The Death of Prigozhin: Whether Nature’s Course or a Heinous Crime, It Closed a Trying Chapter of Putin’s Presidency (Part 2)

Yevgeny Prigozhin (above). On August 23, 2023, the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin and nine other passengers were killed in a jet crash north of Moscow. The crash came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the  Russian Federation Defense Minister Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. A deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it was certainly not enough to prove he ordered albeit a not-so-unique form of execution. As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. There remains be much to understand regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s life. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

This essay should be considered a continuation of the preceding greatcharlie post.

On August 23, 2023, a private Embraer jet flying to St. Petersburg crashed north of Moscow killing all 10 passengers onboard. Onboard was the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin, two other top Wagner Group officials, to include Dmitry Utkin, Prigozhin’s four bodyguards and a crew of three. The crash garnered international attention as it came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However, a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid what all sides feared would be the further “shedding Russian blood.” The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow.

Assuredly, if Prigozhin’s deadly jet crash was not accidental and ordered by the highest authorities in the Russian Federation government, the decision was most likely multifactorial. Many opinions have offered by analysts and experts on the Russian Federation on how Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin benefitted from the action were also offered. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it is certainly not enough to prove he ordered such a not-so-unique form of execution in authoririan regimes, also occasionally witnessed in democracies. Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non pœna, perire. (Death claims all things. It is law, not punishment, to die.)

The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood,by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. The 2023 North Korea–Russia summit between Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jung-un was held in Moscow on September 23, 2023. Putin in his first foreign visit after the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest visited Kyrgyzstan on October 12, 2023. Putin then visited People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Bejing on October 17, 2023. Each event provided ample opportunity to further assess Putin’s words and behavior to construct a firmer understanding of the man and his decisionmaking. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. After all, Putin and Prigozhin, at least for a time, were true friends. That was somewhat evident in Putin’s initial public comments on the crash. In many respects, for Putin, the deadly episode amounted to a private tragedy within what seemed a public conflict. Many details will likely remain kept from both the public and the newsmedia. Still, from what has been been presented to the public, there remains be much to gain regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s presidency. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

Unless there is additional information so newsworthy concerning Prigozhin that it cannot be dismised or avoided, greatcharlie believes this will be it last entry on the passed-on Wagner Group owner. Still, as has been the case with its previous posts, greatcharlie hopes this essay will stimulate among readers, particularly students, new lines of thought, even kernels of ideas on how US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other governments might proceed concerning the Russian Federation. Certainly, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Though, for greatcharlie, it would be satisfying enough to have this commentary simply stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy. Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus omnibus est vitæ; sed famam extendere factis, hoc virtutis opus. (Each one has his appointed day; short and irreparable is the brief life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the work of virtue.

Putin in a pensive mood (above). Part 1 of this essay, the discussion revolved around the dynamics of Prigozhin’s personal and professional relationships with Putin. When Putin met Prigozhin, he was already a relatively successful businessman, energized by connects created by a school chum Boris Spektor. After Putin became the Russian Federation President, he presented Prigozhin with lucrative business opportunities, chances of a lifetime. Prigozhin broke with those initial business partners and struck on his own, working primary via Concord Management and Consulting services. From a successful businessman, Prigozhin moved into realm of the country’s oligarchs. That was a circumstance not too unusual in Putin’s Russia. Between Putin and loyal associates, unique professional opportunities were developed on the basis of the quality of their personal relationships with him. Breaks between Putin and associates would more often be the result of personal differences that cropped up, unpredicted and unacceptable. Often those former associates completely vanished, quietly from the scene in the Russian Federation. There are those in the West who would insist that Putin nothing more than a black hearted snake, unable to have lasting, enjoyable relationships with associates. Equally, they would likely proffer that all of his relationships have been based on their utility for him. In that vein, there had to be some advantage gained or there would be no reason to know someone. The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, when it began, was hardly based on utility.

Putin’s Personal Relationships Versus Professional Relationships: Some Nuance

In Part 1 of this essay, the discussion revolved around the dynamics of Prigozhin’s personal and professional relationships with Putin. An acute example of individuals in the Russian Federation with solely professional relationships with Putin are the oligarchs. Oligarchs managed over the years to amass great wealth and great power and influence within the country to the extent possible under the oversight and control of Putin. Their support of regime and its policies is explicit. A number of those who have failed to meet Putin’s expectations, even to the extent of ostensibly posing a political threat to his regime, have found themselves arrested on charges such as fraud, tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, and embezzlement. Trials of such individuals have been very public. Putin’s professional relationships with the oligarchs may be useful and at times convenient, but hardly friendly. PUtin’s relationship with Prigozhin was personal. When Putin met Prigozhin, he was already a relatively successful businessman, energized by connects created by a school chum Boris Spektor. After Putin became the Russian Federation President, he presented Prigozhin with lucrative business opportunities, chances of a lifetime. Prigozhin broke with those initial business partners and struck on his own, working primary via Concord Management and Consulting services. From a successful businessman, Prigozhin moved into realm of the country oligarchs. That was a circumstance not too unusual in Putin’s Russia. Between Putin and loyal associates, unique professional opportunities were developed on the basis of the quality of their personal relationships with him. Breaks between Putin and associates would more often be the result of personal differences that cropped up, unpredicted and unacceptable. Often those former associates completely vanished, quietly from the public scene in the Russian Federation.

There are those in the West who would insist that Putin nothing more than a black hearted snake, unable to have lasting, enjoyable relationships with associates. Equally, they would likely proffer that all of his relationships have been based on their utility for him. In that vein, there had to be some advantage gained or there would be no reason to know someone. The idea is essentially slander. The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, when it began, was hardly based on utility. By the accounts from the majority of observers to include the independent newsmedia and independent research groups as well as the opposition political parties in the Russian Federation, their friendship grew from initial social contacts tied to Putin’s visits to Prigozhin’s restaurants. 

Many long-term personal relationships that have also had professional links to Putin tended to be low profile and given relatively scant newsmedia coverage in the country. Some Russian Federation analysts and experts might point out is Putin’s long-term relationship with Sergei Roldugin.

Sergei Roldugin has been friends with Putin since the late 1970s  Since In those days, Roldugin has affectionately referred to Putin with the diminutive “Volodya”, and still does so today. Putin met Roldugin via his older brother, Yevgeny, who attended the KGB training with Putin. Allegedly it was Roldugin who introduced Putin to his wife Lyudmila. Putin chose Roldugin as the godfather of his first daughter, Maria, born in 1985. Roldugin is known to be a celebrated cellist based in St Petersburg, but he has also been labeled a businessman. The label has some meaning to the extent that Roldugin is a key figure in the covert efforts “to hide Putin’s fortune.”

Due to his low-key presence, some believe Roldugin has actiually been excused from serving Putin in some way financially. However, investigative journalists in the Russian Federation estimate that nearly $2 billion have moved through accounts in his name. With direct concern to the music arts, Roldugin was allowed to open and operate a “Musical House” in an opulent 19th-century palace in St. Petersburg which was not a mean financial feat.

There is also Putìn’s ex-wife, Lyudmila Putina, now remarried and named Lyudmila Ocheretnaya (hereinafter referred to as Lyudmila). Putin married Lyudmila on July 28, 1983. At the time, she was a flight attendant for the Kaliningrad branch of Aeroflot. The couple had two daughters, Maria, aforementioned,  born in Leningrad on April 28, 1985 in Leningrad, and Katerina born on August 31, 1986 in Dresden, East Germany. After 30 years of marriage, Putin and wife publicly announced their divorce publicly before the Russian Federation newsmedia at the State Kremlin Palace during the intermission of a performance by the Kremlin Ballet.

In January 2016, Lyudmila was remarried to Artur Ocheretny. Reportedly Ocheretny, health and fitness expert, owns luxury real estate in Europe. Presumably with blessing of her ex-husband and his support Lyudmila has generated millions through the Centre for the Development of Inter-personal Communications (CDIC) which she created and supports. CDIC’s offices are located in the center of Moscow, on Vozdvizhenka Street in the building previously known as Volkonsky House. Rents in the building wich amount to about $3–4 million are paid to the company Meridian, which is in turn owned by a company known as Intererservis. Intererservis is wholly owned by Lyudmila. The chairman of CDIC’s management board is Lyudmila’s second husband Ocheretny.

As with Prigozhin, there were business transactions and opportunities earn income involved in the relationships between both Sergei Roldugin and Lyudmila Ocheretnaya that only the Russian Federation President could create. To that extent, the difference between a personal and a professional relationship with Putin might appear nonexistent for many observers. However, it does exist. When Putin makes the choice to ask a favor, a special task, of a friend, he imaginably makes the assessment that he can expect a degree of trust and dependability of that individual. For the friend entreated to assist the Russian Federation President, nothing more would expected than to follow Putin’s instructions to the letter. Any rewards, meager or of great magnitude would be for Putin to decide. Suffice to say the offer of “assistance” from Putin would require close friends to walk out on thin ice. The last thing the wise amount them would want to do is disappoint Putin even by happenstance. In particular, one would not want to act on any wherewithal provided from Putin’s largess behind the Russian Federation President’s back, so to speak The consequences would certainly been severe. Their involvement with his enterprises is something to fear. Whether a friend of Putin can, through their own actions, expiate for his or her betrayal of Putin’s trust is unknown to greatcharlie. Perhaps that has hardly been the case. Prigozhin may have been the rare exception on couple of occasions, likely over matters unrelated to the Wagner Group. However, that can only be supposed in the abstract. One might consider the apposite Act V, scene 4 of William Shakespeare’s play The Two Gentlemen of Verona (1589-1593) in which Valentine discovers his best friend Proteus attempted, unsuccessfully, to curry the affections of his beloved, Sylvia. In response to the outrageous act by Proteus, the much wounded Valentine states: “I am sorry I must never trust thee more, / But count the world a stranger for thy sake. / The private wound is deepest: O time most accurst, / ‘Mongst all foes that a friend should be the worst!.” Remarkably, despite what was said, the two men reconcile at the end of the play after Proteus repents and Valentine forgives him. However, Putin once betrayed has hardly been forgiving.

Prigozhin failed to meet Putin’s expectations with regard to the Wagner Group and possibly Concord. Prigozhin did not object or seem to worry about accepting opportunities he surely had never foreseen or handled before. Not so quietly, he amassed a great degree of wealth. Many other professional relationships did not blossom to the size of Prigozhin’s multi-billion dollar empire. It was perhaps a measure of his friendship with Putin. However, a not so apparent or expected development at the time was a considerable degree of control and power Prigozhin chose to exercise over assets Putin made available to him. In this way, Prigozhin’s handling of money from Putin was indeed quite different than theirs. Prigozhin became exceptionally hands-on at the Wagner Group. Seemingly lost upon him was the reality was that everything came from Putin. As aforementioned, Putin went to some pains to explain that he was the engine behind the Wagner Group as well as Prigozhin’s lucrative Concord. Without Putin, the Wagner Group would never have existed, at least in the robust form that it did by 2023. As for his presence in the newsmedia, Prigozhin had far exceeded what could have been called high-profile. His role had become disastrous within the Wagner Group and for the Russian Federation government. As admitted in previous posts and in the introduction of this essay, Prigozhin was largely in the right when he complained about the inept handling of combat operations and the astronomical loss of Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine. 

Putin tried to mitigate matters by regaining control of the professional aspects of his relationship with Prigozhin as they concerned the Wagner Group. Particularly after the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin insisted more than once that Wagner Group troops sign an oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation and contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Rather than cooperate, Prigozhin rejected the idea of signing oaths and agreement as he did when it was first broached in early June 2023. He publicly expressed his concern he would lose control of “his” organization to the Defense Ministry and especially his nemesis Shoigu. He did not view resting formal control of the Wagner Group to the government as a shift of control to Putin. The friendship between Putin and Prigozhin had surely gone off the rails. There was much on Putin’s plate at the time, but his troublles with Prigozhin were doubtlessly frustrating, worrisome, and angering.

As noted earlier in Part 1, Prigozhin had lost perspective completely. By the end, he was out of control. He was not “acting”, putting on a show, which very well may have been part of the image he publicly presented during the Wagner Group Rebellion as discussed in greatcharlie’s July 1, 2023 post entitled “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)”. Prigozhin was being his true self.

Respecting Boundaries

Cuiusvis est errare, nullius nisi insipientes, in errore perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.) There are limits, boundaries in relationships which should not crossed. Normally, among the mature, those boundaries do not need to be put forth. Often there are those seemingly drawn to violate those boundaries, consciously despite knowing the consequences. Those individuals are poor choices for friends. There also those who may violate those boundaries of friendship unconsciously. (In civilized societies, advanced countries, a consequence for the violation of such boundaries of friendship should not be death. That would be unacceptable behavior, unreasonable, and typically against established law.) One or the other may have been the case with Prigozhin. Month after month, he trampled so aggressively on the vineyard of friend both he and Putin nutured for more than two decades. Assuredly, he placed himself on dangerous ground with his barage of publicized statements.

There were many close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. A number of theories have been suggested by greatcharlie in previous posts, particularly Part 1 of this essay, for Putin’s apparent patience. At least publicly, Putin is a devout Russian Orthodox Catholic. At the core of Putin’s faith is the injunction to forgive. Perhaps something about Prigozhin and few others sparked Putin to act to some degree within the stricture of his faith with regard to forgiveness. Perhaps, as suggested in Part 1, the cause for his forgiving nature at times has been his sense of humor. Yet with Prigozhin, specifically, he appeared to display a level of tolerance that even then too many friendly observers appeared against his own self-interests. It was clear to anyone observing worldwide that while Prigozhin rambled on about the special military operation in Ukraine beginning in 2022, Putin would only hold him at arms length.

Perhaps Putin recognized that Prigozhin was too gravely wounded by what transpired in Ukraine that it was beyond his capacity to regulate his behavior on the matter. While greatcharlie has no training or expertise in identifying or diagnosing mental health issues, from its layman’s eye, it appears to have been some prominent symptom from a form of  post traumatic stress Prigozhin was suffering that was left untreated. It is possible that Putin understood early on that Prigozhin was not fully aware, or could not comprehend, the trying situation in which he had placed the Russian Federation President. Even greatcharlie would assess without equivocation that Prigozhin went too far. Putin could forgive him no more. He could not save him. It is in this vein the Putin’s comments concerning Prigozhin’s mistakes, made the day after the jet crash, take on additional meaning. A few of those mistakes were discussed in Part 1 of this essay.

Indeed, in Part 1, Putin broke his silence on Prigozhin’s jet crash on August 24, 2023 during a meeting with the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, in the Kremlin. If readers can cast their minds back to Putin’s initial remarks, they may recall that Putin stated: “First of all, I want to express my sincere condolences to the families of all the victims, this is always a tragedy.” Putin went on to say: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He described him as “a talented man, a talented businessman.”

Putin intriguingly then added: “He was a man of difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results needed both for himself and when I asked him about it–for a common cause, as in these last months.” There were indeed many mistakes that Prigozhin made while ostensibly assisting Putin. Prigozhin had required but had not always warranted Putin’s forgiveness many times. Putin had forgiven much. To that extent, such is not so apparent as Putin mentioned that Prigozhin always did what he asked him to do. Often, Putin had to hold him at arms length. The list of disappointments is far lengthier than one might imagine as it concerned the failure to optimally serve Putin’s interests. It went far beyond Prigozhin’s ramblings about Ukraine. A small number are listed here.

Surely, Prigozhin was aware that in the Russian Federation or anywhere else in the world, he may have chosen to go, without the protection of Putin, he would have had little chance of survival against a considerable number of adversaries. Doing anything to lose Putin’s protection would have been tantamount to suicide. (Of course, if any had decided to harm Prigozhin while he was under Putin’s protection, nothing could have done to change what may have had occurred. However, certainly Putin would have used available resources to retaliate aggressively.) Still, despite the great meaning Putin’s protection as well as financial support meant for Prigozhin’s survival, he bizarrely proceeded to denigrate Putin’s special military operation, and consequently, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff, and ministers and senior generals leading those organizations.

Prigozhin’s ego not intellect very likely convinced him that his attacks upon Shoigu and Gerasimov and the special military operation following the Wagner Group Rebellion were well-nuanced, laser focusing attention those matters. They were not well-nuanced. They were in greatcharlie’s humble judgment, insultingly obvious. To that extent, Prigozhin could not fathom the degree to which he dangerously undermined his dear friend and dear leader. To consider the matter in even more simplistic terms,, maybe in his mind, all Prigozhin was doing was something akin to taking his toys and leaving Ukraine. However, to Putin, and in fact in reality, the Wagner Group and all that Prigozhin possessed belong to him. One might imagine that in Putin’s mind, the successful and wealthy Prigozhin, a Russian oligarchs, was his creation, his Frankenstein.

In a way, through his last moves on the grand stage and certainly through many of his previous “mistakes” as Putin described his fumbles on the national and international scene, Prigozhin was actually exercising power over the Russian Federation President. He squeezed dry all that energized the bond of friendship between the two men. As these situations sometimes go–based on word of rare survivors, it is possible that when Prigozhin found himself hurtling to the ground in his catastrophically disabled lear jet–if he survived the alleged grenade blast, he may had an epiphany. He may have finally realized that he had gone too far with his public, dysregulated behavior. Rules are rules. Everyone in the Russian Federation at his level knew them with regard behavior toward Putin’s interests and he broke them He broke the rules repeatedly.

Although not directly paralleling the story-line of the erstwhile relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, pertinent conceptually is the plot of Lohengrin a Romantic opera in three acts composed and written in 1848 by Wilhelm Richard Wagner (May 23, 1813 to February 13, 1883). As mentioned previously in Part 1, Wagner  was a German composer, conductor, and ptolemicist, known mainly for his operas. Lohengrin premiered in Weimar, Germany, on August 28, 1850 at the Staatskapelle Weimar under the direction of Franz Liszt, the father-in-law, close friend and early supporter of Wagner. Wagner himself was unable to attend the first performance, having been exiled because of his part in the 1849 May Uprising in Dresden. The story is derived from the Parzival of Wolfram von Eschenbach, a medieval German romance, and its sequel Lohengrin, inspired by the epic of Garin le Loherain. It is part of the Knight of the Swan legend. Set in Antwerp during the first half of the 10th century, the story’s plot revolves around Elsa, the daughter of King Heinrich of the Brabant dynasty. Briefly, in Act I, Elsa has been accused by the evil Ortrud of murdering her own brother, Gottfried, the heir to the dynasty. Ortrud is the wife of Count Telramund, giving her standing to level such an accusation. However, it is revealed that Gottfried was not killed by Elsa but enchanted by Ortrud. When King Heinrich arrives in Antwerp from a journey, he insists upon an explanation for the difficulties that have beset Brabant. Beweeping her outcast state, Elsa dreams of a knight in shining armor who will rescue her. Called to defend herself, she prays and manifests a knight, who arrives in a boat guided by a swan. The knight, Lohengrin, pledges his loyalty to Elsa on the condition that she never questions his name or origin (“Nie sollst du mich befragen, noch Wissens Sorge tragen, woher ich kam der Fahrt, noch wie mein Nam’ und Art!”). Challenged by Telramund, Lohengrin defeats but does not kill him with his sword. Thereby, Elsa’s innocence is established and Lohengrin becomes her defender. In Act II, the malevolent Ortrud and the shamed and banished Telramund conspire to seek revenge. Ortrud tries to sow seeds of doubt in Elsa’s mind, but Elsa responds with innocence and extends friendship to Ortrud. When Lohengrin is named the guardian of Brabant, Telramund in response quietly marshals noblemen to plot against him. In Act III, Elsa and Lohengrin are being wed, but Ortrud and Telramund arrive at the cathedral entrance, seeking to disrupt the wedding. Ortrud alleges that that Lohengrin is an impostor. Telramund accuses him of sorcery. Elsa remains faithful despite the doubts. Afterward, in their bridal chamber, Elsa and Lohengrin express their love, but Elsa’s growing doubts cause her to inquire about her husband’s origins and identity. Suddenly, Telramund and his co-conspirators break in. In the struggle that ensued, Telramund is killed by Lohengrin. Then, returning to Elsa’s inquiry, Lohengrin reveals that his home is the distant temple of the Holy Grail at Monsalvat (“In fernem Land”), that his father is Parsifal, and his name is Lohengrin. Yet, as a result of what has transpired, Lohengrin must return to his sacred home, abandoning Elsa. With prayers, he returns Elsa’s brother, Gottfried, who was actually the swan that led Lohengrin’s boat to human form, and declares him Duke of Brabant. A dove descends from heaven and, taking the place of Gottfried at the head of Lohengrin’s boat and then departs. Ortrud rejoices over Elsa’s betrayal, but meets her demise, sinking into the lake. While calling for her departed husband, Elsa, as Lohengrin forwarned, collapses lifeless, having violated the conditions of his union with her.

Whatever may have actually transpired, much as the aforementioned Lohengrin of Wagner opera sought to protect Elsa from spiritual death, Putin was unable to protect Prigozhin from his indiscretions, from himself. To describe it in a less graceful way,, Prigozhin became a figurative rogue elephant, stomping through the higher realms of Russian Federation foreign and national security policy, trampling on all of working being done by the Kremlin to get a handle on the Ukraine matter.

Prigozhin at Troyekurovskoye cemetary in St. Petersburg in April 2023 (above). Prigozhin was aware that in the Russian Federation or anywhere else in the world, he may have chosen to go, without the protection of Putin, he would have had little chance of survival against a considerable number of adversaries. Doing anything to lose Putin’s protection would have been tantamount to suicide. (Of course, if any had decided to harm Prigozhin while he was under Putin’s protection, nothing could have done to change what may have had occurred. However, certainly Putin would have used available resources to retaliate aggressively.) Still, despite the great meaning Putin’s protection as well as financial support meant for Prigozhin’s survival, he bizarrely proceeded to denigrate Putin’s special military operation, and consequently, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff, and ministers and senior generals leading those organizations. Prigozhin’s ego not intellect very likely convinced him that his attacks upon Shoigu and Gerasimov and the special military operation following the Wagner Group Rebellion were well-nuanced, laser focusing attention those matters. They were not. They were in greatcharlie’s humble judgment, insultingly obvious. To that extent, Prigozhin could not fathom the degree to which he dangerously undermined his dear friend and dear leader. 

Prigozhin’s Denouement

Erat hiems summa. (It was the very depth of winter.) As aforementioned, on the first occasion Putin spoke of Prigozhin’s jet crash, he stated: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He went on to describe him as a “talented businessman” but added that he had “complicated fate.” To many, those remarks were likely perceived at first glance as a small commentary. They may have been easily overlooked. However, the comments were small much as the small movement of the needle of an old style seismogragh would indicate that a great earthquake was occurring. If Putin had anything to do with Prigozhin’s jet crash, taking such a step would hardly have been something he wanted to do. He unlikely would have done anything harsh against him if he thought that he had some alternative. 

Additionally as aforementioned, Putin sought to quell matters by taking control of the professional aspects of his relationship with Prigozhin as they concerned the Wagner Group. The method devised was to have Wagner Group troops sign an oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation and contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, thereby giving his government reigns over organization and giving Prigozhin nothing to complain about. However, the time had passed for anything such as that with him. Other than that tack, the system in the Russian Federation that he spent 25 years to shape provided no alternatives for Prigozhin’s behavior. There could only be one boss.

Putin, being human, is allowed to feel sadness. However, what is churning in his Iinner-self is hardly stuff for public view and consideration. Surely, Putin has a morbid fear of his enemies at home and abroad getting the chance to peek, to gaze within on him. He would likely assess the possibilities of how they could use observations of such to harm him as limitless. Still, there was the crack in his armor, only for a brief moment is his comments on Prigozhin’s jet crash made on August 24, 2023, that spoke volumes about his long-time connection to his former friend.

Of course, Putin has a need to mask any sense in those he directs, those he through force must control, and perhaps those he holds at bay, that he has weaknesses, that he is human. Such that would typically be recognized as virtue in others, would be a liability,, anathema to him, under his circumstances. To that extent, Putin never appears tortured at all about his circumstances. He has never appeared suffocated by decisions that require aggressive act as most national leaders are not so much effected by such.

It may have been decided among the most powerful in Moscow that if Prigozhin had to be “put down”, it would need to be done in a way that would have a sound educational effect on all others whose loyal, even friendship, toward Putin was uncertain. In a CNBC report dated August 24, 2023, former US Navy Admiral James Stavridis, who served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander from 2009 and 2013, said Prigozhin’s death was a dog whistle to those who dissent from Putin’s absolute rule. He added: “He [Putin] needed to demonstrate who really is running the joint.” Stavridis described the attack as a “public execution.” He went on further to state: “No real surprise here, it’s a marker of how lethal, and how deadly and how unscrupulous Vladimir Putin is.”

The same CNBC report included that statement to MSNBC from Ben Rhodes, a tormer deputy national security adviser in the administration of US President barack Obama, explaining that the attack “was not a mysterious accident.” He continued: “This has all the hallmarks of appearing like a military-style takedown,” Rhodes added that Prigozhin’s fate was eminent following a short-lived mutiny about two months ago.

It would seem that missed by Prigozhin was the possability that he may have been brought back from Moscow by the prearrangement of those who would perform the highly clandestine task of terminating him. As greatcharlie is in the dark regarding the truth of the matter, it supposes in the abstract that Prigozhin was much disturbed by whatever information from Moscow that got him to reportedly rapidly board his private jet to get there. One might presume the subject of the communicate concerned the well-being of the Wagner Group. The matter would likely have been made more grave if it had been the case that he was called to meeting of a very senior political authority. Prigozhin being Prigozhin may have rushed to Moscow to demand a meeting with a senior political authority. So far, no mention has been publicly reported on a meeting set between a very senior political authority and Prigozhin, Whether a meeting was set with a considerably senior political authority or an impromptu was insisted upon by Prigozhin would not have been important in this case. Important would have been getting Prigozhin back to his country. Whatever communication was sent to him in Africa managed to get that ball rolling. Patria est ubicumque est bene. (The homeland is where there is good.) Á peine dans ce cas.

One might imagine that those individuals performing the hypothetical heinous task may have been aware through a flight plan or calculations that Prigozhin would leave Moscow in the direction toward St. Petersburg  Yet, in the end, as alluded to earlier, how the murderous task may have been carried out is not important. The ones who ordered the act and, to an extent, those physically committed the act, and why it was done is of greater significance. As of the time of this writing, it seems unlikely that any urgency or any effort at all is being placed into finding answers on those points is underway in the Russian Federation or in Western capitals. 

Mostly lost in the discussion of Prigozhin’s jet crash was the loss of Dmitry Utkin. In the nascent years of the Wagner Group, he was the face of the organization. The military acumen of the decorated former Spetsnaz officer that served to shape the Wagner Group into a formidable force. Utkin, who seldom spoke publicly and offered no notable opinions about the special military operation in Ukraine or the Russian Federation Defense Ministry–at least nothing negative, nonetheless suffered the same fate of Prigozhin. It may have been a case of guilt by association in the truest sense of the term.

Putin, hand on head, taking a moment to think matters through (above). Behind the scenes in the higher realms of politics and power in the Russian Federation there very well could be individuals actually conspiring against not only Prigozhin but Putin in some silent, convoluted way to to seek revenge. There may have been an effort to sow seeds of doubt in Putin’s mind about Prigozhin,  in response to which for the lonest time possible he reject believeing in Prigozhin’s innocence and went a bit further by extends friendship to him after the Wagner Group Rebellion. The somewhat obvious suggestion might be that Shoigu desperate to rid himself of the annoying Prigozhin, slowly but surely wore away at Putin’s trust in him. This idea was initially hinted at in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1).

 Cui Bono?: Flights of Fancy?

As in Act II of the aforementioned Lohengrin, behind the scenes in the higher realms of politics and power in the Russian Federation, mutatis mutandis, there very well could be individuals much as Ortrud and Telramund who were actually conspiring against not only Prigozhin but Putin in some silent, convoluted way to to seek revenge. There may have been an effort to sow seeds of doubt in Putin’s mind about Prigozhin,  in response to which for the lonest time possible he reject believeing in Prigozhin’s innocence and went a bit further by extends friendship to him after the Wagner Group Rebellion. The somewhat obvious suggestion might be that Shoigu desperate to rid himself of the annoying Prigozhin, slowly but surely wore away at Putin’s trust in him. This idea was hinted at in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)”

In national capitals, Shoigu has been known for his equanimity and sangfroid. He has been described in most accounts by analyst, experts, and newsmedia commentators internally and externally as a discreet and reliable confidant of Putin to the extent one could be. He has managed the Russian Federation Defense Ministry for over a decade. Recognizably, given evidence of the challenges of the special military operation his ministry has faced, he has not proven to be the most qualified one in wartime. As explained in Part 1, Shoigu, much as Prigozhin, never received formal military training. He was appointed to the rank of major general in the National Guard by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 toward the end of events associated with the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-proclaimed Gosudárstvenny Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency). Shoigu did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School, the Frunze Military Academy, or the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. Shoigu spent nearly a decade as the Minister of Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM. In November 2012, Putin appointed Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister.

Prigozhin is not the only one who for whatever reason was moved out of the way of Shoigu as they were ostensibly a hindrance to his efforts to achieve success in Ukraine. General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 was sacked in September 2022 He was deemed ineffective. General Aleksandr Dvornikov was labelled the first senior commander but not the overall commander of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine. He was sacked between July and September 2022. Colonel General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine was sacked in September 2022 due to the lack of progress and significant losses in his area. He died suddenly in 2023. Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in its September 2022 offensive in the east. Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, was removed from his post in February 2023. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.” Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin was replaced by Gerasimov as commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”.  Surovikin became Gerasimov’s deputy commander in the Southern “Grouping”. At the start of the Wagner Rebellion on June 23, 2023, Surovikin was detained by the security services and was reportedly released some time in September 2023. Then of course there was Prigozhin.

Given how many Russian Federation senior military commanders have been sacked by Shoigu with Putin’s blessing of have suddenly died away from the battlefield since the special militsry operation began, one might argue that it is uncertain whether he will emerge the winner in his ostensible struggle to stay top and in good stead and uncertain whether he is simply a survivor weaken severely by endless internal maneuvers. With Prigozhin out of the way, Shoigu was made better able to direct the Wagner Group not around the world–a mission that may be maintained–but in Ukraine in a way that satisfies him. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units and possess exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations. Shoigu will likely take the organization’s troops and use them essentially as infantry formation with no greater tasks than those of basic infantry units.

Left with few or no rivals, for the first time, Shoigu stands exposed. He will unlikely be able future mistakes and failures on others. He made find himself stalling Russian Federation forces or creating great difficulties for them against repeated Ukrainian counteroffensives or rapid defeat. It is unlikely that he along with Gerasimov could completely manipulate Putin, get him to move wildly in a new, unplanned direction. Plainly, they lack the faculty to manipulate him or develop any bold plans. It is nearly assured Putin would reject any inordinate plans and see them straight as the .inept leaders they are. He would either warn them off tactfully, or respond ruthlessly to their potential crass subterfuge.

In the abstract, one might consider the possibility that beyond the forward edge of the political battlefield n the Russian Federation are those who sought to separate Prigozhin from Putin. Such powerful individuals, hiding behind the façade of respectability, have considered what the transition from Putin to a new leader might appear. Their number would doubtlessly be kept small as they would surely want to eliminate the possibility of being detected over inordinate levels of communication. With a silent hand, perhaps they have already begun to shape events hoping to ensure any future transition in leadership would favor their interests. To that extent in this hypothetical situation, Prigozhin loyal to Putin and quite formidable, could have potentially posed a threat in response to any plans and audacious moves that they might make at a given time. He certainly no. onger poses any threat to them Such ideas are purely speculative, but not so fanciful that they are unworthy of some modicum of consideration. This is not meant to suggest or hint that such individuals would have carried out or had a hand in the death of Prigozhin. Rather, through their means to influence others and a few subtle efforts, they may have caused the ball to begin to roll in the right direction.

There is the possibility that the cause of Prigozhin’s death was multifactorial, having, involving, or produced by a compound of hostile elements mentioned here, creating a bizarre murderous, synergistic effect. Perhaps one might speculate that Prigozhin did not really have a chance of living beyond August 23, 2023, the fated point of confluence. 

Whatever may have transpired, it seems Putin was unable to protect Prigozhin from himself. He became a figurative rogue elephant, stomping through the higher realms of Russian Federation foreign and national security policy, trampling on all of the work being done by the Kremlin to get a handle on the Ukraine matter.

Putin (left) meeting with Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (1st right) and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander (2nd right) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin. Putin’s inner circle, though one man short, generally seems no worse for wear. Dare one say, the entire environment is quite a bit less noisy as a consequence of Prigozhin’s demise. However, efforts to replace Prigozhin and Utkin and rejuvenate what remains of the Wagner Group will likely pose some problems for the immediate future  Efforts by Putin to reinvigorate the organization in some effective form have been public. Readers may cast their minds back to reports that on September 29, 2023, Putin met with a number of former senior commanders of the Wagner Group ostensibly to discuss how “volunteer units” could best utilized in Ukraine. On state television, Putin was shown meeting Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander known by the cognomen, “Sedoi” (Grey Hair) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin. The trick for Putin’s newly appointed leaders would be to put the pieces of Wagner Group back together again to his satisfaction without Prigozhin’s charisma and special touch, and the force of Utkin’s reputation as a fighting leader. Back in June 2023, the Wagner Group’s troop strength was tens of thousands. As aforementioned, it is widely understood in the Russian Federation that since the Wagner Group Rebellion, that many Wagner Group veterans have joined other private military companies and have returned to Ukraine under individual contracts with Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Some of the Wagner fighters have signed up for service with the Russian Army.

The Impact of Prigozhin’s Loss to the Wagner Group Appears Greater than Putin Estimated

Putin’s inner circle, though one man short, generally seems no worse for wear. Dare one say, the entire environment is quite a bit less noisy as a consequence of Prigozhin’s demise. However, efforts to replace Prigozhin and Utkin and rejuvenate what remains of the Wagner Group will likely pose some problems for the immediate future  Efforts by Putin to reinvigorate the organization in some effective form have been public. Readers may cast their minds back to reports that on September 29, 2023, Putin met with a number of former senior commanders of the Wagner Group ostensibly to discuss how “volunteer units” could best utilized in Ukraine. On state television, Putin was shown meeting Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander known by the cognomen, “Sedoi” (Grey Hair) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin.

Yevkurov, a few months prior to the meeting, had reportedly travelled to several countries where Wagner mercenaries have operated. Troshev, a decorated veteran of Russia’s wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya and a former commander in the SOBR interior ministry rapid reaction force, is from St Petersburg, Putin’s home town. He was awarded Russia’s highest medal, Hero of Russia, in 2016 for the storming of Palmyra in Syria against ISIS militants. Both men were pictured with Putin in the television broadcast.

In the video of the meeting, Putin addresses Troshev stating that they had spoken about how “volunteer units that can perform various combat tasks, above all, of course, in the zone of the special military operation.” He continued: “You yourself have been fighting in such a unit for more than a year,” Putin went further: “You know what it is, how it is done, you know about the issues that need to be resolved in advance so that the combat work goes in the best and most successful way.” Additionally, Putin remarked that he wanted to speak about social support for those involved in the fighting. No comments were heard from Troshev during the broadcast. Following the meeting, Russian Federation Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the Russian Federation’s RIA news agency that Troshev had become a Russian Federation Defense Ministry official. The publicized Kremlin meeting appeared to signal at that juncture that the Wagner Group would be directed by Troshev and Yevkurov.

The trick for Putin’s newly appointed leaders would be to put the pieces of Wagner Group back together again to his satisfaction without Prigozhin’s charisma and special touch and the force of Utkin’s personality and reputation as a fighting leader. Back in June 2023, the Wagner Group’s troop strength was tens of thousands. As mentioned in Part 1, it is widely understood in the Russian Federation that just before and especially after the Wagner Group Rebellion, many Wagner Group veterans reportedly joined other private military companies and have returned to the fight in Ukraine under individual contracts with Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Some of the Wagner fighters signed up for service with the Russian Army. Sources from the United Kingdom’s military intelligence have explained: “The exact status of the redeploying personnel is unclear, but it is likely individuals have transferred to parts of the official Russian Ministry of Defence forces and other PMCs [private military companies].”

What greatcharlie assessed at the time as an extraordinary turn of event, six days after the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses in June 2023, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

Some readers may recall Putin’s rather gracious speech concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion given on June 27, 2023, in which he focused on the future disposition of Wagner Group. He did not indicate at the time that there would be further problems for its members ahead. Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was ostensibly a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

In the minds of the Wagner Group troops, they had already pledged their allegiance to the Russian Federation not only in words but with the shedding of their blood. They watched their Wagner Group comrades die on many battlefields on foreign lands for the Russian Federation. Imaginably, in their minds, they were free and independent fighting men, not longer serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The allegiance of the Wagner Group appeared to be unambiguous to the Kremlin

However, as hinted on in Part 1 of this essay, dealing with Putin often means hearing promises from him that were not sure at all. Putin turned on his promises to merely maintain his trust in the loyalty of Wagner Group troops. Putin made it crystal clear following the death of Prigozhin that he was unwilling to brook further opposition to his will from anyone in the organization.

After August 25, 2023, volunteer fighters working on behalf of the Russian Federation were required to swear an oath to the Russian Federation flag. A decree was signed by Putin on that very day, which was just two days after the death Prigozhin. According to the Kremlin website, the oath applied to groups “contributing to the execution of tasks given to the armed forces”–members of volunteer formations, private military contractors–and territorial defense units. The website went on to state: “Fighters were required to pledge “their loyalty to the Russian Federation . . . strictly follow their commanders and superiors’ orders, and conscientiously fulfill their obligations.” The step was allegedly designed to help in the “forming the spiritual and moral foundations for the defense of the Russian Federation.” Not every volunteer fighter was a Russian Federation citizen, so the oath was a considerable requirement for many. Prigozhin strenuously objected to the idea of a loyalty oath when it was first suggested believeing it would essentially bring about the end of the Wagner Group. When asked about the future of the Wagner Group at the time of the decree was signed, Peskov made the surprising and shocking public statement that: “legally the Wagner private military group does not exist.”

Wagner Group Headquarters in St. Petersburg (above) In the minds of the most Wagner Group troops, they had already pledged their allegiance to the Russian Federation not only in words but with the shedding of their blood. They watched their Wagner Group comrades die on many battlefields on foreign lands for the Russian Federation. Imaginably, in their minds, they were free and independent fighting men, not longer serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The allegiance of the Wagner Group appeared to be unambiguous to the Kremlin. Putin promised as much in speeches and meetings with Wagner Group commanders and officials. However, as hinted on in Part 1 of this essay, dealing with Putin often means hearing promises from him that were not sure at all. Putin turned on his promises to merely maintain his trust in the loyalty of Wagner Group troops. Putin made it crystal clear following the death of Prigozhin that he was unwilling to brook further opposition to his will from anyone in the organization. After August 25, 2023, volunteer fighters working on behalf of the Russian Federation were required to swear an oath to the Russian Federation flag. A decree was signed by Putin on that very day, which was just two days after the death Prigozhin. Prigozhin strenuously objected to the idea of a loyalty oath when it was first suggested believeing it would essentially bring about the end of the Wagner Group. When asked about the future of the Wagner Group at the time of the decree was signed by Putin, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov made the surprising and shocking public statement that: “legally the Wagner private military group does not exist.”

The Way Forward

Western Russian Federation analysts and experts and mainstream newsmedia on commentators on foreign affairs have often been frightfully querulous about Putin’s decisions and actions to the point at which some have more occasionally appeared dysregulated. That has had no constructive impact upon their assays on his management of complex issues in which the Russian Federation is involved. In their public the aforementioned assessments, analysts, experts, and commentators typically include observations of him behaving in ways that are abberant. 

The rather dramatic way in which Putin had distanced himself from staffs and guests at the Kremlin during a following the COVID-19 pandemic–it is uncertain whether Putin still engages in this practice–is popularly pushed out by the Western newsmedia as evidence of some unusual, unhealthy shift in his thinking. On this popular point, greatcharlie conversely suggests there is the real possibility that unbeknownst to all but those closest to Putin that he was successfully poisoned recently, and his extremely cautious behavior has been spurred on by such an unpleasant, perhaps life-threatening, episode. If such a hypothesized event occurred in truth, having his most senior advisers, in photographs and videos of meetings in the Kremlin, sit rather naturally though seated somewhat distant from him would surely be more understandable. Certainly, they would be fully understanding and support his need and efforts to show greater vigilance for his personal safety. Yet, returning to Western perspectives, what makes Putin’s behave appear strange can be viewed as enough to go as far as to conclude he cannot be judged as a trustworthy interlocutor and reliable party to any talks.

The relatively efficient functioning of the Russian Federation government is dependent upon Putin’s strong presence, hands-on management, and dynamic leadership. Surely, no one in Putin’s inner circle would feel too comfortable facing the world without him. (Imaginably, some observers in the West might dismissively and facetiously remark that in Putin’s world, they have little choice to do otherwise.) Additonally, if a life-threatening incident actually occurred sometime recently, it might expected that HIS personal security detail–to the extent that anyone might insist Putin do anything–would insist upon dramatic precautions such as the very seating arrangements in Kremlin that the world has observed.

Without pretension, greatcharlie states that it never presumed that the discussion here would offer the degree of clarity or stimulate a degree of lucidity that would allow readers through insights presented to unravel the truth of the mystery of Prigozhin’s jet crash. Perhaps for some it strangely enough has. However, with regard to Putin In many ways, the course of his relationship with Prigozhin holds up a mirror to the nature of his relationships not only within his inner circle, but with the Russian people and with foreign allies and partners

Putin generally seeks to develop personal bonds among national leaders and greater bilateral ties where there at best can be mutual interests and goals from a position of strength. He will be generous as part of his efforts foster relations at those various levels, but holding superior position always remains paramount.  In that course, Putin will emphasize boundaries .Putin has appeared tolerant of their occasional violation, but ultimately he has acted in response of such. An exception to this course would be China with which the Russian Federation only holds a stronger position due to its nuclear arsenal. That could potentially change in the near future but that remains to seen.. The US is not a friend of the Russian Federation. Under the best circumstances, Putin over the years has sought cordial ties, an entente cordiale with it.

As was the case with Prigozhin, after losing Putin’s “trust”, countries seeking to reach some reasonable and sustainable agreement with him on anything should only expect subterfuge and betrayal. Capitals in the West are not ignorant of this reality. Based on all that has been presented to Moscow by the West, it does not appear that any constructive end state is apparent. To that extent, nothing go is reasonably expected. Moreover, what appears uncertain with them is how far things might go with Putin’s behavior. The danger of the situation is compounded by the fact that Putin doubtlessly views the conflict with Ukraine as a conflict between the Russian Federation with the US and its NATO allies. The conflict may be one fought indirectly by the two sides, the Rubicon has been crossed. The die has been cast. As military theorists and planners in the 20th century, many long departed, calculated decades ago, a conflict of this kind could put the East and West on a collision course in a nuclear way.,The best hope to avoid that would having the reasonable take steps right now. However, it would seem the Russian Federation is not being led by wholly reasonable thinkers. Looking back, their choice to invade Ukraine, and carry out military operations in the way they did, was truly counterintuitive.

While many may rebuff and reject what is stated here, greatcharlie remains firm in its belief that the course of relations between the Russian Federation with the US, the rest of the West, eastern powers other than China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the current vector of policy is toward eventual disaster. The only aspect unknown to all but clairvoyants is the timing of a future conflict. If greatcharlie is in not in error, and the reality of Putin’s attitude and behavior escapes political authorities in the US and its allies following this episode between Putin and Prigozhin discussed here, they are displaying a disregard for their respective countries’ self-interests which is daylight madness. Analysts and forecasters in the foreign and national security bureaucracies in Western countries who find such an outcome too difficult to imagine and would prefer continuing to proffer assessments under which Putin would eventually submits to the will of the US and its allies–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–are simply whistling in the wind. Only realistic thinking and planning on the matter may bring forth viable solutions if any exist. Solum ut inter ista certum sit nihil esse certi. (In these matters the only certainty is that there is nothing certain.)

The Death of Prigozhin: Whether Nature’s Course or a Heinous Crime, It Closed a Trying Chapter of Putin’s Presidency (Part 1)

Photo and roses laid at St. Petersburg gravestie of Yevgeny Prigozhin during his funeral on August 29, 2023. On August 23, 2023, the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known in the Russian Federation as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin and nine other passengers were killed in a jet crash north of Moscow. The crash came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the  Russian Federation Defense Minister Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. A deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it was certainly not enough to prove he ordered albeit a not-so-unique form of execution. As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. There remains be much to understand regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s life. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

On August 23, 2023, a private Embraer jet flying to St. Petersburg crashed north of Moscow killing all ten passengers onboard. Onboard was the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin, two other top Wagner Group officials, to include Dmitry Utkin, Prigozhin’s four bodyguards and a crew of three. The crash garnered international attention as it came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However, a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid what all sides feared would be the further “shedding Russian blood.” The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow. 

Assuredly, if Prigozhin’s deadly jet crash was not accidental and ordered by the highest authorities in the Russian Federation government, the decision was most likely multifactorial. Many opinions have offered by analysts and experts on the Russian Federation on how Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin benefitted from the action were also offered. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it is certainly not enough to prove he ordered such a not-so-unique form of execution in authoririan regimes, also occasionally witnessed in democracies. Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non pœna, perire. (Death claims all things. It is law, not punishment, to die.)

The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. The 2023 North Korea–Russia summit between Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jung-un was held in Moscow on September 23, 2023. Putin in his first foreign visit after the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest visited Kyrgyzstan on October 12, 2023. Putin then visited People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Bejing on October 17, 2023. Each event provided ample opportunity to further assess Putin’s words and behavior to construct a firmer understanding of the man and his decisionmaking. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. After all, Putin and Prigozhin, at least for a time, were true friends. That was somewhat evident in Putin’s initial public comments on the crash. In many respects, for Putin, the deadly episode amounted to a private tragedy within what seemed a public conflict. Many details will likely remain kept from both the public and the newsmedia. Still, from what has been been presented to the public, there remains be much to gain regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s presidency. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior. 

Unless there is additional information so newsworthy concerning Prigozhin that it cannot be dismised or avoided, greatcharlie believes this will be it last entry on the passed-on Wagner Group owner. Still, as has been the case with its previous posts, greatcharlie hopes this essay will stimulate among readers, particularly students, new lines of thought, even kernels of ideas on how US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other governments might proceed concerning the Russian Federation. Certainly, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Though, for greatcharlie, it would be satisfying enough to have this commentary simply stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy. Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus omnibus est vitæ; sed famam extendere factis, hoc virtutis opus. (Each one has his appointed day; short and irreparable is the brief life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the work of virtue.)

Police guard site of crash of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s private jey in the Tver region of the Russia, Feration, August 24, 2023 (above). The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

The Grenade Gambit

(Beware the man who offers answers when no questions are asked, excuses when their is no apparent misstep or error, an alibi when there is no allegation, or a most apparent contrived defense when there is no accusation, as such virtual confessions often indicate the individual is so tormented by the possible discovery of their own errant or surreptitious behavior to the extent they can only see the world from their own anxiously insecure or unrepentantly deceitful mindset, and perhaps seeks to manipulate what they imagine others likely think.) As aforementioned, on October 5, 2023, meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Putin suggested the jet was blown up from inside, basing his comments on a report he received from the head of Russia’s investigative committee a few days before. Putin stated: “Fragments of hand grenades were found in the bodies of those killed in the crash.” He continued: “There was no external impact on the plane–this is already an established fact.” Putin cut short his comments concerning a grenade or grenades that may have been detonated on board. Yet, in support of the idea of any mishandling of ordinance onboard, Putin stated that he thought investigators remiss in failing to perform alcohol and drug tests on the bodies of those who died in the jet crash. Regarding his reason for that concern, Putin noted that in the past, quantities of cocaine had been found in the Wagner Group’s headquarters in St. Petersburg. With regard to Putin’s comments on any external impact, he was apparently rebuffing assertions made by anonymous US sources just after the jet crash suggesting it had been shot down. Russian Federation officials investigating the jet crash have not reported publicly on the cause as of this writing. Ad calamitatem quilibet rumor valet. (Any rumor is sufficient against calamity (i.e., when a disaster happens, every report confirming it obtains ready credence)

With little else to go on, it is assessed by greatcharlie that concerning the grenade fragments being found, Putin may have actually been presenting the truth. In the abstract, surely, such an explanation is not too far from possible. (Surely “evidence” now exists to fully support the Russian Federation President’s statements. It is hard to imagine who would be so daring in the Russian Federation to challenge Putin’s word on what may have transpired.) What remains unclear is why Putin would publicly express such derogatory information on one who was a prominent member of his retinue for some time. Those willing give Putin the benefit of the doubt might accept his negatuve comments as an odd, yet understandable and natural expression of his anxiety. To that extent, the public exposition may have assisted Putin in exercising the ghosts. Maybe they would proffer that it was an effort by Putin to persuade himself that there was some logic in the senseless, troubling circumstance of Prigozhin’s loss. Anger is a stage of grieving. Born Jacques Anatole François Thibault, known as Anatole France (April 16, 1844-October 12, 1924) was a French poet, journalist, and novelist. Considered in his day as the ideal French man of letters. he won the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature in recognition of his literary achievements. In Part II, chapter 4, of The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard (1881), Thibault wrote: Tous les changements, même les plus so ont leur mélancolie, car ce que nous quittons, c’est une partie de nous-mêmes; il faut mourir à une vie pour entrer dans une autre. (All changes, even the most longed for, have their melancholy; for what we leave behind us is a part of ourselves; we must die to one life before we can enter another.)

Under another line of thought, it might be considered that because he is always politically minded, and posturing to present the best picture of himself possible, Putin’s remarks were most likely–doubtlessly–curated, calculated, but mainly so as part of an effort to convince the Russian people that he could not have committed such as heinous act. Indeed, conceivably Putin offered the new facts with the hope of better shaping the Russian people’s conclusions on the incident and opinion of his government. He seems on a quest to create a more favorable image of himself on the matter given so much bad has resulted from his Ukraine enterprise. It is surely an uphill battle. After all, few in the world seemed to doubt that he ordered or members of his regime were complicit in  responsible for the crash of Prigozhin’s jet.

Interestingly enough, if Putin initially believed what he offered in Sochi was logical, he went a long way to make connections that were hardly certain. It would require perhaps too much imagination think senior commanders of the Wagner Group, having traveled together for years without incident, were doing any more than discussing important matters in camera onboard the jet as they made their way in the direction of St. Petersburg. It would require too little imagination to believe Prigozhin’s private jet was nothingless than le bateau iver–the boat of drunks–aboard which passengers werante perhaps in an inebriated state playing “hot potato” with a live grenade and soething went terribly wrong or tempers flared during a heated argument and disregulated party to the exchange well-beyond making a deadly threat, pulled the pin on a grenade. Even that would seem possible if Putin believes the imagination of the Russian people is boundless. Evidently, the passengers had traveled on more than one occasion on similar jets, perhaps the self-same one, without any fatal incidents with ordinance. In any event, Putin apparently does not want to leave the matter for the Russian people to reach their own conclusions on what is true or not.

If in some moment of intense quiet reflection, Putin should conjer any additional insights on the Prigozhin case, one would imagine that he might be less likely to share it publicly it as the story now thoroughly belongs to the past. Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant.

Common Wisdom in the West: The Prigozhin Jet Crash Was a “Mafia Style” Act by Putin

Comparisons with what some in the mainstream Western newsmedia have alleged as Putin’s Mafia act and his behavior as a Mafia Don as often depicted in novels and Hollywood films of the organized crime genre, are too much for greatcharlie to contenance. It acknowledges that it was all most inappropriate given that ten individuals died in a jet crash and not a fictional event. Such thinking is perfectly understandable as nearly everything discussed for mass public consumption is reduced to banal amusement. While this popular explanation of Mafia tactics, technique, procedures, and methods in drawn from the abstract, in most cases, such expertise, expressed with confidence, is drawn from novels and Hollywood films, “The Godfather”, “Goodfellas”, and “The Sopranos.” Then again, perchance some commentators are signalling a desire to reveal even greater information made known to them through unnerving contacts with organized crime groups, but that would be unlikely. Knowing how deadly such organize crime figures can be, they would hardly seek on such a point to reveal confidences of ghastly acts shared with those sadistic individuals.

As of the time of this writing, early October 2023, the return to secondary school–rentrée–is complete. At that level, nothing less could expectedly be heard at the cafeteria tables as students who might have a passing interest in world affairs. Any similar theories of this kind offered by serious analysts, journalists, and newsmedia commentators, could at best be recognized as faulty humor, pretension, or some unfortunate internal response to the cognitive collective imperative rather than investigated facts. Such surmisal could  certainly not be viewed as an informed opinion. It is stated again that there are no publicly reported facts that indicate there was an effort to disable or down Prigozhin’s jet. Even if such existed, there is nothing that would point to Putin as being behind the air tragedy directly or indirectly. There is no proof of orders being issued from Putin or others in the Kremlin. There certainly has been no mea culpa from covert operatives from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the security services, or “contractors”. Furthermore, no offical information released publicly indicates ordinance was detonated onboard the jet.

Putin and Prigozhin as Associates

Wilhelm Richard Wagner (May 23, 1813 to February 13, 1883) was a German composer, conductor, and ptolemicist, known mainly for his operas. He is categorized as part of the 19th century musical movement of nationalism. In his compositions, Wagner would synthesize elements of disciplines such as music, poetry, architecture, painting, and others. Wagner described his inclusive vision in a series of essays published between 1849 and 1852 as the concept of Gesamtkunstwerk, or “total work of art.” Over the years his concept has influenced work in diverse fields to include in some part, intelligence analysis where accepted, in support of the examination of individuals, events, and policy decisionmaking beyond the surface. To that extent, in making use of what it feels is an apropos use–at least a pinch–of the artistic genre of film to conceptualize, greatcharlie takes into consideration the profound remarks of Austrian film director Marie Kreutzer. (It must be noted that no connection at all is implied between the talented and inspiring Kreutzer and Wagner.) As a result researching through history for her films, Kreutzer has stated often, “Every biography is an interpretation of the facts.” Developing a credible character, in the relative in the abstract, she suggests it is paramount to stay true to the personality one reads about than presenting just the facts, not simply ticking historical boxes. Using those available facts and guided by its understanding of the personalities of both Putin and Prigozhin, greatcharlie offers a new analysis, a well-grounded interpretation of their relationship to create pertinent, credible and useful insights, 

The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin began with friendship and cordially, and not at least solely or primarily, a mutual effort to seek respective gain. The two men appreciated each other. During the initial years of his pesidency, Prigozhin was observed often in Putin orbit, but he certainly was not a typical member of his retinue. Prigozhin was neither siloviki, formerly employed in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, nor Chekisty, having a father or grandfather who worked in the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD–an earlier iteration of the security services, famed during World War II and the start of the Cold War–as Putin is. (Surely, not everyone close to Putin today possess such attributes. As time goes on, that will doubtlessly become more the case.) Quite the opposite of possessing security service background, in the 1980s and bit of the 1990s when any of that might have been possible. In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution.  Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad. In 1990, Prigozhin studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

However, from that point, Prigozhin by fate, received the firm support of his family, joining its street food vending business. Having knack for the work he successfully expanded the business and gained some notoriety. From street vending, Prigozhin entered the established food service industry. Next, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. In that realm, he linked up with a school chum, Boris Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St. Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by the Russian Federation independent news source, Novaya Gazeta, that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good acquaintance. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story. In 1997, Prigozhin and a business partner, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city. In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000 when the newly minted Russian Federation President brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003.

In those initial halcion years of their burgeoning friendship, Prigozhin been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand Putin’s thinking and feelings. Beyond just liking Prigozhin, Putin displayed his feelings for his friend before everyone. The Russian Federation independent newsmedia source Meduza reported Putin welcomed Prigozhin as “one of the boys.” The five-act grand opera composed originally in French by Giuseppe Verdi “Don Carlos” is based on the dramatic play Don Karlos, Infant von Spanien (Don Carlos, Infante of Spain) by Friedrich Schiller. Verdi additionally borrowed portions of Eugène Cormon’s 1846 play Philippe II, Roi d’Espagne. In Act I, Carlos’ dear friend Rodrigue, Marquis of Posa, who has just arrived from the oppressed land of Flanders, enters. The two greet each other joyfully with the aria: “J’étais en Flandres”. Posa asks for Carlos’ aid on behalf of the suffering people there. Carlos reveals that he loves his stepmother. Posa is first shocked, but then sympathetic. He encourages Carlos to leave Spain and go to Flanders, and to forget his pain by focusing on political activity there. The two men through a tenor/baritone duet swear eternal friendship in French titled, “Dieu, tu semas dans nos âmes”, and in Italian titled, “Dio, che nell’alma infondere”. The lyrics of the duet in Italian are: “Dieu, qui de nos coeurs sincères / As fait les coeurs de deux frères, / Accepte notre serment! / Nous mourrons en nous aimant! / Ah! Dieu, tu semas dans nos âmes, etc” (“God, who of our sincere hearts / has made the hearts of two brothers, / receive our vow! / We will die loving each other! / Ah! God, you scattered in our souls, etc.”)

