Trump Uses Prior Experience, Flexible Thinking, and Even Empathy, to Make Foreign Policy Decisions Fit for Today’s World

US President Donald Trump (above). International Institutions as the UN, the World Bank, and NATO have served well in promoting global economic development, international peace and security, and providing responses to threats to democracy and freedom. Still, some countries, sensing they are surrendering a degree of control and power by creating space for the conciliation of such institutions, frequently work outside of them. Doing that well is not easy. Lessons can be drawn from Trump’s efforts at effecting change in other countries’ foreign and national security policy decision making.

Throughout centuries, overwhelming military power, hard power, has been used by empires, countries, tribes seeking to force some modifications in other groups or halt certain actions altogether. Threaded through that history has been the less frequent use of what the renowned international affairs scholar Joseph Nye referred to as “soft power”, the ability to shape the long-term attitudes and preferences of country by using economic and cultural influence rather than force. Institutions as the UN, the World Bank, and NATO, have well-served the interests of countries since the postwar era by promoting economic development worldwide, international peace and security, and providing responses to Communist aggression and other threats to democracy and freedom. However, effecting change peacefully since the end of the Cold War has often been a process in which stronger, very capable, sophisticated countries, with a goal of “leveling the playing field”, and promoting an Utopian unreality of all countries “negotiating as equals”. Great strain and limitations have been placed on their diplomatic efforts. Indeed, they feel that they have been in a downward spiral in which they are slowly surrendering an ever increasing degree of control and power to create space for the conciliation of international institutions. Hardline political elements of those countries have gone as far as to complain that working through international institutions has resulted in an absolute derogation of their respective countries’ rights and power.In addition, authoritarian regimes have regularly exploited international institutions for their own ends. For example, Cuba and Venezuela, two of the world’s most egregious human-rights abusers, sit on the UN Human Rights Council. China exploits benefits of membership in the World Trade Organization while engaging in unfair trade practices to protect its domestic market.

In response to this dilemma, the US and a number of other countries have begun to engage more frequently outside of those institutions in their diplomatic efforts on major issues. They want to better enable themselves to determine outcomes on those efforts. Moreover, as Kiron Skinner, Director of Policy Planning at the US Department of State, explained in a December 11, 2018 opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal: “With the international order under siege from actors that would remake it in their own illiberal image, the Trump administration is acting to preserve a just, transparent and free world of sovereign states.” Surely, this does not mean that international institutions are not being abandoned. Efforts are being made to reform them. Abandoning them completely would be a terrible miscalculation for their good offices still have purpose in certain urgent and important multilateral, regional, and global diplomatic situations. Rather, as an alternative, countries can cooperate effectually by making themselves the guarantors of their own domestic freedoms and national interests. Once national leaders become involved in bilateral or multilateral diplomacy outside of the auspices of an international institution, they must be a bit shrewder, more incisive, have an optimal situational awareness, and remain truly dedicated to reaching an agreement or resolution as there will be no “middleman” available to referee or mediate. They must be willing to struggle with an idea until its inception, rather than back away from finding a solution because it takes too much effort, energy, and time. Countries may not be able to insist upon negotiating as equals outside of international institutions, but that matter can be overcome by acting with a heightened spirit of goodwill. National leaders and negotiators must ensure that they are empathetic toward an opposite’s circumstances and positions.

Lessons can be drawn from the approaches taken by Trump aimed at affecting change in the foreign and national security policy decision making of other countries in his first term while working outside the auspices of international institutions. There might be some disagreement with this suggestion, but often from what observers might perceive as crises, Trump has managed to create starting points for new beginnings in relations with other countries. Trump sees potential in everything. As a result, if he sees a better way, an easier route to put the figurative golden ring in his reach, there will occasionally be surprise shifts in his approaches. His critics and detractors insist that there are strictures on foreign and national security decision making to which he must adhere as US President. However, Trump, having been engaged in international business for years, has had time to examine the world using his own lens, and not a political or bureaucratic prism. He came to office confident that he could maneuver well among the galer of national leaders, each with his or her own ideas, goals, ambition, will, and predilections. He indeed exhibits the type of flexibility of thinking and action that an accomplished general would hope to display in war. It is possible that he has by instinct the methodology to do it all well. By identifying and examining patterns in his efforts, lessons become available. From an out-of-the-box perspective, an abbreviated discussion is provided here of the types of considerations behind Trump’s thinking on four salient foreign and national security policy issues set before his administration: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK”) denuclearization; Russian election interference in the US; the Russia-Ukraine confrontation in the Azov Sea (Kerch Strait); and, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Khashoggi assassination. The intention here is not to insist that other national leaders should be guided by the meditations of greatcharlie on Trump’s decision making. Rather, the discussion simply outlines what may be some of the new necessities of thinking and reasoning by national leaders and their foreign and national security policy decision makers today as more countries seek to engage in diplomacy outside of international institutions. Further, it is hoped that the discussion here will become part of policy debate concerning the Trump administration. ‘Tu me’ inquis ‘mones? iam enim te ipse monuisti, iam correxisti? ideo aliorum emendationi vacas?’ Non sum tam improbus ut curationes aeger obeam, sed, tamquam in eodem valetudinario iaceam, de communi tecum malo colloquor et remedia communico. (“What,” say you, “are you giving me advice? Indeed, have you already advised yourself, already corrected your own faults? Is this the reason why you have leisure to reform other men?” No, I am not so shameless as to undertake to cure my fellow-men when I am ill myself. I am, however, discussing with you troubles which concern us both, and sharing the remedy with you, just as if we were lying ill in the same hospital.)

Trump (left) and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un (right) in Singapore. The Singapore Summit was held on June 12, 2018. in the months since, Kim, nestled in Pyongyang, has likely become comfortable. Just thinking now and then about drawing closer to denuclearization and the future Trump presented, likely disrupts that sense of comfort. Calculating what would actually be required to effectuate the economic transformation of his country, may make change a less attractive. Encouriaging Kim to move forward may be a challenge for Trump, but not an insurmountable one.

The DPRK and Denuclearization

Given DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un’s apparent temporizing on the decision to denuclearize, critics and detractors of Trump would want everyone aware of the interactions between the US and DPRK to believe that Kim is using the US President to achieve his own ends. However, even if Kim actually feels that there is something more to the idea of denuclearization, surely he would still be hesitant to advance the matter. It would only be natural for anyone to have a bout with wintery feet facing the enormity of the potential undertaking before Kim. In the chambers where Kim and the DPRK’s most senior officials make decisions on foreign and national security policy, innovative and imaginative thinking would hardly be welcomed and denuclearization is likely accepted unenthusiastically. What has been produced there for quite some time has usually been uninspired stuff, aimed primarily at advancing the ideals of the Worker’s Party of Korea . Kim is surely aware of what happened in Russia economically with the help of “Western experts” after the fall of the Soviet Union. As mentioned in the July 27, 2018 greatcharlie post entitled, “To Foster Forward Movement on Denuclearization by Kim, Trump Says there Is No Rush, But His Patience Has Limits”, a complete trust in Trump hardly could have sprouted and blossomed exponentially in Kim during the Singapore meeting. Months have passed since Singapore, Kim is some distance away from it all. Any initial second-guessing Kim may have had about Trump may have morphed into considerable apprehension since. Kim has been comfortably nestled in Pyongyang. Drawing closer to the world that Trump presented, would require Kim to tear away from the only world he and his people have known. Just ruminating about what would be required to effectuate the economic transformation of his country may make it all seem so difficult and thereby a less attractive option.

Whem mulling over a new approach on a matter in negotiation with another country or countries, the foreign and national security policy machinery of countries as the DPRK will very often move with the same speed as the massive naval dreadnoughts of early and mid-20th century. Wheeling those giant ships port or starboard took real effort. They often moved so slowly that during World War II in particular, they became relatively easy targets for dive bombers and torpedo planes. Self-interested bureaucracies will champion their points of view on a matter and guard their turf. Their devotion to ensuring the primacy of their organizations’ partisan interests can even surpass their enthusiasm over the matter at hand. Decisions are usually reviewed endlessly, as they seek to advance their organizations’ parochial interests in an optimal way. Indeed, the bureaucracies can suffer the paralysis of analysis. Compromise is usually reached as last resort. Yet, “turf battles” can become so volatile on an issue that often in the end, while their may have been some compromise from the different organizations, no satisfactory decision is made at all, no approach truly beneficial to the country is advanced. Another result can be some composite solution that will be ineffectual in resolving the matter at hand in the best interests of their country. Further, there can be a result in which too many points, most of which were found to be too controversial to settle on in the bureaucratic struggle, are left uncovered, making it virtually impossible to proceed in the best interest of their country on a matter. All of this makes encouraging change in the thinking of another countries foreign and national security policy appear insurmountable. Trump and his advisers and aides have taken all of this into full consideration, and remain confident that the administration’s efforts will lead to success. In fact, it remains a goal in Washington to find a way to get Kim to accelerate his efforts at denuclearization. What they would like to do is create an occasion on which Kim to have a second chance to be in contact with the persuasive and assuring Trump. For Trump, there is a type of voluptuous quality about the entire challenge, as it will require the full use of his capabilities along the lines of excellence. Moreover, Trump has the freedom to maneuver in his own unique and often successful ways in the negotiation process. He does not need to be concerned that an international institution might impose limitations on his ability to make deals. Fortuna adversa virum magnae sapientiae non terret. (Adverse fortune (adversity) does not frighten (intimidate) a man of great intellect.)

As a practical matter, negotiating countries should ascribe probabilities of their opposites’ likely actions and reactions respectively. In that vein, national leaders of the negotiating countries must also be a bit more empathetic of each others circumstances. As the negotiation process continues, direct communication must be used to convey and remind what the expectations are for both sides and respective red-lines on trade-offs that neither side will cross. Nothing does more to prove how vested the other is on an issue when one party absolutely refuses to negotiate on it, even when perhaps minor agreements tied to it are reached in the negotiating process. Every country has lines that it simply will not cross. If anything, those small steps that might be achieved should serve to build confidence on other matters as the negotiations continue. If one country feels unduly pressured or imposed upon, some capitals could react in a disproportionately negative way. One-sided outcomes successfully forced down one party’s throat will not last.  One-sided outcomes, even if consented to by the initiating party will rarely survive over time. The was recently observed with regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Paris Agreement of Climate Change.

Months have passed since Singapore. Any initial second-guessing Kim may have had about Trump may have possibly morphed into considerable apprehension. The foreign and national security policy machinery of the DPRK, mulling over a new approach on a matter in negotiation with the US, is moving very slowly. Self-interested bureaucracies will champion their points of view on a matter and guard their turf. Their devotion to ensuring the primacy of their organizations’ partisan positions undoubtedly far surpass their “enthusiasm” over denuclearization. 

For Trump, as would be the case for any US president, success in such an endeavor would also depend upon the ability to create an outcome that supports balance in the international order; that is compatible with US values and interests. If the matter at hand is urgent enough, substantial resources and energy will be speedily directed to it. That has been the case with DPRK denuclearization; trade with China; and the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement. For Trump specifically, there would most likely be a determination to remain stalwart at the side of the US public. Without deviation, he will keep the US public first and firmly in mind as he considers how he will encourage and initiate the changes he desires. He will also keep the US public first and firmly in mind as he considers withdrawing from US military commitments overseas. While reelection in 2020 is certainly the goal and the plan, Trump is not in a popularity contest to the extent that he only wants to make the US public happy or get the people to like him. (Many do already.) He wants to do what is best for their true interests, both for the short-term and the long-term. In that respect, Trump cannot always, metaphorically, serve dessert first, but there is always something better coming.

