Trump Says Putin Means It About Not Meddling: He Also Wants to Make Sure It Does Not Happen Again!

US President Donald Trump (above). After speaking in camera with Putin on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Trump said that he had again asked Putin whether Russia meddled in the 2016 US Presidential Election, but his continued focus on the issue was insulting him. Although Trump faces attacks from critics due to perceived inaction, he has acted in a well-paced manner, taking calibrated steps to assure the defeat of any future election meddling, and make something positive out of a negative situation.

According to a November 11, 2017 New York Times article entitled “Trump Says Putin ‘Means It’ About Not Meddling”, US President Donald Trump expressed the view on Saturday, November 11th that he believed Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin was sincere in his denials of meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election. (A version of this article appears in print on November 12, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Putin’s Denials Of Interference Satisfy Trump.) The November 11th New York Times article suggested Trump felt Putin was sincere in his denials of Russia played any role in the US elections, and he called questions about Moscow’s meddling a politically motivated “hit job” that was hindering cooperation with Russia on life-or-death issues. After speaking in camera with Putin on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Trump said that he had again asked whether Russia had meddled in the contest, but that the continued focus on the issue was insulting to Putin. Trump proffered that it was time to move past the issue so that the US and Russia could cooperate on confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea, resolving the Syrian civil war and working together on Ukraine. Trump told reporters traveling with him aboard Air Force One as he flew to Hanoi for more meetings that he asked Putin again about meddling in the US elections. According to Trump, “He said he didn’t meddle.” He went on to state: “You can only ask so many times. I just asked him again. He said he absolutely did not meddle in our election. He did not do what they are saying he did.”

The New York Times reported that Trump did not answer a direct question about whether he believed Putin’s denials in Danang. In response, the New York Times offered the surmisal that Trump indicated he was far more inclined to accept the Putin’s assertions than those of his own intelligence agencies which have concluded the Russian president directed an elaborate effort to interfere in the vote. The article pointed out that the FBI, CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence all determined that Russia meddled in the election. The next day, however, the New York Times explained Trump seemed to walk his comments back a bit, saying that he did not dispute the assessment of the nation’s key intelligence agencies that Russia had intervened in the 2016 presidential election.Trump said at a news conference in Hanoi alongside Vietnam’s president, Tran Dai Quang: “As to whether I believe it or not, I’m with our agencies, especially as currently constituted with their leadership.”  He further stated: “I believe in our agencies. I’ve worked with them very strongly.”

Damnant quod non intellegent. (They condemn what they do not understand.) For critics to insist that Trump is malingering on the issue of Russia’s election meddling because he is not doing what they want him to do, is truly unfair. Trump is doing his job, and it would appear, certainly on foreign policy, that he is doing his job well, with a positive energy, and desire serve the US public. Critics who to demand for Trump to continually reproach and punish Putin over Russia’s election meddling have the luxury to do that away from the fray. They do not have the responsibilities of the president. Further, critics condemn him for having a somewhat nationalistic in tone. Yet, they turn away from the reality that if anyone would feel rage over the idea of another country interfering with the US election process, it would be him. As a responsibility of being US President, Trump must suppress those emotions and consider the issue of Russian meddling in the 2016 election in a way that it best serves US foreign policy. Despite any strong feelings, he must not engage in a vendetta to right a wrong, now past. Critics must accept that Trump does not intend to go to war with Russia over its election meddling. Moreover, he does not intend to pummel Russia with unending waves of sanctions, vengeful behavior which would best match the incessant cries of “foul” and figurative grunts and groans from critics due to the hurt the election meddling caused them. There is a foolhardiness to pursuing something that will lead to nothing. Trump would prefer to deal with the root causes of anger in Putin’s mind, in the minds of other senior Russian officials, that lead to a decision to undertake the risky operation in the first place. Trump understands that the true cure for the meddling problem and others is to develop a good relationship between Putin and himself and greatly improving relations between the US and Russia as a whole. Trump wants to work alongside certain countries, including Russia, to resolve urgent security issues such as North Korea, Syria, and Ukraine. On his recent foreign trip, Trump has kindled or strengthened his relationships with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines and secured deals with their countries to improve trade the conditions of trade with them. When one develops a viewpoint, there is nothing unusual about the individual expatiating on it. Yet, somehow in their world, removed from making actual decisions and taking action, some critics have gone a bit too far. They insist that Trump acted in collusion with Russia achieve a victory he would want to win on his own and could win on his own. The suggestion that there is an authentic, direct link between Trump and Russia concerning the 2016 US Presidential Election will likely prove to have been sheer caprice. It would be appropriate to take a look at what Trump has been doing on the election meddling issue.  Moreover, it also would be fitting to examine possible underlying reasons why critics, in the face of Trump’s rather efficacious efforts, questioning his performance and have been so certain and have behaved so harshly toward him over allegations of actions by him that remain unproven. Id bonum cura quod vetustate fit melius. (Take care of the good since it improves with age.)

Trump (left) and US National Security Adviser US Army Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster (right). Critics demand for Trump to continually reproach Putin over Russia’s meddling in the 2016 election. If anyone would feel rage over the idea of another country interfering with the US election process, it would be Trump. Yet, as a responsibility of being US President, Trump must suppress those emotions and consider Russia’s election meddling in a way that best serves US foreign policy.

Trump’s Quiet Approach to Defeating Election Meddling by Russia

As a reminder of what the issue of Russia’s election meddling is all about, from June 2015 to November 2016, Russian hackers penetrated Democratic Party computers in the US, and gained access to the personal emails of Democratic officials, which in turn were distributed to the global media by WikiLeaks. Both the CIA and the FBI report the intrusions were intended to undermine the US election. Cyber gives Russia a usable strategic capability. If benefits from its use appear great enough, Moscow may want to risk additional attacks. Indeed, the US Intelligence Community concluded that Moscow will apply lessons learned from its “Putin-ordered campaign” directed at the 2016 US Presidential Election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes. The report of the January 16, 2017 US Office of the Director of National Intelligence entitled, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Election” presents the best publicized assessment by the US Intelligence Community of the Russian cyber attack during the 2016 US Presidential Election. It stated: “Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

The English mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead stated: “The art of progress is to preserve order amid change and to preserve change amid order.” Trump is doing just that. Although Trump faces attacks from critics due to perceived inaction, he has acted in a well-paced manner, taking calibrated steps, to eliminate the possibility of any future Russian election meddling, and to make something positive out of an extraordinarily negative situation. Trump is aware that there are many lines of approach Russia can take to reach the US public. By examining recent actions by Trump, one can infer what he and his national security team have most likely deemed as “decisive points” to focus on in order to be most effective in impacting Russian behavior and reduce the possibility of future meddling. The following six points are very likely part of a suite of preventative measures employed by the administration.

1. Trump Tries to Sit on Russian Cyber Activities Against the US

Adversus incendiary excubias, nocturnos vigilesque commentus est. (Against the dangers of fires, he conceived of the idea of nightguards and watchmen.) On July 9, 2017, when Trump broached the issue of the Russia’s hacking of the 2016 Presidential Election, Putin apparently became a bit scratchy. Putin’s denial of the facts presented most likely signalled to Trump that he would be engaged in a argument without end on the hacking. Trump had to either move away from the issue or move laterally on it in some way.  Surely, Trump did not want to abandon the matter. As an immediate response to Putin’s denials on the matter, Trump then proposed forming a cyber security unit. According to Reuters on July 9, 2017, Trump wrote in the actual tweet about the cyber security unit: “Putin & I discussed forming an impenetrable Cyber Security unit so that election hacking, & many other negative things, will be guarded and safe.”

The proposal for a joint cyber security unit did not simply materialize from thin air. On the one hand, it likely stemmed from Trump’s experience as a negotiator, his gaining of the conversation with his national security team, and his consideration of all the “what ifs” possible. It was also developed more during an intense discussion between Trump and Putin on how to remit Russian cyber warfare programs directed at the US and perhaps similar US programs aimed at Russia. It may have been the product of brainstorming by the two leaders. Trump’s proposal was never supposed to serve as a form retribution against Russia for its intrusions into the US democratic process. Surely, it was not created to be a final solution to the threat of hacking US election. Immediately after the bilateral meeting in Germany, it was revealed that forming such a joint cyber security unit with Russia was prohibited under US law. Yet, although creating an actual cyber security unit was out of bounds, the concept of bringing US and Russian cyber experts together in some way to talk about some cyber matters was not. Trump’s likely aim with the proposal was to create a situation in which US and Russian officials were talking about hacking. Ostensibly, those conversations would create goodwill, perhaps stimulate a more open discussion about the issue, and promote honest talks about the issue among senior officials. In that way, the proposal would have served as a confidence building measure.

Trump (right) and Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) in Hamburg. Trump does not intend to pummel Russia with unending waves of sanctions, vengeful behavior which would best match the incessant cries of “foul” and figurative grunts and groans from critics due to the hurt the election meddling caused them. There is a foolhardiness to pursuing something that will lead to nothing. Trump would prefer to deal with the root causes of anger in Putin’s mind that lead to a decision to undertake the operation in the first place.

2. Enhancing the US Surveillance Capability

US has the ability to monitor activities of Russian Federation intelligence organizations operating on the ground in the US, to include: Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR; the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU; and, the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Undoubtedly, Putin also well aware of this now. This capability was made public by the administration of US President Barack Obama in a June 23, 2017 Washington Post article that included a leaked account of that administration’s reaction to reports about ongoing Russian efforts to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Election. That article indicated that Obama was in a dark mood over the intelligence findings about Russian activities. The approaching transfer of power gave urgency to his National Security Council’s deliberations on how to retaliate against Russia. By mid-December 2016, Obama’s National Security Adviser, Susan Rice, was quoted as saying to senior national security officials: “We’re not talking anymore. We’re acting.” A senior national security official at the time told the Washington Post that Rice challenged them go to the “max of their comfort zones.” Economic sanctions, originally aimed only at the GRU were expanded to include the FSB. Four Russian intelligence officials and three companies with links to those services were also named as targets.

The Washington Post article, as an overt source to intelligences service worldwide, informed that the FBI had long lobbied to close two Russian compounds in the US–one in Maryland and another in New York–on the grounds that both were used for espionage and placed an enormous surveillance burden on the Bureau. The FBI was also responsible for generating a list of Russian operatives, that it had concluded, were working under diplomatic cover to expel, drawn from a roster the Bureau maintains of suspected Russian intelligence agents in the US. In the end, Rice submitted a plan to Obama calling for the seizure of both Russian facilities and the expulsion of 35 suspected spies. Obama signed off on the package and announced the punitive measures on December 29, 2016 while on vacation in Hawaii. Trump has undoubtedly increased FBI electronic and other technical monitoring and surveillance of Russian intelligence activities, and can increase it further. Interviews will invariably be conducted with senior leaders among Russian intelligence officers with official diplomatic cover. To the extent that it does not interfere with counterespionage operations, the FBI will conduct interviews with suspected Russian intelligence operatives working in the US with non-official cover.

3. Trump Seeks to Find Chemistry with Putin to Enhance Communication

Ad connectendas amicitias, tenacissimum vinculum, est morum smilitudo. (For cementing friendship, resemblance of manners is the strongest tie.) One must try to live a life based on a strong moral foundation. In foreign policy and diplomacy there must be some confidence in, some foundation of trust, among opposing parties that they are both trying to do the right thing. Diplomacy will not succeed, and relations will not flourish, if that is not the case. After his bilateral meeting with Putin in Hamburg, Germany during the G-20 Economic Summit, Trump emphasized that he raised allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election with Putin. Reuters reported on July 9, 2017 that Trump stated: “I strongly pressed President Putin twice about Russian meddling in our election. He vehemently denied it. I’ve already given my opinion…..” When Putin denied meddling, a US official at the time said that Trump expressed the view that both countries must agree to disagree on the issue and move on to other topics where they could work together. As mentioned earlier, after Trump spoke privately with Putin on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang, Vietnam, Trump revealed he again asked Putin whether Russia had meddled in the contest, and that he gotten the impression that the continued focus on the issue was insulting to Putin. When Trump would ask Putin about Russia’s election meddling, he would likely speak to Putin with un voce de fil, a reserved voice, but with a power behind it that allows it be discerned in the balcony. Trump raised contentious issues with Putin, not to confront but show Putin that there was a need for the two to confide in one another about urgent and important issues if relations between the two countries were to transform. In terms of positive actions, this was a maximum effort.

Russian officials will normally vehemently deny launching cyber attacks. Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence operations. Putin has never publicly discussed them. Trump was undoubtedly advised of this fact by his national security team. Perhaps the best way to explain it all is to say that Putin’s denials are routine. Yet, among Trump’s critics, revelations about his response on Russian intelligence activities seems to overwhelm those who learn about it all. When Trump received Putin’s response, he was left with choices. Indeed, both he and Putin were aware of that. He could accept Putin’s denial, or create a hostile exchange by demanding he “tell the truth” as it is known in the US. Surely, there would be no positive or professional end to recreating the communication failures, diplomatic missteps, and delinquencies of the previous administration. Trump would most likely have stoked the same fires that led to a specious struggle of words between Obama and Putin and also ignited a miscalculated decision in Moscow to interfere with 2016 US Presidential Election which the US Intelligence Community assures took place. Actually, engaging in such actions would defy Trump’s own efforts to pull relations in a new direction and the action would best get described as counterintuitive. Trump has no intention of doing so. As the November 11, 2017 New York Times Trump said it was time to move past the issue so that the US and Russia could cooperate on confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea, solving the Syrian civil war and working together on Ukraine.

On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor-in-chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.” While he may not have regrets, Putin may at least be rethinking, reevaluating the operation that stirred so much trouble for the Obama administration and could have potentially destroyed his relations with the new Trump administration before it even started. Trump wants Putin to give that consider. Further, Trump is offering Putin the opportunity to have a unique, intimate relationship with Trump. With Trump, good things are possible if that is what Putin truly wants. Things done together will lead to goodness for both. Opposition, and to an extent, competition, must be replaced by unity. In amicitia nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum, et quidquid est verum et voluntarium. (In friendship there is nothing fictitious, nothing is simulated, and it is in fact true and voluntary.)

Putin (left) with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (right). Russian officials will normally vehemently deny launching cyber attacks. Russian officials almost never open up their covert intelligence operations. Putin has never publicly discussed them. Trump was undoubtedly advised of this fact by his national security team. Perhaps the best way to explain it all is to say that Putin’s denials are routine.

4. Trump Seeks to Obviate Russia’s Penchant for Being Manipulate

The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. To an extent, it was simply bad chemistry between the two leaders. Trump feels he can find the solution. True, the meeting between Trump and Putin will unlikely be a catalytic moment when opponents of Trump, political or otherwise, will see the method in his madness and appreciate his accomplishment. Moreover, when Russia behaves in ways that tear others from peace, it must still face consequences. However, Trump’s efforts evince his desire not to isolate Russia, or allow engagement with it to fall off. He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. Much as a warrior with power and know-how, and interact with Putin eye-to-eye, head-to-head, brain-to-brain. Through both strength and understanding, Trump believes the US and Russia can be good neighbors on the same planet. Yet, in what seemed to an effort to instigate further troubles for Trump, senior Russian officials provided an alternative account of his meeting with Putin in Danang, Vietnam. Almost mockingly, they asserted that Trump had accepted Putin’s denial of election interference and even said that some in the US were “exaggerating” Moscow’s role without proof. Their efforts at burlesque were in considerable variance with Putin’s response to efforts to connect Russia with the 2016 US election. Putin, sought to avoid the issue altogether, dismissing revelations that Russians had contacts with Trump’s campaign team. After the summit meeting, the Russian news media quoted Putin as saying: “I think that everything connected with the so-called Russian dossier in the United States is a manifestation of a continuing domestic political struggle.”  Putin told reporters in Danang, “It’s important that we find an opportunity, with our teams, to sit down at the level of presidents and talk through our complex relations.” He continued: “Our relations are still in crisis. Russia is ready to turn the page and move on.” Putin also commented that Trump comported himself at meetings “with the highest level of goodwill and correctness,” adding, “He is a cultured person, and comfortable discussing matters related to work.”

