The Plight of Surovikin and Other Russian Generals Reveals More of What Is Wrong with the Russian Federation Government

A still image from the June 2023 video of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–implorng Wagner Group troops to halt their rebellion. As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion, that according to the common wisdom, nearly sent the regime of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin spiraling down the drain, may have been an effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would be remiss for Putin’s most loyal subordinate, the Russian Federation security services, and possibly Putin himself, not to see the possibilities. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely have been the case that a decision to investigate military officers would have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Here, greatcharlie parses out the circumstances of the detention of several Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services, with an emphasis on handling of Surovikin.

Except for some possible changes in the efficiencies in the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ prosecution of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation).  So much outside of good reason appears to have guided top officials in the Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Ministry) and top commanders of the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff), that hardly anything should be discounted as impossible at this point. For some in the West, that reality props open the door for potential moves that could be made by those same top commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the near future that would be positively unsettling to the government of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. 

The private military organization, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) has fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of the invasion. The organization’s  owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, of poorly conducting the then 16 month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.”

As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts mutually entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Parts 1 and 2)”, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion may have been a hypothetical effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would have been remiss for someone as the most loyal Putin subordinate, the Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, and possibly for Putin, not to see the possibilities. The FSB’s monitoring of responses to Prigohzin’s actions and possible communications with him should have been expected at least. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely be the case that a decision to investigate military officers would likely have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Indeed, in the Russian Federation security services, names have changed and so have technologies, but in the end that old chestnut from the Soviet days of “weeding out reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries” who supposedly pose a never-ending internal threat is apparently at the root and drives many of their activities. History has provided more than enough evidence of how well that turned out.

It is greatcharlie’s purpose here to parse out the circumstances of the detention of Surovikin and other Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services to gain a better understanding of what is truly at the root of the action, what is likely occurring, and why the potential outcome for the Kremlin may very well be against its interests in more ways than one. Apparently suspected from the start of the whole Wagner Group episode was Commander in Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin, the deputy commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on his detention and what surrounds it essentially as a yardstick to consider the plight of others. It is not concealed that greatcharlie believes the detention is a monumental injustice, a fantastic outrage. Human rights are available equitably to all humans, even Russian Federation generals. Hopefully, there will not be too much argument against that among a few readers. Some of what is discussed about the handling of Surovikin is written in the abstract but founded on long-reported treatment experienced by political activists, disfavored officials, and ordinary citizens alike whose interests “did not align with those of the government” and were thereby detained by the Russian Federation security services. It is greatcharlie’s contention that there is no reason to “search” for the truth. The true and pertinent is already known to all following the matter. No alternate facts to those generally reported in the Western newsmedia are revealed. No legal arguments based on Russian Federation law are offered here. Logic and reason are the tools brought to bear on the matter. Security service investigators surely have their “convictions”. Surovikin’s detention is hardly a subject that anyone could expect to discuss rationally with managers of the security services. Still, one might hope that at the top of the Russian Federation government, the light of good reason will eventually shine upon the matter. Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt? (what good are laws when there are no morals?)

On June 24, 2023, a video appeared on Telegram that depicted “talks” between Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and the Deputy Commander of the GRU, Vladimir Alekseyev, at the Southern Military District’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don of which the Wagner Group had taken control. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were made out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories had the less noble aim of rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, an audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. Those outbursts and, even more, the Wagner Group Rebellion, did much to provide such evidence.

Regarding Sedition and Insurrection in the Russian Federation

When asked during an interview broadcasted on CBS News “Face the Nation” in May 2023 what he thought was really behind the very public feud between Prigozhin and both Shoigu and Gerasimov, former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded: “My view is, this is all taking place, with Putin’s approval.” Gates went on to explain the following: “This is- this is Putin, dividing and conquering. Putin, given how badly the war has gone, has to worry, at some point, that his military decides he’s a problem. By giving Prigozhin power and strengthening Prigozhin and letting him criticize the Ministry of Defense, Putin keeps them divided. If the two came together and decided Putin was a problem, then Putin would have a really big problem. So, my view is that- that Putin is sort of orchestrating this to a degree in the sense- or at least letting it go forward, because it serves his interest in keeping these two powerful forces at each other’s throats, rather than potentially beginning to collude against him.”

Imaginably, Gates, forever the consummate intelligence analyst, might appreciate fragments of an alternative perspective in the abstract on the perceptions of Prigozhin and his Wagner Group’s commanders and Russian Federation Armed Forces operations and senior operational commanders of the circumstances in Ukraine. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely out of his concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin was vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, Prigozhin’s decision to have a bit of fun at the expense of elite circles was very much ill-timed. An audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. 

There is a perspective expressed in foreign and national security policy circles in the West that the time for Putin to leave power has come. Indeed, such is the intensity of negative feelings about Putin among many in West that the long-remembered words spoken by Oliver Cromwell in the House of Commons in 1653 concerning his ejection of the remaining members of the *Long Parliament” used famously on other occasions in the United Kingdom’s Parliament, well-expresses their sentiment: ‘You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!” Gates’ comments about the Russian Federation Armed Forces or the Wagner Group or both posing a threat to Putin’s power were nuanced and derive from a depth of understanding on the situation in the Russian Federation externally matched by few, it would fall in line not only with a multitude of mainstream analyses that have explored that possibility, and now feel their assessments were proven on-track with the advent of the Wagner Rebellion. 

It is very important for those thinking along those lines to consider how the insurrection truly end. It did not end with the return of Wagner Group troops to their ans some leaving for Belarus with Prigozhin. That was one stage of the whole show. It ended when Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

With regard to prospective plotters among Russian Federation Armed Forces  commanders, surely they understand that the special military operations’ present outcome was actually due to their failures and those of the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders. Surely, they were aware or should have been aware, just how deficient their forces truly were. This is hard saying for them, but the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders of the conventional forces were and still are inadequately suited to defend their country or to successfully invade a country such as Ukraine, especially when it is receiving robust support from NATO member countries and other countries with an interest in the matter. Due their own colossal failure to consider eventualities of such an enterprise, they did not foresee the deluge of Western military aid and training or what a huge impact it would have on the special military operations course. Strategic failures by Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders and the inability to recognize opportunities for decisive action and turn failure into success continue to the point where its too painful for those concerned with the wastage of human lives to watch. Among the Ukrainian people, whose country the Russian Federation wrongfully and illegally invaded, maybe those failures might be viewed [as a relative blessing from on high. (Yet, what really can ever be called a blessing during a war: survival?) 

If one might believe that what has transpired in Ukraine since February 2022 was all a deliberate act of subversion by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff, the question would then be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous extent in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing upright and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This allegation shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round. 

Certainly, Putin had authority over what transpired but had no expert role in the technical management of any of it. Imaginably, top Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders could still hold Putin accountable for all that has occurred in Ukraine or dare to say such things in public or private, however they should guard against such delusional thinking even in their darkest moments. With the idea of overthrowing Putin being bandied about, doubtlessly, the security services have been very much on the prowl, more so now than ever, watching, listening, and hoping to pick up the trail on anything even slightly out of order. 

Putin (left) and Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, talk along a corridor followed by stout securitymen. From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. The Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow. Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by an a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of the Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the disturbance.

Background on the Russian Federation Security Services

During his July 27, 2023 address at the Kremilin’s Cathedral Square, Putin enumerated the organizations that fall under the heading, the security services of the Russian Federation He included the following: the Federal Security Service; National Guard; Interior Ministry; Federal Guard Service; and, the Defense Ministry.

Federal Security Service

Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) or FSB, is the principal security service of the Russian Federation. The primary responsibilities are within the country and in certain circumstances,, externally,, are: counterintelligence, internal and border security, counterterrorism, surveillance and the investigation all other capitol crimes, violations of federal law violations, and unenumerated and unforeseen national security matters.

The National Guard

Federal’naya sluzhba voysk natsional’noy gvardii Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Service of the Troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation) or Rosgvardiya is the country’s internal military force, comprising an independent agency that reports directly to Putin under his powers as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The National Guard is not an element of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2016, Putin signed a law establishing the federal executive bureaucracy. The stated mission of the National Guard is securing the Russian Federation’s borders, serving as the lead agency on gun control, combating terrorism and organized crime, protecting public order and guarding important federal properties.

Interior Ministry

Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation) or MVD is responsible for law enforcement within the country by performing tasks as described I n the names of its main agencies: the Police of Russia, Migration Affairs, Drugs Control, Traffic Safety, the Centre for Combating Extremism, and the Investigative Department.

Federal Guard Service

Federalnaya sluzhba okhrany (the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation) or FSO, is the federal government agency concerned with the tasks related to the protection of the most senior national officials as mandated by the relevant law, to include Putin. The FSO is also responsibile for the physical security of certain federal properties.

Defense Ministry

With regard to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it is not a security service per se, but technically plays an in security service role, being able to provide supporting ground, air, and navalnavalNaval assets when needed to support the main security organizations. Penultimately, the Defense Minister exercises day-to-day administrative and operational authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Russian Federation General Staff executes the Russian Federation President’s and the Russian Federation Defense Minister’s instructions and orders. Ultimately, the Russian Federation President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and directs the activity of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry.

From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. To all intents and purposes, the Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. (Perhaps that was an expression of his crni humor and it escaped the vast majority of listeners.) In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the “disturbance”.

As greatcharlie noted in its aforementioned August 1, 2023 post, in his June 25, 2023 address to the Russian Federation on the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Putin then fired something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to those similar to “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he described players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. To that extent, it would be expected for the security services to single out examples from the senior ranks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to terrorize them into believing none would be safe from their watchful eyes and protective hands. If even the slightest scent of sedition or insurrection emanated from their direction, the security services would much like a tiger in the jungle at its prey.

As the Wagner Group Rebellion took shape, many officials and observers in the West proffered that Prigozhin and his troops would not have been able to take over military facilities in southern Russia so easily and mount his rapid march on Moscow without collusion with some members of the military’s elite. It is possible that such assessments and even the words of Gates spoken about a possible military insurrection drove top officials into such a frenzy that they became more determined to light on any officer over the slightest suspicion. It is fairly unlikely that the security services could say for certain that any military officers were absolutely involved in the Wagner Group Rebellion or any other apparent plots. Nevertheless, action was expected, and action was taken. The noble pagan of Ancient Rome, the renown statesman and scholar Marcus Tulius Cicero (106 BC to 43 BC), attributed to the Athenian statesman Solon (c. 630 BC to 560 BC), the quote: “Rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, præmio et pœna.” (A state is regulated by two things, reward and punishment.)

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. There was evidently no reason for any of the officers to believe they were guilty of anything. All were apparently devoid of any instant fear. Apparently, not one attempted to act first by using resources available to general officers to take refuge from the security services or evade investigators upon their arrival to detain them. For each, the discovery that they were subjects of an investigation by the security must have come to each as a bolt out of the blue. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release. In Act 2 Scene 1 of William Shakespeare’s tragedy, The Life and Death of Julius Caesar (1599), the character Brutus, considers, in a soliloquy, his reasons for assassinating Caesar on the Ides of March, states words surely pertinent to thinking of the security services regarding the subjects of their investigations ostensibly for treasonous acts though such behavior was unseen: “And therefore think him as a serpent’s egg / Which, hatch’d, would, as his kind, grow mischievous, / And kill him in the shell.” With its own hand, the Russian Federation government is gutting its own military of premium commanders. Que puis-je dire? 

The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to Wagner Group Rebellion. Citing the Wall Street Journal, the Moscow Times stated “The detentions are about cleaning the ranks of those who are believed can’t be trusted anymore.” Indeed, although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release.

Background on Surovikin

Holding the rank of General of the Army, Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin has served as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine from October 8, 2022 to January 11, 2023, during which time helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year. He was replaced as the top commander in January 2023 by Gerasimov but retained influence in running war operations while in command of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone.

He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the medal and title Hero of the Russian Federation and the Order of St. George. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when on November 22, 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces. It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), under one command. 

Surovikin was born in Novosibirsk in Siberia on October 11,1966. He is currently 56, married, and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, unknown to greatcharlie is the degree to which he is observant. After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during the last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency. Fighting in the Afghan War in the latter stages when the US was conducting its covert operation to support the Soviet’s main opponent, the Mujahideen at full-bore was most likely a very challenging experience for Surovikin.

Surovikin discussing the situation in Ukraine during his period of service as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone. The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that , which said Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain and commander of the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. When the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-declared Gosudarstvennyj Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP., orders were sent down by the GKChP requiring Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into the barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. Shortly after that, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, prompted by politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior decided to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RussianFederation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

The security services were surely ready and willing to grab those that both their sister national security bureaucracies and elites as Shoigu and Gerasimov could point a finger at. If some document had been created listing those officers that the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff had doubts about, Surovikin’s name would surely have been placed on the top of that list. For those who might have thoughts of seditious thoughts or considering insurrection, they would surely suggest that Surovikin be their role model: “Dein Vorbild!”

Surovikin (left) proudly receives Order of St. George, 3rd degree, from an apparently satisfied Putin (right). For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. 

How Jealousy and Envy Likely Poisoned the Thinking of Shoigu and Gerasimov on Surovikin

US officials briefed on intelligence concerning Surovikin’s detention have said they do not know if his was actively involved in the Wagner Group plot to abduct Shoigu and Gerasimov. Searching for reasons behind Surovikin’s detention, the Western newsmedia as well as Russia scholars and policy analysts have repeatedly noted that when he was selected as the commander of Russian Aerospace Forces in 2022 and as the Russian Federation’s overall commander in Ukraine, none other than Prigozhin very publicly welcomed his appointment to those posts, calling him a “legendary figure” and “born to serve his motherland”. These quotes and other supportive ones, along with a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin, have fuelled rumors in the West that Surovikin may have been “purged” or put under investigation for his ties to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, even if fuelled by rumor, would indeed be more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into.

Still, despite any perceived ties between Surovikin and Prigozhin, it is more likely the case that he was a fitting target for the security services because he was, and presumably still is, disfavored by Shoigu and Gerasimov for, all of things, possessing a military acumen that surpassed theirs by leaps and bounds. No one could have been more aware of how inept Shoigu and Gerasimov were than Surovikin. No one did more to make the duo’s inadequacies readily apparent just by doing his job right. Rather treasure their subordinate as someone who gets things done in the midst of the Russian Federation’s conundrum in Ukraine, at the nub of their concern over him was very likely jealousy, envy, and insecurity. Shoigu and Gerasimov have respectively demonstrated themselves to be very flawed men in their thinking and actions. It is conceivable that they would go a bit further and prove themselves prone to punish subordinates because of their talents. Que l’enfer est faux avec vous?

When Surovikin was promoted to overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone on October 8, 2022, he began to make moves that brought some positive results and good news for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Surovikin surely understood that leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer, although he may have wanted to do so in many areas. Despite shortcomings of his forces in the field and accepting the situation as it actually was, Surovikin sought to solidify the position of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. Fully in his element in ground warfare, he stepped up better organized localized attacks to have a cumulative effect and push back on advances by Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) at that time. His defensive moves reportedly raised worries among US military officials and officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden that Russia Federation troops might be able to withstand renewed Ukrainian offensives.

Yet Surovikin’s efforts, which were bearing fruit, did not appear to be enough to impress or satisfy his military superiors. One might wonder whether Surovikin was intentionally given a fool’s errand when given overall command in Ukraine. One might speculate it was part of a pre-concerted effort conjured up by his superiors, hoping to brand him with a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission to correct a near Intractable situation before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Readers may recall that it was greatcharlie’s prediction in its October 30, 2023 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, that the situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) According to Thucydides’ own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1 of The History of the Peloponnesian War, he was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because he had “great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland.” However, the renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports that it was firmly under Spartan control were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

It also could have been the case that Surovikin’s ability to establish order from chaos convinced others they could grab glory from his success and claim his successful actions as their own. Surovikin’s replacement as overall commander in Ukraine was none other than Gerasimov. When Gerasimov arrived to take command of the special military operation from him, Surovikin was not dismissed as was the case with Thucydides. He became one of three deputies subordinate to Gerasimov in the Special Military Operation zone, which meant Surovikin’s sound military thinking,  good insights, and reliable intuition would be at his disposal. Further, by keeping Surovikin in the mix, any negative feelings Putin might have developed over a dismissal would be avoided. At that time, he still appreciated Surovikin, and would have unlikely tolerated his dismissal and would likely have responded negatively to efforts to dismiss him. However, if his superiors were truly “gunning for him”, as suggested by greatcharlie, their efforts would hardly end with his demotion. It seems they managed to set up a better aimed second shot at him during the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Surovikin with laser pointer (left) and Shoigu (right). Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, Putin, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk, implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . . ] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, at the meeting with bloggers in Russian Federation on June 23, 2023, Putin implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.” For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. On the face of it, one might have imagined Putin and the general would have a very harmonious relationship, Both were devout servants of the Soviet Union and desired to preserve their erstwhile country. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability became most apparent to Putin through his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded.

The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

A matter that might presumably have caused Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness, particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin needs to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity. Vana quoque ad veros accessit fama timores. (Idle rumors were also added to well-founded fears.)

Surovikin (left) and Gerasimov (right). It would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

By countenancing the detention of Surovikin, Shoigu and Gerasimov would have essentially given their blessing to the actions of the security services. When the guilt of an individual is near assured by such authority, and results are expected at the top, the faculty of thought can often be suspended, even lost every step of the way. By observation–empirical data gleaned from years of newsmedia reporting–this appears true for almost every country, sorry to say. (If this faulty practice at all sound familiar to readers from security services of other countries, change your ways today! (More easily said than done one would suppose.)) Sufficit unum lumen in tenebris. (A single light suffices in the darkness.)

Surovikin appears to have found himself in a pickle with Putin similar to that of Ancient Roman military leader Belisarius (c. 500 AD to 565 AD) with Roman Emperor Justinian I (482 AD to 565 AD). Far more than simply a military commander, Belisarius was one of the greatest of Antiquity. He has been dubbed by historians as “the Last of the Romans.” He conquered the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa in 9 months, then turned to conquer much of Italy. He was victorious against the Vandals at Tricamarum and Ad Decimum. He recaptured the city of Rome for the Empire and held on to it under siege despite the fact that in both seizing the city and defending it, his force was outnumbered. Although subsequently defeated by the Persians at Callinicum, he won a great victory against their forces at Dara. Belisarius repulsed invasion attempts by the Huns at Melantias and by the Persians at Ariminum by causing them to lift the siege of the city. Skilled at using deception in warfare, he led the Persian commander to withdraw without a fight. However, having accomplished all of this and more, in 562 AD, toxic advisers, jealous and envious of Belisarius’ success and favor with Justinian, managed to convince the emperor that his loyal commander was conspiring to overthrow him. He was found guilty at trial, stripped of rank, publicly humiliated, and imprisoned. After reconsidering the matter, Justinian pardoned Belisarius and demanded his release. He restored him to favor at the imperial court. Belisarius died very shortly afterward.

It would seem the security services are very much troubling Surovikin with a lengthy examination. One might imagine if the security services had a clear cut case against the Surovikin, they would have readily thrown a light on all that is dark to everyone about the matter by making some complacent public statement in a very grand way. Certainly, that would happen, albeit only if Putin sanctioned it. Out of sheer curiosity, it would be interesting to hear what sort of ragbag of dissonant trifles the security services have in their possession about Surovikin. In the aggregate, their evidence would unlikely amount to anything managers in any legitimate law enforcement organization elsewhere would find satisfactory or acceptable. Conceivably, any evidence possessed by the security services could hardly be more than circumstantial and unlikely exact, but surely whatever it possesses would be near enough for the security services to believe their case is solid. Each bit of nothing in their minds would presumably rate higher meaning. To that extent, one might assess in the truest sense, the supposed crimes of the suspected officers were featureless ones. Nos hæc novimus esse nihil. (We know that these things are nothing (i.e., mere trifles.)

Snakes are able to unhinge their jaws, which allows them to swallow animals much larger than their heads. After they devour the animal, their jaw hinge goes back into place. Much as with snakes, right or wrong, security service officials, whether in the Russian Federation or governments of freedom loving democracies of the West, will figuratively unhinge their jaws to devour “larger prey” such as Surovikin or any subject of an investigation for whatever recherché rationale or due to an investigator’s some very apparent mental abnormality, highly valued by them. Often too easily given the authority by their superiors who are usually eager to receive results, investigating security service officials are usually reluctant to release the subjects of their investigations even if it requires busting budgets by increasing staff and hours on the beat and increasing the use of technical resources to include contractors to collect evidence that unlikely existed. Errant investigators will continue to clamp down on their victim even when it is clear there are no substantial leads, or trifles, to follow up on. Curiously, superiors in most security service do not appear to  circulate in a way to observe such aggressive investigative practices or hear from subordinates whether anything inordinate is transpiring. Typically, managers in the security services have come up from the same system and are unwilling to push too hard on anything thoroughly. They know the deal! To be sure, the behavior of investigators in the security services can be unhinged not as much in a physical way as with the snake’s jaw, but psychologically. Once its victim is completely figuratively devoured, broken in a real sense, their jaws will return to their original position.

Gerasimov (above) moves through a well-protected bunker to the rear of the frontlines in Ukraine. A matter that might presumably cause Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin wants to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Surely Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity.

On Bullying Surovikin

Turning to the Bard again, in Act 3, scene 3 of Shakespeare’s play Othello, the Moor of Venice (1603), the consummate antagonist, the ensign Iago, acting full bore in a dastardly campaign to destroy the commander, Othello, psychologically, seeks to create doubt in his mind about his wife Desdemona’s fidelity and that she could possibly be in love with his captain, Cassio, his most loyal subordinate. In convincing Othello that it would be a tremendous blow to his reputation if word of what was in reality a nonexistent relationship between the two, became widely known, Iago states the famous passage: Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, / Is the immediate jewel of their souls: / Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; / ‘Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands: / But he that filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not enriches him / And makes me poor indeed.” While likely embarrassed, disheartened and potentially humiliated initially by the public spectacle and dishonor of his detention, the brave soldier, a former spetsnaz officer, will not so easily be driven past hope and into despair despite the worst the security services might be able to dish out. True, the message Surovikin recorded urging the Wagner Group troops to halt their “mutiny” was likely made at the suggestion of the security service which likely had him in their possession at the time. Yet, the possibility is greater than not that Surovikin truly wanted the whole episode with the Wagner Group to end in order to prevent an atrocious “blue on blue” clash, save the lives of much needed troops, and avoid doing anything that would give the Russian Federation’s opponents an advantage. Surovikin likely saw it as one more chance to be a good commander and patriot despite his difficult situation. Doubtlessly in their interrogation of Surovikin, investigators are very likely repeatedly testing every link of their conceivably defective and possibly contaminated chain of evidence. However, no fabricated disclosures or incriminating false confession under duress should be hoped for from Surovikin. A likely denouement would be the general’s call to higher service unless he is released. The security services would of course assure all that Surovikin had met his fate by his own hand if he were to die in their custody. Hopefully, none of that will transpire.

For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars.. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Perhaps every Western capital, as well as the capitals in other regions concerned about Ukraine, was aware of it. Western intelligence appears to have been more fully informed on the details of what was transpiring on the border than the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff and the security services in the aggregate. It brings to mind how difficult it seemed for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services to monitor Prigozhin’s movements between Belarus and the Russian Federation after the rebellion. Time and effort was spent raiding empty homes garnering little more than wigs and some old gag photos, gold bars and automatic weapons, all of which were returned to their owner. In the meantime, Western intelligence had been monitoring every move he made by satellite. One might hazard a guess that the US Intelligence Community knew details such as what he was typically having for breakfast and lunch and how much time he was spending watching television. The juxtaposition of the respective approaches to investigating the two subjects by the security services is almost comical.

Surely, the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services themselves had a more than adequate opportunity to monitor and disrupt any plan of the Wagner Group, to prevent if from assembling and rolling out against the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, and long before the “mutineers” left their line of departure and reached Rostov-on-Don. The reason why they failed to act, robustly or discreetly, is anyone’s guess. The failure of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and security services to interfere with the Wagner Group before the situation took a grave turn was surely a worse act of enabling the rebellion than any other. If Surovikin is being held over any knowledge potentially possessed and withheld by him, he could hardly have concealed anything that everyone did not already know on the matter. As the whole saw how the whole episode played out, one might wonder what sort of special piece of information he could have held back. Recalling the dialogue from the 1979 blockbuster film “Apocalypse Now!”, a portion of a line spoken by the character US Army Captain Benjamin L. Willard is apropos in this case. With that line added on here, one could then state with considerable accuracy that charging anyone with having foreknowledge of the Wagner Group Rebellion would be “like handing out speeding tickets at the Indy 500.”

If Surovikin is being held over some possible errant words spoken by him, then, as suggested earlier, the time has long passed since the security services should have let Putin, the Russian people, and the world know they have got it out. However, such is surely not the case. Everything made publicly known so far points to the likelihood that they have no real case against Surovikin. Perchance the best case for which the security services are actually providing strong evidence is the case proving what an absolute abomination the Russian Federation government is. Some might argue that too is an “open secret”.

Regarding the inadequacies of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services, greatcharlie need not go as far as to call attention to just how wrong their respective pre-invasion conclusions were about the Ukrainian people welcoming invading Russian Federation troops with open arms. One might infer from the quality of their previous work product, in the minds of security service investigators, no matter how implausible or off-kilter their cause for holding Surovikin might be, they believe there is good reason to detain Surovikin. They can “rest assured” that they have got the right man. Again, they have got it out! Complètement folle!

Interestingly, while Russia scholars and policy analysts will never recognize the sovereign territory of Ukraine in the Donbass as Novorossiya, it is supposedly a reality for the Russian Federation government. That being the case, if the Wagner Group on territory that was in the minds of Russian Federation officials now their country’s sovereign territory, whatever the Wagner Group was doing was a matter that fell primarily if not solely within the security services’ province. How inelegant it is for the security services to foist their responsibilities upon commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield who at that moment were swamped, struggling to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from delivering a crushing military blow, sending the entire enterprise in Ukraine from swiftly spiraling downward into a defeat on a scale not seen since World War II. (Undoubtedly, with regard later offensives that have lead to grand defeats, some might call attention to the May 4, 1975 spring offensive (Chiến dịch mùa Xuân 1975), officially known as the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 (Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy mùa Xuân 1975), which was the final North Vietnamese campaign of the Vietnam War that led to the capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the surrender and dissolution of Republic of Vietnam. Others might call attention to the May 2021 offensive of the wretched Taliban in blatant violation of a peace agreement that led to the capture of Kabul, the complete collapse of the internationally backed government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and subsequent dissolution of the robustly supported the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces on August 15 2021.)