Omnis nimium longa properanti mora est. (Every delay is too long to one who is in a hurry.) As a caveat, one should not become so steeped in the effort to encourage and draw the response from the other side that one would be willing to make concessions that were never even imagined before the negotiation process began. Trading off something a country’s negotiators would prefer not to relinquish, a major concession, may very well be required at some point. It is almost an immutable part of the process of negotiating at the international level. Still, a line must be drawn along the measure at which nothing beyond would be acceptable. To lessen the pain of giving up anything, whatever one might be willing to part with must be determined and enumerated before any diplomatic negotiations begin. When mulling over what to give up, one must use reason to determine what it’s relative value might be to the other side. It must be useful enough to create some sense of equity, balance, and perhaps if a side is lucky, it might represent some real gain. (In that process of determining what would be best to trade versus what might be gained, difficulties can arise internally in many national governments’ foreign and national security bureaucracies.) Concerning the DPRK and denuclearization, the Trump administration certainly does not want to give up the strengths and equities of its alliances with allies. Those ties that bind allies in the region are the same ties that assure unity when dealing with China.

The Trump administration officials, particularly US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have sought to engage in very open, honest, and frank communications with their DPRK counterparts. That would include making inquiries regarding what is happening within the chambers of decision making of the DPRK. From that information, the administration has been able to proceed with a good idea of whether success is possible. There have also been letters from Kim to Trump that have provided a sense on where things stand in the DPRK regarding denuclearization. Where explanations are somewhat unclear, there becomes the need to ascribe the probability of success from the interpretations of what has said and even what has not been said during negotiations and in the briefest communications to include pull asides and other less formal discussions away from the negotiating table. Attention would also need to be placed on what is said contemporaneously among officials from the respective countries who may have met on unrelated matters. That would include theories, surmisals, and any offhand comments. When negotiators get beyond their own wits as to what may come next from the other side, or are unable to decipher what type of obstacles may be delaying or blocking a favorable decision, it is the best time to seek greater assistance from the intelligence services.

US Air Force U2 Surveillance Plane (above). When negotiators get beyond their own wits as to what may come next from the other side, or are unable to decipher what type of obstacles may be delaying or blocking a favorable decision, it is the best time to seek greater assistance from the intelligence services. In Western countries, particularly the US, substantial information is also collected by electronic surveillance, typically obscure, clever ways to collect what is happening over the horizon via satellites and special aircraft from above.

As greatcharlie explained in its May 31, 2018 post entitled, “An Open Mind and Direct Talks, Not Reports Developed from Overt US Sources, Will Best Serve Diplomacy with Trump”, for intelligence services, getting to know what is happening in a country, regarding a particular event or issue will invariably require having agents who are in the right place, are articulate, can answer questions, and receive instructions. In Western countries, particularly the US, substantial information is also collected by electronic surveillance, typically obscure, clever ways to collect what is happening over the horizon via satellites and special aircraft from above. Electronic collection, although very costly, has brought many benefits, by allowing for the monitoring of all manner of communications, discovering plans, patterns of activity and locations of targets. Many have grumbled for years in the intelligence industry that increased use of such surveillance and reconnaissance systems has resulted in the disappearance of the sure-fire agent on the ground with his string of spies and informants and with a willingness to travel the danger route. When this issue became most apparent in the US in the late 1970s and the 1980s, there were efforts to make adjustments, but it is still posited that human intelligence has taken a back seat in favor of technology.  Illud autem ante omnia memento, demere rebus tumultum ac videre quid in quaque re sit: scies nihil esse in istis terribile nisi ipsum timorem. (Remember, however, before all else, to strip things of all that disturbs and confuses, and to see what each is at bottom; you will then comprehend that they contain nothing fearful except the actual fear.

Trump has no intention of moving down a blind alley. Regarding the use of his “gut feelings”, intimations backed up with the strength of reports and briefings from intelligence community, military, and diplomatic professionals. Supported in that way, such feelings are less guesses than judgments based on the aggregate of all the information received, tied in with an awareness of seemingly abstract pieces of information to form an orderly and coherent perception. During World War II, German military commanders were known for relying on intimations based on what was occurring on the battlefield and perceptions of what the thinking and planning was in the opponent’s command center. Still, in contemplating what Kim might do, the US will do much more than rely on such hunches. The administration cannot afford to become complacent even to the slightest degree. It will remain vigilant and cautious. Resources have been dedicated to surveilling developments at North Korean nuclear sites. As many analytical resources as possible should also be dedicated to the discernment of signs of a reversal in Pyongyang.

Il ne fait pas l’ombre d’un doute que Trump and his advisers and sides will seek to be read-in on daily assessments, appraisals, and conclusions. Concrete facts, inference, interpolations from data, intimations, hunches based on experience, will all be heard and considered when senior US foreign and national security policy officials meet. Leg work by a secret grey army of US intelligence officers in the region and confirmed reports from agents ensconced naked where detection could mean certain death, serve to confirm possible actions or unsettling activity, even if not immediately threatening, would be rapidly synthesized and provided to decision makers. Those consumers may also have an interest in reading reports from intelligence officers of regional allies and their agents, as well as data streams from technical collection systems of those allies. US allies just might discern something the US might have missed. Despite the most optimistic hopes and projections on the DPRK, Trump remains ready to process in his mind what he sees to surmount what he is hoping for. Looking deeper allows one to see what is lacking. The diplomatic process with the DPRK cannot sit between success and failure in a figurative foreign policy halfway house. Previous administrations submitting to the fantasy that the DPRK wanted peace allowed Pyongyang to establish a pattern of success that very likely helped build Kim’s self-confidence in dealing with US. One can be assured that Trump will not base his decision on an emotional response, and bend too much in an effort to understand the uneasiness of Kim’s position. It is most important for Kim to know that.

Trump (right) and former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (left). The efforts of Russian operatives were too unnatural, too unusual. Their focus was primarily on the unconstructive and destructive aspects of US political activity, and were detected. The fact that Clinton, Trump’s opponent in the 2016 Presidential Election, won the popular vote, evinces that the degree to which Russian efforts failed to sway the US public was disproportionate to the degree of risk involved with undertaking a political manipulation effort of such magnitude in the US.

Russia’s Ongoing Election Interference

The unique qualities and character of each US President in great part impels the US public to select them on election day. As chief executive of the US Government requires the president to take certain positions and actions in accord with US values and interests. Yet, it is the unique qualities and character of each which causes the choices of each to diverge a bit or a lot from those of their predecessors. How a president will act on certain foreign and national security policy issues will typically be outlined during an election campaign for the public to read and hear. From what is enumerated, the public will form an opinion on a candidate. Indeed, in the end, it is not what is wrong with a candidate that sticks in the mind of a voter that is so important. It is what is right for the voter which makes the difference. The thinking of the US public generally moves in that direction.

To clarify further on the perception of how a candidate will perform differently to satisfy the voter, there must be the belief that the candidate will make a positive difference in their lives personally such as making them financially better off and more secure, allowing for improvement to their communities by making more services available and life better in general, and in the country by improving its condition, guiding it in a positive direction, and ensuring its status as a world leader and force for good. Negative ideas that might to orbit around a preferred candidate and even a rival candidate, while seemingly important in campaign efforts–every campaign has elements that focus on those matters and to an extent promulgate negative information on an opponent–and in news media stories broadcasted, published, and posted, may remain correlative, even de minimus, in the minds of many voters. In some cases, the negative information about a preferred candidate may drive voters to the polls to ensure their candidate wins.

Although Russian Federation intelligence services may pride itself in having what it believes to be considerable expertise on the US affairs, it surely is not up to snuff when it comes to understanding US politics. While their studies and observations of the US may have appeared to yield a genuine picture of the broad US political scene, certainly when it came to understanding what was happening in the lead up the 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Presidential Election, they completely missed the mark. An immediate impression is that since Russian analysts lacked points of reference within their own society that resembled what was happening in the US, there was really nothing upon which they could found their interpretations and conclusions. As social media was a main focal point on which Russian operatives sought to inflict considerable damage during the 2016 US Presidential Elections, it appears that much of what was collected and extrapolated about the US political scene came from popular, yet incredibly hostile commentaries propagated on social media by emotional individuals across of the political spectrum, political activists, and fringe elements who simply attack and lack boundaries. The Russians analysts could not discern that what was on social media did not reflect what was going on in the mind of the US public. Basing the interference operation on that sort of failed interpretation of US political activity, meant it was doomed from the start. Essentially, it was sabotaged by ignorance. As they performed their mission, the efforts of Russian operatives, being too imitative, too unnatural, too unusual, stood out. It was all nothing more than  a soupy simulacrum of the real thing. Their focus was almost solely on the unconstructive and destructive aspects of US political activity. Their efforts  were out of rhythm and rhyme with the stylings of authentic political message of mainstream US political parties. No matter how well Russian operatives may have believed their operation was cloaked, executed, and managed, those who began investigating what was going on could flag their burlesque without too much difficulty. The fact that Trump’s opponent in the 2016 Presidential Election, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reportedly won the popular vote, evinces that the degree to which Russian efforts failed to sway the US public. The operation’s modicum of success was disproportionate relative to the degree of risk involved in undertaking an extensive political manipulation effort in the US. The interference operation really appears to have been an act of vengeance more than anything else. Passion did not obey reason in the Kremlin.

Added to that, the US intelligence community and law enforcement had the technological means to trace the efforts of Russian operatives all the way home to their headquarters. So successful were the counterintelligence efforts of the US intelligence community and law enforcement that they could determine when and how things happened and who was involved. For example, they acquired complete profiles of those members of the Russian Federation’s Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU involved with the interference operation. They were able to determine the particular role each played in it. Recall that Putin reached the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. Once on the right path, he broke all sorts of records on his way to the top. In 1997, he served as head of the Main Control Directorate. In 1998, he was named first deputy head of the Presidential Administration, responsible for the regions, he was ordered to serve as director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, and he was named Secretary of the Security Council. Having observed the US collect such granular information on the operation, it is very likely that Putin had parsed out that someone in Russia’s intelligence services pointed the US in the right direction. He likely began to believe that there was a rotten apple buried somewhere at the bottom of the Russian intelligence apple barrel. One might informally speculate that anger, even rage over the the ability of the US to discover so much might have been one more straw on the pile that has caused Russia to lash out at the West, and those in West’s fold, in ham-handed ways since. Ira furor brevis est; animum rege. Anger is a brief madness; govern your soul (control your emotions))

The fact that Russia sought to disrupt the democratic process of the country is what makes the interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election so insidious. A long espoused criticism of Trump is that he has a self-enchantment with tyrants, strongmen, rogue leaders such as Putin. His comments about Putin have been decried by critics as being unduly pleasant and oleaginous. This tenuous notion became a story was heavily covered even before Trump’s inauguration, and has received even greater coverage since. The story considered in light of reports from the US intelligence community that Russia interfered in the 2016 US Presidential Election, has been posited as the causality for the investigations of the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller. The reality is that rather finding a national leader as Putin intoxicating, Trump has his own considerable reservations about them. In the past year, Trump observed Putin behave in a very disappointing manner. Indeed, while engaged in diplomacy, the Trump administration has closely monitored hostile Russian moves, not only the continued interference in US elections, but also: Russia’s continued interference in the election processes of countries other than the US; Russia’s efforts to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; and, Russia’s efforts to tighten its grip on Crimea and the Donbass. As it was explained in the October 31, 2018 greatcharlie post entitled, “Building Relations between Trump and Putin: Getting beyond the “Getting to Know You” Stage”, Trump has repeatedly gotten on Putin’s case about the matter, and has publicly insisted that he has done so. Trump also has surely shared his perspectives with him on: how reported government abuses within Russia have left the world with a very negative impression of the country as a whole; why it is difficult for anyone to see Russia as a decent constitutional society; why considerable doubt exists in the minds of top Russia hands and his close advisers and aides that Russia could ever be an honest broker and good partner in tackling transnational issues; and, how tough it will be for Russia to ever overcome such views on its own. It would seem that Trump could publicly snatch Putin’s lunch away, eat it, and pop the bag in his face, and critics would still say he too soft on the Russian leader. There could not be a worse source or gauge of Trump’s interactions with Putin than his critics and detractors.