Putin’s contacts with the US have certainly not been about shutting the door. Yet, although he may very well have recognized opportunities to create a more positive relationship with the US, his senior advisers seem to be focusing upon the atmosphere of pure hatred and rejection propagated by the “counter-Trump milieu.” (In the US, many journalists, think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration, propagate a cult of ugliness directed at the US presidency. The mass of their combined efforts and the environment they create, is referred to by greatcharlie as the counter-Trump milieu.) They cannot help but recognize that there is an effort to separate Trump from the US public and create turmoil and frustration for him that Russia, for certain, does not have his hand in. They perhaps are suggesting to Putin that he should do nothing that might help Trump restore respect for the US presidency. A rationale for Putin advisers to take such a position is that it fits well with the idea of supporting their leader’s apparent desire of turning Russian into a simulacrum of the Soviet Union into more than a dream. It would accomplished through the capture of former Soviet republics that are now sovereign countries in Russia’s near abroad. The notion that Trump is a neophyte with regard to Washington politics may also be something they believe to be a tangible fact and perhaps even an advantage for Putin’s advisers to develop analyses of Trump’s thinking and action.

Fluctuat nec mergitur. (It is tossed by waves but it does not sink.) The reality is that Trump and his administration are in good nick. Putin might be genuinely engaged in a deliberate process of developing an amicable, constructive relationship with Trump. Trump never had a personal relationship with Putin before  he became US president. It is very clear that Putin is trying to understand his positions and his thinking in a granular way.  Putin’s adviser would do well to engage in a similar effort to develop greater insight on Trump. It would seem they have already run Trump through analyses for an uncongenial, combative relationship, as evinced by given words they expressed Danang. They should dig deeper than the surface, to understand where new linkages can be established. A conscious effort should be made to stay away from distortions propagated from the very emotional, often very irrational, counter-Trump milieu. Trump administration attempts to engage in confidence-building with Moscow should be viewed as perfect opportunities to discuss common ground that exists between the two countries from Moscow’s perspective. Advisers of the two leaders must have ongoing, frank discussions on the timing for presenting initiatives on issues before any bilateral talks. Such discussion would be the best way for them to inform their counterparts of rocky domestic political situations and other political obstacles, that may derail initiatives if not handled with precision. Additionally, discreet matters must be kept discreet. That is a key responsibility of both sides. Resolutions to issues are less likely be found if they are subtly expressed in condescending or patronizing way, even if it is simply an expression of crni humor or some other form of banal amusement. Gaining a perspective akin to that outlined here may demand the development of a duality in the thinking of Putin’s advisers, however, it would unlikely be deleterious to their efforts regarding the US. The more Trump pushes Russia in the right direction, the more Putin may push for better analyses, and better answers concerning the US. The more he pushes, the great chance Putin advisers may decide to see things in a way as discussed here. Intriguingly, although Trump’s approach toward Putin’s advisers is nonviolent, benign in fact, in military terms, it would be akin to “the attack in-depth.”

Trump (right) with Putin (left) in Danang. Trump understands that the true cure for the meddling problem and others is to develop a good relationship between Putin and himself and greatly improving relations between the US and Russia as a whole. Trump wants to work alongside certain countries, including Russia, to resolve urgent security issues such as North Korea, Syria, and Ukraine.

5. Trump Turns Refraining from Meddling into a Matter of Honor for Putin

Long before Putin became the President of the Russian Federation, he revealed that he both engaged in efforts to influence elections in other countries and personally felt the negative impact of election meddling in Russia. Putin outlined his experience influencing elections as a KGB officer in other countries Indeed, in Part 4 of his memoir, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that in East Germany his work was “political intelligence,” which included obtaining information about political figures and the plans of the main opponent: NATO. (See greatcharlie’s book review of First Person.) In a precise statement of his intelligence activities, Putin intriguingly described them as follows: “The usual intelligence activities: recruiting sources of information, obtaining information, analyzing it, and sending it to Moscow. I looked for information about political parties, the tendencies inside those parties, their leaders. I examined today’s leaders and the possible leaders of tomorrow and the promotion of people to certain posts in the parties and the government. It was important to know who was doing what and how, what was going on in the foreign Ministry of a particular country, how they were constructing their policy on certain issues and in various areas of the world, and how our partners would react to disarmament talks. Of course, in order to obtain such information, you need sources. So recruitment of sources, procurement of information, and assessment and analysis were big parts of the job. It was very routine work.”

In Part 6 of First Person, Putin also goes into great detail about his work in the 1992 and 1996 mayoral elections in St. Petersburg following his resignation from the KGB. and a sense is provided of his acumen and instinct for work in the political sphere. In 1992, he played a definitive role in the election of his political mentor, Anatoly Sobchak, as the first popularly elected mayor of the city. Putin explains that as chair of the Leningrad City Council under an older system, Sobchak could have been removed by the council members at any moment. Putin felt Sobchak needed a more stable position. Sobchak finally agreed that the post of mayor had to be introduced. The decision to introduce the post of mayor was passed by the Leningrad City Council, by a margin of a single vote. However, from the experience of arranging Sobchak’s political victory, Putin was able to assess four years later that in order to win re-election, Sobchak would need “professional campaign managers and technicians–not just a guy who could finesse the deputies.” Putin saw that it was a whole new ball game. Campaign plans had to be adjusted to fit circumstances. Putin said that he told Sobchak right off, “You know, you’re on a completely different playing field now. You need specialists.” He agreed, but then he decided that he would conduct his own electoral campaign. He says: “You know, running a campaign, bringing in specialists–all of this costs money. And we didn’t have any. Sobchak had been under investigation for a year and a half on allegations that he had bought an apartment with city funds. But in fact, he did not have any money either for an apartment or for an election campaign. We were not extracting funds from the city budget. It never entered our heads to find the money we needed that way.” However, with regard to Sobchak’s opponent, Vladimir Anatolyevich Yakovlev, the former governor of Leningrad oblast (province), Putin said that he got the funds he needed at Moscow’s expense. He believed Yakovlev was supported by the very same people who orchestrated an ethics campaign against Sobchak. Putin described the critical junture in the campaign in the following way: “During the election campaign, someone sent an inquiry to the Prosecutor General’s office, asking whether Sobchak was involved in any criminal investigations. The very same day, the answer came back: Yes, three were two criminal cases under investigation. Naturally, they didn’t explain that he was a witness, not a suspect, in these cases. The reply from the Prosecutor General’s office was duplicated, and flyers were dropped over the city from a helicopter. The law enforcement agencies were interfering directly in a political contest.” The newly elected mayor of St. Petersburg, Yakovlev did not move Putin out of his office right away; but as soon as the presidential elections were over, he was asked rather harshly to free up the space. By that time, Putin had already turned down Yakolev’s offer to keep his post as deputy mayor. Putin said Yakolev made the offer through his people. Putin explained: “I thought it would be impossible to work with him.” However, Putin said what really made staying on a bad idea were attacks he against Yakolev during the campaign. Putin said: “I don’t remember the context now, but in a television interview, I had called him Judas. The word seemed to fit, and I used it.”

Trump knows Putin has personal experience in attempting to interfere with nation elections of other countries. He presumably knows this not only through First Person, but also reports provided by the US Intelligence Community, knows Putin disfavors such efforts given what happened to his mentor Sobchak. As mentioned earlier, Trump said, “Every time he sees me he says, ‘I didn’t do that,’ and I really believe that when he tells me that, he means it.” Trump added: “I think he is very insulted by it, which is not a good thing for our country.” There are pitfalls to relying on ones own moral barometer in the performance of diplomacy. Trump appears to have courageously taken that tact regarding Putin and the issue of Russia’s election meddling. Trump has not said that he agrees with Putin’s view, nor has he  let Putin off the hook. He will not forget what transpired. Yet, by refusing to publicly reproach Putin for not being more forthcoming over the election meddling in the US when he questioned him, Trump demonstrated that he understands the tough situation Putin is in regarding the meddling, now well-exposed. It would appear that the covert operation of election meddling was supposedly crafted to be plausibly deniable, allowing and, perhaps under Russian codes, requiring Putin to gainsay its existence. Trump appears to be holding out hope that his decision to be tolerant of Putin’s response has appealed to Putin’s sense of honor. Indeed, he likely hopes that it will be a factor in future interactions with Putin. At the same time, however, Trump is actually cutting off Putin from possible equivocation and outright denials. Putin’s future actions would be gauged off of denials of interference. Many in US foreign policy circles have absolutely no faith Putin as an honest broker. Yet, Trump’s expectations appear to manifest his nature as a visionary, his sense of imagination. Along with the sense of expectation is an intuition that what is expected will be more vital than what exists. Trump has no intention of recreating the failures, delinquencies of the previous administration. There is no logical purpose in stoking the fires the led to a childlike struggle of words that also likely ignited an adversarial decision that led to an attempt to interfere with 2016 US Election which the US Intelligence Community has confirmed. 

Trump’s critics have not covered themselves in glory. Their performance, though overwhelming, has been disjointed. It is difficult to imagine how presidential historians will judge how critics’ hammered Trump over the manner in which he is handling Russia’s election meddling, and allegations that Trump worked with Putin to secure Russia’s assistance in winning the 2016 US Presidential Election.

6. Trump Offers Business Opportunities to Mitigate Putin’s Desire to Punish the West

Certainly, Trump cannot know exactly what is in Putin’s heart. Putin is a calculator. Various US policy analysts and academics have hypothesized over the causality for the Russia’s misunderstandings and crises with the West over Eastern Europe during the past 25 years. Putin, himself, explained at the 2007 Munich Security Conference and many times since that former NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner had guaranteed that NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, he has pointed to the statements of German parliamentarian Egon Bahr who explained on June 26, 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” In a Bild interview on January 11, 2016, Putin pointed to what he described as a very concrete suggestion by Bahr on how that danger could be averted: “the USA, the Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structures.” When the Bild interviewer pointed out to Putin that under NATO’s rules and self-understanding it can accept free countries as members if they want to be members and meet certain requirements.  Putin responded, “Nowhere is it written that NATO had to accept certain countries. All that would have been required to refrain from doing so was political will. But people didn’t not want to.” Putin declared the reason for NATO’s lack of restraint was “NATO and the USA wanted complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone.”  

Bis interimitur qui suis armis perit. (He is doubly destroyed who perishes by his own arms.) Putin’s penchant for acting in that direction lead to his capture of territory in Georgia, capture of Crimea, and investment in Eastern Ukraine. Interestingly enough, Georgia and Ukraine are not NATO members, but in 2008 had been explicitly and publicly assured that they would be granted Membership Action Plans. By occupying those countries Putin has assured they would never join NATO in the near term. Indeed, no country will ever join NATO while being partly occupied by Russia. To that extent, part of Putin’s grand strategy entails halting NATO expansion while securing more territory in countries in its near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. Recall that Napoleon Bonaparte, in an effort to unite Europe under his rule, took an inexorable path to destruction. He became morally myopic. To that extent, as Victor Hugo stated: “Napoleon embarrassed God.” For Putin, now is a time for reflection and resolve. This may be the moment to genuinely improve Russia’s relations with the US.

There are several bargaining chips of differing value to both Trump and Putin. Trump managed to become US president doing what he wanted to do, having truly dominant knowledge of the desires of the majority of the US public and overall US political environment. He knows what he wants and what he can really do. Cooperation on counterterrorism, ISIS, climate change, and poverty may serve as a bargaining chips to get agreements on other issues. However, Greater bargaining chips might include: the return of Russia properties in the US, reconstruction assistance in Syria, peace-enforcement in Syria, making the Group of 7 the Group of 8 again with inclusion of Russia, economic sanctions, closing sanction loopholes, and lifting restrictions on the Exxon-Rosneft agreement through an exemption. Some of these actions may not appear plausible and could have a deleterious effect on the sanctions regime against Russia over it actions in Ukraine and create an uproar among the Europeans. However, Trump undoubtedly believes bold action, when appropriate, may be the very thing to turn situations around, modify Russian behavior, and get relations moving forward. When presidential action could immediately resolve matters, those issues may be hashed out at the table or it could be agreed to allow for  some additional consideration before giving a response. Trump must put “America First” but keep firmly in mind how his decisions and actions regarding Russia might impact European allies and partners. Given domestic political concerns, initial offerings from Putin may appear paltry. There is a real possibility that if he feels secure enough, Putin could offer much, particularly to loosen the US grip on Russia’s figurative economic throat. To date, a degree of good-faith bargaining and compromise between Washington and Moscow has occurred. There have been mutual peace offerings. However, refraining any interference with US elections cannot be part of any peace offering or any quid-pro-quo arrangement. Without any further inquiries about what exactly happened, Russia must stop engaging in such operations. If Russia crosses the line again, everything accomplished will be obliterated and all of the great possibilities will never be realized. Tragically, it would likely once again lock up the diplomatic process. Trump can assume that Putin knows this, too!

Trump (right) and Chinese President XI Jinping (left). On his recent foreign trip to Asia, Trump kindled or strengthened his relationships with the leaders of China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines and secured deals with their countries to improve trade the conditions of trade with them. He helped US companies arrange over $250 billion in business deals while in Beijing.

Causality for Critics’ Relentless Attacks on Trump Despite His Discernable Efforts

For those longing for an end to the Obama administration and the many vicissitudes it faced on foreign policy, were heard shout to the effect of “Blessed be the Trump administration and health to all its parts.” However, many critics deemed Trump unfit for the president even before his election victory. The words “not presidential” were heard every time Trump spoke. Eventually, moves by Trump of any kind would elicit a range of reactions by those engaged in the broad, piquant, counter-Trump discourse.

Custos morum. (Guardian of morals.) Some critics seem to believe that they figurative hammers, designed to shape Trump into the instrument they want. While they may self-declare themselves repositories of the accumulated wisdom on US foreign policy, they are not. Moreover, they are not the stewards of US foreign policy. There other critics who apparently have found nothing desirable and everything loathsome about Trump. Oscillating, moving from one point to the other, critics of Trump have their own relentless logic. Whenever one of Trump’s efforts fail or whenever he makes a mistake, they were over the moon with joy. Short of pushing Trump out of office, it strikes one’s conscience to think that nothing would soothe them than to prescribe plunging Trump forevermore into the boiling cauldrons of Hell from the French playwright Mollière’s, École des femmes. Indeed, they seemed to have let their aggression toward Trump come alive inside of them. At times, admonitions and opprobrium expressed through all manner of writings, created the impression that some giant golem was struggling, fighting to escape their inner souls.