Putin (center top) meeting with select members of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Russian Federation security services, and the Security Council during the Wagner Group Rebellion. For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Pitfalls for Military Officers Who Get Too Close to Political Matters

With Prigozhin being a very close associate of the Russian Federation President and, by reports, ostensibly under the control of the GRU and the Russian Federation General Staff, it is not too difficult to imagine Surovikin was most likely reluctant, or strongly desired, to stay out of matters closely concerning Prigozhin’s activities outside of military matters. By doing so, one could only bring unneeded trouble upon oneself. It would be impossible, without all of the facts of what was really the case, what was in play. One of the other aforementioned commanders detained and questioned by the security services, Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of the GRU, military intelligence, certainly would have known prying into whatever the Wagner Group was doing off the battlefield would be counterintuitive. He too would know just getting too close could result in trouble as the situations for Yudin, Alekseyev, and Surovikin clearly demonstrate.

In greatcharlie’s June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, a true picture of the thinking among the Russian people concerning service to the state–to the best understanding of greatcharlie–was outlined with frankness. At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, some citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances even following what could reasonably be called the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. (On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) For certain, laws concerning the people’s well-being can be legislated with some regularity in most countries but justice is very often harder to achieve.

To that extent, greatcharlie supposed that scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would unlikely be quick to assist the Russian Federation government by providing any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. Indeed, there perhaps would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively depicted or impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. It would be enough of a tragedy to simply find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, those among the Russian people who might have something of real value to contribute may decide, or their respective families and friends might advise, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

Putin (left) and Shoigu (right). Behind Putin to the left is Alexei Dyumin, Acting Governor of the Tula Region of the Russian Federation. Behind the pensive Shoigu, to the left, is Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister and State Secretary, General of the Reserve Army, Nikolai Pankov. Dyumin holds the rank of lieutenant general in the Russian Army. He once served as the chief security guard and assistant of Russian Federation President  before Putin promoted him to lead the Russian Federation’s Special Operations Forces which he oversaw during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The following year, he became Deputy Defense Minister. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. It has been suggested within the Western newsmedia that Dyumin would likely replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister if the need arose. Politics at the highest realms of the Russian Federation are complicated and dangerous. Those who really do not have “hold any cards” or are not “covered” politically much as Icarus of Ancient Greek mythology tend to get burned and fall whenever they intentionally or incidentally get too close to the fire.

Beyond being shocked and surprised, Surovikin was likely horrified upon initially discovering that the entire political cabaret of the Wagner Group Rebellion was being launched in the eastern sector of his area of responsibility. If he had not been, he might have supposed the security services, to include the Border Guard and the National Guard, would be in the best position to put the brakes on the matter. He then might have expected the FSB would have the situation “well in hand”, going about interviewing Wagner Group commanders and detaining them if necessary. None of that happened. It turned out none of the security services took on the task of dealing with the Wagner Group. (Still, one might suggest in their own way, FSB managers did have the matter covered alright. They would select suspected, not necessarily guilty, co-conspirators after the fact, and deflect any culpability for their own failures.) One could imagine Surovikin’s facial expression upon hearing from security service investigators. Perhaps he was stoic. 

Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely putting too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his real job, fighting an illegal war initiated by the Kremlin. The security services, however, are unable to see that. They exist in an alternate reality–a cognitive bubble–much as they do in every country. That is something that legislatures and executive authorities in democracies must do far more to guard against.

The mainstream opinion reported in the West generally is that Surovikin is a skilled commander who would likely continue to pose problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The New York Times described Surovikin as a respected military leader who helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year, analysts say. He was replaced as the top commander in January but retained influence in running war operations and remains popular among the troops. Perhaps he is looked upon as something far less formidable by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff on which he served. A common theme heard during the Wagner Group Rebellion was that the action was benefitting the enemies of the Russian Federation. Among the points made in his July 24, 2023 “Address to the Nation” concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin explained that external threats–tacitly understood to be the US and other Western countries–would exploit anything that might provide advantage for them against the Russian Federation. Putin stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history. Putin continued: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Oddly enough, in a dark, cynical twist, Surovikin, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–and propping himself in a chair against a wall in an unmilitary fashion, spoke briefly on a video recording. Surovikin remarked: “We fought together with you, took risks, we won together,” He then entreated:  “We are of the same blood, we are warriors. I urge you to stop.” Surovikin added: “The enemy is just waiting for our internal political situation to deteriorate.” He  then implored the Wagner Group troops: “Before it is too late . . . you must submit to the will and order of the people’s president of the Russian Federation. Stop the columns and return them to their permanent bases.” It is almost certain that when the video was produced, Surovikin was already being held–and likely being roughly handled–by security service investigators.

Readers may compare Surovikin’s typically appearance depicted in this photo (above) with his deportment in the June 24, 2023 video and judge for themselves the general is doing well. In the video broadcasted on June 24, 2023, Surovikin as aforementioned, appears in an unkempt state, unshaven and wearing an unpressed uniform. Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely to put too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his job.

With regard to what the Moscow’s perceived enemies were actually thinking and saying about the Wagner Group Rebellion, the New York Times on June 27, 2023 reported that US officials interviewed, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence, explained concerning Surovikin and the Wagner Group Rebellion that they have avoided discussing what they and their allies know publicly to avoid feeding Putin’s narrative that the unrest was orchestrated by the West.

At the same time, US officials admitted to the New York Times that US has “an interest in pushing out information that undermines the standing of General Surovikin, whom they view as more competent and more ruthless than other members of the command.” Reportedly, they further stated: “His removal would undoubtedly benefit Ukraine, whose Western-backed troops are pushing a new counteroffensive that is meant to try to win back territory seized by Moscow.” This statement alone would hardly serve as striking proof that the secret Western agencies were working around the Russian Federation to sabotage its efforts in Ukraine, efforts on the world stage, and efforts to maintain national unity. Still. destroying Surovikin is viewed as desirable among the Russian Federation’s declared opponents–enemies, then given the Russian Federation security service investigators’ actions, one might ask of them: “Je suis désolée, de quel côté es-tu?”

It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone even near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, if not certainly, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Russian Federation Deputy Defense Ninister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Russian Federation Defense Ministry post. He has since been released. Expectedly, Putin would have insisted upon Prigozhin’s release if he had been quietly detained.  However, that would likely have been late under any circumstances as the Russian Federation security services can do an incredible amount of damage to one’s person in a very short period of time. Prigozhin, a convict in a Soviet prison in the 1980s while in his 20s, likely would have had no desire to experience such treatment in 2023 while in his 60s.

One must also remember that service to Putin, Prigozhin, would do just about anything if Putin told Prigozhin it was part of his plan or simply said that was what he wanted. That would be all he needed to hear. If the choice had to be made between Surovikin’s well-being and Putin’s satisfaction, there would be no contest. Prigozhin’s choice would be to satisfy Putin. Such is the nature of Prigozhin’s relationship with Putin. Prigozhin is dedicated to Putin, No one should make a mistake about that. He is also quite beholden to him for his largess and position within the highest realms of Russian Federation society. Putin likely came to recognize Prigozhin’s rather flattering attachment to him long ago. Absent such dedication, he likely would have shaken Prigozhin well before. It would doubtlessly be a strain for Prigozhin to swallow such an act of betrayal against Surovikin or arduous for him to carry that truth until the end of his days, but surely he will attempt to do it. Thinking about how Prigozhin has been so willing to offer his opinion, his predilection for talking too much, and his penchant for flying off the rails of logic during his fiery ravings, what comes to mind is “Bigmouth Strikes Again”, a 1986 song from the third album of the English rock band The Smiths. Written by Johnny Marr and Morrissey, the lyrics of the refrain are: “Bigmouth [La-la, la, la, la-la!] / Bigmouth [La-la, la, la!] / Bigmouth strikes again / And I’ve got no right to take my place / To the Human race.”

Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin leaving Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Deputy Defense Minister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Defense Ministry post. He has since been released.

No Little Lamb Driven to Slaughter: Surovikin’s Violent Antecedents

Virtus præmium est optimum. Virtus omnibus rebus anteit profecto. Libertas, salus, vita, res, parentes, patria et prognati tutantur, servantur; virtus omnia in se habet; omnia assunt bona, quem penes est virtus. (Virtue is the highest reward. Virtue truly goes before all things. Liberty, safety, life, property, parents, country, and children are protected and preserved. Virtue has all things in herself; he who has virtue has all things that are good attending him) In truth, as an officer in the Russian Federation Armed Forces,, and the Soviet Army before that, Surovikin has by no means comported himself as virtuous man. To be certain, greatcharlie does not want to leave readers with the impression that Surovikin is an innocent lamb being driven to potential slaughter. A number of violent antecedents are associated with his name. Indeed, in Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. 

As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring, where three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders.  In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. During his tours in Syria, Surovikin received the nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” At one time there were supposedly whispers in the Russian Federation that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source. Surely, others following his career more closely could perhaps enumerate more “bumps in the road”.

Who Wins, Who Loses?

While wanting to develop a better picture of Surovikin’s likely treatment, greatcharlie admits without pretension that diving into what might be the “low vibrational” thinking of those holding him is a disquieting and distasteful journey of exploration through the grotesque. Perhaps greatcharlie’s “tirade” in this post on the enormous injustice against Surovikin comes as a result of studying Prigozhin’s videos on Telegram too closely during research for its preceding post. (Can mere association with behavior via video recording breed similarity?) After reviewing what is presented here, a small number of readers might minimize in a well-meaning way as intelligent speculation. In the introduction, greatcharlie admitted there was a small degree of that. Noticeably, there is no effort to predict future events concerning Surovikin’s detention. Those who may believe they have gained by it are surely powerful enough with the system and intent on having their way with him. However, who gains and who loses on the matter perhaps has not been considered in the round by those who have some part in it.

Following his grand victory over the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin’s dominion over the Russian Federation very likely felt more secure to him at least to some satisfactory level. It could be the case that the detentions and dismissals of Russian Federation general officers could reverse that sense of success. Putin may not have considered all of the possible effects of the action taken by the security services upon his situation. Under immense pressures, fending off distractions, Putin is likely to make mistakes, misunderstand situations, ignore his intuition and intimations. This is true despite his considerable knowledge and experience. In fact, Putin would know that. What is overlooked and misread will remain as elements of failure unless time permits successful correction. It might be worth noting that when Nazi Germany’s Fuhrer und Reichkanzler (Leader and Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler, following an assassination attempt in July 1944, feared plots were being made to remove him from power and that the end was near, he had his top henchman Reichführer-SS (Reich Leader-SS) Heinrich Himmler unleash the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) against the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) which resulted in the destruction some of his most capable generals, such as Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge when he needed them most on the battlefield. Parallels, mutatis mutandis, are found between what transpired years ago in Nazi Germany and what is transpiring today in the Russian Federation. Perchance Putin has not considered this.

Tanto est accusare quam defendere, quanto facere quam sanare vulnere, facilius. (It is just so much easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to inflict than to heal a wound.) Putin should be aware that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them. 

.Putin must not act–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–out of fear but confidence in his commanders. His public demand for Surovikin’s return to service would send an extraordinary signal of support to his commanders from the most junior lieutenant to Gerasimov. The positive impact on their psyche would likely be immeasurably positive. Among the Russian people, surely a Solomonesque act of justice would send a signal of unity during the crisis and favorable response–a boom–in terms of his popularity ratings. At the same time, taking such corrective action would not be a matter of becoming, or proving himself to be, a virtuous man. It is really just a matter of putting his house in order. As aforementioned, Justinian I released Belisarius, but a bit too late. By all indications, it is not too late for Putin to order the release of Surovikin. “Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant”

On August 15, 2023, Elisa Braun and Zoya Sheftalovich of Politico reported their discovery of information dated August 13, 2023 on the VChK-OGPU blog–known to closely associated with the Russian Federation security services–explaining on that Surovikin is now “under a kind of house arrest” by which he is restricted to an “apartment” in which he being detained. However, the blog indicated has been permitted visitors, including several of his subordinates. As aforementioned, in response to inquiries from journalists, the Kremlin still has neither made an official public statement concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts nor offered anything more than vague references of “speculations, allegations” about his awareness of the Wagner Group’s plan to revolt as of this writing. 

Putin (above) might consider that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them.

The Way Forward

In the abstract, one might presume the likely accepted wisdom of members of the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies from the most junior military analyst or Ukraine specialist to the most senior military officers and diplomats or state secretaries and ministers, even if only tacitly accepted, is that poor intelligence analysis and deplorable performance by military planners and commanders in the field were the main sources of problems that have hampered the special military operation. However, at the nub of it all is the reality that a country in which so much negative energy could be devoted to destroying its most capable commanders over petty personal biases and grumblings of their superiors, could never muster the dynamic, synergistic, positive power to act in unity and in the case of Ukraine, in a true military fashion, to accomplish what has been asked of it by national authority, Putin, in the Kremlin. The Russian Federation government appears rotten at its core, and that rot contaminates whatever it engages in. In its most important responsibility, providing for national defense–if illegally invading Ukraine could fall under the rubric of national defense–the whole world can see just how rotten it all is. No national government, not even friends in Beijing, Minsk, Pyongyang, New Dehli, Johannesburg, Brasilia, Yerevan, Ashgabat  Tashkent, Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Damascus, Havana, Caracas, or elsewhere would likely say so plainly to Putin just how surprisingly bad the Russian Federation Armed Forces have performed, but they see it and think it nonetheless. What all of this means is that despite how much victory might be wished for in the Kremlin, no matter what gimmicks might be used and shortcuts taken, will never come. That was the case from the start. The greatest opponent the Russian Federation government faces is itself. Destroying its operation in Ukraine will prove to be its greatest victory over itself. On this point, greatcharlie does not believe it is in error. However, surely it would fully accept that if Surovikin were to be immediately released near the time of this writing, error upon it would be proved to some considerable degree. Certainly, greatcharlie, with some trepidation, will publish a more than apologetic retraction of it all once news of Surovikin’s release is reported. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. (For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)

“Official” company photo of veteran Wagner Group troops in Ukraine (above). Was their rebellion about their well-being, the war’s management, or something deeper? The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only neeed to be the possibility for their wishes to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

This post should be considered a continuation of the preceding one

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refer to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

In a photo released by Prigozhin’s Press Service, the Wagner Group owner is seen recording one of several video addresses in Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

The Wagner Group Rebellion

As things moved, on the morning of June 23, 2023, Prigozhin alleged Russian Federation forces had launched a fire mission on Wagner Group troops in Ukraine causing considerable casualties. Prigozhin announced he had launched an armed effort with his Wagner Group to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Wagner Group troops crossed from Ukraine into Russia and entered Rostov, meeting no resistance by border guards. Just after 12:00AM on June 23, 2023, it was reported in the newsmedia that the FSB issued a warrant for Prigozhin’s arrest. 

About 8 hours after that, morning newsmedia reports showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin posts a public announcement by video on Telegram from the captured base to report events. Prigozhin stated: “We are inside the [Russian Army] headquarters, it is 7:30AM. Military sites in Rostov, including an aerodrome, are under control. Prigozhin then issued what amounted to warning and intriguingly foreshadowing certain events by saying: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.” Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee. About 2 hours after that, Putin made a national address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 6 hours after that, Prigozhin is seen in a video widely broadcasted and posted online, discussing a deal to halt the rebellion and withdraw. On the heels of that, reports from the newsmedia indicated that Belarus President, Lukashenko, brokered the deal between the Kremlin and Prigozhin to end the “mutiny”. Wagner Group troops who participated in the rebellion would not be prosecuted, while those who did not join–presumably only those operating in Ukraine and not referring at all to those operating in African countries, in Syria, or elsewhere–would be offered contracts by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would leave the Russian Federation and remain in Belarus. Prigozhin ordered his troops back to their field camps in Ukraine. About 3 hours after that, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had completely withdrawn from Rostov-on-Don. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. In Rostov-on-Don, crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on.

About 48 hours after that, Putin made a late evening address broadcasted and posted online by the Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia concerning the rebellion in which he provided “more detail” regarding his decisionmaking and the “bigger picture.” About 12 hours after that, at an afternoon event held with much fanfare at the Kremlin’s Cathedral Square with some 2,500 members of the military, the security forces, and the National Guard in attendance, Putin expresses his appreciation for the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. Lukashenko’s role did not receive mention on that occasion. He expresses sorrow and praise for the Russian Federation aircrews that lost their lives confronting the “mutineers.” About 2 hours after that, Putin in a smaller setting indoors, again addressed Defense Ministry, National Guard, FSB, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service units who reportedly “ensured law and order during the mutiny.” Putin again thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 48 hours later, in the evening in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan in the Russian Federation, after the totality of the weekend’s events had a chance to settle well in the minds of the Russian people, Putin is shown in a video widely broadcasted in the country’s state-run and independent newsmedia greeting a very excited, sizable cheering crowd. The sense of genuine joy on his face upon engaging with the cheering Russian Federation citizens was most apparent.

Wagner Group troops in a company truck travel from the chaos of the frontlines to the serenity of Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. On the morning of June 24, 2023, newsmedia reports across the Russian Federation showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don, 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation Armed Forces, which was directing a considerable element of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee.

Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

Surely there were relatively significant attendant events in between the key events that occurred within the 24-hour news cycle. For example, the FSB seized the Wagner Group Headquarters. The Russian Federation military without fanfare established a protective posture in the southern portion of Moscow. The commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, who was once the overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine, addressed the rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. The first deputy chief of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev appealed to rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. Shoigu and Gerasimov vanished from public view during the entire period. Perhaps the most chilling moment during the rebellion was when Wagner Group troops actually advanced just 200 kilometers (120 miles) from Moscow, according to Prigozhin. A column Wagner Group troops that reportedly included mounted tanks, armored vehicles, at least one self-propelled rocket launcher and numerous personnel trucks. had reached the Lipetsk province, about 360 kilometers (225 miles) south of Moscow. The downing of six Russian Army helicopters occurred while that column was en route to Moscow and the shoot-down of a Russian Air Force surveillance plane at some point. Surely, under the circumstances, the Russian people were hungry for information on events. The beginning of the day when Prigozhin was seen and when Putin made the first of his appearances during the episode, end of the day, when Putin made second appearance are times when the majority of the Russian people receive their news. Those moments turned out to be main events that did much to signal the direction the story was taking. Yet, the many pieces in-between as the few highlighted here also fit well within what could be characterized as the complex puzzle that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Once Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops agreed on June 24, 2023 to withdraw from Rostov-on-Don, they departed immediately. Crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and speedily returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarusian President AlexanderLukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.

The Narrative Putin Wanted the Russian People To Garner Regarding the Wagner Group Rebellion

Certainly, it never would have been considered sufficient in the eyes of the senior Kremlin officials to allow the Russian people to simply receive a well-paced flow of events on the Wagner Rebellion to decipher in many ways. State-run and independent newsmedia broadcasts did the job of letting them know events were taking place concerning the Wagner Group, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff and the special military operation. What they needed to hear and grasp about those matters would be explained to them by the ultimate source in the country, the Russian Federation President. To that extent, Putin provided four well-crafted addresses, one during and three immediately on the heels of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Given the nature of the lens through which Putin apparently views the world, considering past public addresses, interviews, decisions and actions, his concise and succinct addresses in addition to well-communicating the required facts to the Russian people, had to meet what were his specific priorities. To that extent they reflected his mindset, emotions, state-of-being, reasoning, and intentions. He did not exactly offer water-tight explanations, but there was probably scant concern among Putin and his advisers that the overwhelming majority in the targeted audience would dive too deeply into his explanations or energetically question any aspect of them. Indeed, it was likely expected in the Kremlin that for the audience in the Russian Federation, it would be enough just to have some answers on the rather unique development.

Putin’s First Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 24, 2023

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin emphasized that challenges to the government of any kind would not be tolerated. For the first time, he characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Putin, wearing a solid black suit and black pindot tie, stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.” He added: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Offering a flash of his personal outrage over the rebellion, he went on to say dramatically: “Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.” However, far from eliminating the threat based in Kyiv, the Russian Federation Armed Forces have barely held on to initial gains made since the initial weeks of the war before Ukraine was better armed. The odds of it advancing further into Ukraine now are slim to none. Prigozhin ostensibly was acting in response to what perceived were actions by Shoigu and Gerasimov that would eventually cripple the Russian Federation’s ability to defend itself. Perhaps Putin had not been listening closely to Prigozhin’s tantrums after all.

Ever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events. Putin stated: Any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people. He then said: “A blow like this was dealt to Russia in 1917, when the country was fighting in World War I. But the victory was stolen from it: intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, and the loss of vast territories, ultimately leading to the tragedy of the civil war.” One might argue that the Russian military was a spent force by 1917 and poorly led. At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. The country’s forces were resuscitated to some degree by the Spring of 1915. However, those huge initial  losses essentially knocked Russia out of World War I. As for the 1917 Revolution, it garnered support under the guise of offering the people a better existence, an alternative to penury. Misled and misguided, many followed the revolutionaries.

Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin stated: “The Armed Forces and other government agencies have received the necessary orders. Additional counterterrorism measures are now in effect in Moscow, the Moscow Region and several other regions. Resolute action will also be taken to stabilize the situation in Rostov-on-Don. It remains difficult; in effect, the work of civil and military authorities has been blocked.” These were certainly strong and comforting words for the Russian people. However, Putin’s government to that point had not been successful in handling very apparent threats to the country’s security. Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) had launched several successful drone attacks and helicopter attacks on Russian Federation targets, including on Moscow, and as aforementioned in Part 1, there had been more than one attack on Russian Federation territory by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian militant groups near the border with Ukraine. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin had to emerge unconditionally victorious.

Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Putin stated: “Any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people. Our actions to defend the Fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people.” However, Putin rather than dealing with “rebels” harshly, he directed Wagner Group troops to sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Recognizably, under that arrangement, the Wagner Group, as it once stood in Ukraine, was essentially disbanded. The organization’s troops elsewhere in the world were apparently unaffected by the ruling. Yet, the Wagner Group right before the very eyes of the Russian people were being provided ample means to avoid prosecution and all penalties.

Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Although these remarks may not appear inordinate from Putin given inflamed sentiments of the moment and the fact that under his authoritarian regime, he had established limitless for himself. However, it also could have been something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to others, “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he remarked about players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. It would seem the world has yet to see the regime’s tyranny touch bottom.

Prigozhin went unnamed directly by Putin in his first address. Yet, presumably, even though he was not mentioned, Putin’s words in this first iteration of his addresses nevertheless may have sounded harsh enough to Prigozhin. Certainly, Prigozhin is not a fragile man. However, perhaps these initial words were spoken by Putin, an individual who he clearly holds in very high esteem pinched just a little. “Enjoy the Silence” is a song by English electronic music band Depeche Mode. Recorded in 1989, it was released on their album, Violator (1990). It is pertinent here to the extent that on June 25, 2023,  Putin moved from near complete silence on the spat between Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to a veritable roar in his address to his nation. For Prigozhin, no matter what was altogether transpiring, they must have had their impact. The lyrics of the first verse are: “Words like violence / Break the silence / Come crashing in / Into my little world / Painful to me / Pierce right through me / Can’t you understand?”

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin, for the first time, characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Forever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events.Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits.

Putin’s Second Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 26, 2023

Among the top five points Putin wanted to communicate n his second address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, he wanted to assure the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized that departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters and handling them swiftly and diligently and all other parts continued to perform their functions without interruption. Putin, wearing a solid dark navy blue suit and solid dark navy blue tie, stated: “I will repeat–society and the executive and legislative branches of government at all levels displayed high consolidation. Public organizations, religious denominations, the leading political parties and actually all of Russian society held a firm line, taking an explicit position of supporting constitutional order. The main thing–responsibility for the destiny of the Fatherland–has united everyone, brought our people together.” He said further: “I will emphasize that all necessary decisions to neutralize the emerged threat and protect the constitutional system, the life and security of our citizens were made instantly, from the very beginning of the events.” These comments would be expected of Putin–or any leader in his situation–in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, if his government actually “had been on the case” as he suggests, the Wagner Group Rebellion hardly would have gotten off the ground. The conspirators, as he refers to the Wagner Group leadership, would presumably have been twinkled out and approached for questioning by the security services. 

In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Putin stated: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people. He continued: “It was exactly this outcome, fratricide, that the enemies of Russia–the neo-Nazis in Kiev, their Western patrons and other national traitors–wanted to see. They wanted Russian soldiers to kill each other; they wanted the military and civilians to die; they wanted Russia to lose eventually, and our society to break up and perish in a bloody feud.” All of this was said despite Prigozhin’s earlier expressions indicating the rebellion was an impromptu emotional reaction–originally understood to be the result of an attack on the organization’s camp in Ukraine by Russian Federation troops under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov–Putin in his address alters that narrative by explaining that it was the threat of the cudgel and not good brains that brought the matter to close. That his ever-vigilant government, particularly the work of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services–that allowed the Wagner Group to cross the border into the Russian Federation untouched–crushed the plot. One might consider that plots that are part of false flag operations tend to be the easiest plots to sort out. “Go figure!”

Adding to perceptions that the Wagner Group Rebellion was the opponent, yet at the same time paradoxically weakening the notion that there was anything too deep in the thinking of the “conspirators”, Putin emphasized the reckless nature of the conspirators’ undertaking. Putin stated: “An armed mutiny would have been suppressed in any event. Mutiny plotters, despite the loss of adequacy, were bound to realize that. They understood everything, including the fact that their actions were criminal in nature, aimed at polarizing people and weakening the country, which is currently countering an enormous external threat and unprecedented pressure from the outside. They did this at a time when our comrades are dying on the frontline with the words “Not a step back!” There was irony in this idea as the crux of Prigozhin’s ire for months was the reckless and incompetent manner in which his Wagner Group troops and Russian Federation troops had been used in the special military operation how ironic and bizarre it was for him to undertake such a monumentally reckless and hopeless action as to march on Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from power. If the lives of Russian Federation Armed Forces’ aircrews had not been reportedly lost in the near final stage of the impromptu rebellion, the whole enterprise could be chuckled at for being comical.

Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all Russian lives matter, the indication and implication being  that the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Still, he indicated that his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin stated: “We knew before and know now that the majority of Wagner Group soldiers and commanders are also Russian patriots, loyal to their people and their state. Their courage on the battlefield when liberating Donbass and Novorossiya proves this. An attempt was made to use them without their knowledge against their comrades-in-arms with whom they were fighting shoulder to shoulder for their country and its future.” He went on to explain: “That is why, as soon as these events started to unfold, in keeping with my direct instructions, steps were taken to avoid spilling blood. It required time, among other things, as those who made a mistake had to be given a chance to change their minds, to realize that their actions would be strongly rejected by society, to understand what tragic and devastating consequences for Russia, for our country the reckless attempt they had been drawn into, was leading to.” Despite the fact that Putin, by displaying restraint during the “crisis” did save Russian lives, ironically and incredulously, as a result of his special military operation, astronomical and abominable losses had been suffered by Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine over 16 months to that point in time. One might suppose the careless loss of those troops could be set down as occasional mistakes.

Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

With regard to allowing the Wagner Group troops to move to Belarus, to greatcharlie that seemed a curious decision. Belarus is hands down the Russian Federation’s closest ally. One might call the relationship Putin has established between the two countries as the most successful effort in his quest to bring the former republics of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation’s fold. Putin recently placed several nuclear warheads in storage in Belarus. To that extent, many of the erstwhile Rebel Wagner Group troops possess exquisite special operations capabilities and could pose a threat in terms of potentially capturing those warheads. One might suppose the weapons are secured so well in their new homes that a build up of the Wagner Group troops was nothing to signify. Intriguingly, one might consider that Belarus borders Ukraine and a number of NATO countries. Sending the Wagner Group troops there could have been predicted to cause considerable alarm in the capitals of those bordering countries and in NATO Headquarters. (Interestingly, it is now understood that Wagner Group troops in Belarus, far from a spent force, are providing tactical training to Belarusian troops.) Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his second address.

Among the top five points Putin communicated, he assured the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters, handling them swiftly and diligently, and all other parts continued to function without interruption. In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers, who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He claimed his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin then informed the Russian people about his somewhat remedy for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders.

Putin’s Third Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Seemingly speaking to the newsmedia’s audience, not in attendance physically, Putin, wearing a solid navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: Today, standing here on the historic Cathedral Square of the Moscow Kremlin are the service personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, soldiers and officers of the National Guard, the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Guard Service. They are the ones who, together with their comrades-in-arms, at a time of challenge for the country, threw themselves in the way of trouble which would have inevitably led to chaos. More directly addressing the assembled audience of some 2,500 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard, Putin stated: “You have defended the constitutional order, as well as the life, security and freedom of our citizens, steering our Motherland clear from upheavals and de facto stopping a civil war in its tracks. He continued: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.”

Revealing what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Putin stated: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.” Pointing to exactly what was daunting about their activities that it compelled special praise, Putin explained: “Defense Ministry units, the National Guard, officers of the Interior Ministry and special services ensured reliable operation of all critical decision-making bodies, strategic facilities, including the defense ones, ensured the security of border regions, the rear lines of our Armed Forces, of all combat units which carried on with their heroic frontline operations during that time. We did not have to withdraw any combat troops from the special military operation zone.

Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. Putin stated: “Our comrades-in-arms–pilots–lost their lives while confronting the mutineers. They held their ground and fulfilled their orders and their military duty with honor. I am asking you to observe a minute of silence in tribute to their memory.” silence.” One might say Putin was making an extra effort to get a message across here that was not so easy for the Russian people to accept from him given the events in Ukraine that Russian soldiers’ lives matter.

In his first and second addresses, Putin excoriated the Wagner Group’s leaders, going as far to say in the first address: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people.” That noisome tack was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts. Putin stated: “Your resolve and courage, along with consolidation of Russian society, played an essential and decisive role in bringing the situation back to normal. Those who were drawn into the mutiny saw that the army and the people were not with them.”

Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically. Putin stated: “The swift and well-managed deployment of defense, security and law enforcement units helped prevent the situation in the country from going down a very dangerous road and ensure that there were no civilian casualties. He then remarked: “I extend my gratitude to you and all the personnel of the Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and security services for your service, courage and valor, for your devotion to the people of Russia.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his third address.

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Among his top five point, he revealed to the Russian people what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. His noisome tack of excoriating Wagner Group leaders was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts.Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically.

Putin’s Fourth Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. He ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. The address would reach the Russian people via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. This final iteration of his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses presented almost immediately following his address in Cathedral Square.

Putin was a bit less formal in thanking those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. Putin began his address by once again expressing his thanks and appreciation for the efforts of the armed forces and security services. Putin, still wearing a navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: “You and your comrades had a special part to play in this. Special words of gratitude go to you. I want us all to understand what happened and what could have happened if you hadn’t done what you did and hadn’t fulfilled your military duty and hadn’t shown loyalty to your oath and the Russian people. As is always the case during such developments – the same thing happens every time and everywhere – armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now.”

Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. Putin stated: “As is always the case during such developments–the same thing happens every time and everywhere–armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now. He went on: “Regrettably, you had to work in difficult circumstances in order to avoid civilian casualties, because you had to work on busy motorways.” Speaking of them and their well-being so often, it would appear that a primary takeaway from the whole episode that Putin wanted the Russian people to garner was that they were always on his mind and that they were what mattered most to him. It could not be missed by any who heard any of his four addresses.

While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Putin stated: “The fact that we have losses is even more regrettable. These are, of course, combat losses. There is no other way to put it. Our comrades died defending the Fatherland. It is not an overstatement or an exaggeration. I want to stress once again that chaos in the country would have been inevitable, and the enemy would have surely taken advantage of it. He continues: “The enemy is trying to do so anyway–I will get to that a little later–but nothing is coming out of it, and, I hope, nothing will come out of it, I am even sure of that. But it is absolutely clear that they would have taken advantage of it. No one knows what would have become of the country in the end, but all the achievements that have been made during the hostilities, many of them, anyway, would have been lost. And you prevented it.” In a way, the shift in whom Putin focused on as the opponent marked the close of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the issue of primacy. For members of the Wagner Group there may have been some sense of relief having suffered his bombardment of obloquy.

What started as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly appeared to become an example of why one should elegantly limit how much one should talk if the goal is to control information. Putin laid out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Perhaps he was in a very transparent way attempting to create a greater schism between the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group by disparaging the latter. Perhaps he wanted to convince members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces that although he liked the Wagner Group troops, they were his favorites. Perhaps he was having a little too much fun with it all. Perhaps Putin was concerned some in the Russian Federation might have imagined the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group colluded on the rebellion. That would be a dangerous idea that he would urgently need to knock down.

Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Surely, it was an odd set of statements to make before a group of military officers and security service members. Gone were the days of plausible deniability for the Russian Federation government with regard to the Wagner Group’s activities worldwide. Yet, more importantly, Putin admits plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord–discussed in some detail in Part 1, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot one day further. These were surely sensitive matters that Putin’s audience of individuals who had successfully moved up in their careers by avoiding did not want to hear or be involved with, especially since it concerned the highest realms of politics in the country. Putin, nevertheless, gave them the details, and likely measured their uneasiness in the process.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About his Wagner Group, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. To be certain, greatcharlie would not attempt to cast aspersions on anyone concerning who among the powerful in the Russian Federation might have been profiting from government payments to Concord or Voentorg. The better prosecutors and litigators in Western courts would surely light on Putin’s statement: “The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address.

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. Among his top five points, he ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter” Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Then Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. While clearly putting Prigozhin in the spotlight, Putin never mentioned his dear friend’s name.

The Wagner Group Rebellion: A Staged Crisis?

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Happy is the one who is able to know the causes of things.) To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in the whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions, many hardly thought through, were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that the Putin regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories, Hopefully it was done due to some internal collective cognition imperative, but possibly under official external influence. Remarkably, it was the same picture of Putin presented by national capitals and many mainstream media outlets of their respective countries that for years have defamed him as some awkward, insecure leader, a throwback from another era. Currently, the perception in the West and much of the world is that the Wagner Group Rebellion marked the beginning of the end for Putin. All of greatcharlie’s instincts are against such an explanation. 

Putin’s Priorities

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Everyone who was able in Rostov-on-Don took a photo with their Wagner Group “occupiers”. To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in a whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that Putin’s regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports from other newsmedia houses seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories.

To discerning eyes, the Wagner Group Rebellion actually had the appearance of a “controlled crash” creating the simulacrum of change without any real change at all. The situation was never so difficult that it had the potential to capsize the regime. Despite predictions have been voiced by those less than clairvoyant on Putin’s downfall, he still sits in the Senate Building of the Kremlin. His government was never genuinely in peril, neither was his person. Putin, himself, was hardly tested. In its June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, greatcharlie suggested observers might expect some recherché, outside the box move by Putin in the midst of everything. The wily and for the most part intuitive Russian Federation President might very well have demonstrated that he has.more than a few tricks to pull from his sleeve. 

Putin is first and foremost the steward of the Russian Federation. However, before Putin could begin to address vicissitudes besetting his country, first and foremost he had to stabilize his own position. That was in greatcharlie’s view the main purpose of this giant artifice perform on the international stage. Often mentioned when suggesting one first ensure their own safety and stability before helping others is the pre-flight safety directions–briefing–given by flight attendants. Among those given is, “In the case of a change in cabin pressure, be sure to place the resulting oxygen mask over your own face first before assisting anyone else, even your own children.” Surely, this runs counter to the “3M principle” of “mission, men me” for military leaders. In order of priority the mission must be the focus of efforts and all must be done to accomplish it. The well-being of one’s soldiers must be kept in mind. They must not be wasted and use them in a way to exploit their optimal effectiveness. Lastly, a leader must consider his or her well-being having covered the essentials, two other priorities. However, a leader must not carelessly place them in mortal danger knowing his or her role is to think through and direct the actions of troops to achieve the objective. (It would be interesting if Putin, having made several flights over the years, found such directions instructive. Perhaps his detractors would insist that for him self-interest has always been his priority and he would only be compelled to act by it.)

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023. During the latter, Putin was able to have a true connection with the people. The tide has begun to come back in and the waters have risen again. Soon enough skewed perspectives expressed of Putin somehow losing ground politically in the Russian Federation following the Wagner Group Rebellion will most likely disintegrate in the face of reality. Certainly, this is a hard saying for some to hear. Hopefully, polls will be conducted on the public response to the Wagner Group Rebellion by independent research groups in the Russian Federation such as the Levada Center, The Chronicle, and The Russian Field that may shed light with regard to any boom in support for Putin.

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023.

For those unfamiliar, Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of the Russian Federation’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it. Putin also served as Sekretar’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser for Yeltsin. A long-time intelligence operator and intelligence manager such as Putin knows many a dodge. To that extent, it would not be too far off to suggest if Putin has actually taken the course suggested by greatcharlie here would fall under the category of maskirovka. 

The Russian term maskirovka or masking originally had military pertinence as it regarded the use of camouflage. However, maskirovka eventually expanded in meaning to concerning battlefield masking through the utilization of smoke and other screening methods. The meaning would evolve further as a reference to the utilization of military deception against an opponent, and expand from there refer to full-scale denial and deception operations. Maskirovka would transcend military operations to refer to the use of a clever gimmick to create ambiguity and uncertainty and to give Russian Federation’s foreign and national security policy actors the freedom of action to achieve their country’s objectives in the diplomatic economic arenas. Further, maskirovka has been used to create a picture of events in the Russian Federation for the outside world.. As it appears to greatcharlie, what transpired from June 23, 2023 to June 26, 2023 resembled maskirovka, and perhaps a bit more than that. One thing for certain, the plan laid out under greatcharlie’s supposition, could not be allowed to fail. Putin’s reputation, his world, his future, hung in the balance. Part 1: The Tragedy of Birlstone in The Valley of Fear, Arthur Conan Doyle’s fourth and final Sherlock Holmes novel published by George H. Doran Company in New York in 1915, the esteemed author has Holmes in Chapter 1, The Warning deliver a notable quote, quite apposite to readers who have grasped what is being suggested about Putin’s actions here. Holmes explains: “Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius.”

Naysayers might point out that events turned out the way they did by happenstance and there was hardly any orchestration of them behind the scenes. If one might choose to stand firm on the idea that the Wagner Group Rebellion was an authentic expression of outrage by the organization and nothing more, greatcharlie says to them that the unlikely must never be confused with the impossible, and would suggest they take a second look. Once reviewed in light of the artifice hypothesized by greatcharlie, but not coloring them with its theory, events of the Wagner Group Rebellion take on greater meaning and quite on their own appropriately to fall into place. To that extent, they arouse suspicion.

For instance, it is interesting how the whole Wagner Group Rebellion went off so relatively cleanly. A starting point for examining that angle would be the Wagner Group’s marshaling of resources on the Russian Federation’s border with Ukraine for some time prior to the start of the rebellion. Reports in the Western newsmedia state the even US intelligence Community managed to collect information indicating that Prigozhin had been assembling his forces near the border with Russia over a period of time. Yet, there was no interference with the Wagner Group’s build up by the Russian Federation government. The Russian Federation Armed Forces, and the FSB, did not take serious interest in or move a jot to reign in the Wagner Group before anything got off the ground, This was the case even though there was concern over all activities on the border given the actions of pro-Ukraine, anti-Putin, ethnic-Russian militias and cross border incursions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The entire event unfolded right before the very eyes of the government. The build up on the border in preparation for the rebellion was surely out of sync with Prigozhin’s claim that the Wagner Group’s Rebellion was in response to an attack on his camps in Ukraine on June 23, 2023 by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Ibit, ibit eo quo vis qui zonam perdidit. (The one who has lost his money belt will go where you wish.) It remains fascinating to greatcharlie is that the Wagner Group troops were still receiving remuneration during their rebellious eastward march. What persistently nags at greatcharlie is how Prigozhin was allowed access to his financial assets to pay them. If the Wagner Group’s financial assets had been frozen by order of the Kremlin, Prigozhin would have found himself in a pickle with those rough men. He had to be able to pay them as guaranteed. 

During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don, were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and made certain all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord –Prigozhin’s billion dollar catering firm discussed in Part 1–has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

The troops of the Wagner Group are not international freedom fighters and revolutionary mercenaries in the mold of the 19th century Italian patriot and soldier Giuseppe Garibaldi (July 4, 1807 to June 2, 1882). They are driven by money not a desire to save the world. During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don. They were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord, which is the billion dollar catering firm owned by Prigozhin–discussed in Part 1, has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

Difficult to understand also is how the Wagner Group, which Prigozhin regularly complained was left short of resources by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, was apparently swimming in such an abundance of petroleum and oil lubricants that it could ostensibly squander those resources to move a number of the organization’s tanks and other vehicles east. 

It is hard to see how Wagner Group troops would have been able to appropriately resupply themselves if they would have become engaged with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services in Moscow even under the most favorable terms for them. If they failed to immediately seize their objective in Moscow, they eventually would have run out of steam and would have had to surrender or fight to the bitter end. Thereby, it would seem that upon all else that was inordinate about their rebellion, one is asked to believe that the Wagner Group troops, individuals who joined the organization to earn money, were knowingly participating in a kamikaze-style action. In a burst of complete illogic during his initial video address from Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin curiously uttered: “After we finish what we started, we will return to the front to defend our Motherland.” That was a moment when Prigozhin was either frighteningly detached from reality or being facetious, adding one more over-the-top absurdity to the hoax that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Reportedly, Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched by Putin. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Russian Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarus President,, Lukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.. Conveniently, Lukashenko was able to put all else aside that weekend and immerse himself in the matter.

Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB (above). Bortnikov sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no initial indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were all but branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Interestingly, only at a late hour during “the crisis” was a very visible effort made in Moscow to prepare for a visit of the Wagner Group by erecting checkpoints with armored vehicles and by positioning troops on the city’s southern edge. About 3,000 Chechen troops were reportedly pulled from fighting in Ukraine and rushed to Moscow on Saturday morning. State television in Chechnya reported that Russian Federation troops armed with machine guns had established checkpoints on Moscow’s southern outskirts, and engineers had dug up sections of highways to slow the Wagner Group’s advance.

The Chechen troops are under the control of Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov, mufti of Chechnya and a colonel general in the Russian Federation Armed Force.the, who publicly condemned the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is interesting how the Chechens, in considerable numbers, arrived in Moscow so much faster than the Wagner Group. Perhaps they used a faster route from Ukraine or special vehicles. What would be truly difficult for greatcharlie to accept is that the Chechens sped past the “rebellious” Wagner Group troops on the same road to Moscow. If there was a quicker route from Ukraine to Moscow which the Chechens were able to take advantage of, it is difficult to see why the Wagner Group, supposedly in a rush to get to Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from their respective posts, conspicuously chose not to travel on it.

The Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin declared Monday, June 26, 2023 a non-working day for most residents as part of the heightened security. Curiously, the declaration, a now seemingly superfluous measure, was allowed to remain in effect even after the total withdrawal of Wagner Group troops was completed. All in all though, there was no significant alteration in the federal government’s course. Certainly, there was an atmosphere–stimmung–in the Russian Federation of everything being under control despite what was visible. Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end )

If one were to take a second look at Putin’s four Wagner Rebellion addresses, as noted earlier, in each address one would discern how he laid out the narrative on events he wanted the Russian people to take from the whole show. Yet, in the context of the suggested artifice, it would have been of the utmost importance for Putin to provide all of the insights the Russian people would need to ruminate upon his handling of on the Wagner Group Rebellion or to exchange in their own discussions with family, friends, classmates, and colleagues on the crisis. In each well-crafted, concise address, each given at what were very likely predetermined points in time, there appeared to be specific issues that Putin wanted to reveal in digestible pieces to the Russian people. For the most part–at least until the fourth address, there was nothing so outré or too complex spoken by him that might have acted as a distraction. To that extent, this aspect of the suggested artifice could be characterized as a preconcerted, well-organized information campaign, carried out predominantly by the Russian Federation’s “Communicator-in-Chief.”

With further regard to his four Wagner Group Rebellion addresses, one might discern that Putin seemed to take pains to ensure his punches at Prigozhin were very heavy even without mentioning his name. Perhaps it was a reflection of his known penchant for engaging in acidulous humor with close associates. He doubtlessly was aware that all of the bombastic rhetoric concerning Prigozhin would definitely reach the ears of his dear friend and other close associates filled in on the artifice. When the words of Putin’s fourth address captured Prigozhin’s attention, as aforementioned, he had no reason to be cheerful, but in the end the Wagner Group owner assumedly would have smiled and would have shaken his head in response to the very noisy overkill, fully understanding that Putin needed to do what he did, needed to say what he said, in accord with the aims of the artifice suggested by greatcharlie here. The greater cause was firming up public opinion about Putin’s presidency, his leadership. Prigozhin would fully recognize and accept that what is best for Putin is best for the Russian Federation and that would surely include himself as a citizen and an ultra-loyal subordinate. Perchance there would even be a considerable reward not too far down the road for his fealty.

Fascinatingly, based upon depictions in both detective fiction and spy fiction literature and film, Putin appears to mimic, mutatis mutandis, an assassin’s method of leaving three to five suicide notes to ensure the victim’s death would be accepted as suicide and not his or her murderous handiwork. Perhaps some might be willing to agree, may be with some reservations, that Putin gave all four addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion with an underlying, surreptitious purpose of furnishing a false clue. The notion may not be too way out.

It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes for use in plain sight, troop movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia. While the news cycle everywhere is 24-hours, it seemed the most important announcements were issued to best serve morning and evening newsmedia readers, listeners, and viewers. Enough time was allowed to lapse between almost everything released for the state-run newsmedia to process and parrot the Kremlin’s well-curated narrative of events and the domestic audience to absorb. That absorption rate would likely have been calculated by Kremlin public information specialists who would have been deeply immersed in the project. Enough time would also be allowed to lapse from one event to the other to convince the independent newsmedia to draw “the right conclusions” and publish surprisingly similar accounts of what was occurring and so on. The whole show was likely set up to transpire on a weekend which meant businesses did not have to be concerned over their weekday commerce being interfered with, and the Russian people generally would be better able to follow events  on what for most were days of leisure, off from work and days for associating with family and friends, and visiting dachas.

The Wagner Group troops rapidly loading up a tank in order to ride out of Rostov-on-Don (above). It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes, movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia.

The Degree to which Wagner Group Troops Were Likely Aware of the Supposed Artifice

If this scenario staked here was at all possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

It would be enough for the Wagner Group troops to follow orders to the letter as they have always done and were paid to do. To that extent, this may account for the downing of six Russian Army helicopters and an electronic warfare plane by Wagner Group troops on their march to Moscow. Those in the Russian Federation Armed Forces who sent the Russian Army helicopters would also unlikely have been aware of what was transpiring. Those aircrews that encountered the Wagner Group could not have known everything was staged and how surprising and threatening their arrival on the scene would be to the Wagner Group troops. The Wagner Group’s, no matter what they may have been told about how “safe” everything would be, were way out on a limb and necessarily quite tense and on the alert, ready to deal with any immediate danger. Prigozhin, negotiating at the time in Rostov-on-Don to end the rebellion, likely had less knowledge of his troops’ actions way up front. Perhaps he was informed about it all after the fact just as everyone else. Still, one might recall what Prigozhin specifically stated on the first video he posted from Rostov-on-Don: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads.

Far be it for greatcharlie to make light of, or denigrate the loss of a soldier in defense of his or her homeland, but it posits that while unlikely, it is possible the helicopters shot down over the Russian Federation during the rebellion were already counted among those lost in the Ukraine fight. One might imagine that far beyond morbid curiosity and within the farthest range of their respective investigative capabilities–seeing how close lipped the Russian Federation Armed Forces are about losses during the Ukraine War or any conflict for that matter and how records of its casualties reported usually appear so out of sync–journalists and military and intelligence analysts may have already examined whether those helicopters and aircrews lost battling the Wagner Group were not already listed as lost during the Ukraine War and may have kept their discoveries confidential. (If there have been funerals for the airmen lost in late June 2023 and an error can be proved upon greatcharlie, it asks the respective families of the fallen for their forgiveness.)

Intriguingly, the Wagner Group doubly proved the concept, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already proven, that the Russian Air Force against a modern force has little to no ability to ensure the survivability of its aircraft and its aircrews. That has not been the only deficiency of the Russian Air Force. Another of many of considerable interest to greatcharlie is that both on the frontlines in Ukraine and during the Wagner Group Rebellion, the indications and implications are that the Russian Air Force planners and air operations officers have given up on, are completely distant to, or positively unaware of the airpower concept of high altitude bombing by strategic air assets to support tactical movements on the ground. That would put the Russian Air Force just short of 80 years behind the times. To that extent, one might consider how easy it should have been for competent air commanders and planners to utilize Russian Federation strategic air assets and tactical air assets to turn the route that the Wagner Group troops were traveling on toward Moscow into a “highway of death”. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops rolled on as if they had little to fear from such a threat. Readers might cast their minds back to an incident in Syria in which Wagner Group troops decided to clash with US Special Forces soldiers. The US Special Forces soldiers called in airpower to lend some support. Things did not turn well at all for the Wagner Group that day.

As aforementioned in Part 1, the Wagner Group employs a semi-international group of fighters. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. One might imagine that of the three main Wagner units, the Rusich unit led the drive eastward. Unless Russian Federation citizenship has quietly become a requirement for or privilege of Wagner Group employment, it would seem legally questionable to charge the international fighters with treason. Other criminal charges might have better fit. The Kremlin officials would know that. Putin would know that.

Even as he lent support to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s move to subordinate all militias serving in Ukraine on its side, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk Putin implied that much of Prigozhin’s criticism of the army had been correct–recognized even in the mainstream US newsmedia as a possible sign Wagner had yet to entirely lose his support. Putin stated: “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly,” He continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

If the artifice suggested by greatcharlie might have at all been possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

Prigozhin Mansion Raid

As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia, posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. One photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed Forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

Prigozhin in many disguises (above). As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia,  posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. A photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

It would appear that despite the importance of matters concerning Prigozhin–after all, according to the Western newsmedia, he led a paramilitary rebellion that knocked the Kremlin back on its heels and accelerated the Putin regime’s downward spiral–the Russian Federation security services and law enforcement organizations in particular failed to keep eye on the mansion. The indications and implications of the heavy use of manpower are that there is such a paucity of technological resources available that Prigozhin and whatever entourage of security that would likely be traveling with him could not be detected. It is very likely that trained K-9s–search dogs–have been utilized to more stealthily locate anyone present in the mansion instead of a police special weapons and tactical teams who observably in the video recording they made, moved through the residence creating a noise worthy of Bedlam. It is remarkable how closely the video and photos  provided on the raid of Prigozhin’s mansion mimicked video recordings released of the raid on the Mar-a-Largo residence of former US President Donald Trump provided by US law enforcement and. released to the newsmedia by the US Department of Justice. Many would likely chalk up the similarities to the fact that parallels exist in foundational law enforcement tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in every country. In this case, the similarity might be better chalked up to sarcasm.

It is difficult to imagine what might be referred to as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,  and in particular, the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations, are so inept that independently or in conjunction, could not keep track of Prigozhin’s location and movements. Indeed, one might have presumed that the Russian Federation Armed Forces and particularly the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations kept themselves well-aware of Prigozhin’s affairs and under current circumstances had gone so deeply into them that they at least collectively should have had a complete handle of all of its details. Nothing should have been so unknown by them respectively that their knowledge would seem at best to equal that of the far from the not so prying mainstream newsmedia in the Russian Federation. One could be convinced that everything is done in the Russian Federation in such an incompetent fashion to convince the world that within it “folly doctor-like controls skill.” How the government managed to keep perfect track of, and come down so hard upon the aforementioned Boris Nemetsov and Alexei Navalny, and other activists such as Anna Politkovskaya is a wonder. Based on newsmedia reporting, greatcharlie proffers that the US Intelligence Community surely has been monitoring Prigozhin’s movements as somewhat of a priority mission. Newsmedia reports indicate they were keeping track of how Prigozhin’s private jets were shuttling back and forth from Belarus to the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous. Dulce est desipere in loco. (It is delightful to play the fool.)

If one might exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation Armed Forces, law enforcement and security services are unable to competently monitor Prigozhin, one might turn to the idea that the raid of one of Prigozhin’s mansion and the bombardment of photos in the newsmedia of Prigozhin was designed to throw inquisitive minds and close observers off his scent for hot minute. Verily, perhaps the raid was one more step to ensure those who might have begun questioning in the aggregate whether the Wagner Group’s rebellion, the nature of the Kremlin’s response, and Prigozhin’s disappearance, were elements of some grand artifice. It all falls into place too well. For an intuitive few following it all very closely, the next set events might very well seem predictable.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous.

Prigozhin: Proceeding with Caution?

After all is said and done, greatcharlie’s recognizes that the veritable sacrificial lamb could prove to be Prigozhin, although it is unlikely. He may very well view himself, in a more dramatic and grander way, as a martyr on the altar of his country. He would forever disagree that he was a patsy. Some might insist that his exile to Belarus was likely one of many negative life ramifications of his behavior to that point. He does carry vile antecedents. Either being frugal with information or simply lacking further information on his disposition, the newsmedia to this point has convinced many that Prigozhin remains exiled in Belarus, under duress, as lonely as a cloud. Regardless of where he may be, recognizably, Prigozhin has bravely borne his fate. He does not appear to have let his nerves run away with him. He is unquestionably as strong as a lion. Leve fit, quod bene fertur, onus. (The load is light if you know how to support it.)

