An Open Mind and Direct Talks, Not Reports Developed from Overt US Sources, Will Best Serve Diplomacy with Trump

US President Donald Trump (above). Nearly every government seeks to fill gaps in knowledge and understanding, and verify its on perspectives through its own intelligence efforts. Having a full, compatible understanding of a situation through direct talks by officials, allows leaders and top diplomats to speak correctly and authentically about issues. It also improves the chances for crafting agreements. If countries desire to effectively engage with Trump diplomatically, they must ensure how and what they collect about him and the US is accurate and well-considered.

In the US, the news media serves as a watchdog over government power and political activity. It is a source from which the public can inform itself on the decisions and actions of elected leaders and appointed officials. The news media is at its best when it provides the public with an intimate look inside government bodies and operations. Its role in the society is sacrosanct. “Freedom of the press” is one the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments of the US Constitution listing specific prohibitions on government power. Admonishment can be viewed as a warning, and one may seek to encourage, improve the quality of another’s performance by warning. However, news media criticism of US President Donald Trump appears aimed at bringing his administration down. Trump’s critics also seemingly have the goal of destroying him as a person, reduce him to a demimonde. It has become de rigueur to speak against Trump. All of the negativity catches the eye. Middle of the list journalists have managed to make a place for themselves at the top by presenting anti-Trump stories with reckless abandon. The ranks of his critics actually extend beyond the US news media to include: think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration. Some of Trump’s critics are convinced that Trump does not really want to do well for the US public or the world. They make such assertions being fully aware that the consequence of them might be to harm the trust that many in the US public have in Trump. Indeed, critics may have infiltrated and despoiled the psyche of many US citizens, and perhaps may have even destroyed the possibility for some to have confidence in future US administrations, both Republican and Democratic. When Trump fights back, his comments are very rough and tough, but they unlikely do enough to prevent negative reports and commentaries, all the opprobrium of critics, from sticking.

If one were to consider, for example, the coverage of efforts to organize talks between US President Donald Trump and Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Kim Jung-un, one might recognize that the two leaders were not really given a fair chance to virtually relate as leaders before they met. The atmosphere was poisoned by exceptionally strong negative reports and commentary of expert observers, well-known political foes, critics, and news media pundits. What was actually being said and done in both capitals was being distorted. The main focus of critics was a back and forth on Twitter, a few awkward official statements, and predictions by experts of unconstructive behavior by Kim. What saved the pas de deux was a step by step approach toward North Korea well-managed by South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Moon met with Kim at the Demilitarized Zone. Pompeo both as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Secretary of State met with Kim in Pyongyang. Trump enabled their efforts by expressing a willingness to meet. The US in a way reciprocated on Pompeo’s visits by having the North Korean Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol, meet with Pompeo in New York City for talks and then meet with Trump in Washington, DC. Particularly for the North Koreans, having the chance to get to know Trump and Pompeo, and learning what US thinking in the administration was directly from the US President and Secretary of State was both edifying and important. What the North Koreans learned was certainly far more informative and satisfying than what their intelligence services may have been gleaned in the abstract from US news media sources and free wielding comments of experts in conferences and interviews. The meetings also likely had a stabilizing effect.

Nearly every government seeks to fill gaps in knowledge and understanding, and verify its own perspectives through its own intelligence efforts. Relatively isolated countries can easily become victims of false reports, misleading, politicized commentary. Not knowing what gold is, they often gather pyrite. In the current environment, there is so much to sift through to find the truth. The consequence of using bent intelligence, even if only slightly, could be catastrophic. Having a comparable knowledge and full understanding of the situation through direct talks by officials, allows leaders and top diplomats to speak correctly and authentically about issues. It also improves the chances for the crafting of bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements. If countries desire to effectively engage with Trump diplomatically, how and what they collect about him and the US must be accurate and well-considered. That is the issue discussed here. Oculis de homine non credo, habeo melius et certius lumen quo a falsis uera diiudicem: animi bonum animus inueniat. (I do not trust my eyes to tell me what a man is: I have a better and more trustworthy light by which I can distinguish what is true from what is false: let the mind find out what is good for the mind.)

Chinese President XI Jinping (left) and Trump (right). In general, foreign leaders encounters with Trump are welcoming and friendly. During them, Trump appears at ease, self-possessed. Those who have engaged in conversation with him are usually left with the feeling that he was in the moment with them. He projects an empathy. At the same time, Trump has a strong presence, a bearing of authority, which may be intimidating to some. Trump’s nature is to try while in direct contact with an individual to create a bridge, if not a bond.

The “Authentic” Trump

Boiled down to the bones, open minded, immediate perceptions of Trump from most who have met him, from national leaders to average US citizens, would most likely agree that their encounters with Trump are welcoming and friendly. He is typically at ease, self-possessed with others. Those who have conversed with him are usually left with the feeling that he was in the moment with them. He projects an empathy. At the same time, Trump has a strong presence, a bearing of authority, which may be intimidating to the odd few. Trump’s nature is to try while in direct contact with an individual to create a bridge, if not a bond. Meeting Trump, one must remember that he has expectations from them. Red flags can be detected in his facial expression. Many discerned them too late in a conversation with Trump to repair the damage. Those who plan to create some interaction with Trump in their own way or seek to create some deal or agreement only on their terms, will accomplish nothing but raise his ire. Those simply trying to create some personal linkage alone should avoid overplaying their hand. Trump will let one know what type of relationship that he would prefer to have with one. A barrier will be created once a line is crossed. One should never try to become too familiar with him too fast. If anyone is going to rustle feathers by being a bit extra jovial during an interaction, it would need to be Trump. In such cases, he would invariably still mean well. Following that, he might try to be giving in some way. It would be better not to meet him, if one intends to go as far as breaking the spoken and unspoken rules of civility with him. Those who might use the opportunity to meet Trump in order to play to popular public sentiment at home by displaying irreverence for Trump, displaying their will to challenge him on issues, and create the optics that would confirm some silly notion of fearlessness by taking on the US President will do great disservice to their people and interests of their countries. There would be so much to gain from the opportunity to meet with Trump, and it would all be tossed away.

One should not glean from what has been stated that Trump dislikes developing new relationships. Quite to the contrary, Trump appreciates crafting new things to include new relationships. That desire to create is unquestionably due to the fact that he has the mind, vision, and spirit  of an artist. His successful professional paths as a businessman, land developer, entertainment promoter, and reality television host evinced that. As a businessman, Trump for decades engaged in high stakes negotiations and immersed in the granular details of forging solid, mutually agreeable deals. As a developer, he thoroughly invested himself in the planning, designing, and constructing buildings. In that process he was humble, meticulous, perceptive, and innovative. He could become lost in his art. As a media celebrity, he lived a life of high drama while he entertained and bedazzled. While very public accusations have made of alleged indiscretions, in the aggregate, the greater side of Trump is influenced by a moral center, his faith. He is a Presbyterian, and attends religious services. At the same time, he is respectful, appreciative, and has a good understanding of other religions, and often will attend their services.

On making decisions specifically on foreign policy, Trump will first demand to be read-in on available information and mulling things over, and formulating an approach. (This fact runs counter to what has been drilled in the minds of many through critics statements that Trump is disinterested in reports and briefings.) Trump will typically begin bilateral and multilateral interactions with high hopes that he can well-serve US interests, achieve positive results. While he attempts to craft a mutually satisfying, sustainable agreements, he will put US interests first. He famously stated during his UN General Assembly address: “As President of the United States, I will always put America First. Just like you, as the leaders of your countries, will always and should always put your countries first.” He also explained that, “All responsible leaders have an obligation to serve their own citizens, and the nation-state remains the best vehicle for elevating the human condition.”

Trump was elected US President having never served In political office at the national, state, or local level. He reviewed US foreign policy, it successes and failures in recent years and how his predecessors got things done, and decided to apply lessons he learned in business to make improvement to enhance US policy approaches. He labelled the central concept and intent for making improvements as “America First”. Trump discovered being successful would not simply require transitioning from the role businessman to that of president. In his short period of time in office, his thinking in terms of his duty and responsibilities and also personally, began evolving. In that process of evolution, Trump has not conformed with politics as usual in Washington. Rather, Trump, while keeping the heart of America First, began a process of transformation in which life lessons on getting things done, coalesced with lessons he would learn on the job daily as president. The change that Trump has brought has been most disturbing for critics as well as allies set in their ways, preferring Trump would take buttoned-down, old fashioned approaches to issues. He has pushed back against their insistent voices that he do things their way, seeking instead to find the truth in himself and doing things his way. A very evident part of Trump’s process of evolution are staff changes. He wants advisers that will best allow for the smooth execution of his plans. A very interesting and practical duality in his thinking has also been revealed as Trump has exercised his own magic. On some matters, Trump has found, sometimes the hard way, that conventional ways of doing things are best. When he has turned to unconventional approaches, he has relied upon a shrewd inner voice, intimations of a military commander in battle, all of it honed and polished by decades of human interactions, to help guide his decisionmaking.

The change that Trump has brought to Washington has been disturbing for critics as well as allies set in their ways, preferring that he would take buttoned-down, old fashioned approaches to issues. On some matters, Trump has found that doing things conventional ways are best. When he has turned to unconventional approaches, he has relied upon a shrewd inner voice, intimations akin to those of a military commander in battle, all of it honed and polished by decades of human interactions, to help guide his decisionmaking.

Indeed, when Trump takes a conventional track, he will support approaches that would require initial, relatively small steps perhaps to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. He would also seek to gauge actions and responses from the opposite party. If he discerns a positive way forward, his sense of possibility would broaden and he would open his mind up to more options. In certain circumstances, Trump might promote creativity by breaking problems into smaller components; in doing so, he would build a multi-issue business negotiation out of what may have initially appeared to be a single-issue deal. Using multiple issues allows one to make valuable tradeoffs and facilitate a good-faith negotiation. Trump will collect important information by asking lots of questions and listening carefully to the answers. He usually demonstrates a willingness to be flexible by putting forth several different proposals at the same time. He is usually be willing to contemplate unconventional deal-structuring arrangements to bridge the gap between what the other side wants and what he could accept. He will even explore contingent agreements to help overcome differences in beliefs about future events and outcomes. He may even add on conditions for a deal such as “I’ll do X if you do Y”; and, engaging in “mind games” like brainstorming to facilitate creative problem solving and prompt unexpected solutions. On May 25, 2018, when there was discussion about restoring the summit talks with Kim after they were called off, questions were asked in the news media whether the back and forth between the US and North Korea was part of a strategy, Trump was quoted as saying: “Everybody plays games.”

In an unconventional mode, Trump will appear driven by the idea that bold action can turn situations around in the case he is facing. His goal is to exploit success, preserve his freedom of action on immediate matters, and reduce vulnerability from action by his competitors. He acts in a manner designed to gain advantage, surprise, and momentum over his competitors, achieving results that would normally require far more time and would be more costly to the US. This has been observed repeatedly in his interactions with foreign leaders. Trump’s discernment of events and situations as well as his planning and execution of actions against competitors greatly resembles what military thinkers define as maneuver. He rushes to place himself in superior position in order to overcome and defeat his opponents efforts. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Early in life, Trump was inculcated with a strong sense of duty, honor, and country in secondary school. Trump matriculated for five years at the renowned New York Military Academy (NYMA) at Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, NYMA was the closest thing to a preparation school for the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, which was only a short drive from NYMA’s campus.  Trump excelled at NYMA. Friends and instructors have noted how Trump eventually thrived in military environment. He graduated as one of five captains, the S4 (supply officer) on the Senior Staff. In his senior year, Trump was given command of a composite company of cadets for the 1963 Columbus Day Parade, and led them and rest of marchers to St. Patrick’s Cathedral where he greeted Cardinal Francis Spellman. Among his many other accomplishments, he commanded NYMA’s Honor Guard in both 1963 and 1964. From 1960 to 1964, he was an Honor Cadet and played on the Variety Baseball team. Trump proved throughout his secondary school years that he could consistently perform well both as a student and leader. Given Trump’s successful ascent as a NYMA cadet, it is hard to imagine that within him there was not a desire to attend the West Point. However, that was unlikely his decision to make. His father, Frederick Trump, who Trump would only describe as a builder to fellow cadets, was a well-known New York City real estate developer. His father likely insisted that Trump attend Fordham University where he would educate himself for work in the family business. Trump behaved dutifully and honorably in response to his father’s wishes. What is left for observers to see from that decisive point in Trump’s life is a juxtaposition between his strong military metiér and his dedication to family and a business path. As a leader, Trump is always ready to subordinate what he might want for what he must do.

Trump has undoubtedly recognized that to be a successful president he had to become a living sacrifice for his country, taking on almost limitless duties and burdens he very likely unforsaw as a candidate. The lifestyle that he led as a successful business leader had to be shed. Interests and focuses of his attention and energy, if simply for recreation, have been replaced by his country’s needs. Through visits to Mar-A-Largo, Trump National Golf Club in Bedminster, and Trump Tower, he is able to enjoy fragments of a life he once lived. It will be interesting to see where this evolutionary process will lead Trump. No one is required to say anything about it, but this aspect of Trump is minimized or ignored in reports and commentaries of critics.

Trump’s father, Frederick Trump (left), mother, Mary Anne MacLeod Trump (center), and Trump (right). Trump was inculcated with a strong sense of duty, honor, and country at the New York Military Academy. He proved throughout secondary school that he could perform well consistently both as a student and leader. Given his successful ascent as a cadet, it is hard to imagine that he did not desire to attend the United States Military Academy. However, that would not have been his decision to make. His father clearly had plans for him to work in the family business.

Who Is Watching?

In intelligence services, getting to know what is happening in a country, regarding a particular event or issue requires agents who are in the right place, are articulate, can answer questions, and receive instructions. In Western countries, particularly the US, substantial information is also collected by electronic surveillance, typically obscure, clever ways to collect what is happening over the horizon via satellites and special aircraft from above. Electronic collection, although very costly, has brought many benefits, by allowing for the monitoring of all manner of communications, discovering plans, patterns of activity and locations of targets. Many have grumbled for years in the intelligence industry that increased use of such surveillance and reconnaisance systems has resulted in the disappearance of the sure-fire agent on the ground with his string of spies and informants. When this issue became most apparent in the US in the late 1970s and the 1980s, there were efforts to make adjustments, but it is still posited that human intelligence has taken a back seat in favor of technology.  Illud autem ante omnia memento, demere rebus tumultum ac videre quid in quaque re sit: scies nihil esse in istis terribile nisi ipsum timorem. (Remember, however, before all else, to strip things of all that disturbs and confuses, and to see what each is at bottom; you will then comprehend that they contain nothing fearful except the actual fear.)

When national leaders do not grasp what is happening on an issue and cannot get a handle on a situation in a satisfying way, there is an anxiety, a sense of panic even, that may ensue from lacking intelligence to answer big questions or fill gaps in knowledge, to develop policies, strategies, and nuanced approaches. In some sudden and urgent situations for a country, sources for its intelligence service might be sparse, or nonexistent, and all one might have are bits and pieces from electronic collection, particularly if that capability is rudimentary. When there is no one to approach, When there is nobody present to approach anyone, whatever has been gathered by intelligence professionals from clandestine operations and perhaps electronic collection, may be supplemented and even complemented in the worst case by theories and guesswork. Among the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of many intelligence services of countries of various sizes and power, analytical units will mine through overt sources of intelligence, traditionally newspapers, magazines, books of certain authors, and now websites, blogs, and social media to see what information is out there. That information may also be used to supplement and even complement information that a service already possesses.

Using information from overt sources to confirm things or infer things can be rather dicey as there is no longer assurance that the information is true. Without the means for verifying and confirming whether it is true, intelligence service must proceed with caution. Presently, overt sources can pose nearly as much danger as information that might be dangled before collectors by adversaries. When the wrong information is collected and presented to consumers, things can go terribly wrong. Policy and decision makers demanding intelligence, may not ask or give a cursory look at how and from where the information available was collected. Depending on how bad the situation is, those officials directly advising or supporting key leaders, rather than be palms up due to detected discrepancies, questionable findings, intimations, will pass it along as work product, demonstrating that there some type of understanding of on-going events, some handle on the situation. Consumers receiving that information might be pleased to receive verification of inferred ideas of the leadership. Those inferred ideas, with the support of new data, can often become fact and make its way from consumer to consumer, all the way to the top. In some countries, it has essentially been custom in analytical units of intelligence services covering the US, to use particular sources of intelligence, for example, US newspapers of record, as the New York Times and Washington Post, and watch and listen to NBCNEWS, ABCNEWS, CBS News. on the US. Therein lies the rub.

Then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Pompeo (left) and Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kim Jong-un (right). Relatively isolated countries can easily become victims of false reports, misleading, politicized commentary. In the current environment, there is much to sift through from overt sources to find the truth. The use of bad information will result in bent intelligence. The consequence of its use, even if slight, could be catastrophic.

Despite an awareness that many reports and commentaries about Trump, particularly from his critics, might be questionable as well as objectionable, and declared by the administration as completely inaccurate, intelligence services in some foreign capitals may not be ready to halt the counterproductive practice of using them. Those intelligence services may not fully understand why US news media houses have surrendered their impartiality in order to proffer negative reports and commentaries about Trump in great volume. They may have observed that critics would be so willing to surrender their credibility in producing reports and commentaries that would be proven wrong in short time. They may have difficulty understanding what would compel critics to attack Trump, speak against his efforts, predict failure, when his successes are successes for the US. They may have discerned that what certain reports and commentaries merely evince a particular political position or preference for a candidate who lost the 2016 Presidential Election, Hillary Clinton, and reject those of the candidate who won, Trump. They may recognize that many critics have behaved figuratively as hammer hoping through relentless pounding to fashion an image of Trump that want the world to see and if possible shape him into what they want him to be. There is said to be a temper of the soul that wants to live in illusion. Still, that alone would not compel most intelligence services to be remiss by continually using suspect information from certain overt sources from the US. A more likely cause for such counterintuitive behavior would be bureaucratic inertia. In nearly every system, there are those who will do their homework, whose trade craft would cause them to do a deeper dive into the information. Raising concerns over such information within some intelligence organizations might be considered blasphemous and those who might suggest there could be issues with standard methods of overt collection may simply be shut down by traditionalist, orthodox voices among bureaucrats who may be managing the intelligence collection process. It would be best to omit information that one does not fully understand. One should not rush to conclusions. Non refert quam multos sed quam bonos habeas. (It is quality rather than quantity that matters.)

A better way to satisfy requirements for collection would be to insist upon and invest time and effort into creating opportunities to meet at some official level with representatives of an adversary or even an ally. It could be done, if necessary, away from the public eye. In such meetings, specific questions could be asked of a foreign counterpart, and information could be provided to ones opposite number to ensure that the genuine position of another government on key matters, not the meditations of pundits or guesswork, would be run through mechanisms for analysis included will prevail in analyses. Depending upon the nature of relations between countries, the relative size of two or more countries, and the urgency or importance of issues between them, direct bilateral or multilateral talks between the most senior officials may not always be possible. For example, one may not officially recognize the sovereignty of another and perhaps visa versa. In the best case for the intelligence services of the respective countries, meetings would be held between senior intelligence officials. There may be the reality that one side may have more power to control the time and place of even such lower level engagements might be an issue for the other side to work through. Still, at whatever level officials might meet, whenever and wherever they might meet, and whether it might be a one shot opportunity, they must come prepared to collect enough information through well-crafted questions, keen listening to words, and skilled observations of behavior to satisfy intelligence requirements and prepare the best possible product for consumers. Interestingly, questions asked also can serve the purpose of informing the other side what one already knows, what one does not know, and what is most important. Questions serve as a curious form of sharing as much as collecting.

Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea Kim Yong-chul with his interpreter. (left), Trump (center), and US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (right). For the North Koreans, having the chance to get to know Trump and Pompeo, and learning what thinking in the administration was directly from them was both edifying and important. What the North Koreans learned was certainly far more informative than what their intelligence services may have been gleaned in the abstract from US news media sources and free wielding comments of experts in conferences and interviews.

The US News Media and Trump Critics: Caveat Emptor

The modality of the attacks on Trump from the news media catches the eye. It appears to exceed what few years earlier would have been considered impossible. The media never admired Trump. More seasoned, balanced, critics, have produced reports and commentary explaining that lots of things should be done, omitted, changed, and corrected by Trump. However, many other critics better skilled in “inpleasantry” than bon mot, have deemed Trump unfit for the presidency even before his election victory. The words “not presidential” were heard every time Trump spoke. Efforts by Trump of any kind would elicit a range of reactions by those engaged in the broad, piquant, counter-Trump discourse. (In 2017, greatcharlie frequently used the term, “counter-Trump milieu”, but alas, it failed to gain traction in the foreign policy debate.) There are other critics who apparently have found nothing desirable and everything loathsome about Trump. Trump’s efforts are explained as a cunning deceit, a dark tragedy. He is characterized as just another seductive tyrant, a demagogue. It could be said the US news media has not covered Trump as much as it has attached itself to him. They walk alongside him in order to discomfort and discourage him, increase the power of the blows against him. In the aggregate, they do not want Trump to feel a sense of serenity, calmness, quietness, peace and joy as president for one moment. Apparently, they want Trump to feel a deep-seated frustration, anxiety, worry.  They seem determined to throw Trump into loneliness and pain. Their hope for glory in attacking and defeating Trump walks hand in hand with their own doom for they live in the same country, the civilization that Trump is trying to improve. Ars prima regni est posse invidiam pati. (‘Tis the first art of kings, the power to suffer hate.)

Many critics are at a point in which they simply reject possibilities without hearing others. They rely upon self-serving explanations and surmisal. Critics see their efforts as righteousness, and they see far greater moral authority in themselves than in Trump. Critics analyses of history, of what was spposedly better, is nostalgia at best, myth at worst. Previous administrations would languish in the halls of inaction on a policy issue. They seemed to gain some satisfaction by merely moving from office to office, from conference room to conference room, from building to building, writing one memorandum after another, and declaring that in itself was action. Trump would admit that some mistakes have been made and a number of situations could have been handled differently, particularly on the domestic front. However, Trump has learned lessons. Modifications have been made in the way he makes statements and approaches situations. Nevertheless, critics reject the notion that he has evolved at all, and argue that he will never change. Lacking faith in the president, they surrender all hope that he could accomplish anything good for the US. While one might normally expect some change in behavior or conciliatory attitude from critics as time passes, their civility only seems recede further. There is a Hebrew term, küwl (cool), which means to sustain a hardship, to maintain ones balance in spite of what is happening. Trump has sought to avoid having a wounded spirit, powering away from despair and disappointment. Initially, Trump, in reaction to some critics, would “imitate the action of the tiger, stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, disguise fair nature with hard favor’d rage.” Trump has since become more selective as to when and to whom he will direct his disagreement. Few men could display true sangfroid if stress were assailing them as it has Trump. Some religious leaders would explain that a trial can present an opportunity to persevere under pressure. Moreover, one can grow in the midst of conflict.

