the NATO Summit to be sufficient to deter or combat Russian forces which could presumably be well reinforced from within Russia. Further, halting any additional US troop reductions in Europe and rejuvenating “Reforger Exercise” (Return of Forces to Germany), that rehearsed the reinforcement of forces in Europe through the deployment of large units from the US, may send a signal that the West is becoming more assertive regarding Russia’s actions in Ukraine. It may deter Russia from possible action against the 15 other former Soviet Republics elsewhere along its border, particularly those that are now NATO Members States. Yet, sending signals to Russia in this way may do little to improve the situation. So far, Russia has been most effective at sending signals to other former Soviet republics contemplating stronger military or economic ties to the West. In addition to acting in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has created fears that it may stir-up “frozen conflicts” in Moldova or between Armenia and Azerbaijan to stop those countries from moving closer to the West.

Some Considerations Regarding the Rapid Reaction Force

It would be counter-intuitive to believe the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or senior officers of security organizations as the Main Intelligence Directorate, considering how to cope with the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, would in an aggressive act, use the same tactics seen in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in Ukraine. When NATO prepared to offer a path to membership to Georgia in 2008, Russia sent troops to reinforce peacekeepers in the Russian-speaking, breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After a five-day conflict with outmatched Georgian forces supported by the West, Russia recognized the independence of the breakaway regions, where Russian troops remain. Georgia’s potential membership disappeared from the NATO agenda, Late 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych decided to forgo an Accession Agreement with the EU and join Putin’s Eurasian Union. After months of violent demonstrations by Ukrainian citizens, Yanukovych fled Ukraine. Putin intervened militarily, sending in “green men” to take control of key points in Crimea, leading to its annexation. Reports from Western news media sources indicate Russian forces similarly infiltrated the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of eastern Ukraine to join rebel forces of “New Russia”.

Russia may rush in with troops massed along the border of a neighboring state with heavy armored and mechanized units, highly mobile infantry, combat service units, and combat service support units. However, as a matter of speed and surprise, Russia may rapidly deploy forces from based well inside Russia to key points in a neighboring state. In the best case scenario for NATO, the Rapid Reaction Force, in response to intelligence reports of a Russian threat, would be deployed to a NATO Member State in advance of any significant movement of Russian forces into it. The NATO Rapid Reaction Force would be able to set up its defenses, make use of prepositioned systems and ordinance, and air power would be made available to support dynamic defensive actions and negate opportunities for Russian forces to overwhelm units. Russian political leaders would need to choose whether to clash with the NATO Rapid Reaction Force or retreat unable to secure its objectives without displacing a multinational NATO troops. Perhaps the Russian decision would rest on how soon and how large would reinforcements arrive to support the Rapid Reaction Force before it could inflict catastrophic losses upon it. In 1999, Russia found itself in this very situation without prepositioned weapons and ordinance in Kosovo in the aftermath of NATO’s Operation Allied Force to expel Yugoslav Army units and irregular forces from the Serbian province. Then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic was viewed as a partner of Russia. As NATO ground forces under the command of then British Army Lieutenant General Sir Michael Jackson reached Pristina, Russian airborne forces that were deployed in northeastern Bosnia as part of the Stabilization Force, rushed ahead to Pristina International Airport to secure the airfield on which several Russian fighters had landed. Jackson did not try to displace the force as ordered by his superior US Army General Wesley Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (NATO’s commanding general). Jackson famously said, “I’m not going to start the Third World War for you.” Jackson established a rapport with the Russian commanders. It was revealed that Russia, blocked from participating in NATO’s peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, decided to create a role for itself. Unable to move or be reinforced, the Russia relented, but it was agreed Russian troops could serve independently as peacekeepers.

If NATO Rapid Reaction Force cannot get to the Member State first, Russian forces would likely try to displace, destroy any local opposition with a superior force before NATO arrived, and quickly secure key points on the territory of a neighboring state. The NATO Rapid Reaction Force must clash with the Russian force if the objective is to displace it from key points or to expel it. Before NATO sent the force in, political leaders of Member States would need to decide in advance whether the Rapid Reaction Force would fire the shot to likely start World War III. Sending in the NATO Rapid Reaction Force to link up with local forces heavily engaged with Russian forces would guarantee NATO and Russian forces would clash. To get in country, the NATO Rapid Reaction Force would need to hope Russian forces, in preparation for their deployment to a neighboring state, would not destroy air bases and other facilities from which fighter support and transports could land in reasonable proximity to their targets.   Russia would be able to provide air cover and close air support for Russian troops. Russia would surely have air assets available to bring up reserve units and logistical support.