What is truly problematic is the reality that critics may have infiltrated and despoiled the psyche of many in the US, perhaps may have even destroyed the possibility for some to have confidence in future US administrations, both Republican and Democratic. Most of Trump’s critics are individuals with advanced degrees, apt to be eloquent enough on key issues concerning the purported “Trump threat.” The US public is open to eloquence. Further, the precept of being innocent until proven guilty has been forcefully pushed aside in the US newsmedia with regard to all matters related to Trump. Hopefully, in the end, the truth will be revealed to those who are confused and bewildered by it all, both among general the public and Trump’s critics. Certainly there were many personal reasons for critics to harbor such strong, negative opinions of Trump and efforts against him. Their efforts have inflamed passions globally. The administration might explain that concerns expressed about Trump’s approach to the presidency were a manifestation of critics own struggle to accept the change from the traditional to modernity. The old is replaced by Trump’s new way of doing things. It has been said that some attacks on Trump are being used to cultivate critics’ emotions on: US policies, Obama’s departure, and Hillary Clinton’s election loss. There is the possibility that their varied attacks may just be projections of character flaws that critics see in themselves. Even more, there is the notion that Trump’s victory has caused them so much emotional harm that there is a desire to strike back, to take vengeance. That is perhaps the idea most worthy of examination.

Trump (left) and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (right). Through meetings, Trump and Abe have kindled a good relationship. Seldom have Trump’s critics taken public inventory of themselves, and considered whether their thinking and actions are appropriate or representative of their own notions of good character. It would appear that even the most noble among them have not considered the impact of their attacks against Trump on US foreign policy.

Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion

There are many sources for the belief in moral responsibility. Many philosophy scholars today conclude that the deepest roots of our commitment to moral responsibility are found in powerful emotions. In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (MIT Press, 2015), philosopher Bruce Waller at Youngstown State University explains this strike back emotion is one of the main sources of our strong belief in moral responsibility.

Indeed, human beings are a punitive species, and share the strike back emotion with other animals. It has been hypothesized that since humans are social animals, and engage with one another to achieve goals, humans are well-disposed to punish those who seek advantage over themselves and others. Wrongdoing stirs formidable emotions in humans, even when it is done to others. In social groups or in societies, anger and resentment is raised toward those who take benefits to which they are not entitled. It almost universally leads to some form of punishment. Culpam poena, premit comes. (Punishment closely follows crime as its’ companion.)

Revenge can seem sweet, and retribution may bring satisfaction, but those feelings are often short-lived. Moreover, the emotional source of moral responsibility, the strike back desire, can create problems with regard to given other desired ends, such as future safety, reconciliation, and moral formation. Most psychotherapists would explain that vengefulness, itself, generally is the manifestation of a serious pathology. Vengeful desires and behavior can ensnare an individual in a vicious cycle of hatred and prevent any resolution of the original harmful experience. Most vengeful actions are based on the misconception that harm to the self can be undone or at least mitigated by harming the perpetrator, when, in fact, undoing of what has already been done is impossible. Ones injuries, pain, and emotional distress is never relieved or obviated. Rather, vengeful action could cause those hurts to smoulder. Sometimes, when the sense of moral justification is high, and the desire for vengeance becomes strong enough, individuals can become willing to sacrifice, violate laws, sustain injury, or even self-destruct, in order to punish a perpetrator. The only permanent solution is working through those feelings, as well as feelings of powerlessness.

Trump (left) with South Korean President Moon Jae-in (right). Trump knows the truth about his actions. While it should naturally disappoint him to hear critics shed doubt of the legitimacy of his election victory, he welcomes all light to shine brightly upon his campaign and election for the truth is stands in his corner. Trump’s critics at times have offered insufficient, inconsistent, or incongruous data, leaving huge gaps. At the same time, their efforts have inflamed passions globally.

Deciding that someone is responsible for an act, which is taken to be the conclusion of a judgment, is actually part of the process of assessing blame. If we start with a spontaneous negative reaction, then that can lead to hypothesizing that the source of the action is blameworthy and the start of an active desire to blame the perpetrator. That will shape ones interpretations of the available evidence to the extent that they support ones blame hypothesis. Evidence is highlighted that indicates negligence, recklessness, impure motives, or a faulty character. Any evidence that may contradict ones blame hypothesis is ignored. Rather than dispassionately judging whether someone is responsible, the spontaneous reaction of blameworthiness is validated. Trump’s critics display the reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, blame, and moral anger toward: the results of the 2016 US Presidential Election; Trump as a person; and the litany of actions in which his campaign allegedly engaged to win the election.

Subjecting Trump to reactive attitudes should only be viewed as righteous and appropriate if Trump was found through Congressional oversight or the justice system to have committed some offense. So far, such evidence does not exist. Critics are only able to use purely backward-looking grounds to say their judgments, attitudes, or treatments are justified. There is a real possibility that critics will never find their legs in their efforts against Trump. In 2014, a set of 5 studies by Cory Clark and his colleagues found that a key factor promoting belief in free will, is a fundamental desire to blame and hold others morally responsible for their wrongful behaviors. In this respect, the many investigations underway in the US Congress, the Office of the Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller, support the critics’ view that Trump is guilty and morally beneath them, and should be subjected to punishment. In the studies reported by Clark, evidence was found to suggest that greater belief in free will, is due to heightened punitive motivations. Interestingly, other researchers have found that ones moral evaluation of whether an action was deliberately done was impacted ones the like or dislike of the outcome of that action. Beyond that, there have also been studies that have found an “asymmetric understanding of the moral nature” of ones own actions and those of others, such that one judges ones own actions and motivations as morally superior to those of the average person. The Dutch philosopher Maureen Sie explained: “In cases of other people acting in morally wrong ways we tend to explain those wrongdoings in terms of the agent’s lack of virtue or morally bad character traits. We focus on those elements that allow us to blame agents for their moral wrongdoings. On the other hand, in cases where we ourselves act in morally reprehensible ways we tend to focus on exceptional elements of our situation, emphasizing the lack of room to do otherwise.” Seldom have Trump critics taken public inventory of themselves, and considered whether their thinking and actions are appropriate or representative of their notions of good character. It would appear that even the most noble among them have not considered the consequences of their attacks against Trump, particularly with regard to foreign policy.

Trump (left) with Vietnamese President Tran Dai Quang (right) The New York Times reported that Trump did not answer a direct question about whether he believed Putin’s denials while traveling to Hanoi Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting in Danang. Oddly,  the newspaper later offered the surmisal that Trump was far more inclined to accept the Putin’s assertions than those of his own intelligence agencies. There must be more thoughtful assays in their stories on the US president.

The Situation Appears To Be Developing as Trump Hoped

On November 21, 2017, just before leaving the Washington for the Thanksgiving holiday, Trump spoke with Putin by telephone for more than one hour. According to the White House, Trump and Putin affirmed their support for the Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation issued at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit on November 11, 2017. Trump and Putin emphasized the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2254, and supporting the UN-led Geneva Process to peacefully resolve the Syrian civil war, end the humanitarian crisis, allow displaced Syrians to return home, and ensure the stability of a unified Syria free of malign intervention and terrorist safe havens. Both leaders also discussed how to implement a lasting peace in Ukraine, and the need to continue international pressure on North Korea to halt its nuclear weapon and missile programs. Additionally, the two presidents affirmed the importance of fighting terrorism together throughout the Middle East and Central Asia and agreed to explore ways to further cooperate in the fight against ISIS, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations. True to the original wish Trump expressed for improving relations with Russia, his engagement with Putin moved beyond talking over again about Russia’s election meddling. It has turned toward positive communication and cooperation.

Trump with his family on the White House lawn (above). On November 21, 2017, just before leaving the Washington for the Thanksgiving holiday, Trump spoke with Putin by telephone for more than one hour. They discussed how US and Russia could cooperate on confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea, resolving the Syrian civil war, and working together on Ukraine. True to the wish he expressed for improving relations with Russia, Trump’s engagement with Putin has moved beyond Russia’s election meddling and is turning more toward cooperation.

The Way Forward

In Act III, Scene i of William Shakespeare’s Life of King Henry VIII, Queen Katherine is in her apartment when the arrival of Cardinal Wolsey and Cardinal Campeius is announced. Wolsey says he has not come to accuse her but to learn her thoughts on the dissolution of her marriage to King Henry and to offer advice. Katharine does not believe that they are on an honorable errand. The cardinals request to speak with her in a private room. However, Katherine lets them know that her the conscience is clear, and she has no problem speaking about the matter in a public room. Katherine states: “Speak it here: There’s nothing I have done yet, o’ my conscience, Deserves a corner: would all other women Could speak this with as free a soul as I do! My lords, I care not, so much I am happy Above a number, if my actions Were tried by every tongue, every eye saw ’em, Envy and base opinion set against ’em, I know my life so even. If your business Seek me out, and that way I am wife in, Out with it boldly: truth loves open dealing. Trump knows the truth about his actions. While it should naturally disappoint him to hear critics shed doubt of the legitimacy of his election victory, he welcomes all light to shine brightly upon his campaign and election for the truth is stands in his corner. Trump’s critics have not covered themselves in glory. Their performance, though overwhelming, has been disjointed. They offer insufficient, inconsistent, or incongruous data, leaving huge gaps. It is difficult to imagine how presidential historians will judge how critics’ hammered Trump over the manner in which he is handling Russia’s election meddling, and allegations that Trump worked with Putin to secure Russia’s assistance in winning the 2016 US Presidential Election. As their attacks take flights of fancy in the face of a contradictory reality, the critics will likely reduce themselves to nothing more than supernumeraries in this drama. One may disagree with the hypothesized impact of the strike back emotion on the attitudes and behavior of critics. Yet, one still can extrapolate from that much that could be useful in understanding the actions of Trump’s critics and in interpreting what impels their efforts. For those with a bent against Trump, it is not too late to modify their efforts. Critics may be able get from where they are with regard to Trump to where they need to be. There must be more thoughtful assays and greater balance in their examinations of the US president. Pride and ego must be subdued. They must subjugate lower passions to a higher reality.

Gloriosum est iniurias oblivisci. (It is glorious to forget the injustice.) Trump has not dismissed the Russian election meddling issue. He has not been delinquent on it. Trump is doing his job. He has been quietly taking calibrated steps to make something positive out of an extraordinarily negative situation. Many of those steps can be discerned. Due in part to the election meddling, Trump’s relationship with Putin is not yet ready to move past its fledgling stage and become cemented. That is perhaps one of the more apparent consequences of the decision in Moscow to interfere. Any belief that Trump’s decision to move on from election meddling in diplomatic talks at least resembles an aggressive display of passivism could not be further from the truth. Trump is unthreatened, and unmoved by notions proffered about Putin to the effect that he serves all things evil.  Putin’s cravings for power and territory could reassert themselves at any moment. If Putin’s ultimate goal is to receive payment in full for a debt he says NATO has owed Russia for nearly three decades and to have the US submit to his will, Trump will not allow that to happen. It is not completely certain, perhaps even a bit unlikely, that Trump has completely forgiven Putin. To forgive is not easy. It is not simple. There is no reason to forgive anyone unless it can be done with enough humility to inspire humility in the one who is forgiven. That is essentially what Trump is hoping for. Putin once mentioned God in discussing how He built his life. Everyone is indebted to God, none of us has enough to pay the debt. God is willing to forgive the debt, but the condition of the absolution is that everyone grant it to those around us.

Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess: Unfit for Counter-Trump Narrative, Critics Dismiss Story

A column of the 1st Tank Guards Army at the Borisovsky range during Zapad 2017 (above). During Zapad 2017, a military exercise, Russian Federation forces in Belarus and in Russia near the Baltic region were joined by forces in the Arctic and Far East, the Black Sea, close to Ukraine’s borders and in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, to rehearse defensive tactics against a “terrorist force.” Critics of US President Donald Trump, who have tied anything Russia related to an alleged nefarious link between him and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, hardly reacted to Zapad 2017. Moral relativism seems to be at play in their thinking.

According to an October 1, 2017 New York Times article entitled “Vast Exercise Demonstrated Russia’s Growing Military Prowess”, details were provided on a major military exercise named Zapad 2017, held jointly by the Russian Federation and Belarusian armed forces from September 14 to September 20, 2017. Reportedly, Russian and Belarusian troops in Belarus and Russian troops near Russia’s Baltic region were joined in the exercise by Russian troops in the Arctic and Far East, the Black Sea, close to Ukraine’s borders and in the Abkhazia region of Georgia. Western military officials discerned from the exercise that Russia had made significant strides in their ability to conduct the sort of complex, large-scale operations, using drones and other new technology, that would be part of any all-out war with the US in Europe. The October 1st New York Times article explained that the military exercise, planned for many months, was part of a larger effort by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to showcase Russia’s military prowess as it tries to reassert itself as a world power. Before Zapad started, US and Baltic military officers expressed fears that the maneuvers could be used as a pretext to increase Russia’s military presence in Belarus, a central European nation that borders three critical NATO allies: Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The commander of US Army in Europe, US Army Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges was quoted in the article as saying: “Zapad forced us to get smarter about how to share intelligence.”

The October 1, 2017 New York Times article, albeit was one of the few in the mainstream media that recognized that the massive exercise even took place. Synoptic reports about Zapad appeared in the US newsmedia, particularly in print. Many newsmedia houses simply reprinted stories via Reuters and the Associated Press. There was very little mention of Trump in stories. At first blush, one might argue that newsmedia coverage, stories and commentary, should focus upon what sells papers, magazines, and advertising space, what stories can grab interest and gain traction. Stories that support a popular counter-Trump narrative that Trump lacks the competence to be president and with the advent of his administration, tyranny’s bloody banner has been raised, have been selling for a long season. One could hypothesize that most US newsmedia houses believed Zapad 2017 was not a story that would sell, and was not an event of great consequence in the big picture even given the enormity of the seven-day Russian exercise. What makes the tepid coverage or lack of coverage of the exercise especially intriguing is its variance from the the now normal massive US newsmedia coverage of Trump’s alleged ties to Putin and Russia, to include secret back channels to Moscow, to questionable contacts, and worst of all, to secret deals and promises to perform favors for foreign leaders if Trump reached the presidency. The purported rationale for that alleged activity was to lay the foundation for lucrative business deals for Trump’s business concern in Russia as well as to acquire Russia’s help to win the 2016 US Presidential Election. Beyond such efforts to manipulate the 2016 US Presidential Election results, Russia’s armed forces have in recent years captured Crimea and intervened in eastern Ukraine, deployed troops to Syria, rattled the Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with snap exercises, and buzzed NATO planes and ships. The question, ‘What about Russia?”, has been written and spoken countless times when critics have sought to find fault with Trump. The modus operandi has been to look for wrongdoing, some fault, to hover at his elbow once he awakes every morning. On Zapad 2017, critics resembled a referee missing a foul in a championship match. Moreover, Trump, with the goal of stirring things up and ending the status quo, has been tough on NATO Members and creating some grievances among them, one might expect critics would turn the issue, despite Trump’s ostensibly noble intentions, into something akin to  a pocket full of firecrackers.