Surely if some artifice had been dramatically acted out the weekend of June 23, 2023 as hypothesized here, Prigozhin had to have been a willing participant in the whole cabaret. Make no mistake, Prigozhin is willing to do just about anything to assist Putin: “Papa.” It was Putin who catapulted him to the highest realms of wealth in the world. Putin has likely shielded him from very dark elements that out of envy, jealousy, ethno-racism, or madness would choose to lash out at him in the Russian Federation and outside. Prigozhin will surely never forget how Putin helped him. Outwardly, he has always demonstrated his appreciation. It would seem that Prigozhin truly dislikes Shoigu and Gerasimov. However, as suggested in Part 1, he would hardly go out of his way, waste his own money, to disrupt Putin’s government. Putin likes both Shoigu and Gerasimov and would not allow anyone to destroy them just as he would protect Prigozhin from a serious threat. Prigozhin knows that. Certainly, the last thing Prigozhin would ever want for himself would be to replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister. Given the situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Defense Minister’s post is surely a heavy yoke he would happily leave for another to bear.

If an artifice was in play, it was not apparent initially whether Prigozhin had been shielded sufficiently or at all from the law or political enemies. Shoigu and Gerasimov now seem so drenched with villainy that it is hard to imagine how they will ever be able shed it. For Putin, such issues are surely secondary, if not tertiary. Likely to him, whether he wants them to continue at their posts or not is all that matters. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that although all three put their trust in Putin, naturally but quietly, all three may be a little uncertain about whether being so trustful was justified. Prigohzin can only hope to remain free and have the opportunity to further serve “Papa.” However, Prigozhin lives by an odd code, perhaps it could be called an archaic one. He will likely take whatever comes from his boss standing upright with his eyes wide open. Perhaps a total victory in Ukraine is the only hope of redemption for Shoigu and Gerasimov. Unfortunately for them, that is very unlikely. An educated guess would be that Putin will not play any tricks with his three subordinates. Amicitia sine fraude. (Friendship without deceit.)

Based on a number newsmedia reports in July 2023, the situation appeared to change a bit faster than most would have expected for Prigozhin. On July 6, 2023, Lukashenko stated that he was not in Belarus, but was in the habit of traveling between St. Petersburg and Moscow as he wished. The Belarusian President also stated that any money and weapons that had been confiscated by Russian Federation authorities had been returned to Prigozhin. To the extent the original agreement to end the Wagner Group Rebellion was intact as it regarded Belarus, Lukashenko explained that the organization’s troops had remained in their camps in his country. According to newsmedia reports, approximately 8,000 Wagner Group troops are currently deployed in Belarus. However, the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, the senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, who was mentioned earlier, stated in an online post republished by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel that 10,000 Wagner Group troops would eventually be deployed in Belarus.

Interestingly, when Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group troops were redeployed in Belarus on June 30, 2023, he also explained that his country could make use of the experience and expertise of the organization’s members through training. By July 2023, the Ministerstva abarony Respubliki Belarus’ (Belarusian Defense Ministry) had announced that “The Armed forces of Belarus continue joint training with the fighters of the Wagner PMC (Private Military Company).” Giving what seemed to amount to a forewarning to neighboring Poland and NATO, on the week of July 20, 2023, the Belarusian Defense Ministry would announce: “During the week, special operations forces units, together with representatives of the Company will work out combat training tasks at the Brest military range.” The Brest military range is 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of the Polish border.

Very compelling is a video posted on Prigozhin’s press service on Telegram depicting the Wagner Group’s owner welcome his organization’s troops to Belarus and discussing the future of the whole enterprise, Prigozhin is heard telling the Wagner Group troops, “We fought honorably.” He goes on to say, “You have done a great deal for Russia. What is going on at the front [in Ukraine] is a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in.” Reportedly, Prigozhin tells his troops that they should behave well towards the locals and directs them to train the Belarusian Army and gather their strength for a “new journey to Africa.” The video on Telegram additionally shows Prigozhin receiving the Wagner Group black flag, decorated with the motto” Blood, Honour, Motherland, and Courage”, brought up to Belarus from the organization’s camp in the Russian Federation’s South. Clearly, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group may be a bit down, but they are not completely out, by the good grace of “Papa” one might say. 

In a most extraordinary turn of events, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.” In the third quatrain of “Sonnet 119” (1609), William Shakespeare writes what appears most apposite, mutatis mutandis, to the evolving state of the relationship between Putin and Prigozhin: “O benefit of ill! now I find true / That better is by evil still made better, / And ruin’d love, when it is built anew, / Grows fairer than first, more strong, far greater.”

Putin in Derbent, Dagestan close-up (above). Putin’s visage says it all. Looking at Putin as he met with the cheering crowd in Derbent, it is very clear that he was very pleased. So rarely has his face expressed such happiness, many were led to believe it was not Putin in photo but a body double. Such impressions were quite singular. Putin was greeted in Derbent as the Russian people’s champion. In the “struggle” with the Wagner Group, he was hands down the victor. At least, that is how the situation appeared to the Russian people. If all that transpired was actually a clever artifice executed to garner their increased political support and ratchet up his popularity, as suggested by greatcharlie–maskirovka, Putin was surely very satisfied with the outcome.

The Way Forward

Of course, greatcharlie is unable to swear by this theory that the whole Wagner Group Rebellion was a clever, well-calibrated artifice devised by Putin and what has come afterward also has been guided by his hand. What greatcharlie does believe will become more apparent as time goes on is that the Wagner Group Rebellion did not accelerate some supposed spiral downward of Putin’s regime. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that to it, the whole cabaret felt simply too contrived from the first day. It is unfortunate any lives were reportedly lost in its implementation. Such is always the risk when thousands of well-armed fighting men are moving about with different purposes and understandings of a situation, and no significant central control and communication exists. Of course, establishing such certainly would have made the hypothesized artifice far easier to detect and to deny.

Sic multa quæ honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta. (Thus many things that seem honorable by their nature are rendered dishonorable by circumstances.) As for the Putin ultra-loyalist Prigozhin, greatcharlie is not completely dismissive of assessments by some Russia scholars and policy analysts that he may still be in trouble with his dear leader and dear friend in the Russian Federation. Even Putin loyalists cannot be too sure what he thinks of them or what plans he has for them at any given time. They can only do their level best to remain in his good standing. In greatcharlie’s aforementioned June 5, 2023 post on the possibility of the Kremlin using insights from analysts outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, it noted that finding scholars and policy analysts willing to assist the regime might be difficult as there might be a tacit understanding that there is a real danger involved with serving it. The same senior officials they might work hard to assist could very well turn against them much as wild animals without rhyme or reason known to the reasonable or the rational. In a similar vein, if Prigozhin actually committed himself and the Wagner Group to some artifice for the sake of strengthening Putin’s position nationally as hypothesized here, he may have been too trusting and may have taken too great a risk. Pitfalls have been something Prigozhin has clearly been able to dodge in various endeavors tied to Putin up to this point, but fate might finally come calling. One wonders whether Prigozhin was at all uneasy when he and 34 of his Wagner Group commanders were graciously invited to the Kremlin to meet with Putin, and one and all were welcomed back into the fold by the Russian Federation President with open arms. 

There is a little more to consider in this drama as it concerns Putin and Prigozhin. As greatcharlie makes this final point–and has a little fun doing so, it hopes readers will stick around as it goes admittedly the long way–albeit maybe a bit too prolix–to provide some background on a story that best promotes discernment of ideas presented in the discussion. From what greatcharlie would usually refer to as banal amusement, a Hollywood film, a deeper understanding of Prigozhin perhaps can be drawn. In this case, greatcharlie says film is art, and art is yeast for intellect. Many readers may already know the storyline of the very intriguing 1977 blockbuster film, “Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope”, but perhaps not in the context in which it is presented here. (It was suggested by a reader that greatcharlie do more to connect with the younger generation by tying points of discussion on foreign and national security policy with popular interests of today. So, greatcharlie, being responsive, reached back to a film that premiered 46 years ago to connect with younger readers. Was kann ich sagen?)

In the film, young Luke Skywalker comes across two “droids”, C-3P0 and R2-D2 on his home planet, Tatooine, with the latter holding a hologram recording of a desperate plea from Princess Leia, a key leader of the Rebellion against the Empire that has an iron grip. Leia, who is being held captive by Darth Vader, a type of galactic Imperium, the right hand of an evil empire that had enslaved the galaxy for help from Obi-Wan Kenobi. Skywalker seeks out Old Ben Kenobi, a neighbor whose name closely resembles the name in the message and discovers they are one in the same. Due to tragic circumstances, Obi-Wan Kenobi must take Skywalker along to rescue Leia. During their time together, Obi-Wan Kenobi sets forth to teach Skywalker about the Force, a positive, spiritual energy by which all existence flows not only in the galaxy, but the universe, and how it allows those with the gift to tap into it, mystical, supernatural abilities. The duo secure the help of blackmarketer Hans Solo and his trusted co-pilot Chewbacca, with the promise of remuneration. Skillfully flying his dilapidated yet considerably advanced and agile Millennium Falcon, Solo manages to evade asteroids, Imperial TIE fighters, and Imperial Star Destroyers. The diverse band of irregulars then come upon and are pulled into the Death Star, a superweapon with a giant planet crushing laser with which the Empire intended to use in eliminating the Rebellion once and for all. It was also where Leia was being held by Vader. The small band rescues Leia and escapes but not without the painful loss of Obi-Wan Kenobi in a duel with Vader, who by the way was the embodiment of the negative side of the force. Yet, after his death, Obi-Wan Kenobi could do more to help Skywalker than ever. With the promise of great reward from Leia, Solo takes the group on to the Rebel base on Yavin IV, which is the next target of the Death Star.

On Yavin IV, information collected by R2-D2 on the Death Star’s defenses and vulnerabilities was reviewed and plans for a small group of fighters to attack and destroy it were formulated. The Rebel mission entailed firing rockets into a small vent along an equatorial trench of the Death Star. Time was of the essence as the Death Star would be moving into position to destroy Yavin IV. Skywalker would join a group of pilots flying small X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters against the Death Star. He implored Solo to join the group but Solo emphasizes that his interests from the start were solely pecuniary and he would never risk himself in a suicide mission, which aptly described the Rebel pilots plan of attack. Skywalker left Solo with Chewbacca, as they stowed in his ship the massive reward Leia promised. Flying with R2-D2, Skywalker and the relatively small group of fighters then left to engage the giant Death Star which had nearly reached Yavin IV. Their mission was monitored by the Rebel command base on the planet. Once in contact, the losses in X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters mounted rapidly as a mass of Imperial TIE fighters intercepted the group. Vader, himself, joined them. With barely a handful of Rebel fighters left, Skywalker led what would be the final assault along the trench to reach the vent. As two X-Wing fighters trying to hold Vader and two TIE fighters off him were defeated and R2-D2 was lost, Skywalker sped to the target. It was then that Skywalker through clairaudience received a message from Obi-Wan Kenobi to rely on the Force to complete the job. Leia and the commanders at the Rebel base were flummoxed as Skywalker, responsive to Obi-Wan Kenobi’s voice, disengaged his computer targeting system. As the Death Star prepared to fire on Yavin IV, and Vader closed on Skywalker, surprisingly Solo arrives with the Millennium Falcon and perfectly disrupts Vader’s pursuit of his young friend, freeing him to hit the target directly and destroy the Death Star just in time.

That moment in the film was frightfully small, but small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph. There is considerable materiality and profundity about it. Solo had often indicated in the film that his interests during the odyssey of the small band were solely pecuniary. However, whether compelled by the Force via telepathy to act in support of Skywalker or impelled by the power of friendship and a sense of responsibility, Solo acted. Risking the loss of his ship, his treasured co-pilot, his grand reward, his hopes and dreams for the future, his life, all that he had, he rushed to the Death Star. It is unclear whether Solo had already left Yavin IV in a direction away from the fighting and reversed back to join Skywalker or whether he had flown directly to the scene from the targeted planet. Solo surely would have understood that  Skywalker and the other Rebel pilots were facing trouble at the Death Star, but he could not have known just how bad the situation might have been until he arrived upon the scene. The small force of Rebel fighters may have been completely destroyed by the time he arrived. His young friend could have been lost already. He may have found himself alone, contending with a swarm of Imperial TIE fighters. Nevertheless, Solo went in. A reason for his valorous action could perhaps be found in a logic intrinsic to comradeship in war. So often, a parent may learn their child was lost in war not knowing that he or she abandoned relative safety to remain beside a friend and together they ran forward against the odds into mortal danger. It is easy and satisfying for some to ascribe a bundle of negatives to create a picture of individuals as Prigozhin. However, among such men, the mind works in mysterious ways. As long as Putin continues to stand with him, publicly or privately, he will most likely continue to stand with Putin. Indeed, no matter how bad things become for Putin, Prigozhin will most likely be there. As long as experts continue to get the relationship between the two so wrong, particularly those in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western countries and other countries interested, there will remain a gap in their understanding of certain events, which Putin, as meditated upon here, will likely seek to exploit in different ways. Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. (A certain friend is seen in an uncertain matter.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the individual at the center of the Wagner Group Rebellion (above). The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refers to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin,and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

Prigozhin arrives with guards at funeral ceremony held in the Troyekurovskoye cemetery in Moscow, Russia, April 8, 2023. In this post, greatcharlie chronicles Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

About Prigozhin

Since Prigozhin, as aforementioned, is at the center of all that has transpired, it seems appropriate to provide some background on the individual who allegedly took on Putin. An account of Prigozhin’s life has been widely circulated in the international newsmedia. Those biographies usually discuss certain elements of his life, typically offering a fragmented picture of Prigozhin story: other than average beginnings; potential as skier lost; imprisonment; release, family support and entry into food service industry; support from friends; entry into restaurant and gambling businesses; elite contacts and growth; Putin ties; catering and opportunities of a lifetime; and, business diversification to include internet business and the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s life had the least promising commencement.  He was born on June 1, 1961 in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in the Soviet Union, the son of a nurse, Violetta Prigozhina, and a mining engineer, Viktor Prigozhin. His father died when Prigozhin was a 9-year-old, leaving his mother to support him and his sick grandmother by working at a local hospital. During his school years, Prigozhin aspired to be a professional cross-country skier. He was trained by his stepfather Samuil Zharkoy, who was an instructor in the sport, and attended a prestigious athletics boarding school from which he graduated in 1977. However, due to an injury, he left the sport. Unfortunately, the criminal culture of St Petersburg drew him in.

There is an old saying directed at youth which greatcharlie paraphrases: “If one is around the wrong kind of people one will likely get involved with the wrong kind of things.” In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution. Id nobis maxime nocet, quod non ad rationis lumen sed ad similitudinem aliorum vivimus. (Is especially ruinous to us, that we shape our lives not by the light of reason, but after the fashion of others.)

In a five-page biography attached to an October 2021 email acquired by the Intercept from Capital Legal Services that appears to have been drafted by his attorneys, it was revealed that Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad, according to Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper known for its critical coverage of the Kremlin. The newspaper also reported that Prigozhin in 1990 studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

Food Service

Prigozhin would next move in a completely different direction which placed his life on an amazing trajectory. He set up a hot-dog stand in Leningrad with his mother and stepfather in the Aprashaka Flea Market. Prigozhin was essentially a street vendor, without much in the way of formal food service training or food service management. Yet, he clearly possessed a considerable knack for preparing and selling food to people. He apparently knew what they liked and knew what was right. He was quoted in an interview with the New York Times as stating: The rubles were piling up faster than his mother could count them.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Prigozhin followed the entrepreneurial spirit of the times and founded or became involved in many new businesses. Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeing that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.)

From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. 


Boris Spektor (above). From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

According to the Guardian, Prigozhin found Tony Gear, a British hotel administrator who had previously worked at the Savoy in London and was now at one of St Petersburg’s few luxury hotels. He employed Gear to manage first a wine shop, then the Old Customs House. Initially, the Old Customs House employed strippers as a way to drum up clientele, but oddly enough the restaurant’s food became the real draw for patrons and stripper operations were suspended. Gear marketed the Old Customs House as the most refined place to eat in a city that was only just discovering fine dining.

On its website, the Old Customs House is described on its website as one of the oldest restaurants in the city. Pop stars and businessmen liked to eat there, as did St Petersburg’s mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who sometimes came with his deputy, Putin. Photographs of Prigozhin in his exclusive St. Petersburg restaurants typically depict him serving the elite of the Russian Federation and standing-by dutifully in the background, ready to respond to his very important patrons’ every need. Prigozhin does not display a scintilla of shyness now, and he was hardly shy during those early years of his restaurant ventures. One might imagine that Prigozhin had a gift for repartee which was most likely greatly appreciated by patrons.

 

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush with their spouses on board the New Island Restaurant. Prigozhin is standing by dutifully, back and to the left of Putin. Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. Prigozhin assistance was clearly an integral part of whatever plan Putin had for foreign dignitaries. To that extent, Prigozhin was integral to Putin’s approach to handling foreign and national security policy issues with his visitors. The degree of Prigozhin’s connection with Putin was undeniable, frightfully apparent. Putin would go on to make use of Prigozhin’s assistance on many matters of the utmost importance to the Russian Federation and utmost importance to him. If greatcharlie is correct, he continues to do so today

During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by Novaya Gazeta that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good friendship. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story.

In 1997, Prigozhin and Ziminov, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. Inspired by waterfront restaurants on the River Seine in Paris, the two created the restaurant by spending $400,000 to remodel a rusting ferry boat on the Vyatka River. Prigozhin told the magazine Elite Society in 2008 that the new restaurant offered Russians something new and different from boring “cutlets with vodka.”

It was no mean feat to create a profitable restaurant in St. Petersburg with a potential clientele that represented a small percentage of the population and managed to get them through the doors every night, let alone open a second based on a concept alien to a good portion of that exclusive clientele. In 1998, he opened the New Island Restaurant on a boat, which one tourism website calls “St. Petersburg’s only floating luxury Restaurant-Ship.” The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city.

In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. 

Putin clearly displayed liking for Prigozhin before everyone. Meduza reported Putin welcomed him as “one of the boys.” To clarify, Prigozhin was neither Chekisty, the son or grandson of a member of the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, an iteration of the security services during World War II, as Putin is, nor was he Siloviki, someone who had served in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB as Putin and most of his close associates had. Current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev, who was an attorney in St.Petersburg when Putin met him, also falls into that “other than Chekisty or Siloviki” category. Prigozhin’s good relations with others among the Russian Federation’s elite also assisted in bring in lucrative catering contracts

Prigozhin attends to Putin during his inspection of a Concord Management and Consulting facility. By 2003, Prigozhin left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. Concord Management and Consulting, a  company founded by Prigozhin in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. He was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with him, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region.

During those early stages of his growth in the business world, Prigozhin was known for being rather strict as a manager. However, he is not remembered as being one to complain about being wronged and suffering losses. He was hardly one who could be characterized as temperamental and thin-skinned. It would appear that any behavior that resembled such was truly left behind in prison. Seemingly, he very likely would have thought dwelling on such matters would have cost him too much time and energy; on the face of it, he likely believed his time would always be best spent on pursuing new, greater ventures. The profits from them surely surpassed any prior losses. Much as water down a stream, when Prigozhin encountered an obstruction, he would work around it rapidly to reach the next profitable objective. Beyond the immediate moment, there was always the potential for more ahead. (The indications and implications from this might be that his complaints concerning the Wagner Group’s treatment in Ukraine have been fostered by the realization that there are no prospects for advancing on to some satisfying new course upon which he could greatly improve his organization’s situation.) Good fortune seemed to stick on Prigozhin’s side. He could provide his family with pleasure and affluence.

Quam sæpe forte temere eveniunt, quæ non audeas optare. (How often things occur by mere chance, for which we dared not even to hope.) Over the course of the 2000s, Prigozhin grew even closer to Putin. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. 

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90 percent of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. Leonid Teyf, former deputy general director of Voentorg (the company charged with contracting caterers for the military), assisted Prigozhin in securing the orders. of Voentorg’s assets related to food supply and army maintenance to Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract signed by Voentorg for 2013-2014 amounted to $999 million. The contract was signed by the director of Voentorg Vladimir Pavlov. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, approximately amounted to $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies.

Prigozhin (center) reaches the top! He stands close to both Putin (left) and current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev (right) During confidential conversation. In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply more than 90 percent of all food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90% of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract for 2013 to 2014 amounted to $999 million. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Defence Ministry, approximately amounted to  $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies. As discussed in Part 2, Putin would oddly lay out the tie between Concord and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry in an address following the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency.

It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

Three “cheerful” photos of Prigozhin (above) on a US Federal Bureau of Investigation “Wanted Poster”. Perhaps in the Russian underworld in which Prigozhin ostensibly has his hands somewhat dipped, the poster is a badge of honor, a sign that he had made it to the top! It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary political opponent then, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin.

Prigozhin and the Wagner Group

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St.. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present).

As explained in some detail in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations”, from the time of the organization’s inception, it was widely believed that the organization was founded, owned and led by Dmitriy Utkin. Utkin is a veteran of the First and Second Chechen Wars. Until 2013, he served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of the 700th Independent Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Detachment) of the 2nd Independent Brigade, a special forces unit of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) or GRU. However, in an August 2017, article in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, the suggestion was made that Utkin was only a figurehead for the company. Fingers pointed at Prigozhin as its true owner. Prigozhin went some distance to deny any ties to the Wagner Group. He even denied any communication with it. Prigozhin actually sued Bellingcat, Meduza, and Echo of Moscow for claiming he had links to the organization. In an interview in December 2018, Putin also denied allegations that Prigozhin had been directing the Wagner Group’s activities. However, in September 2022, Prigozhin relented and admitted to having created the group. Prigozhin claimed, “I cleaned the old weapons myself, sorted out the bulletproof vests myself and found specialists who could help me with this. From that moment, on May 1, 2014, a group of patriots was born, which later came to be called the Wagner Battalion.” As noted earlier, the Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged in the fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts. 

At the organization’s core, Wagner Group troops are predominantly retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are typically aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. However, the Wagner Group also employs an international group of fighters. There are three main fighting units of the organization. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. There is a Serbian unit built upon complement of former members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard–also known as “Arkan’s Tigers”–created by the deceased 1990s ethno-religious nationalist Serbian paramilitary warlord Zeljko Raznatovic’s–also known as Arkan. A relatively new unit in the Wagner Group consists of citizens of Scandinavian countries, particularly from Norway. It participated in the firefights on the Bakhmut front. The unit is referred to as the Níðhöggr“, sometimes also known as Nidhogg.

The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Prigozhin, in a dark blue suit (second from right) attends a meeting involving top Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff and members of Libya’s National Army in Moscow on November 7, 2018. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). The Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged. Fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts.. 

According to initial statistics available after April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As noted, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. The recruitment of prison inmates for service in the Wagner Group is nothing new. The organization reportedly recruited imprisoned UPC rebels in the Central African Republic to fight in Mali and Ukraine. They are reportedly nicknamed the “Black Russians”. It was the Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that suffered high-profile casualties. Callous Russian Federation commanders threw them into battle pell mell. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. 

It would later be revealed by the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, a senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, that  22,000 of the organization’s troops had been killed in action in Ukraine. In his statement, published by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel, Marx further explained that another 40,000 were wounded in action. Of the 78,000 Wagner Group troops who served in what Marx referred to as “the Ukrainian business trip”, 49,000 of them were convicts. The Wagner Group has reportedly halted the practice of recruiting convicts in its ranks. Former convicts in the organization that survived service in Ukraine have been released from their contracts.

Prigozhin surely recognized early on that more than simply suffering under inept leadership of Russian Federation commanders, he and his organization were being pushed toward the precipice of losing everything by individuals seemingly more skilled in finding ways to defeat him than defeating their opponent on the battlefield. He certainly was not going to countenance that. An idea perhaps alien or incomprehensible to many readers is the possibility that Prigozhin was tolerant, at least up to a point, of the unpleasant set of circumstances under which he was caused to operate in an effort to demonstrate his loyalty and support for Putin. Homo antiqua virtute ac fide? (A man of the “ancient” virtue and loyalty?)

Particularly during the months-long battle for the Ukrainian coal-mining town of Bakhmut, senior managers and troops of the Wagner Group surely felt they were being thwarted, from keeping the Russian Federation in the fight, meeting their organization’s longstanding commitment to Putin and the Russian Federation, as well as meeting their personal and emotional promise to Putin not to leave Ukraine until the Russian Federation won the war. It is all very heavy stuff for a group of individuals whose top priority most would likely argue is profit. Based on his public comments, Prigozhin appears to believe victory is still possible under the right military leadership. It was during a crucial stage in the Bakhmut fight that Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose forces the Wagner Group jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would somewhat likely say, “to rescue.” Wagner Group units apparently were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred. (In meditating on Prigozhin’s position, Putin might want take into consideration the terrible outcome of the decision by Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, to use his beloved spetsnaz units with their exquisite military capabilities to perform stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, on the frontlines in conventional roles. the specialized units were over relied upon and consequently suffered devastating losses.)

Well known is the fact that Putin prefers to take as few people as possible into his confidence. Even with those lucky few he is doubtlessly frugal with his thoughts. Conceivably, Putin had spoken quietly with Prigozhin over the very public vocalization of his rage over the fundamental failures and gross mismanagement of the special military operation by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff since its start. Whatever may have been discussed in such a meeting it hardly concerned taking steps against Shoigu and Gerasimov that Prigozhin was insisting upon, but a solution of some kind may have been voiced by Putin that manifested his unique lens on matters. Note, Prigozhin has neither expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He has always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with the most recent events most firmly in mind. 

Prigozhin in Bakhmut (above). The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Reality Check

Non mihi si linguæ centum sint oraque centum, ferrea vox, omnes scelerum comprendere formas omnia pœnarum percurrere nomina possim. (Not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, could I repeat all the types of wickedness, and run over all the names of penal woes.)  The supercharged modality of Prigozhin’s expressions concerning the performance of Shoigu and Gerasimov was by no means been within normal parameters and such reproach and obloquy from anyone toward those immensely powerful government leaders and organizations would never have been expected before the special military operation began. In the Russian Federation, “discrediting the armed forces” carries a maximum 15-year prison sentence. Many of Prigozhin’s public statements about the situation in Ukraine are now famous worldwide.