German troops passing through Ardennes Forest on their way to France in 1940. (above). Trump knows it would be imprudent to ignore information from the US Intelligence community that confirm some action by an adversary is very likely, imminent, or has been taken. The failure of consumers to include assessments of situations in their calculations can be unfortunate. Consider how the French military high command failed their government In 1870, 1915, and 1940 by dismissing warnings about the intentions of Prussian and German Governments.

Trump knows that it would be imprudent to ignore information from the US Intelligence community that confirms some action by an adversary is very likely, imminent, or has been taken. Predictions concerning an action are made more urgent when commingled with existing impressions of a national government or national leader, specifically, based on behavior both at home and abroad. The consequence of insufficient intelligence analyses, the failure by consumers to include valuable forecasts in their appraisals of situations, can be most unfortunate. Consider for example how the military high command of France failed their government 3 times in 70 years by minimizing warnings about the intentions of Prussian and German Governments. In 1870, the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army, with its attitude of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”), did not heed signalling that the Prussian Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1918, the French Grand Quartier Général (General Headquarters) did not heed indicia signalling that the Imperial German Army, to avoid French defenses on the Franco-German border, would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, relying on the defenses of the Maginot Line, did not heed indicia signalling that the German Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. Even with this history, in 1944, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe ignored idicia signalling that the German Army might attempt to move via the the Ardennes Forest into Belgium in an attempt to reach Antwerp and cut Allied Forces into two pieces. The result was the Battle of the Bulge in which US forces suffered an estimated 75,000 casualties.

A newly discovered official US Government memorandum has revealed that intelligence collected about the activities of the Imperial Japanese Navy, led to assessments that Japan might attack the US on the West coast, the Panama Canal, and the US naval and military bases in Hawaii some time in December 1941. The Japanese Imperial Navy would eventually execute a devastating surprise, aircraft carrier-based, aerial attack and submarine attack on the US Naval Base and Headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and aerial attacks against the US Army Base at Schofield Barracks and the US Army Air Corps Base at Hickam Field. Most US military commanders were bewildered by the successful attack which they never would have believed Japan could execute before it actually happened. By leaning into those beliefs, they were caught flat-footed by the attack. Their immediate responses were meager and ineffectual.

There were more recent occasions when intelligence was not given primacy required and not sufficiently analysed and integrated in the decision making of a US administration. Boiled down to the bones, in the late summer of 2001, the administration of US President George Bush was remiss in not giving primacy to information indicating the leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, Osama Bin Laden was determined to have his to reanimation strike in the US. In fact, Al-Qaeda did strike on September 11, 2001. Failing to become overly concerned over warnings of an impending terrorist attack, the Bush administration did not formulate and implement an effectual response to deter or defeat the threat that revealed itself. As explained in the December 2018 greatcharlie post entitled, “Commentary: Trump Withdraws US Troops from Syria: What Considerations Impelled His Decision?”, US President Barack Obama and other national leaders poorly interpreted information concerning an opposition movement that had organised against the regime of Syria Arab Republic President Bashar Al-Assad in March 2011. They believed that opposition movement made Assad regime ripe for change, however, opportunity was seen by Obama and his foreign and national security policy decision makers where there was none. The conclusion was that with a modicum support for the right opposition groups, the Assad regime would face collapse and be forced to the negotiation table, where Assad, himself, would agree to an orderly and immediate transition of power. Among a long list of negative consequences that have resulted from that policy approach have been: a seemingly never ending civil war in which millions of civilians have become casualties, millions more have been displaced; Russia and other countries who are potential adversaries of the US have strengthened their presence in Syria and increased their influence on the Assad regime; and, extraordinarily dangerous terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have established strongholds.

How a US President might proceed at forks on the road on policy concerning, a countries, or group of countries will typically be based on information provided by the US intelligence community. Sometimes, that information will create a clear path on which the president can proceed with a relatively assured step. In cases in which US responses have been ineffectual or simply wrong, there may have been a failure to integrate information that warned that success was unlikely. Sometimes, “The path is smooth that leads on to danger.” If the US public were kept aware of every occasion in which Russia posed a threat or interfered with US interests, and if the US Government were to react publicly to concerns and intelligence reports about Russian activity, certainly the US would have stumbled into war with Russia long ago. Consider for example that the Russians regularly use their satellites to interfere with US satellites as they transit the Earth. That situation is made more challenging by the fact that there is considerable positive cooperation between the US and Russia on space and it would be disadvantageous to tear it apart. In that same vein, an honest assessment must be made of where incidents fit into the bigger picture of vital US interests and the maintenance of international peace and security. At best, the country must rely on a president’s experience and judgment as each incident arises.

Having been placed under the bright lights, it is hard to imagine why Russian intelligence and security services are reportedly continuing their efforts to manipulate US elections. The operation was blown. Perhaps it will end after Putin recognizes that the more his spies plug into the US system to do damage, the more US intelligence services and law enforcement is enabled to discover about Russian intelligence tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods, leadership, personnel, and resources.

Russia was wrong to act against US interests in the 2016 elections. Trump can continue to respond to its behavior by keeping the most effective punitive economic measures in place. However, he also knows that Putin, to the best of his ability has thought through the possible consequences to his actions with his advisers. He does not at least publicly appear overly concerned with retribution from the US short of acting on Russian sovereign territory or acting harshly against Russian interests and its allies. Beyond providing lip-service to Putin as suggested by critics and detractors, Trump has sought to close the door on Russian election meddling activities against the US as best as possible, build a positive personal relationship with Putin, and improve US relations with Russia. Although Trump, a patriotic US citizen, very likely feels some anger, bitterness, and resentment in his heart over what Putin and Russia have done, he knows behaving too aggressively would be short-sighted, and would only lengthen the distance he will need to travel to improve the US relationship with Russia. Trump will not sacrifice any benefits that might result from his acting in a measured way. Having been placed under the bright lights, it is hard to imagine why Russian intelligence and security services are reportedly continuing their efforts to manipulate US elections. The operation was blown, and keeping it going seems a bit barky. Perhaps it will end after Putin recognizes that the more his spies plug into the US system to do damage, the more enabled US intelligence services and law enforcement are to uncover Russian intelligence tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods, leadership, personnel, and resources. Perhaps he is on the verge of becoming conscious or accepting of that now.

According to Kiev, the confrontation in the Kerch Strait began on November 25, 2018, when 3 of its ships, travelling from Odessa to Mariupol, were intercepted by the Russian Federation Coast Guard. (The Kerch Strait is a crucial waterway separating the Black and Azov seas.) The Russian Coast Guard vessels then fired on the Ukrainian ships and also rammed one of their tugboats. Moscow says 3 Ukrainian sailors were wounded, Kiev says the number was 6. The 3 Ukrainian ships and 24 sailors are now being held in Crimea by Russia.

Russia, Ukraine and the Kerch Strait Incident

Trump came office with the intention of assuaging the long standing tension and anger that characterized the US-Russia relations, exacerbated by the Obama administration’s poor stewardship of it. He did not begin by trying the figuratively test the water nervously with his big toe. With boldness, he jumped right in, attempting to find a way to create a genuine connection with Putin in order to establish a stronger bond bofh between themselves and their two countries and hopefully as a result, a decent arrangement for interaction could be created. Trump has been graceful in his overtures to the Russian leader, focusing on finding ways to connect with Putin on issues, creating a unique positive connection as leaders of nuclear superpowers, and finding a chemistry between them. With any luck, Putin would understand and appreciate what Trump has been doing and recognize the great opportunity that lies before him to let Russia be seen as doing some good for the world. It has been a bedeviling process. At Helsinki, there was an incident that certainly raised Trump’s antennae. Despite his desire and efforts to make things right, Putin took the anomalous and very awkward step of presenting Trump with an official football from the World Cup saying, “The ball is in your court.” Trump stated that he would give the ball to his son Darren, and tossed it to the First Lady, Melania Trump. One could immediately observe by his visage that Trump would want answers from his team on what Putin’s move was all about.

Although, with some effort, benign intent can be posited to Putin’s presentation of the ball to Trump. The negative side of Putin may have been on full display. It was clear to all who observed closely that Trump’s reaction to the presentation was negative. His countenance revealed disgust and disappointment in Putin. It may very well be that Trump felt vibrations about trouble ahead with him. It was also very surprising because Putin, an acute watcher and listener. should have known by the time he met with Trump in Helsinki that the presentation of the ball would have created more difficulties than inroads with him. Critics and detractors of Putin would surely explain that he did not seek to gain anything from doing such an unorthodox thing and that it was all very characteristic of the Russian President’s churlish thinking. Si animus infirmus est, non poterit bonam fortunam tolerare. (If the spirit is weak, it will not be able to tolerate good fortune.)

The clash between Russia and Ukraine in the Kerch Strait makes plain the reality that problems between the two countries are deepening. According to Kiev, the confrontation began on November 25, 2018, when 3 of its ships, travelling from Odessa to Mariupol, were intercepted by the Russian Federation Coast Guard in the Kerch Strait. The Russian Federation Coast Guard vessels then fired on the Ukrainian ships and also rammed one of their tugboats. Moscow says 3 Ukrainian sailors were wounded, Kiev says the number was 6. In addition, Russia scrambled jets and helicopters, and even blocked the Kerch Strait with a barge, closing access to the Sea of Azov. Russia claims the Ukrainian ships violated territorial waters. The 3 Ukrainian ships and 24 crewmen as have been held as of January 2019 by Russia in Crimea. The Kerch Strait is a crucial waterway that serves as the gateway from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov, which borders both Russia and Ukraine. From Moscow’s perspective, it is most importantly, the waterway between mainland Russia and Crimea which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014. Both countries have the right to patrol the waters in accord with a bilateral treaty. However, the strait is also the site of a new 12-mile bridge built by Russia that cost an estimated $4 billion. Russia has significantly built up its military presence in the region since 2014.