A reasonable assessment by experts or an informed guess by any keen observer before the special military operation began in 2022 would have been that Prigozhin would unlikely be separated from Putin anytime too soon. Having observed Prigozhin closely during their earliest interactions, Putin obviously concluded that he could well-serve his needs. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. They were opportunities of a lifetime. Bien mal acquis ne profite jamais.

Putin (center) visits Prigozhin (right) at a Concord Management and Consulting facility in 2010. In the initial halcion period of their burgeoning friendship in the early 2000s, Prigozhin been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand Putin’s thinking and feelings. Beyond just liking Prigozhin, Putin displayed his feelings for his friend before everyone. The Russian Federation newsmedia source Meduza reported Putin welcomed Prigozhin as “one of the boys.” A reasonable assessment by experts or an informed guess by any keen observer before the special military operation began in 2022 would have been that Prigozhin would unlikely be separated from Putin anytime too soon. Having observed Prigozhin closely during their earliest interactions, Putin obviously concluded that he could well-serve his needs. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. They were opportunities of a lifetime.

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. Сonсord received multiple contracts under that program. Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin was linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry were alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. It has been suggested that Prigozhin was advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, was a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. 

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera–the Wagner Group. Although private military companies were not permitted under law in the Russian Federation at the time, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Concerning the special military operation in Ukraine or any matter in which both men’s interests were concerned, Prigozhin never publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He hHd always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with recent events most firmly in mind. Yet, as aforementioned, Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow.

Prigozhin should have been savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. Putin showed considerable regard for Prigozhin but even greater regard for Shoigu both professionally and privately for a longer time. Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements.

It might have been plausible enough for Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically in advance of committing his Wagner Group troops to ensure that he and his unit commanders would play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities would be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. His démarche might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed on the ground, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. Apparently nothing of  the kind happened.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigohzin likely knew that Putin really did not need at any point during the flailing special military operation was an extra problem that from one angle might boil down to him, at least initially, as mere in-house bickering between two close associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin was someone seemingly well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin was always the priority. What Putin thought was of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. There can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin greatly concerned himself with the trying times Putin had been facing following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. Going out on a limb, greatcharlie states that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever intentionally acted in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life. That being stated, he was not always on target when it came to understanding Putin’s perspective. It appears that the more complex a situation was, the less effective Prigozhin’s “foresight” and “intuition” became. It seems something went terribly wrong around the time of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Le bon critique est celui qui raconte les aventures de son âme au milieu des chefs-d’œuvre. Ernst Julius Günther Röhm (November 28, 1887-July 1, 1934) was a close friend and early ally of Adolf Hitler, A former military officer and senior member of the Röhm co-founded and led the Sturmabteilung (SA), thel paramilitary wing of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  (National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party) , from 1931 to 1934. The SA played a key part in Hitler’s ascension. The are many intriguing parallels, mutatis mutandis, concerning the two relationships between the two national leader and two  paramilitary heads, to the extent that much as Prigozhin fell out with Putin, Rõhm fell out with Hitler. In 1919, Röhm joined the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Workers’ Party), the precursor of the Nazi Party formed in 1920, and became a close associate of Adolf Hitler. When he joined the German Workers Party, Röhm had already begun using his military ties to develop paramilitary groups across Germany in service of Hitler. Leading the most prominent group, the SA,  Röhm participated in Hitler’s failed 1925 Munich Beer Hall Putsch aimed at seizing governmental power. Röhm was arrested but received a suspended prison sentence. Afterward Röhm became a Reichstag deputy, but broke with Hitler in 1925 over the future direction of the Nazi Party. Resigning from all positions Rõhm traveled to Bolivia to serve as an advisor to the Bolivian Army. However, at Hitler’s insistence, Röhm returned to Germany in 1930 and was officially appointed Chief of Staff of the SA in 1931. The organization then numbering over a million members, waa reorganized by Röhm. Its mission remained the same, engaging in campaigns of political violence against Communists, rival political parties, Jewish communities, and other groups. Despite praise from the party for his efforts with the SA, as public knowledge of his homosexuality gradually increased via the newsmedia, opposition to Röhm grew. Note that there was no issue with regard to homosexuality–essentially a crime in the Russian Federation–concerning Prigozhin. Yet, what has surfaced is an issue concerning him and narcotics abuse. Röhm maintained Hitler’s trust to the extent that once Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, he made Röhm Reichsleiter, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party, and appointed him to the Reich Cabinet as a Reichsminister without portfolio. However, more problems arose from Röhm. In the years 1933 and 1934 when the Nazi government was consolidating it power,  Röhm engaged in noisy rhetoric, calling for a “second revolution” that would transform german society that worried Hitler’s industrial allies. Further, Röhm  continually demanded more power for the SA. The Reichswehr (German Armed Forces) saw the SA as a growing threat to its position. Hitler eventually saw his long-time friend as a threat to everything he was building and a potential political rival. Under Hitler’s orders, Reichfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler and the Deputy Reichfuhrer-SS and Director of Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) Reinhard Heydrich purged the entire SA leadership during the infamous Night of the Long Knives on June  30,1934. Röhm was reportedly executed in a Munich prison on July 1, 1934

Prigozhin’s Mistakes

Putin broke his silence on Prigozhin’s jet crash on August 24, 2023 during a meeting with the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, in the Kremlin. If readers can cast their minds back to Putin’s initial remarks, they may recall that Putin stated: “First of all, I want to express my sincere condolences to the families of all the victims, this is always a tragedy.” Putin went on to say: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He described him as “a talented man, a talented businessman.” Most relevant, Putin intriguingly added: “He was a man of difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results needed both for himself and when I asked him about it–for a common cause, as in these last months.” There were indeed many mistakes that Prigozhin made while ostensibly assisting Putin. Prigozhin had required but had not always warranted Putin’s forgiveness many times. Putin had forgiven much. To that extent, such is not so apparent as Putin mentioned that Prigozhin always did what he asked him to do. Often, Putin had to hold him at arms length. The list of disappointments is far lengthier than one might imagine as it concerned the failure to optimally serve Putin’s interests. It went far beyond Prigozhin’s ramblings about Ukraine. A small number are listed here.

Food Poisoning of Schoolchildren

As aforementioned, in 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

Fumbled Effort To Interfere with the 2016 US Elections.

By 2016, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. As noted earlier, a portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

In November 2017, Putin surely went to Hanoi G20 Summit within interest in discussing with the new US President, Donald Trump, a variety of issues to include, very important to him, the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (The Magnitsky Law), which had a devastating impact on the ability of oligarchs and other business leaders to operate in the US and alongside US businesses. Yet, as a consequence of the foul-up of Prigozhin’s organization in its effort to impact national elections in the US in 2016, Trump reportedly bombarded Putin with questions about the Russian Federation’s interference in Hanoi. It was to a degree, an embarrassment for Putin. As with other Western newsmedia sources, on November 11, 2017, in Agence France-Presse, it was headlined that Putin and Trump talk Syria, election meddling at their brief meeting. No mention was made of the Magnitsky issue

US President Donald Trump (right) speaks with Putin (left) during a stroll  in Hanoi Vietnam on November 11, 2017. By  2016, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry were alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, was a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 was offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. In November 2017, Putin surely went to Hanoi G20 Summit with an interest in discussing with the new US President, Donald Trump, a variety of issues to include, very important to him, the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (The Magnitsky Law), which had a devastating impact on the ability of oligarchs and other business leaders to operate in the US and alongside US businesses. Yet, as a consequence of the foul-up of Prigozhin’s organization in its effort to impact national elections in the US in 2016, Trump reportedly bombarded Putin with questions about the Russian Federation’s interference in Hanoi. It was to a great degree, an embarrassment for Putin.

Wagner Group Attrocities in Bucha, Ukraine

The Kremlin could barely suggest that it had acted in the interest of international peace and security when it invaded  Ukraine or took previously in just about any other intervention externally during Putin’s era of leadership. Nonetheless, it made every effort to sell its case, pressing its narrative on Ukraine. The last thing the Kremlin wanted to contend with were reported large scale atrocities, with evidence alleged caught by Western newsmedia cameras. That was the circumstance Prigozhin created, after the Wagner Group left the town of Bucha. 

Via the Agence France-Presse on April 7, 2022, the Times of Israel published a report that German intelligence services intercepted radio traffic of Russian soldiers discussing the killings of civilians in Bucha. The Agence France-Presse used the renowned German newmedia source, Der Spiegel, which cited a closed-door briefing given by Germany’s foreign intelligence service BND. In the Bundestag. Der Spiegel reported that the audio files ofthe BND gleaned at the Bundestag briefing provided evidence of the Wagner mercenary group’s role in the atrocities. Der Spiegel said the audio files intercepted by the BND also provide evidence of the Wagner mercenary group’s role in the atrocities. The German government said its satellite images from last month from the period of March 10, 2022 to March 18, 2022, and reliable evidence showed that Russian Federation forces and security units were deployed in this area from March 7, 2022 until March 30, 2022. The Kremlin denied the accusations of mass killings. It claimed that the images emerging from Bucha were “fakes” or that the deaths occurred after Russian Federation troops withdrew from the town.

In the West, Putin’s regime is looked upon as one in which the powers of evil are exalted. Under the leadership of Prigozhin, the Wagner Group in Bucha helped to hammer in that idea with the West and much of the world. Prigozhin did not help the Kremlin’s situation.

Prigozhin’s Refusal To Have the Wagner Group Sign an Oath of Allegiance and Contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry 

Before the Wagner Group Rebellion transpired, seemingly many of the organization’s troops sensed big trouble ahead. That sense stemmed from controversy stirred over an order from the Federation Defense Minister on June 10, 2023 requiring all “volunteer detachments” to sign contracts with his ministry by the end of that month. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry explained that order was given by Shoigu in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of “volunteer detachments”, all such units–or their men–would have to sign a contract with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry by July 1, 2023. The order did not mention the Wagner Group by name. However, it was understood then that it routinely referred to the organization as “volunteer assault detachments”. As for the rationale behind the order, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry claimed“This will give the volunteer formations the necessary legal status, create unified approaches to the organisation of comprehensive provision and fulfilment of their tasks. Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov shared: “These measures will increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the armed forces and their volunteer detachments.”

The following day, Prigozhin publicly stated that his Wagner Group troops would not sign any contract with Shoigu. Prigozhin viewed the order as an attempt by Shoigu to take control of the Wagner Group.  Prigozhin suggested that the Defense Ministry might use the failure to comply with the order as a reason to deprive Wagner of supplies. Prigozhin stated: “What could happen after this order is that they will not give us weapons and ammunition. We will figure it out, as they say.” He went on to say: “But when the thunder breaks, they will come running and bring weapons and ammunition with a request to help.” The entire episode created a further rift between Shoigu and Prigozhin. It surely caused Putin additional distress. Most of the Wagner Group troops did not sign the Defense Ministry contracts then. However, some in a bid to distance themselves from the dangerous controversy, left the Wagner Group, moving away from the situation, and signed the contracts in order to ply their trade with other private military companies and the Defense Ministry, too. Chacun voit midi à sa porte.

Prigozhin’s Bizarre Video Recordings from Rostov-on-Don during the Wagner Group Rebellion 

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have beenmay very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Still, there were also unnecessary ad-libs Prigozhin made on video recordings from Rostov-on-Don broadcast and posted online during the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some were dangerously threatening and perceivably seditious. As the matter continued,which naturally appeared grave, Prigozhin’s continued comments dipped into the realm of the absolute absurd. Well over the top were his remarks on video on the morning of June 24, 2023 from Roostov-on-Don in which he rashly stated: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.”  He went further off the mark when he bizarrely declared: “Once again I’m warning everyone: we will … destroy everything around us. You can’t destroy us. We have goals. We are all ready to die. All 25,000 of us.”

Prigozhin was putting his unique “golden touch” on the whole matter likely creating some concern and considerable stress among many in the Kremlin as to whether everything would come together as planned. that stress was doubtlessly felt by Putin at the time. If Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would have had hypothetically driven into Moscow and would have taken control of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the outcome for them would not have reminded anyone who would have observed their march much as the renowned final stands of glory such the The Alamo (1836 )in what was then the Texas Territory or the Battle of Camerone (1863) in Mexico. It most likely would have closely resembled something akin to Colonel Armstrong Custer’s Last Stand at the Battle of Little Big Horn (1876), a complete massacre with no appreciable positive ououtcome. With his words, he had what his troops could not have, a damaging psychological impact on the psyche of the Russian people. He made the government appear vulnerable.

The Appearance of Complicity with Russian Federation General Sergei Surovikin.

A real tragedy that cropped from Prigozhin’s position as owner of the Wagner Group was his seemingly unfettered engagement with the general staff and other senior generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces due to his close association with Putin more so than his ownership of the organization. Such a political association in the Russian Federation and just about any country is very tricky business for a senior military commander. It must be handled tactfully and delicately. If not, a fine career can easily be shipwrecked. One association which Prigozhin spoke of often was that with the Commander-in-Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin. During the invasion of Ukraine, Surovikin who was once commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone later became Deputy commander in the Southern “Grouping” of the Special Military Operation zone where the Wagner Group operated and has bases. Surovikin had also worked with the Wagner Group while serving two tour in Syria in 2017. Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. On June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. Among Russians who welcomed the appointment of Surovikin when he took command in Ukraine was Prigozhin. In a statement put out at the time by Concord, Prigozhin said: “Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian Army.” He called Surovikin a “legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.” He noted: “Having received an order [in 1991], Surovikin was that officer who without hesitation got in his tank and went forward to save his country.”

However, beyond being a friend of Putin and owner of Wagner Group which often operated with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, there were no personal reasons and perhaps no reasons for to be a close associate of Surovikin or any general. Prigozhin was not a professional soldier. He owned the Wagner Group just short of 10 years and training as it’s commander was on the job and surely limited. Unlike Surovikin, Prigozhin did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School. He did not begin his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. He did not graduate from the renowned Frunze Military Academy.. He did not graduate from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Discussions with him on military matters must be somewhat trying at times. Surovikin certainly was not a billionaire oligarch much as Prigozhin. From what was known publicly, he had no obvious prospect of ever becoming one. Prigohzin could not make him one. The relationship between Prigozhin and Surovikin was likely superficial for the most part. Yet, because it was enough that the two were talking at all was enough to cause sufficient suspicion on Surovikin with regard to Prigozhin’s thinking during the Wagner Group Rebellion. To that extent, Surovikin was to suffer as a result of guilt by association. Indeed, ostensibly in great part due to a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin that fuelled rumors of the general’s alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, there was apparently more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into. There was also the fact the Wagner Group Rebellion was unluckily launched from Surovikin’s Southern sector in Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Surovikin was detained by the security services on June 23, 2023. It was the starting date of the Wagner Group Rebellion. Reports of Surovikin’s release from detention surfaced in the newsmedia in the West on September 4, 2023. It was reported at the same time that his service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces was terminated.

Prigozhin created an “unsafe” environment for Surovikin, politically. Perhaps Putin had a good idea of how and why the general had gotten entangled with Prigozhin and the Wagner Group Rebellion. However, he did not stop what transpired, at least not right away. Putin did not take any chances. The regime still worked against the general–particularly with endless “interviews”–in the way that is does. Being heavy-handed as they typically, no thought was likely given the dynamics of the relationship between Prigozhin, a friend of Putin, and Surovikin. No consideration given to that fact that Surovikin was already swamped by the need to handle an on-coming counteroffensive of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and could not dedicate any real time Prigozhin’s puzzle. No concern was likely given to the significant gap between Surovikin’s military knowledge, experience and education, with Prigozhin, who relatively was lacking on the subject. There could not have been any great discussion between the two on dealing with Shoigu–who also never receive formal military training and education–and Gerasimov or the Russian Federation’s struggle in Ukraine in general. Based on information from various sources, the newspaper of record in the US, the New York Times, reported on September 4, 2023, the security services seemed to open their eyes wide enough to notice there was reason, not even a good imaginary one, for Surovikin to remain in detention. The Russian Federation security services released him.

Prigozhin looks over maps of the tactical situation in Bakhmut, Ukraine in 2023 (above). A real tragedy that cropped from Prigozhin’s position as owner of the Wagner Group was his seemingly unfettered engagement with the general staff and other senior generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces due to his close association with Putin more so than his ownership of the organization. Such a political association was very tricky business for a senior military commander in a regime such as Putin’s, and had to handled tactfully and delicately. Beyond being a friend of Putin and owner of Wagner Group which often operated with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, there were no personal reasons and perhaps no reasons for to be a close associate of any general. Prigozhin was not a professional soldier. He had owned the Wagner Group for just short of 10 years and his training as its commander was “on the job” and surely limited. Unlike Surovikin, Prigozhin did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School. He did not begin his career serving in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. He did not graduate from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. He did not graduate from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Discussions with him on military matters must be somewhat trying for senior military officers at times.

Embezzlement at Concord or the Wagner Group Specifically?

There may very well have been issues aggravating Putin concerning the skimming of profits from government payment to the Wagner Group for its contract services. Putin oddly hinted at this possibility in a speech, but did not offer much evidence on the villainy. For him to even broach to matter publicly was a powerful act in itself. On June 27, 2023, Putin’s fourth of four major addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion, initially he spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry,.However, as explained in greatcharlie’s August 1, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)”, what began as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly became an effort by Putin to lay out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Putin explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Putin admitted plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. In its operations, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot farther.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About “his Wagner Group”, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. If the allegations of Embezzlement were true, the implications were tremendous. There would ne punishment. Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address. Looking at the speech today, there was no pretension. Nothing good was in the making by that time.

Prigozhin’s Final Mistake?

It remains possible that there was some new mistake, some new transgression, unknown to the public, over which Putin reached his peak. Conceivably, in the not so distant future, that hypothesized mistake might be made known by Putin, himself. In all honesty, greatcharlie believes that is somewhat unlikely for as it was suggested earlier, Putin surely wants the matter of Prigozhin to remain closed forever. He will unlikely be the one to dredge it up again. Perhaps such any imaginable that independent newsmedia houses may hear whisper about some new and final mistake by Prigozhin. Such whisper might very well become a popular topic of among journalists and well-known Kremlin watchers in the Russian Federation. It might also become known those in the opposition movement, the fount of all juicy rumor and gossip about Putin. Yet, then again, it may be the case that they, too, have had their fill on the Prigozhin matter. Prigozhin and his men were engaged in a dark, dangerous business, in which the deaths of others and monetary gain were the only “rewards.” He and his commanders met their fate while engaged in that work, and perhaps only a precious few in the independent newsmedia as well as in opposition political circles in Russian Federation might be moved enough to shed tears for them. 

More likely, however,  the last on the possible list of mistakes are actions by Prigozhin that could only have left Putin better than annoyed with him.  Indeed, in the abstract, greatcharlie can only presume Putin was particularly displeased with Prigozhin’s continued counter messaging on Ukraine well after the Wagner Group Rebellion. He suggested Africa was where the Wagner Group should direct its talents. He declared that Africa should be the Wagner Group’s priority. Prigozhin publicly stated that he wanted to recruit Bogatyrs-rough men–for Africa. He expressed no desire to have his organization serve in Ukraine. He made it clear that Ukraine was a non-issue for the Wagner Group. It is possible that he believed in speaking this way, he was very apparently lashing out at Shoigu and Gerasimov and not Putin’s government or Putin, himself. Yet, at this point, Putin unlikely wanted to hear too much more about the Wagner Group and what it could not do for him. After all, the Wagner Group Rebellion was settled.

When meeting with Prigozhin after the Wagner Group Rebellion,, Putin most likely made it clear to Prigozhin that he want he wanted no more negative, noisy talk on Ukraine. it would have been delinquent for him to do otherwise. One might imagine that Putin warned that there would be no second chance as too much was at stake. There was indeed a line that could not be crossed and it might be said by observers, inside and outside the Russian Federation, that Prigozhin had already crossed it more than once. Putin’s likely issuance of a warning to Prigozhin takes greatcharlie’s thought to the fateful discussion between the Great Shawnee Tribe Chief, Tecumseh and the Governor Willian Tyler in 1811 concerning White settlers further westward expansion into Native controlled land. Beginning in 1808, the Shawnee leader Tecumseh travelled throughout the US gathering supporters and allies to form a native confederacy that could resist westward expansion by white settlers. In August 1811, Tecumseh met with Governor William Henry Harrison to discuss the recent treaties, land purchases, and violence throughout the Indiana territories. At their meeting, Tecumseh spoke for a large group of natives along the Great Lakes, and told Harrison, “that piece of land, we do not wish you to take it,” indicating that his allies wanted “the present boundary line to continue.” Should the whites continue their expansion into the region, Tecumseh warned, “I assure you it will be productive of bad consequences.”

Putin is no longer a young president filled with thoughts and excitement about a bold future ahead. He has accomplished much. There were close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. Perhaps the cause for that in part has been Putin’s sense of humor. In the case of Prigozhin, however, there was every indication that any further association with him had to end. His behavior could have potentially marred all that the Russian Federation President created and was creating. Putin may have logically concluded that all he had achieved and surely wanted to complete before his end was being put in some jeopardy by Prigozhin.  Far more was at stake than friendship and nostalgia. At stake for Putin and others operating at the highest levels of government  were the Russian Federation’s interests and aims, its survival. There was every indication that any continued association with Prigozhin or any attempt to further countenance of his behavior might potentially have been further disruptive, if not destructive.

To be sure, the impact of Prigozhin’s final verbal blows, albeit unintended to harm Putin, were certainly felt by the Russian Federation President. Surely behind the Kremlin’s walls, it was likely apparent that Prigozhin was out of control. Perhaps all elites with real influence in Moscow could see that and were flummoxed by events since February 24, 2022, the starting date of the special military operation.

It seems that by the time Prigozhin was going off on further tangents following the Wagner Group Rebellion, telling his troops to focus on Africa and the need for the organization to recruit bogatyrs for Africa, he had likely passed everyones point of no return except Putin. Putin being Putin, however,, was not going to be forever disposed to hang on a knife’s edge over what fantastic outrage Prigozhin would utter or engage in next. Putin needed the Russian people to support the special military operation, the invasion of Ukraine. Casting doubt about the special military operation for any selfish reason, for any reason, particularly after the Wagner Group Rebellion was over, was unacceptable to him. Putin was not going to wait to find out if new, greater damage was being done by Prigozhin’s declarations on Ukraine and disparagement of the war effort.

Annum iam tertium et vicesimum regnat. (He has been reigning for twenty-three years.) To gnaw a bit further on the matter, Putin, is no longer a young president filled with the thoughts and excitement about the future ahead. He has accomplished much. There were close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. Perhaps the cause for that in part has been Putin’s sense of humor. In the case of Prigozhin, however, there was every indication that any further association with him had to end. His behavior could have potentially marred all that the Russian Federation President created and was creating. Putin may have logically concluded that all he had achieved and surely wanted to complete before his end was being put in some jeopardy by Prigozhin.  Far more was at stake than friendship and nostalgia. At stake for Putin and others operating at the highest levels of government  were the Russian Federation’s interests and aims, its survival. There was every indication that any continued association with Prigozhin or any attempt to further countenance of his behavior might potentially have been further disruptive, if not destructive. Order must be maintained in the Russian Federation. Prigozhin managed to become a strain that he could no longer tolerate. He could not allow the special military operation to flounder as result of Prigozhin’s problems with Shoigu and Gerasimov and simply his continued stupidities. There was nothing even slightly humorous about any of it.

Putin could no longer hope to save his friend. He could only go one direction on the matter. That did not necessarily mean Prigozhin had to be killed. Perhaps it would be enough to state fate stepped in.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (center), takes a moment to gather himself while seated between Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Glavnokomanduyushchiy Voyenno-morskoy Flot Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Naval Force or Russian Navy) Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov (right). The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s way; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have had their impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individua he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, a lack of good solutions, options for action when trouble began was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters, his willingness to try novel ideas that make sense, may have changed. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies for insights and options and could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches. That possibility is discussed here.

The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have even had a profound impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individual he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, when trouble began, a lack of good solutions, viable options for alternative actions, was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition to develop better answers. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters may have changed, and there might be a willingness, not to go off the rails, but to try novel ideas that make sense. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to garner ideas, insights and options that could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches unexpected in Western capitals. That possibility is discussed here. In Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies one might expect some well-accepted and well-used approaches to understanding Putin’s decisionmaking and rationalizing Russian Federation action based on what is known about its tactics, techniques, procedures and methods of doing things. Due to this, unexpected changes in his thinking might throw the West off-track to some degree, depending on what on-going approaches he hypothetically might change and how. The implications could be enormous. There remains a place for the bog standard analyses of Putin on some matters. However, with regard to Ukraine,  it is essential to get beyond thinking along well-worn lines and the expected and consider all possible eventualities.

For a over a decade, some of officials of the US foreign and national security policy apparatus have made their intense dislike greatcharlie and disapproval of its plainly innocuous scribblings well known to it. Nevertheless, for others, greatcharlie hopes its efforts here are not value neutral, particularly with regard to students. Although greatcharlie would be satisfied enough to have this commentary stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem. (I should prefer ineloquent good sense to loquacious folly.)

A confident Putin (above) at the February 21, 2023 Security Council meeting regarding Ukraine. Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin, expectations for future fruitful talks would be far lower now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. Facing such trying circumstances daily, Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 24, 2022. Putin has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that he, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster, at least until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

A New Putin?: Transformed by His Circumstances

Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin. there would be far lower expectations of future fruitful talks now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. They might find words from the play Henry the VIII. a collaborative effort between William Shakespeare and John Fletcher  might find most apposite concerning him. In Act IV, scene iii, Katherine, Henry VIII’s ex-wife, reduced to princess dowager, converses to her attendants about the death of Cardinal Wolsey. Wolsey, a once trusted advisor to the king, having failed to secure an annulment of Henry VIII’s first marriage, was removed from government, arrested for treason, grew ill, and died a broken man. Katharine though saying she will speak of him with charity proceeds to characterize him in the following negative way, saying: “His own opinion was his law: i’ the presence / He would say untruths; and be ever double / Both in his words and meaning: he was never, / But where he meant to ruin, pitiful.”

Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 2022. He has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that for, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

It is very likely that even Putin as much as anyone else was surprised by the limited level of control he could exercise over his use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces especially once they were placed on the battlefield in great numbers. Indeed, events have been so far off from anything Putin most likely wanted or foresaw in Ukraine, that one could hardly believe genuinely that he ever had full control of the situation and reasonably make only an attenuated argument in support of that belief. The poor thinking of Russian Federation commanders and the positively horrible outcomes of their actions was most likely another eye-opener for Putin.

Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.) In its preceding post, greatcharlie stated that the Russian Federation would unlikely win the Ukraine War based on the record of performance of Russian Federation commanders to date. However, it must be explained further that the situation they face is not impossible to crack. Military commanders of other countries, such as the US for instance, would more than likely readily see the correct course of action to “breakout” of the Western and Southern fronts. One might hypothesize that a zealous emphasis on Russian military history in the course of studies in the 30 schools of Voyenny uchebno-nauchny tsentr Sukhoputnykh voysk “Obshchevoyskovaya ordenov Lenina i Oktyabr’skoy revolyutsii, Krasnoznamennaya, ordena Suvorova” (The Combined Academies Order of Lenin Order of the October Revolution Red Bannered Order of Suvorov of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation-Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Russian Ground Forces), the equivalent of Western command and general staff schools and Voyennaya akademiya General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), what suffices for Western war colleges, and an apparent failure to encourage student officers to examine in the round the strategy, tactics, and the operational art displayed by other countries armed forces in other wars, has left Russian Federation commanders without the slightest idea of how closely their current situation in Ukraine parallels that of a number of commanders in other larger conflicts of the past. Case studies of such done by student officers that would have familiarized them with those past foreign commanders’ successful combined arms actions that allowed them to maneuver their forces out of trouble and gain and retain the initiative would have likely changed the course of the current war.

Spectemur agendo. (Let us be judged by our acts.) Still, even if Russian Federation commanders hypothetically came upon an historical or novel way to storm through the frontlines of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and put themselves in a position to do some “open field running,” it is hard to conceive of what would be their follow through to exploit success. Given their aberrant moves from the first day of the special military operation, it is difficult to imagine what for them would be priority objectives they would have in mind and why, whether they would intend to conquer all of Ukraine or limit themselves to securing certain useful territory. They surely would know by experience–disco inferno–or at least intimate that the Ukrainians would never tolerate any additional territorial gains in their country and in response to such a loss, build up stronger with the support of their allies, and strike back harder than ever before. Another rapid “dagger thrust” at Kyiv would be counterintuitive. One would expect Putin would have the most say in what to do next. Under this hypothetical situation, he would likely publicly or through classified orders, express his objectives for the next phase of the war, and from that, the concept and intent for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would be established. 

Equally difficult to imagine in this hypothetical circumstance is what could potentially be planned under Putin’s concept and intent, given the likely remaining strength of units in contact with the Ukrainians, shortages in weapons systems, ammunition, other supplies, and authentic forecasts of future casualties and expenditures of military resources. All of that would likely preclude plans to do anything big. To that extent, it is hard to see even under the most favorable circumstances where this whole enterprise is going for Putin. (Discernibly, greatcharlie to a great degree here mimics the worst sort of strict (toxic) instructor. However, no lessons are being offered.)

Assuredly, Putin had influenced some decisions in the field such as the move against Kyiv early on in the invasion. In preceding posts, greatcharlie previously discussed what it felt was his likely role in that fiasco. However, Putin more than likely had no idea what in actual fact needed to be done to succeed, and worse, was completely unaware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces were to successfully perform the mission he gave them. Likely believing everything else had been planned in a proper manner and prepared in the appropriate way, he doubtlessly could not have imagined that any “minimal input” from him on taking Kyiv could have so negatively shaped the entire picture of the operation.

To gnaw a bit further, if Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Maybe Putin could have micromanaged the military if he had earnestly made the effort after becoming Russian Federation President to develop the acumen to act as a quasi strategist and tactician, at least at a level greater than Shoigu and at a proficiency somewhat better than Gerasimov. Perhaps he could have accomplished this in the model of the guerilla fighters, Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi-Minh, or build on the military or paramilitary experiences that he had in government resemblant of US President Franklin Roosevelt, who, for seven years and throughout World Wat I, was an assistant secretary of the Navy, or United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who albeit he was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, a decorated British Army officer, twice served as First Lord of the Admiralty. However, none of that happened for Putin. (Goodness, greatcharlie can only imagine what the backlash of some readers would have been if it had suggested there was some firm comparison of Roosevelt and Churchill with Putin. Á la Berezina!)

Although it is not discussed in this manner much in the newsmedia, it possibly could have been a terrible emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when he has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine to hear that an insider, his fidus Achates Prigozhin, was ready to take his Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) out of Ukraine. The Wagner Group, Putin’s ride or die–as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. As described briefly in greatcharlie’s May 15, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries. The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

A screenshot from a video published on May 5, 2023 depicting Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin (above) announcing the organization’s planned exit from the fierce struggle in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Although it has not been parsed in the round in the international newsmedia, it surely must have been an emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine that Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) was ready to leave Ukraine. The Wagner Group–Putin’s “ride or die”, as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. The organization expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would surely say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

Where Is the Good Advice?

Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual may be facing, often the presumption from the outside is that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his “trauma smile” does its job of hiding what is going inside.. Satisfied with appearances, few would investigate further into the matter with vigor, especially if what might result from that exploration would not “harmonize” with recognized perceptions of said individual at high-levels of management. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. For a deeper dive, one would only need to consider in real terms what the inner conversation must be for the individual in question. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie took a look at what Putin’s inner conversation might have been at the time examining an historical example from Antiquity. (Usually, the potency of works from Antiquity is immediately apparent.) In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3 of The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 B.C. – c. 425 B.C.), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle, Demaratus. 

Herotodus writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.” This passage of The Histories underscores the reality that even in a past age when leaders were viewed as something just short of gods, or actually as gods, there was the recognition that no matter how wise, there were things they could not know, things they could not control. 

The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before. The course of the invasion of Ukraine, the result of which he was certain of, may have left less doubt, if any, on the correctness of this hypothetical hope of his. 

True, Putin could choose to stumble forward against all the odds and eke-out whatever existence life presents after the Ukraine War at great personal loss for himself and the Russian Federation. However, that appears unlikely. If the records can serve as evidence, he will likely continue on the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022. That may mean triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West–that began during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the death of which he mourned with considerable grief.

Putin (above) attends the Collective Security Treaty Organization Leaders Meeting in Yerevan, Armenia on November 23, 2022. If Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have fully recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Unlike the aforementioned Xerxes of Persia, for Putin there is no uncle and general as Demaratus, to put him in the full, genuine picture of what he faces and authentic possibilities for action. Perhaps even more, someone to stimulate genius. Holding its focus upon the Ancient World, greatcharlie is unaware of any equivalents of the Ephors of Sparta to whom Putin can turn. An Ephor (Overseer) discussed in intermittently–yet too often to properly cite here–in the Hellenica (c. 362 BC) by the Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC), was a member of a board of five magistrates in Sparta, annually elected by the body of eligible voting citizens. They were experienced and wise individuals whose advice was worth a king’s ransom. Ephors had an extensive range of judicial, religious, legislative, and military powers, and could shape Sparta’s domestic and foreign affairs. Their primary responsibility, however, was to oversee the actions of Spartan kings. They could critique a ruler’s plans for war,use their extra powers to reel in a ruler, and reproach them for the unsound actions. This had greater necessity and meaning due to the fact that Sparta was ruled by two hereditary kings of the Agiad and Eurypontid families, both supposedly descendants of Heracles and equal in authority, so that one could not act against the power and political enactments of his colleague. In concept, the Ephors’ purpose was akin to that of a US Congressional Oversight Committee, mutatis mutandis, for executives of foreign and national security bureaucracies who must often face withering inquiries on their policy plans or ongoing initiatives, among many other issues. In greatcharlie’s May 15. 2023 post entitled “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, it was briefly mentioned that the US Congress established the War Powers Act of 1973 in the wake of the Vietnam War to gain a better handle on the ability of the US President to intervene with the armed forces. In the Congress, stronger action toward chief executives whose actions were deemed out of bounds by the majority of Representatives has included impeachment proceedings. (Recognizably, Congress unfortunately in more recent times has overreached on simple matters as simple as phone calls preferring to react upon impressions, presumptions, and political and public pressure, than actualities. Perhaps it could be chalked up to human nature, human fallibility.)

The situations presented in the two examples from past and present noted here are quite different from that of Putin. In accord with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President is elected directly by popular vote, is head of state, and chief of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government, headed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President with a legislature’s approval. Legislative power is vested in the two houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, an upper house of appointed representatives from each of Russia’s administrative divisions, and the State Duma, a 450-member popularly elected lower house. Still, it is the President’s office and the government ministries which issue numerous legally binding by-laws. 

All of this being stated, the common wisdom is that Putin is an autocrat who holds near limitless power under the system he created. On foreign and national security policy, he faces no obstructions concerning his decisionmaking on diplomacy and war. Putin has no need to end-run the Federal Assembly, no need to heed advice as precious as that of the Ephors from Senators of the Federal Council of Representatives of the State Duma. He runs the whole show. Managing the internal affairs of the Russian Federation on its own is a colossal task, and surely as a one man show, Putin has made his share of mistakes and is bound to make more mistakes into future. He is not a deity; as aforementioned, he is only human. Taking on not only Ukraine militarily but the wherewithal of nearly every Western country and others, without relinquishing on scintilla of responsibility for normal duties, there would be the likelihood that he would drop an almighty clanger. Perhaps the Ukraine venture could best be described as a blunder of a lifetime.

Beneath the Surface

Alios ego vidi ventos, alias prospexi animo procellas. (I have seen other winds and faced other storms.) Putin may secretly worry that good answers may never be found, not even mere acceptable ones to his problems regarding Ukraine. As already hinted, everything he has, his hopes, his future, the future he has planned for his country, are under the real threat of dissolution. His imagination would not be at work overtime on these points. Indeed, such thoughts may be unfixed, moving about freely in his mind, perhaps billowing up at inconvenient moments. Among ordinary individuals, such thoughts can break through the strongest defense the mind can raise against them. Putin is not outwardly despondent, although there have been public moments when he was not exactly his usual self.

Surely, it would be one thing if Putin had brought disaster and suffering upon himself alone by his actions. That would pain him, but he would almost certainly be able to carry it well.  Casualty lists from Ukraine are likely far more difficult for him to carry. Unless one has faced similar circumstances, one might safely say it is hard to imagine–surely impossible for greatcharlie to imagine–how it all must feel. Perhaps the situation would be made far worse if the Russian people had decided to light on him over the war’s progress, but that has not happened. 

In a poll of Russian Federation citizens on the direct question of whether they supported the war conducted by the independent and well-known research group in the country, the Levada Center, it was found that respondents who said yes fluctuated between 74 and 76 percent in April 2022 and August 2022, declined to about 71 to 74 percent in September 2022 and December 2022, and climbed back to around 75 percent to 77 percent in January 2023 and February 2023. The Levada Center utilizes face-to-face polling. In a poll on support for the war conducted by The Chronicle, a one year-old polling group, it was found that support rose in the first months of the war from 59 to 66 percent. Support then declined to 51 percent, its lowest point, at the end of September 2022. Yet, by February 2023, support rose upward again to 59 percent. The Chronicle conducted its polling by telephone. The Chronicle also offered respondents the option “I do not want to answer” in addition to the usual “undecided” option, which reduced the share of both war supporters and war opponents. The recent polling start-up, The Russian Field, conducted a survey which indicated support for the war rose to nearly 60 percent at its start and then stabilized at about 66–68 percent.  The Russian Field also used the telephone survey method.

Clearly, support for the war is nowhere near overwhelming, yet given its progress it still appears rather high. Any external effort to create the impression that there is no support for the war among Russian Federation citizens or an effort to stir sentiment against Putin would most likely fall flat. There is likely no greater priority for Borrnikov than to make certain that is the case. While considering Putin’s effort to get a hold of his thinking on all that has transpired and what he must do next, the lyrics of singer-songwriter James Taylor’s 1970 hit “Fire and Rain” were brought to mind. The apposite lines are: “Been walking my mind to an easy time / My back turned towards the sun / Lord knows, when the cold wind blows / It’ll turn your head around / Well, there’s hours of time on the telephone line / To talk about things to come / Sweet dreams and flying machines in pieces on the ground.”

A somber Putin (above) attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual has been facing, it is often the presumption from the outside that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his trauma smile does its job of hiding what is going inside them. Satisfied with appearances, few would invest much more into the matter. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside of the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before.

Throwing a Curveball at the West

As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given the Kremlin’s Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. At the same time, individuals as Putin can often have unique reasons for singular choices. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might cause him to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be the state of Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing but nevertheless distressing curveball at the West. 

If only out of academic interest, greatcharlie considers how seeking answers from outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies could potentially be useful to Putin, and what the potential outcome of quietly taking such an unexpected course might assist in fostering new ideas and approaches in the Kremlin. No matter how unorthodox, disagreeable, or round the bend as they might seem, it might behoove some managers in US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to consider it and other possible, albeit recherché, eventualities and apply them in analyzing Putin’s decisionmaking process. Doing so might serve to improve the chances at accurately predicting any “unexpected” moves. (In previous posts concerning the conundrum of the very successful and unhindered Chinese intelligence operations within the US, greatcharlie benignly made the suggestion that US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies make use of those capable of performing analyses of the situation from outside the box.)

Over the years of Putin’s leadership, a small number of organizations in the Russian Federation have been invited to share their views through studies and presentations with the government on foreign and national security policy issues. At the top of the heap are: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Russian International Affairs Council, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Given their size, political contacts, and financial means, these organizations are able to dominate the think tank scene in the Russian Federation. As aptly put by the Atlantic Council in a November 12, 2019 report, they represent albeit from different ideological angles, the rather volatile mainstream. If novel ideas and insights are being developed those organizations, it would seem they are being put forward at glacial speed. Indeed, the indications and implications of what Moscow continues to do are that nothing Putin has received so far from what might suffice for “outside the bureaucracies advice” has had the power to moved events forward Moscow’s way in a manner befitting a power of the size, strength, and prominence in the world–at least from Putin’s lens.

Putin signing documents, including a decree recognizing two Russian-backed breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine as independent entities, during a ceremony in Moscow, Russia, February 21, 2022. As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given their Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might lead Putin to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing, but nevertheless distressing, curveball at the West.

As aforementioned, greatcharlie, without pretension, states that it doubts anyone at the Kremlin is aware of, or would  have the slightest interest in, its scribblings. However, there is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide advice for Putin concerning the prosecution of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. If any readers feel that anything as such is being offered to Putin, then it would surely be unreasonable for them in particular to continue reviewing this commentary with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

A reality about analytical departments of foreign and national security bureaucracies worldwide is that certain dogma insinuates itself in work produced within them, and it can color the thinking of consumers of that product. Supervisors in the analytical departments, knowingly and occasionally unknowingly because it would only be human, may place limitations on what paths, albeit even reasonable and logical ones, that analyses can move along. By using perspectives from outside of the foreign and national security bureaucracies, one could possibly garner a fresh look at issues from other angles. New thinking might rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. Condescendingly, some from the inside Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outside of the bureaucracies thinkers as mere shots in the dark, guesswork, and suppositions, from those perceived as lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to the Ukraine issue. With no intent to offend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. 

One looking for fresh, viable solutions would expect and perhaps want “outside of the bureaucracies” thinking to move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in singular cases such as Ukraine that may be hard to crack. What the outside of the bureaucracies thinker brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies thinker. One might suppose the length and breadth of the outside of the bureaucracies thinkers’ distinctive knowledge and unique life lessons are what found their alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been acquired through personal study. Of course, bog-standard thinking would still have its place in other simpler issues.

Each reason shared here concerning a hypothetical decision by Putin to seek assistance for ideas and insights outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies is suggestive of itself. Together they have a cumulative force. At the same time, one could also conjure more than one reason to doubt this outcome. As mentioned, Putin has not as yet taken any unorthodox approaches in his handling of the Ukraine matter or any other foreign or national security policy matters. Some observers might argue that there are distinct patterns in his decisionmaking. Deviations from his standard course would be as shockingly noticeable, to steal a phrase from one of Arthur Conan Doyle’s 56 Sherlock Holmes short stories, “The Adventure of the Bruce-Partington Plans” (1917): “as if you met a tram-car coming down a country lane.” (One could easily imagine seeing such in a film created by Austrian director Marie Kreutzer.) To double-dunk on Doyle’s work, one might say that Putin has his rails and he runs on them, so to speak. However, perhaps one disappointment after another in Ukraine may not have derailed him, but may have stirred some interest in possibly switching at the points to an alternative rail untravelled by him before. What is being considered here is not just Putin’s attitudes and behaviors in spite of his experiences with Ukraine, but the possibility of some alterations in such because of those experiences. To that extent, one might also argue that the record of his two decades of leadership in the Russian Federation actually shows that Putin’s mind has its quirks, and in that respect it is as individual and curious as any other. As Maurice de Saxe (October 28, 1696-November 20, 1750) the famed military commander of the 18th century stated in the preface of his Mes Rêveries (My Reveries) (1757), “routine and prejudices are . . . a natural consequence of ignorance.”

At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, its citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances following even the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. (Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) 

To that extent, perhaps scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. 

Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. In the end, it would be enough of a tragedy to find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

File photo of Putin as a young KGB officer (above). At an early age, Putin revealed to his parents that he wanted to work in the security services. The genesis of the idea were books and spy movies. Putin says his mother and father, with the help of his martial arts coaches, tried to dissuade him from his career choice given the nature of the work and people within such organizations, but to no avail. A few years later, his dream became a reality. Perhaps today scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing its possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them.  Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

In Part 2, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that at an early age, he wanted to serve in intelligence. His family was dismayed, but not shattered by his decision. His father, given his experience in the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, was painfully aware of the grave nature of work in that field. However, once they became fully apprised of the extreme nature of his ambition to join the intelligence service, his parents sought to discourage him as best they could. When Putin’s martial arts coach, Anatoly Rakhlin, who he fondly called “Semyonovich”, went to see them to say that as an athlete, their son could get into an Institute practically without passing exams, that led his parents to pressure the coach to encourage him to go into an Institute. Putin, however, disagreed with the idea. Semyonovich could not fathom why Putin resisted. Another coach from Putin’s martial arts club, Leonid Ionovich, came to visit, fully informed of his decision to join the intelligence service. As Putin explained it, “He was a clever guy.” Recounting the exchange with Ionovich over his career choice, Putin said the following: “‘Well,’ he [Ionovich] said to me, ‘Where are you going?’ Of course he already knew. He was just acting sly. I said, ‘To university.’ ‘Oh, that’s great, good for you,’ he said. In what department?'” Putin says he only replied, “The law school.” Then, Ionovich roared: “What? To catch people? What are you doing? You’ll be a cop. Do you understand?” Insulted, Putin yelled back, “I’m not going to be a cop.” (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.) Putin would hardly be surprised if very few who truly had much to offer would come forward knowing they were hearing similar things about serving his government that those who cared deeply about him said concerning his interest in getting anywhere near the Soviet intelligence service

Quomodo in perpetua pace salvi et liberi esse poterimus? (How (in what way) will we be able to be safe and free in everlasting (an enduring) peace?) Returning to the idea of seeking answers from analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, on the face of it,  surely it would  be unwise for Putin not to avail himself of their services if they could be of assistance. Additionally mentioned in Book 2, Chapter 4, Section 31, Book 3, Chapter 4, Section 11, and  Book 4, Chapter 5, Section 6 of Xenophon’s Hellenica are the embassies. (The role of the embassies is also discussed in Herodotus (c. 484-c. 425 BC) The Histories (c. 426 BCE-c. 415 BCE) in Book 5, Chapter 49-51 and in Thucydides (c. 460 BC–400 BC) The History of the Peloponnesian War (c. 430 BC) Book 2, Chapter 12, Section I and Book 8, Chapter 5, Section I.)

As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracies thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than a mouse and as solid as Stonehenge. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, ideas and insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. 

Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

Again, this is all hypothetical. It is possible that defeating any hypothetical outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies approaches potentially taken by Moscow would only require the energetic preparation for such a possibility by repeatedly considering and working through all of the “what-ifs”, the possible eventualities, on an appropriate schedule.

Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov (above). As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracy thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than mouse and as solid as Stonehenge, that may help resolve the Ukraine conundrum. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

The Way Forward

It remains to be seen what will come next. In Act II, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play, All’s Well That Ends Well (1623), standing in the King’s Palace, Lafeu, an old lord at the court of France, opens the scene with the comment regard the king’s miraculous recovery: “They say miracles are past; and we have our / philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, / things supernatural and causeless. Hence is it that / we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves / into seeming knowledge, when we should submit / ourselves to an unknown fear.” While greatcharlie has not come across a cogent argument proving that events in Ukraine represent something supernatural or that one should submit to fears of the unknown, there is pertinence in the statement that trifles should not be made of terrors, especially as they regard nuclear war or that feel assured at all about Putin’s next moves. 

What stands near certain is whatever measurable degree of peace and security existed before the invasion of Ukraine will unlikely be restored. Each side in this conflict seems bent upon ensuring the other will not find satisfaction with any agreement that would obviate complete victory. An authentic forecast for the situation could only project a situation worse than before or the worst thing imaginable. When things are very wrong, one must remember they can always be worse. One only needs to imagine the possibilities. At least, there is a clear choice for both sides: take an albeit uncomfortable step toward peace; or, let things play out as they are moving now. Neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quit non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. (There is no one who loves pain itself, who seeks it and wants to have it, simply because it is pain, but because sometimes circumstances arise in such a way that with effort and pain they can obtain some great pleasure.)

Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations

Wagner Group troops filmed in action from a Ukrainian Armed Forces drone in the town of Popansa on May 4, 2022 (above). In the image, a Wagner Group squad is involved in intense street fighting with Ukrainian troops. The Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation whose units have been deployed to bolster the number of Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. From the start of the special military operation, Moscow has used paid fighters to bolster its forces. However, Russian Federation commanders, displaying a remarkable lack of military acumen across the board, have used Wagner Group troops, and some of their own, essentially as “suicide squads” or “cannon fodder” to achieve less than important objectives. This is especially true with regard to Wagner Group “penal units” which have suffered high-profile casualties. The use of this tact is hardly novel. Here, greatcharlie discusses four military formations which in fairly recent history were created and utilized by their respective governments on the battlefield much as the Wagner Group in Ukraine, mutantis mutandis. In each case, military commanders could provide what they believed were clear, logical, and plausible explanations for their respective choices.

As alluded to in greatcharlie’s preceding January 31, 2023 post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, there is a strange buoyancy and caustic ebullience that seems to have overcome some in the Western newsmedia concerning videos recorded of the daily slaughter of members of Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) by the hundreds in Ukraine. Those videos are broadcasted and streamed online by several newsmedia houses without end: cui bono? On immediate impression, one might presume its is the product of newsmedia managers possessing a seemingly seared conscience or spliced moral cord, who perchance, mutatis mutandis, are not too different in their callous thinking from those who started the war. Yet, despite how disagreeable such reporting may be to greatcharlie, recognizably, it has been considerably helpful in shining a spotlight upon the positively callous and diabolical practice of Russian Federation commanders to force their troops to waste their lives for meager gains. This is especially true as some military experts have already judged to be a lost cause in Ukraine. Many of the newsmedia stories on the slaughter of Russian Federation troops have focused on the abysmal losses of Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group).

The Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation whose units have been deployed to bolster the number of Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. From the start of the special military operation, Russia has used paid fighters to bolster its forces. In April 2022, it was estimated to have initially deployed between 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries, including Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. To increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut. It is most apparent that misperception, and not reality, had driven top Russian Federation commanders’ decisionmaking on the battlefield in Ukraine. Coping with the situation as it actually stands presently has been better than challenging for them. Some aspects of their struggle such as the wasteful expenditure of their own troops but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops, believing that tact will somehow serve to bring forth victory, seems to escaped any alteration.

The use of the ugly and unnerving tact of essentially throwing troops at an opponent is hardly novel. In modern times, the remarkable idea of using one’s own their own troops essentially as “suicide squads” or “cannon fodder” to achieve less the important objectives was given birth in many countries. Casting one’s mind back again to its preceding January 31, 2023 post, there, greatcharlie considered the line of thought that resides in the minds of commanders of Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield that would allow them to use their troops so carelessly and callously, centering its examination on parallels in Union Army and Russian Federation commanders’ thinking and behavior respectively at the Battle of the Crater, a calamitous episode of the US Civil War and present-day in Ukraine. It was noted that there are countless cases in military history when frightfully high casualties have been suffered in actions on the battlefield that never held hope of accomplishing anything except the destruction of the units sent out to fight. The main focus of the discussion here are four military formations which in fairly recent history were created and utilized by their respective governments on the battlefield much as the Wagner Group in Ukraine. There was little to no regard for their troops’ well-being. In nearly every case, though, those who sent them out to futile fights could provide what they believed were clear, logical, and plausible explanations for their respective choices. Omnia mala exempla ex rebus bonis orta sunt. (Every bad precedent originated as a justifiable measure.)

Wagner Group troops in Ukraine pose for photo (above). Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, over a decade ago, the Wagner Group were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Vladimir Putin while Russian Federation Prime Minister in an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). The Wagner Group first appeared in Ukraine in 2014, where it participated in the annexation of Crimea.

More on the Wagner Group

While publications and online Information regarding Wagner Group is readily available and the organization is well-known and been well-studied among military analysts, greatcharlie believes it is necessary to at least offer some baseline of facts about it. The hope is to some degree help equalize among readers as to what it is all about, particularly undergraduate and graduate students who constitute the largest portion of greatcharlie’s readership. (The discussion could possibly serve as a basis for their own discoveries.) As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). 

It is alleged by some that the Wagner Group was founded by Dmitriy Utkin, a veteran of the First and Second Chechen Wars. Until 2013, Utkin served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of the 700th Independent Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Detachment) of the 2nd Independent Brigade, a special forces unit of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Much speculation exists over the choice of Wagner as the organization’s name. On dit, the group’s name comes from Utkin’s own call sign “Wagner”, reportedly after the 19th century German composer Richard Wagner. Utkin–a member of Putin’s ethno-religious nationalist circle–supposedly picked Wagner due to his alleged infatuation with the Third Reich (Note that Nazi Germany’s Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler’s favorite composer was Wagner). Additionally, some have presumed Utkin is a full-blown  neo-Nazi because, as reported by the Economist, he has several Nazi tattoos. It is further alleged that some members of the Wagner Group have been linked to white supremacist and neo-Nazi far-right extremists. This allegation is particularly directed at members of Wagner’s openly far-right and supposedly neo-Nazi Task Force Rusich, simply reference Rusich within the organization. Other circumstantial evidence to support such theories is the fact that Wagner members have left neo-Nazi graffiti on the battlefield.

Conclusions about members of the Wagner Group and neo-Nazism are juxtaposed with their role in promoting the ethno-religious nationalism espoused by the Russian Federation’s present leadership. To the extent that Wagner Group members are understood by the regime to be dedicated solely to the values and interests of Putin’s Russia, the Russian President–a self-declared fervent anti-Nazi–awarded Utkin and three other Wagner Group’s senior commanders, Alexander Kuznetsov, Andrey Bogatov and Andrei Troshev, with the Order of Courage and the title Hero of the Russian Federation at Kremlin reception to mark the Day of Heroes of the Fatherland. (Kuznetsov is alleged to be the commander of Wagner’s 1st Reconnaissance and Assault Company, Bogatov was identified as the commander of the 4th Reconnaissance and Assault Company, and allegedly, Troshev was identified as the Wagner Group’s “executive director”.) One would suppose that Putin would hardly award a group of neo-Nazis with such honors. Putin surely would know if they were neo-Nazis.

Gnawing a bit further at the neo-Nazi issue, those analyzing Wagner Group members might consider that in the case of the Wagner Group, any Nazi symbols may not be used by members as a sign of their adherence to a depraved, well-worn political expression, but a readily available means to express that there was a desire to be harmfully malicious in their undertakings. If anything, their reported use of Nazi symbols would more likely manifest their wish to somehow express the evil, the homicidal ideation and ill-will that exists within them and around which the thoughts of senior commanders of Wagner very likely circle. Certainly, through the use of such symbols, the likely aim is to induce and instill terror among opponents and observers alike. For most individuals, the sight of a swastika is far more disturbing than the sight of a pentagram. None this is meant to suggest the members of the Wagner Group are simply tearaways making nuisances of themselves. They are indeed very dangerous men, and it takes a lot to deal with them. Laisser s’établir des amalgames primaires, assimilant immaturité masculine toxique et néo-nazisme.

The indications and implications of all that has been observed about the organization by various journalists may alternatively be that the Wagner Group is actually demonic in nature. Surely, its members by their action have shown a hatred mankind and the whole wide world, and an intent is to disrupt, or better destroy, in order to sow chaos and conflict. None of this is to suggest that the Wagner Group is some Satanic cult. However, the Wagner Group’s activities have never been aimed at improving the lives of people anywhere. Intriguingly, it is very apparent that often tragic consequences have beset those who have chosen to join, associate with, or briefly come in contact with, the organization. That has certainly been the case for the organization’s usual volunteers as well all those who have formed its penal units who have been sent into Ukraine. What contact the Wagner Group has meant, or will mean, for Putin and the Russian Federation Armed Forces is open to debate. Having stated all of this, the organization, surely is not supernatural, and can be and has been defeated on the battlefield. In Syria, February 2018, there was the singular case of a large unit Wagner Group troops encountered a small detachment of US Special Forces soldiers at their base at a refinery in the town of Khasham. The US Special Forces defenders, making effective use of air support and artillery, dealt a devastating blow to the Wagner Group troops. (For more on that event, see greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine”.)

From another albeit “spiritual” angle, reportedly some closely associated with the Wagner Group leadership claim many are followers of the Slavic Native Faith, Rodnover. Indeed, along that vein, reportedly, anonymous members of Wagner Group have insisted that Utkin is a Rodnover. In the Routledge International Handbook of Religion in Global Society (Routledge, 2020), it is stated that Wagner Group members insist that Utkin is a ssuredly a Rodnover. Under Rodnover  theology, there is the belief in an absolute, supreme God (Rod) who begets the universe, lives as the universe, and is present in all its phenomena. Among Rodnovers, there is the belief that their religion is a faithful continuation of the ancient beliefs of the Slavs that survived as a folk religion following their Christianization during the Middle Ages.

The owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin (center), poses for a nighttime photo with his troops on the frontlines in Ukraine. In August 2017, a Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak made the suggestion that Yevgeny Prigozhin was owner of the Wagner Group, a role he had constantly denied. At the time, Prigozhin was already recognized as a member of Putin’s coterie. An intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds considerable standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. He is affectionately called “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin became heavily involved in matters concerning the special military operation in Ukraine especially since massive numbers of troops from his organization were operating there. Prigozhin has made his judgments concerning the incompetence and fidelity of Russian Federation Armed Force’s top commanders as Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov very clear and very public.

Wer ist dein mysteriöser Chef? It was in August 2017, Yeni Şafak, a Turkish newspaper, made the suggestion that Utkin was only a figurehead for the company. The individual later revealed to be the owner of the Wagner Group was the Yevgeny Prigozhin. Now well-recognized as a pivotal player in the Russian Federation war effort in Ukraine, as well as an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin, called “Putin’s chef”, because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, was known to have ties with the Wagner Group and Utkin personally. For quite a while, Prigozhin even denied any communication with the Wagner Group. Prigozhin actually sued Bellingcat, Meduza, and Echo of Moscow for claiming he had links to the organization. In an interview in December 2018, Putin also denied allegations that Prigozhin had been directing the Wagner Group’s activities. However, in September 2022, Prigozhin relented and admitted having created the group. Prigozhin claimed, “I cleaned the old weapons myself, sorted out the bulletproof vests myself and found specialists who could help me with this. From that moment, on May 1, 2014, a group of patriots was born, which later came to be called the Wagner Battalion.”

Prigozhin has made his judgments well-known to Putin concerning the incompetence and fidelity of Russian Federation Armed Force’s top commanders as Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. He has also made his views on the matter very public. Et monere at moneri proprium est verae amitcitiae. (It is a characteristic of friendship to give advice and to receive it.)

Among standing units of the Wagner Group is the aforementioned Rusich. It is referred to as a “sabotage and assault reconnaissance group”, which has been fighting as part of the Russian separatist forces in eastern Ukraine. The Wagner Group is believed to have a Serb unit, which was, until at least April 2016, under the command of Davor Savičić, a Bosnian Serb.  Savičić reportedly was a member of the Serb Volunteer Guard, known as “Arkan’s Tigers” during the Bosnian War and the Special Operations Unit (JSO) during the Kosovo War. A new unit in the Wagner Group consists of citizens of Scandinavian countries, in particular, from Norway. It has participated in the firefights on the Bakhmut front. The unit is referred to as the Níðhöggr“, sometimes also known as Nidhogg. Níðhöggr is one of the great serpents (dragons) in Norse mythology. The snake gnaws at the roots of the Yggdrasil tree (the world tree symbolizing the universe), and also devours sinners. Dragons have been seen upon various patches of this unit in the field.

Typically, Wagner Group fighters are retired regular Russian Fedrration Armed Forces servicemen aged between 35 and 55. Their pay was once alleged to be between 80,000 and 250,000 Russian rubles a month which the rough equivalent of $667 to $2,083. It was recently suggested by one source that their pay was as substantial as 277,200 Russian rubles or US$3,500. Nulla salus bello. (There is no security in war.) It is widely known that since July 2022, the Wagner Group’s chief, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. Prigozhin possesses the authority to promise prison inmates that in return for agreeing to fight in Ukraine, are promised the termination of their prison sentences and a salary for six months. Indeed, the Wagner Group offers 200,000 rubles ($2,700 approximately) and amnesty for six months of “voluntary” service in Ukraine. Reportedly, a death benefit of 5 million rubles is provided to their relatives if they were killed in action. The recruitment of prison inmates for service in the Wagner Group is nothing new. The organization reportedly recruited imprisoned UPC rebels in the Central African Republic to fight in Mali and Ukraine. They are reportedly nicknamed the “Black Russians”. However, as noted earlier, it is these newly raised penal units that Russian Army commanders typically send to attack Ukrainian positions in frontal assaults, allowing them to identify defenses for the artillery to bombard. The tactic has proven marginally effective, but nonetheless it is a most apparent display of archaic wartime callousness. The troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose.

Curiously, a possible way to look at the conundrum Russian Federation Armed Forces face might be that they are essentially shipwrecked in Ukraine. Since retreat was never an option, from the moment the situation went sour, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. To that extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be their saving grace–Prigozhin might say the rescuers–of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. However, it was not long before everyone realized that they were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

 

Prigozhin in conversation with Russian Federation prison inmates about service in Ukraine with the Wagner Group. is widely known that since July 2022, the Wagner Group’s chief, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. Prigozhin possessed the authority to promise prison inmates that in return for agreeing to fight in Ukraine, are promised the termination of their prison sentences and a salary for six months. of “voluntary service”, and a death benefit for their relatives if they were killed in action. It is these newly raised penal units that Russian Army commanders typically send to attack Ukrainian positions in frontal assaults, allowing them to identify defenses for the artillery to bombard. The tactic has proven effective, but nonetheless it is a most apparent display of archaic wartime callousness. The troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose.

The Image of Penal Units and Suicide Squads Created by Hollywood

What many of a certain generation commonly know about prisoner volunteering for special units in wartime perhaps is perhaps drawn from Hollywood through films as the iconic 1967 hit, “The Dirty Dozen.” The film, directed by Robert Aldrich and produced during the Vietnam War era, was a representation of Pop Culture of the 1960s. It told the fictional story of OSS Major Reisman, who is an insubordinate US Army officer facing a court-martial, when he is allowed one last chance for a reprieve. He was given the mission to  select 12 Army prisoners from a maximum-security detention center, train them for a top-secret mission behind the German lines, and then lead them into battle. If they succeed in the mission, they will be released. Throughout the film the higher levels of the US military are depicted as deeply flawed, and nearly every effort was made by the military bureaucracy to thwart his efforts. Riesman succeeded by breaking through red tape and turned those characters representing the riffraff of the military into the heroes.

Interestingly enough, the screenplay was based on author E. M. Nathanson’s 1965 bestseller which was founded on the story of an actual unit of demolition specialists of the 101st Airborne Division that operated behind enemy lines during World War II dubbed the “Filthy Thirteen”. It has been suggested that another inspiration for the screenplay was the story of an unusual public offer to US President Franklin Roosevelt by 44 prisoners serving life sentences at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary to serve in the Pacific on suicide missions against imperial Japan. A number of special units were created by the US during World War II to take on very dangerous and challenging missions against Nazi German and Imperial Japanese forces. They were not penal units or suicide squads.They were essentially what would today be called special operations units, highly trained for such missions. Among the more commonly known were: the US Army Rangers; the US 6th Army Special Reconnaissance Unit (Alamo Scouts); the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), (Merrill’s Marauders); the Marine Raiders (Carlson’s Raiders); the US Navy Underwater Demolition Teams/Frogmen; Doolitle’s Tokyo Raiders of the US Army Air Force; and, the US-Canadian 1st Special Service Force. During World War II, penal units and suicide squads were more popular within the totalitarian regimes of both the Allied and Axis sides.

These men have been alleged to be members of a Shtrafbat standing stripped of their ranks, medals and orders, awaiting instructions (above). The individual in the foreground appears to be a political officer.. The Shtrafbat were military penal battalions in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Army suffered one catastrophic defeat after another, at the hands of the Nazi German Army. It had been driven all the way back to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The leadership of the Soviet Union was unsure of how to reestablish military discipline and the motivation among troops to stand and fight. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin issued Order No. 227 in the summer of 1942 increased the number of Strafbats and expecting of them. Order No. 227, known popularly as “Ni shagu nazad!” (Not one step back!) required harsh punishments, including summary execution, for unauthorized retreats. Troops thrown into the Shtrafbats, known as Shtrafniki.

The Shtrafbat

Shtrafbats were military penal battalions in the Soviet Union. Dire circumstances on the Soviet Union’s Western Front in World War II, would lead to their use as suicide units against the Nazi German Army. Almost immediately upon the launch of the Nazi German Army’s Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet Army suffered one catastrophic defeat after another. The Soviet Army had been driven all the way back to Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The leadership of the Soviet Union was unsure of how to reestablish military discipline and the motivation among troops to stand and fight. Supposedly after learning of the Nazi German Army’s effective use of penal units, best known during the war as the Strafbatalllon–also discussed here–in combat, Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin issued Order No. 227 in the summer of 1942 increased the number of Strafbats and expecting of them. Order No. 227, known popularly as “Ni shagu nazad!” (Not one step back!) required harsh punishments, including summary execution, for unauthorized retreats. Troops thrown into the Shtrafbats, known as Shtrafniki, were stripped of their ranks, medals and orders. Although Shtrafniki were able to serve as junior commanders in their units, senior commanders were drawn from regular units, and often the best ones at that. Among the list of offenses that could result in assignment to a penal unit as a Shtrafnik included: cowardice in combat, desertion, neglect of military equipment, sabotage,and drunkenness.The maximum term of service in a penal unit for a convicted soldier was three months. After that, Shtrafniki were promised that their ranks and awards would be reinstated, and they would be returned to a conventional Soviet Army unit. Unlike the Shtrafniki, staff officers, company commanders, platoon leaders, political officers, and most junior commanders were assigned to the battalions on a permanent basis.

Some Shtrafniki were ordered to service in the Soviet Air Force and the Soviet Navteq, however, their most common use was in infantry roles. In infantry service, penal companies were allotted an authorized strength under Order No. 227 of 150 to 200 men. The strength authorized at the battalion level was originally set at 800. Shtrafbats initially served under the control of commanders of Armies. Later, Shtrafbats would be raised within Fronts (the equivalent of Army Groups). Infantry service was recognized by many Soviet prisoners as the equivalent of a death sentence. Theoretically, Shtrafniki could receive military decorations for outstanding service. However, there was also the possibility that Shtrafniki would be placed under suspicion for being politically disloyal. Those Shtrafniki who faced that fate would become targets of political officers and in many cases thay were persecuted even after the war ended. 

Soviet Army troops in the assault (above). To ensure Shtrafniki would advance as ordered, “zagraditel’nye otriady” (anti-retreat) detachments of the Soviet special organization known as Smert Shpionam (Death to spies) or SMERSH. When positioned as barrier troops, regular Soviet Army troops  could not be relied upon to carry out their orders with regard to retreating Shtrafniki. SMERSH blocking detachments positioned at the rear would aggressively respond to Shtrafniki who retreated. More significant punishments would befall Shtrafniki that were arrested and faced court martial on the drumhead. With no means to escape their fate, Shtrafniki would advance with reckless-abandon toward Nazi German lines until they were killed by mines, heavy machine-gun fire, or artillery. If any Shtrafniki managed to reach their objective or simply survive, they would be reassembled among fresh units and sent forward again. Occasionally, some Shtrafbat battalions executed their missions even when barrier troops were not positioned to their rear.

To ensure Shtrafniki would advance as ordered, ‘zagraditel’nye otriady’ (anti-retreat) detachments of the Soviet special organization known as Smert Shpionam (Death to spies) or SMERSH. When positioned as barrier troops, regular Soviet Army troops  could not be relied upon to carry out their orders with regard to retreating Shtrafniki. SMERSH blocking detachments positioned at the rear would aggressively respond to Shtrafniki who retreated. More significant punishments would befall Shtrafniki that were arrested and faced court martial on the drumhead. With no way or means to escape their fate, Shtrafniki would advance with reckless-abandon toward Nazi German lines until they were killed by mines, heavy machine-gun fire, or artillery. If any Shtrafniki managed to reach their objective or simply survive, they would be reassembled among fresh units and sent forward again. Occasionally, some Shtrafbat battalions faithfully executed their missions even without barrier troops positioned to their rear.

All of this sounds quite familiar with regard to the use of Wagner Group troops in Ukraine. The indications and implications are that there may actually be nothing that Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders plan to do to reduce the Wagner Group’s casualties as they may not see anything unorthodox or callous in the manner they use them. Perhaps, without any alteration, Russian Federation Armed Force will insist upon the continued slaughter of Wagner Group troops. There is much available for Zbroyni Syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) to exploit in a non-lethal way from this situation,  allowing it radically change the course of events concerning the war beyond the battlefield.

Members of a Nazi German Strafbataillon engaging in dangerous urban combat on thee Eastern Front (above). Strafbataillon (Penal Battalion) was the term used for penal units created with prisoners in all branches of Nazi Germany’s armed forces (Wehrmacht) that were held for both criminal and political offenses. It was in 1942, long after the war began, that the term Strafbataillon was widely used. The pre-war program for segregating soldiers deemed troublesome from others was known as Sonderabteilungen (Special Departments). Government policy then was to rebuild the armed forces by keeping “potential troublemakers” away from other troops, thereby preventing any “destructive elements” from interferring with their dutiful military service. Once World War II began, the role of the Strafbataillon was altered. Hitler conceived of a new way to effectively manage incarcerated members of the Wehrmacht as well as so-called subversives. To give them greater purpose, he issued an order stating any first-time convicted soldier could return to his unit after he had served a portion of his sentence in a special probation corps before the enemy. 

The Strafbataillon

Strafbataillon (Penal Battalion) was the term used for penal units created with prisoners in all branches of Nazi Germany’s armed forces (Wehrmacht) that were held for both criminal and political offenses. It was in 1942, long after the war began, that the term Strafbataillon was widely used. The pre-war program for segregating soldiers deemed troublesome from others was known as Sonderabteilungen (Special Departments). Government policy then was to rebuild the armed forces by keeping “potential troublemakers” away from other troops, thereby preventing any “destructive elements” from interferring with their dutiful military service. The number of Sonderabteilungen grew on May 21,1935, Nazi Germany’s Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler decreed that under the new Nazi Defense Act, any conscript who was deemed “unfit for military service because of subversive activity” would be arrested. Soldiers who were marked as disruptive to military discipline, yet “worthy of service”, would also be sent to military Sonderabteilungen. The objective of the penal units then became to change attitudes toward state and national policy while instilling a sense of duty, honor, and purpose. That was, however, achieved through harsh discipline and punishments, extensive indoctrination programs, and restrictions on home leave. Troops who conformed were eventually transferred to regular units. Those who remained undisciplined or continued to oppose the military were transferred to Sachsenhausen Concentration Camp. Before World War II, there were nine Sonderabteilungen within the Wehrmacht in Nazi Germany. According to estimates, between 3000 and 6000 Wehrmacht personnel passed through those special departments. A total of 320 dubbed “incorrigible rogues” were transported to concentration camps.

Once World War II began, the role of the Sonderabteilungen was altered again. Hitler conceived of a new way to effectively manage incarcerated members of the Wehrmacht as well as so-called subversives, and give them greater purpose. He issued an order stating any first-time convicted soldier could return to his unit after he had served a portion of his sentence in a special probation corps before the enemy. Eventually, the Sonderabteilungen were disbanded and a new formation, the Feld-Sonder Battalion (Special Field Battalion), was created and placed under the command of the Feldgendarmerie, the military police of the Wehrmacht that performed tasks as traffic control and population control behind the frontline as well as the suppression and execution of partisans and the apprehension of enemy stragglers. However, as the war continued, the need for more military personnel grew. To drive more military personnel to the battalions, military tribunals were directed by the Oberkommando Wehrmacht (the Nazi German Armed Forces High Command) to send incarcerated members of the Wehrmacht, as well as “subversives”, to what were named Bewährungsbataillone (Probation battalions). During World War II, more than 27,000 soldiers served a probation period in a Bewährungsbataillon. The initial unit was Bewährungsbataillon 500.  Service in Bewährungsbataillon 500 was intended to be unpleasant. The unit fought across the Eastern Front, and casualties were quite high. Troops assigned to the Bewährungsbataillone were expected to undertake dangerous operations at the front. Refusal entailed enforcement of the original sentence in Strafgefangenelager (punishment camps) in which conditions were scarcely better than in some concentration camps. Most convicted soldiers desired to regain their rights as citizens and lost honor. Thus, there was actually incentive among them to serve a probation period in Bewährungsbataillone despite the high battle losses suffered within those units, and morale within them was reportedly high. They were observed, evaluated, and commanded by selected officers, non-commissioned officers, and assigned enlisted men. Beginning in April 1941, convicted soldiers—even those sentenced to death—who had shown exceptional bravery or meritorious service were actually allowed to rejoin their original units. 

It was in 1943 that the penal units were more widely referred to as Strafbataillon, as noted earlier. The Strafbataillone were still serving under the control of the Feldgendarmerie, but were redeployed to conduct not only dangerous, but what were essentially suicide missions for the Heer (German Army) to include clearing minefields, assaulting difficult objectives and defending positions against overwhelming attacking forces. They were also made to do hard manual labor in positions under enemy observation and fire, building and repairing military structures such as bunkers and pillboxes as well as military infrastructure. A specially-formed military police force, Feldjägerkorps, would by its disciplinary actions help maintain the flow of troops to the Strafbataillone. The Feldjägerkorps was given the responsibility to maintain control and discipline throughout all the Wehrmacht as well as the Schutzstaffel (Protection Squadron) or SS. Feldjägerkorps units were formed from combat-decorated officers and noncommissioned officers. The force received its authority directly from Oberkommando Wehrmacht. The Feldjägerkorps units in the field could summarily execute officers or enlisted men for any breach of military discipline, order or duty. By September 1944, all soldiers and recruits who received a sentence of deferred execution in a drumhead court-martial from the Feldjägerkorps were sent directly to Strafbatallione which greatly increased their strength right up to the end of the war.

Strafbataillon troops of the Nazi German 999th Light Africa Division troops advance through town toward Allied positions (above). Major operations conducted by Strafbataillione on the Eastern Front included Kamianka, Ukraine, as well as at Gruzino and Sinyavino, near Leningrad. In October 1942, the 999. leichte Afrika-Division (999th Light Africa Division) was formed in Tunisia from civilian criminals and prison inmates who had been deemed “unfit for military service.” Indeed, a third of the 28,000 troops who joined the division were political prisoners from the concentration camps at Baumholder and Heuberg. They were encouraged to volunteer on the promise that all past crimes would be wiped out by exemplary bravery in combat. The 999th Light Africa Division initially fought in North Africa and later in the Soviet Union. Some units were also used as garrison troops in Greece and in the anti-partisan campaign, in the Balkans. 

Infanteriebataillone 500, 540, 550, 560, 561, and 609 were Strafbatallione engaged in major operations conducted on the Eastern Front including Kamianka, Ukraine, as well as at Gruzino and Sinyavino, near Leningrad. These units were supplied and treated nearly as normal units, but, as noted, were used for special dangerous missions. Presumably due to the fact that troop shortages were ubiquitous in units on the frontlines, often soldiers were allowed to fulfill their probation in their field unit. However, when their respective units were not at the front or did not engage in actions in which the soldiers could stand the test, they were transferred to one of these Infanteriebataillone. In October 1942, the 999. leichte Afrika-Division (999th Light Africa Division) was formed in Tunisia ffroma hodge-podge of civilian criminals and military prison inmates who had been deemed Wehrunwürdig (unfit for military service). A third of the 28,000 troops who joined the division were political prisoners from the concentration camps at Baumholder and Heuberg. They were encouraged to volunteer on the promise that all past crimes would be wiped out by exemplary bravery in combat. Although the 999th Light Africa Division fought in North Africa, the fighting in there was largely over by the time it took the field. The unit would additionally serve in the Soviet Union. Some of its units were detailed as garrison troops in Greece and other were deployed to the Balkans to engage in the Bandenbekämpfung, or anti-partisan campaign there. 

The Waffen-SS also raised probation units. They included: SS-Fallschirmjäger-Btl 500 (SS Parachute Battalion 500); SS-Sturm-Btl 500 ( SS Assault Battalion 500); and, the notorious SS-Brigade Dirlewanger, a unit discussed later in this post. They were generally manned with troops Straflager und Wehrstraflager (punishment camp and defense discipline camp) In the Straflager and Wehrstraflager, extremely  hard labor had to be performed without the availability of appropriate supplies. Those who survived were said to be “endangered” for transfer into one of these units.

Notable here is the fact that as the course of the war had turned against Nazi Germany, military losses and the need to maintain discipline by example led the Oberkommando Wehrmacht to order the formation of additional punishment units from the thousands of Wehrmacht military prisoners that were held in its military prisons. Hopefully, the discussion of such here will not appear as a sort of suggestion to Putin on how the increase the strength of his forces in Ukraine. (In all honesty, greatcharlie hardly believes Putin or anyone in the Russian Federation government would have even a remote interest in its scribblings.) Prigozhin has at least deigned to ask prison inmates to serve in Wagner Group units. If the right occasion arises, all of that may quietly change for both military and civilian prison inmates. The hypothetical move might be announced publicly, couched in some plausible excuse of exigence or perhaps, prison inmates might be taken from penal institutions en masse and covertly sent to Ukraine. It might be said then: Unbewusst, war vielleicht Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler das Vorbild. 

The Dirlewangers move through the streets of a town on the Eastern Front (above).The SS Dirlewanger organization was a rather unorthodox Nazi German military organization of anti-partisan fighters. As the Wehrmacht rolled through Europe at the start of World War II, it faced increased resistance from partisan insurgents. To manage the problem, in 1940, the SS began an experiment. An initial 55 convicted poachers from prisons and concentration camps that it believed possessed the necessary skills, were put in service through impressment for the purpose of hunting down and capturing partisan fighters in their camps in the forests of the Eastern Front. A conditional pardon was promised to prison inmates who served in the recherché unit. They were placed under the command of Oskar Dirlewanger. Dirlewanger’s troops could do almost anything they pleased: loot, rape and pillage. There were often no repercussions for the most heinous actions. In Poland, Dirlewanger and his men would commit their most horrible war crimes. First, it was the Wola Massacre or Wola Slaughter (August 5, 1944 to August 12, 1944) in which 40,000 to 50,000 Poles in the Wola neighborhood of Warsaw were systematically slaughtered. Then, given its reputation, the Dirlewangers were called upon to assist in the quelling of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. (August 1, 1944 to October 2, 1944). 

The Dirlewangers

During World War II, a rather unorthodox military formation of anti-partisan fighters was fielded by Nazi Germany known infamously as the Dirlewangers. As the Wehrmacht rolled through Europe at the start of war, it faced increased resistance from partisan insurgents. To manage the problem, in 1940, the SS began an experiment. It organized 55 convicted poachers from prisons and concentration camps, that it believed possessed the necessary skills to hunt down and capture partisan fighters in their camps in the forests of the Eastern Front, were put in service through impressment in an organization named Wilddiebkommando Oranienburg (Oranienburg Poacher’s Unit). As noted earlier, such anti-partisan campaigns were referred to as Bandenbekämpfung. A conditional pardon was promised to prison inmates who served in the recherché unit. Orders were passed down to train the unit’s members in marksmanship and placed them under the command of four SS officers. The unit was placed under the command of SS Obersturmführer Oskar Dirlewanger, an alcoholic, convicted of illegal arms possession and embezzlement and imprisoned twice for the rape of a 14 year old girl and sexual assault. Subsequently, the unit was named after him, Sonderkommando Dr. Dirlewanger. Dirlewanger found a patron in a comrade from World War I, SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS Gottlob Berger. It was arranged for Dirlewanger to report directly to the Reichführer-SS (Reich Leader of the SS) Heinrich Himmler, a most senior leader of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers Party or the Nazi Party), and a member of Hitler’s inner circle. It was not long before the number of poachers in the Dirlewangers dwindled and the unit began to take any men it could get. The strength of the unit was increased with additional prison inmates who had been convicted of burglary, assault, murder, and rape. The unit grew further when it took on deserters, punished soldiers and even concentration camp survivors. At that point, the unit was designated SS-Sonderbataillon Dirlewanger, 

Despite being subordinated to large military organizations in the field, Dirlewanger’s troops could do almost anything they pleased: loot, rape and pillage. There were often no repercussions for the most heinous actions. It is said that other Nazi German units, even some from the Waffen SS oddly enough, detested Dirlewanger and his men. However, any efforts to remove them from the battlefield and prosecute the soldiers for their atrocities were quietly knocked down in Berlin. To prevent any loss of control of his troops, Dirlewanger well-maintained unit discipline through beatings and shootings. Reportedly, if a civilian or soldier displeased him, Dirlewanger shot them in the hand. If one of his men grabbed any items that he wanted, he would execute him on the spot.  Given the conditions that existed in the unit, desertion became commonplace. 

Anti-partisan warfare was intense and casualties in Dirlewanger’s unit were high. On January 29, 1942, the battalion received authorization to recruit foreign volunteers to supplement its strength. On August 20, 1942, Hitler further authorized the expansion of the unit to two battalions. The added strength would come from additional poachers, Russians and Ukrainians recruited in the field, and military delinquents. This latter source of recruits was approved on October 15, 1942. The term “military delinquents” referred to men from all branches of the Wehrmacht, including the Waffen-SS, who had been convicted of felony offenses while in service. As the Soviet Army drove West and German forces retreated, the Dirlewanger organization was raised to the level of brigade as SS-Sturmbrigade Dirlewanger (SS Assault Brigade Dirlewanger).

Oskar Dirlewanger was an alcoholic, convicted of rape and sexual assault among other crimes. Dirlewanger reported directly to the Reichführer-SS (Reich Leader of the SS) Heinrich Himmler, a most senior leader of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers Party or the Nazi Party), and a member of Hitler’s inner circle. Dirlewanger would eventually receive the rank of SS-Oberführer. It is said that other German units, particularly from the Waffen SS oddly enough, detested Dirlewanger and his men. However, any efforts to remove them from the battlefield and prosecute the soldiers for their atrocities were knocked down in Berlin. To prevent any loss of control of his troops, Dirlewanger maintained unit discipline through beatings and shootings. Reportedly, if a civilian or soldier displeased him, Dirlewanger shot them in the hand. If one of his men grabbed any items that he wanted, he would execute him on the spot.  Given the conditions that existed in the unit, desertion became commonplace. 

With the help of his friends in Berlin, the ranks of the unit would grow even further, and In May 1943, the unit officially became a regiment, designated SS-Regiment Dirlewanger (SS Regiment Dirlewanger). The unit would next receive the designation, SS-Sonderregiment Dirlewanger (SS Special Regiment Dirlewanger) with the addition of a third bataillon, approved in August 1943. However, before that battalion could be formed, the regiment was sent into the frontline on an emergency basis with Army Groups Center and North, beginning on November 14, 1943. Both poorly equipped or trained for that purpose, the unit consequently suffered extremely high casualties and was reduced to a reported strength of 259 troops. Hundreds of military and concentration camp convicts were forwarded to Dirlewanger to allow him to rebuild the regiment, and by February 19, 1944, its strength had reached 1200 men. On April 15th, the unit was enabled to establish its own replacement company to facilitate replacing casualties. Soviet citizens were no longer recruited, and future recruits for the regiment would be selected exclusively from military prison inmates and volunteers from the concentration camps. These latter were not only convicts but also political prisoners. It was then that Dirlewanger reportedly would go as far as to accept the criminally insane into his unit’s ranks.

In Poland, Dirlewanger and his men would commit their most abominable war crimes. First, it was the Wola Massacre or Wola Slaughter (August 5, 1944 to August 12, 1944) in which 40,000 to 50,000 Poles in the Wola neighborhood of Warsaw were systematically slaughtered. Then, given its reputation, the Dirlewangers were called upon to assist in the quelling of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. (August 1, 1944 to October 2, 1944). The Dirlewangers killed an estimated 35,000 men, women, and children in one day. A fairly well-known story associated with the tragedy is that a witness in the Warsaw Ghetto at the time observed Dirlewanger ordering his men to execute 500 young children. Dirlewanger reportedly insisted that his troops save their bullets and execute the task with rifle butts and bayonets. Nearly 80 percent of Warsaw was practically razed to the ground by the unit.. The complaints against the Dirlewangers continued to mount. That led the SS to move the unit from Poland to the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (now Belarus) to allay the fears of field commanders. Still, Dirlewanger was rewarded for Warsaw with the promotion to SS-Oberführer on August 15, 1944. On its first deployment to Byelorussia in 1942, Dirlewanger’s unit would kill 30,000 people. Apparently, Dirlewanger’s favorite method of suppression was to round Byelorussians up in a barn, set it on fire, and machine gun anyone who fled. In October 1944, the unit was given the mission to quell the Slovak National Uprising. On February 20th, 1945 while at the Oder River in Silesia, the Dirlewanger Brigade along with parts of a number of Nazi German Army units were formed into the 36.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS Dirlewanger (36th Waffen SS Grenadier-Division Dirlewanger). While the unit rejoiced in becoming a division, it was only such in name only as it lacked the required strength.

It has been more than alleged that the Wagner Group’s actions in the Eastern Ukrainian town of Bucha fairly mirrored the horrors committed by the Dirlewangers during World WarII.  After Russian forces had retreated from Bucha on March 31, 2022 following a near month-long occupation of the town, the bodies of 419 unarmed civilians, many found with their hands bound behind their backs. Local Ukrainian authorities reported that nine children were among those killed. The Bundesnachrichtendienst, Germany’s foreign-intelligence service, later intercepted secret messages confirming Russian mercenaries known as the Wagner Group played a leading role in the massacre.

Members of the Foreign Legion engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Algeria (above). The Foreign Legion is a carry-over from the 19th century–perhaps some might say it is an anachronism. The military formation was established by King Louis-Philippe on March 9, 1831, as a unit to support the conquest of Algeria, which the French had invaded in 1830. To fill its ranks, focus was placed on collecting the foreign deserters and criminals who had drifted to France in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. It was discovered that these men, viewed by the French government as a potential threat to civil society, could be induced to become professional soldiers at minimal cost. Indeed, the Foreign Legion attracted many refugees who migrated to France as well as unemployed soldiers from all points in Europe. It was especially popular among members of the Swiss regiments who had served the unpopular Bourbon regime before to the July Revolution of 1830. The Legion under-performed in the French struggle for conquest in Algeria, the conflict for which the formation was raised. Among the variety of factors. Before the Algerian campaign ended, 844 legionnaires died. Sadly, heavy losses among legionnaires from that point on were considered acceptabl, and perhaps expected in the many military interventions on foreign soil by France that followed.

The French Foreign Legion, 

The French Foreign Legion, in purpose and task, could be characterized as a throwback to the 19th century–perhaps some might say it is an anachronism. The military formation was established by King Louis-Philippe on March 9, 1831, as a unit to support the conquest of Algeria, which the French had invaded in 1830. To fill its ranks, focus was placed on collecting the foreign deserters and criminals who had drifted to France in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. It was discovered that these men, viewed by the French government as a potential threat to civil society, could be induced to become professional soldiers at minimal cost. Indeed, the Foreign Legion attracted many refugees who migrated to France as well as unemployed soldiers from all points in Europe. It was especially popular among members of the Swiss regiments who had served the unpopular Bourbon regime before the July Revolution of 1830. The Legion under-performed in the French struggle for conquest in Algeria, the conflict for which the formation was raised: its raison d’être. Among the variety of factors the led to such result were the mismanagement of troops, problems with instilling military discipline and enforcing regulations among its homogeneous battalions of Algerians, desertion, and the staffing of its formations with the least qualified officers in the French Army. In the Legion’s initial engagement there, a unit of 27 legionnaires was overrun after being abandoned by a French officer and the cavalry under his command. By the time the Algerian campaign ended, 844 legionnaires were killed. Sadly, heavy losses among legionnaires from that point on were considered acceptable, marked their many military interventions on foreign soil, and perhaps to some degree were expected. 

During France’s intervention in Spain from 1833 to 1839, around 9,000 died or deserted. The death toll of legionnaires in the Crimean War from 1853 to 1856 was 444. From 1861 to 1865, France intervened in Mexico with the aim of overthrowing the reformist government of Mexican President Benito Juárez and establishing a European satellite state under the authority of the Austrian Prince Maximilian. Of the 4,000 legionnaires sent into Mexico, half were lost. Mexico emerged victorious and Maximilian was killed. However, an important piece of legionnaire history was actually established in the Mexico debacle at farm compound near a village called Camarón, in Vera Cruz. There, 62 legionnaires barricaded themselves and fought to the last man against superior Mexican forces. In the 1930s, the story of the engagement was transformed into an officially cherished legend of “Camerone!”  The story assisted in propagating the notion that the Foreign Legion faithfully carried out orders regardless of the sacrifice required. Performing honorably in battle was an obligation that required dismissing thoughts or feelings about self-preservation. On va faire Camerone!

Between 1870 and 1871 during 1he Franco-Prussian War, more than 900 legionnaires died while reinforcing the French Army. It brought the Foreign Legion from their bases in Algeria to France. Once the fighting ended, the Foreign Legion was used by the French government to violently reduce the Paris Commune. Legionnaires were ordered to kill French citizens and did so sometimes by summary execution in the street. In the aftermath, After order was restored, the legionnaires were quickly returned to their bases in Algeria.

French paratroopers very likely of the 6ème Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux (6 BPC)–(even the French officials do not know who exactly is in the image–during a counter-attack against the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu in March 1954. The Foreign Legion’s unorthodox composition, isolation in Algeria, and the absence of patriotic purpose purportedly assisted in shaping it into a resolute fighting force in the years following its inception. Over those same years within the Foreign Legion, the notion that meaningless sacrifice is itself a virtue took hold. That sentiment was manifested in an 1883 address by French General François de Négrier to an element of legionnaires who were being deployed to Indochina to fight the Chinese. He reportedly stated: “You! Legionnaires! You are soldiers meant to die, and I am sending you to the place where you can do it!”  Many legionnaires would die in Indochina as well as in some of France’s many African colonies.  The Foreign Legion was called to France again to fight in World War I. The record indicates that 5,931 legionnaires were killed in action. Between the wars, the Foreign Legion again returned to its bases in North Africa. When World War II began, legionnaires could only monitor the fight from there. No time was available or no was any effort made to deploy them to the homeland given the short span of the Battle of France from May 10, 1940 to June 25, 1940. The Foreign Legion did not see heavy combat again until the postwar period in Indochina as part of the French Union’s Far East Expeditionary Corps.

The Foreign Legion’s unorthodox composition, isolation in Algeria, and the absence of patriotic purpose purportedly assisted in shaping it into a resolute fighting force in the years following its inception. Over those same years within the Foreign Legion, the notion that meaningless sacrifice is itself a virtue took hold. That sentiment was manifested in an 1883 address by French General François de Négrier to an element of legionnaires who were being deployed to Indochina to fight the Chinese. He reportedly stated: “You! Legionnaires! You are soldiers meant to die, and I am sending you to the place where you can do it!”  Many legionnaires would die in Indochina as well as in some of France’s many African colonies.  The Foreign Legion was called to France again to fight in World War I. The record indicates that 5,931 legionnaires were killed in action. Between the wars, the Foreign Legion again returned to its bases in North Africa. When World War II began, legionnaires could only monitor the fight from there. No time was available or no was any effort made to deploy them to the homeland given the short span of the Battle of France from May 10, 1940 to June 25, 1940. The Foreign Legion did not see heavy combat again until the postwar period in Indochina as part of the French Union’s Far East Expeditionary Corps. There, 9,017 legionnaires were killed in action in the failed attempt by France to hold on to its Southeast Asian territory from December 19, 1946 to July 20, 1954. The final engagement was the decisive Battle of Điện Biên Phủ. French defensive positions were overrun by the Viet Minh on May 7, 1954 following a two-month siege, Although a few French troops escaped to Loas, 11,000 were captured. A mere 3,300 survived imprisonment. Ce fut une défaite écrasante, une déroute complète

The Foreign Legion would return to Algeria after the Indochina debacle. Many of its officers were embittered, feeling they had been betrayed by bureaucrats in Paris. Eager to prove they had the moral fiber to defend the integrity of France, they zealously took on a new struggle to quell an Algerian independence movement. The fight was reportedly characterized by the use of torture, retributive killings, and atrocities committed by both sides. It is estimated that a million people died in the struggle. The Foreign Legion lost 1,976 men. Today, the Foreign Legion ihas a strength of nearly 9,000 men which represents 11% of the operational strength of the French Army.

Camerone Day 2017 in Aubagne, France, the Headquarters of the Foreign Legion. On Camerone Day, the doors of the Legion are open for public as part of the commemoration of the Bataille de Camerone (Battle of Camarón), a crucial moment in the history of the French Foreign Legion. It is portrayed as a pure example of bravery and the determination to fight to the finish, an example to be followed by every legionnaire. The phrase “On va faire Camerone!” (Let’s make Camerone) became popular among legionnaires, clearly expressing their will to fight to the last bullet. The date April 30, 1931 was designated as both the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the Foreign Legion’s creation (although it should be March 10th), and the first official public commemoration of the epic Battle of Camarón. It is proudly commemorated even by the smallest Legion unit stationed in the most isolated place on the planet. The Recit de Camerone (Narration of Camerone), the telling of the story, is inseparable from the ceremony.

Perhaps what has been presented here is enough for readers to draw in their own mind’s the shape of the Foreign Legion. Crucial to understanding the Foreign Legion is understanding the “heart” of the legionnaire and his dedication to the organization’s proud history of sacrifice for France. From the outside, however, the organization would reasonably be assessed as one that manifests its government’s desire to exploit the misfortune of those from the lower rungs of the social strata, training them and then throwing them into often questionable military operations overseas with little regard for their well-being are they viewed dismissively as being expendable. Clear, logical, and plausible arguments could surely be made on that side of the matter, too!

Interestingly, the Foreign Legion and the Wagner Group diverge with other penal units and suicide squads of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, two among the worst regimes conceived in the 20th century, that were also discussed here to the extent that their respective ranks are not filled through impressment or emergency laws, but rather through volunteerism. Nevertheless, their troops have been used essentially in the same harsh ways. The Wagner Group is a fairly young organization, having existed for less than a decade. Although its role in the foreign and national security affairs and support from the Russian Federation is not established under existing laws, there remains the real chance that the Wagner Group, now with veil lifted on its operations given its massive presence in Ukraine and strength that it has reached so far, may be established within the Russian Federation government as a military formation more in the vein of the Foreign Legion at the time of its establishment in 1831. This may be a possibility at least during the prospective life span of the current government under Putin. Overarching is the possibility that his regime may not survive the Ukraine War which it started.

The Way Forward

Generally, the objectives for which the Wagner Group have been used by Russian Federation government have been better than controversial, often at odds with the established international order and transnational interest to maintain peace and stability around the world. However, those objectives have always been in line with the values and interests of the government in which the organization serves. Its troops are presently being used in negligent and wasteful ways in Ukraine. However, one would not have to look too far to find military formations in advanced industrial countries, such as France with its Foreign Legion, that serve similar purposes for their respective governments and have a history of being used in similar, questionable ways. It would seem the story of Wagner Group in Ukraine is not so outré after all.

Commentary: Maintaining the Harmony between the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security in an Apparent Totalitarian China

People’s Republic of China President and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee Xi Jinping (center right) in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. On August 26, 2020, Xi presented Minister of Public Security (MPS) Zhao Kezhi and Minister of State Security (MSS) Chen Wenqing with the “Police Flag” at a ceremony in which over 300 police officers were present. Xi ordered the security forces to be loyal to the Party, serve the people, be impartial in law enforcement, and maintain strict in discipline. Xi also called on the security forces to uphold the Party’s absolute leadership. Historical evidence shows maintaining two main intelligence and security services with overlapping responsibilities is an odd choice as it usually creates difficulties for senior executives and managers of the respective organizations in sorting out issues over cases, turf, and budgets. At least publicly, MPS and MSS have managed to coexist peaceably.

Among some Western intelligence and counterintelligence services, distracting bureaucratic and operational rivalries have been observed.  However, the two main civilian intelligence and counterintelligence services in China, Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbù (Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China) or MPS and Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guójiā Ānquán Bù (Ministry for State Security of the People’s Republic of China) or the MSS, have publicly avoided such problems despite inherent parallels in their domestic responsibilities. Except for experienced hands on China policy and the Chinese intelligence services and national security via diplomatic, intelligence, defense, military, or law enforcement work, most in the West have likely never heard of either organization. MPS is an intelligence service under the State Council in charge of the country’s internal and political security and domestic intelligence. MSS, also under the State Council, is an intelligence service responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security as well. Their impact stems mainly from providing consumers in Beijing to include the Communist Party of China leadership, the Party’s key organs responsible for foreign and national security policy, and ministers and senior executives of appropriate ministries and organizations of the State Council, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with data that may shape their decisions. This commentary briefly focuses on the apparent management of a smooth working relationship between MPS and MSS as they share overlapping intelligence responsibilities in the service of Communist Party of China, all powerful in the People’s Republic of China. Concordia res parvae crescent. (Work together to accomplish more.)

These two national intelligence organs are the embodiment of the logic that created the Chinese system’s intimidating, authoritarian–perhaps it could even be called totalitarian–order and for years has choreographed events to accomplish the Communist Party of China’s purposes. To that extent, the Communist Party of China has entrusted the defense of the modern Communist Chinese state to these two complex government organizations. On August 26, 2020, at the ceremony held in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping conferred the “Police Flag” to Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi and Minister of State Security Chen Wenqing. Xi ordered China’s security forces to be be loyal to the Party, serve the people and be impartial in law enforcement. Xi also demanded the police force forge iron-like discipline and conduct. In his address at the ceremony, Xi lauded the major contributions made by the Chinese police to safeguarding national security, social stability and people’s interests, He called them a mighty force that can be fully trusted by the Party and the people, and spoke highly of the major contributions made by the Chinese security forces to safeguarding national security, social stability and people’s interests. Xi also called upon the security forces to uphold the Party’s absolute leadership.

Xi has placed considerable focus on police, judges, prosecutors, public security,, and state security officers as part of a new Communist Party of China drive against graft, abuses and disloyalty in their ranks. The campaign is also said to be part of an effort by Xi to bolster domestic discipline as he prepares for a leadership shake-up at the Communist Party Congress in 2022. Reportedly, Xi has been spurred on to push for iron authority down to local police stations as a result of the reaction among Communist Party of China leaders toward near-endless protests in Hong Kong, and their need to be assured of the Party’s total control of the population after that became an issue during China’s coronavirus outbreak. The ministers of the MPS and MSS understand their marching orders. Zhao, the Minister of MPS, was quoted as saying, “Resolutely put absolute loyalty, absolute purity and absolute dependability into action.”

Ubi concordia ibi victoria. (Where there is unity, there is victory.) As already alluded to briefly, historical evidence shows that maintaining two main intelligence and security services with many overlapping responsibilities is an odd choice gor it normally creates difficulties for senior executives and managers of the respective organizations in sorting out issues over over cases, turf, and budgets. However, MPS and MSS have managed to coexist peaceably, at least publicly. The most apparent reason that such high profile parochial struggles over turf and budgets do not exist at least publicly between MPS and MSS, interestingly enough is that they are actually prohibited under the People’s Republic of China National Security Law. Hypothesizing on the matter, purely out of academic interest, if a competitive relationship between MPS and MSS had ever taken flight, it very likely would have been the result of happenstance in the 1980s. During the after its inception in 1983 and the larger part of the 1990s, MSS took on an assignment from the Communist Party of China concerning a burgeoning student movement that was redundant given the matter was covered by MPS.

As that situation stood, the Communist Party of China’s leadership became concerned about the student movement as a threat to social order and its power. In response, there was a call for all hands to mitigate those fears. MSS, newly minted, had the officers and was available. The Communist Party of China insisted that it place its focus on students in both China and abroad after the Tiananmen Square protests. Tiananmen Square, in addition to being embarrassing to the Communist Party of China leaders, caused them to remain greatly concerned over a possible follow-on move by students. That concern was somewhat supported when Chinese authorities announced that some 200 Chinese had been accused of spying for the Soviet Union. One might conclude that due to the counterintelligence aspect of the assignment, it made some sense to pass it the MSS. The MSS as an organization, threw itself into the immediate domestic task set for it by the Communist Party of China.

Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia proprium, semper incipit vivere. (Among other evils, folly has also this special characteristic, it is always beginning to live.) Perchance to further satisfy and impress the Communist Party of China or perhaps in an attempt to redesignate the intelligence service’s purpose wholly, MSS leaders at the time, arguably taking a turn down the wrong path, exploited the situation by deciding to expand and invigorate their organization’s presence in the provinces and municipalities. That expansion occurred in four waves. In the first wave during MSS’ inaugural year, the municipal bureaus or provincial departments of state security for Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shanghai were created. A second wave appeared shortly thereafter between 1985 and 1988, including Chongqing, Gansu, Hainan, Henan, Shaanxi, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The third wave from 1990 to 1995 completed the expansion of the Ministry across at the provincial levels, bringing in Anguilla, Hunan, Qinghai, and Sichuan provinces. The fourth wave the provincial-level departments expanded vertically, taking over local public security bureaus or established subordinate municipal or County bureaus. The MSS policy of expanding representative offices in most major towns and cities was reversed in 1997. Nevertheless, by then, the MSS was a nationwide security organization at every level. Presumably, having reached that status, it may have been called upon to perform some special tasks for the Communist Party of China’s leadership on occasion.

To add to that situation, in its first two decades, the ranks of the MSS were filled with longtime MPS who transferred over to the office. MSS provincial branches were often staffed with PLA and government retirees. The new MSS was funded in part by the MPS.To help MSS take on its mission, MPS also passed some networks to the new organization. With some uncertainty that existed as to the political nature of MSS, MPS was reportedly reluctant to make such transfers. MSS was declared to be a foreign intelligence organization, but as things stood then, it was doing more of what its rank and file knew how to do best, which was to perform as police.

In the end, though, MPS has remained the dominant service concerning the domestic counterintelligence mission. Moreover, with regard to MPS’s organizational identity, as aforementioned, from its beginnings, has embodied the will of the Communist Party of China, and its leaders insisted upon retaining that grand status. Even today,, MPS leaders are regularly striving to garner praise and the further favor of the Communist Party of China from the flash and bang, bells and whistles, of high profile cases. MSS leaders returned to shaping their organization into a truly effective foreign intelligence organization. The MSS foreign intelligence capability was built up most effectively when intelligence cadres from the Communist Party of China were brought into its ranks. An uptick in both competency and necessity favored a rise MSS influence in foreign policymaking. When direct political power is absent, influence usually relates to merit and necessity. Senior leaders of the Communist Party of China involved in foreign policymaking  would eventually want the MSS in the room, contributing to deliberations. Yet, MSS still maintains a very significant domestic operation via provincial and municipal offices throughout China. Presently, the MSS’ thirty-one major provincial and municipal sub-elements. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Use what is yours without harming others.)

Placing MPS and MSS alongside the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a search for parallels, the record indicates their situation was the contrary as considerable conflicts over cases, turf, and budgets once existed between the two US organizations. A growing schism resulted in cooperation between them on intelligence and counterintelligence being mandated by authorities to the chagrin even to date of some case officers and special agents. Notably, the CIA does not independently determine its intelligence collection priorities. The CIA’s intelligence activities are instead conducted in response to intelligence requirements established by the President and the CIA’s other intelligence consumers. Specifically, the Director of National Intelligence approves the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF), which establishes national intelligence priorities that reflect the guidance of the President and the National Security Advisor with input from Cabinet-level and other senior government officials. The CIA’s duly authorized intelligence activities are conducted in response to the NIPF priorities or other intelligence requirements imposed by the President and other intelligence consumers. Under the framework established by Executive Order 12333, the CIA’s intelligence activities are primarily focused outside the US. The FBI is responsible for coordination of clandestine collection of foreign intelligence through human sources or human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside the US. Generally though, the CIA can cooperate with the FBI to collect foreign intelligence within the US, subject to the restrictions imposed by statute, Executive Order 12333, the Attorney General Guidelines, and other legal and policy requirements. Specifically, the National Security Act prohibits the CIA from exercising police or subpoena powers or otherwise engaging in law enforcement or internal security functions, with the exception of the security protective officers who protect CIA facilities within a limited jurisdiction pursuant to the CIA Act. If, for example, the FBI has a cooperative relationship with an individual inside the US who provides foreign intelligence information, the FBI may appropriately consult with the CIA regarding the relationship, and the CIA may continue the relationship for intelligence purposes should the individual travel overseas.

Of course, the situation between the MPS and MSS is also made quite different from that of FBI and CIA particularly due to the nature of the government in which the two intelligence services respectively function. In a country such as China, there is a need among leaders to create some acceptable degree of certainty about their world that is existential. As an expression of need, they tend to find it preferable to have as many ears to the ground as possible, know what comes next, be sure of who can be trusted, understand how to protect their personal interests, be made aware of where the next likely challenge from the inside, and be forewarned of the next threat to the country from the outside, will come from. The role of the security services in satisfying that need is not an ancillary role. Thereby, protecting the interests of the political leadership is really their raison d’être.

The 20th century US philosopher and political theorist, Hannah Arendt, in her seminal work The Origins of Totalitarianism (Schocken, 1951) provides an excellent discussion of why multiple security services exist in totalitarian countries. The history of Chinese intelligence validates what she presents. The most relevant passage, too precious to condense, is presented here in its entirety. Using the situation in the Soviet Union as a yardstick, Arendt explains: 

In Russia, the ostensible power of the party bureaucracy as against the real power of the secret police corresponds to the original duplication of the party and State known as Nazi Germany, and the multiplication becomes evident only in the secret police itself, with its extremelycomolicate, widely ramified network of agent, in which one Department is always assigned in the supervising and spying on another. Every enterprise in the Soviet Union has its special Department of the secret police, which spies on party members and ordinary personnel alike. Coexistence with this department is another police division of the party itself, which again watches everybody, including the agents of the NKVD [Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs)], and whose members are not known to the rival body. Added to these two espionage organizations must be the unions in the factories, which must see to it that the workers fulfill their prescribed quotas. Far more important than these apparatuses, however, is “the special department” of the NKVD which represents “an NKVD within the NKVD,” i.e., a secret police within a secret police. All reports of these competing police agencies ultimately end up in the Moscow Central Committee and the Politburo. Here it is decided which of the reports is decisive and which of the police divisions shall be entitled to carry out the respective police measures. Neither the average inhabitant of the country nor any one of the police departments knows, of course, what decision will be made; today it may be the special division of the NKVD, tomorrow the Party’s network of agents; the day after, it may be the local committees or one of the regional bodies. Among all of the departments there exists no legally rooted hierarchy of power or authority; the only certainty is that eventually one of them will be chosen to embody “the will of the leadership.”

The only rule of which everybody in a totalitarian state may be sure of is that the more visible the government agencies are, the less power they carry, and the less is known of the existence of an institution, the more powerful it will ultimately turn out to be. According to this rule, the Soviets, recognized by a written constitution as the highest authority in the state, have less power than the Bolshevik party; the Bolshevik party, which recruits it members openly and is recognized as the ruling class, has less power than the secret police. Real power begins where secrecy begins. In this respect, the Nazi and Bolshevik states were very much alike; their diffetence lay chiefly in the monopolization and centralization of secret police services in [SS-Reichsführer Heinrich] Himmler on the one hand, and the maze of apparently unrelated and unconnected police activities in Russia on the other.

It must be noted that there remains some debate in a few scholarly circles as to whether China would qualify as a totalitarian state, such as that deliberated on by Arendt. China certainly ticks off most of the boxes that would qualify it as such. Totalitarian countries are those in which the government does not permit its people to partake in political decision making. Instead of giving the people a voice, a totalitarian country is typically ruled either by a single dictator or a group that has not been collectively elected by the people. The ruling leaders, in China’s case, a ruling party, of totalitarian countries do not merely enact laws. Rather, the people or person in charge controls all aspects of both public and private life. There is no limit to what a totalitarian government can control because there are not any checks or balances placed on the leaders of the country. Essentially, totalitarian leaders can do whatever suits their agenda and say anything that comes to mind.

Citizens are stripped of all freedoms in totalitarian countries. Denial of the right of free speech will usually include a ban on freedom of the press. Ideologies, beliefs, and religions may even be highly curtailed or absolutely forbidden in a totalitarian country. The national government has full and total control. Totalitarian leaders often rule through fear because they take advantage of citizens’ emotions in order to keep them from revolting and protesting. When you live in fear, you do not know how to speak out against injustices because you are scared. It becomes a matter of staying silent in order to stay alive, and totalitarian rulers know this. In fact, they thrive off of this natural human instinct. To reinforce the idea that citizens must show complete alliegance and compliance with the government, totalitarian leaders typically have security forces, some secret, that ensure citizens do not fall out of step. In some totalitariam countries, certain religious minorities and political groups by the security forces. Expressing dissent toward government decisions and actions is strictly prohibited in these countries. Although liberal democracies pride themselves with regard to the way people can form and express their own reactions to the government, people who live in totalitarian regimes must agree with everything the government does, says, and enforces. Outward expressions of disagreement are forbidden. By these qualifications, China certainly could be viewed as a totalitarian state. Audi vide, tace, si vis vivere in pace. (Use your ears and eyes, but hold your tongue, if you would live in peace.)

Senior executives and managers of the MPS and MSS are mutually responsible for creating tranquillitas ordinis—the tranquility of order. That is indeed a charitable perception of their work, especially MPS, which has a history using brutal methods in the name of establishing law and order. It would seem that between the two intelligence services, there has been the some successful creation of a figurative cross organizational masonry through which fruitful communication, agreements, and interoperability can be shaped and facilitated. One might imagine establishing that order has rested in efforts such as obliging both MPS and MSS to mutually keep each other informed of developments. One could hardly imagine that one organization steps on the figurative toes of the other by suggesting anything as grand as using an alternative strategy in an ongoing investigation of an individual or group of individuals would occur. At this stage, MPS does not desire to share the anxieties of MSS, and visa-versa. There would appear to be enough for both organizations to do. Further, sources of funding and support for both derive from specified sources, leaving little need to struggle for means. Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.)

Book Review: Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994)

In The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, published in 1994, Oleg Kalugin, a former major general in the erstwhile Soviet Union’s KGB details the realities about the KGB foreign intelligence service and to a great degree provides a good framework for understanding what Russian Federation intelligence services are doing right now. It also provides a framework by which readers are enabled to peer into the future, with all of its mysteries, and better conceptualize what those intelligence services might do under the present leadership in Moscow. Most of all, First Directorate provides a look into the art that moved the mind of one of the most capable spymasters of the 20th century. Kalugin’s work surely earned him a place among the era-defining geniuses of the intelligence industry of the Eastern Bloc.

The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West is the memoir of Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, a former major general in the erstwhile Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. The KGB was responsible for Soviet internal security, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence during the greater part of the Cold War era. It is fairly well-understood now that the KGB was the embodiment of the Soviet systems intimidating, inhumane, authoritarian order. The book’s title First Directorate referred to Pervoye Glavnoye Upravieniye (First Chief Directorate) or PGU of the KGB which was the element responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities. The manner in which Kalugin details the realities about the KGB foreign intelligence service in First Directorate provides a good framework for understanding what Russian Federation intelligence services are doing right now. To that extent, First Directorate better enables readers to peer into the future, with all of its mysteries, to better conceptualize what those intelligence services might do under the present leadership in Moscow. Most of all, the book provides a good look into the art that moved the mind of both a superlative foreign intelligence officer and a foreign counterintelligence officer. Kalugin was one among of a number of era-defining geniuses within the intelligence industry of the Eastern Bloc. Surely, he could be rated alongside luminaries such his mentor, former Chairman of the KGB and eventual Soviet Premier, Yuri Andropov, and the chief of the German Democratic Republic’s Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Main Directorate for Reconnaissance) or foreign intelligence service, Colonel General Markus Wolf. Based on information that has been made public from US intelligence services and law enforcement records since the end of the Cold War, Kalugin was viewed by them as an extremely clever antagonist. While Kalugin was on the beat, the US tried to play down the degree of damage Kalugin’s success had inflicted but it could hardly be denied that his efforts left US intelligence services limping back to the barn a bit. One would be completely off the mark if one expected a diatribe from Kalugin in First Directorate about his former US adversaries of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US not only became the host of Kalugin and his family, but granted them US citizenship.

