Literary Insight: James Risen, The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, the Mafia, and the Kennedys―and One Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown and Company, 2023)

Senator Frank Church holding a poison dart gun developed by the US Intelligence Community (left) and Senator John Tower observing (right) at the Church Committee’s first open session on September 17, 1975. In the wake of Watergate, Church was tasked with investigating abuses of power by the US Intelligence Community. Rather than noting mere oversteps by the Intelligence Community, Church and his  Congressional Committee put forth dark truths about its work that they uncovered. Indeed, Church exposed a myriad of clandestine and covert plots orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as other federal organizations. In many cases, singular actions were taken by the Intelligence Community actually amounted to criminal violations of federal law. This essay is not a book review. Instead, it is a literary insight essay providing meditations of Risen’s The Last Honest Man. In this essay, greatcharlie’s insights are delimited to a discussion of occasional rogue behavior, abuses of law, by members of the US Intelligence Community. The book is remarkably suggestive with respect to contemporary times. Such an edict surely requires examination. In this essay, readers may come upon aspects of issues or view new angles of the discussion they may not have not recognized or perhaps would not have considered after reading the book.

James Risen’s The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, the NSA, the Mafia, and the Kennedys–and One Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown and Company, 2023), [ISBN-13 9780316565134] tells the story of how Frank Church, at the the time  Senator of Idaho for almost two decades, attempted to reign in US Intelligence Community activities in 1975 after years of no Congressional oversight. Risen draws upon hundreds of interviews, thousands of pages of recently declassified documents, and reams of unpublished letters, notes, and memoirs, some of which remain sensitive today. The story as told in the 480 page tome is true to reality.

As a Senator, Church promoted, advocated, and vigorously defended the US Constitution. He was guided by US values and supported its interests. Church’s beliefs would compel him to lead congressional opposition to the Vietnam War and had become a scathing, radical critic of what he saw as US imperialism around the world. Yet, Risen suggests the “rebellious” Church was politically ambitious, and sough acceptance from the foreign and national security policy establishment of which he was very skeptical. He was also  interested in running for president. The author indicates that Church was not devoid of faults. In the wake of Watergate Church was tasked with investigating abuses of power by the US intelligence community. Rather than noting mere oversteps by the Intelligence Community, Church and his Committee put forth dark truths about its work that they uncovered. Indeed, Church exposed a myriad of clandestine and covert plots orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as other federal organizations. In many cases, singular actions were taken by the Intelligence Community that actually amounted to criminal violations of federal law.

The course taken seemed right to Church as the Committee’s Chairman. One might imagine he understood there was great pitfall involved with criticism the work of Intelligence Community, however, Church never hesitated. By Risen’s account, Church was in fact persistent in his pursuit of the matter. He would show historic strength in his greatest moment. Risen did not indicate that Church had wasted any of the Committee’s valuable time rooting around in extraneous matters. Church stayed focused on his task. 

This essay is not a book review. Instead, it is a literary insight essay providing meditations of Risen’s The Last Honest Man. In brief, a literary insight essay’s purpose is to express a readers feelings and ideas about a literary work. It is a journey of introspection. In this essay, greatcharlie’s insights are delimited to a discussion of occasional rogue behavior, abuses of law, by members of the US Intelligence Community. The book is remarkably suggestive with respect to contemporary times. Such an edict surely requires examination. In this essay, readers may come upon aspects of issues or view new angles of the discussion they may not have not recognized or perhaps would not have considered after reading the book

In previous times, one might have supposed the understanding, acceptance of what Founding Fathers who authored the US Constitution defined as the unalienable rights of life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were sacrosanct. However, one might be able to comfortably conclude today that far less importance is given to those rights upon which the country’s soul and existence was once firmly based and upon which the US public’s expectation and requirement for the good governance of the democracy has its roots. What seemed so certain about the once lauded strictures–as a sampling, the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendmens of the US Constitution–that would guide the country perpetually, is far less sure today than ever before. There are laws, but very often justice for the people is much harder to find. Breaches of regulations of the US Intelligence Community against ordinary citizen, not responsible for any wrongdoing, must not only be examined but vigorously pursued. Si quid novisti rectius istis, candidus imperti; si nil, his utere mecum. (if you can better these principles, tell me; if not, join me in following them.)

Meeting of the Members of the Church Committee prior to several hearings in autumn (above). Some Members of Congress in 1975 would likely have been more inclined to be dismissive of an investigation of the Intelligence Community than give serious attention to it. The Intelligence Community’s leadership could only hope that matters concerning its operations would be handled by the Church Committee with the same delicacy. The Congress for years had failed for years to put a leash on the Intelligence Community. Consequently, it ran off on its own in the world. Nothing but the foreign opposition, stood in its way. As for what remotely sufficed for “oversight” before the Church Committee was set up, information on Intelligence Community activities was curiously gleaned from the organizations’ directors by senior Members of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They would meet with the directors to occasionally chin-wag likely on the latest activities, resources, personnel, latest activities, troublesome spots, and accomplishments. In those times, save the Congress and the free press, the US public would be assuredly have been kept in the dark regarding the government’s actions in the province of intelligence. The means today by which the US public is kept equally abreast of the Intelligence Community’s activities as then is not as certain. To that extent, what aided the Church Committee’s cause was the fact that certain elements of the national newsmedia, far less then than today, were nevertheless the best and only fount of information about the US Intelligence Community’s performance.

The Church Committee, known formally as the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities established on January 27, 1975. Open sessions were held in September and October of 1975, but incisive research was conducted throughout that year.  Prior to the Church Committee, there had not been any formal Congressional oversight process for what became the US Intelligence Community for nearly 30 years. The CIA was established in 1947, and the NSA was organized in 1952.The FBI has been around since 1924. The intelligence activities of a White House domestic surveillance program and the Internal Revenue Service were also probed. Following up on information reported in a December 22, 1974 New York Times article authored by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, there was plenty sitting in the vaults of the Intelligence Communityfor the Committee to investigate. It was not mere tittle-tattle.

Some Members of Congress in 1975 would likely have been more inclined to be dismissive of an investigation of the Intelligence Community than give serious attention to it. The Intelligence Community’s leadership could only hope that matters concerning its operations would be handled by the Church Committee with the same delicacy. The Congress for years had failed for years to put a leash on the Intelligence Community. Consequently, it ran off on its own in the world. Nothing but the foreign opposition, stood in its way. As for what remotely sufficed for “oversight” before the Church Committee was set up, information on Intelligence Community activities was curiously gleaned from the organizations’ directors by senior Members of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They would meet with the directors to occasionally chin-wag likely on the latest activities, resources, personnel, latest activities, troublesome spots, and accomplishments. 

There was a danger that as a result of the Church Committee coming off the heels of the Vietnam War, the violent response to the Civil Rights Movement, the assassinations of Martin Luther King , Jr., Senator Edward Kennedy, and the earlier assassination of US President John Kennedy, Watergate, and the country’s continued disfunction on race, equality for women, and gross inequities in wealth establishing large divisions in social class, enabling poverty. the Intelligence Community would not be used as a depository for the ills of US foreign and national security policy.

Omne ignotem pro magnifico. (Everything unknown is magnificent.) In the old-fashion, out-moded sense, the US public at the time appreciated the services provided by its case officers and special agents, had possessed an sense of obligation to its Intelligence Community. However, ultimately,  the Intelligence Community is beholding to the people who expect and deserve its unwavering fidelity.

When evidence of Intelligence Community wrongdoings and abuses became overwhelming, much changed on all fronts. The US had to confront the truth about itself if it was reach the heart of the matter.The Committee soon discovered that there was no possibility to the limits of the Intelligence Community’s operations. It was clearly capable of any fantastic outrage. There was a certain method to the eccentric madness of the Intelligence Community. What was discovered was all outside of the common. There was no outlier so to speak. Nothing revealed could have dare been called trivial. It was essential for the Church Committee Members to be put in the full picture. A priority appeared to be to gain a sense of the scale of those activities. This matter went much deeper than originally supposed.

It required life experience to understand what might be possible, to explore with an open-mind, all that would likely stand much of what Church Committee Members believed to be known on its head. To accept all that was being exposed in Church’s Committee would require one to possess a mind that could view it all with a mixture of imagination and reality. At the same time, many Church Committee Members and staff served overseas during World War II, as well as in the Korean War and in the Vietnam War were not mystified by any of it. It was about killing, death. Nothing was beyond their comprehension. As with other Committee members, Church examined the Intelligence Community’s activities burdened with a rational frame of mind. There were difficulties, but there would always be difficulties.

True, what was done was done. However, there was the chance to prevent the furtherance of such activities, crimes and halt any additional damage to the reputation and standing of the US worldwide . The US is a constitutional federal republic, meaning its government is based on a Constitution which is the supreme law of the country and both citizens and their governing officials are bound to follow the rules established in that Constitution. The Intelligence Community’s actions overseas over the years fell under the jurisdiction of the countries in which the occurred. However, their actions against US citizens inside the US fell under federal and state law. Remarkably, an extraordinary number of operations conducted by Intelligence Community members and other government organizations against domestic targets were discovered.

In those times, save the Congress, as well as a free press, the US public will be assuredly kept in the dark regarding the government’s actions, particularly in the province of intelligence. The means today by which the US public is kept equally abreast of the Intelligence Community’s activities as then is not as certain. To that extent, what aided the Church Committee’s cause was the fact that certain elements of the national newsmedia, far less then than today, were nevertheless the best and only fount of information about the US Intelligence Community’s performance. At least for a generation or two, not too long afterward, certain services of the Intelligence Community would remain dark organizations in the minds of many conscientious US citizens. There has been nothing of such consequence concerning the Intelligence Community beyond the IranContra Affair in which its activities have been put from and center for the US public. As a news story in present times, Church Committee findings unlikely would be of interest to the overwhelming majority.

William Colby, Director of the CIA from 1973 to 1976 (above). Once the Church Committee came prying, the Intelligence Community’s leadership and even White House under US President Gerald Ford appeared to become unsettled. The Intelligence Community’s leadership knew exactly what had been transpiriing in their organizations over the years. A reasonable assessment, completely unbiased, would be that under the strictures of US law, particularly on the domestic front, much of it was wrongful. To that extent, the Intelligence Community’s leadership, particularly the CIA’s leadership, knew members of the Church Committee would light on them once they had the opportunity to become read in on information available and actiually see and handle some of the recherché tools and gadgets the Intelligence Community had developed. Given how the hearings were organized, Intelligence Community executives and senior managers would have a considerable measure of control over their organizations’ fates and their own careers as would provide testimony as key witnesses before the Church Committee in both open and closed sessions. Whatever the Intelligence Community’s leadership hoped to accomplish, particularly with regard to minimizing the shock to the US public over each fantastic outrage revealed, surely failed if disproving newly hatched fears about the Intelligence Community was one goal, their efforts were not successful. Contrary to whatever public relations benefit the Intelligence Community’s leadership may have been hoping to garner as result of the hearings, the Intelligence Community’s reputation instead was decisively sullied. Yet, years later, it is clear that whatever resulted from the Church Committee Hearings hardly held fast. The way that the US public thought about not only the government and the Intelligence Community and also the ability to hold it accountable, would shift, opening the door to abuses that would have been beyond the Church Committee’s wildest imagining.

Once the Church Committee came prying, the Intelligence Community’s leadership and even White House under US President Gerald Ford appeared to become unsettled. The Intelligence Community’s leadership knew exactly what had been transpiriing in their organizations over the years. A reasonable assessment, completely unbiased, would be that under the strictures of US law, particularly on the domestic front, much of it was wrongful. To that extent, the Intelligence Community’s leadership, particularly the CIA, knew members of the Church Committee would light on them once they had the opportunity to become read in on information available and handle some the recherché tools and gadgets the Intelligence Community had developed.

From their view, circumstances of the time, the Cold War, the Modern Age, surpassed the use of ordinary ways and means to defeat threats and assure policy aims. They expoused that extreme circumstances required extreme action. Much more was constantly being required to meet ends covertly. Despite the rather widespread disapproval of its actions, the Intelligence Community’s leadership never believed the use of “ramped up” tactics, techniques, and procedures was not a crime. Through there use, the Intelligence Community could fight adversaries by means other than war to safeguard US national security.

That explanation–that alibi–would not have a steadying effect on the US public, many of whom had been made quite concerned after learning from news media reporting of the open sessions of the Church Committee how the government, honorable and powerful, had been behaving in their name. Again, there was mostly disappointment among the people. A fearful mood had gripped some. If it were only a smattering of odd incidents, any audacious thinking and action perhaps might have seemed slightly tolerable. That by no means was the case. 

The Church Committee Hearings were a moment at time in which the Intelligence Community’s leadership would been behooved to guard against self-deception and delusion to avoid becoming too far a field. However, their conviction over everything the Intelligence Community did, however, was so unwavering that one might imagine a private response among some executives and senior managers was ironically to question the loyalty of Church Committee members. The pretense within the Intelligence Community’s leadsrship was that their organizations were “something above”,” something better”, than the rest of society and thereby they were entitled to do things outside US values,  principles, and laws.

Given how hearings were organized, Intelligence Community executives and senior managers would have a considerable measure of control over their organizations’ fates and their own careers as they would provide testimony as key witnesses before the Church Committee in both open and closed sessions.

If the Intelligence Community’s leadership had any thoughts of avoiding hearings, the Church Committee would brook no denial. Forced to go through the investigative process, they might have left the door open in their minds to the hope that the Church Committee’s findings would allow for the suggestion of a rationale for the behavior of their personnel and all the transpired over the years. They might have hoped to hear a plausible explanation that would circle around notions of the ubiquitous and ceaseless Communist threat posed by the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc countries,, and the People’s Republic of China to the US, its allies and friends, and other democracies worldwide.

A figurative pirate’s chest of the strange, unusual technologies and maccabre tactics, techniques procedures, and methods was unlocked and opened wide. It was trove of horrors. To the overwhelming majority of US citizens who gave their attention to the Church Committee hearings, all that was discovered felt, to turn a phrase of the era, very un-American. Risen describes Church Committee revelations on assassinations targeted at Cuban President Fidel Castro in Cuba, Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. There were others. He reports on the CIA’s MKULTRA program.and the use of LSD. and it’s domestic surveillance program, HTLINGUAL. He tells the shocking story of the FBI’s surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other US activists under COINTELPRO operations. The CIA contacted an organized crime figure, Johnny Roselli, to act as an intermediary to elicit the assistance of  Chicago organized crime boss Sam Giancana, to coordinate CIA efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro with the Mafia. This list barely scratches the surface. 

There was a sense of revulsion among Committee members and staff. Each Committee Member may have felt something private, very intense, very off putting  about matter. Some might say that many of Intelligence Community lurid activities reflected a loathing of the human race. Seemingly, it was the organization’s preferred way to have others to perceive it. The Church Committee did not really warm to any of those who testified. The Intelligence Community’s leadsrship was not always well-collected while offering testimony. Still, among those Church Committee Members who may have felt disgust over the deeds of the Intelligence Community they had funded generously, there was no intention of allowing anger and grief conspire to create a blindness that might interfere with their vital work.

Whatever the Intelligence Community’s leadership hoped to accomplish, particularly minimizing the shock to the US public over each fantastic outrage, surely failed. If mitigating newly hatched fears about the Intelligence Community was one goal, their efforts were not successful. Contrary to whatever public relations benefit the Intelligence Community’s leadership may have been hoping to garner as result of the hearings, the Intelligence Community’s reputation instead was decisively sullied. Yet, years later, it is clear that whatever resulted from the Church Committee hearings hardly held fast.. The way that the US public thought about not only the government and the Intelligence Community and also the ability to hold it accountable, would shift, opening the door to abuses that would have been beyond the Church Committee’s wildest imagining.

Surely, nothing uncovered by the Church Committee was lost upon the Intelligence Community’s opponents overseas. Their opponents overseas were tough and numerous. However, it seems elements of the US Intelligence Community thought of themselves as being tougher, and sought to be rougher still. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China saw or heard anything too shocking or surprising. The Church Committee’s findings were unlikely music to their ears regarding the international front. Clearly, the US was active clandestinely and covertly overseas in a big way. On the domestic front in the US, however, the situation was likely viewed as much better by adversarial foreign intelligence services. News of the Intelligence Community’s history of operations against political targets very likely indicated to the Intelligence Community’s opponents that it was flush with so much cash that it could divert resources and manpower to those efforts. 

Although it was not broached in Risen’s book, those political diversions may have provided enough reason for their foreign intelligence services to sense they were often operating with impunity in the US. Resources and manpower were not just diverted to that mission, but dedicated to it through multiple programs. Conceivably, that may have encouraged the Soviet Union,  Eastern Bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China to increase their presence and efforts in the US. The Soviet spymaster of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, Oleg Kalugin, indicates in his memoirs that the 1960s and 1970s were heady, fruitful times for Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence operations inside the US. (SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2020 post entitled, “Book Review: Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994)”) It would have been almost impossible for the Intelligence Community to know the totality of what foreign intelligence services might have been successfully collecting at the time until new political, economic, or financial information allowed some unexplained upper hand or scientific or technological advances would crop up that evinced tell-tales of its origins and that it had been stolen.

Risen explains Church worked after the Committee Hearings to establish Intelligence Community oversight. Steps included the development of the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 and creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 19, 1976 and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 1977.

James Angleton, Chief of CIA Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975, at the Church Committee Hearings. A figurative box of the strange, unusual technologies and maccabre tactics, techniques procedures, and methods was unlocked and opened wide. It was trove of horrors. To the overwhelming majority of US citizens who gave their attention to the Church Committee hearings, all that was discovered felt, to turn a phrase of the era, very un-American. Risen describes Church Committee revelations on assassinations targeted at Cuban President Fidel Castro in Cuba, Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. There were others. He reports on the CIA’s MKULTRA program.and the use of LSD. He tells the shocking story of the FBI’s surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other US activists under COINTELPRO operations. The CIA contacted an organized crime figure, Johnny Roselli, to act as an intermediary to elicit the assistance of  Chicago organized crime boss Sam Giancana, to coordinate CIA efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro with the Mafia. This list barely scratches the surface. During his testimony at the Church Committee, Angleton was pressed on the CIA’s domestic surveillance program, HTLINGUAL. It was sensed at the time that Angleton had not been completely forthcoming with Committee Members.

Without pretension, what greatcharlie relates in the following discussion is completely true and accurate to the best of its knowledge and belief. The information is simply laid out. There is no insistence that readers accept it. It is what it is.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, practically all curbs of the psyche and actual policy and legal parameters against abuses were not observed to the letter–somewhat overlooked–by the Intelligence Community in favor of a “go get ’em” attitude and offensive posture against “the enemy”. The priority became getting results: killing and capturing terrorists; uncovering and thwarting terrorist plots; destroying terrorist networks; and, seizing terrorist assets. The practice nearly became “anything goes.” The mainstream newsmedia in the US was supportive of just about everything done and a very vocal US public demanded further retribution. The emotional response of the US public was certainly understandable, however, most were abysmally ignorant of the Intelligence Community’s activities were overseas, literally on the high seas, and domestically. Among US public there are those who, even after being introduced to actualities, are unable to would hardly shake their views how their government can often operate. Today, only a fraction might take a firm interest in the misdeeds, violations of rights under the Constitution, or even larceny and outright violent crimes committed by the Intelligence Community.  It is likely the case for members of the US public that as long as the Intelligence Community’s actions do not directly effect them or their own, there is little to be concerned about. To go a step further, some members of the US public may not be willing to accept that rogue elements of the Intelligence Community and their contractors would engage in surveillance and direct acts against innocent US citizens. Nevertheless, it happens, as Risen’s book makes it very clear. 

The Global War on Terror has not ended. However, US President Joe Biden has reorganized resources and manpower in the over two decades long ubiquitous fight. Fewer airstrikes are ordered in fewer countries. US counterterrorism forces appear to be operating overseas in lesser numbers. The tempo of their operations has decreased. One would expect those decisions and others have had a correlative impact of ratcheting down the Intelligence Community’s use of resources and manpower. Looking a bit further on its tasks, no greater evidence of the Russian Federation’s potential for military aggression exists at the present than the Ukraine War. Yet, relative threats posed by the Russian Federation to the US and its interests has lessened. The degree of inefficiency and albeit incompetence that has been displayed by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the intelligence services in the prosecution of operations of or pertaining to the Special Military Operation that the Cold War fears of the untamable and indomitable “”Russian Military Bear” has since faded at bit.. However, concerning the People’s Republic of China, however, its intelligence services have displayed an acumen in their espionage activities within the US that has been seemingly beyond the capacity of US counterintelligence services to combat. US foreign intelligence operations in the People’s Republic of China also have not met with great success. In the aggregate, the People’s Republic of China has delivered wrenching blows against the US. 

The point here is that with relatively reduced threats against some opponents and barely a modicum of success against espionage directed from the People’s Republic of China foreign intelligence services in the US, some unscrupulous individuals in the organizations of the Intelligence Community may feel a “greater flexibility to do other things” undistracted by real work upon which they could fully focus their minds and hone their “skills”. Thereby, in an odd and unhealthy, and criminal twist, they appear to have shamefully preyed upon the average US public. Rogue members of these organizations–and there always have been a few– have engaged have engaged in this behavior for years, but happens not with similar frequency. They generally engage in their wrongful acts well-below the radar.  It is awful to accept that a few personnel of the US counterintelligence services, including not so trustworthy contractors they call upon, to knowingly use the exquisite technical resources of the US and tactics, techniques procedures and methods to crush ordinary citizens who have no interest in doing anything against the US. (On this matter, greatcharlie writes not from study, but rather from personal experience as an innocent target of such wrongful and incredibly costly activities.)

The rogue federal officers and contractors have their own reasons for turning to villainy and own reasons for selecting their victims. The victims names may have been found on some innocuous list within the rogue federal officers organizations. Through wrongdoing, the names are apparently transferred to an active list of targets for the rogue federal officers and contractors to prey upon. Rogue federal officers and contractors will claim to have legitimate cause for their actions them. Warrants from “helpful” judges presiding on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) will be provided based on those claims, allowing electronic surveillance,  physical search, and other forms of investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes. (The FISC was established by Congress in the aforementioned FISA.) More importantly, the warrants will allow the rogue federal officers and contractors to increase available financial resources for activities against their innocent victims. 

Needless to say, cellphone calls, texts, emails of victims are monitored. Letters and other missives are intercepted, extracted from, and occasionally inserted into, the victims mail deliveries. Electronic devices to monitor the victims in their own homes are used. Cable television and high speed internet services are weaponized for use as monitoring equipment. The technologies may have changed, but this practice of monitoring resembles that used against Martin Luther King, Jr. when he was, as noted earlier, the target of a federal surveillance and “dirty tricks” program. Yet, far much more, not relayed here, is done along this track. The individual’s personal life, finances, property, could are targeted. Doors will be closed to employment, association with social and professional groups, membership in organizations. Recognition and awards for achievement and excellent will be denied. Family members and friends will also face attacks designed to separate them from the individual or destroy them. Every effort will be made to shun the victim from society.

To gnaw a bit further on the surveillance of a victim, as a standard practice that task is performed through the use of manpower on the street. The personnel of a contractors are used mostly for this purpose. Some are employeed to engage in electronic surveillance.  To use manpower on the street in a very robust way, contractors, albeit errantly, will hire ordinary individuals from the US public to assist them. Greater budgets allowed once FISC warrants are secured mean bigger operations.  That permits exigent hires  For rogue federal officers and contractors greater budgets through innovative ways mean greater wrongful operations,, but also the potential for increased financial gains for them. (In the past, waggish federal officers were sometimes heard to jest that such improper efforts perfectly allowed for the creation of a “second retirement” much better than the one their organizations were going to provide.) C’est comme ça.

It is rarely difficult to find exigent hires willing for usually modest, but sometimes exhorbitant payment–bribes–to zealously engage in surveillance activities and aggressive, even criminal acts at the behest of rogue federal officers and contractors. Most of the exigent hires only understand “spy work” through Hollywood depictions and exciting novels. Most are thrilled to live out “Walter Mitty” fantasies of being a spy as they disrespect, betray and bully the innocent! The ranks of citizen hires are inflated by the exigent employ of permanent and temporary residents, visitors, tourists, and undocumented immigrants as well. The visitor to the US will receive an unforgettable lesson on the meaning and nature of civil rights in the country courtesy of the rogue federal officers and contractors. Whether a citizen or visitor, the hires receive remuneration. Exigent hires are compensated immediately for their wrongful service. The payments are in essence bribes to encourage and to reward their violation of the law. If prospective hires take the unusual step of asking why such surveillance of the victim is necessary, the rogue federal officers and contractors will offer an apocryphal story that may shock, anger, or outrage the prospect concerning the victim, tell outright, ghastly lies about the victim’s character, or conversely set aside any wrongdoing or any threat posed by the victim and convince the hire that anything done will be to the victims benefit! Intriguingly, the latter actually works exceedingly well.

Exigent hires will invariably  approach the surveillance of their innocent victim using the limits of their varied faculties. The results can be atrocious, shocking, and sometimes silly. Exigent hires can often be seen hiding behind pillars, jumping behind cars, and hiding their faces with their hands among a few things. As the vetting of hires is nonexistent, the dysregulated are often employed and they will often vent rage directly at the victim over false reports about them from rogue federal officers and contractors to relieve unbalanced levels of stress and frustration. Occasionally, participation is shamefully impelled not only by remuneration, but by racial, ethnic, religious, and gender prejudice. Those hires will indubitably make their offensive perspectives known to victims when walking by them or loitering near them. Evidence of how they manage racist and otherwise biased hires may offer an indication of whether the rogue federal officers and contractors harbor similar prejudices toward a victim. They can often develop a kinship with such odious individuals. On the odd occasion, one might unexpectedly observe the rogue federal officers and contractors communicating with them in plainview! Those hires surely receive opportunities for contracts and more chances to abuse a victim for payments. There is often a sense great importance and power that conspiring with “secret men” and “secret women” conveys to most hires, this can expectedly lead to hostility, aggression, and violence against an innocent victim.

Since none of the hires employed under these circumstances are not acting against actual officers or operatives of a foreign intelligence service or some other dangerous group, these exigent hires can act with relative impunity against victim. A victim’s response to the hires transgressions must not include acting physically. The rogue federal officers and contractors will use their standing and FISC warrants to ensure local law enforcement will arrest a victim and “friendly” prosecutors will secure fines or sentences against them. Such occurances have indeed been tragedies. Yet, the activities of the rogue federal officers and contractors will not stop even after causing that degree of harm. On s’en fout!

The exigent hiring of “operatives” by rogue federal officers and contractors is not always unsystematic. Some hires are offered contracts to encourage regular service against innocent victims. Often, contract hires are asked rogue federal officers and contractors to log their observations of victims via text or group chat. They often provide the information on what the victim is wearing, the number of the taxi in which the victim is riding, the direction the victim is walking or the activity in which the victim is engaged. (Interestingly, rogue federal officers and contractors always inform their hires of their victims whereabouts, yet they will often insist their hires log their “observations” of the victim by text or group chat. Other than creating activity for the hires, that work amounts to kabuki, hardly serving a useful purpose day-to-day when the rogue federal officers and contractors are watching the victim themselves. Maybe it is more a matter of keeping up appearances.

Some exigent hires are sought out because they are in a position to have opportunities for more than occasional contact with a victim. These “key hires” will,typically be associated with the victim’s personal and professional life, and the victim’s simple daily activities. A short list of such hires would typically include: neighbors; apartment building staff; contractors; locksmiths, municipal civil service workers of all types to include the police and emergency services technicians; dog walkers; taxi cab drivers; car service drivers; barbers; hairstylists; restaurant staff; pizza shop employees; coffee shop staff; street food vendors; conveniance store clerks; department store employees; luxury watch store employees;  supermarket employees; car garage attendants; storage company employees; moving company employees; realty agency staff; funeral directors, movie theater staff, museum staff; performing arts center staff; elementary and secondary school staff; parents of elementary and secondary school students; elementary and secondary school students; visiting professors at nearby universities; sports book authors; content management system employees; bank branch employees; accountants; tax preparers; paralegals; lawyers; medical office administrative staff and technicians; physical therapists; doctors; court house staff; and, judges. (The actions of judges co-opted by the rogue federal offcers and contractors in an US court proceeding against a victim are typically so remarkably corrupt that greatcharlie assures they must be seen to be believed.) It is fascinating to observe just how many individuals are typically made privy to the rogue federal officers and contractors “secret operations” against innocent victims.

Through contact with such key hires, the rogue federal officers and contractors aditionally hope to receive information about the victim through “clandestine conversation”. Usually, they will insist these hires ask victims specific questions about themselves which is most often incongruous with the natter in which they might be normally engaged. The activities of those key hires, along with other hires who have contracts, are controlled through cellphone calls, direct texting, and group chat. Group chat is at the present the most unified way for the rogue federal officers and contractors to assemble and mass their hires to act upon a victim collectively. Essentially, hires are organized for “gang stalking” and out-and-out harassment–bullying. These hires are compensated usually at central locations in the vicinity of their activity: a parked car or a coffee shop.

Interestingly, with warrants from the FISC in hand, rogue federal officers and contractors can also make use of programs created for use by employees of specific service industries to surveil and act against targets of investigations. In New York City for example, a clandestine program–so called a covert program by officials–was developed by federal and local law enforcement and US intelligence services to use taxi cab and car service drivers to surveil and photograph targets when they are on the street and to engage them in clandestine conversations as passengers with the aim of “surreptitiously interrogating” them or passing disinformation to them. Remember, the victims are absolutely innocent, have no special information offer. So, insisting the taxi drivers engage in such a practice, certainly not as training, along with simply using the shed light upon the mental state of the rogue federal officers and contractors. Maybe it is again a matter of keeping up appearances. It is as plain as a pikestaff that the taxi and car service drivers are impelled by pecuniary interest and ego, certainly not intellect. Clearly, most of the drivers take on their “secret work” having received insubstantial educations overseas, possessing a limited vocabulary as English is usually a second language for them, being devoid of sophisticated conversational skills–being tactless, and not knowing what it means to be congenial. One can imagine how awkward, clumsy, and better than annoying their efforts at “clandestine conversations” usually are. Ironically, the drivers must rely upon the politeness and tolerance of the victim to perform their “clandestine” work while lacking any compunction over deceiving a victim or potentially causing them harm.

It might be worth noting that warrants from FISC also allows for the rogue federal officers and contractors to cooperate with members of foreign intelligence and security services of US allies stationed in the US. The officers of some foreign intelligence and security services will make their presence known to victims by behaving overly aggressively, with hostility, and even a threatening them. Indeed, they take on this barbaric posture even against US citizens living in their own country. Officers of somewhat more sophisticated foreign intelligence and security services may make it a point to have an attenuated presence. However, they may deliberately make themselves known if they have been tasked to ask questions of–softly interrogate–the target. Interestingly, that task invariably falls to female officers of the foreign intelligence and security services who, with male colleagues close by, will “noticeably” spend an ordinate amount of time studying the victim before moving in. Such activities fall under the category of transnational repression and are illegal. Foreign intelligence and security services of US allies are surely pleased to receive financial resources from their US counterparts for their cooperation. Warrants from FISC open the financial spigot for such funding. However, what is imaginably most important for the foreign intelligence and security services of US allies who might participate in such activities at the victim’s expense is finding a place for themselves at the “high intelligence roundtable” with the powerful US. Once again, rogue federal officers and contractors more than likely trigger this activity by foreign intelligence and security services stationed inside the US as a matter of keeping up appearances.

Attempts to co-opt a victim’s immediate family members and other relatives are also made by rogue federal officers and contractors. If successful, they will usually forever destroy the victim’s immediate family unit and separate the victim permanently from other relatives. 

The definition of success among the Ancient Greeks was the full use of one’s powers along the lines of excellence. At a minimum, success for the rogue federal officers and contractors against their victims clearly has meant stripping them of anything resembling an ordinary life, completely restricting their liberties in a normal sense by standing between the victims contacts with others, and interfering with any effort to pursue happiness. The whole wrongful process can go on for years or at least as long as the victim lasts. Yet, very often the outcome desired by the rogue federal officers and contractors is far more sinister. The “stress response”, the flight or fight system, is triggered when mind and body are out of balance. When mind and body are out of balance, in stress mode, one is headed for health problems, disease, or breakdown. No organism can stand being in emergency mode all the time. The infliction of daily episodes of gang stalking and harassment can elicit heart disease, heart failure, and psychological disorders. Cases of suicide can also stem from a victims in ability to cope with strains too strong and too alien for “normal living” in an advanced industrial democratic society to countenance. Mere empirical observations of rogue federal officers and contractors actions and the results inflicted upon victims should reasonably assure one that there is not a shred of decency among them. Far more perverse actions are taken against victims. Plainly, the rogue federal officers and contractors have even acted in a variety of ways to cause a victim’s death.

As mentioned, the exigent hires and contract hires of the rogue federal officers and contractors are generally more concerned with how much money they will receive. Typically, hires will hardly notice, or even look to see on their own volition, if the victim were suffering physically or psychologically in some discernible way. As a combination of the hires’ “low-vibrational” character and their receipt of regular abhorrent reports from the rogue federal officers and contractors about the victim usually meant to infuriate their hires or even amuse them, there is generally no empathy shown by hires for the victim. The victim is not recognized as a human being. The victim is seen only as a commodity. Noticeably, hires are quite deliberately directed and bound as a collective through a form of mind control. From the prostitute and drug peddler to the doctor and state court judge, the rogue federal offcers and contractors get their hires to do exactly what they want them to do. The reality is there is no professional side to involving US citizens and so many others in the wrongful–illegal–surveillance and possibly the criminal homicide of anyone, especially an innocent victim. In their own criminal way, the rogue federal officers and contractors are destroying the fabric of the society.

Victims of rogue federal officers and contractors have no voice. The few who would make reports of their maltreatment and entreaties for justice are stifled by the corrupt. Through the use of their standing with law enforcement and judicial systems, FISC warrants, and long exercised technical ways to block a victim’s communications, it is assured that the victim’s pleas will go unheard. Many victims are so despaired by trying and failing to successfully report their mistreatment and circumstances surrounding it that they are led to either very quietly or very publicly self-destruct.

As suggested earlier, it is easy enough for those in the US public who cannot accept corruption and murderous criminality on such great scale among corrupt members of the US security services and their contractors and some will surely to find comforting ways to dismiss it or outrightly rebuke it. Yet, those who would accept this reality may be unwilling to speak against it. The number of other government officials in the organizations who may discover others acting corruptly and may wish to report or to investigate such criminality would be few as the consequences of their detection might be retribution in the form of daily attacks on the job equal or worse than those suffered by the innocent victims.

Leaders of organizations can be changed in response to revelations of wrongdoing at the senior level and within the rank and file. However, a subsequent change in leadership to that could lead to the rejuvenation of such vengeful, aggressive thinking and actions against the previously targeted inedividual found guiltless, incident free will be ordered. The individual’s personal life, finances, property, could once again be targeted. Doors will be closed once again to employment, association with social and professional groups, membership in organizations. Recognition and awards for achievement and excellent once again will be denied. Family members and friends not co-opted by the rogue federal officers and contractors once again will face attacks designed to separate them from the individual or destroy them without fail. Victims will once again be shunned by the society. During the new episode, the most devastating psychological and physiological attacks upon the individuals–by then a few years older and likely less interested in struggling against a tide a wrongdoing–would be launched by authorities with far greater intensity, to achieve their destruction or even deaths through suicide or violence so dearly wanted by others through the original effort. Ironically, the rogue federal officers and contractors who assisted in organizing and managing the individual’s destruction originally, will very likely have retired from their federal security service by then to enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing. However, others would doubtlessly rush forward to take their place. Où va-t-on à partir de maintenant?

This is in some small part the actual state of affairs for many victims of rogue federal officers and contractors at the moment. It is a whole world invisible to the ordinary citizen. As explained earlier, there is no insistence that anything discussed here be accepted by readers who are unfaniliar with it all. Nevertheless, everything presented is true and can be easily substantiated with the cooperation of honest and thoughtful law enforcement officials. (Note: All that is discussed concerning the mistreatment of citizens by rogue federal officers and contractors is based on the author’s personal experience!) One might suppose that for those who may be interested in how surveillance is conducted on the street level in the US, this discussion may prove instructive. It is unlikely lost upon readers that “one” who might desire to penetrate domestic surveillance activities in the US, not too much would be involved with becoming a “contract hire”. Once onboard as a hire, one would potentially have access to details about the daily surveillance activities of some US intelligence service or law enforcement organization, such as what organization was currently tasked with, who exactly is being targeted, where the target is acting, and who the organization’s street “operatives” are. What could be accomplished by “one”, one in a hypothetical case being a foreign intelligence officer or a team of officers and operatives tasked with the mission of infiltrating surveillance activities of a US intelligence service or law enforcement organization, must be left to the imagination. 

One possibility might be the regular successful “collection” of vital information to protect their country’s foreign intelligence operations inside the US. One can only guess how difficult it would be to launch successful counterintelligence operations against a wily foreign intelligence sserviceoperating inside the US when it knows everyday where its opponent’s officers and operatives are and who and what they are looking at. Perhaps something of the kind is already happening on some scaleg. For that reason, for more than a theory, on-going surveillance operations as discussed here, either sanctioned by authorities or wrongful conducted by the rogue federal officers and contractors, should be immediately rolled up, audited, and assayed. Perhaps doing any of that would be too bothersome. (Curiously, the average individual in the US public may not accept that such wrongful behavior by rogue federal officers and contractors occurs, however foreign intelligence services surely have no doubts about what transpires.) Born Jacques Anatole François Thibault, known as Anatole France (April 16, 1844-October 12, 1924) was a French poet, journalist, and novelist. Considered in his day as the ideal French man of letters. He was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature in recognition of his literary achievements. In Le Petit Pierre (1918), ch. XXXIII, he wrote: “De toutes les définitions de l’homme, la plus mauvaise me paraît celle qui en fait un animal raisonnable.” (Of all the ways of defining man, the worst is the one which makes him out to be a rational animal.)

Martin Luther King, Jr. (above). When King was the victim of FBI’s surveillance and harassment under its COINTELPRO operations, he had committed any federal crimes and was not a threat to US national security. He was an innocent US citizen. To that extent, actions taken against him by Intelligence Community organizations once uncovered by the Church Committee were shocking and surprising. In previous times, one might have supposed the understanding, acceptance of what Founding Father’s who authored the US Constitution defined as the unalienable rights of life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were sacrosanct. However, one might be able to comfortably conclude today that far less importance is given to those rights upon which the country’s soul and existence was once firmly rooted and upon which the US public’s expectation and requirement for the good governance of the democracy has its foundation. What seemed so certain about the once lauded strictures–as a sampling, the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendmens of the US Constitution–that would guide the country perpetually, is far less sure today. There are laws, but very often justice for the people is much harder to find. Breaches of regulations of the US Intelligence Community against ordinary citizen, not responsible for any wrongdoing, must not only be examined but vigorously pursued.

Seared in the minds of the authors of the US Constitution, the Founding Fathers, were the extraordinary sacrifices made by thousands of Colonists before and during the Revolution. Attendant to that were acts of tyranny leveled upon colonists by authorities in the Kingdom of Great Britain. There was usually much suffering dealt by the British Army to the rebellious in territory controlled by the British Empire. Methods used by the professionals of the British Army for the purpose of assuring the Kingdom’s grip on the Empire’s many lands overseas were tried and true. Given the that, the victory of the American Colonists, with assistance from France, was spectacular and almost supernatural. The tyranny resulting from the imposition of coercive power by the Kingdom of Great Britain was a manifestation of what was intrinsic in mankind: the desire to control others for self-interest. The despotic intrusion of ones will upon another compelled in some. The Bill of Rights, the initial 10 Amendments of the US Constitution are in part responses of the Founding Fathers. to egregious injustices under which Colonists suffered much of which was intended to break any sense of unity among them.

It is greatcharlie’s firm belief that few in the US public–indeed, relative to the size of the population and to include officers of the court–are aware of the contents of the Bill of Rights and their meaning. There is the real possibility that many in the US may have no interest at all in the matter. Rather than simply utter the term, Bill of Rights, which for many may amount to empty words, greatcharlie offers the concisely authored first 10 amendments of the Constitution passed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791.

The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

The Third Amendment states: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”

The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

The Sixth Amendment states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”

The Seventh Amendment states: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed ttho deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

It must be noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment, which concerns civil rights–as well as Senators, Representatives, and the public debt, citizens in the US, born or naturalized, and other individuals living in the US are entitled to equal protection under the law of the US and the State in which they reside and no person shall be. deprived life, liberty, or property, without due process of law under either jurisdiction.

Two centuries after the Bill of Rights were ratified, power can still corrupt. In the country the Founding Fathers constructed, led by a government formed of the people, for the people, and by the people, the aforementioned intrinsic negative impulses in mankind could nevertheless manifest within those who were members of the citizenry themselves. Despite swearing to an oath to support, protect, and defend the US Constitution and the solemn compact between government and the people, various episodes of corruption have taken their place in the country’s history.

Sojourner Truth was a 19th century African-American abolitionist and activist for civil rights, women’s rights, and alcohol temperance. Truth was born into slavery in Swartekill, New York, but escaped with her infant daughter to freedom in 1826. Sojourner Truth is known for saying “The truth is powerful and will prevail.” The truth will “prevail.” That is as may be. However, without some preconcerted, energetic effort to make certain the truth is heard, understood, and accepted by all who are reasonable and rational, it will unlikely have an impression and be unappreciated. Only a precious few open-minded individuals, following the law and holding firm to their beliefs, spiritual or philosophical, will hold firm to the truth.

Reportedly, the writer, professor, political activist, Nobel laureate, and Holocaust survivor, Eli Weisel, once explained God created man because He loves stories: Weisel would cite the Chasidic tale of the Baal Shem Tov. Accordingly, when misfortune threatened his community, Tov would venture into a certain part of the forest to meditate. There he would light a fire and say a special prayer. In consequence, misfortune would be averted miraculously. During a later time of peril, a despondent Rabbi Israel of Rizhyn addressed God as follows: “I am unable to light the fire. I do not know the prayer; I cannot even find the place in the forest. All I can do is to tell the story: this must be sufficient.” It did suffice, and God saved His People. Dum spiro spero. (While I breathe, I hope.)

By Mark Edmond Clark

The Continued Ascent of Dong Jingwei: After  Succeeding at MSS, His Sights Are Now Set on Opponents in Hong Kong

Dong Jingwei (above). Without a doubt, Hong Kong and its future are issues of great concern for People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping and the Party leadership in general. Likely to Xi’s satisfaction, Dong Jingwei is now in firm control of issues concerning protests and conspiracy against the regime and foreign sponsored efforts to orchestrate and sustain resistance in the city. Having pondered Dong’s posting and its responsibilities, greatcharlie has sought in this essay to dive a bit deeper into Dong’s background to better understand him and to meditate on his likely plans to get a handle on Hong Kong. Interestingly, in the photo image above provided by the Guangxi People’s Congress, conspicuously displayed on center of Dong’s jacket (above) is his official name tag. Readers may note, Dong is the only attendee visible in the photo that displayed both a table placard and a name tag to identify himself. While he apparently saw the need for “maximum” identification to assure recognition, Dong at the time of a photo served in the fairly well-known and powerful positions of Vice Minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence.

On July 18, 2023, the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced Dong Jingwei was appointed as the central government’s commissioner for the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Dong succeeded Zheng Yanxiong was appointed director of the Liaison Office of the of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in January 2023. The Office for Safeguarding National Security was established in 2020 just months after China imposed a national security law in the wake of extended pro-democracy and anti-People’s Republic of China government protests that began in 2019. Protests were attended reportedly by as many as half a million people, In 2022, a HK$508 million ($65 million) headquarters building was constructed in Hong Kong for the organization. Zheng was the first director and.a founding member of Dong’s new office. John Lee Ka-chiu was installed as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on July 1, 2022. Upon the announcement of Dong’s appointment, Lee welcomed him in a statement saying Hong Kong “will continue to work and communicate closely” with the Office for Safeguarding National Security as it seeks to fully implement the 2020 law.

Concerning the 2020 national security law, following the Hong Kong protests from 2019 to 2020, the People’s Republic of China imposed it to enable the prosecution of four major crimes, stamping out dissent. Zheng, at that time, pursued dissenters with vigor and was consequently sanctioned by the US for his activities. Of equal concern was the need to eliminate external influences in the form of foreign intelligence services. Beijing reported with conviction that they were entangled in Hong Kong’s protest activities,  providing both funding and direction to pro-democracy and anti-government activists. His extensive background at Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guójiā Ānquán Bù (Ministry for State Security of the People’s Republic of China) or the MSS and working alongside Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbù (the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China) or MPS, in part gave Dong a leg up for selection to the commissioner’s job.  MSS is essentially the People’s Republic of China’s equivalent to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and is responsible for foreign intelligence worldwide and counterintelligence both abroad and at home. MSS counterintelligence is directly aimed at the infiltration of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services and the neutralization of their operations. MPS is a sort of dual law enforcement and intelligence service under the State Council in charge of the country’s internal and political security and domestic intelligence. MSS and MPS share the counterintelligence mission for the People’s Republic of China. As national security bureaucracies, both organizations are organized under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, but both have settled lines to the highest realms of power into the Party. Very likely, it was Dong’s successes against foreign intelligence networks and operatives on the mainland in particular as the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence that also caused him to stand out of the best choice.

Interestingly, official sources on Dong’s appointment were especially frugal with their information about his intelligence background, never mentioning his very accomplished previous post as the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence. At the time of the announcement of Dong’s appointment, a representative for the Hong Kong government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Dong’s appointment, including his past experiences at MSS. The China Daily only went as far to state Dong was the director of the political department of the MSS from 2017 to 2018, according to a resume published on the website of the China Law Society, of which he is vice president. It added the he previously served as director of the Hebei Provincial Department of State Security from 2006 to 2017. Omne ignotem pro magnifico. (Everything unknown is magnificent.) 

Without a doubt, Hong Kong and its future are issues of great concern for People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Secretary Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China’s leadership in general. To what is likely Xi’s satisfaction, Dong is now handling of issues in the city concerning protests and conspiracy against the regime and foreign sponsored efforts to orchestrate and sustain such resistance. In this essay, greatcharlie has sought in this essay to dive a bit deeper into Dong’s background, to include apparent safeguards taken for his security and what may have been external efforts against him, and what he may have in mind for quelling the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China’s opponents’ in Hong Kong. Thoughts are offered not only on decisions he has likely made but also on decisions he may likely make in the immediate future to shape events. Dong may have reason to believe the national security situation in Hong Kong may soon turn considerably in the Communist Party of China’s favor. This essay is relatively brief and could hardly have squeezed issues dry so to speak and put one in the full picture of regarding Dong’s thinking. However, the hope is that greatcharlie’s ideas and insights may lead readers, hopefully to include some practitioners in the field of foreign and national security policy analysis and decisionmaking, to develop new lines of thought on how to proceed concerning this pressing issue. Luce sunt clariora tua concilia omnia. (All your advice is clearer than the light.)

Before July 2021, this photo image of Dong Jingwei (above) was accepted by greatcharlie as authentic. As with all other elements of the intelligence industry, counterintelligence work requires wisdom, reason, and logic to be performed well. It is not the nature of intelligence services to regularly use force and aggression to halt an opponent, shut down its networks, thwart its operations, and intercept its intelligence officers, operatives, and informants. The intellect is the tool used for doing so. Dong is a man who has a deep understanding of how people tick, how they fit in and feel where they live and work, and how they can get the ones they have targeted tangled up in their respective espionage enterprises. In attempting to ascribe certain traits to Dong given his role at MSS, those considered by greatcharlie may appear to be mere abstractions. However, among the few traits listed should be a reliable intuition, further honed when at MSS he coped with challenges posed by foreign opponents. It may have enabled Dong to perceive likely thinking, decision making, planned approaches, and actions of managers within the intelligence services of opponents.

Things To Know about Dong

As reported by greatcharlie in its June 30, 2021 post entitled, “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”, Dong was born on November 18, 1965. At the time of this writing, he is 59 years old. In the People’s Republic of China, it would be of some significance to note that he is of Han nationality. As for his studies, he earned a master of science degree. The only publicly reported member of Dong’s family is his daughter, Yang–also known as Dong HuaHua on social media, She is the ex-wife of Jiang Fan, who at the time was an Alibaba executive, heading the company’s e-commerce platforms, Tmall and Taobao.

Suffice it to say Dong is a member of the Communist Party of China. Highlights of his career include service as the Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the State Security Department of Hebei Province from 2006 to 2017. He served as Director of the Pokitical Department of the Ministry of State Security from 2017 to 2018. He eventually became a Member of the Party Committee and Vice Minister of the Ministry of State Security and the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence. It was noted in the July 24, 2015 edition of Intelligence Online that Dong’s direction of the State Security Department in Guo’anbu in the Hebei Province was significant for him as that province has reportedly produced many of Xi’s “securocrats.” Loyalty to superiors, age, and regional background apparently put him in good standing with senior party officials under Xi. One could probably safely mention reliability and discretion. By 2015, Dong reportedly became part of the “Xi Jinping Clique”, one of the main political factions within the Communist Party of China. By 2018, Dong was close to Xi. Other important Communist Party of China titles and accolades provided to Dong include: Representative of the 18th and 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China; and, Member of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Further concerning the MSS, as briefly noted earlier, it is an intelligence service responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security as well. To go a bit deeper, its impact stems mainly from providing consumers in Beijing to include the Communist Party of China leadership, the Party’s key organs responsible for foreign and national security policy, and ministers and senior executives of appropriate ministries and organizations of the State Council, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with data that may shape their foreign and national security policy decisions. The People’s Republic of China’s intelligence services and law enforcement organizations have had considerable success in destroying the networks and intercepting the intelligence officers and operatives of foreign intelligence services operating in their country. Dong surely would had a considerable role in the interception and neutralization of those foreign an local actors. Whatever may have been put in place to ensure those foreign intelligence services networks would not be rejuvenated or replaced in some form has successfully mitigated such efforts. Dong surely had a considerable role in creating such a defense to foreign opponents aims and efforts as well. It would stand to reason that whatever Dong organized while at MSS to hold back the People’s Republic of China’s opponents surely could have been recognized by results as being strong enough, sustainable enough, to allow him to advance to his new position in Hong Kong.

Very likely from the view of the Communist Party of China’s leadership, Dong was much deserving of promotion and greater authority, and should not be held down indefinitely in the MSS as counterintelligence chief. Such has not been an obvious choice for national authorities in many countries to make about an individuals such as Dong. In foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in many countries, individuals such as Dong have been kept in place when they have exhibited great skill and seemingly unique capabilities in their jobs. For instance, Alexander Bortnikov has stood as Director of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB since 2008. During the Cold War, CIA executive, James Angleton held his position as chief of counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975. Further, in the broader sense of counterintelligence as being a element of law enforcement, J. Edgar Hoover led the US Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1924 until 1972.

Dong achieved great success at MSS primarily under the leadersip of its director, Chen Winqing. Apparently, they had an good working relationship  Dong assured for Chen Winqing that MSS would have solid one-two punch against opponents via foreign espionage and counterintelligence. However, through a decision made at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, on October 28, 2022, Chen Winqing was named Party Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, overseeing national security and intelligence. He was additionally made a member of the Communist Party of China’s 24-member Politburo. On October 30, 2022, Chen Yixin was officially appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress as his successor at MSS.

The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission is the Communist Party of China’s highest security body and oversees all legal enforcement agencies, including the police force. As it concerned his preceding service at MSS with Dong at his side, Chen Winqing’s 2022 appointment more importantly placed him in charge of the People’s Republic of China’s national security and intelligence systems. It was only a few months later did Dong receive his opportunity to advance to the national security position in Hong Kong.

It is unclear why Dong did not simply receive to the top job as Minister of the MSS. However, it seems having Dong simply replace Chen Winqing was not likely viewed as the answer at any point. It was likely accepted by decisionmakers that it would be best to promote Dong to a duty of great importance and requiring immediate results that few could handle successfully. The position would require him to immerse himself on critical, exigent, and defined issues and not “just manage” MSS with its broad purview, although he most likely could have performed the top job there well, too. To that extent, Communist Party of China authorities, to include his former chief, Chen Winqing, obviously felt the best choice was to appoint a counterintelligence manager, a spymaster, a blood hound for a spycatcher as Dong to Hong Kong.

Notably, Dong’s appointment was confirmed only after a revamping of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). The HKMAO is an administrative organization  of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Dong’s organization with its security role sits under the HKMAO.

This photo image of Dong Jingwei (above) was posted on Wikipedia website at the time greatcharlie wrote its June 2021 essay about his alleged defection. It has since been removed. The public in the People’s Republic of China and the world will never get to see a true photo image of Dong. Perchance the fact that there are discrepancies in those photo images leaves room open for the supposition that the latest official image popularly displayed in the local newsmedia in Hong Kong and beyond may indicate a desire by Beijing authorities or by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to furnish a false clue as to the spymaster’s true identity. For whatever reason, the use of varied photo images may be a national security requirement set for Dong by Chen Winqing and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. It also ostensibly gives the impression that in official foreign and national security policy circles in Beijing and Hong Kong, and particularly in the Communist Party of China, that Dong holds a place of importance to them which surpasses that of any ordinary civil servant posted to the region. To gnaw just a bit further, the use of alternative images of Dong may tindicate the use of decoys is a more commonly used practice by the People’s Republic of China’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services than anyone outside of the country might have imagined. Surely, the sense of security the practice may create perhaps brings comfort to those who would otherwise be under the chronic stress caused by adversaries attempts to surveil and monitor their activities by a variety of means. Mentioned in theis essay in the use of an alias by Sun Qingye, one of Dong’s senior deputies in Hong Kong.

The Photo Image Discrepancy

As the two images have far more similar features of the official than dissimilar, one could very easily understand how it might present a challenge for many to distinguish between their facial features of the individuals in the photographs. Yet, both photographs, in reality, display enough distinct aspects to allow one to discern fairly significant differences between them. To support greatcharlie’s discussion on the discrepancies in the two popular photo images of Dong, two are used, and discussed  briefly within captions of this post. The discrepancies in the two photo images was covered in somewhat ample detail in greatcharlie’s July 15, 2021 post entitled, “”Commentary: Will the Real Dong Jingwei Please Stand Up?: Comparing Features of Popular Images of People’s Republic of China’s MSS Vice Minister”. However, it is not greatcharlie’s intention to re-visit the discussion on the issue of the variance in Dong’s images here

There remains the real possibility that both photographs exist to completely deceive observers, and Dong’s true image is not present in either of them. If that is the case, then in the possible effort to conceal his identity, Dong has done the thing completely. The two photographs focused upon here will continue to be published perhaps until another plausible image, or perchance another two or more, of Dong surface at some time and via some source of Beijing’s choosing.

As the two images have far more similar features than dissimilar, one could very easily understand how it might present a challenge for many to distinguish between their facial features of the individuals in the photographs. Yet, both photographs, in reality, display enough distinct aspects to allow one to discern fairly significant differences between them. Of the two different photo images, one may actually be Dong.

Suffice it to say as discussed in some greater detail in greatcharlie’s July 15, 2021 post, the idea of a director, senior executive, or key operations manager of an intelligence service taking steps to conceal his or her identity would not be unique in the annals of secret intelligence. Turning to a handful of examples, in greatcharlie’s November 13, 2019 post entitled, “Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997),” it was explained that Markus Wolf, chief of the foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA of the erstwhile Deutsch Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) or GDR, lived a life in relative obscurity, brilliantly concealing his presence and the footprint of his organization as both operated against the West. His memoir’s title, Man without a Face, was a direct reference to the fact that at one point, Western intelligence services only had a blurred photograph of Wolf while he attended the Nuremberg Trials from which elements within the CIA managed to identify him in 1959. Unable to collect an up-to-date photograph from which to identify Wolf afterward, for a long-time he was referred to among Western intelligence services as the “man without a face.” As the story goes, only after a GDR defector, Werner Stiller, identified Wolf in a photograph in 1979 for the counterintelligence element of West Germany’s Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) or BfV did that change. The photograph of Wolf was captured by Säpo, Sweden’s National Security Service, during a visit he made with his wife to Stockholm in 1978.

At the time Stephen Dorril wrote his authoritative book, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (Free Press, 2000), Richard Dearlove, then head of the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service–colloquially known as M16–was virtually unknown. A contemporary photograph was not published in the newsmedia. According to a BBC report, when Stella Rimington in 1992 was named the first female chief of the United Kingdom’s Security Service–known colloquially as MI5–her neighbors finally discovered what she did. Even her children learned of true occupation for the first time. No official photographs accompanied her name at that time. However, later, official photos of her were provided after photographers managed to take what was described as “a very blurry picture of her out shopping.” Petit rusé, petit malin!

Interesting also is the fact that Sun Qingye, a deputy head of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, has a background in MSS. More directly, he served in the China International Cultural Exchange Center. When he assume his post in Hong Kong, in July 2020, Sun used the alias “Sun Winqing”.

The public of the People’s Republic of China and the world may never get to see a true photo image of Dong. Perchance the fact that there are discrepancies in those photo images leaves room open for the supposition that the latest official image popularly displayed in the local newsmedia in Hong Kong and beyond may indicate a desire by Beijing authorities or by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to furnish a false clue as to the spymaster’s true identity. For whatever reason, the use of varied photo images may be a national security requirement set for Dong by Chen Winqing and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. It also ostensibly gives the impression that in official foreign and national security policy circles in Beijing and Hong Kong, and particularly in the Communist Party of China, that Dong holds a special place for them which surpasses that of any ordinary civil servant posted to the region. To gnaw just a bit further, the use of alternative images of Dong may tindicate the use of decoys is a more commonly used practice by the People’s Republic of China’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services than anyone outside of the country might have imagined. Surely, the sense of security the practice may create perhaps brings comfort to those who would otherwise be under the chronic stress caused by adversaries attempts to surveil and monitor their activities by a variety of means. Recall the aforementioned note on the use of an alias by Sun Qingye, one of Dong’s senior deputies in Hong Kong.

Admittedly, greatcharlie lacks any information that would allow it to judge which photograph holds Dong’s true image. As promised, greatcharlie has only sought to parse out a few possibilities here. What is presented are simply perceptions based on observations made of less than a handful of photographs. Certainly in China, there are more than a few people in the MSS, MPS, the State Council, and the Communist Party of China who know exactly what Dong looks like and which of the two photographs, if either, depicts him. It may very well be that the causaliy for the use of mixed images of Dong is based on an effort to increase security. However, just as greatcharlie, a nonpracticioner, “amateur sleuthhound”–as one reader sardonically  referred to the editor–has examined two reported images of Dong in photographs, Expert, professional analysts in US intelligence services and those of foreign intelligence services allied with the US have doubtlessly examined all of the photographs available that purportedly include Dong using Artificial Intelligence and other advanced technologies, and have reached to their own conclusions. Thus, despite any possible efforts to conceal Dong’s identity, they likely have a fair idea of how he looks, too!

In the end, Dong’s work product will tell volumes about the individual and indicate his presence. Certainly, even if business as usual to date is the best foreign intelligence services may have offer to retain a handle on Hong Kong, with Dong on the beat, they will have to find answers where currently there may be none to simply maintain their grip, big or small, on the situation.

The Defection Rumor

Rumors of the alleged defection of Dong Jingwei, a vice minister of MSS were the subject of intense discussion worldwide, but especially in the US newsmedia and social media in June 2021. The singular story was previously discussed in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled, “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”. Assuredly, as with its July 15, 2021 post regarding Dong’s photo images, there is no intention by greatcharlie to simply rehash in detail territory that it has well-trampled. The aim is to explore a bit deeper for readers.

Allegedly, Dong fled the People’s Republic of China in February 2021 and handed himself over to US intelligence officials. Dong would have been one of the highest-ranking officers from People’s Republic of China’s Intelligence Community, and the Chinese government in general ever to defect to the US. Yet, alas, the rumored defection never occurred.

As reasoned by greatcharlie in its June 2021 post, the nature of the man or woman who would be able to serve as the chief of MSS counterintelligence, it indicated that is was hard to form a mental picture of Dong and how he of all people could had defected to the US, with his daughter in-tow no less. It is harder to envision who among those with any knowledge of the People’s Republic of China government and the national security apparatus would believe, Dong would ever consider defecting to the US no matter what the circumstances may be within the Communist Party of China or in his personal life. One could imagine Dong would be a deadender, sticking with the Party and his country until the rattle. It is also difficult to imagine what individual, organization, or professional organization gave the rumor its wings. Equally hard is understanding how those who ignited the rumor of Dong’s defection intended to benefit from its formulation and promotion. There was always the possibility–though there are absolutely zero newsmedia reports anywhere that suggested some proceeding mental health episode had befallen him–that Dong hypothetically could have been overwhelmed by some cacoethes. Yet again, the defection never happened.

There may be something to learn concerning how such a bold lie took public form. Among those who reported on the defection, there was general acceptance of the sequence of events. The defection scheme as laid out was indeed mad-capped. Dong allegedly defected in mid-February, flying from Hong Kong to the US with his daughter, Dong Yang. Dong supposedly provided the US government with information about the Wuhan Institute of Virology that allegedly impacted the position of the administration of US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris on the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Han Lianchao, a former People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who defected in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Dong’s defection was raised by then Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi, and then People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the US-China Summit in Anchorage, Alaska in March 2021. On June 16, 2021, Han, citing an anonymous source, alleged that in Anchorage, Yang and Wang demanded that the US return Dong to China, but US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken refused. Subsequent reports, coupled with analyses by China specialists continued as Dong’s precise whereabouts remained unknown. Speculation had even reached Chinese social media threads after Dong had not been seen or photographed for several weeks.

Inferred from the odd choice to promote newsmedia stories of a defection was the potential confusion and chaos that might have been created in the minds of MSS, MPS, and People’s Libération Army’s Intelligence Bureau officers operating in the US and in the confines oF US interests overseas. The implications of such a breach in security would have been enormous. Information mined from such a highly positioned executive and director of MSS through interview, and potentially coercive interrogation, could result in the identification of officers, managers and their operatives, the exposing of netwirks, and collective information on sensitive operations conducted in the past and being performed at the moment

Rather than having a deletorious effect on the psyche of such officers, as well as their operations, the move uncovered the fact that they would hardly shrink at the last. In the worst cases scenario for the People’s Republic of China, Dong would have likely been quickly replaced under such circumstances. They as intelligence officers had accepte# the risk that there could the unexpected, things could go terribly wrong in the field. They had to prepare themselves for before travelling to the US or elsewhere.

Nothing about the tricky step would indicate a path upward to strengthen counterintelligence efforts against the People’s Republic of China’s espionage in the US. The People’s Republic of China’s Intelligence services have been steady in the approach to their work. Conceivably, the dismal failure of the suspected psychological operation would embolden if not the People’s Republic of China, but other foreign intelligence services to take bolder steps the Breach US security and ignite recruitment and espionage operations of audacity and  of an extent never considered in the past elsewhere.

Within the foreign and national security bureaucracies in Beijing, the assessment may likely have been that finding itself bereft of ideas, the choice was made by some foreign intelligence service or counterintelligence service to use a gimmick, a deception, a dangle if any specific response or individual were to be caught in a trap. It was likely assessed that the source was a Western counterintelligence service, perhaps one in Washington. 

As a friendly suggestion from a humble observer, it might be best for foreign counterintelligence services to refrain from engaging in such “poorly calculated” and “poorly calibrated” disinformation operations, if one of them was indeed involved in the Dong Jingwei defection hoax. Such action would appear to have the effect of emboldening People’s Republic of China intelligence officers operating overseas. If foreign counterintelligence services might insist upon adding to the chronicle of wasted time, perhaps one of them could send a large, ultra-high altitude balloon over the People’s Republic of China. Surely, it would mimic Beijing’s own actions throughout January and February of 2023. Still, one could imagine that a balloon as such, blithely passing over the country, would at least garner the attention of, and some discernible reaction from, a few officials of the security services there. (It remains difficult for greatcharlie to understand why the People’s Republic of China’s high-altitude balloons were not colored red if not to represent the Communist Movement then for artistic reasons: “Le Ballon Rouge” (1956). In leaving the balloons colorless, perhaps the aim was once again deception. Ostensibly, they could have been any country’s big balloons.) Einen Vogel haben!