Some in the mainstream Western newsmedia would lead their audience to believe Prigozhin’s regular public ravings about how the war was being managed was an indication that he may have an unhealthy mind. Res ipsa loquitur!  Bizarre reports of Prigozhin providing information on the positions of the Russian Army in Bakhmut appear equally faulty. They have only evinced a misunderstanding of Prigozhin’s relationship to Putin and what the very active private military contractor means to the Russian Federation President personally. From the moment any claim was made of Prigozhin’s betrayal, at least on the Russian Federation side, it was doubtlessly viewed as a comical yet nonetheless apocryphal rumor ginned up by his opponents. To that extent, it was surely rejected as fast as inane suggestions meant to bias the mind back in March 2022 that the extraordinarily violent and most loyal Putin subordinate, the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, would possibly overthrow his president and take over the government and on a matter outside of the Ukraine War context, the very patriotic and extremely dangerous People’s Republic of China Vice Minister for counterintelligence of the Ministry of State Security, Dong Jingwei, had of all things defected to the US in June 2022. (The Dong Jingwei defection matter is treated in some detail in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”.) These suggests were not clever, but rather crass. One could get the impression that those responsible for the US political warfare effort against the Russian Federation have been soliciting ideas from a group of local junior high school boys for the most immature suggestions possible. Surely, that would count as a bold attempt to exploit thinking from outside the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies. Conscia mens recti famæ mendacia risit. (The mind conscious of integrity scorns the lies of rumor.)

Speaking plainly as he does, Prigozhin’s vocal expressions might at best send a clear signal to Wagner Group troops that they genuinely matter to him, but alone, his words do not appear to have accomplished too much. Prigozhin clearly recognized that as long as his organization’s troops remain in Ukraine, they will be “at the mercy” of what he clearly deems to be careless and inept top officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. That does not bode well for them. If one might toss on top of everything Prigozhin’s contentious relationship with those officials and commanders, it becomes nearly impossible to foresee anything positive coming the way of those troops in the future. Such will likely remain a constant no matter how things fall, one way or another in the midst of Moscow’s Ukraine enterprise. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Prigozhin standing before rows of Wagner Group troops killed in action in Ukraine. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing at the White House, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders.

The limited capabilities of Prigozhin’s organization as a military force also adds to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. As with everything else in which they were delinquent or deficient, the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces moved to utilize the Wagner Group as part of their combat operations during the special military operation doubtlessly with preconceptions in their minds via existing intelligence reporting on how the Ukrainians were situated to fight. To name a few of the deficiencies likely imagined in Moscow, it was surely thought to be short of weapons, short of good leadership, and short of well-trained troops. Through international newsmedia reporting, the whole world was led to believe the same. (Irony of ironies, it was the Russian Federation Armed Forces that actually had shortages of everything, including gear, troops, and especially military acumen.) The Wagner Group, loaded with veteran fighters, was expected to have a multiplier effect on the frontline. They made the questionable choice to utilize their own spetsnaz units in the same way.

Carelessly unforeseen and unimagined by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff was the massive level of assistance that the Ukrainians would eventually receive from the Western powers and other countries. (That matter is examined in some detail in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)  That assistance has made the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Ukrainian Armed Forces), even with its few remaining deficiencies, one of the more formidable military powers in Europe. Far more than just javelin and stinger shoulder fired weapons, small arms, and uniforms, the long list of assistance has included high-tech armaments as Patriot air defense systems and NASAMS (Norwegian (or National) Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) air defense systems, MLRS systems HIMARS systems, mobile and precision long-range artillery, anti-ship rockets, Abrams, Leopard, and Challenger tanks, MiG-29s, F-16s, helicopters, a variety drones, real-time intelligence, and loads of troop training. The Wagner Group could hardly have had a multiplier effect as the one dimensional force that it has been on a battlefield in which its opposition possessed such weapons and capabilities. 

For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated Russian Army trucks was not enough. Additionally, a robust, organic drone capability would be needed particularly for ISR, direct action, and psychological warfare operations to support the more effective planning and execution of missions. Given how the war in Ukraine has progressed, the new ways in which existing technologies are used and new ones are developed and introduced, new efficiencies in warfighting may render these few suggestions outdated. Still, the crux of what is presented here should be readily apparent. (Even the White Russian anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian insurgent groups–the Freedom For Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps used rather pricey Western-made military vehicles to launch their May 2023 raid into Belgorod region of Russian Federation. The vehicles were reportedly supplied by an unknown source. Images appeared on social media allegedly displaying those vehicles. Reporting on the equipment it observed, the Oryx open-source weapons tracking group, stated that the Russian Federation forces captured two International M1224 MaxxPro MRAPs, two 2 M1151 HMMWVs-, and one M1152 HMMWV that was damaged.)

As for procurement, the Wagner Group might have effectively sought out Independent sources of military resources for the company not with regard to its service in Ukraine but more generally to supply itself as a fully autonomous, fully operational professional military contractor. It would be one more step in attenuating its reliance upon the largess of the fickle Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation Armed Forces. All of that being stated, interoperability of armaments procured with those in the Russian Federation inventory would likely be viewed as a requirement by Prigozhin, keeping in mind the possibility of needing to operate in cooperation with the country’s armed forces, especially if asked to do so by Putin. Without variance, any procurement efforts should only be made with a keen eye on working within the parameters of existing international sanctions concerning armaments and the Russian Federation. It would be useful for the Wagner Group to have its own supply of food, water, medical facilities, and petroleum and oil lubricants. As long as these relative inadequacies as well as others persisted, the Wagner Group as noted, would remain poorly situated to optimally serve in support of Russian Federation military operations in Ukraine. As long as they exist, Prigozhin’s demands for greater autonomy will remain something less than legitimate. No statements have been made or actions taken concerning the structure, strength, composition, or rearming of the organization that would indicate the situation would change anytime soon.

It is very possible–actually more likely–that Prigozhin may not have had any interest at all in making great changes to how his organization’s units were structured. To that extent, Prigozhin may have long ago accepted that there would be a strategy-resources mismatch that would prevent the Wagner Group from playing a greater and genuinely effective role in support of Russian Federation military objectives in Ukraine even if it had been given a feerer hand. Given the few actualities presented here and others, one option that evidence suggests clearly arose in the mind of Prigozhin was to mostly withdraw his organization from the field in Ukraine, while keeping a portion available in-country to serve as effectively as possible structured as it is. In that way, Prigozhin could then continue to put the Wagner Group to use elsewhere worldwide where it could serve more effectively and more successfully. Again, that is what Prigozhin appeared to have been doing or at least seemed to be what he wanted to do before the Wagner Group Rebellion “erupted.” (It is not possible for greatcharlie to confirm any of Prigozhin’s burgeoning actions were founded on reasons similar to those expressed here.)

Prigozhin assists his Wagner Group troops load up in trucks moving up to the front in Ukraine. The limited capabilities of his organization as a military force added to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. They possessed diminutive armor, mechanized, and firepower resources. For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated, second-hand, Russian Army trucks was not enough.

A Few Oscillating Ruminations on Prigozhin 

Serum est cavendi tempus in mediis malis. (The time for caution is too late when we are in the midst of evils.) It might have been plausible enough for many experts and observers to believe it would have been in the best interest of Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically to ensure that he and his unit commanders will play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities will be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. That might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. In that vein, Prigozhin ostensibly could have made a genuine go at using his considerable political influence with Putin, speak truth to power and so on, and implore him to provide the Wagner Group with a greater say in how it will execute missions in support of Russian Federation Armed Forces. Yet, such a political move would have been tricky or if not a grave blunder. Prigozhin is savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. True, despite the nature of professional relations between Putin and Prigozhin concerning the Wagner Group and military affairs, more important was their personal relationship. That relationship, recall, was at the crux and the apex of Prigozhin’s standing in the regime and in military circles as well as his sense of entitlement to issue criticism of the top military leadership of the Russian Federation and foist his cconvictionsupon everyone on how his organization could best be used in Ukraine.

Putin has shown considerable regard for Prigozhin bbutfor quite some time he has shown even greater regard for Shoigu professionally and personally (privately). Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements. Militarily, a sine qua non for Putin is to possess without doubt, to believe with comfort, that the Russian Federation has the capability to successfully attack and destroy the US and its interests with nuclear weapons.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigozhin was surely well-aware that Putin really did not need at any point, for any reason, and especially during the flailing special military operation would have been an extra problem that from one angle might simply boil down to him as mere in-house bickering between two “closely ranked” associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s preceding June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin is conceivably someone well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him on anything that is not quite an emergency. After all, in the Wagner Group, he has long-demonstrated that effectively dealing with, managing, and understanding strong-spirited and strong-willed men is his forte. A leader must be strong, but also. at the right time, compassionate.

If one might see some plausibility in greatcharlie’s discussion along this line about Prigozhin, one might be been able to accept or at least consider that on his own volition, he very unlikely would have pushed the matter of his struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov to the point where his forces amassed for days in plain view on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation–even the US had then under surveillance by satellite–would after a very public announcement of rebellion, begin a military drive toward their offices. True, that is exactly how things appeared to have happened to many. Still, it was unlikely the case.

To gnaw a bit further on this point, there can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin has greatly concern himself with what Putin has been facing in these very trying times for the Russian Federation following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. What Putin thinks is of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin is the priority. Discussing Prigozhin during an interview, political activist Aleksei Navalny stated: “[Prigozhin] didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In the old-fashioned, out-moded sense, Prigozhin is under obligation to Putin. Yet, as a knock on to all of this, greatcharlie will go out on a limb and state that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever act in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life.

The Platters was one of the most successful vocal groups of the early rock and roll era. Their distinctive sound was a bridge between the pre-rock Tin Pan Alley tradition and the growing new genre. “Only You (And You Alone)” (often shortened to “Only You”) is a pop song composed by Buck Ram. It was originally recorded by The Platters in 1955. In the first verse of this song about true devotion and love which seem to greatcharlie to be befitting Prigozhin’s “frame of mind” on Putin are the words: “Only you can make all this world seem right / Only you can make the darkness bright / Only you and you alone can thrill me like you do / And fill my heart with love for only you.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restaurateur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

One might hazard to suggest that it is Prigozhin’s nourishing side which seeks to sustain his relationship with Putin and give him the support he needs to fortify his regime’s interests abroad. It is the destructive side of Prigozhin that Putin has exploited to achieve the ends of his expressed and secretive foreign and national security policies. Expectedly, some observers might dare say that Prigozhin’s desire to undertake such a morbid venture is part and parcel of some severe pathology. (Of course, similar private military contractors “could hardly thrive” in the socially and technologically advanced industrialized countries of the West.)

Perhaps somewhere at the confluence of the two modes of thinking deep within, there is a conflict. He has stood casually among piles of Wagner Group troops he recruited, many from Russian Federation prisons, piled in bags in storage rooms and laid out in fields. He openly admitted to the loss of 40,000 of those who joined his organization. The potency of it all is readily apparent. Prigozhin is still only human. There must be moments when he wonders what it is all amounting to. The US author Megan Devine provides words that may be apposite in this context in her bestseller, It’s OK That You’re Not OK: Meeting Grief and Loss in a Culture That Doesn’t Understand (Sounds True, 2017): “There are losses that rearrange the world. Deaths that change the way you see everything, grief that tears everything down. Pain that transports you to an entirely different universe, even while everyone else thinks nothing has really changed.”

There are those who would suggest Prigozhin has become bitter and disillusioned about the world around him, the Putin regime; essentially he is feeling jaded. Of course, it was the largesse of Putin’s regime that over the years  allowed him to become a billionaire. On a more specific level, it might be posited that Prigozhin has become jaded with regard to the Ukraine War. There may very well be scope to that idea. He has talked of moving on with his Wagner Group to better things. To that extent there may also be some materiality. It would be questionable to characterize Prigozhin as a cynic who is endlessly expressing his underlying distrust of everything. Yet, far from believing the Russian Federation’s situation in Ukraine cannot become better, Prigozhin appears determined to right wrongs by those he feels have failed Putin and the Russian Federation and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat somehow.

In greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled, “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, it was noted that there have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian Federation units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it went on further to state: “It would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restauranteur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

According to Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2023, a shoot-out allegedly erupted in the settlement of Stanytsia Luhanska (Luhansk Oblast) between Russian Army soldiers and Wagner Group troops concerning which side is to blame for Russia’s failures amid the invasion of Ukraine. Those reports were not substantiated by Kyiv or confirmed by any sources in Moscow. On June 2, 2023, Prigozhin, writing on Telegram, alleged his troops had discovered 12 locations in rear areas where Russian Federation Defense Ministry officials had planted various explosive devices, including hundreds of anti-tank mines. He further reported that when he inquired with Defense Ministry officials as to why the charges had been set, they explained it was an order from their superiors. Prigozhin stated: “It was not necessary to plant these charges in order to deter the enemy, as it [the area in question] is in the rear area. Therefore, we can assume that these charges were intended to meet the advancing units of Wagner.” Prigozhin noted that none of the charges went off and no one was hurt. Still, he added: “We assume this was an attempt at a public flogging.”

The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering?

If Putin had suddenly spoken out on the matter before the rebellion and in Solomonesque fashion, directed Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to work out an amicable plan to resolve their differences on the sustentation and upkeep of the Wagner Group and present their results to him, the respective loyalty and obedience of all three would have been put to the test. Shoigu and Gerasimov pretty much control the whole show which is essentially the problem to which Prigozhin has been calling attention. Under such a scenario, they would unlikely have been willing to brook any serious discussion of making the Wagner Group a stronger and far greater force. Prigozhin would most likely have remained flawlessly obedient to Putin’s orders to hash it out but deep down would hardly have been interested in putting too much time into butting heads with the leadership of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff. Prigozhin would probably see in advance that the most trying part of such a “confrontation” would be not be contending with the disdain of Shoigu and Gerasimov toward him, but their obsolescent preconceptions of military affairs and military science in general, which he might foresee would doubtlessly have caused them to filter his new ideas for the role of his organization through their archaic and prosaic ones. (It is possible that Shoigu and Gerasimov also had viewed the relationship of the Wagner Group to their organization’s as parasitical. Their actions concerning the combat support and combat service support of Wagner give force to that idea.) The only concession Prigozhin might have made under such circumstances would be to agree to keep his Wagner Group troops in Ukraine for the duration of the conflict and maintain its presence in-country at a certain strength. Shoigu and Gerasimov would have needed to make many concessions to satisfy Prigozhin based on past behavior. Still, even if some allegedly practical plans might be worked out and presented to Putin, in this hypothetical, what would be presented might better reflect what is possible than what will be. Nous sommes reconnaissant de votre considération et croyons que vous aurez du plaisir à être partenaire avec nous. Only the emergence of some exigent circumstance could have had the effect of shifting more power to one side or another on the “control” issue. Not to get too far ahead, but it would seem the Wagner Group Rebellion provided just such an emergency.

Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Supreme Economic Eurasian Council at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, May 25, 2023. The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering? Perhaps something deeper was going in his remarkable mind.

Fun and Games, Quicks and Aberrations

As alluded to earlier, Prigozhin’s wailing has not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out. 

Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling many elites of the Russian Federation who find him to be anathema and not a forewarning of things to come. Perhaps making such nettlesome utterances helps to pass the time for those at the top of the food chain in Moscow. Prigozhin, himself, has made his thoughts on a mutual dislike between him and Russian elites living in the luxurious Moscow suburb of Rublyovka very public. Laughing off aforementioned reports that he had offered to reveal Russian troop positions to Ukrainian military intelligence in exchange for Kyiv’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated in an audio message posted on Telegram: “People from Rublyovka” could be behind the allegations.” He went on to state in his unique style: “Of course they will pour as much s*** on me as they can.” La leçon d’elegance de Yevgeny Prigozhin.

If Prigozhin’s original comments concerning a possible revolution in the Russian Federation actually was a manifestation of his brand of acidulous humor directed at antagonizing political and business elite at home, surely they were not appreciated among leaders of the FSB, especially since they came just before raids were launched along the Russian Federation’s borders by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian groups. The eyes of FSB officials should have become strained after watching Prigozhin’s every more at that point. Given their reaction to events concerning the Wagner Group later in June, they would seem to have thrown little more than a few stray glances his way.

Intriguingly, the ultranationalist political figure Igor Girkin has alleged via a string of videos that Prigozhin’s public pronouncements concerning the military campaign in Ukraine as merely “a project” created by an influential group within Putin’s inner circle. Girkin, known among associates by the cognomen “Strelkov” (Shooter) is an anti-semite, and is likely unstable. He is a former officer in Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Girkin gained notice as an operative behind the Russian Federation’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. In the aftermath of the invasion, he became a prominent player in the effort to establish Nova Rossiya (New Russia) on the sovereign territory of Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odessa. Girkin insists Prigozhin efforts are backed by Sergey Kiriyenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the President of the Russian Federation, who Putin has appointed to oversee the occupied Ukrainian lands. Girkin has been quoted as saying: “Kiriyenko is openly at war with Shoigu, which is why Prigozhin attacks the Defense Ministry.” To that extent, Girkin claims Prigozhin is “not just a man whose eyes were suddenly opened and began speaking the truth.”

Girkin asserts further that “Kiriyenko is backed by the Kovalchuk brothers, people who are part of the President’s inner circle.” Yury Kovalchuk is the chairman and the largest shareholder of Rossiya Bank. According to the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), together with his brother Mikhail Kovalchuk, as well as Mikhail Mishustin, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, Andriy Turchak, the Secretary of the General Council of United Russia–Putin’s political party, Prigozhin, and others, he formed the influential Kovalchuk-Kiriyenko group.

It is important to note that Girkin emphasizes that Prigozhin is “not Russian by nationality,” more than insinuating that just as the “majority of Bolsheviks,” he is of Jewish origin and thereby poses a considerable threat to Russia. Ultimately, Girkin and all others similar to him–and there are many similar to him in the Russian Federation–are political figures that Putin must manage, not Prigozhin. Girkin, clearly a creature of the worst kind from the Russian Federation’s Intelligence Community, appears vindictive, passionate, ill-balanced, jealous, envious. The intelligence services of many countries–especially those in the US–have their fair share of Girkins. The utmost should be done to guard against them. That is not always the case: disco inferno!

Interestingly, so intense and focused had been the internecine quarreling between elites in Moscow that rarely heard publicly from them at the time was that old chestnut that the invisible hand of the US and its Western alter egos is behind all that has gone wrong for the Russian Federation and that is all part of a long-term plan destroy their country.

Prigozhin speaking on his media service channel on Telegram. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert dedicated to Russian servicemen taking part in the military operation in Ukraine on the eve of Defender of Fatherland Day at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, February 22, 2023. There was surely great contrast between the ebullience displayed by Putin at the patriotic event and his thoughts and feelings behind the scenes about what his military commanders are doing in Ukraine and what he can expect from them as the war continues. Many decisions and actions made by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance. In examining this issue, greatcharlie seeks to reinforce somewhat likely conclusions by foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in the US and around the world not just concerning Putin’s control of Russian Federation Armed Forces, and to some degree, his security services as well, but also his culpability for crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as soldiers. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Many decisions and actions taken by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance, a perspective put in plain view during his February 24, 2022 address, broadcasted just as the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) began. With no pretension intended, greatcharlie states the Russian Federation’s handling of its wrongful invasion at all levels has been deplorable. What arouses an interest at this juncture has been Putin’s lack of control over many “big things” during the massive enterprise. Within the boundaries of its faculty, here greatcharlie humbly provides a few insights on how many things have gone wrong for Putin, the colossal issues that now beset him concerning the war, how he might seek to gain firmer control of the situation, and what that might mean going forward. Hopefully, greatcharlie provides new perspectives not just concerning Putin’s control of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces), and to some degree, his security services, but also his culpability for heinous crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as unarmed soldiers. An historic parallel to his lack of control over events in the field is presented. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC) was an Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, born in Athens. At the age of 30, Xenophon led one of the largest Greek mercenary armies of the Achaemenid Empire, the Ten Thousand, that famously attempted to seize Babylon but failed in 401 BC. As a writer, one of his works was Cynegeticus, usually translated as On Hunting or Hunting with Dogs. In discussing his wish that readers would find value in his treatise, Xenophon writes a passage which interestingly parallels greatcharlie’s desires regarding this essay. He states: ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν. οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι τὰ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι: ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὸ ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι:καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. (Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation—philosophers I will not call them —because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set, will say that what is well and methodically written is not well and methodically written—for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres, but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted.) (Regarding the presentation of the Greek text, greatcharlie asks its readers to kindly pardon its indulgence. It is presented here in “private” acknowledgement and celebration of someone of the utmost importance who will begin her undergraduate studies in the Classics in the Fall of 2023!)

I. The Magnitude of the Ukraine Disaster Begins to Take Form within Putin 

Stepping into the realm of conjecture, greatcharlie can imagine Putin, at the time of his decision to launch the special military operation was girded by the belief that his extreme action was necessary to secure a spiritual victory for mankind over the ugly evil of Nazism. However, Putin at the time of this writing may see the situation a bit differently. Clearly, he has plunged his country and the world in a challenging situation by acting on what he doubtlessly would likely still call “certainties” concerning Ukraine, NATO Expansion, and Western threat to the Russian Federation.

Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them.

Putin attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them..

II. Putin’s Actual Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

When there are missing pieces among facts collected in an investigation, a reliable imagination can be very useful. One can imagine what might be happening with another party. That supposition could become a working hypothesis. One then can act upon it, and if lucky, the investment in time and energy will prove justifiable. As alluded to earlier, the received wisdom among many Western military analysts and Russia scholars is that The Kremlin runs the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and in their view “today the Kremlin means Putin.” His military advisers are Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. Evidence offered of his control of the armed forces is the fact that “both generals serve “entirely at the pleasure of Putin” and “the respective predecessor of each was summarily dismissed.” One steps out on an attenuated thread when standing behind such evidence to support arguments regarding Putin’s control of the military. What may be perceived as simple truth, in reality is not so simple.

Over the two plus decades of Putin’s leadership, the record shows that unethical and outright criminal behavior can surely be well concealed under the Russian Federation government system. Certainly long before, in the erstwhile Soviet system, corruption in the armed forces was endemic and lucrative enough for those senior commanders engaged in such who would quietly “grease the palms” of superiors and who were not caught. The sales of military equipment to black marketers was the commonplace betrayal of some commanders. Another example that remains in greatcharlie’s memory from the days of the Cold War was learning that fighter pilots would pay commanders in order to serve in certain top tier squadrons. The military is not the only foreign and national security bureaucracy ham-strung and suffering from corruption. Unimaginable but true, even the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB Alexander Borrnikov, an irreplaceable member of Putin’s piratical crew, was shrewdly deceived by subordinates in the FSB 5th Department foreign intelligence service before the special military operation began. (The matter is discussed in further detail later in this essay. SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” for other insights shared on the matter.)

If one It has been suggested by some experrs that in Ukraine, Putin by his own hand destroyed the armed forces that built up over two decades. Looking at this supposition open-mindedly, one might added that if that is so, he certainly did not do it deliberately. However,,it is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was at the hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did a superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind. On February 24, 2022, they rolled the dice and poured their troops into Ukraine as ordered, hoping somehow that things might fall into place. Things did not go their way. Putin most likely had no idea how much damage was being done by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He could hardly admit even now that he did not know. If he did not need them now as a buffer between himself all the many failures militarily, and all the political drama, and if he had anyone else tied as closely to him that he knew as well and could turn, Putin would have likely sent them to higher service already, as is the pattern. If the Ukraine War were to end in the Russian Federation’s favor, an unlikely outcome, perhaps the two general might face trying times. Putin does not forget or forgive such betrayals. He is not the understanding type.

If one might suggest that it was all a deliberate act of subversion by one or both of the generals, the question would be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous degree in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties.

Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing flat-footed on the ground and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This averment shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round.

Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (right). It is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was atbthe hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did an superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind.

A. Delegation and Disappointment

Further to the preceding point, what did not serve Putin well was any thought that he could delegate matters concerning the special military operation that he typically would have overburdened himself with in the past. It appears to have been a matter of misplaced trust, which is very unusual for Putin. As an executive he made the proper management decision, but given the nature of his regime and its players, it was the wrong choice, at the wrong time, anc the wrong issue to do any delegating over. If Putin had been truly In control of the facts and the moving pieces, greatcharlie goes out on a limb to say he probably would have never gone into Ukraine and as it was, encountered considerable, unexpected resistance or just bad luck. However, if he would have still decided to go in knowing what he knows now, he would very likely have done his homework and to the very best of his ability developed real answers to resolve prospective problems having imagined more than enough possible failures and mishaps that could derail his plans and having most likely rehearsed over and over in his mind more than one way to resolve them. The situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would doubtlessly look a lot different than it does now. Of course, none of that happened.

Power and control are often limited for political authorities, even autocrats, during conventional military operations. That lack of control–along with US experience in Vietnam– is what in part inspired the US Congress to pass the War Powers Act in 1973. Surely, laid bare in Ukraine for Putin is his own lack of control  Certainly many may disagree with this assessment, but those who insist that Putin directly controlled events in Ukraine, even war crimes committed, should look more directly at just how poorly he has controlled aspects of his special military operation. On the four occasions presented here, Putin’s lack of control was self-evident.

1. The First Big Let Down: Russian Federation Intelligence on Ukraine

Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen in the Russian Federation. Far more than just being familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services, in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. (Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership.) In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Before becoming Russian Federation President, Putin served as Yeltsin’s Secretary of Sovet bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser. Having those experiences, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, he should have known that reporting from them must be scrutinized. In a very perplexing way, Putin felt confident enough to appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast announcing the start of the special military operation. Putin said: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” Lastly, he stated: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.”

 As the story goes, the now former head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda and his deputy as well as head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh, reportedly had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. Whatever Putin’s inner voice might have been saying about what he was being told about Ukraine, he closed his ear to it. Putin was apparently so convinced by reporting that Ukrainians were so dissatisfied with the leadership in Kyiv ready to welcome regime change, he attempted to appeal to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to acquiesce to invading Russian Federation forces. Putin seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness to self-interest and to the interest of the Russian Federation. Considering how Putin spoke so boldly in his broadcast to the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) audaciously suggesting they turn on their government, If the whole matter were not so grave, it could be viewed as Armed Forces comical.

Putin (center) Shoigu (left) and Gerasimov (right) at military exercises 2022. Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin, himself, might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was essentially recognized as a master stroke of military genius. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them.

2. A Study in Contrasts: Acumen Displayed in Zapad, Vostok, and Other Military Exercises and Poor Performance on the Battlefield

Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was a master stroke. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them. 