What appears to have influenced the manner in which critics covered Zapad 2017 was their recognition of the exercise as an incongruency, failing to fit their typical narrative on Trump. Indeed, critics mostly chalked up Zapad 2017 as being outré; outside their vision of the alleged, nefarious lien d’affaire between Trump and Putin. In fact, Zapad 2017 contradicts it. Rather than just label it all brustschmerzangst, strange and just wrong, one could assess from the tame response of critics to Zapad 2017 evinces that a sort of moral relativism is at play in their thinking. That moral relativism has allowed critics to cherry pick matters that solely support what they perceive as “Trump the Bad”, whose thinking and actions are well outside the country’s sensus communis, the society’s basic beliefs and values. In that vein, they have focused so intensely on surmised ties between the Trump administration and Russia. They have argued the existence of those ties with such certitude that they, perhaps unconsciously, ignore the reality that Russia has not fully relaxed its posture militarily toward the US, or the West since Trump was elected. Looking at Zapad 2017 a bit closer reveals alleged illegal foreign contacts and secret deals, real or not, did nothing to temper Moscow’s behavior toward the US. Looking at Zapad 2017 closer one might also be better able to discern that given Moscow’s attitude and behavior toward the administration of US President Barack Obama and the generally acknowledged steps Moscow took to impact the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, only now, with Trump, is there a real possibility to create positive change in the US-Russia relationship as well as ignite an authentic bolstering of European security. Ab actu, ad posse valet illatio. (From what has happened we may infer what will happen.)

Looking at Zapad 2017 closer reveals alleged foreign contacts and secret deals, real or not, did nothing to temper Russia’s behavior toward the US. Rather, looking at Zapad 2017 and matters surrounding it closer, one can discern that given Moscow’s resulting attitude and behavior toward the administration of US President Barack Obama after interaction with it and bold steps apparently taken by Moscow to impact the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, only now, with Trump, is there a real possibility to create positive change in US-Russia relations as well as bolster European security.

The term “moral relativism” is understood in a variety of ways. Most often it is associated with an empirical thesis that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements and a metaethical thesis that the truth or justification of moral judgments is not absolute, but relative to the moral standard of some person or group of persons. Sometimes ‘moral relativism’ is connected with a normative position about how one should think about or act towards those with whom one morally disagrees. The most common position is that one should tolerate them. When one is certain of a reality, one abides by its rules. Moral relativism has been said to be on the opposite end of the continuum from moral absolutism, which says that there is always one right answer to any ethical question. There are a variety of philosophical arguments against moral relativism. Aporia for rejecting moral realism include the view that there are some objective moral truths. Other arguments against relativism insist arguments offered in favor of relativism are typically flawed, shortsighted. Various ways of understanding moral relativism exist. Under metaethical moral relativism states that objective grounds for preferring the moral values of one culture over another do not exist. Accordingly, moral choices made by societies are based on their unique beliefs, customs, and practices. There is a tendency for individuals to believe that the “right” moral values are the values that exist in their own culture. Under descriptive moral relativism, often referred to as cultural relativism, it is recognized that moral standards are culturally defined. There may be a few values that seem nearly universal, such as honesty and respect, but many differences appear across cultures when people evaluate moral standards around the world. Normative moral relativism is the idea that all societies should accept each other’s differing moral values, given that there are no universal moral principles. For example, just because political corruption is accepted to a degree in some societies does not mean that other societies cannot rightfully condemn it. Most philosophers disagree with this idea that no universal moral principles exist.

Having taken such a firm stand against Trump, even experienced and reliable observers, journalists, can say things that cannot be. Possibilities are rejected without hearing others. Self-serving explanations, opinions are relied upon. While all of this has suddenly become acceptable with regard to Trump, but it is all actually outside of standard practice and norms within the US society. Critics who have the US public’s’ ear must respect and honor, not abuse, the public trust. Journalists, in particular, including Trump critics among them, should report the truth as they encounter it. When stories such as Zapad 2017, they must still be energetically covered, especially when they cast doubt of their perspectives of Trump. There has been a dearth of such stories so far. The US public is not only reactive to opprobrium, invective, banal amusement, but is also open to eloquence.

Facts Concerning Zapad 2017 Trump’s Critics Ignored Likely Due to Moral Relativism

Zapad 2017 was an exercise that was designed to have a sound educational effect on the Obama administration and a prospective administration of former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. That in itself seems worthy of news media attention at the present. Moscow was very concerned that troubles with Washington would continue with the advent of administration led by former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Indeed, as part of an assessment completed by the US Intelligence Community on the possible effort by Russia to influence the US Presidential Election of 2016, it was concluded that Putin took affirmative steps to avoid the nightmare scenario of Clinton victory by ordering an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s objectives were: to undermine public faith in the US democratic process; to denigrate former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton; and, to harm her electability and potential presidency. The US Intelligence Community further assessed that Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for then President-elect Trump. In following, it also assessed Putin and the Russian Government aspired to aid President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. Praetenta mutare non possimus sed futura providere debemos. (We cannot change the past, but we can anticipate the future.)

Zapad fits neatly into the story of US-Russia relations for nearly a decade. The whole matter also looms large in the story of the Obama administration. The genesis of Zapad 2017 was the desire by Moscow to take steps in the midst of a descending spiral of uncongenial relations with the US against Russia’s interests. Indeed, there was nothing ambiguous then or now about Moscow’s approach to the US. Putin has never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. It was practically guaranteed that Putin would push back against what he might call an intrusion by the West into Russia’s near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. The term was reportedly popularized by former Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s. For centuries, Russia has sought to ensure its physical security through its control over neighboring territory. For Putin, the term represents a concept akin to the Monroe Doctrine. Upon returning to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2011, Putin began the process of increasing Russian military manpower by 25 percent to 850,000 between 2011 and mid-2014. Russia supposedly has about 2.5 million active reservists out of a total population of 143 million. It ranks second, behind the US, on the list of countries with conventional warfighting capabilities. Expenditures on defense, and the related category of national security and law enforcement, accounts for 34 percent of Russia’s budget which is more than twice in comparison with 2010. The US only spent 18 percent, or $615 billion of its budget in 2014 on defense and international security. Explaining his concept for achieving this growth, Putin told senior military commanders and defense industry executives at a meeting in Sochi on May 12, 2015, “We can and must do for the defense industry what we did for Sochi.” Putin was referring to the $50 billion spent in to host the 2014 Winter Olympics there. He went on to state, “All questions relating to adequate resource allocation have been resolved.” Putin would seek to exert pressure against the West where and when he felt it would pay dividends.

The Obama administration approached Russia with the idea that the relationship between the two countries could be “reset.” The reset with Russia was one of the administration’s major foreign policy initiatives. Relations with Russian Federation President Dimitry Medvedev were positive. For three years, a relatively smooth and business-like tenor existed in relations with Russia. That contrasted with the contentious relations that followed the Georgian War in 2008 while Putin served as president. It boded well for Obama’s legacy over which White House officials publicly admitted being absorbed. With its Russia policy on track, the administration was comfortable enough to turn toward an even greater priority at the end of 2011 which was referred to as the “pivot to Asia.” Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained it all in an edifying discourse in the October 11, 2011 edition of Foreign Policy magazine. The very substance of the ambitions is merely the shadow of a dream. Putin undoubtedly took great interest in these Europe’s force reductions and the Obama administration’s decision to also make steep reductions in US conventional forces. Those cuts left the US less able to project power, take and hold ground in a non-permissive environment in defense of the interests of the US, its friends, and allies. As noted in the greatcharlie.com post entitled “As World Boils, Fingers Point Obama’s Way; In Putin’s View, Obama’s Doing Just Fine”, in 2013, the US withdrew its last two heavy armored brigades from Germany. Tank units anchored the US military presence on the ground in Europe for 70 years. US military leaders have considered withdrawing the last squadron of F-15C air superiority fighters from England. When Putin received the Obama administration’s proposals in 2013 calling for steep reductions in nuclear forces, he may have discerned that for the Obama administration, the US nuclear arsenal was merely a political bargaining chip, but not a military tool. Putin rejected the administration’s proposals.

Putin (left) and Obama (right). When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the Obama administration responded to him as if he were a neophyte and not a seasoned national leader. Old ills that were part of US-Russian relations resurfaced, and new ones arose. The actions and reactions of the Obama administration to Russia did much to further pollute and obscure what was already a difficult path to travel regarding US-Russia relations. Hell called Hell. One misstep led to another.

Cuiusvis est errare nullius nisi insipientes, in error perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.) Having taken on Putin on the nuclear issue, Obama kept pushing into more troubling waters. His administration moved along the path humiliate him. It was hard for Obama administration staff, perhaps due to their youthful exuberance, to recognize that words cannot return. The administration predominantly staffed with eager, youthful officials who very often displayed an arrogance that seemingly drove them to convince the world they were the center of the cosmos. One should not allow one’s ego to run away from one. One certainly should not make choices with a confused ego. The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. The actions and reactions of the Obama administration to Russia did much to further pollute and obscure what was already a difficult path to travel regarding US-Russia relations. Hell called Hell. One misstep led to another. It all seemed a bit barky. When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the Obama administration responded to him as if he were a neophyte and not a seasoned national leader. Old ills that were part of US-Russian relations resurfaced, and new ones arose. On the world stage, Putin will never allow Russia to be perceived as wilting before what he views as Washington’s effort to establish total dominance. He would resist and counter pressures. One matter to which Putin gave primacy to getting the US and EU to take into account Russia’s interests on Ukraine and other issues.

In Ukraine, Putin insisted that he was only acting in response to Western behavior toward Russia. Speaking at a conference in Moscow on April 16, 2015, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu explained: “The United States and its allies have crossed all possible lines in their drive to bring Kiev into their orbit. That could not have failed to trigger our reaction.” The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov stated at the same conference, “Considering themselves the winners of the Cold War, the United States decided to reshape the world to fit its needs.” He further explained, “It’s clear that measures taken by NATO to strengthen the bloc and increase its military capabilities are far from being defensive.” Nonetheless, nothing Russian officials might say would dissuade most in the US and EU from believing Putin is driving events forward. After alienating Putin by preventing him from further participation in the G-8, and hitting many of his close associates, their business interests, and Russian industries with sanctions, the US and EU expected him to back off of Ukraine and Eastern European states. Yet, those who believed sanctions and other coercive means, and deploying small sets of US forces to the Baltic States and Poland would modify Putin’s behavior were in the cradle intellectually. Sanctions from the US and Europeans, which posed a serious economic threat to Russia despite any heroic claims otherwise by Putin, put relations between Russia and the West, built largely on economic cooperation, at considerable risk. It is unlikely the administration foresaw things would go so badly. It has been proven that humans cannot control events too long. This is not without application to the circumstances examined here. Historia magistra vitae et testris temporum. (History is the teacher, the witness of times.)

A Newsweek map of Russian Federation armed forces deployed against the West (above). By 2015, NATO Members acknowledged that Russia posed a genuine threat to the well-being of their countries. The RAND Corporation prepared a study for the US Department of Defense on the outcome of Russian military move against the Baltic States. The study was based on war games played by US military officers and civilian officials over several months between 2014-2015. The game ended with a disastrous defeat for NATO in a matter of days.

NATO Responds?

NATO Members were flabbergasted by their gross miscalculations about Putin and Russia. By 2015, they were willing to acknowledge that Russia posed a genuine threat to the well-being of their countries. The RAND Corporation prepared a study for the US Department of Defense on a possible Russia move against the Baltic States. The study centered on several tabletop war games played by US military officers and civilian officials over several months between 2014 and 2015. The games incorporated tactics used Russia when it deployed forces into the Crimea. The games ended with a disastrous defeat for NATO in a matter of days. The study found that NATO forces deployed to the Baltics were small, and lacked the vehicles and firepower to take on the Russian juggernaut of heavy tanks and mechanized vehicles opposite them. The study indicated that NATO ground troops lacked anti-aircraft artillery to fend off Russian warplanes in a wartime scenario. More specifically, regarding the outcome reached under the study’s scenario, “By and large, NATO’s infantry found themselves unable even to retreat successfully and were destroyed in place.” Regarding US and allied air power, despite its ability to strike in depth against advancing Russian forces, destroying many in place and disrupting and delaying the attacks of others, US and allied air commanders would need to limit the number of aircraft dedicated to that mission and deploy them to negating the capabilities of Russia’s air defenses and provide air cover against Russian air attacks on rear areas. It was accepted that Russian forces would be able to smash through NATO defenses and drive on to Riga or Tallinn within 36 to 60 hours. The RAND study assessed that US and its allies would be left with three equally unpalatable options. NATO could launch a prolonged counter-offensive to take back the Baltic capitals; NATO could threaten Moscow with direct attack; or NATO could accept the outcome of the Russian lightning strikes and devise a long-term counter-strategy. RAND asserted that options one and two would lead to nuclear war; option three would result in a new Cold War that could eventually go hot. In discussing a possible way forward, it was RAND’s judgement that through “due diligence” and bolstering its defenses, NATO would send “a message to Moscow of serious commitment and one of reassurance to all NATO members and to all US allies and partners worldwide.”

Initially, Europe’s requests for support from the US to counter a perceived growing threat from Russia were met by mediocre responses by the Obama administration. The world witnessed the vicissitudes that hammered the Obama administration on foreign policy. The situation in the Middle East was particularly dire then. The Obama administration often failed to acknowledge how bad problems really were. It settled upon bromides, with a seductive kind of superficiality, to very challenging situations, which later prove to be shallow entrapments. At the NATO Defense Ministers Meetings on June 24, 2015, participants decided on air, maritime, and special forces components of an enhanced 40,000 strong NATO Response Force (NRF). Ministers took measures to speed up political and military decision-making, including authority for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe to prepare troops for action as soon as a political decision is made. Ministers approved a new concept of advance planning. They also finalized details on the six small headquarters being set up in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said, “They will each consist of around 40 people, and will play a key role in planning, exercises, and assisting potential reinforcement.” Ministers additionally decided to establish a new Joint Logistics Headquarters, to facilitate the rapid movement of forces when necessary.  Directly on Russia, Stoltenberg stated, “We are carefully assessing the implications of what Russia is doing, including its nuclear activities.” He added that NATO is working on how to deal with hybrid threats, including through close cooperation with the European Union. To avoid misperceptions of NATO’s actions, Stoltenberg explained, “We do not seek confrontation, and we do not want a new arms race.” He stressed, “we want to keep our countries safe… this is our job.”

True, increases in defense spending were seen even during the Obama administration in 2016. That year, a majority of delinquent countries spent their required share in the face of Putin’s build-up and enhancement of Russian forces and his operation in Ukraine. Yet, even then, allies agreed to spend only the required 2 percent of economic output on defense every year by 2024 and reverse a trend that saw military research spending in the European Union fall by more than 20 billion euros ($23 billion) since 2006. Still, only four of NATO’s 27 European members–Greece, Britain, Poland and Estonia–met the spending target in 2016. Romania would also do so in 2017, followed by Latvia and Lithuania in 2018.

Troops of the new German Army (above). At a NATO Defense Ministers Meeting in June 2015, in response to Russia’s move into Ukraine, participants decided on air, maritime, and special forces components for an enhanced 40,000 strong NATO Response Force. Ministers took measures to speed up political and military decision-making. Ministers also approved a new concept of advance planning, and finalized details on the six small headquarters being set up in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.

What Is the Zapad Exercise?