Some Discerning Leaders Can Distinguish Perception from Reality Re Trump

Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.) Political and social pressures to conform to a counter-Trump outlook appear to exist in capitals worldwide. However, for any country, relations with the US are too important to allow ties to be damaged by behavior and attitudes displayed by leaders with a skewed understanding of realities about Trump.  As posited here, it would be very easy for intelligence service to provide information with a counter-Trump bent to their leaders thus creating that situation. Perhaps a decision to embrace such information would be the fact that it confirmed individual biases or prejudices those leaders might have about Trump. Many leaders who initially chose to take a stance hostile to Trump recognized that they had done a great disservice to the people and interests of their country. They subtracted such negative thinking and changed their approach to him. Others learned lessons from leaders taking a wrongful counter-Trump tact, and allowed themselves the opportunity to draw their own conclusions about him through direct contacts.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) and a Trump (right). After meetings in Washington with Trump from March 17, 2017 to March 18, 2017, Merkel made the harsh comment that Trump was not a reliable partner Germany and the Continent could depend upon. Her comments expressed her angst. Merkel was personally disappointed that Trump initially declined to publicly endorse NATO’s doctrine of collective defense, or agree to common European positions on global trade, dealing with Russian aggression, and mitigating the effects of climate change.

1. German Chancellor Angela Merkel

Following meetings in Washington with Trump from March 17, 2017 to March 18, 2017, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hailed as Europe’s most influential leader, made the stunning comment that US President Donald Trump is not the reliable partner her country and the Continent can depend upon. She was quoted in a May 28, 2017 New York Times article as stating: “The times in which we could rely fully on others — they are somewhat over,” adding, “This is what I experienced in the last few days.” Merkel went on to state: “We have to know that we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.” Her strong comments represented a potentially seismic shift in trans-Atlantic relations, as she has concluded without reservation that the US is now less willing to intervene overseas. The Times article explains that Merkel was personally disappointed that Trump declined to publicly endorse NATO’s doctrine of collective defense or to agree to common European positions on global trade, dealing with Russian aggression or mitigating the effects of climate change. Merkel’s comments were truly an expression of angst. Her words would lead one to believe that the current period, rather than being of change, and reinvigoration, is languid and dissolute. Yet, as a result of her statement, she may have also stirred concerns in the capitals of other NATO countries over how they will defend themselves against their most likely opponent, Russia, and handle other matters, without the US.

However, at some point after the meeting, Merkel likely recognized that she needed to take inventory of what had transpired so far with the US. She needed to stop moving the relationship in a negative direction.  From what Merkel said after her initial contacts with Trump, it was clear that Merkel felt some personal struggle with him. That was very troubling. Merkel’s responsibilities in meeting Trump was not to express her personal feelings about him. The genuine job at hand for the Chancellor was to do what best served the interest of the German people. Berlin needed to reorient Merkel on the matter. At stake was the relationship of Germany, and to an extent Europe, with the Trump administration. Berlin needed to find ways for Merkel to better respond and engage her country’s most powerful ally and cope with the Trump administration’s approach to policy matters concerning Europe. German policymakers, foreign policy analysts, and diplomats had to find answers. Resources needed to be diverted to that end. Cuiusvis est errare nullius nisi insipientes, in error perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.)

Things changed. While campaigning for her fourth term in office, Merkel stated on August 23, 2017 that Trump must be shown appropriate respect for holding the office of the US president, even if she may differ with him greatly on some policy issues. Merkel, a Trump critic, left no doubt that she was committed transatlantic relationship, and stressed the strength of German relations with the US. The statement was a rebuff to pressure from her Social Democratic Party rivals to resist demands by Trump for NATO members to increase their defense spending. Merkel explained during an interview with the German business daily Handelsblatt: “If you take the president of the United States, whatever differences of opinion there may be, I know he prevailed in a tough election. It wasn’t reserved for him on a silver platter.” She went on to state: “In the end, he won the election under American electoral law and that means he is democratically elected and that this person should be shown the appropriate respect, regardless of how I assess his views.” Merkel did what many US political opponents and allies, friends–full-time and part-time, former US officials, journalists, analysts, and other among his critics refuse to do or at least have not done well. Merkel apparently took inventory, reviewed what had transpired, and reconsidered the direction she wanted her public comments about Trump to take. During her three-hour visit to the White House on April 27, 2018, her exchanges with Trump were very cordial. Merkel discussed but did not emphasize her differences with Trump on steel and aluminium tariffs and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In a joint press conference afterward, they stressed the long-time ties between the US and Germany and the shared goal of a denuclearized North Korea. Trump now insists that he and Merkel have “a great relationship.”

Merkel apparently took inventory, reviewed what had transpired in March 2017, and reconsidered the direction she, as German Chancellor, wanted her interactions with Trump to take. During her three-hour visit to the White House on April 27, 2018, her exchanges with Trump were very cordial. Merkel discussed but did not emphasize her differences with Trump on steel and aluminium tariffs and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. In a joint press conference afterward, both stressed the long-time ties between the US and Germany.

2. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari

Some foreign leaders from the get-go fully understand that their focus during meeting with Trump should be their countries’ interests and relating well with the US President. They should not be prompted by the news media to speak or behave in ways that would aid its narrow interest in grabbing headlines to promote readership and viewership, and to fill advertising space and increase their profits. On April 30, 2018, Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari had the opportunity to visit Trump at the White House to discuss urgent and important issues concerning his country. Buhari was the first sub-Saharan African leader to be invited for talks with the Trump administration. Trump and Buhari agreed that fighting terrorism is a priority for both administrations. The US sold 12 counterinsurgency aircraft worth $496 million to Nigeria to help in its fight against Boko Haram jihadist insurgents, despite previous refusing to approve the sale due to human rights concerns. Trump let Buhari know that he wanted Nigeria to remove trade barriers and allow imports of US agricultural produce. What was not discussed were disparaging remarks Trump allegedly made concerning African countries on January 11, 2018.

However, when Trump and Buhari held a joint press conference in the White House Rose Garden, the Nigerian President was asked about Trump’s alleged complaints about immigrants coming to the US from Haiti, El Salvador and some African nations. Buhari was very aware of problems between the news media and Trump and aware more so of his duty to serve Nigeria’s interests. He astutely replied: “I’m not sure about, you know, the validity of whether that allegation against the president is true or not.” He added: “So the best thing for me is to keep quiet.

When Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari (left) and Trump (right) met on April 30, 2018, terrorism, human rights, and trade were on the agenda. In a joint press conference, however, reporters asked Buhari about Trump’s alleged complaints about African immigrants. Aware of problems between the news media and Trump and aware of his duty to serve Nigeria’s interests. Buhari astutely replied: “I’m not sure about, you know, the validity of whether that allegation against the president is true or not.” He added: “So the best thing for me is to keep quiet.”

3. French President Emmanuel Macron

When French President Emmanuel Macron visited the US from April 24, 2018 to April 25, 2018, he came with the purpose to bridge differences over the Iran nuclear agreement, encourage Trump not to withdraw so fast from Syria, exempt European countries from then prospective US steel and aluminum tariffs, and discuss the Paris Agreement on climate change and global warming. Indeed, Macron told Trump that France recognized the need for the US and France to work together to defeat terrorism, curtail weapons of mass destruction in North Korea and Iran, and act together on behalf of the planet. At the same time, Macron emphasized the importance of the Franco-American relationship, the commitment and the bond between the two countries, its historic importance and importance for both countries and world into the future.

Trump had already enjoyed very positive interactions with Macron. Trump was Macron’s guest in July 2017 at the annual Bastille Day military parade in Paris. During the visit, Macron and his wife, Brigitte, took Trump and his wife on a tour of Napoleon’s tomb and the Eiffel Tower where they had dinner while overlooking the City of Light. Trump reciprocated during Macron’s visit to Washington with a welcoming ceremony filled with pageantry and ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House, that included a 21-gun salute. Macron presented Trump with a thoughtful gift of a tree sampling from ”Devil Dog” fountain at Belleau Wood, where US Marines fought a deadly battle from June 1, 2018 to June 24, 1918, to repel a push by German forces toward Paris during World War I. Devil Dog fountain was a rally point for surviving Marines after they defeated the Germans. The Marines suffered nearly 10,000 casualties. Before an audience of US military personnel and Cabinet officials, Trump explained that the relationship he forged with Macron at the start of his presidency was a testament to the “enduring friendship that binds our two nations.” He thanked the French leader for his “steadfast partnership” in the recent missile strike in response to the chemical attack in Syria. Trump went on to state, “It’s an honor to call you my friend.” He predicted that Macron would be a historic leader of France. In a jovial mood in the Oval Office, Trump displayed some personal chemistry with Macron by feigning to brush off Macron’s suit jacket and saying, “We have a very special relationship; in fact, I’ll get that little piece of dandruff off. We have to make him perfect — he is perfect.” During a toast at a formal state dinner, Trump mentioned the ties between the US and France, saying, “May our friendship grow even deeper, may our kinship grow even stronger and may our sacred liberty never die.”

The next day, at a joint press conference, Macron focused on the relationship between the US and France, Macron said, “History is calling us. It is urging our people to find the fortitude that has guided us in the most difficult of times. France and with it, Europe, and the United States have an appointment with history.” However, through a translator, Macron again got down to business, stating: “Mr. President, please allow me to go back to a number of issues, which are fundamental for not only our relationship, but beyond. The first topic is Iran. You said once again, in front of the press, what your position was during the campaign and as well as the President of the United States.  It’s not a mystery we did not have the same starting positions or stances, and neither you nor I have a habit of changing our stances or going with the wind.” On his last day in Washington, Macron, in flawless English, addressed the US Congress. Although Macron spoke critically to an even greater degree of a number of Trump’s foreign policy, trade and environmental decisions, he did so in a well-considered, methodical way, always leaving real hope that at some point a meeting of minds could be reached.

Critics put off by the congenial interaction between Trump and Macron. Their friendship was derided as “Le Bromance” and critics groaned that there were “exaggerated handshakes and a pair of kisses.” Macron was referred to as a “Trump whisperer” because he converses with Trump often by telephone. Critics seemed to find solace in the belief that Trump’s relationships with other European leaders are more strained. While the idea emphasized, it is not necessarily the case. Critics also noted that Trump ended his first year in office without receiving a foreign leader on a state visit, the first president in nearly 100 years to fail to do so.

French President Emmanuel Macron (left) and Trump (right) When Macron visited the US from April 24, 2018 to April 25, 2018, he hoped to bridge differences with Trump over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, encourage him not to leave quickly from Syria, prevent prospective US steel and aluminum tariffs on European countries, and make headway with Trump on the Paris Agreement on climate change. Macron spoke critically on a number of Trump’s foreign policy, trade and environmental decisions, but did so in a thoughtful way. He also emphasized the importance of the Franco-American relationship and his friendship with Trump.

The Way Forward

In Act I, scene iii, of William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth, Generals Macbeth and Banquo have already defeated the invading armies of Ireland and Norway. As they cross a moor together, they encounter three witches. The witches hail Macbeth as thane of Glamis–his original title–and as thane of Cawdor. The witches also declare that Macbeth will be king one day. They call Banquo “lesser than Macbeth, and greater,” and “not so happy, yet much happier”; then they proffer that he will never be king but his children will sit upon the throne. Once the witches vanish, Macbeth and Banquo stand baffled and speak skeptically of their prophecies. However, two of King Duncan’s men, arrive. One tells Macbeth that the king has made him thane of Cawdor as the witches prophesized. While Macbeth is intrigued that the witches words came true, Banquo warns: “That trusted home Might yet enkindle you unto the crown, Besides the thane of Cawdor But ’tis strange: And oftentimes, to win us to our harm, The instruments of darkness tell us truths, Win us with honest trifles, to betray’s In deepest consequence.” The agendas of foreign governments are usually single-minded. They will try to push the US to use its wherewithal and capabilities in a way that favors their countries positions. Some national leaders have projected a sense of apprehension about approaching Trump to improve their countries’ conditions, enhance military, diplomatic, political situations, or at least maintain the status quo. Some partners, much as competitors, have pushed hard with their respective agendas with the US from a counter-Trump perspective. Both the impetus and confirmation of their thoughts, words, and deeds can usually be sourced from reports and commentaries of Trump’s critics. Naturally, discord has obtained as a consequence of taking such an ill-considered tack. Critics have painted a portrait of Trump, and through it, a personality of Trump is conveyed, but it has always been their version of him and it has never been complimentary. They see no style, grace, creativity or intellect in the ways in which he has addressed foreign policy issues. They insist that a dictatorial mayhem exists in the Trump administration and only the worst foreign policy decisions could possibly flow from it. As explained here, one route such thinking from critics can travel to national leaders is through their countries’ intelligence services. Those services might be willing to allow intelligence reports to be colored with information from overt US sources produced by critics openly hostile toward Trump. That information, in turn, would confirm leader negative views of him. That information could “betray with deepest consequence.”.

Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is, in reality, nothing so mysterious about Trump that should lead any national leader to throw a history of good relations with the US out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Trump’s critics will destroy any opportunity for a new, better, enriching path to develop. Those leaders must consider what their respective countries relationships with the US mean not only on one issue, but in the bigger picture. They should consider what the US really offers. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the US, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover that Trump, in doing things a bit differently, presents possibilities for getting many new, better things done. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the US and become their country’s dénouement concerning Trump. They can still recurvate. Changes on one issue could result in great benefits on another. Sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum, securum; etiam si quid obstat, nubium modo intervenit, quae infra feruntur nec umquam diem vincunt. (Virtue alone affords everlasting and peace-giving joy; even if some obstacle arise, it is but like an intervening cloud, which floats beneath the sun but never prevails against it.)

US-Led Military Strikes in Syria Were a Success: Was a Correlative Political Warfare Success Achieved, Too?

Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-Assad (left) and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (right). Given all that transpired in Syria surrounding the US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes, Putin, Assad and their respective senior advisers may very well have begun to ask questions about future of relations between their countries. Relations between Moscow and Damascus may have begun moving in a new direction to the dissatisfaction and disappointment of Putin, and the dismay and anger of Assad.

Correlative effects can result from airstrikes, cruise missile strikes, drone strikes, and artillery attacks. Those effects could include damage to surrounding structures, or could mean unfortunate harm to civilians, in or near a target struck. Correlative effects can sometimes include shaping the attitude and behavior of an opponent targeted, his ability think, what he thinks, his ability to fight, and even his interactions with individuals with which he is allied or tenuously unified can be others. A correlative result of the April 13, 2018 US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes in Syria may have been a hard blow upon the ties between Russia and Syria. Indeed, perhaps far more was accomplished by that US-led coalition than the Trump administration could have imagined. On April 13, 2018, US military forces, acting in coordination with military forces from the United Kingdom and France, took decisive action against the chemical weapons infrastructure of the Syria Arab Republic. It was in response to an April 7, 2018 chemical weapons attack against his own citizens in Douma. According to the Trump administration, the US has vital national interests in averting a worsening catastrophe in Syria, and specifically deterring the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. The military strikes took out “the heart” of the Syrian chemical weapons enterprise, but there were other facilities that were not struck due to concerns about civilian casualties. He declined to say exactly how much of the chemical weapons program was taken out. US Defense Secretary James Mattis explained that the strikes were “a one-time shot.” US Marine Corps Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie, the director of the Joint Staff, explained in an April 18, 2018 press conference at the Pentagon that the US carefully plotted out the strength, length of time, and target set of the strikes. Efforts were made to minimize the potential for chemical weapons to leak out of the facilities, with McKenzie saying “we believe we successfully mitigated” the risk. He explained that while it is possible that some material and people were moved from the site in the lead-up to the attack, there were certain pieces of equipment that the regime would not have been able to relocate. McKenzie acknowledged that the three sites did not represent the totality of the Syrian chemical weapons program known to the US. However, McKenzie and Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White emphasized that future strikes in the region could not be ruled out, saying that it is entirely up to the Assad regime. They went on to explain that the use of chemical weapons in the future could lead to more strikes.

After everything, Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-Assad sits ostensibly in relative safety and comfort in Damascus as the leader of all of Syria, even though he only controls a small part of the country’s territory. He only holds on to that with the assistance of Russia and Iran. Even more, he wields as much power as Russia will grant him to wield. To observers, there appears to be a blindness in Moscow about Assad. Yet, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is well aware of his Syrian counterpart’s merits and deficits. He has an intellectual understanding of Assad, his habits, his ways. Indeed, at this point, Putin, with albeit some effort, very likely can track his thoughts, and likely has intimations about his moves whenever he thinks about Syria. For some, the optics of their interactions would support the idea that Assad is something akin to a ventriloquist’s dummy for Putin. Others would insist that they have a strong personal bond. Imdeed, there are Western foreign policy analysts and scholars would go as far as to say the relationship with Assad is indissoluble. Putin would likely assert that the two men simply have a better than average friendly rapport based on mutual interests and military, diplomatic, and economic arrangements. It would be practically impossible for the truly experienced not to see that in their relationship, Putin is the top, the leader, the senior party and Assad is the bottom, the follower, the junior party. Often, Putin displays choreographed support for Assad. When relationships are built on mutual interests and useful arrangements, and not a higher bond, sometimes conditions can change to such a degree that the relationship might be altered or ended.

Given all that transpired in Syria surrounding the US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes. Putin, Assad and their senior advisers may very well have begun to ask questions about future of relations between their countries. The interior thoughts, emotions officials in Moscow and Damascus play an important role in all that is happening with Syria. There was nothing but negative feedback for Assad regarding Putin. Assad likely had no doubt that Putin would stand with him against the West. Yet, as the Western military strikes were executed on April 13, 2018, Assad watched as Putin did nothing. The lesson for Assad was that he should not be so trusting of Russia and his other somewhat powerful allies. After all, when desires action from them, he has almost no way to aafely shape their behavior. While Assad did not publicly brood over what transpired on April 13th, he was likely resentful and bitter about it. Postulating that the military strikes in Syria were designed to have the effect of sowing seeds of mistrust and dissent between Russia and Syria would go a bit beyond conjecture. However, there may have been coincidental, correlative political warfare effects resulting from the April 13th military strikes. A glut of information about Assad is held by the intelligence services of the US, United Kingdom, and France. Amid what has been collected is undoubtedly information about the dynamics of Assad’s relationship with Putin. It may confirm that their relationship is now a bit different. The tons of information coming in from Syria may be at a constipation point. Information of that sort may not have been synthesised yet. Nothing has been made public or provided newsmedia reports on whether the April 13, 2018 military strikes had either a deliberate or correlative effect of rocking the boat between Moscow and Damascus has been produced. Still, one can ruminate, outside of the box, that a ball may have begun rolling in a new direction to the dissatisfaction and disappointment of Putin, and the dismay and anger of Assad. The possibility that the relationship may take a new direction is briefly examined here. Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. (Time destroys the figments of the imagination, while confirming judgments of nature [God].)

Assad (left) and Putin (right). From all that is publicly known, scoring a political warfare victory was not part of the concept and intent of the US. Unless one was involved in the planning of the military strike, it would be impossible to posit with certainty that some consideration was given to how the military strikes would affect the Russia-Syria relationship. Still the features of a political warfare effort, even if coincidental, are discernible.

Detecting Political Warfare

Again, from all that is publicly known, scoring a political warfare victory was not part of the concept and intent of the US and did not factor into the planning of the military strikes in Syria. Unless one was involved in the planning of the military strike, it would be impossible to posit with certainty that some consideration was given to how the military strikes would affect the Russia-Syria relationship. Still the features of a political warfare effort, even if coincidental, are discernible. Under a definition offered by the RAND Corporation, political warfare consists of the international use of one or more of the implements of power–diplomatic, information, military, and economic–to affect the political composition of decision making within a state. Political warfare is often, yet not necessarily, carried out covertly, but must be carried out outside the context of traditional war. In the broadest sense, it could take the form of anything other than military operations. It could for example include: economic subversion, propaganda–not tied to the military effort, psychological warfare–as part of a military effort; conditional aid to a state; aid to political parties; aid to resistance groups; political accommodation; and, assassination. Renown security affairs analyst Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation explains that political warfare reverses the famous dictum of the 19th century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz that “war is the extension of politics by other means,” political warfare is the extension of armed conflict by other means. Political warfare does not focus exclusively on enemies who are at large or end with their capture. It targets those on their way in to enemy ranks, those who might be persuaded to quit, and those in custody. Political warfare sees the enemy not as a monolithic force, but as a dynamic population of individuals whose grievances, sense of humiliation, and desire for revenge, honor, status, meaning, or mere adventure propel them into jihad and resistance. Political warfare accepts no foe as having irrevocably crossed a line, but sees enemy combatants as constantly calibrating and recalibrating their commitment. It sees every prisoner not merely as a source of operational intelligence, but as a potential convert. Political warfare is infinitely flexible and ferociously pragmatic. It accepts local accommodations to reduce violence, offers amnesties to induce divisions and defections, and cuts deals to co-opt enemies.

Until recently, things have typically gone relatively well between Putin and Assad. There has rarely been reason for them to think too negatively of one another. However, as circumstances develop in which their perspectives grow in variance on matters of mutual concern. The atmosphere has already changed a bit. It will change even more if Assad decides to use chemical weapons again. Common wisdom in the West is that Assad would unlikely use chemical weapons again, not because his known chemical capability has been denigrated, not because he has been punished him excessively, but because Assad, according to Western thinking, Assad has already won the war with the assistance of Russia and Iran. Dropping more chemical weapons would have no strategic value any Western military analysts can think of. Moreover, it would not make sense to incur the wrath of the US and other Western powers as a result of using such weapons. All of that being stated, it appears the West must learn over and over again that Assad thinks differently than most national leaders, and military analysts as well. Assad has embraced his role as a tyrant. He is concerned mainly with holding power. In his conscious or unconscious mind, he may be haunted by the fear of facing retribution for violent acts ordered in defense of his power and atrocities committed against his own people. Everyone does not think the same and Assad is a perfect example of that. Putin, however, is certainly aware of how different Assad is.

The chief foreign linkage of Syria under Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, before him, have been the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union, respectively. The present Assaf has been useful to Russia as a figurehead, a symbol of resistance to the Syrian opposition, ISIS and Islamic terrorist groups  and the West.  He is undoubtedly viewed in Moscow as Putin’s man, and his ball to play with. It was the strength and realities of those ties between Damascus and Moscow  that were poorly considered when the US injected itself in Syria in support of the anti-Assad opposition movement during the Arab Spring in 2011. By the Fall 2015, Assad appeared to lack the ability to remain in power against ISIS and perhaps US-backed Syrian Opposition forces. The military situation began recurvate after Russia, with the urging of Iran, moved its forces into Syria in September 2015 and supported Syrian military operations.

It is interesting how Putin and Assad, two men from desperate backgrounds have established a very positive relationship that goes beyond mutual courtesy and civility. Putin rose from humble beginnings, raised by a mother and father who respectively managed to survive the siege of Leningrad and violent battles during World War II. Assad, on the other hand, was the privileged, eldest son of the former President of Syria, General Hafez Al-Assad, who ruled from 1971 to 2000. Putin completed his studies in law at Leningrad University before embarking on a successful career in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. Along with the well-earned praise of his colleagues and positive evaluations from his superiors, he had a record of service that led others to support his rise to the pinnacle of power in Russia. Assad was educated as a doctor, trained as a surgeon, and lived a comforrable life in London before being called home to take the reigns in Syria after his father’s death. Indeed, one man, Putin, was self-made, with his knowledge and capabilities shaped and polished by every obstacle and adversity he managed to overcome. The other man, Assad, had everything in life laid out in front of him, and there were few character shaping struggles. Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes viros. (Fire provides proof of gold, misery, proof of strong men.)