Despite what may have been choreographed to display a well-trained, well-equipped war machine for Putin’s unknowing eyes, the walls fell down in Ukraine. A poor strategy, faulty planning of the military operation, leaving the door open to supply and resupply of arms, equipment and sustenance, failure to decisively conquer by moving up the River Dnieper to cut off the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, reinforcing the failed operations in the Donbas, in part resulted in a stalled invasion and the epic slaughter of a modern army. Putin counted upon commanders with limited combat experience and no experience who more than anything else displayed negligence, inattentiveness to details large and small, delinquencies, and deficiencies. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. As for the concept of the Combined Arms Army, the formations raised and operated under it were as empty with troops as the concept was with promise.

3, Putin’s Faith in Spetsnaz: “A Weapon Is Only as the Man Who Wields It”

Putin has never hidden his admiration for Russian Federation Special Operations Forces. In foreign and national security policy approaches taken by the Russian Federation, special operations forces have been the go-to hammer to swing when the application of force was deemed required by the Kremlin. Such has also been the case with regard to domestic threats, particularly emanating from the Caucasus. Outside of government structures, Putin’s admiration for commando-type formations has likely played a role in his full acceptance and regular utilization of professional military contractors as the Wagner Group which are teaming with erstwhile spetsnaz members. In the opening days of the special military operation, Putin put his appreciation for the Russian Federation’s special operations forces on display by taking time on  February 27, 2022 to broadcast a message congratulating active military personnel and veterans of their formations on their professional holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day”. More than just a canned speech, Putin laid his heart out bare by stating: “You have demonstrated many times that you are prepared to act with the utmost efficiency and under the harshest conditions to precisely and professionally complete the most difficult and demanding missions. You always perform your military duty to protect your native country and citizens with honor and protect Russia’s national interests. The heroic traditions of the special forces find their roots in the centuries-long history of our army. They were fortified during the Great Patriotic War, matured and grew even stronger in Afghanistan and many hotbeds, as well as during the elimination of terrorists gangs both in the North Caucasus and in Syria. Putin said further: “I know that you undergo exactly this kind of training -comprehensive, all-encompassing and intensive, a real school of warfare. You strive to follow the best paragons of courage and bravery, true patriotism, and you set an example for new generations of defenders of the Fatherland and pass on your experience to young servicemen.” Very likely with reference to former spetsnaz serving in the Wagner Group, Putin remarked: “I want to thank the command and the personnel of the special operations forces as well as special forces veterans for their loyalty to the oath, for their impeccable service to the people of Russia and our great Motherland. My special appreciation goes to those who are performing their duty in the special operation to render assistance to the people’s republics of Donbass.”

Putin’s faith in the spetsnaz to carry out their duties to their utmost abilities was warranted, but as is the same with special operations soldiers in every country, they were only human and could only do so much. Placing them with their exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, under the control of Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, did not help. Among the classified US national security materials leaked online through the messaging platform in March 2023 were assessments of officials within the foreign and national security bureaucracies on the strength and capabilities of Russian Federation spetsnaz forces. According to those findings, there was such an overreliance on the specialized units on the frontlines that they consequently suffered atrocious losses. Behind the decision to use spetsnaz in such a role purportedly was skepticism among Russian Federation commanders that their conventional forces’ abilities could achieve objectives set in the invasion plans. Leaked documents also reportedly indicate US officials believe the high casualties of these units has rendered them less effective not only in Ukraine but also in other parts of the world where Russian Federation forces operate. Evidence of the losses in the spetsnaz units apparently was provided by satellite imagery featured among the leaked materials. Before-and-after imagery of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade’s base in southern Russia allegedly revealed that “all but one of five Russian Federation Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” Materials citing intelligence intercepts, assess the 346th brigade “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.” US intelligence analysts, who monitored the return of spetsnaz units to their respective bases, believe that extremely high losses in the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment “could explain why there is no clear [intelligence] signature of their return to garrison.” The loss of so many among the spetsnaz very likely came as a shock to Putin.

4. Hoping the Wagner Group Will Shift the Fight Moscow’s Way

As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Mentioned earlier was also that fact that Wagner Group fighters are typically retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. From the moment the situation went sour in Ukraine, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is widely known that since July 2022, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. To an extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be the saving grace of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 

However, it was not long before everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops. According to the best statistics available to greatcharlie, since April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As alluded to earlier, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner Group troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut.

In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin has expressed concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. Surely, Putin maybe somewhat concerned that the Wagner Group’s losses may eventually become so great that the organization would not be available to handle other foreign and national security policy matters for some time to come. In a pinch, perhaps the Wagner Group could recruit from among special operations veterans who served in the FSB and Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, but those former operators would for the most part lack the same level of battlefield experience spetsnaz from the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost in Ukraine possessed.

The full list of disappointments for Putin of or pertaining to the Ukraine enterprise is frightfully long and would overload and overwhelm this essay if included. Though, as aforementioned, theories of Putin’s control over the Russian Federation Armed Forces are accepted, it appears that nearly every theory confirming his alleged control cannot figuratively hold water.

Putin (left) and Gerasimov (right) holding a press conference following announcement that Gerasimov had become overall Russian Federation commander in Ukraine. Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

B. The Power to Hire and Fire Generals: What is It Worth?

Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

1. Putin Sacked a Slew of Generals in May 2022

Based on information made public by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, on May 19, 2022, Putin fired two senior commanders Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, who had commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov of the Black Sea Fleet. Osipov was reportedly fired following the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, which was a major embarrassment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Moscow-based media group, RBCreported on June 1, 2022, that on May 30, 2022, Putin issued a decree dismissing senior commanders of the security services. The list of those removed from their posts included: Major General of Police Vasily Kukushkin, who was head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir region; Major General Alexander Laas, deputy head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory; and, Major General Andrey Lipilin, head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region. Major General Alexander Udovenko of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Major General Yuri Instrankin, deputy head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were also among the dismissed. Additionally, Putin reportedly fired Police Colonel Emil Musin, who was the first deputy head of the Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Putin Fired 22 Russian Army Generals in August 2022

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence reported that General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 had been sacked. it was at that time there were the rather quiet, yet widely suspected firings of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was the senior but not overall command of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine and General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine. US officials estimated at the time of these dismissals that more than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured, which represented more than 50% of the number of troops Russia initially deployed in  the special military operation. According to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, at least 10 generals were among those killed.

3. Putin Fires Russian Army Generals for Failed Response to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in September 2022

Based on information from Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Telegraph reported on September 12, 2022 that Putin fired Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in a recent offensive in the east.

4. Putin Replaces Overall Commander in Ukraine in January 2023 and Fires Russian Army General for Vuhledar Fiasco in March 2023

A shift in command well-known among those following events in the Ukraine War was the replacement of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin by Gerasimov as overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”. On or just before March 26, 2023, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, had been removed from his post. Muradov had previously come under criticism for his failure in Vuhledar from Prigozhin who believed its capture was possible and may have had the effect of turning the war in Moscow’s favor. The Moscow Times, described as an independent English- and Russian-language online newspaper with offices in Amsterdam that is currently outlawed in Russia, also reported that Muradov had been suspended, One of the Moscow Times’ sources told the online daily, “Muradov was suspended because he was a crazy idiot who could command soldiers to die. Many complained about him.”

In February 2023, Muradov attacked Vuhledar by sending his soldiers into minefields, right under the artillery fire of the Ukrainians. As a consequence of his actions, reportedly two elite Russian Naval Infantry brigades, one presumed to be the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 103 pieces of equipment were reportedly lost in just three days. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.”

As the record indicates, on every occasion when Putin, usually via his Defense Minister, sacked a group of generals who underperformed, a month or a couple of months later, he was dismissing another group for similar, if not parallel failures. Sacking a general, more than just a punishment, is a very strong form of public embarrassment. By now, everyone interested in Putin has recognized that he rarely reverses his own decisions. (If that were the case, he surely would have reversed his decision to invade Ukraine. Declaring success early on and offering purported measurables among other things would have been the most likely off ramp.) Firing generals from commands whose records he doubtlessly reviewed and gave ultimate approval for top assignments unlikely came easy for him. Perhaps Putin may even be concerned that it reveals that he is not the best judge of people, that he has lost his touch, and worst of all, it confirms for some that he is not infallible. His mistakes with the military have very noticeably begun to pile up. Interestingly, despite being punished, the generals who were sacked will at least live to see another day. The soldiers, some incredibly young, whose lives they carelessly wasted in Ukraine will not have that chance.

There is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide an apology, legal advice, or worst, a legal defense, for Putin over war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Thoee among greatcharlie’s readers who may feel anything of the kind is being offered here to Putin, then it is respectfully suggested they stop reading the commentary at this point for it would surely be unreasonable, unconstructuve to continue with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

Alexander Gardiner’s famous photograph of US President Abraham Lincoln, and Union Army Major General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (right) and Allan Pinkerton (left) at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862. Although many readers, particularly in the US, both technically and perhaps more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America.

C. Another Leader Who Struggled To Control His Commanders During Wartime

Although many readers, particularly in the US both technically, and more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America. The author of the military law was jurist Franz Lieber, a German lawyer, political philosopher, and combat veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Lieber essentially modernized the military law of the 1806 Articles of War to ensure the Union Army could prosecute its war against the Confederate States of America with legitimacy.

However, despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the #humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

In fairness to Sherman, it must be noted that he acted in accord with the concept and intent of Lincoln’s Lieber Code when he gave explicit instructions to his troops regarding their conduct while on their march through Georgia, but there were a few deviations. In his Special Field Order No. 120, Sherman out of necessity encouraged foraging and the confiscation of livestock as he left his Army Group’s supply lines behind to travel so deep, so fast, and so furiously into Georgia. Home invasions were off limits. However, if antagonized by Confederate Army soldiers, Union Army officers were granted permission to destroy private and industrial property. Additionally, the field order permitted able-bodied Black laborers to join the march, but commanding officers were instructed to prioritize the distribution of supplies for soldiers of their Army Group. The majority of Union Army soldiers complied with Field Order No. 120, but some dubbed “bummers” roamed the countryside intentionally terrorizing civilians and looting. Although bummers were technically engaging in forbidden activities, the overall psychological impact of their actions on the local population was in sync with the purpose of the march. The greatest damage done by Sherman’s troops was the destruction of Georgia’s railroad lines, both a conveyor for industries and military transportation. Union Army soldiers would rip up and melt down tracks in full view of the demoralized populace.

Union Army troops tearing up railroad tracks in Georgia as Confederate civilians watched in horror (above). Despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

The text of the Lieber Code was arranged to create concordance with the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863) and prohibited racist discrimination against Black soldiers of the Union Army, specifically by Confederate Army troops who denied them the rights and privileges of prisoners of war. The military law clearly had little impact on the treatment of racially segregated Black soldiers of the US Colored Troops (USCT) by their White Union Army comrades in arms. At the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), incredulously, yet painfully true, White soldiers of the Union Army’s 1st Division essentially assisted soldiers of the Confederate States Army massacre Black soldiers of the 4th Division (USCT) in the midst of the fighting. (SEE the February 28, 2023 greatcharlie post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”.

On top of that, a succession of commanders failed to meet Lincoln’s expectations during the war. He could insist upon regular consultations on their battle plans, but he could not control what they actually did on the battlefield. He could only remove them. or allow them to resign, but he could not repair the damage they had done to the Union effort, or do anything about the wastage of Union Army soldiers. Very briefly, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, having previously functioned as Commander of the Army and Department of Northeastern Virginia from May 27, 1861 to July 25, 1861, served as a general in the Army of the Potomac until after the Second Battle of Bull Run when he was relieved of command at his own request on September 6, 1862. Major General George “Little Mac” McClellan was appointed Commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, and later, the Army of the Potomac (July 26, 1861 to November 9, 1862). In 1862, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign unraveled after the Seven Days Battles, and he also failed to decisively defeat the forces of General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Frustrated by McClellan’s cautious tactics, Lincoln removed him from command. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside served as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from November 9, 1862 to January 26, 1863. Following his infamous “Mud March”.and the senseless slaughter of his troops during the Union Army’s defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Joseph Hooker served as Commander of the Army and Department of the Potomac from January 26, 1863 to June 28, 1863. Concerned about Hooker were first raised when reports were made that his headquarters doubled as a combination of bar and brothel. Hooker’s timid command performance and grave defects as a commander–he lost mental control of his command in battle–were exposed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Ostensibly recognizing “faults” in his behavior and performance and reportedly sensing the distrust of Lincoln and Union Army General in Chief Major General Henry Halleck, Hooker resigned his command on June 28, 1863, on the eve of battle. Major General George Meade jumped in as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from June 28, 1863 to June 28, 1865. Meade repulsed the forces of the General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg from July 1, 1863 to July 3, 1863 with tactical adroitness; however, he was castigated by some for failing to hotly pursue the remainder of Lee’s forces. He instead allowed them to escape from his immediate reach. Lincoln in duress penned a letter to Meade dated July 14, 1863, relieving him of his command but never sent it. Success was not assured at Gettysburg, but Meade had apparently failed to keep any preconceived follow through firmly in mind in the event of victory.. Although Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, his independence of action was sharply curtailed after March 9, 1864, when General Ulysses S. Grant took control of Union  forces from Halleck and was named Commanding General of the US Army. 

Despite keeping a close eye on them to the point that he nearly micromanaged the war, Lincoln could only possess marginal control over the actions of his most senior commanders. He surely had even less of a chance to control the actions of subordinates well beneath them in the chain of command on the battlefield. A law such as theLieber Code could at best signal intent. In the end, what was done was done. If unlawful or unethical acts were witnessed, they could at best be reported and adjudicated within the system of military justice, or if egregious enough, reviewed in Congressional hearings. 

Painting of the representatives of 12 countries at the conference held in the Alabama room at Geneva’s Hotel de Ville August 22, 1864 where they adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” (above). The International Committee of the Red Cross while recognising that it is “primarily the duty and responsibility of a nation to safeguard the health and physical well-being of its own people,” knew there would always, especially in times of war, be a “need for voluntary agencies to supplement . . . the official agencies charged with these responsibilities in every country.” To ensure that its mission was widely accepted, it required a body of rules to govern its own activities and those of the involved belligerent parties. A year later, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the US Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. A total of twenty-six delegates from 16 countries came to Geneva. The meeting was presided over by Swiss General Guillaume Henri Dufour. The conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.” Representatives of 12 countries signed the convention at that time.

IV. Under the Geneva Convention Military Commanders Are Responsible for What Happens in Field

To the extent the political authorities cannot control events in the field, commanders take on greater responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Under Geneva Convention I , Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129; Geneva Convention  IV, Article 146; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 28; and, Geneva Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87, it is clear that commanders shalll be held criminally responsible under the law if they knew or should have known that subordinates were going to violate the law by committing a war crime, yet failed to take steps to prevent it. Further, commanders would be held liable for failing to punish or report subordinates who have already committed a war crime. To that extent, commanders are viewed as being in control of their troops and being responsible for all that transpires within their commands at all times. That rationale gains support in the following way. When the commander develops a plan of action, necessary is the requirement to assess all factors relevant at the time, such as ground and enemy forces, your own forces, logistics, courses open. (In greatcharlie’s day, it was referred to as the METT+T analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available. Yes, greatcharlie’s editor is that old!) Once the plan is decided, the commander issues orders to subordinates. The next aspect of control is the direction of the engagement, during which it is expected that the commander will take into account the law of armed conflict. 

V. Likely Big Lesson Learned by Putin Concerning Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 

Having learned a very painful lesson with his conventional forces during the special military operation, Putin will ensure that he fully controls the “crown jewels” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: the nuclear triad. That effort to establish that control has been mostly revealed with each public move he has made with regard to the supply, continual redeployments, and drilling of those forces. With regard to to those who command the nuclear forces, as explained in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: What Comes Next for Putin at Home and in Ukraine?: An Assessment One Year After the Start of His Special Military Operation”, just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, literally Strategic Purpose Rocketry Troops) which control land-based ICBMs, the strategic bombers and other nuclear capable airframes of the Voenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force), and satellites of the Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony (Russian Aerospace Defense Forces) without a shadow of doubt would go into action. In addition, commanders of the strategic submarines of the Voyenno-morskoy Flot (Russian Naval Force) in both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would execute their missions. Indeed, commanders who are in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise. Surely, there are more than enough members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces hurting over the nightmare that has befallen their comrades in Ukraine. They more than likely want to dish out some “payback” against those countries that they likely perceive–based on what they surely have been told–created circumstances there, and many can deliver payback in the extreme.

At the Battle of Camarón, an important episode of the Second French Intervention in Mexico (December 8, 1861 to June 27, 1867), the 3rd company of 62 Legionnaires and three Legion officers, led by Captain Jean Danjou was sent to reinforce a French military convoy, transporting 3 million francs in gold bullion, siege guns, and sixty wagons of ammunition. Information was received that the convoy would be ambushed. Before Danjou could reach the convoy, the led elements of a force of 3,000 Mexican Army infantry and cavalry made contact with his unit and he was forced to make a defensive stand at the Hacienda Cameron, in Camarón de Tejeda, Veracruz, Mexico. At the point when he recognized that victory would be absolutely impossible to achieve against the larger Mexican force massed around their defenses, Danjou urged his soldiers to take an oath to fight to the death rather than surrender. He made them swear their fealty on his wooden hand. Danjou then shared his bottle of wine and encouraged his men with has been called  “those noble words that warm one’s heart and makes the final sacrifice less difficult to face.”  When the French Foreign Legion moved to France, Capitain Danjou’s wooden hand was taken to Aubagne, where it remains in the Legion Museum of Memory.  The hand is the most cherished artifact in Legion history.  April 30th is celebrated as “Camerone Day,” an important day for the Legionnaires, when the wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is brought out for display. In 1892, a monument commemorating the battle was erected on the battlefield containing a plaque with the following inscription in French: Ils furent ici moins de soixante / Opposés a toute une armée / Sa masse les écrasa / La vie plutôt que le courage / Abandonna ces soldats Français / Le 30 Avril 1863 / A leur mémoire la patrie éleva ce monument. (Here there were less than sixty opposed to a whole army. Its numbers crushed them. Life rather than courage abandoned these French soldiers on April 30, 1863.  In their memory, the fatherland has erected this monument”) The railing from the Legion grave at Camarone can now be found at the village of Puyloubier near Aix-en-Provence. (The importance of the Battle of Camarón with regard to the history and culture of the French Foreign Legion is discussed in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations.”

Although perhaps willing to accept that Putin is the quintessential “bad actor”, it appears almost impossible for many to believe Putin could decide for the Russian people that as a country the Russian Federation would accept a similar fate, mutantis mutandis, rather accept what he ostensibly would perceive and envision as the nightmare of life under the thumb of Western powers and the near certain invasion of their country in the near future. Indeed, observers might try to consider a scenario in which Putin after observing the Russian Federation Armed Forces lose one decisive battle after another in rapid succession and all had unraveled in Ukraine, would make a nationwide broadcast one evening explaining to the Russian people that the Russian Federation was about to be invaded by the proxy forces of the Western powers, that the special military operation, meant as a pre-emptive action has lifted the curtain on the true nature of the Western powers’ objectives and operations in Ukraine and based on all that has been revealed concerning the actions of the Western powers and the astronomical support of the offensive military activities of their partner in Kyiv, despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin for them not to continue their aggressive activities in the Russian Federation’s near abroad, a state of total war existed between the Russian Federation and the US, its NATO allies, and the EU. He would tell the Russian people that their support, prayers, and courage were needed as his government took its next steps. Putin would likely display sangfroid and equanimity, and speak with the tone of a leader in complete command of a situation.(Readers might cast their minds back to Nazi German Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ February 18, 1943 address at the Berlin Sportpalast following the Wehrmacht’s epic loss at Stalingrad to the Soviet Army, in which he zealously implored the German people to commit anew to an all-out war effort: Totaler Krieg–Kürzester Krieg! (Total War–Shortest War!) From the point of that hypothetical broadcast, it would most likely just be a matter of time before the worst possibility would materialize.

It is greatcharlie’s contention, without pretense, some absurd desire to establish some greater sense of importance, or a ridiculous effort to claim of greater sapience, that Western diplomats would do well to reflect on this assessment and consider how responding to what they might deem as Putin’s misperceptions to open the door to great possibilities.)

The Russian Federation’s Sarmat Intercontinental ballistic missile (above) is a 115 feet (35-meters) tall and has a range of 11,185 miles (18,000km)(). Some estimate this to be higher. It can carry at least 10 multiple targetable re-entry vehicles – each with a nuclear warhead – which can each be aimed at a different target. It can also deliver hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles that can travel further and faster, flying in a variable path to overcome missile defenses. Just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad and supporting organizations would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise.

VI. The Arrest Warrant for Putin

In Paragraph 6 of  the First Oration of his Catalonia Orations, Marcus Tulius Cicero, an excoriation of rival senator Lucius Sergius Catiline, who he alleged sought to overthrow the Roman Senate, he writes: Quamdiu quisquam erit, qui te defendere audea, vives, et vives ita, ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firms praesidiis obsessed, ne commovere te contra rem publicam possis. Multorum te etiam oculi et aures non sentience, sicut adhuc fecerunt, speculabuntur atque custodient. (As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live, but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to.stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall perceive them.) Doubtlessly, with the necessary adjustments, surely this is the fate many in Western governments hope will befall Putin and he would be left in such a depleted state. However, greatcharlie suggests the satisfaction that they seek will unlikely manifest and the cost of any attempt to get their hands on Putin would be far worse than steep. Such attempts to create such a circumstance would inflame Putin’s ardor to a degree one could only reasonably expect the worst.

On March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant of arrest for Putin in the context of the situation in Ukraine. (Indicted along with Putin on that day was Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation since 2021.) As Russian Federation President, Putin has been declared allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” The Pre-Trial Chamber II also stated that “the crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory at least from February 24, 2022.” The Pre-Trial Chamber II further explained that it has reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility “(i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” The alleged war crime as outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber II is horrendous. At the nub of the matter is the issue of Putin’s level of control over the actions of all Russian Federation elements in Ukraine.

So often it has been the case with Putin’s presidency, legal action in response to his behavior on the world stage may have been warranted, but not necessarily required given the context of situations. Prioritizing the furtherance of international peace and security, the leader of Russian Federation with an enormous nuclear arsenal under his control, and members of his coterie, were hit with tongue lashings, finger-wagging, and sanctions. National governments, regional organizations, and international organizations would level economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and national legislatures would pass punishing business and financial laws designed to stifle the ability of the Russian Federation business community, particularly the country’s elite, to maintain and generate within advanced industrialized systems. The Magnitsky Law passed in the US created a considerable degree of pain and aggravation for Putin. Other than that, and a few other other coercive measures, Putin was repeatedly extended a degree of latitude. Putin was surely smart enough to recognize that. (One might posit that he flaunted that latitude allowed to him in the faces of Western powers by invading Ukraine.) In an environment in the West in which political leaders, especially among NATO and EU countries were being hounded over not doing enough to support Ukraine and not enough to decouple and lash out against Putin, the choice of the US-led international community became to exercise legal power over the Russian Federation President. Urging the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, though significant, was seemingly rather trivial in comparison with the greater task of assisting Ukraine in defeating the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, it helped set a path toward what may be a future of even more trying diplomatic efforts with Putin, which to great extent–unless the international community makes another choice, the unthinkable choice of granting Putin whatever he wishes–has put the outcome somewhat out of its rational hands.)

A. Putin Still Minimized as an “Oppositional Adolescent” by the West?

As touched upon in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post, it is difficult to see exactly what end was hoped for when the decision was made to indict Putin. There was likely some ego stroke scored as a result of sticking it to Putin, but not much more was accomplished than that. (How horrifying and disappointing it would be to discover the intent was to goad Putin to react adversely and make mistakes. If such is even remotely accurate, perhaps those who hypothetically were impelled by that thought might not have considered a big mistake Putin might have immediately made–and could still make–could have been to start a nuclear war. “Wishful thinking” is not a form of optimism, it is a euphemistic term for denial.)

Whether it was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

Maybe it would have been far more reasonable and practical to demand Putin confess irresponsibility over leading his country into war with so many criminally minded senior officials and military men unaware that he would not have genuine control of those who would eventually perpetrate heinous acts in Ukraine under orders from unstable authorities far beneath those in the Senate Building at the Kremlin as well as some sort of diabolical control from Hell. The chance of Putin cooperating in either case would doubtlessly be the same: zero! One might wonder what would be the plan of the International Criminal Court to successfully and safely take him into custody. 

Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, an arrest warrant can be issued publicly or under seal when the arrest of the person appears necessary to ensure a person’s appearance at trial. Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, the court may request the cooperation in the arrest and surrender from any State on the territory of which the person may be found. The court has no internal enforcement mechanism which would allow it to arrest persons subject to arrest warrants. In the interest of promoting good interstate relations, diplomacy, and peace and security and simply in the planetary interest, under such trying circumstances, discretion in taking such actions–at least refraining from declaring as criminal a party essential to establishing peace–would be the best choice, the better part of valor. Putin’s accountability and culpability for war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian Federation forces was something which could have been dealt with later. The priority now is ending the war if possible.

B. Actualities Concerning Intelligence and Making Claims against Putin

With regard to providing evidence of Putin’s crimes, one would need to be dismissive of the fact that the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation have sophisticated capabilities. One cannot say for certain what would happen if the Kremlin produced its own classified information confirming Putin plainly stated he would brook no behavior by Russian Federation forces in the field of the kind for which he is accused of having some responsibility. Hypothetically, the Kremlin might be able to produce transcripts of communications between errant commanders demonstrating their deliberate effort to conceal their actions from superiors, making false any suggestion that Putin controlled or ordered their illegal actions. To that extent, it might be proven with a sea of declassified official internal documents by the Kremlin that generally Putin did not impose too much on his commanders and within reason, relied on their reports and advice on the special military operation. Of course, one could expect it to possess a profusion of redactions to give them that ultra official feel and if any documents are authentic, to hide any nitty-gritty. With such evidence at hand, the Kremlin would surely insist it has no need to respond to baseless accusations about the Russian Federation President. 