In First Directorate, Kalugin does not engage in an esoteric discussion of the strong-arm security apparatus of the Soviet Union, what 20th century US philosopher and political theorist, Hannah Arendt, best described as a totalitarian and authoritarian Communist regime in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Indeed, he discusses it in a manner easily perceived from a KGB-officers-eye-view, from junior worm up to the top of the heap, effectively illustrating how completely alien the KGB culture was to Western attitudes and inclinations. At the same time, Kalugin offers readers a reality a bit different from what are very common perceptions of the activities and inner workings of the KGB foreign intelligence service and to a large extent, present-day foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation. He achieved much in terms of recruiting spies who were already well-placed in the US national security apparatus and collecting some the most secret information concerning the defense of the US and Western Europe. Although Kalugin considers fair the assessment notion among many Western experts of an ultra-labyrinthine structure and system that existed within the KGB that thwarted even officers’ understanding of how the organization worked, he knocks it down describing how it’s system worked with a certain simplicity and consistency, once one became accustomed to it. Condensed, everyone had a particular job, and knew their responsibilities. However, he notes that the manner in which some KGB officers performed their jobs would vary from what was expected. Therein lies the rub. Indeed, the peculiar behavior of some officers ignited a near catastrophic end to Kalugin’s career. It became an inflection point in his life story. While narrating a story, Kalugin explores such situations with readers and provides edifying answers. One might go as far as to state that he takes on the role of instructor, introducing nuanced details about certain matters in his lecture as if he were trying to impart the full benefit of his experience to nescient, young KGB officers at the erstwhile Yuri Andropov Training Center housed at Leningrad State University or Red Star in the Yasenevo District of Moscow, preparing them for what they might face on the beat overseas. Of course, he certainly is not part of that anymore.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a deluge of information put out about the KGB. Numerous books were written by the organization’s former intelligence officers. Given the quantity and quality of a big portion of what has been made available about Soviet and Russian Federation foreign intelligence services, it was surprising how many self-declared and presumptive experts on this subject, ignored or were blissfully unaware of the realities about such work that rather casually accused US President Donald Trump of being an agent for Moscow. (If the basis was his four visits to Moscow over a 25 year period, once for a beauty pageant, then potentially any US citizen could be vacuously accused of spying for any country they may have visited more than once for tourism, business, or any other Innocuous reason. All countries have intelligence services and all are interested in the US at all levels.) Surely, Trump’s accusers believed that they fully understood as much as they needed about the Russian Federation intelligence services to reach that conclusion. Surely, in all seriousness, that purported knowledge was augmented with what they may have extrapolated from James Bond and Jason Bourne films, as well as streaming television programs about spying. They are all banal amusements, mere jumped up versions of 19th century penny dreadfuls and “adventure stories for boys.” Even Members of both chambers of the US Congress among Trump’s political adversaries, who actually receive briefings from the US intelligence community, hold hearings in committees in order to get questions about any information answered, and are allowed access to intelligence, appear more influenced by such “data” from Hollywood. Such is the state of national politics and political discourse in the US today. A problem arising from it all is that many US citizens have been bewildered by such absurd propositions from supposedly reliable sources as Members of Congress. Argumentum ad veracundiam. (Argument from authority.)

In The Second Book of his work, The History of Britain, That Part Especially Now Called England, (1670), the great 17th century English poet and intellectual, John Milton, explains: “Worthy deeds are not often destitute of worthy relators; as for a certain fate, great acts and great eloquence have most commonly gone hand in hand, equalling and honoring each other in the same age.” As is the case with his memoir, Kalugin is a worthy relator of his own actions. Surely, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to enumerate all of the mistakes, the poor choices, Kalugin made. With regard to that, Kalugin clearly was willing in the text to consider the propriety of his choices and actions or at least at that point he seems to have begun that sort of post-mortem self-evaluation. That process takes place on paper as he candidly conveys his personal experience within the system that turned against him. As one learns about Kalugin through First Directorate, not creating his own record of what he did in the KGB, what KGB had done, and what the Soviet system was really all about, would have been tantamount to admitting to never having had a spark of dignity or decency.

In First Directorate, Kalugin creates a sense of immediateness to what he writes. He would often build tension on the book’s pages while doing that. Indeed, many anecdotes he relates, great and small, are truly edge of seat, nail-biting stuff. Of the cases that he selected to detail, each had its own set of intriguing complications, stirring and engaging the interests of the reader. As for what he shares, his style of presentation, his pace, Kalugin’s efforts are nothing less than brilliant, and greatcharlie has come across nothing better. He beautifully provides the mise en scène using crisp descriptions of surroundings. He marvellously constructs in the mind’s eye of readers a certain atmosphere and desired theatrical effect.

About the Author

Kalugin was born in Leningrad on September 6, 1934. He is of medium height, and for his age, which as of this writing is 85. He has maintained an excellent build, and was at least at one time, quite athletic. Even into his 60s and 70s was known to go on long distance ocean swims. In public, he keeps himself well-groomed, well-attired. Apparently, he is appreciative of a good suit. He has been also blessed with being handsome for a lifetime, possessing what would be popularly described as “manly good looks.” Indeed, it is hard to imagine how anyone would hire Kalugin as an intelligence officer, believing he would be able to avoid notice in public or fade into the background. However, by his countenance, one could immediately recognize his was not just “a pretty face.” Beyond his becoming smile, there has always been a discernable depth to Kalugin even during his earliest years. Nearly everyone who has met Kalugin has called him a charming man with a big and ready laugh and an attractive wit. In conversation, he is talkative, but does not dwell long on unpleasantries. In the US, Kalugin lived in a suburb north of Washington in Silver Spring, Maryland. His wife Ludmila was part of that life for 47 years. They fell in love in 1951, the same year that he made the firm decision to join the intelligence service. She saw Kalugin through all of the rough days of his career, particularly the false allegations, his demotion, the transfer to Leningrad, his stand against the KGB after retirement, his difficulties with Putin’s regime, and the self-imposed exile. His wife was also at his side in the US when she died of cancer in 2001. Doubtlessly, at least at some point, it was difficult for Kalugin to keep it together over her loss. Kalugin is known to entertain visitors to his home by showing off mementos of his intelligence career. Initially upon his independent return to the US, he served as a lecturer at Catholic University. Since then, Kalugin has become a much sought out speaker, and has lectured at a multitude of venues, traveling his new homeland, from state to state “without papers,” enlightening audiences primarily on Putin’s Russia and the often stunning actions of his intelligence services. Currently, he is a professor at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

Kalugin’s connection with Soviet intelligence began at an early age. After graduating from high school in Leningrad in 1952, and completing his mandatory military service, Kalugin was admitted to study at the Institute of Foreign Languages in Leningrad run by the Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) or MGB, the precursor of the KGB foreign intelligence service. After graduation from there in 1956, with honors, he was sent as a young officer to study at the Higher Intelligence School No. 101 of the KGB in Moscow which actually fell under the USSR Council of Ministers. The KGB leadership selected Kalugin for assignment to the First Department of First Chief Directorate which concerned foreign intelligence operations in and against the US and Canada. In 1958, Kalugin, who was considered a graduate of the faculty of journalism, was deployed to New York to undertake journalism studies at Columbia University. After briefly returning home, he was deployed again to New York, working in the early 1960s as a journalist for Moscow Radio at the UN. Kalugin was very competent as a reporter. He was not just a spy, but a successful one. One might say that spying seemed to be Kalugin’s metier. His working habits as a KGB officer, as he describes in First Directorate, were to be envied. He was always honorable and discreet, using mental agility and memory, acting gradually and with a certain gentleness. Kalugin let nothing escape his examination. In 1964, due to the threat of being arrested, he was recalled to the Soviet Union, and assigned as press officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, he was not in Moscow long. He was soon sent back to the US, on that occasion to Washington. There, Kalugin would serve as the equivalent of the deputy KGB station chief under the guise of a deputy press attaché of the Soviet Embassy. In 1971, according to Kalugin, he was suspected of treason, but the Chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, knocked the matter down deciding the case in his favor. Andropov, as elaborated upon further later in this review, was a mentor for Kalugin and took an interest in his career trajectory. He was transferred to the external counterintelligence service. By 1974, at the age of 40, Kalugin received the rank of KGB Major General. It was at this stage that the Kalugin’s activities were more reflective of Soviet behavior that caused most to deem the country as an immoral, worldwide menace, and threat to global peace and security.

For Kalugin, there was unlikely any real opportunity, in the midst of his work against the West, to view matters from a broader or humane perspective. Comparing Kalugin’s efforts side-by-side versus his opposite numbers in the West boil down to efforts to apportion wickedness. There was a balance of terror in the Cold War. Deception, subversion, and countersubversion was what it was all about. The 18th and 19th century French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte was quoted as saying: “In war, as in politics, no evil–even if it is permissible under the rules–is excusable unless it is absolutely necessary. Everything beyond that is a crime.” It was easy enough in the West to understand that during the Cold War, intelligence services fought under the conundrum of knowing how much could be done to defend a free and decent society while remaining a free and decent society worth defending. The Soviet Union was governed under an authoritarian, Socialist and Marxist-Leninist system directed under the auspices of the de facto one-party rule of the Communist Party. As aforementioned, instrumental in maintaining order to allow for the implementation of revolutionary precepts was the KGB, which often in the performance of its domestic security mission showed little regard for the human rights of Soviet citizens. To that extent, its behavior observed domestically would be reflected in its foreign intelligence activities overseas. Yet, despite what may have been the concept and intent of KGB headquarters concerning the conduct of its officers, not all, but many performed, without ethics, without any moral creed. Certainly, Kalugin had well-served the Soviet Union and the Communist Movement. There was never any indication in First Directorate that Kalugin had a sense that he had sacrificed his own humanity during his career. In Kalugin’s mind, whatever he did for the service, even if it skirted what was morally questionable by his own ethics, was for the greater good, not to soothe his own ego. If Kalugin caused anyone any suffering through this process, he most likely would say it was regrettable but the best option at the time.

Facilis descensus Averni: Noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis; Sed revocare gradium superasque evadere ad auras, Hoc opus, hic labor est. (The gates of hell are open night and day; Smooth the descent, and easy is the way: But to return, and view the cheerful skies, In this the task and mighty labor lies.) While there was a tacit understanding that a recruit could find a home with all the care and comfort imaginable during and after active service in the KGB, the Soviet government made no real promises that the link would be permanent through thick and thin. When things were going well, there was a duplicity between Kalugin and the KGB that he loved. That meant that he, as with others, would support and tolerate what he knew was wrong. When things were not going well, especially between managers and a staff or field officer, Kalugin demonstrates that the KGB could become a very brutal place internally for that officer. By the time Kalugin had been demoted and sent to Leningrad, long since renamed St. Petersburg following the collapse of the Soviet Union, he had become jaded by what he experienced on the front line of the Cold War. Alas, all of his efforts may have felt futile to him. Indeed, in the end, his struggles with the West, his extertions over the years, proved to be Sisyphean. Kalugin metaphorically was left standing alone on a dark and stormy night, apparently feeling abandoned by the Soviet government that he loved so dearly, to which he was loyal to the core. Due to all of this, Kalugin had to face the painful reality of many loyal Soviet citizens, which was that the hand of the Soviet state that they were taught early on, was benign, caring, comforting, encouraging, and infallible, as not always extended open palmed toward them and their needs. Kalugin had to lift his head above those of his adversaries. He would eventually recognize the need to make up for quite a sin of promoting such an organization. Kalugin retired from the KGB on February 26, 1990, and became a vocal independent critic of the Communist system. When one who lacks political power is unable to implement change, one can still voice opposition. Levels of success and failure will vary due to circumstances. It was Kalugin’s inability to stand by quietly that brought down upon him the full weight of the intelligence industry, the oppressive reputation of which he helped to build. Kalugin’s continuous attacks on the KGB garnered him notoriety and a political following. In 1990, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was rash enough to sign a decree stripping Kalugin of his rank, decorations, and pension. If Gorbachev only had a hint of what was coming his way from the same KGB management that his decision supported, perhaps he most likely would have made another choice. Gorbachev would restore all that was taken from Kalugin in August 1991, after the coup attempt. Kalugin loved his homeland, Mother Russia and the Soviet Union, and presumably still does today. Certainly, he does not love the regime that controls it. After retirement, Kalugin served as a deputy in the Supreme Soviet, representing the Krasnodar region from September 1990 to December 1991. Kalugin ventured into politics to change the security apparatus, reform it. That was simply not in the cards. Doubtlessly, Kalugin never planned to become an expat, or more accurately, live in a self-imposed exile. He had little choice otherwise for existential reasons. He could not change his circumstances, so he had to change his perspective. Kalugin conquered the uncertainties of his life in Russia by leaving his homeland and embarking on a new journey in the US. It is from the US that he produced his memoir.

Nullius addictus lurare in verba magistri. (No master can make me swear blind obedience.) Vladimir Putin came on the scene ostensibly as a reformer, hand picked by Yeltsin. Apparently, Putin came highly recommended by other self-declared reformists and he managed to curry favor with President Boris Yeltsin of the nascent Russian Federation. Yeltsin, known for being earnest, was a bit too trusting. Putin ostensibly embraced the idea of a new beginning for Russia. At that point, it would have been counterintuitive for Putin to bemoan the Soviet Union’s collapse. What lurked beneath the surface would eventually set the path upon which he placed his country. Kalugin was able to see Putin straight. Alarm bells started to ring in his head, and he could see what was coming. By the time he wrote First Directorate, he was already feeling terribly apprehensive. Little was done directly by Kalugin to set himself up for what became a near David and Goliath schema of independent, capable man taking on the monstrous Evil Empire as well as its second-self, Putin’s Russia. Indeed, left in control of the Russian Federation by Yeltsin after 1999, Putin, rather than reform the system, gradually made it look more and more as the old Soviet one, particularly with regard to the intelligence services. Putin wanted all of the former KGB men, many of whom had become extremely popular among the Western think tanks, academia, the news media and law enforcement and intelligence services, to become Lotus Eaters. Much milk had been spilled concerning Eastern intelligence operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dutiful Kalugin had been tasked one more time by his “former” masters in Moscow, to get some of it back into the bottle. Putin felt that there was a threat posed by revelations by KGB officers eager to please book publishers, magazine editors, and television producers than an effort to establish power over the intelligence service left over from Soviet times, including the old boy network of retirees. If any talking had to be done, Putin likely would have preferred pushing out a message strictly controlled by the Kremlin amounting to a curious sort of ventriloquism. Active measures had come home. Kalugin came to the personal attention of Putin himself. Kalugin from what was presented was the very soul of discretion. There was presumably nothing to fear from him. He was not snooping round corridors. However, there was an apparent sense of anger toward Kalugin in the Kremlin not only because he ostensibly traded in on his knowledge of the service, but that he told enough to stir a sense of betrayal. Among Kalugin’s former KGB colleagues who would eventually people Putin’s government, were the same adversaries from the organization who could not hold a candle to him in the industry. They did not have his stature, only reputations for wrongdoing, oppression. Thus, envy and jealousy were also the likely culprits for their odium toward Kalugin as much as anything else. Kalugin would be solely portrayed in a negative light by Putin and his senior aides and advisors. To hear Kalugin speak of Putin, it is clear that the leader had become a perfect monster in his eyes. While Kalugin was lecturing in the US in 2002, he was put on trial for treason in absentia in Moscow, in part for certain revelations placed in First Directorate, and consequently sentenced to 15 years in prison. Kalugin now appears relatively serene. Through his words, one recognizes that he has come to terms with his role in an extremely dangerous and dynamic organization. Kalugin became a US citizen on August 4, 2003. Kalugin would insist that Putin would love to send a message to the US by harming him. At the present, with Donald Trump as US President, the harsh consequences of Moscow doing such would with assurity far outmatch any possible gain, psychic or otherwise.

Critiquing First Directorate

Perhaps it may be revealing too much, but without pretension, greatcharlie must admit initially feeling somewhat ambivalent about reviewing First Directorate, unsure of being knowledgeable enough to judge the written work of such an extraordinary professional as Kalugin. Suffice it to say that it must be left to readers of this review, who will hopefully also read First Directorate, to determine whether greatcharlie got it right. Seeking out Kalugin’s memoir, one might discover as greatcharlie did that his1994 book was published in English under two titles: First under First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West published by St. Martin’s Press, as it is reviewed here; and, Spymaster: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West published by Smith Gryphon Publishers. In a 2009 revised edition of Spymaster: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, rev. ed. (Basic Books, 2009), in which the text is enhanced with greater details about his cases. In a new Epilogue, discusses developments in his personal life since the book’s first publication. Upon examining the text of each edition, one cannot help but be impressed by the care invested in the creation of this work. As indicated on the cover of both titles, Kalugin completed the book with the assistance of the journalist and former head of theMoscow Bureau of the Philadelphia Inquirer, Fen Montaigne. Surely Montaigne’s contribution was useful and important. Still, anyone fortunate enough to have heard Kalugin speak publicly or review recordings of his many news media interviews and presentations at colleges, universities, think tanks, foreign policy associations and societies on YouTube, could attest that his command of the English language is superb. Indeed, he writes First Directorate in a way that is clear, concise, and flawless grammatically. Surely, Kalugin would have had little difficulty actually establishing himself as a novelist or nonfiction writer in the West if he had chosen to do so. Kalugin initially developed his proficiency in English to serve as an element of his tradecraft overseas. It did, as he used the unofficial cover in the US of Soviet journalist. He had to comfortably communicate with others and fully comprehend the world in which he was immersed. Kalugin was also proficient in German and Arabic.

Kalugin hangs what he provides In First Directorate’s 374 pages on two chronologies: the chronology of his career; and a historical chronology, neatly pairing events of his times and experiences he had which were directly connected to them. The titles of books chapters mark milestones of a life lived. They include: “A Stalinist Boyhood”; “Washington Station”; “The Spy Game”; and, “Exile”. Kalugin jumps into his story as early as the Prologue with an anecdote from his formative years as a KGB officer, working in the US under non-official cover. Indeed, Kalugin offers readers bits and pieces on the Cook case, which involved a US scientist from the US defense contractor, Thiokol, who became his and the KGB’s prize recruit. It proved to be a particularly important episode for Kalugin. He later discusses how the echoes of that case ultimately shaped the outcome of his career. Having set the reader off on that track, Kalugin then formally begins the memoir, allowing the reader to learn about his formative years. Readers are provided an understanding of how he came to accept Communism from top to toe in the traditional sense, how that shaped his worldview, his choice for a career, and how he got into the KGB. As he retraces his steps, he begins skillfully peopling the world in which he allows his readers. For instance, readers learned about his father and the psychic influence that he had on Kalugin due to his position in the the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, a forerunner of the KGB. He provides enough about each personage, allowing for the creation of a full image of the individual in the reader’s mind. Having shared memories from his early years, Kalugin begins discussing his career in Soviet foreign intelligence. Interestingly, his connection to the intelligence service began as early as the years of his formal education. It all neatly blends together.

First Directorate is far from dull, plodding, or pedantic. As for the mechanics of his method, once Kalugin decided what he is going to offer, he did so with a pace that could be called a very smooth and normalized ejection fraction–stealing a term from the medical industry concerning the measure of blood pumped out with each heartbeat. The anecdotes told are the blood which keeps makes Kalugin’s story lively, informative, edifying, and satisfying. Kalugin does not simply unload ideas and hope the reader does not get lost in the weeds when they encounter what seems to be abstraction, due perhaps to a lack of in-depth knowledge about the spy business. One will discover that as the situations he describes evolve, characters evolve, and Kalugin evolves. Kalugin makes no assumptions about the reader’s ability to grasp all that is going on in the text in terms of tradecraft and the spy business. He does not take for granted how much the reader can absorb from what he teaches. Rather, he takes control of that process, apportioning how much of the story he feels would be appropriate. When he feels the reader should be ready for more, Kalugin increases quantity and complexity in his anecdotes. To that extent that he does all of this, Kalugin uses what could be best described as a pedagogy for developing the reader’s understanding of the world he is moving them through.

Kalugin creates a sense of immediateness to what he writes. He would often build tension on the book’s pages while doing that. Indeed, many anecdotes he relates, great and small, are truly edge of seat, nail-biting stuff. Of the cases that he selected to detail, each had its own set of intriguing complications, stirring and engaging the interests of the reader. As for what he shares, his style of presentation, his pace, Kalugin’s efforts are nothing less than brilliant, and greatcharlie has come across nothing better. He beautifully provides the mise en scène using crisp description of surroundings. He marvellously constructs in the mind’s eye of readers a certain atmosphere and desired theatrical effect. Unless greatcharlie is extremely mistaken, he paints with words in a way that will cause First Directorate’s readers to find themselves, at the same time while fortunately sitting in at some safe spot, feeling as if they are actually present on the scene that he describes, watching everything transpire perfectly through the mind’s eye.

It would be an understatement to say First Directorate did not have paeans written about in 1994 when published in the US. Indeed, Kalugin’s book was not really appreciated or welcomed. Through book reviews, one can pick up on a reviewer’s disposition generally, and can gain a good insight about a reviewer’s perceptiveness and thinking. (In that vein, readers can perhaps gain some degree of insight into how greatcharlie thinks given what is noted here as important about First Directorate.) Perhaps 1994 reactions were due to the proximity of the book’s publishing to the so-called end of the Cold War, marked with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Feelings within journalistic and literary circles about the Soviet Union and all connected to it were still decidedly negative, even hostile. It was likely those sensibilities that influenced the thinking of reviewers of First Directorate. The following is a sample of the reviews it received. In a October 13, 1994 review in the Washington Post, Amy Knight did little to conceal her disdain for Kalugin. Knight wrote: “Though he proclaimed himself a democrat in 1990 and denounced the KGB, Kalugin had spent more than three decades determinedly trying to undermine Western democracies. His book tells us a great deal about the KGB’s operations during the Cold War, but it also raises anew the question of how we should react to the confessions of erstwhile enemies.” Distrustful of his intentions in the foregoing statement, she evinced her concern over Kalugin’s integrity with the words: “Kalugin can hardly be criticized if he wrote this book simply to make money. After all, we in the West have been encouraging Russians to become entrepreneurs. But did he have another, darker purpose? Is it possible that Kalugin’s much-publicized denunciation of the KGB was stage-managed to give him credibility in the West, so that he would be believed when he told people that he knew of no KGB moles in the CIA?” In a December 25, 1994 review in the Baltimore Sun, entitled, “The Spy Who Loved It: Tales from a KGB Life”, Scott Shane begins by stating: “In ‘The First Directorate,’ written with the assistance of former Philadelphia Inquirer Moscow correspondent Fen Montaigne, Mr. Kalugin tells his engrossing story and tells it well. Focusing on Kalugin as KGB intelligence officer, he notes: “A spy lives by his powers of observation and memory, and they equally serve the autobiographer.” Shane reveals his suspicions of Kalugin, writing: “Mr. Kalugin, whose perpetually raised eyebrows give him a look that is at once untrusting and untrustworthy, nicely illustrates the habit of lying spies naturally develop. Indeed, Mr. Kalugin is so candid about the cheerful Iagoan malice with which he did his dirty work that his occasional, self-described twinges of conscience come across as unconvincing. As his story almost unconsciously makes clear, it was not the KGB’s brutality that turned him against the agency.” Having stated that, Shane completes his review somewhat positively, saying: “One need not wholeheartedly admire Mr. Kalugin, however, to enjoy his story. It is a reminder that in the wake of the Soviet collapse, we have learned a good deal more about the KGB than we have learned about the CIA and its sister agencies on the other side of the Cold War.” On November 9, 1994 in composite review of post-cold-war scholarship on Lenin, the atomic bomb, and KGB espionage in the Christian Science Monitor, Leonard Bushkoff stated about First Directorate: “After the beautifully crafted books by Holloway and Kapuscinski, there is a letdown in The First Directorate: My 32 Years In Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, the bureaucratic memoirs of Oleg Kalugin, a retired KGB major-general whose authoritative visage has graced American television. His book–written with Fen Montaigne–is filled with lively tidbits about operating in the United States, recruiting agents, roaming the world on this or that mission – and enjoying the perks. Bushkoff goes on the say: “The ideological disillusionment that Kalugin insists began in the 1980s is unconvincing in this ambitious career-minded official, who now presents himself as a liberal, democratic political figure.” Among professional reviewers, there seemed to be more of a willingness to beg off on uncoated expressions of suspicion over Kalugin’s intentions and actions, and even more, his character as with the foregoing. In Booklist, a book-review magazine that has been published by the American Library Association for more than 100 years, Gilbert Taylor wrote in August 1994: “After he had been cashiered from the KGB in 1990, Kalugin blazed into prominence as a critic of the pervasive spy empire. But oddly enough, he remains a professional loyal to the spook’s ethos: tell no tales out of school. Although frank about generalities, he ventures few blockbusting specifics that haven’t popped up elsewhere in the post-cold war wave of espionage books, but this memoir of a stellar career in the secret service is, nonetheless, engrossing for aficionados.” Taylor finishes his review noting: “Filled with anecdotes linked by personal journey from Stalinist true believer to champion democrat, Kalugin’s account of life in the secret world will haul in all spy buffs–a number to be augmented by a full-press publicity push.”

Given Kalugin’s former profession, spying, it would be fair to ponder whether the book relates truth, fiction, or something in between. Indeed, some readers may wonder whether one of the main elements of spying, promoting fraud, influenced his writing of First Directorate. As aforementioned, Kalugin has the skills to provide a colorful description of a man, and ascribing vibrant characteristics, impressive associations, and intriguing experiences to him. It also cannot be stated with absolute certainty by greatcharlie Kalugin actually loosed-off a full-frontal on himself as well as the KGB. However, greatcharlie is convinced that while there may very likely be certain omissions from his anecdotes, Kalugin presents the truth about himself in First Directorate. That truth about himself is rich enough, and would hardly require any embellishment. Although Kalugin’s intelligence career was amazing and his superb work in the KGB that made him more desirable to his new country’s government, there was more to Kalugin than his work. Some might feel Kaligin does quite a bit of preening in First Directorate. However, perhaps a second thought might be given to that idea backed by the consideration that among specialists, masters of a particular craft, there is typically a desire to look over their shoulders, to detail what has transpired, and to scrutinize themselves and their actions technically and tactically. Chronicling the past on paper, the convivial Kalugin also seemed to recount it all in his soul and spirit. As Kalugin dredges around himself, to discuss his contacts with people and memories of events, he willingly opens the kimono on his conscience. In the Preface of The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts, the 18th century English romantic poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley, wrote: ”The highest moral purpose aimed at in the highest species of drama is the teaching the human heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself.”

The symbol of the KGB (above). It should not be overlooked that all that Kalugin discusses in First Directorate is actually couched in an overarching discussion of the operations of the giant Soviet state security service, the KGB. The KGB was gloriously called the Soviet Union’s ”Sword and Shield” and the “Vanguard of Communism.” Its  primary responsibilities of the KGB were: foreign intelligence; counterintelligence; operatives investigatory activities, protecting the Soviet border, protecting the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; organization and security of government communications; and combatting nationalism, dissent, and anti-Soviet activities.

What Was the KGB?

It should not be overlooked that all that Kalugin discusses in First Directorate is actually couched in an overarching discussion of the operations of the giant Soviet state security service, the KGB. At the risk of being perceived as tiresome to those who already know much on the subject, some of the basics about the behemoth Soviet security organization are laid out here by greatcharlie for those less-familiar with it. The KGB was gloriously called the Soviet Union’s ”sword and shield” and the “Vanguard of Communism.” Its  primary responsibilities of the KGB were: foreign intelligence; counterintelligence; operatives investigatory activities, protecting the Soviet border, protecting the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; organization and security of government communications; and combatting nationalism, dissent, and anti-Soviet activities. Headquartered at Lubyanka Square, 2 Moscow, the KGB was well-situated, well-equipped, to cope with external, foreign threats to the system, counterrevolutionaries and reactionaries internally, as well as organized criminals and the black market. Its manpower would steadily grow in parallel with its activities and influence, reaching a total of 496,000. A large portion of that number included the Pogranichnyie Voiska KGB CCCP (Border Troops of the KGB USSR), a defense against threats from land, air, sea to Soviet territory. In 1989, the organization’s strength was estimated at 230,000 covering 63,000 kilometers of the Soviet border. There were additional smaller formations and independent units. Its land air and maritime troops and sailors functioned under the Main Directorate of the Border Troops which was subordinated to the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB. The Vtoroye Glavnoye Upravleniye (Second Chief Directorate) or VGU was the Internal Security Service of the KGB. Among Soviet citizens at home and abroad, it was the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate in a paranoid search for Soviet enemies and never ending quest to maintain total control over the Soviet Union’s population that unnerved and struck terror in their hearts as they tried innocently going about their daily business. In Hollywood, a sure-shot way to create a dark, mystifying picture of life in the Soviet Union was to depict scenes in which ordinary Soviet citizens would occasionally be taken aside by the KGB and asked: “Show me your identity card” or, make the more polite request, “Identity card please.” It would capture the flavor of Soviet rule and have the chilling effect on audiences, accurately illustrating how alien and atrocious life was in the Soviet Union and under Communism in general. The KGB was to be avoided by the ordinary Soviet citizen as best as possible. During Kalugin’s time, the KGB truly had a grip on everything except the Communist Party organization. Even then, the KGB was also known to play an important part in the allocation of power and authority by Soviet leaders after Stalin’s death, being drawn into the arena of internecine conflict among them. Perhaps it could be said that all Soviet citizens sailed the same sea but KGB members did so in different boats. The nomenklatura in the Soviet Union, or high ranking management of government bureaucracies and Communist Party functionaries, reigned as the main authorities in the country, ironically becoming the de facto aristocracy in its society, and entitled themselves to opportunities and privileges unavailable to ordinary citizens. The apparatchiks, or government bureaucrats, who actually oversaw the KGB’s abhorrent work of keeping the Soviet people under the thumb of their government, saw themselves as being indispensable members of an indispensable Soviet instrumentality. Most generally believed that as a benefit of being a member of the KGB, there was little chance that the conditions which beset ordinary Soviet citizens would impact their circumstances until discovering otherwise. Nimia illæc licentia profecto evadet in aliquod magnum malum. (This excessive license will most certainly eventuate in some great evil.)

The history and organization of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service, which directly concerns Kalugin’s career, well reflected the nature of its global mission and how that mission was performed. In 1917, the post-Bolshevik Revolution Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) secret police was founded and designated Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya Po Borbe S Kontrrevolyutsiyey I Sabotazhem Pri Sovete Narodnykh Komisarov RSFSR (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage under the Council of People’s Commissary of the RSFSR) better known as the Cheka. It was Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin, himself, who characterized the Cheka as the sword and shield of Communism. In those postwar years, Soviet internal security, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence organizations went through a period of transformation donning an alphabet soup of titles. As outlined in Henry S. A. Becket, The Dictionary of Espionage: Spookspeak into English (Stein & Day, 1986), its various iterations included: 1922-1923, Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (State Political Administration) or GPU; 1923-1934, Obedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenye (Unified State Political Administration) or OGPU; 1934-1938, Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) or NKVD; 1938-1946, Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (People’s Commissariat for State Security) and Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) or NKGB-NKVD, placing police and security functions under one chief; and, 1946-1953, Ministerstvo Vnuirennikh Del (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) or MVD-MGB. Eventually all of the non-military security functions were organized in what was dubbed the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or the KGB. Founded upon the experiences of other iterations of Soviet state security, the new KGB had no need to shed baby fat as it were. It was populated by men and women made of the same solid stuff of those who around 20 years before defended Leningrad and Stalingrad and drove Germany and its allies eastward until they reached Berlin. However, things are seldom perfect in any organization.

KGB’s leadership included its Chairman, the First Deputy Chairman (there could be more than one), Deputy Chairman (as many as 4 to 6), a policy Collegium, which included a chairman, a deputy chairman, the directorate chiefs, and the KGB chairmen of the Soviet republics. As aforementioned, Pervoye Glavnoye Upravieniye (First Chief Directorate) or PGU of the KGB which was the element responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities and concerned Kalugin’s work. As such, the First Chief Directorate would provide for the training and management of covert agents, intelligence collection administration, and the acquisition of foreign and domestic political, scientific and technical intelligence. According to Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanford University Press, 1993), the KGB included the following directorates, services and departments during Kalugin’s years there. Included among the directorates and services were: Directorate R: Operational Planning and Analyses; Directorate S: Illegals (agents inserted into societies, blending in, but carrying out orders from Moscow.

Forged documents, establishes themselves as citizens of the host country.); Directorate T: Scientific and Technical Intelligence (collected scientific, technological, and military information through espionage. Targets were in the Western industrial sector.); Directorate K: Counter-Intelligence: (infiltration of all the foreign special service operations: intelligence, counter-intelligence, police forces worldwide); Directorate OT: Operational and Technical Support; Directorate I: Computers; Directorate RT: Operations in USSR; Directorate V: “Wet affairs” (track down traitors, sabotage, assist international revolution, terrorism, and act in time of war.); Service A: Active Measures (disinformation, propaganda, forgery; support of front organizations, underground movements, revolutionary insurgencies, criminal and terrorist groups; Service R: radio communications; and, Service A of the 8th Chief Directorate at the First Chief Directorate (the code section).

Operations broke down regionally and functionally in the following departments: First Department: US and Canada; Second Department: Latin America; Third Department: United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, Malta; Fourth Department: East Germany, West Germany, Austria; Fifth Department: Benelux countries, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania; Sixth Department: China, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea; Seventh Department: Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines; Eighth Department: non-Arab Near Eastern countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Israel; Ninth Department: English-speaking Africa; Tenth Department: French-speaking Africa; Eleventh Department: liaison with Socialist states; Thirteenth Department: direct action, “assassination,” of enemies abroad and at home; Fifteenth Department: registry and archives, security of government installations; Sixteenth Department: signals intelligence and operations against Western code clerks; Seventeenth Department: India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma; Eighteenth Department: Arab Near Eastern Countries and Egypt; Nineteenth Department: Soviet Union Emigres; and, Twentieth Department: liaison with Third World states. It must be noted that special attention was given to the UN by the First Chief Directorate. The UN provided a peaceful, respectful, diplomatic forum for international dialogue, yet it was the site of extensive Soviet activities inside the UN during the Cold War. Impartial UN employees from Eastern Bloc also employed by KGB. Ideals and goals of the UN not followed. The orders that they would obey only came from KGB.

Beyond its own operations, the First Chief Directorate very successfully directed and controlled other Eastern Bloc intelligence services that were very often operating under the radar in many countries around the world. The officers of those aligned intelligence services certainly did not in any form akin to the Malgré-nous of the Alsace-Moselle performed for the German Waffen-SS during World War II. The product of many Eastern Bloc intelligence services actually far exceeded expectations as well as the capabilities of their Soviet task masters. Case in point was the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), the foreign intelligence service of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic). Under the skilled leadership of Markus Wolf, its Western foes even had to acknowledge that it was probably the most efficient and effective such service on the European continent

The author as a teen (above). As a teen, Kalugin devoured the books of Arkady Gaidar, which included stories of young characters doing courageous and noble deeds for Motherland. It planted seed in Kalugin’s mind of becoming a secret service officer. Those feelings were intensified when he attended camp for children of secret police. He met with university students attending the Security Ministry’s Higher School. Kalugin saw them as confident, fun loving. Kalugin stated: “I wanted to be like those dashing officer trainees, and a career in the Intelligence Service beckoned.” At 17, he decided to join the intelligence service. With an English proficiency and strong academic capabilities, he was well qualified.

Kalugin’s Early Years and Career Choice

In illo viro, Tatum robur corporis et Naomi fuit, it quocunque loco Angus esset, Fortuna facturus. (In that man there was such oak-like strength of body and mind that whatever his rank by birth might have been, he gave promise of attaining the highest place in the lists of fortune.) As has been the case with previous reviews, greatcharlie most enjoys examining a memoir to understand what sort of individual develops into who the author became. In its review of First Directorate, greatcharlie explores how, from youth to his earliest years in the KGB, how Kalugin evolved into the man he is today.

At least from what he shares, his early life was entertaining, pleasurable to recall rather than filled with dissatisfaction, disappointment, and hard lessons. Indeed, Kalugin relates the days of his youth with a subtle humor, recounting the efforts of a young man trying to make his way through life. Kalugin was raised in a “sleeping district” outside of Leningrad, something akin to a French banlieue. His circumstances seemed relatively ordinary, however, his father worked for the NKVD. Kalugin’s father, Danil, was a dark haired, handsome man with facial features revealing a Tartar blood trace. He was not well educated, but by Kalugin’s description a solid man, who cared for his family. After serving In the Red Army in the 1920s, he sought work in Leningrad, and that is when he landed a job as security guard for the secret police, then known as the NKVD. When Kalugin grew up, his father was working at the Headquarters building in Smolny. (Interestingly, in the KGB, officers who were the children of officers and former officers of the security services are affectionately referred to as Chekisty (Chekists), a name derived from the first security service in Communist Russia mentioned earlier, the Cheka. Some would come from families whose “roots” go back to the beginnings of the Communist Party as Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Children raised in the Chekist community, attending schools and a university Chekists’ progeny typically attended.)

Kalugin’s mother Klavdia, came from a family of skilled factory workers from St Petersburg for more than a century. Based on the manner in which he described himself, Kalugin was clearly a bon garçon, born with a good soul, nourished by a fine family and appropriate associations in his youth. Unfortunately, he was born during a wave of terror in which 29 to 40 million Russians were killed, and a dark shadow hung over Russia. When Nazi Germany invaded Russia, Kalugin travelled wuth his mother to stayed in Omsk, Siberia. His father remained in Smolny, guarding Party elite. Kalugin and his mother returned to Leningrad after a 900 day siege. Only her sister survived the war. Other seven members among 27 million lost during war. This clearly had an impact on the young Kalugin. Dogma among Russians in the immediate postwar period was to say that Russia’s victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War proved Communist system was best. The defeat of the Nazis proved to Kalugin and his young compatriots that Soviet Union was invincible. Still, it went much further for Kalugin. He confirms in First Directorate that from the days of his youth he was absolutely subsumed by Communism; he was a true believer, and that perspective colored every decision he made. He yearned for the opportunity to defend his political ideals, defend his country, and fight on behalf of the Communist Movement. Kalugin’s political leanings did not make him a zealous firebrand.

Unless greatcharlie is terribly mistaken, as he grew, Kalugin appears to have been gentle in temperament, but at the same time a mature boy, not showy, but within possessing a burning ambition with an idea of where to place it. Kalugin undertook the path toward excellence as a Communist with a great sense of ritual. He joined the Young Pioneers at an early age, and in his teens, he became involved with Kommisol. These were the sort of activities that types such as Kalugin went for. One could posit that as a result of his indoctrination in the Soviet Union, Kalugin genuinely viewed Communism as a coherent ideology and provided a clear direction. For the Communist, too, hope supported imagination and drove the individual’s faith in the system. Faith supported and drove the individual’s action to achieve. Despite violent outcomes of KGB dealings with his fellow citizens, Kalugin would have likely confided that there was no reason to argue the point. In his heyday during Staliin’s era of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, Kalugin likely would have looked any Western accusers directly in the eye and declared it all as Western disinformation, compelled by their bourgeoisie sense of morality to falsely critique the “superior” Soviet system any way they can. Much of what Soviet citizens were told about their country’s government, its security apparatus, its leaders, and its place in the world was filtered out by Moscow leaving what was reasonably bad out. Given the Kremlin insistence on concealing the truth about the country, many indoctrinated adherents of the system would contribute to their misunderstanding of it by doing their own filtering. Thus, the rest of what was understood of the Soviet Union, typically shaped by the desire to create the best picture of their country as possible, was usually just conjecture. It also made reasonable sense to those as Kalugin, psychically bound to the Soviet system, that there would always be the occasional differences of opinion over how efficiently something was done or how the government might have handled a matter more effectively under the Socialist framework. Amabilis insania. (Fond illusion.)

As a teen, he devoured the books of Arkady Gaidar, which included stories of young characters doing courageous and noble deeds for Motherland. It planted seed in Kalugin’s mind of becoming a secret service officer. Those feelings were intensified when he attended camp for children of secret police. He met with university students attending the Security Ministry’s Higher School. Kalugin saw them as confident, fun loving. They sang songs in English and Russian to campers to younger students. Kalugin stated: “I wanted to be like those dashing officer trainees, and a career in the Intelligence Service beckoned.” Kalugin had never assumed that he would have an ordinary life. Kalugin saw possible work in the state security service as more than a job. For him, it was a grand opportunity to support and defend his political ideals. Kalugin and his cohorts believe they were born to be men of action. Each wanted to be a pride to his fellow countrymen. For Kalugin, as with most of his young colleagues, the KGB offered a solid basis for believing that the Soviet system could be protected and sustained. The KGB, as a central organ of the government, ostensibly had the know-how and the resources to prevent the Soviet Union, and the contiguous countries of the Eastern bloc that it led, from falling into a chaotic condition. There was a perspective once common in the Soviet Union, and perhaps holds a place today in the Russian Federation, that in an heroic way, Kalugin and his KGB comrades were making good on the sacrifices of the previous generation of Soviet citizens in the Motherland’s defense. Kalugin explained that at 17, he decided to join the intelligence service, then called the MGB. With an English proficiency and strong academic capabilities, he felt qualified. Kalugin’s father, Danil strongly objected. As he worked for the NKVD, his father knew only too well what happened in the Soviet Union under Stalin, and. Indeed, he witnessed first-hand–from the screams he heard as a jail guard to the countless Communist Party bosses he saw disappear during his days at Smolny–what the glorious security services were doing to the Soviet people. Danil Kalugin secretly told his son about what he had seen and heard in the security forces. He explained to Kalugin that was what the NKVD was really all about; violence, torture, death. He did not want his son involved with the dirty work of the NKVD.

Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeking that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.) Strangely enough, Kalugin explains that his father’s stories made the life of a secret policeman seem even more intriguing. Kalugin put it this way: “After all, wasn’t the KGB on the front line of the battle against capitalism and world imperialism? The thought of dying for one’s country and the Socialist ideal stirred my blood. His talk of screaming prisoners didn’t sound nice, but I asked myself, What else can you expect in a bitter struggle with our enemies?” Kalugin was held captive by the idea and ideals of Communism and too easily overcome by the seeming prestige, the power, and the draw of it all. With his romanticized visions of a career in the state security service, he was too excited to look both ways, too young and inexperienced to intuit where it all might lead. While Kalugin’s very caring father did his level best to dissuade his son from joining the security service but  was not able to fully comprehend what he was telling him, that the security service was not something ideal, not an organization of “superheroes,” but a real place with real people, and certain unusual men worked in the state security service.  As he moved through the years at KGB, Kalugin would slowly come to realize exactly what his father told him about the security service’s horrors. Four decades later, Kalugin, more mature, more experienced, more insightful, explained to readers much as his father tried to explain to him what he unexpectedly experienced in the intelligence service. What Kalugin expresses sometimes plainly, but most often subtly, throughout in First Directorate, is that from his first days of training to the day of his retirement, some KGB personnel, not all, did not appear to be well-vetted psychologically to perform their function given the behaviors they displayed. Surely, among the KGB’s internal security elements, there were acts of undue severity and abominable cruelty committed, bordering, if not fully manifesting, sadism. Such monstrous individuals appeared absolutely unhinged from the reality that they were serving the Soviet government, not themselves, and that their authority came from the government, not themselves. Much of that was already well-known.

In the more elite KGB formations, officers were engaged in more complex and challenging tasks, were further vetted and had received extensive training However, Kalugin also gets across that problems similar to those that impacted the internal security section also existed among some employees of the more elite intelligence sections. (Examine the text very closely; such statements are really there!) Surely, this was a very important matter for Kalugin as he repeatedly makes a point of describing the many different personalities that he encountered in the KGB. His depiction of them left no doubt that they had no business being in the organization. As readers will discover late in the book, such individuals got the ball rolling in the right direction to lower the curtain on Kalugin’s career. The indications and implications of the insights Kalugin shares concerning the KGB’s organizational well-being were that a nexus existed between the decaying performance of the KGB and the eventual collapse of the Soviet system. True, KGB recruits were strenuously vetted through training, yet some who did not openly manifest any deficiencies while under the watchful eyes of instructors apparently got through. More than a few violent, overzealous, under motivated, dishonorable, and vengeful individuals, suffering from a wide range of other pathologies, would move up through its ranks. As the success of each directorate, department, and service of the KGB was dependent on the quality and consistency of the performance of individuals in their respective positions, these bad hires given their troubling actions and the ugly environment they would create, managed to have a damaging impact upon the organization over time. (The uneven thinking and anomalous behavior Kalugin reports was exhibited by some clearly misplaced KGB officers, is actually a phenomenon common to many large intelligence services. It is very possible that deep-seated emotional difficulties or disorders are stimulated and amplified in the individual working in an intelligence services due to the unique responsibilities of the job, rather broad authority one possesses, unusual and morally questionable activities required, and potent stressors that strain. The thinking and behavior noted here was recently evinced in the record of activities undertaken by members of the US Intelligence Community who vigorously sought to destroy reputations and the lives of several innocent individuals inside and outside of the Trump administration. It was an apparent venomous, mentally unbalanced quest to force the collapse of Trump’s presidency. The exact reasons for their behavior will likely be difficult to identify until facts about them and their actions are fully known. Unfortunately, honorable men and women in the intelligence services run up against such damaged individuals in their organizations more often than they should.)

After graduating from high school in Leningrad, Kalugin passed four entrance exams with high marks and qualified for service in the MGB. In 1952, Kalugin began his studies at the Institute of Foreign Languages ​​of the MGB in Leningrad. There was only one other school similar to it for MGB officer training in the Soviet Union, the Higher School in Moscow. As mentioned earlier, in the immediate postwar period, Ministerstvo Vnuirennikh Del (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) were combined to form the MVD-MGB. Kalugin graduated from the Institute of Foreign Languages with honors. Kalugin notes that at time of his graduation, his father was suffering as a result of a sharp decrease in KGB wages ordered by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in an effort to reign in the heavy-handed security service and he was subsisting with partition employment offered by friends. Yet, despite his own situation and his expressed misgivings about his son’s career choice, Kalugin’s father told him that he was proud of his achievement. By then the MVD-MGB had become the KGB.  The next step for Kalugin was more specialized training at the KGB Higher Intelligence School No. 101 or Advanced Spy School in Moscow. At the Advanced Spy School–later renamed the Andropov Red Banner Institute by the KGB and now called the Academy of Foreign Intelligence–Kalugin was trained as an Arabist, and in the course of his education, he studied the Middle East in detail. Kalugin was trained in tradecraft and prepared for technical work in the field. He learned how to set up radio transmitters, to use and detect bugging devices, to make microfilm and how to conceal microfilm and microdots in household items, how to cultivate intelligence assets, coding/decoding and cryptology, location orienting when dropped into unfamiliar locations, how to use a gun, how to tail people invisibly, how to detect when being tailed, how to evade all kinds of surveillance, and how to pass a package without being noticed even when being tailed. As his training came to a close, the leadership identified him for distribution to the most complex and prestigious First Foreign Intelligence Department, which, as aforementioned, dealt with the US and Canada. He was also informed that he would be joining a group of young people to take a graduate course in the US. As he relates the early days of his career, Kalugin appears to be transported to a place of happiness. The 20th century US philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer, John Dewey said: “To find out what one is fitted to do, and to secure an opportunity to do it, is the key to happiness.”

Kalugin (center right) with Soviet cohorts at Columbia University. Kalugin initially came to the US in September 1958 to attend the Columbia University School of Journalism as one of 17 ostensible students from the Soviet Union to arrive under the Fulbright exchange program. In reality, half of them, including the 24-year-old Kalugin, were officers from Soviet intelligence services. Before going to the US, Alexander Feliksov, Head of the KGB’s North American Department instructed Kalugin: “Just lay the foundation for future work. But don’t overstep the line. Now that you’ve been picked to go to America, make it your business to learn more about the country. Buy yourself good maps. Improve your English. Find out about their way of life. Communicate with people and make as many friends as possible.”

Kalugin’s First Visit to the US

Kalugin initially came to the US in September 1958 to attend the Columbia University School of Journalism as one of 17 ostensible students from the Soviet Union to arrive under the Fulbright exchange program that year, and the first Soviet citizens to study in the US since the end of World War II. In reality, half of them, including the 24 year old Kalugin, were actually representing Soviet intelligence services. He was already a lieutenant in the KGB. Before he left, Alexander Feliisov, the Head of the KGB’s North American Department instructed Kalugin: “Just lay the foundation for future work. But don’t overstep the line. Now that you’ve been picked to go to America, make it your business to learn more about the country. Buy yourself good maps. Improve your English. Find out about their way of life. Communicate with people and make as many friends as possible.” In New York, Kalugin came in contact with a culture alien to him. He tried to better understand it by experiencing as much of it as possible. Kalugin was impressed by Manhattan; the power, the beauty, the bustle. Other worldly creations, skyscrapers, the Empire State Building. He travelled throughout the city, no restrictions were placed on his movement. He would ride the subway for hours. He saw 100 films and visited clubs in Greenwich Village. Soon enough, the haunts and pleasures of the elite class became his stomping ground, too! He attended Broadway musicals, the Metropolitan Opera, and visited Manhattan’s many museums. Extremely impressive to Kalugin were giant department stores well stocked with a diversity of items and supermarkets with their abundance of fresh food, unheard of in the Soviet Union, known for shortages of everything and long breadlines. It is here, early on in the book that the reader has the opportunity to enjoy the vividness of Kalugin’s descriptions. One can imagine him taking in the sights, the sounds, the smells, the touch, the impact of the city on the young Soviet citizen. His level of thrill and enjoyment, though expressed on paper, is all made so palpable

Kalugin recognized that FBI operatives sought to make clandestine contacts with him at Columbia University, but did not experience such problems outside the school. At Columbia, he wrote for the school newspaper. He was elected to the Student Council. Kalugin curried enough curiosity by his presence in New York that the New York Times interviewed the young Fulbright Scholar for a human interest article which was given plenty of page space and garnered a lot of attention. Kalugin would venture outside of New York to Philadelphia, Chicago, New Orleans, and Washington. He also travelled through Iowa and Wisconsin. People were mostly very friendly to him. He admitted his happiness with all that was good gave him joy, but it also created a spark of doubt about his own world back home. His prescience, however, served him well as he kept his eyes wide open. He never took any experience to its furthest extreme to consider how he would fit into such a world. He would take note that the US had visible flaws. He noticed problems of poverty in Bronx Bowery, and Harlem. Kalugin also discovered endemic racial prejudice and ethnic and social discrimination. He learned about clashes over civil rights as well as voting rights and labor laws. He kept in his head that Soviet Union had a longer way to go, given what he saw in the US, but its vitality would overcome the US which would very likely stumble over its own deficiencies.

As his experience at Columbia University evinced, counterintelligence officers of the FBI and CIA likely had eyes on Kalugin as soon as he arrived in New York. What was akin to present-day FBI SSG surveillance teams and their typically maladroit surveillance contractors, would have been assigned to watch his every move. The insistence of his superiors that he remain untangled with anything before him was presumably based on their judgments on that strong likelihood. The alert sounded over FBI counterintelligence efforts was intriguing as it indicated that somber and astute KGB officers would heavily factor in FBI surveillance and attempts at clandestine contacts in all activities in the US to include mundane tasks of daily life such commuting, shopping, exercising, visiting museums, attending the opera, going to the movies and engaging in other recreational activities. Aa Kalugin goes on to explain, the rather heavy hand of FBI counterintelligence would prove most apparent at social events, receptions, dinners, cocktail parties, and gatherings in private homes.

While Kalugin’s contact with Soviet émigré named Anatoly that he gave the pseudonym Cook, who was a scientist at Thiokol has regularly been chalked up to luck, there is the possibility that it was not so unusual. Kalugin was not the only one involved in the recruitment; Cook had a say in the matter. There was an awareness in the US, especially among educated US citizens, as Cook–who it turned out was a Stalinist–that the Soviet Union was an authoritarian, Communust regime. As such, its citizens did not move freely overseas. Those travelling abroad with the approval of the regime would very likely be tethered to it via the KGB. Contact with a Soviet citizen visiting New York and attending an event on technology at the once famous New York Coliseum, would almost guarantee creating a potential link to the KGB. Kalugin’s level of success with Cook albeit was frightfully high. To borrow from cricketing parlance, Cook was a lolly, an easy catch. However, Kalugin did not struggle afterward to duplicate that first success. Rather than focus on trying to capture lightning in a bottle twice, he focused on simply doing his job as best he could. Esse quam videri bonus malebat; ita quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum sequebatur. (He chose to be good rather than to seem good; and so, the less he strove for fame, the closer it followed after him.)

His First Deployment: New York

During his first full operational deployment, Kalugin went back into the US, returning to New York. From June 1960 to March 1964, operated out of the Rezidentura at the Soviet UN Mission, using the cover of Radio Moscow UN correspondent. Kalugin’s true purpose was political intelligence work. Kalugin  would send communications with information necessary for the leadership in Moscow under the pseudonym Felix. He spent time cultivating US citizens and diplomats and citizens of other countries at the UN and in New York, who he foresaw could supply the KGB with classified or unclassified information about US foreign and domestic policy. Those in contact with Kalugin were imaginably unaware that he was a KGB officer, collecting useful information from them. Kalugin would also utilize his contacts for active measures. Indeed, active measures activities were not something apart from, but integral to the KGB officer’s day-to-day efforts in the field. Paralleling efforts to determine the political leanings and the degree of compatibility and favorability toward the Soviet viewpoint was spotting, developing, assessing, recruiting and even handling agents. While engaged in active measures, KGB officers would reflexively spout “the party line” on issues of the day with those they encountered while making their social rounds. The intention of injecting the Soviet line and disinformation into conversations in this way was to infect the opinion making process in the US. New York was fertile ground for that activity as it was the center of publishing, newsmedia, writers and “agents of influence,” that would set the US political agenda. He, indeed, had conversations with luminaries in US society from all fields. Not every KGB agent performed this work well. Kalugin did. Indeed, in First Directorate, Kalugin provides an ample idea of how that work transpired in real terms operationally, bringing him triumph and bringing grief to adversarial US counterintelligence officers. Active measures, however, included much more than exchanges of knowledge and sharing news stories. More intense activities, as Kalugin recounted, would include paying for, and helping write, ads in the New York Times signed by prominent and unsuspecting political activists protesting the US involvement in Vietnam. The KGB sent racist letters, supposedly from US citizens, to African diplomats at the UN and has operatives paint swastikas on synagogues and desecrate Jewish cemeteries. Kalugin would visit the site of the vandalism and write reports for Radio Moscow on how anti-Semitism was sweeping the US.

What is particularly interesting about active measures is the double-edged impact the work may have had ultimately. Essentially, all of the information relentlessly propagated by the KGB in the US and the rest of the world, though ostensibly the Soviet line, was false information or disinformation. It was designed not to authentically inform but to shape thinking in a pro-Soviet direction or forment dissatisfaction and social and political unrest in the target country. To that extent, most likely consciously but perhaps subconsciously in the minds of the KGB officer engaged in such work was that the Soviet line, the same one Soviet citizens were hearing at home, was full of lies. Certainly KGB officers were worldly wise enough to know that no strategy should have been necessary to present the truth, for it stands for itself. Activities such as active measures were really being used to defend against or counter the power of the truth. Perchance it was never calculated or officially considered what type of destabilizing impact requiring KGB officers to engage in active measures might have on morale, esprit de corps, honor, loyalty. The impact of KGB officers’ sensibilities may have also played a role in decisions by some to defect. While the ultimate ends of active measure may have justified the means in Moscow Center, the collateral effects of the activity on its personnel may not have. (This causes one to consider what impact former senior and mid-level US intelligence and law enforcement officials who, every ten seconds wrongfully and repeatedly argued in the news media and elsewhere in public that Trump and members of his administration, in truth all guiltless, had colluded with the Russian Federation Government, but meanwhile testified under oath in US Congressional Committees that there was no evidence that they had actually seen that indicated such. In this instance, one could genuinely ruminate on whether one of the main elements of spying, promoting fraud, influenced their perjurious behavior. Ultimately, the conscience of each may by their undoing. In Act V, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play The Life and Death of Richard the Third, King Richard, on Bosworth Field, confesses: “My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, / And every tongue brings in a several tale, / And every tale condemns me for a villain. / Perjury, perjury, in the high’st degree / Murder, stem murder, in the direst degree; / All several sins, all used in each degree, / Throng to the bar, crying all. Guilty! guilty!”)

In the ordinary sense Kalugin was not engaged in laborious toil as an foreign intelligence officer. Yet, surely, the work was strenuous, high-pressure, and anxiety-filled. The risks were never trivial. For his daily work, within the limitations of his cover assignment, Kalugin was on the street, working agents and performing technical intelligence tasks. From what can be ascertained from Kalugin’s description of his work in the US played out, generally, he, just as other officers, would handle four or five agents or targets under development. He was not expected to spread his range of intelligence activities further, although he was still encouraged to develop a large circle of casual contacts among whom he could conduct active measures and from whom a relatively small number of serious targets might be selected at some point. As Kalugin describes his work, he undoubtedly demonstrated his flexibility and adaptability, ensuring the collection of valuable information from sources reached his managers. There was a particular case in which Kalugin made the unconventional choice. He came into contact with a 25 year old Columbia University graduate student who held extreme left-wing political views. Thinking he could be motivated to work for Soviet Union to promote Socialist state. However, he could not deliver anything really of value. His parents, both of whom were Communist  told him to stop working with Kalugin because it was too dangerous. Kalugin was insistent but to no avail. Despite that breakdown, the young student’s father contacted Kalugin and asked him to leave his son alone and offered to help him instead. Kalugin, convinced he was genuine, told his manager at the UN Mission. When his manager contacted the Center, in a reply Kalugin was admonished not to deviate from procedure again but to continue with the recruitment. Further, the cable ended with the instruction: “Allowing for the initiative and courage shown by Comrade Felix–as aforementioned Kalugin’s codename, I suggest he be promoted to the rank of senior case officer.” The father turned out to be a good KGB asset, and was used on numerous occasions to run messages and deliver materials to agents outside the 25 mile city radius to which Soviet Mission staff were restricted. By Kalugin’s own admission, the Center displayed a considerable degree of patience over that move. It did not want Kalugin to be inventive. It wanted officers to strictly adhere to procedures. Yet, the Center also very much wanted good results. Ostensibly, while deviations from procedures were greatly frowned upon, apparently if no damage was done to a case and the efforts of the officer and his station were not detected or harmed in any other way, and success was achieved, nothing punitive beyond a bit of admonishment resulted. Indeed, KGB case officers were held strictly to account for the results of their actions. Yet, they were not expected to report on day-to-day developments to the Center. KGB officers were expected to be on the beat and usually did not spend much time at the desk writing reports, reading guidance from headquarters or maintaining his files. When he had a problem he took it up with his boss, but was supposed to know the difference between what he really needs consultation about and what he ought to be able to handle on his own. There was virtually no lateral distribution of communications and an extreme emphasis on compartmentation. His boss in turn has the responsibility of not only guiding the case officers that work for him, but of ensuring that vital information pertinent to the work of one case officer but acquired through another is made available. The custom that each officer prepares his own reports and kept them brief, made it possible for their reports to actually be read all the way up the chain.