In crafting a fruitful relationship with Assad, Putin seems to have handled him much as he would have handled an operative during his days in the intelligence industry. During his one-on-one contacts with Assad he has likely spent time motivating, befriending, briefing, advising, counselling, debriefing, and perhaps paying and welfaring him. It has served to establish the bridge between them. It is the sort of interaction to which Putin is attracted. It has helped to shape the dynamic and apparent congenial nature of their exchanges. It is likely that somewhere, Putin keeps notes that are part of a personal study of Assad. At age 65, Putin as a man and a leader, and in terms of capabilities and shrewdness, is far more advanced than Assad who is 52. For Putin, there certainly would be advantage in maintaining the relationship as is, if he can. There is an expediency in working with something, someone that you understand, who has been predictable. It is hard to imagine Putin might be overly concerned with Assad’s feelings. Yet, while Putin might only relate to other leaders much as strangers on a train, his relationship with Assad has been something more. In all the years until this point, whenever he met with Assad, they likely simply picked up wherever they leave off. Assad was granted a ticket to the high table international affairs by Putin. Contrarily, Assad cannot do much independently to enhance Putin’s life.

Putin (left) and Assad (right). In crafting a fruitful relationship with Assad, Putin seems to have handled him much as he would have handled an operative during his days in the intelligence industry. During his one-on-one contacts with Assad, he has likely spent time motivating, befriending, briefing, advising, counselling, debriefing, and perhaps paying him. It has served to establish a bridge between them.

Putin almost never fails to publicly cover Assad’s actions that reach the world’s gaze. He has supported Assad with strong words, diplomatic maneuvering at the UN and bilaterally with a handful of receptive countries, mostly it neighbors. He has of course, supported him by deploying Russian military forces to his country to protect his regime. Moscow’s initial response to the Assad’s chemical attacks in Douma was a grand denial that the Assad regime had anything to do with it. Russia, a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, sought to fight fire with oil, giving credence to the idea that Assad did not and would not use chemical weapons and the entire matter was a hoax. This was made worse by Russia’s futile attempt make the investigation of the chemical attacks a joint venture in which Russia would work alongside the UN Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at the site of the attack and in their research labs. It must not be forgotten that Assad should not have access to chemical weapons at all, but an intriguing diplomatic tact taken by Moscow in 2013 left the door open to that. On September 14, 2013, Moscow and Washington reached an agreement under which Russia guaranteed Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and all equipment for producing, mixing, and filing chemical weapons would be destroyed before the end of the first half of 2014. The OPCW would implement the agreement.  The genesis of the agreement was an August 21, 2013 chemical attack by the Assad regime against several towns of the Ghouta agricultural belt to the West and East of Damascus.  Reportedly the administration of US President Barack Obama was nearing a decision to launch US-led punitive strikes against Syria. A suggestion was made by the US Secretary of State John Kerry stated offhandedly at a press conference on September 9, 2013 that the US might not conduct military strikes if Assad placed Syria’s enture chemical weapons stockpile under international control within a week. Hours after that statement, Russian Federation Foreign Minister managed to have Syrian Arab Republic Foreign Minister Walid Muallem agree to the idea. On April 13, 2018, and back on April 6, 2017, the Trump administration, based on clear and convincing evidence took action against Assad contrary to decision of the Obama administration when it had the opportunity. Most importantly, however, action had to be taken because both Russia and Syria clearly failed to meet their responsibility under the 2013 agreement. There has been little no mention of the September 14, 2013 agreement by Moscow or Damascus after the April 13, 2018 chemical attacks. Moreover, rather expressing of concern over the use of chemical weapons, as could be expected, prevarications emanated from Moscow and Damascus concerning the attacks.

Moscow also made false claims that the majority of cruise missiles fired into Syria were shot down. Russian news outlets, as well as social media from the region, had claimed as many as 70 percent of coalition weapons were shot down by Syrian or Russian air defenses. But the Russian systems did not attempt to intercept the incoming weaponry, and the Syrian system launched around 40 surface to air missiles after the last targeted weapon hit its target, Referring to this type of activity by Moscow as information warfare perhaps gives it too much respectability as its purpose is to position it as master of the mob: anti-US, anti-EU, anti-West, and pro-Russian elements worldwide. Even Moscow must realize that in each case, all of its falsehoods would be overcome by the truth over time. Assad clearly had no concern over having frightful clouds hang over himself for atrocities committed before and during the Syrian War. There is not much that could further vulgarize his reputation. From experience of the Soviet Union as well as that of their own Russian Federation, officials in Moscow should have learned that the wounds Russia’s image suffers from such antics are all self-inflicted, deleterious, and all very unnecessary. Russia is reduced to a level akin to a “Fourth World” dictatorship, a so-called “Banana Republic”, when it prevaricates on matters concerning the US.

Every time Moscow distorts the truth, it confirms the worst about itself. The ugly image many policy makers, decision makers, and analyst in the West long since have had seared in their minds about Russia are reinforced. Few anywhere in the world can be confident what’ Moscow says is true, except those willing to be deceived. When Putin and his officials make claims on other occasions to the effect that Russia is a land of the mind, this questionable behavior, along with a lot of other things, puts that notion in doubt.

Intriguingly, Moscow puts significant effort into improving its image as a world leader, yet undermines that effort by backing Assad and destroying its image in the minds of many. There are consequences to the way one lives. He who walks with wise men will be wise, but a companion of fools will be destroyed. On April 11, 2018, Trump wrote on Twitter: “You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!”, referring to Moscow’s alliance with Assad. Assad, by his actions, has repeatedly immobilized Putin. He is left unable to smoothly move on to better things. If there are future chemical attacks by Assad, it is uncertain what the future of his relationship with Putin will be. A number possible scenarios exist based on questions Putin and Assad might ask themselves as well as steps they might take as the situation between them develops. Those steps would likely fall under the category of political warfare.

US President Donald Trump (above). It is intriguing to observe Moscow put significant effort into improving its image as a world leader, and then undermine that effort by lending unwavering support to Assad after he has acted against the norms of civilized world. On April 11, 2018, Trump wrote on Twitter: “You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!”, referring to Moscow’s tie with Assad. By his actions, Assad immobilizes Putin, leaving him unable to move on to better things.

Is Assad Worth the Trouble?: Scenario for Putin

Due to flaws in his government, his own deficiencies as a leader, and perhaps a lack of empathy, Assad failed to spare the people of the old ills of war and crime. Without the support of Putin and Russia, one could reasonably conclude that Assad would have been brushed aside awhile ago. Indeed, in 2015, Assad appeared to lack the ability to remain in power against both ISIS and other Islamic terrorist groups and the US-backed Syrian Opposition forces. Policy makers and decision makers in Moscow and Tehran doubted Assad could hold on to power in Damascus without assistance. They mainly feared the real possibility that Syria would fall in the hands of ISIS. One could only imagine what would have been needed to regain and retain control of the country if ISIS had forced the regime out of Damascus. Putin provided a rational for Russia’s intervention in Syria in a speech at a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Dushanbe Tajikistan, on September 15, 2015. In response to Western criticism of Russia’s move, Putin explained, “We support the government of Syria in its opposition to terrorist aggression. We have provided and will provide necessary military and technical support and call on other nations to join us.” Putin noted the exodus of refugees toward Europe and the crisis in Syria was a result of the support foreign powers provided the Syria opposition rebels. He said, “I would like to note that people are fleeing Syria because of the military actions that were largely imposed externally by deliveries of weapons and other special equipment. People are fleeing to escape the atrocities committed by terrorists.” Putin went on to state, “[The refugees] are fleeing from radicals, above all. And if Russia had not supported Syria, the situation in this country would have been worse than in Libya, and the stream of refugees would have been even greater.”

Speaking to Western and Arab capitals, Putin declared, “We must sideline geopolitical ambitions, refrain from so-called double standards, from the policy of direct use of separate terrorist groups to achieve opportunistic goals, including the change of governments and regime that may be disagreeable to whomever.” Concerning Assad, Putin relayed that he might be willing to enter a power-sharing agreement with opposition but that the fight against terrorism was the priority. To that extent, Putin explained, “The Islamic State is providing ideological indoctrination and training to fighters from different countries including, unfortunately European countries and the Russian Federation, and many former Soviet republics. And of course, we are worried with the possibility of them returning to our territories.” As explained in a December 30, 2015 greatcharlie post, commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces reportedly believed the military objective of any ground operations in Syria should first be to create a regime stronghold in what is referred to as “Useful Syria” (Suriya al-Mufida) from Damascus up to Aleppo through Homs. That would require Russia and its allies to sweep up the Western part of Syria. The objective was to take pressure off Latakia, a pro-Assad, Alawite heartland and locale of an important airfield and take pressure off Tartus, a long-time Soviet Naval port passed on to the Russian Federation Navy. It is key for the delivery of military material to Russian and Syrian forces and important for the conduct of military operations in support of Syria. After reaching Latakia, Russia and its allies would turn toward Idlib. Part of the force could have pushed farther north to gain control of the Syrian-Turkish border west of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) territory, blocking the US coalition and ISIS from access to it. In an additional phase of their offensive, Russia and its allies would press eastward. A key objective was to take Palmyra from ISIS and the oil and gas resources around it. Russia began to gain control of the situation on the ground in Syria soon after deploying significant forces there in September 2015. At this point, the fight to secure “Useful Syria” has essentially been won. Syria, however, is still reliant upon a military and security umbilical cord tied from Moscow to Damascus.

Discord obtains when things get mixed up. Assad would likely disagree with any assessment that described him as a follower, or stated that his existence is contingent upon Russian power. He would likely describe himself as partner with Putin and other leaders and that Syria is working jointly with its allies. It is imaginable that Assad believes he is delegating part of the job of using military power to defeat Syria’s enemies to Russia and others. For Assad, all arrows point his way, for he almost always thinks and acts in terms of self-interest. Assad would likely proffer that Syria in the aggregate has the capability and capacity fend off threats to its security. Trouble comes when Assad sets out to confirm his thinking with heinous acts of violence, such as the chemical weapons attacks, which he knows are antithetical to norms of the civilized world, counter international law, and in defiance of demands made of his regime by the UN Security Council through resolutions. Assad apparently has much to prove to his fellow countryman, to other regional leaders, to his allies such as Russia, and the rest of the world. When he has lashed out, and he has done so regularly during the war, he proves that he is truly a despot. Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum. (To err is human, to persist in it, is diabolical.)

Assad (left), Putin (center), and Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (right). Commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces reportedly believed the military objective of any ground operations in Syria should first be to create a regime stronghold in what is referred to as “Useful Syria.” Once Russian forces moved into Syria in September 2015, the military situation began to recurvate. The fight to secure “Useful Syria” has essentially been won. Syria, however, is still reliant upon a military and security umbilical cord with Russia.

In Syria, the Assad regime, through an unending propaganda campaign, projects an image of its president in a way in which he is in firm control. That image also serves to assure the Syrian people that they still live in a sovereign state and that they have control over their own destiny. That image is completely inaccurate. Yet, there is little in Syria to interfere with that imaginative process as the government has strict control over media. True, Syrians can see that Putin has provided thousands of Russian advisers, troops and airmen who are engaged in daily operations to fend off and destroy the regimes adversaries. Yet, Syrians supportive of the Assad regime would likely assure that the tie between their leader and Putin was unbreakable. Rather than feel threatened, they, in fact, welcome Russia’s presence and taken refuge in the umbrella of the added security provided by the Russians. They are happy to believe they need not fear for their survival as long Putin and Russia are working hand in hand with their country. Simultaneously, those same Syrian’s would argue that Assad is still the real power in Syria. Moreover, they are likely ignorant or unconcerned with the problems Assad’s actions have caused Russia. Vivit et est vitae nescius ipse suae. (Man lives in ignorance of his own life.)

Assad very likely believes his self-crafted, virtual image truly mirrors his real life. Looking at newsmedia video clips of Assad in Damascus, one might be bemused by the artificial size of his life. Syria is an authoritarian regime ruled by Assad much as, but albeit far less orderly and competently than his father before him. Politically, Syria is an odd hybrid, a quasi-national socialist, Islamic state. Assad is accepted by his beloved Alawites as well as elites from his own Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, other like-minded political groupings, business leaders, and leadership of the Armed forces and the security services. The People’s Council–the national legislature of Syria–and the Syrian judicial system cannot even provide a fig leaf of democracy for Assad regime. Syria’s elites appear satisfied with conditions in “Useful Syria”. It is something akin to a kingdom of gold for them. The coffers of Syria have serve the purposes of the elites and Assad. It is a type of larceny Assad inherited from his father. Those in Syria who have money, power are celebrities, heroes of the society, having what the majority can never attain. The Presidential Palace on Mount Mezzah is emblematic of Assad’s efforts to provide a venir of prosperity and power over a broken country in unimaginable suffering has visited countless homes.

None could doubt at this point that the life, happiness of the common man means nothing in Assad’s Syria. Assad does not have the type of government that elevates human beings. Assad has never used his words or events in the outside world to encourage Syrian to raise themselves up, to be more, to accomplish more. Assad uses words to stimulate nationalism, to cause Syrians to accept that the source of their country’s problems is the aggressive, greedy, external world, the West as opposed to any cause that comes from within, such as himself. An appropriate understanding among all Syrians about of what is happening in Syria will never be obtained as long as they are fed contradictory or insufficient facts. Even if the “have nots” in proximity of elites demanded some changes, an almost inexhaustible number of agencies among the security services would subdue them, punish those who do not revere the masters of their society. When the war is over, Syrians who can, would like to love the simpler lives they had once before. Syrians want to return to Assad’s version of peace and tranquility: the peace of submission to the regime; the tranquility of working in a secure position within the narrow confines of the regime’s dictates. Assad’s vision for future of Syria is most likely based on self-interest, his own well-being. The hope that anchors him is that he will remain in power, and the problems that have seized him since the civil war in Syria began in 2011 would eventually go away. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniusta s, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. (For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.)

Perhaps it would not be judged as a fair comparison, but compared with countries in the West, Syria could hardly be viewed as a normal, functioning, sovereign country. A sovereign country that cannot defend its borders is not authentically sovereign. Moreover, Syria could be labelled derelict given the condition of most of its towns and cities. To Putin, who, unlike Assad, is thinking realistically about the future of Syria, it is very apparent that reconstruction in Syria will be another huge hurdle to overcome. The bellwether of Syria’s future condition can be observed in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Donetsk People’s Republic, and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Lacking any significant resources from the US and the rest of the international community to rebuild, that would be the only viable long-term condition that Syria could reach with Moscow’s assistance alone. Syria would simply become a larger version of those political, economic, and social disasters. Few other countries or international organizations appear willing to dive in to help Syria with signigicant financial assistance or investment. Few countries are in a rush to reopen or fully staff their embassies in Syria. They most lilely believe there would no benefit, but only difficulties in working with Assad. As a result, the Syrian people are shut off from those in the rest of the world who might be able to truly help them.

Optimists would hold out some hope that the situation would improve. However, no international conference, no guarantees from Russia to keep him in check, no surgical procedure even, could make Assad palatable to the West at this point, or to any government in the Middle East other than Iran. Manipulations that might ordinarily knock things back on track with Assad would likely have been exhausted or be seen as useless. It may be safe to say the Assad will never develop, never change. Luckily for Moscow, Assad is actually at its disposition. Given the strong influence Russia has on the Assad regime’s main elements of his power, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and the security services, at the very least, the effort might be made to remder Assad’s presidency symbolic. In a more virile approach, Russia, perhaps in sync with Syria’s foreign benefactors, might seek to replace Assad with a leader who would be more acceptable among the Syrians, more palatable for themselves. As far as Assad’s well-being was concerned, the basing arrangements for Russian naval, air, and ground forces, and the relationship developed with Putin would no longer have meaning.

Assad would likely disagree with any assessment that would describe him as a follower, or that his existence is contingent upon Russian power. He would likely describe himself as partner with Putin and other leaders and that Syria is working jointly with its allies. It is imaginable that Assad believes he is delegating part of the job of using military power to defeat Syria’s enemies to Russia and others. For Assad, all arrows point his way, as he nearly always thinks and acts in self-interest.

Keep the Status Quo or Assert Himself?: Scenario re Assad

So far, Assad has been able to have his cake and eat it, too! He has defiantly launched chemical weapons against his own people, while savoring the general protection and support of Russia and others. How long this situation will last is uncertain. Surely, the Russians will have a say in that. There are still a lot of hand shakes and pats on the back from Putin meant to encourage. Yet, a handshake or pat on the back cannot supplant rejection. It cannot correct a problem or resolve a serious disagreement.

If Assad were to sense an undercurrent of dissention toward him inside Syria, he would undoubtedly physically thin out the ranks of those he would deem potential plotters and replace them immediately with a more loyal sort. He would do so taking care not disturb the defined ecosystem of power elites, sending the message that he demands loyalty but avoid starting another uprising particularly among those who have supported him.

Such events would certainly catch the attention of the Russians. Assad might conclude that Moscow may see some benefit in aiding an group of Syrian elites willing to remove him. An “organic rebellion” that could remove Assad would be more agreeable to Putin and elites in Russia who might have already concluded that his removal will lead to more beneficial outcome of Russia’s investment there. He may fear that removing him under such conditions might be more understandable to tyrants in rogue regimes worldwide who may also rely upon Russia to back them with military force, some level of economic wherewithal or payments. However, Assad would not willingly step aside for a successor albeit selected by friendly, outside power, even if he had some say in who would replace him. He surely would not sit idly by as the plot developed to put his reign to an end.

Looking at the US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes in the aggregate, it somewhat understandable that some analysts doubt that Assad and his advisers in Damascus would be so spun up by them. The US-led coalition has conducted airstrikes in Syria against ISIS and targets threatening coalition ground forces for many months. The Israeli Air Force has conducted regular strikes in Syria so precise and effective and with impunity, that one could say with some humor that the Israelis were using parts of Syria as a bombing range. The issue is that the military strikes of April 13th were the second time the US has deliberately attacked Syrian targets and the second time Russia did not act. That is the rub. Prior to the Western military strikes, Russia urged the US to avoid taking military action in response to an alleged chemical attack in Syria. On April 10, 2018, the Russian Federation Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia stated: “I would once again beseech you to refrain from the plans that you’re currently developing.” He warned Washington that it will “bear responsibility” for any “illegal military adventure.” A threat from Moscow to down US missiles came from the Russian Federation’s Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, who said his comments were based on previous statements by Putin and the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov. The Russian Federation Armed Forces stated on March 13, 2018, that it would respond to any US strike on Syria by targeting any missiles and launchers involved. However, Russian air defense systems did not attempt to intercept the incoming weaponry, and the Syrian system launched around 40 surface to air missiles after the last targeted weapon hit its target, according to the Pentagon. The Pentagon noted that the S-400 systems were not turned off, simply not activated, leaving open the option their radar systems were used to tracking incoming threats but the weapons systems were not fired. The fact that those systems were active but not used may serve as evidence that the deconfliction line between the US and Russia, which was used to urge Russia not to escalate the situation, had been effective.

Within his own close circle in Damascus, it may very well be that Assad’s grievances are well-expressed. There may be lung busting exertions of his sense of being betrayed once again by Putin, driven by a nagging sense at this juncture that his relationship with him does not have much future. Assad may wish to take matters into his own hands. Seeing Assad interact with Russian emissaries in Damascus, he left little evidence of being riled emotionally by actions by his benefactors. The Interfax News Agency quoted Natalya Komarova, governor of Russia’s autonomous Khanty-Mansiysk district, made it a point to state: “President Assad was in absolutely positive spirits. He is in a good mood.,” To date, Assad has not publicly proffered any fevered dreams of conspiracy about the military strikes. His own officials and advisers are likely impressed by a type of controlled schizophrenia he displays. Nevertheless, the April 13th military strikes, and events surrounding them, may have set the stage for counteractions by Assad. It may very well be that Assad will launch additional chemical attacks to demonstrate that his regime does not feel threatened by US power, prove to himself that he is not being led by the nose by Putin, and ironically to pull Russia deeper into the situation as it has sought to full back by failing to act April 13th. To foreign policy and military analyst, it may all seem irrational, and that would be a reasonable response. Still, everyone does not think the same. Assad, the trained surgeon, has done so much that would be deemed improbable, it would seem counterintuitive to assume he will act in accord within any norms in the future. Scenarios for other ways in which Assad might seek retribution might include the following:

1) Assad might decide to establish some simulacrum of the US Lend-Lease arrangements of World War with China. Under it, China could possibly build its own military base or port. Assad could receive guarantees of significant assistance from China in Syria’s reconstruction efforts. China could also agree to provide Syria advanced command, control, communication and surveillance systems and agree to allow Syrian forces create garrisons and store Syrian military hardware on its new bases. Assad’s goal in that hypothetical situation would not be to allow a build-up in Syria by China that would establish it as a counterbalance to Russian military power. Assad’s goal in allowing a enough of a build-up that would lead Putin to better the value and importance of his ties to Syria. A decision by Assad to reach out to China might be viewed as injudicious given the possible consequences. Chinese ambitions in Syria might be difficult for Damascus to tame. The opportunity to build bases so close to Europe would present an I exhaustive list of possibilities for Chinese military planners. Putin may overreact to the decision and strongly suggest that Assad to rescind the invitation to China creating a genuine, visible rift between the two countries. Under circumstance, for Assad it would simply be a existential choice to create some counterbalance to Russia power in his country or at least convince Putin that he was willing to do so in order to better position himself with the Russian leader.

2) Assad may attempt to strike US or other Western troops with chemical weapons. Assad may seek to do this even if a suicide mission is required. While he and his advisers may view the operation as risky. Yet, they may also wrongfully believe that as long as the US-led coalition’s response does not result in a direct attack against him,  they may view it as a calculated risk. If Russia decides not to respond in defense of it ally, Syria, Assad might be able to convince himself that he has proved at least to the Syrian people in Useful Syria that he is strong and that he can do powerful things. The US has about 2,000 troops on the ground in Syria, supporting the ongoing US-led Coalition mission to defeat ISIS militants that remain in the region. The April 13th military strikes have created some concern at the Pentagon that those troops could be vulnerable to retaliation from Syrian forces. Efforts by Assad to put his forces in a position near US-led coalition ground forces must be scrutinized and keep in the coalition’s cross-hairs. If multiple streams of intelligence indicate those forces pose a danger, they should be pushed back or destroyed. There is always the possibility and the danger of miscalculation by Assad. As long as Assad thinks rationally, logically, this scenario could never materialize, as he would be deterred by the thought that an attack on US or another coalition ground forces would be met by an immediate, devastating military response. The targets of the US attacks would hardly be limited to the forces that launched them. Attempts at deconfliction for such attacks might be made, but they would take place regardless of whose forces might be nearby or mixed in with Syrian forces. Depending the response of Russia if its forces were caught in the middle of it all, Assad might manage to drag Moscow into what was likely the worst nightmare it thought of when it deployed its forces to Syria.