One could unlikely insist as part of any fair and balanced legal process that Russian Federation classified intelligence is of less veracity and should be distrusted outrightly. Turning to the intelligence of one country–for instance the US, the United Kingdom, or Germany–that can provide information collected through electronic eavesdropping externally on the internal communications of the armed forces and security organizations of another country–for example the Russian Federation–with the aim to refute and discredit said monitored country’s own intelligence on what was being discussed among its military and security officials, would be something better than an act of bias and stand the idea of objective justice on its head. The International Criminal Court is supposed to be an objective tool for the world. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness but having stated the former, it believes that such a chauvinistic step and in the end finding Putin “unhesitatingly and with utter conviction” guilty, perhaps even in absentia, rationally imaginable given how predisposed so many that serve in regional and international bodies are to think unfavorably about him. The thinking of the court is certainly not to be judged by greatcharlie. It is only outlining what it perceives as a likely possibility. (This statement is not intended as apophasis.) If one might take into account anything about Putin’s arrest warrant written here could even remotely have some influence, it would at best be as a cautionary assessment for Western foreign and national security bureaucracies to consider before pursuing the arrest warrant matter any further.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) at the Kremlin on March 8, 2023. Whether the action was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice among powers of great influence in the West, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

VII. Energetic Diplomacy: The Best Chance of Stemming Catastrophe

In the aftermath of everything, historians would likely be forced to choose whether there really was something so peculiar about Putin that makes energetic efforts at diplomacy at this stage so taxing. It may actually be the case that the fault for ineffective diplomatic efforts with lies with the foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders of the many countries that had to deal with him. Perchance it was the fault of both parties for failing to see a true middle ground in things satisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless, it is greatcharlie’s conviction that at the present the West is in grave danger. The source of that danger in the Russian Federation. Ending the Ukraine War on favorable or acceptable terms for all parties is of the utmost importance. However, the priority is to ease the world back from an apparent slow spiral to armageddon.

In its March 30th post, greatcharlie suggested that at this point, diplomacy with the Russian Federation on Ukraine has figuratively been knocked off the rails. True, indicting Putin was a step that practically ensured his refusal to negotiate with Kyiv unless he had attained some considerable advantage in Ukraine and his negotiating position would be very strong. However, rather than draw a line there as in March and succumb to despair, here greatcharlie pulls back from the statement that the opportunity for diplomacy has been lost. 

A  Having the Right Answers

Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand, given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made. Putin shall not countenance what he may perceive as a diminution of the great dignity of the Russian Federation. 

Although all countries with an immediate stake in the Ukraine matter should be made aware of the diplomatic effort to achieve an entente with Putin, the new contact may need to be performed discreetly. Perhaps this is best that can be done at this juncture. Hope can be the only thing that comforts people in misery. For Russian people, who are the ones who will decide whether there is a need for change in the direction their country has been moving, hope for that change could be founded through contact between their president and the outside world. Paradoxically, while Putin may indeed enhance his standing among many as they will see the Russian Federation still acting as an important player on the world stage, many others may perceive such diplomacy as proof that the Russian people are viewed as far more than just potential targets for retaliatory nuclear strikes from the the US, the United Kingdom, and France, and written off as nothing to signify. It is suggested by greatcharlie in an opaque way that such a diplomatic effort could even mean far more to the right number of them. In public discussions of the new diplomacy, Western diplomats would do well to emphasize the effort has been undertaken with consideration of the well-being of the Russian people and make other statements of that nature.

There are for certain countless pitfalls that could disrupt or even destroy a new, robust diplomatic effort. What may be most important for Western capitals to recognize are the right answers that will bring a negotiated settlement and peace. There is also the issue of time available. Again, Putin has a large say in how things will turn out and surely has his own timeliness for action. To that extent, until some acceptable path to peace is found, perhaps the greatest danger will remain a decision already made by him to act in some ghastly way.

B. In the Meantime, Will the West Lose Control of Its Junior Partner in Kyiv?

The indications and implications of multiple reporting, to include the Washington Post, of alleged swift action by US foreign and national security policy officials to halt a plan by Ukraine to launch mass strikes against Moscow may be that at least the White House is aware of just how close the world in to a potential nuclear war, it does not want that, and that it now has the extra burden of monitoring the behavior of its “junior partners” in Kyiv. It is uncertain whether the Ukrainian leadership was led to take such a course as result of a lack of wisdom and experience or a complete absorption in self-interest or both. However, if newsmedia stories of this episode are accurate, it would appear that they were blind as beetles to the possibility that their planned assault could have triggered a catastrophic response from the Kremlin to the great detriment of Ukraine, but the whole wide world

If Putin already has a mind and the will to take the most drastic step possible against the West, Kyiv in planning an attack on Moscow could have supplied him with a reason better than anything he could have conjured up. The world moves closer and closer to the edge of the precipice with every errant move as this. It is wonder if there were any other planned Ukrainian actions halted by Western powers that would have brought the world the worst. One wonders how long can this balancing act without a safety net go on without catastrophe.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, (left) and U.S President Joe Biden (right) shake hands during their meeting at the Villa la Grange in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made.

The Way Forward

Putin watched his predecessors mismanage,  breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating not even a simulacrum of what came before it, despite his best efforts, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down “the wide-world and its fading sweets.” It is a wonder Putin has not gone mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him since the special military operation began and even beforehand. Standing on the precipice of losing everything, it would be best for the wide world if Putin can continue to retain his balance. The clear choice for him is either to continue forward or abandon at great personal loss, the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022, and triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West, begun during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Putin has mourned its collapse with considerable grief and disappointment.

Among those who use wisdom and logic, imagination can have value in an investigation. Imagination is a quality many lack, but many also lack wisdom and logic. Often it is the case that a lack of maturity inhibits one ability to reason matters out correctly. Just having an answer, right or wrong, based on some chain of thinking is enough for some. Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is in reality nothing so mysterious about Putin that should lead any national leader to throw the possibility of acceptable relations with the Russian Federation out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Putin’s worst critics will destroy any opportunity for a fruitful course to develop. As noted by greatcharlie here ad nauseum, those leaders must consider what their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation mean not only with regard to Ukraine, but in the bigger picture. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover possibilities for getting many things done by just doing things a bit differently. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the Russian Federation and become civilization’s dénouement. positive changes on one issue can often result in great benefits on another. Respice finem (Have regard for the end.)

Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion: Does Shoigu’s Involvement Assure Success for Putin?

Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (above) has the task of reinforcing his country’s western flank against NATO. Successful actions in Ukraine and Syria, along with other achievements, have earned Shoigu the reputation as Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s “Do It” man. Creating three new divisions and other measures will likely achieve what is intended: obviate NATO’s recent steps in its east and further shift the status quo between Russian Federation and NATO forces in Russia’s favor.

According to a May 4, 2016 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion along Its Eastern Flank,” Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced at a April 27, 2016 ministry meeting presented on state television: “The Defense Ministry is taking a series of measures to counter the expansion of NATO forces in direct proximity to the Russian border.” A central aspect of those measures is the creation of three new divisions—about 30,000 troops. Shoigu said the cause for the force increase was to counter NATO plans to boost its troop presence along its eastern flank with Russia, to include sending four battalions—about 4,000 troops—to Poland and the Baltic States. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg explained at a news conference in Mons, Belgium that the intent of NATO’s planned troop build-up was defensive. He called the planned deployment a response to an assertive Russia that has shown the will to change borders with force as in Ukraine in 2014.

Beyond the debate over causality for the relative build-ups, it is more important for NATO to know that Shoigu has been given the task of reinforcing Russia’s western flank. Successful actions in Ukraine and Syria, along with other achievements, have earned Shoigu the reputation as Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s “Do It” man. Bean counting forces may be enough for some to make assessments on the relative strengths and weaknesses of Russian Federation and NATO forces. However, any assay of likely outcomes of Russia’s effort to form three new divisions west would be flawed if it did not give higher meaning to Shoigu’s direct involvement. Shoigu will likely achieve what is intended: obviate NATO’s recent steps in its east and shift the dynamic between Russian Federation and NATO forces in Russia’s favor. A look at Shoigu’s background explains why the “Shoigu factor” makes that a real possibility.

Political Ties That Bind Shoigu and Putin: In Brief

With an engineering degree from Krasnoyarsk Polytechnical Institute in 1977, Shoigu joined the Russian government in 1990. He participated in several successful construction projects. His success caught the attention of the Communist Party leadership in 1990. He was placed on the Architecture Committee, but then assumed the leadership of the Russian Rescuers Corps, a new corps of rescue workers. Emergencies in Russia include droughts, forest fires, Islamic militant bombings, and hostage dramas. The Russian Rescue Corps was formed by a directive decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in the aftermath of the 1988 Armenian earthquake and the Chernobyl disaster. However, these big developments in Shoigu’s career as a rescue worker coincided with the momentous collapse of the Soviet Union.

During the collapse, Shoigu became a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin. When things settled a bit, he continued performing his duties in the Russian Rescuers Corps. It was re-established as the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations, known EMERCOM internationally, responding to crises in the Soviet Union. Russia and the “near abroad,” to include mediating conflicts in South Ossetia, Chechnya, and in nearby Tajikistan. In 1994, the State Committee became part of the Russian Federation government as the Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations). Yeltsin, the Russian Federation President, made Shoigu its minister. In 1994, he made Shoigu a major general in the Russian Federation Army and a member of Russia’s Security Council. In the 1990s, Shoigu wanted to focus on his duties in the Russian Rescuers Corps, re-established as the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations (known as EMERCOM internationally). Yet, during Soviet Union’s collapse, Shoigu became a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin. He later aided Yeltsin during an attempted coup d’etat in 1991, came to the rescue of Yeltsin in the constitutional crisis in 1993, and was part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996. He was made leader of the pro-Yeltsin Unity Bloc in 1999.

Despite Shoigu’s desire to make emergency work his focus after the tumultuous events of 1990, those events became a starting point from which he was drawn further into national politics. Shoigu rushed to Yeltsin’s aid during an attempted coup d’etat in 1991. Shoigu also came to the rescue of Yeltsin in the constitutional crisis in 1993. Shoigu was part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996. By 1999, Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia, and his supporters were shifting to the opposition. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party, with a new face, loyal to him: Unity. Shoigu, then Minister of Emergency Situations, was named the leader of the pro-president party. He was partnered with Alexander Karelin. Shoigu by then was seen as someone “who saves people” more than a politician. Karelin, a triple Olympic gold wrestling champion, was politically connected but also a symbol of Russian strength. Unity was promoted as a party of common sense, not political but honest and strong using that strength to help people in misfortune. Elements of Unity’s economic policy were akin to Thatcherism. It included, for example, the promotion of low inflation, the small state and free markets via tight control of the money supply, and privatization. That said, Unity also supported the reliance on powerful police and security structures and media control. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency. While he spoke of Shoigu as “our greatest star,” he chose Putin.

Yeltsin first saw promise in Putin when he selected him on July 25, 1998 to serve as head of the Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Federal Security Service) or FSB.   At the time, Putin was an unemployed deputy-mayor from St. Petersburg. He served at the FSB until August 9, 1999, when Yeltsin called him to the post of acting prime minister. Late that same month, there was a bomb blast in a luxury shopping mall by Red Square which was the first in a series of blast resulting in casualties. In September 1999, there were apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, in Dagestan, and Volgodonsk, in Rostov. They collectively killed 300 Russian civilians and wounded hundreds more that were reportedly the responsibility of Chechen Islamic militants. Putin acted forcefully against the mall bombing, the apartment immolations, and a bold Islamic militant incursion from Dagestan into Chechnya, led by Shamil Basayev. The first of 100,000 troops were sent to the northern Caucasus within weeks. In a famous September 24, 1999 speech, Putin spoke with determination in explaining his approach to defeating terrorism: “We will pursue the terrorist everywhere. If they are in an airport, then, in an airport, and forgive me, if we catch them in the toilet, then we will waste them in the outhouse . . . The issue has been resolved once and for all.” Putin marked his rise in power by acting viciously against terror. Shoigu’s Unity Party then served as the instrument for Putin’s rise to the presidency. The Unity Party eventually entered into an alliance with the Fatherland-All Russia political bloc. The Party later morphed into United Russia, the country’s current ruling party that rubber stamps Putin’s initiatives in the Duma. By 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party loyal to him: Unity Bloc. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency. While he spoke of Shoigu as “our greatest star,” he chose Vladimir Putin.

Mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo. (My conscience means more to me than all speech.)  Although he was Unity’s leader, Shoigu had no presidential aspirations. Given the tempestuous environment in Russia politically, economically, socially, and militarily at the time, it made sense. Putin was far better equipped to control, manipulate, and strong arm, seemingly endless groupings of political adversaries during that time of many sinful capers. Indeed, Putin was particularly well-equipped to deal with the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the far right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party of Russia, men who better understood the lash than words of peace. Perhaps to signal the acceptance of his role, Shoigu gave Putin a black Labrador retriever, “Koni.” After ceding power to Putin, Shoigu gave even more. He became the model upon which Putin’s image as the new leader of Russia was formed. Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Kremlin adviser, told The Economist that the administration deliberately crafted Putin’s image in part on Shoigu’s: “Putin was supposed to be a rescuer, too.”

Putin was lornful over the Soviet Union’s collapse. As his presidency grew out of its infancy, Putin was determined to save Russia from further disintegration, and frustrate those he perceived as enemies aiming to weaken it. He would not be satisfied until Russia’s global power and influence was restored and the independent states of the former Soviet Union were brought back under Moscow’s political, economic, and military (security) influence. Putin believed that the greatest danger to Russia came from the West. He saw Western governments as being driven to weaken Russia, create disorder, and make their country dependent of Western technologies. He felt then and now that under former President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian leadership made the mistake of believing Russia no longer had any enemies. Often Putin would publicly lament about the collapse of the Soviet Union, under Western pressure, calling it the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th Century. Russia’s economic collapse, in the view of many Russians, was worsened by the destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts. They believe Western suggestions on ways Russia should conduct its affairs domestically and internationally only served to cripple their country. Experts in the West spoke lightheartedly of Russia as a dying super power, lacking the wherewithal to do anything serious politically, economically, socially, or militarily. In The Guardian at the time, Russia was referred to as “an immature, fledgling democracy which in eight years has gone from one party politics to no-party politics, from communism to fantasy.” Yet, in the hallowed eyes of a so-called dying Russia, life was spying in the form of Putin and like-minded officials. Putin restored order after the internal chaos of the 1990s, becoming the face of the government. Once the heady events surrounding the Soviet Union’s collapse subsided, Shoigu focused on advancing the Ministry of Emergency Situations to achieve all possibilities. For nearly 22 years, Shoigu was present at all major and many minor disasters in Russia. His strong, almost stoic comportment at events, along with his precise, short orders and comments to the newsmedia, radiated a sense of confidence that Russians appreciated. He skillfully navigated Russia’s bureaucracy, accruing power, popularity without making real enemies.

While Putin advanced Russia’s interests his own way, both at home and globally, Shoigu made the most of his own capabilities and effectively advanced the Ministry of Emergency Situations to achieve all possibilities. His ministry became a service with many responsibilities. For nearly 22 years, Shoigu was present at all major and many minor disasters in Russia, standing stoically, with barely a muscle moving in his face. His comportment at events, along with his precise, short orders and comments to the newsmedia, radiated a sense of confidence that Russians appreciated. By skillfully navigating Russia’s Byzantine bureaucracy, he has accrued power and popularity without making any genuine enemies. Even former notables such as Boris Berezovsky appear to have respected Shoigu. Evgeny Minchenko, an analyst who studies the Russian elite, told The Economist: “There’s no one else like him in the ruling class.” He added, “It’s an absolutely unprecedented story. By the 2000s, the Ministry of Emergency Situations grew into a 350,000 strong operation with its own special forces.” Omnia mea mecum porto. (All that is mine I carry with me [My wisdom is my greatest wealth].)

Shoigu As Adviser To Putin

Putin’s management style was likely shaped by his short term in politics in St. Petersburg as the protégé of Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. Putin became his deputy in 1994.   However, his style was surely most influenced during his initial career as an officer from 1975 to 1991 in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. With a strong, self-assured, authoritative, no nonsense personality, most advisers’ interactions with him have varied. They may occasionally antagonize the overworked leader even with important or urgent situation reports. Shoigu, however, who was never in the KGB or along with Putin in St. Petersburg, has been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand his leader’s thinking and feelings. Every word Putin has said, his reactions to statements, have informed Shoigu’s understanding of him. Every inflexion, tone, and change in Putin’s voice has provided Shoigu with some insight into what his president was sensing. Added to this is Shoigu’s humble, self-effacing persona and intellectual acuity. It should not be implied from this that Shoigu has not interacted with an “inclement” Putin. After facing Putin’s “larger” voice, he likely tries to salvage whatever may be constructive from such encounters. Surely at times, Shoigu may have his own strong feelings about situations. Nevertheless, as Carl Von Clausewitz, the 19th century Prussian military thinker perhaps would have explained, the ability to maintain his balance in spite of them is a reflection of Shoigu’s strength of character. Some may view Shoigu’s behavior as a manipulation. However, Putin has remained in power by confounding insincerity, and he does not suffer fools lightly. Having observed him closely, Putin obviously feels Shoigu well-serves his needs. Et monere at moneri proprium est verae amitcitiae. (It is a characteristic of friendship to give advice and to receive it.) During significant crises, it is very important for Putin, as much as any other national leader, to have an adviser who fully understands his needs. The encouragement of another, a paraclete, may prove comforting. When Putin and Shoigu talk, Putin perhaps feels free to “clear the air” with him over issues Russia is facing.

Critics at home and abroad whose obloquy should have distracted, disrupted, or diverted Putin, have mainly served as sandpaper to refine his positions. Since his initial rise to power, Putin has become skilled in implementing what critics have called “charm offensives,” explaining his ideas and actions in a manner that is easy, comfortable, assuring, and logical. Sometimes, however, such moves are not enough. Indeed, during significant crises, it is very important for Putin, as much as any other national leader, to have an adviser who fully understands his needs. The encouragement of another, a paraclete, may prove comforting. When Putin and Shoigu talk, Putin perhaps feels free to “clear the air” with him over issues Russia is facing. Of course, Putin would rather tell Shoigu what is to be feared than what he fears for always he is Putin. Shoigu has never used Putin’s confidence in him and strength of his position among advisers to become a haustyrann. Rather, Shoigu also has been able to understand the mood and reactions of Putin’s other capable cabinet members and policy advisers in certain situations, to ensure real cooperation and effective action. It likely accounts, in part, for Shoigu’s refulgence among them.

Shoigu, Tuva, and Paranoia

Shoigu, born on May 21, 1955, was raised in the town of Chadan in southern Siberia, near the Altai Mountains, in a little known Republic of Tuva. His mother was ethnic Russian and his father was ethnic Tuvan. He had a liking for sports, backyard brawls, and risky stunts, such as hopping the ice flows across the powerful Yenisei River. Such high jinks earned him the nickname Shaitan (Satan). Tuvans are among the ancient peoples living in Central Asia. The cultural roots of ancient Tuvans, Uigars, and Kyrgyzians form the basis of Tuvan culture. The traditional religions of Tuvans are Buddhism and shamanism. It is regarding shamanism that for some Russians discord obtains. Shamanism is a practice shrouded in darkness, in which mystery is emphasized and obscurantism is cultivated; as a result, it stirs up fear. Shoigu’s rearing in Tuva at best would only circumstantially suggest, against actual facts, that he might adhere to shamanism.

On May 9, 2015, during celebrations of the 70th Anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, Russian television cameras fixed on a black convertible carrying Shoigu into Red Square. Shoigu, in full-dress uniform, crossed himself as he passed beneath one of the Kremlin towers. The highly unusual gesture was seemingly designed to allay any questions about the half-Tuvan, half-Russian’s Christianity. Before that, in 2008, during an interview on the Ekho Moskvy radio station, Shoigu stated that he was baptized in the Orthodox faith at the age of 5. Questions over Shoigu’s faith are perhaps the only thing the very popular defense minister must countenance. Shoigu has never done anything to cause concern.  It is not a wish of greatcharlie.com to ignite a debate on concerns a modest few Russians might have on Shoigu’s faith. Delving deeper into the matter may appear as engaging a bit of apophasis (for one to say one will not say what one is going to say). However, Shoigu is a central figure in Russian politics. Ignoring this aspect of his background would weaken the discussion about him here.

An assortment of beliefs and practices claiming the ability to travel from the secular to the “spirit world” for the purpose of spiritual contacts is covered by the term shamanism. Those contacts can also supposedly be achieved through channeling and the use of spirits coming in the form of animals. It is further claimed that practitioners can take on those shapes themselves. Shamanism requires the use of the archaic techniques of ecstasy, developed independent of any religious philosophy. Ecstasy is a prophetic exaltation or rapture characteristic of shamanism and visionary states. Those states can be naturally induced with entheogenic plants and herbal concoctions. They can be artificially induced by breath control, fasting, meditation, drumming, and other shamanic and yogic practices. Entheogens come in many forms but most commonly from plants known as psychoactive drugs. The use of hallucinogenic plants and herbal concoctions can result for example in visions of demons, distant persons, landscapes, or detailed enactments of recent unsolved crimes. Shamanistic medicinal practices include the application of various ancient witchcraft techniques. Those treated with such can be drawn into deeper, darker occult practices. They can also open a door to evil spirit possession and other forms of occult bondage. Its rituals and methods can lead to intense physical pain and afflictions, temporary insanity, emotional depression, and powerful spiritual torment. How Shoigu’s alleged adherence to shamanism might tie into his role in government or as Putin’s adviser is uncertain.

Putin knows that there are those Russians who will do such things as react superstitiously toward Shoigu. He has vacationed in Tuva with Shoigu many times since. Putin would like Russians to replace any unfounded superstitions about Shoigu and Tuva with authentic truths and worthier ideas.

Putin knows that there are those Russians who will do such things as react superstitiously toward Shoigu. However, Putin has not been dismissive of the problem. He has taken on issues surrounding Shoigu’s Tuvan roots with some guile. Putin went on a fishing trip to Tuva with Shoigu and Prince Albert II of Monaco in 2007. He has vacationed in Tuva with Shoigu many times since. Putin would like Russians to replace any unfounded superstitions about Shoigu and Tuva with authentic truths and worthier ideas. Putin wants all Russian citizens to be part of their country’s rise to greatness. Divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion and origin hinder that.

Much as the orator, poet, and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero, concluded about his Ancient Rome, Putin similarly believes loyalty to the Russian Federation must take precedence over any other collectivity: social, cultural, political, or otherwise. As noted by Clifford Ando in Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (University of California Press, 2013) in the hierarchy of allegiances outlined by Cicero, “loyalty toward Rome occupied a superordinate position: her laws and her culture provided the normative fabric that would, to borrow a phrase of Rutilius Namatianus [Poet, Imperial Rome, 5th Century], ‘create from distinct and separate nations a single fatherland’.” Likewise, Russia’s laws and culture provide the normative fabric from which a united country is created from diverse peoples. Possession of citizenship should be the basis to cause individuals to identify with the concerns of others in widely disparate populations among Russia’s republics. Putin wants Russians to be in a “Russian state of mind,” a mental state created when diversity, creativity, and optimism coalesce. A citizen’s attitude, perspective, outlook, approach, mood, disposition, and mindset should stand positively Russian.

Shoigu As Defense Minister: The Shoigu Factor

Appointed on February 15, 2007, former Russian Federation Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov launched a much needed reform effort to make the Russian Federation Armed Forces more effective. However, Serdyukov ran afoul of the defense industry and senior military commanders with failed procurement programs, efforts to import foreign weapons systems as the France’s Mistral aircraft carrier, and purges and unit reorganizations. In addition, there were a series of highly publicized corruption scandals in the ministry. On November 6, 2012, Putin tore Shoigu away from a very short stint as the elected Governor of Moscow Oblast that began on April 5, 2012 and put the armed forces in his hands.

Evidence of the “Shoigu factor” became apparent as soon as Shoigu started the job. While essentially preserving Serdyukov’s reforms, and harnessing expenditures, Shoigu improved military readiness. He created a new corps, the Airspace Forces. He created eight new operational task forces, twenty-five divisions, and fifteen new brigades. He improved the control system of the armed forces by creating the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation. Shoigu ordered soldiers to wear socks instead of cloth foot-wraps (portyaniki). He had Army commanders increase snap inspections and military exercises. Long-range Airspace Force bomber flights and Navy combat patrols steadily increased.  Morale in the armed forces picked-up as a result of these measures and others. Upon becoming Defense Minister, Shoigu improved the control system of the armed forces by creating the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation. Within the ranks, Shoigu ordered Army troops to wear socks instead of cloth foot-wraps (portyaniki). He had Army commanders increase snap inspections and military exercises. Long-range Air Force bomber flights and Navy combat patrols steadily increased. These and other measures enhanced military readiness and rejuvenated morale in the armed forces.

Quemad moeum gladis nemeinum occidit, occidentis telum est. (A sword is never the killer, it is a tool in a killer’s hands.) The views of Putin and Shoigu on “the threat” the West poses to Russia are in sync. Shoigu told the TASS news agency in October 2015, “Russia’s sovereignty, which is secured by its army and navy, will always be the obstacle against which during the 1,152 years of Russia’s existence many Western rulers have broken their teeth.” Russia’s strategy toward NATO is based on the premise its’ intent is hostile. Aerial and naval probes into NATO’s defense zones have wreaked havoc on the sense of security of some Member States. In Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russia has been able to boldly and effectively project power. In Syria, Russia Federation Armed Forces have used new weapons systems, including: the sea-based Kalibr 3M-14 cruise missile, launched from surface ships and submarines from as far as 1500 kilometers away from their targets; the air launched KH-101 cruise missile; and, the Sukhoi Su-34 strike fighter. On December 19, 2015, Putin stated: “We see how efficiently our pilots and intelligence agents coordinate their efforts with various kinds of forces—the army, navy, and aviation; how they use the most modern weapons.” Putin continued, “I want to stress that these are by far not all of our capabilities,” adding, “We have more military means. And, we will use them—if need be.” Other military means Shoigu is working on include: greater use of military spetznaz (special service troops) to train allies and support their combat operations, the RS-28 Sarmat Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the RS-26 ICBM, and the PAK-FA T-50. The spetsnaz unit of the Russian Airborne Troops and the Special Brigade of the Serbian Army (above) engage in a joint exercise in Serbia. Putin has discussed their presence in Ukraine. Spetznaz can provide a spectrum of military capabilities to include: advising Russian allies, providing airborne and special operations training, and directly supporting combat operations. Their capabilities have been displayed in Syria. Spetznaz have also provided training to Russian Federation allies in its near abroad.

Spetznaz can advise Russian allies through special operations training and during combat by assisting in the location and designation of targets for air strikes, and engage in direct action by locating, capturing or killing specific leaders and other specific personnel, destroying military facilities leaders and conducting raids and ambushes, and destroying military facilities, and infrastructure, as well as protecting Russian and allied facilities, assisting in providing medical services, and coordinating the distribution of equipment to allies. Their capabilities have been displayed in Syria. Putin has referred to their presence in Ukraine. Spetznaz have also provided training to allies of the near abroad as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia and as far west as Serbia. The RS-28 “Sarmat” is the newest heavy liquid-propelled ICBM under development for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2018, the Sarmat will replace older Soviet R-36M (SS-18) missiles dubbed “Satan” by NATO, as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear forces. The Sarmat’s twelve heavy thermonuclear warheads will be infividually stearable during reentry.