Deterrence is created when the doubt of success or fear is generated in the mind of an adversary over a potential response to a attack. In addition to the doubt and fear created, there must be an ample demonstration of the capability to respond efficaciously. The Zapad exercise was first conducted by Russia in 2009, and again in 2013. Traditionally, during Zapad, Russia displays new tactics and technologies. The expressed reason for Zapad 2013 was the rehearsal of Russia’s defense against armed terrorists moving in from the Baltic. The Zapad 2013 exercise was called a counterterrorism training exercise. However, tying Zapad 2013 to counterterrorism was a public relations farce, akin to dressing up a clumsy stumble as a brisé volé. In 2009, the exercise ended with a mock nuclear strike on Sweden. In 2013, the exercise ended with a mock nuclear strike on Poland. In Zapad 2017, ended with the test launch of RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles–two were real, one was an electronic simulation.

However, when Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu announced Zapad 2017 on November 21, 2016, he did not outline it in a way that made it resemble counterterrorism exercise. Indeed, he stated that the joint exercise, which would be the “main military event of 2017.” During Zapad, he stated Russian and Belarusian armed forces would cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken. Shoigu words reflected Putin’s intent of never allowing Russia to be perceived as wilting before what he views as Washington’s effort to establish total dominance. Putin and his advisers were also compelled to resist and counter pressures. He wanted the US and EU to take into account Russia’s interests on Ukraine and other issues. Zapad 2017 would be emblematic of that perspective, full of sound, fury and ferocity that would cause trembling in the capitals of European powers. Interestingly, the raison d’etre settled upon for Zapad 2017, however, was counterterrorism and it was finally labelled as a counterterrorism exercise. Yet, after the inauguration of Trump on January 20, 2017, Zapad 2017 then became an exercise directed at an administration that was already out of power and a prospective administration that never took power. Indeed, the exercise was a response to a feud that has ended. Inevitably, there was a change in thinking in Moscow in response to Trump’s approach of seeking to improve relations with Russia was made. Nevertheless, Moscow was unable to fully discern what the change from Obama to Trump on not only European defense, and redesign Zapad 2017’s to meet immediate circumstances, reduce cost, and the size and scope of the exercise early on. Obama certainly did not leave matters in Europe better than he found them in 2008 or in the best shape possible when Trump entered the White House.

Putin holds binoculars while observing Zapad 2017 exercises with senior commanders (above). The genesis of Zapad 2017 was the desire by Moscow to take steps in the midst of a descending spiral of uncongenial relations with the US. The Obama administration never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. Putin never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. Putin pushed backed against what he viewed as the West’s intrusion into territory surrounding Russia’s borders.

A Brief Review of ZAPAD 2017

The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense claimed that around 13,000 service personnel participated in Zapad 2017. However, most observers believed the exercise was quite a bit larger. London’s Royal United Services Institute reported some independent estimate around 70,000 troops were involved. Boiled down to the bones, the drafted drill scenario for Zapad 2017 was a covert, foreign incursion into western Belarus, which some Western military analysts such as Mathieu Boulègue of the Chatham House, say greatly resembled Russia’s tactics in Crimea, while combat involved a series of measures honed in Syria. In the very early stage of Zapad 2017, the aim was to raise combat readiness among the deployed force groupings, moving troops, deploying command-and-control assets, as well as organizing interactions among these forces and affording force protection. Under that scenario, Russian airborne units are sent for reconnaissance and to repel the enemy incursion. Indeed, reportedly, aviation and air-defense units from the 6th Army Air Force and Air Defense in the Western Military District conducted various tactical episodes aimed at repelling “massive air strikes” by a conventional opponent. Pilots also worked on striking ground targets and providing escort for bombers. Operational-tactical and other tactical missiles were used during this process. The Russian Federation Aerospace Forces conducted sorties mainly using Su-27, Su-35, Su-30SM and MiG-31 fighters to destroy enemy aircraft, while Su-34 bombers struck infrastructure, columns of armored vehicles, and enemy command-and-control nodes; an Su-24MR jet was used for reconnaissance to transmit the coordinates of ground targets. Newly observed in this phase of Zapad 2017 was use of a suite of high-tech equipment to support the arrival of paratrooper forces, to include radio and electronic capabilities and the integration of drones. Drones were regularly spotted in the sky during Zapad 2017. The speed and reliability of its own data links and communication systems was tested in a scenario where speed was primary requirement, as opposed to the need in the past for greater forces.

The Russian Federation Army then prepared for ground attack with aerial and naval support. This type of multidimensional warfighting, tying an artillery-enabled ground assault with air support, is now called Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities. A multilayer air-defense bubble, similar to the Russian A2/AD assets used in Syria, was constructed. Russian air-defense systems were forward deployed from their bases in the Western Military District, including S-300s, S-400s and Pantsir-S1s. The simulation that ensued targeted enemy cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft. In Kaliningrad, similar activity among Russian naval assets was reported.. Corvettes in the Baltic Fleet were used to strike aerial, naval and coastal targets, implying an A2/AD mission. In this case, the air attack was simulated by Su-24 attack aircraft alongside Ka-27 anti-submarine-warfare helicopters. Other Russian A2/AD components featured in this phase of Zapad 2017 included the Iskander-M, a nuclear and conventional tactical ballistic missile. Iskander strikes were reported at training ranges, including a 480-kilometer strike against a target at a training range in Kazakhstan from units in the Central Military District, as well as a variety of cruise missiles fired from air, land and sea. The Missile and Artillery Troops, a Branch of Arms in the Ground Forces, serving as the primary means of destroying enemy forces by conventional and nuclear fires, were in action throughout Zapad. Those forces also used the older Tochka-U system, which is in the process of being fully replaced by the Iskander-M. The Iskander’s appearance in Russian exercises is assumed to indicate the rehearsal for a tactical nuclear weapons strike. In Zapad 2017, the Iskander was mainly conventional in its support of A2/AD. Moreover, the Russian missile forces appear to have rehearsed the use of a cruise missile that can be mounted on the Iskander platform, greatly extending the system’s strike range well beyond 500 km. Then, as mentioned, all of these activities during Zapad 2017 were squeezed between 3 test launches of the RS-24.

Russian tanks and BRDM-2s (above). Although Zapad 2017 was called a defense drill and a counterterrorism operation, in a very overt way, the tactics switched into an offensive against a conventional military force on its heels. The ground air operations rehearsed in Zapad 2017 were an expression of Russia’s objective of establishing dominance to prevent long wars, thwart and deter strikes at new points, and avoid escalation. The drill was all about NATO, and it really showed.

Although Zapad 2017 was called a defense drill, in a very overt way, the tactics switched midway into an offensive against a conventional military force on its heels. As mentioned earlier, it was not a counterterrorism operation. The ground air operations rehearsed in Zapad 2017 were an expression of Russia’s objective of establishing dominance to prevent long wars, thwart and deter strikes at new points, and avoid escalation. Boulègue of Chatham House told Newsweek: “The drill was all about NATO, and it really showed.” In the end, the whole cabaret of Zapad 2017 competed for attention of general staff with Al Nusra attack in force in Syria requiring heavy use of Russian air assets. Ironically, that was a more authentic counterterrorism operation.

Where Does All of This Leave Trump?

Clearly, in his last spell of contact with the US, Putin found no joy. The commitment to resources to Zapad 2017 despite the benign intentions expressed, is worthy of note given emphasis made by US newsmedia of how Russia wanted to make Trump look good. The forward movement of Russian Federation armed forces in a westward direction, in a military exercise translated into English means “west”, was of concern for US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Marine Corps General Joseph Dunford, and US National Security Adviser Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster, and all other senior members of the Trump administration’s national security team. In September 2017, while Trump’s national security team was heavily immersed on North Korea, supporting partners heavily engaged on the ground in Syria and Iraq, and dealing with the implication of events in Charlottesville, they were also closely watching Zapad 2017. They worked with NATO allies and other European partners on the matter, and conducted significant multinational drills that coincided with the Russian exercise. The October 1st New York Times article explained that US Secretary of Defense James Mattis ordered that a wider array of European partners have access to classified US information during the exercise to simulate conditions during combat. The sangfroid shown by the Trump administration has allowed to engage in sober analysis of Zapad 2017 and all of its elements.

By letting Zapad 2017 come and go from the scene, Trump made it clear that he did not see the need to stoke the fires between the US and Russia that were set during the Obama administration. He preferred to let those fires die out on their own. Trump’s response to Zapad 2017 was also a manifestation of his desire to soften anti-US sentiment in Russia and anti-Russian sentiment in the US. Trump’s believes hope was that normative behavior and positive relations between the US and Russia could be established by working to surmount contentious issues. Trump came into the Oval Office believing the moment had arrived to create positive change in US-Russia relations. Rebus angustis animosus atque fortis appare; sapienter idem contrahes vento nimium secundo turgida vela. (Appear strong and firm in steep affairs; likewise, you will wisely shorten your sails swollen in a too favorable wind.)

Trump (left) and Putin (left) at G20 in July 2017. The sangfroid shown by the Trump administration in response to Zapad 2017 has allowed for a sober analysis of all of its elements. Trump made it clear that he did not see the need to stoke the fires between the US and Russia that were set during the Obama administration. He would prefer to let those fires die out on their own. Trump wants his administration to focus on creating positive change and congenial ties between the US and Russia by surmounting contentious issues.

All of this draws focus to Trump’s intriguing, positive duality on Russia and Europe. Trump fully understands that NATO is absolutely necessary, contrary to the song and dance of wondering if he knew what NATO was and whether he thought it was truly obsolete much as he gestured essentially out of political expedience during the 2016 US Presidential Campaign. Trump wanted to stir things up, draw attention to the issue, and express ideas favorable to his political base, which is what politicians do when campaigning. Once he became US President, Trump’s intended to be constructuve, not destructive via his criticisms about NATO. Trump apparently never intended to truly signal that he did not support for NATO or understand its importance. Though his “constructive criticism”, Trump ostensibly sought to hone thinking among leaders of NATO Member States and encourage the polishing of their best ideas in support of collective defense.

Yet, Trump, before and after becoming US President, also expressed his genuine belief that NATO allies have been “coddled” by the US for too long, causing leaders of NATO allies to feel comfortable repeatedly missing the agreed spending target of 2% GDP on defense. On April 12, 2017, the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with Trump in Washington to discuss his concerns about NATO. Stoltenberg was able to convey that a new spirit of unity and commitment that prevailed among NATO Members. Stoltenberg, in turn, would discover that Trump’s sentiments were noble contrary to what critics were stating. In an hour long meeting in the Oval Office, Trump and Stoltenberg discussed ways in which the NATO Secretary General planned to get member countries to increase military spending to bolster the alliance. Stoltenberg listened to Trump’s concept to accomplish the same, and saw no mysterious elements to Trump’s approach. It was at that Oval Office meeting that Trump explained that NATO was a “bulwark of international peace and security.” He went as far as to say that the alliance was increasing cooperation to stem terror attacks, among other steps. During a news conference with Stoltenberg, Trump added: “I said it [NATO] was obsolete. It is no longer obsolete.”

Rerum concordia discors. (The concord of things through discord.) Invited to the unveiling of a memorial to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US at the new NATO headquarters building in Brussels, on May 24, 2017, Trump intensified his accusations that NATO allies were not spending enough on defense. Trump did say during the ceremony that the US “will never forsake the friends who stood by our side.” However, he focused far more on Europe’s drop in defense spending since the end of the Cold War. Standing before a piece of the wreckage of the World Trade Center, Trump stated: “Twenty-three of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying for their defense.” Trump added before the leaders of other NATO countries: “This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States, and many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years.” Stoltenberg, having previously talked with Trump in Washington, was not surprised by anything Trump said. In fact, Stoltenberg defended Trump, saying that although he was “blunt” he had “a very plain and clear message on the expectations” of allies. Trump had the impact both he and Stoltenberg apparently wanted upon NATO Members. While critics ratcheted up reports and commentaries on how Trump embarrassed himself and was tearing NATO apart, Stoltenberg explained that Trump ignited a new drive in NATO to authentically build up defense.

Trump (right) and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg (left). Invited to the unveiling of a memorial to the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks on the US at the new NATO headquarters building in Brussels, on May 24, 2017, Trump intensified his accusations that NATO allies were not spending enough on defense. Having met with Trump in Washington, Stoltenberg was not surprised by anything he said. Stoltenberg defended Trump, saying although he was “blunt,” he had “a very plain and clear message on the expectations” of allies.

Speaking in Brussels a month later on June 28, 2017, Stoltenberg explained that 23 of NATO’s 29 allies planned to lift spending that year. He would add that for the first time, NATO governments will produce national plans showing how they would reach the 2024 spending pledge, focusing not just on spending increases but also monitoring troop contributions to missions and acquiring technology such as precision-guided munitions. The new figures were part of a broader rise in military spending in Europe. The US committed billions more in dollars to return troops and heavy weaponry to the continent to deter Russia. The EU sought to do its part by setting up a multi-billion-euro defense fund. Stoltenberg explained: “We have really shifted gears, the trend is up and we intend to keep it up.” On the nature of the force build up, Stoltenberg stated: “It’s more about high-end forces, heavier forces and more ready forces, meaning we need forces that are fully equipped, fully manned and fully trained.” Beyond increasing the levels of heavy weapons and gear for troops in strategically positioned bases and standing watch on NATO’s borders, Stoltenberg further stated that the increase in funds would be spent on more military exercises, training and equipment and to allowing NATO troops to deploy at ever faster notice, as well to pay salaries and pensions. There remained a curiosity for where Trump stood in response to Putin’s attitudes and expressions toward the West. Some confusion and bewilderment resulted particularly from ideas publicly expressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Trump was unwilling to stand with Europe against Russia. While still disagreeing with Trump on some policy areas, Merkel has since expressed far more positive perspectives regarding him and European security. Post proelia praecima. (After the battles came the rewards.)

Trump reiterated his support of NATO on July 6, 2017 in Krasiński Square in Warsaw, the site of the 1944 uprising against the Nazis. In that magnificently melodramatic setting commemorating resistance against a cruel foreign occupier, Trump suggested that a lack of collective resolve could doom the transatlantic alliance which had endured the Cold War. Trump painted a picture of the West facing existential challenges and needed to “defend our civilization” from terrorism, bureaucracy and the erosion of traditions. As an example of resolve, Trump pointed to Poland, which in the last century endured occupations by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union twice. Trump explained: “The story of Poland is the story of a people who have never lost hope, who have never been broken, and who have never forgotten who they are.” It was noted in the European newsmedia that in his speech, Trump for the first time “stood by” Article V of the NATO Charter, a provision requiring NATO Members to come to each others defense once under attack.  Yet, Trump kept up the pressure on those NATO Members who were “failing to meet their full and fair financial obligations on defense spending.” Trump expressed the view that his tough criticism of NATO Members who had not met the target of raising defense spending to 2% of GDP was paying off, with billions more being committed to defense across Europe. In a powerful expression of the need for alliance unity through use of the rhetorical technique of anaphora, Trump stated: “The fundamental question of our time is whether the west has the will to survive. Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to defend our borders? Do we have the desire and courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and destroy it?” What should have been of particular interest to the US newsmedia was Trump’s criticism of Russia. He accused Moscow of “destabilising activities in Ukraine and elsewhere,” and declared that Putin was supporting “hostile regimes including Syria and Iran.” It is worth noting that all of this transpired before Zapad 2017. Trump’s leadership of NATO and his demand for Europe’s vigilance in the face of military threat from Russia is certainly worthy of attention. By ignoring such facts, critics lend credence to the allegation that they display a consistent disregard of genuine facts about Trump’s efforts which are inconsistent with their counter-Trump narrative. Quid enim est stultius quam incerta pro certis habere, falsa pro veris? (What, indeed, is more foolish than to consider uncertainties as certain, falsehoods as truths?)