If Assad wants to maintain conditions that will allow the march of time to move forward in his favor, he should be reluctant to bother Putin about matters surrounding the April 13th chemical attacks. Doing so would very likely raise even greater concern in Putin. Assad’s circumspection itself may have already awakened Putin’s curiosity. Putin, after all, is super observant. It is a quality that stirs admiration from some and or elicits terror in others. If any one could detect a hint of anger or dissention in the eyes, in mannerisms, in bearing and deportment, in the words of another, it would be Putin. If he manages to discern a new uneasiness in Assad, that might trigger Putin to take steps against him or at least begin peering into the regime with a nearly zoological interest in its main players, searching for a plot against its main ally. Yet again, it may be that Assad is not worried at all about Putin’s reaction. Rather, Assad’s primary concern may be managing Putin’s behavior. Assad may believe that he has been successfully doing that. A mistake in that possible “management effort”, however, would be to attempt to convince Putin that he can count on him. It would be an even bigger mistake for Assad to try to get the pulse of Putin, to find out what he is thinking about him. No one should ever ask Putin if he loves them. The answer in nearly every case would be “No!”

If Assad wants to maintain conditions that will allow the march of time to move forward in his favor, he should be reluctant to bother Putin about matters surrounding the April 13th chemical attacks. Doing so would very likely raise even greater concern in Putin. Assad’s circumspection itself may have already garnered Putin’s curiosity. Putin, after all, is super observant. If he manages to discern a new uneasiness in Assad, intimate trouble, it might cause him to take steps against him.

Is It Time to Wrap Things Up with Assad?: Scenario re Putin

Fata volentem, ducunt, nolentem trahunt. (Destiny carries the willing man, and drags the unwilling.) Moscow entered into all of its deals with Assad, strengthened links to him, with its eyes open. Putin would unlikely have engaged with Assad in a search for areas of common ground on handling chemical weapons. Putin is not conciliatory. He very likely set rules for Assad on the matter. However, leaving the door open for Assad somehow to use the weapons has come back to haunt him. Given what has transpired, Putin surely can reasonably be viewed as being complicit in Assad’s use of chemical weapons. Yet, while Putin may find Assad’s attitude toward those in the West, in the Middle East, and in his own country who oppose him to be understandable, he may also view his approach as reckless.

Syria is broken, and with someone such as Assad at its helm, hardly any outside of the country, capable of supporting its reconstruction, would be willing to do so. In Moscow, there must be some authenticity in its examination of Assad and what it will be able to do with him in the future. Putin most likely sees that there is nothing about Assad that would indicate he can be transformative, creative, or productive. After the April 2017 cruise missile strikes by the Trump administration, a discourse should have been initiated in Moscow on how to better handle the remnants of Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal and how to defeat their use against Russian Federation Armed Forces in Syria. If Putin can truly discern what billows in Assad’s mind, he may have already made the decision to move against him. Finding a leader or group of very senior leaders among elements of power in Syria may not be too difficult. Most in Damascus who are in the best position to know what is happening in Syria understand they live in privileged times. They may not speak of, or whisper, about being called on to be part of a change in leadership. Still, they may be considering where they will stand and how they will act if the situation arose.

To this point, nothing has been stated to indicate that there was anything time sensitive about Putin’s relationship with Assad. Syria’s standing internationally has not been good to say the least. Assad has not used any time or exploited any opportunities to make improvements in his situation. It is unknown whether Assad is ignorant, willfully ignores, or perhaps even suppresses thoughts about reconstruction, something Russia, by jumping into Syria may have committed itself to as a duty. Assad does not appear emotionally devastated by what has befallen his country. This was observed in his very congenial newsmedia appearances the day after the April 13, 2018 military strikes.

Assad is not a shy man, and is unlikely frozen in fear contemplating what Putin might respond the fact that he has rocked the boat so thoroughly. Even if only unconsciously, though, he likely has felt an elevated level of concern over his future since April 7, 2018 chemical attacks. Putting himself in Assad’s shoes, perhaps Putin could imagine that Assad is feeling a bit betrayed by his unwillingness to deter or defeat the Western military strikes in Syria, no matter how unreasonable that would have been. Putin can be sure Assad knows him well enough to realize that expressing his disappointment through impotent snarling will accomplished nothing useful or good. Yet, he also may sense that in the long run that Assad may not be truly able to move on. Putin might consider that when one is angry for a long time, one in a way becomes comfortable with that anger. Soon that anger becomes so familiar that the individual forgets feeling any other way. Assad is a calculator, although he albeit uses an odd calculus. Sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fiery nec, considerate potest. (But still anger ought be far from us, for nothing is able to be done rightly not judiciously with anger.)

Putting himself in Assad’s shoes, perhaps Putin could imagine that Assad is feeling a bit betrayed by his unwillingness to deter or defeat the Western military strikes in Syria, no matter how unreasonable that would have been. Putin can be sure Assad knows him well enough to realize that expressing his disappointment through impotent snarling would have accomplished nothing useful or good.

Putin may eventually need to make a decision if Assad cannot restrain himself from using chemical weapons again. As mentioned earlier, It is possible that Putin has already has plan for responding to Assad’s future actions. Big issues likely remaining are exactly when and how to set things up. It is also possible that given the gravity of the decision to remove Assad from power, he has not made a final decision. He may prefer to mull things over until he is left with no choice. To decide exactly how to proceed, Putin would unlikely need to refer to any notes or look among huge piles of information collected from Syria to find pieces that answered his questions. He would only need his knowledge, experience, insights, intuition, and instincts. Putin would review what Russia really wants with Syria, what its goals are. He would then need to thoroughly consider how exactly removing Assad will better able Russia to reach those goals. Putin may decide to give Assad the benefit of doubt. He knows the margin between being very clever and being very stupid is very thin. If in some odd way, alien to most reasonable thinkers, the goal of Assad’s behavior only been to strengthen his position with Putin and ensure Russia’s investment and commitment to his well-being and the well-being of the country.

However, if Assad seems to be on the road to doing something spectacular, going astray and lashing out against its long time ally, Putin would invariably choose to act first and decisively. Assad would not have any lobby available to advocate for him in the Kremlin. Money is short in Russia. Decision makers would hardly sign on to allowing Syria to languish without end in a difficult and dangerous situation given the moves of its leadership. While Assad created an image of himself as a strong leader in Damascus, in Moscow, a portrait has most likely been painted that depicts him a being bad for the long-term interests of Russia and Syria. Russia never had the intention of sacrificing its own image to make Assad look good. As mentioned earlier, Assad has no problem with acting in a way that makes Russia look bad. Among likely steps Putin would consider are the following three:

1) After some convincing, have Assad voluntary depart Syria to begin exile somewhere in Russia. The Syrian people would be informed via a video recording that Assad is completely fine and well-aware for, and it was necessary to move him to Russia due to an imminent threat from Western powers to capture him and usher him to the Hague for War Crimes trial. Once, in Russia, it could be said Assad would never be surrendered to anyone and, that he would indeed be returned to Syria once Russia resolves the matter. In the meantime, the Syrian people would have an interim, acting president. In fact, Assad would never return to Syria. If Putin were to ask Assad to leave Damascus, he would have no need to ask twice. Damascus would become a far more dangerous place for him if he does not go.

2) Through a coup de main, Putin could have Assad suddenly captured and relocated to an undisclosed site in Russia. This would be done after making appropriate arrangements furtively with Syrian military officers, security service officials, and other elites in Damascus. Again, he could be brought to an undisclosed location in Russia. After some He would be strongly encouraged to made a video recording for broadcast in Syria indicating that he is safe, doing well, and was brought to Syria’s main ally, Russia, temporarily for his own safety. The specific threat Assad would not need to be disclosed. For security reasons, the source of the information would not revealed. Forcing Assad to leave would be an alternative to having him eliminated.

3) There is the possibility that after appropriate arrangements have been made again with Syrian military officers, security service officials, and other elites, Assad might be assassinated. Russia would be the arbiter of the matter with likely nods from Iran and Turkey,

With Assad removed, Putin would move quickly to install his successor. It would be necessary for Russia to have a central figure, a strongman, one in charge in Syria to assure it has a central conduit through which it could impose its will. Assad’s successor, certainly an Alawite, would be enabled to hold a degree of power similar to that Assad held as long as Russia remains in strength in Syria, and is willing to mitigate pressure placed on the regime from Islamic extremist groups as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the battered and tattered Syria Opposition forces as well. The change, no matter how necessary or expected, would be traumatizing to many in Damascus and in every capital that has supported him. It would be the end of a sad story concerning the misuse of power, the poor stewardship of a country. Moscow would likely dub the successor’s acting presidency as a caretaker government. Only with the insistence of the US and other P5 Members, would new elections be held.to replace him.  The acting Leader’s presidency would be tainted by the irregular nature of his installment. At the UN Security Council, there would be reminders of Resolution 2254 (2015) concerning free and fair elections in Syria. Moscow would dance around it claiming there that new constitution had not been drafted as also required under the resolution. Moreover, Moscow would explain that conditions were not right for elections as the war was not over. Meanwhile, it would argue Syria was on the right path and seek aid for its reconstruction.

A more tense relationship may eventually ensue if possible future military strikes from a US-led coalition, or even Israel, are met with inaction by Russia. If Assad is able to detect real trouble from his benefactor, he might draw back, and walk back any statements. However, if he fears for his life, anything is possible.

Will He Bite the Hand That Saved Him?: Scenario re Assad

Although Putin has not heard grumblings from Mount Mezzah, he surely recognizes that his relationship with Assad has not been not perfect since the April 13th missile strikes. Putin cannot be sure that Assad accepts that he is concerned with him or Syria or that he has any real compassion for what has befallen his regime. Putin knows that he too would feel somewhat betrayed by any ally who promised to stand by him against an adversary, yet did nothing during an attack. Putin may sense that Assad, after constantly hearing rhetoric from Moscow about curbing the power and defeating its adversary, the US, has not seen any significant efforts in that direction even when opportunities present themselves, such as the April 13th military strikes. Putin cannot deny that he completely and correctly, abandoned his ally in the face of US diplomatic pressure and military power. Under such circumstances, Putin’s promise after the April 13th missile strikes to provide Assad with new, high performance weapons amounted to a bromide. It could not resolve problems facing the Russia-Syria relationship.

It seems unlikely that Assad will remain quiet if there were future Western military strikes in response to his further use of chemical weapons or other dark moves, and as on April 13th, Russia fails to act. Conspiracy theories are an element as ubiquitous as rumors in statements of officials and common conversation among citizens within rogue, authoritarian regimes. It is a corrupted version of thinking out of box preferred mostly because it typically points to behavior of external elements, enemies and false friends, as causality for a regimes disappointments and failures. Assad and his advisers may be discussing whether Russia even considered defending Syria from the military strikes of the US, the United Kingdom, and France. Some might postulate in confidential meetings that Russia may have been hoping the US would destroy Syria’s remaining chemical weapons inventory. Assad and his advisers know that Moscow was in contact with Washington in the days and hours before the military strike. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff USMC General James Dunford explained that normal deconfliction channels were used to deconflict the airspace that we were using. Dunford further explained that the US did not coordinate targets or any plans with the Russians. Yet, in Moscow, the head of a Russian parliamentary defense committee, Vladimir Shamanov, said Russia was in direct contact with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff about the situation. Hearing this view from Russia would likely satisfy Damascus as it would support surmisals there that Russia assisted the US in identifying targets as the Russians certainly did not use any countermeasures interfere with US efforts to target sites. In an inner monologue, Assad may ponder whether the failure of Russia to act may mean that there was some truth to expressions made by Moscow and Washington in 2017 that there was a new, cooperative era in US-Russia relations. That would contradict what Russia insists in private, and what is strongly hinted public statements, that the US is its adversary. Assad could conclude that in the crafting of the April 13th military strikes, Russia had a figurative vote!

A more tense relationship may eventually ensue if possible future military strikes are met with more inaction by Russia. It is in that environment that Putin would very likely consider moving against Assad. He would most likely act without warning. If Assad is able to detect trouble, he would draw back, and walk back any statements. However, if he fears for his life, he will likely act. Indeed, there could be a final demonstration of his power. He will make a stand or lash out with vigor before he goes. His concealed stockpiles of chemical weapons might even allow him to strike any erstwhile allies with some effect.

Surely, Assad comprehends that Russia commands great power. However, Assad may also feel that there are limits to Putin’s ability to respond to his aggressive moves. Putin would be remiss not to explore whether that is Assad’s thinking. Assad may believe even now that as long as he has chemical weapons and has demonstrated a willingness to use them, he can deter the few allies he has from turning against him. People with the most absolute power in history have tried to hold on by their fingernails knowing when they let go, all will be gone. They have often self-destructed. Misused power is always built upon lies. Tyrannical figures redefine what exists into projections of their egos. There are no noble thoughts. They become wrapped up in themselves. Assad seems to find pleasure in what is evil. As time goes on, the more tragic he becomes as a figure.

Surely, Assad comprehends that Russia commands great power. However, Assad may also feel that there are limits to Putin’s ability to respond to his aggressive moves. Assad may believe that as long as he has and has demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons, he can deter the allies he has from turning against him. He could also use them in a final self-destructive act. Putin would be remiss not to consider that possibility.

The Way Forward

In Act I, scene iv, of William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth, Generals Macbeth and Banquo have already defeated two separate invading armies, from Ireland and Norway. Following that, they encounter three witches as they cross a moor. The witches prophecy that Macbeth will be made thane of Cawdor and eventually King of Scotland, and Banquo, will beget a line of Scottish kings. Once the witches vanish, Macbeth and Banquo speak skeptically of their prophecies. However, some of King Duncan’s men arrive to thank the generals for their victories and tell Macbeth, just as the witches prophesized, that he has been named thane of Cawdor. The previous thane was executed for betraying Scotland by fighting for the Norwegians. Arriving at King Duncan’s castle, Macbeth and Banquo profess their loyalty and gratitude toward him. King Duncan announces Malcolm will be named heir to his throne. Macbeth declares his joy but notes to himself that Malcolm, the Prince of Cumberland, stood between him and the crown the witches also said he would have. Standing aside, Macbeth says to himself: “The Prince of Cumberland! that is a step On which I must fall down, or else o’erleap, For in my way it lies. Stars, hide your fires; Let not light see my black and deep desires: The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be, Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see.” Regarding the military strikes from the US, United Kingdom, and France, the most effective way for Assad to deal with the matter and maintain the status quo is accept that what happened, has happened, and no matter how upsetting it might be, it cannot be changed. Retribution is not a reasonable or rational option. Creating difficulties in Syria’s relationship with Russia by advancing the idea will only lead to additional problems  does not need. Negative feedback from the Assad regime’s experience when it fought alone in Syria without Russia assistance may have helped convinced Assad not to make waves. Still, as the situation on the ground has changed somewhat with the US-led coalition’s efforts against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamic militant groups, he may feel that regime forces are in a better position to do more by themselves. Syrian elites and some average citizens may be welcoming, supportive of the Russian partnership and presence at the moment. However, after observing the effects of few months of rain and wind on the ruins of cities and towns, they may eventually recognize that Moscow cannot support “Useful Syria” in a way that would allow for its rebuilding. The situation would only worsen if pressure was placed on Russia over Syria through future sanctions.

If Assad continues launching chemical attacks, Russia will need to keep justifying his actions and its failure to control him. It may very well be that Putin has developed a negative outlook on Assad, particularly concerning his reliability and trustworthiness. Given Assad’s nature, perhaps Putin has foreseen that the time will come to wrap things up with him. Assad’s wrongs have been too big to successfully cover up using the usual public relations methods. His inadequacies have become stark. Russia is not dealing with a brush fires in Syria, but a serial arsonist in Assad. Syria exists in a condition that the Syrian people would not have too much difficulty moving forward and getting past Assad’s loss. They have been doing that for seven years now. They have faced one tragedy after another. Many Syrians may have been concerned about Assad’s safety after the April 13th military strikes. They only knew he was safe when they saw him on national television the next morning. If the Syrian people were to learn that Assad was gone, those outside of the regime’s good graces in Syria, those displaced, and those who live as refugees worldwide would likely roar and dance in celebration. Those in Useful Syria would be very likely be disappointed, distraught, and likely some in the North Mezzah and Ar Rabwah neighborhoods where he has resided, would be devastated. Still, the old, Assad, would be replaced by the new. With little choice otherwise, all Syrians would move on to the next phase. Omnia autem quae secundum naturam fiunt sunt habenda in bonis. (Whatever befalls in accordance with Nature [God’s will] should be accounted good.)

Trump Delivers a Mixed Message on His National Security Approach: Judge His Strategy by Its Qualities and Results, Not Inference

US President Donald Trump (above). On December 18, 2017, US President Donald Trump presented the 2017 National Security Strategy.  It requires the US government to put “America First”. US borders will be fortified, unfair trade agreements will be voided, and US military power will be enhanced. Critics claim a disconnect exists between Trump’s discussion of the new strategy and the analysis in it, consequently confusing the US public and foreign governments over its meaning. Nevertheless, the document is a clear expression of Trump’s vision for his administration’s approach on national security.

According to a December 18, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Trump Delivers a Mixed Message on His National Security Approach”, US President Donald Trump that day presented the 2017 National Security Strategy which warned of a treacherous world in which the US faces rising threats from China and Russia, as well as rogue governments such as North Korea. The December 18th article explains the new strategy requires the US government to put “America First”. US borders will be fortified, unfair trade agreements will be voided, and US military power will be strengthened. However, the December 18th article also proffered that there was a disconnect between Trump’s discussion of the new strategy and the analysis in the new document. The article insists that the breach between Trump’s speech and what is written in the new document attests to a broader challenge his national security advisers have faced in their struggle “to develop an intellectual framework that encompasses Mr. Trump’s unpredictable, domestically driven and Twitter-fueled approach to foreign policy.” Additionally, the article offers the opinion that “The same confusion has confronted foreign governments trying to understand Mr. Trump’s conflicting signals.”

As explained by the White House, the 2017 National Security Strategy builds on the first eleven months of Trump’s action to restore respect for the US internationally as well as renew the confidence of US public in their country. It is directly in line with Trump’s vision statement of “America First” which was first made during his presidential nauguration on January 20, 2017. The term encapsulates his belief that the US can still reach new heights, and is the idea that would guide his transformational initiatives by setting a defined direction for its growth. ”America First” has been explained by top administration officials as signaling “the restoration of American leadership and our government’s traditional role overseas—to use the diplomatic, economic and military resources of the US to enhance American security, promote American prosperity, and extend American influence around the world.” Administration officials had already commented that “the world is not a ‘global community’ but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage.” Trump’s declaration of “America First” was intended “to send clear message to our friends and partners: Where our interests align, we are open to working together to solve problems and explore opportunities.”

Quod cibus est aliis, aliis est venenum. (What is food to some is poison to others.) Although the 2017 National Security Strategy is a clear expression of Trump’s vision for his administration’s approach on national security, many questions have been asked about the document in the US and internationally. Much also has already been assumed, hypothesized, and surmised about it. As illustrated by the December 18th New York Times article, critics of Trump and his administration insist that the validity of the new strategy should be placed in question due to its inconsistency with Trump’s own words and actions on foreign and national security policy. That distorted picture of the new strategy is fully in line with perspectives and positions being propagated by a very emotional and sometimes irrational, counter-Trump milieu. It is presented with such dynamism and high spirit that it creates the impression among many in the US public and internationally that there is some movement forward in the effort to push Trump from office.  It has all become very ordinary, gewöhriche. For the better part of 2017, greatcharlie has been focused on the Trump and US foreign and national security policy. The intention of greatcharlie was not to become a blog that was ‘“all Trump, all the time.” However, US foreign and national security policy is of interest to the US public and is of great importance in all capitals worldwide. This assay looks at the new strategy in a constructive, more balanced, and fresh perspective of Trump’s concepts, intentions, and decisions. Hopefully, it may help, even if only bit by bit, to establish a more positive dialogue on the administration’s new strategy, and the overall foreign and national security policy debate. Post tenebras spero lucem. (I hope for light after darkness.)

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (left), US Secretary of Defense James Mattis (center), US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford (right). The 2017 National Security Strategy is the product of the collaborative process of Trump’s national security team. In Trump’s administration, interdepartmental cooperation is not insisted upon as a bromide for parochialism or for mere appearances. The collaborative process brings together the talents of the extraordinarily experienced leaders of the relevant departments and agencies to produce something better than any independent effort by one.

The Thinking Behind the 2017 National Security Strategy

Respice, adspice, prospice! (Examine the past, examine the present, examine the future!) In analyzing Trump’s thinking and decisions on foreign and national security policy, there is a usefulness in looking at the spiritual qualities of his efforts, the integration of mind and craft into his work. Trump possesses a certain mental agility. His strengths of flexibility, adaptability, and originality, are applied particularly on priority issues. Critics, however, frown upon Trump’s use of those strengths, and they would hardly dub any of his attributes as anything so lofty as “strengths”. Trump may make strong statements to figuratively shake the trees, rustle the reeds, and beat the bushes with the goal of testing a competitors’ metal and getting to the crux of his competitors’ thinking. He may take a stand on an issue off middle ground in order to drive competitors to offer better terms to bring the US back to a mutually satisfying path. Indeed, he has sought to shape his environment. Although he may have expected, and may have been willing to accept, complaints and rebuffs from foreign capitals in response to his efforts, he was undoubtedly taken aback somewhat by the harshness of attacks of critics from home. In many cases, they equalled or surpassed anything expressed by the worst foreign adversaries. An empirical analysis of comments of critics and statements emanating from US adversaries, side-by-side, would cause one to believe those adversaries are feeding off of the critics words. Critics of Trump, whose ranks include US newsmedia members, think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration, have developed a perceptible negative ideation about Trump. That ideation apparently impels them to insist that all reactions to his work, especially on foreign and national security policy, must be negative. However, critics have not stifled Trump’s dreams, his resolve, his will. With a face like thunder on occasion, he powers forward with a sense of zuversicht, a sense of confidence for all to see. His activities are high tempo. Critics often seem shocked by Trump’s pace. With audacity, and at times brashness, Trump is always looking up front, pushing forward, while being well aware of what is behind.

Nemo timendo ad summum pervenit locum. (No man by fearing reaches the top.) Typically on an issue, Trump starts lightly and then extends from his ideas, his moves, his unanticipated actions. He initially summarizes his ideas in speeches, and many times on Twitter, while administration officials may expiate on them a bit in statements, policy briefs, and even op-ed pieces. While taking action, or while engaged in action, he seeks counsel from his top advisers to ensure that there is an effective integration of knowledge and action. Working with them, he polishes those ideas much as marble. Administration policy makers have come to expect and make provision for his swift, decisive moves. Those in the administration who craft foreign and national security policies and strategies accept those strengths as an advantage and not as a drawback. Trump’s interaction with his advisers is akin to that of the renowned 18th century Prussian Army Marshal Leberecht von Blücher–a hero at Waterloo in close second to the Duke of Wellington–and his chief of staff General August Gneisenau. In Clausewitz: (Scarborough, 1979), Roger Parkinson quotes von Blücher’s explanation of his relationship with his brilliant chief of staff as follows:  “Gneisenau, being my chief of staff and very reliable, reports to me on the manoeuvres that are to be executed and the marches that are to be performed. Once convinced that he is right, I drive my troops through hell towards the goal and never stop until the desire goal has been accomplished–yes, even though the officers trained in the old school may pout and complain and all but mutiny.” Parkinson further quotes von Blücher noting that he said after being offered an honorary degree at Oxford University following the Napoleonic War: “Well, if I am to become an doctor, you must at least make Gneisenau an apothecary, for we two belong together always.”