The Russian Federation deploys an estimated 307 ICBMs which can carry approximately 1040 warheads. They represent only 40 percent of the country’s total arsenal of thermonuclear warheads. The RS-28 Sarmat is the newest heavy liquid-propelled ICBM under development for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2018, the Sarmat will replace older Soviet R-36M (SS-18) missiles, dubbed “Satan” by NATO, as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear forces. The Sarmat will use the same silos as the Satan, but modified for its specifications. The silos would also be equipped with additional active anti-missile systems that would protect them from a pre-emptive strike. The Sarmat will have a dozen heavy thermonuclear warheads, each individually steerable during reentry. Those warheads are said to have advanced anti-missile countermeasures meant to beat the US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Shield. It is speculated that they would have a conventional variant similar to the US Advanced Hypersonic Weapon and could be used as a precision intercontinental weapon in a non-nuclear conflict.

Referred to as a “doomsday weapon”, the new road-mobile RS-26 ICBM (above) has a potential range of 11,000 kilometers. It can continuously change trajectory, and is far more accurate than current ballistic missiles. It’s four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are supersonic and carry 300 kiloton warheads.

The RS-26 is a new road-mobile ICBM. It has a potential range of 11,000 kilometers. Its booster stage is down to under five minutes giving NATO little time to register its launch. Far more accurate than current ballistic missiles, the RS-26 travels along a continuously changing trajectory. Its four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) of the RS-26 carry 300 kiloton thermonuclear warheads and are supersonic. Once fired, they can continuously change course. In Russia, the RS-26 has been referred to as a “doomsday weapon”. Prior to 2010, no mobile Russian Federation ICBMs carried MIRVs. The Russian ICBM force is significantly smaller than the US force of 400 ICBMs. Yet, Russian military planners seek to compensate for this by ensuring all of their ICBMs carry MIRVs by 2020. The PAK-FA T-50 stealth fighter appears quite capable and is a big upgrade for the Russian Federation Airspace Force. The first production models of the stealth fighter will purportedly be put into service in 2016.

The PAK-FA T-50 stealth fighter appears quite capable and viewed in many Western defense circles a big upgrade for the Russian Federation Airspace Force. The first production models of the stealth fighter will purportedly be put into service in 2016. In addition to its stealth capability, PAK-FA will hold 12 types of missiles, some of which will be hypersonic and designed to fit into the fighter’s bays in order not to interfere with its stealth characteristics. It reportedly has the advantage of sensor data fusion along with very advanced avionics.The essence of the “Shoigu factor” is that once he is given a military mission, he never fails. Shoigu will surely have three new Russian Federation Army divisions set up before Putin meets the new US President. As power plays, rivalries and intrigues in the Kremlin are speculated upon in the West with enthusiasm, and as more pursue the practice dubbed “Putinology”, at the Kremlin, officials carefully watch the West and act, and on their faces, there are no smiles.

The Way Forward

In November 2013, a year after he took the helm of the Ministry of Defense, the state-run pollster VTsIOM conducted a survey on the attitudes of Russians toward Shoigu. At the time, 46 percent said that they respected him, 35 percent said that they trusted him, and 15 percent said that they sympathized with him. The poll was conducted among 1600 people with the margin of error not exceeding 3.4 percent. In fact, according to polls by the Independent Levada Center, for the last three years, Russians have named Shoigu “Person of the Year” behind only Putin. Last month, Shoigu took second place behind Putin in a rating of Russian officials and politicians in which respondents were asked to choose several names from a list as the most trustworthy leaders. Shoigu was chosen by 26 percent of respondents, ahead of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was named by 21 percent. Putin was chosen by 60 percent of respondents. Polls were conducted among 1600 respondents with a margin of error not exceeding 3.4 percent.

Commentary on Shoigu in the Western media tends to include speculation over a nonexistent ambition to ascend to the pinnacle of power in Russia. Some journalists and pundits in the Western newsmedia seem to be projecting their own sensibilities upon Shoigu. Such stories are more entertaining than newsworthy. Shoigu is real, not some amusement. Despite his political capital and support from the Russian public, he has consistently stayed away from politics. He has never forgotten that he serves the Russian Federation and his president. The big story about Shoigu is that once given a military mission, he never fails. That is the essence of the “Shoigu factor.” He will surely have three new Russian Federation Army divisions set up before Putin meets the new US President. There is a popular misconception that Putin, Shoigu, and other Kremlin officials are “asking” for the West’s respect. On the contrary, they believe the West “needs” to respect Russia. As power plays, rivalries and intrigues in the Kremlin are speculated upon in the West with enthusiasm, and as more pursue the practice dubbed “Putinology,” at the Kremlin, officials carefully watch the West and act, and on their faces, there are no smiles.

Russia Is Ousted From Group of 8 by US and Allies: Things Aren’t Improving on Ukraine, But Maybe General Dempsey Can Change That

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, is cast in the same mold of a long line of senior military leaders who have effectively advised US presidents in time of crisis.

According to a March 24, 2014, New York Times article entitled “Russia Is Ousted from Group of 8 by US and Allies,” US President Barack Obama and other leaders of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies cast Russia out of their organization to punish Russian President Vladimir Putin for his annexation of Crimea.  The leaders also threatened tougher sanctions against Russian interests if Putin escalates aggression against Ukraine.   When asked to discuss such efforts to compel a change in course by Russia, Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have literally shrugged their shoulders.  Other Russian officials have scoffed and mocked such measures with great bluster.  Where possible, Putin has taken parallel actions against US and other Western interests in Russia. 

Though it seems Putin may be content with his military achievements so far, US officials, policy experts, journalists, as well as pundits outside of the policy making process, insist upon ratcheting up the situation, publicly declaring that an even greater threat exists from Putin.  Indeed, they pessimistically imagine Putin engaging in further aggression, ostensibly attempting to also annex territories of various former Soviet republics in which ethnic-Russian populations dominate, using the pretext of self-determination with those groups.  In doing so, they perhaps unwittingly have suggested Putin’s actions may mirror former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s efforts to grab ethnic-Serbian held territory in break-away Yugoslav republics to form a “Greater Serbia.”

Putin is astute enough to realize Crimea may be more than enough for Russia to handle.  As former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recently commented at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event, “We’re going to see if Crimea becomes a small bone in Putin’s throat.”  In that vein, the US and its Western partners will have their hands full, too, trying to build Ukraine up economically, politically, socially, and militarily. Russian media reports remain rife with suspicions and accusations of US involvement in the collapse of the regime in Kiev that was friendly to Moscow.  They emphasize to the Russian people that their country has an upper hand in the situation.  One news anchor in Moscow reminded Russian viewers that “Russia is still the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S.A. into radioactive ash.”

On the positive side, meetings between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who have regularly worked together on other urgent and important issues for both countries, have already begun.  Every effective channel reportedly has been opened by the US to express a message to Russians of US concerns about Ukraine.  However, there seems to be a notion held by Putin and Russian officials in their heightened state of alert that any efforts to find common ground with the US would amount to appeasement.  Expressions of US positions have been interpreted as US demands, eliciting a reflex response by Moscow not only to reject those positions, but any proposals drawn from them.  Communications are now somewhat mangled.  All important telephone conversations between Obama and Putin have been reduced to bristling confrontations between the two.  By all accounts, the conversations very likely would have been a finger-wagging sessions between Putin and Obama if they had taken place face to face.  The situation remains tense and dangerous.

Thinking outside of the box, handling the Russians, even with very apparent political and diplomatic aspects of the problem, might be facilitated with more input from a member of the US national security team who had recent success in negotiating with senior Russian military officials on critical defense matters.  That individual is US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey.  In addition to knowing what the most concerning Russian military capabilities and possibilities for action might be, his professional military experience, depth of knowledge, understanding of history, insights and worldliness, make him someone Obama perhaps could rely on more heavily for advice on the Ukrainian crisis.  Indeed, as a senior military officer he may possesses the capability of being effective in advising Obama in such crises in a way perhaps not possible for other presidential advisers at the moment.

Dempsey was recommended for the job of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Gates had already nominated Dempsey to be the Army Chief of Staff. In his recent book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (Knopf, 2014), Gates explains that Dempsey had commanded forces in Iraq and command in Iraq or Afghanistan was a quality he wanted in the next chairman.  Gates also thought Dempsey had also performed superbly as the deputy commander and acting commander of the US Central Command.  When notifying Dempsey of his decision to nominate him as chairman, Gates explained to Dempsey that he was well-equipped to face the challenges of the budget, to lead the chiefs as a team, to maintain cohesion, and to help a new secretary of defense manage the relationship between the military services and the president.  Obama has clearly been very satisfied with Dempsey, selecting him twice as chairman.

Dempsey has dealt with a challenging agenda since assuming his present post.  Most relevant in the Ukraine crisis has been Dempsey’s part of the process of ensuring sustained positive US-Russian relations.  Dempsey recently demonstrated his ability to manage line of communication and promote constructive conversations with the Russians when he met with General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on January 21, 2014, in Brussels.  In that long-scheduled meeting, Dempsey displayed solid judgment and diplomatic acumen to advance an agenda for bilateral military relations.  The two generals produced a workable agreement that detailed 67 activities on which the armed forces of the US and Russia would continue to cooperate, despite pre-existing political and diplomatic problems and new concerns that arose over security assistance at the Sochi Olympic Games.  Indeed, the meeting came amidst a blitz of criticism leveled against Putin and organizers of the Games by US officials.  Those criticisms served to create the impression worldwide that the Games in Sochi were not safe to visit. The comments were almost perfectly designed to evoke the worst reaction possible from the Russians. 

Upon seeing Gerasimov, Dempsey likely noted he was a tough general, but not totally devoid of charm. As recounted through press reports of the Moscow Times, RT, RIA Novosti, Interfax, and other Russian press offices and of the American Forces Press Service (AFPS), Reuters, and the New York Times, Dempsey sought cooperation from Gerasimov through encouraging him to consider their unique situation as commanders of the most powerful military forces in the world.  Both were well aware of the esoteric, advanced, and frightening technologies that could be brought to bear in war and the need to maintain peace and stability in their nations’ relations and throughout the world.  Cooperation was the best way to achieve that end.  Dempsey was quoted as saying, “I think we have an opportunity to advance the relationship on areas of common interest.” Issues such as the US missile defense system, vehemently opposed by Moscow, were discussed.  However, Dempsey noted to Gerasimov’s apparent appreciation that Russia was a vital partner to NATO providing supply lines for its mission in Afghanistan, agreeing to allow the movement of nonlethal material to and from the war zone through Russian territory.  That rail and road network is becoming increasingly important as protests in Pakistan choke efforts to use the more convenient supply lines there.  Dempsey reassured Gerasimov about US and NATO efforts to ensure stability in Afghanistan after the departure of the International Security Assistance Force at the end of 2014.  Gerasimov asked for regular updates on the US and NATO effort to train, advise, and equip Afghan National Security Forces, as well as Afghanistan’s ability to maintain and control transportation lines in and out of the country. In an AFPS interview, Dempsey was quoted as stating: “We agree that a stable Afghanistan that is not a sanctuary for terrorism is in our common interests.”

By the end of the meeting, Gerasimov was comfortable enough to endorse “regular contacts” between their militaries as “quite useful.”  Pointing to the less than congenial political and diplomatic relations between the US and Russia, Dempsey said it was important for the militaries “not to foreclose on conversations, even if at some points there are disagreements that prevent the forward movement” in other parts of the relationship whether political or diplomatic.  There could be no better time to consider using of that effective line of communication than now.

At the same meeting, to ensure a safe and secure Olympics, Dempsey made a nearly open-ended offer to Gerasimov to provide “full assistance” from the US military, echoing an offer made to Putin by phone that same week.  Gerasimov’s reaction of expressing a need for anti-IED technology was plausible to the extent that Islamic militants could have used roadside bombs against Russian government or civilian vehicle at the Games.  However, Russian Islamic militants were viewed as more likely to carry out a martyrdom operation (suicide attack) than plant a roadside bomb and detonate it at a distance.  If Gerasimov hoped to exploit US concerns and generosity, that all stopped with Dempsey.  He understood the implications of just giving it away, nonetheless, Dempsey remained quite respectful of the Russians’ request.  He understood that it was after all the job of the Russian security services to seek advantages over potential adversaries, and the effort to exploit the thinking among US political officials should have been expected.  There was a guarantee that Dempsey despite Gerasimov’s push for US technology would be guided foremost by his duty to defend the US.  Abiding by that, Dempsey seemingly, instinctively stood his ground against Russian appeals “in the interest of improving military cooperation and communication” while truly seeking to further military ties likely more earnestly than his Russian counterpart.

Dempsey’s insight on working with military elements of the Russian government could help his president through this crisis.  Dempsey may very likely be able to demonstrate that there is a way to deal with Russians even under current conditions.  He may be able to bring Russia to the diplomatic table, despite the very militaristic and aggressive mindset in which Russian leaders are currently steeped.  In a pinch, he may very-well act as a brake on any possible runaway breakdown in US-Russian communications. 

However, to be most effective in providing perspective and military advice from the chiefs for Obama on Ukraine, Dempsey would need to heed lessons from his experience with Obama on Syria in August 2013.  From that experience, Dempsey likely foresaw difficulties advisers would have in getting Obama to rapidly come to terms with any plans or proposals offered on Ukraine.  Providing a range of military option to effectively achieve objectives based on the president’s concepts, would be not be sufficient enough with Obama.  On Syria, Dempsey was initially tasked with providing advice and viable options for calibrated military strikes in response to Obama’s expressed goal of deterring and degrading Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons. In his Rose Garden statement, Obama took comfort in Dempsey’s advice, stating confidently: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has informed me that we are prepared to strike whenever we choose.  Moreover, the Chairman has indicated to me that our capacity to execute this mission is not time-sensitive; it will be effective tomorrow, or next week, or one month from now.”  Yet, Obama was actually driven to resolve the crisis not by military action, but in a manner that would allow his worldview—that problems can be solved at the diplomatic table using reason and logic—to win through.  Unable to quickly find that handle to the situation, uncertainty and indecisiveness ultimately prevailed.  Obama was apparently paralyzed by fears of a bitter scenario that would have the US and the region embroiled in a larger conflict as a result of such action.  That was coupled by his concerns over the legal ramifications and international implications of military action against Assad regime.  Not knowing how best to respond, Obama strayed from a path of assertive and decisive action which most likely would have achieved all military goals and had a strong educational effect on Assad.  After making very shrill accusations that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had crossed his red-line by using chemical weapons, Obama made the now world renown decision not to take military action.  Obama settled for a deal Russia proposed and negotiated with the US to eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile.

Seeing how wrenching and difficult the decision making process on Syria was for his president, Dempsey surely understands that to ensure advice to Obama on Ukraine would be effective, the advice of the chiefs on military aspects of the situation would need to go in tandem with helping Obama remain strong and of good courage in the face of daunting circumstances.  Fears of greater problems stimulate the imagination, can lead to a pessimistic outlook on the future, and often cause a leader to deviate from a path.  Remaining confident a resolute when a crisis is brewing is made more difficult in a dispute such as the one between the US and Russia on Ukraine, when party seems determined to maintain an environment unfavorble for communication.  Dempsey’s advice in that respect would need to be direct and personal.  An example of how Dempsey might proceed would be to first put matters in perspective by discussing Ukraine from the context of the military stalemate that has existed between the US and Russia during and since the Cold War based in part on first-hand experience as a US Army officer.  Following that, Dempsey could assist Obama in understanding the calculated risks and possible outcomes of a variety of diplomatic and military initiatives with Russia given assessments made both in the past and present to make the situation more controllable for his president.  Consideration of what is possible to do and what will likely be faced would also facilitate reaching decisions on options to help bring Putin and Russian officials to a point where negotiation on the issues might be possible.  That is the advice Obama apparently wants foremost.  Along the way, Dempsey could continually assure Obama that he has the full support of the military chiefs.  He could assist Obama in mulling over possible courses of action to ensure a sharpening of his perception and clarity of direction.

Boiled down, Dempsey’s role would be that of mentor or coach for Obama, who apparently is still trying to understand how to manage US military capabilities, leveraging US strength through diplomacy and engaging in decision making on the use of force to deter and defeat opponents.  Putin and Russian officials may discern “tweaks” in Obama administration’s message and communications prompted by Dempsey, and respond favorably to a request to negotiate.

The Way Forward

The US and its European partners have met to discuss and level sanctions and other economic actions against Russian interests in retribution to the Crimea-grab and to deter Russian efforts to further destabilize a weak Ukraine.  However, Putin has executed plans to annex Crimea and a return to the status quo ante will not occur.  For Obama’s advisers, finding ways to bring Russia to the diplomatic table, given the confrontational attitude of Putin and Russian leaders, has been challenging.  However, resolving the Ukraine crisis may more importantly require bringing Obama to see and understand that it requires a certain agility to develop solutions for coping with opponents whose thinking is different from his own.  “Might doesn’t make right,” an utterance recently heard from Obama, is not best philosophy to which one might subscribe when dealing with real aggression.  This is particularly true for the US which predicates its ability to engage effectively in diplomacy worldwide on its capability to enforce its policies and protect its interests with considerable military power.

Advisers such as Susan Rice, Antony Blinken, Wendy Sherman, and Samantha Power, in addition to well-experience officials as Joe Biden, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel, and John Brennan, certainly have a great deal to offer to Obama.  Yet, results show that they, most likely for various important reasons, have been unable able to reach Obama over the Ukraine crisis in a manner that has allowed him to appear truly in control of the situation.  There is a certain “human element” to advising leaders in time of crisis. In recent history, a line of remarkable senior military officers have very effectively served their presidents in a manner described here. Included among them are: Maxwell Taylor, Brent Scowcroft, Stansfield Turner, Alexander Haig, Colin Powell, and James Jones.  Dempsey was recommended as chairman based on his military experience.  That same military experience made him “expert” in encouraging, advising, and coaching fellow commanders in difficult circumstances.  Dempsey’s counsel would truly help his president in dealing with Putin and the Russians beyond the battlefield or even the diplomatic table.  Hopefully, Obama will somehow come to understand the benefits that would come from more fully utilizing Dempsey, and seek “greater” counsel from him soon.

Russia Calls on US Military Tech to Counter Roadside Bombs at Olympics; An Act of Vigilance or Effort to Exploit? Go Figure?

Russian President Vladimir Putin sits near Sochi with good company, Russian Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, and good tea.  Russians expect to host and enjoy the Olympic Games, violence free.  Fear mongering has been left to foreign critics.

In a February 3, 2014 USA Today article entitled, “Russian FSB Has Poor Record against Terrorists,” journalist Masha Charnay discusses the view expressed by many US security experts that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which has the lead role in security for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, has a poor track record in Russia’s fight against home-grown terrorists.  For those who have dealt with the FSB, the notion that it could be considered ineffective in its security efforts would be debatable.  However, in the article, Charnay cites sources such as a study by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the University of Maryland, which asserts the frequency of terrorist attacks in Russia has been steadily increasing over the past two decades.  The National Consortium study also explains that most of the attacks have happened in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia federal republics, all of which have a significant presence of Islamic militants and are in the same region as Sochi.  The article’s author also spoke to Andrew Kuchins, the director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.  Kuchins was quoted as saying about the Islamic militants, “They’re Muslim jihadists, taking a page from Al-Qaeda.”   Kuchins’ comment, however, veils the reality that attacks from Islamic militants in Russia have been suicide attacks.  An attacker who is determined to self-destruct in an effort to destroy others is perhaps the most difficult to defend against.  Albeit, any individual within a society determined for whatever reason to commit suicide is very likely to succeed, unless you have prior knowledge of the attempt and the act can be pre-empted.  Proactively, security services might economically deploy personnel to prevent certain sites from being used for such purposes, particullarly by terrrosts, but unless the resources exist, no security force can truly be everywhere at once.

The reports and theories of US experts on the capability of the Russian security services to protect Sochi from terrorism cited in the USA Today article added to the voices of US officials who have been highly critical of security measures taken by the Russians for the Olympic Games and the level of cooperation from Russian security service officials with their counterparts from US security organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Diplomatic Security Service.  That criticism intensified one month before the Games after two December terrorist bombings occurred in Volgograd, 690 km northeast of Sochi, that killed 34 civilians and injured many others, and after Russian authorities made it known that they aware of credible threats posed to the Games by Islamic militants, including the presence of “black widow” suicide bombers in the vicinity of Sochi.

For their part, the Russians have displayed great patience in the face of nearly endless criticisms leveled against the Games’ organizers.  Russian President Vladimir Putin and other authorities have confidence in the preparations made and capabilities of their security services to keep Sochi safe and secure.  As scheduled, Putin made his final review of preparations for Sochi by the first week of January.  It occurred just as the blitz of criticism from US officials began, very effectively creating concerns worldwide that the Games in Sochi were not safe to visit.  From the Russians’ perspective, everything that could be done had been done.  It seemed unlikely that the Russians would react to any events or criticism to the extent that it would divert them from their planned approach to the Games.  US officials and experts appeared to have incited the Russians, not to change their plans for Sochi, but on security matters beyond the Games.  By accepting the US offer for help, the Russians placed themselves in a position to potentially acquire the benefits of billions of dollars of US defense research in a secret weapons system and enhance Russia’s military capabilities without any expenditure of their own financial resources.  Those financial resources have been made more limited in Russia now as a result of its huge investment in the Games.  In response to the US offer to help, the Russians requested anti-improvised explosive device (IED) technology.  However it was not made to US political officials, who might have rushed to provide the system to the Russians perhaps to prove a point or out of political expedience.  The request was made to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who dealt effectively with the matter.

The US Offer of “Full Assistance” to Russia

According to a January 21, 2014 Moscow Times article, the Russian request for anti-IED technology came on January 21, 2014, when the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, met in Brussels with his Russian counterpart, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov.  During their meeting, in the name of supporting Russian efforts to create a safe and secure Olympics, Dempsey made a nearly open-ended offer to Gerasimov to provide “full assistance” from the US military.  It is difficult to know whether there was some discussion that Dempsey would make this generous offer to help during any advance meetings between US and Russian military officials before the meeting of their chiefs.  If that was the case, all of the security services in Russia most likely would have come together to discuss what exactly should be requested from the US in response to its offer.  When the “green light” was given to respond favorably to the US offer, it most likely initiated a type of feeding frenzy among them.  Undoubtedly, FSB as well as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the Main Intelligence Directorate from the armed forces (GRU), and even the Ministry of the Interior likely had intelligence requirements (specific information) that they were determined to collect from the US.    

Some requests considered by the Russian security services may have been as simple as asking the US to cover the costs for the deployment of greater numbers of Russian security men in and around Sochi.  The Russians could have asked the US to provide all of the data the US has compiled on the activities of Islamic militants operating at home and abroad that the Russians may not possess.  Questionable requests may have been considered, such as obtaining the latest surveillance and encryption deciphering technology from the National Security Agency that would prevent Islamic militants from planning beyond the Russian authorities’ ability to monitor them and to increase the Russian security service capability to monitor workers and visitors in and around Sochi to better defend against attack.  Unreasonable requests might have included obtaining the names and locations of US intelligence officers and their Russian agents.  By providing that information, the Russian security services presumably would have released security officers from counter-intelligence activities against the US and allow them to be redeployed for protective security and intelligence gathering duties in Sochi.  However, that request, as absurd as it may seem, would likely have been be off-putting enough to the US officials that it would have dissuaded them from continuing to offer assistance or offer to cooperate with the Russians on Sochi.

The Response to Gerasimov’s Request

The eventual request for anti-IED technology was plausible to the extent that Islamic militants could have used roadside bombs against Russian government or civilian vehicle at the Games.  The funny thing is that Russian Islamic militants are more likely to carry out a martyrdom operation (suicide attack) than plant a roadside bomb and detonate it by remote control or cellphone.  (It could very well be that Islamic militants from outside Russia who might use IEDs are considered a threat to the Games.)  If the request was an attempt to exploit US concerns and generosity, that all stopped with Dempsey.  Dempsey was unfazed by Gerasimov’s request, and by his actions proved he has great situational awareness not only on the battlefield but also during diplomatic talks.  He knows very well that it took considerable effort and expense to the US military to develop and acquire the anti-IED technology to protect troops on patrol in Iraq and Afghanistan.  He fully understands the implications of just giving it away.  However, Dempsey was respectful of the Russians’ request.  He understood that it was after all the job of the Russian security services to seek advantages over potential adversaries, and an effort by the Russians to exploit the thinking among US political officials was predictable.  Regarding the entreaty for anti-IED technology by the Russians, Dempsey told the Armed Forces Press Service , “We would favorably consider requests from them.”  However, he also pointed out the likelihood of compatibility problems between US anti-IED technology and Russian equipment, something it seems the Russian security services or Gerasimov did not fully appreciate. 

 US anti-IED technology, according to a January 21, 2014 New York Times article, was designed to detect and disrupt cellphone or radio signals used by militants to detonate improvised explosives from a distance.  However, it also could muddle electronic signals, creating a situation where competing and overlapping systems cancelled out the effectiveness of other systems in use at the same time and in the same area.  As Dempsey explained, “If you are not careful, you can actually degrade capability, not enhance it.”  For that reason, Dempsey insisted on having US and Russian technical experts make certain that the US systems could be integrated into the communications networks and security systems being set in place by Russia.

After mitigating its negative connotations, Dempsey used the opportunity of the Russian request for anti-IED technology to emphasize the importance of military-to-military contacts between the US and Russia.  He emphasized the value of having the military chiefs even when at some points there are disagreements, whether political or diplomatic, that could prevent the “forward movement” in other parts of the relationship.  (See greatcharlie.com August 17, 2013 post entitled, “Ties Fraying, Obama Drops Putin Meeting; Cui Bono?”

 Assessment

This is greatcharlie.com’s last commentary on the 2014 Winter Olympic Games at Sochi.  Instead of sparking discussion about sports, the name Sochi, itself, has been politicized.  It is associated with criticisms from US officials over the inability of Putin and Russian authorities to meet the standards proffered for security.  However, in the final analysis, the Russians have done whatever possible to pre-empt and stop any violence at the Games.  The repeated proffering of predictions that an attack will occur and the complaints about what has been put in place to halt terrorism smacks more of fear mongering than an expression of concern or support.  Putin has achieved his objective, and Sochi is safe and secure.  A good bet for the Games would be that no attacks will occur and everything will go smoothly.  An even better bet is that after the Closing Ceremony on February 24th, those watching far from Sochi, those visiting the Games, and those athletes who are competing in them will be filled with the spirit of the Olympics, and anxiously awaiting the next Winter Olympic Games in four years.

www