Kalugin (center) on the beat in New York. During his first full operational deployment, from June 1960 to March 1964, Kalugin operated out of the Soviet UN Mission, using the cover of a Radio Moscow UN correspondent. Kalugin would send communications with information necessary for the leadership in Moscow under the pseudonym Felix. He spent time cultivating US citizens and diplomats and citizens of other countries at the UN and in New York, who he foresaw could supply the KGB with classified or unclassified information about US foreign and domestic policy. Within the limitations of his cover assignment, Kalugin was on the street, working agents and performing other intelligence tasks. Appreciation of Kalugin’s work by headquarters resulted in further promotions. From 1965 to 1970, he would be assigned to Washington as deputy rezident with the cover of deputy press officer, and then acting chief of the Rezidentura at the Soviet Embassy.

Recruiting KGB Spies

When tested by unexpected challenges in the field, Kalugin would assess the situation, then begin to act based on his training. A big lesson gleaned from Kalugin’s anecdotes is to “Trust your training.” Still, the most devastating weapon stored in Kalugin’s figurative armoire as a KGB intelligence officer was his mind. Kalugin possessed an intellect that stood out a mile (and still does now). There were never too many moving parts in a situation. What Kalugin could not see or confirm with his own eyes, he was clearly able to conceptualize better than most. Even more, Kalugin’s intellect was continuously animated concerning his work. To be successful at running agents in the field, an intelligence officer must know a lot about humanity. One must know a lot about human relationships. There are said to be certain secrets and knowledge of human existence, human circumstance. Whether Kalugin managed to acquire that hidden bit of information is unknown to greatcharlie. However, little doubt is left that Kalugin very much wanted to better understand, to put it sort of whimsically, “what made people tick.” Clearly, he successfully acquired that knowledge and experience as evidenced by all of his interactions recounted in First Directorate. Concerning prospective recruits, Kalugin would parse out all that is made available to him about the subject at hand. The minute Kalugin observes something, he knows what can happen. Kalugin would know the answer; he knows the usual result. Kalugin could feel a good recruitment on the tips of his fingers. As aforementioned, the Center left no doubt in its instructions and communiques to Kalugin that it was not looking for immediate success, dicey efforts. It repeated that guidance often. It may appear that the Center was figuratively hanging on Kalugin’s gun arm, but it certainly was not. The Center was adverse to chasing miracles. The Soviet intelligence service possessed a great deal of patience and determination to wait for years before the source, led along the way, would join the Department of State, the CIA, or some other entity, and attain a position useful to it. According to Kalugin some US recruits were approached even before reaching college. It was the understanding of KGB that US intelligence services were unable to wait that long. There were some US citizens apparently recruited for a long-term plan. For instance, in the event of war between the US and the Soviet Union, they would be directed to sabotage Washington’s power lines or poison drinking water sources.

Earlier here, greatcharlie mentions how Kalugin takes the reader to school concerning KGB spying, particularly running agents in the field. This was particularly true of his in-depth discussion of the recruiting process. One also learns from Kalugin in First Directorate that each recruitment effort is a little different.  There are always different triggering motives leading to cooperation with an intelligence service, especially, one from another country. The psychological contact of the intelligence officer with the prospective recruit is key. In recruiting agents, speech is everything. Word choices must build confidence, create trust, console, assure, inspire, and comfort. To create compliant agents, the right word choice must be made every time. To that extent, Kalugin could not conceal his ebullience, recalling occasions when all he collected about a prospective recruit would coalesce and he formulated, once again taking from cricketing parlance, a jaffa, a particularly good pitch. Whether a recruiting target signs something at the time of being recruited (using the KGB terminology) about cooperation or not, really depends on the preceding circumstances. A written agreement was required when a recruitment was based on some compromising materials. If there was a later refusal by an operative to cooperate, the agreement could be used for blackmail. Yet, despite how well Kalugin laid out his discussion of recruitment, the process was far from a simple matter or easy to do. When the Soviet Union looked like the wave of the future, its best spies came to its  intelligence services out of ideological convictions. In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, their recruitment service among such individuals was counted upon. Kalugin posited that after 1956 when Khrushchev exposed the cruelty of the Stalin regime and showed that “ ‘Soviet achievements’ had been built on the bones of our own people,” true believers in the Communist Movement began to dry up and disappear. Kalugin explained further that after Czechoslovakia was invaded in 1968, “only the most fervor ideologue could hold any illusions that the Soviet Union was striving to build a Socialist utopia.”

Both directly and delicately, Kalugin indicated that what drove recruits to spy boiled down to four primary motivations: money; ideology; conspiracy; and excitement. Concerning those recruits interested in money, spying was little more than service offered through a business transaction. There were many such cases. Perhaps the most infamous was that of the notorious US Navy traitor, John Walker, who was able to spy for the Soviet Union for 19 years. His recruitment and handling was Kalugin’s greatest achievement at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Walker was a walk-in, came to the Soviet Embassy with a treasure-trove of secrets. He was in it for the money. The entrepreneur spy included his son, brother, and best friend in his spy ring. He tried to bring in his daughter, but she refused. Walker needed no physical contact with his Soviet handlers, pep talks, and no hand holding. He in fact operated 10 years without meeting one. Nearly everything done after the initial set of meetings was done with dead drops. His wife finally reported his activities to authorities. There were others such as a CIA officer in Washington who claimed to have been recently fired. He made it clear from the start that he was looking for money. He would eventually pass a considerable amount of material. However, the most valuable document was a long paper entitled “Detection and Approaches to Psychologically Vulnerable Subjects of the Enemy,” which cited US efforts to recruit Soviets worldwide and painted a portrait of Soviet citizens most likely to become spies.

Regarding ideology, Kalugin indicated that when a recruits motivations were ideological, they were typically pro-Soviet, adherents of Socialism and the Communist Movement, fellow travellers. At other times, they were simply left-leaning in that era of protest. The Soviets could recruit such agents in the US and provide them no remuneration. Some even refused it. An example was that of left-wing publisher, M.S. Armoni, editor of a journal Minority of One, who would do the bidding of the KGB by publishing articles allegedly written by Kalugin. They were actually written by the KGB propaganda department in Moscow. The KGB supplied money for Armoni to run several ads in the New York Times criticizing the US involvement in  Vietnam and signed by leading liberals at the time. When Armoni had financial difficulties, Kalugin provided him with nearly $10,000 in funds for being “So faithful in presenting the Soviet view of world affairs.” The money broken down into smaller sums was falsely attributed by Armoni to anonymous US donors. Kalugin also gives the example of a diplomat at a Western European embassy who furnished the KGB with diplomatic cables, top secret reports, recording with the US State Department. The same diplomat was approached without immediate result when posted to Bonn, West Germany. Kalugin met with him in Washington under orders from the Center. He convinced the diplomat to provide classified materials for very little money. His motivation was ideological because he held leftist political leanings.

Relating to conspiracy, such recruits were most often vengeful toward the government, scientific, or technological organization that employed them. An extraordinary case was that of an FBI special agent with considerable access. He first approached the KGB station chief one day and said he wanted to help the Soviets. He immediately supplied the station chief with some information about FBI activity against several Soviet citizens in New York City. The KGB was suspicious, but the FBI man proved reliable. Through personal meetings and by mail, the FBI recruit sent other portions of information about the FBI’s counterintelligence work against the KGB. the mysterious FBI recruit, as Kalugin refers to him, never asked for money.

As to excitement, there were the sensation-seekers, driven by the excitement of spying, self-gratification, or amusement. Kalugin recalls a female diplomat from what Kalugin characterized as “a major European country,” who, after being posted in Moscow for two years and becoming involved with a KGB officer, made contact with Kalugin in Washington. She would supply information to him, as Kalugin suggested, to support the work of her romantic interest still in Moscow. Kalugin would meet with her frequently in restaurants and receptions. When asked to provide cables from  her Foreign Ministry, she refused but recited what was in those she read when they met. Kalugin would also gift her with jewelry, scarves, and other presents. Kalugin deduced that the woman likely knew he was a KGB officer, but enjoyed the sensation of meeting in cozy restaurants and being treated well by him. What the woman provided was valuable political intelligence. There was also the curious case of I.F. Stone, a well-known left-leaning Washington journalist. The Center had informed Kalugin that Stone had been a useful contact who broke off after the invasion of Hungary in 1956. It wanted Kalugin to reestablish the connection. Stone would meet with Kalugin a half-dozen times a year for lunch. During those meetings, he would share insightful views on the US political scene. Kalugin referred to Stone merely as a former “fellow-traveller. However, having meetings with someone he likely suspected was a KGB officer was undoubtedly intriguing to Stone. Stone abruptly ended their acquaintance, however, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Big Promotions

Appreciation of Kalugin’s work by the Center resulted in further promotions. From 1965 to 1970, he would be assigned as deputy rezident at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, with the cover of deputy press officer, and then acting chief of the Rezidentura at the embassy. He was invited to serve in Washington initially by an eventual mentor of a sort, Boris Solomatin, who was taking over as rezident there. As defined in The Dictionary of Espionage, the KGB section of a Soviet Embassy was the Rezidentura. The ranking officer of the embassy was the rezident, who operated under diplomatic cover, and this had diplomatic immunity. The rezident’s equivalent in the US Embassy was the CIA chief of station. As the rezident would hold senior status in the KGB, his identity in the foreign intelligence service was known to Western intelligence services and law enforcement. To that extent, the rezident engaged in almost no espionage activities while deployed abroad. What is curiously noted in The Dictionary of Espionage is that some residents did roam the cocktail circuit where posted “for hard drinking seemed to be a prevalent trait.”

Interestingly, KGB officers were promoted through the service on bicameral tracks. Being essentially a military organization, an officer was promoted from junior lieutenant up to lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and then, if fortunate enough, through the general ranks, major general, lieutenant general, colonel general, and general of the army. The KGB officer’s formal rank was largely based on his time in service up to lieutenant colonel. Concurrently,  the officer receives the classification as a junior case officer, case officer, or senior case officer, and then progresses further as a deputy rezident or rezident. Those operational designations were based on the officer’s experience and performance as an operator in an assigned field. The chain of command was determined by operational positions rather than rank. Indeed, a major could be reassigned from one part of the KGB to the First Chief Directorate and be designated as a junior case officer for lack of experience and be subordinate to a senior lieutenant who was a case officer or senior case officer. Pay was determined by where the officer was ranked in both hierarchies. Kalugin’s title at the Soviet Embassy was acting rezident, and not fully the official rezident. Kalugin explains that the cause for this was sensational editorial columns aimed at exposing Kalugin as a KGB officer. It was an act completely estranged from tradition among journalists in Washington. First, there was a Washington Post article referring to a Soviet intelligence officer’s work with a Greek agent. The name of the officer published was Victor Kraknikovich, the alias Kalugin used for the Greek case. The Center was informed. Kalugin suspected the story was fed to the Washington Post by the FBI and the beginning of a campaign. Then, Jack Anderson published an article naming Kalugin as a Soviet agent. The article’s opening paragraph stated: “His name is Oleg Kalugin, second secretary at the Soviet embassy. For some time, he has been trying to place a female acquaintance of his as his agent in the State Department. He also instructed an aide to cultivate a girl who works at the FBI. Neither attempt succeeded. Both girls have been leading him under the direction of the FBI.” Anderson followed up on the Kalugin story in his “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column, headlined “Soviet Spy Allowed To Remain in U.S.”, “His [Kalugin] undercover activities in this country are known to the FBI.” Anderson included: “But only the State Department knows the reason he is still here. Other spies caught in the act have been declared persona non grata and have been given 48 hours to leave the country.” On first impression, the Center took it all very calmly, telling Kalugin “Curb your activities just a bit but do not worry.” Nevertheless, the Center was concerned that Kalugin would be deported, a headache the KGB did not need. Kalugin was not deported. An intriguing reality was that KGB operations in the US were not solely dependent on the work of the rezident at the Embassy in Washington. As noted in the aforementioned The Dictionary of Espionage, along with the official rezident, an illegal rezident was deployed who lived abroad without any official cover, usually with an assumed identity, responsible for controlling subordinate illegal agents who worked in his area. The illegal rezident would have no contact with the Soviet Embassy or any of its personnel, and he maintained his communications with the Center. In terms of authority, the illegal rezident had the rank of the official KGB rezident. If the illegal rezident was arrested, the officer could not plead diplomatic immunity and would go to prison.

On the Threat of Defections

Once operating in foreign territory, a considerable concern regarding intelligence officers and their agents was the threat of betrayal. Concerns were almost always raised among Soviet citizens when anyone with whom they may have just met or were in contact for other reasons, suddenly showed an eccentric interest in them. One had to be resolute regarding personal and collective loyalty. There had to be a defined sense of what you owed to your country, what you owed to your own sense of ethics and morality. For some KGB officers, deployed overseas, even while facing-off with their Western counterparts, it often became the same old trudge day in, day out. Some of Kalugin’s fellow KGB foreign intelligence officers would struggle mightily to develop informants, find bona fide targets with access to considerable information to recruit, and get anything started from which they could develop concrete proposals for a foreseeable recruitment at their postings. Others figuratively shuffled along, hoping to go unnoticed and evade the behests of the Center along much as the theatrical comic relief of an aged butler seeking to avoid the master and mistress of the house hoping to keep his exertions to a minimum. Causality for such difficulties often resided in those KGB officers, themselves. Personal and professional inadequacies, having gone undetected during the vetting process and training, often found their way to the surface, and would provide an open door to inappropriate indulgences and improprieties. Embezzlement was a problem. There were those who would keep hundreds of dollars of payments intended for KGB operatives for themselves. A number would outrightly make personal use of KGB funds. Some had already displayed the most deplorable carnal behavior while still in the Soviet Union. Then deployed to Western countries, they would indulge in all that had to be offered. They would set aside their defensive training. In the end, a number of them would be caught flat footed in rather fatuous, fairly obvious honey traps set by US counterintelligence. They most likely were obliged to play the double-game against their bosses at Moscow Center. Kalugin explains that there was a particularly nasty problem in Canada in which a half dozen KGB personnel were left open to blackmail by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and all were recalled and disciplined. (An individual is tracked by an intelligence or counterintelligence organization with the goal uncovering evidence for a case or investigation. To endlessly surveil an individual, or subject as one would be dubbed, using mountains of taxpayer dollars, with no real goal, is not just inept, it is malfeasance. The subject, who may not be guilty of anything, is essentially being harassed, and very likely some dishonorable individuals in the intelligence or counterintelligence organization violating their oath to the country and highly likely, in nasty surreptitious ways, attempting to build an extra pension for themselves. It happens in Intelligence services more than one might imagine.)

FBI counterintelligence, Kalugin’s main opponent in the US, engaged in near endless  attempts to intercept him and perhaps neutralize and recruit him, came in the form of clandestine contacts. Those attempts confirmed that he had actually been under surveillance as the FBI would only have undertaken such an effort if counterintelligence managers believed that special agents had collected enough about him and his activities that they were convinced he was a Soviet intelligence officer, that they understood how Kalugin thought, and that he would respond favorably to an effort to make clandestine contact with him. The method used by FBI counterintelligence to reach Kalugin was its bog-standard employment of women as honey traps. As defined in The Dictionary of Espionage, a honey trap is a method of sexual entrapment for intelligence purposes, usually to put a target [such as Kalugin] into a compromising position so that he or she can be blackmailed. Perhaps it would be enough to say Kalugin displayed restraint and elegance in the face of advances by the female FBI counterintelligence operatives. Indeed, as he describes his response, he displayed a sensibility akin to what the French call “bof” (whatever) to it all. One might simply chalk that up to Kalugin’s self-discipline, his Apollonian nature. In the field, Kalugin was always dedicated to his country, the Communist Movement, and his mission. He was laser focused on his responsibilities as a KGB officer to spot potential recruits, collect information, even passively, and report observations, engage in active measures, and not fall prey to the women used against him. Beyond consideration of Kalugin’s professional response to what to him were far less than enticing honey traps, consideration should be given to his response simply as an individual. There exists a line of thinking which notes unless one has already thought, deliberated, pondered, or meditated on certain behavior, one will be hardened to it. One would not be going out on a slender thread to presume Kalugin was neither ignorant of nor surprised by attempts at such manipulations, carnal behavior among adults. Perchance, he simply never considered getting involved with such nonsense  or pondered having anything to do with such women while on the beat.

Perhaps proof and precedence of previous successes with less capable, less adroit, or simply inept KGB officers, along with some likely unsupported, doctrinaire, Cold War era preconceptions concerning the Russian male libido, convinced FBI counterintelligence of the correctness and efficaciousness of that method of clandestine contact with Kalugin. The focus was on the physical, the carnal, not the intellectual. The underdeveloped mind can rarely get beyond physical facts. Even at the most basic level of decisionmaking on the matter, some recognition that a mental attraction, some cerebral connection between Kalugin and a female operative foisted upon him might be required. That was apparently ignored or disregarded by the FBI, presumably counting upon some id-explosion that would overwhelm him. It was a considerable oversight. Based on how he described the women involved, such a connection under any circumstance, would have been near impossible. In the intelligence game, nothing about making contact with an opponent in the field can be considered too trivial to disregard. under the leadership of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, Special Agents in counterintelligence were genuinely tough. Kalugin admits to that in the book. Yet, they could hardly be judged as being socially conscious by current standards. Their record of responses on a variety of other issues, the Civil Rights Movement and Anti-War Movement for instance, indicates they were in fact quite the opposite. The use of honey traps and similar artifices by FBI Special agents, surveillance specialists or contractors, continues today.

Although as he recounts them, Kalugin indicates that he was cautiously amused by the FBI honey traps, but he also seemed to take a professional interest in why in US society in which there were far more better things to do, would a woman even entertain the idea of serving as a seductress for the FBI. Recognizing that the use of the method was a gauge, a manifestation of the thinking among serious US government intelligence and law enforcement officers, Kalugin very likely began at that time to contemplate how Soviet foreign intelligence in the US could effectively turn the ploy against them and other targets in the US. That is exactly what he did. Kalugin used his personal attributes and charm and those of other handsome males and females to further the KGB’s mission by loosening those attractive qualities as weapons against unsuspecting Western officials and especially secretaries working in key offices in the US foreign and national security policy apparatus, when he believed something considerable could be gained by doing so. The Ancient Greek comic and playwright, Aristophanes in The Birds (414 B.C.) wrote: “Men of sense often learn from their enemies. Prudence is the best safeguard. This principle cannot be learned from a friend, but an enemy exorts it immediately. It is from their foes, not their friends, that cities learn the lesson of building high walls and ships of war. And this lesson saves their children, their homes, and their properties.”

Kalugin (right) standing with Kim Philby (left). In reaction to increasing defections by KGB officers, Yuri Andropov, the Chairman of the KGB, ordered KGB foreign counterintelligence to develop a new program that would make defection to the Soviet Union attractive. He ordered that life for existing defectors made to be envied and to make certain to let the world know about it. Kalugin was directed to handle the matter. A defector that Kalugin devoted time to was Kim Philby, the United Kingdom MI6 traitor. Philby’s life in the Soviet Union was awful and Kalugin found him in a terrible state. He had faced considerable mistreatment, particularly psychological torture. Kalugin set forth on a genuine course to rehabilitate Philby. Yet, reversing the damage to those mistreated by intelligence and counterintelligence services is extraordinarily difficult. If anything, Kalugin salvaged the best of what was left of the Soviet spy. In the photo above, relative to Kalugin, Philby appears as if he had the Hell posted out of him.

At KGB Foreign Counterintelligence

In 1971, having returned from the US, Kalugin became deputy chief of the Second Service of First Chief Directorate, which meant a two-step increase in the hierarchy of the central intelligence apparatus. However, the counterintelligence service proved to be broken, unprepared, and understaffed. The counterintelligence function was pivotal to KGB operations and its mission, but it was not given the status and attention it truly required. Even housing made available for its officers was undesirable. Kalugin had a negative immediate impression of the director of the Second Service of First Chief Directorate, Vitaly Boyarov. However, his concerns were resolved over time. Concerning the other deputies Kalugin had nothing greater good to say. One was a chain smoking, profane man who constantly berated his subordinates. Kalugin described another deputy as a fussy, indecisive man who had “no business being in the KGB let alone in relatively high position.” Kalugin depicted the third as an “utter nonentity.” All three were at least a decade older than Kalugin. The decline for KGB foreign counterintelligence operationally was also apparent. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign counterintelligence, according to Kalugin, had managed to penetrate deeply into the French, United Kingdom, and Italian intelligence services. Concerning the US, the KGB had Walker, their superspy. However, by the 1970s, it was clear to many that the Soviet Union really was not the model society of the future, both politically and socially, and the Soviet system could do nothing to reverse that impression. As disillusionment with the Soviet Union set in, the number of KGB defectors also began to skyrocket, further damaging its operations.

When Kalugin first started working in foreign counterintelligence in 1970, the KGB was only experiencing a trickle of defections from the ranks. However, the rate steadily increased. However, the defection of Oleg Lyalin of Department V, tasked with preparing contingency plans for sabotage and assassination in time of war, defected after working for the United Kingdom’s intelligence services for six months. The story of his activities as presented by Kalugin would surely be astonishing to any readers. His revelations resulted in the expulsion of 105 Soviets from the country, personal non grata. Visas for known KGB officers were denied. In reaction to Lyalin’s defection and the many others, Yuri Andropov, the Chairman of the KGB, ordered Kalugin’s director at counterintelligence, Boyarov, to develop a new program that would make defection to the Soviet Union attractive. He suggested using large amounts of money, fancy apartments and country homes, and complete freedom of movement in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. He also ordered that life for existing defectors made to be envied and to make certain to let the world know about it. Boyarov put Kalugin on the case. That led to perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of that period of Kalugin’s career, his contact with the infamous double agent Kim Philby, formerly of the United Kingdom’s MI6, Secret Intelligence Service. While Kalugin met with a number of the defectors, to include the infamous George Blake, also from the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service, and Donald Maclean, but Philby was the most interesting case. Suffice it to say, greatcharlie sense that it is going out on a slender thread in discussing the matter of Philby, but it is critical to the process of understanding and characterising Kalugin. Philby is a delicate and painful subject in some Western intelligence services even today. Harold Adrian Russell “Kim” Philby, was a member of “The Magnificent Five.” Others included two diplomats, Guy Burgess and the aforementioned Donald Maclean, and the former officer of MI5, the  domestic focused Security Service, and leading art historian, Anthony Blunt. The identity of the fifth member was never confirmed. The intelligence officer, John Cairncross, was suspected. All but the fifth member defected to the Soviet Union. Kalugin had heard rumors of Philby’s life in Moscow–”drinking, womanizing, hours of depression, and squalid existence.” Most of it proved to be true.

For Philby, defection to the Soviet Union did not pan out as he had hoped. It was nothing near the paradise he likely envisioned. He had a relatively decent apartment, but had few possessions in it worth having. The big problem he faced though was not so much being deprived of material things, but rather his treatment. Philby was subjected to repeated house arrests over regular suspicions of KGB as to his “activities.” His every movement, even in his home, was considered suspect. For instance, when he was heard writing over hidden microphones, it was determined that he was composing reports to pass to Western agents. The overall surveillance was ham-handed, guaranteed to harass and cause discomfort. The only element that was missing from his treatment was the rough stuff, physical torture, though there was plenty of psychological torture. The deep grief felt by Philby over the death of his image of a Soviet wonderland, coupled with his mishandling was likely made somewhat less painful by his daily practice of soaking himself in alcohol. For those in the KGB who were acting against him, that likely provided a sense of accomplishment. They were clearly the types. Philby’s behavior was rumored to have been questionable–”drinking, womanizing, hours of depression, and squalid existence,” but little was placed in official reports about his treatment. For this reason, Kalugin did expect to find what he did when he contacted him. As things were, there was no chance of showcasing Philby’s situation as reflective of that of defectors. If the truth of Philby’s actual treatment had gotten out to the rest of the world, it would have choked the Soviet voice on defections. A singer with fine pitch would notice something wrong with a note that an ordinary or amateur might not. However, everything Kalugin observed was plain as day, actually absolutely over the top. The inhumanity, illogica, and incompetence of Philby’s handling screamed out. As Kalugin described what those KGB officers involved in what had been done to Philby were further examples of how deep seated psychological issues of some officers would drive them to engage in odious acts. Kalugin set forth on a course of attempting to rehabilitate Philby. There was nothing superficial about his efforts. He essentially debriefed him again under calm, informal conditions. He began to visit him somewhat regularly. He then brought other friendly KGB officers to talk to him, ask his opinion on professional matters, tradecraft, trying to give him a sense of being useful, capable, and needed. Kalugin used the authority granted to him by Boyarov to involve Philby in KGB training. He brought him to the KGB Higher School to lecture young officers who were set to be deployed to Western countries. Philby would help with active measures by inserting sins poster passages in US State Department and CIA documents. Kalugin would genuinely ask Philby for input into programs being formulated for defectors and prospective recruits. For all in which Philby was becoming involved, Philby was amenable and did not want payment. Kalugin did what he could to remunerate him by boosting his ongoing payments. He had repairs made to his apartment and replaced the furniture. Kalugin would also arrange for Philby to travel outside of the Soviet Union to Socialist Countries in the Eastern Bloc and beyond to Cuba and Mongolia. In doing all of this, Kalugin followed his orders, but his noble and humane effort did credit to both his head and his heart.

The damage intelligence and counterintelligence services can do to an individual’s psyche is well understood to be grave and considerable. To paraphrase a recent remark by US Senator Charles Schumer of New York on the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of the US Intelligence Community, they can come at you six ways from Sunday. The soul and the spirit of the target of such efforts is typically seared. Surely, some having suffered similar harsh treatment from their own side as in Philby’s case, have been able to have renewal of mind. Yet, rehabilitating those mistreated by intelligence and counterintelligence services, reversing the damage, is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. That is a reality that is rarely understood or dismissed. Perhaps there is such a strong desire to believe otherwise by those who might engage in such efforts, that the mere notion, itself, that it can be done, becomes true. As for the individual, supposedly being rehabilitated, it is likely that when placed regularly under inhumane treatment, physical or psychological, a valiant effort is made to hold on to all of the many aspects of themselves. However, self-discernment would more likely cause them to face the reality that much has been lost after enduring such terrible experiences. Kalugin, at the time, appears unable to fully fathom that although he was interacting with someone who looked, sounded, and moved as original Philby, the zealous member of the Komintern, the Soviet spy, the proud defector, but that man was gone, no longer intact. The psychological capsule that Philby likely created to hold on to the remainder of himself, to protect himself, to survive, would never have been so easy to break open in an effort to find him. Philby was also very likely suffering from a form of severe, debilitating depression. The original Philby may have had far more to offer. If anything, what Kalugin did was salvage the best of what was left. The trust that Kalugin sought to create was not really possible either. Doubtlessly, Philby noticed Kalugin, for whatever reason, was authentically trying to be congenial and helpful. Understanding that, he may likely have displayed an outward modification of attitude and behavior perhaps even to satisfy Kalugin. To that extent, he understood that Kalugin was the source of better things than before, and with the hope this does not sound indelicate, he responded to Kalugin, though not obsequiously, but much as stolid hound that recognizes its owner as the source of its nourishment and shelter. Perchance, there was much more in all of this. In an uncanny way, Philby’s situation foretold a similar future for Kalugin. Indeed, perhaps Kalugin had an extra sense, a presentiment that he might find himself in a similar boat in another country. Both men experienced somewhat similar types of betrayal by the same monstrous Soviet system and the same organization, the KGB, in which that they placed so much faith and for which were ready to surrender their lives. Luckily for Kalugin, when his day of reckoning came, he ran into individuals in the US possessing sensibilities much as his own, and not the sort that Philby dealt with upon arrival in the Soviet Union.

In March 1973 Kalugin became head of the Directorate KT, KGB Foreign Counterintelligence. In the process he became the youngest leader at that level in the KGB. In 1974, the 40-year-old Kalugin received the rank of major general, making him the youngest general in the KGB. A KGB officer was promoted from junior lieutenant up to lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and then, if for nature enough, through the general ranks, major general, lieutenant general, colonel general, and general of the army. The KGB officer’s formal rank was largely based on his time in service up to lieutenant colonel. Concurrently, the officer receives the operational designation as a junior case officer, case officer, or senior case officer, and then progresses further as a deputy rezident or rezident. Those designations were based on the officer’s experience and performance as an operator in an assigned field. The chain of command was determined by operational classification rather than rank.

In March 1973 he became head of the Directorate KT, foreign counterintelligence. In the process he became the youngest leader at that level in the KGB. In 1974, the 40-year-old Kalugin received the rank of major general, making him the youngest general in the KGB. Such career leaps, Kalugin believes, were primarily due to the personal patronage of Andropov. Kalugin refers to Andropov his “guardian angel,” and writes that “the relations of father and son” developed between them. Made aware of Kalugin’s success, as all of the most senior managers of KGB doubtlessly had, Andropov surely recognized that the KGB had a gem in their midst, a “bright red” carbuncle. Andropov was a rather intriguing player in the history of Soviet Intelligence. As it was detailed in Robert Pringle’s Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), from the Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence series, much as Kalugin’s career at KGB, Andropov’s career moved up rapidly in Soviet political sphere. His advancement began after being appointed Soviet ambassador to Hungary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1954. While at that post, the November 1956 Hungarian Uprising ignited. A segment of the society demanded independence from the socialist state. The upright morphed into an armed conflict. Andropov called the uprising “counter-revolutionary, an anti-social riot” and informed the Kremlin that he supported the idea of sending Soviet troops to aid the Hungarian socialist government to quell the protesters. Andropov directly coordinated the activities of pro-Soviet forces in Hungary, which managed, with the support of Soviet forces, to keep all of Hungary socialist. More than 2,500 people died during the conflict.The Hungarian Uprising shaped Andropov’s thinking, after leaving his post in 1957, he reportedly kept on speaking about it. Soviet diplomat Oleg Troyanovsky remembered: “Andropov of 1956 in Hungary. He often said: ‘You can’t imagine what it is – hundreds of thousands of people flooding the streets, completely out of control’.” Troyanovsky believed that Andropov feared to see such a scene in the USSR – and did all he could to prevent it. Still, his advisors recall that when he led the department on relations with the socialist parties within the Communist Party’s Central Committee from 1957-1967, he was a “liberal leader.” According to renowned political scientist, Georgy Arbatov, Andropov would supposedly say: “In this room, we all can speak our minds, absolutely openly. But the second you leave it–play by the rules.” During Leonid Brezhnev’s tenure as Soviet leader from 1964 to 1982, Andropov, efficient and professional, became one of the most important figures for the regime. Named Chairman of the KGB in 1967, Andropov took on several urgent and important issues, with a predictable hardline approach, to include:  international crises in the Middle East; Czechoslovakia; Afghanistan; regional conflicts in the Soviet Union; and, suppressing Soviet dissident movements, putting dozens in asylums and deporting hundreds of others. On November 12, 1982, Andropov would become General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and on June 16, 1982, he became Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. However, he died on February 9, 1984, serving just under fifteen months in power.

Kalugin reasoned that Andropov trusted him. Still, knowing Andropov’s history, Kalugin knew exactly who he was dealing with. Developed from that understanding appears to have been an invaluable intuition about his own organizations’ moves on issues and regarding personnel. Anecdotes included indicate that he was able to intuit the decisions of managers and executives allowing him to think ahead to how he could satisfy their next steps, and new requirements. The very positive impression with Andropov enabled Kalugin, at least until late in his career, to survive the danger that KGB managers would pose to him. An eventual cause of problems for Kalugin was another protégé of Andropov, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

KGB Chairman and later Soviet Premier, Yuri Andrpov (above). Kalugin believes his career leaps were primarily due to the personal patronage of Andropov. Kalugin refers to Andropov his “guardian angel.” Made aware of Kalugin’s success, as all of the most senior managers of KGB doubtlessly had, Andropov surely recognized that the KGB had a gem in their midst. Kalugin reasoned that Andropov trusted him. Still, knowing Andropov’s history, Kalugin knew exactly who he was dealing with. From that understanding, he appears to have developed an invaluable intuition about his own organizations’ moves on issues. The very positive impression left with Andropov enabled Kalugin, at least until late in his career, to survive the danger that other KGB managers would pose to him. An eventual cause of great problems for Kalugin was another protégé of Andropov, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

The primary mission of the Soviet Foreign Counterintelligence Service was infiltration of all the foreign special service operations: intelligence, counter-intelligence, police forces all over the world. The primary target was the US. Second came NATO and Western European countries. As chief of counterintelligence, Kalugin had control of the most significant cases due to the possibility that potential success was merely pretense by the FBI. What appeared interesting may merely have been dangled before KGB with the hope of entrapment of its officers and their networks. The counterintelligence unit, Directorate K of the First Chief Directorate, would take charge of a case from the regular chain of command of the foreign intelligence service whenever an agent appeared to be doubled, compromised, or on track to be compromised. The field case officer may remain the same, but in Moscow the Counterintelligence Service assumes full authority for directing the case. Deception and some types of complex political action operations often were run directly by the headquarters element, Department A, that prepares the operation in Moscow. In such cases, of course, local assets of a Rezidentura may well be employed in support, but the operations are frequently run by specialists. In the Soviet Union, foreigners, especially, US citizens, were closely investigated by the local internal KGB office. That kind of investigation was not conducted with a view to recruit immediately. It was important to identify the psychological profile of a person, his political orientation, his attitude towards his home country and towards the country he was visiting for some reason. After accumulating a sizable amount of material (based on a whole array of undertakings: plain observation, audio- and video-surveillance of the places of residence, agency-level scrutiny, including “honey traps”), on the basis of the analysis, a decision is made about a transforming the investigation into a recruitment with appropriate conditions (such as through compromising materials or a voluntary agreement) or about wrapping up the whole thing by “educating” a foreigner in order to convey a favorable image of a country that investigated him, in his home country.

As his record at counterintelligence indicated, Kalugin could hardly have been judged as being too kind-hearted in his job. In 1975, Kalugin was directly related to the operation to abduct and rendition Nikolai Artamonov, alias “Lark,” to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Artamonov died along the way. Kalugin claimed that the reason was an error with the dosage of the anesthetic. Kalugin was one of only three men in a meeting in which the KGB sanctioned the assassination of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978. Kalugin explains that the KGB’s science and technology directorate had the weapon designed and constructed in Japan. It was an umbrella that fired a small dart into Markov’s leg. Kalugin would pass the orders from his KGB bosses along to subordinates to provide the poison-tipped umbrella used in the assassination. Kalugin would also organize and execute the 1981 bombing of Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich.

Kalugin indicated that his Foreign Counterintelligence Service was not organized to carry out assassinations. According to the KGB table of organization provided earlier, that dirty work was the shared responsibility of Directorate V and the Thirteenth Department. Work as a KGB foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officer, however, required an understood pledge to commit certain violent undertakings. It would be a leap to call Kalugin an ordinary cutthroat due to his obedience to facilitate that action. There is a classic expression heard in organizations: “One is either in or one is out.” Kalugin certainly was “all in.” Nonetheless, many in the KGB began to doubt that.

Reversal of Fortune

In a sudden pivot in his story, Kalugin’s luck would change at what was for so long his beloved KGB. Kalugin’s reporting of observed lawlessness and arbitrary rule and cronyism within the KGB created friction within its leadership. Shadows gathered. In response to his vocal disagreements with how the KGB was operating, the Center threw Kalugin a dip that caught him by surprise. Telling that part of his story, Kalugin positioned himself as the protagonist, and rightly so in greatcharlie’s humble opinion. Although acting with the best intentions, Kalugin incurred the worst. Soon enough, he found himself facing great difficulties. Despite his near impeccable record, Kalugin’s work was placed under “special scrutiny.” Senior executives of KGB, to whom Kalugin was loyal and obedient, loosed counterintelligence investigators, headhunters who relished ruthlessly destroying officers’ careers, even innocent ones, upon him. They were dishonorable individuals who willingly bore false witness on Kalugin and breathed out lies. Kalugin explained that at first he was a bit bemused by it all, then disgusted as his whole world seemed to come crashing down around him. Nothing would be the same again.

The 18th century French Enlightenment writer, historian, and philosopher François-Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire, wrote in a August 8, 1736 letter to the Prince Royal of Prussia who later became Frederick the Great: “Such is the destiny of great men that their superior genius always exposes them to be the butt of the enveloped darts of calumny and envy. “ Undoubtedly, there were quidnuncs in the KGB who would happily push out scuttlebutt on what was going on everywhere in it and occasionally exacerbating situations, despite all the secrecy and efforts at classification and compartmentalization. Employees within an intelligence service would surely understand the need to keep watch against efforts by adversaries to recruit spies among their organizations ranks. With the right manipulations and pressures, such breakdowns can often be forced. There is also the need to stand guard against the possibility of betrayal and defections impelled by a variety of reasons. However, stories of management’s undue suspicions of officers and internal investigations, seen and unseen, would have conceivably created apprehension within the organization as to what was actually transpiring within the KGB. Consequently, it also became more difficult for officers to know who to trust among their colleagues. Thus, in his career, Kalugin had to become expert in figuring out how to avoid garnering the negative attention of KGB managers who, due to nothing greater than their own disposition or paranoia, would occasionally see innocent officers as potential security risks. As aforementioned, due to his superb work, his good relations with KGB senior executives, he had no normal reason to feel his position was threatened. Aforementioned as well, Kalugin believed that he was close to Andropov, not only due to his official position, but simply because he trusted him. Yet, knowing all that he did about the organization’s quirky leaders, problematic officers in the ranks, doing his job right, and how to look good, it was only a matter of time before his fate would change. As long as Vladimir Kryuchkov, another Andropov protégé, was still Head of the First Chief Directorate, Kalugin had to keep his eyes open and ears pinned back. Kryuchkov had a reputation for acting against perceived rivals for power. Turning to Robert Pringle’s Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015) as a source on Kryuchkov, one learns that he initially began working not in the Soviet intelligence services, but rather in its justice system as a prosecutor’s assistant in Stalingrad. However, Kryuchkov began moving in the direction of foreign intelligence after graduating from the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and becoming a diplomat. Kryuchkov met Andropov in Budapest in 1955 while he was serving as the Soviet ambassador, and got to know him closely supporting his activities during the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. From then on, Andropov became Kryuchkov’s main patron. He joined Andropov at the Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries in 1959. When Andropov was selected as a Secretary of Communist Party’s Central Committee in 1962, he eventually brought Kryuchkov on from 1965 to 1967 as his aide. Then, when Andropov was selected as Chairman of the KGB on May 19, 1967, he brought Kryuchkov to Moscow with him to serve as Head of the Secretariat, KGB. He allowed Kryuchkov to gain experience with intelligence operations, including covert activities by placing him in charge of foreign intelligence operations under his tutelage starting in 1971. Then, in 1974, Andropov appointed Kryuchkov as head of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, and he remained there until 1988. (In 1988, he would become Chairman of the KGB, where he would remain until the failed coup of 1991.) During Kryuchkov’s years in the KGB’s foreign intelligence service, it was involved in funding and supporting various communist, socialist and anti-colonial movements across the world, some of which came to power in their countries and established pro-Soviet governments; in addition, under Kryuchkov’s leadership the Directorate had major triumphs in penetrating Western intelligence agencies, acquiring valuable scientific and technical intelligence and perfecting the techniques of disinformation and active measures. At the same time, however, during Kryuchkov’s tenure, the Directorate became plagued with defectors, had major responsibility for encouraging the Soviet government to invade Afghanistan and its ability to influence Western European Communist Parties diminished even further.

Vladimir Kryuchkov, Head of the First Chief Directorate and later KGB Chairman (above). Having caused a stir by pointing out troubles in the KGB First Chief Directorate, fertile ground was created for Kalugin’s rivals to take him down. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Head of the First Chief Directorate became Kalugin’s biggest problem. He suggested Kalugin was possibly a US spy. According to Kalugin, Kryuchkov’s reasons for wanting to destroy him was his strong relationship with Andropov. Kalugin said Kryuchkov likely thought that he would be sent somewhere, leaving him to become the head of the First Chief Directorate. Kryuchkov’s anxieties would manifest in the sort of unsettling hostile and destructive behavior that Kalugin repeatedly pointed out had rotted away at the soul of the KGB. Kalugin could not avoid problems by staying well back from him. Kryuchkov, after all, was his manager. Kalugin could not escape his fate.

Having caused a stir by pointing out troubles in the KGB First Chief Directorate, fertile ground was created for Kalugin’s rivals to take him down. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Head of the First Chief Directorate became Kalugin’s biggest problem. He suggested Kalugin was possibly a US spy. According to Kalugin, Kryuchkov’s reasons for wanting to destroy him was his strong relationship with Andropov. Kalugin said Kryuchkov likely thought that he would be sent somewhere, leaving him to become the head of the First Chief Directorate. Consequently, Kryuchkov’s anxieties would manifest in the sort of unsettling idiosyncratic behavior that Kalugin repeatedly pointed out had rotted away at the soul of the KGB. Kalugin could not avoid problems by staying well back from him. Kryuchkov, after all, was his manager. He could not escape his fate. As part of Kryuchkov allegations, he claimed Kalugin was possibly instrumental in allowing the flow of what was characterized as dicey intelligence from a questionable source to the Center. He determined that an intelligence source, who was Cook from Thiokol, Kalugin’s earliest recruitment in the US, was a supposed means by which the US was enabled to channel chicken feed through the Soviet system. No one really cared about Cook who was arrested for possessing and selling foreign currency and making hostile statements about the Soviet regime. He was simply used as the predicate for taking the drastic step of insinuating that Kalugin had been compromised, despite a mountain of exculpatory evidence to the contrary. Wrongful preconceptions can always be supported by bent intelligence.

Kalugin explains that things were made far worse because the matter was investigated by General Victor Alidin, head of the Moscow KGB. Kalugin explained that Alidin was an abominable KGB officer, with a solid reputation for brutality and widely reviled. Yet, he was extremely close to Soviet Premier Brezhnev. In Washington, Kalugin had caught Alidin’s son-in-law embezzling hundreds of dollars of payments intended for KGB operatives. Kalugin recommended tough action, but Solomatin, his rezident, limited the response to a reprimand to avoid all of the trouble with Alidin that likely would have followed any stronger action. Alidin and his men, to whom Kalugin refers as “Alidin & Company,” set out to find spies! As Kalugin described how their reports on the case were written, they seemed as mad as March hares, concocting a bizarre parody of a nonexistent relationship between Cook and Kalugin. It emphasized the Cook’s job as a mole was to string the KGB along and make Kalugin look good. There were leading questions asked of Cook. Those questions  concerned Kalugin’s alleged recruitment by the CIA. Alidin & Company engaged in the worst possible behavior as investigators. Using their well-exercised nefarious stratagems, they were able to make right look wrong and good look bad. One might suppose that it was relatively easy for Kalugin’s adversaries to question that an officer, so early in his career, could stumble upon such a find as Cook. Many officers with far more years and experience never came close to such an achievement. To an extent, Kalugin’s success proved to be his undoing. After being surreptitiously interviewed formally by Alidin and his investigators under the guise that they were fact-finding and needed his help in investigating Cook of Thiokol, It did not take Kalugin long to figure out what they were driving at. Kalugin’s description of the moment when he became conscious of his KGB investigators’ plans against him was chilling. After twisting and turning facts, Kalugin’s rather sophomoric investigators were able to bear false witness against him, breathing out lies. As Kalugin depicted the matter, it all seemed surreal-to-the-point-of-silliness. Again, not a bit of evidence supposedly collected on Cook or Kalugin was conclusive. Certainly, the presumption of innocence was a principle alien in the Soviet Union. Erring on the side of liberty was not something done in its system. Kalugin’s treatment ostensibly could have been chalked up as a lesson to others that all intelligence activities were subject to scrutiny. Perhaps the real lesson was that in the KGB there was an ever-present danger of certain peccant officers, petty tyrants, who, having been provided with brief authority by the Soviet state, were willing to abuse it. Within such officers, there was typically a need through harsh and disruptive behavior to prove, mainly to themselves, that they have power over others and to soothe some uneasiness over what they may recognize as their own shortcomings. They were imaginative in their thinking but in all the wrong ways. Dead ends would only open doors to more illusions and thereby their pursuits were never exhausted.

As Kalugin related this whole tragic episode, there was a duality of emotions manifested in his words. Surely there was disdain, but there was also great pity. Kryuchkov had attained one of the most important positions in the KGB. Rather than relate to Kalugin as one his successful managers and display his competence to possibly take on the position KGB Chairman, he shrunk to reveal the idiosyncrasies of a paranoid KGB official, who could think only of his own personal interest and attempt to destroy two innocent men in the process. Ironically, Kryuchkov would become KGB Chairman in 1988. Unable to accept the ideals of perestroika and glasnost implemented by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, he participated in  the 1991 coup attempt, the consequence of which was triggering the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union. Kryuchkov was a major part of the problem that led to destruction of the KGB, and a major part of the problem that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse. If anything could be said about Kryuchkov’s nefarious plan to undo Kalugin, he was quite thorough leaving nothing to chance, even the likely response of his mentor, Andropov. He moved Kalugin out of the Center into what was then a relative nether region of the Soviet Union, Leningrad. He would become First Deputy Chief of the Leningrad KGB, second-in-command there. In what turned out to be their final meeting Andropov in a friendly manner: “You have stirred up too much dust here at headquarters. I just want you to go away until things settle down. You go to Leningrad and when things calm down, you’ll be back. I promise you. It will take a year or so. No longer than that. You’ll be back soon.” However, Andropov died in two years, and Kalugin remained in Leningrad for seven years.

Certainly, Kalugin knew that Andropov was quite shrewd, and made endless calculations in his decision which all had to be made in the context of Soviet politics. Kalugin was invaluable to Andropov when it came to being set straight on what was happening on the ground versus the West and what was happening among the rank and file on foreign intelligence inside the KGB. Yet, from where he was situated, Kalugin likely understood Soviet politics to a limited degree. The interplay between Andropov and Kryuchkov surely included efforts to discern the Communist Party political scene. Indeed, in the years following the 1956 Hungarian Uprising on which they worked together closely, Kryuchkov, the former prosecutor and diplomat, may have served as more than a loyal confidant who could provide bits of information, but an invaluable sounding board on political developments for Andropov. With his ears always pinned back, Kryuchkov surely had an appreciation of what was happening in the Communist Party and the Soviet system in general. His political awareness and sensitivity likely enabled him, much as that of an attorney to a client, to illuminate for Andropov, ways to finesse responses to Kremlin requests, particularly politically charged ones, to avoid any pitfalls, to ensure his survival and to create possibilities for his advancement within the political realm. Kryuchkov, while twenty years younger than Andropov, was ten years Kalugin’s senior, though he appeared about ten years additional, and spent more time observing senior Communist Party leaders and had more experience formulating nuanced responses to them, given their sensibilities. (Perhaps no better example existed Kryuchkov’s political savvy than the way in which he knocked the career of Kalugin, another Andropov protégé, completely off track while incurring no consequences for himself.) Andropov most likely thought that if he were moved up in the hierarchy and a choice had to be made for a new KGB Chairman, it would be good to have his protégé Kryuchkov to be in the running for the post. By interceding for a second time on Kalugin’s behalf, and thereby blatantly undermining Kryuchkov, Andropov may have sent the wrong signal concerning his confidence and impressions about him in the KGB and the Communist Party, potentially making Kryuchkov a weaker candidate for the top KGB post later. When Andropov was actually promoted to Deputy Chairman in 1978, Kryuchkov was not elevated to KGB Chairman but remained at the First Chief Directorate. (Kryuchkov eventually assumed that post on October 1, 1988, almost five years after Andropov’s death.) Again, Kalugin’s father warned him about the Soviet system, the state security service, the people within it.

Demoted from his post as head of KGB Foreign Counterintelligence, Kalugin was sent to the Leningrad KGB branch. There, Kalugin witnessed first-hand the true nature of the KGB’s activities as a domestic political police. He discovered that the KGB’s internal functions had precious little connection with state security but rather, benefitted corrupt Communist Party officials by keeping them in power. Indeed, from Leningrad, Kalugin could see more clearly the wretchedness of the Soviet system, and real socialism at its fullest. Further, he was authentically in touch with Soviet people for the first time and began to understand how they lived. Kalugin concluded the Soviet system was unworkable and needed to change.

At Leningrad KGB

In the end, Kalugin was demoted to serve as first deputy chief of internal security in Leningrad. Regardless of the circumstances, Kalugin did his job in his new post. One interesting case he was involved with in Leningrad was a counterespionage operation, the handling of a double agent. According to Kalugin, the KGB ran double agents to gather knowledge on hostile intelligence services. The KGB could learn a great deal by the kind of questions a hostile intelligence service was asking a double agent such as what kind of intelligence was required and what type of assignment it was giving to the double. To illustrate that point, he provides the theoretical circumstance of a CIA officer outlining what he was seeking from a Soviet agent. The officer might say a bit too much in explaining the matter and let slip some interesting information. Double agents could passively pick up valuable material just by being in the presence of hostile intelligence officers. Kalugin then gives a real life example of how a Soviet double agent grabbed a roll of microfilm that his CIA handler had forgotten. Dozens of intelligence documents, shedding light on the CIA Tokyo station were on that microfilm. Kalugin explains that the KGB also used double agents to plant disinformation and confuse hostile intelligence agencies. And running a double game could be extremely valuable in the propaganda battle with the West. On several occasions when the KGB was sure the CIA or other agency had been duped by its double, it would then nab the CIA agent for espionage. The KGB would then go about revealing details of the CIA’S spying operation, and expel the US case officer in a great fit of publicity.

Concerning the counterespionage case he became involved with while in Leningrad, the KGB elicited the cooperation of a Leningrad scientist named Pavlov who frequently traveled the world on a Soviet research ship. Ostensibly, he had access to information about Soviet science and the Soviet military industrial complex. Instructions were given to him to express dissenter views, engage in some black market operations, and do everything possible to attract the attention of the CIA and other intelligence services. For two years Pavlov was dangled at the CIA, doing everything that he was told. The KGB was surprised, for it expected the CIA to show interest in a man who had so much access. Then out of the blue, the KGB received a cable from the KGB’S station chief in Buenos Aires, Argentina stating that Pavlov had come to the Soviet Embassy and reported that the CIA tried to recruit him. He talked to the CIA agent, passed along some information, undoubtedly chicken feed, and agreed to meet him in Leningrad upon his return home. Kalugin said that his boss in Leningrad was skeptical, but the Center told them to go ahead with the meeting. And indeed such a meeting took place. Our surveillance people observed Pavlova and a diplomat from the US consulate in Leningrad–clearly a CIA case officer–rendezvous ingredients on a remote street in the city. Pavlov took money from the CIA case officer in exchange for scientific information. A second meeting was scheduled 25 miles outside of Leningrad. Pavlova was to give the CIA agent documents in exchange for another payment. As it turned out, however, the meeting came only days after the September 1, 1983 Soviet shoot down of Korean Airlines Flight 007. The Center made the decision not to continue to pursue the counterespionage operation. It ordered the arrest of the CIA case officer when he met with Pavlov and use of the incident to counter the storm of controversy that swept over the Korean Airlines fiasco. The CIA officer was caught red handed. He was expelled, but the incident while hyped did not make a dent in the bad publicity suffered over the shoot down. However, it also turned out that Pavlov was not being honest about the money he received from the US, pocketing more than he reported. As a result of suspicions over Pavlov’s honesty, his apartment was searched and the KGB found large sums of money proving he was pocketing payments. Pavlov confessed and was sentenced to 13 years in jail. He was granted amnesty in Yeltsin’s era.

In the Leningrad KGB branch, Kalugin also witnessed first-hand the true nature of the KGB’s activities as a domestic political police. He discovered that the KGB’s internal functions had precious little connection with state security but rather, benefitted corrupt Communist Party officials by keeping them in power. Indeed, from Leningrad, Kalugin could see more clearly the wretchedness of the Soviet system and appreciate real socialism at its fullest. Further, in Leningrad, he was authentically in touch with Soviet people for the first time and began to understand how they lived. Kalugin concluded the Soviet system was unworkable and needed to change. It was a conclusion from inside the Soviet Union and was not prompted by any outside ideas or reports. The disintegration of what were once considered the indestructible foundations of the KGB, as outlined by Kalugin, placed it on the road to destruction. In this segment, Kalugin provides a stark warning about what can happen to a state security organization that has lost its way. In vinculis etiam audax. (In chains yet still bold.)

Concerning the story of how his career ended, no one could be as sound on the details of the matter as Kalugin, himself. In the section of this review dubbed “About the Author,” may have been a bit of a spoiler, telling the story of how things progressed to the present very briefly. Kalugin was forced into retirement but seemed content to break free of the suffocating chains of the KGB bureaucracy, and daylight madness of a few power wielding superiors or equals in other departments. Kalugin then took a very active part in the rallies of Democrats. His disillusionment culminated in a sensational appearance at a political gathering in Moscow in the summer of 1990. He gave a speech from the abundance of the heart at the “Democratic Platform in the CPSU” conference. The former KGB general reports that he struggled to steady his voice and said: “Some people may think that I have jumped on the democratic bandwagon with evil intentions. I understand that there may be suspicions in your m8nds, but let me tell you that you’re wrong. I am from the KGB. I worked in that organization for more than thirty years, and I want to tell all of you how the KGB works against the best interests of democratic forces in this country.” Kalugin then describes an utter silence in the hall as he talked about himself and explained why the KGB must be radically reformed and the number of agents drastically reduced. He stated:  “We cannot begin a serious restructuring of society until we rid ourselves of the restraints imposed by an organization which has penetrated every sphere of our lives, which interferes with all aspects of state life, political life, the economy, science, arts, religion, even sports. Today, just as ten or twenty years ago, the hand of the KGB is everywhere. And any real talk of perestroika without reforming the KGB is nothing but a lie. All the much-ballyhooed changes in the KGB are cosmetic, a disguise upon the ugly face of the Stalin-Brezhnev era. In fact, all elements of the old dictatorship are still in place. The chief assistant and handmaiden of the Communist Party remains the KGB. In order to secure genuine changes in our country, this structure of violence and falsehood must be dismantled.” The speech was met with roars of approval, and a standing ovation. Requests for interviews and speeches followed in the weeks afterward. What also followed was a predictable KGB attack. A statement was released by the KGB press office declaring in effect: “The KGB is going to have its say about Kalugin, who he is and what he stands for.” Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev dealt the heaviest blow, issuing a decree on July 1, 1991, stripping Kalugin of his rank of major general, revoking all of his KGB awards, and cutting off his pension. Kalugin persisted against the odds. He was soon elected People’s Deputy of the USSR from the Krasnodar Territory. He remained a very vocal independent critic of the Communist system. His continuous attacks on the KGB garnered him notoriety and a political following. Political courage had to replace physical courage in the field as a KGB officer, though the real threat of violence, his assassination, existed. Nevertheless, he continued to protest KGB abuses.