US National Security Adviser US Army Lieutenant General H.R McMaster (above). To the extent that critics might find something false or misleading about the new strategy, perhaps greater assurance that it can be relied upon as an authentic, guiding document on US policy is the fact that McMaster was responsible for its construction. He is an exceptional military officer, who exudes the values of duty, honor, country. It could be said colloquially of McMaster that he is “As straight up as twelve o’clock!” To assert that anything produced by him would be some form of deception would manifest a mindset as distant from reality as east is to west.

Malum consilium quod mutari non potest. (It is a bad plan that cannot be changed.) When Trump acts on an issue, his goal is to exploit success, preserve his freedom of action on immediate matters, and reduce vulnerability from action by his competitors. He acts in a manner designed to gain advantage, surprise, and momentum over his competitors, achieving results that would normally require far more time and would be more costly to the US. Even more, Trump does it all avec brio, with a certain panache. This has been witnessed repeatedly in his interactions with foreign leaders. Trump’s discernment of events and situations as well as his planning and execution of actions against competitors greatly resembles what military thinkers define as maneuver. He rushes to place himself in superior position in order to overcome and defeat his opponents efforts. Trump’s approach is very similar to what was once taught at Germany’s Kriegsakademie (War Academy) in Berlin before World War II. It was emphasized that commanders needed a superior understanding of maneuver at all points to ensure they would always be stronger than an opponent at the decisive point, which they referred to as the Schwerpunkt. Military science scholars and historians may recall two classic examples of this being applied by German commanders during World War II: the Battle of Flanders during the German invasion of France in May 1940; and, the Battles of the Minsk and Smolensk Pockets during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. One could surmise that these hints of a pattern of thinking and decision making similar to that of military commanders historically and a pattern of action a tinge in a military fashion on foreign and national security policy issues, that provides current and former military commanders in the administration a unique insight, a special edge, in understanding their president’s choices. Indeed, they can certainly see and better discern far more than any of Trump’s critics.

The Construction of the 2017 National Security Strategy

The 2017 National Security Strategy is saturated with meaning and purpose. It reflects Trump’s concept and intent on formulating and implementing his administration’s foreign and national security policies and strategies, and his overall vision on US national policy. Indeed, in its published summary of the new strategy of December 18, 2017, the National Security Council explained that the document “articulates and advances the President’s concept of principled realism.” It was further explained: “It is realist because it acknowledges the central role of power in international politics, affirms that strong and sovereign states are the best hope for a peaceful world, and clearly defines our national interests. It is principled because it is grounded in advancing American principles, which spreads peace and prosperity around the globe.” With these ideas in mind, the administration seeks to authentically gain and retain the initiative in advancing its concept of principled realism while reestablishing a strong, positive image of the US worldwide.

Trump’s national security team at Camp David (above). Before taking action, or while engaged in action, on an issue, Trump seeks counsel from his top advisers to ensure that there is an effective integration of knowledge and action. Working with them, he polishes those ideas much as marble. Administration policy makers have come to expect and make provision for Trump’s swift, decisive moves. Those in the administration who craft foreign and national security policies and strategies accept those strengths as an advantage and not as a drawback.

Trump has a good idea of what is “out there in the dark” that might harm the US, its interests, and its allies. It would appear that Trump’s examination of those threats worldwide has been of biographical nature, with a focus on national leaders, political leaders, and nongovernmental actors such as terrorist leaders and organized crime bosses. Indeed, the National Security Council’s summary of the new strategy takes special note of: “regional dictators”; “jihadist terrorists”; and, “transnational criminal organizations.” While not mentioning Chinese President XI Jinping and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin by name, the strategy notes “revisionist powers, such as China and Russia” present challenges to the US. He wants to cope with their past and present actions and threats posed by adversaries to the interests of the US and its allies. In a way, as US President, coping with the behavior of mankind has become Trump’s business.

The new strategy is the product of the collaborative process of Trump’s national security team. In Trump’s administration, interdepartmental cooperation is not insisted upon as a bromide for parochialism or for mere appearances. The collaborative process brings together the talents of extraordinarily experienced leaders of the relevant departments and agencies to produce something better than any independent effort by one. A density of knowledge, power of intellect was brought to bear during the strategy’s development given the participation of .senior officials such as US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, and US National Security Adviser Lieutenant General H.R McMaster, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and White House Economic Adviser Gary Cohn. To the extent that critics might find something false or misleading about the new strategy, perhaps even greater assurance that the document can be relied upon as an authentic guiding document, is the fact that McMaster was responsible for its construction. In addition to his impeccable qualities and the amazing capabilities he brings to his job, he is an impressive individual, an exceptional military officer, who exudes the values of duty, honor, country. It could be said colloquially of McMaster that he is “as straight up as twelve o’clock!” To assert that anything produced by him would equate to some form of deception, a hoax, or a fig leaf, as some critics have, would manifest a mindset as distant from reality as east is to west. McMaster could be accepted as a measure to understand all other members of Trump’s national security team. Nullum saeculum magnis ingeiius clausum est. (No generation is closed to great talents.)

US Navy aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan (bottom), USS Theodore Roosevelt (center), and USS Nimitz (top) in the Pacific. The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy is not simply a long range plan for the development and use of US military power and other security elements. As crafted, the new strategy encompasses all tools of US power available and brilliantly integrates them into a seamless web with a single, defined goal: the advancement and prosperity of the country.

The Four Pillars of the 2017 National Security Strategy

The 2017 National Security Strategy is not simply a long range plan for the development and use of US military power and of other security and law enforcement elements. As crafted, the strategy encompasses all tools of power available to the US and brilliantly integrates them into a seamless web with a single, defined goal: the advancement and prosperity of the country. The new strategy identifies four vital national interests, or “four pillars” as: 1) “Protect the homeland, the American people, and American way of life”; 2) “Promote American prosperity”; 3) “Preserve peace through strength”; and, 4) “Advance American influence.”

1) Protect the Homeland

Patria et communis omnium parents. (Our native land is the common parent of us all.) The new strategy reiterates the administration’s determination to stand up for our people and our way of life. Trump has been unequivocal in declaring that the primary interest of the US government is the safety and security of its citizens.  Before the UN General Assembly, on September 19, 2017, Trump stated: “Our government’s first duty is to its people, to our citizens — to serve their needs, to ensure their safety, to preserve their rights, and to defend their values.” Administration officials believe that the display of that commitment deepens the respect of friends toward the US. Vital US interests will be protected and advanced while greater cooperation will be fostered, and relationships will be strengthened, with our allies and partners.

Under ”Protect the Homeland”, the National Security Council’s summary of the new strategy explains the following actions will be taken: “We will strengthen control of our borders and reform our immigration system to protect the homeland and restore our sovereignty. The greatest transnational threats to the homeland are: Jihadist terrorists, using barbaric cruelty to commit murder, repression, and slavery, and virtual networks to exploit vulnerable populations and inspire and direct plots. Transnational criminal organizations, tearing apart our communities with drugs and violence and weakening our allies and partners by corrupting democratic institutions. America will target threats at their source: we will confront threats before they ever reach our borders or cause harm to our people. We will redouble our efforts to protect our critical infrastructure and digital networks, because new technology and new adversaries create new vulnerabilities. We are deploying a layered missile defense system to defend America against missile attacks.”

US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin (left) and White House Economic Adviser Gary Cohn (right). Senior Trump administration officials have emphasized that US economic prosperity is critical to the country’s national interests. They have explained that a strong economy will protect the US public, supports their way of life, and sustain US power.

2) Promote Economic Prosperity

Culpa par odium exigit. (The offense requires a proportional reaction.) Senior Trump administration officials have emphasized that US economic prosperity is critical to the country’s national interests. They have explained that a strong economy will protect the US public, support their way of life, and sustain US power. The administration has sought to breakout from under lopsided agreements and do some open field running, showing what it can really do and get not only fair but better deals. The country will come first, hence “America First”. Trump does not want the US to get bogged down on bumpy roads with competitors, mired in one slug fest negotiation after another in an attempt to rectify the bad deals made by the prior administration. In 2017, the administration secured defense investments that would strengthen regional and American security and create American jobs. Efforts to solidify relationships with other countries included getting them to stand firm against all unfair trade practices and foster a truly level playing field.

In its summary of the new strategy, under ”Promote American Prosperity”, the National Security Council stated that the administration would pursue the following: “We will rejuvenate the American economy for the benefit of American workers and companies, which is necessary to restore our national power. America will no longer tolerate chronic trade abuses and will pursue free, fair, and reciprocal economic relationships. To succeed in this 21st century geopolitical competition, America must lead in research, technology, and innovation. We will protect our national security innovation base from those who steal our intellectual property and unfairly exploit the innovation of free societies. America will use its energy dominance to ensure international markets remain open, and that the benefits of diversification and energy access promote economic and national security.”

A US Air Force B-2A “Spirit” Stealth bomber (above). The Trump administration has promised to greatly increase the capabilities and capacity of the US military. Additionally, it has sought to bolster US power by strengthening its alliances and its partneships with economically thriving partners. It has done so while ensuring  that those alliances and partnerships are based on mutual respect and shared responsibility.

3) Preserve Peace through Strength

Qui desiderat pacem praeparat bellum. (Who desires peace [should] prepare [for] war.) In 2017, the Trump administration explained that taking the lead internationally and advancing US military, political and economic strength is a third vital US interest. To that extent, the Trump administration has promised to greatly increase the capabilities and capacity of the US military. Additionally, it has sought to bolster US power by strengthening its alliances and its partnerships with economically thriving partners. It has done so while ensuring that those alliances and partnerships are based on mutual respect and shared responsibility. This approach was evinced when Trump reconfirmed the US commitment to NATO and Article 5. At the same time, he challenged NATO allies to share equitably the responsibility for our mutual defense. Regarding partnerships, in Israel, for example, Trump affirmed that a secure, prosperous and democratic Jewish state is central to US interests in the region. In an effort to be equitable, the administration also explained to the Palestinian authorities that it fully intends engagement in the pursuit of a historic peace deal between them and the Israelis. As for those countries that may choose to remain or become US adversaries and to threaten vital US interests, the US will become their worst foe.

In the National Security Council’s summary under, ”Preserve Peace Through Strength”, steps the administration plans to take were outlined as follows: “We will rebuild America’s military strength to ensure it remains second to none. America will use all of the tools of statecraft in a new era of strategic competition–diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to protect our interests. America will strengthen its capabilities across numerous domains–including space and cyber–and revitalize capabilities that have been neglected. America’s allies and partners magnify our power and protect our shared interests. We expect them to take greater responsibility for addressing common threats. We will ensure the balance of power remains in America’s favor in key regions of the world: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.”

Trump (left) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (right). Under the new strategy, US diplomatic and development efforts will compete to achieve better outcomes in all arenas–bilateral, multilateral, and in the information realm–to protect our interests, find new economic opportunities for Americans, and challenge our competitors. The US will seek partnerships with like-minded states to promote free market economies, private sector growth, political stability, and peace.

4) Advance American Interests

Clara pacta, boni amici. (Clear agreement, good friends.) The Trump administration would explain that the world is not a “global community” but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage. To that forum, the US brings unmatched military, political, economic, cultural and moral strength. Unlike the previous administration, the Trump administration embraces that reality, rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs. The administration has already let adversaries know that the US will not only take their measure, but will deter conflict through strength, and will defend US interests and values. Still, at the same time, the US will look for areas of common interest that allow us to work together to solve problems and explore opportunities. Indeed, those countries that may prove to share our interests will find no friend more steadfast than the US. As two senior administration officials explained in a May 30, 2017 Wall Street Journal op-ed: “We engage with the world not to impose our way of life but to ‘secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.’ “

Under “Advance American Influence”, the National Security Council summary indicates the administration will act accordingly: “We must continue to enhance our influence overseas to protect the American people and promote our prosperity. America’s diplomatic and development efforts will compete to achieve better outcomes in all arenas–bilateral, multilateral, and in the information realm–to protect our interests, find new economic opportunities for Americans, and challenge our competitors. America will seek partnerships with like-minded states to promote free market economies, private sector growth, political stability, and peace. We champion our values–including the rule of law and individual rights–that promote strong, stable, prosperous, and sovereign states. Our “America First” foreign policy celebrates America’s influence in the world as a positive force that can help set the conditions for peace, prosperity, and the development of successful societies.”

Trump (right) and Chinese President XI Jinping (left). The Trump administration recognizes that the world is not a “global community” but an arena where nations, nongovernmental actors and businesses engage and compete for advantage. The US brings to that forum unmatched military, political, economic, cultural and moral strength. The Trump administration seeks to embrace that reality, rather than deny this elemental nature of international affairs as the previous administration had.

The Way Forward

In Act IV, Scene i of William Shakespeare’s play, The Life of King Henry the Fifth, Henry is at the English camp, before the Battle of Agincourt. Wrapped anonymously in a borrowed cloak and pretending to be an ordinary soldier, Henry sits by the common campfire,and talks with whoever wanders by. Eventually he encounters John Bates, Alexander Court, and Michael Williams at the campfire. Henry discusses with them the English troops’ odds in the coming battle. They also discuss the righteousness of the king’s cause, whether they should give consideration as to whether the king is right or wrong side of the war, and nature of their obedience to the king. Still disguised, Henry offered a defense of the king’s position. However, experienced in war and understanding what the experience of war can amount to in the hearts and minds of some soldiers in its aftermath, Henry states the following: “Every subject’s duty is the king’s; but every subject’s soul is his own. Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as every sick man in his bed, wash every mote out of his conscience: and dying so, death is to him advantage; or not dying, the time was blessedly lost wherein such preparation was gained: and in him that escapes, it were not sin to think that, making God so free an offer, He let him outlive that day to see His greatness and to teach others how they should prepare.” The 2017 National Security Strategy presented by the Trump administration is not the water and milk of the previous administration and does not merely regurgitate on paper what was useful from earlier strategies without real intent to implement provisions. The ideas within the new document are those to which one can take a firm grip upon and to which one can dedicate oneself. The strategy was developed by those who truly understand first hand what it means to execute actions required under the strategy, and have freely offered their own lives in service to their country. That priceless massing of wisdom and experience gives extra meaning to all of the strategy’s aspects. Those contributors want to ensure not only that the US is prepared and protected, but that those who are now asked to commit themselves to the country’s security know that their cause is righteous and not based on political expediency. In foreign capitals, it would behoove those stewards of their nations foreign and national security policy to take heed of what is actually provided in the strategy and to examine the plethora of negative critiques of the new document with caution, and even suspicion.

Qui nimium probation, nihil probat. (One who proves too much, proves nothing.) Interpretations of Trump by critics do not appear to be softening. Critics do not want to make Trump’s life easy. Yet,. having been proven wrong on occasion after occasion, critics have been left, time and time again, grasping at thin air. There will likely be frustration and despair for the majority of Trump’s critics in the end. Unless they decide to go as far as to believe some deus ex machina will be suddenly introduced that will provide a solution of their very liking to their insoluble difficulty, the grand illusion, that Trump somehow will be deposed, will be shattered. At some point, critics must take a comprehensive look at what has transpired so far. After placing so much emphasis on Trump’s defeat, destruction, and defenestration, critics must consider why their path has been one of confusion, bewilderment, and missteps and why Trump, as with time, marches on. They must examine their motives, and look into their own personal and private histories. The time has come for many to change their ways. In a recent essay, the Catholic priest and theologian Father George Rutler reminds that the famed US novelist George Orwell presented the idea of “doublethink”, which means holding out contradictory beliefs simultaneously and accepting both of them. The intolerance of Trump’s critics is called tolerance but it is the false kind of tolerance which, as the renowned English writer G.K. Chesterton said, is the virtue of the man without conviction. In changing one’s ways, one must go through a psychological transformation. In previous posts, greatcharlie has suggested that many of Trump’s critics consider changing their approach to him and his administration, not only because their efforts have brought little success–and have actually done some harm to US diplomatic efforts, and not to merely surrender, but to redirect their energies to the more positive pursuit creating positive change. They could try to offer real solutions—and not old, failed ones—that may be useful to the very dedicated officials of the administration. As Individuals, they must assume the responsibility of making things better. If they can work together, as a group, they can focus their combined energy to actually make things better. A wealth of goodness would certainly be created by constructive behavior bent on bringing success to the US via worthy endeavors as opposed to engaging in actions to defeat the administration’s efforts. The eminent US civil rights leader, Reverend Jesse Jackson, once said “Never look down on anybody unless you’re helping him up.” Spero melior.  (I hope for better things.)

Trump Has Spoken, the Ball Is in Kim Jong-un’s Court, But This Is Not a Game

A US B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber (above). The B-2 is a long-range strike asset of the US Air Force. It can penetrate deep into enemy territiry and drop a conventional or nuclear payload without being detected.

North Korea manifests a stubbornness reflective of the disposition of Kim Jong-un, the Chairman of the Workers Party of Korea and the Supreme Leader of Democratic People Republic of North Korea. Lately, the country has made itself practically unavailable for direct diplomatic contact. Soon enough, it will be discovered, whether Pyongyang is so determined to build a nuclear arsenal, whether the current issue is tied so much, in Kim’s view, to North Korea’s dignity, that efforts to reach an agreement will be impeded. During Kim’s years in power, the government in Pyongyang has sought to create the appearance of being dangerous and savage. Creating an image is one thing. That effort can be ignored by others. However, while engaged in that process, one must keep firmly in mind that there are some boundaries beyond which one cannot return.

As reported in the US newsmedia, US President Donald Trump stated that there would be forceful retaliation from the US if aggressive action is taken by North Korea against the US territory of Guam and US allies. Trump said the US military is “locked and loaded” and that Kim “will regret it fast” if action is taken. Trump has reassured the residents on the US territory of Guam, by saying “I feel that they will be very safe,” despite Kim’s threats to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) toward the island. Trump revealed that in a telephone call with a key player in the Northeast Asia, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping, that both leaders reiterated “their mutual commitment to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Nothing aggressive that North Korea is doing will be rewarded. Rather, there will only be the harshest of consequences. Kim must understand that Trump has not made a half hearted vow to do something. Make no mistake, Trump has the requisite will to act.

The Trump administration has tried to be reasonable with North Korea. Recall that Trump, with a positive mindset, tried to reach out to Kim. He tried to see the world through King Jong-un’s lens. Trump publicly expressed the view that it must have been difficult for Kim to take on so much responsibility at a relatively early age following his father, Kim Jong-Il. Trump even suggested that he would be willing to meet with Kim to communicate head to head, brain to brain. A resolution might have been crafted from Kim’s elaborations on what troubles him. Trump engaged in a sincere search for common ground. However, Kim did not budge in Trump’s direction. Rather, Trump was with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in Florida on February 11, 2017 when the North Korea fired an intermediate range missile into the Sea of Japan. It seemed that efforts with North Korea were becoming a struggle against the inevitable. Trump urged China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to assist in reducing tensions by talking frankly with Pyongyang. The effort was certainly reasonable as the administration’s contact with China has resulted in a degree of solidarity from it. China voted to place sanctions against North Korea under UN Security Council Resolution 2371. However, initially, at least, prompted assistance from China did not appear to do too much to stop Kim.

Normally, It would be expected that the US and any potential or true adversaries would be at a sparring stage at this early point of the administration, feeling each other out. There was really no need for big moves, big challenges. In Northeast Asia, the Trump administration has rruly acted in a measured way. Trump was sowing seeds for solid growth in relations with Japan, South Korea, and China. The administration has also moved toward creating improved relations with Russia, which resides in that neighborhood, too! Yet, that particular tact has been famously admonished by Trump’s critics. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was doing an admirable job as chief diplomat, consulting bilaterally and multilaterally with allies and friends on urgent and important issues. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis invested himself in Asia the same way, discussing ways to improve and giving assurances on security arrangements. Questions on issues of multilateral concern that can be handled in the UN Security Council were fielded well by Nikki Haley. Their dialogues with foreign leaders and counterparts have been complex. Despite what one might learn about inter-departmental interaction in a US Government 101 undergraduate course, there was no indication, no hint of parochialism, associated with the actions of either department secretary or staff. There was no concern that one was poaching on the others reserve. Personal preferences, especially for Mattis who has no love for the North Korean regime, were put aside. Back channels to Pyongyang were even set up. They were used to secure the release of Otto Wambier, a student from the University of Virginia from a North Korean prison.

Kim Jong-un stands on terrain high enough to be able to survey the liabilities and salutary prospects of war with the US. Rather than looking out upon vistas of possibilities, Kim is staring into a cold, dark abyss. He has allowed his ego to run away from him. He may soon find himself moving from hubris to humiliation. The North Korean people live in a country with conditions that no one anywhere would envy. They know the world through Kim’s lies, his deceptions. They hear his substitute truth designed to seduce. Those North Koreans, who actually believe his gossamer fantasies, have been left in the cradle intellectually. Often North Koreans are ordered to put their love for their Great Leader and their country on display for the world see and the security apparatus to judge.

North Korean generals may recognize, albeit only through intuition and intimation, that their country is considerably vulnerable to the US. However, the Intelligence in Pyongyang, undoubtedly politicized, is probably murky about what the US can really do and Trump’s will to fight. That, along with their survival instinct, triggered daily due to close, fear-laden, contact with Kim, enables them to remain fully committed to the lie that North Korea has the military wherewithal to take on the a military superpower. Kim only has power in the world that the world has allowed him. It could be said that he is the invention of those who have been dilatory. Right now, it seems Kim believes that he can delay negotiating with international community until after he develops a nuclear capable rocket force able reach the US. That possible ploy could result in a dark tragedy for him and the North Korean people. Trump has made it very clear that he does not want North Korea to develop a nuclear force. Deterring that force once it has been developed is not in Trump’s plans.

Misused power is always built upon lies. Indeed, tyrants redefine what exists into projections of their egos. There are no noble thoughts. They become wrapped up in themselves. One wrapped up in oneself becomes a small package. Kim has a history of mocking what is good, and finding pleasure in what is evil. As time goes on, Kim becomes more tragic as a figure. Kim may not wait for his reign to come to an ignominious end at the hands of Trump without some demonstration of his power. He may seek to make some grand stand. Tyrannical figures have often self-destructed when their power appeared to be slipping from their hands.

The manner in which North Korea is presented in the US newsmedia has greatly impacted the US public’s impression of it. North Korea is presented in the US news media as odd and mystifying. Well-known representations of North Korea’s mystification include: Kim, who is shown as a curious little man with a curious choice of hair style; North Korea’s testing of short and long range rockets and nuclear warheads; and, videos of massive parades of uniformed military and weapons systems and citizens’ patriotic demonstrations in Pyongyang. Kim rules with an iron fist. Within the tyrannical government, maintaining secrecy, obscurity, are key elements of its mechanism of control over the populace. The North Korean regime is essentially a cult of darkness. Kim and his subordinate leaders in Pyongyang relish rule by violence killing, death. Death is exalted, the nuclear program, rocket program are means being developed to support its ends. Mystification is also what Hollywood uses to help generate fear and horror, to make films spooky. In our culture, timidity easily takes the form of affected joviality, hoping to diffuse tension by amiability, a hug or a slap on the back, and then let the dialogue begin. That may work with victims of evil, but not with evil regimes as the one in North Korea.