If Putin ordered a Russian force, overwhelming in size and combat power, to quickly engage the NATO Rapid Reaction Force on the ground, it might be futile for the NATO Rapid Reaction Force to attempt to handle it, even if the absolute maximum amount of pre-positioned weapon systems and ordinance were made available. The Rapid Reaction Force would at best be able to courageously hold on until a stronger NATO conventional force arrived to reinforce it and strike back and expel Russia from the country under attack. Again, Russia would most likely create a non-permissive environment for reinforcement. To the extent air power might be used against the Russian force, Russia may also use powerful conventional weapons to destroy NATO forces and support capabilities in the area of the neighboring state. If NATO forces were unable to halt and expel the Russian advance, new options would be needed. It would not be acceptable for the allies to simply retreat. As in the Cold War, the use of tactical nuclear weapons to repel the Russian force might be considered. The Rapid Reaction Force could be publicly declared a trip wire to trigger their use. Europe would once again face the prospect of becoming a nuclear battlefield. The use of strategic weapons in response to Russian aggression could also be threatened.

The Way Forward

Initially having ruled out military action, the West’s primary means to respond to Putin’s support of pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine and elsewhere has been economic sanctions and political exclusion. However, despite their dependence on Russian gas and the economic consequences for trade with Russia, along with the US, EU countries have adopted a fourth round of sanctions. Through NATO, Western powers now seek to reassert themselves militarily. While the title “Strongman of Russia” surely fits Putin, he is not a fanatic. He would undoubtedly prefer to establish peace and security in Ukraine and in Russia’s other neighboring states, without further conflict and further economic, political, and military expense. It may still be viable to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. One clearheaded option may be to organize a summit meeting between a delegation of leaders from NATO Member States and Putin in Moscow or some other neutral location. Perhaps not all of the leaders from NATO Members States should attend the summit. The goal would not be to overwhelm Putin with numerical superiority, but to transmit NATO concerns and find some solutions. It might be best if a delegation of leaders from senior NATO Member States. Foreign secretaries could attend. However, as a summit meeting, it might be best if the leaders themselves hashed things out alone in a daylong session. They would have a real opportunity to “clear the air” regarding any personal concerns they had at the highest-level and build confidence. A way to work together to satisfy Western and Russian interests may be found. If that is not achieved, at least leaders would remove any ambiguity about where things are headed.

For leaders of NATO Member States in particular, decisions would no longer need to be based on an understanding of “where Putin’s thinking is” in the abstract. For those leaders, speaking face to face, leaders would be given a chance to sense the other’s thinking and feelings. Everything the other says or how the other reacts to statements is important to know. Every inflexion, tone, and change in the other’s voice provided some insight as to what was on a leader’s mind. Speaking by telephone, when difficult or contentious issues arise, especially when relations are already uncongenial, is not the best option. Without seeing the other party, the call can become tense. Animus may find its way into the discussion in the form of terse comments. The result would not be a solution, but greater disagreement and frustration.

Pride and ego can block the truth, and lead one to reject all evidence of a problem. Political advisers of NATO leaders would explain that a summit with Putin would allow him to show that under his leadership, Russia has returned to the world stage as a global power. The meeting would have been a proud occasion for Putin and the Russian people and that Russia that he was a strong leader who is able to respond effectively to security issues and that he had control over the Ukrainian situation.  If the summit were held in Moscow, Putin would likely receive the chance to present his resurgent Russia in the best light possible. Yet, whatever public relations benefit or image boost Putin might gain through a summit would be trumped by the having the leaders reach a satisfactory diplomatic outcome.

Even during the most troubled times, relations between US and Russian leaders were maintained through a difficult process of summit meetings. Such Cold War meetings between US presidents and their Russian counterparts may have been distasteful for leaders on either side to undergo. However, leaders understood that maintaining a constructive relationship was not a personal matter; it was their duty. Despite proxy wars and other confrontations and conflicts along the course of the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union, while possessing the unique and mutual capability to annihilate one another and the world with their nuclear arsenals, did not. With a strong diplomatic action taken now, hopefully the issue of mutual annihilation will not become a major concern all over again.