This photo image of Dong Jingwei was posted on Twitter on June 16, 2021 by the US based, Chinese pro-democracy activist, Han Lianchao. In the tweet Han discusses how he came upon a rumor from an associate that Dong had defected to the US. If readers could pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, and not to disparage Han’s efforts, but as the rumor in the tweet was false, perhaps the photo that accompanied the tweet was a false image of Dong, too! In the rather diminutive space of Hong Kong–relative to mainland, Dong may be able to once and for all destroy all inroads made by foreign intelligence services. It will be more than a chess piece battle. Dong’s hope appears to be obviating all future possibilities for funding, providing information, and directing protest actions as the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing suggest were organized in 2019 and 2020. Lessons learned in successfully destroying foreign intelligence networks in mainland China will very likely serve as the basis to develop new and far more effective and  efficient tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods best suited for Hong Kong. Successful work by Dong could potentially improve the chances for the Communist Party of China to bring Hong Kong more peacefully back into its fold earlier than it might have envisioned.

Dong as a Threat to Activists and Foreign Intelligence Service Secreted in Hong Kong

As with all other elements of the intelligence industry, counterintelligence work requires wisdom, reason, and logic to be performed well. It is not the nature of intelligence services to regularly use force and aggression to halt an opponent, shut down its networks, thwart its operations, and intercept its intelligence officers, operatives, and informants. The intellect is the tool used for doing so. Dong is a man who has a deep understanding of how people tick, how they fit in and feel where they live and work, and how they can get the ones they have targeted tangled up in their respective espionage enterprises.

In attempting to ascribe certain traits to Dong given his role at MSS, some considered by greatcharlie may appear to be mere abstractions. Among the traits it feels should be listed is a reliable intuition. His intuition was surely exercised when at MSS he handled challenging problems posed by foreign opponents. It may very well have enabled Dong to perceive likely thinking, decision making, planned approaches, and actions of managers within the intelligence services of opponents. Perchance the same trait likely assisted Dong in successfully navigating to the top rung of the People’s Republic of China’s national security apparatus and to perform well at the side of leaders of the Communist Party of China.

Unt desint vires tamen est laudanda. (Even if it is beyond one’s power, the will [to try] is worthy of praise.) If foreign intelligence services are doing their jobs well in Hong Kong, it is almost assured that intelligence officers, their operatives and informants, covert sites, and clandestine lines of communication are well-ensconced in the city. Certainly from the Communist Party of China’s perspective, all foreign intelligence operations in the city are ready to be cracked. As of this writing, Dong has held his new position for nearly six months. Imaginably, in the initial phase of whatever Dong hopes to do, he and his managers will study the problem afresh ad nauseum and mine through existing information collected until with some assurance he can strike with speed, surprise, and–again from the Communist Party of China’s perspective–in some cases, lethality. He would very likely hope that his first big operation against his opponents would have a strong educational effect on them. However, foreign intelligence services would unlikely leave their operations open to defeat with one decisive blow. After all, they likely learned lessons from their intelligence disasters on the mainland.

On October 1, 2023, on the blog of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Dong expressed a philosophical perspective on what his office’s work would entail. In brief, he stated: “The central government has built a comprehensive legislative and enforcement mechanism for the SAR to safeguard national safety, introducing the law, which had provided a solid security guarantee for the long-term prosperity, and started a new era for one country, two systems.” He proffered that Hong Kong has been transformed from chaos to order and was advancing from stability to prosperity but still faced risks and challenges in maintaining long-term prosperity. To help the city along that path, Dong stated that his office will use Xi’s thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era as guidance. That would include upholding a holistic view of national security to implement one country, two systems. He declared: “[The office] will work with the committee for safeguarding national security of the HKSAR and relevant departments, to deeply implement the national security law in Hong Kong, combat all acts that endanger national security, and safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests of the country.” Expressing a holistic view, Dong said that he hoped various sectors of Hong Kong could support the work, strengthen the awareness, and “jointly build a solid dam” of safeguarding national security, to “promote a greater role for Hong Kong in building a great country and rejuvenation of the nation.”

However, before October 2023, Dong spoke more plainly about the counterintelligence task ahead in his country. At the aforementioned 2021 seminar on a counter-espionage regulation, Dong, then an MSS vice minister, spoke plainly about the counterintelligence task in his country. He explained they must catch spies as well as the funders working behind the scenes who carry out anti-China activities, according to the ministry’s summary of the meeting. Two months later, according to an online report by People’s Republic of China’ Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Dong held a press conference and stated the national security departments had “mobilised all forces in the society for a people’s war against spies.” According to the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission’s website, Dong told reporters, “We insist on catching both the foreign spies as well as the hidden traitors.” He added: “We are determined to adopt powerful approaches in order to resolutely safeguard state sovereignty, security and development interests.”

What Will Dong Do?

In Hong Kong’s very crowded and rather diminutive space–relative to mainland, Dong may have a better chance to once and for all destroy all inroads made by foreign intelligence services there. However, it will be no mean feat and much more than a chess piece battle. Dong’s hopes may be to obviate all future possibilities for foreign intelligence services to fund, providing information to, and direct protest actions. One could infere from statement from the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing that they were convinced foreign intelligence services played a role in organizing the protests in 2019 and 2020. How Hong Kong and Beijing came across such information has never been made clear publicly. No clear and convincing evidence of the presence and interference of foreign intelligence services has been put forth. Perhaps the information was gleaned as a result of interviews and interrogations of both detained and arrested Hong Kong activists. Perhaps one of the overseas stations of the People’s Republic of China”s foreign intelligence services was able to secure information about an opponent’s foreign intelligence operations in Hong Kong. In any event, lessons learned through the successful destruction of foreign intelligence networks in mainland China will very likely serve as the basis to develop new and far more effective and efficient tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods best suited for Hong Kong. Despite the stated desire in Beijing to a policy of one country, two systems, successful work by Dong could potentially improve the chances for the Communist Party of China to bring Hong Kong peacefully into its fold politically.

The whole world watched in 2019 and 2020 via broadcast newsmedia and online sources, thousands of people rushed to the streets of Hong Kong to call for greater freedoms and more autonomy from mainland China. Not just governments but ordinary observers everywhere noticed the protests, commonly known as the Anti-extradition Protests, were well-organized and well-orchestrated. Apparently, Beijing was actually unnerved by the spectacle. Its reaction to it all was quite different from that toward the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2016 Mong Kok Unrest. As part its legal response, Beijing imposed an overarching national security law in 2020, equally effective in Hong Kong, to punish four major crimes: secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign organizations. The offenses carried sentences up to life in prison. Under the 2020 law, People’s Republic of China security service officers were for the first time allowed to openly operate in the city unbound by local laws. The law also allows for suspects to be extradited to the justice system on the mainland. An estimated 260 people have been arrested and 79 convicted under the law, including dozens of Hong Kong’s most prominent democratic politicians and activists.

Under Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is required to implement its own national security law. Once enacted, law known as Article 23, most likely would prohibit not just four, but rather seven offenses in the city: treason; secession; sedition; subversion against the central government; theft of state secrets; the conduct of political activities by “foreign organizations”; and, the forming of ties between local organizations with foreign organizations. As of this writing, the city’s government is reportedly continuing to develop effective legislative options and will have its own law in 2024. La patience, la persévérance et la perspiration forment une combinaison imbattable pour le succès.

Yet, seemingly foremost in minds of most in Hong Kong at the moment of Dong’s posting to the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was talk about eight pro-democracy activists who fled abroad to evade national security charges. The story has been extensively covered in local newsmedia reports developed local and to a smaller extent within the international newsmedia. Of such great interest is the story that it shared coverage with Dong’s appointment. In July 2023, the city’s Chief Executive, Lee, pledged a lifetime of police pursuit for the eight fugitives. In support of that pledge, Hong Kong authorities have put a HK$1 million bounty on each of them. 

One might have expected that the flight of the eight fugitives normally would have been a matter best investigated by the city’s main law enforcement organization, Xiānggǎng Jǐngwùchù (the Hong Kong Police Force) or HKPF. HKPF is the primary law enforcement, investigative agency, and uniformed force in the city. Much as MPS officers, HKPF investigators would be authorized to travel outside of the city to track down fugitives as a uniform course of action. Typically, to support those efforts, HKPF would make use of the resources of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and national, provincial, and locally police forces worldwide. For the MPS, a huge benefit of such cooperation as essentially a matter of procedure has been the INTERPOL “Red Notice”. INTERPOL defines a Red Notice as “a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action. A Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant. The individuals are wanted by the requesting member country, or international tribunal.” However, the “forced repatriation” of the eight fugitives would be handled under standard operating procedure by the HKPF. The “forced repatriation” of the eight fugitives would not be looked upon in a similar way to the cases of thousands who absconded from the People’s Republic of China and were returned under the MPS’s Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Sky Net.

Reading and hearing reports from the local reporters and commentators, it seemed almost certain that interested authorities in Hong Kong and Beijing, in the name of providing justice, would insist that Dong run down the rabbit hole of pursuing the eight fugitives. The case of the eight fugitives indeed achieved such prominence as a national security matter that it rose to a level of importance requiring the “full” attention” of Dong’s new office. Subsequently, a “good number” of its investigators were surely dedicated to the puzzle. (It is the best “figure” greatcharlie can come up with in the abstract.)

Certainly, Dong would have been very satisfied with tracking down the fugitives so early in the game. Their capture would certainly make quite a splash for the newsmedia and a feather in Dong’s cap. He surely will not hesitate to have the national security police detain pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians and journalists under national security law. However, chasing down the eight fugitives who are now essentially smaller actors on the larger stage of foreign inspired and supported activities to destabilize the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region would hardly be a matter upon which Dong would prefer to focus. 

Directly on the matter from his first day, it very likely would have viewed as most important by Dong to study and make strong and ample observations on the pattern of activities, contacts, communications, and external influences, that allowed for the popularized “eight fugitives” to slip away That, as a start, would have assisted him in understanding how it was established and eventually shutting down the network that facilitated their actions and shutting down other networks that were in place. Such work would likely include to use of the latest technology advances in electronic surveillance developed in the People’s Republic of China. Some innovative combined use of existing technologies and manpower may provide a surprising new wrinkle to Dong’s counterintelligence effort in the city. Dimidium facti qui coepit habet. (Half is done when the beginning is done.)

Still, that work would hardly have diverted Dong’s focus on what has been professed as the bigger picture of the activities of foreign intelligence services and their varied contacts in Hong Kong for the past six months. As aforementioned, Dong’s tacitly declared the objective of People’s Republic of China’s counterintelligence efforts is not just to frustrate, seriously inconvenience, or hamper efforts by foreign intelligence service, but rather, to destroy them completely. That is a priority. Utilizing what he may likely uncover from his studies and observations of the activities of pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians, journalists, and other elements, as well as using what the People’s Republic of China”s foreign intelligence services might collect about foreign intelligence operations in Hong Kong from their overseas stations, he would likely develop a strategy to level a decisive blow against his opponents. What would put him on track would be the successful identification of foreign intelligence officers operating in Hong Kong. From that point, he could monitor their efforts to: create clandestine linkages with pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians and journalists; recruit and run operatives and informants in the city; and, develop multiple, sustainable, networks of operatives and informants there. Ostensibly, Dong would look in those particular directions as he would expect foreign intelligence services by tradecraft to take steps in those same directions. Les petits ruisseaux font les grandes rivières.

Dong in uniform (above) while serving in his previous post as Vice Minister for State Security. Dong once declared the objective of People’s Republic of China’s counterintelligence efforts is not just to frustrate, seriously inconvenience, or hamper efforts by foreign intelligence service, but rather, to destroy them completely. That is a priority. Utilizing what he may likely uncover from his studies and observations of the activities of pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians, journalists, and other elements in Hong Kong, as well as using what the People’s Republic of China”s foreign intelligence services might collect about foreign operations in Hong Kong from their overseas stations, he would likely develop a strategy to level a decisive blow against his opponents.

The Way Forward

Out of academic interest, one might consider in the abstract that rather than being the former fount of acumen and success at MSS counterintelligence, Dong may have merely been the benefactor of the excellent work of bright and capable members of his team. If so, it might account for any decision revealed that he brought members of his MSS counterintelligence team in Beijing with him to Hong Kong. Of course, if he did take a few with him that may not at all have been his reason for doing so. In any event, whether Dong succeeds or suffers shipwreck in Hong Kong will truly tell if he is Communism’s greatest spymaster, albeit post-Cold War. With some hesitancy, greatcharlie is willing to go out on an attenuated thread, likely to the disagreement and dismay of some foreign intelligence services–if its humble opinion is of interest to members of any of them, and state Dong is the real deal!

As it is now likely been the case, managers of foreign intelligence services and counterintelligence services responsible for Hong Kong as well as the People’s Republic of China may now wake up in the morning wondering: “We know Dong has been doing something. What could that  possibly be?” They would want to avoid chasing shadows, but they would want to find out, peering into figurative darkness, if Dong is “getting close.” Putting Dong and his clandestine operations in the spotlight would seem the best way to concentrate resources and talent on thwarting him. However, until enough of his organization’s clandestine counterintelligence steps in Hong Kong are identified and studied, some pattern of its activities in the city takes shape, and its efforts become predictable to a sufficient degree–if any of that ever happens–that task will not be so easy. Sine ira et  studio. (Without animosity, without favoritism.)

The Plight of Surovikin and Other Russian Generals Reveals More of What Is Wrong with the Russian Federation Government

A still image from the June 2023 video of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–implorng Wagner Group troops to halt their rebellion. As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion, that according to the common wisdom, nearly sent the regime of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin spiraling down the drain, may have been an effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would be remiss for Putin’s most loyal subordinate, the Russian Federation security services, and possibly Putin himself, not to see the possibilities. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely have been the case that a decision to investigate military officers would have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Here, greatcharlie parses out the circumstances of the detention of several Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services, with an emphasis on handling of Surovikin.

Except for some possible changes in the efficiencies in the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ prosecution of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation).  So much outside of good reason appears to have guided top officials in the Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Ministry) and top commanders of the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff), that hardly anything should be discounted as impossible at this point. For some in the West, that reality props open the door for potential moves that could be made by those same top commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the near future that would be positively unsettling to the government of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. 

The private military organization, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) has fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of the invasion. The organization’s  owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, of poorly conducting the then 16 month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.”

As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts mutually entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Parts 1 and 2)”, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion may have been a hypothetical effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would have been remiss for someone as the most loyal Putin subordinate, the Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, and possibly for Putin, not to see the possibilities. The FSB’s monitoring of responses to Prigohzin’s actions and possible communications with him should have been expected at least. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely be the case that a decision to investigate military officers would likely have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Indeed, in the Russian Federation security services, names have changed and so have technologies, but in the end that old chestnut from the Soviet days of “weeding out reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries” who supposedly pose a never-ending internal threat is apparently at the root and drives many of their activities. History has provided more than enough evidence of how well that turned out.

It is greatcharlie’s purpose here to parse out the circumstances of the detention of Surovikin and other Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services to gain a better understanding of what is truly at the root of the action, what is likely occurring, and why the potential outcome for the Kremlin may very well be against its interests in more ways than one. Apparently suspected from the start of the whole Wagner Group episode was Commander in Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin, the deputy commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on his detention and what surrounds it essentially as a yardstick to consider the plight of others. It is not concealed that greatcharlie believes the detention is a monumental injustice, a fantastic outrage. Human rights are available equitably to all humans, even Russian Federation generals. Hopefully, there will not be too much argument against that among a few readers. Some of what is discussed about the handling of Surovikin is written in the abstract but founded on long-reported treatment experienced by political activists, disfavored officials, and ordinary citizens alike whose interests “did not align with those of the government” and were thereby detained by the Russian Federation security services. It is greatcharlie’s contention that there is no reason to “search” for the truth. The true and pertinent is already known to all following the matter. No alternate facts to those generally reported in the Western newsmedia are revealed. No legal arguments based on Russian Federation law are offered here. Logic and reason are the tools brought to bear on the matter. Security service investigators surely have their “convictions”. Surovikin’s detention is hardly a subject that anyone could expect to discuss rationally with managers of the security services. Still, one might hope that at the top of the Russian Federation government, the light of good reason will eventually shine upon the matter. Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt? (what good are laws when there are no morals?)

On June 24, 2023, a video appeared on Telegram that depicted “talks” between Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and the Deputy Commander of the GRU, Vladimir Alekseyev, at the Southern Military District’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don of which the Wagner Group had taken control. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were made out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories had the less noble aim of rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, an audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. Those outbursts and, even more, the Wagner Group Rebellion, did much to provide such evidence.

Regarding Sedition and Insurrection in the Russian Federation

When asked during an interview broadcasted on CBS News “Face the Nation” in May 2023 what he thought was really behind the very public feud between Prigozhin and both Shoigu and Gerasimov, former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded: “My view is, this is all taking place, with Putin’s approval.” Gates went on to explain the following: “This is- this is Putin, dividing and conquering. Putin, given how badly the war has gone, has to worry, at some point, that his military decides he’s a problem. By giving Prigozhin power and strengthening Prigozhin and letting him criticize the Ministry of Defense, Putin keeps them divided. If the two came together and decided Putin was a problem, then Putin would have a really big problem. So, my view is that- that Putin is sort of orchestrating this to a degree in the sense- or at least letting it go forward, because it serves his interest in keeping these two powerful forces at each other’s throats, rather than potentially beginning to collude against him.”

Imaginably, Gates, forever the consummate intelligence analyst, might appreciate fragments of an alternative perspective in the abstract on the perceptions of Prigozhin and his Wagner Group’s commanders and Russian Federation Armed Forces operations and senior operational commanders of the circumstances in Ukraine. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely out of his concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin was vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, Prigozhin’s decision to have a bit of fun at the expense of elite circles was very much ill-timed. An audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. 

There is a perspective expressed in foreign and national security policy circles in the West that the time for Putin to leave power has come. Indeed, such is the intensity of negative feelings about Putin among many in West that the long-remembered words spoken by Oliver Cromwell in the House of Commons in 1653 concerning his ejection of the remaining members of the *Long Parliament” used famously on other occasions in the United Kingdom’s Parliament, well-expresses their sentiment: ‘You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!” Gates’ comments about the Russian Federation Armed Forces or the Wagner Group or both posing a threat to Putin’s power were nuanced and derive from a depth of understanding on the situation in the Russian Federation externally matched by few, it would fall in line not only with a multitude of mainstream analyses that have explored that possibility, and now feel their assessments were proven on-track with the advent of the Wagner Rebellion. 

It is very important for those thinking along those lines to consider how the insurrection truly end. It did not end with the return of Wagner Group troops to their ans some leaving for Belarus with Prigozhin. That was one stage of the whole show. It ended when Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

With regard to prospective plotters among Russian Federation Armed Forces  commanders, surely they understand that the special military operations’ present outcome was actually due to their failures and those of the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders. Surely, they were aware or should have been aware, just how deficient their forces truly were. This is hard saying for them, but the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders of the conventional forces were and still are inadequately suited to defend their country or to successfully invade a country such as Ukraine, especially when it is receiving robust support from NATO member countries and other countries with an interest in the matter. Due their own colossal failure to consider eventualities of such an enterprise, they did not foresee the deluge of Western military aid and training or what a huge impact it would have on the special military operations course. Strategic failures by Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders and the inability to recognize opportunities for decisive action and turn failure into success continue to the point where its too painful for those concerned with the wastage of human lives to watch. Among the Ukrainian people, whose country the Russian Federation wrongfully and illegally invaded, maybe those failures might be viewed [as a relative blessing from on high. (Yet, what really can ever be called a blessing during a war: survival?) 

If one might believe that what has transpired in Ukraine since February 2022 was all a deliberate act of subversion by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff, the question would then be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous extent in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing upright and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This allegation shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round. 

Certainly, Putin had authority over what transpired but had no expert role in the technical management of any of it. Imaginably, top Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders could still hold Putin accountable for all that has occurred in Ukraine or dare to say such things in public or private, however they should guard against such delusional thinking even in their darkest moments. With the idea of overthrowing Putin being bandied about, doubtlessly, the security services have been very much on the prowl, more so now than ever, watching, listening, and hoping to pick up the trail on anything even slightly out of order. 

Putin (left) and Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, talk along a corridor followed by stout securitymen. From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. The Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow. Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by an a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of the Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the disturbance.

Background on the Russian Federation Security Services

During his July 27, 2023 address at the Kremilin’s Cathedral Square, Putin enumerated the organizations that fall under the heading, the security services of the Russian Federation He included the following: the Federal Security Service; National Guard; Interior Ministry; Federal Guard Service; and, the Defense Ministry.

Federal Security Service

Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) or FSB, is the principal security service of the Russian Federation. The primary responsibilities are within the country and in certain circumstances,, externally,, are: counterintelligence, internal and border security, counterterrorism, surveillance and the investigation all other capitol crimes, violations of federal law violations, and unenumerated and unforeseen national security matters.

The National Guard

Federal’naya sluzhba voysk natsional’noy gvardii Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Service of the Troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation) or Rosgvardiya is the country’s internal military force, comprising an independent agency that reports directly to Putin under his powers as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The National Guard is not an element of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2016, Putin signed a law establishing the federal executive bureaucracy. The stated mission of the National Guard is securing the Russian Federation’s borders, serving as the lead agency on gun control, combating terrorism and organized crime, protecting public order and guarding important federal properties.

Interior Ministry

Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation) or MVD is responsible for law enforcement within the country by performing tasks as described I n the names of its main agencies: the Police of Russia, Migration Affairs, Drugs Control, Traffic Safety, the Centre for Combating Extremism, and the Investigative Department.

Federal Guard Service

Federalnaya sluzhba okhrany (the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation) or FSO, is the federal government agency concerned with the tasks related to the protection of the most senior national officials as mandated by the relevant law, to include Putin. The FSO is also responsibile for the physical security of certain federal properties.

Defense Ministry

With regard to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it is not a security service per se, but technically plays an in security service role, being able to provide supporting ground, air, and navalnavalNaval assets when needed to support the main security organizations. Penultimately, the Defense Minister exercises day-to-day administrative and operational authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Russian Federation General Staff executes the Russian Federation President’s and the Russian Federation Defense Minister’s instructions and orders. Ultimately, the Russian Federation President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and directs the activity of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry.

From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. To all intents and purposes, the Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. (Perhaps that was an expression of his crni humor and it escaped the vast majority of listeners.) In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the “disturbance”.

As greatcharlie noted in its aforementioned August 1, 2023 post, in his June 25, 2023 address to the Russian Federation on the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Putin then fired something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to those similar to “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he described players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. To that extent, it would be expected for the security services to single out examples from the senior ranks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to terrorize them into believing none would be safe from their watchful eyes and protective hands. If even the slightest scent of sedition or insurrection emanated from their direction, the security services would much like a tiger in the jungle at its prey.

As the Wagner Group Rebellion took shape, many officials and observers in the West proffered that Prigozhin and his troops would not have been able to take over military facilities in southern Russia so easily and mount his rapid march on Moscow without collusion with some members of the military’s elite. It is possible that such assessments and even the words of Gates spoken about a possible military insurrection drove top officials into such a frenzy that they became more determined to light on any officer over the slightest suspicion. It is fairly unlikely that the security services could say for certain that any military officers were absolutely involved in the Wagner Group Rebellion or any other apparent plots. Nevertheless, action was expected, and action was taken. The noble pagan of Ancient Rome, the renown statesman and scholar Marcus Tulius Cicero (106 BC to 43 BC), attributed to the Athenian statesman Solon (c. 630 BC to 560 BC), the quote: “Rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, præmio et pœna.” (A state is regulated by two things, reward and punishment.)

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. There was evidently no reason for any of the officers to believe they were guilty of anything. All were apparently devoid of any instant fear. Apparently, not one attempted to act first by using resources available to general officers to take refuge from the security services or evade investigators upon their arrival to detain them. For each, the discovery that they were subjects of an investigation by the security must have come to each as a bolt out of the blue. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release. In Act 2 Scene 1 of William Shakespeare’s tragedy, The Life and Death of Julius Caesar (1599), the character Brutus, considers, in a soliloquy, his reasons for assassinating Caesar on the Ides of March, states words surely pertinent to thinking of the security services regarding the subjects of their investigations ostensibly for treasonous acts though such behavior was unseen: “And therefore think him as a serpent’s egg / Which, hatch’d, would, as his kind, grow mischievous, / And kill him in the shell.” With its own hand, the Russian Federation government is gutting its own military of premium commanders. Que puis-je dire? 

The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to Wagner Group Rebellion. Citing the Wall Street Journal, the Moscow Times stated “The detentions are about cleaning the ranks of those who are believed can’t be trusted anymore.” Indeed, although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release.

Background on Surovikin

Holding the rank of General of the Army, Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin has served as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine from October 8, 2022 to January 11, 2023, during which time helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year. He was replaced as the top commander in January 2023 by Gerasimov but retained influence in running war operations while in command of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone.

He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the medal and title Hero of the Russian Federation and the Order of St. George. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when on November 22, 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces. It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), under one command. 

Surovikin was born in Novosibirsk in Siberia on October 11,1966. He is currently 56, married, and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, unknown to greatcharlie is the degree to which he is observant. After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during the last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency. Fighting in the Afghan War in the latter stages when the US was conducting its covert operation to support the Soviet’s main opponent, the Mujahideen at full-bore was most likely a very challenging experience for Surovikin.

Surovikin discussing the situation in Ukraine during his period of service as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone. The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that , which said Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain and commander of the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. When the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-declared Gosudarstvennyj Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP., orders were sent down by the GKChP requiring Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into the barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. Shortly after that, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, prompted by politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior decided to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RussianFederation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

The security services were surely ready and willing to grab those that both their sister national security bureaucracies and elites as Shoigu and Gerasimov could point a finger at. If some document had been created listing those officers that the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff had doubts about, Surovikin’s name would surely have been placed on the top of that list. For those who might have thoughts of seditious thoughts or considering insurrection, they would surely suggest that Surovikin be their role model: “Dein Vorbild!”

Surovikin (left) proudly receives Order of St. George, 3rd degree, from an apparently satisfied Putin (right). For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. 

How Jealousy and Envy Likely Poisoned the Thinking of Shoigu and Gerasimov on Surovikin

US officials briefed on intelligence concerning Surovikin’s detention have said they do not know if his was actively involved in the Wagner Group plot to abduct Shoigu and Gerasimov. Searching for reasons behind Surovikin’s detention, the Western newsmedia as well as Russia scholars and policy analysts have repeatedly noted that when he was selected as the commander of Russian Aerospace Forces in 2022 and as the Russian Federation’s overall commander in Ukraine, none other than Prigozhin very publicly welcomed his appointment to those posts, calling him a “legendary figure” and “born to serve his motherland”. These quotes and other supportive ones, along with a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin, have fuelled rumors in the West that Surovikin may have been “purged” or put under investigation for his ties to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, even if fuelled by rumor, would indeed be more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into.

Still, despite any perceived ties between Surovikin and Prigozhin, it is more likely the case that he was a fitting target for the security services because he was, and presumably still is, disfavored by Shoigu and Gerasimov for, all of things, possessing a military acumen that surpassed theirs by leaps and bounds. No one could have been more aware of how inept Shoigu and Gerasimov were than Surovikin. No one did more to make the duo’s inadequacies readily apparent just by doing his job right. Rather treasure their subordinate as someone who gets things done in the midst of the Russian Federation’s conundrum in Ukraine, at the nub of their concern over him was very likely jealousy, envy, and insecurity. Shoigu and Gerasimov have respectively demonstrated themselves to be very flawed men in their thinking and actions. It is conceivable that they would go a bit further and prove themselves prone to punish subordinates because of their talents. Que l’enfer est faux avec vous?

When Surovikin was promoted to overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone on October 8, 2022, he began to make moves that brought some positive results and good news for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Surovikin surely understood that leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer, although he may have wanted to do so in many areas. Despite shortcomings of his forces in the field and accepting the situation as it actually was, Surovikin sought to solidify the position of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. Fully in his element in ground warfare, he stepped up better organized localized attacks to have a cumulative effect and push back on advances by Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) at that time. His defensive moves reportedly raised worries among US military officials and officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden that Russia Federation troops might be able to withstand renewed Ukrainian offensives.

Yet Surovikin’s efforts, which were bearing fruit, did not appear to be enough to impress or satisfy his military superiors. One might wonder whether Surovikin was intentionally given a fool’s errand when given overall command in Ukraine. One might speculate it was part of a pre-concerted effort conjured up by his superiors, hoping to brand him with a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission to correct a near Intractable situation before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Readers may recall that it was greatcharlie’s prediction in its October 30, 2023 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, that the situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) According to Thucydides’ own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1 of The History of the Peloponnesian War, he was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because he had “great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland.” However, the renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports that it was firmly under Spartan control were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

It also could have been the case that Surovikin’s ability to establish order from chaos convinced others they could grab glory from his success and claim his successful actions as their own. Surovikin’s replacement as overall commander in Ukraine was none other than Gerasimov. When Gerasimov arrived to take command of the special military operation from him, Surovikin was not dismissed as was the case with Thucydides. He became one of three deputies subordinate to Gerasimov in the Special Military Operation zone, which meant Surovikin’s sound military thinking,  good insights, and reliable intuition would be at his disposal. Further, by keeping Surovikin in the mix, any negative feelings Putin might have developed over a dismissal would be avoided. At that time, he still appreciated Surovikin, and would have unlikely tolerated his dismissal and would likely have responded negatively to efforts to dismiss him. However, if his superiors were truly “gunning for him”, as suggested by greatcharlie, their efforts would hardly end with his demotion. It seems they managed to set up a better aimed second shot at him during the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Surovikin with laser pointer (left) and Shoigu (right). Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, Putin, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk, implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . . ] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, at the meeting with bloggers in Russian Federation on June 23, 2023, Putin implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.” For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. On the face of it, one might have imagined Putin and the general would have a very harmonious relationship, Both were devout servants of the Soviet Union and desired to preserve their erstwhile country. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability became most apparent to Putin through his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded.

The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

A matter that might presumably have caused Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness, particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin needs to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity. Vana quoque ad veros accessit fama timores. (Idle rumors were also added to well-founded fears.)

Surovikin (left) and Gerasimov (right). It would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

By countenancing the detention of Surovikin, Shoigu and Gerasimov would have essentially given their blessing to the actions of the security services. When the guilt of an individual is near assured by such authority, and results are expected at the top, the faculty of thought can often be suspended, even lost every step of the way. By observation–empirical data gleaned from years of newsmedia reporting–this appears true for almost every country, sorry to say. (If this faulty practice at all sound familiar to readers from security services of other countries, change your ways today! (More easily said than done one would suppose.)) Sufficit unum lumen in tenebris. (A single light suffices in the darkness.)

Surovikin appears to have found himself in a pickle with Putin similar to that of Ancient Roman military leader Belisarius (c. 500 AD to 565 AD) with Roman Emperor Justinian I (482 AD to 565 AD). Far more than simply a military commander, Belisarius was one of the greatest of Antiquity. He has been dubbed by historians as “the Last of the Romans.” He conquered the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa in 9 months, then turned to conquer much of Italy. He was victorious against the Vandals at Tricamarum and Ad Decimum. He recaptured the city of Rome for the Empire and held on to it under siege despite the fact that in both seizing the city and defending it, his force was outnumbered. Although subsequently defeated by the Persians at Callinicum, he won a great victory against their forces at Dara. Belisarius repulsed invasion attempts by the Huns at Melantias and by the Persians at Ariminum by causing them to lift the siege of the city. Skilled at using deception in warfare, he led the Persian commander to withdraw without a fight. However, having accomplished all of this and more, in 562 AD, toxic advisers, jealous and envious of Belisarius’ success and favor with Justinian, managed to convince the emperor that his loyal commander was conspiring to overthrow him. He was found guilty at trial, stripped of rank, publicly humiliated, and imprisoned. After reconsidering the matter, Justinian pardoned Belisarius and demanded his release. He restored him to favor at the imperial court. Belisarius died very shortly afterward.

It would seem the security services are very much troubling Surovikin with a lengthy examination. One might imagine if the security services had a clear cut case against the Surovikin, they would have readily thrown a light on all that is dark to everyone about the matter by making some complacent public statement in a very grand way. Certainly, that would happen, albeit only if Putin sanctioned it. Out of sheer curiosity, it would be interesting to hear what sort of ragbag of dissonant trifles the security services have in their possession about Surovikin. In the aggregate, their evidence would unlikely amount to anything managers in any legitimate law enforcement organization elsewhere would find satisfactory or acceptable. Conceivably, any evidence possessed by the security services could hardly be more than circumstantial and unlikely exact, but surely whatever it possesses would be near enough for the security services to believe their case is solid. Each bit of nothing in their minds would presumably rate higher meaning. To that extent, one might assess in the truest sense, the supposed crimes of the suspected officers were featureless ones. Nos hæc novimus esse nihil. (We know that these things are nothing (i.e., mere trifles.)

Snakes are able to unhinge their jaws, which allows them to swallow animals much larger than their heads. After they devour the animal, their jaw hinge goes back into place. Much as with snakes, right or wrong, security service officials, whether in the Russian Federation or governments of freedom loving democracies of the West, will figuratively unhinge their jaws to devour “larger prey” such as Surovikin or any subject of an investigation for whatever recherché rationale or due to an investigator’s some very apparent mental abnormality, highly valued by them. Often too easily given the authority by their superiors who are usually eager to receive results, investigating security service officials are usually reluctant to release the subjects of their investigations even if it requires busting budgets by increasing staff and hours on the beat and increasing the use of technical resources to include contractors to collect evidence that unlikely existed. Errant investigators will continue to clamp down on their victim even when it is clear there are no substantial leads, or trifles, to follow up on. Curiously, superiors in most security service do not appear to  circulate in a way to observe such aggressive investigative practices or hear from subordinates whether anything inordinate is transpiring. Typically, managers in the security services have come up from the same system and are unwilling to push too hard on anything thoroughly. They know the deal! To be sure, the behavior of investigators in the security services can be unhinged not as much in a physical way as with the snake’s jaw, but psychologically. Once its victim is completely figuratively devoured, broken in a real sense, their jaws will return to their original position.

Gerasimov (above) moves through a well-protected bunker to the rear of the frontlines in Ukraine. A matter that might presumably cause Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin wants to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Surely Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity.

On Bullying Surovikin

Turning to the Bard again, in Act 3, scene 3 of Shakespeare’s play Othello, the Moor of Venice (1603), the consummate antagonist, the ensign Iago, acting full bore in a dastardly campaign to destroy the commander, Othello, psychologically, seeks to create doubt in his mind about his wife Desdemona’s fidelity and that she could possibly be in love with his captain, Cassio, his most loyal subordinate. In convincing Othello that it would be a tremendous blow to his reputation if word of what was in reality a nonexistent relationship between the two, became widely known, Iago states the famous passage: Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, / Is the immediate jewel of their souls: / Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; / ‘Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands: / But he that filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not enriches him / And makes me poor indeed.” While likely embarrassed, disheartened and potentially humiliated initially by the public spectacle and dishonor of his detention, the brave soldier, a former spetsnaz officer, will not so easily be driven past hope and into despair despite the worst the security services might be able to dish out. True, the message Surovikin recorded urging the Wagner Group troops to halt their “mutiny” was likely made at the suggestion of the security service which likely had him in their possession at the time. Yet, the possibility is greater than not that Surovikin truly wanted the whole episode with the Wagner Group to end in order to prevent an atrocious “blue on blue” clash, save the lives of much needed troops, and avoid doing anything that would give the Russian Federation’s opponents an advantage. Surovikin likely saw it as one more chance to be a good commander and patriot despite his difficult situation. Doubtlessly in their interrogation of Surovikin, investigators are very likely repeatedly testing every link of their conceivably defective and possibly contaminated chain of evidence. However, no fabricated disclosures or incriminating false confession under duress should be hoped for from Surovikin. A likely denouement would be the general’s call to higher service unless he is released. The security services would of course assure all that Surovikin had met his fate by his own hand if he were to die in their custody. Hopefully, none of that will transpire.

For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars.. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Perhaps every Western capital, as well as the capitals in other regions concerned about Ukraine, was aware of it. Western intelligence appears to have been more fully informed on the details of what was transpiring on the border than the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff and the security services in the aggregate. It brings to mind how difficult it seemed for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services to monitor Prigozhin’s movements between Belarus and the Russian Federation after the rebellion. Time and effort was spent raiding empty homes garnering little more than wigs and some old gag photos, gold bars and automatic weapons, all of which were returned to their owner. In the meantime, Western intelligence had been monitoring every move he made by satellite. One might hazard a guess that the US Intelligence Community knew details such as what he was typically having for breakfast and lunch and how much time he was spending watching television. The juxtaposition of the respective approaches to investigating the two subjects by the security services is almost comical.

Surely, the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services themselves had a more than adequate opportunity to monitor and disrupt any plan of the Wagner Group, to prevent if from assembling and rolling out against the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, and long before the “mutineers” left their line of departure and reached Rostov-on-Don. The reason why they failed to act, robustly or discreetly, is anyone’s guess. The failure of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and security services to interfere with the Wagner Group before the situation took a grave turn was surely a worse act of enabling the rebellion than any other. If Surovikin is being held over any knowledge potentially possessed and withheld by him, he could hardly have concealed anything that everyone did not already know on the matter. As the whole saw how the whole episode played out, one might wonder what sort of special piece of information he could have held back. Recalling the dialogue from the 1979 blockbuster film “Apocalypse Now!”, a portion of a line spoken by the character US Army Captain Benjamin L. Willard is apropos in this case. With that line added on here, one could then state with considerable accuracy that charging anyone with having foreknowledge of the Wagner Group Rebellion would be “like handing out speeding tickets at the Indy 500.”

If Surovikin is being held over some possible errant words spoken by him, then, as suggested earlier, the time has long passed since the security services should have let Putin, the Russian people, and the world know they have got it out. However, such is surely not the case. Everything made publicly known so far points to the likelihood that they have no real case against Surovikin. Perchance the best case for which the security services are actually providing strong evidence is the case proving what an absolute abomination the Russian Federation government is. Some might argue that too is an “open secret”.

Regarding the inadequacies of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services, greatcharlie need not go as far as to call attention to just how wrong their respective pre-invasion conclusions were about the Ukrainian people welcoming invading Russian Federation troops with open arms. One might infer from the quality of their previous work product, in the minds of security service investigators, no matter how implausible or off-kilter their cause for holding Surovikin might be, they believe there is good reason to detain Surovikin. They can “rest assured” that they have got the right man. Again, they have got it out! Complètement folle!

Interestingly, while Russia scholars and policy analysts will never recognize the sovereign territory of Ukraine in the Donbass as Novorossiya, it is supposedly a reality for the Russian Federation government. That being the case, if the Wagner Group on territory that was in the minds of Russian Federation officials now their country’s sovereign territory, whatever the Wagner Group was doing was a matter that fell primarily if not solely within the security services’ province. How inelegant it is for the security services to foist their responsibilities upon commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield who at that moment were swamped, struggling to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from delivering a crushing military blow, sending the entire enterprise in Ukraine from swiftly spiraling downward into a defeat on a scale not seen since World War II. (Undoubtedly, with regard later offensives that have lead to grand defeats, some might call attention to the May 4, 1975 spring offensive (Chiến dịch mùa Xuân 1975), officially known as the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 (Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy mùa Xuân 1975), which was the final North Vietnamese campaign of the Vietnam War that led to the capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the surrender and dissolution of Republic of Vietnam. Others might call attention to the May 2021 offensive of the wretched Taliban in blatant violation of a peace agreement that led to the capture of Kabul, the complete collapse of the internationally backed government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and subsequent dissolution of the robustly supported the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces on August 15 2021.)

Putin (center top) meeting with select members of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Russian Federation security services, and the Security Council during the Wagner Group Rebellion. For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Pitfalls for Military Officers Who Get Too Close to Political Matters

With Prigozhin being a very close associate of the Russian Federation President and, by reports, ostensibly under the control of the GRU and the Russian Federation General Staff, it is not too difficult to imagine Surovikin was most likely reluctant, or strongly desired, to stay out of matters closely concerning Prigozhin’s activities outside of military matters. By doing so, one could only bring unneeded trouble upon oneself. It would be impossible, without all of the facts of what was really the case, what was in play. One of the other aforementioned commanders detained and questioned by the security services, Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of the GRU, military intelligence, certainly would have known prying into whatever the Wagner Group was doing off the battlefield would be counterintuitive. He too would know just getting too close could result in trouble as the situations for Yudin, Alekseyev, and Surovikin clearly demonstrate.

In greatcharlie’s June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, a true picture of the thinking among the Russian people concerning service to the state–to the best understanding of greatcharlie–was outlined with frankness. At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, some citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances even following what could reasonably be called the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. (On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) For certain, laws concerning the people’s well-being can be legislated with some regularity in most countries but justice is very often harder to achieve.

To that extent, greatcharlie supposed that scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would unlikely be quick to assist the Russian Federation government by providing any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. Indeed, there perhaps would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively depicted or impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. It would be enough of a tragedy to simply find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, those among the Russian people who might have something of real value to contribute may decide, or their respective families and friends might advise, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

Putin (left) and Shoigu (right). Behind Putin to the left is Alexei Dyumin, Acting Governor of the Tula Region of the Russian Federation. Behind the pensive Shoigu, to the left, is Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister and State Secretary, General of the Reserve Army, Nikolai Pankov. Dyumin holds the rank of lieutenant general in the Russian Army. He once served as the chief security guard and assistant of Russian Federation President  before Putin promoted him to lead the Russian Federation’s Special Operations Forces which he oversaw during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The following year, he became Deputy Defense Minister. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. It has been suggested within the Western newsmedia that Dyumin would likely replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister if the need arose. Politics at the highest realms of the Russian Federation are complicated and dangerous. Those who really do not have “hold any cards” or are not “covered” politically much as Icarus of Ancient Greek mythology tend to get burned and fall whenever they intentionally or incidentally get too close to the fire.

Beyond being shocked and surprised, Surovikin was likely horrified upon initially discovering that the entire political cabaret of the Wagner Group Rebellion was being launched in the eastern sector of his area of responsibility. If he had not been, he might have supposed the security services, to include the Border Guard and the National Guard, would be in the best position to put the brakes on the matter. He then might have expected the FSB would have the situation “well in hand”, going about interviewing Wagner Group commanders and detaining them if necessary. None of that happened. It turned out none of the security services took on the task of dealing with the Wagner Group. (Still, one might suggest in their own way, FSB managers did have the matter covered alright. They would select suspected, not necessarily guilty, co-conspirators after the fact, and deflect any culpability for their own failures.) One could imagine Surovikin’s facial expression upon hearing from security service investigators. Perhaps he was stoic. 

Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely putting too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his real job, fighting an illegal war initiated by the Kremlin. The security services, however, are unable to see that. They exist in an alternate reality–a cognitive bubble–much as they do in every country. That is something that legislatures and executive authorities in democracies must do far more to guard against.

The mainstream opinion reported in the West generally is that Surovikin is a skilled commander who would likely continue to pose problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The New York Times described Surovikin as a respected military leader who helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year, analysts say. He was replaced as the top commander in January but retained influence in running war operations and remains popular among the troops. Perhaps he is looked upon as something far less formidable by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff on which he served. A common theme heard during the Wagner Group Rebellion was that the action was benefitting the enemies of the Russian Federation. Among the points made in his July 24, 2023 “Address to the Nation” concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin explained that external threats–tacitly understood to be the US and other Western countries–would exploit anything that might provide advantage for them against the Russian Federation. Putin stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history. Putin continued: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Oddly enough, in a dark, cynical twist, Surovikin, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–and propping himself in a chair against a wall in an unmilitary fashion, spoke briefly on a video recording. Surovikin remarked: “We fought together with you, took risks, we won together,” He then entreated:  “We are of the same blood, we are warriors. I urge you to stop.” Surovikin added: “The enemy is just waiting for our internal political situation to deteriorate.” He  then implored the Wagner Group troops: “Before it is too late . . . you must submit to the will and order of the people’s president of the Russian Federation. Stop the columns and return them to their permanent bases.” It is almost certain that when the video was produced, Surovikin was already being held–and likely being roughly handled–by security service investigators.

Readers may compare Surovikin’s typically appearance depicted in this photo (above) with his deportment in the June 24, 2023 video and judge for themselves the general is doing well. In the video broadcasted on June 24, 2023, Surovikin as aforementioned, appears in an unkempt state, unshaven and wearing an unpressed uniform. Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely to put too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his job.

With regard to what the Moscow’s perceived enemies were actually thinking and saying about the Wagner Group Rebellion, the New York Times on June 27, 2023 reported that US officials interviewed, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence, explained concerning Surovikin and the Wagner Group Rebellion that they have avoided discussing what they and their allies know publicly to avoid feeding Putin’s narrative that the unrest was orchestrated by the West.

At the same time, US officials admitted to the New York Times that US has “an interest in pushing out information that undermines the standing of General Surovikin, whom they view as more competent and more ruthless than other members of the command.” Reportedly, they further stated: “His removal would undoubtedly benefit Ukraine, whose Western-backed troops are pushing a new counteroffensive that is meant to try to win back territory seized by Moscow.” This statement alone would hardly serve as striking proof that the secret Western agencies were working around the Russian Federation to sabotage its efforts in Ukraine, efforts on the world stage, and efforts to maintain national unity. Still. destroying Surovikin is viewed as desirable among the Russian Federation’s declared opponents–enemies, then given the Russian Federation security service investigators’ actions, one might ask of them: “Je suis désolée, de quel côté es-tu?”

It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone even near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, if not certainly, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Russian Federation Deputy Defense Ninister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Russian Federation Defense Ministry post. He has since been released. Expectedly, Putin would have insisted upon Prigozhin’s release if he had been quietly detained.  However, that would likely have been late under any circumstances as the Russian Federation security services can do an incredible amount of damage to one’s person in a very short period of time. Prigozhin, a convict in a Soviet prison in the 1980s while in his 20s, likely would have had no desire to experience such treatment in 2023 while in his 60s.

One must also remember that service to Putin, Prigozhin, would do just about anything if Putin told Prigozhin it was part of his plan or simply said that was what he wanted. That would be all he needed to hear. If the choice had to be made between Surovikin’s well-being and Putin’s satisfaction, there would be no contest. Prigozhin’s choice would be to satisfy Putin. Such is the nature of Prigozhin’s relationship with Putin. Prigozhin is dedicated to Putin, No one should make a mistake about that. He is also quite beholden to him for his largess and position within the highest realms of Russian Federation society. Putin likely came to recognize Prigozhin’s rather flattering attachment to him long ago. Absent such dedication, he likely would have shaken Prigozhin well before. It would doubtlessly be a strain for Prigozhin to swallow such an act of betrayal against Surovikin or arduous for him to carry that truth until the end of his days, but surely he will attempt to do it. Thinking about how Prigozhin has been so willing to offer his opinion, his predilection for talking too much, and his penchant for flying off the rails of logic during his fiery ravings, what comes to mind is “Bigmouth Strikes Again”, a 1986 song from the third album of the English rock band The Smiths. Written by Johnny Marr and Morrissey, the lyrics of the refrain are: “Bigmouth [La-la, la, la, la-la!] / Bigmouth [La-la, la, la!] / Bigmouth strikes again / And I’ve got no right to take my place / To the Human race.”

Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin leaving Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Deputy Defense Minister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Defense Ministry post. He has since been released.

No Little Lamb Driven to Slaughter: Surovikin’s Violent Antecedents

Virtus præmium est optimum. Virtus omnibus rebus anteit profecto. Libertas, salus, vita, res, parentes, patria et prognati tutantur, servantur; virtus omnia in se habet; omnia assunt bona, quem penes est virtus. (Virtue is the highest reward. Virtue truly goes before all things. Liberty, safety, life, property, parents, country, and children are protected and preserved. Virtue has all things in herself; he who has virtue has all things that are good attending him) In truth, as an officer in the Russian Federation Armed Forces,, and the Soviet Army before that, Surovikin has by no means comported himself as virtuous man. To be certain, greatcharlie does not want to leave readers with the impression that Surovikin is an innocent lamb being driven to potential slaughter. A number of violent antecedents are associated with his name. Indeed, in Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. 

As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring, where three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders.  In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. During his tours in Syria, Surovikin received the nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” At one time there were supposedly whispers in the Russian Federation that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source. Surely, others following his career more closely could perhaps enumerate more “bumps in the road”.

Who Wins, Who Loses?

While wanting to develop a better picture of Surovikin’s likely treatment, greatcharlie admits without pretension that diving into what might be the “low vibrational” thinking of those holding him is a disquieting and distasteful journey of exploration through the grotesque. Perhaps greatcharlie’s “tirade” in this post on the enormous injustice against Surovikin comes as a result of studying Prigozhin’s videos on Telegram too closely during research for its preceding post. (Can mere association with behavior via video recording breed similarity?) After reviewing what is presented here, a small number of readers might minimize in a well-meaning way as intelligent speculation. In the introduction, greatcharlie admitted there was a small degree of that. Noticeably, there is no effort to predict future events concerning Surovikin’s detention. Those who may believe they have gained by it are surely powerful enough with the system and intent on having their way with him. However, who gains and who loses on the matter perhaps has not been considered in the round by those who have some part in it.

Following his grand victory over the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin’s dominion over the Russian Federation very likely felt more secure to him at least to some satisfactory level. It could be the case that the detentions and dismissals of Russian Federation general officers could reverse that sense of success. Putin may not have considered all of the possible effects of the action taken by the security services upon his situation. Under immense pressures, fending off distractions, Putin is likely to make mistakes, misunderstand situations, ignore his intuition and intimations. This is true despite his considerable knowledge and experience. In fact, Putin would know that. What is overlooked and misread will remain as elements of failure unless time permits successful correction. It might be worth noting that when Nazi Germany’s Fuhrer und Reichkanzler (Leader and Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler, following an assassination attempt in July 1944, feared plots were being made to remove him from power and that the end was near, he had his top henchman Reichführer-SS (Reich Leader-SS) Heinrich Himmler unleash the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) against the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) which resulted in the destruction some of his most capable generals, such as Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge when he needed them most on the battlefield. Parallels, mutatis mutandis, are found between what transpired years ago in Nazi Germany and what is transpiring today in the Russian Federation. Perchance Putin has not considered this.

Tanto est accusare quam defendere, quanto facere quam sanare vulnere, facilius. (It is just so much easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to inflict than to heal a wound.) Putin should be aware that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them. 

.Putin must not act–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–out of fear but confidence in his commanders. His public demand for Surovikin’s return to service would send an extraordinary signal of support to his commanders from the most junior lieutenant to Gerasimov. The positive impact on their psyche would likely be immeasurably positive. Among the Russian people, surely a Solomonesque act of justice would send a signal of unity during the crisis and favorable response–a boom–in terms of his popularity ratings. At the same time, taking such corrective action would not be a matter of becoming, or proving himself to be, a virtuous man. It is really just a matter of putting his house in order. As aforementioned, Justinian I released Belisarius, but a bit too late. By all indications, it is not too late for Putin to order the release of Surovikin. “Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant”

On August 15, 2023, Elisa Braun and Zoya Sheftalovich of Politico reported their discovery of information dated August 13, 2023 on the VChK-OGPU blog–known to closely associated with the Russian Federation security services–explaining on that Surovikin is now “under a kind of house arrest” by which he is restricted to an “apartment” in which he being detained. However, the blog indicated has been permitted visitors, including several of his subordinates. As aforementioned, in response to inquiries from journalists, the Kremlin still has neither made an official public statement concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts nor offered anything more than vague references of “speculations, allegations” about his awareness of the Wagner Group’s plan to revolt as of this writing. 

Putin (above) might consider that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them.

The Way Forward

In the abstract, one might presume the likely accepted wisdom of members of the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies from the most junior military analyst or Ukraine specialist to the most senior military officers and diplomats or state secretaries and ministers, even if only tacitly accepted, is that poor intelligence analysis and deplorable performance by military planners and commanders in the field were the main sources of problems that have hampered the special military operation. However, at the nub of it all is the reality that a country in which so much negative energy could be devoted to destroying its most capable commanders over petty personal biases and grumblings of their superiors, could never muster the dynamic, synergistic, positive power to act in unity and in the case of Ukraine, in a true military fashion, to accomplish what has been asked of it by national authority, Putin, in the Kremlin. The Russian Federation government appears rotten at its core, and that rot contaminates whatever it engages in. In its most important responsibility, providing for national defense–if illegally invading Ukraine could fall under the rubric of national defense–the whole world can see just how rotten it all is. No national government, not even friends in Beijing, Minsk, Pyongyang, New Dehli, Johannesburg, Brasilia, Yerevan, Ashgabat  Tashkent, Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Damascus, Havana, Caracas, or elsewhere would likely say so plainly to Putin just how surprisingly bad the Russian Federation Armed Forces have performed, but they see it and think it nonetheless. What all of this means is that despite how much victory might be wished for in the Kremlin, no matter what gimmicks might be used and shortcuts taken, will never come. That was the case from the start. The greatest opponent the Russian Federation government faces is itself. Destroying its operation in Ukraine will prove to be its greatest victory over itself. On this point, greatcharlie does not believe it is in error. However, surely it would fully accept that if Surovikin were to be immediately released near the time of this writing, error upon it would be proved to some considerable degree. Certainly, greatcharlie, with some trepidation, will publish a more than apologetic retraction of it all once news of Surovikin’s release is reported. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. (For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.)

Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert dedicated to Russian servicemen taking part in the military operation in Ukraine on the eve of Defender of Fatherland Day at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, February 22, 2023. There was surely great contrast between the ebullience displayed by Putin at the patriotic event and his thoughts and feelings behind the scenes about what his military commanders are doing in Ukraine and what he can expect from them as the war continues. Many decisions and actions made by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance. In examining this issue, greatcharlie seeks to reinforce somewhat likely conclusions by foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in the US and around the world not just concerning Putin’s control of Russian Federation Armed Forces, and to some degree, his security services as well, but also his culpability for crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as soldiers. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Many decisions and actions taken by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance, a perspective put in plain view during his February 24, 2022 address, broadcasted just as the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) began. With no pretension intended, greatcharlie states the Russian Federation’s handling of its wrongful invasion at all levels has been deplorable. What arouses an interest at this juncture has been Putin’s lack of control over many “big things” during the massive enterprise. Within the boundaries of its faculty, here greatcharlie humbly provides a few insights on how many things have gone wrong for Putin, the colossal issues that now beset him concerning the war, how he might seek to gain firmer control of the situation, and what that might mean going forward. Hopefully, greatcharlie provides new perspectives not just concerning Putin’s control of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces), and to some degree, his security services, but also his culpability for heinous crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as unarmed soldiers. An historic parallel to his lack of control over events in the field is presented. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC) was an Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, born in Athens. At the age of 30, Xenophon led one of the largest Greek mercenary armies of the Achaemenid Empire, the Ten Thousand, that famously attempted to seize Babylon but failed in 401 BC. As a writer, one of his works was Cynegeticus, usually translated as On Hunting or Hunting with Dogs. In discussing his wish that readers would find value in his treatise, Xenophon writes a passage which interestingly parallels greatcharlie’s desires regarding this essay. He states: ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν. οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι τὰ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι: ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὸ ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι:καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. (Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation—philosophers I will not call them —because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set, will say that what is well and methodically written is not well and methodically written—for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres, but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted.) (Regarding the presentation of the Greek text, greatcharlie asks its readers to kindly pardon its indulgence. It is presented here in “private” acknowledgement and celebration of someone of the utmost importance who will begin her undergraduate studies in the Classics in the Fall of 2023!)

I. The Magnitude of the Ukraine Disaster Begins to Take Form within Putin 

Stepping into the realm of conjecture, greatcharlie can imagine Putin, at the time of his decision to launch the special military operation was girded by the belief that his extreme action was necessary to secure a spiritual victory for mankind over the ugly evil of Nazism. However, Putin at the time of this writing may see the situation a bit differently. Clearly, he has plunged his country and the world in a challenging situation by acting on what he doubtlessly would likely still call “certainties” concerning Ukraine, NATO Expansion, and Western threat to the Russian Federation.

Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them.

Putin attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them..

II. Putin’s Actual Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

When there are missing pieces among facts collected in an investigation, a reliable imagination can be very useful. One can imagine what might be happening with another party. That supposition could become a working hypothesis. One then can act upon it, and if lucky, the investment in time and energy will prove justifiable. As alluded to earlier, the received wisdom among many Western military analysts and Russia scholars is that The Kremlin runs the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and in their view “today the Kremlin means Putin.” His military advisers are Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. Evidence offered of his control of the armed forces is the fact that “both generals serve “entirely at the pleasure of Putin” and “the respective predecessor of each was summarily dismissed.” One steps out on an attenuated thread when standing behind such evidence to support arguments regarding Putin’s control of the military. What may be perceived as simple truth, in reality is not so simple.

Over the two plus decades of Putin’s leadership, the record shows that unethical and outright criminal behavior can surely be well concealed under the Russian Federation government system. Certainly long before, in the erstwhile Soviet system, corruption in the armed forces was endemic and lucrative enough for those senior commanders engaged in such who would quietly “grease the palms” of superiors and who were not caught. The sales of military equipment to black marketers was the commonplace betrayal of some commanders. Another example that remains in greatcharlie’s memory from the days of the Cold War was learning that fighter pilots would pay commanders in order to serve in certain top tier squadrons. The military is not the only foreign and national security bureaucracy ham-strung and suffering from corruption. Unimaginable but true, even the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB Alexander Borrnikov, an irreplaceable member of Putin’s piratical crew, was shrewdly deceived by subordinates in the FSB 5th Department foreign intelligence service before the special military operation began. (The matter is discussed in further detail later in this essay. SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” for other insights shared on the matter.)

If one It has been suggested by some experrs that in Ukraine, Putin by his own hand destroyed the armed forces that built up over two decades. Looking at this supposition open-mindedly, one might added that if that is so, he certainly did not do it deliberately. However,,it is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was at the hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did a superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind. On February 24, 2022, they rolled the dice and poured their troops into Ukraine as ordered, hoping somehow that things might fall into place. Things did not go their way. Putin most likely had no idea how much damage was being done by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He could hardly admit even now that he did not know. If he did not need them now as a buffer between himself all the many failures militarily, and all the political drama, and if he had anyone else tied as closely to him that he knew as well and could turn, Putin would have likely sent them to higher service already, as is the pattern. If the Ukraine War were to end in the Russian Federation’s favor, an unlikely outcome, perhaps the two general might face trying times. Putin does not forget or forgive such betrayals. He is not the understanding type.

If one might suggest that it was all a deliberate act of subversion by one or both of the generals, the question would be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous degree in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties.

Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing flat-footed on the ground and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This averment shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round.

Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (right). It is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was atbthe hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did an superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind.

A. Delegation and Disappointment

Further to the preceding point, what did not serve Putin well was any thought that he could delegate matters concerning the special military operation that he typically would have overburdened himself with in the past. It appears to have been a matter of misplaced trust, which is very unusual for Putin. As an executive he made the proper management decision, but given the nature of his regime and its players, it was the wrong choice, at the wrong time, anc the wrong issue to do any delegating over. If Putin had been truly In control of the facts and the moving pieces, greatcharlie goes out on a limb to say he probably would have never gone into Ukraine and as it was, encountered considerable, unexpected resistance or just bad luck. However, if he would have still decided to go in knowing what he knows now, he would very likely have done his homework and to the very best of his ability developed real answers to resolve prospective problems having imagined more than enough possible failures and mishaps that could derail his plans and having most likely rehearsed over and over in his mind more than one way to resolve them. The situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would doubtlessly look a lot different than it does now. Of course, none of that happened.

Power and control are often limited for political authorities, even autocrats, during conventional military operations. That lack of control–along with US experience in Vietnam– is what in part inspired the US Congress to pass the War Powers Act in 1973. Surely, laid bare in Ukraine for Putin is his own lack of control  Certainly many may disagree with this assessment, but those who insist that Putin directly controlled events in Ukraine, even war crimes committed, should look more directly at just how poorly he has controlled aspects of his special military operation. On the four occasions presented here, Putin’s lack of control was self-evident.

1. The First Big Let Down: Russian Federation Intelligence on Ukraine

Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen in the Russian Federation. Far more than just being familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services, in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. (Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership.) In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Before becoming Russian Federation President, Putin served as Yeltsin’s Secretary of Sovet bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser. Having those experiences, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, he should have known that reporting from them must be scrutinized. In a very perplexing way, Putin felt confident enough to appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast announcing the start of the special military operation. Putin said: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” Lastly, he stated: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.”

 As the story goes, the now former head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda and his deputy as well as head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh, reportedly had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. Whatever Putin’s inner voice might have been saying about what he was being told about Ukraine, he closed his ear to it. Putin was apparently so convinced by reporting that Ukrainians were so dissatisfied with the leadership in Kyiv ready to welcome regime change, he attempted to appeal to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to acquiesce to invading Russian Federation forces. Putin seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness to self-interest and to the interest of the Russian Federation. Considering how Putin spoke so boldly in his broadcast to the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) audaciously suggesting they turn on their government, If the whole matter were not so grave, it could be viewed as Armed Forces comical.

Putin (center) Shoigu (left) and Gerasimov (right) at military exercises 2022. Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin, himself, might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was essentially recognized as a master stroke of military genius. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them.

2. A Study in Contrasts: Acumen Displayed in Zapad, Vostok, and Other Military Exercises and Poor Performance on the Battlefield

Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was a master stroke. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them. 

Despite what may have been choreographed to display a well-trained, well-equipped war machine for Putin’s unknowing eyes, the walls fell down in Ukraine. A poor strategy, faulty planning of the military operation, leaving the door open to supply and resupply of arms, equipment and sustenance, failure to decisively conquer by moving up the River Dnieper to cut off the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, reinforcing the failed operations in the Donbas, in part resulted in a stalled invasion and the epic slaughter of a modern army. Putin counted upon commanders with limited combat experience and no experience who more than anything else displayed negligence, inattentiveness to details large and small, delinquencies, and deficiencies. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. As for the concept of the Combined Arms Army, the formations raised and operated under it were as empty with troops as the concept was with promise.

3, Putin’s Faith in Spetsnaz: “A Weapon Is Only as the Man Who Wields It”

Putin has never hidden his admiration for Russian Federation Special Operations Forces. In foreign and national security policy approaches taken by the Russian Federation, special operations forces have been the go-to hammer to swing when the application of force was deemed required by the Kremlin. Such has also been the case with regard to domestic threats, particularly emanating from the Caucasus. Outside of government structures, Putin’s admiration for commando-type formations has likely played a role in his full acceptance and regular utilization of professional military contractors as the Wagner Group which are teaming with erstwhile spetsnaz members. In the opening days of the special military operation, Putin put his appreciation for the Russian Federation’s special operations forces on display by taking time on  February 27, 2022 to broadcast a message congratulating active military personnel and veterans of their formations on their professional holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day”. More than just a canned speech, Putin laid his heart out bare by stating: “You have demonstrated many times that you are prepared to act with the utmost efficiency and under the harshest conditions to precisely and professionally complete the most difficult and demanding missions. You always perform your military duty to protect your native country and citizens with honor and protect Russia’s national interests. The heroic traditions of the special forces find their roots in the centuries-long history of our army. They were fortified during the Great Patriotic War, matured and grew even stronger in Afghanistan and many hotbeds, as well as during the elimination of terrorists gangs both in the North Caucasus and in Syria. Putin said further: “I know that you undergo exactly this kind of training -comprehensive, all-encompassing and intensive, a real school of warfare. You strive to follow the best paragons of courage and bravery, true patriotism, and you set an example for new generations of defenders of the Fatherland and pass on your experience to young servicemen.” Very likely with reference to former spetsnaz serving in the Wagner Group, Putin remarked: “I want to thank the command and the personnel of the special operations forces as well as special forces veterans for their loyalty to the oath, for their impeccable service to the people of Russia and our great Motherland. My special appreciation goes to those who are performing their duty in the special operation to render assistance to the people’s republics of Donbass.”