Trump reiterated his support of NATO on July 6, 2017 in Krasiński Square in Warsaw. In his speech, Trump suggested then that a lack of collective resolve could doom the transatlantic alliance which had endured the Cold War. Trump painted a picture of the West facing existential challenges. Critics noted that in his speech, Trump for the first time “stood by” Article V of the NATO Charter, a provision requiring NATO Members to come to each others defense once under attack.

The Way Forward

In Act II, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play, Othello, Iago, the ensign of the Venetian General Othello, delivers his first soliloquy, declaring his hatred for Othello, his suspicion that Othello has slept with his wife, Emilia, and his determination to destroy him. He lays out his plan to cheat his supposed ally, Roderigo out of his money, to convince Othello that a loyal soldier, Cassio has slept with his wife, Desdemona, and to use Othello’s honest and unsuspecting nature to bring him to his demise. Iago states: “I have told thee often, and I re-tell thee again and again, I hate the Moor: my cause is hearted; thine hath no less reason. Let us be conjunctive in our revenge against him: if thou canst cuckold him, thou dost thyself a pleasure, me a sport. There are many events in the womb of time which will be delivered.” Former US President Jimmy Carter was quoted in the New York Times on October 21, 2017 as saying: “I think the media have been harder on Trump than any other president certainly that I’ve known about.” He added: “I think they feel free to claim that Trump is mentally deranged and everything else without hesitation.” Indeed, at the present, the opportunity to attack Trump is rarely missed by his critics. Their ranks actually extend well beyond the US newsmedia to include: think tank scholars, other policy analysts, particularly former officials of the Obama administration. That has had a multiplier effect when advanced alongside the efforts of journalists among his critics, ensuring that through prose, and even verse, there would be a more than ample stream of bdelygmia. Critics seem determined to throw Trump into loneliness and pain. Yet, they may ultimately discover that Trump has reserves of strength unlike most men which was proven through his business career. Indeed, much as Nebuchadnezzar brought Sgadrach, Meshach, and Abednego from the furnace, stunned by their impunity in the face a tremendous flames, critics may discover in the end, that Trump will endure, survive, and overcome the flames of their best attacks. Trump’s ties to Russia, real and imagined, are a primary focus of attacks by his critics. Yet, Trump’s critics did not try to tie him to Zapad 2017, despite the massive display of Russian military power. Zapad 2017 should have transmitted the idea that Putin is not a new friend of the US, Trump in particular. Regarding Putin, he undoubtedly notices is the atmosphere of pure hatred and rejection propagated by the counter-Trump milieu. He surely recognizes that there is an effort to separate Trump from the US public and create turmoil and frustration which he, for certain, does not have his hand in.

In alio pediculum, intericinum non vides. (You see a louse on someone else but not a tick on yourself.) However, the contradiction that Zapad 2017 presents has not left Trump’s critics figuratively cold and muddled intellectually. Rather, moral relativism seems to be in play. The Catholic priest and theologian Father George Rutler explains that “It does not require genius to sense that all relations in the creation are harmonious. Only because of celestial harmony is there a human intuition that wrong is wrong and right is right. Beyond that intuition one must animate the intellect, use natural law, to parse things out. In classical philosophy, natural law is the universal, practical obligatory judgments of reason, knowable by all men and binding them to do good and avoid evil. The renowned Greek Philosopher Plato considered ignorance and confusion as the opposites of harmony. The goal of the torrent of anger from critics is certainly not bring a happy harmony to a dissonant world. Having promoted themselves figuratively as the defenders of US wisdom. They must find out for themselves who lives within them. Rather than follow the pack and do what is wrong, surmount that impulse and have the courage to do what is right. There appears to be a purpose to Trump which the majority of his many critics do not understand but will ultimately discover. Indeed, by God’s chance, as he toils, performing his duties as president in peace and in war, Trump’s intended course will no longer be a mystery to those who have been bewildered by the counter-Trump milieu.  Opinions expressed by critics about his efforts could also eventually change. In the face of staggering contradiction, an internal discord might obtain within quite a few critics. Many critics may become uncertain as to their true ends. Some may discover that their feelings of indignation and despair over Trump were inauthentic.Consideration may come and whip the offending Adam out of them. All that was said and done by critics may be looked upon curiously as a type of avant-garde expression. Perhaps then critics might finally offer a gesture of goodwill for the moment, and their efforts to hurt may slowly fall off and be replaced by righteous efforts to be constructive. In commenting on self mastery and the good or virtuous life, Aristotle is quoted as stating: “I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies, for the hardest victory is the victory over oneself.”

Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?

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Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (left) with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (right). Putin wants to keep the Republic of Belarus within his country’s sphere of influence. Yet, due to regional security concerns, Belarus has gained new importance in the West. Lukashenko, once called Europe’s last dictator, is being approached by the EU and US. He has responded by trying to strengthen ties with them. Some Western analysts conclude Putin will not react well to this development. However, Belarus’s ties to the EU could actually enable its ally Russia to circumvent sanctions through a creative trade arrangement.

According to an October 29, 2016 article in the New York Times entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters,” dozens of demonstrators held a gathering in front of the headquarters building of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB in Minsk to commemorate the 1937 execution of over 100 members of the Belarusian intelligentsia under the orders of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Josef Stalin. The demonstrators also protested continuing repression in Belarus.  The demonstration was not authorized, however the police did not interfere. The annual commemoration provides the Belarusian public a rare opportunity to show disapproval for the government led by President Alexander Lukashenko. Nikolai Statkevich ran against Lukashenko in the 2010 Belarusian Presidential Election and was imprisoned for five years afterward. The New York Times article quoted him as stating: The fear of repression haunts Belarus as before. Today’s authorities are ideological heirs of those times.”

The EU and US now seem to be approaching Lukashenko with outstretched arms. Lukashenko, once the target of profound obloquy in the West and whose government was called “Europe’s last dictatorship” in 2005 by then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is now covered with good words to the extent that his past iron fisted actions have nearly been cloaked. Belarus, in response to EU and US overtures, has engaged in a vigorous effort to curry favor and strengthen ties with them. The question of whether Lukashenko can genuinely recurvate westward after being oriented so long toward Russia has been responded to by some EU leaders with rather Delphine statements.

Putin wants Belarus to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. He wants to keep Belarus in the Central Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some Western foreign and defense policy analysts would quickly point out that Lukashenko has never been disposed to completely subordinating the interests of Belarus to that of Russia, or of the West for that matter. Pedictably, those Western analysts have concluded Putin, their bête noire, likely perceives Lukashenko as being disloyal, and suggest that he could react aggressively. Such analyses simply signal a fear of Russian military power. They also signal a fear that when the interests of any country in Russia’s sphere of interest is detectably at odds with those of the Kremlin, a “second Crimea” may be in the making. Crimea happened. Putin acted aggressively. However, Crimea should not be the baseline to gauge Putin’s thinking and actions going forward. Putin does not act impulsively; he acts with purpose. He can well-distinguish between what he wants for the moment and what he wants most. Putin does not want to have Russia defined as a rogue country with a military that is nothing more than an army of conquest. Having built solid relations with Minsk, especially with regard to security, for over a score of years, it is hard to imagine Moscow attempting to militarily intimidate or actually attack Belarus over its contacts with the EU. Extrapolations perpetuating such notions are counterintuitive. In fact, Putin has hardly reacted. He may very well recognize some potential in his ally’s new EU contacts for Russia to circumvent economic sanctions via a creative trade arrangement.

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Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. When Putin took office, he viewed Russia’s relations with Belarus as unsatisfactory and improved them. Belarus’s strategic importance to Russia increased following regional events such as NATO’s creep into the post-Soviet space, and the “Color Revolutions.” Belarus and Russia have had a few political and economic rows. Still, the two countries are staunch allies.

Belarus: In Brief

The Republic of Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. Its capital is Minsk. While the borders of Belarus were set at the end of World War II, they were shaped mostly when some territory of the Second Polish Republic was reintegrated into them after the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. During World War II, Belarus lost about a third of its population and more than half of its economic resources. The Soviet Union redeveloped the republic in the post-war years. On July 27, 1990, the Parliament of the Belarus declared the republic’s sovereignty, and on August 25, 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus declared itself an independent country. Since 1994, Alexander Lukashenko has served as the President of Belarus. His leadership was widely criticized in the West. Lukashenko perpetuated a number of Soviet-era policies, to include state ownership of large sections of the economy. For years, political opposition was violently suppressed. Elections in Belarus were declared rigged by the international community.  The country’s rating under The Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index was the lowest in Europe until 2014. Freedom House assessed Belarus under Lukashenko as “not free.”  It was labelled “repressed” in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. In the Press Freedom Index for 2016 of Reporters Without Borders, it was ranked 157th out of 180 countries.

Belarus’s Ties to Russia

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly formed Russian Federation tried to control the post-Soviet space by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991. However, Belarus, much as other republics in the CIS, began drifting away from Russia, which at that time was attempting to cultivate Western relations and save its broken economy. In the early 1990s, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was concerned that his country’s involvement with Belarus might put its bridge building efforts with the West at risk. Yet, while Russia was fixed on improving relations, Western capitals discerned Russia’s inability to act effectively. NATO began to expand east. Stung and threatened by what he perceived as an effort by the West to isolate it from the European environment by grabbing up Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics, Yeltsin sought to improve ties with Belarus. Relations between the two countries became so congenial that in the mid-1990s, following Lukashenko’s rise to power, Yeltsin concluded Belarus would be an ideal candidate for integration with Russia. After signing the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation with Belarus, Yeltsin declared that “the two nations [had] shared a common historical experience over many centuries.” That, he explained, “created the basis for signing the treaty and other documents on deeper integration of our two countries. Among all CIS countries, Belarus has the greatest rights to such a relationship due to its geographical location, its contacts with Russia, our friendship and the progress of its reforms.” One year after April 2, 1996 when the integration process was launched, the Union of Belarus and Russia was established. It culminated with the founding of the Union State between Belarus and Russia on December 8, 1999. When Putin took office, he determined that the status of the relations with Belarus was unsatisfactory and criticized the Union State Treaty. He sought to put real content into it. He formulated a policy genuinely directed at realizing unification. His proposal was to complete unification either in a federation model which meant that Belarus would join the Russian Federation, or build a union which is similar to the EU. However, Belarus rejected those approaches and there was no change. Still, Putin did not abandon the idea of unification completely. The next goal became integration. The strategic importance of Belarus to Putin increased as a result of international events, to include. NATO’s activity in the post-Soviet space; the decision of many Eastern European countries to orient westward; a US plan to deploy a missile defense system in Poland or the Czech Republic; and, the “Color Revolutions.”

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Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of Belarus’s purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Disagreements over profits and payments from the energy trade led to the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 row, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed Belarus owed Russia $200 million in gas arrears for that year. Belarus demanded transit fees owed by Russia. The matter was resolved and went away.

Considering that integration with Belarus would be costly, it is reported that Moscow sought to maximize gains from it. Its goals became to reduce the economic burden which Belarus laid on its economy, and to take over Belarus’s energy transit infrastructure. That tack spurred many of the political and economic rows. Among those conflicts was a disagreement that arose when Lukashenko accused Russia of offering a $500 million loan to Minsk on the condition that it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lukashenko angrily retorted that the position of Belarus was not for sale. Regarding the close military cooperation between Belarus and Russia, Lukashenko compared Belarus’s population of 10 million people as a human shield for Russia against the West. That service, he said, “was not free.” The Milk War erupted in July 2009 when Russia banned all dairy imports from Belarus, explaining that they did not comply with new regulations. Belarus accused Russia of using the ban for political reasons, but Russia denied that. In a statement presented by his press service, Lukashenko lashed out, stating: “Economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus’s closest CSTO ally is trying . . . to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?” Lukashenko acted by refusing to attend the 2009 CSTO summit in Moscow. The CSTO, Putin’s counterweight to NATO, groups Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in a security arrangement. Shortly afterward, Russia lifted the ban and Belarus resumed importing of dairy products to Russia. Additionally, there were the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 Gas War, a dispute arose over a claim by Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed that Belarus owed $200 million in Russia gas arrears for supplies it had used that year. Belarus then demanded transit fees owed by Russia. A resolution was found and the matter quietly went away.

The EEU is an economic integration bloc of post-Soviet republics. It succeeded the erstwhile Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in January 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU later that year. The bloc coordinates policies of its member states in key industries. In that spirit of coordination, the argument between Belarus and Russia over the price of natural gas was resolved, although the two sides have apparently not yet reached a consensus on the scale of the price discount (if any) or the mechanism of its delivery to Belarus. Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of its purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Of Belarus’s overall exports, 39 percent is directed to Russia. Those imports from Belarus totaled only $10.4 billion. For the most part it sells Russia value-added goods in return. Aside from trucks and industrial machines, Belarus sells processed foods. A network of Belarusian grocery stores operates in major Russian cities.

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Above is an assembly line at the Minsk Motor Plant. Nearly a third of Belarus’s overall trade is with its second largest trading partner, the EU. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU has withdrawn trade preferences for Belarus, the potential to greatly expand trade exists.

The Strong Military Linkage Between Belarus and Russia

Although there have been some setbacks in the political and economic integration of Belarus and Russia, the military-integration process between them has been successful. Cooperation with Belarus fits snuggly within Putin’s vision for geopolitical order in the post–Cold War world. Putin has never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. It was practically guaranteed that Putin would push back against what he might call an intrusion into Russia’s near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. The term was reportedly popularized by former Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s. For centuries, Russia has sought to ensure its physical security through its control over neighboring territory. For Putin, the term represents a concept akin to the Monroe Doctrine.

On February 14, 2013 at a conference entitled “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they conclude the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. The Kremlin has accepted the threat assessment of the the Russian Federation General Staff. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. To rehearse the defense against the West, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced massive strategic military exercises Zapad 2017, scheduled to take place in September 2017. He said that the joint exercise, which would include Russian and Belarusian forces, will be the “main military event of 2017.” Further, the two countries armed forces will cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken.

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Belarus (shaded in green), Russia (shaded in violet), and their neighbors. Providing a glimpse of the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, on February 14, 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, explained the depletion of oil, gas and other natural resources will become an ultimate world crisis by 2030. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade Russia from several directions to grab its land and resources. Lukashenko insists that Belarus will remain part of Russia’s defense.

Ubi concordia, ibi victoria! (Where there is unity, there is victory.) To a great degree, Russian and Belarusian regional security approaches have been harmonized. Lukashenko has pledged that Belarus will be an integral part of the Russian Federation’s defense. Indeed, he has gone as far as to say that the army of Belarus, the modernization of which was nearly completed, was ready to defend Russia’s western border. According to RIA Novosti, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russian western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.” Lukashenko has referred to the Belarus population as 10 million human shields in the defense of Russia. Lukashenko further stated that the Belarusian Army will be able to show resistance to any aggressor.  Prior to those statements, Lukashenko told the Belarus Parliament that he would not allow the country’s opposition to depict Russia in the image of an enemy. Lukashenko declared to the Belarus Parliament: “The Russians are our brothers, with whom we have been living for a very long time.”