Russian Federation FSB officer (left) escorts Ukrainian sailor (right). Trump indicated to reporters as he left the White House to travel to the G-20 Summit in Argentina that he intended to be read-in on a finalized report” on the Kerch Strait incident on Air Force One. In flight, Trump tweeted: “Based on the fact that the ships and sailors have not been returned to Ukraine from Russia, I have decided it would be best for all parties concerned to cancel my previously scheduled meeting in Argentina with President Vladimir Putin.”

The incident in the strait alarmed senior US officials. Sharp criticism of Russia’s actions were immediately voiced. For US allies in Europe, the incident was edge of the seat stuff. There were widespread calls for Russia to immediately release the 24 Ukrainian sailors it captured, and some European leaders called for fresh sanctions against Russia. Kiev put martial law in effect for 30 days in Ukraine. The Kremlin scoffed at an appeal by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko for NATO to reinforce the Azov Sea with naval ships. Russia shrugged off Western pressure. Moscow maintained that the crisis was created by Poroshenko for political gain. When Trump commented on the matter right after occurred, his words fell short of condemning Russia directly by stating: “I don’t like that aggression.” While there was nothing irregular about that, Trump’s critics and detractors, in response, characterized him as being too reticent on the matter. However, the situation was fluid, and Trump wanted to collect all the information available before taking any steps. So profound was his reaction that he reportedly signalled to the Washington Post that he would consider forgoing the meeting with Putin after the incident in Kerch Strait and escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine. Trump then indicated to reporters as he left the White House to travel to the G-20 Summit in Argentina that he intended to be read-in on a finalized report” on the Kerch Strait incident on Air Force One. Early in the flight, however, Trump tweeted: “Based on the fact that the ships and sailors have not been returned to Ukraine from Russia, I have decided it would be best for all parties concerned to cancel my previously scheduled meeting in Argentina with President Vladimir Putin.” He added: ““I look forward to a meaningful Summit again as soon as this situation is resolved!”

Likely swept off their feet over “how well” they were managing their interactions with US and believing that they had a handle on the highly publicized meeting with Trump at the G-20 Summit Meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, Putin and his whole cabaret of acolytes were caught completely off guard by his decision. Coming down from there overdose of confidence, their immediate concern would reasonably have been what Trump’s move would mean in terms of future Russian interactions with the US. The Kremlin’s worry seemed to be manifested in the attitude and behavior of Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. At the time, his works lacked a usual sense of certitude. There was a noticeable absence of his normal swagger. He presented a less impressive substitute of himself. Early on November 29, 2018, Peskov told reporters in Moscow that the meeting between Trump and Putin would take place December 1, 2018 around noon. He explained, “We are expecting the two presidents to speak briefly at first, but everything is left to the discretion of the heads of state.” He added that “Washington has confirmed.” Agitated by Trump’s tweet, Peskov told TASS Russian News Agency that the Kremlin had not been informed separately by the White House of the cancellation. He made the necessary correction by stating, explained, “If this is indeed the case, the president [Putin] will have a couple of additional hours in his schedule for useful meetings on the sidelines of the summit.”

Whatever could have led the Kremlin to think for a moment that they ever had a firm handle on Trump is a bit of a black box. Among the basket of possibilities, one might hypothesize that the vengeful thinking the prevailed during Russia’s struggles with the Obama administration is now insinuating itself into the Kremlin’s planning and actions concerning the Trump administration. (Many of former Obama administration officials successfully needle Kremlin’s officials by presenting acidic analyses of Putin’s behavior, antagonistic critiques of Russian foreign and national security policy, and make warlike recommendations on handling Russia for the Trump administration.) There is the possibility that Putin and Kremlin officials, being vexed by Trump’s willingness to bargain on the basis of fairness with them, chose the easy answer of simply continuing to do what they had been doing in response to Obama. There is also the possibility that being unable to understand Trump, and believing that his range of action, ability to do big things, and take on real challenges, was likely restrained somewhat by his domestic political struggles, which they doubtlessly perceive as amusing. If that perchance is the case, there is the possibility that Russian intelligence analysts covering the US political scene have been remiss by conceivably allowing highly politicized commentaries from Trump’s critics and detractors and iniquitous reports in the US news media insinuate themselves in their assessments. It is possible that any penetration by the GRU and the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR in the US may simply be collecting: chicken feed; misleading information grabbed because it was within easy reach of officers, sounded plausible, and would look good in Moscow; or, false reports conjured up by delinquent officers just to look good or prolong their postings in the US. (It can happen even in the best intelligence services.) Additionally, Kremlin officials may have decided to simply leave well-enough alone and remain satisfied with stale, derivative analyses that would serve the bureaucratic requirement of producing some product, but inhibits the exploration or exploitation of opportunities for positive engagement with, and actions toward, the US.

Trump did not make contact with Putin on December 1, 2018 at the G-20 Summit. Reportedly, Trump walked by Putin as if he were a stranger when the leaders stood for a group photo. Still, having studied the the Obama administration responses to very questionable moves by Putin, Trump doubtlessly reasoned that he should not resort to taunting or pressuring him with slights. A conversation finally occurred at a cultural dinner in Buenos Aires, organized for the national leaders and their wives. Putin told reporters later that they discussed the “Black Sea situation.”

Having studied the Obama administration’s responses to contentious moves by Putin, Trump doubtlessly reasoned that he should not resort to taunting or pressuring him with slights. Putin’s reaction to that approach was adverse and disproportionate. Sensing that Putin may actually have a penchant for destroying progress made with the US, Trump would not set him up with the opportunity to do so again. Moreover, Trump saw no need to move up the ladder of escalation for no benefit, for no purpose. Apparently as an expression of his disappointment with Putin over Russia’s actions in the Kerch Strait, Trump did not make contact with him for most of the day, December 1, 2018. Reportedly, Trump walked by Putin as if he were a stranger when the world’s leaders stood for a group photo. Kremlin officials insisted throughout the day that the two leaders would ultimately meet. Finally, the two leaders had an “informal” conversation. According to White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, the conversation occurred at a cultural dinner in Buenos Aires’ famous Teatro Colón, organized for the national leaders and their wives. As for its content, Saunders stated: “As is typical at multilateral events, President Trump and the First Lady had a number of informal conversations with world leaders at the dinner last night, including President Putin.” Putin told reporters afterward that he indeed met with Trump briefly at the event and they discussed the situation in Ukraine. Putin further explained, “I answered his questions about the incident in the Black Sea. He has his position. I have my own. We stayed in our own positions.”

As mentioned earlier, Trump’s patience has limits. However, he will at least make the effort manage contact with Putin as best as possible to get a successful result. If it should all fall apart, it will not be because of a silly move or the failure to do everything feasible within reason to promote it. Again, Trump is not doing any of this for himself; he has committed himself to this process for the sake of his country and the US public in particular. He will not allow his personal feelings about those he may deal with to get in the way.

Jamal Khashoggi (right) entering the Consulate of Saudi Arabia in Istanbul, Turkey. On October 2, 2018, Washington Post columnist and Saudi Arabian national, Jamal Khashoggi, went to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey to obtain a document certifying that he was divorced to enable him to marry his Turkish fiancée. Based on information available to them, Turkish officials said Khashoggi was killed inside the Consulate, his body was dismembered, and then likely disposed of elsewhere.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Khashoggi Matter

On October 2, 2018, Washington Post columnist and Saudi Arabian national, Jamal Khashoggi, went to the Consulate of Saudi Arabia in Istanbul, Turkey to obtain a document certifying that he was divorced to enable him to marry his Turkish fiancée. Based on information available to them, Turkish officials said Khashoggi was killed inside the consulate, his body was dismembered, and then likely disposed of elsewhere. Before the murder, the Turkish Government had been monitoring a 15-person team that arrived at the consulate on October 2, 2018. That team returned to Riyadh the same day. The Turkish Government reportedly provided US officials with both audio and video recordings that confirm Khashoggi was killed inside the Saudi Consulate.

Omnis enim ex infirmitate feritas est. (All savageness is a sign of weakness.) The murder of Khashoggi certainly has not made Saudi Arabia appear as an attractive country. In fact, it has brought views of it worldwide more in line with that of its harshest critics and detractors, particularly those focused on its human rights record and the governance of the House of Saud. With the advantage of hindsight, it would appear that the assassination plot was formed at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, first in line to King Salman. His fate is all over the matter. On dit, the Khashoggi assassination has also allegedly provided a candid look at how the Saudi Arabian Government has typically quieted voices of perceived adversaries both at home and abroad.

When the furtive “wet work” of an intelligence services is uncovered, the consequences for the national government that sanctioned the mission and it’s operatives, even if they avoided detection and capture if acting in another country, can be severe. This is a unique and not so often discussed area of commonality among national leaders. An affinity could surely develop for others in that same circumstance. Attendant to that affinity is a type of empathy that may insist the one should not be too judgmental or harshly slam another leader, particularly over an intelligence misstep or disaster. That empathy may obviate efforts to claim the moral high road and false claim of innocence after perhaps having similar experience. In international affairs, much as in “ordinary life” only partial version of oneself is offered. The priority of coexistence must be considered in what one might say or do versus what might be gained or lost. Countries may spare the feelings, national pride, or honor of allies and friends or even or avoid provoking or inciting adversaries. To that extent, acting in that way requires a country to circumscribe itself. Typically, a national leader who might sign off on any covert operation will be provided with the ability to plausibly deny knowledge of it. Yet, on top of that, secrecy, albeit deceit, might be used to protect relationship with an ally or friend and to make any act of circumscription by that ally or friend a bit easier.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (above). The murder of Khashoggi certainly has not made Saudi Arabia appear as an attractive country. In fact, it has brought views of it worldwide more in line with that of its harshest critics and detractors, particularly those focused on its human rights record and the governance of the House of Saud. From all news media reports, it would appear that the assassination plot was executed at the behest of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, first in line to King Salman. His fate is all over the matter.

Any harsh criticism and expressions of deep disappointment conveyed by the US to Saudi Arabia–which most likely have been made by Trump in his telephone contacts with Riyadh early on during the matter–would never be explicit with an ally of such stature. Certainly, Trump did not shy away from the beastiality of the crime. What Trump and senior administration officials tried to do is bring perspective to the matter. On November 28, 2018, then US Secretary of Defense James Mattis at the Pentagon reminded reporters that as of the moment he was speaking about the Khashoggi matter: “We have no smoking gun the crown prince was involved, not the intelligence community or anyone else. There is no smoking gun.” He further explained that the US still expected those responsible for the killing to be held accountable. In a November 28, 2018 Wall Street Journal Op-Ed piece, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expatiated on the matter, summarizing the position of the US Government as follows: “The US doesn’t condone the Khashoggi killing, which is fundamentally inconsistent with American values—something I have told the Saudi leadership privately as well as publicly. President Trump has taken action in response. Twenty-one Saudi suspects in the murder have been deemed ineligible to enter the US and had any visas revoked. On Nov. 15, the administration imposed sanctions on 17 Saudis under Executive Order 13818, which builds on the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. We’ve worked to strengthen support for this response, and several countries, including France and Germany, have followed suit. The Trump administration will consider further punitive measures if more facts about Khashoggi’s murder come to light.” Pompeo went on the explain the importance of Saudi Arabia as a regional ally, by additionally stating: “The kingdom is a powerful force for stability in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is working to secure Iraq’s fragile democracy and keep Baghdad tethered to the West’s interests, not Tehran’s. Riyadh is helping manage the flood of refugees fleeing Syria’s civil war by working with host countries, cooperating closely with Egypt, and establishing stronger ties with Israel. Saudi Arabia has also contributed millions of dollars to the US-led effort to fight Islamic State and other terrorist organizations. Saudi oil production and economic stability are keys to regional prosperity and global energy security.” Yet, once Trump and his senior officials sought to explain the importance of Saudi Arabia as an ally when discussing the Khashoggi matter, a knee-jerk response of critics and detractors was the hackneyed claim that the US President placed a pecuniary interest in its Middle East ally at greater value than the life of journalist. That claim was stated so often that it became a common observation.

wTrump (left) and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan (right). An intriguing type of leadership could be seen from Trump on the Khashoggi matter. A US President must keep in mind that the US, as a leader on the international stage, is a role model to much of rest of the world. It is in a unique position of being able to promote peace and security worldwide. If the US had officially concluded that Saudi Arabia was responsible for the murder and that a strong response was in order, the country offended most, Turkey, might have taken tough steps against it. 