Putin’s faith in the spetsnaz to carry out their duties to their utmost abilities was warranted, but as is the same with special operations soldiers in every country, they were only human and could only do so much. Placing them with their exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, under the control of Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, did not help. Among the classified US national security materials leaked online through the messaging platform in March 2023 were assessments of officials within the foreign and national security bureaucracies on the strength and capabilities of Russian Federation spetsnaz forces. According to those findings, there was such an overreliance on the specialized units on the frontlines that they consequently suffered atrocious losses. Behind the decision to use spetsnaz in such a role purportedly was skepticism among Russian Federation commanders that their conventional forces’ abilities could achieve objectives set in the invasion plans. Leaked documents also reportedly indicate US officials believe the high casualties of these units has rendered them less effective not only in Ukraine but also in other parts of the world where Russian Federation forces operate. Evidence of the losses in the spetsnaz units apparently was provided by satellite imagery featured among the leaked materials. Before-and-after imagery of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade’s base in southern Russia allegedly revealed that “all but one of five Russian Federation Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” Materials citing intelligence intercepts, assess the 346th brigade “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.” US intelligence analysts, who monitored the return of spetsnaz units to their respective bases, believe that extremely high losses in the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment “could explain why there is no clear [intelligence] signature of their return to garrison.” The loss of so many among the spetsnaz very likely came as a shock to Putin.

4. Hoping the Wagner Group Will Shift the Fight Moscow’s Way

As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Mentioned earlier was also that fact that Wagner Group fighters are typically retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. From the moment the situation went sour in Ukraine, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is widely known that since July 2022, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. To an extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be the saving grace of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 

However, it was not long before everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops. According to the best statistics available to greatcharlie, since April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As alluded to earlier, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner Group troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut.

In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin has expressed concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. Surely, Putin maybe somewhat concerned that the Wagner Group’s losses may eventually become so great that the organization would not be available to handle other foreign and national security policy matters for some time to come. In a pinch, perhaps the Wagner Group could recruit from among special operations veterans who served in the FSB and Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, but those former operators would for the most part lack the same level of battlefield experience spetsnaz from the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost in Ukraine possessed.

The full list of disappointments for Putin of or pertaining to the Ukraine enterprise is frightfully long and would overload and overwhelm this essay if included. Though, as aforementioned, theories of Putin’s control over the Russian Federation Armed Forces are accepted, it appears that nearly every theory confirming his alleged control cannot figuratively hold water.

Putin (left) and Gerasimov (right) holding a press conference following announcement that Gerasimov had become overall Russian Federation commander in Ukraine. Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

B. The Power to Hire and Fire Generals: What is It Worth?

Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

1. Putin Sacked a Slew of Generals in May 2022

Based on information made public by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, on May 19, 2022, Putin fired two senior commanders Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, who had commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov of the Black Sea Fleet. Osipov was reportedly fired following the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, which was a major embarrassment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Moscow-based media group, RBCreported on June 1, 2022, that on May 30, 2022, Putin issued a decree dismissing senior commanders of the security services. The list of those removed from their posts included: Major General of Police Vasily Kukushkin, who was head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir region; Major General Alexander Laas, deputy head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory; and, Major General Andrey Lipilin, head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region. Major General Alexander Udovenko of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Major General Yuri Instrankin, deputy head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were also among the dismissed. Additionally, Putin reportedly fired Police Colonel Emil Musin, who was the first deputy head of the Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Putin Fired 22 Russian Army Generals in August 2022

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence reported that General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 had been sacked. it was at that time there were the rather quiet, yet widely suspected firings of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was the senior but not overall command of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine and General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine. US officials estimated at the time of these dismissals that more than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured, which represented more than 50% of the number of troops Russia initially deployed in  the special military operation. According to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, at least 10 generals were among those killed.

3. Putin Fires Russian Army Generals for Failed Response to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in September 2022

Based on information from Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Telegraph reported on September 12, 2022 that Putin fired Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in a recent offensive in the east.

4. Putin Replaces Overall Commander in Ukraine in January 2023 and Fires Russian Army General for Vuhledar Fiasco in March 2023

A shift in command well-known among those following events in the Ukraine War was the replacement of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin by Gerasimov as overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”. On or just before March 26, 2023, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, had been removed from his post. Muradov had previously come under criticism for his failure in Vuhledar from Prigozhin who believed its capture was possible and may have had the effect of turning the war in Moscow’s favor. The Moscow Times, described as an independent English- and Russian-language online newspaper with offices in Amsterdam that is currently outlawed in Russia, also reported that Muradov had been suspended, One of the Moscow Times’ sources told the online daily, “Muradov was suspended because he was a crazy idiot who could command soldiers to die. Many complained about him.”

In February 2023, Muradov attacked Vuhledar by sending his soldiers into minefields, right under the artillery fire of the Ukrainians. As a consequence of his actions, reportedly two elite Russian Naval Infantry brigades, one presumed to be the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 103 pieces of equipment were reportedly lost in just three days. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.”

As the record indicates, on every occasion when Putin, usually via his Defense Minister, sacked a group of generals who underperformed, a month or a couple of months later, he was dismissing another group for similar, if not parallel failures. Sacking a general, more than just a punishment, is a very strong form of public embarrassment. By now, everyone interested in Putin has recognized that he rarely reverses his own decisions. (If that were the case, he surely would have reversed his decision to invade Ukraine. Declaring success early on and offering purported measurables among other things would have been the most likely off ramp.) Firing generals from commands whose records he doubtlessly reviewed and gave ultimate approval for top assignments unlikely came easy for him. Perhaps Putin may even be concerned that it reveals that he is not the best judge of people, that he has lost his touch, and worst of all, it confirms for some that he is not infallible. His mistakes with the military have very noticeably begun to pile up. Interestingly, despite being punished, the generals who were sacked will at least live to see another day. The soldiers, some incredibly young, whose lives they carelessly wasted in Ukraine will not have that chance.

There is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide an apology, legal advice, or worst, a legal defense, for Putin over war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Thoee among greatcharlie’s readers who may feel anything of the kind is being offered here to Putin, then it is respectfully suggested they stop reading the commentary at this point for it would surely be unreasonable, unconstructuve to continue with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

Alexander Gardiner’s famous photograph of US President Abraham Lincoln, and Union Army Major General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (right) and Allan Pinkerton (left) at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862. Although many readers, particularly in the US, both technically and perhaps more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America.

C. Another Leader Who Struggled To Control His Commanders During Wartime

Although many readers, particularly in the US both technically, and more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America. The author of the military law was jurist Franz Lieber, a German lawyer, political philosopher, and combat veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Lieber essentially modernized the military law of the 1806 Articles of War to ensure the Union Army could prosecute its war against the Confederate States of America with legitimacy.

However, despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the #humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

In fairness to Sherman, it must be noted that he acted in accord with the concept and intent of Lincoln’s Lieber Code when he gave explicit instructions to his troops regarding their conduct while on their march through Georgia, but there were a few deviations. In his Special Field Order No. 120, Sherman out of necessity encouraged foraging and the confiscation of livestock as he left his Army Group’s supply lines behind to travel so deep, so fast, and so furiously into Georgia. Home invasions were off limits. However, if antagonized by Confederate Army soldiers, Union Army officers were granted permission to destroy private and industrial property. Additionally, the field order permitted able-bodied Black laborers to join the march, but commanding officers were instructed to prioritize the distribution of supplies for soldiers of their Army Group. The majority of Union Army soldiers complied with Field Order No. 120, but some dubbed “bummers” roamed the countryside intentionally terrorizing civilians and looting. Although bummers were technically engaging in forbidden activities, the overall psychological impact of their actions on the local population was in sync with the purpose of the march. The greatest damage done by Sherman’s troops was the destruction of Georgia’s railroad lines, both a conveyor for industries and military transportation. Union Army soldiers would rip up and melt down tracks in full view of the demoralized populace.

Union Army troops tearing up railroad tracks in Georgia as Confederate civilians watched in horror (above). Despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

The text of the Lieber Code was arranged to create concordance with the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863) and prohibited racist discrimination against Black soldiers of the Union Army, specifically by Confederate Army troops who denied them the rights and privileges of prisoners of war. The military law clearly had little impact on the treatment of racially segregated Black soldiers of the US Colored Troops (USCT) by their White Union Army comrades in arms. At the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), incredulously, yet painfully true, White soldiers of the Union Army’s 1st Division essentially assisted soldiers of the Confederate States Army massacre Black soldiers of the 4th Division (USCT) in the midst of the fighting. (SEE the February 28, 2023 greatcharlie post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”.

On top of that, a succession of commanders failed to meet Lincoln’s expectations during the war. He could insist upon regular consultations on their battle plans, but he could not control what they actually did on the battlefield. He could only remove them. or allow them to resign, but he could not repair the damage they had done to the Union effort, or do anything about the wastage of Union Army soldiers. Very briefly, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, having previously functioned as Commander of the Army and Department of Northeastern Virginia from May 27, 1861 to July 25, 1861, served as a general in the Army of the Potomac until after the Second Battle of Bull Run when he was relieved of command at his own request on September 6, 1862. Major General George “Little Mac” McClellan was appointed Commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, and later, the Army of the Potomac (July 26, 1861 to November 9, 1862). In 1862, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign unraveled after the Seven Days Battles, and he also failed to decisively defeat the forces of General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Frustrated by McClellan’s cautious tactics, Lincoln removed him from command. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside served as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from November 9, 1862 to January 26, 1863. Following his infamous “Mud March”.and the senseless slaughter of his troops during the Union Army’s defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Joseph Hooker served as Commander of the Army and Department of the Potomac from January 26, 1863 to June 28, 1863. Concerned about Hooker were first raised when reports were made that his headquarters doubled as a combination of bar and brothel. Hooker’s timid command performance and grave defects as a commander–he lost mental control of his command in battle–were exposed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Ostensibly recognizing “faults” in his behavior and performance and reportedly sensing the distrust of Lincoln and Union Army General in Chief Major General Henry Halleck, Hooker resigned his command on June 28, 1863, on the eve of battle. Major General George Meade jumped in as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from June 28, 1863 to June 28, 1865. Meade repulsed the forces of the General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg from July 1, 1863 to July 3, 1863 with tactical adroitness; however, he was castigated by some for failing to hotly pursue the remainder of Lee’s forces. He instead allowed them to escape from his immediate reach. Lincoln in duress penned a letter to Meade dated July 14, 1863, relieving him of his command but never sent it. Success was not assured at Gettysburg, but Meade had apparently failed to keep any preconceived follow through firmly in mind in the event of victory.. Although Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, his independence of action was sharply curtailed after March 9, 1864, when General Ulysses S. Grant took control of Union  forces from Halleck and was named Commanding General of the US Army. 

Despite keeping a close eye on them to the point that he nearly micromanaged the war, Lincoln could only possess marginal control over the actions of his most senior commanders. He surely had even less of a chance to control the actions of subordinates well beneath them in the chain of command on the battlefield. A law such as theLieber Code could at best signal intent. In the end, what was done was done. If unlawful or unethical acts were witnessed, they could at best be reported and adjudicated within the system of military justice, or if egregious enough, reviewed in Congressional hearings. 

Painting of the representatives of 12 countries at the conference held in the Alabama room at Geneva’s Hotel de Ville August 22, 1864 where they adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” (above). The International Committee of the Red Cross while recognising that it is “primarily the duty and responsibility of a nation to safeguard the health and physical well-being of its own people,” knew there would always, especially in times of war, be a “need for voluntary agencies to supplement . . . the official agencies charged with these responsibilities in every country.” To ensure that its mission was widely accepted, it required a body of rules to govern its own activities and those of the involved belligerent parties. A year later, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the US Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. A total of twenty-six delegates from 16 countries came to Geneva. The meeting was presided over by Swiss General Guillaume Henri Dufour. The conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.” Representatives of 12 countries signed the convention at that time.

IV. Under the Geneva Convention Military Commanders Are Responsible for What Happens in Field

To the extent the political authorities cannot control events in the field, commanders take on greater responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Under Geneva Convention I , Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129; Geneva Convention  IV, Article 146; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 28; and, Geneva Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87, it is clear that commanders shalll be held criminally responsible under the law if they knew or should have known that subordinates were going to violate the law by committing a war crime, yet failed to take steps to prevent it. Further, commanders would be held liable for failing to punish or report subordinates who have already committed a war crime. To that extent, commanders are viewed as being in control of their troops and being responsible for all that transpires within their commands at all times. That rationale gains support in the following way. When the commander develops a plan of action, necessary is the requirement to assess all factors relevant at the time, such as ground and enemy forces, your own forces, logistics, courses open. (In greatcharlie’s day, it was referred to as the METT+T analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available. Yes, greatcharlie’s editor is that old!) Once the plan is decided, the commander issues orders to subordinates. The next aspect of control is the direction of the engagement, during which it is expected that the commander will take into account the law of armed conflict. 

V. Likely Big Lesson Learned by Putin Concerning Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 

Having learned a very painful lesson with his conventional forces during the special military operation, Putin will ensure that he fully controls the “crown jewels” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: the nuclear triad. That effort to establish that control has been mostly revealed with each public move he has made with regard to the supply, continual redeployments, and drilling of those forces. With regard to to those who command the nuclear forces, as explained in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: What Comes Next for Putin at Home and in Ukraine?: An Assessment One Year After the Start of His Special Military Operation”, just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, literally Strategic Purpose Rocketry Troops) which control land-based ICBMs, the strategic bombers and other nuclear capable airframes of the Voenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force), and satellites of the Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony (Russian Aerospace Defense Forces) without a shadow of doubt would go into action. In addition, commanders of the strategic submarines of the Voyenno-morskoy Flot (Russian Naval Force) in both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would execute their missions. Indeed, commanders who are in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise. Surely, there are more than enough members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces hurting over the nightmare that has befallen their comrades in Ukraine. They more than likely want to dish out some “payback” against those countries that they likely perceive–based on what they surely have been told–created circumstances there, and many can deliver payback in the extreme.

At the Battle of Camarón, an important episode of the Second French Intervention in Mexico (December 8, 1861 to June 27, 1867), the 3rd company of 62 Legionnaires and three Legion officers, led by Captain Jean Danjou was sent to reinforce a French military convoy, transporting 3 million francs in gold bullion, siege guns, and sixty wagons of ammunition. Information was received that the convoy would be ambushed. Before Danjou could reach the convoy, the led elements of a force of 3,000 Mexican Army infantry and cavalry made contact with his unit and he was forced to make a defensive stand at the Hacienda Cameron, in Camarón de Tejeda, Veracruz, Mexico. At the point when he recognized that victory would be absolutely impossible to achieve against the larger Mexican force massed around their defenses, Danjou urged his soldiers to take an oath to fight to the death rather than surrender. He made them swear their fealty on his wooden hand. Danjou then shared his bottle of wine and encouraged his men with has been called  “those noble words that warm one’s heart and makes the final sacrifice less difficult to face.”  When the French Foreign Legion moved to France, Capitain Danjou’s wooden hand was taken to Aubagne, where it remains in the Legion Museum of Memory.  The hand is the most cherished artifact in Legion history.  April 30th is celebrated as “Camerone Day,” an important day for the Legionnaires, when the wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is brought out for display. In 1892, a monument commemorating the battle was erected on the battlefield containing a plaque with the following inscription in French: Ils furent ici moins de soixante / Opposés a toute une armée / Sa masse les écrasa / La vie plutôt que le courage / Abandonna ces soldats Français / Le 30 Avril 1863 / A leur mémoire la patrie éleva ce monument. (Here there were less than sixty opposed to a whole army. Its numbers crushed them. Life rather than courage abandoned these French soldiers on April 30, 1863.  In their memory, the fatherland has erected this monument”) The railing from the Legion grave at Camarone can now be found at the village of Puyloubier near Aix-en-Provence. (The importance of the Battle of Camarón with regard to the history and culture of the French Foreign Legion is discussed in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations.”

Although perhaps willing to accept that Putin is the quintessential “bad actor”, it appears almost impossible for many to believe Putin could decide for the Russian people that as a country the Russian Federation would accept a similar fate, mutantis mutandis, rather accept what he ostensibly would perceive and envision as the nightmare of life under the thumb of Western powers and the near certain invasion of their country in the near future. Indeed, observers might try to consider a scenario in which Putin after observing the Russian Federation Armed Forces lose one decisive battle after another in rapid succession and all had unraveled in Ukraine, would make a nationwide broadcast one evening explaining to the Russian people that the Russian Federation was about to be invaded by the proxy forces of the Western powers, that the special military operation, meant as a pre-emptive action has lifted the curtain on the true nature of the Western powers’ objectives and operations in Ukraine and based on all that has been revealed concerning the actions of the Western powers and the astronomical support of the offensive military activities of their partner in Kyiv, despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin for them not to continue their aggressive activities in the Russian Federation’s near abroad, a state of total war existed between the Russian Federation and the US, its NATO allies, and the EU. He would tell the Russian people that their support, prayers, and courage were needed as his government took its next steps. Putin would likely display sangfroid and equanimity, and speak with the tone of a leader in complete command of a situation.(Readers might cast their minds back to Nazi German Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ February 18, 1943 address at the Berlin Sportpalast following the Wehrmacht’s epic loss at Stalingrad to the Soviet Army, in which he zealously implored the German people to commit anew to an all-out war effort: Totaler Krieg–Kürzester Krieg! (Total War–Shortest War!) From the point of that hypothetical broadcast, it would most likely just be a matter of time before the worst possibility would materialize.

It is greatcharlie’s contention, without pretense, some absurd desire to establish some greater sense of importance, or a ridiculous effort to claim of greater sapience, that Western diplomats would do well to reflect on this assessment and consider how responding to what they might deem as Putin’s misperceptions to open the door to great possibilities.)

The Russian Federation’s Sarmat Intercontinental ballistic missile (above) is a 115 feet (35-meters) tall and has a range of 11,185 miles (18,000km)(). Some estimate this to be higher. It can carry at least 10 multiple targetable re-entry vehicles – each with a nuclear warhead – which can each be aimed at a different target. It can also deliver hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles that can travel further and faster, flying in a variable path to overcome missile defenses. Just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad and supporting organizations would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise.

VI. The Arrest Warrant for Putin

In Paragraph 6 of  the First Oration of his Catalonia Orations, Marcus Tulius Cicero, an excoriation of rival senator Lucius Sergius Catiline, who he alleged sought to overthrow the Roman Senate, he writes: Quamdiu quisquam erit, qui te defendere audea, vives, et vives ita, ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firms praesidiis obsessed, ne commovere te contra rem publicam possis. Multorum te etiam oculi et aures non sentience, sicut adhuc fecerunt, speculabuntur atque custodient. (As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live, but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to.stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall perceive them.) Doubtlessly, with the necessary adjustments, surely this is the fate many in Western governments hope will befall Putin and he would be left in such a depleted state. However, greatcharlie suggests the satisfaction that they seek will unlikely manifest and the cost of any attempt to get their hands on Putin would be far worse than steep. Such attempts to create such a circumstance would inflame Putin’s ardor to a degree one could only reasonably expect the worst.

On March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant of arrest for Putin in the context of the situation in Ukraine. (Indicted along with Putin on that day was Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation since 2021.) As Russian Federation President, Putin has been declared allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” The Pre-Trial Chamber II also stated that “the crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory at least from February 24, 2022.” The Pre-Trial Chamber II further explained that it has reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility “(i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” The alleged war crime as outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber II is horrendous. At the nub of the matter is the issue of Putin’s level of control over the actions of all Russian Federation elements in Ukraine.

So often it has been the case with Putin’s presidency, legal action in response to his behavior on the world stage may have been warranted, but not necessarily required given the context of situations. Prioritizing the furtherance of international peace and security, the leader of Russian Federation with an enormous nuclear arsenal under his control, and members of his coterie, were hit with tongue lashings, finger-wagging, and sanctions. National governments, regional organizations, and international organizations would level economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and national legislatures would pass punishing business and financial laws designed to stifle the ability of the Russian Federation business community, particularly the country’s elite, to maintain and generate within advanced industrialized systems. The Magnitsky Law passed in the US created a considerable degree of pain and aggravation for Putin. Other than that, and a few other other coercive measures, Putin was repeatedly extended a degree of latitude. Putin was surely smart enough to recognize that. (One might posit that he flaunted that latitude allowed to him in the faces of Western powers by invading Ukraine.) In an environment in the West in which political leaders, especially among NATO and EU countries were being hounded over not doing enough to support Ukraine and not enough to decouple and lash out against Putin, the choice of the US-led international community became to exercise legal power over the Russian Federation President. Urging the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, though significant, was seemingly rather trivial in comparison with the greater task of assisting Ukraine in defeating the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, it helped set a path toward what may be a future of even more trying diplomatic efforts with Putin, which to great extent–unless the international community makes another choice, the unthinkable choice of granting Putin whatever he wishes–has put the outcome somewhat out of its rational hands.)

A. Putin Still Minimized as an “Oppositional Adolescent” by the West?

As touched upon in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post, it is difficult to see exactly what end was hoped for when the decision was made to indict Putin. There was likely some ego stroke scored as a result of sticking it to Putin, but not much more was accomplished than that. (How horrifying and disappointing it would be to discover the intent was to goad Putin to react adversely and make mistakes. If such is even remotely accurate, perhaps those who hypothetically were impelled by that thought might not have considered a big mistake Putin might have immediately made–and could still make–could have been to start a nuclear war. “Wishful thinking” is not a form of optimism, it is a euphemistic term for denial.)

Whether it was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

Maybe it would have been far more reasonable and practical to demand Putin confess irresponsibility over leading his country into war with so many criminally minded senior officials and military men unaware that he would not have genuine control of those who would eventually perpetrate heinous acts in Ukraine under orders from unstable authorities far beneath those in the Senate Building at the Kremlin as well as some sort of diabolical control from Hell. The chance of Putin cooperating in either case would doubtlessly be the same: zero! One might wonder what would be the plan of the International Criminal Court to successfully and safely take him into custody. 

Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, an arrest warrant can be issued publicly or under seal when the arrest of the person appears necessary to ensure a person’s appearance at trial. Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, the court may request the cooperation in the arrest and surrender from any State on the territory of which the person may be found. The court has no internal enforcement mechanism which would allow it to arrest persons subject to arrest warrants. In the interest of promoting good interstate relations, diplomacy, and peace and security and simply in the planetary interest, under such trying circumstances, discretion in taking such actions–at least refraining from declaring as criminal a party essential to establishing peace–would be the best choice, the better part of valor. Putin’s accountability and culpability for war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian Federation forces was something which could have been dealt with later. The priority now is ending the war if possible.

B. Actualities Concerning Intelligence and Making Claims against Putin

With regard to providing evidence of Putin’s crimes, one would need to be dismissive of the fact that the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation have sophisticated capabilities. One cannot say for certain what would happen if the Kremlin produced its own classified information confirming Putin plainly stated he would brook no behavior by Russian Federation forces in the field of the kind for which he is accused of having some responsibility. Hypothetically, the Kremlin might be able to produce transcripts of communications between errant commanders demonstrating their deliberate effort to conceal their actions from superiors, making false any suggestion that Putin controlled or ordered their illegal actions. To that extent, it might be proven with a sea of declassified official internal documents by the Kremlin that generally Putin did not impose too much on his commanders and within reason, relied on their reports and advice on the special military operation. Of course, one could expect it to possess a profusion of redactions to give them that ultra official feel and if any documents are authentic, to hide any nitty-gritty. With such evidence at hand, the Kremlin would surely insist it has no need to respond to baseless accusations about the Russian Federation President. 

One could unlikely insist as part of any fair and balanced legal process that Russian Federation classified intelligence is of less veracity and should be distrusted outrightly. Turning to the intelligence of one country–for instance the US, the United Kingdom, or Germany–that can provide information collected through electronic eavesdropping externally on the internal communications of the armed forces and security organizations of another country–for example the Russian Federation–with the aim to refute and discredit said monitored country’s own intelligence on what was being discussed among its military and security officials, would be something better than an act of bias and stand the idea of objective justice on its head. The International Criminal Court is supposed to be an objective tool for the world. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness but having stated the former, it believes that such a chauvinistic step and in the end finding Putin “unhesitatingly and with utter conviction” guilty, perhaps even in absentia, rationally imaginable given how predisposed so many that serve in regional and international bodies are to think unfavorably about him. The thinking of the court is certainly not to be judged by greatcharlie. It is only outlining what it perceives as a likely possibility. (This statement is not intended as apophasis.) If one might take into account anything about Putin’s arrest warrant written here could even remotely have some influence, it would at best be as a cautionary assessment for Western foreign and national security bureaucracies to consider before pursuing the arrest warrant matter any further.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) at the Kremlin on March 8, 2023. Whether the action was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice among powers of great influence in the West, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

VII. Energetic Diplomacy: The Best Chance of Stemming Catastrophe

In the aftermath of everything, historians would likely be forced to choose whether there really was something so peculiar about Putin that makes energetic efforts at diplomacy at this stage so taxing. It may actually be the case that the fault for ineffective diplomatic efforts with lies with the foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders of the many countries that had to deal with him. Perchance it was the fault of both parties for failing to see a true middle ground in things satisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless, it is greatcharlie’s conviction that at the present the West is in grave danger. The source of that danger in the Russian Federation. Ending the Ukraine War on favorable or acceptable terms for all parties is of the utmost importance. However, the priority is to ease the world back from an apparent slow spiral to armageddon.

In its March 30th post, greatcharlie suggested that at this point, diplomacy with the Russian Federation on Ukraine has figuratively been knocked off the rails. True, indicting Putin was a step that practically ensured his refusal to negotiate with Kyiv unless he had attained some considerable advantage in Ukraine and his negotiating position would be very strong. However, rather than draw a line there as in March and succumb to despair, here greatcharlie pulls back from the statement that the opportunity for diplomacy has been lost. 

A  Having the Right Answers

Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand, given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made. Putin shall not countenance what he may perceive as a diminution of the great dignity of the Russian Federation. 

Although all countries with an immediate stake in the Ukraine matter should be made aware of the diplomatic effort to achieve an entente with Putin, the new contact may need to be performed discreetly. Perhaps this is best that can be done at this juncture. Hope can be the only thing that comforts people in misery. For Russian people, who are the ones who will decide whether there is a need for change in the direction their country has been moving, hope for that change could be founded through contact between their president and the outside world. Paradoxically, while Putin may indeed enhance his standing among many as they will see the Russian Federation still acting as an important player on the world stage, many others may perceive such diplomacy as proof that the Russian people are viewed as far more than just potential targets for retaliatory nuclear strikes from the the US, the United Kingdom, and France, and written off as nothing to signify. It is suggested by greatcharlie in an opaque way that such a diplomatic effort could even mean far more to the right number of them. In public discussions of the new diplomacy, Western diplomats would do well to emphasize the effort has been undertaken with consideration of the well-being of the Russian people and make other statements of that nature.

There are for certain countless pitfalls that could disrupt or even destroy a new, robust diplomatic effort. What may be most important for Western capitals to recognize are the right answers that will bring a negotiated settlement and peace. There is also the issue of time available. Again, Putin has a large say in how things will turn out and surely has his own timeliness for action. To that extent, until some acceptable path to peace is found, perhaps the greatest danger will remain a decision already made by him to act in some ghastly way.

B. In the Meantime, Will the West Lose Control of Its Junior Partner in Kyiv?

The indications and implications of multiple reporting, to include the Washington Post, of alleged swift action by US foreign and national security policy officials to halt a plan by Ukraine to launch mass strikes against Moscow may be that at least the White House is aware of just how close the world in to a potential nuclear war, it does not want that, and that it now has the extra burden of monitoring the behavior of its “junior partners” in Kyiv. It is uncertain whether the Ukrainian leadership was led to take such a course as result of a lack of wisdom and experience or a complete absorption in self-interest or both. However, if newsmedia stories of this episode are accurate, it would appear that they were blind as beetles to the possibility that their planned assault could have triggered a catastrophic response from the Kremlin to the great detriment of Ukraine, but the whole wide world

If Putin already has a mind and the will to take the most drastic step possible against the West, Kyiv in planning an attack on Moscow could have supplied him with a reason better than anything he could have conjured up. The world moves closer and closer to the edge of the precipice with every errant move as this. It is wonder if there were any other planned Ukrainian actions halted by Western powers that would have brought the world the worst. One wonders how long can this balancing act without a safety net go on without catastrophe.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, (left) and U.S President Joe Biden (right) shake hands during their meeting at the Villa la Grange in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made.

The Way Forward

Putin watched his predecessors mismanage,  breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating not even a simulacrum of what came before it, despite his best efforts, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down “the wide-world and its fading sweets.” It is a wonder Putin has not gone mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him since the special military operation began and even beforehand. Standing on the precipice of losing everything, it would be best for the wide world if Putin can continue to retain his balance. The clear choice for him is either to continue forward or abandon at great personal loss, the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022, and triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West, begun during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Putin has mourned its collapse with considerable grief and disappointment.

Among those who use wisdom and logic, imagination can have value in an investigation. Imagination is a quality many lack, but many also lack wisdom and logic. Often it is the case that a lack of maturity inhibits one ability to reason matters out correctly. Just having an answer, right or wrong, based on some chain of thinking is enough for some. Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is in reality nothing so mysterious about Putin that should lead any national leader to throw the possibility of acceptable relations with the Russian Federation out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Putin’s worst critics will destroy any opportunity for a fruitful course to develop. As noted by greatcharlie here ad nauseum, those leaders must consider what their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation mean not only with regard to Ukraine, but in the bigger picture. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover possibilities for getting many things done by just doing things a bit differently. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the Russian Federation and become civilization’s dénouement. positive changes on one issue can often result in great benefits on another. Respice finem (Have regard for the end.)

Roosevelt’s December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat: Inferences from Its Text on Likely Meditations That Helped Him Create Hope for a Country on the Brink of War

US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt customarily delivered his famous Fireside Chats from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House where he is seen (above) seated at a table before seven microphones and newsreel cameras to his front. Roosevelt began broadcasting Fireside Chats during his presidency on March 12, 1933. They initially served as a means for him to inform the public of what the government was doing to resolve the Great Depression. The December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat is famously known as the “Arsenal of Democracy Speech,” for it is recognized as being the moment Roosevelt declared the US “must be the great arsenal of democracy” for countries already fending off the Axis Powers–Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. The story provides a fitting historical example of the trials and tribulations that can beset a President who must lead his country to war. As a bridge to our days, the situation for countries fighting the Axis Powers in 1940 mirrored that of Ukraine in 2022. The Ukrainians, desiring peace, were torn from it by the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. Under US leadership, an array of support from Europe and worldwide in response to the pleas of Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelensky for help. It would be interesting not only to look at what Roosevelt sought to communicate in his address, but discern deeper meaning in what he said. Presented is greatcharlie’s interpretation of what his inner thoughts might have been.

On December 29, 1940,  Fireside Chat, the sixteenth in a series of presidential radio broadcasts in the US, as well as Europe and Japan, 32nd President of the US, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, informed the people of their government’s plans to keep the country safe and secure. This particular Fireside Chat is famously known as the “Arsenal of Democracy Speech,” for it is recognized as being the moment Roosevelt declared the US “must be the great arsenal of democracy” for countries already fending off efforts.by the Axis Powers–Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan–to conquer them. This vital part of Roosevelt’s story provides a fitting historical example of the trials and tribulations that can beset a President caused to lead his country to war, a task made more difficult when the priority of the people is maintaining the peace and avoiding overseas conflicts at almost all costs. New priorities had come to fore and had to be accepted. Dark days were ahead. Terrible challenges would need to be endured by the people. Their strength and fortitude would be tested. As a bridge to our days, the situation in 1940 mirrored that of Ukraine in 2022, mutatis mutandis. The Ukrainians, desiring peace, were torn from it by the aggressive actions of its neighbor, the Russian Federation. Under US leadership, an array of support from Europe and worldwide in response to the pleas of Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelensky for help. In Roosevelt’s case in 1940, he was relying principally on the United Kingdom to hold the line against the Axis Powers across its vast Empire and the Commonwealth. There was no country that the US to fall back on for support. The US was the final protective line of freedom, democracy, and civilization, itself.

Certainly, the December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat has been well trodden by historians and Roosevelt scholars for more than eight decades since its original broadcast. Still, greatcharlie thought it would be interesting not only to look at what Roosevelt sought to communicate in his address but what he, then age 57, pondered at the time when he was alone with his thoughts in an attempt to discern deeper meaning in what he said. In presenting its interpretation of what some of Roosevelt’s inner thoughts might have been, greatcharlie has stayed true to actual facts. Each consideration is informed by what was known to be the situation at the time in the US and rest of the world, particularly the United Kingdom. While sharing its impressions regarding Roosevelt’s complexity. greatcharlie has remained grounded in what was possible. Insights that historians and Roosevelt scholars have already presented are not regurgitated, yet support for its Inferences are drawn from historical examples provided in their works. Notions that have generally been discounted or dismissed in the context of the address are not included. Nothing is made too complex and greatcharlie does not pretend to have all of the answers. 

The text of the December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat is drawn from a transcript provided by The American Presidency Project of the University of California at Santa Barbara. Comparisons were made with the online typescript of the address published by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum to confirm its accuracy. Here, the text is divided into 10 segments with headings to facilitate its examination.

Roosevelt’s December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat,

Roosevelt began broadcasting Fireside Chats during his presidency on March 12, 1933. The broadcasts initially served as a means for him to inform the public of what the government was doing to resolve the Great Depression. While Governor of New York State, Roosevelt had some success using Fireside Chats to inform state residents of the latest developments and steps being taken to provide some relief from the devastating effects of the crisis upon them. The first one he made as governor was on April 3, 1929. During the New Deal, Roosevelt gave a radio address around twice a year, informing the public one or two weeks beforehand with the hope of garnering a large audience. Typically, he would include in the address: aspects of government programs; criticisms of them and his responses; and, expressions of  optimism and encouragement. Roosevelt usually delivered his address from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House. Reportedly, he would arrive 15 minutes before air time to greet members of the newsmedia, including radio and newsreel correspondents.

Despite the severe nature of the threat posed by the Axis Powers, in his December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat, Roosevelt remained a paragon of sangfroid and equanimity in the face of it all. He was a gentleman at all times publicly. One would expect by reputation that he would be on his game on that day, and show well of his presidency, his country, and his own scruple. While offering answers to the dangers he highlighted, he spoke in an informal and relaxed style, his aim being to create a tone of familiarity and sense of forthrightness among listeners. That evening, Roosevelt was speaking to everyone in the US, including officials with whom he worked and conversed daily. At 9:30PM, Roosevelt began his address. It lasted 36 minutes and 53 seconds.

1. Sentences 1 through 11: The Country Faces a New Crisis Unlike the One Discussed in the 1933 Fireside Chat: It Is a Matter of National Security

Inferences

Peior est bello timor ipse belli. (Worse than war is the very fear of war.) A primary purpose of the December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat naturally was to assuage apprehensions on the rise within the US public concerning ongoing violent events in the world. Equally naturally, more than just explaining that everything would be alright, Roosevelt sought to provide hard facts on what was exactly happening in the world and what his administration was doing in response. To the good fortune of the US, at a time of such great crisis, there was an intrepid president in office of great creativity particularly on matters concerning defense and the armed forces. Indeed, he was correct in every particular. Roosevelt did not exaggerate one jot.

The Roosevelt administration’s isolationist policy, then in effect, assured a considerable degree of non-entanglement in international politics, particularly non-involvement in ongoing and burgeoning conflicts in Europe and Asia. The US took measures to avoid political and military conflicts across the oceans, it continued to quietly manage economic interests in China and Southeast Asia and actually expanded its economic interests in Latin America.

Through the isolationist policy, US citizens who were still suffering the effects of the Great Depression, could sense it was okay to focus onward on family sustainability, employment, and community in some cases. Roosevelt’s administration worked feverishly to resolve the situation. The people needed a bit more time to heal from the Depression’s ills and the isolationist policy allowed them the psychic space to do that.

Many isolationists among political and business leaders, scholars, national and grassroots non-interventionist organizations in the US in1940 surely wanted their country to stand fast, dignified and proud, in the face of provocations by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. Aggressive external parties had a great say in how the US would act. The US could not just stand by as some impressive paragon, placid and imperturbable, while Hitler plotted its utter destruction and the enslavement of its people. Time was of the essence. By the end of 1940, for all intents and purposes, a war with the Axis Powers, for all intents and purposes, had essentially become unavoidable for the US. In 1940, that would have been a hard saying. It Is very likely that for the US, everything would have been lost if the US had failed to act as Roosevelt prescribed.

Roosevelt had to bring the people and many in the government, too, to understand not his truth but “the truth” about the situation the US was in. He had to do so realizing how difficult it was for people to unlearn what they have held true for a long time about their country being able to stay out of war abroad.

Sentences 1 through 11 of the Fireside Chat

“My friends:

This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security; because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you, now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the preservation of American independence and all the things that American independence means to you and to me and to ours.

Tonight, in the presence of a world crisis, my mind goes back eight years to a night in the midst of a domestic crisis. It was a time when the wheels of American industry were grinding to a full stop, when the whole banking system of our country had ceased to function.

I well remember that while I sat in my study in the White House, preparing to talk with the people of the United States, I had before my eyes the picture of all those Americans with whom I was talking. I saw the workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories; the girl behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life’s savings.

I tried to convey to the great mass of American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.

Tonight, I want to do the same thing, with the same people, in this new crisis which faces America. We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism.

We face this new crisis–this new threat to the security of our nation–with the same courage and realism.”

2. Sentences 11 through 21: The Threat

Inferences

Nazi Germany would serve as the best example to illustrate the clear and present danger the US faced. It was a danger that could not be ignored or avoided. Nazi Germany was on the rampage in the world abroad the most in the US knew or were from. It would need to be confronted. It would not be enough to dissuade or deter the Nazis. Nazi German Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler’s ability to make war had to be destroyed. There was no other option. No amount of coercive diplomacy would convince Hitler to dismantle his war machine. The time that idea might have had any validity as a suggestion had long since passed. France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, all under the control of the Nazis had to be freed. Hitler could not be allowed to feed off their respective resources and manpower of those countries to further build Nazi Germany’s strength and military prowess. The United Kingdom had to be protected. Surely, Roosevelt considered every possibility.

However, the situation in Europe was positively fluid. Just the year before the United Kingdom, France seemed to have answers to blocking Hitler’s plan to conquer the Continent. In the Low Countries–Netherlands, Belgium and even Luxembourg–had no intention of being open doors for a westward drive by Nazi Germany and took defensive measures. Norway was under threat but still free. By December 1940, the United Kingdom was standing alone. It had already fended off Nazi Germany in its skies, and knowing conquest was foremost on Hitler’s mind, it girded itself for an invasion that nearly everyone expected to come. All of that and more was going on at home while its armed forces were fighting furiously against the Axis Powers.

On May 22, 1932, Roosevelt, then New York Governor of New York State, received a Doctor of Laws honorary degree from Oglethorpe University in Atlanta, Georgia during a commencement ceremony. He gave a powerful address on the state of the country and the place of the youth in its future, the precepts of which founded his New Deal plan as US President. Roosevelt’s address also provides insight into his courageous approach to seemingly insurmountable problems. He explained: “The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something . . .We need enthusiasm, imagination and the ability to face facts, even unpleasant ones, bravely. . . .”

How the US could best take on the fight to defeat the respective Axis Powers while remaining neutral was the big question. In developing a concept for doing that Roosevelt seemed to find wisdom in the aphorism “an ounce of prevention would be worth a pound of cure.” Creating more time to prepare by keeping the aforementioned friendly countries, with which the US had not yet become formally allied, was the most appropriate course of action at that point. He would provide encouragement to countries fighting the Axis Powers to hold the line at all points in which the Axis Powers were active, but Roosevelt did not intend to stand by and wait to see how things would turn out. Rather than wait for what came next, he sought to influence what was transpiring to create favorable outcomes on those frontlines.

To the extent it could, the US responded to requests for weapons and resupply of equipment from “belligerents” at war with the Axis Powers. Time was of the essence. Action had to be swift. The window of opportunity to act as supportive as possible on multiple fronts while standing off from the fighting would remain open for only so long. Despite the assistance provided, many being assisted could still fall. That was the case with France.

Regarding the situation of United Kingdom specifically, in 1939, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in cooperation with his French Premier Edouard Daladier fell for a rather prosaic scheme organized by Hitler and his Nazi government, with Italian leader Benito Mussolini in tow, that evinced a frightfully transparent motive. The leaders negotiated to permit Hitler to take control of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. The government in Prague had no role in the talks. Hitler recognized how the Western powers were willing to surrender the peace and territory of others to protect their own peace and well-being. Chamberlain appeared truly naive to those within his own political party in Parliament, the Conservative Party, byname Tories, and within the loyal opposition, the Labour Party. Labour forced a vote of no confidence which ended Chamberlain’s days as Prime Minister.

Sentences 11 through 21 of the Fireside Chat

“Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now.

For, on September 27, 1940, this year, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the United States of America interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations–a program aimed at world control—they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.

The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

It was only three weeks ago that their leader stated this: “There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other.” And then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: “Others are correct when they say: With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves. . . . I can beat any other power in the world.” So said the leader of the Nazis.

In other words, the Axis not merely admits, but the Axis proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy, their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.

In view of the nature of this undeniable threat, it can be asserted, properly and categorically, that the United States has no right or reason to encourage talk of peace, until the day shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world.

At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom, are being held away from our shores. The Germans and the Italians are being blocked on the other side of the Atlantic by the British, and by the Greeks, and by thousands of soldiers and sailors who were able to escape from subjugated countries. In Asia, the Japanese are being engaged by the Chinese nation in another great defense. In the Pacific Ocean is our fleet.”

United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill at his seat in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street, London, circa 1940.

3. Sentences 22 through 40: Hitler and the Axis Powers: What They Represent

Inferences

United Kingdom Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was installed May 10, 1940. As Roosevelt correctly saw the United Kingdom as essentially the aegis of the US, he appeared to depend particularly upon Churchill to hold the line against Hitler as promised. In Churchill’s first speech before the House of Commons, three days after being installed on May 10, 1940 as Prime Minister, he powerfully stated regarding the war: “You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

Roosevelt learned that holding the line would not be a mean feat for the United Kingdom. In a May 15, 1940 cable, Churchill revealed the truth of the dire straits his country found itself in to Roosevelt. He wrote: “The scene has darkened swiftly. The enemy have a marked preponderance in the air, and their new technique is making a deep impression upon the French. I think myself the battle on land has only just begun . . . The small countries are simply smashed up, one by one, like matchwood. We must expect, though it is not yet certain, that Mussolini will hurry in to share the loot of civilization. We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and by parachute and air borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready from them. If necessary, we shall continue the war alone and we are not afraid of that. But I trust you realize, Mr. President, that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. You may have completely subjugated, Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness, and the weight may be more than we can bear.”

By providing weapons to the United Kingdom, the capabilities of its armed forces would be enhanced and the chances of it holding out would be increased. However, Churchill had to be depended upon to hold the line at home, too. Churchill determined that the United Kingdom would fight on, but there were Members in his War Cabinet willing to sign a peace agreement with Hitler. 

With the hope that three parties would work together with the common aim of defeating Nazi Germany, Churchill created a War Cabinet in which two out of five members were Labour politicians, one was National and two were Conservatives.  Yet, despite the crisis, domestic political fighting was not restrained. In the Parliament, a series of crucial, often heated, discussions and debates took place in late May 1940. If anything had suddenly happened to Churchill, politically or physically, there was the danger that those willing to strike a deal with Hitler would follow through with their wrongheaded ideas. As well as bolster the United Kingdom’s ability to fight, US military assistance would prove to Churchill and those shaky Members of Parliament that the US was standing fast with them. By working together, Roosevelt and Churchill forged a sort of entente cordiale.

Sentences 22 through 40 of the Fireside Chat

“Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere.

One hundred and seventeen years ago the Monroe Doctrine was conceived by our Government as a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an alliance in Continental Europe. Thereafter, we stood guard in the Atlantic, with the British as neighbors. There was no treaty. There was no “unwritten agreement.”

And yet, there was the feeling, proven correct by history, that we as neighbors could settle any disputes in a peaceful fashion. The fact is that during the whole of this time the Western Hemisphere has remained free from aggression from Europe or from Asia.

Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas–and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military. [The source of the transcript of the Fireside Chat utilized here notes that although the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum online typescript of the address includes “Australia” and not “Australasia,” a close review of an authentic recording has confirmed Australasia is correct. Praeterea qui alium sequitur nihil invenit, immo nec quaerit. (Besides, he who follows another not only discovers nothing but is not even investigating.)]

We should enter upon a new and terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats of brute force. To survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.

Some of us like to believe that even if Britain falls, we are still safe, because of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.

But the width of those oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less from Washington that it is from Washington to Denver, Colorado–five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the North end of the Pacific Ocean, America and Asia almost touch each other.

Why, even today we have planes that could fly from the British Isles to New England and back again without refueling. And remember that the range of the modern bomber is ever being increased.”

4. Sentences 42 through 71: What the Axis Powers Are Capable of and Plan To Do; How They Think; Areas They Threaten; The US Plan of Action

Inferences

Every step of the way, Roosevelt had to be thorough in his analysis of matters, very calculating in his choices, and very measured in his actions. Surely, he often had to show restraint, perhaps knowing that certain bold advances would likely be most helpful, yet prohibiting himself to limited moves that would be most effective. No one was allowed to get in the way of those efforts. In greatcharlie’s humble view. the following words of the renowned Irish novelist, short-story writer and poet in “Chapter 9: Scylla and Charybdis” of Ulysses (1922) are apposite to Roosevelt: “His own image to a man with that queer thing genius is the standard of all experience, material and moral.”

Roosevelt was well aware that everyone in Washington had an opinion on how to proceed with regard to Europe and Asia. Roosevelt however, had his own opinions and did not need to pollinate them with theirs. What he wanted most from others were good, solid suggestions for lines of action.

Officials in the government, business, academia, his own political party as well as the ever-present pestiferous critics who were hardly acquainted with the actual facts must have appeared truly counterintuitive to Roosevelt for believing that Hitler would somehow choose to work diplomatically with the US or ignore it on his path to world conquest. He appears to have concluded that given technological advances, the Atlantic could be easily overcome by the massive Nazi war machine whereas others still had not.

As an objective of Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat was not arouse fears within the country but rather put its people on an even keel in a time of trouble, he could hardly explain that the Axis Powers would not forever tolerate robust actions from the US to undermine their respective plans for conquest, even though he likely believed Hitler would strike with some bold violent move soon enough.

For the War Department, the US was the only priority. There, calculations were assuredly being done all the time in 1940, focusing particularly on depleted supplies, weapons and ammunition due to cash-and-carry, which in the department was seen as a virtually unlimited stream of military assistance flowing out of US arsenals and military production plants into the United Kingdom. Cash-and-Carry was a creative program implemented by Roosevelt. Under the program the US could sell countries such as the United Kingdom and France as long as they paid cash and carried the war materials on their own cargo ships. Roosevelt managed to persuade the US Congress to allow the US the flexibility to take such a step just before the passage of the Neutrality Act on August 15, 1935 which imposed strict limitations on US interactions with “belligerent” countries.

Imagining that military commanders and war planners in Roosevelt’s War Department had occasionally turned their focus to classified “map maneuvers and “chart maneuvers” concerning the situation in Europe from the position of the Nazi German Armed Forces, they may have judged that Nazi Germany would easily recognize the United Kingdom, the British Empire and its Commonwealth, stood in the way of their line of march. Churchill actually presented that position as a statement of fact in his June 4, 1940 speech before the House of Commons, saying: “The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war.” They may have concluded in the War Department that soon enough Hitler would want to mitigate that problem. Cutting the United Kingdom off from the US using U-Boats would very likely be Hitler’s solution.

Roosevelt was already keenly aware U-Boats could cause something close to insurmountable damage to merchant fleets operating in the Atlantic. Churchill once wrote that, “The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.” As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt observed how they successfully performed before the US entry into World War I. He would surely find that conclusion logical. Given what had been demonstrated by Hitler to that point, Roosevelt most likely presumed the dictator would eventually seize the opportunity before him. The question left was exactly how much longer Hitler would tolerate the resupply and support from the US that kept the United Kingdom in the fight. 

Undoubtedly concerned with the timing of such a possibility, Roosevelt appeared compelled to increase the tempo of action and do the most possible while conditions were moderately favorable on the Atlantic. As it so happened, by 1940, German U-Boats had already achieved considerable success in sinking merchant ships on the way to the United Kingdom. However, Nazi Germany had not vastly increased their U-Boat arsenal and formed a fleet in such a way to deliver a decisive blow. It is now known that Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) Karl Dōnitz, who at the start of World War II, served as the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (Commander of the Submarines), pushed for a German fleet that consisted almost entirely of U-boats. He fully believed that depriving Germany’s enemies vital supplies such as food and oil would be more effective than sinking enemy ships with the risk of combat. He claimed that given 300 of the Type VII U-boats, he could defeat the entire Royal Navy utilizing tactics that would later be named “wolfpacks”. 

Luckily, Hitler was not so clever. He gave the jobs of both Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) and Großadmiral, Oberkommando der Marine (the Naval High Command) Erich Raeder. Raeder was uninterested in Dönitz’s theories. Raeder was a traditionalist whose focus was surface warfare. Raeder also judged that Germany could not contest the Royal Navy for control of the sea. Even more, Raeder believed submarine warfare was cowardly. By 1941, although relatively small in number, U-boats under then Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral) Dőnitz were threatening Allied shipping as far as the US east coast. However, the U-Boats were never used at a level to knock the United Kingdom out of the war despite having the genuine capability to do so.

Sentences 42 through 71 of the Fireside Chat

“During the past week many people in all parts of the nation have told me what they wanted me to say tonight. Almost all of them expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about the gravity of the situation. One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram begged me not to tell again of the ease with which our American cities could be bombed by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western Hemisphere. The gist of that telegram was: “Please, Mr. President, don’t frighten us by telling us the facts.”

Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead—danger against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of danger, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.

Some nations of Europe were bound by solemn non-intervention pacts with Germany. Other nations were assured by Germany that they need never fear invasion. Non-intervention pact or not, the fact remains that they were attacked, overrun; thrown into modern slavery at an hour’s notice, or even without any notice at all. As an exiled leader of one of these nations said to me the other day—”The notice was a minus quantity. It was given to my Government two hours after German troops had poured into my country in a hundred places.”

The fate of these nations tells us what it means to live at the point of a Nazi gun.

The Nazis have justified such actions by various pious frauds. One of these frauds is the claim that they are occupying a nation for the purpose of “restoring order.” Another is that they are occupying or controlling a nation on the excuse that they are “protecting it” against the aggression of somebody else.

For example, Germany has said that she was occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British. Would she then hesitate to say to any South American country, “We are occupying you to protect you from aggression by the United States”?

Belgium today is being used as an invasion base against Britain, now fighting for its life. And any South American country, in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off place for German attack on any one of the other Republics of this hemisphere.

Analyze for yourselves the future of two other places even nearer to Germany if the Nazis won. Could Ireland hold out? Would Irish freedom be permitted as an amazing pet exception in an unfree world? Or the Islands of the Azores which still fly the flag of Portugal after five centuries? You and I think of Hawaii as an outpost of defense in the Pacific. And yet, the Azores are closer to our shores in the Atlantic than Hawaii is on the other side.

There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack the Western Hemisphere. That is the same dangerous form of wishful thinking which has destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this American Hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the round world.”

US M3 Grant tank being loaded onboard a cargo ship bound for a war zone overseas.

5. Sentences 72 through 108: Plans of Axis Powers to Overcome the US and Explaining Why Opponents to US Assistance Are Wrong; A Struggle for Human Liberty and Freedom Is Underway

Inferences

In Napoléon: Ses Opinions et Jugemens sur les Hommes et sur les Choses (1838) by Jean-Joseph-Stanislas-Albert Damas-Hinard, an entry under courage is Correspondance de Napoléon avec le Ministre de la Marine, Lettre du 25 Mai 1805 states: “Rien ne donne plus de courage et n’éclaircit plus les idées que de bien connaître la position de son ennemi.” (Nothing gives more courage or better clarifies ideas than knowing accurately the position of one’s enemy.) In the prewar years as well as during the war, Roosevelt seemed to have a reliable intuition which he appeared to use to its fullest. Concerning Hitler’s very likely determination to invade the US, Roosevelt did not need to read about that in an intelligence report, or rely upon his intuition. If one could forgive greatcharlie’s frankness, as Roosevelt was an experienced politician from New York State and a learned man, he understood just how monstrous and vile the thinking of individuals as Hitler could be.

Yet, Roosevelt knew the value of intelligence and surely wanted to get a leg up on the Axis Powers however he could. He wanted to know what they were doing abroad, particularly throughout the northern and southern continents, and especially in the US. Rather than wait for the veils to lift, he charged the somewhat meager intelligence resources the US had at the time to break through them.

It is uncertain whether what sufficed for foreign intelligence services for the US at that time–the Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau, of Investigation (FBI), the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division—would have been aware in 1940 of any high-tech research and development planned or underway in Germany such as long-range rocket and ballistic missile programs and jet-powered aircraft. The FBI had developed ties with the United Kingdom’s MI6 foreign intelligence service and MI5 internal security organization and learned much from them in order to work more effectively on common causes.

An Interdepartmental Information Conference in 1939 brought all elements of the burgeoning US intelligence community together for the first time, to discuss creating a structure to handle the espionage threat to the US.  Rather than fight like a sack of wildcats, new linkages were created between the FBI and the US military, and partnerships were established with foreign services such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as well as Mexican and British intelligence officials.  The FBI’s General Intelligence Division was established to manage foreign counterintelligence and other intelligence investigations.  In 1940, US President Franklin Roosevelt signed a Presidential order allowing FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, to begin wiretapping embassies and consulates.  Sizable failures, new initiatives, and the FBI’s education in managing the intricate details of counterespionage matters resulted in the surprise arrest of 33 German agents in 1941, effectively breaking the back of Abwehr (German military intelligence) in the US. To that extent, Roosevelt was made aware of Nazi Germany’s espionage activities in the US, and within certain parameters he could inform the US public of those efforts which were aimed at laying the groundwork for the conquest of their country.

Much as Churchill, Roosevelt seemed gripped by a strange fear about Hitler. He truly believed that it would be impossible to discuss anything with him. In Principalities and Powers: Spiritual Combat 1942-1943  (St. Augustine’s Press, 2013), reviewed in greatcharlie’s March 2, 2015 post, George Rutler explains that Roosevelt believed Hitler could very well have been the Devil Incarnate. Related to this Churchill recalled during a subsequent radio interview that before his discussion with Roosevelt began aboard the battleship HMS Prince of Wales at Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland on Sunday, August 10, 1941, the two leaders attended a church service on the warship’s fantail. Churchill commented regarding the church service: “I felt that this was no vain presumption, but that we had the right to feel that we are serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from on high.”

Sentences 72 through 108 of the Fireside Chat

“Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your Government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

Their secret emissaries are active in our own and in neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor, and vice versa. They try to reawaken long slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our own natural abhorrence of war. These trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people; to divide them into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

There are also American citizens, many of them in high places, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents. I do not charge these American citizens with being foreign agents. But I do charge them with doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done in the United States.

These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. But Americans never can and never will do that.

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.

Even the people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis; but at this moment they do not know how soon they will be embraced to death by their allies.

The American appeasers ignore the warning to be found in the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France. They tell you that the Axis powers are going to win anyway; that all of this bloodshed in the world could be saved; that the United States might just as well throw its influence into the scale of a dictated peace, and get the best out of it that we can.

They call it a “negotiated peace.” Nonsense! Is it a negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay tribute to save your own skins?

Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in all history. And in these contests the Americas would offer the only real resistance to the Axis powers.

With all their vaunted efficiency, with all their parade of pious purpose in this war, there are still in their background the concentration camp and the servants of God in chains.

The history of recent years proves that the shootings and the chains and the concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a “new order” in the world, but what they have in mind is only a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.

The proposed “new order” is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a Government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race.”

Attendees of the August 22, 1940 Destroyer Conference at the White House. From left to right, US Attorney General Robert Jackson, US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Acting US Secretary of State Sumner Welles and US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.

6. Sentences 109 through 123: The US Must Act; What the Failure to Support the United Kingdom Would Mean; Time Is of the Essence

Inferences

Given his objective of doing the most possible while conditions were moderately favorable on the Atlantic, Roosevelt likely reached the logical conclusion that many weapons still sitting in US arsenals, beyond what had already been sent abroad, would be put to far better use in the hands of the combat experienced fighting forces of countries already engaged in the struggle with the Axis Powers. He may have assessed that any additional weapons supplied to the United Kingdom and France while it was still in the fight, would have, what would decades later be dubbed, a “multiplier effect” on both the morale, capabilities, and possibilities of those forces. He clearly wanted the United Kingdom to have every chance of success.

In implementing his policy of assisting the United Kingdom with as much as the US could within safe parameters, Roosevelt had to cope with incessant virtual debates–virtual, as there was no room for a debating directly with the president on foreign and national security policy that he set in place and wanted action on–with top military officers and top bureaucrats in the War Department who believed they were presenting what could be characterized as “America First” arguments.

The US Armed Forces opposed the diversion of its military supplies to the United Kingdom. At the nub of that position was the pessimistic belief of the Chief of Staff of the US Army General George Marshall that the United Kingdom would not be able to fend off Nazi Germany. (That assessment was frightfully off the mark.) As was the case when France fell, Marshall anticipated that when the United Kingdom surrendered, all of the US war materials that were being rushed there would fall into Nazi German hands. Marshall and others argued that the US national defense would not be served by clearing out its arsenals for others’ lost causes, but rather by retaining military supplies for the protection of the Western Hemisphere.

Yet as alluded to earlier, Roosevelt understood that moment, such thinking was too pessimistic, very limited, even defeatist. It has often been the case that only after a crisis has crossed its tipping point that the great value of a creative approach is recognized. However, in this case, if Roosevelt had waited for anyone to have some epiphany, the chance to have a positive impact would likely have been lost forever. If the US failed to try all options with real potential still available, it would tragically have little say in the final outcome which likely would have been dark. To that extent, Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, insisted top military and naval officers and senior bureaucrats in the War Department fix themselves to the task of finding ways to immediately implement his plans, rather than wait to simply hope they would see things his way.

While administering the Navy and working somewhat closely with the Army as Assistant Secretary of Navy during World War I, Roosevelt may have detected a parochialism among senior military and naval officers that colored thinking in planning. He may have also detected that among top commanders and planners, there was a certain piquancy in knowing all the right boxes were ticked and everything that was planned was accepted as being done in the correct way. Roosevelt understood what a liability such thinking would be in the country’s circumstances in 1940. For Roosevelt, the usual practices and perfunctory work had no place.

As noted earlier, Roosevelt would not respond to his advisers in toxic, hostile ways. He remained well-beyond that. Still, at times, senior leaders in the War Department, appearing uncertain, even distrustful of Roosevelt’s thinking, in their own way put extra pressure on him. If he reacted at all, his words would be more sardonic than cutting. In an intriguing December 29, 2015 article in Politico written on the 75th Anniversary of the Fireside Chat discussed here, historian Josh Zeitz wrote, unfortunately without citations, that Roosevelt would often brace and threaten to expel those who were hesitant to comply with his orders. This behavior was most apparent when on June 1, 1940, weeks before France fell to Nazi Germany, Roosevelt unilaterally declared enormous caches of military equipment “surplus” and ordered that they be shipped immediately to the United Kingdom. When the US Secretary of War Harry Woodring, an ardent isolationist, fired off a strong memo to the President voicing concern about the legality of the order, Roosevelt ordered him to comply or resign. (Roosevelt eventually had to demand his resignation when refused to release B-17 “Flying Fortresses” to the United Kingdom. He replaced him with a Republican from the administration of US President Howard Taft, Henry Stimson.) General Henry Arnold, Chief of the US Army Air Corps repeatedly expressed concerns that the order would have a deleterious effect upon the country’s readiness for war, Roosevelt reportedly told an aide: “If Arnold won’t comply, maybe we’ll have to move him out of town.” When the US Navy’s Judge Advocate General balked at sanctioning the transfer, Roosevelt instructed the US Secretary of the Navy, Charles Edison, to send the “sea lawyer” on a protracted vacation. Zeitz explains Edison refused, to which Roosevelt replied: “Forget it and do what I told you to do.”

A national leader must have a well-considered idea of what the objectives of a country’s military action will be and how that action should be prosecuted. Those choices are political, established in the country’s foreign and national security policy long before any choices are made, but often in history the need to fight has been existential. Top military commanders must remain obedient to the concept and intent expressed by the national leader. To that extent, war becomes a continuation of politics with other means much as the 19th military theorist, Prussian General Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, suggested in his renowned book Vom Kriege (On War) published posthumously in 1832: “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.”

As a highly developed individual, Roosevelt seemingly was able to keep perspective on almost everything. He did not appear to truly despair or fault those in the foreign and national security bureaucracies for furnishing patent answers they were long trained to provide and patriotically as well as emotionally compelled to make. Yet, he was also likely aware, well-ahead of most, that the circumstances of war with the Axis Powers would demand that many unlearn lessons from the past and open their minds up to new thinking on a global scale, transcending anything they might have considered or dared to imagine before. Nothing said ever caused Roosevelt to halt or even slow down the export of US military resources. In truth, more often, Roosevelt would receive answers and rapid responses from advisers much as he desired.

When Churchill asked Roosevelt for the loan of “forty or fifty of your older destroyers,” and warned that without them the United Kingdom would be unable to fight the “Battle of the Atlantic” against Nazi Germany and Italy, what followed was three-and-a-half months of negotiations. There were significant issues to sort out. Roosevelt’s first response disappointed Churchill. Roosevelt truthfully responded, “a step of that kind could not be taken except with the specific authorization of Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.” Still, Churchill continued to do his part with regard to holding the line. On July 3, 1940, the Royal Navy was dispatched to bomb the French Navy at its base in northwestern Algeria with the purpose of at best destroying or at least disabling the French fleet to prevent it from being used by Nazi Germany. If the United Kingdom had even largely fallen to Nazi Germany, the naval assets of the French fleet, aggregated with Germany’s Kriegsmarine and the Italian Regia Marina (Royal Navy), the US would be left to fight an enormous armada of naval and air power. By August, talks between the US and the United Kingdom shifted from a loan or sale of the surplus destroyers to an exchange of the surplus destroyers for bases on British Territories in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean. Though he was reportedly not open to thoughts from some advisers on what should be accomplished, he was presumably open to thoughts on the best way to accomplish the “Destroyer-Bases Exchange.”

First, Roosevelt met with US Attorney General Robert Jackson to discuss the legal situation regarding his authority to provide surplus US Navy destroyers on that basis with the United Kingdom without further authorization from Congress. 

Second, on August 13, 1940, US Secretary of State Henry Stimson, US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, met with Roosevelt to outline the essential points of an agreement. Third, on August 15, 1940, Jackson advised Roosevelt that the Department of Justice definitely believed he did have authority to act without the consent of Congress as the destroyers to be transferred fell in the classification of obsolescent materials. All he needed was certification from naval and military authorities that the warships were not needful for the defense of the US. On September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Destroyers for Bases Agreement.

Sentences 109 through 123 of the Fireside Chat 

“The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to “keep out of war” is going to be affected by that outcome.

Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war, if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.

If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit that there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.

The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them; get them to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.

Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today. Certain facts are self-evident.

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest. And they are putting up a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.”

Chief of Staff of the US Army General George Catlett Marshall (seated center) with members of his general staff in November 1941.