Following an attempted 1991 coup against Gorbachev led by Kalugin’s nemesis, Kryuchkov, along with seven others, a popular movement under the Mayor of Moscow Boris Yeltsin emerged to subdue coup supporters. Watching events transpire in Russia as the Soviet Union collapsed and failing to act in some way would have been tantamount to accepting and admitting that he never had a spark of dignity or decency. Kalugin manned the barricades, serving as an inspirational leader for protesters. He jumped on top of Soviet tanks to address protesters. It was Kalugin who supposedly persuaded Yeltsin to address crowds before the Russian White House and elsewhere.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union

Following an attempted 1991 coup against Gorbachev led by Kalugin’s nemesis, Kryuchkov, along with seven others, a popular movement under the Mayor of Moscow Boris Yeltsin emerged to subdue coup supporters. Watching events transpire in Russia as the Soviet Union collapsed and failing to act in some way would have been tantamount to accepting and admitting that he never had a spark of dignity or decency. Kalugin manned the barricades, serving as an inspirational leader for protesters. He jumped on top of Soviet tanks to address protesters. It was Kalugin who supposedly persuaded Yeltsin to address crowds before the Russian White House and elsewhere. In September 1991, Gorbachev restated Kalugin’s ranks along with all decorations and his  pension. Yeltsin took control of the Soviet Union from Gorbachev and dissolved it, breaking it down to constituent republics. It was widely seen as a change for the better for the Soviet people and the world.  Though the new and smaller Russian Federation filled the vacuum of the Soviet space and got off to a very rocky start, reformists such as Kalugin who followed Yeltsin could be satisfied that they at least put it on the right track with an energetic shove. Kalugin decided to become a part of the reconstruction. He believed that Russia could eventually meet its full potential. His sensibilities then were representative of those times. He became an unpaid advisor to reformist KGB Chairman Vladimir Bakatin. Bakatin became famous for issuing a pattern of listening devices at the US Embassy in Moscow. However, Bakatin was only able to dissolve the old system but not reform it. As time went on, he was wise enough to recognize that possibility had passed beyond his view.

It would be easy to say that it should not have been terribly difficult for an intelligent man to predict the future of an authoritarian regime that sought to crush the spirit of its people with deceptions, crimes, and evils. Long ago, as a child, he had reached one set of conclusions on those matters. However. his experiences and intelligence provided him with the capability to discern why his initial conclusions might not have been correct. As he collected more information and experienced more of the darker side of what the Soviet system had to offer, he found that he was able to refute his long held views. Thus, he could no longer press any of his ideals about Soviet Union, the Communist Movement, the Communist Party, Socialism and the geopolitical struggle with the West forward with a degree of confidence. There was nothing puzzling about it all to Kalugin as he made that transition in his thinking. The death of Kalugin’s life in Russia opened the door to a new life in the US. Arguably, to that extent, Kalugin in the long-run oddly benefitted from the wrath of his enemies, and in a way benefited from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The righteous was separated from the unrighteous.

Kalugin always remained resolute in disappointment. He never lost his way. In his mind, he organized and synthesized the conditions that beset him. He never resembled what has been whimsically called “spiritual roadkill.” He had his own ethics, buttressed by a creed of what is right and wrong, fair and unfair inculcated within his soul at home with his parents. Ethics without such a creed are only a hollow shell. Bereft of the Soviet system that was once his mighty and faithful, shining beacon of light, upon which he could place all of his hopes and dreams for his future and the future of the world, over a few short years, as mentioned earlier, Kalugin was forced to make a series of never before imagined, new choices about his future, and his family’s future. Even through that, his heart remained stout and strong. Still today, he has refused to concede defeat to his enemies back in Moscow. How poetry manages to connect is really its classic role in culture. It provides an emotional vocabulary, putting into words what one may be sensing. When thinking about Kalugin’s struggles, wanting to achieve much for his country and do the right things, Arthur Hugh Clough’s “Say not the Struggle nought Availeth” (1849) comes to mind. It connects well with Kalugin’s persistence in humility:

Say not the struggle nought availeth,

The labour and the wounds are vain,

The enemy faints not, nor faileth,

And as things have been they remain.

If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars;

It may be, in yon smoke concealed,

Your comrades chase e’en now the fliers,

And, but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking

Seem here no painful inch to gain,

Far back through creeks and inlets making,

Comes silent, flooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only,

When daylight comes, comes in the light,

In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly,

But westward, look, the land is bright.

Kalugin always remained resolute in disappointment. He never lost his way. In his mind, he organized and synthesized the conditions that beset him. He never resembled what has been whimsically called “spiritual roadkill.” He had his own ethics, buttressed by a creed of what is right and wrong, fair and unfair inculcated within his soul at home with his parents. Ethics without such a creed are only a hollow shell. Bereft of the Soviet system that was once his mighty and faithful, shining beacon of light, upon which he could place all of his hopes and dreams for his future and the future of the world, over a few short years, as mentioned earlier, Kalugin was forced to make a series of never before imagined, new choices about his future, and his family’s future. Even through that, his heart remained stout and strong.

It is imaginable that greatcharlie’s enthusiasm over First Directorate may lead some to simply write this review off as a hopelessly oleagic encomium. However, nothing presented here is expressed with pretension. What one finds in First Directorate is of the highest quality and remains steady from beginning to end. Readers are also enabled to see the world through the lens of a man with years of experience in the world and a thorough understanding of humanity. Information from the text that is presented here, though it may wet the palate, only represents a mere fraction of what “things, wonderful things” the reader will find in First Directorate. In the genre of fiction and nonfiction spy stories, there is an artistic milieu in which writers seek to position themselves amidst. It cannot be denied that human nature instinctively finds entertainment more compelling than edification. While there is plenty in First Directorate to be entertained, in focusing on such, the depth of Kalugin, the man, might be missed. There is much that explains KGB tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in First Directorate. When dealing with details as well as publishers and editors, one may likely find inconsistencies with previous accounts told by Kalugin of people and events. While there are many facts in First Directorate to scrutinize, in focusing on such, the mosaic of Kalugin, the man might be missed. Of course, readers should enjoy First Directorate as they wish. It is nice to get hold of a book that allows readers many ways to enjoy it. For greatcharlie, it was an absolute pleasure to read. As would be expected, greatcharlie wholeheartedly recommends First Directorate to its readers. It is definitely worth the read.

By Mark Edmond Clark

Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man Without A Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997)

On March 30, 2019, Chinese national Yujing Zhang (above) was twice caught slipping into US President Donald Trump’s Florida residence, Mar-a-Lago. When caught the second time, found on her were two passports, four cell phones, one laptop, an external hard drive, and a thumb drive. While detained and at trial, Zhang sought to confuse authorities as to her purpose. Creating doubt to elude suspicion as to their purpose was a tactic used by a legion of deep cover spies the chief of German Democratic Republic’s foreign intelligence service, Markus Wolf, unleashed into the West during the Cold War. His spies penetrated key political offices, government agencies, business concerns and more. In 1997, Wolf published Man Without A Face, revealing intriguing facts on his 35 year intelligence effort against the West.

HK POST

Markus Johannes Wolf, the author of Man wWithout A Face, was senior government official of the erstwhile Deutsch Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) or GDR. The GDR was created as a self-described Socialist workers’ and peasants’ state and a satellite state of the Soviet Union on October 7, 1949 and eventually reunified with the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) on October 3, 1990. Wolf worked for nearly four decades in the GDR’s Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (The Ministry for State Security) or MfS. MfS was also known as the Staatssicherheitsdienst (State Security Service) or SSD. However, it was universally referred to as the Stasi. The Stasi was not just another repressive security service of an Eastern Bloc government. The Stasi has been evaluated as the most effective and repressive intelligence and secret police agency ever to have existed. In a similar way, Wolf was not some ordinary senior bureaucrat in the Stasi. As chief of the GDR’s foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA, for many he embodied the frightening efficiency and domineering power of the Stasi and the overarching freedom crushing nature of GDR Communist system. Even more, Wolf held a unique reputation not only in the GDR, but everywhere else in the Eastern Bloc, during the shadowy intelligence struggle with the West. In Man without a Face, the reader learns exactly who he was and what his job was all about.

Markus Wolf (above). Those who knew Wolf universally described him as strikingly handsome and endowed with great charm. Possessing a tall, athletic build, he was quite the opposite in appearance and demeanor to the common Western image of a Communist security official as a sedentary, somewhat overweight, granite faced apparatchik with the will to enforce Socialist ideals with an iron fist. Although a devout Communist, he admitted a fondness for well-cut suits, elegant diplomatic gatherings, and music. One can discern from the text of Man without a Face that Wolf was a cultured man and possessed scholarly intellect.

The Author

Born on January 19, 1923, Wolf lived a very extraordinary life until age 83, passing on November 9, 2006. His memoir serves as a testament to that. Those who knew Wolf universally described him as strikingly handsome and endowed with great charm. Possessing a tall, athletic build, he was quite the opposite in appearance and demeanor to the common Western image of a Communist security official as a sedentary, somewhat overweight, granite faced apparatchik with the will to enforce Socialist ideals with an iron fist. Although a devout Communist, he admitted a fondness for well-cut suits, elegant diplomatic gatherings, and music. Indeed, one can discern from the text of Man without a Face that Wolf was a cultured man and possessed scholarly intellect. University educated as an aeronautical engineer, his main employment experiences were as a propagandist, journalist, diplomat, intelligence analyst, and spymaster. Reportedly, Wolf possessed an understanding and empathy for others. How that manifested itself with regard to the suffering of the people of the GDR remains an issue if some controversy.  An almost universal criticism of Wolf concerned his political quietism in the response to the hardline approaches of GDR regime and his willingness to serve as a vital part of a government machine that would crush the souls of its own citizens. Yet, with regard to his work, those sensibilities allowed him to display a personal warmth and concern for his chers collégues. Those assigned to Wolf’s HVA, with the exception of those few who defected during the early years, were unshakable in their loyalty to him and a certain esprit developed within their number. In his efforts  to manipulate and exploit adversaries via the HVA, his particular interpersonal gifts proved useful. It has been posited that many double agents recruited from West felt somewhat comfortable turning to Wolf’s side as he had acquired a reputation for being a very capable spymaster with whom, oddly enough, they could feel secure.

In terms of how he comported himself, Wolf recognized both in his work and in his personal life, the importance of patience, nuance, open mindedness, and the full exploitation of information available. Away from official meetings and formal functions in the GDR or in the Soviet Union, Wolf lived a life in relative obscurity, brilliantly concealing his presence and the footprint of his organization as both operated against the West. Interestingly enough, the memoir’s title, Man without a Face, was a direct reference to the fact that at one point, Western intelligence services only had a blurred photograph of Wolf while he attended the Nuremberg Trials from which elements within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) managed to identify him in 1959. Unable to collect an up-to-date photograph from which to identify Wolf, for a long-time he was referred to among Western intelligence services as the “man without a face.” As the story goes, only after a GDR defector, Werner Stiller, identified Wolf in a photograph in 1979 for the counterintelligence element of West Germany’s Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) did that change. The photograph of Wolf was captured by Säpo, Sweden’s National Security Service, during a visit he made with his wife to Stockholm in 1978. Within the Stasi and GDR government as a whole, the HVA would garner considerable power and influence. From its beginnings on a shoestring budget that left Wolf urging his government superiors for more resources, the HVA eventually had a hard currency budget of 10 million Deutschmarks a year. By the mid-1980s, only the KGB exceeded the HVA in manpower among the Eastern Bloc foreign intelligence services. At the same time, Wolf’s HVA was a prime source of intelligence for the KGB. Wolf would explain that his organization’s greatest contribution was helping to maintain peace between East and West by reducing the element of surprise with the information his spies collected.

Wolf did not follow the times with regard to intelligence tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods. He consciously stayed a step ahead of them. His operations enjoyed a level of security that intelligence services today have good reason to envy. Toward the end of his reign at the foreign intelligence service, Wolf excited further interest in the West when he backed the glasnost and perestroika policies of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Wolf explains in Man without a Face that he was planning to retire at the rank of Generaloberst (Colonel General) in 1985. There were alternative explanations for his retirement accepted in the West. It was said that Wolf retired at in 1986 “owing to serious health problems.” There was also the belief that Wolf was forced into retirement, strangely enough, when GDR officials learned that he had decided to divorce his second wife, Christa Heinrich, and marry his mistress Andrea Stingl. After unification, Wolf was convicted of treason by the Federal Republic government and sentenced to six years imprisonment. After an appeal, the charge and sentence were dropped on the basis that he had only been acting as a loyal government servant for the GDR, his erstwhile country.

Through Man Without A Face, the reader is provided with the opportunity to discover how a master craftsman performed his work in his own words. In its review of Man Without A Face, greatcharlie explores what sort of individual becomes Wolf, what the earliest years of Wolf’s odyssey informs the reader of the man, and what one can learn about his thinking process from what he provides in the text. To the extent that Man Without A Face might interest those flirting with Socialism in the West today, the review calls attention to Wolf’s history as a defender of Socialism and the Communist Movement and his ultimate disillusionment and disappointment with the GDR government.

Previous Reviews of Man without a Face

Surely for those thrilled by spy novels, there was enough provided by the great spymaster to allow them to live vicariously through his anecdotes. Among the 365 page book’s 17 chapters are alluring titles such as: “Spying for Love”; “The Chancellor’s Shadow”; “The Poison of Betrayal”; “Active Measures”; and, “Enemy Territory ”. In his October 30, 1997 review for the London Review of Books, David Blackbourn remarked: “Espionage junkies will enjoy bits of tradecraft scattered through the book: dead-ender drops, fullbacks, couriers, phoney brothels, false bottomed deodorant bottles left in the lavatory cistern of the night train.” However, at the time of its publication in 1997, hopes generally ran high that Man Without A Face might also reveal much about the inner workings of a man such Wolf. To their chagrin, Wolf, with the assistance of Anne McElvoy (then a newspaper editor and columnist from the United Kingdom), did not write Man without a Face in a way to make the inner Wolf easily accessible. As a result, many previous reviewers expressed disappointment, feeling unfulfilled, after reading Man without a Face. The intelligence scholar and author, David Wise, in his July 13, 1997 review in the New York Times, explained: “Throughout his account, Wolf has a great deal of difficulty coming to terms with his own actions, and with the Stasi’s Orwellian, police-state methods and its murky operations. He defends his own role by drawing a distinction between his foreign intelligence service and the Stasi branch that acted as East Germany’s own Gestapo. But the lines were often blurred.” In the November/December 1997 edition of Foreign Affairs, Eliot Cohen stated more forcefully: “Wolf’s selective memory, continual attempts at self-exculpation, and specious resort to the argument that the West behaved as badly as the communists are neither convincing nor appetizing.” Some actually expressed anger over the fact the Wolf did not present an absolute “tell all” about life in the Stasi. The remuneration for publishing the memoir would hardly be enough to stimulate Wolf to open the kimono and unload a trove of furtive information which he had held tightly for years. (In the Independent on September 15, 1996, Leslie Colitt revealed in a synopsis of his book on Wolf entitled Spymaster, that Wolf was preempted with a contract to produce three books for more than $400,000.) In a July 17, 1997 review of Man Without A Face in the Economist, it was stated: “Readers with the stamina to compare the English and German versions of Mr Wolf’s tome are likely to be struck by two things. One is how much the accounts vary, not just in substance (a lot more in English, for instance, about how East Germany gave succour to fleeing West German terrorists) but also in tone. Which reveals the true Mr Wolf? A silly question really. The other thing of note is how few of Mr Wolf’s revelations are new. Is that because he has nothing much new to say; or is he keeping in reserve some potentially explosive material about treachery practised by some of the good and the great in the West? Just as insurance, of course, against any western pressure. You can’t be too careful.”

Those who may have had only a passing or no interest in what the High Priest of the GDR intelligence service had to say, but familiar enough with the GDR, might have reasonably presupposed before reading the book that they would come across nothing more than a complete whitewash of the activities of the country’s security apparatus, the intelligence service specifically, and the afflictions and wounds of a society that was crushed under the heel of the government’s figurative iron boot. Gilbert Taylor of The American Library Association’s Book List Magazine stated in a May 15, 1997 review: “Wolf still believes in communism, even oddly describing a “semimystical aspect” to his memories about Stalin, whom he once met and regarded as a demigod. If he still holds onto his political dreams, Wolf is too worldly not to criticize (mildly) its failures; although in the spy game, rather than question the communist enterprise, he applied his worldliness to the exploitation of human nature. In that, at least, he was very good.”

Looking at Man Without A Face today, knowing fully who Wolf was and void of Cold War bias, it appears that such critical assessments were off-base from the get-go. To be honest, anyone knowing much about Wolf might agree that writing Man Without A Face in such an unimaginative, predictable way would be un peu trop classique pour son style et à ses goût. It may very well be that Wolf assessed that for those who may excavate through the book and thoroughly consider points of exposition concerning both himself and activities in which he was engaged, his work would be substantially edifying. To that extent, criticisms that insist Man without a Face is lacking, in the humble judgment of greatcharlie, are wrong. Through Man Without A Face, the reader is provided with the opportunity to discover how a master craftsman performed his work in his own words. In its review of Man Without A Face, greatcharlie explores what sort of individual becomes Wolf, what the earliest years of Wolf’s odyssey informs the reader of the man, and what one can learn about his thinking process from what he provides in the text. To the extent that Man Without A Face might interest those flirting with Socialism in the West today, the review calls attention to Wolf’s history as a defender of Socialism and the Communist Movement and his disillusionment and disappointment with the GDR government.

The symbol of the German Democratic Republic’s Staatssicherheitsdienst (State Security Service), referred to universally as the Stasi (above). The Eastern Zone of Allied Occupied Germany after World War II eventually became the GDR in 1949. The Communist leaders of the new country would lie about or deny realities about what was occuring in their society. Control of the population was aided by the government’s insistence that the people keep a watchful over threats to the new system. It was understood that the reactionary, the counterrevolutionary posed an internal threat and had to be destroyed. In the performance of that mission, the Stasi earned a reputation for being the odious, oppressive instrument of the authoritarian regime.

For Those Unfamiliar with the Defunct GDR

Given the reality of the monstrous treatment that the people of the GDR received from their government, it would be reasonable to expect most of its former citizens to have an emotional response to Wolf’s book. Man Without A Face could only have been prejudged as a distorted chronicle of the GDR’s governance as observed from the warped lens of a man who was among the masters of the nightmare in which the people lived. To many of them, it was also very likely thought to be one more occasion in which the moribund GDR regime sought to reach out from the grave to fire a parting shot in defense of Communist hypocrisy. For those too young to be sufficiently aware of the history of the long since gone GDR, one must go back to the end of World War II, during which the Soviet Union held in its tight grip the Eastern Zone of the four zones of Allied Occupied Germany and East Berlin. Three countries, the US, United Kingdom, and France, had control over what was the more well-heeled Western Zone and West Berlin. In the Eastern Zone and East Berlin, the Soviets took responsibility for the reconstruction of cities, towns, and villages destroyed by Allied bombers or its own advancing forces, building countless new residences for German refugees and displaced persons. There were massive infrastructure projects and governing bodies at the national, provincial, and local level. Yet, the Soviets also worked behind the scenes to establish a puppet government in Eastern Zone of Allied Occupied Germany set in East Berlin that would serve as an extension of Moscow’s rule. That government would have the initial outward appearance of being democratic but in reality was not. Local Communists were gathered into a coalition party then handed power after rigged elections. All political parties, other than the Communist Party, were dissolved. The Eastern Zone of Allied Occupied Germany eventually became the GDR in 1949. The leaders of the new country would lie about or deny realities about what was occuring in their society. Control of the population in the burgeoning Communist government was aided by its insistence that the people keep a watchful over threats to the new system. It was understood that the reactionary, the counterrevolutionary, most often “hiding in the shadows,” posed the greatest threat and was viewed as anathema.

Ostensibly, the response had to be strong enough to match “the severity of the disease”. It was in the performance of that mission that the Stasi earned a reputation for being the horrifically oppressive instrument of the authoritarian regime. The Stasi interfered in the interactions and relationships between citizens, ordered citizens to spy on their fellow citizens, demanded that they betray one another, regularly performed intrusive and demeaning searches of citizens’ person, homes, and workplaces. There were arrests of many innocent citizens, accompanied by abusive and endless interrogations. Untold numbers of GDR citizens were sentenced by kangaroo courts to lengthy imprisonments in dark and dank gaols. There was also the Stasi technique of psychological harassment of perceived enemies known as Zersetzung, a term borrowed from chemistry which literally means “decomposition”, but involved the disruption of the victim’s private or family life. Zersetzung was designed to side-track and “switch off” perceived enemies so that they would lose the will to continue any “inappropriate” activities. For those unfamiliar with the technique, it would likely be hard to imagine just how abominable cruel it was. Any foreigners which had contact with GDR citizens, or any visiting foreigners visiting the GDR were tracked by the Stasi. Essentially all of it was documented as a result of the GDR government’s neurotic practice of endless record keeping on everyone and everything. Records showed that the Stasi had over 90,000 employees and used well over 170,000 Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter or informants. The people of the GDR lived in an environment of fear created by their government. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th century French-Occitan philosopher stated: “A man who fears suffering is already suffering from what he fears.”

The society that would develop in the GDR, with its repressive, authoritarian underpinnings, could best be called a human tragedy. The terms austereness, sternness, dourness, grimness, sombreness, unfriendliness, and coldness all fittingly describe its tenor. The strictures of its laws amplified the government’s intention to limit freedom, experiment with social engineering, promote a collective consciousness, reject individualism, and demand a conformist posture of all citizens at all times. Yet, from the moment the GDR government subjected the German people to terror and horrific brutality through the State security apparatus, it condemned his country to a form of arrestment and its people to soul crushing heartache and despair, and that situation stood until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Germany finally came into port after a rough sea.

Leben heißt nicht zu warten, bis der Sturm vorbeizieht, sondern lernen, im Regen zu tanzen. (Life is not about waiting for the storm to pass, but about learning to dance in the rain.) For the sake of providing a balanced perspective of GDR life, one could still say that most East Germans did not live in misery every minute of every day. Basic needs and services were provided to the people by the government to the extent possible. That allowed for some degree of satisfaction. Citizens of the GDR, as Germans, had a long storied history. They also had a rich culture to which they could adhere. By enjoying German traditions that had not been co-opted by the Communists, they could find some authentic satisfaction, joy, and happiness. Pleasant aspects of life in the GDR may have been things such as good times had among family, friends and colleagues (albeit, they may have been surveilling each other for the Stasi.) Luckily, that whole era is dead. (One can visit the Stasi Museum Berlin located in House 1 on the former grounds of the headquarters of the GDR Ministry for State Security and ”Runde Ecke” Memorial Museum and the Stasi Bunker Museum located at Dittrichring 24 in Leipzig, Germany to discover the actual horrors that the Stasi unleashed upon GDR citizens and how it all worked.)

Looking back, relatively widely-held notions from the past of a new world order based on Communism seem barky, but that certainly was once promoted as a philosophy that offered a better life for all. As decades have passed since the end of the Cold War, marked with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new line of thinking would emerge on the erstwhile geopolitical struggle between East and West and all of the people and events associated with it. Unimaginable a few decades ago, today certain impulses in support of Socialism, apparently untutored by anyone truly knowledgeable on the matter, has manifested itself very publicly on the US political scene. For some, it may be invigorating to read through and adhere to sterilized tenets of Socialism discussed in the abstract in texts of scholars and academics. However, such studies are certainly isolated from the realities endured by earlier generations in the Eastern Europe. Those excited by Socialism today are actually attracted to the best possibilities of a pastiche of the political and economic theory. Their thoughts manifest the vanity of the mind. They need to know the real history of people who suffered under that system.

Konrad Wolf (left), Markus Wolf (center) Friedrich Wolf (right). From Wolf’s account of his childhood in Man Without A Face, there is no way to know whether it was a happy one. What is presented on that aspect of his life in the book is a complex story with a lot of backstory. Wolf’s father, Fredrich Wolf, was a prominent physician, well-known playwrite, pro-abortion advocate, and devout, active Communist. His mother, Else Wolf, was a teacher and also a staunch Communist. Wolf’s only sibling was a brother, Konrad Wolf, who was two years younger.

Excavating Wolf’s Inner Workings

Wolf was born on January 19, 1923 in Hechingen, Germany. From the account of his childhood in Man without a Face, there is no way to determine whether it was a happy one. What is presented on that aspect of his life from Chapter 3 is a complex story with a lot of backstory. Wolf’s father, Fredrich Wolf, was a prominent physician, well-known playwrite, and pro-abortion advocate. He rejected Orthodox Judaism to become a devout and active member of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany). Among the plays his father wrote was “Professor Mamaluke,” which dealt with the oppression of Jews in Germany.  His mother, Else Wolf, was a teacher and also a staunch Communist. Wolf described her as follows: “My mother was quiet and gentle but a person of great courage, whether undergoing the Nazis’ rough house searches or those of the secret police in Stalin’s Russia.” He also stressed: “It was our mother who raised us during our father’s long romantic or political absences.” Wolf’s only sibling was a brother, Konrad Wolf, who was two years younger. Konrad would later become a film director. Wolf affectionately mentions him by his nickname “Koni” at various points in the book. The Wolf family lived comfortably in a large Bauhaus-designed home in Stuttgart. As both of his parents were Communist, Wolf says in Chapter 2 that from them he “came to perceive Stalin as as a wise and distant figure, like the benevolent magician in the fairy tales.” From his father specifically, he received considerable tutorial on Communist Movement as well as naturism. Wolf and his brother would become members of the Communist youth organization, Young Pioneers. However, as Adolf Hitler and the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers’ Party better known as Nazis (Ehrlich! Hitler was a self-styled Socialist!)) took control of Germany, Wolf’s family would eventually rush to resettle in the Soviet Union in 1933.

Readers learn from Chapter 3 that during their exile in Moscow, Wolf’s family lived in a cramped apartment. Wolf adapted well to his new environment, acquired the local slang. He acquired the nickname, “Mischa”. As for his education, Wolf first attended the German Karl Liebknecht School and later a Russian school. Having been primed by his father’s teachings and his experience in the Young Pioneers, Wolf was immediately subsumed by Communism in school. There, Wolf’s understanding of all arguments in favor of the movement and the system were topped off. The beliefs he acquired then likely stood unaltered from that time onward. Any misgivings that he may have had were shucked off. He professed to all his fierce loyalty to Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Interestingly enough, the Wolf’s family was present in the Soviet Union at the time of Stalin’s Purges, but it did not affect them directly, although Wolf indicates in the book that he was aware of what was happening. In 1936, at the age of 13, Wolf obtained Soviet identity documents. The Communist Party became aware of his attitudes and attributes and while a student selected him to be a member of the nomenklatura, the high ranking management of the apparat, the Communist Party or government bureaucracy. In his youth, Wolf could hardly discern that the virtues, that his political mentors asserted the system had, were never practiced fruitfully anywhere in which the Communist Movement took root. Having that new attachment to Communism and the Communist Party was crucial at that point because in 1938, his father, central to his life to that point, had a reduced presence. Very telling of his father’s mentality toward family, in 1938 Wolf’s father made his way to Spain to work as a doctor in the International Brigades. However, he was arrested in France and interned in the concentration camp at Le Vernet. In 1941, he gained Soviet citizenship and returned to Moscow where he became a member of Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (National Committee for a Free Germany), an anti-Nazi, paramilitary organization formed in 1943. He had affairs with other women, producing what Wolf called a “small brood of children.”

Wolf insists that despite his absences, his father remained the strongest political influence on his life. Whenever he was away, he would send letters “full of advice of how to be correct and honorable socialists and human beings.” Perhaps his departure was also made less disruptive by the fact that by that as Wolf grew older, he came to terms with his own life. In fact, Wolf apparently did not go through a vulnerable age, perhaps because did not really have the opportunity to do so. Indeed, Wolf never gave the indication at any point in the book that he was an uncomfortable person. Still, there is the possibility that lack of  permanence in his family relationships due to his father’s competing dedication to the Communist Party had a significant impact in another way. What he may have acquired from observing and internalizing his father behavior may very well have been how individuals can weave themselves into the lives of others and untangle themselves to find a way out and how natural it all can be. (Wolf’s father, by the end of World War II was thoroughly off on his own. He was in the Eastern Zone of the Allied Occupation, where Wolf would also arrive, active in literary and cultural-political issues. From 1949 to 1951 he was the first ambassador of East Germany to Poland. He died in his personal office in Lehnitz in 1953.)

Wolf would enter the Moscow Institute of Airplane Engineering (Moscow Aviation Institute) in 1940. The school was evacuated to Alma Ata, Kazakhstan after Nazi Germany’s  attack on the Soviet Union. Wolf and his mother and brother arrived there on the Writers’ Union train. While there, he was told to join the Comintern, where he and others were prepared for undercover work behind enemy lines. He would ultimately be assigned as a newsreader for German People’s Radio after dissolution of Comintern from 1943 until 1945. Contact with the Communist Party in Germany and a life lived early enough within the authoritarian Soviet Union very likely enabled Wolf to better understand and accept personal and group interactions under the control of others and learn or attain by unconscious assimilation the level of caution required to survive and thrive rather than bother considering notions of freedom of choice and the exercise of free will.

Wolf the journalist (above). In his first position in the Eastern Zone of the Allied Occupation, Wolf directed Berlin Radio in the Soviet Zone of occupation and worked as a journalist. He was among the journalists from the East who observed the entire Nuremberg Trials against the principal Nazi leaders. From 1949 and 1951, Wolf worked at the GDR Embassy in the Soviet Union, but even more importantly in 1951, he also joined the Stasi. He was assigned to its nascent foreign intelligence service. Although Wolf  presents that moment  as a simple anecdote among others, it is actually an inflection point in his life.

Inflection Point: Wolf’s Start in the World of Intelligence

In Chapter 3, readers discover that Wolf, in 1945, just married to Emmi Stenzer the year before and only 22 years old, was sent to postwar Berlin with the Ulbricht Group, led by one of the founding members of the Weimar era Communist Party of Germany, Walter Ulbricht. During the Nazi regime in Germany, Ulbricht lived in exile in France and in the Soviet Union  Although Wolf was actually coming home, the most formative part of his youth was rooted in the Soviet Union. Under such circumstances, even though German, he felt that he was being transplanted into a foreign land. As he states in Chapter 3, Germany was his “Heimat” (heartland) but he felt “a pang of homesickness” for Moscow.

Die Qual der Wahl haben. (To be spoiled for choice.) In his first position in the Eastern Zone of the Allied Occupation, Wolf directed Berlin Radio in the Soviet Zone of occupation and worked as a journalist. He was among the journalists from the East who observed the entire Nuremberg Trials against the principal Nazi leaders. From 1949 and 1951, Wolf worked at the GDR Embassy in the Soviet Union, but even more importantly in 1951, he also joined the Stasi. He was assigned to its nascent foreign intelligence service, operating as the Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Forschung (Institute for Economic Research) under Anton Ackermann. Although Wolf presented that job change as a simple anecdote among others, it was the inflection point of his life. He joined a small cell alongside young Stasi officials as himself. Although Ackermann was the chief of the Institute for Economic Research, it was guided under the stewardship of Ulbricht. Ulbricht was already in control of the GDR, and remained so from 1950 to 1971, as the First Secretary of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party of Germany). Wolf made it clear that he was not exactly a fan of Ulbricht. In describing the GDR’s chief decision maker, Wolf stated that he was hard-line, ruthless, authoritarian, pig-headed and heavy-handed. Displaying a bit of patrician aesthetic, Wolf added that Ulbricht, who was from Leipzig, spoke with a “provincial Saxon accent.” Ulbricht’s continuous purges of senior leaders was a sign of his insecurity and unsteady leadership. (In addition to being First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Ulbricht took on the role as GDR head of state from 1960 until his death in 1973. From 1971 to 1973, he only held the title of Honorary Chairman of the Socialist Unity Party, being succeeded in the actual position in 1971 by Erich Honecker, who ruled in the GDR until German Unification in 1989.)

Wolf’s first assignment in the foreign intelligence service was to serve as the deputy to the chief of analysis, Robert Korb. Korb had already worked with Wolf at Radio Moscow. Wolf’s work alongside of Korb did much to elevate his professional capabilities in foreign intelligence work. Wolf described how important Korb was to his development in Chapter 3. He stated: “Korb had profound political knowledge and an enormous command of facts and breadth of learning. I learned a great deal from him about things that had nothing to do with our work, such as Islam, the complicated background of Israel, and the religious conflicts of the Indian subcontinent. He was a brilliant analyst who taught me to regard field reports with skepticism, and we soon came to conclusion that a careful reading of the press could often produce results far superior to secret reports of agents, and that our own analysts should draw independent conclusions from diverse sources in order to evaluate raw intelligence material. This insight has remained with me ever since.” (Using the news media as an overt source of intelligence is not as feasible today as it was in Wolf’s time. The mainstream news media rarely acts as an unbiased, balanced reporter of events. The misguided extrapolation of information from news media sources is a subject that greatcharlie has dedicated considerable discussion.) Engaging in diligent, granular analysis as he learned at Korb’s side was undoubtedly beneficial to Wolf in his interactions with Ulbricht. Ulbricht was a longtime Communist Party operative, savvy about political intrigue. Once in the thick of things as head of the GDR, he apparently kept his head on a swivel so to speak, keeping everyone on edge, wary of his designs. Wolf’s well-managed interactions with Ulbricht may have resulted in part with Wolf becoming integral in the founding the HVA in 1953.

Starting out, Wolf’s HVA was certainly a weak child among the more mature and experienced Western and Eastern intelligence services. Reportedly as many as 80 intelligence services operated on the beat in postwar Berlin. Under its chief at the time, Ackermann, the HVA encountered a number of setbacks at the hands of the Western foreign intelligence services which were up and running well after World War II. There were great concerns regarding loyalties of GDR agents, the viability of networks, the ties to the intelligence service of the Communist Party of Germany. It was discovered through the Stasi’s arrest of an agent codenamed Merkur on the charge of being a double agent, that far more was known about the GDR spy networks outside of headquarters than any at HVA would have hoped. To better understand the situation, Wolf, then deputy chief of analysis, drew a diagram of the connections and choose connections among the existing intelligence networks, which began to look like a huge web. He attributed his capability to map out such fine details of the spy network to his training as an aeronautical engineer. He described his effort as follows: “On the diagram I connected all of the couriers, safe houses,  and the like. I colored suspected double agents red, sources blue, and residents green. The lines and boxes also identified personal and professional relationships. Special symbols marked suspicious circumstances or suspected contacts to opposing services. To the uninitiated, the diagram would have meant nothing, but to my eyes, it began to take on a clear outline indicating possibilities for expanding and deepening our work. It was also a clear picture of how deeply this service had been penetrated from the outside.” The conclusion for action that Wolf reached was rather prodigious. Recognizing that Western secret services could easily liquidate the whole network if they wanted to do so, Wolf decided to liquidate the network himself, and abandon all HVA contacts with Communists in West Germany. Ulbricht approved the decision. In 1952, the HVA recalled all of its agents, and even the most loyal Communists were placed in isolation under a sort of “villa arrest” and subjected to tough questioning.

Wolf provided an extraordinary description of how the HVA questioned its own agents, perfectly reflecting the nature of the GDR’s brutal, authoritarian regime. Wolf explained: “It was based on psychological pressure against men and women accustomed to drawing their sense of identity and self-esteem from membership in a group of like minded people. When that trust is suddenly withdrawn, the psychological pressure on them becomes acute. There was no need to threaten them or issue formal warrants of arrest. Addressing them as suspects and monitoring their replies was enough to convince us that they were innocent and that we had found no more double agents. Of course, there was no question of deployment in the West. They were warned not to talk about what happened. All of them kept their word about thus, as good comrades do.” It all seems quite intriguing and horrifying at once.

When Ackermann was removed as chief of the foreign intelligence service by Ulbricht. ostensibly because he was caught having an adulterous affair. Wolf, only 30 years old at the time, and only had 16 months of experience in the foreign intelligence service, was given the position. According to Wolf in Chapter 4, he was summoned to Ulbricht’s office and told: “We are of the opinion that you should take over the service,’ said Ulbricht. That was a royal’we–or, more precisely, ‘we’ meant the Party leadership. He did not ask me whether I thought I was up to the job, nor did he invite further discussion.” The HVA remained directly under the watchful eyes of Ulbricht until he was appointed as head of the Stasi, a member of the politburo, Wilhelm Zaisser, who he could rely upon. Wolf recalled that Zaisser was less concerned with the intelligence product HVA produced and focused more on his editing of a new German edition of Lenin’s collected works. Wolf, left to his own devices by Zaisser, worked hard daily to better understand the craft of intelligence. Despite his concerns about Ulbricht, Wolf acknowledged in Chapter 4 that he was provided ample opportunity by him to acquit himself well as the leader of the new intelligence service. That was a rather unique, positive response from Ulbricht. Nevertheless, in Chapter 3, Wolf recounts that he was often disappointed in the early years by the actions of Ulbricht. With regard to the uniforms worn by GDR officials that in Western mind came to symbolize the government’s Godless, authoritarian nature, Wolf noted: “One the odder ideas the Ulbricht espoused during the period was a return to military symbolism–a distinct about face given that we had criticized the West Germans for continuing the military nationalist traditions of Hitler’s Wehrmacht. Traditional military music was also revived . . . Like many Communists who had been brought up to view this blend of militarism and music as having prepared the ground for Nazism, I found this disturbing.” The early years of the GDR mark the time when the country began shaping up to be something far less than what motivated, young Communists had hoped. The direction that Ulbricht decided to take the GDR, according to Wolf, was driven by his uncompromising ideology and his desire to appeal to hardline Stalinists in Moscow. Upon Stalin’s death in 1953, Wolf felt that Ulbricht had leaned too far right, gambling that the Stalinist would emerge on top in a power struggle at the Kremlin and went out of his way to impress them with a policy of “accelerating socialism.”  As Wolf explains in Chapter 4: “Large firms and agricultural companies suffered under the sudden drive to perfect the Socialist economy. The activities of the Church were further curtailed.” Ulbricht bet on the wrong horse. Nikita Khrushchev came to power, famously recognizing the wrongs Stalin had inflicted upon the Soviet people. Ulbricht continued doing things his way nevertheless. A change at the top at Stasi would eventually result in Ulbricht settling on Erich Mielke. Wolf referred to him as Ulbricht’s “watchdog,” and would remain in charge at Stasi until 1989. Perhaps the most telling description of Mielke by Wolf was his statement in Chapter 4: “Mielke was a warped personality even by the peculiar standards of morality that apply in the espionage world.” He set the tone for the Stasi as Wolf further explained: “He [Mielke] was afflicted with an obsession for collecting data, not only on suspected dissidents, whom he ordered to be placed under round-the-clock surveillance, but on his own colleagues.” Such was the environment in which Wolf worked.

Wolf, the young HVA chief, in uniform (right). Wolf recounts that he was often disappointed in the early years by the actions of the GDR leadership. With regard to the uniforms worn by GDR officials, which in Western mind came to symbolize the government’s Godless, authoritarian nature, Wolf noted: “One the odder ideas the Ulbricht espoused during the period was a return to military symbolism–a distinct about face given that we had criticized the West Germans for continuing the military nationalist traditions of Hitler’s Wehrmacht. Traditional military music was also revived . . . Like many Communists who had been brought up to view this blend of militarism and music as having prepared the ground for Nazism, I found this disturbing.”

Inter bellum et pacem dubitabant. (They were hesitating (wavering) between war and peace.) The Cold War was a time of considerable intelligence activity. Intelligence studies and intelligence tradecraft are disciplines unknown in the minds of most observers. What is generally understood about it all is unfortunately gleaned from banal amusements propagated about spying, particularly the commercial product, James Bond. Through Bond, observers are inculcated with the idea that in spying, the mundane day-to-day can become exciting at any moment by expulsion or surprise attack! An everyday item can magically become a telephone, microphone, or weapon. In Chapter 4, Wolf stated that a song, that he helped compose, aided in reminding him that he was fighting an intelligence war on “The Invisible Front.” Still, some aspects of it were not so invisible. For the most part, foreign diplomatic services become a shell for the real Cold War being fought. Yet, while there was an understanding that all sides were engaged in such activity and it appeared to be an orderly world, it was actually anarchic. Both East and West were sending intelligence officers and running agents behind enemy lines was perilous undertaking in which one had to be thoroughly prepared. All agents were armed with a catalogue of proscribed practices. Collecting and disseminating was done under a pall of suspicion from all sides.

Those today who gleefully explore and promote the idea of creating Socialist systems, may be unable to view events of the Cold War as the Communist revolutionaries and anti-Communist forces who battled against one another across their respective borders and worldwide. Communism was indeed an aggressive revolutionary political system dedicated to the destruction of the West. Without having lived through the stand-offs between forces, the proxy wars, and incidents that had the two sides teetering between peace and war, one may be easily taken in by curious assessments of the Cold War that characterize it as an episode that was something less than one of the defining moments of the 20th century. It is instead characterized as something more akin to a mere “dust up” between the East and West. Those assessments of the decades long struggle are wrong. It was a collision between to world during great damage was done, and in the end, the West won. As the French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte explained: “Between a battle lost and a battle won, the distance is immense and there stand empires.” There was no mildness, leniency, or geniality. In the West, Communism was seen as a danger to mitigate and eventually defeat. As Wolf’s opponent declared itself anti-Communist and he became subsumed by the effort to defeat it.

Personnel; Plans and Training

Wolf tried to take the bull by the horns at the HVA and learned with some difficulty how he could best to set about accomplishing things. Being admitted to the top of the intelligence service so quickly by Ulbricht put Wolf, in terms of the theater, downstage center. However, it meant that Wolf never would have the opportunity to see the work of the intelligence service through the lens of a junior worm, upstage, off to the side. At the bottom, off to the side, realities are more apparent. Poor decisions from the top are often felt more personally, and nuance is learned. One becomes very aware of pitfalls to be avoided. The going was initially somewhat rough. It was not long before Wolf dealt with what he called his first “bombshell”. Gotthold Klaus, who served in the HVA’s economic intelligence unit, became the first defector. Wolf explained that it took a heavy toll on him personally and made him realize that his young service was far from secure. Klaus had disappeared during the holiday weekend and his absence was not detected for several days. In that short period of time, West German intelligence extracted everything he knew about the GDR agents. Six were arrested before there was even the possibility of calling them back. The incident became known as the Vulkan affair. Interestingly, Wolf noted: “Franz Blücher, the vice chancellor of West Germany, announced at a press conference that thirty five agents had been arrested as a result of Vulkan information. This was an exaggeration; no officer never would have been allowed to know the identity of so many agents operating in a hostile country. It turned out the West German counterintelligence, overexcited by their first big coup, caught in its net a number of innocent businessmen who did deals in the East but were certainly not spies.”

To his good fortune after that first set back–as well as few other initial failures, Wolf did not put his head completely underwater. He admits to being gently reproved by the head of Stasi, Zaisser, who said: “Mischa, you have to learn more and more about many things.” In the end, despite what occurred, Wolf was kept on board at Stasi. Fortunately for Wolf, at the very top, there was an apparent delicacy toward him. The individual watching over him was none other than Ulbricht. He was responsible for Wolf’s appointment as chief of the HVA, and he had considerable confidence in his capabilities. Presumably, Wolf acknowledged that was operating with a blind spot concerning operational security that prevented him from seeing straight all that was really happening in his service. He failed to completely grasp the full measure of the operational prowess of his opponent. Still, Wolf kept his composure. He stated in Chapter 4: “The following months were spent reorganizing our whole operation along more efficient lines.” Wolf might have pondered how he could ever be sure what is genuine anymore after that initial disaster. He likely wondered how he could avoid falling victim to the same lapses again. Wolf’s diagnosis was to better control his organization’s activities, to deploy his agents throughout the West, ensuring that they were allocated wherever they might have a chance to identify and maximally exploit opportunities to collect critical information and links with key players in military, diplomatic, political, economic, social and business decision making. It was akin to sowing seeds across an open, mostly fertile, field and monitoring their growth. The concept behind it was known as the “principle of patience” in long-term operations. Along the way, Wolf would massage, through controllers,  the infiltration efforts of his agents. Wolf was given a chance to make tomorrow better than today. Wolf went on to develop a sophisticated, intensified plan to place and service illegal agents in deep cover in the West. Of course, he was already engaged in that process at some level. Under the new strategy, his long-term “sleeper” agents were also introduced into the stream of East German refugees entering the West. However, they would remain patient, inert for years, sometimes decades, while they would carefully work their way into key positions.  Once the innermost secrets of the “class enemy” were in their reach, they would begin to supply as much as they could back home.

Walter Ulbricht (left) and Markus Wolf (right). As First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party, Ulbricht controlled the GDR from 1950 to 1971. Wolf made it clear that he was not exactly a fan of Ulbricht. In describing the GDR’s chief decision maker, Wolf stated that he was hard-line, ruthless, authoritarian, pig-headed and heavy-handed. Displaying a bit of patrician aesthetic, Wolf added that Ulbricht, who was from Leipzig, spoke with a “provincial Saxon accent.” Once in the thick of things as head of the GDR, he apparently kept his head on a swivel, keeping everyone wary of his designs. Ulbricht’s continuous purges of senior leaders, Wolf assessed, was a sign of his insecurity and unsteady leadership.

An effective practice for selecting Individuals for recruitment was established at HVA after a lack of diligence and breakdowns were discovered in the process following the Vulkan affair. Wolf had to be a very effective talent-spotter. He explained: “The search for suitable candidates was difficult and costly. Checking their political reliability, their personal ties, and their character took time. We sought young, politically motivated citizens, convinced socialists who believed in serving our country and cause. We were not concerned if candidates to be agents had relatives in the West, in contrast to our policy for potential officers at headquarters, who were barred from employment if they had any. In fact, Western relatives could be quite useful in helping an aspiring agent bypass refugee camps and enter the Federal Republic. Undoubtedly, after studying individuals, Wolf ostensibly knew more about them than they knew about themselves. After looking at the individual over and Wolf and his people liked the “cut of his jib”, the recruitment process would begin in earnest. Recruitment in some services can often be a very imperfect process. In recruiting for his bigger and better intelligence service, Wolf was exceptionally careful at every point. Even for a task as surveillance, care was placed in the selection. The HVA would need to rely heavily on the competence of observers, reports they produced, and even their immediate impressions, all of which would impact data extrapolated and inferences made. It would certainly be daylight madness to hire operatives off the street for an intended clandestine operation that is supposed to be finely calibrated. Nevertheless, that very practice of taking anyone off the street to engage in surveillance for remuneration is apparently accepted among some intelligence services in the US today, as well as crude, money hungry contractors, with whom Wolf never would have considered working with in a million years, to which such work is often outsourced by those services. Ostensibly, the grand thought behind the practice is that the more eyes, even nonprofessional, untrained eyes, are placed on the target the better. Yet, the result of that is simply the accumulation of several observations, varied in accuracy and quality. False observation can often be provided by nonprofessionals in an ordinary case seeking to puff themselves up, as if to say: “Hey, look at me! I am a real spy!” This lesser form of “spying” may bestow a certain dignity to the mixed bag engaged in it, but once made aware of those individuals and the sloppy work they are doing at that level, often it can make the work of many in the same intelligence service who are doing far greater things feel less dignified.

If readers would please allow greatcharlie to digress a bit further, given the potential for dishonor that it creates–not all names on a list of impromptu hires may be genuine–it leaves open the question as to who might benefit by collecting the recompense of such nonexistent operatives. Somber and astute counterintelligence officers or investigators might hypothesize that such hiring could be beckoning initial indicia of someone trying “to give themselves a pension.” Wolf clearly understood that efficacious work at the most basic level would determine the success of his operations. Surely, adversarial intelligence services, by insinuating their operatives with little or no vetting into any surveillance element of the US intelligence service or contractors performing such work, would acquire the capability of knowing when the US was monitoring their own people. They might even attempt to move their operatives closer to whomever was managing the whole cabaret. One might suppose that this may have happened more than once.

Wolf’s preparation of his agents was never slipshod. HVA training was originally in the classic tradecraft of intelligence. It was after all the second oldest profession and there were well-known tactics, techniques, procedures and methods that the organization could utilize. However, after Vulkan, there were clearly many lessons learned that Wolf wanted brought to bear in the training process, and thereby, it became more nuanced. Wolf’s summary of how agents were trained to penetrate security screening and penetrate specific targets is something advanced technology and other firms in the US should pay close attention as present day intelligence services, aware of Wolf lessons, might seek or have already managed to infiltrate their staffs. Wolf recounted in Chapter 4: “Each agent’s training was personally supervised by the man who would be running his operation, and special training was added if there was a scientific or technical objective. Once accepted in West Germany, agents usually began their assignments with an inconspicuous period of manual labor to help overcome the bureaucratic barriers of getting established in the West. We therefore preferred candidates with craftsman’s skills or practical experience in a profession. Almost every one of the students and budding scientists who emigrated in the early years found employment in research facilities or companies of interest to us–the Federal government’s nuclear research facilities in Julich, Karlsruhe, and Hamburg; the Batelle Institute in Frankfurt-am-Main, which had been set up by the United States; Siemens, Germany’s largest electronics company; and IBM Germany or the giant German chemical companies BASF, Hoescht, and Bayer. Because we assumed that Germany’s traditional arms manufacturers would–after the storm over German militarization died down–eventually resume military production, we also placed people in companies such as Messerschmidt and Bölkow.” With specific regard to the controllers, they were not mere handlers of spies in the West but expert psychologists who prided themselves on their close personal ties to their charges on the “invisible front”.

As mentioned previously, West Germany was Wolf’s main target. He explained in Chapter 10: “Department 9, responsible for penetrating the West German intelligence institutions, was the second largest in the service, after the Scientific and Technological Sector was one of the busiest. It was the department to which I felt most closely attached.” Fortunately for him, the West was easily accessible to his spies and couriers, who, given new Western identities, were indistinguishable from West Germans. Wolf was also well-equipped to recruit West Germans as his sleeper agents and deep cover assets. He claimed to have a firm understanding of the habits and mentality of middle to upper middle class Westerners and above all their weaknesses as those were his prewar origin. Confident of being able to collect information at the human level, human intelligence played an outsized role as compared with electronic and technical intelligence gathering done at Sektor Wissenschaft und Technik (the Sector for Science and Technology) or SWT.

It has typically been enough to state that for the intelligence officers, the goal is to compel actions by another collect information or act in any way that would promote the interests of the officer’s country. The officer will seek primarily to penetrate organizations, institutions, and communities, and insinuate themselves in the lives of others. After having maneuvered, with Berliners guidance into a position close enough to the target, they would use their tradecraft to attempt to compel a target through seduction or some other form of manipulation. At a more advanced level, it is less akin to police work to the extent that police are typically required to obtain immediate results more often through stressful even harsh interrogations, threats, and offers of protection. Still, there are occasions when the obligation of meeting requirements to satisfy consumer of intelligence, national leaders has required the use of coercive actions, to include torture. In Chapter 4, Wolf made clear that this was his concept for using his intelligence service. Still, to conceptualize further, the intelligence officer’s main task is to open doors. Whether by their own hands or using the hands of an agent, they must very often find the doors of file rooms, code rooms, vaults, and unprotected and protected computers and open them. However, there is an additional effort made to open doors of the officer’s contacts and targets for recruitment. Before the officer is a figurative wall, a barrier to the inner thinking of the target that may be underpinned by patriotism, an honor code, religious beliefs in good and evil, right and wrong, a political philosophy, loyalty to his service and his comrades. The list is exhaustive. Yet, the intelligence officer’s must get through. Smashing through the wall or hoping to get up and over it may be accomplished through those law enforcement tactics of interrogation and carrots and sticks would represent failure. A pitfall would occasionally be betrayal down the road by the same target as he may be intercepted, neutralized, and recruited or re-recruited by his own side as counterespionage agent. He may simply betray the intelligence officer’s with not just chicken feed, but false information that may arouse the officers managers and stall, paralyse, or disastrously distract and divert activities to bring what may once have been a viable operation to its knees. The intelligence officer must believe that there is a door to the inner thinking, soul of the target, which the officer, if experienced and skillful enough, will manage to open.

The Evolution of Recruitment and Training

In Chapter 5, Wolf explained: “The early years of a new espionage undertaking are always prone to the workings of Murphy’s Law, and scientific technical activity offered abundant potential for errors and misjudgement.” Wolf made adjustments his initial methods. Concerning penetration into the West, he noted that during the 1950s, thousands of the GDR’s citizens streamed across the then practically open borders into West Berlin and West Germany. Those numbers, according to Wolf, increased considerably after a June 1953 uprising in the GDR. Nearly 500,000 of the nation’s 18 million people fled in the following three years. Those considered to be of suitable material, were still being sent along that stream, and they, Wolf says, “laid the cornerstone for many of our later successes.” When they were picked up and questioned in the refugee camps once they got to the West, and the usually were, they still had a good chance of blending in with the mass of refugees. The HVA would equip them with a viable cover story. The declared wish to join relatives in the West was useful. However, HVA diversified the pretexts for to move West. Wolf explained: An agent might say that he had been caught trying to hide his past membership in the Nazi Party or the Waffen SS, or that he made negative comments about our government’s policies.” Diligence in assuring those pretexts were strong, caused him to have HVA place what he referred to as “stains” into personnel files kept on these agents maintained at other ministries to ensure the charges had credibility if perchance BfV somehow got hold of their file. Concerns over the actions of BfV became great enough that Wolf shied away from staffing the HVA with individuals who had relatives in the West. Wolf reasoned that Western intelligence services, particularly West Germany’s Bundesnachrichtendienst (Federal Intelligence Service) or BND, could more easily penetrate us-as we did them–through family links and pressures. Wolf also noted that whereas sending our agents into West Germany, a country with the same language and culture, was clearly an advantage, as the two German countries grew apart, such infiltration became more difficult. The building of the Berlin Wall created even greater problems. Wolf said that it “cut to a trickle the heavy flow of émigrés in which we hid our agents.” Concerning pretexts for moving West, Wolf noted: “This meant cover stories had to become even more foolproof.”

Regarding training and control upgrades, Wolf displayed a firm sense of what he needed from his agents. Wolf stated: “For each person we sent across we had a predetermined mission, and each agent was trained by a staff handler responsible for the mission. We limited training to the elementary rules of espionage and tips on acquiring the information we wanted. It made no sense to train these agents in subjects and skills that did not concern them; in some ways, it would make the operations more risky by unnecessarily complicating their mission. In some cases, we retrieved agents from the West and brought them back to the GDR for additional training when the appropriate time came.” Interestingly, so ubiquitous and ever industrious were Wolf’s spies that they would often encounter each other without knowing due to compartmentalization they were both working for HVA. As a result, there were occasions, those with access to their true identities at headquarters would be tickled on those occasions when they would respectively submit reports on one another suggesting each had useful qualities and would go as far as to recommend one another for recruitment.

In examining the HVA’s success in recruiting West Germans, Wolf recognized that varied, special motives drove them. Wolf explained that among many issues, some felt a conservative distaste for West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s “Americanization”, and other disgust over the top leadership roles former Nazis, Chief of Staff of the German Chancellery Hans Globke, President Karl Heinrich Lübke, and Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger, all of the Christian Democratic Union, managed to play in Federal Republic politics. Many HVA recruits in West Germany believed that their actions were humanitarian contributions to peace. Wolf’s network of spies, sleepers, informers and instructors in West Germany, today estimated to have numbered as many as 20,000 at the height of the Cold War. It should also be noted that Wolf’s agents often sailed under the “false flag” to appeal to the thirst for adventure of potential traitors in the West. At times, they posed as KGB agents. The thinking was that spying for the Soviet Union would sound more exciting for West Germans than spying for the GDR. It worked in many cases. There were times when HVA agents would pose as agents of Western intelligence services under the guise of trying to understand what their West German allies were doing or determine whether West German operations were secure.

Additionally, recruitment and collection was facilitated by the use of so-called “Romeo agents”. Sex has been used to gather intelligence since ancient times. Typically, the female spy would seduce her male victim to obtain secrets. The HVA did not hesitate to use loyal GDR women as well as suitable prostitutes in that capacity. Yet, Wolf’s thinking would go beyond the usual in the sense that he imagined reversing roles to have male agents seduce female targets. To Wolf, it appeared easier for determined agents to ensnare the secretary of a high-ranking Western official than the official himself. In reality, she would often have the same access to confidential information as her boss. He established special team of “women hunters” with the mission of seducing secretaries in West German government offices, turning them into informants. The scores of lonely women that Wolf’s Romeo spies seduced were referred to by the HVA as “Juliets”. Ostensibly, spotters would watch targets, and through observation determine the individual’s needs, desires, strengths, and weaknesses. Wolf’s Romeos would happily waste their substance on lonely women in Bonn government offices and the NATO headquarters in Brussels targeted by HVA.

Within the Eastern intelligence services, the HVA would be known for having a committed visionary at its helm. Whenever Wolf’s spies and others came to light in the West, the event would feed into a paranoid doctrine that all foreign intelligence services were penetrated by Communist spies and intelligence victories were actually their victories. Within the Eastern intelligence services, the HVA would be known for having a committed visionary at its helm.In the West, Wolf was looked upon as a threatening spectre, and he knew it. To quote Wolf from the Introduction of Man without a Face, “As even my bitter foes would acknowledge, it was probably the most efficient and effective such service on the European continent.” Managers in the counterintelligence departments of Western intelligence services would wake up every morning pondering : “We know Wolf has been doing something. What could it possibly be?” Too often, they found themselves chasing shadows. Ironically, a spotlight was placed on a spy chief and his clandestine operations, both of which could not be seen. Der unbestrittene Meister schien unbesiegbar. (The undisputed champion seemed invincible.)