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Putin (right) and Russian Federation Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu (left). Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. Shoigu announced that massive military exercises would be held by Russia and Belarus in 2017 to rehearse their joint defense against the West.

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine into law. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. It views Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

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Belarusian troops (above). Following deliberations in Parliament, Lukashenko signed Belarus’s new military doctrine into law. The doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, but it is apparent that NATO is deemed the greatest military threat. Accordingly, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russia western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.”

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

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Belarusian special forces in training (above). In the new Belarusian military doctrine, emphasis is placed on trends associated with the development of the concept of “Color Revolutions,” and methods aimed at provoking internal conflicts to destabilize the country and violate its territorial integrity. A year ahead of the doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko directed his government to further develop special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems: elements best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations.

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. Officials there view Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

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The EU welcomed Lukashenko’s desire to have Belarus play a constructive role in the region by hosting four-party peace negotiations on Ukraine, as well as his decision to maintain political distance from Russia over Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. EU ministers have encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They have held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Still, many wonder if Lukashenko’s efforts are authentic.

Minsk and Brussels: A Rapprochement?

Some experts have said that it was Lukashenko who began making overtures to the West following Russia’s seizure of Crimea, considerable economic troubles in Belarus, and a degree of instability in Eastern Europe. He managed to grab the attention oF EU leaders in a positive way when he decided to free a number of political prisoners and host multiparty mediations in Minsk for the cease-fire in neighboring Ukraine. EU governments, claiming that they based their decision on content and merit of Lukashenko’s efforts, suspended sanctions on Belarus’s leaders in October 2014. In February 2015, EU foreign ministers terminated sanctions, removing asset freezes and travel bans on 170 officials, including Lukashenko. Three Belarusian companies were also taken off the EU blacklist. The EU maintains an arms embargo and sanctions against four people suspected of being involved in the disappearance of dissidents in the 1990s. Lukashenko responded by intensifying fence mending efforts with the West. As of late, Belarusian diplomats have been pouring considerable energy in enhancing their country’s relations with the West, hoping to capitalize on Belarus’ newfound importance for regional stability. Their approach is bicameral. On the one hand, they seek to develop bilateral cooperation with specific EU countries. On the other hand, they want to develop cooperation with the EU as an institution focusing on the Eastern partnership, a dialogue on modernization, and visa issues. Lukashenko’s current perspective of the EU appears to be reflected in his statements in favor of dialogue with it.  On March 5, 2016, Lukashenko explained: “The Europeans . . . are ready to cooperate with us, including for the sake of security in Europe. We say to them that we’re always open to [talking].” EU and US delegations continue to visit Minsk, but results have been thin. The US has expressed hope not only for improved cooperation on trade, but also on non-proliferation and combating human trafficking.

Praetio prudentia praestat. (Prudence supplies a reward.) Commenting on Belarus, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, remarked, “This is clearly not a rosy or perfect picture . . . but when we see significant, even if limited steps, in what we feel is the right direction, we feel it is right to encourage them.” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke of the “beginnings” of a thaw with Belarus, and concluded, “It’s worth testing in such a situation how much willingness and reciprocity there is on the Belarus side.” Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski told reporters, “This is an experiment.” He went on to state: “As a neighbor of Belarus, we are pleased as we hope this will improve relations with the EU and of course with Poland.” While the EU leaders allege they had no intention of prying Belarus from Putin’s hand, that nonetheless was viewed as possible. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. Indeed, in a statement, the EU ministers encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Lukashenko will take what is offered, but what he really wants from EU countries is financial assistance. Belarus’s international reserves are at the lowest since 2011. Although there has been some direct private investment from the US in Belarus, its development has been relatively slow given the uncertain pace of reform. The US has encouraged Belarus to conclude and adhere to agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the program of macroeconomic stabilization and related reform measures. As of this writing, the International Monetary Fund is still deciding whether it should provide Belarus with a $3 billion, 10-year loan.

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Above are Russian “green men” in Ukraine. In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces, has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations.  Western analysts still insist that Belarus faces the threat of hybrid warfare from Russia. They conclude that Moscow will monitor Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any signs of a serious loosening of ties with Russia.

Are Problems Between Belarus and Russia Becoming Inexorable?

Ad connectendas amicitas, tenacissimum vinculum est morum similitudo. (For cementing friendship, resemblance of manners is the strongest tie.) At the Third Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions on June 9, 2016, Putin explained: “In a collaborative effort, Russia and Belarus work to deepen integration processes in Eurasia. As members of the Union State, we are carrying out about 40 programs and are jointly developing advanced technology programmes, primarily, for the aerospace industry, satellite navigation, geological exploration, and agriculture.” Putin further stated: “We are forming the Eurasian Economic Union’s common market for goods, services, capital, and labour, thereby facilitating sustainable economic growth of the member countries and enhancing the competitiveness of our producers on domestic and foreign markets.”  

Some interesting statements have been made by Belarusian officials concerning their country’s security relationship with Russia. There is the example of Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov, who, speaking on February 23, 2016, stated that security of the country relied also on military cooperation not only with Russia and members of the CSTO. He also underlined Minsk’s “strategic” military cooperation with China and “aspiration to develop a constructive dialogue with NATO in order to strengthen international and regional security.” An interview of Belarus’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei with the Polish daily, Rzeczpospolita, on October 17, 2016, has been called significant because it was titled “We Are Not Dependents of Russia.” In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations. When Shoigu announced that a “joint military organization of the Union State” would be created starting in 2016, including notional unification of the two countries’ armed forces, it appeared Belarus-Russia military ties were further strengthening. Yet, in the West, it was viewed by some analysts as a unilateral statement by Russia, and an effort to save face and show the world that the relationship was still intact. Western analysts note that there was no comment from Belarus on the joint military organization of the Union State. There is a perception in the West that Russia routinely announces joint initiatives with Belarus which have not been endorsed by Minsk. When an announcement of a joint air defence system was made in Russia, Belarus did not comment on it, at least publicly. Reportedly, that same week, Belarus TV broadcasted an extended feature on the country’s Air Defense Troops without once mentioning the new military agreement with Russia. Although the general in charge of the Belarusian Air Force has been nominated as the commander for the “joint system,” Western analysts saw the move simply as a face-saver for Minsk. The lack of reaction by Belarus was said to signal Minsk’s disapproval of the effort by Moscow to control the provision of its security. When Belarus needed to purchase modern fighter aircraft to upgrade its ageing air force, Moscow announced instead that Belarus would be hosting a Russian airbase. Western analysts insist that Moscow pressured Lukashenko for the airbase. However, he insisted upon and arranged the aircraft purchase.

Alter ipso amicus. (A friend is another self.) Some Western analysts have concluded that Russia will observe Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any serious threat to its ties. Yet, that idea conflicts with the reality that Putin considers Belarus to be an integral part of Russia’s geopolitical and cultural space. Moscow has invested heavily in preserving and increasing its influence in the country. Lukashenko has no plans to have Belarus abandon Russia. If some drop in the strength of Belarus’s ties to Russia has occurred, it is negligible.From 2008 to 2010, Putin neither acted violently nor took a hostile tone toward what he perhaps regarded as a recalcitrant, yet typical Lukashenko, with his dalliance toward the West and he has no intentions of reacting aggressively toward Belarus now. Putin knows Lukashenko could never stand by wistfully in the face of Russian decisions impacting Belarus. Putin would never allow Russia to be directed by a foreign capital either. Clashing with Lukashenko is the last thing Putin would want. This may especially be true because Belarus might be able to provide Putin with the possibility to overcome EU sanctions related to Ukraine.

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Moldova, just as Belarus, is not subject to EU sanctions. Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin has proposed that Moldova allow Russia to move its goods into a “European zone” in the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia as a way for Russia to circumvent EU imposed sanctions. As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have the its goods sold to the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions.

Putin’s Possible Move Regarding Belarus?

US and EU sanctions against Russia over Crimea’s annexation will not go away unless Russia returns the region to Ukraine. Russian Federation Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev remarked at a press conference on November 11, 2016, “Our position is that sanctions will remain unchanged.” Just as the Baltic States were never recognized as part of the Soviet Union by the West. Crimea will always be recognized as part of Ukraine, not Russia. As it was explained in the September 30, 2016 greatcharlie.com post entitled “Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action,” Russia is well-aware that cooperation stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of a border by improving conditions for free trade and exchange. Inter-border cooperation is understood to be a prerequisite of broader integration processes and improving relations between neighboring countries. It can serve as a mechanism for coping with the challenges and jolts resulting from the new divisions created between EU and EEU countries.

As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have its goods sold in the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions. Much as with oil and gas pipelines, Belarus would essentially serve as a relay or refining point for Russian goods targeted for Western markets. For that to even become a possibility, it would certainly be in Russia’s interest to see Belarus improve its relations with the EU, particularly with regard to trade and investment. Belarus could be handsomely remunerated with percentages of profits made or perhaps with greater subsidies on imports of Russian resources. There are certainly limits to the level of Russian products Belarus could absorb for sale to the West. Resale of Russian goods at value added prices would murder the project. Russia certainly could not attempt to move goods into EU countries via Belarus at a level equal to anything it might achieve by trading with them directly. Moscow and Minsk would surely set parameters for the bilateral deal. However, the smallest level would surely be far more than Russia could sell as long as sanctions are in place. Trading an EEU partner’s goods externally in this manner may very well be covered in the economic bloc’s trade provisions. Beyond profit, benefits of this trade arrangement would include: the preservation of Belarus’ brotherly relationship with Russia; Lukashenko’s would have no need to be concerned that the sovereignty of Belarus and its interests were not being respected; and, collective arrangements with Russia such as EEU and CSTO will remain intact. Indeed, Belarus would remain in Russia’s sphere of interest. Note that Belarus is among the few states in Europe that has not asked for membership in the EU. While Belarus has strove for better contacts with EU lately, it has simultaneously sought to further its economic and political ties with Russia.

In many ways, this hypothetical trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia would resemble the creative arrangement Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin proposed for trade with Moldova. Moldova is not subject to EU sanctions. Thus, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia and avoid restrictions. A trade arrangement of this type between Belarus and Russia would also resemble the Outward Processing Trade regime that the EU introduced for Belarus. That regime raised import quota amounts for textiles and clothing manufacturers within the EU thus allowing them to produce garments in Belarus that will return to the EU after processing. Additionally, the arrangement would resemble the somewhat awkward way in which some Belarusian firms have been relabelling food from EU countries and selling them in Russia thereby avoiding Russian sanctions. Probae est in segetem sunt deteriorem datae fruges, tamen ipsae suaptae enitent. (A good seed, planted even in poor soil, will bear rich fruit by its own nature.)

What Might Encourage Putin and Lukashenko to Take This Course?

What might encourage Lukashenko and Putin to seek this arrangement is the fact that after Russia, the main trading partner of Belarus is the EU. Nearly, a third of the country’s overall trade is with the EU. That trade could most likely be expanded with a nuanced cultivation. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU withdrew its trade preferences to Belarus under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences in 2007 in response to Belarus’ violations of the core principles of the International Labour Organization, exports from Belarus to the EU did not cease. The decision only required Belarus to pay import tariffs at the standard non-preferential rate. Trade was also promoted through the Outward Processing Trade regime,which was mentioned earlier.

Lukashenko stands on terrain high enough to survey the liabilities involved in moving closer to the West. Voices in the West have indicated that not all are impressed with Lukashenko’s positive words and a perceived unwarranted rapprochement to Belarus. Even when EU ministers decided to lift most sanctions against Belarus in 2015, they said concern remained “with the situation of human rights in Belarus.” Ministers called on Minsk to abolish the death penalty and implement Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) recommendations on democracy before the 2015 Belarusian Parliamentary Elections. An OSCE report said October’s election showed Belarus had a “considerable way go to” on democratic standards, noting the absence of safeguards against multiple voting, limited choice available to voters and the uneven playing field between Lukashenko and his political opponents. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, Mikloś Haraszti, stated after the 2015 Belarusian Presidential Election that he had seen no changes in “the dismal human rights situation.” Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might inadvertently trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

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Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. However, Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

The Way Forward

In William Shakespeare’s comedy, All’s Well That Ends Well, Helena, a physician’s daughter, chooses to marry Bertram, a man of high social position in the French court, but he rejects her love. In response, Helena engages in a plot to wed Bertram by employing what has come to be known as the “Bed Trick.” As she begins to execute her plan in Act 3, Scene 7, Helena states: “Why, then tonight, Let us assay our plot: which, if it speed, Is wicked meaning in lawful act; Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact: But let’s about it.” A trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia as outlined here will likely cause discomfort for those who reasonably demand compliance with imposed sanctions. There is nothing inherently wrong with finding and exploiting a loophole in a regulation, business contract, or sanctions. One must have the will to seize the opportunity.

As the leader of a world power, Putin fully understands that his policies should make the Russian people hopeful for the future, not anxious or intimidated. Negative outlooks only advertise the limits one has. Reacting negatively to growing Euro-Belarus ties would not be useful. Inter-border cooperation has greatly assisted in harmonizing domestic policy priorities and international and regional security issues between Belarus and Russia. Inter-border cooperation between Belarus and Russia, albeit from different perspectives, is a prerequisite for improving the relations of both countries with the EU. (The EU is drawing closer to Belarus due to the nature of its ties to Russia. Russia may move closer to Belarus to exploit its improved ties to the EU.) Belarus is already a priority for Russia’s diplomatic, military, political, and economic resources. If Putin senses that he can, with Lukashenko’s cooperation, exploit the rapprochement between the EU and Belarus to circumvent imposed sanctions, that tack could eventually be accepted by Moscow as a mechanism for coping with problems stemming from the divisions between EU and EEU countries. 

Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion: Does Shoigu’s Involvement Assure Success for Putin?

Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (above) has the task of reinforcing his country’s western flank against NATO. Successful actions in Ukraine and Syria, along with other achievements, have earned Shoigu the reputation as Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s “Do It” man. Creating three new divisions and other measures will likely achieve what is intended: obviate NATO’s recent steps in its east and further shift the status quo between Russian Federation and NATO forces in Russia’s favor.

According to a May 4, 2016 Wall Street Journal article entitled “Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion along Its Eastern Flank,” Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced at a April 27, 2016 ministry meeting presented on state television: “The Defense Ministry is taking a series of measures to counter the expansion of NATO forces in direct proximity to the Russian border.” A central aspect of those measures is the creation of three new divisions—about 30,000 troops. Shoigu said the cause for the force increase was to counter NATO plans to boost its troop presence along its eastern flank with Russia, to include sending four battalions—about 4,000 troops—to Poland and the Baltic States. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg explained at a news conference in Mons, Belgium that the intent of NATO’s planned troop build-up was defensive. He called the planned deployment a response to an assertive Russia that has shown the will to change borders with force as in Ukraine in 2014.

Beyond the debate over causality for the relative build-ups, it is more important for NATO to know that Shoigu has been given the task of reinforcing Russia’s western flank. Successful actions in Ukraine and Syria, along with other achievements, have earned Shoigu the reputation as Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s “Do It” man. Bean counting forces may be enough for some to make assessments on the relative strengths and weaknesses of Russian Federation and NATO forces. However, any assay of likely outcomes of Russia’s effort to form three new divisions west would be flawed if it did not give higher meaning to Shoigu’s direct involvement. Shoigu will likely achieve what is intended: obviate NATO’s recent steps in its east and shift the dynamic between Russian Federation and NATO forces in Russia’s favor. A look at Shoigu’s background explains why the “Shoigu factor” makes that a real possibility.