7. Sentences 124 through 130: A No US Boots on the Ground Pledge; Addressing Naysayers; Integrating the War Needs of US and the United Kingdom

Inferences

In July 1940, the Democratic Party nominated Roosevelt for an unprecedented third term in office. His opponent, Republican nominee Wendell Willkie, agreed with Roosevelt that the US should lend active assistance to the United Kingdom. Yet, as the election drew closer, Willkie began to give speeches warning that a vote for Roosevelt was a vote for entering the war. As polls narrowed, Roosevelt sought to assure voters, stating: “We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas except in case of attack.” Ultimately, Roosevelt won reelection, and with that behind him, he perhaps believed he had more flexibility to make more decisive moves to support countries fighting the Axis Powers and prepare the US for war

On September 16, 1940. the US Congress approved the Selective Service and Training Act. The majority of Members of Congress, despite resistance from isolationists in the body, could see the writing on the wall with regard to the Axis Powers and war. The act, which instituted the first peacetime military draft in US history, required men between the ages of 21 and 36 to register for the draft. The number of selected draftees was capped at 900,000 men, who would be enlisted for one year of training and service, and could only serve in the Western Hemisphere or in US territories. Though there were anti-draft protests on college campuses nationwide, in December 1940, 78% of US citizens polled favored the military draft. Once the Selective Service and Training Act went into effect, the requirements for more weapons and supplies in the US would sharply increase. With conscripts starting to arrive for training in the armed forces, the War Department became concerned that those conscripts would be fully equipped. 

While the situation in Europe worsened, Marshall would repeatedly convey the concerns of the uniformed services in the War Department over his foreign military assistance efforts in his meetings with Roosevelt. Surely, Marshall may have felt he was doing his job with fidelity, speaking truth to power. He, too, was part of the aforementioned “cabal” that questioned the legality and Roosevelt’s decision to declare swathes of war materials surplus and ship them off post haste to the United Kingdom. Expressing caution based on the best ways one knows how to handle a situation was logical, and somewhat understandable. The War Department did have war plans that were dependent on those military resources. Marshall’s intent was to stockpile resources for a coming fight. This certainly would have been the position of top military leaders generally as it is what they had been trained to do. Moreover, it would become nearly impossible to make adjustments and firm up war plans and strategies without knowing what would be available, or better, what would be left, after weapons, surplus and new, from US arsenals were shipped around the world.

Marshall’s reaction to the near non-stop movement of such high levels of military resources to the United Kingdom might have been expected by Roosevelt. According to an anecdote drawn from Forrest Pogue’s George C. Marshall, Vol. 2: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (Viking, 1966), in the fall of 1938, when the threat of war loomed in Europe, Roosevelt called a White House meeting with key members of his administration in order to discuss his proposed defense plan, which primarily consisted of a rapid and dramatic expansion of US airpower. Marshall had been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Army for less than one month. As a new brigadier–one-star–general, he was one of the lowest ranking attendees of the meeting. During the course of the discussion, Roosevelt asked each attendee if they agreed with his proposal. All voiced agreement except Marshall who tactfully disagreed with Roosevelt’s concept. The other attendees noted that Marshall’s disagreement visibly startled Roosevelt. After the meeting adjourned, many of those present made it clear that they believed Marshall had effectively ended his career. Five months later, in a move that stunned most of Washington, Roosevelt asked Marshall to serve as the next Chief of Staff of the US Army. 

In another instance, during a meeting at the White House with Roosevelt, Marshall presented a chart that reflected the arrangement for dividing planes coming off the assembly line, particularly the US Army’s prized B-17 “Flying Fortress”, mentioned earlier, with the United Kingdom, particularly exhibiting the wide difference between orders and deliveries. Marshall reportedly asked pointedly whether the United Kingdom’s consignment should be computed as half of the planes scheduled for delivery or as half of those actually delivered. Roosevelt’s response to Marshall allegedly was: “Don’t let me see that chart again.” As the leader of the US Army, certainly, Marshall was aware of the indications and implications of that statement for him personally.

Perhaps it is bitter this but Roosevelt likely understood Marshall could hardly provide him with a forecast of what the situation would be in another year that would hold any degree of certitude. In other words, Marshall could not be certain how the world for which his planners had organized military strategic objectives, military plans, and military resources would Iook in a year. Roosevelt knew that the time to act was now. In a calibrated way, he could supply the United Kingdom and many others who were fighting the Axis Powers what they needed when they needed it the most. The US would be the one through such efforts to aggregate all of the power available for the fight immediately.

It is possible that in Roosevelt’s eyes, perhaps even for fleeting moments, he might have been irked. Roosevelt, after all, was only human.. In those imagined moments, he might have felt the attitudes and behaviors  that Marshall and other senior officials in the War Department as well as other foreign and national security bureaucracies was more akin to the type of rural or urban shopkeeper who was more focused with the fullness of the stockroom, orderly shelves, and keeping his or her portion of the sidewalk swept than selling inventory, making profits, and best serving his or her community: the recipe for ruin.

When Marshall argued against efforts to elevate the United Kingdom’s military capabilities at the expense of those of the US, perhaps he may have actually managed to create some degree of doubt, no matter how small, that the general was not the best strategic thinker and would not, as Chief of Staff of the US Army, be able to make the whole challenging and unfortunate trek he saw the country on. The general’s attempts to tactfully lobby Roosevelt perhaps would lead many today to think that every so often an afflatus would strike him. To be more frank, Marshall acted as if he viewed his president’s choices as something closer to whims than thoughtful, strategically sound decisions. Roosevelt may have held in mind, perhaps even had nightmares over the fact, that Marshall’s line of thinking somewhat resembled that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in France, British Army General Lord Gort. He used his troops to construct the “Gort Line,” a 45 mile defensive line comprised of bunkers, pillboxes, and anti-tank traps along the France-Belgium border rather than build up mobility assets, firepower, and air power, and train his commanders and their units to integrate combined arms warfare with air power, and to use deception, speed, maneuver, and concentrate power. That approach, seemingly not too advanced for 1940, would have been more compatible with the British Army’s offensively-minded Dyle Plan, established as a response to a possible Nazi German invasion. When the invasion of France began in the Spring of 1940, Gort was unable to act decisively. While Churchill praised Gort in his June 4, 1940 speech before the House of Commons, his remarks about the disaster in France seemed to reveal that he felt Gort’s handling of the British Expeditionary Force may have hurt its chances of achieving greater success. 

Still, Roosevelt seemed to retain enough confidence and faith in Marshall and may have believed the general would come around to looking at things with a broader view that would parallel his own. To the extent that is accurate, it would mean Marshall was an exception. Roosevelt sympathies were always with members of the armed forces knowing how indispensable and difficult their work so often was yet very distant in the thoughts of most of those they defended. Marshall would serve as Chief of Staff of the US Army throughout World War II. Gloriosum est iniurias oblivisci. (It is glorious to forget the injustice.)

Sentences 124 through 130 of the Fireside Chat 

“There is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth.

Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and away from our people. Democracy’s fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and must be more greatly aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines. And it is no more unneutral for us to do that than it is for Sweden, Russia and other nations near Germany, to send steel and ore and oil and other war materials into Germany every day in the week.”

US Navy and Royal Navy sailors inspect depth charges aboard Wickes-class destroyers in 1940. In the background are USS Buchanan (DD-131) and USS Crownshield (DD-134). Both surplus warships were transferred to the Royal Navy on September 9, 1940.

8. Sentences 131 through 144: Replenishing US Arsenals; Building Greater Weapons for Defense; Taking Workers into Consideration; Expectations of Industry Leaders

Inferences

Looking back, one might suggest that rather than burden the president with his concern over stockpiles, Marshall should have developed for Roosevelt plans that would allow for the replenishment of what was old with new weapon systems with the latest capabilities and identified how that replenishment could have been performed rapidly with the existing US industrial base and a recommended expanded one.

When Roosevelt spoke of counsel from the military experts, he concealed the fact that he, himself, was such an expert. Roosevelt had acquired considerable experience maintaining the readiness of the US Armed Forces and preparing them for war long before becoming US President.

As only touched upon earlier, on March 12, 1913, Roosevelt, then a two-term state New York State Senator at age 31, received the nomination to become the US Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the administration of US President Woodrow Wilson. Confirmed unanimously by the US Senate, Roosevelt was the youngest Assistant Secretary of the Navy until that date. US President Theodore Roosevelt, his fifth cousin, had held the same post. It was more than fate that caused another Roosevelt to be selected for the same position. Roosevelt’s superior, US Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels focused on policy and Congressional matters, leaving him to handle personnel matters, operations, and contracting. Although new to naval affairs, Reportedly, Roosevelt had the energy Daniels required to get things done. Fortuitously for Roosevelt, Daniels was willing to serve as a mentor, which allowed him to learn valuable lessons in politics that would be useful to him for years to come.

Even before World War I began, Roosevelt worked to prepare the US Navy for his country’s entry into it. Then, much as in his future, many in government lacked his perspective. Some officials even dismissed the idea that the US would enter the war. Wilson’s doctrine of neutrality would actually thwart many of Roosevelt’s efforts to ready the Navy. Nevertheless, observing events in Europe Roosevelt kept pushing for the Navy’s preparation. Lessons learned on navigating through the administration, particularly with Daniels and Wilson, enabled him to eventually create some movement in the right direction. In late 1915, the US invested in a $600 million program to upgrade and expand the Navy. In the meantime, German U-boats began sinking hundreds of Allied ships. When they began unrestricted warfare on the oceans, Wilson went to Congress for a declaration of war. Congress obliged on April 6, 1917. In the meantime, during the war, Roosevelt placed great focus on mitigating the U-boat threat. He advocated for a plan to lay vast anti-submarine minefields in the North Sea. The mine project was an early sign of Roosevelt’s appreciation for creative solutions. Reportedly, by February 1918, 100,000 mines were prepared for deployment, but the war ended before the system could be fully tested, but the minefield is believed to have destroyed at least four U-boats

It was surely Roosevelt’s unequivocal concept and intent in 1940 to ensure commanders and planners in the US armed forces had as many advantages as possible and enhance the chance for victory, he wanted them to have a preponderance of weapons. It was a mistake for others to think anything otherwise. The war’s outcome bears that out. With an unrivaled wealth of newly minted military resources, their capabilities would be considerable and the possibilities for action would become nearly unlimited. How well US commanders and planners would use them remained to be seen.

Sentences 131 through 144 of the Fireside Chat

“We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency; and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations which are resisting aggression.

This is not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion. It is a matter of realistic, practical military policy, based on the advice of our military experts who are in close touch with existing warfare. These military and naval experts and the members of the Congress and the Administration have a single-minded purpose—the defense of the United States.

This nation is making a great effort to produce everything that is necessary in this emergency—and with all possible speed. And, this great effort requires great sacrifice.

I would ask no one to defend a democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the nation against want and privation. The strength of this nation shall not be diluted by the failure of the Government to protect the economic well-being of its citizens.

If our capacity to produce is limited by machines, it must ever be remembered that these machines are operated by the skill and the stamina of the workers. As the Government is determined to protect the rights of the workers, so the nation has a right to expect that the men who man the machines will discharge their full responsibilities to the urgent needs of defense.

The worker possesses the same human dignity and is entitled to the same security of position as the engineer or the manager or the owner. For the workers provide the human power that turns out the destroyers, and the planes and the tanks.

The nation expects our defense industries to continue operation without interruption by strikes or lock-outs. It expects and insists that management and workers will reconcile their differences by voluntary or legal means, to continue to produce the supplies that are so sorely needed.”

9. Sentences 145 through 168: Refitting Manufacturing To Meet Growing Needs Now and Imagining the Future

Inferences

Roosevelt’s interest and emphasis on workers was well-established when he implemented the New Deal. In his addresses and public and private writings, he expressed a fondness for workers in his tone. He surely was glad his efforts had many back on their feet, but likely ambivalent over the fact that a further increase in employment would be the result of preparations for war. Roosevelt’s discussion of workers here, however, may have also been a manifestation of a concern over having sufficient manpower in the armed forces while also having enough manpower available for greatly increased industrial base. Meeting manpower requirements, based on War Department plans led to the aforementioned Selective Service and Training Act.

Considerations along those lines would likely require examining the degree to which isolationist zeal would cause many able workers to refrain from working in war plants. A sort of counterbalance might be the reality that hypothetical war plant jobs would draw those more concerned about steady work and providing for their families and themselves. Perchance when Roosevelt, not having foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor and its impact on the US psyche, contemplated the possibility of being forced by circumstance to declare war on Nazi Germany or Japan, he may have felt unsure of the public response to some degree. With some many US soldiers dying in 1918 alone and the deaths of troops due to influenza–Roosevelt, himself, caught influenza while returning to the US after a visit to the front lines–it is unclear how many able men would be willing to subject themselves possibly to the same for the sake of the Europeans or the Asians.

Surely Roosevelt wanted to duplicate, at a far greater capacity, the military production underway with urgency in the United Kingdom as Churchill described in his June 4, 1940 speech in the House of Commons. Churchill indicated that in such an emergency, industry and labor can find common ground. Churchill explained: “An effort the like of which has never been seen in our records is now being made. Work is proceeding everywhere, night and day, Sundays and week days. Capital and Labor have cast aside their interests, rights, and customs and put them into the common stock.” To that extent Roosevelt would mention that there was cooperation between the government, industry, and labor. He extolled industry and labor for their dedication to the effort to build up the “Arsenal of Democracy.” However, it was hardly close to the levels he understood would be needed to defeat the Axis Powers.

Sentences 145 through 168 of the Fireside Chat

“And on the economic side of our great defense program, we are, as you know, bending every effort to maintain stability of prices and with that the stability of the cost of living.

Nine days ago I announced the setting up of a more effective organization to direct our gigantic efforts to increase the production of munitions. The appropriation of vast sums of money and a well coordinated executive direction of our defense efforts are not in themselves enough. Guns, planes, ships and many other things have to be built in the factories and the arsenals of America. They have to be produced by workers and managers and engineers with the aid of machines which in turn have to be built by hundreds of thousands of workers throughout the land.

In this great work there has been splendid cooperation between the Government and industry and labor; and I am very thankful.

American industrial genius, unmatched throughout all the world in the solution of production problems, has been called upon to bring its resources and its talents into action. Manufacturers of watches, of farm implements, of linotypes and cash registers, of automobiles and sewing machines and lawn mowers and locomotives are now making fuses, and bomb packing crates, and telescope mounts, and shells, and pistols and tanks.

But all our present efforts are not enough. We must have more ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything. And this can be accomplished only if we discard the notion of “business as usual.” This job cannot be done merely by superimposing on the existing productive facilities the added requirements of the nation for defense.

Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity. The possible consequences of failure of our defense efforts now are much more to be feared.

And after the present needs of our defenses are past, a proper handling of the country’s peace-time needs will require all of the new productive capacity—if not still more.

No pessimistic policy about the future of America shall delay the immediate expansion of those industries essential to defense. We need them.

I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the nation to build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men- the skill- the wealth- and above all, the will.

I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials that are essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield, and will gladly yield, to our primary and compelling purpose.

So, I appeal to the owners of plants—to the managers—to the workers—to our own Government employees—to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. With this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your Government will devote ourselves to the same whole-hearted extent to the great task that lies ahead.

As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our over-all military necessities.”

10. Sentences 169 through 187: The Government Has the Matter Covered; It Is Taking Steps; and More Will Be Done

Inferences

Roosevelt committed the US in June 1940 to assisting belligerents in the fight against the Axis Powers with war material, he did so with the insistence, as required under US law, that recipients pay for purchases with cash. As aforementioned, in the summer of 1940, Churchill warned that his country would not be unable to continue paying cash for purchases. By December 1940, the worst had come to pass, and Churchill informed Roosevelt that the United Kingdom was no longer able to pay it for military supplies. Apparently prepared for such news, Roosevelt had ready a proposal for a new initiative that would be known as Lend-Lease. Under it, the US would provide or “lend” the United Kingdom with the war materials and other supplies it needed to fight Nazi Germany, and payments would be deferred. When payments were eventually made, the emphasis would not be on payment in dollars. Payments would primarily take the form of a “consideration” granted by the United Kingdom to the US.

Roosevelt reportedly garnered support for the lend-lease concept through use of the analogy of lending a neighbor your garden hose if his house was on fire and thereby keeping the fire from spreading to your own house. At a press conference held at the White House on December 17, 1940, at which he announced Lend-Lease, Roosevelt explained: “Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire . . . I don’t say to him before that operation, ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it’ . . . I don’t want $15–I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. . . .”

On January 10, 1941, Roosevelt would introduce the lend-lease program to Congress. It would formally allow the US, via Congressional approval, to lend or lease war supplies to any nation deemed “vital to the defense” while keeping the country only indirectly involved in World War II. The Lend-Lease Act was passed on March 11, 1941. Roosevelt had more than sufficiently proved the concept and value of such an approach throughout 1940.

Sentences 169 through 187 of the Fireside Chat

“We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.

We have furnished the British great material support and we will furnish far more in the future.

There will be no “bottlenecks” in our determination to aid Great Britain. No dictator, no combination of dictators, will weaken that determination by threats of how they will construe that determination.

The British have received invaluable military support from the heroic Greek army, and from the forces of all the governments in exile. Their strength is growing. It is the strength of men and women who value their freedom more highly than they value their lives.

I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best of information.

We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope—hope for peace, yes, and hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future.

I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.

As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.”

Roosevelt and Churchill meet face-to-face for the first time for a secret meeting aboard the battleship USS Augusta at Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland August 9, 1941.

A Job Well Done

In 1940, Roosevelt and Churchill, although not having as yet met in-person, forged a personal bond, an entente cordiale, and more importantly, a bond between their countries that would further develop through the challenges of World War II into what would be called the special relationship. Such a union would have been deemed improbable 154 years before when the Founding Fathers of the US declared their country’s independence from the “United Kingdom of Great Britain”. While all things related to monarchy were surely anathema to Roosevelt given his firm adherence to the precepts of democracy and the US Constitution, yet it would seem the lyrics of George Frederick Handel’s coronation anthem “Let Thy Hand Be Strengthened” (1727) might have been quite an apropos felicitation for him as he led the US, the United Kingdom, and world forward against tyranny: “Let thy hand be strengthened and thy right hand be exalted. / Let justice and judgment be the preparation of thy seat! / Let mercy and truth go before thy face. / Let justice, judgment, mercy and truth go before thy face. / Allelujah.”

Roosevelt was a genius for his practicability, a talented leader superbly harnessed, and self-controlled. Still, taking all aspects of the crisis in daily, as he did, he must have occasionally felt a sense of vulnerability. Even if such intrusive thoughts were infrequent, they would likely have had some degree of influence on his work and his spirit. Alone in his thoughts, Roosevelt apparently was left to dig down deep and draw strength from within. He imparted that strength to the audience of his address in the US.

Roosevelt had an almost mystical, crystal clear perspective of what was happening in the world and what to do despite the atypical and overly generous appearance of his action. Too many advisors did not and seemingly could not gain that same perspective, and placed additional pressures on a President who had already been strained beyond the capacity of most around him. Fulfilling the work that he swore to do during two inaugurations, Roosevelt was faithfully executing the Office of President of the US, and will to the best of his ability, acting with the goal of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the US in the face of threat from the Axis Powers. The even harder work of leading a country engaged in what would be an horrendous and very costly war worldwide had yet to begin.

Roosevelt died during his fourth term in office on April 12,1945 and thereby did not see the results of his incredible efforts. The most important result was the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers and total victory that back in 1940 Roosevelt said would come if war came. The Roman historian Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17), known as Livy, provided in Greek, a history of Rome that begins with the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional founding in 753 B.C. through the reign of Emperor Caesar Augustus during his own lifetime. In the Preface of Book I of that history Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), Livy states about the study of history: “Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites.” (What chiefly makes the study of history wholesome and profitable is this, that you behold the lessons of every kind of experience set forth as on a conspicuous monument; from these you may choose for yourself and for your own state what to imitate, from these mark for avoidance what is shameful in the conception and shameful in the result.)

Book Review: Robert Spalding, War Without Rules: China’s Playbook for Global Domination (Sentinel, 2022)

People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Aircraft Carrier, Type 001A Shandong (Hull 17), the PLA Navy’s second aircraft carrier, but the first built domestically (above). In War Without Rules: China’s Playbook for Global Domination (Sentinel, 2022), retired US Air Force Brigadier General Robert Spalding discusses China’s military concept of unrestricted warfare. Spalding points out the concept may also include the use of armed force with its arsenal of weapons as the Type 001A Shandong, it is a military concept designed for the use of non-military forms of warfare: psychological, media, information, technology, cyber, financial, political, social, and espionage. The aim of unrestricted warfare is to weaken the US internally and to exploit its vulnerabilities. Spalding says there can be no doubt that the ultimate goal of the Communiet Party of China is world dominance. From his perspective, that does not bode well for the US.

People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping promises the Chinese people that China will supplant the US as the world’s dominant power in every sector. (Surely, it would be out of character for Xi to assure the Chinese people something as mundane as French King Henry IV declared one day in 1598 as France was just beginning to emerge from its ruinous religious wars: “Je veux que chaque laboureur de mon royaume puisse mettre la poule au pot le Comanche.” (I desire that every laborer in my realm should be able to put a fowl in the pot on Sundays.). Reference is commonly made to that statement with the phrase, “poulet au pot.”) One might imagine that some similitudes of the romanticism á la the French Revolution, megalomania, or some bizarre combination of both, perhaps in concert with others, have driven the zeal of Communist Party of China’s leadership over the years to achieve this goal. Xi will very likely have a lot of other unsettling things to say as time goes on. As attaining the dominant position in the world has been a long sought goal but never reached, some experts, scholars, and policy practitioners still look askance at the whole idea. China’s ambitions and capabilities as they concern attaining this lofty goal no longer sit in the realm of the theoretical or left to philosophical meanderings. Xi is clearly determined to achieve it under his leadership. If China were ever to make the dream of dominance come true, it would not be so willing to relinquish that position. Beijing would doubtlessly do whatever it took to stay on top.

Although the idea of China being the world’s dominant power may be a pleasurable thought in Beijing, the moral and ethical implications are remarkably overwhelming. The idea of China achieving that goal is a frightening prospect, terrifying leaders in other countries whether its friend or foe. The subject of this review is Robert Spalding’s War Without Rules: China’s Playbook for Global Domination (Sentinel, 2022). In his book, Spalding says there can be no doubt that the ultimate goal of the Communiet Party of China is world dominance. From his perspective, that does not bode well for the US. A retired US Air Force Brigadier General, Spalding, in War Without Rules, expresses his most recent meditations about China’s efforts to achieve dominance overseas and even greater control at home. He offers more answers on how the US and its allies might respond to that effort. Spalding states in his “Introduction”: It is not enough to know what your enemy wants. One needs to understand his strategy. In this regard, Washington has been, to use Spalding’s words, “really confused.” He says the US is “primed to fight in one way-all-out war-and see aggression through the same lens.” The indications and implications of this is that the US over the years has failed to discern and accept the Chinese are doing something very different and thereby, Washington has failed to act appropriately. To that extent, War Without Rules is a further attempt by Spalding to get the word out to US political leaders about what China is doing. Yet, more than a book about China’s concepts, intentions, and actions to knock the US off its perch as the dominant power in the world, greatcharlie found that War Without Rules is a book that stirs the reader’s curiosity. The reader is caused to inquire further into the author’s judgments and give greater consideration of their own views on the matter. Such books are figurative catnip for greatcharlie.

Robert Spalding retired from the US Air Force as a brigadier general after more than 25 years of service. If US Air Force officers were listed by achievements–perhaps they are somewhere in the Pentagon, Spalding would surely be among the luminaries. His Air Force biography provides the best picture of the experience and knowledge he possesses. Spalding is a former insider, who worked within the deepest points, most grave points of the US military and other national security bureaucracies. It must be noted that as a former flag officer and B-2 Stealth bomber pilot and unit commander, he was among a him in unique, elite caste of military officer, not quick to speak out, does not lightly show emotion, at least publicly or react because of it, not the type to fret over a perception without the full facts, and whose views when expressed should be taken very seriously.

Overview

In War Without Rules, Spalding frames the problem in getting Washington to understand how China has been steadily moving in the direction of achieving dominance in his Introduction by stating: “From our standpoint, we use military force to achieve a political outcome.” To that extent, he continues: “So they’re constantly in a state of war, they never exit time to peace. And that means they’re always fighting for advantage, they’re always fighting . . . to gain an advantage over their opponent, and . . . are willing to do whatever means necessary.” Spalding states that over those years he came to two key realizations: first, the number one goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the survival of the Chinese Communist Party; and, second, the number one threat to achieving that goal is American democracy. Spalding observes that although there may not be full agreement in the US that China is an enemy, China certainly views the US as its enemy, an existential one. Much as with Spalding’s preceding work, Stealth War: How China Took Over While America’s Elite Slept (Portfolio, 2019), which greatcharlie reviewed in its November 30, 2021 post, Wat Without Rules is not about moving from choppy waters to calmer times. It is about preparing the US, using all tools of its power, to best handle what is happening with China and the worst that will most likely, or will eventually, come from its direction.

Unrestricted Warfare: the Playbook 

The central element of Spalding’s discussion on China’s efforts to dethrone the US as the world’s dominant power is the concept of “unrestricted warfare.” That concept is laid out in a 1998 book entitled Unrestricted Warfare authored by two People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army (PLA) colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Spalding essentially uses War Without Rules to parse out the text which was once relatively unknown in the West. In each of the chapters of War Without Rules, Spalding presents excerpts from Unrestricted Warfare along with his interpretations and assessments of the text.

Spalding explains the concept of unrestricted warfare, or what the two authors call a “cocktail mixture of warfare” and define as “warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits.” Spalding points out that while China’s version of unrestricted warfare may also include the use of armed force, it is a strategy that prioritizes the use of non-military forms of warfare: psychological, media, information, technology, cyber, financial, political, social, and espionage. (The espionage element will be considered in greater detail later in this review.) The aim of unrestricted warfare is to weaken the US internally and to exploit its vulnerabilities. (Spalding would call unrestricted warfare in War Without Rules as “beyond-limits combined war.” As the term seems to best reflect the flavor of strategy’s meaning in Chinese, greatcharlie shall hereinafter refer to the strategy of unrestricted warfare more thoroughly as “beyond-limits combined war.”) Since under what was a new concept in 1998 the battlefield is everywhere, for the PLA, everything can be weaponized. On a short list of things weaponized, Spalding includes computers, drugs (fentanyl), financial markets, viruses (COVID-19), social media platforms, universities, scientific organizations, NGOs, trade, and media outlets. To create a foundation for the conceptualization of their new approach, Spalding explains that the two PLA colonels “pulled together centuries of Chinese thinking about warfare and made it relevant in a modern context.” To that extent, Spalding goes as far as to state that the book, Unrestricted Warfare, preached a new version of a very old Chinese formula for victory first set down in print thousands of years ago by Sun Tzu, who wrote in Art of War (c. 5 B.C.), which focused on military organization, leadership, and battlefield tactics, that the acme of skill was to defeat an enemy without fighting.

Spalding insists Unrestricted Warfare is “the main blueprint for China’s efforts to unseat America as the world’s economic, political, and ideological leader.” He states further, it is “the key to decoding China’s master plan for world domination.” Spalding points out that the two colonels wrote the book at a time when the US was enjoying its brief “unipolar moment,” having recently achieved victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War and won a one-sided military victory in the First Persian Gulf War. And China had not yet attained economic and military superpower status. Much as their superiors in the Communist Party of China, the sense of ardor of the two PLA colonels were respectively inflamed by what they witnessed in the Gulf War and they became more determined than ever to find a way to enhance their country’s capabilities and raise its status globally. Given what Spalding says Unrestricted Warfare endows, it is a wonder why its two authors were allowed by their masters to publish, nonetheless write such a piece in an unclassified context. There must have initially been some nervousness in China’s Ministry of Defense and the Communist Party of China over security concerns. Some time and effort was presumably put into parsing out how the US and its allies would react if a copy got into their hands.

Cynics and conspiracy theorists would doubtlessly go as far as to say Unrestricted Warfare may be a false document, a piece of disinformation, generated by one or more national governments wanting to create a picture of a virulent, predatory China hellbent upon dethroning the US as the global superpower in any way possible. To that extent, they ostensibly insinuate that Spalding has taken the bait and run with it to an extreme. They would perchance offer a caveat to the effect that readers not allow themselves to be bewitched by Spalding the “dream-weaver” or the “teller of tales”. Other detractors of Spalding’s opus would hypothesize that if political leaders were sufficiently impressed by the length and breadth of Chinese activities depicted in the book, it would open the door to greater overwatch and responsibilities for counterintelligence services in the US Intelligence Community and federal law enforcement. Thereby, the document was very likely created within the intelligence industry to influence political support for enhancing their respective powers, broadening their respective missions, and increasing their respective resources. That would be quite a judgment on the character of the men who run the intelligence services and federal law enforcement organizations in the US. Anything is possible from an industry in which many of its professionals as a practice must deny their own names and concealing their accomplishments and contributions is de rigueur. So many “capers” are still kept close to the vest by top executives and managers. Then again, some could say conversely that any effort to create second thoughts on Unrestricted Warfare could possibly be the work of the opposition, a misinformation campaign of some sort.

Everyone is entitled to an opinion. Having said that, it might be helpful to remind such cynics that Spalding in part resolves the provenance of Unrestricted Warfare by laying out the manner in which events have unfolded and continue to unfold and how Chinese activities “follow the script” of Unrestricted Warfare practically to the letter. Spalding notes that Unrestricted Warfare has been used at China’s military academies. It would be unusual for a “misinformation tool” to be placed on syllabi in such educational institutions. Surely, that evidence alone should help carry his argument well-outside the realm of conjecture and settle it down into reality for most. All that being stated, greatcharlie reckons that diving any deeper into such matters, would be counterproductive, and that it would be best to “stay on mission” and discuss the good readers will find in War Without Rules.

As a book concerning the course of China’s implementation of beyond-limits combined war, War Without Rules, to an extent, is a book about both the past and present. Yet, more importantly, it is an argument concerning the type of future the US and the rest of the world’s industrialized democracies really want. Spalding leaves doubt that he believes the idea of Chinese dominance is unacceptable given the nature of China’s totalitarian government. He feels the growing concern about China within Washington and the capitals of its allies is warranted. Spalding insists that much more must be done by those capitals to convince China that the matter of it becoming the world’s dominant power is simply out of court. In his view, too many mistakes have been made already by them, especially by Washington, that have allowed China to advance quite a bit in that direction. Spalding makes considerable reference to the political leaders, business leaders, senior government officials, and distinguished scholars, academics, and technical experts who exercise the lion’s share of authority within their countries. Western elites called themselves keeping an eye on Beijing, but Spalding explains for far too long have assumed the military is China’s main weapon in a war. To his amazement, he observed they somehow or another failed to realize that money can be a stronger weapon. To the detriment of the interests of their own respective countries, through interactions with China, particularly economic through commerce, finance, and trade, have lavished Beijing with enough money to wage a beyond-limits combined war against them which the Communist Party of China fully intends to win! 

In Act II, scene iv, of William Shakespeare’s The Life and Death of Richard the Second, a Welch captain speaks these words of doom and gloom to the Earl of Salisbury: “The bay-trees in our country are all wither’d / And meteors fright the fixed stars of heaven; The pale-faced moon looks bloody on the earth / And lean-look’d prophets whisper fearful change; / Rich men look sad and ruffians dance and leap, / The one in fear to lose what they enjoy, / The other to enjoy by rage and war:” Rest assured, War Without Rules is not a manifestation of a sense of doom and gloom concerning China held by Spalding. War Without Rules does not present a “scare story”, pour employer une phrase populaire. Spalding certainly is not whining about China in War Without Rules.  From what greatcharlie is aware of, operating with such a mindset would hardly be Spalding’s way of thinking or doing things. Despite his strong feelings, his discussion is more intellectual than overtly emotional. Afterall, he is a consummate professional from the US foreign and national security policy realmand for warriors such as Spalding, “strength of character consists not only of having strong feelings, but maintaining one’s balance in spite of them!” Spalding has a mind and will to win.

In a 1978 October 13, 1978 Wall Street Journal article entitled, “U.S. Monetary Troubles” by Lindley H. Clark Jr., Paul Samuelson, the Nobel laureate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, recalled that John Maynard Keynes once was challenged for altering his position on some economic issue. “When my information changes,” he remembered that Keynes had said, “I change my mind. What do you do?” Spalding admits initially having been somewhat dismissive, himself, about the Unrestricted Warfare and viewed the precepts revealed by the two PLA colonels as somewhat fanciful or lofty. Spalding notes in the Introduction of War Without Rules: “When I first read the Chinese war manual Unrestricted Warfare in 1999, I thought it was wacky. I was flying B-2 Stealth bombers out of Whiteman Air Force Base in western Missouri and reading a lot about war. As an Air Force officer, I thought it was part of my day job to understand the bigger picture–even though the prevailing attitude in the military was ‘Just fly the planes.’ ” Torah Lishmah! Spalding’s whole perspective changed once he discerned China was putting everything he read into motion, and doing it well. Spalding spoke truth to power at the Pentagon and the White House then, and speaks of only what he knows to be the truth in War Without Rules now.

At the time of this review, a 212 page translation of Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America, Reprint ed. (Echo Point Books & Media, 2015) has been made available for purchase on Amazon.com. The description provided for the book on Amazon is as follows: “Two colonels in the People’s Liberation Army, Qiao Liang (乔良) and Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗). Its primary concern is how a nation such as China can defeat a technologically superior opponent, such as the United States.” Having examined Unrestricted Warfare, greatcharlie would wholeheartedly agree that the audience best situated to parse it out in the round would be academics, other scholars, and practitioners in the province of foreign and national security policy. Any level-best effort by those somewhat unfamiliar with these matters, which would be laudable. Still, Unrestricted Warfare is made more easily understood through Spalding’s lens, colored by his expertise and experience. Spalding’s examination of the book via War Without Rules better enables readers with the chance to gain knowledge on a matter that would essentially be limited to those thoroughly steeped in China policy, Chinese defense issues, Chinese military culture, and military science. To that extent, his book will remain an important resource in every personal, public, academic, and institutional library.

The Roman historian Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17), known as Livy, provided in Greek, a history of Rome that begins with the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional founding in 753 B.C. through the reign of Emperor Caesar Augustus during his own lifetime. In Book XLIV, sec. 15 of that history Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), he writes: “Plerumque ipsam se fraudem, etiamai initio cautior fuerit, detegere.” (A fraudulent intent, however carefully concealed at the outset, will generally, in the end, betray itself.) Increasing sunlight has been shone upon China’s activities, not just on the coronavirus disaster or in the domain of foreign and national security policy, but the totality of its malign actions. Included among those actions would be: predatory investment scams directed against trusting governments of often small and less industrialized countries; intrusions into sovereign waters for mass fishing; intellectual property theft from companies and research labs that have invested millions in research and development into; and, demands of censorship insisted upon of those in any arena who have received funding from, or are doing business with, China, Beijing must accept that as a result of such actions, impressions of China have not generally been positive worldwide. Communist Party of China leaders have doubtlessly come across the many statements made internationally about Chinese government spokespersons, diplomats, and other officials. To that extent, the Communist Party of China can hardly be happy about the damage being done worldwide to China’s reputation through books such as War Without Rules. Spalding’s voice is surely one that is looked upon as something better than annoying by the Communist Party of China. Spalding is among an ever growing group of China specialists who are determined to uncloak the fraudulent intent of China established decades ago. They put China’s intentions in full view of the world to see. Perhaps what specialists as Spalding present on China might be perceived as nothing less than affront or rebuke. It could only have been worse it his voice emanated from Taiwan. Then Beijing would have considered his act of writing and publishing the book as one more betrayal.

Spalding holding up copies of War Without Rules (left) and Stealth War (right). Although packed with excellent suggestions, War Without Rules, as with his preceding work, Stealth War, is not about moving from choppy waters to calmer times. It is about preparing the US, using all tools of its power, military, diplomatic, economic, political, and information (media) power, to best handle what is happening with China and the worst that will most likely, or will eventually, come from its direction. Given the success of Stealth War, Spalding was undoubtedly pre-empted to write another work of such magnitude. Surely, he was not lumbered by that task, and welcomed the opportunity to gnaw further at the issue of China ambitions and maligned actions and intentions. War Without Rules is every bit as brilliant as its predecessor. It is another superb exposition of Spalding’s pragmatic thinking.

The Author

In War Without Rules, readers are presented with the perspectives and insights on US-China relations through the lens of a man with years of experience on such matters. While hesitant to rewrite the biography of the author from its aforementioned November 30, 2021 post in which it reviewed Stealth War, greatcharlie believes that only by presenting his singular education and military experience in that way can the reader get a true sense of qualifications to inform readers on the subject matter.

Robert Spalding retired from the US Air Force as a brigadier general after more than 25 years of service. If US Air Force officers were listed by achievements–perhaps they are somewhere in the Pentagon, Spalding would surely be among the luminaries. His Air Force biography provides the best picture of the experience and knowledge he possesses. Excluding his list of educational accomplishments, it reads as follows: “General Spalding received his commission through Fresno State University’s ROTC program in 1991. He earned his doctorate in economics and mathematics from the University of Missouri at Kansas City in 2007. The general attended undergraduate pilot training in 1993, and was subsequently assigned as a B-52 Stratofortress co-pilot in the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota. He subsequently transitioned to the B-2 Spirit at Whiteman AFB, Missouri. In 2001, he was selected as one of three Air Force Olmsted Scholars, and was a distinguished graduate of Mandarin Chinese language training at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. Afterward, the general attended Tongji University in Shanghai as a graduate research student. He then returned to Whiteman AFB as a B-2 evaluator pilot and assistant director of operations for the 393rd Bomb Squadron. The general was then assigned to the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Prisoner of War Missing Personnel Office as the military assistant for the deputy assistant secretary of defense. During the Iraq surge in 2007, General Spalding deployed to Baghdad and directed the Personal Security Coordination Center. After a stint at the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, he was reassigned to the B-2 at Whiteman AFB. While at Whiteman AFB, he was the chief of safety, operations group commander and vice wing commander. He was then selected as a Military Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations in New York. General Spalding then served as the chief China strategist for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff at the Pentagon, Washington DC. His next assignment led him back to China as the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attache to China in Beijing, China. Prior to his current assignment he served at the White House as the Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council, Washington D.C.”

Spalding is by no means an outsider, with special access, looking in on the situation. He is an erstwhile insider, who worked within the deepest points, most grave points of the US military and other national security bureaucracies. It must be noted that being a former flag officer and B-2 Stealth bomber pilot and unit commander, which placed him in unique, elite caste of military officer, not quick to speak out, does not lightly show emotion, at least publicly or react because of it, not the type to fret over a perception without the full facts, never speak idly, and whose views when expressed should be taken very seriously. 

On Stealth War

Spalding’s Stealth War was promoted as a book which discusses how China has quietly waged a six-front war on America’s economy, military, diplomacy, technology, education, and infrastructure, and has been winning. It might be enough for greatcharlie just to describe Spalding’s exceptional achievement with Stealth War as providing piercing judgments, a novel-like reporting of actual events, and a clarity that allows him to cast a cold eye on China policy analysis and intelligence analysis and its practitioners, both past and present. However, Spalding, even more, has interestingly taken his own dissatisfaction, disappointment, and anger over how badly the US has handled China, placed his country in some considerable degree of danger, and safely expressed it on paper, turning it into a positive force to better understand how things have taken shape and how atrocious events are unfolding right before the eyes of every US citizen.

Although packed with excellent suggestions, Stealth War, as with War Without Rules, is not about moving from choppy waters to calmer times. It is about preparing the US, using all tools of its power, military, diplomatic, economic, political, and information (media) power, to best handle what is happening with China and the worst that will most likely, or will eventually, come from its direction. Given the success of Stealth War, Spalding was undoubtedly pre-empted to write another work of such magnitude. Surely, he was not lumbered by that task, and welcomed the opportunity to gnaw further at the issue of China ambitions and maligned actions and intentions. War Without Rules is every bit as brilliant as its predecessor. It is another superb exposition of Spalding’s pragmatic thinking.

If you were fortunate enough to have read Spalding’s Stealth War, you are certainly primed and ready to approach the heady revelations of War Without Rules with an open mind. However, if you have not had the chance to read his preceding work, you can still jump right in War Without Rules. If Spalding had written War Without Rules solely to communicate with professionals within the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies or the respective bureaucracies of US allies, his target audience still would have been somewhat sizable, and in of itself a market satisfying enough for his publisher. 

However, knowing the considerable level of interest in China across an array of issues is presently high, the targeting of a larger general audience was very likely insisted upon by his publisher. Of course, publishers make money selling books. Spalding, himself, was evidently willing to reach a far greater audience with his work, but his priority in writing this book apparently went beyond turning a profit. As Spalding explains in his “Introduction”, in attempting reach a larger audience, his intention was  to make average citizens, particularly in the US, better aware of China’s malign aims and objectives and tactics. An attendant benefit of that would possibly be mobilizing them to get their representatives in the US Congress and especially the White House to mitigate its creeping influence.

As part of his effort to reach a greater audience with War Without Rules, Spalding intentionally presents his discussion in a way as to coast the most interested China policy wonk as well as someone who has not read a book on China beforehand comfortably through the subject matter. Spalding does not take for granted how much the reader can absorb from what he teaches. As part of his effort to control that process, he carefully apportions how much of the story he feels would be appropriate. When he feels the reader should be ready for more, Spalding ratchets up the complexity of discussion and his anecdotes. Spalding surely accomplished that presumed mission, as his text is informative, lucid, challenging and accessible.” One can only imagine an individual with his richesse connaissances is holding back considering how much more he could have potentially ruminated upon. To that extent, while all should find War Without Rules a browsable, satisfying meditation, Spalding’s lack of profundity might disconcert some.

Previous Reviews

As Beijing pushes ahead with its varied malign efforts, books as Spalding’s War Without Rules surely deserve a look from the eyes of many. In most reviews readily available online, appreciation is shown toward Spalding’s willingness to share the meditations of his praiseworthy exploratory mind. Reviewing War Without Rules for the New York Review of Books, Francis Sempa, who at the time was Assistant US Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, explains that China, according to Spalding, is the enemy of the US, and its statesmen and strategists to “know” the enemy better and to appreciate the enemy’s strategy. Sempa points to Spalding’s view that the aforementioned US statesmen and strategist need to appreciate that we are at war with China, though not yet “a shooting war”, and suggests it is uncertain whether they will recognize that reality. Sempa notes Spalding’s evidence that China is waging war lies in the tactics and strategies set forth in Unrestricted Warfare. Citing what Spalding gleaned from that text, Sempa similarly explains that unrestricted warfare, or what the Chinese authors call “beyond-limits warfare,” includes psychological, media, information, technology, cyber, financial, political, social, and espionage warfare. to. Revealing even more from the text of War Without Rules, Sempa explains Spalding believes that China’s practice of waging war with non-military means lulled the US into a false sense of security after the Cold War by convincing US elites that China was liberalizing politically and that the US could benefit financially by “engaging” China rather than containing or confronting it. Sempa notes that a lot of American elites did (and still do) benefit financially from engagement with China. Overall, the review was favorable. Yet, Sempa notes, too, that Spalding failed to mention another factor that imperils US security–the gradual formation of a new Sino-Russian strategic partnership, which developed and expanded while the US was distracted by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He says additionally that China has also engaged in a massive military build-up and has extended its influence throughout the Indo-Pacific region via its Belt and Road Initiative. Sempa declares: “Unrestricted warfare also includes geopolitics.

Reviewing the book for the journal of the US Naval Institute, Proceedings, a Lieutenant Cregge states that War Without Rules is “no doubt a blistering critique of the Chinese Communist Party.” Cregge cites Spalding’s explanation that two Chinese PLA colonels, Unrestricted Warfare, provide the playbook for a broad, undeclared Chinese war against the US. Beyond a translation of the two colonels concepts to English, War Without Rules seeks “to explain the challenging prose, logic, and colloquialisms” of Unrestricted Warfare that remain. Through his own description, Cregge notes that the colonels reflected on, among many other topics, how the face of war “would change”, given the US preeminence demonstrated both in its coalition victory in the First Persian Gulf War and its commanding position in the international economic and diplomatic orders. Cregge states that for those interested in examining an array of examples of Chinese coercion against the US-led international order, War Without Rules provides such cases “in spades.” He also notes that for more skeptical China doves, it may be less convincing. Criticizing the War Without Rules, Cregge proffers the book’s compelling argument suffers for two reasons. He explains that many modern examples of Chinese unrestricted warfare against the US rely on seemingly arbitrary citations. He further asserts the book’s partisan perspective is evident throughout, which may further estrange some policymakers or voters, despite a desire, quoting Spalding, that “we should all be China hawks.” Cregge admits that these particular critiques do not argue that the information asserted is necessarily wrong. Cregge additionally criticizes the book saying that given the weight of accusations against Chinese and US organizations and even named individuals, a comprehensive citation regime and bibliography would have greatly reinforced War Without Rules.

Providing a review of War Without Rules for The Epoch Times, that also makes use of quotes from an interview Spalding provided Epoch TV’s “China Insider” program, journalists Hannah Ng and David Zhang report his book walks readers through the principles outlined in the Chinese publication, revealing the regime’s belief that there is no sector of life outside the realm of war. Spalding, they note, determined that this approach stemmed from a doctrine laid out by two Chinese colonels back in 1999 in their book, Unrestricted Warfare. Seeking to boil the matter down further, Ng and Zhang state that according to Spalding, the notion of war espoused by the Chinese communist regime is completely different from ideas in the West. Citing Spalding, the reviewers note that from the Western standpoint, military force is used to achieve a political outcome. However, the “Chinese Communist Party” sees the outside world as always in a state of war. Thus, China is constantly in a state of war with it. That necessitates always fighting to gain an advantage over their opponent, and are willing to accomplish that through any means necessary. To push back against this unconventional war imposed on the US, Ng and Zhang say Spalding called for the country to decouple from China. Quoting Spalding once more, the reviewers write: “If we can decouple from China . . . get them out of our economic, political, academic and natural systems and begin to reinvest in our own citizens, reinvest in infrastructure and manufacturing in science and technology and STEM [science, technology, engineering, maths] education, you’re going to start to see opportunities arise that haven’t been there for decades in the United States.”

Interestingly enough, more than just reviews exist of Spalding’s book. As of the time of this writing, a couple of unofficial “study guides” for War Without Rules have been made available for purchase on Amazon.com at prices oddly not far short of the cost for the book itself! The study guides are in effect synopses of a synopsis of a book. (Without pretension, greatcharlie hopes readers will not find that its review of War Without Rules should be placed within that category, too.)

The August First Building in Beijing, Headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army (above). The central element of Spalding’s discussion on China’s efforts to dethrone the US as the world’s dominant power is the concept of “unrestricted warfare.” That concept is laid out in a 1998 book entitled Unrestricted Warfare authored by two People’s Republic of China People’s Liberation Army colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. Spalding essentially uses War Without Rules to parse out the text which was once relatively unknown in the West. In each of the chapters of War Without Rules, Spalding presents excerpts from Unrestricted Warfare along with his interpretations and assessments of the text. Spalding insists Unrestricted Warfare is “the main blueprint for China’s efforts to unseat America as the world’s economic, political, and ideological leader.” He states further, it is “the key to decoding China’s master plan for world domination.”

The Chapters of War Without Rules

War Without Rules is 256 pages in length, and has 11 chapters. The chapters are well-arranged and titled as follows: Chapter 1: “Know Your Enemy”; Chapter 2: “A New Way of War”; Chapter 3: “The Magic Shoes of Technology”; Chapter 4: “The Weapons of Revolution”; Chapter 5: “The War God’s Face Has Become Indistinct”; Chapter 6: “Desert Storm: ‘A Military Masterpiece”; Chapter 7: “America’s Weakness”; Chapter 8: “Weaponizing the International Order”; Chapter 9: “Deploying All of the Above”; Chapter 10: “Calling It War”; and, Chapter 11: “Fighting Back with New Rules”. One might figuratively call each chapter a “deep penetration strike” against what the former B-2 Stealth pilot presumably views as Washington’s record of willful ignorance and to a degree, political apathy.

With the aim of not spoiling the readers’ own experience reading War Without Rules, greatcharlie will not provide a sizable review covering chapter by chapter. Instead greatcharlie delights to simply peek, to gaze therein on those parts of his admirable work that it found fascinating and captivating. The same approach was taken in its review of Stealth War. At the same time, Spalding has done a more than admirable job at breaking down the blueprint for China’s effort to attain dominance, Unrestricted Warfare, in order to allow all readers to grasp the work. There was concern in writing this review that an unintended consequence of summarizing his effort would be to gut Unrestricted Warfare to the point that its essence would be significantly obscured to readers. Thus, with a focus on keeping the discussion to the more significant lessons learned from the Gulf War by the two PLA colonels, greatcharlie presents a somewhat fulsome discussion of what it has determined to be its “top 3” chapters. They include: Chapter 4: “The Weapons Revolution”; Chapter 7: “America’s Weakness”; and, Chapter 11: “Fighting Back with New Rules”. Of course, greatcharlie believes every reader will best select for himself or herself, the chapters that content them most.

Chapter 4: “The Weapons Revolution”

In Chapter 4: “The Weapons Revolution”, Spalding explains when Unrestricted Warfare was written China did not have Stealth bombers, am adequate Navy. He notes that the colonels saw promise in what China did have in abundance. Those resources include: a billion people, computer programmers, devious hackers, financial speculators, currency reserves. Spalding, himself, adds what would be recognized as the issue de jure doctors studying exotic viruses. Spalding says the colonels explained all of these, organized and tasked to maximize their potential, could be used as weapons and must be seen as such. Effecting the possible disruption, destruction, and potentially gaining control all areas of the opponents society would be possible to the degree that the opponent’s ability to fight wars in the standard way would be broken. The opponent would be destroyed from the inside similar to an erstwhile healthy individual struck by an unseen virus. The colonels explain that with the weaponization of its abundant resources, China could strike at the very hearts of its opponents. To that extent, the two colonels suggest that fully accepting such ideas requires one to adopt “a new way of thinking about warfare.” Spalding remarks that unlike ships and planes, these weapons needed no upgrades as a result of being suited for the last conflict. The colonels write: “In the past, all that was needed was the invention of a few weapons or pieces of equipment, such as the startup and the Maxim machine gun, and that was sufficient to alter the form of war, whereas today upwards of 100 kinds of weapons are need to make up a certain weapons system before it can have have an overall effect on war. However, the more weapons that are invented, the smaller any individual weapons role in war becomes, and this Is a paradox that is inherent in the relationship between weapons and war . . . Other than the all-out use of nuclear weapons, a situation which is more and more unlikely and which may be termed nuclear war, none of the weapons, even those that are extremely revolutionary in nature possess the right to label future warfare. . . .”

Interestingly, Spalding does not delve too much into the idea that such claims by the two colonels seemed more than just skance as an effort to justify the state in which the Communist Party of China had left their country’s defense, its security. After reading the above passage, greatcharlie thought that perhaps the two colonels overlooked, or worse, dismissed an important aspect of the human element of warfare as it concerns the way weapons are often innovatively used to the extent one could call their influence on the battlefield revolutionary. Imaginably, in the PLA, the sort of go-ahead mentality that has led to innovation in the use of weapons in Western armies, does not fit well. That is doubtlessly the case in all the bureaucracies of China’s totalitarian, Communist government system. The ability of research and development teams, commanders, and soldiers, sailors, and marines to find new ways to exploit available high-tech and information warfare technologies in often absolutely brilliant ways, cannot be discounted, or worse, dismissed so readily. 

In World War II, the decision by German Army commanders to level their long range, high velocity firing, 8.8 cm Flak 18, an 88mm anti aircraft gun, at opposing forces in the North African desert in 1941 changed the picture concerning artillery range, speed, and destructive effort through the war. Batteries of 88s were successful at supporting movement of tank and infantry units and breaking up attacks by opposition forces. In terms of weapons systems as a category, airplanes were initially used in observation and reconnaissance roles. The two colonels mention the contribution of the renowned Italian air war theorist General Giulio Douhet relatively in passing in Chapter 4: “Desert Storm: A Military Masterpiece”. They do not discuss just how genuinely revolutionary his precepts on potential use of the airplane in war were. Spalding surely would have included any comments by the two colonels on US Colonel William “Billy” Mitchell if they had deigned to mention the contribution of his ideas on air power and the need to make airplanes an integral part of US defense in preparation for the next war. It took an impressive degree of inner strength it took for these commanders to subject themselves to being “the voice crying in the wilderness,” a phrase that perhaps alien to the ears of the two colonels (Certainly not to Spalding!). The impact of the airplane was multiplied exponentially when it was eventually used as an asset for tactical and strategic attacks against an enemy. They can destroy enemy positions along the forward edge of the battle area, provide close air support for troops in contact with an opponent or move to a point deep in an opponent’s rear. When attacking an opponent’s units in depth, diverting, disrupting, or destroying attacking forces before they are even in contact with friendly troops, and destroying command, control, and communication centers and lines of supply. In a strategic attack role, airplanes can disrupt and destroy an opponent’s ability to even wage war, affecting the opponent’s ability to produce weapons, train troops. Further, airplanes can serve in an air defense role, friendly forces on the ground and at sea, and provide air cover for other airplanes in strategic attacks.

The two colonels sort of obedient, lock-step, short-sighted thinking on sophisticated weapons systems was further apparent in their statements about high-tech and information warfare. In another quote from Unrestricted Warfare provided by Spalding, it was explained: “Even if in future wars all the weapons have information components embedded in them and are fully computerized, we can still not term such war as ‘information warfare’ . . . because, regardless of how important information technology is, it cannot completely supplant the functions and the roles of each technology per se. For example, the F-22 fighter, which already fully embodies information technology is still a fighter, and the “Tomahawk” missile is still a missile, and one cannot lump them all together as “information weapons” nor can a war that’s conducted using these weapons be termed information warfare. Computerized warfare in the broad sense and information warfare in the narrow sense are two completely different things. The former refers to the various forms of warfare which are enhanced and accompanied by information technology, while the latter primarily refers to war in which information technology is used to obtain or suppress information. . . .” 

Spalding explains the two colonels believe huge investments in cutting edge weapons was a misallocation of funds and a dangerous distraction from what really matters in international conflicts. To that extent, Spalding looked at US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the administration of US President George W. Bush falling into what the colonels saw as a self-made trap as his focus was on constantly improving US weapons systems in terms of accuracy and lethality, an approach called the Revolution in Military Affairs. Intriguingly, on this point, politics seems to be playing more of a role than some sort of singular military thinking. Lending support to the idea that the Communist Party of China has the country on the right course militarily, better than imagined, because it has not heavily invested in weapons technology as the US, could have simply been a manifestation the two colonels belief, trust in, and loyalty toward the decisionmaking of China’s leadership. L’élan de générosité des croyants. On the other hand, China has always lagged behind a bit with the US in terms of its own research, development and deployment of its “big weapons”. It appears the two colonels have gone a bridge too far in suggesting that China would only need to innovate and adapt by exploiting nonmilitary resources to surpass the US and drive it from the top of the world order. Under a totalitarian, Communist government system in which even the commas of a text would be repeatedly scrutinized, placating the leadership and Communist Party of China’s military thinkers by pandering would surely be de rigueur especially if one hopes to have a position in a bureaucracy, advance in it, or even more, stay healthy and safe. Robust expressions of appreciation and optimism over the decisionmaking of the Communist Party of China’s leadership are expected. Speaking truth to power is just not the norm in China. To that extent, as alluded to earlier, it is likely the two colonels were once more taking on the role of “justifiers” in that last passage.

The US Air Force F-22 “Raptor” Stealth Fighter (above). Spalding explains the authors of Unrestricted Warfare believe huge investments in cutting edge weapons as the F-22 was a misallocation of funds and a dangerous distraction from what really matters in international conflicts. To that extent, Spalding considers the idea that Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense in the administration of US President George W. Bush fell into what the colonels saw as a self-made trap because his focus was on constantly improving US weapons systems in terms of accuracy and lethality, an approach called the Revolution in Military Affairs. On this point, politics seems to be playing more of a role than military thinking. The two colonels could possibly be lending support to the idea that the Communist Party of China has the country on the right course militarily, better than imagined, because it has not heavily invested in weapons technology as the US. China has always lagged behind a bit in its own research development and deployment of its big weapons.

Further criticizing the US weapons acquisition process, according to Spalding, the authors of Unrestricted Warfare further explain there is a general unwritten rule that an army fights the fight that fits its weapons. They assert that very often it is the case that only after a military acquires a weapon does it begin to formulate tactics to match it. They go on to say, with weapons coming first, there is a decisive, constraining effect on the evolution of tactics. However, as the Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus was quoted as saying: “Because your own strength is unequal to the task, do not assume that it is beyond the powers of man; but if anything is within the powers and province of man, believe that it is within your own compass also.” One only need consider how the thinking of commanders as Heinz Guderian on the use of tanks, or panzers in his case, impacted German military strategy and tactics through World War II. In 1937, when he was a relatively obscure officer in the German Wehrmacht, Guderian wrote Achtung-Panzer!: The Development of Armored Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential. It was a seminal text that pointed out that in the next war, the importance of the tank with the very crucial addition of motorized infantry had to be recognized by the German Army. After carefully studying armor for 15 years, he insisted through Achtung-Panzer! [Beware the Tank!] that if tank forces were “full of verve” and “fanatically committed to progress” they would “restore the offensive power of the army.” Such ideas were adopted by the German Army, the result of which would be laying the foundation for the German Blitzkrieg. Such was the revolution on the battlefield Guderian had envisioned. He was given the opportunity to put his ideas into effect. Guderian commanded the XIX Corps during the invasion of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, and commanded Panzergruppe Guderian during Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia in 1941.

Similar thoughts were espoused by other military thinkers in the West between the world wars who influenced the way World War II fought and won. then US Army Colonel George S. Patton published a piece entitled,“Tanks in Future Wars”, in the Cavalry Journal (May, 1920), pages. 342-346, in which he explained the War Department must focus on tanks as an armored force and not place them piecemeal among infantry and artillery. He concluded, “The tank corps grafted onto infantry, cavalry, artillery, or engineers will be like the third leg of a duck; worthless for control, and for combat impotent.” Reportedly, Patton was immediately told to cease and desist by the powers that were if he wished to have a career in the US Army. Patton famously led the US 3rd Army on its armored and mechanized rampage through France in 1944 and its drive into Germany in 1945. Captain Dwight Eisenhower, wrote a piece for the Infantry Journal entitled, “A Tank Discussion,” (November 1920), pages 453-458, in which he sought to make the case for keeping tanks as part of the equipment of the infantry units. Eisenhower became the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and great say in how the war was fought in Europe. In the United Kingdom, Captain B. H. Liddel Hart and Brigadier J. F. C. Fuller also mused about a revolution in armored warfare after World War I recognizing how the nature of warfare had changed with the introduction of the airplane, poison gas, and longer range artillery, and that machinery was stronger than wool. The British Army was experimenting with armored units under General Percy Hobart beginning in the 1920s. (In 1926, Fuller who served in the Tank Corps in World and participated in both the Battles of Arras and Cambrai, was given command of an Experimental Force (Tank)  brigade at Tidworth, on the Salisbury Plain. He ran into some difficulties while there.)

After examining in the round the situation of US and NATO Allies in Western Europe which faced a massive Warsaw Pact force in the East and thoroughly reviewing the US military experience in Vietnam, in the late 1970s and early 1980s US military theorists and planners sought to move away from the notion of fighting a battle of attrition, hoping to hold the line against an armored and mechanized heavy surges across the. Inner-German Border into the North German Plain, the Fulda Gap, and the Hof (Hessian) Corridor. They developed the Airland Battle concept which included an emphasis on maneuver, the operational art, high-mobility, high-tempo operations, innovation, flexibility, agility, capabilities, and military acumen, leadership, intimate knowledge of the battlefield, enhanced command, control, communication, and intelligence, the attack in depth, firepower, greater lethality, and the better use of existing weapons systems and the introduction of new, more capable weapons systems with the belief that they would have a considerable multiplier effect on the battlefield.  Notable among those weapons systems were the F-15 Eagle fighter, F-16 Falcon fighter, A-10 close support fighter, M270 MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket System), the UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank, the M2 and M3 Bradley fighting vehicles, the HMMWV (Humvee), and many more pieces of impressive gear. Later would come rather exquisite weapons systems such as the F-117A “Nighthawk” Stealth fighter and the E-8A Joint STARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System). Special operations forces would be better developed in order to successfully engage in direct action behind opposition lines and alongside allied forces, and provide security for critical facilities and equipment and engage in other sensitive missions. The Airland Battle concept was manifested in the US Army’s formidable FM 100-5 Airland Battle Strategy.

For all of the advanced military thinkers mentioned and beyond, it was more often not an easy route to establish a strategy-resources match. They, too, were voices crying in the wilderness in the beginning. However, they managed to get the right attention. Through research, testing, and applying lessons learned from every failure, their theories were validated, the right weapons were procured, and the result was success in its use, though not completely successful for some as Guderian, fortunately for the world, given the politics of his country and the off-kilter way higher authorities prosecuted the war in which they were used. The renowned poet of Ancient Rome, Publius Ovidius Nāsō, known as Ovid (43 B.C. – 17 A.D.) wrote: Cui peccare licet, peccat minus. (Who is allowed to make mistakes, makes fewer mistakes.) In the environment in which the two colonels functioned, it is apparent that creating a theory on war then hoping funds would be  appropriated for their development was unheard of. It is hard to imagine some burgeoning, truly innovative military thinker in China leaping up to suggest ways of fighting wars that were beyond what was immediately understandable to superiors, required the use of weapons systems China did not have, and would have called for massive expenditures on defense.

General Heinz Guderian (top) in a half-track modified for use as a mobile command center during the Battle of France, 1940. According to Spalding, the authors of Unrestricted Warfare explained the general unwritten rule is that an army fights the fight that fits its weapons. They further assert that very often it is the case that only after a military acquires a weapon does it begin to formulate tactics to match it. They go on to say, with weapons coming first, there is a decisive, constraining effect on the evolution of tactics. One only need consider how the thinking of commanders as Heinz Guderian on the use of tanks, in his case, panzers, influenced German military strategy and tactics. In 1937, when he was a relatively obscure field officer in the German Wehrmacht, Guderian wrote Achtung-Panzer!: The Development of Armored Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential. It was a seminal text that pointed out that in the next war, the importance of the tank with the very crucial addition of motorized infantry needed to be recognized by the German Army. His ideas were adopted, they would serve as the foundation for the German Blitzkrieg. Such was the revolution on the battlefield Guderian had envisioned.

Spalding repeatedly remarks that in this chapter of Unrestricted Warfare, the two colonels rebuke the practice of developing weapons to meet the requirements of a theory for a new tactic, doctrine, or grand strategy. The two colonels began to sound more as cynics as Spalding quoted their reflections on US weapons systems design. It seemed more of the same self-serving perspectives seemingly aimed at placating the Communist Party of China. Perhaps coming across weapons systems then being forced to find ways to use them is a problem faced by the armed forces of countries which “garner” foreign military technologies and research, development, and plans by clandestine means.

There are points on which Spalding apparently fully agrees with the two colonels’ assessments. He stated that in Somalia, for the first time in history, unilateral access to superior weapons technology stopped conferring a big advantage to the dominant power. Spalding quotes from Unrestricted Warfare: “Customizing weapons systems to tactics that are still being explored and studied is like preparing food for a great banquet without knowing who is coming, where the slightest error can lead one far astray. Viewed from the performance of the US military In Somalia, when they were at a loss when they encountered Aidid’s forces [the ragged gunmen of warlord Mohammed Aidid, who tried to force foreign troops out of Somalia in the early 1990s], the most modern military force does not have ability to control public clamor, and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner.” Far be it for greatcharlie to serve as an ideal apologist for the US armed forces over Somalia, Afghanistan, or Iraq–it lacks the faculty, but casting ones mind back, one might recall the outcomes of those campaigns were determined more by resources made available, how resources were utilized, and how those campaigns were fought, than by the nature of the varied resources of the US armed forces themselves. Spalding goes on to say the US nuclear arsenal would be useless in small-scale deployments as Somalia and in the counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Cutting edge conventional weapons developed via Rumsfeld’s Revolution in Military Affairs would also have little effect according to Spalding.