Interestingly, Wolf did not particularly stress the presence of NKVD intelligence officers whose job was to guide members of the burgeoning intelligence service into an effective tool for the GDR’s security but more importantly for exploitation by Soviet intelligence. He would only mention that reality here and there, somewhat higgledy-piggledy, in the text. When the “Institute for Economic Research” was stood up, it actually functioned under the control of the Soviet intelligence. In those same postwar years, Soviet organization of its intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security functions went through its own period of transformation donning an alphabet soup of titles from the GPU, to OGPU, to GUGB/NKVD. to NKGB, to MGB. In 1954, the service eventually landing on the title, KGB. The KGB or the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) would be praised by the Soviet Union’s leadership as the country’s ”sword and shield” and the “Vanguard of Communism”. The organizations and intelligence operations undertaken by the Stasi and other Eastern Bloc intelligence services essentially duplicated of those of the Soviet KGB. Their role was made more important due to attention the KGB to Moscow’s chagrin  garnered on the world stage. After only a few years of operation, the KGB became a renowned, albeit dangerous, feature in international affairs. Looked upon as curiosities and celebrities, in foreign policy circles of many capitals, there was considerable, often banal speculation as to who among diplomats at Sovist embassies, consulates, and cultural centers were KGB officers. In certain countries, Moscow determined that was too high profile to use discreetly in the recruitment of agents. The alternative was to make use of other Eastern Bloc intelligence services that were very often operating under the radar in many countries around the world. That effectively took some pressure off the KGB. However, the KGB would insist on maintaining a tight grip on the reigns of all operations of other Eastern Bloc intelligence services. Eastern Bloc intelligence operations directed and controlled by the Chief Directorate of the KGB. The consequence of disobedience to their Soviet masters was well-understood. There is a common belief that those who rise so quickly, much as shooting star, tend to flame out just as fast. Wolf rise was fast, even a bit unsettling for him. Luckily, he and all around him soon discovered that he was a natural at the craft of intelligence. Nevertheless, it would seem he was not out in the world alone when his efforts at HVA first took flight.

Wolf (center) stands in his dress uniform with colleagues at an official event. Within the Eastern Bloc intelligence services, the HVA would eventually be known for having a committed visionary at its helm. In the West, Wolf was looked upon as a threatening spectre. Managers in the counterintelligence departments of Western intelligence services would wake up every morning pondering : “We know Wolf has been doing something. What could it possibly be?” Too often, they found themselves chasing shadows. Der unbestrittene Meister schien unbesiegbar. (The undisputed champion seemed invincible.)

Action and Adventure!

Wolf’s discussion of the various adventures of his agents has been thoroughly recounted in previous reviews of Man Without A Face as well as various scholarly studies, books and articles on Wolf in which his memoir was used a source. Much as a previous reviewer noted, espionage enthusiasts would certainly find what Wolf laid out concerning the adventures of his agents is spine-tingling stuff. Some of the more popular stories concerning his actions and the adventures of his agents are still very much worth reading. Among those that greatcharlie found most edifying are: the Gunter Guillaume case; the Kuron walk-in case; and, the Tiedge walk-in case.

1. Gunter Guillaume Case

Gunter Guillaume was a HVA sleeper agent who navigated his way up to become a top staff assistant to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, a member of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a liberal whose Ostpolitik, looking toward reconciliation of the two Germanys, made him GDR’s favorite West German Chancellor. Wolf admitted that he was somewhat surprised by Guillaume’s success. As he explained in Chapter 9: “We never lost hope of penetrating the heart of Bonn, but no one expected to get so close to the top man. Nor would I have bet on Guillaume, who we codenamed Hanson, to be the one to accomplish this historic espionage coup.” Guillaume and his wife, Christel, were a husband and wife team, just two of the hundreds of potential spies, sent into the West in the 1950s. Guillaume was recruited from an East German publishing house with fairly well-known links to the Stasi. The couple was sent to Frankfurt-am-Main, where Christel’s mother ran a tobacconist’s in the mid-1950s. They opened a small copying business and joined the local Social Democrats. His efforts in SPD politics and his contact with Leber really got the ball rolling for Guillaume. In praise for Guillaume, Wolf recounted: “His discipline and dedication never faltered. He rose to become a member of the Frankfurt-am-Main city council and head of its SPD group. Guillaume’s organizational abilities, along with his staunchly conservative position at a time of great ideological upheaval in the SPD, caught the eye of George Leber, the leader of the building workers’ Union and later minister for transport in the grand coalition of 1966-1969 between the SPD and the Christian Democrats.” Eventually, Guillaume was offered a job in Leber’s office and gained access to a number of secret NATO and Federal Republic documents. These were carefully copied by Guillaume and passed to his controller in empty cigar cases “sold” to the East German intelligence officer in his mother-in-law’s tobacconist’s shop.

Wolf went on to explain that when the SPD became the leading party in West Germany in 1969, the HVA ordered Guillaume and Christel “to play a waiting game and not push for personal advancement in the new administration.” Wolf believed that since the record indicated that Guillaume former worked in East Berlin publishing, if he tried to move into a government job, red flags would be raised. Indeed, Wolf would discover the following: “Herbert Hellenbroich, later the head of West German foreign intelligence (Bundesnachrichtendienst), confirmed that Guillaume had been investigated like no one else before him–but without turning up anything. There had, however, been two vague tips from the evaluators in West Germany’s counterintelligence (Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz–BfV) and Horst Ehmke, the head of Brandt’s office and thus responsible for personnel there, decided to confront Guillaume headlong with these suspicions.” Guillaume brilliantly dealt with all of the suspicions coming his way. With the rare use of a first name, Wolf praised his covert agent, writing: “Gunter’s reactions and his overall demeanor as he explained away his work at the Volk and Welt publishing house seemed so natural, as a stunned Ehmke would say later, that all doubts were put to rest.” (A hidden hope among West German counterintelligence specialists, that such a deep penetration into their country’s political arena was not probable, may have led to a preconception of Guillaume’s innocence that in turn colored their investigation. Such is always a danger. Intensified, thorough research, more interviews, in an effort to find the missing pieces of the figurative ring is the answer, certainly not spurious over compensation in the opposite direction.) When HVA agent, Willy Gronau, one the intelligence service’s oldest sources, was arrested in West Berlin there was concern that suspicion about his concept acts would placed Guillaume in jeopardy. Gronau and Guillaume had maintained professional contact as part of their jobs. However, it was one of those occasions in which neither knew the other’s true identity as an HVA agent. The BND and BfV were never caused to think any similar issues of spying existed among both.

The political world, being complex and often confused, required Guillaume to sift through whatever he came across for golden nuggets. While stuck to the matter at hand, for his own security, he also had to be aware of everything happening around him. Seemingly  extraneous matters were not out of court. In November 1969, Guillaume was offered the post of a junior aide to the newly elected Social Democrat Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume methodically made his way up through the hierarchy of the Chancellery, steadily passing intelligence to East Berlin. Eventually, he became one of Brandt’s top aides. Guillaume’s mission was essentially a political job, monitoring the Brandt administration. Guillaume was able to provide the HVA and hence the KGB with details of divides among NATO members US President Richard Nixon and US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger  sought greater control over the alliance. However, sex would play a part in Guillaume’s work, too! Brandt was a womanizer. According to Wolf, Guillaume procured women for him.

A CIA counterintelligence officer looking into suspicions that there was a spy within the Chancellery remembered a clue from the late 1950s. The East Germans sent messages to their many agents in the West using a five-figure cipher broadcast read out by a female broadcaster who in western intelligence circles was nicknamed “Magdeburg Annie”. The codes were cracked by US computers; one was to an agent in West Germany known as “G” who was active in the SPD. As it was described by another previous reviewer of Man without a Face, with Teutonic precision, the Stasi remembered to radio birthday greetings to its agent. He was also  important enough to be congratulated on the birth of his son. That untidy behavior proved disastrous. The radio traffic was analyzed by the BfV who eventually figured it out. The known details of the agent, and, crucially, the date of the boy’s birth, matched those of Guillaume and his son, and he and his wife were put under surveillance. Guillaume was arrested on April 24, 1974. Brandt resigned ten days later. While the penetration was looked upon with amazement, Wolf lamented that it was all in all a defeat. Wolf, expressing the sense that he had only achieved a bit of a Pyrrhic victory,  explained in Chapter 9, “Our role in bringing down Brandt was equivalent to kicking a football into our own net,” He also stated: “We never desired, planned nor welcomed his political demise. But once the chain of events had been set in motion, they had their own momentum. Where was I supposed to have yelled stop?” Brandt was the architect of Ostpolitik, West Germany’s opening of relations toward the GDR and remainder of the Eastern Bloc beginning in 1969 and the German Basic Treaty of 1972,  setting the basis of relations between West Germany and the GDR. Moreover, the GDR secretly supported and encouraged Willy Brandt’s Ost-politik policy of rapprochement with the East German government. than the former chancellor. His successor as Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, was less committed to the “Eastern” policy.

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (right) and Gunter Guillaume in tinted glasses (left). Gunter Guillaume and his wife, Christel, were a husband and wife team, two of the hundreds of sleeper agents set up in West Germany by the HVA in the 1950s. Guillaume managed to navigate his way up to become a top staff assistant to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. Guillaume dealt well with all of the suspicions that came his way. Wolf admitted that he was somewhat surprised by Guillaume’s success. As he explained: “We never lost hope of penetrating the heart of Bonn, but no one expected to get so close to the top man. Nor would I have bet on Guillaume, who we codenamed Hanson, to be the one to accomplish this historic espionage coup.”

2. Klaus Kuron Walk-in Case

There were occasions fortunate for Wolf when his intelligence officers came across the “walk-ins”, those who on their own volition turn toward and even work for the East. Among those stories is that of the spectacular recruitment of Klaus Kuron, deputy chief of the BfV. Wolf stated in Chapter 10: “ This was exceptional, even for the entanglements of the spy business.” The Kuron walk-in began with a tug of war between HVA and BfV over one of Wolf’s sleeper agents, Joachim Moitzheim. Moitzheim had been caught by BfV attempting to recruit the man who operated the counterintelligence computer named Nazis. Once intercepted by the chief and deputy chief of the BfV, respectively Hansjoachim Tiedge and Klaus Kuron, neutralized him with the threat of a lengthy  imprisonment and recruited him to work as a double agent for them. Moitzheim agreed, but informed Wolf and  his superiors at HVA  of the recruitment effort. The verdict was that Kuron, who was not seen as a threat to the GDR should be function as a triple agent for the HVA. Having been in contact with BfV officials. Moitzheim was asked if he could take a look at a letter anonymously dropped off at the GDR Embassy in Bonn in 1981. The letter written by an individual Wolf believed knew the structure of HVA well, offered to provide a high degree of inside intelligence for a one time payment of 150,000 Deutschmarks. In the letter, Wolf beloved as an effort “to whet our appetites,” by informing in the letter that there was an effort to recruit an official at HVA’s SWT, the unit responsible for technological espionage. To Wolf’s astonishment, Moitzheim identified the handwriting on the letter as Kuron, the deputy chief at BfV with whom Wolf had struggled in the intelligence war. Kuron communicated again by telephone call during which a meeting was arranged in Vienna.

Wolf noted that Kuron “was unembarrassed by his treachery” as he described his situation at BfV. Kuron who came from modest beginnings worked his way  lacked a university degree and was regularly passed over for more senior positions at higher salary levels. Wolf quoted Kuron directly: “It has been a struggle . . . Everyone knows how good I am, but I’ll never go any further.” Noting the bitterness of Kuron’s tone, Wolf quoted him further as saying: “In the West, they say that there is freedom and an equal chance for everyone to achieve their potential. I do not see it like that. I can work till I drop and still end up being treated as a drone. Then they bring along some half-wit bureaucrat whose daddy has paid his way through school and has a glittering path ahead. I can’t bear it any longer.” Wolf saw Kuron as being worth every penny. He noted that for six years, “Kuron did sterling work for us. With the innocent help of his teenage son, who thought he was just doing a favor for his dad for work, . . . . “ Wolf also noted that Kuron took professional pride in his work for the HVA, often helping with projects that fell outside of his agreed contract. While acting for the GDR within the BfV as a figurative predator in the forest, Kuron also had to have an awareness of his surroundings much as prey. Wolf recounted what that entailed. The HVA achieved successes with Kuron, undetected, right up until the fall of the Berlin Wall. For the most part, defections of Kuron’s type were typically driven by such unbalanced ambition. While the overwhelming majority of officers will find the intelligence service to be an acceptable way of life. Evaluations from his supervisors and managers reflect not only the officer’s performance and work product, but attitudes and behavior as observed. When the officer cannot come to terms with the job and the system, a resulting decision may be to escape it. The worst possible impulse would be to take on the defectors cloak and strike against the institution that tried to embrace the officer. The impulse to conquer the institution was equally powerful. It was certainly more than a lack of good judgment. The problem is the insufficiency of the individual.

3. Hansjoachim Tiedge Walk-in Case

As aforementioned, It was Hansjoachim Tiedge’s job as chief at BfV, to intercept, neutralized, and when possible, recruit GDR spies to work as double agents for the Federal Republic. It was believed by many at BfV that Tiedge addicted to the bottle. Tiedge’s condition was more than corridor gossip at the BfV. He could scarcely drag himself through the working day. On the day that Tiedge defected to the GDR, as Wolf thoroughly details in Chapter 10, he used tradecraft. In the summer of 1985, Tiedge reportedly came to the Magdeburg section of the Inter-German Border that a man identifying himself as “Mr. Tabbert” had arrived, demanding to speak to a representative of the foreign intelligence service. Wolf, who was preparing to go on summer vacation in Hungary, was called. According to Wolf: “Throughout Kuron we knew that Tabbert was Tiedge’s code name.” Wolf ordered to quickly pass him through without further questioning, and be treated well. Wolf also directed Karl-Christoph Grossmann, who ran Department 9 and handled Kuron’s first approaches, pick him up on the Autobahn junction leading to Berlin. Once stirred in a safe house outside of Berlin, Tiedge asked to speak with Wolf directly, but he declined to leave the matter to Grossmann. Wolf claimed that he was already planning to retire and decided continuity in terms of his handling was important given all of the ramifications.  After identifying himself to Grossmann, Tiedge reportedly stated: “I’ve come to stay. You are my last chance.” Then the full measure of Tiedge’s dilapidated state became known. Tiedge confirmed that he was a heavy gambler and drinker. His wife died in an accident at home after he had been involved in a drunken fight with her. Investigated for manslaughter, the verdict was death by misadventure. His children were unruly, never forgiving him for their mother’s death. His lifestyle had led to disciplinary proceedings. Tiedge believed he was being kept on at BfV as a means for his superiors to keep an eye on him. Wolf assessed his situation as follows: “Here was a man who had descended into such a psychological hell that he could see two possible escapes, suicide or defection.”

Wolf said regarding Tiedge’s arrival: “It was a much a surprise to me as to everyone else. I had some inkling that he might wash up on our shore if things got much worse for him in Cologne, but we did not seek contact with him.” Wolf used Man without a Face to categorically deny that Tiedge had been HVA’s agent before his defection. Based on what has been made public, Tiedge was very likely Wolf’s greatest catch. Outlining the benefits that Tiedge brought to HVA, Wolf noted: “Tiedge had a memory like a computer for names and connections and filled in a lot of blanks for us, though not as many as he thought, since he was unaware that his colleague Kuron was in our pay.” As the story goes, away from the book’s text, due to Tiedge’s defection, the West German intelligence community was at sixes and sevens, trying to determine what would happen next, who was who, what was real and what was not. His betrayal was called the most damaging of the Cold War for the Federal Republic. It resulted in the recall of numerous West German agents still in the field. In that period, the East Germans captured 168 West German spies. Wolf stated in Chapter 10: “We rubbed our hands in glee at the turmoil.” However, there would soon be a bit of irony to befall HVA as Grossmann, the man entrusted with handling both Kuron and Tiedge, two days after German Unification, accepted an offer to help track down HVA agents. Overall, Wolf believed that the successful recruitment of officials and the collection walk-ins from his adversaries confirmed his notion that intelligence work never simply rests upon technology. It rests upon what cannot be bought, the human element, the mind, thoughts, emotions, conscience and will. Wolf stated in Chapter 10: “Our successes right up to 1989 indicate a technological superiority is of limited usefulness if the basics of the service are mishandled. That kind of expertise can be bought, but good organization, tight discipline, and the right instincts are not commercially available.”

Hansjoachim Tiedge (above) was very likely Wolf’s greatest catch. As chief of West Germany’s Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) or BfV, Tiedge’s job was to intercept, neutralized, and when possible, recruit GDR spies to work as double agents. His betrayal was called the most damaging of the Cold War for the Federal Republic. It resulted in the recall of numerous West German agents still in the field. In that period, the East Germans captured 168 West German spies. Wolf believed that the successful recruitment of officials and the collection walk-ins from his adversaries confirmed his notion that intelligence work rests upon the human element, the mind, thoughts, emotions, conscience and will, and never technology alone.

A Thought about Wolf and the German People

It is not difficult to imagine that Wolf firmly believed that through reeducation and practice, the German people would appreciate the Communist Movement’s benefits and the promise that the Socialist system brought for the GDR’s future. He would work toward the cause of establishing a proletariat paradise. Although Communism had been present as a political movement in Germany, it was never an idea universally accepted by the German people. Before World War II, the German people faced the dilemma of choosing between what were considered two undesirable options: Adolf Hitler and the Nazis and the Communist Party of Germany. The two parties engaged in a tumultuous and very violent struggle for political control of the country. Through the efficacious application of force and a more effective political strategy, the Nazis gained the upper hand. Once Hitler and his Nazis came to power, the Communist Party was eviscerated and banned. The road was left open for German people to fall under the spell of Hitler and to be overcome by the false promises and manipulations of the Nazi Movement. It all seemed inspired by ingenious telepathy from Hell. Nazi Germany was an abomination. Under the Nazis, the German people suffered loss beyond imagination. They were plunged into endless depths of despair, anguish, and agony.

For centuries, the German people had been steeped in Western religious traditions and a spiritual link to God. To that extent the laws of Western societies were generally an amplification of Divine law or biblical law. Much as expressed in Ephesians 4:18, under the Nazis, the German people were alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that was in them, because of the blindness of the heart. Postwar, the Communist finally had their chance to rule in Germany. With their country literally fractured by the war and the majority living in privation, the people of the GDR were subsumed by Communism as pressed upon them by their Soviet occupiers. Unlike their fellow countrymen in West Germany, they had to survive what became “Part 2” of a dark, bitter authoritarian epoque in German history. Once again, Germans in the East found themselves in a far country, which is anywhere outside the will of God. The Communist made certain that the people of the GDR were more thoroughly torn from their spiritual underpinnings. Under the Communists, the mystery of the covenant between God and man and His creation was reduced to a mere human puzzle whose pieces can be arranged according to limited human intelligence. Much as Wolf became an albeit willing victim of institutionalized atheism, which the Communist world’s Soviet masters called “gosateizm”, the same requirement to believe in unbelief was imposed on the people of the GDR.

As a true believer in the Communist movement, Wolf acknowledged feeling somewhat unnerved when he observed how the GDR’s society began to vibrate in response to the benefits of the opening and opportunity created by glasnost and perestroika. Suppressed no longer was the desire by the people of the GDR to have for a better life, a better world, better existence. The people of the GDR also heard a message from the West that resonated. French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte has also been quoted as saying: “There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.”

It is not difficult to imagine that Wolf firmly believed that through reeducation and practice, the German people would appreciate the Communist Movement’s benefits and the promise that the Socialist system brought for the GDR’s future. He would work toward the cause of establishing a proletariat paradise. However, as a true believer, Wolf acknowledged feeling somewhat unnerved when he observed how the GDR’s society began to vibrate in response to the benefits of the opening and opportunity created by glasnost and perestroika. Suppressed no longer was the desire by the people of the GDR to have for a better life, a better world, better existence.

In Man Without A Face, Wolf apparently sought to present himself as the man he believed himself to have been throughout his career, doing his job for his country as best he could. Through all the years of official secrecy and darkness, he saw himself as a normal man. Surely, normal and fine could be considered relative terms when it comes to Wolf, but letting the world know that he felt that way seems to have been an important point of the book. To that extent, Man Without A Face is even more a very personal human story. Of course, everything discussed in Man without a Face is open to interpretation by the reader. One is certainly entitled to form their own opinion of Wolf and his work. To encourage that, greatcharlie suggests its readers take a look at the book give it the old school try! Without hesitation, greatcharlie highly recommends Man without a Face to its readers. Find a copy! For those who have already read it, take a second look. It is truly worth the read!

By Mark Edmond Clark

A Russian Threat on Two Fronts: A New Understanding of Putin, Not Inadequate Old Ones, Will Allow the Best Response

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Putin, himself, appears to be the cause for difficulties that  the Trump administration has encountered in improve relations between the US and Russia. One might accuse Putin of playing a cat and mouse game with Trump. Why Putin would act in this manner is uncertain. An assay of Putin from outside the box may provide a framework from which the Russian President’s complexities can be better understood.

According to a March 3, 2018 New York Times article entitled, “A Russian Threat on Two Fronts Meets an American Strategic Void”, US President Donald Trump has remained silent about his vision to contain Russian power, and has not expressed hope of luring Moscow into new rounds of negotiations to prevent a recurrent arms race. Indeed, the article, largely critical of the Trump administration, explains that “most talk of restraint has been cast to the wind” over the past few months. What purportedly envelopes Washington now is a strategic vacuum captured by “Russian muscle-flexing and US hand-wringing.” A cyberchallenge has enhanced the degree of tension between the two countries. The article reports that top US intelligence officials have conceded that Trump has yet to discuss strategies with them to prevent the Russians from interfering in the midterm elections in 2018. In striking testimony on February 27, 2018 on Capitol Hill, the director of both the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, US Navy Admiral Michael Rogers explained that when he took command of his agencies, one of his goals was to assure that US adversaries would “pay a price” for their cyberactions against the US that would “far outweigh the benefit” derived from hacking. Rogers conceded in his testimony that his goal had not been met. He dismissed sanctions that the US Congress approved last year and those that Trump had not imposed as planned would not have been enough to change “the calculus or the behavior” of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

What was reported by the March 3rd New York Times article presaged a shaky future for US-Russian relations. At the start of the Trump administration, Putin convincingly projected an interest in working toward better relations through diplomacy. Areas of agreement and a degree of mutual respect between Trump and Putin have been found. Yet, agreements reached should have served to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. Putin appears to be the causality for a figurative draw on the scorecard one year into the Trump administration’s exceptionally pellucid, well-meaning effort. Putin seems to be playing a cat and mouse game with Trump–constant pursuit, near capture, and repeated escapes. It appears to have been a distraction, allowing him to engage in other actions. While engaged in diplomacy, the Trump administration has observed hostile Russian moves such as continued interference n US elections, as well as other countries, and efforts to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to tighten Moscow’s grip Crimea and the Donbass. Those actions greatly diverge with US policies on Syria and Ukraine. Putin and his officials have shown their hand too completely over time for anyone in Washington to allow themselves to be seduced by Putin’s guise of wanting to improve ties. In the recent greatcharlie post, it was explained that Trump and foreign and national security policy officials in his administration, who were good-naturedly referred to as “stone hearts”, were well-aware from the get-go that Putin and his government could more often than not be disingenuous.  If Putin truly does not want positive to change in relations, the Trump administration’s diplomatic project with Russia is likely moribund. If there were some touch that Trump could put on the situation right now that would knock the project in the right direction, he certainly would. At the moment, however, the environment is not right even for his type of creativity and impressive skills as a negotiator. For now, there may very well be no power in the tongue of man to alter Putin. Since no changes in relations are likely in the near future, it would be ideal if Putin would avoid exacerbating the situation between the US and Russia by suddenly halting any ongoing election meddling. The whole matter should have been tied-off and left inert in files in the Kremlin and offices in the Russian Federation intelligence and security services. However, Putin seems to going in the opposite direction. The threat exists that Putin, seeing opportunity where there is none, will engage in more aggressive election meddling, and will also rush to accomplish things in its near abroad, via hybrid attacks at a level short of all out war, with the idea that there is time left on the clock before the US responds with a severe move and relations with the Trump administration turn thoroughly sour. That possibility becomes greater if the Kremlin is extrapolating information to assess Trump’s will to respond from the US newsmedia.

Putin’s desire, will, and ability to act in an aggressive manner against the US, EU, and their interests must be regularly assessed in the light of new events, recent declarations,  and attitudes and behaviors most recently observed by Western leaders and other officials during face to face meetings with him. Undoubtedly, Trump is thoroughly examining Putin, trying to understand him better, mulling through the capabilities and capacity of the US and its allies to respond to both new moves and things he has already done. Since Trump is among the few Western leaders who have recently met with Putin–in fact he has met with him a number of times, there might be little unction for him to be concerned himself with meditations on the Russian President made in the abstract. Nevertheless, an assay of Putin from outside the box may provide a framework from which the Russian President’s complexities can be better understood. Parsing out elements such as Putin’s interests and instincts, habits and idiosyncrasies, and the values that might guide his conscious and unconscious judgments would be the best approavh.to take. A psychological work up of that type on Putin is beyond greatcharlie’s remit. However, what can be offered is a limited presentation, with some delicacy, of a few ruminations on Putin’s interior-self, by looking at his faith, pride, ego; countenance, and other shadows of his soul. What is presented is hardly as precise as Euclid’s Elements, but hopefully, it might be useful to those examining Putin and contribute to the policy debate on Russia as well. Credula vitam spes fovet et melius cras fore semper dicit. (Credulous hope supports our life, and always says that tomorrow will be better.)

Putin has publicly declared his faith and has been an observant member of the Russian Orthodox Church. By discussing his faith, Putin has developed considerable political capital among certain segments of the Russian public. Putin’s political opponents and other critics at home, however, would question where faith has its influence on him given some of his policy and political decision, particularly concerning territorial grabs, overseas election meddling, and reported human and civil rights violations in his own country.

Faith

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines faith as complete trust or confidence; a strong belief in a religion, based on spiritual conviction rather than proof. Faith guides the mind. It helps the mind conclude things. Simple faith, involves trusting in people and things. Communists mocked faith in the church, but still had faith in Marx. In that vein, faith allows for the acceptance of the word of another, trusting that one knows what one is saying and that one is telling the truth. The authority being trusted must have real knowledge of what he or she is talking about, and no intention to deceive. Faith is referred to as divine faith when the one believed is God. In discussing Putin’s divine faith, greatcharlie recognizes that to convey a sense of religiousness makes oneself spooky to some. Writing publicly, one of course opens oneself up to constructive criticism at best and obloquy at worst. Still, a discussion tied to faith might be feared by readers on its face as being one more expression of neurotic religiosity, an absurdity. That presents a real challenge. Nonetheless, the effort is made here.

Putin has publicly declared his faith on many occasions. He has been an observant member of the Russian Orthodox Church. Putin was introduced, to religion, faiith, and the church early in his life. In Part 1 of Putin’s 2000 memoir, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that his mother, Mariya Ivanovna Shelomova, attended church and had him baptized when he was born. She kept his baptism a secret from his father, who was Communist Party member and secretary of a party organization in his factory shop. Putin relates a story concerning her faith as well as his own in Part 1’s final paragraph. He explains: “In 1993, when I worked on the Leningrad City Council, I went to Israel as part of an official delegation. Mama gave me my baptismal cross to get it blessed at the Lord’s Tomb. I did as she said and then put the cross around my neck. I have never taken it off since.” Religious formation must start at childhood discussing ideas as being kind, obedient, and loving. They must be told of the world visible and invisible. Children are buffeted by many aggressive, strange, harmful ideas, and must able to surmount them by knowing what is right and doing what is right. Children tend to gravitate toward prayer, which strengthens their faith and helps their devotion grow. One tends to resemble those in which one is in regular conversation, and prayer helps bring children closer to God. The very brief life God bestows to one on Earth is lived more fully with faith. On his death bed, the renowned French philosopher, playwright, novelist, and political activist, Jean Paul Sartre, stated: ”I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured. In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here, and this idea of a creating hand refers to God.” Est autem fides credere quod nondum vides; cuius fidei merces est videoed quod credis. (Faith is to believe what you do not see the reward of this faith is to see what you believe.)

Faith does not replace the intellect, it guides the mind. Whether Putin’s faith has shaped his views or his Ideology is unclear. By discussing his faith, Putin has developed considerable political capital among certain segments of the Russian public. It has allowed Putin to cloak him in something very positive, very healthy, and would provide citizens with a good reason to doubt and dismiss negative rumors and reports about his actions. Many Russian citizens have responded to Putin’s introduction of faith to the dialogue about his presidency by coming home to the Orthodox Church. Perhaps that is a positive aspect that can be found in it all. Members of Russia’s opposition movement and other critics at home, however, would question where faith has its influence on him given some of his policy and political decision, particularly concerning territorial grabs, overseas election meddling, and reported human and civil rights violations in his own country. They would claim that rather than shaping his policy decisions in office, his faith is shaped by politics. They would doubt that he would ever leverage influence resulting from his revelations about his faith in a beneficial way for the Russian people or any positive way in general. They could only view Putin’s declaration of divine worship as false, and that he is only encouraging the superficial worship of himself among the intellectually inmature who may be impressed or obsessed with his power, wealth, lifestyle, and celebrity.

Putin commemorates baptism of Jesus Christ in blessed water (above). On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor in chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.”

Putin is certain that his faith has provided a moral backing for his decisions and actions as Russian President. On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor in chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.”

Having humility means to be honest about ones gifts and defects. The true source, the real hand in ones accomplishments, is God. Once one recognizes this, one can be honest about the need for God’s assistance. Putin’s, to a degree, seems to indicate that he has humility and appears assured that he has been placed in his current circumstances, and has given him the ability to do all that he has done, as the result of God’s will. However, Putin should keep in mind that evil can quiet all suspicions, making everything appear normal and natural to those with the best intentions. To that extent, his decision and actions could truly be the augur of his soul, but perhaps not in a positive way. Evil can go into the souls without faith, into souls that are empty. Once evil insinuates itself in one’s life, there is chaos, one becomes bewildered, confused about life, about who one is. Due to the threat of evil influence one must be willing to look deeper at oneself to discern flaws, to see what is lacking. Having a sense of balance in this world necessitates having an authentic knowledge of oneself, the acceptance of daily humiliations, avoidance of even the least self-complacency, and humble acknowledgement of ones faults. The virtue of temperance allows one to give oneself a good look. Once one gets oneself right, then one can get God right. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. (No one is born without faults.)

Putin seemingly surmises that he is satisfying God through his religious observance and by obeying religious obligations. Yet, one cannot approach God simply on the basis of one’s “good deeds.” Indeed, simply doing the right things, for example, following the law does, not grant you salvation. It does not give you guidance. Approval, recognition, obligation, and guilt are also reasons for doing good. The motive behind your actions is more important than your actions. To simply believe also does not put one in a position to receive. Your heart must be right.

Putin celebrating Christmas in St Petersburg (above). Wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. Putin’s conscience should be able to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong. It should urge him to do that which he recognizes to be right. It should restrain him from what he recognizes to be wrong. Ones conscience passes judgment on our actions and executes that judgment on the soul.

All those who have worked for Putin, and those who have come up against him, would likely agree that he has a wonderful brain, and his intellect must be respected. His talents were first dedicated to his initial career as an officer in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. The job took root in him. As a skilled KGB officer, he was proficient at lying, manipulation and deception. It was perhaps his métier.  Putin would likely say he engaged in such behavior for all the right reasons, as a loyal foot soldier. Subsequently, he would serve in a succession of political positions in the intelligence industry that were thrust upon him. In 1997, he served as head of the Main Control Directorate. In 1998, he was ordered to serve as director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Later that same year, he was named Secretary of the Security Council. Through those positions, he was educated thoroughly on the insecurity of the world. It was a world in which things in life were transient. He discovered the width of the spectrum of human behavior. Putin applies that knowledge of humankind, sizing-up, and very often intimidating interlocutors, both allies and adversaries alike. The 16th century English statesman and philosopher, Sir Francis Bacon said that “knowledge itself is power,” but Intellect without wisdom is powerless. One matures intellectually when one moves from seeking to understand the how of things to understanding the why of things. Through the conquest of pride can one move from the how to the why. One can only pray for the wisdom to do so. In The New Testament, Saint Paul explains: “Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that by testing you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect. For by the grace given to me I say to everyone among you not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to think with sober judgment, each according to the measure of faith that God has assigned. Beatus attempt esse sine virtute nemo potest. (No one can be happy without virtue.).”

The Catechism of the Catholic Church explains that the inclination toward sin and evil is called “concupiscence”. Baptism erases original sin and turns a man back towards God. However, the inclination toward sin and evil persists, and the man must continue to struggle against concupiscence. Sin leads to sin. Acts of sin tend to perpetuate themselves and result in additional acts of sin. Sin can become a way of life if it goes unchecked. When Putin approaches the altar of the Russian Orthodox Church, his purpose should be to expiate sin.

Wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. Putin’s conscience should be able to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong. It should urge him to do that which he recognizes to be right. It should restrain him from what he recognizes to be wrong. For the spiritual, conscience is formed by God’s truth. God’s truth creates order. In addition to knowing God’s truth, one must embody His truth which is inspired by love. The truth is a great treasure, a satisfactory explanation of the world and heaven that should speak to the individual. One should love God, love one’s neighbor, and remain virtuous by choice because it is the right thing to do. The reason for ones existence is best understood once one connects with the Creator of life. One can be happy with what makes God happy. Sub specie aeternitatis. (Under the aspect of eternity.)

Ones conscience passes judgment on our actions and executes that judgment on the soul. One should not do things that do not fit one. Conscience will send warning signals ahead of time. One should not ignore ones conscience. One should not violate it. The conscience should serve as Putin’s protection. Despite everything, it could very well be that Putin has a seared conscience. A less sensitive conscience will often fail an individual. Perhaps his conscience is dead. In following, his ability to know what is right may be dead. Putin declared his faith. He did not declare that he was a moral paragon. Quodsi ea mihi maxime inpenderet tamen hoc animo fui semper, ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem. (I have always been of the opinion that infamy earned by doing what is right is not infamy at all, but glory.).

Putin at the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade (above). Putin would likely be delighted to know there was a general understanding that his pride and patriotism go hand in hand. To that extent, all of his moves are ostensibly made in the name of restoring Russia’s greatness, to save it from outsiders who have done great harm to the country and would do more without his efforts. Some Russian citizens actually see Putin as ‘the Savior of Russia.”

Pride

Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae. (If the world should break and fall on him, it would strike him fearless.) The OED defines pride as a feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived from achievements, qualities or possessions that do one credit, or something which causes this; consciousness of one’s own dignity or the quality of having an excessively high opinion of oneself. Pride has been classified as a self-conscious emotion revolving around self and as social emotion concerning ones relationship to others. It can be self-inflating and distance one from others.

In terms of being conscious of the qualities, the positive nature of one’s country, surely national leaders must have a cognitive pride, an attitude of pride in their countries, their administrations, and missions. They will express their pride with dignity, regardles of how big or small, powerful or weak, that their countries are. Putin insists that all Russian have pride in their country. Putin wants all Russian citizens to be part of their country’s rise to greatness. Divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion and origin hinder that. It is worth repeating from the greatcharlie post, “Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion: Does Shoigu’s Involvement Assure Success for Putin?”, that much as the orator, poet, and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero, concluded about his Ancient Rome, Putin believes that loyalty to the Russian Federation must take precedence over any other collectivity: social, cultural, political, or otherwise. As noted by Clifford Ando in Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (University of California Press, 2013), in the hierarchy of allegiances outlined by Cicero, “loyalty toward Rome occupied a superordinate position: her laws and her culture provided the normative fabric that would, to borrow a phrase of Rutilius Namatianus [Poet, Imperial Rome, 5th Century], ‘create from distinct and separate nations a single fatherland’.” Likewise, Russia’s laws and culture provide the normative fabric from which a united country is created from diverse peoples. Possession of citizenship should be the basis to cause individuals to identify with the concerns of others in widely disparate populations among Russia’s republics. Putin wants Russians to be in a “Russian state of mind,” a mental state created when diversity, creativity, and optimism coalesce. A citizen’s attitude, perspective, outlook, approach, mood, disposition, and mindset should stand positively Russian.

From a theological perspective, the prideful individual acts as if their talents, possessions, or achievements are not the result of God’s goodness and grace but their own efforts. When pride is carried to the extent that one is unwilling to acknowledge dependence on God and refuses to submit ones will to God or lawful authority, it is a grave sin. While not all sins source from pride, it can lead to all sorts of sins, notably presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, hypocrisy, strife, and disobedience. In that vein, pride is really striving for a type of perverse excellence. That type of pride can be embedded deeply in ones being. 

1. Patriotism

Putin’s emotional pride is also expressed in the form of profound patriotism. Patriotism is defined as having or expressing devotion to and vigorous support for ones country. In reading Part 1 of Putin’s First Person, one can begin to understand why patriotism permeates everything Putin does. Given the rich history of his family’s service to the homeland gleaned from his parents and grandparents, it is hard to imagine how he would think any other way. It was gleaned because according to Putin, much of what he learned about his family was caught by him and not taught directly to him. Indeed, he explains: “My parents didn’t talk much about the past, either. People generally didn’t, back then. But when relatives would come to visit them in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), there would be long chats around the table, and I would catch some snatches, so many fragments of the conversation.” Putin’s grandfather, Spiridon Ivanovich Putin, was a cook. However, after World War I he was offered a job in The Hills district on the outskirts of Moscow, where Vladimir Lenin and the whole Ulynov family lived. When Lenin died, his grandfather was transferred to one of Josef Stalin’s dachas. He worked there for a long period. It is assumed by many that due to his close proximity to Stalin, he was a member of the infamous state security apparatus, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD. Putin notes that his grandfather came through the purges unscathed unlike most who spent much time around Stalin. Putin also notes that his grandfather outlived Stalin, and in his later, retirement years, he was a cook at the Moscow City Party Committee sanatorium in Ilinskoye. As for Putin’s mother, she refused to leave Leningrad as the Germans were blockading it. When it became impossible for her to remain, her brother, under gunfire and bombs, took her out along with her baby, Albert, Putin’s brother, to Smolny.  Afterward, she put the baby in a shelter for children, which is where he came down with diphtheria and died. (Note that in the 1930s, Putin’s mother lost another son, Viktor, a few months after birth.) Putin’s mother nearly died from starvation. In fact, when she fainted from hunger, people thought she had died, and laid her out with the corpses. With God’s grace, she awoke and began moaning. She managed to live through the entire blockade of Leningrad.

Putin at the War Panorama Museum in St. Petersburg (above). Patriotism is defined as having or expressing devotion to and vigorous support for ones country. Patriotism permeates everything Putin does. Given the rich history of his family’s service to the homeland gleaned from his parents and grandparents, it is hard to imagine how he would think any other way.

As for Putin’s father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, he was on the battlefield, serving in a NKVD demolitions battalion, engaged in sabotage behind the German lines. There were 28 members in his group. Recounting a couple of experiences during the war that his father shared with him, Putin explains that on one occasion after being dropped into Kingisepp, engaging in reconnaissance, and blowing up a munitions depot, the unit was surrounded by Germans. According to Putin, a small group that included his father, managed to break out. The Germans pursued the fighters and more men were lost. The remaining men decided to split up. When the Germans neared Putin’s father, he jumped into a swamp over his head and breathed through a hollow reed until the dogs had passed by. Only 4 of the 28 men in his NKVD unit returned home. Upon his return, Putin’s father was ordered right back into combat. He was sent to the Neva Nickel. Putin says the mall, circular area can be seen, “If you stand with your back to Lake Ladroga, it’s on the left bank of the Neva River.” In his account of the fight, Putin said German forces had seized everything except for this small plot of land, and Russian forces had managed to hold on to that plot of land during the long blockade. He suggests the Russians believed it would play a role in the final breakthrough. As the Germans kept trying to capture it, a fantastic number of bombs were dropped on nearly every part of Neva Nickel, resulting in a “monstrous massacre.” That considered, Putin explains that the Neva Nickel played an important role in the end.

That sense of pride and spirit Putin seeks to instill in all Russians echoes the powerful lyrics of Sergei Mikhalkov in the National Anthem of the Russian Federation. They are not just words to Putin, they are his reality. As if the vision in Verse 3 could have been written by Putin, himself, it reads: “Ot yuzhykh morei do poliarnogo kraia Raskinulis nashi lesa i polia. Odna ty na svete! Odna ty takaia – Khranimaia Bogom rodnaia zemlia! (Wide expanse for dreams and for living Are opened for us by the coming years Our loyalty to the Fatherland gives us strength. So it was, so it is, and so it always will be!) Putin would likely be delighted to know that there was a general understanding that his pride and patriotism go hand in hand. To that extent, all of his moves are ostensibly made in the name of restoring Russia’s greatness, to save it from outsiders who have done great harm to the country and would do more without his efforts. Some Russian citizens actually see Putin as “the Savior of Russia.”

2. Self-esteem

Pride can cause an individual to possess an inordinate level of self-esteem. They may hold themselves superior to others or disdain them because they lack equal capabilities or possessions. They often seek to magnify the defects of others or dwell on them. The Western country that has been the focus of Putin’s disdain, far more than others, is the US. An manifestation of that prideful attitude was Putin’s response to the idea of “American Exceptionalism” as expressed by US President Barack Obama. In his September 11, 2013 New York Times op-ed, Putin expressed his umbrage over the idea. So important was his need to rebuff the notion of “American exceptionalism”, that he sabotaged his own overt effort to sway the US public with his negative comments about it. The op-ed was made even less effective by his discouraging words concerning US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would not be his last effort to sway the US public on important matters, nor the last one to backfire. Putin is not thrilled by the Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again,” or the concept “America First.” He has expressed his umbrage in speeches and in public discussions. Subordinates such as Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Federation Presidential Spokesperson Dimitry Peskov, using florid rhetoric, have amplified Putin’s views on the matter.

As an officer in the KGB, the main adversary of Western intelligence and security services during the Cold War, Putin would naturally harbor negative sentiment toward his past, now present, opponents. Perhaps if there were some peace dividend at the end of the Cold War that Russia might have appreciated, and his ears were filled by Donna Nobis Pacem (Give US Peace), his attitude may have been different. In fact, the world might never have known Putin, or would known a different one. However, that was not the case. Putin did not inherit an ideal situation in Russia when he became president. While on his way to the top of the political heap, Putin saw how mesmerising “reforms” recommended to Yeltsin’s government by Western experts drastically impacted Russia’s economy in a way referred to somewhat euphemistically by those experts as “shock treatment.” Yeltsin was unaware that Western experts were essentially “experimenting” with approaches to Russia’s economic problems. His rationale for opening Russia up to the resulting painful consequences was not only to fix Russia’s problems but ostensibly to establish comity with the West. The deleterious effects of reforms recommended by Western experts’ could be seen not only economically, but socially. In the West, alarming statistics were reported for example on the rise of alcoholism, drug addiction, birth defects, HIV/AIDS, a decreased birth rate, and citizens living below the poverty line. Russia’s second war in Chechnya which was brutal, and at times seemed unwinnable, had its own negative impact on the Russian psyche. As Russia’s hardships were publicized internationally, perceptions of Russia changed for the worst worldwide. However, Putin saw no need for Russia to lose any pride or surrender its dignity as a result of its large step backward. Putin believed Russia would rise again, and that some acceptable substitute for the Soviet Union might be created, and never lacked faith about that. Putin was loyal and obedient while he served Yeltsin, but saw him tarry too long as Russia strained in a state of collapse.

US President Donald Trump (left) and Putin (right). Intelligence professionals might say that the correct and expected move in response to a covert operation that has failed very publicly, so miserably, would be to “tie it off”. Instead, as reported by US Intelligence agencies and the White House, Russia’s effort to meddle in the US elections has become recursive. Putin declined to be upfront with Trump about the matter. Russia must exit any roads that could lead to disaster.

Putin has not hesitated to use force when he believed there would be some benefit in doing so. Still, he has shown that he would prefer to outthink his rivals in the West rather than fight them. That notion may in part have influenced his responses in contentious situations. It may also account for the sustained peace with the US that Russia has enjoyed under his stewardship. However, it may be possible that this line of thinking was born out of necessity rather than by choice. Except for its long-held, unquestioned ability to engage in a nuclear war with the US, Russia has lacked the capability and capacity to do other big, superpower-type things successfully for nearly three decades. True, Moscow’s Crimea-grab and moves in Eastern Ukraine were swiftly accomplished and significant. Russian Federation military operations in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia garnered the full attention of the West. However, both moves, though important, actually caused more disappointment than create a sense of threat to the interests of the US and EU. To that extent, the US, EU, and NATO were not convinced that there was a need for direct military moves in Ukraine to confront Russia, no positioning of NATO troops in Crimea or Eastern Ukraine to counter Russia’s moves, to make things harder for Moscow. To go a step further, there is no apparent balance between Russia’s self-declared role as a superpower and the somewhat moderate military, diplomatic, economic, political, and communication tools available to it. The more territory Moscow acquires through conquest, the less capable it is to care for territory already under its control as well as tend to Russia’s own needs. In particular, greater economic pressures will be placed on Russia’s already fragile economy. Despite his efforts to make things right in Russia, Putin must spend an inordinate amount of time mitigating existing hardships and the effects of malfunctions across the board in Russia’s government system and its society.

3. Chasing the Unattainable

Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia is unattainable, not by some fault of his own, but rather because its problems are too great, run too deep. He may have run out of answers to put Russia on real upward trajectory given the capabilities and possibilities of the country. Not being remiss, he has used all tools available to him, yet big improvements have not been seen. Putin’s pride may have been a bit marred by this reality. He, better than anyone, knows what Russia is and what it is not. For all that he has done, he has not led Russia, to use a phrase from John Le Carré, “out of the darkness into an age reason.” In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. It would seem, consciously or unconsciously, Putin may simply be moving at a deliberate speed or even procrastinating a bit. When he cannot swim forward, he would prefer to tread water than sink. By continually displaying the strength, and the will, to keep his head above water in tough situations, Putin has become an inspiration to those around him. Most senior Russian officials are unwilling or are unable to take a complete look at the situation. Rather, they seem enamored with Putin, and would likely follow him no matter what. Knowing that has perhaps fed into his sense of accomplishment and confidence

Putin once said that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He believes Western governments are driven to create disorder in Russia and seek to make it dependent of Western technologies. Theories propagated by Moscow that the struggle between East and West is ongoing have been energized by the whirlwind of anger and aggressive verbiage concerning the 2016 US Election meddling issue. The story of the meddling, confirmed and revealed by US intelligence community and political leaders on the national level, has been propelled by a strong, steady drum beat of reports in the US news media. Perhaps the election meddling, a black operation, should have been considered an unsurprising move by Putin. Perhaps due to his experience in the the intelligence industry, hseems to lead him to turn to comfortable tactics, technique, procedures, and methods from it when confronting his adversaries. The Kremlin vehemently denies any interference in the US elections. That may simply be protocal. Russian officials, such as Lavrov and Peskov, have gone as far as to say that insistence of various US sources that the meddling took place is a manifestation of some mild form of hysteria or paranoia. Yet, the Kremlin must be aware that such denials are implausible, and in fact, unreasonable. To respond in such a brazenly disingenuous manner in itself raises questions not just about the conduct Russia’s foreign and national security policy, but the true motives and intent behind Moscow’s moves. It appears that Putin’s personality and feelings influence policy as much as well-considered judgments.

Putin, better than anyone, knows what Russia is and what it is not. Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia is out of reach, unattainable, not by some fault of his own, but rather because it’s problems are too great, run too deep. He may have run out of answers to put Russia on a true upward trajectory. His pride may have been a bit marred by this reality. Despite his aptitude as a leader, he has failed to lead Russia, as a whole, “out of the darkness into an age reason.”

4. Tying-off the Election Meddling

Intelligence professionals might say that the correct and expected move in response to a covert operation that has failed very publicly, so miserably, would be to “tie it off”. Instead, as reported by US Intelligence agencies and the White House, Russia’s effort to meddle in the US elections has become recursive. This would mean that Putin, himself, wants it to continue. Although the meddling operation has been almost completely exposed, and one would expect that those responsible for it would feel some embarrassment over it, Moscow seems gratified about how that matter has served as a dazzling display of Russian boldness and capabilities. To that extent, the carnival-like approach of some US news media houses to the issue well-serves Moscow. Perhaps Putin has assessed that successive meddling efforts will last only for so long until US cyber countermeasures, awareness programs, retaliatory actions, and other steps eventually blunt their impact or render such efforts completely ineffective. Thus, he may feel that he has no need to stop the operation, as the US will most likely do it for him. Still, continued efforts to interfere in US elections may not end well. Russia must exit any roads that could lead to disaster.

Putin at 2018 campaign rally (above). Putin can be proud of his many accomplishments, of his rise to the most senior levels of power in Russia, eventually reaching the presidency, and of being able to make full use of his capabilities as Russia’s President. Yet, having an excessively high opinion of oneself or ones importance, is not conducive to authentic introspection for a busy leader. Putin’s unwillingness or inability to look deeply into himself has likely had some impact upon his decisions on matters such as Russia’s meddling in US elections.

Ego

The OED defines ego as a person’s sense of self-esteem or self-importance; in psychoanalysis, it is the part of the mind that mediates between the conscious and the unconscious mind, and is responsible for reality testing and a sense of personal identity. Ego, as first defined in the OED, can be useful in calibrated doses. A bit of an ego is needed in order for one to believe that new or far-reaching objectives can reached and tough, difficult things can be achieved. When it gets beyond that, problems tend to ensue. The ego is the voice inside an individual that really serves one purpose, and that is to make one feel better about whom one is, to lift oneself up. It will do whatever it needs to do to make that happen. The ego is also the voice inside of an individual that may drive one to kick another when he or she is down, causing them to feel bad about themselves. An example of Putin’s ego pushing beyond what some experts might call the normal parameters was the October 7, 2015 celebration of his 63rd birthday. Putin participated in a gala hockey game in Sochi, Russia, alongside former NHL stars and state officials. Putin’s team reportedly included several world-renowned players, such as Pavel Bure, formerly a member of the National Hockey League’s Vancouver Canucks. Putin’s team won the match 15-10. Putin scored 7 of his team’s 15 goals!

From a theological  perspective, ego, much as pride, separates one from God. s the work of the devil, it is his tool that is used to separate us from God. The ego (Edging-God-Out) is considered the most powerful tool the devil has. It is deceiving in its ways, and makes one feel that one is serving others, when in reality one is serving oneself. Ego has no home is God’s creation. It is a distractive, impure thought, that leads to the destruction of self and others.

Putin can  proud, in the ordinary sense, of his many accomplishments, of his rise to the most senior levels of power in Russia eventually reaching the presidency, and of being able to make full use of his capabilities as Russia’s President. With no intention of expressing sentimentality, it can be said that Putin went from a working class to middle class background in the Soviet Union to very top of Russia’s elite. As he recounts in First Person, and as his critics in the West remind without fail, Putin spent his spare time as a child hunting rats in the hallways of the apartment building where his family lived. To a degree, he was an upstart who alone, with the legacy of honorable and valorous service of his father and grandfather in the intelligence industry only available to inspire him, struggled to the highest level of the newly established Russian society. The arc of his story is that the professional and personal transformation of his life came with the fall of the Soviet Union. That event created the circumstances for his life to be that put him on the path to his true destiny. All of that being stated, humility would require that Putin recognize that his achievements are the result of God’s goodness and grace, not simply his own efforts. Ego would urge him not to think that way.

Perhaps Putin would be better able to understand the source of all good things in his life if he engaged in true introspection, a look within from the context of his faith. It appears that Putin’s unwillingness or inability to look deeply in himself has allowed him to develop an excessively high opinion of himself, a potent confidence that he alone is responsible for all positive outcomes. Holding a distorted sense of self-importance certainly would not facilitate introspection by a busy leader. His attitude of pride has also likely influenced his responses in contentious situations. All of this should not be used to conclude that Putin’s declarations about his faith have been counterfeit. Rather, there appears to be an imbalance between the influence of faith, particularly the restraining virtue of humility and the influence of a willful pride, an seemingly unruly desire for personal greatness. In time, a through his faith, he may find his value in God alone. God can work in mysterious ways.

Often, moves by Putin against the West resemble responses in a sport where there are challenges made and the challenger gains points when able to stand fast against his opponent’s counter moves and gains points based on the ability to knock the challenger back. In that vein, Russia’s move into Ukraine appeared to represent a dramatic victory. There was no military effort to push back against his move. There was no available capability among Western countries to defeat Russia’s challenge in Ukraine short of starting a war. Putin remains adamant about the correctness of that action. His position was amply expressed in his March 14, 2014 speech, declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He noted that Russia’s economic collapse was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple his country.  However, Putin’s moves in Ukraine likely brought him only limited satisfaction. He still has been unable to shape circumstances to his liking. He would particularly like to  knock back moves by the West that he thinks were designed to demean Russia such as: the Magnitsky law, NATO Expansion (NATO Encroachment as dubbed by Moscow), the impact of years of uncongenial relations with Obama, and US and EU economic sanctions. His inability to change those things, and some others, has most likely left his ego a bit wounded.

An example of Putin’s ego pushing beyond what some experts might call the normal parameters was the October 7, 2015 celebration of his 63rd birthday. Putin participated in a gala hockey game in Sochi, Russia, alongside former NHL stars and state officials. Putin’s team reportedly included several world-renowned players. Putin’s team won the match 15-10. Putin scored 7 of his team’s 15 goals.

1. Magnitsky

In the West, particularly the US, there is a belief that in recent years, Putin has simply been reactive to the Magnitsky Act. It was not only a punitive measure aimed at Russia’s economy and business community, but struck at the heart of Putin’s ego. Through Magnitsky law, the West was interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs, good or bad, as if it were some second or third tier country, not as a global superpower with a nuclear arsenal. In retaliation, he would do the best he could to harm Western interests, even those of the US, not just over Magnitsky but a lot of other things. Counter sanctions would be the first step. Suffice it to say, election meddling took that retaliation to a new level. The Magnitsky Act, the official title of which is the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, is named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer and auditor who in 2008 untangled a dense web of tax fraud and graft involving 23 companies and a total of $230 million linked to the Kremlin and individuals close to the government. Due to his efforts, Magnitsky became the target of investigations in Russia. When Magnitsky sued the Russian state for this alleged fraud, he was arrested at home in front of his kids, and kept in prison without charges, in filthy conditions, for nearly a year until he developed pancreatitis and gallstones. In November 2009, Magnitsky, at 37 years old, was found dead in his cell just days before his possible release. The Magnitsky Act was signed into law by Obama in December 2012 in response to the human rights abuses suffered by Magnitsky. The Magnitsky law at first blocked 18 Russian government officials and businessmen from entering the US froze any assets held by US banks, and banned their future use of US banking systems. The Act was expanded in 2016, and now sanctions apply to 44 suspected human rights abusers worldwide. William Browder, a US hedge fund manager, who at one time the largest foreign investor in Russia and hired Magnitsky for the corruption investigation that eventually led to his death, was a central figure in the bill’s passage. Two weeks after Obama signed the Magnitsky Act, Putin signed a bill that blocked adoption of Russian children by parents in the US. Russia then also imposed sanctions on Browder and found Magnitsky posthumously guilty of crimes. Supporters of the bill at the time cited mistreatment of Russian children by adoptive US parents as the reason for its passage. What made Russian officials so mad about the Magnitsky Act is that it was the first time that there was an obstacle to collecting profits from illegal activities home. Money acquired by rogue Russian officials through raids, extortion, forgery, and other illegal means was typically moved out of Russia were it was safe. Magnitsky froze those funds and made it difficult for them to enjoy their ill-gotten gains. The situation was made worse for some officials and businessmen close to Putin who had sanctions placed on them that froze their assets. All news media reports indicate that getting a handle on Magnitsky, killing it, has been an ongoing project of Russian Federation intelligence agencies.

2. NATO

Regarding NATO, in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin essentially explained that he felt betrayed by the actions taken in Eastern Europe by the US, EU, and NATO at the end of the Cold War. Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and EU as having acquitted themselves of ties to promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. He feels historians have ignored the machinations and struggles of people involved. Putn further stated in the Bild interview: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have. You can also see this striving for an absolute triumph in the American missile defense plans.” Putin also quoted West German Parliamentarian Egon Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin’s view has not changed much since the interview. However, despite Putin’s certainty on this position, no former-Soviet republic wants to return to Russia or Moscow’s sphere of influence. Putin appears unwilling to accept today’s more complex reality. Pro-Russian movements and political circles in former Soviet republics do not represent the modern day trend.