Through Trump’s decision making regarding the Khashoggi matter, an intriguing type of leadership could be seen in him. A US President in considering how to proceed on a matter, must indeed keep in mind that the US, as a leader on the international stage is a role model to much of rest of the world. As such, the US is in a unique position of being able to promote peace and security worldwide through its actions. The values and interests of the US, of course, will hold primacy in decision making on a matter, the interests of allies and partners will also be taken into account. In the Khashoggi case, the reality is that the murder occurred in Turkey (although the Saudi Arabian Consulate is technically the sovereign territory of Saudi Arabia). As reported, the assassination team that killed Khashoggi came into Turkey through Istanbul Airport and a number of the co-conspirators moved in and around the streets of Istanbul before and after the killing. If the US had immediately and officially concluded that Saudi Arabia was directly responsible for the murder and that some form of retribution was in order, the country offended most, Turkey, might have taken some type of steps against it. Turkey may very well have acted unilaterally and swiftly, utilizing its military or intelligence services, to punish those who used its country as the site to slaughter an esteemed and welcomed journalist. Turkey would have unlikely felt that it needed the permission of the US to act, just as Saudi officials, at some level, doubtlessly felt that they did not need to confer with or ask the permission of the US to act against Khashoggi.

As for the US role in mitigating Turkey’s likely desire for retribution, it offered not only words exhorting restraint, but also served as an example of restraint. Consider that there was a preexisting animus between Turkey and Saudi Arabia before the Khashoggi murder. Reportedly, Saudi Arabia was angered over Turkey’s support to Qatar and withdraw its troops from the country. That demand caused Turkey to perceive Saudi Arabia as a threat to Turkey’s interests. In Riyadh, Turkey was on the top of its list of enemies. Khashoggi’s murder brought tensions to new heights. Knowing this, Saudi Arabia, days after the murder, made a secret offer to pour billions of dollars into Turkey’s economy and ease its hard-line stance on Qatar if Ankara helped whitewash the scandal. Turkey rejected the proposal. Afterward, Turkey allegedly began producing evidence that indicated Mohammed bin Salman was involved. Nevertheless, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan did stop short of accusing Prince Mohammed directly. He would only posit that responsibility for Khashoggi’s death lied at “the highest levels” of the Saudi Arabian Government. Turkey’s fresh anger against Saudi Arabia also added to decades of animus toward the Arab World ignited as a result of battles of the Ottoman Empire to maintain order. What happened so long ago remains a big part of Turkish history, culture, and psyche. Indeed, the loss of many young Turkish soldiers in Arabia still touches the hearts of many Turkish families. None of this is to suggest or imply that an anti-Arab strain runs through Turkish thinking today. Nonetheless, given that memories of past wars persist, and the fact that emotions were running very high after the Khashoggi murder, convincing Turkey, free to act on its own, not to act, was not an easy thing to do. Turkey, as the guarantor of its own national interests, made the choice to cooperate effectively with US diplomatically, outside the auspices of an international institution.

Trump has made shrewd, empathetic considerations whenever acting on foreign and national security policy. His judgments have been made with circumspection, and are pollinated by US values and interests. With information available and the benefit of experience, he develops his own situational awareness. Taking account of geostrategic realities in a region, he measures what might be lost versus what might be gained short-term and long-term. A great portion of the US public, watching him, feels assured that all will be fine.

The Way Forward

In Act 3, scene 3 of William Shakespeare’s play, Cymbeline, King Cymbeline of Britain has married a woman who has made him her puppet. Cymbeline arranges for his beautiful daughter, Imogen, to marry his new wife’s son, Cloten, but she instead marries the poor but worthy Posthumus Leonatus. Angered, Cymbeline banishes Posthumus. Before he leaves for Italy, Imogen gives him a diamond ring and he gives her a bracelet. In Italy, Posthumus encounters a Iachimo, who vacuously argues all women are naturally unchaste, and bets Posthumus that he can seduce Imogen. Yet, once at the British court, he fails to seduce her. Full of tricks, Iachimo hides in a large chest he has sent to her room; slips out at night while Imogen slept, and steals the bracelet Posthumus gave her, Iachimo returns to Italy and uses both the bracelet and knowledge of the details of Imogen’s bedchamber, to convince Posthumus that he won the bet. Posthumus, furious, sends a letter to his servant, Pisanio, in Britain, ordering him to murder Imogen. Pisanio, believing in Imogen’s innocence, gets her to disguise herself as a boy and get to Posthumus while he would report to him that Imogen was dead.  On the run, Imogen becomes lost in the wilds of Wales, where she meets Belarius, a wrongfully banished nobleman, and his sons, Guiderius and Arviragus. Unbeknownst to them, both were actually Cymbeline’s sons. They would later come to the aid of Imogen and to the aid of Britain against the Romans. The audience first meets Belarius, Guiderius and Arviragus as their “father”, instructs them on the nuances of a calm life while climbing a mountain. Belarius states: Now for our mountain sport: up to yond hill; / Your legs are young; I’ll tread these flats. Consider, / When you above perceive me like a crow, / That it is place which lessens and sets off; / And you may then revolve what tales I have told you / Of courts, of princes, of the tricks in war: / This service is not service, so being done, / But being so allow’d: to apprehend thus, / Draws us a profit from all things we see; / And often, to our comfort, shall we find / The sharded beetle in a safer hold / Than is the full-wing’d eagle. O, this life / Is nobler than attending for a cheque, / Richer than doing nothing for a bauble, / Prouder than rustling in unpaid-for silk: / Such gain the cap of him that makes ’em fine, / Yet keeps his book uncross’d: no life to ours. These words, which may appear somewhat cryptic to modern readers, essentially explain that maintaining a balanced, rational view is the best way of examine a situation and will allow for a rational analysis of it. In each foreign and national security policy issue examined here, evidence indicates Trump made shrewd, empathetic considerations as he acted. His judgments were made with circumspection, considering what precedes and what follows, are pollinated by US values and interests. With information available and the benefit of experience, he developed his own situational awareness. Taking account of geostrategic realities in a region, he measured what might be lost versus what might be gained in both the short-term and the long-term. When moving to make changes in the status quo, Trump typically assessed the situation before him much as a half-back in US football searches for openings in the line that may allow him to breakthrough and do some open field running. Trump has also exuded a confidence on the world stage. Trump knows where he is and what he is doing, and a good portion of the US public, watching him work, feels assured that everything will be alright. Presenting oneself as confident and assured in itself is an art of leaders. When taking risks one naturally feels risk. The French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte explained of himself: “There is no man more pusillanimous than I when I am planning a campaign. I purposely exaggerate all the dangers and all the calamities that the circumstances make possible. I am in a thoroughly painful state of agitation. This does not keep me from looking quite serene in front of my entourage; I am like an unmarried girl laboring with a child. Once I had made up my mind, everything is forgotten except what leads to success.”

In each case presented here, Trump, in seeking to manage and influence the actions of other national leaders, was allowed the freedom to act in his own way, and unshackled by what administration officials might call the limitations of an international institution managing some collective action under its auspices. Countries that would like to work effectively outside of international institutions should feign nothing, and make a wholehearted effort at it. As Trump continues to evolve as US President, other national leaders are provided with an example on how they might approach foreign and national security policy decision making for their own countries. Perhaps most leaders would have small interest in the ministrations of greatcharlie on this matter. Of course, there are rarely situations that arise that are so uniform in nature that lessons from one leader would allow a cookie cutter approach to resolving them. However, smart people are able to find solutions to problems. If national leaders would like to work outside of international institutions more frequently, new more thoughtful and empathetic perspectives must be allowed to arrive in their thinking on their diplomacy with other countries.

Commentary: Trump-Kim Talks: Will Desire Obey Reason or Will Force Be Used to Overcome Force?

The Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un (above). When US President Donald Trump and Kim meet, hopefully their conversation will be positive, but an uncongenial exchange is possible, the portent of which may be war, made more horrible by nuclear weapons. Sangfroid, skilled diplomacy, and adjustments in thinking on both sides will be required if a sustainable agreement is to be reached. Trump has allowed Kim room to think it through. He must make the right choice.

On March 8, 2018, it was announced by the US and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), independently, that talks would be arranged between US President Donald Trump and the Supreme Leader of North Korea Kim Jong-un. The decision was precipitated by efforts of the government of South Korean President Moon Jae-in to end rather bellicose verbiage and repeated muscle flexing by the US, Japan, and his country as well, itself, and halt weapons testing by North Korea. The meeting between Trump and Kim would be the first time leaders of the two countries have ever met. Since the end of the Korean War, previous US administrations had no interest at all in the idea. Indeed, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has remained tense since the end of Korean War during which the US along with forces of the UN fought to eject the forces of North Korea, China, and Soviet Union (who were operating covertly), from sovereign South Korean territory. The very bloody fighting was halted by a July 27, 1953 armistice that established a roughly 160 mile long, 2.5 miles wide, Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the 38th Parallel. For 65 years, tens of thousands of troops on both sides of the DMZ have remained heavily armed and on alert in a stand-off. There have been hot and cold periods in relations between the former warring parties. Violent incidents have occurred between them on the ground and in the waters around in the Korean Peninsula. Yet, the armistice has held. While it is hoped that the talks between Trump and Kim will go well, uncongenial talks between them is a real possibility, the portent of which may be a new war, made more horrible, more destructive, by nuclear weapons. Sangfroid, skilled diplomacy, and some big adjustments in thinking on both sides will be required if a new sustainable agreement to end the extremely dangerous situation is to be reached. Here are a few considerations and an outlinng of some elements that may contribute to the forging of such an agreement.