However, looking at the matter realistically from the two colonels’ position, applying China’s abundance of certain nonmilitary resources much as weapons was,  for so long, the only prospect China had for possibly defeating a larger, more powerful, more advanced industrial power as the US. The US had choices concerning the development of weapons system and strategies, China really did not. Interestingly enough, if the matter were considered forthrightly, those resources in abundance which are discussed in Unrestricted Warfare were resources already in existence. Thus, the beyond-limits combined war concept was developed around those abundant resources. As with any theory, the colonels could hardly have been certain that the application of these resources would yield all the desired results.

French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.” Spalding notes in this chapter that through beyond-limits combined war, China has been acquiring technology without paying a cent toward developing it, carefully taking control of the world’s shipping businesses, infiltrating US corporations and scientific laboratories, using US investor dollars to finance its factories and companies-and then insisting that any profits stay in their country. However, in War Without Rules, Spalding has spotlighted China’s ongoing open and clandestine efforts to implement beyond-limits combined war. To that extent, the prospect that China might quietly succeed completely as originally envisioned ostensibly no longer exists. There is time for the US and other industrialized powers to put things right, but no time to waste. An array of defenses can be further organized and calibrated to thwart China’s beyond-limits combined war.

As War Without Rules was written before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Spalding writes about nuclear weapons arsenals without knowledge that Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin now speaks of using them to respond what he perceives as the US and NATO’s attempt to conquer Russia, rob it of resources and squeeze it to death, much as its was outlined in what is known commonly as the Gerasimov Doctrine. The US faces the real prospect of having to use its nuclear weapons in response to a strategic attack from the Russian nuclear triad. Spalding writes that for superpower as the US, the only real value of the nuclear triad now is as a deterrent. China understood this early on and mostly stayed out of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Until recently, the Communist Party of China chose to maintain a minimal nuclear arsenal, just enough to deter any other nation’s potential nuclear strike. By keeping its stockpile modest and its nuclear budget limited, the Chinese avoided the massive expenses that helped bring down the Soviet Union. However, as their wealth has grown, the Chinese have added to their nuclear stockpile, creating alarm and some confusion among Western analysts. 

Spalding, laying his thinking process bare for the world to read, asks the following questions: Are new silos and warheads just a deepening of their deterrence or is this a change of strategy  in creating an offensive nuclear capability? Is it perhaps a ruse, with empty silos or hollow missiles meant to provoke the US and others to waste yet more billions? Mais dans nos cœurs, nous n’y croyons pas complètement. From the colonels perspective in 1998, nuclear war is obsolete, but this may be an area in which the Chinese leadership has moved beyond that notion.” Spalding then adds, “And even if they are simply increasing their deterrence, does that mean we have to increase our lethality.”

Earlier in this very same chapter of Unrestricted Warfare, Spalding notes how the colonels warn against making statements and acting in ways concerning weapons systems development and deployment which can up the ante with an opponent and result in unforeseen negative consequences. Spalding includes the following passage from Unrestricted Warfare: “Marshal [sic] Olgarkov, the former chief of the Soviet General staff [Nikolai Olgarkov was chief of staff from 1977 to 1984], was acutely aware of the trend of weapons development in the “nuclear age” and when, it an opportune time, he proposed the broad new new concept of the “revolution in military technology,” his thinking was clearly ahead of those of his generation. But being ahead of his time in his thinking hardly brought his country happiness, and actually brought about disastrous results. As soon as this concept . . . was proposed, it further intensified the arms race which had been going on for some time between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was just, at that time, no one could predict that it would actually result in the break up of the Soviet Union and its complete elimination from the superpower contest.” It does not appear China will disintegrate as a result of increasing its nuclear arsenal. However, from what the colonels emphasize here, it is unlikely the Communist Party of China is bluffing, playing some game, by investing in the construction of nuclear missile silos, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a far greater sea launched ballistic missile capable submarine fleet.

Chapter 7: “America’s Weakness”

Spalding begins Chapter 7: “America’s Weakness” explaining that in Unrestricted Warfare, the two colonels were diligent students of the US military. When they performed a post-mortem of the first Gulf War, and discovered a number of missed opportunities by the US that were considerable. What caught his attention was the view of the two colonels that US bombers were used in the war that were nothing less than “flying mountains of gold” which they also said made the US arrogant while they exposed the morbid US fear of casualties as a fundamental weakness. Spalding cites the following passage from Chapter 4 of Unrestricted Warfare: “Large-scale use if costly weapons in order to realize objectives and reduce casualties without counting costs–the kind of Warfare that can only be waged by men of wealth-is a game that the American military is good at. ‘Desert Storm’ manifested the Americans unlimited extravagance in war, which has already become an addiction. Airplanes which cost an average of US$25 million each carried out 11,000 wanton and indiscriminate bombings in a 43-day period, destroying the headquarters of Iraq’s Socialist Party with each US$1.3 million Tomahawk guided missiles, taking aim at foxhole with precision guided bombs worth tens of thousands of dollars . . . even if the American generals knew as soon as they began that they need not spend so much on this unrestrained US$6.1 billion dollar battle banquet . . . their own extravagance would still not have been prevented. An American made bomber is OK Ike a flying mountain of gold, more costly than many of its targets. Shouldn’t hitting a possibly insignificant target with tons of American dollars arouse people’s suspicions?”

Spalding states that although Unrestricted Warfare was published four years before what he calls Gulf War Two, that war’s mismanagement and heavy price in lives and dollars is something they could have predicted. He notes that it began with the same intensity of the first Gulf War, routing the overmatched army of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein rapidly. However, he say what came next, an asynchronous guerilla war fought by remnants of the Iraqi Army along with what he says the colonels would call non-state actors. The mission of the US opponent was to kill US soldiers and create a body count that the US public would not tolerate.

Here once again, the colonels offer the more of the same self-serving perspectives seemingly aimed at placating their commanders in the PLA. Spalding notes as much in this chapter stating:  “These are military men, writing first to a military audience.” The two colonels also again do their level best to establish a clear pattern of purpose and consistency in everything done by the Communist Party of China. Surely, the US spends great amounts on defense. Political leaders have sought to address the problem with defense contractors. Still,, survivability of US soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines is put at a premium. Survivability of the planes they fly,, the ships in which they sail, and tanks in which they fight is an important factor in weapons system research and development. However, at the point in China’s defense development, the leadership was hardly interested in doing the same. This of course left the PLA far less advanced and in fact underdeveloped as a force. The implications would most likely have been dreadful for Chinese troops if they had been asked to fight in the army they had against an advanced industrial power or powers. More than anything else, this chapter of Unrestricted Warfare as with others, is window into the breast of two Chinese Communist military apparatchiks.

Two PRC PLA Navy Upgraded Type 094A Nuclear Submarines underway (above). Spalding writes that for a superpower as the US, the only real value of the nuclear triad now is as a deterrent. China understood this early on and mostly stayed out of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Until recently, the Communist Party of China chose to maintain a minimal nuclear arsenal, just enough to deter any other nation’s potential nuclear strike. By keeping its stockpile modest and its nuclear budget limited, the Chinese avoided the massive expenses that helped bring down the Soviet Union. However, as their wealth has grown, the Chinese have added to their nuclear stockpile, creating alarm and some confusion among Western analysts. Spalding asks the following questions: Are new silos and warheads just a deepening of their deterrence or is this a change of strategy  in creating an offensive nuclear capability? Is it perhaps a ruse, with empty silos or hollow missiles meant to provoke the US and others to waste yet more billions? From the colonels perspective in 1998, nuclear war is obsolete, but Spalding says it is possible that China’s leadership has moved beyond that notion.

Further focusing singly upon the US military with regard to the overall picture of US national security, Spalding indicates the two colonels use beyond-limits combined war as measure to gauge the development of US theory on warfare. Spalding cites a passage from Chapter 4 of Unrestricted Warfare which says the following: “Formulation of the ‘joint campaign’ originally came from the ‘Number One Publication in November 1991 of the United States Armed Forces Joint Operations’ regulations issued by the US Military Joint Conference . . . This regulation exposes the four key elements of the ‘joint campaign’ –centralized command, equality of the Armed Forces, complete unification, and total depth while doing battle. It has made clear for the first time the command control authority of the battle zone unified commander; it has stipulated that any one military branch can 5ake a leading role based on different situations; it has expanded air/ground integrated battle’ into ground, sea, air, and space integrated battle; and it has emphasized implementation of total depth while doing battle on all fronts.” Citing the colonels further, they go on to explain: “The limitations of this valuable thinking , however, lies in that its starting point and ending point have both fallen onto the level of armed force and have been unable to expand the field of vision of ‘joint’ to all of the realms in which humans can produce confrontational behavior. Surely, this a direct reference to their idea of weaponizing almost every enterprise and endeavor in which China can come into contact with the US.

Pushing ahead, the two colonels consider total dimensional warfare, a theory bandied about in the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Headquarters concerning non-military combat operations and referenced the 1998 edition of the compendium, The Essentials of War, which emphasized “a single principle covering all types of the Amy’s military operations.” Spalding quotes them as writing: “Their practice [the US Army] is to no longer distinguish between non-combat operations and general military operations, but to differentiate battle operations into four types–attack, defense, stabilization, and support–and return the original manuscript to such responsibilities of non-combat operations as a rescue and protection and reassembling the old set of combat operations, in order to . . . altogether discard the concept of “total dimensional warfare.” In evaluating their own imperfect assessment of thinking in the US Army which they apparently conflate with thinking across the board in the US Armed forces and the US Department of Defense, Spalding further cites the two colonels as saying: At face value, this a move of radical reform and simplification by simply cutting the superfluous. In reality, however, this is . . . poor judgment. At the same time as the theoretical confusion brought by the unripe concept of ‘non-combat military operations’ was eliminated, the rather valuable ideological fruits that they had accidentally picked were also abandoned on account of the newly revised compendium. . . . Further criticizing the thinking of US military thinkers, the two colonels admonish: ” ‘Total dimensional war’s’ understanding of battle is already much broader than any previous military theorist, but as far as its innate character is concerned, it still has not escaped the ‘military’ category. For example, the ‘non-military combat operations’ concept . . . is much broader in meaning than military operations and can be placed along with comparable war realms and patterns outside the field of vision of American servicemen. It is precisely this large domain that is the area for future servicemen and politicians to develop imagination and creativity–with the result that it also cannot count as truly meaning ‘total dimensional.’ “

In evaluating what the two colonels have stated, Spalding interestingly states in agreement that just considering warfare from the point of view of the application of military force is insufficient. He points out that from his experience on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon that a US President “has numerous levers of power under his control, which can easily lead to overreliance on military options.” Going further he states: “At the end of the day, our system is still geared to leaning on the military and hard power as our best deterrent. That leaves the rest of the playing field open to the Chinese way of war.

All the ways in which that Spalding says China has engaged as beyond-limits combined war–taking every enterprise and endeavor in which one country can come into contact with another, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational, and weaponizing them–would be activities that fell in the province of a country’s intelligence services. Intelligence services engage in a incredibly broad array of both open and clandestine, and covert activities, using appropriated tools and available resources, to create or exploit opportunities to act in support of the policies and the interests of their countries. Legions of agents or operatives are recruited by intelligence services worldwide to work to meet collection requirements and otherwise in various fields and in a multitude of organizations too large for most services to maintain sufficiently trained staffs of professional officers and agents to cover. Recruited spies are selected for their facilities and tabs are kept on the lot of them in reasonable, undetectable ways to avoid the potential double-cross. The Roman historian and politician, Publius Cornelius Tacitus, known as Tacitus (c. A.D. 56 – c. A.D. 120), remains widely regarded as one of the greatest Roman historians by modern scholars. His final work, Annales (The Annals) is a history of the Roman Empire from the reign of Tiberius to that of Nero, the years A.D. 14–68. In Book I, chapter 58, he writes: Proditores etiam iis quos anteponunt invisi sunt. (Traitors are detested even by those whom they prefer.)

The weaponization of the ordinary, the day-to-day, in the intelligence world has been taken to extremes in the spy genre of film, particularly with the series, “James Bond” in which a shoe would become a telephone, a pen would become a pistol, a car would become a submarine, and so on.

It is understandable that China’s state-run and private sectors would work together to act against foreign opponents and imaginably even friends. It would appear from Unrestricted Warfare  and War Without Rules they call it beyond-limits combined war. Cynics might make the case that Spalding has gone a long way in War Without Rules to make what is actually rather mundane appear novel and intriguing. On a more practical level, and to avoid unnecessarily offending any US or foreign intelligence service, the operations of the erstwhile foreign intelligence service of the Deutsche Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, also known as East Germany or GDR) during the Cold War are discussed here to provide an example of an intelligence service engaged in beyond-limits combined war.

Generaloberst Markus Wolf, chief of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic’s (East Germany’s) foreign intelligence service, Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance). All the ways in which that Spalding says in War Without Rules that China has engaged as beyond-limits combined war–taking every enterprise and endeavor in which one country can come into contact with another, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational, and weaponizing them–would be activities that fell in the province of a country’s intelligence services. For instance, East Germany’s foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), with frightening efficiency, operated against its Western opponents to collects as much information possible in preparation for any conflict in Europe between East and West, and be in position to potentially break down the societies of the Eastern Bloc’s opponents from within. Throughout the Cold War, his agents poured into West Germany and when possible countries beyond, secured key positions, and reported on, and influenced the activities of, a multitude of organizations in a broad spectrum of areas, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational.

For 34 years, Generaloberst Markus Wolf was the very successful head of GDR’s foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA. With frightening efficiency, he developed an array of tactics, techniques, procedures and methods for operating against his Western opponents in advance of any eventual conflict in Europe between East and West, or to break down the societies of opponents of the Eastern Bloc. Throughout the Cold War, his agents poured into West Germany and when possible countries beyond, secured positions, reported about, and influenced the activities of a multitude of organizations in a broad spectrum of areas, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational. 

Wolf described the work in his memoir, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997). In Chapter 4, he recounts the process of penetrating non-military combat targets for exploitation. He explains: “Once accepted in West Germany, agents usually began their assignments with an inconspicuous period of manual labor to help overcome the bureaucratic barriers of getting established in the West. We therefore preferred candidates with craftsman’s skills or practical experience in a profession. Almost every one of the students and budding scientists who emigrated in the early years found employment in research facilities or companies of interest to us–the Federal government’s nuclear research facilities in Julich, Karlsruhe, and Hamburg; the Batelle Institute in Frankfurt-am-Main, which had been set up by the United States; Siemens, Germany’s largest electronics company; and IBM Germany or the giant German chemical companies BASF, Hoescht, and Bayer. Because we assumed that Germany’s traditional arms manufacturers would–after the storm over German militarization died down–eventually resume military production, we also placed people in companies such as Messerschmidt and Bölkow.” With specific regard to the controllers, they were not mere handlers of spies in the West but expert psychologists who prided themselves on their close personal ties to their charges on the ‘invisible front’.” (For those interested in more on Wolf and the HVA, see the November 13, 2019 greatcharlie post entitled Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997) for a bit more detail on the matter.)

As a brief thought, perhaps some push back would have been caused in the minds of two the colonels if they had been made aware of the fact that the US Intelligence Community includes a number of organizations from the armed forces and the Department of Defense, to include the US National Security Agency, and human intelligence elements that are staffed in great measure by US military personnel and led by military commanders. From that fact, perchance they would even admit that the US armed forces for quite some time, have been engaged to some degree in beyond-limits combined war worldwide.

Chapter 11: “Fighting Back with New Rules”

In Chapter 11: “Fighting Back with New Rules”, Spalding unleashes one insight after another on how the US should respond to beyond-limits combined war. He explains the US needs a defense to meet an offensive we are only beginning to understand beyond-limits combined war. China is quite different as an opponent than the Soviet Union because it has become the factory of the US providing cellphones to toys. Through its theft, China is becoming competitive in the most high-tech areas such as super computing and artificial intelligence. They have a space program and a rapidly growing military. They have suddenly developed a nuclear arsenal that could potential match that of the US.

Taking lessons from Unrestricted Warfare, Spalding writes the US can begin to exploit a range of economic problems. China has a government of one man, one rule which has never worked. He says world opinion is turning against China due to its blatant aggression. He suggests the same principles of Sun Tzu which the authors of Unrestricted Warfare espoused, should be used to respond to the strategy: Know the face of war: it is combined, unrestricted war that seeks victory through no violent means, but does not rule out violence; Know your enemy, his strengths and weaknesses; Join your forces to meet the threat: create one-mindedness”. Focusing the many parts of our government on the single objective of stopping China is essential; and, The people must be in harmony with their leaders.

Spalding says the US needs to map out a globally inclusive strategy built on three pillars: protect, rebuild, and inspire. These three pillars would found a robust effort to reshape the international order away from the totalitarian form of government upon which China is built and wants to impose on the world and toward the promotion of human rights, democracy, civil liberty, rule of law, and economic prosperity. Exploitation of labor and environmental challenges must also be confronted as global supply chain reorient to nations that support competitive markets, strong labor protections and environmental standards. 

Protect

Refine and export tools that encourage those nations that play by the rules of fair and open markets to tighten collaboration in economic, financial, trade, and information flows. The ability of rule breakers to use the US and partner countries to exploit the free system’s near open borders to avoid tariffs and other protections. Examples Spalding provides for such activity includes: making tariffs permanent for the Communist Party of China-led economy and contingent upon an annual vote in the US Congress,  which would consider whether China is a human rights violator and if it has a market based economy. On finances, he suggests the US Department of Labor allow every person in the US who participates in a public or private pension fund to opt out of sending their investment dollars to China and designate that portion of their funds be invested manufacturing in their local communities.

Rebuild

Spalding recommends a massive movement in fiscal spending “away from guns toward butter.” By focusing on infrastructure, our industrial base, energy, STEM education, and research and development, the US will rebuild its core economic and science and technological superiority to lead the world once again. Explaining that idea, Spalding says $100 billion from the defense budget could be shifted to a massive research and development and reindustrialization effort focused on quantum computing, artificial intelligence, machine learning, 5G and telecommunications, “the internet of things”, nuclear and carbon-free energy, data science, cryptocurrency, biopharma, robotics, logistics, manufacturing, and transportation. Those investments would be protected with a robust counterintelligence program designed to ensure the benefits of these investments only accrue to the US and its allies and partners.

Inspire

Spalding states that the US should join with “developed” allies and partners to create a strategic economic development plan that seeks to promote collective economic prosperity tied to democratic principles. He proposes that idea be brought to fruition via the creation of an organization able to work with like-minded developed countries to identify and promote the economic prosperity and institutional integrity of like-minded developing partners. 

Among further recommendations in this province, Spalding says a Global Development Fund for Democratic Infrastructure Investment should be developed with a mandate to analyze the global trading routes and infrastructure to invest in a robust, resilient international logistics architecture, which would promote free trade, secure and verifiable customs procedures, and the collective economic prosperity of like-minded countries. Attendant to that, he states an international data-tracking system should be developed to inform where the US, allied countries, and their respective companies are investing to assist smaller companies and institutional investors to allow them to take advantage of the accompanying economic growth prospects. Spalding feels that by linking “a resurgent economic and science and technological powerhouse” with democratic-allied and partners countries, the US will forge a new consensus, which will begin to drive positive outcomes in international institutions such as the UN and World Trade Organization. Together, this coalition of free countries with strengthened economic, financial, trade, and informational ties, girded with a robust military alliance focused on deterrence, will fuel a rebound in the growth of democracy around the world 

Spalding insists that there are many specific actions that extend from those strategic concepts that cover all aspects of US society. He concisely examines a few realms among which those actions could occur: political; economic; diplomatic; information; education; military; consumers; and voters.

As it is generally taught in US military educational institutions, for the US to achieve optimal outcomes following a military conflict–in the case with China, non-combat military operations, it must converge all four elements of national power—diplomacy, information, military, and economics (DIME)—into a cohesive, multi-domain campaign plan before, during, and following military confrontation. Here are Spaldings recommendations that concern those elements.

Diplomacy

Spalding praises the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad Alliance: US, Japan, Australia, India) As a strong deterrent to Chinese aggression. It can be strengthened and expanded. As large as Chin’s military might is, when combined with the US, the countries of Asia including South Korea and Vietnam are more than a match. He calls the Australia, United Kingdom,, US (AUSKUS) Agreement an important step in linking the US, United Kingdom and Australia in more than a mere military alliance. The sale of US nuclear submarines to the Australians is an action the Chinese colonels would admire if grudgingly. It draws a line in the sand declaring that China’s actions will be countered. Spalding believes the agreement and the sale have the effect of forcing allies who have maintained close ties economically to China to choose sides. Spalding says the decision really boils down to whether the would prefer to have the US military or the PLA defend their interests in Asia.

US President Joe Biden announcing the AUKUS pact and nuclear submarine deal on September 15, 2021. On screen for their respective announcements on the pact and deal are United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in Canberra. Spalding calls the Australia, United Kingdom, US (AUSKUS) Agreement an important step in linking the US, United Kingdom and Australia in more than a mere military alliance. The sale of US nuclear submarines to the Australians is an action the Chinese colonels would admire if grudgingly. It draws a line in the sand declaring that China’s actions will be countered. Spalding believes the agreement and the sale have the effect of forcing allies who have maintained close ties economically to China to choose sides. Spalding says the decision really boils down to whether the would prefer to have the US military or the PLA defend their interests in Asia.

Information

Spalding notes one of the greatest successes of China has been the use of information warfare. To challenge that success, Spalding suggests the US government should encourage US-based social media companies to assist more robustly in countering Chinese Propaganda. Facebook, Google, Twitter, and others are committed to publishing accurate information. However, a constant flood of Chinese falsehoods, intended to create political dissension should fall well outside their guidelines. In more sophisticated realms, Spalding says the US needs to protect the next generation of data. For example, one key step the US should pursue is universal encryption. By ensuring that all data in a free society are encrypted, and by developing platforms that allow for safe processing of encrypted data, the West can successfully compete with China in artificial intelligence.

Military

Spalding recognizes that while the two colonels did not envision, at least I. Unrestricted Warfare, a Chinese military thar could confront the US, that day appears to be nearing. Still, he notes that the theory of Unrestricted Warfare is that military expansion is just a ruse to provoke even greater spending by rivals. Starting with their second rate aircraft carriers and the proliferation of missile silos that may or may not hold nuclear warheads, the Chinese military may be more Potemkin than not. On this point through his words, Spalding does not connect the cause for China’s military build up as preparation for the possible invasion of Taiwan. Still, Spalding says he believes China will make a move on Taiwan soon. That would require the US to plan the evacuation of Taiwanese civilians and resupply of Taiwan’s military as well as a plan to destroy the country’s high-tech manufacturing capabilities for computer chips.

Yet, Spalding says there remains some small wrinkle in his own thinking that says under Unrestricted Warfare, that the military invasion on the ground would be China’s last option given it has quite a few nonmilitary options at its disposal. If China truly seeks to avoid a shooting war, perhaps the leadership of the Communist Party of China might attempt to find satisfaction in peace.

Casting its mind back to the aforementioned Livy and his Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), greatcharlie is reminded of a passage in Book XXX, section 30, in which the historian presents the exordium of the Carthagian general before Roman generals whose forces werecamp outside of the city of Carthage, itself. He wrote: Maximae cuique fortunae minime credendum est. in bonis tuis rebus, nostris dubiis, tibi ampla ac speciosa danti est pax, nobis petentibus magis necessaria quam honesta. melior tutiorque est certa pax quam sperata uictoria; haec in tua, illa in deorum manu est. ne tot annorum felicitatem in unius horae dederis discrimen. cum tuas uires tum uim fortunae Martemque belli communem propone animo; utrimque ferrum, utrimque corpora humana erunt; nusquam minus quam in bello euentus respondent. non tantum ad id quod data pace iam habere potes, si proelio uinces, gloriae adieceris, quantum <dempseris>, si quid aduersi eueniat. simul parta ac sperata decora unius horae fortuna euertere potest. omnia in pace iungenda tuae potestatis sunt. (The greatest good fortune is always the least to be trusted. In your favorable circumstances, in our uncertain situation, peace, if you grant it, will bring you honor and glory;8 for us who sue it is necessary rather than honorable. Better and safer is an assured peace than a victory hoped for. The one is in your own power, the other in the hands of the gods. Do not commit the success of so many years to the test of a single hour. Bear in mind not only your own resources but also the might of Fortune and the impartial god of war. On both sides will be the sword, on both sides human bodies. Nowhere less than in war do results match men’s hopes. You will not add so much glory, if victorious in battle, to what you can now have by granting peace, as you will lose in case of any reverse. The fortune of a single hour can lay low honors already won, and with them those in prospect. In making peace.)

Economic

Spalding says that China has been getting away with so much for so long, forcing it to play by the rules will cause a shock. From the US side, Spalding explains that there are thousands of details that the US Department of Treasury and the US Securities and Exchange Commission could enforce. Congress has been aggressive about proposing new restrictions, such as requiring companies to certify that there is no forced labor in their supply chain. Spalding believes legislation is needed that will alter the view in the corporate sector that it is in its best interest to promote a country that defies free markets and the rule of law. Spalding says the US growth strategy must be looked upon as a matter of national security. US manufacturing that has gone overseas to China must be brought back.

To an extent, top US civilian authorities and military, intelligence, and law enforcement elements of the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies as well as other policy circles–to include businesses, universities, think tanks, and news media houses, to name a few–are now regularly discussing the matter, at least publicly, displayed concern in studies and reports and more importantly in the spectrum of policy approaches toward China. He also had a haunting suspicion that very few were aware of what was happening. Far less aware of it all was the US public, going on day-to-day believing they were safe and secure from China and every other country for that matter, and the well-being of the country was in the diligent, conscientious, and thoughtful hands of their elected leaders.

Surely the dead-enders among some elected officials, China policy experts, and business executives of firms in the US well-tied and still benefitting immensely from China’s opportunities surely would rebuff what Spalding has been saying. Imaginably, some, perhaps hurt particularly by his insinuations of failing in their respective duties to place concern for their company employees and their country as paramount, would likely look upon him–perchance given what greatcharlie after many years has come to understand about human nature– disdainfully and mock him as something akin to the character of Scottish writer Kenneth Grahame’s The Wind in the Willows (1908), “Mr. Toad”  He writes: “The clever men at Oxford / Know all that there is to be knowed. / But they none of them know one half as much / As intelligent Mr Toad!

In more direct action, Spalding proffers in this section that the US should seek opportunities to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, through which it provides countries loans with the aim to gain political leverage. In many cases, countries that have defaulted on those loans have been left with no choice but to give China long-term access to mineral resources or their ports. Spalding calls it a form of economic colonialism which must be countered.

With regard the other 4 points in which he suggests action should be taken: political, education, consumers; and voters, Spalding says the following: 

Political

Spalding states plainly that the US Needs a single coherent team that would manage its opposition, China. He implores that it can no longer reside in twenty agencies. China comes at the US as one force, thereby, the US Needs to be one force to oppose it. He notes that ultimately, a decision on this matter must come from the US President, but the foreign and national security bureaucracies must go in on it, too.

Education

Spalding believes that there is great value in Chinese students’ coming to the US to study, but the system has been abused and needs to be tightened. However, he notes that the point of such exchanges is to encourage the Chinese to learn our values and way of life. The Chinese government has directed many instead to maneuver into positions from which they can steal US technology. Spalding feels the US government has some leverage on this matter as China does not have the capacity or quality of schools to educate the hundreds of thousands of top students that emerge from its secondary school system each year. He reports that US universities earn billions of dollars by admitting them. He insists the universities, themselves, need to do a better job of vetting who is allowed in, and the federal government probably needs to help. Spalding believes denying Chinese students access to any Chinese apps such as WeChat in the US is one solution. Those apps, he explains, are censored and curated by the Communist Party of China. Spalding says the Communist Party of China’s controlling links to the exchange students must be broken, otherwise they will end up doing its bidding without truly understanding or appreciating democracy. Subita causa, fellitur offectue. (Upon removal of the cause, the effect is removed.) 

Spalding notes that related to this is the growing number of academic espionage cases involving professors and graduate students stealing property. Although both Spalding in War Without Rules and greatcharlie earlier here noted that that US counterintelligence and law enforcement has been following China’s activities albeit all are elements of its beyond-limits combined war strategy, alas, effort to identify and neutral Chinese operatives and their networks have not gone so well. With each successful military and civilian intelligence, industrial, and private effort, and there have been far more than a few, the Chinese learn much about the US security measures and how to penetrate government bureaucracies and private organizations from defense contractors to elite universities. Through that incrementalist approach they have enabled themselves to act at will in the US, pilfering research and development and gaining access to US policy planning, contingency plans, and decision making. Some might state derisively that Beijing now knows more about what is transpiring within many US government bureaucracies, businesses, hi-tech firms, and universities than those who have worked in them for decades. The most apparent evidence of that is when equivalents planned products of sensitive and highly classified US research and development projects are constructed and almost mockingly displayed in official parades and technology fairs and conventions as China’s latest technological achievements. China is dead wrong for stealing industrial and high-tech secrets. However, the operational elements of foreign and national security policy bureaucracies of the US and its allies and partners are wrong for failing consistently over two decades to put a halt to China’s fruitful espionage efforts. Rather than reporting goose chases to headquarters, it appears some investigating agents more often press dead ends and repeatedly sift through the same dust, creating a type of self-inflicted wound to their respective organizations’ efforts. More than yielding nothing, such practices result in further darkening their powers to make headway on new cases by using lessons learned based on failures and looking at facts from new angles. 

It is difficult to discern just how much reliance Spalding would place in the US counterintelligence services and law enforcement to thwart China’s unrestricted warfare operations against the US in the various no military realms. To that extent, he rarely mentions them in War Without Rules. Perhaps something more might be read into Spalding’s final statement in this section, “Our counterespionage efforts have improved, but I suspect there is much more that can be done.” Perhaps it is useful to mention that in Chapter 3: “The Magic Shoes of Technology”, Spalding notes that in September 2021, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Christopher Wray stated before the Congress regarding threats to the US that there were more than two thousand ongoing investigations into Chinese espionage in the US. Spalding quotes Wray as saying: “We’re opening a new investigation that’s tied back to China about every 12 hours, and it covers pretty much every sector of the economy in every state in the nation.” Spalding then writes: “The colonels who wrote Unrestricted Warfare would be proud.” (For more on the efforts by US counterintelligence services and law enforcement to fend off beyond limits combined war by China, see greatcharlie’s August 31, 2021 post entitled, “Sidelights on Nicholas Eftimiades, A Series on Chinese Espionage, Vol. I: Operations and Tactics (Vitruvian Press, 2020))”.

Consumers

Spalding says once again here that US citizens must understand their country is at war with China. It is a war China started, and citizens must avoid doing anything that would make China stronger. He notes, given the fairly common reports in the newsmedia about human rights violations, that China”s actions must be opposed. However, opposing those violations is only one weapon to use against them. Spalding suggests boycotting Chinese products, and avoiding stores that do not sell alternatives made in the US and “democracy-friendly” countries. As War Without Rules was written before current high inflation levels were reached, Spalding suggests “paying a little more and buying a little less as long as products come from the US and reputable countries.”

Voters

Spalding makes the statement highlighted by another reviewer: “We should all be China hawks.” Out of fairness, one might better understand what Spalding meant with these words by citing added to them was a discussion of his concern over what those who seek political office have on their minds about China. He notes the governors have made all kinds of deals with China where the benefits unintended went one way. Spalding feels those whose actions support China over the US interests should be viewed as unpatriotic. That would be particularly true given China’s actions and intentions via unrestricted warfare, beyond-limits combined war. Spalding urges citizens to hold their elected representatives accountable. He albeit aggressively states that China’s actions should be presumed guilty until proven innocent, which is an idea most readers of War Without Rules who adhere to the precepts of the US Constitution, as greatcharlie, would likely feel uncomfortable with. Any pressure that the Communist Party of China can put upon political leaders through corporations that have business ties in China must be thwarted.

Spalding also has a section in this chapter entitled “What Does Victory Look Like?” In it, intriguingly, Spalding does not sound much as the warrior out for blood that some have portrayed him given what is written in this chapter. Rather than explain further, greatcharlie will allow readers to discover what he says and reach their own judgments. Ex inimico cogita posse fieri amicum. (Think that you may make a friend of an enemy.)

Nicolas Malebranche was a 17th century French Oratorian priest and rationalist philosopher. In his works, he sought to synthesize the thought of St. Augustine of Hippo and René Descartes, in order to demonstrate the active role of God in every aspect of the world. Reportedly, after Malebranche read Descartes’ Traité de l’homme, he turned towards a study of mathematics and physics. In his reaction to Descartes’ book is recounted: “The joy of becoming acquainted with so large a number of discoveries caused him such palpitations of the heart that he was obliged to stop reading in order to recover his breath.” Alas, greatcharlie will not go as far as to declare War Without Rules was the manifestation of Divine inspiration through Spalding. Still, as readers may have detected throughout this review, greatcharlie enjoyed reading every bit of the book. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that greatcharlie whole-heartedly recommends War Without Rules to its readers.

It is almost assured that after the first reading War Without Rules, one would most likely go back to the book and engage in that stimulating process repeatedly. There is no telling what insights and how many might be brewed up from within readers after they have had a chance to read through it. Hopefully Spalding will keep on writing books. While writing books may not be as enthralling to him as flying a B-2 Stealth bomber, he nevertheless, is damnably good at it. Vires acquirit eundo. (We gather strength as we go.)

By Mark Edmond Clark

Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

A T80BV tank of the Russian Naval Troops, featuring the distinctive “Z” marking and explosive armor (above), sits on the side of a road after being destroyed by Ukrainian forces in the Luhansk province in February 2022. Due to his confidence in the capabilities of his Russia’s armed forces and intelligence services, Putin unlikely believed Ukrainian forces would pose too much a problem. In a pinch, Putin perhaps believed there might be ingenious maneuvers and techniques that would see Russian forces through and thereby lead Russia to inevitable success. That would hardly be a reasonable schema, and indeed, perhaps the last thing one might consider. However, it may be the case that Putin was not thinking or acting reasonably before the invasion and perhaps he hoped to be covered by some miracle. Through this essay, greatcharlie has sought to briefly consider the thinking within, and actions directed from the top floors of the headquarters of the Russian Federation intelligence services and the general staff of the armed forces before the invasion and during to a degree. It highlights a few of the points at which leaders of those national security bureaucracies served Putin poorly.

While Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s February 24, 2022 televised address made just hours before the invasion of Ukraine was not a comprehensive expression of his ideas and theories to include subjects neo-Nazis and Ukrainian sovereignty called attention to here, although in declaring the right to move Russian forces into Ukraine, he plainly indicated that he did not recognize the sovereign rights of the country. He put before his audience a review of his sense of the threat to Russia from the West, more specifically the threat from the US. Looking back, one might argue that Putin cut a foolish figure, speaking so boldly about the actions and intentions of Russian forces and the notion that Ukrainian forces should lay down their arms. 

Putin surely had too much imagination to expect the Ukrainians not to respond to a Russian invasion the second time around. Certainly, Putin learned long ago that there are patterns one can discern that establish order in the human mind. Awareness of that should have factored into calculations on moving against Ukraine. Placidity should hardly have been expected of Kyiv by anyone thinking clearly in the Kremlin. Allowing Russia to walk into Ukraine the first time in 2014 doubtlessly had tormented leaders in Kyiv since, believing it was a gross error. For Kyiv to allow Russia to walk into Ukraine a second time would surely have been an historical act of gross negligence. Putin was always concerned with Western influence on Ukraine in essays, speeches, and interviews. Perhaps it could be said that Putin had too little imagination to recognize how much the West was involved in correctly preparing the Ukrainians for the possibility of a Russian invasion. In reality, the influence that the West had on Ukraine, something he was so concerned with, likely turned out be far greater than he ever imagined.

In setting unrealistic expectations, one sets oneself up for hurt. Never choose illusion over fact. Illusions disintegrate when confronted by reality, confronted by truth. A leader with unrealistic expectations regarding an enterprise can often be the cause of problems from the start. Presumably due to his confidence in the capabilities of Russia’s armed forces and intelligence services, Putin could not imagine Ukraine would pose too much a problem. In a pinch, Putin perhaps believed there might be ingenious maneuvers and techniques that would see Russian forces through and thus lead Russia to inevitable success. That is hardly a schema, and indeed, perhaps the last thing one might reasonably consider. However, it may be the case that Putin was not thinking or acting reasonably before the invasion. What proved to be truer than anything else was the aphorism that anything which can go wrong will go wrong. That is especially true when the lack of preparedness, readiness, and awareness are stark factors in an undertaking. To bend, to retreat back away from the matter of Ukraine is impossible.

Some questions do not have available answers, and one must learn to live with that. Through this essay, greatcharlie has sought to briefly consider the thinking within, and actions directed from, the top floors of the headquarters of the Russian Federation intelligence services and the general staff of the armed forces before the invasion and somewhat during. It highlights a few of the points at which leaders of those national security bureaucracies served Putin poorly. It hopefully provides readers with insights on what may be the tone within the meeting rooms of those bureaucracies and thinking somewhere deep inside top officials. Many of the latest public sources on prewar thinking in Moscow have been utilized for the discussion. However, much within the essay has been conceptualized in the abstract. In public statements, optimism, the best and most available elixir for defeatism, has been employed liberally. Yet, presumably, senior commanders of Russia’s armed forces and executives in the intelligence services concerned may be feeling a bit stuck and stagmating, clutching at straws, and listening to the wind. Given all that has transpired, perhaps those feelings are well-earned. Some current and former military commanders and military analysts in the West observing Russia’s situation must be able to appreciate the predicament of Russian officials given the experience their armies and national security bureaucracies recently in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Omnia præsumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta. (All things are presumed to have been done duly and in the usual manner.)

Putin (above) in the Kremlin attending a meeting with his advisers. Putin, the final authority on all matters that concerned the invasion, the ultimate decisionmaker, believed assessments on conditions in Ukraine produced by the Russian intelligence services, Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, and Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB augured well with regard to taking military action. Perchance, he never thought that much of it was faulty, perhaps even rubbish.

Blindness Bordering on Madness

In The Civil War, Book III, 68, the Roman Emperor Gaius Julius Caesar writes: Sed fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit; ut tum accidit. (Fortune, which has a great deal of power in other matters but especially in war, can bring about great changes in a situation through very slight forces.) The undeniably disastrous initial results of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine appear to stem from challenges faced in the planning of the “special military operation.” As noted earlier, Putin, the final authority on all matters that concerned the invasion, the ultimate decisionmaker, believed assessments on conditions in Ukraine produced by the Russian intelligence services, Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, and Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB augured well with regard to taking military action. He never thought that much of it was faulty, perhaps even rubbish. As he should have been aware, in the intelligence industry, the only truth unfortunately is that which those at the top declare it to be.

As for his military forces, Putin surely felt they were well-trained and well-equipped to bring vistory. To be fair, even to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their true strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use. The truth was likely concealed from Putin.

For his own part, he indubitably sought to glean as much as he could about Western actions and intentions by interacting with foreign leaders and officials, and applying that to calculations on probable responses to an invasion of Ukraine. (Without any intention of finger pointing, greatcharlie can only imagine what may have been said in camera and hope nothing uttered off-handedly had no influence in the wrong direction.) Putin was able to not only learn more about but confirm his understanding of what cards the West was holding to use against Russia in case he moved ahead with the invasion. He likely believed at that time that his intelligence services had provided him with a picture of Ukraine that indicated he could proceed with confidence and some assurance. The variable of intelligence seems to have been the weakest link of the chain given ceratin revelations, some discussed here.

The indications and implications of it all for Putin were that he could get all that he wanted. Putin could deal a devastating blow to what he perceived to be the expansionist plans of the US and West.  As important perchance would be having the opportunity to act as a sort of avenging angel of ethnic Russians in Ukraine, a protector of the Russian Orthodox church–a holy warrior, a defender the Russian people and all that is Russian. It is possible that Putin genuinely believes he serves in that role. Putin was so comfortable with the whole matter to the extent he left it to the world to see who he is and what he is doing, and how others might feel or respond was either of no concern or of little real interest to him.

Assumedly, the compounded impact of the intelligence failures and military blunders has doubtlessly had a chilling effect on the thinking of Gospodin Vladimir Vladimirovich with respect to political stimmung at home beyond the Ukraine matter. That likely in turn has added to Western anxieties concerning his mental state.

Putin (left) observes Zapad Exercise alongside Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (right). As for Russia’s military and naval forces, Putin surely felt they were well-trained and well-equipped to bring vistory. To be fair to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces’ effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their true strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use.

The Intelligence Services

Qui ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit, nequiquam sapit. (A wise man whose wisdom does not serve him is wise in vain.) Perhaps Putin would been better of seeking assistance from an intuitive empath, who, allegedly with confidence bolstered by assistance from spirits, likely would have been better able to predict the response of the Ukrainians to a Russian invasion. Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Yet, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, and knowing that reporting from them should be examined with a fine-tooth comb, especially concerning a matter of utmost importance as Ukraine, he seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness. Whatever his inner voice may have saying, he closed his ear to it. 

Of course, there is the possibility that Putin, knowing what he knows, experienced as he is, wanted to be deceived because he so badly wanted to invade Ukraine and needed to show his decision could not be viewed as wreckless, but rather based in reason that would be generally accepted. Conceivably, Putin may have recognized that there would be no need for him to potentially light the fuse of a figurative political bomb by trying to explain why he took the risk of invading Ukraine knowing Russian forces might face considerable challenges where there were self-crafted patsys in the intelligence services that he could “learn” to be the cause for his “miscalculation.” A most trusted aviser could serve to uncover the malfeasance and identify the patsys involved and present the wrongdoer and the report of their crimes to Putin all tied with a neat bow. The many aspects that could potentially be part of such a line of analysis that cannot be broached in this brief essay. Indeed, greatcharlie is not absolutely certain it possesses the faculty to properly parse out, in the abstract, all of intricacies and psychological angles involved in the round. (Sometimes that sort of tricky approach suggested here works, sometimes it does not. Vice-Admiral Horatio Nelson, 1st Viscount Nelson, 1st Duke of Bronte, KB, also known simply as Admiral Nelson, the renowned 18th century British flag officer in the Royal Navy is best known for his victory at the Battle of the Trafalgar in 1805. However, he became a national hero long before then due to his prowess as a naval tactician. In 1801, Nelson destroyed the Danish Navy at the Battle of Copenhagen. During the battle he was sent a signal to break off action by the Admiral Sir Hyde Parker. Nelson supposedly put his telescope to his blind eye and told to his Flag Lieutenant, “You know Foley I have only one eye. I have a right to be blind sometimes. I really do not see the signal.” It is unlikely Nelson had a plan for covering himself in case his bit of jiggery-pokery failed.)

When directed by Putin to place greater emphasis on Ukraine, it may very well have been the case that intelligence collected prior to the capture of Crimea in March 2014 was recycled and used as a yardstick to parse out falsehoods on Ukraine. It would not be the first time that a sophisticated intelligence service of an advanced industrialized power engaged in such behavior and subsequently led to a large-scale military action that might have be averted otherwise. That is a hard saying. Perchance many other top officials in the Russian intelligence services never imagined Putin would invade Ukraine full-scale. As is the case, such ignorance often dissolves into tragedy.

Je m’en fiche! When asked to provide assessments on the situation there, they apparently sought to simply placate Putin, responding to his sentiments on Ukraine. The benefit of taking such a risk would be to stay in his good graces. Thus, they substituted what they understood he believed to be true feeling Putin would brook anything else. It is possible that some took this step not out of delicacy toward him but rather due to contempt. To reach a position of such influence in Putin’s government, one would image such a flaw in character would have been twinkled out much earlier. Apparently, none of the intelligence services presented anything to contradict that information to the extent that it caused Putin any pause. Their assessments were illusions without substance, appearances only. The result was a catastrophe for all involved. The problem can by no means eased out of the way. There was no possibility to put the toothpaste back into the ttube. Those left at the top of their respective intelligence services know they serve at the pleasure of Putin and his whims. The best way for them to survive at this point is to look good, focus on the US, find moles, leaks, and seek help that might make a difference from allies as the Chinese. They know that it would be a mistake to show up at any National Security Council meeting in the Kremlin with nothing to say.

Alexander Bortnikov director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Although it is not parsed out here, there is the possibility that Putin, knowing what he knows, experienced as he is, wanted to be deceived because he so badly wanted to invade Ukraine and needed to show his decision could not be viewed as wreckless, but rather based in reason that would be generally accepted. Conceivably, Putin may have recognized that there would be no need for him to potentially light the fuse of a figurative political bomb by trying to explain why he took the risk of invading Ukraine knowing Russian forces might face considerable challenges where there were self-crafted patsys in the intelligence services that he could “learn” to be the cause for his “miscalculation.” A most trusted aviser could serve to uncover the malfeasance and identify the patsys involved and present the wrongdoer and the report of their crimes to Putin all tied with a neat bow.

Carelessness or Conspiracy?

Some intelligence services apparently did more in the direction of providing fabrications than others.. From what can be gathered from newsmedia reports about its findings, the FSB foreign intelligence service seemed to have laid it on thick. There were allegedly many unproven torrid statements on the nature of Ukrainian society made concerning the destructive impact of the West on the culture, morality, spiritually, self-image of the people, ultranationalists, and the leadership in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian people’s willingness to stand fast against an invasion. 

According to Western newsmedia reports, the head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda, was been placed under house arrest. Arrested with Beseda was his deputy and head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Western commentators initially alleged the accusations were made against the officers because there was a search on in Moscow to find scapegoats to blame  for the “poor progress” of the Ukraine invasion. However, as the FSB is under the control of one of Putin’s most faithful and most dangerous officials, Alexander Bortnikov, it is more likely that the FSB head, himself, had determined that there were problems with the intelligence officials’ actions. Indeed, firstly, Beseda and Bolyuhk had been charged with the embezzlement of funds allocated for subversive and undercover work in Ukraine, as well as false information. Embezzlement is an ill that can plague even the most esteemed intelligence service at all levels. Some sardonically call it “creating a second retirement fund.” It was reported secondly that Beseda and Boyuhk had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. The criminal actions by the two intelligence officers were acts of madness. Rather than allowing Bortnikov to handle the matter in his usual fashion, Putin initially chose to have the officials placed under house arrest and allow for a fuller investigation of the matter. He likely wanted to determine the depth of the disloyalty and infidelity of Beseda and Bolyuhk and discover whether were acting on behalf of another country’s foreign intelligence service.

It could have reasonably be expected that within the FSB, some investigation was likely launched to identify any possible intelligence leaks that occurred before the invasion began. Some proposal surely would be made for the broader exploitation of whatever they might have discovered. Such an investigation would very likely start with a discrete look at those who may have put a foot wrong in the intelligence services. Presumably, there was no penetration by the West of a kind that any standard counterintelligence investigation might have the slightest potential to uncover immediately or identify clearly. Nevertheless, if some potential activity might have been discovered under such a hypothetical probe suggested here, it could potentially have been of enough significance to convince Moscow that it had some influence the initial outcome of the invasion and influence follow-on efforts by Russian forces in the field against Ukraine. 

To go a step further, delving into the realm of conjecture, there is the possibility that plans for the Russian invasion were captured by Western intelligence. However, given the performance of Russian forces so far, there was clearly a strategy and resources mismatch. Results in the field have spoken volumes about what Russian forces can and cannot do. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. Of course, the successes and movements of Ukrainian forces will have greater influence on how Russia forces proceed.

In the end regarding the FSB scandal, Putin engaged in the process of elimination in the truest sense of the term. Nearly 150 FSB officers were reportedly dismissed from the service, including Beseda and Bolyuhk who were already under arrest. The head of the department responsible for Ukraine was sent to prison. Gravis ira regum [est] semper. (The wrath of kings is always severe.)

Sergey Beseda, head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th Service. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998 to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Beseda and his deputy Anatoly Bolyuhk had been charged with the embezzlement of funds allocated for subversive and undercover work in Ukraine, as well as false information. It was also reported that Beseda and Bolyukh had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost.

Looking Good Rather Than Being Good: Finding Work To Do

Leading up to the invasion, Washington supposedly plucked a spate of information from classified intelligence on the actions and intentions of Russian forces deployed near the border with Ukraine and inside Belarus and provided to newsmadia houses from reporting and offered in official government statements. By the time the invasion began, real-time reports of movements of Russian forces were being reported daily. The purpose of this step, among others, was to indicate to the world that an invasion was around the corner, Putin was acting aggressively, and the world needed to unite concerning sanctions and all other economic measures to make any action by Putin unprofitable. This schema of using real-time intelligence from exquisite technical collection capabilities of the US Intelligence services to forewarn of what was coming next was declared as a unique and skillful approach to information warfare by US newsmedia commentators friendly to the administration of US President Joe Biden. It ostensibly would serve to stymie the Kremlin’s ability to effectively calculate and establish plans, and stripped Putin of any chance of acting with surprise. The outcome of that effort is now quite clear for all to see.

Tanto est accusare quam defendere, quanto facere quam sanare vulnere, facilius. (It is just so much easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to inflict than to heal a wound.) Readers are asked to indulge greatcharlie as it moves further on this point. Surely, if that US effort had continued, as well as the relative peace, it is likely that the SVR and GRU, much as the FSB, among other things, would have tried to dress-up false pieces of information, chicken feed of a sort, moved it back and forth through channels of communication, through encrypted signals, to determine, off of a long list questions, what the US Intelligence Community and its Western partners are listening to, their preferred source, and what US cryptologists had broken into. Nonetheless, an investigation was doubtlessly launched.

More than that, the Russian intelligence services might look for and discover other secure channels were being monitored from the outside and the encrypted messages of their services were being read. If foreign penetration was not discovered authentically, it might even be fabricated. As alluded to earlier, other Russian intelligence services were apparently reporting nothing prewar that definitively contradicted what the FSB was reporting. Going further down the path of deception might appear counterintuitive. Surely, it is not a prescribed practice in any intelligence service. However, despite the risk, continuing to please Putin would possibly be seen as the best chance for survival. The hope of greatcharlie at this point is that its readers will remain willing to follow along, even stumble along, with its cautious discussion of this novel idea.

The discovery of some penetration, or a bit of fabrication about a penetration, would create the requirement to dig further. Imaginably, the alleged compromised channel or channels would not be shut down immediately. Chicken feed would likely be sent along the channel. Specific movements in the field might be ordered to confirm information was being pick-up on the outside or sent from within. To ensure they would grab attention, the movements ordered would be those of some importance to the overall Russian operation in Ukraine As things have gone, reports of Russian plans to move might appear in the Western newsmedia before they have even begun or have been completed. SVR and GRU counterintelligence services would likely also look at all communications made on particular channels and codes use, and among several Western actions, match them up with Western movements, statements, urgent communications between allies outside of normally scheduled ones, and if the capability actually exists, monitor collection requirements of Western intelligence officers in the field by exploiting counterespionage and counterintelligence successes. Any move by Ukrainian forces which SVR and GRU counterintelligence might discern was likely impacted by an awareness of Russian Federation plans and intentions would also be heavily reviewed. Russian intelligence services would not have been enabled to possibly take such steps if the West had not taken the tack of releasing publicly, freshly collected information and intelligence assessments that normally would have been marked classified. As suggested earlier, perhaps, something disturbing was found. 

On its face, at the full distance of the journeys of exploration by SVR, GRU, and FSB counterintelligence, for Putin it would be unpleasant and disappointing to find that US. Intelligence Community had successfully managed to penetrate the Russian intelligence services at such a high level. However, if SVR, GRU, and FSB counterintelligence hypothetically ran through all the intelligence dumps from the West on Russia’s plans for Ukraine and reviewed the aggregate of past communications sent and actions taken and some network or group of disassociated individuals providing information or making it accessible was uncovered, Putin, himself, would want to roll it up, hide and hair, as well as furtively exploit it for the maximum counterintelligence gain.

More than troubling technical defeat for Russian intelligence services, for Putin, the political implications of the possibility of a US operation to mislead Moscow about Ukraine would be considerable and perhaps work in Russia’s favor. Any US effort to convince the Kremlin that Ukraine was vulnerable to attack would  reveal the intention of the US to dangle the country as low hanging fruit for Russia to grab militarily. Kyiv might be reviled by the idea that the Ukrainian people were used as a goat tethered to a tree along the riverside as the lure for a blood-thirsty Russian tiger. To that extent, Kyiv might conclude that was calculated well-beforehand that if war came, the Ukrainian people would be intentionally used as fodder to wear Russian forces down. As it turned out, the Ukrainians fought admirably as the well-armed, well-trained proxies of the West. They have gnawed voraciously at Russian forces. Still, at the nub of the matter for Putin would be showing the Ukrainian that the war could have been avoided, he would insist that the war was sought by the US, and that there was no true intention by the West to pursue peace. Looking at all the devastation and destruction in the country, Kyiv would hardly be open to much that Putin might say. However, Putin might hope despite everything to a score political warfare victory and convince Kyiv not to stand so closely on the side of West. (Readers should note this partial analysis of the Ukraine war’s causation is not compatible with greatcharlie’s belief at all. The theory was certainly not offered with the intention by greatcharlie to speak against the national interest.)

 

People’s Republic of China Minister of State Security, Chen Wenqing (above). On a closely associated intelligence issue, there is the matter of Washington’s decision to share intelligence with Beijing on preparations by Russian forces for the attack on Ukraine and evidence supporting the likelihood of an attack which Washington shared with Beijing prior to the actual invasion. Washington was clearly groping for alternatives, given it was unable to see any good options. The Chinese would hardly have done anything to influence Russia’s position on the Ukraine as the US wished. The entire schema likely revealed to the Chinese the level of desperation in Washington to find answers to the Russian invasion threat. It may have been the case that Washington’s very apparent pre-invasion fears that Russian forces would rapidly overpower Ukraine stoked Putin’s unwarranted confidence.

Dealing With Beijing

On a closely associated intelligence issue, there is the matter of Washington’s decision to share intelligence with Beijing on preparations by Russian forces for the attack on Ukraine and evidence supporting the likelihood of an attack which Washington shared with Beijing prior to the actual invasion. Washington was clearly groping for alternatives, given it was unable to see any good options. It may have been the case that Washington’s very apparent pre-invasion US fears that Russian forces would rapidly overpower Ukraine stoked Putin’s unwarranted confidence. 

Washington should have understood that leaders of the Communist Party of China and People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials did not come in with yesterday’s rain and would vigorously review the information before doing anything with it. To confirm that the US was truly sharing valuable information–one cannot be so sure that Beijing was not already in possession of it, the Communist Party of China would  involve the best counterintelligence capabilities of the People’s Republic of China PLA Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau and Ministry of State Security. The head of MSS foreign counterintelligence, Dong Jingwei, a favorite of Xi, was once the subject of what his organization likely presumed to be an apparent US counterintelligence effort in which reports were leaked to the newsmedia that he had defected to the US along with his daughter. (See greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax.”) Imaginably, to the MSS foreign counterintelligence service, the potential benefits of the US Intelligence Community from promulgating false information on Dong would be clear. Top officials and managers in Beijing likely would have concluded that a goal could have been the breaking of morale among the alleged 25,000+ Chinese intelligence officers and operatives in the US. Hearing the false report of the MSS counterintelligence head’s defection might have stirred some disgruntled or disillusioned Chinese civilian or military intelligence officers and operatives to do the same. There might have been the presumption that the information was designed to unnerve a specific Chinese intelligence officer or operative that was being targeted by US counterintelligence services. Surely, the use his “good name”, putting his loyalty to China, to the Communist Party of China, and his comrades at MSS in question, enraged the infamous Dong. When the US presented its intelligence information on the build up and activities of Russian forces near Ukraine, Dong surely viewed it with skepticism and viewed the gesture as some ploy. His position on the matter would surely help shape the position the Communist Party of China’s leadership on the matter. The Chinese would hardly have done anything to influence Russia’s position on the Ukraine as the US wished. The entire schema likely revealed to the Chinese the level of desperation felt in Washington to find answers to the Russian invasion threat. 

Additionally, hardline Communist Party of China officials may have viewed the gesture as an effort to impress Beijing with the prowess of US intelligence capabilities, and to that extent issue a subtle warning. In the end, both PLA Major General Chen Guangjun, Chief of CMC Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau and Minister of State Security Chen Wenqing likely recognized the easiest and beneficial way to confirm the validity of the intelligence and enable China to better understand US intelligence human and electronic collection capabilities would be to share the information with their counterparts in Russia’s SVR, GRU, and FSB. Evidently, after the gifted US intelligence moved up through appropriate Communist Party of China channel, People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping green-lit presentation of the information to Moscow. Getting Russian confirmation on the validity of the information would be important. 

Conceivably, Moscow believes that whatever China might have about the US is likely genuine. One might presume, there is some history of intelligence sharing has been established. Perhaps the greatest caveat for the Russians concerning what Beijing had to share would be the knowledge that officials in Communist Chinese foreign and national security bureaucracies absolutely detest the US and conclusions of Chinese intelligence services might very well be colored at certain points by such strong feelings. Yet, as important would be using the opportunity to strengthen China’s position at the intelligence table with its ostensible ally Russia, garner appreciation directly from the Kremlin, and perhaps encourage Moscow to provide a regular stream of information from its human and electronic intelligence sources concerning US military plans and activities in China’s area of interest. It would satisfying for Chinese intelligence to acquire information from Russia that could significantly add to what China already knows and is trying to keep track of. The Chinese also would not mind having the Russians eating out of their hands and the Russians would not put themselves in that position.

The Chinese, knowing what they seem to just know in some way about the daily inner workings of the US Intelligence services– the result of which their intelligence services seemingly operate with impunity and comfortably in the US supposedly in the tens of thousands–would presumably see the Russian intelligence service as just one big leaky ship. Surely, the respective headquarters of the MSS and the PLA’s Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau in Beijing would be hesitant to share anything with headquarters of the SVR Russian civilian foreign intelligence and GRU military intelligence services both based in Yasenevo that might be of the utmost importance to China’s security. One might safely wager that the Chinese were somewhat aware of the deficiencies of foreign intelligence service of the FSB Russia’s domestic security organization given any experiences with it. Beijing, knowing how tense the situation was regarding Ukraine, particularly as it concerned Putin, would have recognized that it would have been counterintuitive to do anything that might stir the pot, muddy the waters with regard to what the Kremlin understood about what the US was doing. Surely, Beijing has strived to avoid playing a part in bringing the world closer the nuclear Armageddon. That would be the rational choice.

The Wagner Group was first called into action on behalf of the Russian Federation government in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. They were among the “green men” who marched in the region unopposed. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group also supported ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine which have have since declared themselves the independent Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Experts in Russian military affairs suggest that the Wagner Group is funded and directed by the GRU. The organization’s base is located in Mol’kino, in Southern Russia, within close proximity to a Russian Army base, perhaps to allow for better control and oversight.

Deflecting: An Possible Effort To Feed Into Kremlin Paranoia About the US

Additionally, it is very likely that some in the Kremlin, perhaps only in private thoughts, may have concluded by now that the Ukrainians could hardly have been so lucky against Russian forces on their own. They may have had intimations, that much of their success was really due to assistance from, and the “handiwork” of, the same well-trained folks who have done among many things, lent significant support to the forces of the late General Ahmad Shah Massoud of the Northern Alliance in their fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan, swept away the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, drove the campaign that destroyed the so-called Islamic Caliphate that cut across Syria and Iraq that was created by the ISIS terrorist organization, and while in that fight destroyed in self-defense, a formation of Russian private military contractors from the infamous Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) in Syria as well. Without direct evidence, however, such imaginings, even in the Kremlin, can only have life in the realm of conjecture. Perchance the Russian Federation General Staff has the GRU investigating that foreign military advisers are covertly on the ground assisting Ukrainian forces, planning operations, controlling maneuvers and supporting attacks. The SVR would also likely reach out to its sources world wide to discover if any evidence or hints exist that such covert operations are underway. If the GRU and SVR are actually studying the matter, their conclusions, either confirming or refuting the possibility, would surely be startle consumers of the information.

The Wagner Group was first called into action on behalf of the Russian Federation government in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. They were among the “green men” who marched in the region unopposed. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group also supported ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of Ukraine which have have since declared themselves the independent Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Experts in Russian military affairs suggest that the Wagner Group is funded and directed by the GRU. The organization’s base is located in Mol’kino, in Southern Russia, within close proximity to a Russian Army base, perhaps to allow for better control and oversight. Reportedly, just before the invasion of Ukraine, the GRU directed the Wagner Group to conduct false flag operations in Eastern Ukraine to ensure such provocations would be available should Putin want to use one or more as a pretext for an attack on Ukraine. (To the extent that reports concerning an engagement between the Wagner Group and US special operations forces are true, the private military organization may be rushing to get to Ukraine not only for financial gain but with the hope of getting a possible rematch ostensibly with US operators defeated their units in Syria and leveled a severe blow to their egos given any real belief on their part that such US operators are indeed present on the ground. If there is a chance that conditions exist for a clash, it may very well turn out even worse than the first for the Wagner Group.)

“Kamerad, ich komm ja gleich!” On March 31, 2022, several hundred Syrian mercenaries arrived in the country, including soldiers from an army division that worked with Russian officers supporting the Assad regime. Russia has previously deployed Syrian fighters in Ukraine but in smaller numbers. In March 2022, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced that approximately 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East had signed up to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. The same month, the Kyiv Independent reported that Ukrainian intelligence learned Russia had reached an agreement the Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar to recruit mercenaries. Official European sources have gone further to report that along with members of the Wagner Group.fighting in the Donbas, Russia has deployed as many as 20,000 Syrian and Libyan fighters there.

Ostensibly all Russian paramilitary units and foreign fighters operating in Ukraine or anywhere on behalf of the Russian Federation would be the province of the GRU. Indeed, the GRU would likely be responsible for their control, would be their link to Russian commanders and would be responsible for their oversight. much as with the Wagner Group. Handling the Wagner Group and foreign fighters would certainly provide plenty for GRU intelligence chief to report to Putin beyond counterintelligence efforts. Most of the reporting from the field about the Wagner Group and the foreign fighters would be good news, too. The GRU, of course, falls directly under the control of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The headquarters of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU in Yasenevo. On March 31, 2022, several hundred Syrian mercenaries arrived in the country, including soldiers from an army division that worked with Russian officers supporting the Assad regime. Russia has previously deployed Syrian fighters in Ukraine but in smaller numbers. In March 2022, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced that approximately 16,000 volunteers from the Middle East had signed up to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine. Ostensibly all Russian paramilitary units and foreign fighters operating in Ukraine or anywhere on behalf of the Russian Federation would be the province of the GRU. Indeed, the GRU would likely be responsible for their control, would be their link to Russian commanders and would be responsible for their oversight much as with the Wagner Group.

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Expectations Versus Realities in Ukraine

On the eve of war, Russia’s invasion force was still considered formidable. Reportedly, this belief was based on the assumption that Russia had undertaken the same sort of root-and-branch military reform that America underwent in the 18-year period between its defeat in Vietnam and its victory in the first Gulf War. Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many analysts in the West speculated that the Russian operation would be something akin to a one act drama with an early curtain. The US Intelligence Community concluded that Kyiv would fall in days. Some European officials thought it might just hold out for a few weeks. 

However, starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation armed forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. Most wide-eyed observers might conclude that the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) is fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Mea culpa

From what greatcharlie could gather about the situation before the February 24, 2022 invasion, the US Intelligence Community has concluded that the Kremlin could be planning a multifront offensive involving up to 175,000 troops. An estimated 100,000 Russian troops have already been deployed near the Russia-Ukraine border. Satellite imagery has revealed a buildup of Russian tanks and artillery as well as other gear near the border, too. Reportedly, online disinformation activity regarding Ukraine also has increased in the way it did in the run-up to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. According to the New York Times, the most evident scenario given the scale of troop movements on the ground is a Russian invasion of Ukraine may not be to conquer the entire country but to rush forces into the breakaway regions around the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, or to drive all the way to the Dnieper River. Purportedly at the Pentagon, “five or six different options” for the extent of a Russian invasion are being examined. Suffice it to say, Moscow calls such assessments of Russia’s intentions slanderous ravings. Russia denies it is planning an invasion and, in turn, accused the West of plotting “provocations” in Ukraine. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who unfortunately does not exactly have a watertight record for tying her statements to reality, laid it on thick in the newsmedia, alleging Western and Ukrainian talk of an imminent Russian attack was a “cover for staging large-scale provocations of their own, including those of military character.” It is really disempowering to put out such a message. 

In the abstract, greatcharlie also had assessed that If Putin decides to go in, firepower, astronomically massed, from ground, air, and possibly the sea assets, would most likely be used to destroy Ukrainian forces in the field, and in depth as far back as units held in reserve or even on training bases. Relentless fire from air and ground would be utilized to support the movement of forces inside Ukraine. What might have been identified as the front line of Ukraine’s defense would figuratively become a map reference for Hell. Russian forces would most likely be deployed in a way to prevent the resurrection of Ukrainian forces in areas which Russian forces have captured. As for reinforcements or reserves, the rest of Russia’s armed forces would be right across the border in Russia. Imaginably, the main objective of the deployment of Russian forces would be to create a sufficient buffer in Ukraine between Russia and “ever expanding NATO forces.” In performing this task, Russian forces would ensure territory and forces that might remain in Kyiv’s control would be of less utility to NATO as potential a launching pad for a ground attack on Russia and could not be used as part of a larger strategy to contain Russia at its own border.

Highly motivated Ukrainian troops riding a BMP push forward against Russian forces in the Donbas. Starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation armed forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. Most wide-eyed observers might conclude that the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) is fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Delinquency Upon Delinquency

The renowned 19th century Irish poet and playwrite Oscar Wilde explained: “To expect the unexpected shows a thoroughly modern intellect.” Yet, during the Russia’s invasion hardly anything that might have been expected was seen. Russian forces moved oddly. Russian information warfare, technological strengths nowhere. Russian air power was not present where it should have been, for example, flying, over Ukraine preparing the battlefield, providing cover for mobile forces, attacking the opponent in depth. 

Russian forces were not organized for war with precision. Units were not ready for battle. Soldiers had no idea of what to expect. Ukraine was allowed use its strengths against Russian weaknesses. Ukraine’s smaller units was able to achieve relative superiority force on force initially in the field. One might have expected that occasionally good fortune would shine upon the relatively lightly-armed Ukrainian forces, and a Russian Army or Russian Naval Troops patrol rolling around or crossing into a danger zone might face ambush, a well-organized ambush, and losses would be suffered. With so many patrol ordered in the different avenues of attack by Russian forces, the greater the chance there would be losses. However, Ukrainian forces outrightly routed Russian units over and over on the battlefield and that line of successes would force Russia to adjust its strategy. This outcome was surely far greater than most military experts around the world could have imagined before February 24, 2022. The possibility of endsieg, victory against the odds, has become all the more real.

Some observers looking through the lens of history might reason that incurring high losses in attack are an aspect of Russian warfighting. Perhaps they might cite as statement allegedly made by Soviet Army Marshall Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov to US General Dwight Eisenhiwer in 1945 as cited on page 207 in Robert Kaiser, Russia: The People and the Power (Atheneum, 1976): “If we come to a minefield, our infantry attacks exactly as it were not there.” Some might recall how Russian forces in the 2008 a war with Georgia had faced difficulties against the rather diminutive Georgian forces. True, Russia had achieved the goal of securing Georgia’s sovereign territory to pass on to the breakaway states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The many deficiencies of the Russia Army exposed during the fighting were stark. Russia troops utilized obsolete equipment, struggled to direct counterbattery fire at Georgian artillery, and the command and control of forces was inept. Still, in 2022, expectedly, everything would be done by commanders sending troops out to obviate that possibility, or mitigate it as best as possible by taking every reasonable precaution. The numbers and regularity of successful attacks on Russian troops would rationally lead one to think commanders have been careless.

The concept of fighting in three dimensionally, with ground forces receiving support from the air and ground receiving support from artillery fires and air and artillery, cross-communicating in real time, coordinating attacks to mass fires and airstrike with the objective of maximizing their impact, did not appear to be part of Russian Army battlefield tactics, at least not in practice. Somewhere on paper, something may be written. In modern armies, a those of the US and its allies, a synchronization matrix enables understanding of what everyone is doing at a particular time and which assets will be supporting which unit. Mission analysis identifies gaps in information required for further planning and decision making during preparation and execution. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements. Russian commanders forces clearly did none of this before they attacked. Amat victoria curam. (Victory loves preparation. [Victory favors those who take pains.])

Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sergey Shoigu conducts meeting with commanders of the armed forces. What has been discovered since the invasion began is that Russia had been running its military campaign against Ukraine out of Moscow, with no central commander on the ground to coordinate air, ground and sea units. Reportedly, that tack assists in explaining why the invasion struggled against an unexpectedly stiff Ukrainian resistance, and was plagued by poor logistics and flagging morale. In situations that require fexibility, improvisation, thinking through problems, armies whose unit commanders at the squad, platoon, company, and even battalion levels, advanced armies tend avoid being as unbending as the Russians. The failure and inability to effectively adapt in unfavorable situation once in contact will suffer considerably.

Calamity

Anyone trying to paint a picture of what was happening in the Russian command over the Ukrainian security operation would accurately produce an ugly daub. What has been discovered since the invasion began is that Russia had been running its military campaign against Ukraine out of Moscow, with no central commander on the ground to coordinate air, ground and sea units. Reportedly, that tack assists in explaining why the invasion struggled against an unexpectedly stiff Ukrainian resistance, and was plagued by poor logistics and flagging morale. In situations that require fexibility, improvisation, thinking through problems, armies whose unit commanders at the squad, platoon, company, and even battalion levels–the battalion being the main tactical formation of the a Russian Army–advanced armies tend avoid being as unbending as the Russians. The failure and inability of Russian forces to effectively adapt in unfavorable situation once in contact–since it is not taught and trained into Russian officers and nonconmissioned officers–would result in them suffering considerably. Often commanders of many units handled their troops and equipment as if they were participating in an exercise–parking companies and battalions of T-90 tanks and BMP armored personnel carriers on open roads without air cover or organic antiaircraft systems providing security–rather than moving in strength behind enemy lines in a shooting war. Disorganized assaults reportedly also contributed to the deaths of several Russian generals, as high-ranking officers were pushed to the front lines to untangle tactical problems that Western militaries would have left to more junior officers or senior enlisted personnel.

From what can be seen in broadcast and online videos albeit most provided by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, no security was set up for units not in contact with their opposing forces in forward battle areas. There were visibly no pickets for armored and mechanized units while halting on roads, no moving pickets, no flank security, no air defense even watching the skies with heavy machine guns. This was the case despite foreknowledge that Ukrainian tank hunters with javelins and Turkish drones were lurking on the ground and in the air in their vicinities. Javelins and stingers provided to Ukraihian forces by the West were exploited to the point at which they had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. To that extent, a popular feature in the broadcast and online newsmedia on the Ukraine War are videos of formations of Russian T-90s and BMPs being identified and destroyed by Ukrainian drones or being hit by Ukrainian troops using javelins. Highways roads, and even trails were seemingly used as a means to locate Russian armored and mechanized units, which were naturally travelling in the direction toward Ukrainian lines on them. Suffice it to say, practically the whole world via the international newsmedia learned this was the situation in the field. No amount of spin by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense could alter the truth of what was witnessed. Russian commanders at the company and battalion levels virtually sabotaged their units as a result of their repeated delinquencies. 

A term Russian armored and mechanized commanders seemed strangely unfamiliar with is “defilade.” Turning a tank into a static low caliber artillery piece, in a protected position while ostensbly awaiting new orders or resupply, is better than having whole companies travelling on roads much as a convoy of singing ice cream trucks. The lives of tank crewmen and mechanized troops were simply thrown away. There was just too much wrong going on for one even now to fully come to terms with the horror of it all. (Feeling dread over the circumstance of another human being should not be conflated with taking sides between warring parties. That is certainly not the case here. To conclude such about these comments would be wrong.)

Strangely, artillery fires have not been used, at least not effectively or robustly, to support movement by armor and infantry, it has not been used to divert, disrupt, and destroy targets on the axis of advancing units, or used for attacks in depth. Surely, these practices should have been rehearsed in military exercises and regular training. In a very archaic manner, artillery fires have at best been used whereas movement is concerned, to mitigate direct fire from opposing forces which was a regular practice during World War I. It would appear that artillery fires, if any are made available, have been lifted as armor and infantry made contact with the opponent allowing the opponent advantages in defense. Artillery has failed to play a dominant role in the field in Russia’s war. That is baffling. Apparently, Ukrainian forces are using artillery fires to support maneuver in their counterattacks and using them effectively to attack in depth. Counterbattery radar sets must have been left back in garrison by most Russian artillery units as Russian counterbattery fires have been ineffective, practically nonexistent.

To be forthright, greatcharlie senses that whatever was really going on at Zapad, the truth of the value of the exercises has come to the surface. In away not too different the director and deputy director of FSB foreign intelligence, military commanders simply went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. As alluded to earlier, it would seem the bigger and better Zapad exercises since 2017, lauded by the leadership of the Russian Federation armed forces, were simply full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. Putin, himself, had regularly observed the Zapad exercises and everything seemed fine enough, but it was not. In a way not too different the director and deputy director of FSB foreign intelligence, military commanders simply went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. To onlookers at the Zapad exercises, as Putin had regularly been, everything seemed fine enough, but things certain were not.

One NATO commander caught on to what had been happening at Zapad and other Russian military and naval exercises before the invasion and could predict Russian military action in Ukraine might prove for Moscow to be catastrophic. When he was commander of American naval forces in Europe and Africa, US Navy Admiral James Foggo had the duty to plan US military exercises recognized that planning the huge Russian exercises were enormous undertakings. As Russia was planning the Vostok exercises in September 2021 in Siberia, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, declared it would be the largest since the Soviet Union’s Zapad exercise of 1981. It would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships. However, Foggo discovered there was quite a bit of deception involved. Rather than actually field large numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, a company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok, for example, was inflated and counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons. Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.)

How spectacularly did the illusion created by Russian Ground Force commanders disintegrate when challenged by reality! It is a sad lesson for commanders in all armies to learn from. The Russian Army of 2022 appears to mimic, albeit unintentionally, much of the Soviet Army of the 1980s. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that after reviewing what has transpired concerning the failures of Russian forces, for at least a fleeting moment, one might get the impression that Russian commanders want to lose. (Intriguingly, despite all that has been witnessed since February 24, 2022, the US Department of Defense continues to regard Russian Federation Armed Forces as an acute threat the US and its interests.)

Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sergey Shoigu (center) and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (left), and Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov,  who took command of military operation in Ukraine in April 2022 (right) hold a meeting aboard an aircraft. As a part of what the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation called the shift from Plan A and Plan B, it was announced that Russian forces would focus its special security operation in Ukraine on “liberating” the east.” A very folksy aphorism that greatcharlie has come across recently is, “There is no education in the second kick of a mule.” Being aware of past thinking, capabilities, and and practices, it seems almost fallacious to expect any novel maneuvers by Russian forces that may be nuanced or special in such a way to make a great difference in their performance in Ukraine.

Resurrection?

An army can not change over night.What Russian military commanders can do is ensure that the many parts of the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Naval Forces to their utmost in harmony to achieve success is what will change the course of things. Once more, greatcharlie ingeminates a most apposite quote, an old chestnut, from the renowned theoretical physicist Albert Einstein said: “Probleme kann man niemals mit derselben Denkweise losen, durch die sie entstanden sind.” (We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used to create them.)

As a part of a shift from “Plan A” to “Plan B”, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation announced on March 25, 2022 that Russian forces would focus its special security operation in Ukraine on “liberating” the east.” According to the Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, head of the General Staff’s main operations administration stated “The main tasks of the first stage of the operation have been carried out.” He further stated: The combat capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces have been substantially reduced, which allows us to concentrate our main efforts on achieving the main goal: the liberation of Donbas.” On April 9, 2022, Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov was appointed commander of the special military operation in Ukraine.

This shift from “Plan A” to “Plan B” has left little doubt in the minds of observers outside of Russia that an apparent initial plan to move rapidly to capture major cities in Ukraine and replace the national government had failed or at least had not gone as planned. There was an attempt to spin the matter as a success. As aforementioned, a big part of that was to omit any discussion of the terrible costs in troops, materiél, and treasure for the military’s blunders. The focus of Rudskoy’s spin was an effort to convince that efforts to encircle key Ukrainian cities as Kyiv and making them subjecting them the multiple airstrikes and artillery onslaught was to pin down Ukrainian forces elsewhere in the country in order to allow Russian forces to focus on the east. 

Since the announcement of the new plan of attack was made, Russian forces have met with some greater success in southern Ukraine. Well reported have been itheir efforts to capture towns and cities such as Kherson, Mariupol, Kreminna, and making some gains in the east. Russian troops also displaced Ukrainian forces from Zarichne and Novotoshkivske in Donetsk as well as Velyka Komyshuvakha and Zavody in the Kharkiv region. Following the shift, Moscow announced that 93 percent of the Donbas region of Luhansk had come under the control of Russian-backed separatists. However, over 33.3 percent of the Donbas was already under the control of ethnic-Russian separatist control before the invasion. It is hard to determine just how well things are going for Russian forces by listening to Moscow’s reports. Only 54 percent of Donetsk province of the Donbas is actually under Russia’s control. While achieving some success in the Kharkiv region, Russia made little vigorous progress in capturing Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second largest city. It was essentially the same story witnessed in Kyiv, huge losses and meager results. Ukrainian forces were fighting so well in the region that Russian forces were eventually forced to withdraw from Kharkiv, so close to their own border, in order to protect supply line and Russian territory as well. There was a US assessment in March the stated that Ukraine could recapture Kherson.

A very folksy aphorism that greatcharlie has come across recently is, “There is no education in the second kick of a mule.” Being aware of past thinking, capabilities, and and practices, it seems almost fallacious to expect any novel maneuvers by Russian forces that may be nuanced or special in such a way to make a great difference in their performance in Ukraine.

A test launch of Russia’s Satan-2 (above) on April 20, 2022 at the Kura Missile Test Range in the Russian Federation’s Kamchatka region. While the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has been dubbed Satan 2 by NATO, it is officially known in the Russian armed forces as the RS-26 Sarmat.  The ICBM carries multiple warheads and has an estimated range of 6200 to 11,800 miles. Doubtlessly through Putin’s eyes, Russia, his world, would stand at the edge of doom if “the West” wins the war. If that occurred, in brief, he would be driven to consider the vulnerable position in which he would ostensibly leave Russia by allowing a well-trained, well-experienced, and well-equipped military force remain intact and powerful on its western border. Putin would surely choose to act as violently as possible now to protect Russia’s existence into the future. Additionally and importantly, all forms of conflict would be permissible in Russia’s defense, including the use of thermonuclear weapons. Putin has repeatedly expressed a willingness to use the crown jewels of his defense arsenal.

The Way Forward

As expressed in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2022 post entitled “The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Brief Meditations on Putin and Small Suggestions That May Support Achieving Peace Through Diplomacy”, there are those who speak freely on taking on Russia in the nuclear dimension, and suggest mightily that Moscow be reminded that the US has a formidable thermonuclear arsenal and will respond fiercely with it if Russia uses its weapons. Such thoughts appear to have been expressed with a complete lack of regard for their own self-interests, the interest of the US. It is unlikely that those individuals have steeled themselves against the possible consequences. The possibility of a thermonuclear attack from Russia are actually more real, more likely, than they might imagine. Unusquisque mavult credere quam iudicare. (Everyone prefers to believe than to think.)

Additionally mentioned in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2022 post is the well-viewed exchange between Putin and Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR. Naryshkin, an absolute Putin loyalist, known for his aggressive anti-western statements, became visibly uncomfortable as Putin interrogated him on Ukraine. Among his very top advisers, there was likely a palpable sense that a fiery sea of anger, rage, and hatred was churning violently inside of him. Perhaps Putin’s exchange with Naryshkin might be considered a new context. It is possible the exchange between Putin and Naryshkin may directly relate to a plan Putin may have of far greater conception what has publicly postulated in the West so far.

As the scene was set, Putin was seated at a desk in a grand, columned Kremlin room with his advisers, seemingly socially distanced from him and each other. Putin asked his advisers to step forward to a podium to offer their respective views on recognizing Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic. Putin was being very sharp with his advisers. When Naryshkin was asked to present his views, he appeared uncomfortable even initially as Putin interrogated him. Naryshkin stumbled with his words. Surely noticing his discomfort, Putin exorts Naryshkin to speak more directly. To hear Naryshkin speak, some might immediately be left to believe the matter at hand is far more complicated than the challenging matter of that moment, recognizing the Luhansk People’s Republic and the Donetsk People’s Republic.

Putin, impatient and insistent, pushes Naryshkin even further. He tells Naryshkin twice, “Speak directly!” Eventually, when he was able to get the words out, When he spoke, Naryshkin uttered that he supported “the LNR and DNR becoming part of Russia.” Putin told him that wasn’t the subject of the discussion; it was only recognition being weighed up. Naryshkin then stated that he supported attempting negotiations first. Putin responded that the discussion was not about negotiations. Finally, Naryshkin was able to state that he supported Putin’s plans. According to newsmedia reports, some Russia experts have suggested that the whole scene might have been a carefully scripted artifice to demonstrate to the West that other options might be available. However, it is Naryshkin’s genuinely flustered expression that does the most to convince much more might have been involved.

The post of director of the SVR, is not for the faint hearted. Naryshkin is understood to be a srurdy individual and good at his job. He is a Putin loyalist and regularly expresses hardline anti-Western views. It is difficult to fathom why he would be so nervous, clearly under stress, when reporting to Putin. Perhaps he was uncertain how it would all play out. Perhaps as greatcharlie has suggested here, reporting from SVR concerning Ukraine has not been as accurate as it could have been as aforementioned due to delicacy toward Putin and is concerned he will be called out on the quality of his organization’s product. Indeed, maybe he thought that he was being burned by Putin. Perhaps the moment has been scripted to serve Putin’s purposes and Naryshkin is nevertheless concerned things may not pan out as planned. Perhaps he has seen that happen to others.

Rationale enim animal est homo. (Man is a reasoning animal.) At the risk of being obvious, greatcharlie suggests that is unlikely that Putin would not have approved the broadcast of the video of the security council meeting, and particularly “the Naryschkin moment” unless he intended to convey a message. Much as a good attorney in court, he would not ask a question of anyone testifying unless he already knew the answer. So much else, was edited out of the Russian newsmedia coverage. Surely, one might have expected much of that segment, a relative confrontation of the Russian President as compared to other exchanges, would have hit the cutting room floor. The video clip, itself, amounted to something akin to a chamber piece in which the theme–though the notion was brushed of by Putin during the meeting–was thermonuclear war. It was expressed via the subtle reference to it in the exchange between Putin and Naryschkin. Indeed, the message was that thermonuclear war is more than just a potentiality in the security council but a part of planning as it concerns halting NATO expansion and perceived Western plans to push into Russia’s sovereign territory to despoil its riches in natural resources.

To that extent, it might be worthwhile to revisit the notion of Putin’s awareness of the danger of setting unrealistic expectations as well as the notion of Plan A and Plan B as it relates to Russia’s special security operation. He has seen the Russian Federation armed forces in action and likely recognizes there is a real chance he could lose the conventional war with Ukraine. Putin, the central focus West, must consider the mass psychological implications of losing a ground war on its border. That would be the bitter end. Some newsmedia houses in Europe have been willing to promulgate the apocryphal rumor that Putin is suffering from pancreatic cancer. It would be difficult to imagine how those sources would have come upon such information as the US Intelligence Community has indicated that the Kremlin remains what intelligence officials call a “hard target”–incredibly difficult to penetrate through traditional espionage.” CNN reported, based on information from an official source, that there has not been any new comprehensive assessment by the US Intelligence Community that indicates a particular change to Putin’s overall health. That being stated, the follow-on thinking would be that if Putin finds himself in deep trouble in Ukraine, he might take the murder-suicide route on an Apocalyptic scale. However, more realistically, other considerations would likely be involved. 

Doubtlessly through Putin’s eyes, Russia, his world, would stand at the edge of doom if “the West” wins the war. If that occurred, in brief, he would be driven to consider the vulnerable position in which he would ostensibly leave Russia by allowing a well-trained, well-experienced, and well-equipped military force remain intact and powerful on its western border. Perhaps as discussed in the preceding March 31, 2022 post, Putin has indeed considered what will he will leave for future generations of Russians to contend with. Perhaps he believes now is the time to confront not just Ukraine, but the West. He has stated many times that he believes the West wants to destroy Russia and strip it of its natural resources. In greatcharlie’s preceding post, it was also suggested that the next generation of Russians will most likely want a future that reflects their own choices, their own desires, not those of a dark past. Russia never became das land des lächelns under his leadership despite his “best” efforts, and it seems that it will never become so. Critics in the West might say that Putin has achieved nothing except create new forms of the old misery. It could very well be that in Putin’s mind, everything that can be done must be done now to make certain future generations of Russians will not be left with the worst choice possible, to give in to Western demands, or worse, possibly surrender to conventional military threat or action. To that extent, and with a lot more factored in, Putin would surely choose to act as violently as possible now to protect Russia’s existence into the future. Additionally and importantly, all forms of conflict would be permissible in Russia’s defense, including the use of thermonuclear weapons. Putin has repeatedly expressed a willingness to use the crown jewels of his defense arsenal. 

Conceivably, the use of such weapons was considered and plotted out as a contingency by Putin long before the eve of invasion. Perhaps the knowledge of that was being telegraphed through Naryshkin’s body language at the National Security Council meeting before the invasion. A hardliner, yet a thinking man and shrewd individual, it may have troubled Naryshkin to think that the situation was drawing closer to such a dire outcome. Surely, in his possession, as the head of foreign intelligence, were true assessments of what might happen in Ukraine and that possible result may have troubled him greatly given the end state scripted by Putin.

Praemonitus, praemunitus. (Forewarned is forearmed.) It has always been up to the respective masters of thermonuclear weapons to maintain peace and stability or use them to their full terrifying potential as weapons of mass destruction. For Putin, the underlying thought for every step at the moment may very well be that it is now or never. Here, greatcharlie will go out on a slender thread to state that in his position taking everything into the round, that if defeated in a conventional struggle with Ukraine Putin would feel left with no choice but to destroy Russia’s opponent by whatever nonconventional means he might see fit. Everyone does not think the same. Things do not always turn out the way one might hope. It was by any reasonable standard daylight madness for Putin to invade Ukraine. Using thermonuclear weapons, although a far more monstrous transgression, would fit well within the mindset of one who do the former.

Everyone knows how the Cold War ended and who won. The history is clear. This critical episode between the West and Russia will likely be much shorter in duration. At the time of this writing, however, Its outcome is still unclear. Perhaps the legacy of the former struggle, thermonuclear weapons, will play a role and put an end to matters once and for all. If the US and rest of West should begin to threaten Russia with their weapons to reign Putin in it would would unlikely have that impact. As aforementioned, for Putin, the underlying thought for every step may be that it is now or never. He will most likely attack them. Omnia jam fient, fieri quæ posse negabam; et nihil est de quo non sit habenda fides. (All things will now come to pass that I used to think impossible; and there is nothing that we may not hope to see take place.)

China’s Operation Fox Hunt: Facts and Theories on How Missions Succeed and Flaws and Delinquencies Ripe for Exploitation (Part 2)

People’s Republic of China Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi (above) Although the citizens sought by China are located overseas, identification and repatriation would be a task intrinsic to the mission of MPS. MPS surely has the most complete, up-to-date records, and tracking down and identifying Chinese citizens is a honed and polished practice of its officers. For that reason, MPS may very well be pulled into the mix of overseas espionage activities more often than may be presently conceived in the US and among its allies and partners. That same information about Chinese citizens is certainly of great interest to the Communist Party of China and in its hands via MPS. In addition to performing standard domestic functions as a law enforcement and intelligence and counterintelligence service, MPS is very much tied to the Communist Party of China to the extent that its present raison d’être and primary responsibility is to help the Party maintain its tight grip on the population.

This post should be considered a continuation of the preceding one

(Brief Overview of the Essay: A bungled Operation Fox Hunt mission in New Jersey that began in 2016 has allowed for the first prosecution involving Operation Fox Hunt in the US. From the New Jersey case, a few insights are drawn by greatcharlie on this particular case of Operation Fox Hunt that may provide a better understanding on what Chinese operatives are doing via the operation and how they are doing what they are doing. With the color and life of the investigative reports greatcharlie found most informative aggregated with the facts laid out plainly in the federal court document, a somewhat definitive account of the event can be constructed. By highlighting flaws in the development, planning, and execution based on available facts of that case, greatcharlie seeks to provide insight on additional ways to defeat ongoing and future Chinese identification and repatriation activities under Operation Fox Hunt or under some new operation launched by Beijing.)

Before boarding his April 12, 2017 flight to Shanghai, Zhu Feng was interviewed by US border and law enforcement officials. During the interview, Zhu identified a photograph of the defendant Tu. Zhu stated that she was a friend of his uncle and he had been Tu’s “tour guide” while she was in the US, that he did not know anything about her job other than that she traveled frequently, and that she did not ask him to do anything in particular on the flight back to China. Searching Zhu’s luggage, US border officials  discovered night vision goggles and associated accessories. When questioned about the equipment, Zhu said that the goggles belonged to Tu, and he was bringing them back to China for her. 

Opprobrium from the Communist Party of China or Observations?

One might presume law enforcement organizations federal state and municipal around the US may take issue with this statement as it feels too  near the bone, but it would seem the powers that be in Beijing assessed that investigators of those organizations often display varied levels of diligence, are often inattentive when visiting site, are rarely thorough and at time outrightly remiss when interviewing individuals of interest, display their insecurities in conversation, prone to bullying their own citizens without any professional cause, and are unprofessional often in dealing with recruited operatives, informants, and other contacts.

Shortly before boarding the flight to Shanghai on April 12, 2017, Zhu was interviewed by US border and law enforcement officials. During the interview, Zhu identified Tu in a photograph he was shown. Zhu falsely stated that she was a friend of his uncle and he had been Tu’s “tour guide” while she was in the US, that he did not know anything about her job other than that she traveled frequently, and that she did not ask him to do anything in particular on the flight back to China. A search of Zhu’s luggage by US border officials led to the discovery of night vision goggles–a device used for surveillance at night or in low-light conditions–and associated accessories. When questioned about the equipment, Zhu stated that the goggles belonged to Tu, and he was bringing them back to China for her. Tu had already departed and could not by reached by US authorities. However, more pertinent was the fact that Tu was a government official and too important to be captured. Zhu, though heavily rely upon on the mission, was expendable. It would not matter as much for him to be captured with the night vision goggles.

Following the border interview, the Zhu told Co-conspirator #2 to destroy any potential evidence: “Delete all of our chat record after reading this [message]. There are some problems. Someone in the US will be looking for you.” Zhu added: “The sooner the better”; “Delete all the chat record. Delete [a measuring application]. You are just a tour guide.”; and “Be careful of everything. If there is anything, use other phones to call. Your cell phone may be tracked.” Tu instructed Zhu on how to handle Xu’s father’s return to China before Zhu boarded his flight with Xu’s father. Tu, who attributed the instructions to Chinese Official #1, told Zhu to speak to Xu’s father about his travel posing as “staff of a travel agency.” Tu added warnings that Zhu should maintain secrecy and operational security, and should not use his own phone number to make any phone calls associated with Xu’s father. In the same series of messages, Tu instructed Zhu to hand Xu’s father to Li in Shanghai. However, during the flight, Zhu was unable to engage Xu’s father and reported that to Tu. As written in the federal court document, Zhu explained: “[John Doe #1’s] [Xu’s] father is very hostile to me and he was convinced that I was one of your young people and asked me again and again how I knew his location and travel plan and he talked to flight attendants repeatedly.” Zhu informed that the flight attendants in response to Xu’s father, forbade him from speaking with the elderly man. Zhu stated that Xu’s father expressed concern that “there is an informant on this flight.” Tu responded by instructing Zhu that he did not “need to take care of Xu’s father” and that he should “delete all the chat content” and to “leave by yourself.”

Michael McMahon, the team’s US-based private investigator, did not receive any warnings from anyone. The detective kept his emails and texts from the case which prove that. McMahon was also not made aware that Xu’s family had contacted the FBI. Still, the FBI saw clear evidence of McMahon’s alleged role in the conspiracy. Reportedly, McMahon emailed a newspaper article to himself on April 6, 2020 the day before Tu flew back to China, with the headline “Interpol Launches Global Dragnet for 100 Chinese Fugitives.” The article had photos of Xu and Liu and information about the Chinese government’s fugitive-apprehension programs. An FBI agent wrote in the criminal complaint: “Accordingly, I believe that McMahon was aware that” the couple “were Operation Fox Hunt targets,” 

As the federal court document indicates, when they believed there would be some benefit, Chinese operatives, with government authorization, have hired private investigators, some non-ethnic Chinese investigators as Michael McMahon, to assist in their effort. Ostensibly the work identification and repatriation teams would ask those investigators to do for them would be requested without informing those investigators of the true nature of the work. There was nothing on the surface so remarkably abnormal or abstruse about the Chinese investigators’ requests to alert McMahon. The Operation Fox Hunt mission planners surely designed the approach to any US private investigator to appear that way. One might suppose that because there was nothing odd, McMahon, despite becoming involved in a case tied to China, was never compelled to ask incisive questions about the purpose of the work he was contracted to do. Six FBI agents and two police officers arrested McMahon at his home in northern New Jersey at 6:00AM on October 28, 2019.

Private Investigators from the US

As the federal document indicates, when they believed there would be some benefit, Chinese operatives, with government authorization, have hired non-ethnic Chinese investigators to assist in their effort. Ostensibly the work identification and repatriation teams would ask those investigators to do for them ” nature of the work. Surely, Hu and other team leaders likely believed the private investigators would try their hardest to avoid disappointing their client as it was presumed they want to receive similar contracts of its kind from “Chinese companies” in the future.

While there appeared to be on each occasion–two well-discussed ones concerning this team–a more than sufficient amount of time and opportunity to make secure choices among private investigators available in the vicinities in which the identification and repatriation teams were operating, the selection, nevertheless, was rushed through. Diligence shown in other aspects of team, was non-existent on this point

Thereby, the private investigator, McMahon, was compromised by the fact that his Chinese client did not tell him everything or that his venal interests overcame requisite precaution when dealing with a foreign client who is a citizen or even merely closely associated with a country that is an adversary. Interestingly, his attorney alleges that he was only paid $5,017.98 for the many challenging tasks that he performed.

Truly, there is nothing on the surface so remarkably abnormal or abstruse about the Chinese investigators’ requests that greatcharlie can highlight. The Operation Fox Hunt mission planners surely designed the approach to any US private investigator to appear that way. One might suppose that because there was nothing odd, McMahon, despite becoming involved in a case tied to China, was never compelled to ask incisive questions about the purpose of the work he was contracted to do. What the Chinese may have believed in establishing this step was that the private investigators primary interest would be venal. However, the apparent failure to conduct a thorough background check of the private investigator, to include discovering his political and patriotic leanings, and the likely lack of due diligence in ensuring a private investigator in California would be motivated by payment and not just presume it was so, resulted in Hu’s team almost falling into a trap set by US counterintelligence officers and law enforcement. Hu and his identification and repatriation team were remiss with a key detail, which left a gaping hole in their security scheme, and nearly resulted in the capture of everyone involved. As it is, a number of the team’s members have been identified and indicted in federal court. Until that point, the identification and repatriation team had not been challenged in any way that halted or deterred their activities. Theirs had been la performance majuscule.

Michael McMahon and his wife (above). As the federal document indicates, when they believed there would be some benefit, Operation Fox Hunt team leaders, with government authorization, have hired private investigators, some non-ethnic Chinese as McMahon, to assist with their effort. Ostensibly the work identification and repatriation teams would ask those investigators to do for them would be requested without informing those investigators of the true nature of the work. There was nothing on the surface so remarkably abnormal or abstruse about the Chinese investigators’ requests. One might suppose that because there was nothing odd, McMahon, despite becoming involved in a case tied to China, was never compelled to ask incisive questions about the purpose of the work he was contracted to do. Interestingly, before setting up surveillance on a house in New Jersey. McMahon took the precaution of alerting local police to the surveillance presumably to prevent any misunderstandings if detected or reported by passers-by. At that point, McMahon demonstrated the willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. Thereby, ample opportunity existed  for US counterintelligence services and law enforcement to enlist his assistance as an informant or operative. For reasons unknown, the opportunity was passed up.

The Noticeable Absence of the Theorized Countersurveillance 

One might say some empiric evidence of a likely withdrawal of support of greatcharlie’s theorized Chinese intelligence covert countersurveillance team ostensibly provided to Hu’s identification and repatriation team. The most obvious evidence is the fact that some team members were captured. It is unlikely that would have transpired so hurriedly if the theorized countersurveillance team had continued to provide overwatch for them. There would most likely be protocols in place concerning the activities the theorized countersurveillance support team during exigent circumstances. If an identification and repatriation team, or some other non intelligence related service operating in the US, has erred and misstepped or stumbled into situation that might result in its detection or capture, the countersurveillance team as a result of operating in its vicinity, would also face the prospect of being detected and captured. Thus, the countersurveillance team as a protocol would perhaps be authorized to immediately disengage and clear out. One might expect it to even terminate its support of the team in operation.

French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “There are only two forces in the world, the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword will always be conquered by the spirit.” Maybe that is relevant here. Approximately seven months after departing the US, Zhu returned from China. Hu had warned Zhu to remain in China after he flew back with Xu’s father, but he did so nevertheless. Once on ground, on November 9, 2017 and November 10, 2017, Zhu participated in two voluntary interviews with FBI special agents. During the interviews, Zhu admitted to his involvement in the scheme to forcibly repatriate Xu to China. Zhu admitted that he was brought into the conspiracy by Hu, that in September 2016, he was tasked by Hu with several activities related to the planning and execution of the attempted repatriation of Xu, that on or around December 2016, Zhu met with Hu, PRC Official-1 and Tu to discuss the scheme, and in April 2017, Zhu traveled to the US with Tu and participated in the effort to coerce Xu’s return to China. Intriguingly, the FBI special agents let Zhu go following the two interviews. Not even an otiose explanation has been offered for that decision. Zhu returned to China the next year.

Breakaway Identification and Repatriation Team Member

The centrality of the Operation Fox Hunt story is the Communist Party of China and its willingness to brazenly violate international law, with the goal of maintaining its iron grip on its citizens. What also emerges, though, is a picture of a country of citizens, some of whom are loyal to it and their conviction that the path it has placed China will lead to great success and in the preeminent position in the world and conversely, those who loathe their government and see nothing good coming out of being led by the Communist Party of China. That was the apparent mix of thinking found among identification and repatriation team members.

Perhaps there was never a time when Zhu did not loathe the regime, much as the larger part of émigrés he assisted in pursuing. On the days he was interviewed by the FBI, he seemed suddenly struck by his true feelings about living under the authoritarian rule of the Communist Party of China, and he chose to spill the beans to the FBI special agents on Operation Fox Hunt. (Admittedly, despite all that discussed here, the thought comes to mind that Hu and managers may have decided to use Zhu as a dangle, hoping US counterintelligence might recruit him to become something akin to a counterespionage agent inside Operation Fox Hunt. However, Operation Fox Hunt has had considerable success despite the New Jersey fiasco. To be frank, it may be the case that Operation Fox Hunt managers feel an effort specifically by MPS to penetrate a US counterintelligence service would not be worth the candle.)

FBI Interview of Key Identification and Repatriation Team Member

Interviews will always be the best way to get to understand an identification and repatriation team member. As was seen with the Fox Hunt caper, not every team member may be fully onboard with the operation and many other things. This perhaps may sound oversimplified, but what must be included in interviews of team members are casual yet personal questions. Among those on the list should be the following: “Have you had a chance to enjoy yourself while you have been in the US?” “Did you really come here at your own free will or have you been sent here and told to obey orders?”; “How are your relatives doing in China?; “Has a family member of yours been threatened with imprisonment or been imprisoned wrongfully?”; and eventually, “Would you ever consider staying in the US? It is critical to display real interest in mending what may be an individual’s broken soul. He or she may not take it, but they should be offered a chance at a better life. An explanation of how it would be made possible should be laid out.

Even if they considered making the jump to the other side, the more astute and mature team members would know the degree of China’s penetration into US national security bureaucracies, if any, and would hesitate and withdraw, feeling the move would not be safe for them on one hand and safe for their families on the other. It would seem best to limit effort placed on those team members who wholly reject anything positive discussed. Praise at unexpected points will keep him or her parsing out the interview. It may lead them to believe that they have a card to play in the future if need be. Try to open that door and wedge it open in the identification and repatriation team member’s mind.

Zheng Congying, hired muscle for the New Jersey mission (above). The identification and repatriation team leader Hu Ji gave Zhu Feng the task of overseeing operatives he had hired in the Chinese community in New York. Among them was Zheng Congying, the 25 year old Chinese citizen and a legal permanent resident of the US, resided in Brooklyn, New York. On September 4, 2018, Zheng and an Anonymous defendant in the federal court case,  drove to the New Jersey residence of Xu and Liu and pounded on the front door. Zheng and Anonymous tried to force open the door to the residence, before accessing the backyard, entering a raised outdoor deck and peering into the windows of the residence. After these efforts, Zheng and Anonymous left a handwritten note taped to the front door of the residence. Surveillance video and fingerprints led investigators to Zheng.

Harassment of the Daughter of Xu and Liu

Only weeks following the failed New Jersey scheme, Hu took a more aggressive approach. The Operation Fox Hunt campaign against Xu turned toward coordinated operations targeting his adult daughter living in northern California dubbed Jane Doe #2 in the federal court document. Indeed, the campaign reportedly next included: a surveillance operation conducted against Xu’s daughter from approximately May 2017 to July 2017, and, an online harassment campaign against her from approximately April 2018 to July 2018 related to the allegations levied by China against Xu. The operations against Xu’s daughter began shortly after the conclusion of April 2017 failed attempt to render Xu, himself. Xu’s daughter had arrived in the US as a child, studying at a private boarding school years before her parents fled China. She had earned an advanced degree at Stanford, had gotten married and made a life for herself far from her parents and their problems with the Chinese courts.

Around May 2017, Zhai Yongqiang directed an an individual based in the US, dubbed Co-conspirator #3 by the US prosecutor, to hire a private investigator to locate Xu’s daughter. Zhai provided Co-conspirator #3 with personal identification information belonging to Xu’s daughter, including her name, date of birth, Social Security Number, known addresses and academic history. According to the federal court document, Zhai told Co-conspirator #3 that if he were to locate Xu’s daughter, Zhai, himself, would receive a fee from a department in the People’s Republic of China’s prosecutor’s office. Zhai Yongqiang promised to split the fee with Co-conspirator #3.

It would appear that Conspirator #3 was actually Rong Jing, Hu’s point man in California. In May 2017, as instructed by Zhai, Rong hired a private investigator to stalk Xu’s daughter. Unfortunately for Rong, the privaye investigator was a confidential informant for the FBI. US officials did not disclose if or how they maneuvered the informant into place. However, after starting an investigation in New Jersey in early April, FBI special agents had been mapping the travel and contacts of the Fox Hunt team. For instance, according to interviews and court records, the FBI became aware that Hu had spent time in California. With a man inside Hu’s operation, the next step for the FBI was to try accomplish as much as possible with him. Negligentia semper habet infortuniam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.)

On May 22, Rong met for four hours with the private investigator-informant at a restaurant in Los Angeles. In a recorded conversation, Rong offered the private  detective $4,000 to investigate and videotape the daughter. If the team succeeded with the repatriation, he and the detective could split any reward money, Rong stated. Rong said the managers in Wuhan had not told him “what to do with” the daughter. It was possible they could ask him “to catch” her, he told the private detective. He explained that they might have to act as proxies for Chinese officers who “wouldn’t feel comfortable to arrest her” in the US. Rong went further to say that if there are “things they wouldn’t feel comfortable to do,” he continued, “we need to be there on their behalf.”

Rong asked whether the detective had a problem with removing someone from the country. “Say, if he wants us to bring him/her over, can you bring him/her over? Would this bring about any legal issues?” Step one for the private detective was to shoot video of Xu’s daughter. The next step would be to contact Xu and Liu and persuade them to return to China, Rong said. For the next few weeks, the private investigator went through the motions of shadowing the daughter, while actually being supervised by the FBI.

Reporting to Rong on July 14, 2018, the private detective discussed photos he had provided of the daughter and her home. Then he asked: “You don’t think they’ll do any harm to her, do you?” Rong’s reply was not reassuring. He said,, if the private detective got in trouble, they would both be in trouble, “If there was an accident,” he said, “in truth you [could claim that you] were just … investigating her.” At other moments, Rong sounded less menacing. She was “simply a daughter,” he said, emphasizing that the parents were the main targets.

A Hiring Pattern/Modus Operandi?

Hiring private investigators in the US was the closest anything the identification and repatriation teams did that resembled improvised and haphazard work. The choice to succumb to expediency errantly is often the point at which many plans fail  in all fields, and in the case of espionage and other crimes, it is the act from which investigators can often catch a big break in a case.

Much as with the first private investigator in the US hired, Hu, the lead investigator wanted to establish an operational relationship with the one hired in California, dubbed by US prosecutors as P1 (Private Investigator 1). As far as one knows, hiring that second investigator felt right to him. There was apparently no reason for the lead investigator to question the private investigator’s intentions. Imaginably, the team’s lead investigator presumed his interest, first and foremost, was venal. Oddly enough, his word was presumed to be inviolate. Hu was also quite satisfied with that private investigator’s work, as was Tu. Whatever criteria caused them to tick the boxes that established confidence in the US private investigators may unlikely be the standard ever again. Yet, a trace as to whom the identification and repatriation teams may still prefer to hire might be found in any similarities in the private investigators’ backgrounds.

A Rare Glimpse Inside Operation Fox Hunt via a Braggart

Recordings of conversations that the private detective made with Rong provided a rare look inside Operation Fox Hunt. Imaginably, for the FBI, collecting those recordings was an accomplishment. As purported by Rong, he performed freelance missions under Operation Fox Hunt exclusively for Wuhan, receiving a fee for each repatriation. Rong spoke of teams of visiting “lobbyists.” He noted that they were salaried “civil servants” of the Chinese government who traveled on work visas under multiple identities. Their task was “persuading people” to return to China. In addition to being the target of surveillance efforts, Xu’s daughter was harassed via online communications from another conspirator, dubbed “Co-conspirator #4” by a US prosecutor, between April 2018 and July 2018, Co-conspirator #4 sent unsolicited and derogatory messages to Xu and Liu about their daughter. Similar messages were sent to Facebook “friends” of Xu’s daughter, as well as to Facebook friends of the spouse of Xu’s daughter.

On September 4, 2018, Zheng Congying and another unidentified co-conspirator allegedly taped a handwritten note in Chinese (above) on the front door of the home of Xu Jin and Liu Feng. The note read: ‘If you are willing to go back to mainland and spend 10 years in prison, your wife and children will be all right. That’s the end of this matter!’

Harassment of Xu Jin and Liu Feng at Their New Jersey Home

In September 2018, Xu and Liu were again harassed by members of the conspiracy, including Zheng Congying and Anonymous, among others. On September 4th, Zheng and Anonymous drove to the New Jersey residence of Xu and Liu and pounded on the front door. Zheng and Anonymous tried to force open the door to the residence, before accessing the backyard, entering a raised outdoor deck and peering into the windows of the residence. After these efforts, Zheng and Anonymous left a handwritten note taped to the front door of the residence. The note, written in simplified Chinese characters, threatened Xu: “If you are willing to go back to the mainland and spend 10 years in prison, your wife and children will be all right. That’s the end of this matter.”

Harassing Mailings to Xu Ji, Liu Feng, and a Relative of Liu

Seven months after the threats of September 2018, Xu and Liu were sent a package anonymously that contained a DVD. Over a song in Mandarin, a video showed images of their relatives in China, including the elderly father whom Hu’s team had brought to New Jersey. It was another “emotional bomb.” Xu’s father sat next to a desk where a book by Xi entitled, The Governance of China, was displayed. A FBI special agent wrote in the complaint: “I believe that this shot was deliberately staged to make [the son] aware that the Chinese government played a role in taking this picture and creating this video.” The special agent described the photo as a form of implicit coercion demonstrating “the government’s control over [the son’s] aged parents.” Reportedly, in the video, Xu’s sister pressured him to come back. She said their parents were sick, isolated and distraught. She went on to state: “When parents are alive, you can still call someplace a home,” She next said: “When parents are gone, you can only prepare for your own tomb.”

Beginning in or around February 2019, a relative of Liu who lives in the US (“Jane Doe #3”), an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, received several unsolicited packages. The packages were from China, purportedly from Xu’s sister’s in China (“Jane Doe #4”), an individual whose identity is known to the Grand Jury,or Jane Doe #4’s husband. Between July 2016 and April 2017, and between April 2017 and December 2018, Jane Doe #4 was imprisoned by Chinese authorities as part of an effort to cause Xu to return to China. On or about April 22, 2019, Jane Doe #3 received a package containing a CD with two “mp4” video files titled “30 Family Letters.mp4” that included a slide show of still photographs depicting her husband’s aged parents, among other family members. Written Chinese text scrolled at the bottom of the video during the presentation. The text, styled as a letter from Jane Doe #4 to Xu, implored him to “come home” to China before his parents died. Among other things, the written text stated that Xu had a “duty as a child” to his parents and much as the letter sent directly to Xu from China, the line was written that “[w]hen parents are alive, you can still call someplace a home; when parents are gone, you can only prepare for your own tomb.” Included among photographs in the video was the same photograph of Xu’s father seated next to a desk featuring Xi’s book, The Governance of China.

The video file “A few words from [Jane Doe #4] to brother.mp4” contained a video of Jane Doe #4. An individual appearing to be her spoke on the video, stating: she was released from Chinese custody on November 4, 2018 after pleading guilty to a crime; Xu’s parents health was deteriorating, and they were suffering; she wanted Xu to return to China; the Chinese government was determined to fight against corruption; Xu should accept responsibility and admit to unspecified crimes; and, Xu should stop defying the Chinese and come back in order to receive leniency. All and all, the “emotional” performances contained in the videos surely would have disappointed Aeschylus.

Seven months after the threats of September 2018, Xu and Liu were sent a package anonymously that contained a DVD. Over a song in Mandarin, a video showed images of their relatives in China, including the elderly father whom Hu’s team had brought to New Jersey. It was another “emotional bomb.” Xu’s father sat next to a desk where a book by Xi entitled, The Governance of China, was displayed. A FBI special agent wrote in the complaint: “I believe that this shot was deliberately staged to make [the son] aware that the Chinese government played a role in taking this picture and creating this video.” The special agent described the photo as a form of implicit coercion demonstrating “the government’s control over [the son’s] aged parents.”

The Way Forward

Fortuna adversa virum magnae sapientiae non terret. (Adverse fortune (adversity) does not frighten (intimidate) a man of great intellect.) An inspirational speech on what US counterintelligence services and law enforcement organizations in the US would likely include expressions to the effect that the time has long passed for them to get off the roundabout concerning Chinese clandestine and covert operations in the US. Beneath it lies a volcano which is being given the chance to erupt turning everything the worst and most destructive direction possible. However, approaching the matter realistically, it appears that a considerable journey lies ahead for law enforcement organizations around the US and US counterintelligence services when it comes to China. Compared to what China may bring on in the near future, what may seem to be a full workout with Chinese operators now will then seem as a mere warm up. The challenge of coping with Chinese operators in the US during a possible conflict was mentioned earlier. Whether they might achieve victories or not, the approaches of law enforcement organizations around the US and US counterintelligence services to China’s malign activities must transition with lessons learned from failures and recognized changes in the opponent’s practices. US counterintelligence services and law enforcement organizations around the US must accept that coping with China successfully will mean accepting the need to be in a state of perpetual evolution. The Chinese intelligence services and other invasive entities are not going to lend a helping hand to law enforcement organizations around the US and US counterintelligence services by waiting for them to catch up. The renowned theoretical physicist Albert Einstein said: Probleme kann man niemals mit derselben Denkweise losen, durch die sie entstanden sind.” (We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used to create them.)

The range and rigor of thinking must be widened. There will always be the basics, that which  is foundational, to each job. Still, as averred to earlier, senior executives and managers and field agents should take heed to opportunities that arise to look at situations, facts through a new lens and consider somewhat unorthodox postulations differently, may open eyes to constructive angles and real possibilities that may contribute mightily to fruitful outcomes. Dictum sapienti sat est. (Enough has been said for the wise.)

China’s Operation Fox Hunt: Facts and Theories on How Missions Succeed and Flaws and Delinquencies Ripe for Exploitation (Part 1)

An Air China jet (above) soars upward after take-off on its flight home. On a number of similar flights from the US, a considerable number of For nearly a decade, undercover Chinese identification and repatriation teams, as greatcharlie has dubbed them, at the direct request and under the authority of the Chinese government, have entered the US under false pretenses, enlisted US-based accomplices, stalked hundreds of people, including US citizens and permanent residents, and coerced and cajoled them to return to China to face charges for economic crimes they allegedly committed. This effort is called Operation Fox Hunt. It went on near unhindered by US authorities until a bungled mission to capture a target in New Jersey led to arrests and allowed for the first prosecution involving Operation Fox Hunt in the US. Through an examination of flaws in the development, planning, and execution of that New Jersey mission based on available facts, greatcharlie provides some insights on additional ways to defeat ongoing and future missions by Chinese identification and repatriation teams.

On the intelligence front, the crisis of Chinese espionage in the US and the rest of the West has all of the hallmarks of a sort of ordeal. Chinese intelligence services have unfortunately managed to do their job successfully, collecting mountains of secret and information from the government bureaucracies and research and development sites, private businesses, high-tech firms particularly, academia, and think tanks. It would seem safe to say that Chinese espionage operations are ubiquitous. It is very likely that everyday they work harder and harder to make their networks and operations better and more effective, pushing their espionage capabilities far-beyond the reach of the counterintelligence services of the countries in which they operate. The primary conductors of China’s successful espionage operations orchestrated in the US, and globally are the Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guójiā Ānquán Bù (Ministry for State Security of the People’s Republic of China) or the MSS, China’s preeminent civilian intelligence agency, responsible for overseas espionage and counterintelligence both at home and abroad, and the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, Intelligence Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), responsible for collecting and analyzing foreign military intelligence, including technology. 

But alas, there are other efforts at penetration and clandestine action undertaken by Chinese operatives in the US as well as other countries that are as insidious and perhaps worse. For nearly a decade, Chinese identification and repatriation teams, as greatcharlie has dubbed them, have absconded not with precious, secret information or property, but rather with people. (Identifying targets was actually one of the most challenging aspects of the teams’ activities. Without the ability to investigate and identify targets, any repatriation effort would be hopeless. In a worst case scenario, the wrong individual might embarrassingly be brought back to China.) Targets have not only been non-residents, but residents and naturalized US citizens. Indeed, incontrovertible proof exists that shows undercover identification and repatriation teams at the direct request and under the authority of the Chinese government have entered the US under false pretenses, stalked hundreds of people, including US citizens and permanent residents, and enlisted US-based accomplices–private investigators and self-styled bounty hunters–and relentlessly hound their targets. Ostensibly, the Chinese operatives have sought out fugitives from justice in China as part of an anti-corruption campaign. 

In a number of operations, Chinese identification and repatriation teams were completely successful in capturing their targets and bringing them back to China to face what the Communist Party of China deemed as justice. Yet, that has not always been the case. There is a great difference between grabbing intellectual property, trade secrets, computer files as well as actual technologies and grabbing people. There is a human element which, particularly under conditions that the Chinese government creates for its “volunteers,” leaves a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability that cannot be assessed until one sees actual results. In identification and repatriation operations, that same uncertainty can exist in the way that the targets may behave, too! That was the case with Chinese identification and repatriation operatives acting in New Jersey beginning in 2016. It was a bungled mission that has allowed for the first prosecution involving Operation Fox Hunt in the US. 

From the New Jersey case, a few insights are drawn by greatcharlie on this particular case of Operation Fox Hunt that may provide a better understanding on what Chinese operatives are doing via the operation and how they are doing what they are doing. With the color and life of the investigative reports greatcharlie found most informative aggregated with the facts laid out plainly in the federal court document, a somewhat definitive account of the event can be constructed. By highlighting flaws in the development, planning, and execution based on available facts of that case, greatcharlie seeks to provide insight on additional ways to defeat ongoing and future Chinese identification and repatriation activities under Operation Fox Hunt or under some new operation launched by Beijing. Just knowing what is wrong is not as great as knowing how to fix the problem. This commentary does not look at the situation only in the end to say everyone appears to be doing their best to halt China’s malign activities and all is peaches-and-cream. Comments and suggestions are offered, leaving it up to readers, think tank scholars, academics, policy analysts, and military and diplomatic officials, journalists, and students, but particularly practitioners who may serve in US counterintelligence, to observe, reflect, and act as they may. In the essay’s discussion, greatcharlie hopes to avoid any appearance of instructing counterintelligence officers on what to do. It would be satisfying enough to know that some of what is presented here might resonate with a few of them. By shedding light on some flaws in the development of plans and the organization of operators for action, as well as delinquencies in the execution of the plan, greatcharlie hopes it can offer something of use to the US, its allies, and friends to combat and to defeat similar malign clandestine and covert operations by China worldwide. If the matter of the identification and repatriation and repatriation operations is not put right, surely it will have an unfortunate effect on US national security now and into the future. Nihil tam difficile est ut non possit studio investigari. (Nothing is so difficult that it is not able to be tracked down by study.)

After People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping (above) assumed power in 2013, he initiated a sweeping anti-corruption campaign. Xi vowed to hunt down powerful “tigers” as well as lowly “flies” in the campaign to eradicate corruption. The slogan of the campaign became “fight tigers, swat flies and hunt foxes.” Xi warned corruption was so bad that it could threaten the Communist Party of China’s grip on power. That campaign has netted thousands of party leaders and rank-and-file government officials domestically. Indeed, Operations Fox Hunt and Operation Sky Net were part of the effort internationally in that regard. In June 2014, authorities established the International Office of Pursuing Fugitives and Recovering Embezzled Assets–staffed with a composite of personnel seconded from eight government agencies. In the first alone, 3,587 fugitives from over 90 countries had been returned to China.

Overview of Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Sky Net

As alleged in a July 22, 2021 criminal complaint filed in the Eastern District of New York, Criminal Division, defendants participated in an international campaign to threaten, harass, surveil and intimidate John Doe #1 and his family, in order to force John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #1 to return to China as part of “Operation Fox Hunt.” It was revealed in the reports of investigative journalists that John Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 are Xu Jin and his wife, Liu Fang. The defendants allegedly engaged in clandestine, unsanctioned and illegal conduct within the US and facilitated the travel of Chinese government officials to the US in order to further carry out these illegal acts.  Between 2016 and 2019, multiple Chinese officials directed the defendants, and several others, to engage in efforts to coerce the victims to return to China.

The US Department of Justice has identified Operation Fox Hunt as an initiative by the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Public Security to locate and repatriate alleged Chinese “fugitives” who had fled to foreign countries that have committed crimes under Chinese law.  The Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbù (Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China) or MPS is an internal and political security and domestic intelligence service. Once back in China, those individuals typically face stiff charges. After  People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping  assumed power in 2013, he initiated a sweeping anti-corruption campaign. Xi vowed to hunt down powerful “tigers” as well as lowly “flies” in the campaign to eradicate corruption. The slogan of the campaign became “fight tigers, swat flies and hunt foxes.” Xi warned corruption was so bad that it could threaten the Communist Party of China’s grip on power. According to Human Rights Watch, that campaign has netted thousands of party leaders and rank-and-file government officials domestically. Operations Fox Hunt and Skynet were part of the effort internationally. In June 2014, authorities established the International Office of Pursuing Fugitives and Recovering Embezzled Assets–staffed with a composite of personnel seconded from eight government agencies. Just three years afterward, 3,587 fugitives from over 90 countries had been returned to China. 

Absent an extradition treaty between the US and China, one might look upon the problem as Chinese authorities taking it upon themselves to bring criminals to justice. However, it is of great concern for US officials that Operation Fox Hunt operatives, rather than working in the US with the approval and coordination of the federal government, instead regularly enter the US without notifying any bureaucracy in Washington relevant to their planned actions and engage in violations of US criminal law. To that extent, the activity has been described not only as “an end-run around the Department of State and the Department of Justice,” but “an end-run around US law.” Even more, it is alleged by US national security officials that despite Beijing’s claims to the contrary, identification and repatriation teams are pursuing certain individuals not due to a business dispute in China or violation of Chinese criminal law. Rather, there is a political purpose to the activity. In addition to tracking down those accused of economic crimes, Chinese identification and repatriation teams travel the world in pursuit of those afoul of the Communist Party of China, to include: Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, and followers of the Falun Gong religious movement. To force them into returning, authorities subject their relatives in China to harassment, jail, torture and other mistreatment, sometimes recording hostage-like videos to send to the US. Somewhat less concerning is Operation Sky Net which is a program that runs concurrently alongside Operation Fox Hunt and augment it by cutting-off the financial flows of citizens who have fled overseas and working to recover any proceeds gained through corruption.

Operation Fox Hunt: A MPS Mission

Although the Chinese citizens sought under Operation Fox Hunt are located overseas, identification and repatriation would be a task intrinsic to the mission of MPS. MPS surely has the most complete, up-to-date records on Chinese citizens and tracking down and identifying citizens its officers have honed and polished over decades. For that reason, MPS may very well be pulled into the mix of overseas espionage activities more often than may be presently conceived in the US and among its allies and partners. That same information about Chinese citizens is certainly of great interest to the Communist Party of China and in its hands via MPS. In addition to performing standard domestic functions as a law enforcement and intelligence and counterintelligence service, MPS is very much tied to the Communist Party of China to the extent that its present raison d’être and primary responsibility is to help the Party maintain its tight grip on the population.

To cloak their pursuit of individuals in apparent legality, Beijing has had the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), an inter-governmental law enforcement organization, to issue “Red Notices,” enumerating hosts of business crimes allegedly committed by their targets. In April 2015, China published a most-wanted list, called “100 Red Notices” that held the names of 100 officials and business executives accused in major corruption cases. According to government statistics, by December 2017, 51 out of “100 Red Notices” had returned to China. Among them, 10 were reportedly repatriated by foreign governments, while 35 returned “voluntarily” after being “persuaded.”

To cloak its pursuit of individuals in apparent legality, Beijing has had the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), an inter-governmental law enforcement organization, to issue “Red Notices,” enumerating hosts of business crimes allegedly committed by their targets. In April 2015, China published a most-wanted list, called “100 Red Notices” that held the names of 100 officials and business executives accused in major corruption cases. According to government statistics, by December 2017, 51 out of “100 Red Notices” had returned to China. Among them, 10 were reportedly repatriated by foreign governments, while 35 returned “voluntarily” after being “persuaded.”

Interestingly, Beijing’s acquisition of Red Notices on the innocent is surely a sinister practice. It has been a human rights concern of considerable importance in US-China relations. Reportedly, there are ongoing efforts by the US and other countries to snuff out Beijing’s Red Notice acquisition activity. One might say that any effort to do that would be near akin to shutting off the lights in the library reading room before closing. The list of “100 Red Notices” and every Red Notice acquired since that list  was posted, long ago should have served as figurative beckoning fingers for those seeking to defeat Operation Fox Hunt as to where the identification and repatriation teams would eventually show up. Countless traps and other tricks should have brought the whole cabaret down. With a proper strategy, officers directly from US counterintelligence services and perhaps truly well-equipped and well-experienced state, county, and municipal law enforcement organizations around the US should have used for good, stealthy, professional reconnaissance and surveillance. That reconnaissance and surveillance would have needed to have been performed unobtrusively and for the sake of those under Beijing’s requested Red Notices, unintrusively. Patience would also have been a main ingredient for success. The 17th century French traveller and jeweller, Jean Baptiste Chardin, (1643 – 1713) in “Voyages en Perse et autres lieux de l’Orient” (1711), wrote: “La patience est amère, mais son fruit est doux.” (Patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet.) Further, to succeed, no assistance from contractors in the activity should have been allowed. Contractors for the most part can only offer what the young people refer to as “gangstalking,” “Keystone Cop” type choreography, and school-boy pranks. In one way or another they would have ruined anything they touched as they typically do.

Federal Court Documents Versus Investigative Reports as Sources

In an interview with George Plimpton in the Fall 1990 edition of the Paris Review, Maya Angelou said: “The facts can obscure the truth, what it really felt like.” Many might imagine the rudiments of tactics, techniques and procedures, and methods of China’s efforts as presented in the federal court document might serve as a source for guidance. They would be mistaken. Reading through the indictment, the facts of the case on first impression may appear laid out in the federal court document in a somewhat Daedalian manner to the nonlegal scholar, the layman. Not even the sequence of events was not made clear. From what is presented in the federal court indictment, one might believe the case leading to the indictment of Operation Fox Hunt operatives was rather featureless. The ways in which Chinese identification and repatriation teams acted as laid out appear almost predictable, given the nature of their mission and their desire to satisfy the authorities who commissioned the enterprise. There is nothing in the document that would strike a reader as something new, intriguing, or recherché. Much of what is within could hardly serve as a foundation upon which US law enforcement and counterintelligence service might be better enabled to construct new approaches to mitigate them. The whole matter actually took on new meaning for greatcharlie after reading a July 22, 2021 ProPublica article which conveyed the facts of the case in an interesting way stirred greatcharlie’s interest and resulted in a decision to dive deeper into the facts of the case.

 In the reports of investigative journalists of ProPublica and other publications, there is general acceptance of the facts as presented in the federal criminal complaint. Yet, even more important, the investigative reports provide color to the story of the identification and repatriation team’s activities. The investigative journalists’ stories offer assessments of principal actors involved, ascribing traits to them, painting pictures of them as well as locations where specific acts occurred, and aiding readers in understanding how it likely felt to be victimized by such an enterprise. Investigative journalists also present moments of life in a way that allows readers to enter an experience. Indeed, there is much to learn from several impressive articles by investigative journalists. By including that information with facts, the story of the episode provides a structure that allows a sufficient parsing of everything involved. 

Xu Jin (above), a legal permanent resident in the US, formerly directed the development commission of Wuhan, China before he left for the US in 2010. In both 2012 and 2014, the Chinese government caused the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) to issue “Red Notices” for Xu and Liu. According to those Red Notices, Xu was wanted by the Chinese government for “embezzlement,” abuse of power, [and] acceptance of bribes,” pursuant to Chinese Criminal Law Articles 383, 385, and 397, which carried a maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment. In 2015, the Chinese government put the couple on its list of 100 most wanted fugitives in Operation Fox Hunt. Chinese authorities have said they made three formal requests for US assistance about the couple, providing evidence about alleged money laundering and immigration crimes that could be prosecuted in the US.