Putin with binoculars at Zapad 2017 Military Exercises (above). Putin perceives the US and EU as having turned their backs on promises made to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. Despite Putin’s certainty of the West’s intrusive behavior, actually, no former-Soviet republic wants to return to Russia or Moscow’s sphere of influence. Putin appears unwilling to accept today’s more complex reality.

3. The EU

Putin has always viewed the EU as a project of deepening integration based on norms of business, law, and administration at variance from those emerging in Russia. Putin was also concerned that EU enlargement would become a means of excluding Russia from its “zones of traditional influence.” Even today, certain Russian actions indicate Moscow actively seeks to encourage members to withdraw from the EU sphere and discourage countries from joining it. Joint projects with European countries have allowed Russia to exploit their differences on political, economic and commercial issues creating a discordant harmony in the EU. A goal of such efforts has also been to undermine EU unity on sanctions. Even away from the former Soviet republics, Russia has engaged in efforts to undermine democratic processes in European countries. One method, confirmed by security experts, has been meddling in elections in a similar way to that widely reported to have occurred in the US.

4. Obama-Putin

Poor US-Russia relations were exacerbated by the uncongenial relationship between Putin and Obama. Indeed, Putin clashed repeatedly with the US President. Sensing a palpable weakness and timidity from Obama, Putin seemed to act more aggressively. The Russian military move that stood out was the capture of the Crimea and movement of troops into Eastern Ukraine to support pro-Russia separatists. There was nothing to encourage Putin to even try to negotiate beyond Magnitsky after Crimea. There was no room for him to turn back with ease or he would be unable to maintain his sense of dignity in doing so. Crimea would prove to be a useless chip to use in bartering a deal on Magnitsky. The US still views Magnitsky and Crimea as separate issues. Putin recognized from the attitudes and behavior of Obama administration officials that even the extreme measure of using subtle threats with nuclear weapons would not be emphatic enough to elicit a desired response from Washington because Obama administration officials would unlikely accept that such weapons could ever be used by Russia which was a projection of a view, a mental attitude, from their side. The Obama administration insisted that Putin negotiate them in the summer of 2013 and when he refused to do so, the administration cancelled a September 2013 summit meeting in Moscow between Putin and Obama. From that point forward, there was always “blood in water” that seemed to ignite Putin’s drive to make the Obama administration, and de facto the US, as uncomfortable and as unhappy as possible short of military confrontation.

5. US and EU Sanctions

As far as Putin sees it, painful sanctions from the US and EU, on top of the Magnitsky law, have damned relations between Russia and the West. Putin rejects the idea that the Trump administration is pushing for additional sanction against Russia and has explained new sanctions are the result of an ongoing domestic political struggle in the US. He has proffered that if it had not been Crimea or some other issue, they would still have come up with some other way to restrain Russia. Putin has admitted that the restrictions do not produce anything good, and he wants to work towards a global economy that functions without these restrictions. However, repetitive threats of further sanctions from the US and EU will place additional pressure on Putin’s ego and prompt him to consider means to shift the power equation. Feeling his back was against the wall, he has previously acted covertly to harm US and EU interests. A very apparent example of such action was his efforts to meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election process. The US and EU must be ready to cope with a suite of actions he has planned and is prepared to use.

Convinced his behavior was an expression of ego, some Western experts believe that Putin may have succumbed to the vanity of his metaphoric crown. In effect, to them, Putin has been overwhelmed by his sense of the great power that he wields in Russia, and that he wants to convince other countries that he can wield power over them, too!

6. Succumbing to the Vanity of “His Crown”

Convinced his behavior is an expression of ego, some Western experts believe that Putin may have succumbed to the vanity of his metaphoric crown. To that extent, Putin has been overwhelmed by his sense for the great power that he wields in Russia, and wants to convince other countries that he can wield power over them, too! If Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces were snatched from Kiev and fell firmly under the control of pro-Russian quasi-states of those entities and Russia, perhaps Putin would erect a statue of himself somewhere there or in Crimea much as one was erected of Zeus in Jerusalem by the Greek ruler of Syria, Antiochus IV. As for the people of those territories, and others in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, they may become the 21st century version of the malgré-nous, with many perhaps serving in the military against their will under the control of Russia. These scenarios are viewed by greatcharlie as long shots. It would surely raise Putin’s ire if he ever heard it. Although he is a dominant leader, he would likely prefer that his power was accepted, understood, and feared if need be, than depicted in such a monstrous or preposterous fashion. Yet, Putin may have behaved in a similar way recently when he announced an array of new “invincible” nuclear weapons.

On February 27, 2018  in a Moscow conference hall, with the back drop of a full-stage-sized screen protecting the Russian Federation flag, Putin gave one of his most bellicose, militaristic speeches since his March 14, 2014 regarding Crimea’s annexation. He told an audience of Russia’s elites that among weapons either in development or ready was a new intercontinental ballistic missile “with a practically unlimited range” able to attack via the North and South Poles and bypass any missile defense systems. Putin also spoke of a small nuclear-powered engine that could be fitted to what he said were low-flying, highly maneuverable cruise missiles, giving them a practically unlimited range. The new engine meant Russia was able to make a new type of weapon, nuclear missiles powered by nuclear rather than conventional fuel. Other new super weapons he listed included underwater nuclear drones, a supersonic weapon and a laser weapon. Putin backed his rhetoric by projecting video clips of what he said were some of the new missiles onto the giant screen behind him. Referring to the West, Putin stated, “They have not succeeded in holding Russia back,” which he said had ignored Moscow in the past, but would now have to sit up and listen. He further stated, “Now they need to take account of a new reality and understand that everything I have said today is not a bluff.”

Putin was speaking ahead of the March 18, 2018 Russian Federation Presidential Election. He has often used such harsh rhetoric to mobilize voter support and strengthen his narrative that Russia is under siege from the West. Yet, oddly enough, Putin emphasized that the new weapons systems could evade an Obama-era missile shield, which was designed to protect European allies from attacks by a specific rogue country in the Middle East and possibly terrorist groups, not Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal. He spoke about Moscow being ignored which was really a problem he had with the Obama administration. Indeed, most of what Putin said seemed to evince that lingering pains were still being felt from harsh exchanges with Obama. With Obama off the scene, and apparently developing military responses to cope with a follow on US presidency under former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Putin simply projected all of his anger toward Trump. Metaphorically, Putin seemed to “swinging after the bell.” So hurt was his ego that he has acted by building Russia’s nuclear arsenal up in a way the no US leader could ever deny the threat to US security that Russia poses. Being able to make that statement likely soothed his ego somewhat.

Religious scholars might state that Putin’s strong, perceptible ego contradicts his declaration of faith. The ego does not allow for the presence of God in ones life. Many have self-destructed as a result of their veneration of self. The ego needs to be overcome and removed from ones heart in order to allow God to fill that space.

In the form of Putin’s face can be found much that is telling about the Russian leader. As of late, its countenance has been far from serene and kindly. The countenance of ones face, smiling or frowning, can effortlessly communicate to others how one is feeling, thinking. Photos of Putin’s face more often reveal a deep, piercing, consuming stare, reflecting the strong, self-assured, authoritative, no nonsense personality, of a conscientious, assertive, and aggressive leader.

Putin’s Countenance

Imago animi vultus est, indices occuli. (The countenance is the portrait of the soul, and the eyes mark its intentions.) In the form of Putin face can be found much that is telling about the Russian leader. As of late, its countenance has been far from serene and kindly. The countenance of ones face, smiling or frowning, can effortlessly communicate to others how one is feeling, thinking. The face can also convey essential characteristics that make individuals who they are. In photos of President Putin in 2000, his eyes appear similar to those of the very best students of a fine university, watching and peering, learning and discerning constantly in order to best prepare himself to lead Russia into the future. It was before he had the eyes of an experienced, battle-scarred leader. Now, photos of Putin’s face more often reveal a deep, piercing, consuming stare, reflecting the strong, self-assured, authoritative, no nonsense personality, of a conscientious, assertive, and aggressive leader. Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae. (If the world should break and fall on him, it would strike him fearless.)

1. The Conscientious Leader

The inner voice of individuals meeting with Putin may not sound an alarm immediately. After all, if Putin is anything, he is a conscientious leader and one would expect to see it reflected in Putin’s face. Conscientiousness is the personality trait of being careful, or vigilant. It implies a desire to do a task well, and to take obligations to others seriously. Conscientious people tend to be efficient and organized as opposed to easy-going and disorderly. They exhibit a tendency to show self-discipline, act dutifully, and aim for achievement; they display planned rather than spontaneous behavior; and they are generally dependable. It is manifested in characteristic behaviors such as being neat and systematic; also including such elements as carefulness, thoroughness, and deliberation. The absence of apprehension, even anxiety, among some who meet with Putin is understandable, reasonable given that in social, as well as business situations, one can usually assume interlocutors mean what they say, are also personally invested in their interactions, and will display certain of manners, in some cases by protocol. Wanting to think well of others, wanting to connect with them, appearance, facial expressions, are looked upon benignly. Responding in this way is also a defense mechanism. Given his reputation, earned or not, aggression discerned in Putin’s face likely becomes sensate among his more worldly interlocutors. He might even be perceived through his countenance as being physically threatening without actually using any other part of his body to make gestures that could reasonably be identified as aggressive.

Somewhere in between, Putin can often appear to be what might be casually called “poker faced”, seemingly unresponsive to events swirling around him. During those moments, he is most likely evaluating everything and everyone, but keeping all his thinking and assessments locked inside himself. He may also be looking beyond the moment, considering what his next steps would be. Interlocutors will typically respond with faces of puzzlement and sometimes terror. Having the confidence to “face” foreign leaders in such a manner is a reflection of Putin’s assertiveness. (In the case of Trump, the response was likely disappointment, which masked a cauldron of intense rage. That should concern Putin and will become something to which he will need to find an answer.)

Putin gestures to a reporter at a press conference (above). Given his reputation, earned or not, aggression discerned in Putin’s face likely becomes sensate among his more worldly interlocutors. He might even be perceived as being physically threatening without actually making any aggressive gestures.

2. Putin’s “Assertiveness”

According to Fredric Neuman, Director of the Anxiety and Phobia Center at White Plains Hospital, being assertive means behaving in a way that is most likely to achieve one’s purpose. Under that definition, most successfully assertive individuals will have a suite of ways to act in given circumstances. Neuman explains that there are times when the right thing to do is to be conciliatory, and other times when resistance is appropriate. When one is actually attacked, verbally or otherwise, it may be appropriate to respond by resisting forcibly. Surely, there is a balance in Putin’s behavior in situations, but he has never been a wilting flower before anyone. A KGB colleague would say about Putin: “His hands did not tremble; he remained as cool as a mountain lake. He was no stranger to handling grave matters. He was expert at reading and manipulating people, and unfazed by violence.” Many foreign policy and human rights analysts in the West, and members of Russia’s opposition movement would say that Putin has amply demonstrated that he has no concern over sacrificing the well-being of Russians to further his geopolitical schemes and the avarice of colleagues. They report that he regularly persecutes those who protest. All of this runs contrary to image of Putin as a patriot. Those who study Putin would also point to the deaths of the statesman, politician, journalist, and opposition political leader, Boris Nemtsov; journalist Anna Politkovskaya; and, former KGB officer Alexander Litvinenko.  Attention might also be directed to the deaths of 36 generals and admirals from 2001 to 2016. In the majority of cases, the causes of death listed were listed as suicides, heart attacks, or unknown. Among those who died are former Russian Federation National Security Adviser and Army Major General Vladimir Lebed and the Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Russian Federation Army Colonel-General Igor Sergun.

3. Putin the Predator

Certainly, Putin prepares for his meetings or any other official contacts in advance, by mining available information about his scheduled interlocutors and by considering all possible angles of how they might challenge him and how he would explain himself in a plausible, satisfying way. Such is the nature of politics as well as diplomacy. However, there are reportedly times when Putin, after considering information available, will simply declare his superior position relative to his interlocutor and let them know that they must accept what he says. His success in a meeting relies heavily upon how well he does his homework. Clearly, individuals as Putin can have a different context for learning about people. When Putin asks about an interlocutor’s family, home, office, even capabilities, it not small talk or the result of friendly interest. Rather, he may be signalling, warning, that he has already evaluated an interlocutor as a potential target. He may be confirming information or collecting more. He may also be testing ones vulnerability to falsehoods or how one might respond to unpleasant information. He is creating a perceptual framework for his interlocutor. Such tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods truly match those of a predator. “Human predators” often use deflection, social miscues, and misinformation to provide cover for themselves. They can use a contrived persona of charm and success to falsely engender trust. They have an exit plan in place, and are confident with regard to the outcome of their actions. Boiled down, they accomplish their deception using three steps: setting a goal; making a plan; and, compartmentalizing. By setting a goal, they know what they want and what it will take to get it or achieve it. They have no inhibitions about causing damage or harm. They stay focused. By making a plan, they not only determine ways to get what they want, but also develop exits if needed. By compartmentalizing, they detach themselves emotionally from attachments that might be embarrassed or be an annoyance if caught. They train themselves to give off no such tells, so they can pivot easily into a different persona. While some might acquire this skill as Putin through training and experience in the intelligence industry, others may simply lack any sense of remorse.

When immobilized or in a controlled “silence,” Putin’s face can also manifest a type of ambush predation in his thinking. He may be attempting to conceal his preparation to strike against a “troublesome or even threatening” party, if not at that moment, eventually. Ambush predators are carnivorous animals or other organisms, that capture or trap prey by stealth or by strategy, rather than by speed or by strength.

When immobilized or in a controlled “silence,” Putin’s face can also manifest a type of ambush predation in his thinking. He may be attempting to conceal his preparation to strike against a “troublesome or even threatening” party. Ambush predators or sit-and-wait predators are carnivorous animals or other organisms, that capture or trap prey by stealth or by strategy, rather than by speed or by strength. In animals and humans, ambush predation is characterized by an animal scanning the environment from a concealed position and then rapidly executing a surprise attack. Animal ambush predators usually remain motionless,  sometimes concealed, and wait for prey to come within ambush distance before pouncing. Ambush predators are often camouflaged, and may be solitary animals. This mode of predation may be less risky for the predator because lying-in-wait reduces exposure to its own predators. If the prey can move faster than the predator, it has a bit of an advantage over the ambush predator; however, if the active predator’s velocity increases, its advantage increases sharply.

There is a Christian religious allegory warning of the inner spiritual decay manifested by an outer physical decay presented in a historical framework that includes Leonardo da Vinci. As told, when Leonardo da Vinci was painting “The Last Supper”, he selected a young man, Pietri Bandinelli by name as the person to sit for the character of the Christ. Bandinelli was connected with the Milan Cathedral as chorister. Several years passed before Da Vinci’s masterpiece painting was complete. When he discovered that the character of Judas Iscariot was wanting, Da Vinci noticed a man in the streets of Rome who would serve as a perfect model. With shoulders far bent toward the ground, having an expression of cold, hardened, evil, saturnine, the man’s countenance was true to Da Vinci’s conception of Judas. In Da Vinci’s studio, the model began to look around, as if recalling incidents of years gone by. He then turned and with a look half-sad, yet one which told how hard it was to realize the change which had taken place, he stated, “Maestro, I was in this studio twenty-five years ago. I, then, sat for Christ.”

Perhaps Putin is simply making the most of what is. Putin may just be living life and doing the most he can for his country and the Russian people, no matter how limited. Satisfaction might come in the fact that he firmly believes things in Russia are better than they would be under the control of anyone else.

Other Shadows of Putin’s Interior

Nam libero tempore, cum soluta nobis est eligendi optio, cumque nihil impedit, quo minus id quo maxime placeat facere possimus, omnis voluptas assumenda est, omnis dolor repellendus. Temporibus autem quibusdam et aut officiis debitis aut rerum necessitatibus saepe eveniet, ut et voluptates repudiandae sint et molestiae non recusandae. Itaque earum rerum hic. Tenetur a sapiente delectus, ut aut reciendis voluptatibus maiores alias consequator aut preferendis dolorbus asperiores repellat. (In a free hour, when our power of choice is untrammelled and when nothing prevents our being able to do what we like best, every pleasure is to be welcomed and every pain avoided. But in certain circumstances and owing to the claims of duty or the obligations of business it will frequently occur that pleasures have to be repudiated and annoyances accepted. The wise man therefore always holds in these matters to this principle of selection: he rejects pleasures to secure other greater pleasures, or else he endures pains to avoid worse pains.) Although thngs may go wrong, Putin knows that disappointments in life are inevitable. Putin does not become discouraged or depressed nor does he withdraw from the action. Putin knows he must remain in control of himself as one of his duties as president, and as a duty to himself.

1. Risky Moves

As mentioned earlier, Putin may very well be simpy making the most of what is. Putin may just be living life and doing the most he can for his country and the Russian people, no matter how limited. Some satisfaction might come with the fact that he firmly believes things in Russia are better than they would be under the control of anyone else. Despite his optimism and confidence in his abilities, Putin must be careful of risky moves, creating new situations that may lead to discord, disharmony. For example, interfering in Ukraine was a move that felt he could keep a handle on. Regardless of how positive, professional, and genuine Trump administration efforts have been to build better relations between the US and Russia, it would seem Putin has decided that entering into a new relationship with US would have too many unknowns and possible pitfalls. Putin knows that the consequences of missteps can be severe. He has the memory of what former Russian President Boris Yeltsin experienced in the 1990s to guide him. 

Although he holds power, Putin must always labor with the loneliness of leadership, the anxiety of decision making, and an awareness of threats to his well-being. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that there can be any real happiness for one who is under threat, in a country riddle with corrupt officials and a somewhat fragile system of law and order.

2. Dionysius and Damocles

Although he holds power, Putin must always labor with the loneliness of leadership, the anxiety of decision making, and an awareness of threats to his well-being. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that there can be any real happiness for one who is under constant threat, in a country riddle with corrupt officials and a somewhat fragile system of law and order. The ancient parable of Dionysius and Damocles, later known in Medieval literature, and the phrase “Sword of Damocles”, responds to this issue of leaders living under such apprehension. The parable was popularized by Cicero in his 45 B.C. book Tusculan Disputations. Cicero’s version of the tale centers on Dionysius II, a tyrannical king who once ruled over the Sicilian city of Syracuse during the 4th and 5th centuries B.C. Though wealthy and powerful, Dionysius was supremely unhappy. As a result of his iron-fisted rule, he had created many enemies. He was tormented by fears of assassination—so much so that he slept in a bedchamber surrounded by a moat and only trusted his daughters to shave his beard with a razor. Dionysius’ dissatisfaction came to a head one day after a court flatterer named Damocles showered him with compliments and remarked how blissful his life must be. “Since this life delights you,” an annoyed Dionysius replied, “do you wish to taste it yourself and make a trial of my good fortune?” When Damocles agreed, Dionysius seated him on a golden couch and ordered a host of servants wait on him. He was treated to succulent cuts of meat and lavished with scented perfumes and ointments. Damocles could not believe his luck, but just as he was starting to enjoy the life of a king, he noticed that Dionysius had also hung a razor-sharp sword from the ceiling. It was positioned over Damocles’ head, suspended only by a single strand of horsehair. From then on, the courtier’s fear for his life made it impossible for him to savor the opulence of the feast or enjoy the servants. After casting several nervous glances at the blade dangling above him, he asked to be excused, saying he no longer wished to be so fortunate.

Having so much hanging over his head, Putin has no time or desire to tolerate distractions. He does not suffer fools lightly. Putin’s ability to confound insincerity has been key to his ability to remain power. Early on as president, Putin effectively dealt with challenges posed by ultra-nationalists who were unable to temper their bigoted zeal, such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the extreme right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party of Russia. The challenges posed by them lessened every year afterward. To the extent that such elements, and those far worse in Russia, could potentially react more aggressively to Putin’s efforts to maintain order, he most remain ever vigilant. Putin has also become skilled in implementing what critics have called “charm offensives,” explaining his ideas and actions in a manner that is easy, comfortable, assuring, and logical. Still, such moves are sometimes not enough. Indeed, during significant crises, it is very important for Putin to have advisers who fully understand his needs. For an overburdened, embattled leader, the encouragement of another, a paraclete, may often prove comforting.

Putin undoubtedly strives for a gesamtkunstwerk: a harmonious work environment. At the present, Putin is probably working with the best cabinet he has ever crafted both in terms of the quality of their work and chemistry. They may occasionally antagonize the overworked leader with a report not crafted to Putin’s liking, or worse, report on a setback. On such occasions, in contrast to his usual equanimity, Putin allegedly has become spectacularly incandescent.

Putin has sought to take on qualified ministers, directors, and other officials to handle specialties. That effort was hampered to an extent during Putin’s early years in power given the need to respond to the wishes of certain patrons. Yet, Putin never hesitated to fire those foisted upon him or his handpicked hires, whether former KGB or not, when they failed to perform. Putin has known what advice, prognostication, and proposals to accept in order to promote his efforts at home and internationally and develop a coherent set of policies. Since he brings his “A-game” to his office everyday, striving for perfection and hungering for improvement, and he expects the same from his cabinet. There are never any spectators, passengers along for the ride. All must be able to answer the who, what, when, where, why, and how of issues they cover, because that is what Putin will demand. Among his advisers, Putin undoubtedly strives for a gesamtkunstwerk: a harmonious work environment. At the present, Putin is probably working with the best cabinet he has ever crafted both in terms of the quality of their work and chemistry. They may occasionally antagonize the overworked leader with a report not crafted to Putin’s liking, or worse, report on a setback. On such occasions, in contrast to his usual equanimity, Putin allegedly has become spectacularly incandescent with them.

When speaking about what is important to him, Putin does not use throw away lines. He is straightforward and to the point. When he was declared the winner of the 2012 Russian Federation Presidential Election, Putin publicly wept. It is impossible to know what was happening inside Putin to bring that on, but his emotional expression was clearly genuine. To that extent, Putin is not a man without emotion or innermost feelings.

3. Breathing Space

Every now and then Putin stops to take a rest to regroup, and probably to take inventory of his life, determine what he wants, and consider where things are headed. Speculation over Putin’s whereabouts for 10 days in March 2015 became a major news story worldwide. Some sources argued Putin was likely the subject of a coup. Others claimed that his girlfriend had given birth in Switzerland. There were even reports suggesting he had health problems. Putin good-naturedly dismissed it all. Putin’s main outlet for relaxation is sports of all kinds, particular judo and ice hockey. Since the days of his youth, Putin’s involvement in the martial arts, sports in general, had a strong influence on him, impacting his lifestyle. Sports provided Putin with a chance “to prove himself.”However, when he wants, Putin can also display an enjoyment of life and good times, and be quite gregarious, outwardly happy, full of smiles.

Putin, an experienced judoka, displays an element of his nage-waza (throwing technique) with a sparring partner (above). Since the days of his youth, Putin has been involved in the martial arts. Sports of all kinds have been Putin’s main outlet for relaxation. Sports have also provided Putin with a chance “to prove himself.”

When he wants, Putin can also display an enjoyment of life and good times, and be quite gregarious, outwardly happy, full of smiles. Putin undoubtedly understands the importance of having a sense of humor despite any difficulties he may face. Humor is beneficial for ones physical and emotional health. It reinforces ones relationships with family, friends, and colleagues. Physically, laughter can improve resistance to diseases by declining the stress hormones and increasing infection-fighting antibodies in the human body according to some research. Laughter can ease physical tension­ and help muscles relax. Emotionally, humor helps you to release stress and to keep an optimistic attitude. When one feels anxious or sad, a good laugh can lighten ones mood. The positive feelings emitted when one laughs will increase energy for the brain and body. That allows for greater focus and will allow one to look at the problems from less frightening perspectives. Humor helps one remain optimistic and humor communication boosts the emotional connection that will bring people closer together and increases happiness as well. Sharing a good-hearted laugh may serve in part to smooth out rough times. Putin’s sense of humor is evinced when he tells jokes. Putin told the following joke publicly in response to a question about the economic crisis in Russia.: Two friends meet up, and one, Person A, asks the other, Person B: “How are things?” Person B says, “Well, things right now are like stripes, you see, black and white.” Person A asks, “Well, how are things right now?” Person B says, “Black!” Half a year passes before they meet again. Person a asks Person B, “Well, how are you – wait, I remember, like stripes, how are things right now?” Person B says, “Right now, they’re black.” Person A says, “But back then it was also black!” Person B says, “Nope, it turns out it was white back then.” Putin has also often told a joke from the Soviet-era that humorously depicts the KGB’s bureaucracy. The joke goes as follows: “A spy goes to Lubyanka, KGB Headquarters, and says: “I’m a spy, I want to turn myself in.” He is asked, “Who do you work for?” The spy says, “America.” He is told, “OK, go to room 5.” He goes to room 5 and says: “I’m an American spy. I want to turn myself in.” He is asked, “Are you armed?” The spy says, “Yes, I’m armed.” He is told, “Go to room 7, please.” He goes to room 7 and says: “I am an American spy, I’m armed, I want to turn myself in.” He is told, “Go to room 10.” He goes to room 10 and says: “I’m a spy, I want to turn myself in!” He is asked, “Do you have any communication with the Americans?” The spy says, “Yes!” He is told, “Go to room 20.” He goes to room 20 and says: “I’m a spy, I’m armed, I’m in communication with America and I want to turn myself in.” He is asked, “Have you been sent on a mission?” The spy says, “Yes!” He is then told, “Well, get out and go do it! Stop bothering people while they’re working!”

Putin undoubtedly understands the importance of having a sense of humor despite any difficulties he may face. Humor is beneficial for ones physical and emotional health. It reinforces ones relationships with family, friends, and colleagues. Putin’s sense of humor is evinced when he tells jokes. When he wants, Putin can also display an enjoyment of life and good times, and be quite gregarious, outwardly happy, full of smiles.

The Way Forward

In Act II, scene i, of William Shakespeare’s play, A Comedy of Errors, Adriana, the wife of Antipholus of Ephesus, and, Luciana, her sister, wait at home for him to return for dinner. Antipholus of Ephesus, a prosperous Ephesus citizen, is lost the twin brother of Antipholus of Syracuse who coincidentally has been searching worldwide for him and his mother, is in Ephesus. Even more of a coincidence, the father of both men, Egeon, a merchant of Syracuse, is condemned to death in Ephesus for violating the ban against travel between the two rival cities. He avoids execution after telling the Ephesian Duke that he came to Syracuse in search of his wife and one of his twin sons, both lost 25 years ago. While waiting, Adriana and Luciana have an exchange. Luciana proffers that men are freer than women because their work and responsibilities take them out of the home, and she thinks Adriana should just wait patiently for her husband to return and understand that she cannot control him. Adriana, chastising Luciana for preaching patience and servitude when she has not experienced marriage, declares: “A wretched soul, bruised with adversity, We bid be quiet when we hear it cry; But were we burdened with like weight of pain, As much or more would we ourselves complain:.” If Trump could have unwound the labyrinthian Putin and found success in improving relations with Russia, it would have been sublime. As a complex leader himself, self-reflection would naturally lead him to consider that the key to working with Putin would be to get to know him from the inside. It has been a bold effort, given failed attempts of previous US administrations, and brave, considering the degree in which the effort would open himself up to further attacks by critics. The benefits of improved relations with Russia would have been enormous. It would also be a magnificent diplomatic achievement by the Trump administration. It was Jean-Paul Sartre who said, “Only the guy who isn’t rowing has time to rock the boat.” For the most part, Trump’s critics find nothing desirable and everything loathsome about Putin, and impute upon him a lust for power and the intent to acquire greater territory and control in Russia’s near abroad. They consequently claim that Trump has a somnolent conscience when it comes to Putin. It is a segment of an ugly picture critics have painted of Trump fumbling on Russia and issues concerning the rest of the world. Their view of Trump is a far cry from reality. As it was explained in the recent greatcharlie post, Trump and his experienced foreign and national security policy officials had reservations about the whole matter. Faster than a canary in a coal mine, they were able to detect what was wrong and disingenuous about Putin’s approach. Putin’s lack of desire for that change is perhaps best evinced by Russia’s persistent efforts to meddle in US elections. If that unconstructive behavior continues, there will be little reason left than to recognize and deal with him not just as an adversary, but as an anathema. There is always hope. After all, along with all the bad, hope was also an element released from Pandora’s Box. However, US foreign policy cannot be simply based on hope and the unverifiable. It must be based on pragmatic choices with the expectation of certain outcomes. At this juncture, only an exceptional optimist among Trump’s most ardent supporters would hope with aplomb that he might be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat by having a few more ideas that might create real prospects for success.

Putin may feel some degree of temporary satisfaction over the arguable accomplishment of ensnaring previous US administrations in artificial diplomatic efforts by feigning interest in improving relations, by offering little steps that are nothing more than bromides. (Perhaps the Obama administration was an exception. Putin displayed little interest in working with it to achieve anything.) Taking that course has required a delicate balance of actions, and so far Putin has managed to avoid creating a greater danger for civilization. (In a way, meddling in US elections has brought things to the edge of the envelope of safety.) Putin unlikely vehemently desires to build up Russia’s nuclear arsenal especially considering costs involved and the likely impact on Russia’s economy. The new weapons announced systems reflected highly of the efforts of his country’s advanced defense research, but even more, provided notice to world that  Russia still has “deterrent” power. Further, it appears that through that announcement, Putin has denied any interest in, and signal his rejection of, genuine efforts to rebuild US-Russia relations. Looking at Putin from the inside, as was attempted here, it would appear that pride had much to do with that choice as he has tied the entire matter to Russia’s dignity, as much as his own. By placing himself in a position of control, being able to reject US diplomatic efforts, he undoubtedly temporarily satisfied his ego, building himself up a bit. Putin would unlikely be interested in the ministrations of greatcharlie on what Putin should be doing with his presidency. However, it would certainly be serendipitous if Putin would move beyond derivative thinking on US-Russian relations. For anyone settled in certain ways, that would require an epiphany of a sort, a degree of  personal growth: from insecurity to complete confidence over Russia’s place in the world. With future generations of Russians in mind, it is hard to image how keeping it separate from the rest of the world would be to their benefit. Much as the conservative US President Richard Nixon opened relations with Communist China, only under Putin will ties with the US reality take shape, could it be made sustainable. Russia would certainly remain strong, competitive, and self-sufficient. Looking at the hypothetical decision holistically, nothing would be lost. To use a sports metaphor, the ball is really in Putin’s court. For now, Trump appears to be available for talks. Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. (For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it confirms the determination of nature and of truth.)

Book Review: Robert Lindsey, The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (Open Road Media, 2016)

With deep regret, greatcharlie has removed its book review of Robert Lindsay’s The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friendship and Espionage (Open Road Media, 2016). The review will remain off our blog for an indefinite period. An extremely reliable source made greatcharlie aware some time ago that the review was being used by dishonorable individuals to support grossly false claims that greatcharlie was an instrument of the Russian and Iranian governments and support the further incredulous claim that there was a pro-Russia and pro-Iranian bent to greatcharlie’s essays. Without any furtive or negative intent and oblivious to any intentions to make wrongful use of our efforts, greatcharlie produced its review of The Falcon and the Snowman after receiving an email request from Greta Shull, the Marketing Coordinator at Open Road Media to write a review of its eBook of The Falcon and the Snowman. According to Shull’s email, the decision to contact me was “Based on my review of The Good Spy by Kai Bird, . . . . ” While it is noted in greatcharlie’s “Book Reviews” page that our blog welcomes solicitations for reviews, to date it has only received one, and that was from Open Road Media. On October 26, 2016, greatcharlie posted its review of The Falcon and the Snowman. It was from that particular moment onwards, the posted review has been misused. Removing the review was the only option available to attempt to halt all false claims and the continued misuse of our content. (Amazingly, even with this message placed on the post, the essay is still being used as evidence of a pro-Russian bent to our work. Either there is absolutely no oversight by management in the organization in which the dishonorable individuals tragically serve, or their managers condone their wrongful and offensive behavior.)

In the spirit of full disclosure, greatcharlie must inforn its readers that a very reliable source has also repeatedly indicated to us that the wrongful use of our blog is actually part of a larger, very unusual effort in violation of the rights of the blog’s founder, Mark Edmond Clark since 2013. Note, however, that hostile acts against Clark by certain dishonorable and unscrupulous individuals actually began at least two years beforehand. The wrongful use of essays and book reviews from greatcharlie to fallaciously establish Clark’s ties to the Russian and Iranian governments and falsely prove a supposed pro-Russian and pro-Iranian bent to Clark’s writing was conducted with the intent to support even greater false claims made by dishonorable individuals that he was a threat to US national security. (In addition to the information provided by “very reliable sources”, the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”) identified the dishonorable individuals engaged in illegal actions against Clark as federal officials and contractors working at their behest. A NYPD sergeant quoted one of the federal officials stating to him incredulously in 2014 that they were “interested in an international matter concerning Clark outside the scope of the NYPD’s mission.”) Two additional absolutely false claims that the dishonorable individuals are still propogating are that “Clark was a government analyst,” flattering themselves, connecting Clark to any government work in which they are engaged, making such and “Clark trained foreign troops overseas,” which is shear fantasy. When these outright lies are told, no information is ever provided as to the specific government organizations that Clark supposedly worked for when he allegedly carried out these activities. The most basic research into Clark’s background would easily and completely disprove these ridiculous claims made by the dishonorable individuals. A third false claim, rather odd and remote yet tacked on the others, is the insistence that “Clark is afraid of dogs.” That is an utter lie, conjured up undoubtedly with the same vacuity and enthusuasm as all of the dishonorable individuals’ other lies. Most recently, to Clark’s utter shock, it was revealed to him the greatest false claim of all has been made by the dishonorable individuals. They have made the incredulous claim that Clark is has been long engaged in espionage against the US. This claim is so absolutely false, that it may serve as an indication of some considerable psychological problems amongst the dishonorable individuals. It is impossible to believe that anyone of sound mind would state something completely false to a great number of people without having any ability whatsoever to support it with truth. Nevertheless, the false claim has been made. At the start of 2020, Clark was informed that the dishonorable individuals for years had claimed he once served in the US Navy. Clark never served in the US Navy or US Marine Corps for that matter. These fact can also be easily verified. How foolish it would be for anyone who actually knows Clark to believe any of the dishonorable individuals false claims. Any one who might investigate this matter should know that these problems were in fact initiated by a rogue FBI Special Agent, John Consoli, who held an irrational dislike of Clark and promised him some time ago that he would hurt him by making certain that Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York acted against him. In Consoli’s words: “Once they are in you, they will never let you go!” At that time, Consoli was apparently a member of what was called the “Iran Unit” of the FBI’s New York Office. Clearly, Consoli set forth on that hostile, wrongful path as he vowed with the help of other FBI Special Agents. Along the way, other federal agencies saw fit to jump in on the unwarranted effort to destroy Clark’s life and the lives of his elderly mother and young daughter. Doubtlessly following the inception of the attack against Clark, no further manipulation by Consoli was required to encourage the other federal agencies to seek a piece of action in a well-budgeted cooperative effort against him. (Note: FBI Special Agent John Consoli once attempted to draw a pistol on Clark in the quondom Three Star Diner in New York and was stopped with force by a fellow FBI Special Agent, Mark Kellert who was present, essentially saving Clark’s life. Further, this particular John Consoli is very well known to, and once sought by, Italian authorities.)

According to another very reliable source, in addition to their misuse of essays and reviews on greatcharlie, the same dishonorable federal officials and contractors, with promise of significant remuneration, encouraged Clark’s ex-wife, who is unnamed here, to write numerous damaging false statements, with the purpose of supporting their false claims about Clark as being a threat to society and a threat to US national security. That in turn enabled them to secure authority to engage in a very costly, wide-ranging, and needless surveillance operation against him, as well as conduct a very destructive, very apparent “dirty tricks” campaign against him of which a record has been kept by Clark. Clark had battled his ex-wife in an extremely contentious divorce in which the custody of his daughter was at the forefront. Thus, his ex-wife, had a pre-existing animus toward Clark and had indicated more than once that she had a personal aim of severely harming him. In numerous trenchant false statements she provided against Clark, nearly all concerned completely imaginary activities that he purportedly engaged in with foreign governments. Again, based on very reliable sources, she continues to provide similar absolutely false statements to date, even though Clark has had no contact or communication of any kind with her for nearly three years. Reportedly, his ex-wife was introduced to the dishonorable individuals who encouraged and paid her to write the false statenents by a parent named Sylvia Kovac at his daughter’s school. In 2013, Kovac had been directed by the same dishonorable individuals to establish clandestine contacts with Clark. After contact with the same dishonorable individuals, Clark’s daughter’s school, itself, eventually became involved in the matter. Vigilante actions by parents at the school, mostly surveiling Clark and engaging him in leading conversations, directed by members of the school’s security office, specifically Lou Uliano and Joseph Pignataro, both formerly of the NYPD. Those wrongful, destructive activities were approved by the head of the school, then Joan Lonergan and the then head of the lower school, Frank Patti. Those activities intensified when Clark’s daughter entered the Middle School and the school was placed under the new leadership of Tara Christie Kinsey. Note that the school and parents were paid quite well by the dishonorable individuals for engaging in such activity. This had a devastating psychological impact on Clark’s young daughter. Clark’s inquiries with school officials into what was transpiring were met with terse denials. Once Clark’s daughter entered the Upper School, and few parents would pick up their daughters when classes ended at 3:00PM, any time Clark came within the vicinity of the school to drop his daughter off by taxi or meet her in the street, the school’s security director Joseph Pignataro, with assistance of the dishonorable individuals as spotters, would have Middle School parents along with their daughters, aggressively surveil Clark. This had a further devastating psychological impact on Clark’s daughter. Far more sinister steps were undertaken by school security officials, surely to the satisfaction of the dishonorable individuals, to eviscerate Clark’s reputation among school faculty, staff, and especially school families. (Clark maintains a list of those individuals, too long to enumerate here, and the dates and times in which they engaged in such activity which he can make available to investigators.) The effect of the hostile activities of school security and other school officials has been to constructively eject Clark from the school community and destroying any chance that Clark could ever have an authentically positive relationship with his daughter’s school. (Note, as Clark observed, that the dishonorable individuals and their operatives had absolutely no compunction about engaging in their wrongful, nefarious, vacuous, activities in a school, hospital, or house of worship.) Away from the school, itself, but in its vicinity, there were also efforts by operatives organic to the organization in which the dishonorable individuals worked to establish clandestine conversations with Clark. In 2013, the initial effort was made by a writer named Nunyo Demasio. His apparent goal was to encourage Clark to make negative statements about the US government and incriminating statements about himself. Many others have attempted to engage Clark in clandestine conversations. Parents from the martial arts school that his daughter attended while in 2nd and 3rd Grades would absurdly don sunglasses and come down to her high school during pick-up time to track Clark and his daughter as they walked home. Another effort included having individuals familiar with Clark contact him with emails, all essentially with the same message, insisting that he contact them immediately and answer some frightfully meaningless questions. Those who engaged in such behavior can be readily identified by Clark by name. They can also be identified via their emails, text messages, photos, and through Clark’s telephone logs. An authentic patriot and Founding Father of the US, James Madison, in describing the mob mentality of such individuals organized as vigilantes by the dishonorable individuals and their operatives for such a sinister purposes, perfectly stated that they were, “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”

The unjustified surveillance and an apparent fraudulent investigation of Clark supported by the use of false statements also included the use of the harsh, technique of “raking”. Through that technique, the effort was made by the aforementioned dishonorable and unscrupulous individuals to influence anything and anyone associated with Clark or anyone with whom Clark came in contact. Organizations, businesses, lawyers, doctors, his daughter’s pediatrician, tax preparers, bank staff, school officials, literally any individuals with whom Clark spoke and any employees in any establishment in which he shopped, were intercepted and told the most odious things possible about him. The dishonorable individuals have sought to assure Clark would not be able to enjoy the warmth of authentic human contact. They insisted upin getting between Clark and his contacts with anyone. The overwhelming majority of those who heard such statements from the dishonorable federal officials and contractors, who presumably mistakenly believed that they were receiving information from a credible source, and after being offered remuneration, and perhaps becoming excited over the idea of spying against an “officially” declared “enemy”, were quickly convinced that Clark was a threat to society and a threat to US national security. They ostensibly relieved themselves of doubt or guilt by accepting that they were acting against him upon the direction of their government. As a clerk working in a neighborhood Duane Reade pharmacy told Clark, “We just follow orders!” For Clark, creating new relationships or acquaintances of any kind, business or personal, eventually became impossible due to the immediate interference of the dishonorable federal officials and their contractors between him and anyone else. (Remember, this extreme situation has existed for Clark for over eight years! The actual surveillance has been underway for over a decade.) It would seem that not much could have been worse than to have federal officials and their contractors propagate ideas that would bring the loyalty of a patriotic citizen as Clark into question. Such false claims tragically tend to stick even after the truth has been revealed. The dishonorable individuals, however, have commumicated things that were far worse! The dishonorable individuals are apparently so lacking in self-confidence, that they have felt the need to compensate for that deficit via the development of an egotistical mindset that has led them to brag about their power and capabilities to their “operatives” and amazingly, in Clark’s case, go as far as to spread rumors of their plans to injure and even kill him and members of his family. That particular behavior was especially prevalent in the Fall and Winter of 2015 during which Clark was repeatedly warned by some long time acquaintances (whose names Clark can reveal to an investigator), who, to their great surprise, were contacted by the dishonorable individuals.

When examined, elements of the aggressive surveillance have left little doubt that the dishonorable individuals have also clumsily engaged in a far less thoughtful simulacrum of the East German Stasi (State Security) technique of psychological harassment of perceived enemies known as Zersetzung, a term borrowed from chemistry which literally means “decomposition”, but involved the disruption of the victim’s private or family life. Zersetzung was designed to side-track and “switch off” perceived enemies so that they would lose the will to continue any “inappropriate” activities. The disinformation and “dirty tricks” aspects of the dishonorable individuals campaign against Clark and his family appear to be part of their imitative Zersetzung program. In the case of Clark, however, neither he nor his mother and daughter have ever engaged in any inappropriate activities that have needed to be halted. On far more occasions than not, those taking direction from the dishonorable federal officials and contractors displayed extraordinarily hostile attitudes toward Clark and committed aggressive, even violent acts against him while engaging in their untrained, unskilled surveillance.  It has all been vigilantism in a particularly odious form. Clark’s elderly mother, now 89, and young daughter have also faced the same or worse attitudes and behavior from quickly recruited, ad hoc “operatives”–some hired astonishingly right off the street–as they engaged in their amateur surveillance activities against them. Reportedly, those taking such overzealous actions have been showered with praise and support, and payments, from the dishonorable federal officials and contractors. They further manipulate their amateur operatives by telling them that by engaging in such aggressive action they prove themselves to be “true patriots!” A plethora of evidence available indicates the wrongful actions outlined here as well as many others, all of which violate their First Amendment rights of Clark and his family under the US Constitution are unfortunately still being conducted against them as of this writing, particularly inside the apartment building in which they live. Main offenders engaged in this activity over the past four years in the apartment building in which Clark resides on East End Avenue in New York City include tenants: Seth Balsam; Leonardo Celestino; Joel Weisberg, Dana Rolf, Joseph Cohen; Jim Cronin; Elaine Ann Cronin; John David Griesedieck; Abby Reeves Griesedieck; Ira A. Altman; Susan Levkoff; Sebastian Teslic; Jay Desai; Dorothy Chan; Joanne Chan; John Lysohir; Pamela Lysohir; Robert Terry; Barbara Ainslie; Austin Hayden; Nesrin Salkin; Melissa Iorio; Erin Yurkewecz; Laura Nardelli; Christina Zugor; Maureen Linehan; Jennifer Marian Lee; Christopher Gonzålez-Ribot; Allegra Lugo; Christopher P. Cau; and, Barbara Frankfurt. The names of many other tenants engaged in hostile behavior toward Clark’s family are also known. The unrelenting, attrocious behavior of Joel Weisberg, Laura Nardelli, Barbara Frankfurt, Leonardo Celestino, and Christopher Gonzålez-Ribot, in particular, has far surpassed that of all others. In addition to making threatening comments and obscene gestures to Clark, which were reported to the NYPD, Celestino, who lives in the apartment above him, regularly creates disturbances by literally hammering on the floor throughout his apartment at all hours–at times the hammering sound was deafening, moving chairs across the floor in the early morning hours, and is constantly accessing and pulling on the wiring in the walls. When Celestino’s behavior was reported to the Superintendent, nothing was done concerning it. Instead, Clark received an email from the landlord insisting, with the threat of eviction, that he not disturb the other tenants. One morning in late May 2020, Frankfurt stood with her dog in the hall of Clark’s apartment floor, and for reasons unknown waited six feet from his apartment door. When Clark’s young daughter arrived on the floor by elevator and walked casually toward her own home, Frankfurt, standing only a few feet away with her dog, declared to her “If you come near me I will call the police!” Clark’s daughter did absolutely nothing to provoke Frankfurt. (Frankfurt is a former employee of the landlord of Clark’s apartment building.) Untrained for surveillance, or such “active measures”, each would undoubtedly confess to their activities when questioned by an experienced investigator. (An especially revolting aspect of the actions of those recruited to engage in surveillance against Clark and his family is a decision by those “untutored operatives” to include their own children in their activities. They will hold them as shields as they try to get closer to Clark; bring them to locations where Clark and his daughter may be seated and move their children as close to them as possible; or, have the children block a means of egress for Clark, literally placing them in his path. Tenants in Clark’s apartment building regularly engage in this abhorrent action. It is horrible to watch. It is hard to imagine how those individuals live with themselves. One individual who was recruited by the dishonorable individuals to spy on Clark and his family and formerly engaged in this practice of using his own children when surveilling them, admitted to Clark that the dishonorable individuals strongly suggested surveillance recruits who were parents, include their children in their activities. Reportedly, the dishonorable individuals assured their operatives that Clark would never be aware of how the children were being used as “props.” One might presume that the remuneration for the surveillance work is increased when parents include their children. Children were reportedly presented with little gifts from the dishonorable individuals. It is unsettling to regularly observe how the natural sensibilities of parents to protect their children from trouble or a slight possibility of harm can be so easily overcome by the lure of easy money. [Note: Since the time this information was included, the use of children in the dishonorable individuals wrongful surveillance activities against Clark and his family, particularly in restaurants and cafes, has increased twice as many times in new, more disturbing forms.])

It has been repeatedly called to Clark’s attention by his apartment building landlord that there have shockingly been numerous complaints filed with the NYPD about his alleged “hostile and threatening behavior” against other tenants in his apartment building. From all that Clark has been told, a bundle of complaints from tenants were all filed contemporaneously in 2018. It is odd in itself that so many complaints about individual negative contacts with Clark would reported at the same time. However, more importantly, Clark has the great benefit of being able to provide proof of his whereabouts at all times and of knowing he has not initiated any contact with any tenants since he arrived in the apartment building. The contacts he has had unfortunately have been those occasions in which other hostile tenants have approached him suddenly and levelled threats at him, as well as those occasions during which aggressive tenants have engaged in dreadful behavior toward his family and him. Without a shadow of doubt, the complaints made to the NYPD against Clark are all false complaints. It is extremely possible that the mass reporting of complaints against Clark by tenants was a tactic encouraged and organized by the dishonorable individuals. Many of those who made complaints against Clark had likely never been in contact with the police before. Again, with the benefit of knowing he did not engage in any of the behavior reportedly alleged in the complaints, Clark is also well aware that not one complaint made against him can be substantiated. Further note that not one complaint was made under oath. In fact, the type of complaints that were reportedly made, can made by anyone, against anybody, for literally any reason

While it may have appeared to be a foolproof, no risk action to take against Clark, and it may very well be that the dishonorable individuals may have convinced tenants in Clark’s apartment building that such was the case, in reality, making false complaints to the NYPD is a violation of the law. Under New York  Consolidated Laws, Penal Law – PEN § 240.50, Falsely reporting an incident in the third degree, a person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the third degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, he or she gratuitously reports to a law enforcement officer or agency (a) the alleged occurrence of an offense or incident which did not in fact occur;  or (b) an allegedly impending occurrence of an offense or incident which in fact is not about to occur;  or (c) false information relating to an actual offense or incident or to the alleged implication of some person therein. The penalty for engaging in such a violation of law could be as much as imprisonment for one year. If a tenant, who made one of the complaints among the bundle of the complaints supposedly filed against Clark to the NYPD, would be willing to discuss why they made them in an interview with any investigators, it would almost certainly be revealed that they were prompted by the dishonorable individuals to engage in such behavior. Along with providing remuneration to tenants in Clark’s apartment building in return for their assist in violating Clark’s First and Fourth Amendment rights under the Constitution, and securing numerous false statements about Clark from his ex-wife, unnamed here, and Sylvia Kovac which were reportedly used wrongfully to secure FISA Court warrants, the request that tenants violate the law by making false complaints to the NYPD evinces a pattern by the dishonorable individuals of encouraging and supporting unlawful actions by all of their “operatives” against Clark and his family.

Certain parties associated with Clark’s apartment building management have made written threats to use NYPD police complaints from tenants that he possesses, all of which are absolutely false, in court proceedings to harm Clark and remove him from his apartment. Under § 210.35 of Article 210 of New York Penal Law, Part 3, Title L, a person is guilty of making an apparently sworn false statement in the second degree when he subscribes a written instrument knowing that it contains a statement which is false and does not believe to be true. Making a sworn false statement in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor. Again, as aforementioned, Clark has the benefit of knowing he did not engage in any of the behavior reportedly alleged in the complaints. Clark is also well aware that not one alleged complaint made against him can be substantiated. Clark can substantiate his own claims of his whereabouts at all times. At no time was he aggressive toward other building tenants, engage in threatening behavior, or initiate any negative verbal exchanges with any tenants. Clark has gone out of his way to avoid engaging other tenants.

According to Clark’s daughter, a building back elevator operator who works predominantly as a doorman, George Semeniouk, regularly makes unspeakable misogynistic comments toward her grandmother and her on mornings when they are on their way to her school. He has on more than one occasion threatened to harm Clark. Doorman Lech Stepien had sought to engage in clandestine conversations with Clark on behalf of the dishonorable individuals during 2017, 2018, and better part of 2019. (While he would consistently ask Clark specific and intrusive questions about his work, Stepien’s purpose for the dishonorable individuals was to authentically engage Clark to support their wrongful claims of statements, all of which were untrue, that Clark supposedly made to him.) Having failed to entrap Clark, Stepien took a hostile posture toward him from that moment on. When at the concierge desk, he turns his back or walks away from it whenever Clark enters or leaves the building. When other building employees are present with Stepien when Clark is entering or exiting the building, according to what a couple of those employees have told Clark, he makes ugly statements in Polish referring to Clark as something less than human. As the supervisor/scheduler of the building’s doormen due to his seniority, surely not capabilities, Stepien insists that other doormen cooperate with fully with the dishonorable individuals despite the reluctance of some to do so. The behavior of both Semeniouk and Stepien has been encouraged ultimately by the apartment building superintendent, Marek Kurkarewicz. Kurkarewicz has also encouraged contractors working the building, doing renovations or repairs and relatively transient, to engage in hostile behavior toward Clark and his family, to include making outrageous lewd comments toward his young daughter. Kurkarewicz has done much on behalf of the dishonorable individuals to spread the lie among old tenants and all new tenants, that Clark Is an “enemy spy.” Further, he has encouraged them to become fully involved in the wrongful surveillance of Clark and his family. Finally, to respond directly to an absolutely false claim concerning Clark’s status in the apartment building, he is not simply a visitor or resident but his full name is on the executed apartment lease and he has a hard copy of that document to prove that. Efforts have been made for nearly 5 years to spread false information that Clark was not on the apartment lease. (For all those concerned, be advised that a lease is a contract between a landlord and a tenant, containing the terms and conditions of the rental. It cannot be changed while it is in effect unless BOTH parties agree.) Presumably, the dishonorable individuals want to claim that they did not violate Clark’s First and Fourth Amendment Rights in his apartment building by using deception to falsely establish, and convince anyone involved or interested, that Clark is not a full-fledged tenant there. Clark is due all of his Constitutional Rights as tenant signed on to the apartment lease, and his rights have been violated for countless months by the dishonorable individuals and their operatives, apartment building tenants and employees. Further, Kurkarewicz would provide the apartment building landlord with false, disconcerting reports about Clark to include lies about him openly threatening building tenants and employees, prompting the landlord to send Clark emails, the last one as recent as February 2020, threatening to evict his family from the building if the behavior reported by Kurkarewicz continued. The threats have been made despite the fact that the landlord could not substantiate any of the fictitious claims concocted by Kurkarewicz. Any possibility for a positive relationship between Clark and the landlord was successfully destroyed by Kurkarewicz. An apartment building employee who acted essentially as Superintendent Kurkarewicz’s executive officer or sidekick in all matters concerning the wrongful treatment of Clark and his family is Arthur Passamonik. By his own admission to Clark indirectly, subtly, yet undoubtedly, Passamonik has had access to a curious set audio and video surveillance tools directed at Clark’s apartment. This access has existed uninterrupted for 4 years. Passamonik finds the fact that he has been presented access to the surveillance tools by the dishonorable individuals responsible for the overall illegal, intrusive, and wrongful surveillance if Clark and his daughter and mother as quite humorous. While Clark made requests for repairs in his apartment, Kurkarewicz ignored his requests and problems in the apartment have been left unrepaired for almost 5 years. It is unclear whether the apartment building landlord is fully aware of the extent of the audio and video surveillance of Clark in the apartment building. (It has been made apparent to Clark that other tenants in the apartment building hostile to Clark, given comments and behavior, such as Leonardo Celestino, have also been provided access to feeds from the audio and video surveillance tools directed at Clark apartment by the dishonorable individuals.)

Lastly, in one of the saddest parts of the whole matter of apartment building staff behavior is that concerning Chris Warsawa, a doorman. Warsawa, as with other members of the apartment building staff became involved with the surveillance of Clark and his family inside the apartment building shortly after their arrival. He was a porter then. Soon after being promoted to doorman by Kurkarewicz, he was fully involved with all aspects of surveillance and harassment activity at the behest of the dishonorable individuals, to include: facilitating the wrongful surveillance actions of tenants; refusing to provide Clark with names of tenants who were rude and discourteous to him as well as his mother and daughter; denying the wrongful behavior of tenants and staff when asked; call Clark ostensibly to discuss his deliveries and mail; and, providing and doing anything else the dishonorable individuals asked him to do against Clark. When he actually witnessed or was made aware of occasions when tenants misbehaved toward Clark he would do nothing but presumably report it to the dishonorable individuals as part his responsibilities to them. On occasion when Clark asked Warsawa the name of another tenants, Warsawa would only say the tenant’s name was “Joel.” Suddenly, everyone was named Joel. Soon enough, Warsawa’s conversations with Clark, although they concerned apartment building business, were being used by the dishonorable individuals to claim Warsawa had established clandestine contact with Clark, an important goal for them. Clark is well-aware that any contacts Warsawa has with him now are transmitted as captured clandestine conversations to the dishonorable individuals much as Lech Stepien had done before Clark began to avoid him completely. As Warsswa is the youngest member of the apartment building staff and seemed initially to be of good nature, Clark tried to convince him to move away from the dishonorable individuals. For months, Clark has sought to explain to Warsawa why the surveillance and all other harassing activity was not only wrong but illegal. All of Clark’s efforts came to no avail. Unbeknownst perhaps to Warsawa, the dishonorable individuals, using surveillance operatives other than apartment building tenants and staff, would let Clark know that they were fully aware of his conversations with Warsawa, having their operatives repeat things Clark said and by taking action on things he said, particularly regarding surveillance activity. The hope of the dishonorable individuals in doing those things was most likely to get Clark to turn against young Warsawa. Of course, destroying positive interactions between people is their forte. Clark understands that for Warsawa, as a young man, gaining approval from so-called experienced men in important and he believes he is doing something important, something special, by committing wrongful acts on behalf of the dishonorable individuals. However, he is only violating Clark’s rights and violating the law by helping the dishonorable individuals. Left with no options, Clark has finally decided to reveal what Warsawa has been doing. Rursus prosperum ac felix scelus virtus vocatur; sontibus parent boni, ius est in armis, opprimit leges timor. (Once again prosperous and successful crime goes by the name of virtue; good men obey the bad, might is right and fear oppresses law.)

Through their abuse of power, the dishonorable federal officials and contractors have successfully torn Clark’s family away from peace and a happy life in what is a democratic society based on a Constitution. It is impossible to believe by any stretch of the imagination that any part of what the dishonorable individuals have done to Clark and his family could be called “professional conduct.” Under the law, the rights of its citizens must be protected. One might hypothesize that for those dishonorable individuals acting against Clark and his family, one is guilty when they say one is guilty. One is not presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law. Be assured that none of what has been presented here is intended to serve as some banal amusement. The situation is real and the facts presented are true and accurate.

If the removal of our essays and reviews has inconvenienced anyone among our loyal readers,greatcharlie offers its sincerest apologies.