The fact that Kim has test launched ICBMs that can reach the Continental US, and has expressed the intention of aiming the next test launch of missiles dangerously close to the US territory of Guam is not the primary concern of Trump’s critics. Rather, they accuse Trump of ratcheting up the situation with his “fire and fury” rhetoric. Those critics were many of the same who harped on the fact that Europeans, who Trump declined to join on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and who he called out for being long-time beneficiaries of US largesse and for failing to meet their obligations for NATO defense spending, are reviled by what they view as Trump’s gaucheness. Trump’s touch with common humanity in no way detracts from his dignity. Further, despite what may be dubbed his outbursts on Twitter, he is aware that anger blinds and chokes. He knows what he is doing. As for the strong, confident nature of his approach to North Korea, Trump ostensibly feels that if he is going to be damned by critics on that or other issues, he might as well be damned for doing what he feels is right and being who he really is.

There is said to be a temper of the soul that wants to live in illusion. In the opinion of most of Trump’s critics, lots of things should be done, omitted, changed, and corrected by him. There are endless calls for a diplomatic solution to the North Korean issue from many of Trump supporters, but mostly from his critics. That demand in itself is misleading. All viable diplomatic angles are being examined by Trump and his foreign and national security policy advisers. Tillerson can handle negotiations with any country, any leader, that is now a proven fact. Yet, an option may be to send a doyen from the foreign policy field, knowledgeable of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, to develop conditions for talks. China can be offered great incentives to use its influence with North Korea more efficaciously, to halt tests and make a deal. Beijing certainly has an interest in preserving its strategic buffer to the US. Still, in the end, it all depends on Kim.

If Trump is given cause to use overwhelming US military power to resolve the North Korean problem, his critics will likely relentlessly remark that he created desolation and called it peace. Anyone who claims a position of moral authority who thinks it possible to diffuse tension between good and evil by playing the minstrel, only signals his own insecurity. The prospect of war on the Korean Peninsula may be so horrifying, so unnerving to some, that consciously or unconsciously, they become disposed to underestimating Kim’s capacity for evil. In such situations, even some experienced and reliable analysts might say things that cannot be. They begin to reject possibilities without hearing others. They will rely upon on self-serving explanations and surmisals. One must process in the mind what one sees to surmount what one sees. Previous administrations derived scant tranquility through negotiation with North Korea. They submitted to the fantasy that Kim wanted peace. Kim prospered by establishing for him a pattern of success that helped build his self-confidence in dealing with US. Scant To ignore evil as a real problem is to leave oneself defenseless. Even if the US made a deal with Kim, his craving for a nuclear capable rocket force could soon reassert itself. Leaders often sign agreements and do nothing afterward.

The safety of the people is the supreme responsibility of a national leader. The US and its allies did not ignite this episode by threatening North Korea. North Korea has boldly posed a significant threat to US territory and allies with ICBMS, intermediate range rockets, and nuclear warheads  It is unfortunate that different philosophies, Kim’s being a defective one, kept him from responding to the initial overture made by Trump toward his regime. Kim’s heart may very well be hardened by a belief that the greatest danger to North Korea,comes from the US, However, Trump will not moan over any of that. There was nothing Delphic about Trump’s statement about responding to aggression from North Korea. He is well aware of the importance of clarity of expression in diplomatic communication. He says what he means. He wants as much information as possible, no matter how feeble in order to be read in on everything. In days ahead, the world may see the best of human accomplishments in diplomacy or the worst of human foibles. Victory by the US and its allies through military action is not in doubt. However, victory by nature can be superb and insulting, given its costs.

Trump Backtracks on Cyber Unit With Russia: His Proposal Was Flawed, But His Thinking Is on Target

US President Donald Trump (above). Trump has engaged in negotiations for decades. In his face to face bilateral meeting with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, Trump was allowed the chance to adjust to circumstances, become more fluid in his thinking, more creative in his approach. His proposal for a joint cyber security unit, while scoffed at, and albeit, not viable under US law, appeared to be a product of his willingness to consider the full range of options. Moreover, as a confidence building measure, it may have had a positive impact on Putin.

According to a July 10, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Trump Backtracks on Cyber Unit With Russia After Harsh Criticism”, US President Donald Trump, on July 10, 2017, backtracked on his push for a cyber security unit with Russia, tweeting that he did not think it could happen, hours after his proposal was harshly criticized by Republicans who said Moscow could not be trusted. The New York Times article explained the idea was a political non-starter. It was immediately scorned by several of Trump’s fellow Republicans, who questioned why the US would work with Russia after Moscow’s reported meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. The episode over the proposal unfolded on July 9, 2017 after his bilateral meeting with Putin in Hamburg, Germany during the G-20 Economic Summit. Trump emphasised that he raised allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election with Putin. Reuters reported on July 9, 2017 that Trump stated: “I strongly pressed President Putin twice about Russian meddling in our election. He vehemently denied it. I’ve already given my opinion…..” As an immediate response to Putin’s denials on the matter, Trump then proposed forming a cyber security unit. According to Reuters on July 9, 2017, Trump wrote in the actual tweet about the cyber security unit: “Putin & I discussed forming an impenetrable Cyber Security unit so that election hacking, & many other negative things, will be guarded and safe.”

When Trump broached the the issue of the Russia’s hacking of the 2016 Presidential Election and his discussion with Putin apparently became a bit scratchy. Putin’s denial of the facts presented most likely signalled to Trump that he would be engaged in a argument without end on the hacking. Trump had to either move away from the issue or move laterally on it in some way.  Surely, Trump did not want to abandon the matter. The proposal for a joint cyber security unit apparently stemmed from an intense discussion between Trump and Putin on how to remit Russian cyber warfare programs directed at the US and perhaps similar US programs aimed at Russia. It may have been the product of brainstorming by the two leaders. Trump’s proposal was never supposed to serve as a form retribution against Russia for its intrusions into the US democratic process. Surely, it was not created to be a final solution to the threat of hacking US election. Immediately after the bilateral meeting in Germany, it was revealed that forming such a joint cyber security unit with Russia was prohibited under US law. Yet, although creating an actual cyber security unit was out of bounds, the concept of bringing US and Russian cyber experts together in some way to talk about some cyber matters was not. Trump’s likely aim with the proposal was to create a situation in which US and Russian officials were talking about hacking. Ostensibly, those conversations would create goodwill, perhaps stimulate a more open discussion about the issue, and promote more fulsome, honest talks about the issue among senior officials. In that way, the proposal certainly would have served as an effective confidence building measure.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines an apologist as a person who offers an argument in defense of something controversial. That is not the intent here. The OED defines an analyst as someone who conducts analyses. Foreign policy analysts scrutinize facts and data and interpret them, often in different ways. Given what is publicly known about Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit, the analysis here explains that although flawed, it is the sort of unconventional product that can result from intense negotiations aimed at coping with a seemingly intractable issue. The troublesome issue in this case is Russia’s intrusions into the 2016 US Presidential Election with all of its considerable security and political implications. It is also explained here that Trump’s proposal reveals a bit about his negotiating style. Trump clearly becomes target-oriented in his talks, and will make smaller agreements to build his interlocutor’s trust in him. From congruences Trump discerns in his interlocutor’s thinking and his own, he will try to craft a mutually satisfying agreement that, of course, ensures he will get what he wants. At this stage, Trump is still trying to get answers from Russia about the election issue and mollify the anxieties of various constituencies in the US over the negotiations, while hard at work trying to improve relations with Russia. Using his skills and experience, he seems to be swimming in the right direction. Audacibus annue coeptis. (Look with favor upon a bold beginning.)

Over the past decade, Russia has mounted more than a dozen significant cyber attacks against foreign countries, sometimes to help or harm a specific political candidate, sometimes to sow chaos, but always to project Russian power. From June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic Party officials. Russian officials deny engaging in such operations.  Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence efforts.

Russian Cyber Attacks during the 2016 US Presidential Election

As it was discussed in the July 6, 2017 greatcharlie post entitled “Trump to Meet with Putin at G-20 Gathering: Trump Seeks an Authentic Relationship with Russia”, over the past decade, Russia has mounted more than a dozen significant cyber attacks against foreign countries, sometimes to help or harm a specific political candidate, sometimes to sow chaos, but always to project Russian power. The Russian strategy is typically to pair cyber attacks with online propaganda. That approach has been refined and expanded by Russian intelligence. From June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic officials, which in turn were distributed to the global media by WikiLeaks. Both the CIA and the FBI report the intrusions were intended to undermine the US election. Cyber gives Russia a usable strategic capability. If benefits from its use appear great enough, Moscow may want to risk additional attacks. Russian officials will normally vehemently deny launching cyber attacks. Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence operations. Putin has never publicly discussed them.

The report of the January 16, 2017 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Election” presents the best publicized assessment by the US Intelligence Community of the Russian cyber attack during the 2016 US Presidential Election. The Russian operation to influence the 2016 US Presidential Election demonstrated a marked escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of  Moscow’s longstanding desire and effort to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order. US Intelligence Community assesses that Putin, himself, ordered the influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s objectives were: to undermine public faith in the US democratic process; to denigrate former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; and, to harm her electability and potential presidency.  The US Intelligence Community further assessed that Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for then President-elect Trump. In following, it also assessed Putin and the Russian Government aspired to aid President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. The approach the Russia took to operation reportedly evolved over the course of the campaign given its understanding of the US electoral prospects of the two main candidates. The Intelligence Community concluded that once it appeared to Moscow that Clinton would likely win the election, the Russian operation began to focus more on undermining her future presidency. It was uncovered by Intelligence Community that the influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blended covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.”

The Intelligence Community has declared that much as its Soviet predecessor, Russia has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections, using Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin. Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US were Presidential Election, including targets associated with both major US political parties, were conducted by Russian intelligence services. The Intelligence Community assessed with high confidence that the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data collected in cyber operations publicly, in exclusives to media outlets, and transmitted material to WikiLeaks. Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral boards. US Department of Homeland Security assessments in the report explain that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or compromised were not involved in vote tallying. The Russia’s state-run propaganda machine Russia Today contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.  The US Intelligence Community concluded that Moscow will apply lessons learned from its “Putin-ordered campaign” directed at the 2016 US Presidential Election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes.

Testifying before the US Senate Intelligence Committee on June21, 2017, Jeanette Manfra, the US Department of Homeland Security’s acting deputy Undersecretary of Cyber Security revealed that 21 US state election systems were targeted as part of Russia’s wide-ranging operation to influence the 2016 elections. She explained that a small number state election systems were also breached but there was no evidence any votes were manipulated. Manfra noted that the elections are resilient to hacking in part because they are decentralized and largely operated on the state and local level. Nevertheless, the hacking of state and local election databases in 2016 was more extensive than previously reported. According to Time, there was at least one successful attempt to alter voter information. Reportedly in Illinois, more than 90% of the nearly 90,000 records stolen by Russian state actors contained driver’s’ license numbers, and a quarter contained the last four digits of voters’ Social Security numbers.

According to the US Intelligence Community, 21 US state election systems were targeted as part of Russia’s wide-ranging operation to influence the 2016 elections. A small number state election systems were also breached but there was no evidence any votes were manipulated. However, there was at least one successful attempt to alter voter information.  In Illinois, more than 90% of the nearly 90,000 records stolen by Russian state actors contained driver’s license numbers, and a quarter contained the last four digits of voters’ Social Security numbers.

Reaching Agreements: Easier Said than Done

Before the Trump-Putin bilateral meeting, what had been observed in diplomatic exchanges between the US and Russia is a type of modus vivendi, a way of living, working together, between leaders and chief diplomats. After Putin granted US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson a meeting in Moscow after his talks with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Trump granted Lavrov a meeting in Washington during a visit to meeting with Tillerson. It also indicated a willingness to establish a balance in negotiations or quid pro quo on issues when possible. US State Department and Russian Foreign Ministry officials are also working together to resolve nagging issues that could serve to harm efforts to foster good relations. Such seemingly small steps helped to build confidence in both Washington and Moscow that the prospect for change was real, and it lead to the arrangement of a meeting between presidents. Those small steps also supported an open line of communication between chief diplomats which is all importance as US and Russian military forces work in close proximity in Syria, fighting continues in Ukraine, and aerial and naval intrusions remain constant in skies and waters in NATO, Canadian and US territory. If all went well, there will certainly be more to follow.

All of that being stated, the successful formulation and execution of such small steps is a daunting in public. When Putin initially took power on January 1, 2000, the West expected him to give it nothing less than his unequivocal cooperation in a manner similar to his predecessor, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin. Western capitals also expected Putin to be a bit wobbly taking on so much responsibility at a relatively early age. Yet, Putin knew his shoulders could bear the burden. He had no desire to be just a man of the moment in Russia. Much as Yeltsin, Putin, too, showed patience toward the West for a while, but he did not procrastinate. He took on the mission of breathing fresh breath into a country that was dying. He pushed ahead with plans “to save” Russia from disintegration and frustrate what he sensed were Western efforts to weaken it. Indeed, Putin did not believe congenial relations with the West were authentic given the many years of geopolitical struggle. Putin believed then, and believes now, that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He believes Western governments are driven to create disorder in Russia and make it dependent of Western technologies. Still, Putin has shown that would prefer to outthink his rivals in the West rather than fight them. That notion has influenced his responses in contentious situations. After the period of a term away from the presidency during which he served as his country’s prime minister, Putin was reelected for a third term on March 4, 2012. He clased repeatedly with US President Barack Obama and seemed to act more aggressively. The Russian military move that stood out was the annexation of the Crimea.

The US and EU took Putin to task for that bold military operation. Harsh sanctions were levied and Russia was cast out of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies. Putin has held on to the territory and has continued to do so in the face of even tougher sanctions against Russian interests. He levied his own sanctions against US and EU products and even began heavily supporting separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. In a March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Putin vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating some Western actions that fostered contempt in Moscow. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he refers to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Ulterius ne tende odiis. (Go no further down the road of hatred.)

Given the many years of geopolitical struggle, Putin was unconvinced congenial relations between Russia and the West could exist authentically. He believed the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. After Putin was reelected for a third term, he clashed repeatedly with US President Barack Obama. Putin became more aggressive; took more military action. After traveling a bumpy road with the Obama administration, Moscow hoped Trump’s approach to Russia in any direction would reflect the desire not just for new deals, but a new US-Russia relationship.

Trump’s Negotiating Style: It’s Similar to the “Harvard Way”

Parva scintilla saepe magnam flamam excitat. (The sparkle often initiates a large flame.) Given Trump’s gift for agile maneuver against opposite parties in negotiations and his ability to mask his approach, if he chooses to do so, his decisions cannot be forecasted with exactitude. Trump, a self-admitted master of the art of the deal.  His negotiating “tactics, techniques, procedures and methods” Trump appears to have used that were likely developed a tad via his graduate business education at the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania along with heavy dose of experience gained after nearly five decades of business negotiations. His concepts appear similar to those promoted by Harvard University’s Program on Negotiation. Such concepts ostensibly guided him in his first “business meeting” with Putin. They include the following: promoting creativity by breaking problems into smaller components; by doing so, you can build a multi-issue business negotiation out of what might appear to be a single-issue deal; using multiple issues to make valuable tradeoffs and facilitate a good-faith negotiation; collecting important information by asking lots of questions and listening carefully to the answers; impressing the other side with your flexibility by putting forth several different proposals at the same time; contemplate unconventional deal-structuring arrangements to bridge the gap between what the seller wants and what the buyer can afford; exploring a contingent contract to help overcome differences in beliefs about future events and outcomes; creating even more value in business negotiations by adding conditions to your deal such as “I’ll do X if you do Y”; and, engaging in “mind games” like brainstorming to facilitate creative problem solving and unexpected solutions.

Trump surely had high hopes before and during his meeting with Putin. He likely would argue then, and would argue now, that bold action, when appropriate, would be the very thing to turn situations around. Ideally, if big agreements were reached, they could help modify Russian behavior, and get relations moving forward. Yet, Trump is also pragmatic and recognizes that plans must fit circumstances and circumstances cannot be created or imagined to fit plans. Trump understood that there would likely need to be initial, relatively small steps perhaps to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. He would also seek to gauge actions and reactions of his interlocutor, Putin. If he discerned a positive way forward, his sense of possibility would broaden and he would open his mind up to more options. When Trump broached the issue of Russian cyber attacks and eventually presented his proposal, his goal was not to mollify Putin, but rather provide an opportunity for all sides to “clear the air” on the issue of Russia’s hacking of 2016 US Presidential Election but he was unable to receive anything other than denials. Trump is not happy about Russia’s interference with the 2016 Presidential Election both as a patriotic citizen and as a candidate in that election. He may not completely agree that Russia’s action greatly impacted his election victory, but he recognizes that the aesthetics of the intrusion over time could diminish his accomplishment in some minds, particularly among his supporters. Trump understood Putin would likely deny Russia had any connection to the election intrusion, but he undoubtedly believed it was worth a try to have him confirm what most in the US believe.

As Trump and Putin did not have a relationship established prior to the meeting, they did not possess the requisite degree of trust that would allow them to relax and explore the territory outside their formal negotiating positions. They could not talk about their assumptions, strategies, and even fears. They had to work in the abstract from reports of others’ observations and analyses about their respective interlocutors.

The ability of Trump in his negotiations with Putin, to restrain the expression of emotion, in this case anger, perhaps even rage, and not to publish to the world by changes of countenance those thoughts and feelings, was critical if relations were to move forward. To exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to recreate oneself endlessly. Admitting errors, missteps, is a sign of maturity and wisdom. One evolves as a result of recognizing ones mistakes. The mature one has moved from the passive voice to the active voice–that is when one stops saying, “It got lost” and begins saying, “I lost it.” The bilateral meeting between Trump and Putin was a promising moment in relations between the US and Russia. In an advanced, mature way of thinking, a presidential way of thinking in 2017, Trump sought some temporary step on the issue of Russia’s intrusion into the 2016 US Presidential Election by taking into consideration the relative strengths of the positions and capabilities of all sides. Trump understands the peace that can be achieved must be the focus. The focus must not be how much each side can destroy the other through cyber warfare but rather how to end cyber as a mutual threat. One cannot solve a problem with the same thinking one used when one created the problem. Mens sibi conscia recti. (A mind conscious of its own rectitude.)

The Flawed Cyber Proposal: A Telling Product of the Negotiation Process

Six building blocks for diplomatic negotiations were superbly outlined by the renowned US statesman, former US Secretary of State James Baker over a decade ago. Baker explained that the building blocks worked well when properly applied through solid preparation and hard work. The building blocks included: 1) Understanding an opponent’s position; 2) Gaining trust through personal relationships; 3) Reciprocal confidence building; 4) Taking a pragmatic approach that does not sacrifice principles; 5) Being aware of timing; and 6) Maintaining a deep respect for the politics of the situation.

As Trump and Putin did not have a relationship established prior to the meeting, they did not possess the requisite degree of trust that would allow them to relax and explore the territory outside their formal negotiating positions. They could not talk about their assumptions, strategies, and even fears. They had to work in the abstract from reports that presented observations and analyses of others about their respective interlocutors. With specific regard to reciprocal confidence building, both leaders demonstrated that they could negotiate. Baker suggested that at the earliest stage, one could arrange a series small negotiations on issues that could be resolved quickly, reasonably, and amicably to assist in developing a dialogue. Baker explained that finding even a minor, common point of agreement, for example on the shape of the negotiating table, can serve to set the tone of the relationship. It also helps develop a dialogue, which is one of the most important aspects of negotiations.

Former US Secretary of State James Baker (above). Six excellent building blocks for diplomatic negotiations were outlined by former US Secretary of State James Baker over a decade ago. Baker explained that they worked well when properly applied through solid preparation and hard work. Included among them were: 1) Understanding an opponent’s position; 2) Gaining trust through personal relationships; 3) Reciprocal confidence building; 4) Taking a pragmatic approach that does not sacrifice principles; 5) Being aware of timing; and 6) Maintaining a deep respect for the politics of the situation.

Confidence Building Measures: In Brief

Perhaps the best definition for confidence building measures was provided by Simon Mason and Siegfried Matthias, in their seminal article, “Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) in Peace Processes” published in Managing Peace Processes: Process Related Questions. A Handbook for AU Practitioners, Volume 1 (African Union and the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013). They define confidence building measures as series of actions that are negotiated, agreed, and implemented by parties in a dispute in order to build confidence without specifically focusing on the root causes of the dispute.

Confidence building measures are designed to build confidence. Confidence is a psychological state, whereby actors make themselves vulnerable and ready to take risks based on the expectation of goodwill and positive behavior from a counterpart. Confidence building measures can prevent a dispute or larger problem from escalating even if the negotiating process is to be started in the short term. Preventing escalation has value in itself and may also allow the negotiation process to begin again later on. Mason and Matthias intriguingly note that confidence building measures can prevent parties from escalating even when there is a denial of any problems or tensions that could escalate. Successful negotiations require risk taking by the parties. That is why a minimum degree of confidence is needed for negotiations to even start. For negotiating parties, confidence building measures are attractive because they are seen as a low-cost and low-risk activities, since they can be implemented with limited resources and calculated risks. The negotiating parties, themselves, must craft confidence building measures to fit their specific case. If not, what is agreed to will not be owned by the parties, and will not serve to build trust. Confidence building measures must also be reciprocal in nature. One party should not feel that it is going out on a limb without the other also doing so. To assist in ensuring confidence is sustained and agreements are appropriately implemented, confidence building measures concerning communication should be put in place.

In an incremental approach to confidence building measures, a series of agreements are used to slowly tackle the more difficult core issues later on. Under this approach, confidence building measures become stepping stones or a pathway to greater agreements. Indeed, agreements on confidence building measures early on generally build trust and interest in negotiating more complex agreements at a later stage. In this sense, confidence building measures create opportunities for parties to collaborate on something that is not strategically important to them and, in so doing, build the trust needed to subsequently discuss important strategic issues. Confidence building measures pull parties away from the obstacle they are blocked on. Once confidence exists, it is then easier to address the obstacles. Mason and Matthias use the metaphor of steps of a ladder also highlights the incremental nature of building trust which takes time and an accumulation of small steps. That is referred to by some as the confidence building process.

Mason and Matthias caution parties negotiating confidence building measures that wider constituencies may view a negotiation process with suspicion before, during, and after negotiations, and may not be willing to accept deals made. Individuals from those constituencies typically will not be present at the negotiation or understand how agreements were arrived at. Plans for responding to the wider constituencies’ concerns must be considered. A mutual understanding that one party made need to break away from a confidence building measure must exist. An agreement could be negotiated that allows the parties an amount of time in which they could communicate to one another about the need to break away from a confidence building measure. Working together on such a matter in itself could build confidence, create some degree of trust.

US military personnel in Cyber Command (above). There is no doubt with regard to the legal barriers to Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the US Department of Defense, which is the parent organization of the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, from using any funds for bilateral military cooperation with Russia. However, the mere fact that Trump offered to work jointly with Russia to sort out a cyber matter, and thought of creating an organization for that, seems to have had a positive impact on Putin.

Even though Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit was flawed, the dialogue among US and Russian cyber experts that might have resulted from it could have helped to develop a mutual understanding about the harmful effects of cyber activities and potential consequences, to include proportional asymmetric responses. Experts from the US side in any hypothetical liaison team would have likely been very experienced, highly qualified US personnel from the US National Security Agency and Cyber Command, and perhaps the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of State, the primary US agency most major cyber negotiations. They might have caused Russia to halt its cyber operations against the US by helping to establish a modus vivendi, or way both countries could live together while possessing this significant strategic capability. One could speculate even further that talks may have even resulted in the very near-term suspension of any cyber attacks underway, or a reduction in the intensity or tempo of such attacks that have been sourced to Russia and perhaps some that have not as yet been identified as such. Trump’s proposal, encouraging talks, although flawed legally, ideally could have inspired both countries to move forward toward a greater agreement.