Targets of the New Jersey Mission

As reported in the Wall Street Journal, Xu had directed Wuhan’s development commission before he left for the US in 2010 with his wife, Liu, who is a former insurance company executive. Xu and Liu, both 57 at the time of this writing, had obtained US green cards through a program that grants residency to foreigners who invest more than $500,000 in the US. In the interest of full-disclosure, a California consultant who helped them apply for the green cards later pleaded guilty to immigration fraud, and investigators in that case alleged that the wife’s petition for residency contained false information. But they remain legal residents. Using its standard artifice to tie everything up neatly with a legal bow, in and around 2012 and 2014, the Chinese government caused the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), an inter-governmental law enforcement organization to issue “Red Notices” for Xu and Liu. According to those Red Notices, Xu was wanted by the Chinese government for “embezzlement” abuse of power [and] acceptance of bribes,” pursuant to Chinese Criminal Law Articles 383, 385, and 397, which carried a maximum possible penalty of life imprisonment. In 2015, the Chinese government put the couple on its list of 100 most wanted fugitives in Operation Fox Hunt. Chinese authorities have said they made three formal requests for US assistance about the wanted couple, providing evidence about alleged money laundering and immigration crimes that could be prosecuted here. A spokesperson for the US Department of Justice declined to comment on that assertion.

In April 2018, the Chinese privately owned company, Xinba Construction Group Company, filed a lawsuit against the couple in New Jersey state court, accusing Xu of holding up projects to extort money from companies, and due to his actions, those companies still owe Xinba more than $10 million for contracts performed. In court filings, the couple denied Xu extorted or looted any company, calling the litigation an artifice designed to coerce the couple “to return to China and, if not, to harass and attempt to bankrupt” them. Their countersuit also alleged an extensive harassment campaign was being waged against them by Chinese operatives. They also claimed those same operatives had kidnapped Xu’s father living in China and that they had posed as special agents of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to stalk an immediate relative of Xu’s living in the US. Although the endangered couple’s attorney had accurately and clearly laid out the Chinese government’s villany, a judge in September 2019, out of ignorance, rejected their claims, saying they failed to provide sufficient evidence that Xinba was working with the Chinese government. A preceding judge overseeing the case, completely failing to understand the absolute gravity of matter with regard to US national security, remarked: “It’s not your ordinary case you see in the Superior Court in Essex County, but we’re open for all business I guess . . . No herniated discs. No slip and fall in this case.”

Perchance, back in Beijing, dismissive responses as such  from jurists of the US court system were predicted. US judges, unsure when they wanted to be sure, would reject what they did not understand or thought unimaginable. Predicting such behavior would presumably be one among a set of assumptions and predictions made in Beijing on the actions and reactions of those elements in the US whose responsibility and capability would be to present obstacles or prevent Operation Fox Hunt from succeeding. Those elements in the US were apparently no more threatening to senior executives, managers, and planners in MPS than the Maginot Line was to the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht in 1940.

Liu Feng (above), is the wife of Xu Jin. A former insurance company executive, she came to the US with Xu in 2010. According to a Red Notice issued by Interpol, Liu is equally sought for arrest as Xu. In April 2018, the Chinese privately owned company, Xinba Construction Group Company, filed a lawsuit against Xu and Liu in New Jersey state court, accusing Xu of holding up projects to extort money from companies, and due to his actions, those companies still owe Xinba more than $10 million for contracts performed. In court filings, the couple denied Xu extorted or looted any company, calling the litigation an artifice designed to coerce the couple “to return to China and, if not, to harass and attempt to bankrupt” them. Their countersuit also alleged an extensive harassment campaign was being waged against them by Chinese operatives. They also claimed those same operatives had kidnapped Xu’s father living in China and had posed as federal agents to stalk an immediate relative of Liu living in the US.

Preparation for the Mission: What Was likely Raised in Feasibility Studies Done in Advance?

One should never expect China to come charging in with reckless abandon. If it had happened in the past, it surely will happen any more. The efforts of those operating in the US on all levels, espionage, identification and repatriation, and perchance, covert operations, will typically be calibrated, with supposedly every precaution taken into consideration. Vouloir c’est pouvoir. Operation Fox Hunt has been marked by concerted, energetic, and endless activity by China. For the most part, Chinese efforts in the US have been quiet, smooth, and quite sophisticated in nature. Albeit moving into the realm of conjecture, one can imagine how a feasibility study for the rendition operation was constructed and the assessments that led to the project being green-lit. 

MPS in coordination with China’s foreign intelligence services likely studied the situation, and recognized just how open the US was for the theft of its secrets in all sectors and then clearly decided to pour through, taking whatever they could. To date, there is no indication that they have decided to pare down any aspect of their clandestine and covert operations in the US, and evidently they have encountered nothing to even suggest that they should retreat. Ventis secundis, tene/tenete cursum. (The winds being favorable, hold the course.)

Surely, there were several feasibility studies produced on the possibility of successfully conducting identification and repatriation operations with concern at minimum focused on how under current circumstances, with espionage activities drawing so much attention in the US, the situation has not been made less secure for all teams operating there,  and the pitfalls of conducting such identification and repatriation operations with relations between the two countries at a relative low point. Such studies would likely be put before those assigned to manage the identification and repatriation operations in the US ostensibly  along with the volumes of studies done that provided confidence fhst China’s “espionage tsunami” would meet with considerable success.

Imaginably, information gathered for such feasibility studies would be up-to-date, and perhaps would be thorough enough to include manifests of law enforcement officers and counterintelligence officers within the planned area of operation of the identification and repatriation team, with notes on their working hours, usual movements and daily habits. If that might even remotely be the case, it would also mean China has engaged, and is likely continually engaged, in covert surveillance of many law enforcement and counterintelligence officers in the US who they may have discovered were handling Chinese espionage and identification and repatriation cases. They may have discovered that those investigators often display varied levels of diligence, are often inattentive when visiting site, are rarely thorough and at time outrightly remiss when interviewing individuals of interest, display their insecurities in conversation, prone to bullying their own citizens without any apparent cause, and are unprofessional often in dealing with existing contacts. Despite this perception based on analyses in the abstract or empirical evidence, US counterintelligence and law enforcement organizations around the US are not without count, and it would prove to be a mistake to minimize the threat of their presence altogether.

It is possible that feasibility studies such as those suggested had some influence on the decision on the location, the timing of the operations, and which émigré to pursue from a list of those sought. To this extent, Chinese investigators, as those participating in the identification and repatriation scheme, would be armed and enabled with an abundance of information. They enter the US, clearly equipped, able, and expecting to overcome difficulties foreseen and unforeseen from federal, state, or even municipal law enforcement or US counterintelligence services they may encounter. They have managed to establish, in the venues in which they have operated, freedom of movement so to speak. Of course, certain levels of information deemed “ultra-secret” or however it might be described by Chinese intelligence, would unlikely be shared by intelligence services with the identification and repatriation teams. Perhaps overall, the exchange of information by some organizations would be on a “need to know” basis.

In the abstract, conceivably lessons learned are internalized, studies and observations of law enforcement as much as counterintelligence surely are constantly underway in all the countries by every organization operating in respectively. In turn those studies and observations are doubtlessly shared to mutually support the success of one another. What may be recognized as too risky, ineffective, expected by the adversary through recent experience, would be cut away. What seemed to be a more available path to ends, is given consideration, and will likely find its way in efforts to prepare those going on the next missions. Malum est consilium quod mutari non potest. (Bad (ill-considered) is the plan that cannot be changed.)

Most important to note is that whether the matter is espionage or other malign clandestine and covert activities overseas, there can be no doubt that all are constantly moving through a process of evolution. It appears to be a manifestation of an idea, reflective of what has been dubbed “Xi thought,” that Chinese activities performed by government, Communist Party of China, or irregulars must be driven by an energy to push the country onward and upward into the position of the dominant power of the world and one might imagine perhaps even beyond that stature, whatever designs the Communist Party of China leadership might have in mind for that to be. At first blush, these comments may strike a few readers as being a bit lightweight, but some reasoning behind risking such audacious action in the US should be parsed out and laid out for readers to possibly accept and provide a basis for greatcharlie’s suggestions as to what may have been organized and had transpired beneath the surface.

The Main Operation Fox Hunt Players in This Drama

Once fully operational, the identification and repatriation team for the New Jersey mission grew to at least 19 US and Chinese operatives. Nine of the operatives among the identification and repatriation team members of the Operation Fox Hunt New Jersey operation are part of the case filed in the Eastern District of New York, Criminal Division.

Included in the criminal complaint were the following. Hu Ji was the lead investigator and identification and repatriation team leader.  Hu was at the time of the indictment a 46 year old officer serving in the Wuhan Public Security Bureau, a municipal bureau of MPS. To be a bit more specific, he was a veteran officer of the bureau’s foreign affairs unit. Hu is a man of the world with a natural turn for clandestine action and placing others in trying positions. Hu gained notice after joining an Operation Fox Hunt task force. Reportedly, in early 2016, the Wuhan newsmedia had published glowing profiles about him, describing his imposing height, his travels to 29 countries, and his arrests of eight fugitives.  In the view of the Wuhan newsmedia, Hu est a un autre niveau! In an interview, Hu told the Hubei Daily: “Out of the country does not mean out of the legal system.” He added: “Show your sword and punish even those in faraway lands.” 

Though in photographs Hu looks careworn, they typically present him as a professional, intelligent, well-minded, well-built–about 6-foot-1, well-dressed, well-groomed, handsome, smooth, and confident-looking, Chinese male. Hu is a compound of cunning and audacity, girded with steady nerves. His gift as a cool observer of mankind and an understanding of complicated interpersonal relationships allowed him to successfully carry off the job of team leader. That understanding of people surely aided him in manipulating and exploiting others. Hu’s cases had led from Fiji to France to Mexico, making headlines back home. The work was riskier here; in fact, it was illegal. He acquired dominant knowledge of the territory in which he operated. Hu was not even afraid to be at the elbow of law enforcement personnel to explain his purpose using some tall story, some artifice. Hu would identify himself as a Chinese police officer on his tourist visa. US officials hardly gave him a second glance. Sometimes, it was best to hide in plain sight. Perhaps the best way to express what is discussed here is to state that in his work, Hu could be dashing and audacious, but also honorable and discreet, using wits and memory, acting gradually. He could display a certain gentleness but certainly had the capability to be quite cruel. He had no qualms about exploiting individual weakness. Surely, individuals as Hu often seem far too well-equipped for the world in comparison to people most readers might know, or to themselves. In attempting to ascribe certain traits to Hu given his role as a normal Operation Fox Hunt lead investigator and identification and repatriation team leader, those considered by greatcharlie may appear to be mere abstractions. However, as far as one can tell, these are precisely the traits that assisted Hu in becoming a master at his work.

 At the time the complaint was filed, Zhu Feng, also known as “Johnny Zhu,” was a 34 year old PRC citizen and US lawful permanent resident, and until approximately April 2017, was a resident of Flushing, Queens, in New York City. Zhu had studied in Guam before moving to Flushing, which holds one of largest enclaves of Chinese immigrants in the US. His extended family became legal US residents and appreciated life in their new home. Zhu’s older brother served in the US military and then worked for the Social Security Administration and Customs and Border Protection, according to court documents and public records. Zhu reportedly performed odd jobs: tour guide, selling used cars. On social media, he sported a Yankees cap and a boyish smile and called himself “Endless Johnny.” He was torn from that life to serve as an involuntary clandestine operative for the Chinese government. Zhu Yong, also known as Jason Zhu,” was a 64 year old Chinese citizen and a legal permanent resident in the US. Zhu Yong was the father of co-defendant Zhu Feng. The older Zhu, is divorced and suffers from diabetes and high blood pressure. He did not have a steady job, and divided his time between a home in Connecticut and his older son’s place in Queens. He traveled frequently to China which very likely caught the attention of MPS.

This conscription of families of captured targets is a ruthless and effective tactic. Yet, Chinese authorities find great value in it reportedly because they believe it ensures loyalty and obedience. They also apparently believe that allowing identification and repatriation teams to use local intermediaries enable them to shield Chinese officers from scrutiny by US counterintelligence services and state, county, and municipal law enforcement organizations around the US. The teams are often organized in what has been described as silos to keep operatives unaware of who other team members are or the full details of their mission.

Michael McMahon, a 53 year old US citizen, was a licensed private detective in New Jersey. McMahon came from an Irish-American family of police officers and firefighters. During his 14 years at the New York City Police Department, he worked in narcotics and an elite street crime unit, rising to detective sergeant. He received the Police Combat Cross, the department’s second-highest honor, for his role in a gunfight in the Bronx. In 2003, he retired on partial disability related to ailments caused by his time at Ground Zero after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. His wife, an actress, once had a long-running part on “As the World Turns,” a daytime soap opera. Zheng Congying, a 25 year old Chinese citizen and legal permanent resident, resided in Brooklyn, New York. Investigators believe he was hired muscle. Li Minjun, a 65 year old citizen and resident of China, was a physician formerly of the Hubei Xiangyang Center Hospital in Xiangyang, China. Li had also worked for the MPS. Brought aboard the team as a specialist, her assignment was to escort Xu’s father from China to the US against his will with the hope that he would cause his son to surrender to the identification and repatriation team.

Hu Ji was the lead investigator and identification and repatriation team leader.  Hu was at the time of his indictment was an officer serving in the Wuhan Public Security Bureau, a municipal bureau of MPS. To be a bit more specific, he was a veteran officer of the bureau’s foreign affairs unit. Hu is a man of the world with a natural turn for clandestine action and placing others in trying positions. Hu gained notice after joining an Operation Fox Hunt task force. Reportedly, in early 2016, the Wuhan newsmedia had published glowing profiles about him, describing his imposing height, his travels to 29 countries, and his arrests of eight fugitives. In an interview, Hu told the Hubei Daily: “Out of the country does not mean out of the legal system.” He added: “Show your sword and punish even those in faraway lands.”

PRC Official-2 was at one time an individual whose identity was known only to the Grand Jury. However, PRC Official-2 has since been revealed to be Tu Lan, a 50 year old citizen and resident of China, was employed as a prosecutor with the Hanyang People’s Procuratorate and a leader of a Wuhan Fox Hunt task force. She would eventually direct day-to-day activities of the identification and repatriation team. However, as she did not speak English, Johnny would stick close and be her intermediary between her and Michael McMahon, the US private investigator, who was referred to by the identification and repatriation team members simply as “Mike.” 

Zhai Yongqiang, a 46 year old Chinese citizen, resided in China and California. According to court documents, Tu Lan and Zhai Yongqiang, age 46, were the last of the nine charged in the superseding complaint. The identity of a ninth defendant, named Anonymous by US prosecutors, remains under seal.

Among those also included in the federal court documents but not indicted were PRC Official-1 is an individual whose identity remains known only to the Grand Jury.  PRC Official-1 is said to be a Chinese citizen and a director of the Wuhan prosecution office’s anti-corruption bureau. Note that US prosecutors did not charge or identify PRC Official-1 or PRC Official-2 which frequently occurs for strategic and diplomatic reasons with regard to counterintelligence cases. Rong Jing, a 39 year old permanent resident in the US, was Hu’s point man in California. He was a married businessman, living in Rancho Cucamonga, about 35 miles east of Los Angeles. Court documents state Rong described himself as a bounty hunter for the Chinese government. He apparently enjoyed his “Motherland” and was quite talkative about it. Rong’s discussion of his work as identification and repatriation team member provided investigators with a wealth of information on the insidious nature and ubiquitous presence of the Operation Fox Hunt networks. Co-conspirator #3 was an operative who on or about and between May 15, 2017 and May17, 2017, contacted and hired a private investigator in California–dubbed P1 in the federal court document–for the purpose of surveilling Jane Doe #2. Co-conspirator #3 provided P1 with a picture of a document from the defendant Zhai Yongqiang containing the name and personal identification information belonging to Xu.

Communist Party of China Expectations of the Identification and Repatriation Team 

In 2015, Liu Dong, then deputy director of MPS’s economic crimes division, headed Operation Fox Hunt for the organization. He used interviews with China’s newsmedia to supposedly provide citizens with a rare look into the Operation Fox Hunt teams. He told Xinhua news agency that the work required a young team because members needed the strength to withstand long hours and frequent long-distance travel. Liu also told Xinhua that his team was highly intelligent, tough and nimble, with backgrounds in economics, law, foreign languages and business management. He further stated that team members were selected in part for their “emotional quotient” for dealing with overseas law enforcement, and for their ability to handle adversity.

For those team members indoctrinated in Communist Chinese thought doubtlessly recognizes his or her solemn responsibility to ensure China achieved its maximum potential everyday. Chinese intelligence officers in the various services likely feel that they can outperform their opponents and overcome their efforts to defend targets from espionage and efforts to intercept them. One might postulate in the abstract that Chinese intelligence officers may very well have closely observed, or may have read reports on how the behavior, performance and professionalism of officers of organizations in adversarial countries responsible for investigating and halting China’s espionage and any other activities in them was so negative, self-defeating, and self-destructive that confidence in their own abilities was uplifted. Perhaps this impression or belief grows in certitude with every review of certain adversaries. While there may not exactly be a wide open door there likely appeared to be seemingly endless potential for action and perhaps limitless possibilities.

Imaginably, those operatives from China already associated with the Chinese government who were selected for the identification and repatriation team had no bad habits–such as indulging in alcohol, narcotics, pornograpby, misogyny, and prostitution–that could potentially become amplified in a Western environment. To go a bit further using Chinese intelligence officers as a model, identification and repatriation team members, while deployed in service of their country, would not be expected to take any aspect of their duties lightly. They expectedly would never display any desire to involve themselves with banal amusements to fill time when not active in the field–one could hardly call any time while deployed “outside working hours.”–or entertain themselves on mobile phones while performing work tasks. One might presume that whatever they may most enjoy, they contented themselves with least. In effect, the team was expected to figuratively display the “company culture” of the Communist Party of China and live and act by “company principles.” By engaging in heavy handed actions against family members of the targets, team members certainly could be said to have displayed the “best practices” of the company.

Despite all of the safeguards in place, team members were well-aware that danger in the form of lurking US counterintelligence services. While perhaps highly motivated, on the ground, the hyperbole of China’s domination of the field in the US uttered by senior executives and Communist Party of China leaders is likely obviate in the minds of many operatives due to the very strong desire not to be captured. Presumably, no Chinese intelligence officer or clandestine or covert operative of any kind wants to be caught due to his or her own delinquency, carelessness, or outright stupidity. There is also the matter of punishment they might face back home for their failure. In recent memory, few to none among have been caught and put on trial in a US court. This is surely the standard and the expectation for all of those deployed at the Chinese government’s bidding. Unusquisque mavult credere quam iudicare. (Everyone prefers to believe than to think.)

In 2015, Liu Dong, then deputy director of MPS’s economic crimes division, headed Operation Fox Hunt for the organization. He used interviews with China’s newsmedia to supposedly provide citizens with a rare look into the Operation Fox Hunt teams. He told Xinhua news agency that the work required a young team because members needed the strength to withstand long hours and frequent long-distance travel. Liu also told Xinhua that his team was highly intelligent, tough and nimble, with backgrounds in economics, law, foreign languages and business management. He further stated that team members were selected in part for their “emotional quotient” for dealing with overseas law enforcement, and for their ability to handle adversity.

Stalking and Attempted Repatriation of Xu Ji and Liu Feng

As the story goes, in September 2016, Hu flew to New York to launch the operation. Among his first moves, he went into New Jersey to reconnoiter the house in Short Hills and other locations. Then at Hu’s direction, his bevy of clandestine operatives began building a network. First, they needed a local private investigator, preferably a former police officer with contacts and the skills to track people down. Zhu Yong, together with co-conspirator whose identity is known only to the Grand Jury as “Co-conspirator #1,” hired Michael McMahon to investigate and surveil Xu. McMahon came from a family of police officers and firefighters. As an officer in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for 14 years, he had served in a narcotics unit and an elite street crime unit. He rose to the rank of detective sergeant. He received the Police Combat Cross for his role in a gunfight in the Bronx. McMahon retired in 2003 on partial disability related to ailments caused by his time at Ground Zero after the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attack. Reportedly, his wife, an actress, had a long-running part on “As the World Turns,” a daytime soap opera. Imaginably as a security precaution, Hu’s operatives enlisted a woman who presented herself as the New York-based employee of a translation company to contact McMahon. The woman explained to him that she discovered him through a Google search. She then introduced him to Zhu Feng and Zhu Yong, describing them as representatives of a private Chinese company that was trying to recover assets from a former employee who had stolen money.  Zhu Feng identified himself as the nephew of the owner of the Chinese firm, which he allegedly described as a construction company. The following month, Hu traveled to the US to meet with McMahon at a Panera Bread restaurant in Paramus, New Jersey, a suburb about 20 miles from New York City. Reportedly, the MPS officer presented himself as Eric Yan, an executive of the private company, during that meeting and other interactions. Zhu Feng and Zhu Yong also participated in Hu’s meetings with McMahon. Hu provided McMahon with a retainer of $5000 at that first meeting.  The two Zhu’s were reportedly involved with his succeeding payments. McMahon’s attorney claims his client “believed he was meeting company personnel” and never learned the identification and repatriation team’s true mission. “Nothing seemed suspicious at meetings” according to McMahon’s attorney. He also indicates that the identification and repatriation team members that his client met at no point mentioned the Chinese government or that anybody worked in law enforcement in China. He claims the focus of discussions was asset recovery, and they convincingly portrayed themselves as company employees with a vested interest in locating the money. 

Soon after he was hired, McMahon began to investigate Xu and his family, a process which included conducting surveillance on Xu and obtaining his banking information. ProPublica reports that McMahon brought in two more investigators to help stake out a suspected location of Xu and Liu, a house in New Jersey. He took the precaution of alerting local police to the surveillance presumably to prevent any misunderstandings if detected or reported by passers-by. (At that point, McMahon demonstrated the willingness to cooperate with law enforcement. Thereby, ample opportunity existed  for US counterintelligence services and law enforcement to enlist his assistance as an informant or operative. For reasons unknown, the opportunity was passed up.) As indicated by the federal document, McMahon’s activities were initially directed by the defendant Zhu Yong and later directly by Hu and Zhu Feng. McMahon was diligent in providing reports on his progress to Hu. In the Fall of 2016, McMahon sent Hu information regarding Xu and his family. In or about November 2016, McMahon emailed information about Liu’s international travel. Later, around December 2016, McMahon emailed Hu information concerning Liu’s date of birth, Social Security Number, and banking information. In November, Hu, still using the nom de guerre Yang, emailed McMahon to say he had “reported all we found” to his superiors in China

In December 2016, Hu visited New York again. On that occasion, he traveled with his manager. US authorities only identified Hu’s superior only as PRC Official-1, the director of the Wuhan prosecution office’s anti-corruption bureau and a leader of a Wuhan Fox Hunt task force that includes prosecutors and investigators in the Communist Party’s anti-corruption unit. After that visit, Hu and Zhu Feng returned to China. Oddly enough, in a meeting in Wuhan, Hu confided to Zhu that next time they did not plan to come back from the US without the targets.

Following months of investigative work by McMahon, the identification and repatriation team planned a specific operation to stalk and grab Xu via psychological coercion. It was then that the team moved to bring Xu’s elderly father from China to the US in order to communicate a threat on behalf of the Chinese government directly to Xu. As part of the plan, Xu’s father was directed to tell him to the effect that if he did not return to China, his family there would suffer serious harm, including imprisonment. In furtherance of this criminal scheme, team members, Zhu, Tu Lan, and Li Minjun traveled to the US.

Malgré-nous Among the Team’s Members

It has been said that in zealousness, one can usually find some weakness, some hidden doubts. In China, the world is limited to what is seen through the lens of the Communist Party of China and “Xi thought.” For some Chinese citizens, that line of thinking and a will of iron act as blinders, preventing other perspectives from seeping in. From the view of the Communist Party of China, in the New Jersey operation, a team was being sent in under Hu’s leadership whose members’ minds were turned wholly toward bringing John Doe #1 back to China. In no small part, therein lies the causality for the ultimate breakdown of the New Jersey identification and repatriation operation. 

Interestingly, not all team members were members of the Communist Party of China or aspired to be such. One would think Party membership would be sine qua non for a mission of this type as it was actually commissioned by the Party and given that certain exigent circumstances could arise, requiring almost anything of team members, including literal self-sacrifice. Those called upon were indeed not the most dedicated. The teams and their superiors in Beijing erred in presuming without any reliable ability to predict or confirm the fidelity of those non-Party members would gladly follow orders in every circumstance.

With the New Jersey enterprise, it is clear two team members, Zhu Feng and Zhu Yong were called upon presumptively because their loyalty was guaranteed with dangled threats to cause misfortune for their relatives, some of whom had already suffered by the government’s hand. It was certainly an odd type of fidelity. In Zhu Feng’s particular case, in the summer of 2016, he received news from relatives in Wuhan that MPS had brought his uncle, a former accountant, back to China from Houston. Zhu’s relatives also contacted him to say: “The cop who caught your uncle is named Hu Ji. They further explained: “He will contact you about another case. Do what he says.” Team Members of identification and repatriation teams such as Zhu Feng and Zhu Yong are ostensibly China’s version of the French malgré-nous. Malgré-nous were those men of the Alsace-Moselle region who were conscripted against their will into the German Wehrmacht or the Waffen SS during World War II. Chinese citizens were torn from their normal daily lives and pressed into service not simply as a matter of being under the authority and thumb of hostile power that controlled the territory in which they lived, but coping with the threat of harm, even death, of loved ones also living under the regime.

The Initial Effort and the First “Emotional Bomb”

In the spring of 2017, the plan was ready and all team elements were assembled in the US. Hu remained in Wuhan, managing activities, but he sent in a specialist, Tu Lan, a prosecutor for the Hanyang District of Wuhan. She would lead the repatriation team on the ground, but because she did not speak English, Zhu Feng (hereinafter referred to as Zhu as the role of his father, Zhu Yong, was not discussed beyond this point in any sources) would stick close and be her intermediary with McMahon. The other specialist sent into the US, Li Minjun, as aforementioned, was a doctor who had worked for MPS, US officials allege her assignment was to escort an elderly man across the world against his will in order to ambush his son, Xu. Reportedly, Hu hoped the shock would cause the wanted man, Xu Jin, to surrender on the spot. The true age of Xu’s father has not been disclosed, but presumably Hu felt he was frail enough to put Li at his side for the more than 15-hour flight. Interestingly, Zhu Yong, who at the mission’s outset was entrusted to find and establish links with a US-based private investigator with specific characteristics, Tu, Li, and McMahon were ages 64, 50, 65, and 53 respectively. It seems that for MPS managers, age has importance, imaginably equating to experience, capability, reliability, solid judgment, and wisdom among other positive qualities.

Hu told McMahon in an email in March that the plan was to bring the father unannounced to the house in New Jersey and lure him out. Hu also gave him the following instructions: “We just want to recomm[e]nd you trace him to find [his son’s] address.” According to the federal court document, Hu offered to pay McMahon in cash for his assistance. McMahon accepted the offer. Hu later emailed McMahon two photographs, one of which depicted Xu and Liu while the other depicted Xu’s parents. Before returning to the US, Zhu was given the task of overseeing operatives he had hired in the Chinese community in New York. He sent a text message ordering one operative to join Mahon’s  surveillance in New Jersey with instructions to “conduct surveillance there for 5 days. 12 hours on the first day, 10 hours on the second day, and 8 hours on the last three days . . . The compensation is 1800USD.” 

To all appearances, Zhu had Hu’s complete confidence. On first impression, an interesting historical parallel comes to mind with regard to the developing relationship between Zhu as a conscript with his superiors, or more accurately, his captors Hu and Tu. Despite being torn from his former carefree existence and forced to become a player in Operation Fox Hunt, he was nevertheless given key tasks, considerable responsibility, and treated in a rather avuncular manner particularly by Hu. In Ancient Rome, occasionally certain masters would depend upon slaves to perform important duties and provide them with opportunities for growth within the society. A couple of famous examples of that are the relationship that grew between the master Terentius Lucanus and Publius Terentius and that between Carpophorus and Callixtus. Born between 195/185 BC, Roman senator Terentius Lucanus brought Publius Terentius to Rome as a slave. He educated him, and freed him after being impressed by his abilities. Publius Terentius would become a playwright known better today as Terence. Terence’s 6 plays have survived through the centuries. He died young around 159 BC. Callixtus was a young slave from Rome. His master Carpophorus, gave him the responsibility of collecting funds given as alms by other Christians. Callixtus would become a Christian himself. According to Sextus Julius Africanus, Callixtus would become the Bishop of Rome from c. 218 AD, and is known both as Callistus I and Pope Callixtus. He was martyred for his Christian faith in c. 223 AD and is venerated as a saint by the Catholic Church. Perchance Hu was grooming Zhu as a protégé and foresaw a future for him as a full-fledged officer in MPS or some other security service.

Exploitation of Émigré Communities

Clever choices have been made by the identification and repatriation teams based on studies on the practices of law enforcement organizations around the US where Chinese investigators must operate. Aware of the Chinese government’s hostile activities within their own community, it would seem to be grave error to believe law enforcement around the US could possibly know what the Chinese government is doing in the US against émigrés or what it is capable of doing to please or make a good impression with the Communist Party of China. It is not always the case but to an extent, the émigrés, thinking ostensibly in survival mode, will typically see no other way to get by but to remain obedient to Chinese authorities. Unfortunately, there is of course the other reality that not everyone can be or wants to be a noble soul. 

As discussed in the December 13, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled  “Meditations and Ruminations on Chinese Intelligence: Revisiting a Lesson on Developing Insights from Four Decades Ago,” under Article 9 of the National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 15th session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress, maintenance of national security, priority shall be given to prevention, equal attention shall be paid to temporary and permanent solutions, specialized tasks shall be combined with reliance on the masses, the functions of specialized authorities and other relevant authorities in maintaining national security shall be maximized, and citizens and organizations shall be extensively mobilized to prevent, frustrate, and legally punish any conduct that compromises national security. Article 11 decrees that there will be no tolerance shown for the failure to meet one’s obligation to maintain national security. The article states: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China, state authorities, armed forces, political parties, people’s groups, enterprises, public institutions, and other social organizations shall have the responsibility and obligation to maintain national security.” Authorities in China understand that extraordinary powers are entrusted in the hands of many, such as MPS and MSS officers, who work on national security matters. Contractors, and even informants, who might work on their behalf are placed under the same scrutiny. Those who have attempted to cross the Chinese government have faced stiff reprisals. The shadow of sudden death can hang over the head of any individual arrested for such betrayal. As stated under Article 13: “Whoever as an employee of a state authority abuses power, neglects duty, practices favoritism, or makes falsification in national security work or any activity involving national security shall be held liable in accordance with the law.” The article further declares: “Any individual or organization that fails to fulfill the obligation of maintaining national security or conducts any activity compromising national security in violation of this Law or any relevant law shall be held liable in accordance with the law.” The furtive work of Chinese citizens at home and abroad under the direction of the MPS, MSS, or PLA, does not need to be without guerdon. As explained under Article 12: “The state shall commend and reward individuals and organizations that have made prominent contributions to maintaining national security.

Unable to keep pace with the identification and repatriation teams from the start, naturally the initial hope would be given the gravity of the intrusion on US soil, that while moving about within Chinese émigré communities, the teams would at least act with some measure and would not exceed what is decent. That has not been the case regarding their behavior. Operation Fox Hunt teams have created great fear among the émigré communities. One might toss on top of that an apparent impunity with which hunters from China act against them. True, on paper, members of the Chinese émigré communities have nothing to fear in the US and are welcome to enjoy the benefits of living in a free society. Yet, as the MPS was able to accomplish more than imaginable in the US, displaying its power and capabilities, there remains uneasiness, fear, terror among Chinese émigré communities from something they are thousands of miles from. Chinese émigré communities are for the most part convinced of the ubiquitous nature of the Communist Party of China and China’s security services.

Chineee Émigré Communities and Unshakable Grip of Beijing

Unable to keep pace with the identification and repatriation teams from the start, the initial hope would be given the gravity of the intrusion on US soil, that within Chinese émigré communities, the teams would act with some measure and would not exceed what is decent. Surely, that has not been the case regarding their behavior. Operation Fox Hunt teams have created great fear among the émigré communities. One might toss on top of that an apparent impunity with which hunters from China act against them. True, on paper, members of the Chinese émigré communities have nothing to fear in the US and are welcome to enjoy the benefits of living in a free society. Yet, as the MPS was able to accomplish more than imaginable in the US, displaying its power and capabilities, there remains uneasiness, fear, terror among Chinese émigré communities from something they are thousands of miles from. Chinese émigré communities are for the most part convinced of the ubiquitous nature of the Communist Party of China and China’s security services. Indeed, within the émigré communities, there is an expectation, especially among more recent arrivals that always close by are recruited informants of MPS, Party Members, planted United Front Work Department operatives and informants, planted MSS intelligence officers, operatives, recruited informants. Memories and ways of living to survive in an authoritarian China are not easily shaken off. Quando libertas ceciderit, nemo libere dicere audebit. (When liberty will have fallen (falls/is lost), no one will dare to speak freely.) 

The learning curve for law enforcement organizations around the US may remain steep for some time as the ways and means with which the Chinese government uses to approach Chinese émigré communities on matters such as returning citizens and former citizens to China “to face justice,” is ever evolving. Use of lessons learned by the Operation Fox Hunt identification and repatriation teams will mean for the future more effective use of artifice, more effective collection of information within émigré communities, more effective counter-surveillance, more effective sharing information and data useful for operations among organizations engaged in clandestine and covert operations in the US.

To get Xu’s father into the US without incident, Zhu coached the captive elderly man on responses to standard questions asked by border inspectors at Newark Liberty International Airport. In advance of Xu’s father’s arrival in the US, the defendants Zhu and Tu flew to  Newark Liberty International Airport on or about April 3, 2017. Xu’s father and Li, the doctor, arrived at Newark Liberty International Airport on a flight from Shanghai on April 5, 2017. While in the US, the Tu met with Zhu and an individual known to US prosecutors as Co-conspirator #2 at a hotel in New Jersey. At that meeting, Tu directed Zhu and Co-conspirator #2 to surveil a residence belonging to a relative of Xu and Liu using night vision goggles in advance of bringing Xu’s father to the home. Tu also subsequently communicated with Zhu with regard to the logistics of the operation. On the evening of April 5, 2017, identification and repatriation team members brought Xu’s father to a house in New Jersey that belonged to his wife’s relatives. As that transpired, McMahon performed surveillance in the vicinity of the house belonging to Liu’s relatives to determine the present locations of members of Xu’s family, including Hu himself, which at that time remained unknown to the team.

On April 6, 2017, Xu met his father at a public location before they returned together to his residence. McMahon and other team members monitored the meeting of Xu and his father. That same day, Zhu requested that McMahon run a database check for a license plate number and address associated with Xu. McMahon provided that info. Xu’s father remained with his son for several days. During that time, he explained to Xu that his family in China would be harmed if he did not return to China. Hu’s hopes for a lightning-bolt triumph evaporated. Instead of acquiescence, the family stood fast and contacted law enforcement. The FBI got involved, a move the Operation Hunt team was almost immediately made aware of. According to the federal court document, on April 7, 2017, Zhu sent a text to Tu saying Hu wanted her “and the doctor to come back as soon as possible” to “evade actions by US law enforcement.”  That same day, Tu departed from John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York on a flight to Beijing. The next day, Li departed from Newark Liberty International Airport on a flight to Beijing.

Identification and Repatriation Team Receives Intriguing Alert

Although executed piecemeal, the departure of key members and leaders of the identification and repatriation team after the alert was sounded may have followed a prearranged course. As it was always possible that such a need to move fast would arise. Nevertheless, a flaw became apparent in that process. it would have made a bit more sense if team lead investigators and their superiors, when selecting team members, had only selected individuals who possessed certain talents, perhaps demonstrated on previous operations maybe in other areas, who would expectedly contribute to the operation’s success. In this particular situation, some identification and repatriation team members who remained in the field as Zhu appeared unsure of how to proceed, were unfamiliar with steps to take, and required supervision. Those next steps that needed to be taken should have been standard operating procedures deeply ingrained through training. In an exigent situation, the team leader also appeared not certain as to how team members might perform. Tu, for instance, appeared to feel the need to be emphatic when issuing instructions. Zhu communicated in a similar way to the operatives that he supervised. This “crack” in the team selection process was to a degree a self-inflicted handicap and vulnerability that could have proved costly if US counterintelligence services and law enforcement organizations around the US were aware of the situation and positioned themselves to take advantage of it. Knowing that this is how the identification and repatriation teams operate, it could allow them to be better prepared and steal a March on their prey on another occasion when they are in their sights. However, this may have been a lesson learned by Operation Fox Hunt managers and it is unlikely that they would not make the necessary changes to avoid dealing with this issue in the future. Surely, there remains a chance the situation will be the same next time, too! Some Operation Fox Hunt managers may feel on ne change pas une équipe qui gagne!

Chinese Countersurveillance Operations in the US

The fact that the identification and repatriation team received an alert that the FBI was fully aware of the effort to coerce Xu by using his father was reported almost as a trifle in the federal court document. Yet, in reality, it was small much in the way that the small movement of a needle on a seismograph can report a giant earthquake. Upon first reading about this particular moment of identification and repatriation operation, there grew an interest in greatcharlie in how Chinese operators engaged in all sorts of activities in the US are seemingly forewarned whenever law enforcement and counterintelligence services draw near them. Of course, one of the counterintelligence organizations might just be a leaky ship. There could be rotten apples in their midst. However, it certainly would not be too fanciful to conceive that Chinese operatives on government sanctioned missions receive more support from unknown entities nestled in the US than may be recognized officially or publicly.

One might postulate that with so many Chinese intelligence officers–there were reports of as many as 25,000 “in country” back in 2017–and their operatives and informants moving furtively throughout the US, there may very well be specialized counterintelligence elements, covert surveillance teams, positioned in numbers deemed sufficient by the powers that be in the PLA CMC Joint Military Staff Intelligence Bureau and MSS counterintelligence that provide overwatch for espionage operations. The PLA teams, rather than come from intelligence units, might instead be formed from PLA Army special operations units primed in the reconnaissance and surveillance operations and to engage in a special reconnaissance mission. Teams from MSS would likely be secounded from the provincial departments and municipal bureaus, Chinese intelligence elements operating in the US would surely appreciate a resource that would allow their officers, operatives, and informants to repeatedly evade intercept. Similar covert surveillance teams may be operating in other countries. It is just a theory.

One might postulate that with so many Chinese intelligence officers–there were reports of as many as 25,000 “in country” a few short years ago–and their operatives and informants moving furtively throughout the US, there may very well be specialized counterintelligence elements, covert surveillance teams, positioned in numbers deemed sufficient by the powers that be in the PLA CMC Joint Military Staff Intelligence Bureau and MSS counterintelligence secounded from the provincial departments and municipal bureaus, that provide overwatch for espionage operations. If providing assistance to them would actually be feasible, it would be counterintuitive not allow identification and repatriation teams to enjoy the overwatch of any theorized covert countersurveillance teams of MSS and PLA operating in close proximity to them. 

If providing assistance to them would actually be feasible, it would be counterintuitive not allow covert countersurveillance teams of MSS and PLA to provide overwatch for other operations ostensibly underway in close proximity to them, perhaps of a variety and number far in excess of espionage. Such would be to the great benefit of the Operation Fox Hunt identification and repatriation teams.

As part of their mission, the theorized covert surveillance teams would very likely shadow any law enforcement or US counterintelligence organizations for the purpose of countersurveillance and early warning. No law enforcement or US counterintelligence organizations would be allowed to surprisingly appear at the site of a meeting between team members and a target ol contracted operative. No law enforcement or US counterintelligence organizations would be allowed to place surveillance teams on any of Chinese operatives without the knowledge of the covert surveillance teams. Any alerts about threatening moves by law enforcement or US counterintelligence organizations would unlikely be relayed through channels from the intelligence element’s headquarters down to those managing the teams as the circumstances would invariably be exigent, and time would be of essence. Communication between intelligence elements and the team would ostensively be confined at the level of the intelligence field managers and the lead investigator of the team. Imaginably, MSS and PLA managers would establish some incognito for their contacts as a security measure in case some catastrophe should befall the identification and repatriation team and through interrogation, the team leader reveals anything about their MSS or PLA counterpart that could identity them.

MSS and PLA intelligence network managers would hardly want some incident with the identification and repatriation team to draw unwanted attention to their province. It would be best to help the team get in and get out rapidly and safely. Additionally, having the opportunity to study and make observations of their opposition’s practices in surveilling suspected foreign operatives or the steps they go through and how they perform and behave while in investigation mode imaginably would be invaluable for MSS or PLA intelligence officers operating in the US. On top of everything, as the identification and repatriation operations are apparently the brainchild of the Communist Party of China, it would be essential for them to accomplish their task. Those able to make that a reality would be expected to do their utmost to assist with all possible precautions taken into consideration. All involved would likely be called to account if it failed. A MSS or PLA field manager who has the identification and repatriation teams operating in their area of operation would have to be considerably indifferent to the wishes of the Communist Party of China to have a clear ability to ensure the success of the team’s effort, and do nothing to assist and actually allow it the flounder.

Much as the MPS organized the identification and repatriation teams, it may very well be that any prospective covert surveillance teams organized for purpose suggested, might be well trained officers of MPS–also an intelligence service with what might be deemed a counterintelligence proclivity, doing what they do best for the Communist Party of China, keeping an iron grip on all Chinese citizens. Covert communications between team lead investigators and the covert countersurveillance teams theorized here would likely be uniquely designed by MPS in China for the operation. If the theorized covert surveillance team discussed in this essay were a creature of MPS, having it take their eyes off what members of the identification and repatriation teams were doing surely would not thrill the powers that be at MPS Headquarters.

Omne ignotum pro magnifico est. (We have great notions of everything unknown.) Of course, it is possible that nothing remotely resembling what has been suggested here exists at all. On the other hand, there may actually be surveillance teams operating around the US in a manner of far greater conception than what has been hinted.

Gnawing Bit More on the Theorized Covert Surveillance Teams 

Conceivably, when not engaged in their patient vigil over Chinese operatives of all kinds, the hypothetical covert surveillance teams maintain a low key, traveled existence wherever they are. What may be viewed as most remarkable about the covert surveillance team members if discovered would be the fact they are by appearance so unremarkable. Anything linked to their activities would hardly be found wherever they might reside or frequent. All in all, they would surely keep themselves to themselves. Yet, perhaps the most troubling aspect of the theorized covert surveillance team is that they would likely be gaining experience and honing their skills with everyday that passes during which they have perhaps been out in the field. As their skills increase, their capabilities and willingness to take on greater challenges would also likely increase. Further, for those trying to cope with Chinese operatives of all kinds in the US, the imagined increase in experience and capabilities among the theorized covert surveillance teams would surely be attended by a marked increase in the degree of difficulty in capturing them. Imaginably some financial support would be provided for the additional expenditures on logistical needs for the supportive surveillance work. As the activity would be in direct support of a Communist Party of China directed operation, a large request would unlikely be made to cover personal service expenses. The honor and privilege of serving the Communist Party of China would expectantly be viewed in Beijing as sufficient reward.

Oddly enough, the identification and repatriation team still did not just pull the shutters down and run off just because FBI agents were onto them. With the specialists safe, the identification and repatriation team members rather audaciously continued to watch Xu’s in-laws home and Xu’s home. Tu joined Hu at the command post back in Wuhan where she continued to direct the identification and repatriation operation while in China. On April 9, 2017, Zhu messaged Tu Lan, inquiring: “Prosecutor Tu [Tu Lan] whose order should I take for now while I am here?” Tu replied: “You communicate with me and Hu [Hu Ji]. I will go to the Commission for Discipline Inspection this afternoon. I will contact you afterwards.” The “Commission for Discipline Inspection,” which was a Chinese government agency responsible for investigating members of the Communist Party for corruption. Tu also wrote to Zhu: “[Y]ou need to confirm that Mike [McMahon] can execute according to our requirement.” According to the federal court document,, on April 9, 2017, Tu  sent an electronic message to the Zhu asking: “Did you tell Hu [Hu Ji] that I still want to confirm [John Doe #1’s ] [Xu’s] father’s status?” Zhu responded, “It seemed that he has reported to the [Chinese Official #1] already,” and added that “I arranged to have me [McMahon] stay there Monday morning.” Zhu told Tu Lan that ” the money I have on hand can only have me [McMahon] to stay there for two days.” On April 11, 2017, McMahon and Zhu discussed–in English–additional steps to intimidate Xu into returning to China. The federal court document specifically quotes McMahon as proposing they “harass” Xu, including by “[p]ark[ing] outside his home and let him know we are there.” Zhu replied that they “can’t harass [John Doe #1] [Xu] like that lol.” The efforts to persuade Xu to return to China were unsuccessful. The emotional bomb fizzled.. On April 12, 2017,  Zhu and Xu’s father departed from Newark Liberty International Airport on a flight to Shanghai.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Sidelights on Nicholas Eftimiades, A Series on Chinese Espionage, Vol. I: Operations and Tactics (Vitruvian Press, 2020)

China is currently engaged in a very aggressive, massive espionage, cyber, and covert action assault on the US with the goal of catching up with it technologically, militarily, and economically as quickly as possible. China hopes to eventually become the world’s dominant power. Atrocious thefts are now occurring right before everyone’s eyes. Penetration by Chinese officers, operatives, and informants appears to be successfully carried out almost anywhere China desires in the US or worldwide. Victories on the intelligence front have likely most satisfied People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping, as under his leadership, China’s intelligence capabilities have been greatly enhanced and have evolved. In his monograph, A Series on Chinese Espionage, Vol. I: Operations and Tactics (Vitruvian Press, 2020), Nicholas Eftimiades shares information and data that will shock its readers. They will discover that China’s spy activity is of far greater conception than they might have ever imagined.

Since the era of the People’s Republic of China’s Second Chairman Deng Xiaoping, from 1976 to 1994, the Communist Party of China’s leadership has lived in optimistic expectation of better fortune for the Chinese people in terms of economics and their standard of living. Party leaders covet the position the US holds as the dominant power in the world. In accordance with that thinking, long range plans were formulated. Such really should have been the expected response of Chinese national leaders who were first and foremost dedicated to a very aggressive revolutionary movement. It was determined in Beijing that espionage offered a relatively cheap, quick, and easy method to obtain information that could help Chinese companies remain competitive. At that time, many of China’s largest companies were state owned, or had close linkages to the government. From all accounts, China thereby embarked on what has become a very aggressive and massive espionage, cyber, and covert action assault on the US with the ever-fixed goal of catching up with it technologically, militarily, and economically as quickly as possible.

Atrocious thefts are now occurring right before everyone’s eyes. Penetration by Chinese officers, operatives, and informants appears to be successfully carried out almost anywhere China desires in the US or worldwide. Chinese intelligence officers have experienced innumerable satisfactions in the spy war. According to a former chief of Counterintelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Olson, in his superb book, To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Georgetown University Press, 2019), China is presently in a class by itself in terms of its espionage, covert action, and cyber capabilities. (The January 31, 2021 greatcharlie post is a review of Olson’s To Catch a Spy.) The struggle on the intelligence front impacts the whole climate of the relations with China. Even when China is engaged in bilateral or multilateral talks, whether on trade, security, or the environment, Chinese intelligence services never cease engaging in robust espionage. Imaginably, victories on the intelligence front provide a most satisfying opportunity for People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping, to cock-a-doodle, about how, under his leadership, China’s intelligence capabilities have evolved to the point at which the intelligence services can carry the battle to the home ground of the US itself and win. Senior executives and managers in US counterintelligence services doubtlessly stand exasperated over regular disappointments.

In A Series on Chinese Espionage, Vol. I: Operations and Tactics (Vitruvian Press, 2020), Nicholas Eftimiades shares information and data that, although well-known within the US Intelligence Community and within other intelligence services worldwide, will shock nonpracticioners among his monograph’s readers. They will discover that China’s spy activity is of far greater conception than they might have ever imagined. As might be expected, Chinese intelligence services target a broad range of US national security actors, including military forces, defense industrial companies, national security decision makers, and critical infrastructure entities. The revelation will be that Chinese espionage activity is not the exclusive purview of China’s civilian and military intelligence services. In addition to government organizations, commercial entities, academic institutions, and private individuals, entrepreneurs are heavily engaged in espionage against preferred targets in highly industrialized countries. Chinese firms have proved themselves to be quite capable at performing such work. Surely, if the average US citizen fully understood the audacity and effectiveness of this campaign, they would be outraged and would demand action. 

Eftimiades examination is based on his study on the nature of Chinese espionage worldwide and in-depth understanding developed through decades of experience in the intelligence field. He reviews intelligence processes, setting objectives and tasking, organizations that engage in espionage, looks at their efforts through case studies and analysis of them. He also discusses how China’s espionage activities worldwide has had an impact on US national security, international security, the international political economy, and geopolitics. Eftimiades delves into the practical matters that concern intelligence officers of government organizations and employees of commercial entities and academic institutions as they engage in espionage, and how the Chinese government manages the hybrid government and “independent” civilian intelligence system it has created. While Series on Chinese Espionage, Vol. I: Operations and Tactics is the actual title of Eftimiades’ monograph, the monograph is listed on Amazon.com as Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics (Vitruvian Press, 2020). The monograph is heretofore referenced in this essay by the latter title. (It might be best for those who may wish to possess a copy to research the text under the latter title. The publication date is September 3, 2020).

A sidelight, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, is a piece of information usually given by accident or in connection with another subject, that helps one to understand somebody or something. The goal of sidelights offered in this essay is to present Eftimiades’ monograph in a way that will give our readers a good sense of both what is in it and sort of ideas and insights they might draw from it. In effect, it is a review. For those who may excavate through the monograph and thoroughly and consider points of exposition concerning specific malign activities conducted by China, his work will prove to be substantially edifying. What is most impressive to greatcharlie about the monograph is the manner in which it stimulates thought on a grave issue concerning China. As stated in prior posts, greatcharlie prefers to review texts that can stir a fire inside a reader, and transmit the author’s passion for a subject. Those writings are the most memorable and most enjoyable to sit with. Praeterea qui alium sequitur nihil invenit, immo nec quaerit. (Besides, he who follows another not only discovers nothing but is not even investigating.)

The role of reviewer, an unsolicited intermediary between a text’s prospective reader and the author, is a responsibility that greatcharlie takes seriously. Rarely if ever, will greatcharlie read a work then take the time to write a negative review, presenting its judgments on the shortcomings and failures of an author’s toil. It is greatcharlie’s preference to provide reviews, sidelights here, that readers of the blog can enjoy and from which they may edify themselves. Nothing greatcharlie states in this essay is intended to give Eftimiades some stick–perish the thought. In greatcharlie’s view, he is brilliant, and works such as his monograph educate nonpracticioners as greatcharlie. They are very much appreciated. This review is not an inquiry into facts presented. All that is being presented here are insights greatcharlie birthed while parsing out the text. Although important details of Eftimiades monograph are discussed here, not everything is revealed. This is greatcharlie’s hard and fast rule on reviews, whether books, or as in this case a monograph. Plenty is left for readers to discover and draw their own insights upon.

Nicholas Eftimiades, the author (above), among other high level positions in the US government, was formerly the Director of Counterintelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is highly regarded for his expertise on China and national security space issues. Currently, Eftimiades is a professor at Pennsylvania State University, working in the Homeland Security Program. He is a member of the graduate faculty, teaching homeland security, intelligence, and national security policy. He conducts research on China’s economic espionage, intelligence, and emerging threats. Eftimiades holds an MS Strategic Intelligence, National Defense Intelligence College; and a BA East Asian Studies, George Washington University.

The Author

Eftimiades, among other high level positions in the US government, was formerly the director of Counterintelligence at CIA. He is highly regarded for his expertise on China and national security space issues. For over two decades, senior government officials and Members of the US Congress relied on Eftimiades to provide in-depth expertise and cogent analysis on China and other national security issues. As a former senior intelligence executive, he has considerable experience in managing intelligence programs, strategic security issues in Asia, and emerging threats/disruptive technologies. The Intelligence Community awarded Eftimiades with its highest honors to include the National Intelligence Council Achievement Award and DIA Director’s Intelligence Award. As of this writing, Eftimiades holds appointments on the National Intelligence Council as an Intelligence Community Associate, Homeland Security Advisory Council, Economic Security Subcommittee, and the Defense Science Board. Although he has left the CIA, one does not get the impression that Eftimiades has left the fight yet! Eftimiades has testified before several US Congressional and Presidential Commissions concerning National Security issues, future technology development, and the future of the US space program. 

Among several high level positions, Eftimiades was formerly the director of Counterintelligence at CIA. He is highly regarded for his expertise on China and national security space issues. For over two decades, senior government officials and Members of the US Congress relied on Eftimiades to provide in-depth expertise and cogent analysis on China and other national security issues. As a former senior intelligence executive, he has considerable experience in managing intelligence programs, strategic security issues in Asia, and emerging threats/disruptive technologies. Currently, Eftimiades is a professor at Pennsylvania State University, working in the Homeland Security Program. He holds an MS Strategic Intelligence, National Defense Intelligence College; and a BA East Asian Studies, George Washington University. He has lived and studied in Asia. He once served as a senior research fellow at King’s College, War Studies Department in London. During that period, Eftimiades authored books, reports, and a number of articles on China’s intelligence methodology, national security, technology, and space issues. Currently, Eftimiades is a professor at Pennsylvania State University, Homeland Security Program. He is a member of the graduate faculty, teaching homeland security, intelligence, and national security policy. He conducts research on China’s economic espionage, intelligence, and emerging threats. 

As Eftimiades possesses such formidable credentials, it seems needless to say that readers should approach all matters of fact presented by Eftimiades as true to the best of his knowledge and belief. Eftimiades spoke truth to power within halls of the US national security bureaucracies and in the White House. He presents the monograph’s discussion essentially in that same mode, discussing only what he knows to be the truth on Chinese Intelligence Operations. His proceeding publication, Chinese Intelligence Operations is regarded as the seminal work in the field. In the period surrounding its publication in 1994, greatcharlie’s editor did not have the pleasure to read Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 1994) and in fact was not even aware of its existence. Having read through it in preparation for this review, the book impressed as being a damnably good breakdown of the organization departments, the missions, guiding concepts and intent of its leaders, and the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of each service of the “Chinese Intelligence Community” during what could now be called a bygone era. 

To the extent that it has relevance other than by mere subject matter with regard to Eftimiades Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics. The preceding enables one, through comparisons of assessments of the work performed in varied operational and functional areas, to observe how far Chinese intelligence services have evolved, among many things, as organizations, within the country’s foreign and national security policy bureaucracy, and as vital tools in the hands of the leadership of the Communist Party of China. Interestingly, by examining both Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics and Chinese Intelligence Operations, one is also provided the opportunity to examine an evolution in the experience, education, thinking and type of insights developed on Chinese intelligence services.. Perhaps readers will discover, much as greatcharlie did, that Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics takes the reader to a higher level of understanding of the topics and raises the level of discourse to a seasoned intelligence analyst on China. For China watchers in particular, the monograph provides a loom from which new understandings and fresh insights can be crafted. Of course, for those who have not read or do not plan to read Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations, the opportunity still exists to prosper intellectually by plotting Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics as the start point on the figurative charts of their respective learning curves on Chinese Intelligence.

Make no mistake, Eftimiades worked at the sharp end of intelligence work and knows the true value of each bit, even trifles, emphasizing in the text what is important to know in order to get the counterintelligence job done. Indeed, through his monograph, readers get a small taste of the discourse between intelligence officers within the bureaucracies in which Eftimiades served, and the flavor of its tone. One might as far as to say that by reading Eftimiades monograph, one gets a sense of the thinking within key US national security bureaucracies on Chinese intelligence activities in the US in the current climate.

Previous Reviews

Among reviews of Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics published on Amazon.com are a few from former and current US senior executives and intelligence officers of the US Intelligence Community. Their glowing expressions of satisfaction and appreciation,reviews attest to the value, positive impact the monograph had on their thinking and their work. One such review was by Maryann Fialdini, Former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). She explained: “Mr Eftimiades has broken new ground on his closely researched series on Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics. His work on Chinese espionage spans 30 years in the intelligence community. In the 90’s he sounded the alarm on China’s rising espionage activities directed against US corporate and government entities. His current series on Chinese Espionage identifies for the reader China’s massive “whole of Society” approach to espionage activity and offers the exceedingly rare combination of insight and judgement from a professional who has a wealth of firsthand experience. Eftimiades work fills an important gap in US literature as it relates to Chinese intelligence. I highly recommend this book!” Another fine review was from David Tsai, formerly of the Library of Congress. He stated: “Most up-to-date comprehensive and detailed treatment of the subject based on the author’s objective analysis of close to 600 cases! An intelligence practitioner as well as academic scholar Mr. Eftimiades has given his readers a clear picture of Chinese espionage doctrine and tradecraft, based on a combination of his experience and scholarship. This excellent and insightful book is highly recommended for both professionals and novices who are interested in this subject.” A review from Nicholas Kikis, former Director of the DIA’s Defense Clandestine Service and Chief of East Asia Division, that appears on the back of the monograph, proffers: “A must-read for professionals in Counter intelligence, security and government affairs. The author has crafted the most detailed account ever published on China’s espionage operations and tactics . . . The USA is loosing its secrets and technology to China’s “whole of society” approach . . . Our Nation’s need for good counterintelligence has never been greater . . . Mr. Eftimiades is the real deal, a veteran of the Intelligence Community who describes the challenges and provides recommendations on how to do a better job in protecting America.”

Interestingly, Eftimiades does not mention anything about having to submit his monograph to the Publications Review Board of his former employer, CIA, for review. For security reasons, it is a requirement for officials from the US Intelligence Community with backgrounds as his. One might expect his former employer’s solemn warning of secrecy was increased with regard to the knowledge he retained as any of that information could possibly provide some important bit, some nuance on what the US knows about China’s espionage operations and tactics in the US. Surely, the Publications Review Board stopped anything from going into the text if in its view it even approximated classified information. Hypotheses and arguments are a bit more challenging to judge for security reasons. Certain facts, even if left out hypotheses and arguments, can be assessed as being confirmed by some clever sorts in an adversaries camp seeing that those facts might alone be the sole solid basis upon which a particular inference might logically be made.

Sidelights

Eftimiades’ monograph is divided into 12 sections. They are entitled as follows: Section1: “Preface”; Section 2: “Key Findings”; Section 3: “Introduction”; Section 4: “Analytical Methodology”; Section 5: “China’s Legal Framework for Espionage”; Section 6: “PRC Organizations Conducting Espionage”; Section 7: “Intelligence Collection Objectives”; Section 8: “Analysis of Espionage Cases”; Section 9: “Analysis of Espionage Tradecraft”; Section 10: “Impact”; Section 11: “Summary”; and, Section12: “Link to video Analysis of China’s Economic Espionage Tactics.” Since the monograph is only 56 pages in total, it seemed apropos for this review to condense the discussion of 8 of its 12 sections, highlighting from each what might be its most intriguing elements/aspects for our readers. For 9 of the monographs sections, to include one not précised, greatcharlie provides sidelights.

Section 1: “Preface”

From the outset, Eftimiades makes it clear that the focus of his monograph, although there is some emphasis on espionage activities against the US, is on China’s worldwide human intelligence operations. The monograph does not include a discussion of China’s intelligence analysis capabilities, technology collection, not domestic operations against perceived internal threats. He indicates that cyber espionage is only addressed in select cases which were enabled by humans providing insider access. Eftimiades notes that he brings his own experiences and perceptions into his interpretations of those cases.

Eftimiades also gives notice to readers that the monograph only reflects known Chinese intelligence operations. Even with a review of hundreds of espionage cases, he recognizes that certain matters are left open such as the number of individuals engaged in espionage activities worldwide for China, and whether the cases he analyzed represent as much as 90 percent of the total or as little as 10 percent. (The word “worldwide” qualified the former statement of the two. Perchance the number operating in the US is known!) Eftimiades insists that even the Chinese government does not know the precise number of individuals spying on its behalf. He suggests that uncertainty about that total would be due to China’s decentralized “whole of society” approach to intelligence collection. Still, he felt enabled due to the volume of cases and careful–experienced, astute–analysis of operational details, he could draw certain conclusions about China’s espionage operations and tactics.

Eftimiades’ statement about Chinese intelligence operations and tactics practiced in the US is a very bold one to make starting off from scratch in his “Preface”. Writing in that manner, Eftimiades was sure to create more questions than anything else. Reading what was stated by a number of reviewers of the monograph from outside the US national security bureaucracies, this point could perhaps be deemed as the metaphorical low-hanging fruit for criticism. Given the strength of the mind of a man as Eftimiades, it could be the case that he has dangled this statement on the number of Chinese officers and operatives around the world, aware that it would draw a strong reaction among close readers and light the fire that would ignite a lively discourse within and among them. He is a former director of CIA Counterintelligence, which makes him a member of a rather unique caste of singular individuals who would hardly do anything without considerable forethought. To go a bit further, given Eftimiades background one might think perhaps there is some counterintelligence benefit in refusing to confirm publicly, not allowing an adversary to discover what the accepted size and strength of its espionage operations are. Imaginably that information might aid them in planning around US thinking, potentially finding some advantage if the estimated figures are too high, too low, or spot on. 

The likely first impression of readers resulting from Eftimiades’ “declaration of nescience” on the numbers of would be Eftimiades could not have managed to effectively consider the ends, was, and means of Chinese organizations engaged in espionage if an important leg of the three leg “strategy stool”, means, which includes the resources, size and strength of those organizations, was unknown to him. Unaware of that it was harder to see how he could delve into a more elaborate discussion of their operations and tactics. Curiosity over how Eftimiades managed everything would surely compel the many readers to push forward into the text. However, it would very likely be regularly done with some reservation. To the extent that Eftimiades does not have the actual figure of Chinese intelligence officers and operatives or numbers of Chinese espionage operatives from commercial entities, academia, as well as individuals engaged in such activity at his fingertips, anything he discusses that offers some picture of the totality Chinese espionage in the US, to be both above board and fair, are only proffered in the abstract.   

Readers looking at the matter on their own might wonder what is the average caseload for a Chinese intelligence officer from either the civilian or military service If it is more than one, let one surmise three or four, then one might begin to believe the espionage crisis is much greater in magnitude. One might consider that given likely number of Chinese intelligence officers and operatives in the field, the true number of Chinese personnel involved increases exponentially when the number likely needed to provide logistical support for such a grand number of officers and operatives in the field and their operations which appear to vary in size and scope, are considered. One might not only infer from the number and size of known operations, their intensity and tempo, and apparent effective level of support for each the totality of Chinese intelligence officers and operatives in the field, but a close approximation of their number might be reached by considering just how much has been stolen, usually detected well after the fact. Later, in the “Summary” section, Eftimiades notes that although he may not be certain of the true number of Chinese intelligence officers that are on the ground in the US but himself surmised it must be in the thousands.

There have been claims that the number of Chinese intelligence officers in the US was at least 25,000, meaning the number of their operatives in the field. The issue of numbers of Chinese spies in the US is not limited to debate within the US Intelligence Community. It has been widely reported by the mainstream newsmedia in the US that China’s intelligence services have established espionage networks throughout the country. Guo Wengui is a billionaire businessman who claimed to have close ties to China’s civilian and military intelligence services and broke with the regime. Guo revealed in his first interview in the US that those espionage networks reportedly include up to 25,000 Chinese intelligence officers and more than 15,000 recruited operatives. Guo explained that he learned about Chinese spy activities from Ma Jian, a former vice minister of the civilian intelligence service and Ji Shengde, a former military intelligence chief. As that figure, 25,000, was put forward nearly 5 years ago, the number of Chinese intelligence officers who have essentially strolled into the US and are now operating clandestinely and successfully on the ground now may be much higher. Surely, there is an officially estimated number of Chinese intelligence officers and operatives in the US Intelligence Community. Whether it will ever be made public remains to be seen, but surely, even without that figure, there is some general acceptance that what is coming toward the US is à la débandade.

People’s Republic of China Minister of State Security, Chen Wenqing (above). Chen studied Law and Political Science at Southwest University in Chongqing, and joined the Ministry of Public Security in 1984, where he worked for a decade. In 1994, Chen was assigned to the Ministry of State Security (MSS), becoming Deputy Director at the Sichuan provincial state security department. In 1998 Chen took over leadership of the State Security Department in Sichuan. He held that position until 2002, when he was appointed Chief Prosecutor at the Sichuan Provincial People’s Procuratorate. In 2006, Chen transferred to Fujian, serving as Deputy Party Secretary and concurrently head of the provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) until 2012. Following the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party China, Chen was brought to Beijing to serve as a Deputy Secretaries of the CCDI. He was appointed Party Secretary of the MSS in October 2016 and Minister in November 2016.