As it was noted in the August 15, 2017 greatcharlie post entitled, “Trump Has Spoken, the Ball Is in Kim Jong-un’s Court, But This Is Not a Game!”, the Trump administration has tried to be reasonable with North Korea. Recall that Trump, with a positive mindset, tried to reach out to Kim. He tried to see the world through King Jong-un’s lens. Trump publicly expressed the view that it must have been difficult for Kim to take on so much responsibility at a relatively early age following his father, Kim Jong-Il. Trump even suggested then that he would be willing to meet with Kim to communicate head to head, brain to brain. A resolution might have been crafted from Kim’s elaborations on what troubles him. It was a sincere search for common ground. Kim did not budge in Trump’s direction. Rather, Trump was with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe in Florida on February 11, 2017 when the North Korea fired an intermediate range missile into the Sea of Japan. It became clear that efforts with North Korea have simply become a struggle against the inevitable. Trump had also urged China, North Korea’s economic lifeline, to assist in reducing tensions by talking frankly with Pyongyang.  The administration’s contact with China has resulted in a degree of solidarity from it. In August 2017, China voted to place sanctions against North Korean under UN Security Council Resolution 2371. Those sanctions limited North Korean exports of coal, iron, lead, and seafood. Restrictions were placed North Korea’s Trade Bank and prohibited any increase in the number if North Koreans citizens working in other countries. However, that effort initially did not seem to do much to stop Kim. Advancements made by North Korea and an escalation in provocations continued. To get even tougher on North Korea, in September 2017, UN Security Council Resolution 2375 was passed, limiting North Korea restricting North Korean crude oil and refined petroleum product imports, banned joint ventures, textile exports, natural gas condensate, and liquid imports, and banned North Koreans citizens from working in other countries. The administration intensified a “maximum pressure” campaign on Kim’s regime and its supporters, increasing military exercises in coordination with South Korea and Japan, deploying missile defense systems in South Korea with urgency, sending more firepower there, and encouraging Congress to enact the strongest sanctions possible against North Korea and its enablers. Eventually, in February 2018, the US imposed a raft of sanctions in an effort to target entities linked to North Korea’s shipping and trade sectors. Those entities included one individual, 27 shipping companies, and 28 vessels  Through such harsh economic sanctions, and the much needed, and very helpful cooperation from China and the Russian Federation, albeit with some reluctance, the entire matter has reached this point.

Trump’s Thinking on North Korea and Talks

In utrumque paratus. (Prepared for either alternative.) Trump has made a number of statements concerning North Korea. However, the best source for understanding his positions on Kim and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs before the talks is perhaps his remarks before the 72nd Session of the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2017. In his remarks, Trump explained that North Korea was a member of a small group of rogue regimes that represented “the scourge of our planet today.” Noting what those countries had in common, he explained that they violated every principle on which the UN is based. He added, “They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries.” Trump declared that North Korea was perhaps the worst aming them, being responsible for the starvation deaths of millions of its citizens and for the imprisonment, torture, killing, and oppression of countless more. Trump reminded that there were a number of very public displays of its outrageous behavior to include the mistreatment of University of Virginia college student Otto Wambier who died only a few days after being returned to the US; the assassination of Kim’s brother with banned nerve agents in an Indonesian international airport; and, the kidnapping of a 13-year-old Japanese girl from a beach in her own country to enslave her as a language tutor for North Korea’s spies. Trump explained that North Korea’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles was a manifestation of the same depraved mental attitude Kim evinced through his violent acts against foreign visitors, his family members, and citizens on the sovereign territory of their own countries. His work on nuclear weapons and missiles threatened the entire world with unthinkable loss of human life. Trump pointed to the fact that some countries not only trade with North Korea, but arm, supply, and financially support it. Trump insisted that it was not in the interest of any country to see North Korea arm itself with nuclear weapons and missiles. Trump indicated that he felt Kim was “on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime.”  He declared: “It is time for North Korea to realize that the denuclearization is its only acceptable future.” Trump closed his remarks concerning North Korea by reminding that the US “has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.” He added: “The United States is ready, willing and able, but hopefully this will not be necessary. “

While his comments at the UN were somewhat severe, Trump has indicated that there is room for a degree of flexibility in his thinking by the mere fact that he has agreed to meet with Kim. More apparently, since those remarks were made, Trump has not launched an attack on North Korea to destroy its nuclear weapons and missile programs most likely hoping Kim can reach an understanding on his own of the dangerous situation in which he has put his country or that the maximum pressure campaign would eventually breakdown the ability of his regime to function because his activities would prove absolutely unprofitable. For the moment, Trump has elected to “give peace a chance.” Time will tell how long he will allow that window of opportunity for North Korea to remain open.

Kim’s Concept on the US and Talks

The emotional response of the North Korean people toward Kim, a near religious belief in him, is similar to that which they held for his father, Kim Jong-il, and his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, before. The people’s fervor for Kim is at the foundation of opinions and actions formulated and implemented by the government in Pyongyang. Anything that could be considered reasonable must flow from Kim’s ruminations, meditations, concepts, ideals, and intentions. Contrary to practices in Western governments, reason and knowledge have little place. Kim’s intuitive, visceral thinking is cherished. As greatcharlie has emphasized in previous posts, wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. However in North Korea, questioning, or worse, challenging a position or notion of the Kim will end badly: imprisonment or death. Given their acceptance of the reality created for them, North Koreans see Trump as a danger, and threat he poses is part of larger picture of the US, a capitalist adversary, seeking conquest, attempting to subordinate their smaller nation. They see Kim as defending them from Trump, from the US threat. They accept that Kim, their Great Leader, has built up the North Korean nuclear arsenal to a level that has given their countrt the capability and capacity to strike the powerful US. Kim’s father and grandfather were unable to achieve that. Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia proprium, semper incipit vivere. (Among other evils, folly has also this special characteristic: it is always beginning to live.)

What the world is hearing from North Korea since the talks were announced is a new Kim whose approach does not emphasize the need to challenge the US with force. North Korea’s official news organization, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), in a March 20, 2018 commentary reported that its country’s “proactive measure and peace-loving proposal” have caused a “dramatic atmosphere for reconciliation” to be “created in relations between the North and the South of Korea, and that there has been a sign of change also in the DPRK-U.S. relations.” KCNA further noted that North Korea had begun a “dialogue peace offensive.” To that extent, it explained: “The great change in the North-South relations is not an accidental one but a noble fruition made thanks to the DPRK’s proactive measure, warm compatriotism and will for defending peace.” KCNA also proffered: “Such an event as today could be possible as the DPRK’s dignity has remarkably risen and it has strong might.” The KCNA commentary strongly criticized current and former officials and experts in the US and Japan, as well as conservatives in South Korea, for claiming Pyongyang was pushed into a corner by sanctions. The commentary responded harshly to calls for sustained pressure on North Korea and to skepticism voice that suggests its “peaceful approach” is a ploy intended to gain time or drive a wedge between the US and South Korea. Additionally, KCNA declared: “The economy of the DPRK is rising,” and added, advances in science and technology around the country are “promising the bright future for the improvement of the people’s living standard.” It emphasized: “The dialogue peace offensive of the DPRK is an expression of self-confidence as it has acquired everything it desires.” Lastly,  KCNA called on all parties involved to act with “prudence, self-control and patience.” North Korea, since agreeing to meeting with Trump has gone a step further by scheduling a meeting between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in for April 27, 2018. While North Korea would have the world believe that a “new Kim” and new North Korea have emerged, one must never forget that Kim is the steward of a tyrannical government, and make no mistake, he rules with an iron fist. The North Korean people live under conditions that no one anywhere would envy. They only know the outside world through Kim’s lies, his deceptions. Only one who might be susceptible to gossamer fantasies could be seduced by Kim’s expedient “charm offensive” to support his supposed position on denuclearization. There is nothing that would lead any reasonable individual to be believe that Kim has a genuine interest in changing his thinking. North Korea has not moved beyond being the moral slum that it was when it emerged from the wreckage of World War II. Truthful assessments expressed in the West about North Korea’s broken society lhave mostly been looked upon by that country’s policy analysts and scholars with bewilderment. Not knowing why anyone would say there was anything wrong with their world, they typically chalk it up to a type of abstruse indignation. Among the more obedient, zealous government officials and other elites, such Western assessments are viewed as a manifestation of arrogance of Western powers which insist that any society or system not designed or created under their philosophies is subordinate in every way. 

What Baker’s Building Blocks Might Require

The building blocks for diplomatic talks and negotiations were well-outlined by former US Secretary of State James Baker over a decade ago. The renowned US statesman explained that his building blocks work well when properly applied through solid preparation, doing ones homework. Included among the building blocks were: 1) Understanding an opponent’s position; 2) Gaining trust through personal relationships; 3) Reciprocal confidence building; 4) Taking a pragmatic approach that does not sacrifice principles; 5) Being aware of timing; and 6) Maintaining a deep respect for the politics of the situation.

1. Understanding an opponent’s position

Amat victoria curam. (Victory favors those who take pains.) For negotiators, much as commanders on a battlefield, a full awareness of the situation is the first step in ensuring that once in contact with an opponent, one will be better prepared to cope with common contingencies as well as the unexpected, the reasonable “what ifs” that may arise. To that extent, the opposite party to talks as much as an opposing commander must be given his due. It must be accepted that he seeks success, and will take creative steps or may act in an unexpected manner, to accomplish that. For a smaller or weaker party or force, the aim would be to overcome the odds that are against them. 

For Trump, the goal of talks would be to initiate a process from which a sustainable agreement to halt North Korea nuclear testing, weapons development, and missile development can be reached. If the matter of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs is to be decided through diplomacy, reaching such an agreement is a immutable goal for Trump. He must be able to safeguard the safety and security of the US, the safety and security of US military forces and US interests in Asia and the Pacific, and the safety and security of US Allies and their interests in the region. However, Trump will not come to the table using some playbook to which he will adhere rigidly.North Korea can rest assured that Trump will come to talks well-informed and well-prepared to deal with Kim. Moreover, with Trump, Kim will face a US leader with an aptitude to find value in all of the information made available to him even at the negotiating table. He will use what he hears to find an opening in a position or argument or beginning planning future actions. Available information also allows Trump to develop thoughts about his opponents likely moves in advance. He studies how his opponent thinks. 

Kim likely hopes that the talks and negotiation process will result in the elimination of the longstanding policy that had the US provide a nuclear umbrella for South Korea and Japan, safeguarding them from nuclear attack by promising a nuclear response. Kim would also hope to severely limit, or at best, eliminate annual joint military exercises by the US, South Korea, and Japan. Through other efforts,  such as bilateral talks, Kim hopes to severely weaken, or at best, break the decades long security linkages between US, South Korea, and Japan. If Kim arrives at the table unwilling to discuss his nuclear weapons and missile programs and attempts to give a history lecture or offers positions on denuclearization and unification filled with political hyperbole supportive of the self-inflicted false reality North Korea has lived in for decades, there will be little chance of successful talks. A pragmatic, succinct discussion of the matter at hand will be the only way to move the discussion forward and reach any agreement. It is important for Pyongyang to keep that in mind. 

2. Gaining Trust through Personal Relationships

Trump and Kim have neither met nor have had any interaction by telephone. There is no degree of trust between them that would allow a relaxed exploration of territory outside their formal negotiating positions, nonetheless their assumptions, strategies, and even fears. Both have been working from reports in the abstract that presented observations and analyses of others about each other. For diplomats, positive personal relationships can be fostered by joint efforts in ordinary circumstances. However, only so much could ever have been hope for in terms of building personal relationships between US diplomats and fully indoctrinated North Korean officials. The development of such relations, would certainly be frowned upon by North Korea security elements as turning away from their country’s revolutionary ideals, a loss of patriotic zeal and faith in the Great Leader: in other words, treason. To the extent that Trump and Kim can reach agreements on smaller, common issues, there may be hope that they be able to broach larger ones. Reaching agreements on those smaller issues at an early stage, quickly, reasonably, and amicably, would represent the beginning of a constructive dialogue, which is one of the most important aspects of negotiations. Reaching an agreement on the site of the talks is a relatively small step that could begin the exchange between leaders.