A Bad Reaction

As it was explained earlier, wider constituencies represented by negotiating parties may view the process with suspicion. In that vein, political allies and adversaries alike in the US rejected Trump’s proposal for a joint cyber security unit. There was an immediate rebuff from several Republicans, who questioned why the US would work at all with Russia after Moscow’s alleged meddling in the 2016 U.S. election. US Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, a Republican, stated on the US Sunday morning news program “Meet the Press”: “It’s not the dumbest idea I have ever heard but it’s pretty close.” On Twitter, US Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, a Republican, immediately criticized Trump’s cyber proposal. Rubio wrote: “While reality and pragmatism requires that we engage Vladimir Putin, he will never be ally or reliable constructive partner.” He further stated: “Partnering with Putin on a ‘Cyber Security Unit’ is akin to partnering with [Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-] Assad on a “Chemical Weapons Unit.” US Senator John McCain of Arizona, a Republican who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, recognized Trump’s desire to move forward with Russia. However , McCain further explained on the US Sunday morning talk show “Face the Nation”: “There has to be a price to pay.” McCain went on to state: “Vladimir Putin … got away with literally trying to change the outcome … of our election.” He also added: “There has been no penalty.” US Representative Adam Schiff, the top Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, told CNN’s Sunday morning program, “State of the Union”, that Russia could not be a credible partner in a cyber security unit. Schiff stated: “If that’s our best election defense, we might as well just mail our ballot boxes to Moscow,” Schiff added. A former US Secretary of Defense in the administration of US President Barack Obama, Ashton Carter, told CNN: “This is like the guy who robbed your house proposing a working group on burglary.”

There is no doubt with regard to the legal barriers to Trump’s proposal for a joint US-Russian cyber security unit. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act prohibits the US Department of Defense, which is the parent organization of the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, from using any funds for bilateral military cooperation with Russia. The purpose of the law is avoid providing Moscow with insight into US cyber capabilities. In the US, it has been long-believed that Moscow is averse to revealing any of its cyber capabilities.

Multiple proposals will be presented in the process of improving US-Russian relations. Trump’s cyber proposal was one of many tabled by him during his bilateral meeting with Putin. As Trump tweeted, success was achieved in other areas. For example, Trump and Putin agreed over a ceasefire for southwest Syria that was set to begin on midday, July 9, 2017. US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said it showed the US and Russia were able to work together in Syria and that they would continue to do so.

Dumping the Cyber Security Unit Proposal

It was only hours after Trump’s proposal for the joint US-Russian cyber security unit was harshly criticized by Republicans who said Moscow could not be trusted that he backtracked on it. He tweeted: “The fact that President Putin and I discussed a Cyber Security unit doesn’t mean I think it can happen. It can’t.”

Even without being implemented, the fact that Trump offered to work jointly with Russia to sort out a cyber matter, and thought of creating an organization to do so, may have had a positive impact on Putin’s thinking. Putin can choose cautious cooperation or subterfuge, which many in foreign policy circles would call his penchant. In his dealings with Trump, it seems to some degree Putin has chosen cooperation. Indeed, it must be noted that Putin discussed Trump’s proposal and was apparently open to some type of interaction between cyber experts of both countries. Recall also that Trump initially tweeted that Putin entertained the proposal. As Putin has the final say on all foreign policy matters in Russia, he established that Russia at the moment has an interest in reaching an understanding on cyber. Trump’s July 7, 2017 cyber proposal is dead. However, as the process of building relations between the US and Russia, there is a real chance that a new, better crafted proposal on cyber, within bounds legally, may surface, perhaps even from Moscow. Only time will tell.

Multiple proposals will be presented in the process of improving US-Russian relations. Trump’s cyber proposal was one of many tabled by him during his bilateral meeting with Putin. As Trump tweeted, success was achieved in other areas  For example, Trump and Putin agreed over a ceasefire for southwest Syria that started on midday, July 9, 2017. Tillerson said it showed the US and Russia were able to work together in Syria and that they would continue to do so. Tillerson announced some key understandings brokered in the meeting amounted to success. He explained: “We had a very lengthy discussion regarding other areas in Syria that we can continue to work together on to de-escalate the areas and the violence, once we defeat ISIS.” Tillerson also said the US and Russia would “work together towards a political process that will secure the future of the Syrian people.”

The Way Forward

In William Shakespeare’s play, The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth, while King Henry away from the throne, the Duke of York, urged by Warwick, sat on it. Just then, Henry arrives with followers. Henry tells York to step away, but York announces an alleged claim to the crown against the King’s hereditary possession. Henry convinces York to wait to be crowned after he dies. Henry’s nobles are astonished that he disinherited his own son. Queen Margaret arrives and is struck by the news. York, at home, is convinced by Richard’s sons Edward and Richard, and his follower Montague to take the throne right away. A war for succession ensues. After several horrific battles, the opposing sides massed for a final engagement. In Act V, Scene iv of the play, Margaret leading Henry’s supporters gives a final stirring speech, summoning courage and the fighting spirit. On the plains near Teaksbury she states: “Great lords, wise men ne’er sit and wail their loss, but cheerly seek how to redress their harms. What though the mast be now blown overboard, the cable broke, the holding-anchor lost and half our sailors swallow’d in the flood? Yet lives our pilot still. Is’t meet that he should leave the helm and like a fearful lad with tearful eyes add water to the sea and give more strength to that which hath too much, whiles, in his moan, the ship splits on the rock, which industry and courage might have saved? Ah, what a shame! Ah, what a fault were this!” As Trump engages in efforts to improve relations with Putin and Russia, his opponents and a few fellow Republicans seem to feel the US is staring into a dangerous, dark abyss. They place little faith in Trump, and no trust or hope in Putin. Conversely, Trump, in thinking about the potential for improving relations, likely conjures panoramic views of endless vistas. While Trump’s critics would associate the disturbing sound of a dissonant flute with Trump’s effort to rebuild relations with Russia, Trump seeks to create a harmony between the US and Russia that even Johann Sebastian Bach would find sublime. The entire matter seems to enthral him. He remains optimistic and is pushing ahead in the face of considerable obstacles, the majority of which are actually unrelated to his efforts with Putin.

Trump has engaged in negotiations for decades. In his face to face bilateral meeting with Putin, Trump was allowed the chance to adjust to circumstances, become more fluid in his thinking, and more creative in his approach. Trump’s sense of possibilities was broadened. His proposal for a joint cyber security unit, while scoffed at, and, albeit, not viable under US law, undoubtedly resulted from his willingness to consider the full range of options. As a confidence building measure, it may very well have had a positive impact on Putin’s thinking without even being implemented.  Reports about the actual Trump-Putin meeting indicate both leaders had a good sense of one another’s positions but they also sought find out more about one another’s approaches. By doing so, both provided themselves with a better chance of reaching a successful conclusion. Both were attentive to how the other perceived issues, no matter alien that view may have been to their own. They noticed patterns of behavior, some perhaps influenced by history and culture, and recognized political constraints the other faced. Both Trump and Putin tried to crawl into one another’s shoes. As time moves on, that effort may very well assist the two leaders in building a relations that will facilitate the building of ties between the US and Russia. Durate, et vosmet rebus servate secundis. (Endure, and keep yourselves for days of happiness.)

US and Allies Extend Iran Nuclear Talks by 7 Months: A Deal May Be Reached with Trust, But Not with Certainty

Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari (right) stands close to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (left), at a ceremony. For hard-liners as Jafari, the failure to reach a deal by November 24th proved the West only wants Iran to surrender its nuclear program. Fears of US military action are gone. Hard-liners have gained even more of Khamenei’s attention on foreign policy.

According to a November 25, 2014 New York Times article entitled “U.S. and Allies Extend Iran Nuclear Talks by 7 Months”, the US and partners in the P5+1 (the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council—the US, United Kingdom, France Russia, and China—plus Germany), to declare an extension for talks with Iran on its nuclear program until June 30, 2015. The extension came after a yearlong effort to reach a sustainable agreement with Iran to dismantle large parts of its nuclear infrastructure. There was no indication of why negotiators felt they could overcome political obstacles blocking a deal. Until very recently, negotiators from all sides insisted that the November 24, 2014 deadline for a deal was hard and fast.

The November 25th New York Times article explained the already extended high-level diplomacy over the Iranian nuclear program was arguably US President Barack Obama’s top foreign policy priority. The results on November 24th had to be a disappointment for him. Negotiators did not even agree on the framework for a comprehensive deal. In expressing hope that a deal could still be reached, US Secretary of State John Kerry told reporters that a series of “new ideas surfaced” in the last several days of talks. He further stated “we would be fools to walk away,” because a temporary agreement curbing Iran’s program would remain in place while negotiations continued. Indeed, it has been reported that Iran has actually kept its end of the deal under the November 24, 2013 interim agreement, named the Joint Plan of Action, by reducing its stock of 20 percent enriched uranium, not enriching uranium above a purity of 5 percent and not installing more centrifuges in addition to other things. In extending the interim agreement, Iran has ensured itself sanctions relief, bringing it $700 million a month in money formerly frozen abroad. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani appeared on Iranian national television with a message of both reassurance and resistance. He told Iranians that a deal would end sanctions, but also said “the centrifuges are spinning and will never stop.” The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has rejected US demands for the deep reductions in Iran’s enrichment capability. His view may not change before a March 1, 2015 deadline for reaching a political agreement, the first phase in the seven-month extension.

For the hard-liners in Iran, the failure to reach an agreement proved the US and its allies were not negotiating honestly and simply wanted to take away Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian moderates however, seem to realize an authentic agreement that includes the removal of sanctions and an acceptable modification of Iran’s nuclear activities can be reached. Yet, they likely also worry that the failure to reach an agreement coupled with the lackluster US reaction over events in Iraq and Syria has strengthened hard-liners’ resolve, and worse, strengthened their position and influence with Khamenei. Threats made by the Obama administration to take military action if negotiations fail now ring hollow. Western negotiators remain concerned over how Iran will proceed with or without a deal. A deal would need to be made with the prayer that Tehran will not announce one day that it has a weapon.

Zarif Wants An Agreement to Resolve the Nuclear Issue in Tehran

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, was upbeat before reporters at a press conference on November 25, 2014 in Vienna saying with a broad smile that he was optimistic that in the next few months a solution would be found. He was quoted as saying “We don’t need seven months.” Zarif directed his words at the US Congress saying Iran would not be ending all of its nuclear activities. He explained “If you are looking for a zero sum game in nuclear negotiations, you are doomed to failure.” He also revealed that the step by step removal of sanctions was a stumbling block in the talks. Zarif apparently argued to the end in the talks that the sanctions must be lifted permanently and almost immediately. For both Rouhani and Obama, the next seven months may be difficult to manage. Opponents of concessions of any kind have been gaining strength in both countries. It seems time has quickly passed since the summer of 2013 when considerable enthusiasm was created in Washington and other Western capitals over the potential of negotiations with Iran. Rouhani made an eloquent case for opening a dialogue with the US before and after his inauguration.  Skepticism expressed in the US came mainly from Kerry.  He made it clear that the warming a relations between the US and Iran did not mean that the US would back off its demands on Iran’s nuclear program.  Kerry was also unequivocal about his willingness to shut down any talks if he discerned an effort to stall, misdirect, or deceive through the process. However, as the process got underway, there was a perceptible shift in the US position.  US negotiators seemed to fall over themselves just to reach a nuclear deal with Iran.  Talk of military action against Iran’s nuclear program has become a distant memory.  Obama administration officials pleaded with Congress not to levy new sanctions against Iran because sanctions would not convince the Iranians to accede to US wishes.  Simply put, the White House wanted to reach a deal, and US officials did not really hide that fact. Zarif apparently recognized the change in US attitude.  He told the Iranian media, “There are indicators that John Kerry is inclined [to advance the nuclear matter in Iran’s interests].”

By that point, Zarif saw the real possibility of reaching an agreement with the P5+1 that Tehran could live with. He argued with hard-line elements in Tehran, including the leadership of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and hard-line political and religious leaders, that a deal would be beneficial to Iran. The hard-liners did not desire to engage in negotiations, particularly with the West and remained reluctant, but, in obedience to Khamenei, they did not oppose his efforts. Zarif assures that Iran neither needs nor simply wants a nuclear weapons capability. That is to the best of his knowledge. Zarif believes Iran’s size and strength and level of technological development makes it unnecessary to augment its power with nuclear weapons. Zarif believes the goal of Iran’s nuclear program was to produce fuel for its nuclear reactor. That argument has remained at the root of his efforts during the entire negotiation process.  In a US television interview in July 17, 2014, he explained that nuclear weapons would likely reduce Iran’s security and influence in its region.  He said “It doesn’t help anybody.”  He went on to state “The fact that everybody in the international community believes that mutual assured destruction, that is the way the United States, Russia and others, get, seek, peace and security, through having the possibility of destroying each other 100 times over, is simply mad.” Zarif argued: “Have they [nuclear weapons] made Pakistan safe? Have they made Israel safe? Have they made Russia safe? All these countries are susceptible. Now you have proof that nuclear weapons or no amount of military power makes you safe. So we need to live in a different paradigm. And that’s what we are calling for.” To prove Western claims about Iran’s nuclear program untrue, Zarif has proposed confidence-building measures and responded to proposals from the P5+1. However, firm limits to what he could commit to were set by Khamenei. As the November 24th deadline approached, Tehran apparently pulled the reign on Zarif tighter. Zarif undoubtedly recognized that other events in the region were having an impact on Khamenei’s thoughts on the negotiations. Threats of US military action had already dissipated. However, once the Obama administration displayed great reluctance to act militarily in Iraq in the face of monstrous actions by Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS), fears were mitigated within all quarters in Tehran that the US would act militarily against Iran.  Obama’s October 2014 letter to Khamenei may have further substantiated that view. With less worry that failed negotiations would lead to war, leaders in Tehran, particularly Khamenei and the hard-liners, saw no need to deal away any more of Iran’s nuclear program.

Hard-liners Strengthen Their Position with Khamenei

From the prism of hard-line elements in Tehran, the negotiation process has been a contest of wills. IRGC Commander General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari stated: “All must help the negotiations team of our country and the foreign policy apparatus in order to create consensus and public unity at the current time in order to help them demand the fundamental rights of the nation of Iran in the nuclear field and stand against Arrogant [US] blackmail and greed during negotiations and meetings.” Yet, as the eagerness of the Obama administration to reach a deal became even apparent to them, the hard-liners watched, anticipating that the US would acquiesce to Iran’s demands. Previously, Iran contended with the administration of US President George W. Bush who threatened regime change and, hinted at a possible ground attack from Iraq. However, the Obama administration seemed less threatening and somewhat pliant to hard-liners. That perception was apparent iin the reaction of Jafari to the negotiations latest outcome. He explained “The Americans’ surrender to the authority of Iran is apparent by their behavior in the region and in the [nuclear] negotiations, and the issues of the enemy in combat with Iran were fully felt. Of course, their excesses in some cases are due to their fierce temper.” Jafari still expressed no genuine interest in reaching a deal with the P5+1. He stated, “The main elements of our power are in the hands of God and country. We should not seek our dignity and authority from the foreigners.”  He waxed on Iran’s potential to become a global power, and the need for a strategy to promote its interests and the Revolution worldwide. Jafari proffered, “Our problem is that we don’t have a broader outlook; the Supreme has also stressed this issue . . . If we don’t have a comprehensive and broader outlook, we will go wrong in all fields and decision-making, even the negotiations and nuclear issues.”

IRGC senior commanders have always looked with a bad eye at the size, power, and capabilities of the US military, and have wanted to surpass it in the Middle East and beyond. The IRGC and Iranian Armed Forces regularly declare their willingness to defend Iranian territory to the end and display Iran’s military capabilities. Jafari stated: “[The US and Israel] know well that they have been unable to take any military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and if they make any foolish move of this sort, there are many options on the table for Iran and deadly responses will be received.” Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi, stated, “With God’s grace, Iran’s army has transformed into a strong, experienced, and capable army twenty-five years after the [Iran-Iraq] war’s end, and is now considered a powerful army in Western Asia.” On Syria, the US has not interfered with Iran’s military forces on the ground and efforts to shape events there. Despite declaring red-lines on the use of chemical weapons in Syria and publicly accusing the Assad regime of using chemical weapons, the Obama administration expressed fears over placing “boots on the ground” and eventually declined to act.  That led IRGC commanders in particular to publicly deride the US as being indecisive and predict it would be pliant to Iran’s demands. IRGC Quds Force Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Qassem Suleimani said of the US, “There was a day when the US used three options: political, economic, military.  Today they lie and say ‘we have forced Iran to negotiate with sanctions’ or the Islamic system is weaker.’  Really, today, the US has the most debt of any country in the world.  The US has also failed everywhere they have interfered militarily.  From a political perspective, they are not accepted anywhere in the world.  In a situation in which the US is considered the world’s greatest power, they are ruined in every dimension.”

In one of his early public statements on the Iraq, Khamenei said, “The Dominant System [US], using the remnants of Saddam’s regime as the primary pawns and the prejudiced takfiri elements as the infantry, is seeking to disrupt Iraq’s peace and stability and threaten its territorial integrity.” Hard-liners apparently had to convince Khamenei that the Obama administration did not have the situation under control and was not moving with an assured step. Much as Zarif seemingly recognized, hard-line military and security officials apparently concluded uniformly that the US has no intention of attacking Iran if the nuclear talks fail. The hard-liners appear to have convinced Khamenei that Obama’s reluctance to fight ISIS showed he would be even more reluctant to face the IRGC, Iranian Armed Forces, and other security elements globally if the US attacked Iran’s nuclear program.  The hard-liners also likely inferred from Obama’s reluctance he would not want to concurrently fight Iran and ISIS. Khamenei was able to see Iran was in, what Jafari would characterize as, a stronger position versus the US, even on the nuclear issue.

Jafari has always looked with a bad eye at the US military. He believes the US is in decline and wants Iran to acquire a broader outlook regarding its role in world affairs.

A maturing public relations apparatus in Khamenei’s office shaped official quotes from the Supreme Leader in response to the talks’ result. On Thursday November 27, 2014, Khamenei made it clear that he backed the extension of nuclear negotiations with the P5+1, and praised the negotiating team for its efforts. Khamenei expressed on his website, “For the same reasons I wasn’t against negotiations, I’m also not against the extension.” He characterized Iran’s negotiators as “hard-working and serious . . . [They] justly and honestly stood against words of force and bullying of the other side, and unlike the other side, they did not change their words every day.” In another message on his Twitter account, Khamenei stated “We accept fair and reasonable agreements. Where there’s bullying and excessive demands, all of Iran, people and officials, will not accept.”

However, in a more genuine manifestation of his feelings on the negotiations, Khamenei, in a November 25, 2014 meeting with Muslim clerics in Tehran, dismissed the diplomatic and economic pressure that world powers had brought to bear on his country over its nuclear ambitions. Khamenei said that the West had failed to bring Iran “to its knees.” On his website, he further stated that “In the nuclear issue, America and colonial European countries got together and did their best to bring the Islamic Republic to its knees, but they could not do so—and they will not be able to do so.” Several Twitter posts from an account used by Khamenei’s office, accused the West of meddling in the Middle East and using Sunni militant groups to thwart the Arab Spring uprisings with intra-Muslim infighting, “in line with arrogant [US] goals.” Some of Khamenei’s November 27th statements actually lapsed into the same aggressive tone. Khamenei said the US would be the biggest loser if the extended talks failed. He remarked “Know that whether or not we reach a nuclear agreement, Israel becomes more insecure day by day.” He then proclaimed, “Our people are willing to maintain their authority and values, and will bear the economic pressure.” Khamenei has stated repeatedly that Iran does not want a nuclear weapon. However, his statement likely came with caveats. If Khamenei, as the steward of Iran’s national security, felt a weapon was necessary for Iran’s security, he would build it and expect the Iranian people to faithfully overcome any Western efforts in response.

The Danger That Lurks: Real or Imagined?

Before the nuclear talks began, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obtained information suggesting Iranian leaders are not completely opposed to developing a nuclear weapon. In an internal 2009 IAEA document, most of which was published by Institute for Science and International Security, is a section titled “Statements made by Iranian officials.”  It states: “The Agency [IAEA] was informed that in April 1984 the then President of Iran, H.E. Ayatollah Khamenei declared, during a meeting of top-echelon political and security officials at the Presidential Palace in Tehran, that the spiritual leader Imam Khomeini had decided to reactivate the nuclear programme. According to Ayatollah Khamenei this was the only way to secure the very essence of the Islamic Revolution from the schemes of its enemies, especially the United States and Israel, and to prepare it for the emergence of Imam Mehdi. Ayatollah Khamenei further declared during the meeting, that a nuclear arsenal would serve Iran as a deterrent in the hands of God’s soldiers.” The November 2011 IAEA Safeguards Report described the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program that peaked in 2002 and 2003, and then was abruptly halted. The IAEA report also presented information from UN Member States indicating aspects of this program continued or restarted after 2003 and may be on-going.

The concern among US and European negotiators is that hard-liners in Tehran are using the on-going nuclear talks to misdirect them, enabling elements of the Iranian government to pursue the covert weaponization of the nuclear program.  Continued progress with the nuclear program has been a feature of Iran’s negotiations with the West since such talks began with the Bush administration. Iran may have the capability to engage in a dual-track approach to resolve problems over the nuclear issue with the West within the parameters of Khamenei’s concept of heroic flexibility.  Rouhani and Zarif would take a path toward diplomacy to acquire concessions from the P5+1while the IRGC, the Ministry of Defense, and other government elements secretly develop the ability to create a nuclear weapon. According to a May 27, 2014 Wall Street Journal article, Western intelligence agencies discovered Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear device dated back to the late 1980s, at a Defense Ministry-linked physics research center in Tehran.  According to the IAEA, Iran consolidated its weaponization researchers in the 1990s under an initiative called “AMAD Plan,” headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a nuclear engineer and senior member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).  The mission of AMAD Plan was to procure dual-use technologies, developing nuclear detonators and conducting high-explosive experiments associated with compressing fissile material, according to Western intelligence agencies.  AMAD Plan’s most intense period of activity was in 2002-2003, according to the IAEA, when Rouhani was Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.  The May 27th article asserted Fakhrizadeh has continued to oversee these disparate and highly compartmentalized activities under the auspices of Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, known by its Persian acronym, SPND. Nulla tenaci, invia est via! (For the tenacious, no road is impossible!)