Section 2: “Key Findings”

In the section, “Key Findings”, Eftimiades provides a list of judgments supported by the information and data in his monograph. For readers, especially students, they may provide some guidance on an academic inquiry concerning Chinese intelligence. Right out of the gate, he notes that his “Key Findings” section is the product of his earlier analysis of 595 documented cases of China’s worldwide collection efforts. Thereby, they stand here independent of, but a primary feature of what is discussed in the monograph. In the monograph’s “Preface”, Eftimiades plainly states that “the focus of this work is on [China’s] worldwide human intelligence (HUMINT) operations.” Yet, in his key findings, he seems to indicate that the true focus of the monograph’s discussion, rather than being the aggregate espionage efforts of government organizations and commercial entities, academic institutions, and independent individuals in the US, is Chinese government civilian and military operations. Imaginably for some, Eftimiades may appear to shortshrift readers on any findings developed through the study of the totality of China’s espionage in the US. Perhaps in Eftimiades’ defense, his omission may very well have been more of an issue of editing and oversight.

To the extent that his key findings are limited to government espionage activities, some might readily assert that rather than opening up new territory, his findings were nearly all well-trodden ground. Indeed, at first blush, one might view what Eftimiades presents as his findings as a somewhat prosaic enumeration of highlights from his examination of the 595 cases. However, greatcharlie assures that they are much more as there are some striking elements among them. Eftimiades 10 key findings were a follows: 1) Chinese espionage activity  has greatly expanded in the past 20 years; 2) Chinese entities conducting espionage include government agencies, the People’s Liberation Army, State Owned Enterprises, private companies, individuals, and several universities; 3) Approximately half of China’s worldwide intelligence collection efforts target military and space technologies; 4) Over 90 percent of China’s espionage activities are performed by ethnic Chinese and males perform more than 80 percent of it; 5) The Ministry of State Security, China’s main civilian intelligence service, exploits social media to target foreigners with access to sensitive information. Those recruitment efforts vary in quality considerably; 6) The Ministry of State Security make use of China’s visa and border control system to identify potential recruitment and manage clandestine assets; 7) Ministry of State Security espionage tradecraft has improved over the last four years, due in part to pressure against it from US counterintelligence services; 8) Nearly half of China’s traditional espionage efforts–pursuing political and military secrets–and covert action campaigns are targeted against Taiwan; 9) China’s foreign science and technology collection efforts correlate closely to the priority technologies identified in government strategic planning documents; and, 10) China’s “whole society approach” to espionage has a harmful effect on the US economy, diplomatic influence, and military capabilities. Furthermore, China’s actions threaten European national and economic security through espionage and coercion against government entities and business decision making.

What sparked greatcharlie’s interest considerably was Eftimiades finding concerning non-ethnic-Chinese recruitment, that more ethnic Chinese recruits are used than nonethnic ones by Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US. Multum in parvo. (Much in little. (Small but significant.))

He makes an impressive statement, but regrettably, he does delve deeper into this issue at any point later in the monograph allowing readers to understand how he got there.  His “Analysis of Espionage Tradecraft” section would have been taken to even greater heights. Useful at some point of the monograph’s discussion also would have been some background on the evolution of Chinese intelligence practices to recruit nonethnic Chinese as well as ethnic Chinese as operatives. With regard to greatcharlie’s aforementioned presumption concerning Eftimiades somewhat likely effort to stoke debate on the monograph, perchance once again he is providing more grist for the mill on this score. Perhaps a set plan regarding the monographs page length did not allow him to expound on the matter.

Perhaps it would be enough for some to say in this case that Chinese intelligence services may have recognized they can achieve their respective goals more efficiently and effectively by working mainly with ethnic Chinese recruits. Yet, surely, Chinese espionage in the West has evolved from pursuing ethnic Chinese sources alone. All things considered, such a limited effort by Chinese government organizations and commercial entities would hardly be the case. It stands to reason that the number of nonethnic recruits with which they have been successful is far higher than the few he has enumerated. To an extent, in Eftimiades own examples there is evidence that a number of nonethnic Chinese operatives were targeted and successfully recruited. Chinese intelligence services clearly have the interest and capabilities to bring in such recruits presumably as would Chinese commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US.

As discussed in the July 31, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is this Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign against the US? (Part 1),” it was once generally understood in the West that the standard approach to human intelligence collection by MSS has been to co-opt low-profile Chinese nationals or Chinese-American civilians to engage in the acquisition of mid-level technology and data. Travellers, businessmen, students, and visiting researchers are often approached to undertake intelligence tasks, and the MSS maintains control of them through inducements and personnel connections, and the potential threat of alienation from the homeland. Members of the Chinese diaspora residing in Western countries, especially new émigrés, who possessed the requisite expertise and appropriate positions in a public or private organization and family members remaining in China, would be compelled to perform tasks and to steal information of interest that they came across for the intelligence services. This method of intelligence collection also followed the concept of keeping things simple. It is still being put to use. However, while ostensibly being a satisfactory solution, MSS found itself simply working on the margins targeting ethnic Chinese as a priority. It proved too reserved, too limiting. Not wanting to confine themselves to a small set of targets for recruitment, the logical next step was to attempt the recruitment of operatives and agents from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. According to William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi in Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (Routledge, 2013), cases at the time of the book’s writing suggested that was exactly what Chinese intelligence services did as a whole. Tradecraft was observably broadened to include the recruitment non-ethnic-Chinese assets as well. MSS still uses this method.

Guo Wengui, aforementioned here as the billionaire businessman who broke with the regime and revealed information from highly placed sources in the Chinese intelligence services that China’s espionage networks reportedly include up to 25,000 officers and 15,000 operatives, also spoke on the matter of non-ethnic-Chinese recruitment. Guo said Ma Jian, who recall was the vice minister for the civilian intelligence service, told him that a major shift by the Chinese was expanding the scope of agent recruitment from Asians to other ethnic groups.

One might argue that if Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US were running only a few nonethnic operatives in the field, an idea Eftimiades’ statistics would apparently support, those few nonethnic operatives were doing a colossal amount of work alone to collect the loads of information from institutions where ethnic Chinese may not necessarily have been well represented or significant at all. In the abstract, and not to cast aspersions on any employees anywhere in which the erstwhile spies worked, but it may have been the case that other nonethnic Chinese employees were involved in espionage in those same institutions who went undetected and whose work was completely unknown to those who were caught.

Imaginably from a counterintelligence standpoint, if Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US were running merely two or a few more nonethnic operatives in the field, trying intercept so few well-concealed individuals from a field of dozens of potential spies would conceivably be rather challenging. Finding them all during the past few years would be nothing less than spectacular accomplishment. C’est chercher une aiguille dans une botte de foin.

Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US go after whomever might be best suited to meet their needs. For the accomplished services in the intelligence industry, espionage is a results focused business, not an ethnocentric one. It was noted earlier that Eftimiades insists that no one really knows how many officers and operatives working for China are on the beat in the US, but later in his “Summary” section suggests that they may very well number in the thousands. Aforementioned, too, were claims that the numbers of Chinese intelligence officers in the US was at least 25,000, meaning the number of their operatives in the field would be enormous. If those high numbers are accurate, it would likely mean those officers would be going after greater numbers of recruits. Surely, along with increased ethnic Chinese recruiting, nonethnic Chinese recruiting numbers would see far more than a nominal increase as a result.

Incidentally, Eftimiades mention of the balance between ethnic and nonethnic Chinese recruitment by Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US, determined as a product of his analysis of the 595 cases, somewhat flies in the face of what he boldly asserted earlier in the discussion on the general on the unawareness of numbers of officers and operatives working on the ground there for China. As stated earlier, to the extent that Eftimiades does not have the actual figure of Chinese intelligence officers and operatives or numbers of Chinese espionage operatives from commercial entities, academia, as well as individuals engaged in such activity at his fingertips, anything he discusses that offers some picture of the totality Chinese espionage in the US is in the abstract.   

People’s Republic of China PLA Major General Chen Guangjun (above), Chief of Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau. The 54 year-old Chen currently serves as chief of Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, Intelligence Bureau as well as an Assistant to the Chief of the Joint Staff. Chen joined the Rocket Forces of the PLA in 1984. In the mid-2000s, he earned a Ph.D. from Northwestern Polytechnical University. The PLA’s human intelligence (HUMINT) operations are managed by the aforementioned Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, Intelligence Bureau. Chen achieved some notoriety prior to taking over the Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau. Through 2007 and 2008, Chen was the focus of several newsmedia reports chronicling his role in improving levels of education in his unit.

Section 3: “Introduction”

Eftimiades begins his Introduction by stating that while espionage is often employed to support foreign policy, a country’s clandestine activities rarely become the subject of foreign policy. However, despite how rare it might be, he says that is the case for the People’s Republic of China with its massive “whole of society” approach to conducting espionage. Eftimiades believes its approach is creating a new paradigm on how intelligence activities are conducted, viewed, and addressed by countries. He notes that a key element in the US-China trade war and downward spiral in relations–a matter the received much attention from the US newsmedia at the time he penned his monograph–is Washington’s demands that Beijing cease stealing US intellectual property and trade secrets. Despite China’s denials, Eftimiades stressed that “hundreds of recently prosecuted espionage cases” prove otherwise. China’s espionage activities are changing the global balance of power, impacting the US and foreign economies, and providing challenges to domestic, national security, and foreign policy formulation.

Not to be an apologist, but rather, to be fair-minded, Eftimiades notes that there are otger governments, companies, and individual entrepreneurs that violate US laws in the drive to possess or sell US technology, government and corporate secrets. He states: “Violating a country’s laws is common practice in the murky world of espionage. According to Eftimiades, almost every time an intelligence service conducts espionage in another country, it violates that country’s laws, and that includes US intelligence operating overseas.” However, he insists that the difference is that the US and other countries engage in espionage to determine and counter hostile or potentially hostile adversaries. The purpose of espionage is not to develop their countries’ own industries or transfer foreign wealth which is a main focus of China’s activities.

There is little doubt that the public affairs departments of nearly every bureaucracy under the State Council, and Propaganda Department and Foreign Affairs section of the Communist Party of China would chomp at the bit to enthusiastically and gloatingly state in response that the US space program was developed through the employment of scientists and engineers from Occupied Germany. The resettlement of the professionals and all of their research and development was facilitated by intelligence elements of the US national security bureaucracies. The Chinese would doubtlessly assert that US activities on that matter essentially established the model for acquiring foreign capabilities through national security bureaucracies to support their technological needs and channel down to large industries mostly related to defense and intelligence to support their advancement. Chinese public affairs spokespersons would surely go on to state, likely with the pretension of lamenting, that as a result of depriving Germany of its own citizens best efforts in aerospace technologies, the country was denied trillions in revenue from potentially providing the world the fruit of their expertise. Indeed, Germany could have become the epicenter of aerospace technology development and research in the world. (Mind readers this is a presumed argument of the Communist Party of China, not at all the position of greatcharlie.) Mayhap, the counterpunch would be that Werner Von Braun and the other German scientists and engineers sought to to the US and if they were left to their devices in Occupied Germany, the Soviet Union would have surely grabbed them up to use for Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin’s sinister purposes. Germany as a whole benefited immensely from postwar reconstruction due to the US Marshall Program. German industries were given an excellent restart as a result of their rebuilding and retooling under that program.

Section 4: “Analytical Methodology”

Eftimiades explains that for purposes of this study, all of the legal definitions of criminal acts in the statutes and administrative regulations found in the export violations–International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Export Administration Regulations (EAR), International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), as well as covert action, and research violations, are categorized as espionage. Eftimiades again explains that over a period of 10 years, he compiled and analyzed 595 cases of Chinese espionage that have occurred worldwide. He notes that over 450 of those cases occurred after 2000. He states again that through the analysis of these cases, sufficient evidence provided on espionage by the Chinese government, Beijing’s promotion and support of organizations outside of the government responsible for the same, and the information objectives, determines gaps in their knowledge, and operational “tradecraft” techniques of those organizations.

There is perhaps an argument to be made that once Eftimiades decided upon the definition of espionage mentioned in this section, he shaped his discussion of what Chinese non-government entities, institutions, and individuals would be viewed as engaging in espionage. One could hardly find fault with his decision. After all, his choice was not without precedent as certain bureaucracies of the US government involved in the 595 cases he studied made the same decision based on the law. However, from the lens of the accused Chinese non-government entities, institutions, and individuals, it may be the case that they were stealing trade secrets and intellectual property, but they may not have viewed their actions as espionage, rather just theft and just a part of business. One could imagine individuals of elements involved with such thefts saying with acidulous humor that if those, who possess information that they desired to purloin, really wanted to prevent theft, they would do a far better job at securing that information. Those with such larcenous instincts might go on to insist that those possessing the information would need to look deeper within to find the answer as to why they have so often left themselves wide open to theft. This thought, on the perception of thieving Chinese non-government entities, institutions, and individuals on whether their actions are a matter of espionage or “merely” grand larceny, is developed further in this essay in the “Analysis of Espionage Tradecraft” section.

The monograph’s following four sections on Chinese operations and tactics were meat and drink for greatcharlie and will likely be for like-minded souls. They are: Section 6: “PRC Organizations Conducting Espionage”; Section 7: “Intelligence Collection Objectives”; Section 8: “Analysis of Espionage Cases”; and, Section 9: “Analysis of Espionage Tradecraft”. Only three of the four are fully discussed in this review.

Section 6: “PRC Organizations Conducting Espionage”

The espionage effort by Chinese government organizations and commercial entities, as explained by Eftimiades, has features that are entirely its own. From an analysis of his 595 cases, Eftimiades explains espionage activities correlated to their sponsoring organization (the “customer” receiving the information or technology) showed five distinct clusters of organizations engaging in espionage. The governing Communist Party of China uses government, quasi government, academic, and commercial entities as mechanisms to conduct all forms of espionage abroad. Most interesting of these are China’s “non-traditional collectors”, which include State Owned Enterprises, universities, and private companies. He confirms that the employment of such a broad set of entities for intelligence collection evinces China’s “whole of society” approach to espionage. The list of includes: 1) the Ministry of State Security, the Guojia Anquan Bu, China’s preeminent intelligence agency, responsible for overseas espionage and counterintelligence both at home and abroad; 2) the Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, Intelligence Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), responsible for collecting and analyzing foreign military intelligence, including technology; 3) State Owned Enterprises (SOE), include the 50,000 aerospace and defense companies, subordinate research institutions, and technology transfer organizations owned by the central government; 4) Private Chinese companies or individuals acting unilaterally for commercial benefit only were engaged in espionage in approximately 22 percent of cases Eftimiades analyzed, and in nearly 30 percent of those cases, there was a clearly identifiable Chinese government, SOE, or university as the ultimate customer for illegal exports or trade secrets; and, 5) Other Chinese government elements that collect intelligence (information) and technology include the PLA Political Department Liaison Office (targeted against Taiwan), the United Front Work Department (UFWD), and many universities under the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND). 

Most intriguing to greatcharlie was Eftimiades’ discussion of the PLA Political Department Liaison Office, the UFWD, and SASTIND. Beginning in reverse with SASTIND, Eftimiades explains that the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), which is housed under the State Council, manages military acquisition requirements for the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Department. Clearly put by Eftimiades, as the start point of a virtual wheel of information exchange, SASTIND assigns projects to ministries with military production responsibilities. Those ministries pass the work to the research institutes under their auspices. The associated research institutes send their information and technology gaps back to SASTIND. There are two departments within SASTIND,responsible for developing and tasking technologically related intelligence requirements and for collecting intelligence against those requirements.They are the Comprehensive Planning Department and the International Cooperation Department. The Comprehensive Planning Department tasks collection to the MSS and most likely to the PLA Joint Intelligence Bureau. The International Cooperation Department has its own independent collection capability. Members of this department travel with China’s scientists to collect information against specific requirements.

Eftimiades reports that SASTIND also has direct supervision over seven universities as well as contracts more defense research with 55 additional universities. The seven universities have been dubbed the Seven Sons of National Defense. Some have been identified in US federal court documents as actively conducting espionage, working with the MSS to conduct espionage, or receiving stolen foreign research and technology. Many of these universities have high security research facilities that support classified technology development for the PLA and are on the US Department of Commerce Entities List for their research in support of Chinese defense entities involved in the theft of technologies. That list includes: Beijing Institute of Technology; Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics; Beijing Engineering University; Harbin Engineering University; Harbin Institute of Technology; Northwestern Polytechnical Institution [University]; Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics; and, Nanjing University of Science and Technology. As of the monograph’s writing, over 35 Chinese universities (or professors from those universities) have been identified in US federal court documents as having some role in China’s overseas espionage cases, according to Eftimiades.

Eftimiades explains that the distribution of Chinese espionage cases worldwide illustrates the magnitude of Communist Party of China controlled businesses, research entities and business organizations involved in espionage activities. Providing superb graphs and charts for readers to examine while following along with his discussion, he shows that there is a near equal distribution of espionage activities between the four major organizational clusters (MSS, PLA, SOEs, and Private Companies). Eftimiades explains that the distribution indicates a concerted effort to use all mechanisms of government and the economy to collect foreign information and technology. To date, the Communist Party of China and the Chinese government have not taken steps to impede illegal activities (according to foreign countries laws) of their state corporations, private businesses, universities, and citizens. Eftimiades says China, referring to it once again as a “digital authoritarian state”, is clearly capable of doing so. He suggests that the Communist Party of China sees the appropriation of foreign innovations and technology as part of a policy aimed at developing domestic technology and increasing production.

In addition, his statistical breakdown of the 595 espionage cases illustrates that Chinese private companies have an aggressive posture in conducting espionage, resulting in 136 cases or approximately 23 percent of all activity worldwide. Similarly, SOEs were surreptitiously examining or collecting information or technology in 121 cases or 20 percent of the total. The SOEs are primarily collecting advanced military technology and associated research. Private companies and individuals primarily pursue commercial technologies, intellectual property and military technologies. Espionage activities conducted by the PLA Joint Intelligence Bureau give primacy to defense information, armaments, and military (or dual use) technology. The PLA was involved in 122 instances of espionage or 19 percent of all cases. Eftimiades reports that the MSS was involved in 95 instances of espionage or 16 percent of all cases. Preferred MSS targets included political or defense information, foreign policy, overseas dissidents, military capabilities, too, and foreign intelligence services. The final category of entities conducting espionage on behalf of China were Chinese universities and the UFWD. The universities generally targeted foreign technology to support advanced military weapons systems development and commercial endeavors.

Regarding the PLA Political Department Liaison Office, Eftimiades, in a markedly  unadorned way, explains that it is targeted against Taiwan. However, some confusion may befall those readers who perhaps may think of the Communist Party of China’s International Liaison Department when they come across the title, International Liaison Office. Among the pertinent facts, as part of Xi’s military reforms, in November 2015 the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission was abolished and was replaced with the Political Work Department. In January 2016, the Political Work Department became official. Its primary role as the chief political organ under the Central Military Commission is to integrate the Communist Party of China and its ideology and propaganda into the People’s Liberation Army. In that role, its responsibilities include: preparing political and economic information for the reference of the Political Bureau; conducting ideological and political work on foreign, particularly adversarial armed forces, by promoting China’s policies among their ranks, and disrupting unit cohesion within adversarial forces by withering their morale. It also has the duty to incite descension and rebellions particularly within the Taiwan army and other foreign armed forces. The Political Work Department’s Liaison Department controls a united front organization called the China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) that is active in overseas intelligence gathering and influence operations. Reportedly, the International Liaison Office has dispatched agents to infiltrate Chinese-funded companies and private institutions in Hong Kong. Their mission is also counter-espionage, monitoring their own agents, and preventing their recruitment of Chinese personnel by foreign intelligence services.

The International (Liaison) Department of the Communist Party of China is a very different organization. It stands as one of four key bodies of the Communist Party of China’s bureaucracy at the central level for building and exercising political influence outside the party, and especially beyond China’s borders. The other three include the UFWD, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Propaganda Department. Founded in 1951, International (Liaison) Department is the party’s diplomatic arm, handling relationships with more than 600 political parties and organizations as well as individual, primarily political, elites. The department previously handled the Communist Party of China’s relationships between fraternal Communist parties and cultivated splinter factions of Moscow-dominated Communist parties after the Sino-Soviet split. The activist bent of the International Department disappeared as the department began re-establishing itself from 1970 to 1971 following the tumultuous early years of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, in the 1970s, as Anne-Marie Brady explained in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), the International Liaison Department’s intelligence efforts often surpassed and even outmatched those of regular Chinese intelligence services. It became deeply involved in inciting and assisting international revolution by moving weapons, financial support, and other critical resources to numerous Communist and non-Communist insurgencies and guerrilla movements worldwide. Interestingly, the department originated as a UFWD bureau before being carved out into an independent entity.

You Quan (above), head of the Communust Party of China’s United Front Work Department (UFWD). You Quan was appointed United Front Work Department (UFWD) head on November 7, 2017. You directs the UFWD, assisted by seven deputy directors. The UFWD is divided into offices, bureaus, and subordinate units, that is to say, mass organizations. The nine numbered Bureaus each specialize in either a particular facet of united front work or a geographic location. While the Communist Party of China employs many means through which it seeks foreign intelligence, the UFWD is distinct from other organizations in its overt and benign appearance.

Although he mentions the UFWD, Eftimiades does not provide any discussion of the organization. For readers wholly unfamiliar with it, greatcharlie provides some small treatment here. As discussed in the October 19, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “The Case of a NYPD Officer Allegedly Engaged in Intelligence Activities for China Spotlights the United Front Work Department”, within China, the UFWD plays a vital policy development and coordination role, especially for ethnic and religious minorities. Outside of China, the UFWD has had a hand in developing political and business ties with overseas Chinese, bringing investment and research benefits, as well as helping the Communist Party of China shape foreign views of China. Xi has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the UFWD to China’s rejuvenation. United front work is the central element to understanding what the Communist Party of China is doing and why to shape the world outside of itself. In a June 9, 2020 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, You Quan, the head of the UFWD, is quoted as saying: “The United Front is a political alliance, and united front work is political work. It must maintain the party’s leadership throughout, having the party’s flag as its flag, the party’s direction as its direction, and the party’s will as its will, uniting and gathering members of each part of the United Front around the party.” People’s Republic of China Chairman Mao Zedong described the purpose of this work as mobilizing the party’s friends to strike at the party’s enemies. In a more specific definition from a 1950s CIA paper, united front work was referred to as “a technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-communist masses.” In other words, united front policy addresses the party’s relationship with and guidance of any social group outside the Party.

Perhaps from a publisher’s point of view and with some intimation of what would most interest the monograph’s readers in fields of business and finance, Eftimiades thought it most necessary to place emphasis upon the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) over all of the other PRC organizations engaged in espionage. The information presented on SASTIND, for instance, is assuredly not part of regular discourse on Chinese espionage. Eftimiades, in a rather sedate tone but still a quite edifying stream of consciousness, lays out what that government organization’s well-controlled work against the US and other highly industrialized countries worldwide and its stealthy and insidious nature.

It should be expected, and may actually be tacitly accepted by some intelligence analysts in the US and in the services of other highly industrialized countries, that among Chinese government organizations and commercial entities on the ground in the US engaged in espionage, there are understood defined areas of responsibility and much as the clear boundaries already set, and well-known, between PLA HUMINT targets and activities and those of its civilian counterpart, MSS, similar arrangements have been made to avoid unwittingly conducting redundant operations, accidental collision of officers and operatives in the field, and potential interservice competition and quarrels in pursuit of available sources for US secrets. A similar delineation between the MSS and Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbùthe Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China (MPS), both a law enforcement and an intelligence and counterintelligence service. Harmony among organizations is doubtlessly desired and required in order for them to succeed and to avoid being caught.

Yet, with so many Chinese government organizations and commercial entities on the ground in the US engaged in espionage, theft, overt collection, hiring operatives, surveilling and studying the opposition, as a reality, on more than one instance an effort to collect a particular type of information might lead more than one organization, for example, one governmental and one commercial, to the same target. One might imagine how chaos could reign without some communication. Officers and operators, perhaps not even immediately aware of each others presence, might literally run into each other, occasionally tread on each other’s work, and might even step on each other’s toes now and then creating some disruption. Some general agreement between organizations and entities in the field would need to exist in order to ensure possible fruitful operations would not face “friendly” challenges and obstacles albeit unintentionally, and to ensure they are enabled to adhere to clearly delineated lanes of action for each organization. On the matter of security, one might imagine how much easier it would be to detect and intercept Chinese espionage operators from the different organizations if they all kept showing up at the same institution trying to contact, recruit, smooze, cajole the same people in them, or one institution were simply bombarded by attempts by individuals to inveigle their way into it with a similar focus on its research and development. Obviously Chinese espionage efforts have been far quieter, smoother, and more sophisticated in nature.

Perhaps the best way to what is discussed here is simply to state that there are likely furtive bridges across organizational lines and areas of responsibilities that allow managers on the ground and officers, old hands in the business who have mastered the job, engaged in intricate operations against similar targets to directly communicate, provide assistance, modest resources, and advice all designed to facilitate security and activities and promote success. It would be a form of unofficial, collegial, furtive modus vivendi established with the requirements for operational security firmly in mind and every imaginable precaution taken. In this section, Eftimiades briefly mentions that in at least two cases, there were actually joint MSS and PLA operations in which individuals inside an aerospace company were recruited as operatives to assist in targeting the company for cyber-attacks. The MSS is so segmented with its many state department’s and provincial bureaus, that the most effective aspect of any effort by the two organizations to work jointly must have occurred between managers in the field. Given the success each espionage element, government or otherwise, has found in the US, the Communist Party of China, which would indubitably be aware of such interorganizational contacts, would likely stay mum about it all but monitor it all the same. After all, Communist Party of China intelligence organs operating sub rosa in diplomatic missions and commercial entities or incognito wherever else, would conceivably benefit too from being tied into the clandestine communications among managers in the field imagined here.

Concerning another point that flows from this discussion, rather than lacking actual knowledge or even a good sense of where everyone was relative to each other among Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US and not having an full account of who was on the ground and stand bereft of paths for the most senior network managers of each organization to liaise, potentially in some extraordinary emergency, in the abstract, surely one could conceive that there would be a least some tacit coordination among their senior leaders, perhaps back in China. Such information would at least be in PLA, MSS, and–as often ordinary Chinese citizens will usually be involved–MPS hands. MPS surely has the most complete, up-to-date records–are perhaps often pulled into the mix of overseas espionage activities to some small degree for that reason. That information would also most likely be in the hands of the Communist Party of China via MPS. In addition to performing standard domestic functions as a law enforcement and intelligence and counterintelligence service, MPS is very much tied to the Communist Party of China to the extent that it helps the Party maintain its tight grip on the population.

For the edification of greatcharlie’s readers who may be not so familiar PLA intelligence, as explained in the  January 31, 2021 greatcharlie post entitled Book Review: James M. Olson, To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Georgetown University Press, 2019)”, the PLA’s human intelligence (HUMINT) operations are managed by the aforementioned Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department, Intelligence Bureau. The previous breakdown of the PLA into intelligence departments has been eliminated. Oversight of the PLA’s technical intelligence capabilities (including cyber, signals, and imagery intelligence) resides with the new Strategic Support Force under the Central Military Commission. Thereby, the Second Department of the People’s Liberation Army (2PLA), responsible for human intelligence, the Third Department of the People’s Liberation Army (3PLA), something similar to the National Security Agency (NSA), responsible for cyber operations, and a Signals Intelligence, or a Fourth Department of the People’s Liberation Army (4PLA), responsible for electronic warfare are now aggregated into the Strategic Support Force. As with its sister civilian service, the MSS, and intelligence services worldwide, the PLA makes regular use of diplomatic, commercial, journalistic, and student covers for their operations in the US. It aggressively uses Chinese travelers to the US, especially business representatives, academics, scientists, students, and tourists, to supplement their intelligence collection.

Eftimiades explains that the State Administration for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND), which is housed under the State Council, manages military acquisition requirements for the Central Military Commission’s Equipment Department. Eftimiades reports that SASTIND has direct supervision over seven universities as well as contracts more defense research with 55 additional universities. The seven universities have been dubbed the Seven Sons of National Defense. On that list is Northwestern Polytechnical University of Xian, China, It is ranked number 1 in the discipline Aeronautical and Astronautical Science and Technology, known for producing some of the best brains in China’s defense industry.

Section 7: “Intelligence Collection Objectives”

As promised, greatcharlie has condensed the sections of Eftimiades monograph, providing important details, but it has not revealed everything. Yet, with such a relatively short text, there would naturally arise occasions when little option would appear available than present wholly what is provided in a particularly diminutive section, in order to provide the reader with a full understanding of the author’s thinking. That is the case with the “Intelligence Collection Objectives” section of the monograph. Under what has been whimsically dubbed as “spookspeak” by members of the intelligence industry some time ago, Collection Objectives, also known as Information Objectives or Requirements, identify the specific information or technology that is tasked to intelligence services for collection. Eftimiades stated that requirements can number in the tens-of-thousands, and explains that one can infer from requirements a country’s knowledge and technology gaps for they are a reflection of them. He provides as an example a country that has been continually pursuing information on specific components of turbine engines. The implications and indications for taking that course, says Eftimiades, are that the country most likely lacks the required information or technology on turbine engines for its planned purposes and espionage presents the only immediate way of acquiring it. Non solum eventus hoc docet, iste est magister stultorum, sed etiam ratio. (Not only does the outcome teach (us) this, that is the teacher of fools, but (so) too does reason.)

Regarding China, Eftimiades explains that its strategic collection objectives can be identified through a number of national level strategic planning documents. Listed earlier in the “Key Findings” section in the monograph, they are: Made in China 2025; Space Science and Technology in China; and, A Road Map to 2050, the National Key Technologies R&D Program, and the 13th Five Year Plan. Those national level strategic planning documents can be subdivided into specific technology development programs, are the following: the National Basic Research Program (973 Program); the National High-Tech Research and Development Program (863 Program); the National Key Technologies R&D Program; and, The National S&T Major Projects. Eftimiades offers a subset of those National S&T Major Projects which includes: Advanced Digital Control Machines and Fundamental Manufacturing Equipment; Breeding of New Variety of Transgenic Biology; Core Electronic Devices, High-end General Chips and Fundamental Software; Key New Drug Innovation; Large Scale Development of Oil and Gas Fields and Coal-bed Gas; Megascale Integrated Circuit Manufacturing Technologies; Next Generation of Broad Wireless Mobile Networks; Wastewater Control and  S&T Achievement Industrialization; National New Products Program; and, the National Soft Sciences Research Program. 

Eftimiades says that as one further breaks down the strategic technology objectives, a strong correlation to China’s espionage activity emerges. The Director of National Intelligence report, Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace (2018) identified industries and private technologies that are frequent targets of foreign espionage. Eftimiades’ informs that an even closer correlation between China’s espionage efforts and national requirements can be made when comparing the 595 cases with the 19 key Technologies identified in the Communust Party of China strategic industrial planning documents Made in China 2025. These technology requirements were the primary objectives in the 435 cases. The fact that such a high proportion of espionage activities are correlated in Made in China 2025 Key technology list indicates the Communist Party of China’s role in guiding China’s global espionage effort.

Laying out points on this matter from his case analysis for all readers to understand, avec brio, Eftimiades states that China puts a strong emphasis on the collection of aerospace and aeronautical equipment. (116 cases). Approximately half of those collection activities are targeted against military aerospace technologies, related trade secrets, and intellectual property. The primary collectors are: the PLA Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau and private companies conducting export violations, and individuals, Eftimiades refers to as “Insider Threats”, working in foreign aerospace companies. He says the MSS is actively engaged in stealing foreign aerospace technology, too. Several of the 595 cases show the MSS utilizes both HUMINT and contract cyber hackers to collect foreign aerospace technology. In at least two cases, these were Joint operations recruiting individuals inside an aerospace company as operatives to assist in targeting it for cyber-attacks. Such collection efforts support PLA military aerospace programs and China’s commercial aviation sector. Going further, he states that a review of the 116 cases targeted at aerospace companies identified over 200 specific military and civilian technologies and trade secrets (stolen and attempted stolen). Among the many “Key Technologies” sought, were: Cryogenic pumps for space vehicles, valves, transfer lines, refrigeration equipment, space qualified radiation hardened circuits, components for the storage and use of liquid hydrogen, cryogenic coolers, Ka-band space communications, satellite/missile insulation blankets–germanium coated polyimide film, and multi octave traveling wave tubes used as amplifiers in satellite transponders. Major systems include: the Space Shuttle, Delta IV Rocket, F-15 Fighter, C-17 transport, F-22 Fighter, F-35 Fighter, B-1 Bomber, Ch46/47 Chinook, C-130 training equipment.

China’s Mars rover, the Zhurong (above) rolls off its lander, to begin a mission of seeking out geological discoveries. Was its development the result of espionage? Eftimiades states that China puts a strong emphasis on the collection of aerospace and aeronautical equipment. (116 cases). Approximately half of those collection activities are targeted against military aerospace technologies, related trade secrets, and intellectual property. The primary collectors are: the PLA Joint Staff Department Intelligence Bureau and private companies conducting export violations, and individuals, Eftimiades refers to as “Insider Threats”, working in foreign aerospace companies. He says the MSS is actively engaged in stealing foreign aerospace technology, too. Several of the 595 cases show the MSS utilizes both HUMINT and contract cyber hackers to collect foreign aerospace technology. In at least two cases, these were Joint operations recruiting individuals inside an aerospace company as operatives to assist in targeting it for cyber-attacks.

Another high priority collection target of Chinese espionage is information technology. Statistically speaking, China’s collection of information technology (113 cases) is second in numbers only to aerospace technology. China has placed strong emphasis on collecting information technology to include semiconductors and manufacturing technology. Eftimiades reports that in 2015, Beijing began allocating $50 billion dollars for the domestic development of advanced integrated chips. This action was initiated to ensure self-reliance after the US began restricting semiconductor sales to the Chinese company ZTE. ZTE was sanctioned for evading sanctions on Iran and North Korea respectively, and repeatedly lying to US Department of Commerce officials. The US subsequently lifted the order three months later when the company paid a $1 billion fine and agreed to reprimand its Board and cut their bonuses, which it never did. The Chinese company Huawei has been under similar export restrictions for evading restrictions on Iran and stealing US technology. Company personnel face charges of economic espionage or espionage in the US, Germany, and Poland. Eftimiades explains that China has not as yet developed the manufacturing technology to produce certain categories of advanced semiconductors, including radiation hardened chips. Such technology has as its core element, several methods of etching laser lithography chips at a nanoscale.

Key information technology related to China’s collection requirements include: microelectronics, microwave integrated circuits, microprocessors, circuit boards, crypto key devices, data and voice transmission systems, semiconductors, and trade secrets such as laser manufacturing techniques. Semiconductor manufacturing is a priority target for Chinese espionage as the US and several other nations still maintain a sizable lead over China in production capabilities. Additional priority targets for collection include biopharma and medical devices, automated machine tools and robotics, energy saving/new energy vehicles, and new materials development. Eftimiades informs that these are often distinct patterns of intelligence activity that correspond to each category of technology. For example, excluding China’s  cyber espionage campaigns, collection on biopharma and medical devices is limited to exploiting research programs (e.g., Thousand Talents Program) or economic espionage using company insiders. The three targets for this category are universities, research institutes, and pharmaceutical companies. Lastly, In the category of energy saving/new energy vehicles, Eftimiades states that most of the collection activity has been economic espionage employing insiders. The two targets for this collection effort have been companies and research laboratories. Eftimiades reveals that the majority of thefts of this technology have occurred through insider threats with cyber espionage as a secondary method.

To be succinct, in many fields, subject areas for analysis, facts are often misused and abused, but on intelligence, it can lead to great failures, and potential national disaster. Facts cannot be nailed down and used to support only what one wishes. To the contrary, facts should take the analysis toward what is authentic. From that judgments and plans must be based. Doing anything otherwise, especially while in pursuit of an opponent, is simply to procrastinate by entertaining oneself with errant deliberations. The opponent, no matter what one might choose to believe, does not procrastinate. As Eftimiades, himself, notes in the “Intelligence Collection Objectives” section of his own text, the Chinese know what they want and go after it at the time, in the way, and with the means they desire. Operatives complete their tasks and off secrets go–and oftentimes actual technologies as well–to China. That is one of the simple and more apparent keys to the opponent’s success.

China has shown little compunction over putting in full view at home, marketing, technologies, and making geopolitical moves that would be suggestive of the fact the information that allowed for those developments and actions was stolen from the US. It is almost as if the Communist Party of China encourages such actions to flaunt their country’s considerable bag of intelligence victories. Of course, government officials in Beijing will normally assert that there have been thefts and declare any evidence presented of such as circumstantial or outright lies.

Given just how much China has poached from the US has been revealed, even paraded in Beijing, one could reasonably conclude–and it is absolutely true–that China has run off with far more than a bale of information and data on classified defense and intelligence related projects, innovative commercial products, trade secrets, intellectual property, and classified foreign and defense policy documents. It is safe to say that an enormous amount is being collected. It might leave some to reasonably accept that a stratospheric level of espionage is being conducted by far greater numbers of intelligence officers and operatives and it has been ongoing.

Eftimiades provides a brilliant account of Chinese intelligence collection requirements. He supports his claims with superb charts. Some are practically signposts pointing to where the adversary is likely to show up next. Some are strong enough to serve as figurative beckoning fingers enticing along with whispered words, “Here they are.”

Eftimiades reports that in 2015, Beijing began allocating $50 billion dollars for the domestic development of advanced integrated chips. This action was initiated to ensure self-reliance after the US began restricting semiconductor sales to the Chinese company ZTE, now defunct. ZTE was sanctioned for evading sanctions on Iran and North Korea respectively, and repeatedly lying to US Department of Commerce officials. The US subsequently lifted the order three months later when the company paid a $1 billion fine and agreed to reprimand its Board and cut their bonuses, which it never did.

Section 8: “Analysis of Espionage Cases”

The dominant activities for China’s overseas espionage are espionage, economic espionage, and export administration regulation (dual use) violations, together comprising 60 percent of all activities. Taken as a whole, statistically speaking, illegal exports (theft of dual use and military technology) make up approximately 47 percent of China’s espionage activities abroad. Eftimiades divides the 595 espionage cases that he analyzed into the following categories: espionage; economic espionage as defined by ITAR, EAR, IEEPA; covert action; and, research violations. China’s illegal export of military and dual use technology, to include IEEPA, EAR, and ITAR violations and other export related violations in the US, comprise 43.7 percent (260) of all cases worldwide. Eftimiades says more than 80 percent of these cases occurred in the US. Reportedly, economic espionage which is mainly conducted by private companies or individuals, account for 25.98 percent (119 total) of cases). The category of “traditional espionage” stands at 22 percent (108 total) of worldwide activities. Eftimiades notes the figure of traditional espionage cases sits at 55 if Taiwan is separated out as a Chinese intelligence target. Of known cases, Taiwan is the single highest priority target for individual espionage.

On a chart provided by Eftimiades, one can observe the distribution of cases to the many venues of Chinese espionage in the US. The distribution pattern reveals concentrations occurring in tech sectors, manufacturing hubs and business centers. In California, “Silicon Valley” is shown to be the number one spot in the US for China’s illegal technology collection efforts. Apparently, more than half of the 140 cases that occurred in California targeted technology firms in that venue. Other cases centered around San Diego and then Los Angeles in the state. Further, collection activity in California was mainly economic espionage (51) cases), EAR violations (30 cases), ITAR violations (25 cases), and IEEPA violations (13 cases). In the economic espionage cases, the predominant form of tradecraft was using insiders (employees) to access restricted technology and trade secrets. Priority collection objectives in California were information technology (46 cases), aerospace and aeronautical equipment (27 cases), and automated machine tools and robotics (20 cases). Nationwide, China’s collection activities cluster around the major educational, research, and manufacturing centers in several states to include Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Florida, New Jersey, and Texas. Victims of China’s espionage efforts in the US include major defense and aerospace companies, pharmaceutical firms, technology research companies, and manufacturers. In cases in Virginia and Florida, Chinese diplomats and citizens were caught trespassing on military facilities to conduct ground photo reconnaissance. Those facilities were associated with US Naval forces and special operations capabilities.

Multi cives aut ea pericula quae imminent non vident aut ea quae vident neglegunt. (Many citizens either do not see those dangers which are threatening or they ignore those that they do see.) Eftimiades notes that research universities are clearly primary targets for collection efforts, achieved most often through talent programs such as China’s Thousand Talents Program, Hundreds Talents Program. Eftimiades reports that most estimates suggest there are “at least 200 Chinese talent programs designed to employ academic and professional expertise from the West into serving China’s national development.” He continues further to explain: “This expertise ranges from scientific and engineering fields to business, finance, and social Sciences. These programs are serviced by 600 overseas stations that gather information on foreign scientists and then attempt to recruit them. In numerous cases, professors, graduate students, and PLA researchers have also been arrested for stealing research from overseas universities for use in China.”

Chinese intelligence services apparently studied the situation, and recognized just how open the US was for theft of its secrets in all sectors and then clearly decided to pour through, taking whatever they could. Surely, the Communist Party of China saw no need to halt commercial entities engaged in their own espionage activities, much as Eftimiades remarks earlier in the section entitled “PRC Organizations Conducting Espionage”. It appears they have seen nothing but opportunities to do a lot of open field running for them with little real risk. To date, it appears that they have all found no reason to pare down their operations, and certainly no reason to retreat. From Eftimiades own data, one can infer their espionage activities have steadily increased. Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. (For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it confirms the determination of nature and of truth.)

Though Eftimiades explains in his Preface that “cyber espionage is only addressed in select cases which were enabled by humans providing insider access. However, in discussing how exactly the FBI and DHS have thwarted Chinese espionage efforts later in his “Analysis of Cases” section, the discussion meanders into cases in which they discovered sources within China of cyberattacks into sensitive computer files of the US government, defense related businesses, financial institutions, high-tech and medical research facilities, academia, and anywhere else the hackers apparently believed there was a good opportunity to break-in and seize data. While Eftimiades expressed the intent to focus on HUMINT operations and tactics of Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US, it would seem that he had little choice but to present it if he sought to put some positive face on what US counterintelligence services are doing to thwart China’s efforts. It is the brightest rift which can at present be seen in the clouds,

Readers may recall in Act 1, scene 3 of William Shakespeare’s play, The Life and Death of Julius Caesar, Cassius utters these apposite words to his co-conspirator Brutus: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars / But in ourselves, . . . .” With the intention of being frank, but by no means beastly, greatcharlie proffers that the fault for China’s success may lie with the US counterintelligence services themselves. It may be less a matter of tactics, techniques, procedures and methods, and rather a problem among US counterintelligence service personnel that the Chinese have recognized that they can exploit. As a matter of professional development, some effort might be made to ensure their cognitive abilities regularly honed through weekly, even daily, exercises and tests to strengthen their thinking skills, their prowess at uncovering all relevant facts, even from trifles, and developing solid insights from those facts, and their effective and correct use of a reliable intuition and intimation. Though this is stated in the abstract, one can almost be certain that the Chinese intelligence services to some degree are doing like-minded things to strengthen their intelligence officers competences. It could be something as simple as the private performance of Tai chi chuan or likely Martial Qigong every morning. (imaginably, both techniques would be performed respectively with a dynamic and free-flowing form and stances that would cause any instructor to weep with delight while observing ) Along with exercise, stretching, and breathing, it would allow their intelligence officers to mediate and attain deep focus and a relaxed state. Such activity would be helpful in any struggles with dépaysement.The Chinese intelligence services surely are quite determined to maintain an edge over their adversaries. So far, they have proved themselves to be competent and accomplished services in the field.

The Chinese company Huawei has been placed under similar export restrictions as ZTE had been, for evading restrictions on Iran and stealing US technology. Company personnel face charges of economic espionage or espionage in the US, Germany, and Poland. Eftimiades explains that China has not as yet developed the manufacturing technology to produce certain categories of advanced semiconductors, including radiation hardened chips. Such technology has as its core element, several methods of etching laser lithography chips at a nanoscale.

Section 9: “Analysis of Espionage Tradecraft”

As stated earlier, a condensed review of Section 9 “Analysis of Espionage Tradecraft” is not included here. The section is left to each reader to enjoy at first blush and perceive and decipher all they can from it. Recall that in November 1922, when excavating the tomb of Tutankamen, the English archeologist and Egyptologist, Howard Carter, pierced a hole enabling him to see inside the actual chamber. He was asked by colleagues if he could see anything, and he simply replied: “Yes! Wonderful things!” Readers will say the same when they read this section.

Having stated that, greatcharlie nevertheless includes some commentary on section, compelled by Eftimiades to mention that among those committing acts of espionage for China are commercial entities, SOEs and private companies, academic institutions, and independent individuals, particularly entrepreneurs. Eftimiades explains that SOEs and commercial entities have been determined to engage in espionage in the US and elsewhere outside of China. Having dubbed them as entities engaged in espionage, they are examined as such and ascribe all of the qualities of an intelligence service. Thereby, one would expect to observe certain traits of an intelligence service such as tradecraft to be performed by their representatives while operating in the field. Yet, unless there is some information collected by US Intelligence Community–and that would unbeknownst to greatcharlie–stating those entities as well as individual business engaged in similar acts, view themselves to be intelligence services or espionage organizations, one may not see them regularly act as such.If they display any tactics, techniques, or methods that resemble tradecraft it should be viewed as exceptional and not an expectation. Imaginably, they, themselves, might be quite surprised anyone might refer to them as espionage organizations. They simply may view themselves as a “collective” Chinese citizens working in the US availing their home companies and country of technologies, hardware, documents or whatever else they might grab from US institutions that may employ them as the opportunities present themselves. To that extent, they may really be nothing more than somewhat organized rings of thieves, nothing more. As for these individuals showing such willingness to respond to the requests and demands of the Chinese intelligence services or other State Council bureaucracies as SASTIND, too much might be made of the fact that they are obedient to the commands and demands of their authoritarian and very often punitive, government. After all, in addition to their own lives, everything that they hold dear, their families, are in the hands and under the awful power of an authoritarian–some might say totalitarian–Communist government in Beijing.

Of course, one must be open-minded. Thus, the door should not be shut completely on the possibility of some deliberate design in the practices of such commercial entities and individuals with regard to their espionage. Note that overall, their practices are not chaotic or haphazard, but rather they are grounded and for the most part accomplished. Aliquis latet error. (Some trickery lies hidden.)

In the abstract, one could imagine their movements and interactions of individuals operating for commercial entities may be intentionally stochastic. Indeed, if the activity is genuine espionage and not simply criminal behavior what greatcharlie supposes should really draw the attention of US counterintelligence is not as much whether it meets a certain expected standard of tactics, techniques, procedures and methods. What should draw that attention is the appearance of control, orchestration, and forceful activity, and that something intense is happening. Something is intended and is being achieved. The fact that there is a professional side to all of that activity must also be considered. The focus, greatcharlie humbly suggests, perhaps should be placed first on the purposefulness of the activities displayed by Chinese commercial entities and individual businesspeople, not its randomness. 

Acting as described, they allow themselves some degree of security without the need to set up resources, set up sites, train in tactics, techniques, procedures and methods to communicate and pass information physically. Keeping their movements randomly determined might leave their efforts open to analysis statistically. One could discern some random probability distribution or pattern. However, it might still be impossible for those movements and interactions to be predicted in a useful way. One might imagine that to rise to a certain level in their companies or institutions, the individuals involved are well-educated or clever enough to consciously plan their activities in a seemingly random way. Surely, anyone in a commercial entity or institution selected for such work will be tested and screened before being sent off. In some welcome back, job well-done session or maybe a torturous debriefing, the employees surely inform their manager what practices worked well in the field and which at the time were determined to be too risky.

What would seem as important, or perhaps even more vital for Chinese commercial entities, would be properly casting each “espionage operative” or “thief.” The absolute right man or woman must be assigned for the right job. Surely, human resources would bring in and spotlight the right people and managers would make selections for such work and overseas deployment. One would hardly find such individuals to be hot-blooded, and wreckless, incompetent in any fashion. They would exude equanimity, sangfroid, graciousness, and professionalism. They apparently work with a mindset that nothing is unattainable. Loosely, one might posit, taking such an attitude and approach to their efforts, might be said to be at the foundation of any “ostensible tradecraft.” Everything they do, choices they make, flows from that line of thinking.

Looking at Eftimiades discussion a tad more it would seem that he gives Chinese commercial entities and individuals engaged in espionage too much and too little credit at the same time. He perhaps gives them too much credit by identifying them as intelligence gathering organizations and thereby assessing their use of tradecraft. He gives them too little credit in that if he believes his presumption as to their status as spies and their “spy-like practices,” correct, then he dismisses the possibility that their actions are disguised, deliberately performed in a way distant from tradecraft as a technique. If their intention was to cause confusion among possible observers by taking that tack, Eftimiades’ expression of some puzzlement over the absence of traditional tradecraft in their practices serves as evidence that to a degree they may have succeeded in that. At the same time, certainly nothing they might do, would be intended to stand out, such as, perhaps in extreme, appearing gargoyle or something of the type, and drawing attention daily.

Some foundational information and thought on Chinese espionage activities in the US has to be established if study and understanding on the subject is to be advanced. The establishment of such a baseline of information, however, should not result conversely in some uncompromising stance toward it. New facts must be collected and an openness must exist to consider alternative analyses of those facts, which may lead to new possibilities and potential successes against such activities. There are likely many unexplored possibilities that perhaps should be considered about all matters concerning the subject. From what has been publicly reported, often in the US national security bureaucracies, perspectives on adversaries have reportedly become too austere. Over time, even unknowingly, walls are built around those perspectives, fending off an effort to more accurately understand an adversary at the present that may shake the foundations of them. That sort of mindset, perhaps most akin to an unconscious bias, can creep its way in and become comfortable. That can spell disaster. This may very well be the case with regard to Chinese foreign intelligence activity in the US.

It seems high time that US counterintelligence services ceased looking at Chinese intelligence operations and tactics with a focus on their deficiencies and flaws in practice. Equally or even more important is to consider precisely what they are doing right in order to be successful. A starting point would be an assessment of how Chinese intelligence services and all the other government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US view US counterintelligence services and how they are responding to US defenses set up against them. It would seem from Eftimiades text that a burgeoning notion in defense of the current situation in which China is achieving a degree of success is that their numbers in the US are so high that it would naturally be difficult to struggle with them head-to-head. Hopefully, this is not the case. To be frank, the ability of Chinese intelligence services to position so many of their personnel in the US is just a symptom of the conundrum of not being able to stem their activities. Focusing upon that will not yield a cure. There are surely considerable deficiencies and flaws in the way in which US counterintelligence operates that have given Chinese government organizations and commercial entities the confidence to act without much fear. Res ipsa locquitor. (The thing speaks for itself.)

Of the seven universities that have been dubbed the Seven Sons of National Defense, some have been identified in US federal court documents as actively conducting espionage, working with the MSS to conduct espionage, or receiving stolen foreign research and technology. Many of these universities have high security research facilities that support classified technology development for the PLA and are on the US Department of Commerce Entities List for their research in support of Chinese defense entities involved in the theft of technologies. On that list is the Nanjing University Aeronautics and Astronautics (above). Nanjing is also known for providing the MSS with recruits for its corps of intelligence officers.

Section 11: “Summary”

Since what is found in Eftimiades “Summary” section is drawn from his discussion of his analysis of the 595 espionage cases since 2000, it would stand to reason they would serve well as a figurative subset of eight ample bullet points for his “Key Findings” which themselves extracted directly from the facts of those many cases. Of that seeming “subset of findings” in Eftimiades “Summary” section, the “top 5” selected by greatcharlie are the following.

First, Eftimiades explains that the US Intelligence Community is not well-organized to protect the secrets of US industries. It is far better at protecting its own secrets. He says the same holds true for most other technologically advanced [highly industrialized] countries. A problem he points to, calling it obvious, is that commercial industry and scientific research programs, the primary targets for Chinese intelligence collection, are the most vulnerable.

Second, as aforementioned in the discussion of the monograph’s Preface, Eftimiades says the DHS and the FBI are leading the effort in the US “to combat China’s massive intelligence collection campaign.” He again states that both organizations “have done excellent work in reducing Beijing’s relentless efforts,” noting the FBI has made advances since 2018 to assist US industry and academia, and DHS is also working aggressively to curtail illegal exports of advanced technology and those who steal scientific research. However, he declares “there is still much more to be done.” He explains that the work of other government agencies as well as a bipartisan effort in Congress will also be necessary to ensure national and economic security.

Third, Eftimiades proffers that success in thwarting China’s aggressive collection efforts will ultimately rest upon three factors: 1) the ability of US law enforcement and intelligence apparatus to shift organizational culture and support private industry and academia; 2) developing a strategic campaign in the US integrating all the elements of the government and its allies; and, 3) having Congress pass laws to raise the costs of economic espionage to the Communist Party of China. Chinese companies and individuals via visa restrictions, sanctions, investment restrictions, and otherwise. 

Fourth, Eftimiades explains, as he has surely illustrated throughout his monograph by reporting his case analysis, yet does not declare in any vehement way, that China’s “whole of society” approach to espionage has been quite successful thus far in defeating government and private industry organizations. He focuses more on what has been positive about US counterintelligence efforts,

Fifth, Eftimiades reveals that efforts by some countries within the EU, India, and Japan to restrain China’s intelligence activities have been comparatively less apparent in public sources. Although espionage arrests in India, Germany, France, Belgium, and Poland have been low in number, he sees such developments as an indication that those countries now seek to more vigorously counter China’s collection efforts. In addition, Eftimiades asserts that “China’s public image is suffering worldwide as the French and German governments have made statements on China’s aggressive espionage on social media, human rights issues, COVID-19 response, and Beijing’s threats over trade.”

In determining the percentage of Chinese espionage efforts thwarted, it must again be noted that the percentage would need to be calculated based on the entirety of the Chinese espionage effort. If one accepts Eftimiades does not know that number, and there is no reason not to do so, knowing the percentage of thwarted espionage efforts seems impossible and his claim is only a presumption or at best the result of “secret knowledge.”

When writing about the success of the FBI and DHS in thwarting espionage efforts of Chinese government organizations and commercial entities, there was less of an appearance by Eftimiades of reporting facts, and a more apparent effort by him to convince readers on a position tenuously supported in the text that he wants them to accept. To that extent, he actually presents more than anything else, as there is no supportable alternative story to present given the realities of the situation, is a well-supported outline of concerted, energetic, and endless activity to steal US secrets by China.

It would seem that the nature of the situation has already been firmed in the minds of the public based on reports in the newsmedia. It is unlikely that readers of his monograph would be inclined to Eftimiades perspective, despite his remarkable background. It is unlikely that anyone in the US counterintelligence services, particularly among senior executives and managers, is on Cloud 9 over results versus Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US. Somewhere deep inside, some may feel a bit stuck and stagnating, clutching at straws, and listening to the wind, but conceal such concerns from their colleagues. One might imagine their feelings: “Je suis las de toujours faire la même chose.” That would be a multifaceted problem for US counterintelligence services in itself. Perchance in trumpeting FBI and DHS success was an effort to boost morale or at least comfort those from each service who may have had their fill of Chinese success in their country. Eftimiades may have viewed optimism as the best and most available elixir for defeatism, and employed it liberally. Perhaps this line of thinking that drove Eftimiades, who leaves no doubt that he is unwavering in his support and confidence of the FBI and DHS, consciously drifts a tad away from his encomium of their respective work against Chinese espionage moves in the US. As also mentioned in the discussion of the monograph’s Preface, in the “Summary” section, Eftimiades does say “there is still much more to be done.”

Noticeably, in the “Summary” section, as noted in the discussion of the Preface, Eftimiades also relents so to speak from his “declaration of nescience” to say there are very likely thousands of Chinese espionage operators in the US. However, although there is clear evidence that their purpose is to steal US secrets and technologies, one might consider in the abstract whether there may be other interests of the utmost importance to the Chinese intelligence services that require such a labor-intensive effort. That should beat the brain. Going back to the suggested figure of 25,000 intelligence officers, professionals, albeit discrepantly trained and experienced, on the ground–a force one and half times the current size of a US Army armored division, it may be worth considering whether they may be engaged in a bold, cunning reconnaissance and surveillance mission of far greater conception than ever seen in the past or might normally be imagined in the present. Itt might be a mission that could not be performed in any other way than with a large force of professional intelligence officers. To be direct, yet admittedly still a bit Delphic, there must be a clear reason why officers of Chinese Intelligence services operating in the US, in particular, are so successful at not being wherever, whenever US counterintelligence services are looking for them. 

There is a thin line that separates reality from illusion. It must be kept firmly in mind that if one denies or unconsciously suppresses reality, what is left is only an illusion, false reality. Once one begins planning and operating within that, all is lost. If that is or ever would be the case concerning the Chinese conundrum, the situation will become far worse than ever imagined. Further, the more one deals in truths and reality, the more one develops reliable intuition and intimations. The more one entertains fallacies and what is artificial, the farther one moves away from having any real intuition or developing any intimations at all. These skills in the end will prove to be absolutely imperative if endsieg, a final victory against all of the odds stacked against them, is to be achieved by US counterintelligence services in their struggle against Chinese espionage efforts. As the celebrated Spanish novelist, translator, and columnist, Javier Marías remarked during an interview for the Winter 2006 issue of the Paris Review: “One must have courage to see what one does see and not to deny it for convenience.”

Regarding China’s concern about having the image of being a country of thieves and copycats, stealing the best ideas of other countries to support and propel its conspicuous advancements in nearly all sectors, the Communist Party of China absolutely has an interest in global public opinion of China and perceptions of its actions on the world stage. Still, it is unlikely that the Communist Party of China has too much concern about that in that vein. One must remember, the Party insists that at the foundation of all advancements of the Western industrial powers are the years those countries overwhelmed peoples who were defenseless and through a colonial system violently oppressed them and allowed business enterprises of their respective countries to exploit the conquered peoples’ lands for raw materials and mineral wealth for centuries. They will use the experience of China to support that argument. Within their own countries, the Party says down-trodden workers were essentially enslaved by the same business enterprises now called multinational corporations. (Note that greatcharlie asserts in the abstract that this is the Communist Party of China’s perspective; it is by no means greatcharlie’s perspective.)

Still, more salient based on the Party’s mindset would be the overall judgment of the world on the robust energy China displays as it pushes onward and upward into the future and, albeit mistakenly believing, eventually reaching the position at the top as the world’s dominant power. From that perspective, the Communist Party of China would see their country as having a very positive, lasting impact on global perceptions of it everyday. To that extent, the Party leaders and propagandists likely weigh that global perception on “energy” and Western measures of global public opinion ratings, particularly if those ratings are based on reactions to independent events and not the bigger picture. While one might agree that there are some universal truths about our world, still not everyone thinks the same on all issues. China’s view of its future is quite at variance with that held by most in the US best familiar with the issues involved. Fere libenter homines id quod volunt credunt. (In most cases men willingly believe what they wish.)

There will naturally be more that US counterintelligence services would want from the US Congress to appropriate for them in order to pursue adversarial countries’ intelligence services operating without pause, on the ground, in the US. However, the matter must be examined from the lens of Congressional leadership. From their view, US counterintelligence services  presently possess considerable resources to pursue Chinese intelligence officers and operatives. There are no indications Chinese espionage networks are being regularly taken down. Harsh critics and skeptical observers might begin to believe that, unbeknownst to the public, US counterintelligence services are actually being restrained from doing their utmost to defeat opponents here in the US. However, there would hardly be any logic to that. Surely, US counterintelligence services are not flâneurs, in the field simply playing chase games. Even the slightest act in that direction would betray the trust and reliance the US public has in their fidelity and  their belief that they are protecting the country’s sovereignty, its property, its interests and especially its people. As expressed in the February 26, 2021 greatcharlie post entitled “Suggestions for Resolving the Conundrum of Chinese Intelligence Operations in the US: Fragments Developed from a Master’s Precepts”, by 2021, it should have been the case that MSS networks were being regularly penetrated by US counterintelligence and rolled up in waves at times chosen by US counterintelligence services. Ongoing and developing MSS operations should have already been heavily infiltrated and those infiltrated operations which are not destroyed should be used as conduits to push disinformation back to China. As for individuals recruited by MSS, many should have already been identified as a result of US counterintelligence infiltration of MSS networks and at appropriate moments, those operatives and informants should have been intercepted, neutralized, and recruited as counterespionage agents. Sardonically, from a paranormal perspective, one might suggest that although Chinese intelligence officers may be operating in the same spaces in which US counterintelligence services are looking hard, they do so in some other plane existence, undetectable by mortal eye. Sous une surface calme tout se passe.

There has been more than enough talk about how bad the problem with China is. C’est la Bérézina. As it has been discussed so often that, in a way, such talk haa become by the by to some degree for the US public. There must be more talk about how to defeat it. The US must move from the defensive to the offensive, and destroy all of its networks. As greatcharlie has mentioned in proceeding posts on the Chinese espionage crisis, It could be the case that US counterintelligence officers must relearn and hone the skill of lying before the water course and awaiting the big game. Many plans can be developed to advance against a problem. However, choosing the right plan, the one that will work, is the challenge. Eftimiades clearly understands that much as with physicians, for investigators, every symptom must be told before a diagnosis can be provided. Fundamental changes may be needed in efforts to halt Chinese espionage operations. There is the possibility that certain apparent aspects of Chinese intelligence operations are not being focused on sufficiently or appropriately. Making the right improvements requires being persistent in one’s search for answers. To continue the pursuit successfully will require a certain boldness in thinking. Although he literally lost his head by guillotine two years later, George Jacques Danton, the 18th century French revolutionary leader, addressed the Legislative Committee of General Defence, September 2, 1792 with words concerning the situation in France which are apposite for counterintelligence organizations dedication protecting their countries against any harm by Chinese intelligence services: “De l’audace, et encore de l’audace, et toujours de l’audace, et la France est sauvee.” (Boldness, more boldness, and always boldness, and France is saved.)

What Eftimiades presents on Chinese espionage operations and tactics represents a stage of those activities existent at the time he wrote the monograph. However, Chinese intelligence operations and tactics appear to be constantly and rapidly evolving, becoming something more effective, more efficient everyday. As their capabilities improve, the possibilities for action also increase. It is difficult to accept but very likely a reality that success has given Chinese intelligence services so far good reason to approach the future with confidence. To that extent, the worst may be yet to come. However, on the other side of the coin, while it may seem counterintuitive to some ears, the success of Chinese government organizations and commercial entities engaged in espionage in the US should not frustrate US counterintelligence officers. Rather, it should embolden officers of US counterintelligence services to struggle even harder to succeed. Hope must still exist in the situation for that. Surely, establishing a pattern of success would go a much longer way in building self-confidence among officers in US counterintelligence services struggling on their own home ground with the Chinese.

What one finds in Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics is of considerable quality. The book remains a steady flow of information, data, and expressions that well-demonstrates the author’s command of the subject matter, from beginning to end. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that what is presented here represents less than twenty percent of the insights birthed in greatcharlie by Eftimiades monograph. Readers should imagine what insights might be brewed up from within themselves after they have had a chance to read through it. 

It is assured that after the first reading Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics, one would most likely go back to the book and engage in that stimulating process again and again. The monograph will very likely be regularly consulted as a reference for intelligence professionals and prompting new ideas and insights among intelligence professionals, law enforcement officers, other professional investigators, and scholars. Surely, the monograph would be quite useful to an Intelligence Studies instructor who, as a primary part of an assignment, might decide to have students read the monograph, observe the manner in which Eftimiades report is formatted, how information is presented in its sections, and develop insights from its discussion.

Perhaps it is eedless to say at this point, but it is nonetheless stated with absolute conviction and true relish, greatcharlie unequivocally recommends Eftimiades Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics to its readers.

By Mark Edmond Clark