There would be some common requirements insisted upon by protective security elements of the US and North Korea regarding a meeting site. A small sample of those likely required would be: the full consent and support from the leadership of a host country to hold the meeting in their country; the confirmed capability and capacity of security elements of the host country to provide granular security needs, and coordinate with and complement with security units, the efforts of US and North Korean protective security elements if it is anywhere other than the US or North Korea; acceptable facilities for transport of leaders of officials to and from the host country, appropriate accommodations to support leaders and officials traveling to the meeting, an appropriate sized and secure meeting site, whether a official office, hotel, official or historic residence, or some other facility that would appropriately meet the requirements for the meeting. These and other standard requirements must exist if a site even to be considered. Short lists for a meeting site created by both countries might include: the Demilitarized Zone between South Korea and North Korea; Pyongyang,in North Korea; Washington, D.C. in the US; Hawaii in the US; Stockholm or elsewhere in Sweden; Oslo or elsewhere in Norway; Copenhagenor elsewhere in Denmark; Helsinki or elsewhere in Finland; Geneva or elsewhere in Switzerland; Paris or elsewhere in France; Berlin or elsewhere in Germany; Rome or elsewhere in Italy; Beijing or elsewhere in China; Seoul or elsewhere in South Korea; Tokyo or elsewhere in Japan; Manila or elsewhere in the Philippines; Saipan Island in the Pacific; and, Wake Island in the Pacific. Every prospective site would need to meet the basic requirements for security. However, each has some political or emotional significance to both countries that might be an asset or liability to it in the selection process.

Regarding Stockholm, Sweden hosts the US interest section in its Embassy in Pyongyang and as has negotiated as a back channel between the US and North Korea on the release of Otto Wambier and has aided efforts concerning three US citizens now being held in North Korea. However, the matters involved is a presidential summit are different. The Swedish back channel should not be mixed up in the development of a new channel at the presidential level on nuclear weapons. Geneva, as a European site, might have value as a neutral site. It has been the site for the hashing out of issues and the crafting of many agreements in the years since World War II. The biggest issue might be distance for Kim. He might sense he too far away from his center of power. To rule with an iron fist, he must remain relatively close to home and keep his ear to the ground to detect even the slightest “revolutionary movements” by so-called reactionaries. While he has travel as recently as March 2018 to China, hidden adversarial elements could potentially see his scheduled absence as an opportunity to act against him. North Korean officials might also have concerns that most European countries that would qualify to host the summit are not only economic partners, but military allies of the US and willing to support US interests. The DMZ has traditionally been a site for talks between US and North Korean senior military officials since the end of the war. The South Korean President and North Korea’s Kim will meet there in April 2018. As South Korea and North Korea are engaged in separate talks, the issues of the Trump-Kim presidential summit should not be blended with that effort. Further, as the site for the first summit meeting between the US and North Korean leaders it may not be of appropriate stature as it evokes immediate memories of a past war and that may not be conducive to generating forward thinking to reach a sustainable, peace agreement agreement. Traveling to South Korea, away from the DMZ, would be fine for the US, but problematic for the North Koreans who would view Kim’s visit as a loss of dignity, and surrender to the notion that the South is the greater and the true Korea.  Pyongyang would certainly satisfy North Korea, but it might be deemed inappropriate to have a sitting US President visit there. Pyongyang much as the DMZ brings the past war to immediate perception and evokes the memory of United Kingdom Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier traveling to Germany for the disastrous Munich Meeting of September 1938. Trump would likely consider any similarity to that as anathema. For Kim, traveling to Washington, DC would be unacceptable in a similar way. Going there would not be felt as an act of peace, but politically and emotionally, an act of submission to Western authority and power. A meeting in Hawaii would evoke negative memories of the infamous surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Schofield Barracks, and Hickam Field on December 7, 1941. It may likely heighten the idea that handling a rogue threat to the US with nuclear weapons must not languish in talks but be dealt with swiftly and decisively. Beijing or elsewhere in China would unlikely be a desired choice by the US. China, with some coaxing by the US, has put tremendous pressure of North Korea with regard to it nuclear weapons development and missile development. Yet, China remains a political, economic, and military ally of North Korea, not a neutral party to events. In a similar way, Japan and the Philippines are allies of the US, likely obviating the possibility that Tokyo or Manila or any other site in those countries would satisfy North Korea. Japan has more than once faced the threat of North Korean missiles test fired in its direction. Japan might acquiesce to a US request if asked to host the summit, but the decision might cause some domestic political strains. In the Pacific, Saipan Island, might be a possibility. It was the site of a tragic battle between US and imperial Japanese forces during World War II. While remote, it should be close enough to North Korea that Kim would have less anxiety about traveling there for a day by air or sea. However, the North Koreans might view it as a negative given that it is a US Commonwealth and its the history of being a staging area for US covert intelligence operations in North Korea during the Korean War. Wake Island was the site of the historical October 15, 1950 meeting between US President Harry Truman and US Army General Douglas MacArthur on the status of the fighting in Korea and reaching some agreement on its course. It was also the site of a tragic battle between US and imperial Japanese forces during World War II. Much like Saipan, it would be close enough to North Korea that Kim should have less anxiety about traveling there for a day by air or sea. Unlike Saipan, Wake Island is an unincorporated US territory. Still, Wake Island is controlled by the US Army and the US Air Force which might make it undesirable to the North Koreans. Although all of these considerations could remove these cities and countries from consideration as a site for the summit, there is always the strong likelihood, that certain inconveniences will be tolerated by the US or North Korea and one of them will be selected. Reaching a common point of agreement on the site of the talks in a positive fashion might also serve to set the tone for the talks.

One site that may be a long shot, and may not be on the list of either US or North Korea, but certainly worthy of consideration is Mongolia. Mongolia has relatively positive relations with both the US and North Korea. Although Mongolia is bordered solely by the Russian Federation and China, Mongolia has described the US as its most important “third neighbor.” Currently, targeted US assistance has promoted good governance and the rule of law; helped to nurture a new generation of democratic leaders; invigorated private sector-led growth, economic diversification, and long-term capital investment; and mitigated transnational criminal activity, to include human trafficking, and reduced domestic violence, US training and equipment has supported the professionalization of Mongolia’s defense forces and their continued support for United Nations peacekeeping operations. Because of Mongolia’s long and highly porous borders. The US has also assisted Mongolia with its nonproliferation activities. The US and Mongolia have signed a Bilateral Transparency Agreement, an Investment Incentive Agreement, a Bilateral Investment Treaty, and a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. US President George Bush visited Mongolia in November 2005 became the first US President to do so. Mongolian Presidents have visited the US on several occasions. They have also visited North Korea. Mongolia has injected itself in critical matters in Northeast Asia as the abduction issue between Japan and North Korea. It has urged North Korea to consider emulating its post-Cold War transition model, and uphold rule of law and respect human rights of its citizens. North Korea has sought Mongolia’s help in modernizing its economy and industries. Mongolia has invested in North Korea’s oil industry, reached agreements for 5000 North Korean workers to come to Mongolia. Beyond political and economic issues, an intriguing link between Mongolians and North Koreans are “unique ties of blood”. Reportedly, Koreans and Mongolians ethnically belong to the Altaic language family. Many Korean clans are believed to have come from eastern Mongolia. According to some experts, those ties encourage both countries with each other with mutual respect and understand in way unavailable, with the ostensible exception, mutatis mutandis, with South Korea. The most likely location for the meeting in Mongolia would be Ulan Bator, the capital. Certainly, Mongolia can meet basic security requirements. It is close enough for Kim to travel, either by air or by ground in a day.

3. Reciprocal Confidence Building.

Before any talks occur or follow-on negotiations between the two countries begin, there are certain mutual understandings that must exist between the US and North Korea. There must be mutual respect shown and understanding given to participants and positions expressed in negotiations. To that extent, use of respectful language in addressing issues public to support congenial relations and  promote increased exchanges. This has been a considerable problem to date, and some governance must be placed on public verbiage. No precondition of creating parity in status as powers as talks or negotiations begin. There is no need to create a faux levelling of the playing field established, whereas the negotiations could be described as an “exchange between equals.” In reality, the talks concern North Korea’s  survival, not the survival of the US. The result of talks cannot simply be temporary steps, but a verifiable, sustainable agreement to keep peace in Northeast Asia. Parvis componere magna. (To compare great things with small.)

Acts the US could perform  as confidence building measures might include temporarily reducing or halting aerial exercises until negotiations are established, and then a decision on how to proceed from that point forward would be made. More vigorous talks on reducing military forces along the DMZ in a mutually acceptable way could be arranged between senioe military officials of the US, North Korea, and South Korea. It would represent an effort to make the Korean Peninsula safer from conventional war as well as nuclear exchange. (It would be counterintuitive of North Korean officials to expect Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul to accept that with the destructive power of their massive build up of artillery aimed at Seoul that “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula would make South Korea safer.) These would be talks far beyond, more complex than those that have been occasionally held on the border between South Korea and North Korea at Panmunjom to handle contentious issues. Talks could be initiated by the most senior diplomats of the US and North Korea on crafting a final agreement on ending the Korean War. The US could recommend that a direct line of communication between Washington and Pyongyang at level of Foreign Minister and Secretary of State. There could be discussions arranged between diplomatic officials to mitigate “nagging issues” that have exist ed since the end of p hostilities in 1953. Incentives might be put in place, except financial giveaways, that would allow North Korea to rejuvenate its own society, reinvigorate its own industries. Suggestions could be sought from the North Koreans on what they feel would be helpful to aid the economic conditions in their country. Much as inviting a sizable delegation from Pyongyang to attend the PyeongChang Olympics, and creating a joint Korean Women’s Ice Hockey team allowed them to move from the shadows of the well walled-in, “hermit kingdom” into the light of the rest world. More visits, more congenial openings to the world could be proposed, encouraged to lift the shades, raise the blinds, and open the shutters for light from the outside world to come into North Korea. (It is likely that such openings would be limited by Pyongyang as such contacts with the outside world for too many North Koreans would be considered potentially destabilizing for its controlled society.) The North Koreans should hardly expect any huge giveaways, no Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to result the talks or negotiations that would cover the enormous expenditures made on the nuclear weapons and missile programs so far. There would be no discussion of purchasing the program.

Acts the North Koreans could perform as confidence building measures could include: the release of three US citizens being detained on varied charges in North Korea; the return of any remains of US troops from Korean War collected by the North Korea; make its own recommendation to create a direct line of communication between Washington and Pyongyang at level of Foreign Minister and Secretary of State. A potent step that Kim or North Korean officials could take, but would seem unlikely, is the return of the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence ship captured on January 23, 1968 and converted into a museum. (It is of questionable utility to officials in Pyongyang particularly now as their country is facing potential annihilation.) Kim or North Korean officials, on their own volition could indicate a willingness to pull back artillery aimed at Seoul. If in Pyongyang, taking these steps would represent a loss of dignity, particularly if they took those steps after talks with Trump, Kim or North Korean officials could claim it was more the result of bilateral talks with South Korea. All of this being stated, however, no matter what Kim may agree with at the talks, if he feels once back in Pyongyang, that he has given too much, he would not hesitate to walk-back, through official statements, any undesirable points. Qui cumque turpi fraude semel innotuit, eriemsi verum dicit amittit fides.  (Whoever has once become known for a shameful fraud, is not believed even if he speaks the truth.)