The Way Forward

While stumbling blocks are addressed, new approaches to ameliorate US concerns are being explored such as ways to provide the US with at least a year to discover if Iran was racing for a weapon, a standard that the US has set. Such steps could involve a combination of Iranian commitments to ship some of its nuclear stockpile to Russia, efforts to disconnect some of the country’s centrifuges in ways that would take considerable time to reverse, and limits on output that could be verified by international inspectors.   However, efforts in that direction may not amount to much in the current political environment, particularly in Iran and the US. When it was announced that no deal was reached and negotiations would be extended, lawmakers inthe Iranian Parliament erupted in chants “Death to America” after a lawmaker commenting on the deadline extension spoke of “the U.S.’s sabotaging efforts and its unreliability.” The lawmaker, Mohammad-Hassan Aboutorabi-Fard, who is the deputy speaker of the Parliament, said Iran had learned from the nuclear negotiations that it had a strong hand to play. “Today, we can speak to the U.S. and its allies with the tone of power,” he said in remarks quoted by the Fars News Agency. “A lesson can be taken from the recent nuclear talks that, for various reasons, the U.S. is not reliable.” The Republican controlled Congress really has no interest in restoring or improving relations with Iran while it has a nuclear program. Congressional Republicans have threatened to impose new sanctions on Iran regardless of whether such action interfered with the nuclear talks. Obama will no longer be able to rely on Democratic leaders in the Senate to bottle up legislation that would require new sanctions. Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told the New York Times, “I don’t think Congress is going to sit still.” He further stated, “There is a fear the administration is being played for time, and there will be a desire to express that in some form of a sanctions bill.” Disapproval over the renewed sanctions relief that had brought Iran $700 million a month in money formerly frozen abroad may very well compel Congress to levy new sanctions. If the nuclear negotiations failed, any outrage expressed after such an occurrence would simply amount to lip service.  The use of military force would be unlikely given current circumstances in the Middle East and Obama’s disposition on it. There would be sanctions, but it is likely Tehran has already calculated what the consequences of such measures would be and how it could best mitigate their effects. Khamenei has assured that, if the extended talks fail, “the sky won’t fall to the ground.”

Evidence that the Iranian nuclear program has been militarized does not exist. Yet, despite what Zarif has argued, Khamenei and hard-line Iranian leaders may believe a nuclear weapon would make Iran more secure. At a minimum, they might seek the option to weaponize. Proceeding in that way would be very dangerous for Iran in the long-term. Iranian leaders know that when dealing with the US, ultimately, issues do not center on whoever occupies the Oval Office at any given time. Term-limits set by the US Constitution prevent Obama for serving a third term. As greatcharlie.com has cautioned more than once, striking a balance between demands for relief from economic sanctions and the gradual cessation of the nuclear program may not be at issue for the next US president. To the extent the US is a staunch ally of Israel and to a similar extent, Saudi Arabia, the next US president might decide to ameliorate the US approach, requiring new concessions from Iran, to include an immediate halt of its nuclear activities. A new demand might be made for Iran to surrender its nuclear program or face military action.  If the current global perception that US leaders lack the will and power to act militarily still prevails in 2016, the next administration may not be able to compel outcomes on many issues with diplomacy or threats to use force. Favorable outcomes may result only from robust use of US military force.

An above average understanding of human nature and faith will be required to formulate a final decision on a deal under current circumstances. Clearly, some reasonable doubt exists, at least among Western partners in the P5+1, over whether the terms of a deal would be observed. With circumstances in the world seeming off-balance, George William Rutler, pastor of Saint Michael’s Church in New York City and author of Cloud of Witnesses, recently reminded greatcharlie.com of a live radio message by King George VI on New Year’s 1939, offering reassurance to his people. It would have an important effect on the listening public as they moved closer to war. King George VI acknowledged that there was uncertainty over what the new year would bring. He explained, “If it brings peace, how thankful we shall all be. If it brings us continued struggle we shall remain undaunted.”   He went on to quote a poem from Minnie Haskins of the London School of Economics entitled “The Gate of the Year” (The Dessert 1908). It seems apropos to present that quote here at the end of 2014, given the situation the leaders of the P5+1 nations will face in 2015 over the nuclear negotiations.

“I said to the man who stood at the Gate of the Year:

‘Give me a light, that I may tread safely into the unknown!’

And he replied: ‘Go out into the darkness and put your hand into the Hand of God.

That shall be to you better than light and safer than a known way’.”

Obama Wrote Secret Letter to Iran’s Khamenei about Fighting ISIS; Khamenei Is Counting on Suleimani, Not US Cooperation

Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force Commander General (Sarlashkar) Qassem Suleimani (above) travelled to Baghdad the week of June 9, 2014 with sixty-seven of his top advisers. An Iraqi official explained then that Suleimani was “in charge of arming, deploying forces, weaponry and planning the battles.”  He has achieved some success.  Iranian President Hassan Rouhrani said Iran would consider working with the US against ISIS if it sees the US begin to confront the terrorists.

According to a November 6, 2014 Wall Street Journal article entitled, “Obama Wrote Secret Letter to Iran’s Khamenei About Fighting Islamic States”, in October 2014, US President Barack Obama sent a highly confidential communication to Islamic Republic of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  The letter to Khamenei appeared directed at both bolstering the anti-ISIS campaign and prodding him toward a nuclear deal.  Those briefed on the letter familiarize the Wall Street Journal of its content.  Obama apparently wrote to Khamenei that expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) posed a threat to both the US and Iran, creating a common enemy for both countries. Obama stressed that both had the goal of defeating ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria.  While Obama did not recognize Iran as the primary power in the region, as Tehran insists, he acknowledged in a way that Iran was “important” to his military and diplomatic campaign to push ISIS from territory it has gained in past months and dubbed the Islamic Caliphate.  Obama ostensibly sought to mitigate Tehran’s concerns over the future of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.  Although the US is arming and training Syrian opposition rebels, Obama apparently wrote in his letter that US military operations in Syria were not targeted at Assad or his security forces.  Those familiar with the letter explained Obama did not explicitly propose that the US and Iran coordinate their military activities.  However, they said there was a strong implication that coordination was desired.  Concerning the nuclear negotiations, Obama informed Khamenei that cooperation on ISIS was largely contingent on Iran reaching a comprehensive agreement with the P5+1 (the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council—the US, United Kingdom, France Russia, and China plus Germany) on the future of Tehran’s nuclear program by November 24, 2014 deadline.  That point in the letter seemed to also imply cooperation would be more to Iran’s benefit.

News of Obama’s letter to Khamenei was somewhat confusing in the US given past statements by the administration on Iran.  When US National Security Adviser Susan Rice was asked on NBCNews “Meet the Press” on October 12, 2014, if Iran was providing help to the anti-ISIS coalition, she said “No!” Rice went on to state “We’re not in coordination or direct consultation with the Iranians about any aspects of the fight against ISIL [ISIS].  It is a fact that in Iraq, they are also supporting the Iraqis against ISIL [ISIS].  But we are not coordinating.  We’re doing this very differently and independently.”  Yet, despite Rice’s statement, Obama’s letter proposing the two countries cooperate in the anti-ISIS fight seems to be, at minimum, a move towards direct consultation with Tehran.  In the US Congress, Obama’s decision to send the letter revealed what the administration is saying about Iran may be different from its plans for Iran. Republican and Democrat Members of Congress are concerned that the administration is prepared to make far-reaching concessions to Tehran on a nuclear deal.  Members likely also sense the administration is uncertain of how to proceed regarding ISIS, having pledged not to commit ground troops for combat operations.  While willing to support the anti-ISIS fight with funding, they will likely wants to reign in what they see as Obama’s perilous approach toward Iran.

For leaders, discerning how to proceed on foreign policy is made more difficult in adverse circumstances.  Some choices that may appear wise are not.  Near desperation on wanting a situation to be a certain way has led many, well-intentioned leaders in error to project their “positive thinking” on that of a foreign counterpart, or worse, an adversary.  Such decisions are often supported by captivating assessments of positive outcomes not based in reality. Only a negative outcome would reveal the flaws of an approach for some.  Perhaps in its rush to respond to the ISIS problem, the Obama administration may have been blinded to the fact that it could be sending the wrong signals and creating conditions for future difficulties with Iran.  Qui totum vult totum perdit.  (He who wants everything, loses everything.)

Obama’s Letter: Cui bono?

Developing options for Obama has been vexing for administration officials and advisers. Obama has been adverse to taking military action. That has typically left a limited range of options that they have been able to present to Obama.  Even in situations where the use of force is almost absolutely necessary as with ISIS, officials and advisers likely presented options for actions that were light-weight, very small in scale, and calibrated precisely. The initial size and scope of the US anti-ISIS air campaign evinced that.  At the “human level,” among reasons sending a letter to Khamenei was determined acceptable may have been that letters had been sent to Khamenei in the past with satisfactory results.  (Indeed, the October letter marked at least the fourth time Obama has written Khamenei since taking office in 2009.)  Sending the letter was easy enough to do.  The option was a diplomatic tact and therefore more attractive to Obama than the “unappealing” military options already adopted for Iraq.  Discussion on the letter among officials and advisers fell outside the milieu of the unending military intervention debate in the White House.  Additionally, as previously discussed by greatcharlie.com, Obama has a predilection toward forgiving or, considering the overwhelming military power of the US, showing mercy toward an offending rogue actor.  The letter is one more example of that tack. The effort to bring Iran into the anti-ISIS fight as a partner, even nominally, certainly is in line with Obama’s policy of promoting multilateral cooperation, particularly regarding the  commitment of military forces.  His apparent obsession with making it work may be part of the impetus for his administration’s outreach to an unlikely ally. So far, the administration has not had much luck prodding its anti-ISIS coalition partners into ground combat operations against ISIS. In 2014, the Obama administration began insisting that the US would act only when multilateral approaches were available. The impression was given that this was a world in which once sufficient effort was made by the US to organize other nations, problems could be handled through cooperation. When ISIS was on the move, it seemed that the US State Department, in addition to “rearranging,” with good intentions, the Iraqi government, was most interested in gathering countries to become members of the “global coalition” to degrade and defeat ISIS. 

Qualifications for inclusion in that coalition were nominal. Of the sixty-two countries participating in the anti-ISIS coalition, the vast majority are not contributing militarily.  Many countries simply pledged their support.  As greatcharlie.com discussed in its October 25, 2014 post entitled, “Who Has Contributed What in the Coalition Against ISIS?; The Obama Administration Must Place Success Against ISIS Ahead of Creating the Appearance of a Broad Multilateral Effort”, the US has practically demanded more from some countries.  One country the US has pressured for action is Turkey. Although Turkey is a power in the Middle East region, the notion that Turkey, possessing far less military capabilities than the US would subordinate its own concerns and interests, to support and defend others under US pressure is flawed.  Turkey likely reached the same conclusions as the US about conditions for intervening in Iraq and Syria with ground troops.  In Syria, there would hardly be a Syrian opposition force with which Turkish troops could work.  If Turkey’s operations in Syria were to “creep” beyond destroying ISIS and the Assad regime was displaced, political leaders in Turkey would likely feel ambivalent about simply turning over a nation on its border, Syria, to the very dysfunctional Syrian opposition.  Even if Turkey controlled or greatly influenced the Syrian opposition, it is hard to see how taking on the stewardship of Syria, which would surely be a political, economic, and social basket case, would be to Turkey’s benefit.

Responses in Tehran to Obama’s Letter

The thinking on Obama’s letter in Tehran was certainly different than his administration must have hoped.  An adviser to Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Ali Khoram, speaking in Oman, confirmed to the Arabic daily, Asharq al-Aswat, that Obama reached out directly to Khamenei in a mid-October letter.  However, Khamenei’s foreign affairs adviser, Ali Akbar Salehi, told Iranian State media that he was not aware of Obama’s outreach.  Khamenei’s web-site does not acknowledge receipt of the letter.  Obama’s letter, on its face, likely aggravated Khamenei, particularly to the extent that Obama did not render appreciation or even praise for the considerable effort and sacrifices already being made by Iran against ISIS.  That was a massive “oversight” if the goal of the letter was truly to promote cooperation at some level with Iran.  Using the anti-ISIS fight as a basis for dialogue with Khamenei perhaps had become a futile effort after he declared in October 2014 that “America, Zionism, and especially the veteran expert of spreading divisions—the wicked government of Britain—have sharply increased their efforts of creating divisions between the Sunnis and Shiites [Shi’a].”  He further stated, “They created al Qaeda and ‘Islamic State’ in order to create divisions and to fight against the Islamic Republic [Iran], but today, they have turned on them.”  It is possible that to Khamenei, the letter may have appeared more as a manifestation of Obama’s attitude than a response to a foreign policy problem.  Khamenei may have viewed the letter as an expression of Obama’s uncertainty over the US’s ability to shape the outcome of the anti-ISIS fight on his terms.  Khamenei, a spiritual, religious leader, likely sensed Obama’s inner-struggle over using the US military.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani had already expressed ambivalence about continued communication between leaders in Washington and Tehran.  The Associated Press reported Rouhani stated in October 2014 that the time “wasn’t right” for another phone conversation or a meeting with Obama “because of the sensitivity that still exists between the two countries.”  The Associated Press also reported Rouhani as stating there must be substantive reasons with “high objectives” for conversations between world leaders.  If not, he said, “telephone calls are somewhat meaningless.”  Rouhani explained a phone conversation between leaders “would only be constructive and fruitful when it is done according to a precisely laid plan with precisely clearly stated objectives.” Otherwise, he said, “it will never be constructive or effective.”

Obama’s letter most likely did much to boost confidence among Iranian leaders, particularly the IRGC and political and religious hardliners that the US was not moving with an assured step and posed no threat to plans Iran has in Iraq or the region.  The failure of the US to act effectively and decisively in Iraq right away and the abysmal results shown for the nearly decade long US training program for the Iraqi Army and police forces very likely mitigated fears within all quarters in Tehran that the Obama administration might take military action against Iran or use Iraqi security forces to attack Iran.  Officials and advisers to Khamenei likely feel the fight with ISIS has caused Obama to consider what the US might face from the Iranian Armed Forces and other security elements globally if it attacked Iran’s nuclear program.  They certainly believe going to war with Iran would be a far greater enterprise for the US than fighting ISIS.  They probably feel certain that the US would never attack Iran while the anti-ISIS fight was raging.  They likely believe Obama would totally reject the idea of fighting Iran and ISIS simultaneously.

Iran’s Efforts in Iraq

Sitting right across the border from Iraq, Khamenei, Rouhani, the leadership of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and hard-line political and religious leaders, saw an even greater danger from ISIS than the US did, and immediately attended to it.  Rouhani has stated “We’ve actually been the ones countering terrorism in the region for years.”  He also stated, “Had it not been for Iran’s timely assistance, many of the Iraqi cities would have fallen to the hands of these vicious terrorists.”  The Iranians were never going to wait and see what the US does next once ISIS was on the move. They needed to stop ISIS. Iranian leaders certainly realized that waiting could lead to tragic consequences.  ISIS had begun engaging in abuses and summary executions of civilians as well as captives.  Syria provided a reliable model to understand just how bad things can become for Iraqis in ISIS controlled territory.  Back on June 15, 2014, insurgent fighters from ISIS posted images purporting to show the execution of hundreds of Shi’a fighters.

Iranian military and security officials knew that ISIS could reach a level of strength that it could threaten to execute entire populations of towns and villages to deter attacks against its fighters.  ISIS would follow through with their threats without hesitation.  ISIS has since committed such acts in Iraq. The Iranians also knew ISIS would set up an Islamic state in captured territory, sustainable or not.  If ISIS managed to establish itself in Iraq, the Shi’a community in Iraq would not be the only ones at risk.  ISIS would surely attack Iran.

Iran has IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Qassem Suleimani handling the situation in Iraq. The eyes of Iran are on him.  The Sunday Times of London reported on June 15, 2014 that Suleimani travelled to Baghdad the week of June 9, 2014 with sixty-seven of his top advisers. A senior Iraqi official explained then that Suleimani was “in charge of arming, deploying forces, weaponry and planning the battles.”  The Iraqi source also said Suleimani brought “light and medium weapons, rockets, heavy machine guns and lots of ammunition.”  Much publicity has been produced by the Iranian government over Suleimani’s presence on the ground in Iraq.  As it was predicted by greatcharlie.com, Suleimani began his operations against ISIS by using the Quds Force, which are IRGC special operations forces that he directly commands, and small numbers of other IRGC combat units.  Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) personnel, supported by Quds Force troops increased intelligence collection through surveillance and reconnaissance in ISIS held territory.  By moving throughout Iraq, particularly in the so-called Islamic Caliphate, Iranian intelligence officers have gained information on all aspects of their opponent’s operations and kept their ear to ground, also getting a sense of the Iraqi peoples’ reaction to events. Positive links certainly have been established with commanders of Kurdish fighters and Iraqi security forces to make the process of gathering information about ISIS militants less complicated. Those contacts with the Iraqi security forces have reportedly also allowed for the collection of information on, and creation of informal communication with, US military and intelligence elements operating on the ground in Iraq.  Intelligence collected concerning ISIS has been utilized in the development of an operational plan. When necessary MOIS and Quds Force personnel, have been used tactically, fighting primarily alongside Kurdish fighters against ISIS.  Indeed, Iranian forces have done a lot of fighting, and they have gained the Kurds’ respect and confidence.  Suleimani ramped up the training and equipping of Iraqi Shi’a militiamen.  Battle-ready units have been deployed in defense of Shi’a dominated parts of Iraq and Holy Shrines.  Others are being sent directly into the combat against ISIS.  Suleimani has reportedly deployed Lebanese Hezbollah to Iraq to work with the Shi’a militias.  Truckloads of arms and equipment from Iran continuously flow to the Shi’a militiamen. Some supplies and weapons are being flown in.  Five Sukhoi-25 fighter-bombers were from Iran into Iraq for the Iraqi Air Force.

Once operating in the shadows, photos of IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Qassem Suleimani (center) on the battlefield in Iraq have recently appeared in Iranian state media, on Twitter, and on Facebook.

How Iran Could Proceed

Iran is still not counting on the US to act on the ground in a muscular way against ISIS any time soon since it has just begun training “its Iraqis.”  In the meantime, Iran might opt to greatly increase its level of commitment in Iraq.  Back in June 2014, Senior Foreign Policy Adviser to the Supreme Leader and Head of the Expediency Discernment Council Strategic Research Center, Ali Akbar Velayati, in a lengthy interview with the Chinese CCTV network on June 19, 2014, stated, “We can do in Iraq what we did in Syria, meaning we are capable of providing the same type of training to the Iraqi Army that we have been able to provide the Syrian Army in confronting terrorists…We have much experience in this field.” That apparently meant having greater numbers of IRGC, Quds Force, and MOIS personnel pour into Iraq to join their comrades long since operating there.  The more Iran can accomplish against ISIS, the less the US will need to do.  There would also be less for US trained Iraqis to do.  Even with the specter of sectarian strife hanging over everything, Iran will be viewed among many average Iraqis as rescuers.

As discussed in greatcharlie.com’s June 30, 2014 post entitled “While the US Explored Talks with Iran on the Crisis in Iraq, Iran Acted, And May Do a Lot More!“, a  further increase in Iranian intervention might include bringing heavy artillery and rocket batteries in country. Massed fire missions could be executed with heavy artillery and heavy rockets, along with airstrikes, not coordinated with the US-led, anti-ISIS coalition, to destroy ISIS units being organized and armed for an attack or traveling. Marshalling points and supply routes for arms and military materiel away from urban areas could also face artillery onslaughts.  Armored and mechanized units would also become more apparent.  They would provide Kurdish fighters, Shi’a militia, some Iraqi security forces, and all Iranian units in Iraq with mobility and firepower and a maneuver capability that ISIS would be unable to match.  Combat support and combat service support units could be sent in to support the advance and help control recaptured territory.

With Iraq’s consent, Iran could deploy a close air support capability from attack helicopter units to fighter-bombers to facilitate movement by ground units.  A huge deficit in the Iranian effort if Suleimani’s plan is to defeat ISIS is close air support.  Regardless of the availability of artillery, close air support is the best, most rapid means to exploit tactical opportunities in the offense or defense.  It can provide fires, with appropriate ordinance, to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, harass, neutralize, or delay ISIS forces.  Iran’s fight against ISIS now is one-dimensional.

Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that Iran, just as the US, and just as Turkey, will not commit itself so heavily to Iraq without expecting to acquire even greater influence over it.  With greater control over the Shi’a community and increased influence with the Kurds, it is hard to see how Iran would not be able to shape the political, economic, and social situation in Iraq for years.  If the Iranians manage to shape the military situation on the ground in Iraq—and that could happen depending on the scale of its of intervention even though some Western analysts have expressed doubts, they will have much to gain.  Iran’s position as the dominant power in the region would be furthered.  Military and security officials may become the primary voice in the ear of Khamenei who still has a decision to make on Iran’s nuclear program.

The Way Forward

Unfortunately, on Iraq, as well as Syria, Obama really seems to be searching for answers. Some might derisively state he is paralyzed with uncertainty over what to do.  Given that possibility, Obama’s letter on ISIS likely satisfied Khamenei although he rejected it.  In the US, “cynics” among Obama’s political opponents hearing of the letter may have wanted to quote to their president the warning of conservative political commentator William F. Buckley, Jr. that there is always a need to combat the devilish conceit that peace might issue from a concordance with evil.  Intimation of a willingness to do so can only lead to disaster. Devising foreign policy approaches requires that US decision makers to possess shrewd insights into human nature.  Obama, himself, must respond to issues not based on his personal needs, values, and principles, but those of the US.  His country’s needs must come before establishing his legacy.

As US National Security Adviser Susan Rice confirmed in October 2014, US forces and Iranian forces are both operating in Iraq to support local elements in their battle against ISIS.  The Iranian commander, Suleimani, does not have any friends in the US military given his activities against US forces during the Iraq War.  US military and intelligence officials would certainly like to get their hands on him.  However, as US and Iranian forces have been tasked to operate in the same space, it had to be expected that they would cross paths.  Informal cooperation between Suleimani’s Quds Force operatives and MOIS officers and US special operators and intelligence officers, albeit through the Iraqi security force intermediaries, has resulted.  For example, in the fight for Amerli, Iraqi security forces, Shi’a militiamen, and Iranian operators, maneuvered on the ground against ISIS fighters while US airpower struck ISIS targets with multiple airstrikes.  US and Iranian commanders “coordinated informally” by passing messages to each other through commanders of the Iraqi security forces in the fight.  Such professionally handled interactions will likely continue to occur.  While some cooperation agreement by national leaders might prove helpful, US and Iranian interactions in Iraq must be sorted out on the scene.

The Commander-in-chief’s confidence in US military commanders at the Pentagon and US Central Command and officers and enlisted men on the ground in Iraq is the most important factor in all of this.  Rather the send letters to Iranian leaders at this juncture, Obama would do more to enhance chances of success in Iraq by communicating with, and encouraging, his own fighters.  He should meet those he has sent to Iraq confidentially, perhaps even on the ground, and let them know directly how important they are to him and how important their mission is to the US.  He must let them know that he has complete confidence in their capabilities and that he is relying on them to successfully complete their mission.  German Field Marshal Walter Model, the controversial World War II battlefield genius, was known to use a line from Goethe to praise his finest officers: “Den lieb ich, der umogliches begehrt! (I love him who craves the impossible!)”  The special operators that were sent to Iraq to perform the advise-and-assist mission may not be able to perform the impossible.  However, knowing they have the full support and confidence of their commander-in-chief, they will do whatever is humanly possible to destroy ISIS and perform beyond any projections by analysts in or out of the military.  Significant achievements of those “quiet professionals” in Iraq could inspire the Iranians to reach out to the US regarding “coordination.”  After all, when Rouhani was asked in September whether Tehran could formally work with the US to tackle ISIS, he stated, “We can think about it if we see America start confronting the terrorist groups in Iraq.  We all should practically and verbally confront terrorist groups.”