4. Taking a Pragmatic Approach That Does Not Sacrifice Principles

Trump does not intend to turn down a diplomatic detour similar to that taken while trying to build relations with the Russian Federation. Finding a way to establish an authentic positive relationship with Russia was a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would try to find the solution, and explained that he would give it his best effort. Then Secretary of State Rex Tillerson began with small steps, working groups to settle nagging issues. Although those small steps were supposed to lead to bigger ones, and confidence was supposed to grow that was not the case. Small steps led nowhere. It appears that Russia used then simply as distraction. Seemingly long planned moves in locations such Syria, Ukraine, Estonia, Moldova, the Czech Republic, France, Germany the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Serbia, and Montenegro were executed at the same time. No movement on Crimea was even considered or broached in conversations between Tillerson and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as talks between Trump and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Denials regarding Russia’s military presence in Eastern Ukraine continued. Intermediate Range weapons were not removed from Kaliningrad. Incessant cyberattacks were followed by denials from Moscow. Reportedly, Russia continued operations to interfere in US elections process nationwide according to intelligence and law enforcement officials. Finally, Putin rolled out new generations of nuclear weapons and delivery systems that Putin claimed US could not defeat. Included was a presentation of how missile could hit Florida, the location of Trump’s Mar-a-Largo Estate. All of those issues eere topped off by Putin’s unwavering and antagonizing denial that Russia interfered in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. After starting with promise, the effort moved metaphorically, one step forward and two steps back. Tillerson is no longer at State, and Trump intends to repair the situation. Hopefully, North Korea has not found anything instructive in what Russia has done.

Despite the long observed attitudes and behaviors of Kim and bellicose rhetoric of government spokespeople in Pyongyang, it may very well be, as experts declare, that the North Koreans are not suicidal. Understanding that should ostensibly provide some edge for Washington. However, it is difficult to deal with a morally flawed leadership. For national leaders lacking moral guidance, there is a greater chance that a mistake, an uncontrolled impulse will lead to disaster.  Much of what Kim has done so far, invest the North Korean treasury into weapons that in the current environment may only lead to his country’s annihilation, has been both unconstructive and self-destructive. There are intelligence estimates that say Kim has used an exorbitant $300 million of North Korea’s national treasury on weapons development. Estimates are that another $180 million has gone toward the production of 460 statues or monuments glorifying the Kims. Without a doubt, Kim is truly wrapped up in himself. While it may seem unimaginable for Kim to trigger an unbalanced, nuclear exchange would bring satisfaction, the 17th century French philosopher, mathematician, and physicist, Blaise Pascal, offers an interesting thought that might lead one to think otherwise. In Pensées, there is his statement: “All men seek happiness. This is without exception. Whatever different means they employ, they all tend to this end. The cause of some going to war, and others avoiding it, is the same desire in both, attended with different views. The will never takes the least step but to this object. This is the motive of every action of every man, even of those who hang themselves.”

5. Being Aware of Timing

As a political leader, there are no reelection worries for Trump at the moment that would lead North Korean officials to believe his decision making would be impacted by election or other political considerations. Trump’s foreign policy initiatives appear somewhat severed from issues shaping midterm elections for the US Congress . Kim also has no reelection worries for Kim. Kim, after all, rules everything in North Korea. However, while experts deemed would take a short amount of time before North Korea is close to developing a nuclear capability that could pose considerable danger to the US, there is an element of uncertainty in those calculations. Kim may achieve his goals even sooner than anyone might predict. Talks would hopefully quell Kim’s  nuclear ambitions before he reaches all of his development goals.

6. Maintaining a Deep Respect for the Politics of the Situation.

After mourning the death of his father Kim Jong Il on December 17, 2011,  the younger Kim tried to gain momentum during the fifth session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly in April 2012, where he was elected Supreme Leader of the country. Much as his father, he is also referred to as the “Great Leader” by the North Korean people. The title Supreme Leader conferred Kim with all power over the Korean Workers’ Party and other political bodies and effectively concluded the power succession. North Korean elites are obedient and terrified of him.

Fama, malum qua non allud velocius ullum. (Rumor, the swiftest of all evils in the world.) North Korean officials, attempting to prepare Kim for his meeting with Trump, invariably have already been mining through overt information about Trump, to try to more fully understand him, albeit in the abstract. They would undoubtedly like to determine how he will likely approach the talks and possible angles from which he might challenge Kim, and how Kim could explain North Korean positions and demands in a plausible, satisfying way. A task for North Korean officials would be to filter out distractive, musings about Trump presented by his critics. If their briefings are filled with reports based on such critiques of Trump, the talks could prove to be useless which would be tragedy for their side. Perhaps the most useful thing for them to know is that the current concept and intent of US foreign and national security policy is develop from Trump’s thinking. Professional, dutiful subordinates can at best offer policies and approaches impelled by the US President. Some journalists, former politicians and political operatives among Trump’s critics, have apparently become so habituated to engaging in narrow thinking and been victimized their own malicious rhetoric and hateful distortions, that they have completely ignored or forgotten this reality.

The Way Forward

In Act V, scene i of William Shakespeare’s play, Titus Andronicus, the Roman general, Titus Andronicus, has returned from ten years of war with only four out of twenty-five sons left. He has captured Tamora, Queen of the Goths, her three sons, and Aaron the Moor. Obedient to Roman rituals, he sacrifices Tamora’s eldest son to his own dead sons, earning him Tamora’s unending hatred. As fate would have it, the new Emperor Saturninus makes Tamora an empress and from her new position, she plots revenge against Titus. She schemes with Aaron to have Titus’s two sons framed and executed for the murder of Bassianus, the emperor’s brother. Unsatisfied, she urges her sons Chiron and Demetrius to rape Titus’s daughter Lavinia, after which they cut off her hands and tongue to prevent her from reporting their crime. Finally,  Lucius, the last son of Titus is banished from Rome. Lucius then seeks an alliance with his sworn enemy, the Goths, in order to attack Rome. Titus, feigning madness, manages to trick Tamora. He captures her sons, kills them, makes pie out of them, and feeds the pie to her. He then kill Tamora and his daughter Lavinia. In Lucius’ camp with the Goths, a Goth soldier who learned the fugitive Aaron, along with his baby, were in an abandoned monastery, brought them back to camp. Lucius’s impulse was to hang the child hang first and have Aaron watch. While in a noose, Aaron makes a bargain with Lucius to save his child in exchange for knowledge of all the horrors that have occurred. Once Lucius agreed to do so, Aaron revealed every violent act directed by Tamora. However, he then tells more about himself, listing other crimes he has committed. He states: “Even now I curse the day–and yet, I think, Few come within the compass of my curse,–Wherein I did not some notorious ill, As kill a man, or else devise his death, Ravish a maid, or plot the way to do it, Accuse some innocent and forswear myself, Set deadly enmity between two friends, Make poor men’s cattle break their necks; Set fire on barns and hay-stacks in the night, And bid the owners quench them with their tears. Oft have I digg’d up dead men from their graves, And set them upright at their dear friends’ doors, Even when their sorrows almost were forgot; And on their skins, as on the bark of trees, Have with my knife carved in Roman letters, ‘Let not your sorrow die, though I am dead.’ Tut, I have done a thousand dreadful things As willingly as one would kill a fly, And nothing grieves me heartily indeed But that I cannot do ten thousand more.” Eventually, Lucius has the unrepentant Aaron buried alive, has Tamora’s corpse thrown to beasts, and he becomes the new emperor of Rome. As Trump alluded to in his September 2017 remarks at the UN, Kim’s regime is extraordinarily violent and he seems to possess a homicidal ideation. South Korea’s main intelligence agency apparently examined the matter in December 2016. Indeed, according to a December 29, 2016 article in Yonhap, the National Intelligence Service (Gukga Jeongbowon), Kim is likely responsible for a record number of purges and executions since fully assuming power. Indeed, the white paper reportedly concluded that in the first five years of his reign, Kim may have dismissed or killed 340 North Koreans, many of them government officials. The white paper additionally explained that the number of purges and executions has also skyrocketed as Kim increased his authoritative grip on the country after he was elected Supreme Leader of the country in April 2012. It was concluded in the white paper that those mass executions of hundreds of high-ranking officials, including the public sentencing of Kim’s uncle-in-law Jang Song Thaek, were part of Kim’s plan to firmly consolidate his inherited power as the third-generation ruler of North Korea. Yonhap quoted the white paper as stating: “There were 3 [purged or executed] in 2012, more than 30 in 2013, greater than 40 in 2014, and more than 60 in 2015.” The white paper added:  “The numbers show a rapid increase.” The white paper further noted that North Korea “temporarily refrained” from mass purges after the sudden execution of Defense Minister Hyon Yong Chol in 2015, but resumed killing senior officials in 2016.

Kim has initiated a charm offensive, presenting himself as an exponent of denuclearization, unification, and peace. However, he has already shown enough of his hand for anyone to conclude his intentions are likely  hostile. Trump knows Kim is a predator and simply trying to manage attention the world’s attention, but perhaps he also sees that Kim is in a dire situation. He seems to be allowing him some room to take a new tact. If everything goes the way of the US, North Korea will scrap its nuclear weapons and missile programs. Sadly, the very likely possibility is that Kim is not directing his efforts at Trump but at South Korea. Talking to Trump may serve to convince the South Koreans of their peaceful purpose. Getting an agreement on anything with the US may be inconsequential  to him. A signal of success in the talks for him would be a unilateral decision by South Korea to halt their participation in US-lead military exercises. Even better for him would be a request in the near future by South Korea for partial, substantial, or the complete withdrawal of US forces from their country before or simultaneous with a dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. It all seems to be part of a North Korean strategy of gaining control of the Korean Peninsula by getting South Korea to buy into the fantasy that cooperating with it would create conditions for truly peaceful relations between the Koreas. Subsequently, the region would also be made safer, and the door would be opened to genuine Korean unification. If this sort of scenario has been presented to Kim by officials in Pyongyang mainly to soothe his ego regarding the talks, North Korea may be doomed. Negligentia semper habet inforturnam comiten. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.)

Tyrannical figures have often self-destructed once their power began slipping from their hands. While he speaks one way, consciously, he may be acting unconsciously to a deeper thought that his regime faces inevitable destruction. Unknowingly, he might very well be setting the stage to lash out in a spectacular way before Trump does. He may attempt to use as much of his existing stockpile of nuclear weapons as possible, any way he can. Kim apparently holds his sister, Kim Yo-jong, in high regard and seems to take counsel of her on occasions. She led a delegation of North Korean officials to the PyeongChang Winter Olympics. However, there is no public indication that he has a close associate , a friend that he can rely upon consistently, much as Roman Emperor Augustus Caesar relied upon General Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, according him the status of Imperium, holding the power of the Emperor in the Eastern Mediterranean. To that extent, no one in a caring way could comfortably or confidently, approach Kim and counsel him to “Stop chasing your destructive dream of developing a large nuclear arsenal capable of striking the US.” Trump certainly is not a friend of Kim, but it appears that it has been left to him to convince Kim of the truth. Appetitus rationi pareat. (Desire ought to obey reason.)