Political Ties That Bind Shoigu and Putin: In Brief

With an engineering degree from Krasnoyarsk Polytechnical Institute in 1977, Shoigu joined the Russian government in 1990. He participated in several successful construction projects. His success caught the attention of the Communist Party leadership in 1990. He was placed on the Architecture Committee, but then assumed the leadership of the Russian Rescuers Corps, a new corps of rescue workers. Emergencies in Russia include droughts, forest fires, Islamic militant bombings, and hostage dramas. The Russian Rescue Corps was formed by a directive decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic in the aftermath of the 1988 Armenian earthquake and the Chernobyl disaster. However, these big developments in Shoigu’s career as a rescue worker coincided with the momentous collapse of the Soviet Union.

During the collapse, Shoigu became a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin. When things settled a bit, he continued performing his duties in the Russian Rescuers Corps. It was re-established as the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations, known EMERCOM internationally, responding to crises in the Soviet Union. Russia and the “near abroad,” to include mediating conflicts in South Ossetia, Chechnya, and in nearby Tajikistan. In 1994, the State Committee became part of the Russian Federation government as the Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations). Yeltsin, the Russian Federation President, made Shoigu its minister. In 1994, he made Shoigu a major general in the Russian Federation Army and a member of Russia’s Security Council. In the 1990s, Shoigu wanted to focus on his duties in the Russian Rescuers Corps, re-established as the State Committee for Extraordinary Situations (known as EMERCOM internationally). Yet, during Soviet Union’s collapse, Shoigu became a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin. He later aided Yeltsin during an attempted coup d’etat in 1991, came to the rescue of Yeltsin in the constitutional crisis in 1993, and was part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996. He was made leader of the pro-Yeltsin Unity Bloc in 1999.

Despite Shoigu’s desire to make emergency work his focus after the tumultuous events of 1990, those events became a starting point from which he was drawn further into national politics. Shoigu rushed to Yeltsin’s aid during an attempted coup d’etat in 1991. Shoigu also came to the rescue of Yeltsin in the constitutional crisis in 1993. Shoigu was part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996. By 1999, Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia, and his supporters were shifting to the opposition. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party, with a new face, loyal to him: Unity. Shoigu, then Minister of Emergency Situations, was named the leader of the pro-president party. He was partnered with Alexander Karelin. Shoigu by then was seen as someone “who saves people” more than a politician. Karelin, a triple Olympic gold wrestling champion, was politically connected but also a symbol of Russian strength. Unity was promoted as a party of common sense, not political but honest and strong using that strength to help people in misfortune. Elements of Unity’s economic policy were akin to Thatcherism. It included, for example, the promotion of low inflation, the small state and free markets via tight control of the money supply, and privatization. That said, Unity also supported the reliance on powerful police and security structures and media control. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency. While he spoke of Shoigu as “our greatest star,” he chose Putin.

Yeltsin first saw promise in Putin when he selected him on July 25, 1998 to serve as head of the Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Federal Security Service) or FSB.   At the time, Putin was an unemployed deputy-mayor from St. Petersburg. He served at the FSB until August 9, 1999, when Yeltsin called him to the post of acting prime minister. Late that same month, there was a bomb blast in a luxury shopping mall by Red Square which was the first in a series of blast resulting in casualties. In September 1999, there were apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, in Dagestan, and Volgodonsk, in Rostov. They collectively killed 300 Russian civilians and wounded hundreds more that were reportedly the responsibility of Chechen Islamic militants. Putin acted forcefully against the mall bombing, the apartment immolations, and a bold Islamic militant incursion from Dagestan into Chechnya, led by Shamil Basayev. The first of 100,000 troops were sent to the northern Caucasus within weeks. In a famous September 24, 1999 speech, Putin spoke with determination in explaining his approach to defeating terrorism: “We will pursue the terrorist everywhere. If they are in an airport, then, in an airport, and forgive me, if we catch them in the toilet, then we will waste them in the outhouse . . . The issue has been resolved once and for all.” Putin marked his rise in power by acting viciously against terror. Shoigu’s Unity Party then served as the instrument for Putin’s rise to the presidency. The Unity Party eventually entered into an alliance with the Fatherland-All Russia political bloc. The Party later morphed into United Russia, the country’s current ruling party that rubber stamps Putin’s initiatives in the Duma. By 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party loyal to him: Unity Bloc. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency. While he spoke of Shoigu as “our greatest star,” he chose Vladimir Putin.

Mea mihi conscientia pluris est quam omnium sermo. (My conscience means more to me than all speech.)  Although he was Unity’s leader, Shoigu had no presidential aspirations. Given the tempestuous environment in Russia politically, economically, socially, and militarily at the time, it made sense. Putin was far better equipped to control, manipulate, and strong arm, seemingly endless groupings of political adversaries during that time of many sinful capers. Indeed, Putin was particularly well-equipped to deal with the likes of Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the far right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Gennady Zyuganov of the Communist Party of Russia, men who better understood the lash than words of peace. Perhaps to signal the acceptance of his role, Shoigu gave Putin a black Labrador retriever, “Koni.” After ceding power to Putin, Shoigu gave even more. He became the model upon which Putin’s image as the new leader of Russia was formed. Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Kremlin adviser, told The Economist that the administration deliberately crafted Putin’s image in part on Shoigu’s: “Putin was supposed to be a rescuer, too.”

Putin was lornful over the Soviet Union’s collapse. As his presidency grew out of its infancy, Putin was determined to save Russia from further disintegration, and frustrate those he perceived as enemies aiming to weaken it. He would not be satisfied until Russia’s global power and influence was restored and the independent states of the former Soviet Union were brought back under Moscow’s political, economic, and military (security) influence. Putin believed that the greatest danger to Russia came from the West. He saw Western governments as being driven to weaken Russia, create disorder, and make their country dependent of Western technologies. He felt then and now that under former President Boris Yeltsin, the Russian leadership made the mistake of believing Russia no longer had any enemies. Often Putin would publicly lament about the collapse of the Soviet Union, under Western pressure, calling it the worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th Century. Russia’s economic collapse, in the view of many Russians, was worsened by the destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts. They believe Western suggestions on ways Russia should conduct its affairs domestically and internationally only served to cripple their country. Experts in the West spoke lightheartedly of Russia as a dying super power, lacking the wherewithal to do anything serious politically, economically, socially, or militarily. In The Guardian at the time, Russia was referred to as “an immature, fledgling democracy which in eight years has gone from one party politics to no-party politics, from communism to fantasy.” Yet, in the hallowed eyes of a so-called dying Russia, life was spying in the form of Putin and like-minded officials. Putin restored order after the internal chaos of the 1990s, becoming the face of the government. Once the heady events surrounding the Soviet Union’s collapse subsided, Shoigu focused on advancing the Ministry of Emergency Situations to achieve all possibilities. For nearly 22 years, Shoigu was present at all major and many minor disasters in Russia. His strong, almost stoic comportment at events, along with his precise, short orders and comments to the newsmedia, radiated a sense of confidence that Russians appreciated. He skillfully navigated Russia’s bureaucracy, accruing power, popularity without making real enemies.

While Putin advanced Russia’s interests his own way, both at home and globally, Shoigu made the most of his own capabilities and effectively advanced the Ministry of Emergency Situations to achieve all possibilities. His ministry became a service with many responsibilities. For nearly 22 years, Shoigu was present at all major and many minor disasters in Russia, standing stoically, with barely a muscle moving in his face. His comportment at events, along with his precise, short orders and comments to the newsmedia, radiated a sense of confidence that Russians appreciated. By skillfully navigating Russia’s Byzantine bureaucracy, he has accrued power and popularity without making any genuine enemies. Even former notables such as Boris Berezovsky appear to have respected Shoigu. Evgeny Minchenko, an analyst who studies the Russian elite, told The Economist: “There’s no one else like him in the ruling class.” He added, “It’s an absolutely unprecedented story. By the 2000s, the Ministry of Emergency Situations grew into a 350,000 strong operation with its own special forces.” Omnia mea mecum porto. (All that is mine I carry with me [My wisdom is my greatest wealth].)

Shoigu As Adviser To Putin

Putin’s management style was likely shaped by his short term in politics in St. Petersburg as the protégé of Mayor Anatoly Sobchak. Putin became his deputy in 1994.   However, his style was surely most influenced during his initial career as an officer from 1975 to 1991 in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. With a strong, self-assured, authoritative, no nonsense personality, most advisers’ interactions with him have varied. They may occasionally antagonize the overworked leader even with important or urgent situation reports. Shoigu, however, who was never in the KGB or along with Putin in St. Petersburg, has been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand his leader’s thinking and feelings. Every word Putin has said, his reactions to statements, have informed Shoigu’s understanding of him. Every inflexion, tone, and change in Putin’s voice has provided Shoigu with some insight into what his president was sensing. Added to this is Shoigu’s humble, self-effacing persona and intellectual acuity. It should not be implied from this that Shoigu has not interacted with an “inclement” Putin. After facing Putin’s “larger” voice, he likely tries to salvage whatever may be constructive from such encounters. Surely at times, Shoigu may have his own strong feelings about situations. Nevertheless, as Carl Von Clausewitz, the 19th century Prussian military thinker perhaps would have explained, the ability to maintain his balance in spite of them is a reflection of Shoigu’s strength of character. Some may view Shoigu’s behavior as a manipulation. However, Putin has remained in power by confounding insincerity, and he does not suffer fools lightly. Having observed him closely, Putin obviously feels Shoigu well-serves his needs. Et monere at moneri proprium est verae amitcitiae. (It is a characteristic of friendship to give advice and to receive it.) During significant crises, it is very important for Putin, as much as any other national leader, to have an adviser who fully understands his needs. The encouragement of another, a paraclete, may prove comforting. When Putin and Shoigu talk, Putin perhaps feels free to “clear the air” with him over issues Russia is facing.

Critics at home and abroad whose obloquy should have distracted, disrupted, or diverted Putin, have mainly served as sandpaper to refine his positions. Since his initial rise to power, Putin has become skilled in implementing what critics have called “charm offensives,” explaining his ideas and actions in a manner that is easy, comfortable, assuring, and logical. Sometimes, however, such moves are not enough. Indeed, during significant crises, it is very important for Putin, as much as any other national leader, to have an adviser who fully understands his needs. The encouragement of another, a paraclete, may prove comforting. When Putin and Shoigu talk, Putin perhaps feels free to “clear the air” with him over issues Russia is facing. Of course, Putin would rather tell Shoigu what is to be feared than what he fears for always he is Putin. Shoigu has never used Putin’s confidence in him and strength of his position among advisers to become a haustyrann. Rather, Shoigu also has been able to understand the mood and reactions of Putin’s other capable cabinet members and policy advisers in certain situations, to ensure real cooperation and effective action. It likely accounts, in part, for Shoigu’s refulgence among them.

Shoigu, Tuva, and Paranoia

Shoigu, born on May 21, 1955, was raised in the town of Chadan in southern Siberia, near the Altai Mountains, in a little known Republic of Tuva. His mother was ethnic Russian and his father was ethnic Tuvan. He had a liking for sports, backyard brawls, and risky stunts, such as hopping the ice flows across the powerful Yenisei River. Such high jinks earned him the nickname Shaitan (Satan). Tuvans are among the ancient peoples living in Central Asia. The cultural roots of ancient Tuvans, Uigars, and Kyrgyzians form the basis of Tuvan culture. The traditional religions of Tuvans are Buddhism and shamanism. It is regarding shamanism that for some Russians discord obtains. Shamanism is a practice shrouded in darkness, in which mystery is emphasized and obscurantism is cultivated; as a result, it stirs up fear. Shoigu’s rearing in Tuva at best would only circumstantially suggest, against actual facts, that he might adhere to shamanism.

On May 9, 2015, during celebrations of the 70th Anniversary of the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, Russian television cameras fixed on a black convertible carrying Shoigu into Red Square. Shoigu, in full-dress uniform, crossed himself as he passed beneath one of the Kremlin towers. The highly unusual gesture was seemingly designed to allay any questions about the half-Tuvan, half-Russian’s Christianity. Before that, in 2008, during an interview on the Ekho Moskvy radio station, Shoigu stated that he was baptized in the Orthodox faith at the age of 5. Questions over Shoigu’s faith are perhaps the only thing the very popular defense minister must countenance. Shoigu has never done anything to cause concern.  It is not a wish of greatcharlie.com to ignite a debate on concerns a modest few Russians might have on Shoigu’s faith. Delving deeper into the matter may appear as engaging a bit of apophasis (for one to say one will not say what one is going to say). However, Shoigu is a central figure in Russian politics. Ignoring this aspect of his background would weaken the discussion about him here.

An assortment of beliefs and practices claiming the ability to travel from the secular to the “spirit world” for the purpose of spiritual contacts is covered by the term shamanism. Those contacts can also supposedly be achieved through channeling and the use of spirits coming in the form of animals. It is further claimed that practitioners can take on those shapes themselves. Shamanism requires the use of the archaic techniques of ecstasy, developed independent of any religious philosophy. Ecstasy is a prophetic exaltation or rapture characteristic of shamanism and visionary states. Those states can be naturally induced with entheogenic plants and herbal concoctions. They can be artificially induced by breath control, fasting, meditation, drumming, and other shamanic and yogic practices. Entheogens come in many forms but most commonly from plants known as psychoactive drugs. The use of hallucinogenic plants and herbal concoctions can result for example in visions of demons, distant persons, landscapes, or detailed enactments of recent unsolved crimes. Shamanistic medicinal practices include the application of various ancient witchcraft techniques. Those treated with such can be drawn into deeper, darker occult practices. They can also open a door to evil spirit possession and other forms of occult bondage. Its rituals and methods can lead to intense physical pain and afflictions, temporary insanity, emotional depression, and powerful spiritual torment. How Shoigu’s alleged adherence to shamanism might tie into his role in government or as Putin’s adviser is uncertain.

Putin knows that there are those Russians who will do such things as react superstitiously toward Shoigu. He has vacationed in Tuva with Shoigu many times since. Putin would like Russians to replace any unfounded superstitions about Shoigu and Tuva with authentic truths and worthier ideas.

Putin knows that there are those Russians who will do such things as react superstitiously toward Shoigu. However, Putin has not been dismissive of the problem. He has taken on issues surrounding Shoigu’s Tuvan roots with some guile. Putin went on a fishing trip to Tuva with Shoigu and Prince Albert II of Monaco in 2007. He has vacationed in Tuva with Shoigu many times since. Putin would like Russians to replace any unfounded superstitions about Shoigu and Tuva with authentic truths and worthier ideas. Putin wants all Russian citizens to be part of their country’s rise to greatness. Divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion and origin hinder that.

Much as the orator, poet, and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero, concluded about his Ancient Rome, Putin similarly believes loyalty to the Russian Federation must take precedence over any other collectivity: social, cultural, political, or otherwise. As noted by Clifford Ando in Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (University of California Press, 2013) in the hierarchy of allegiances outlined by Cicero, “loyalty toward Rome occupied a superordinate position: her laws and her culture provided the normative fabric that would, to borrow a phrase of Rutilius Namatianus [Poet, Imperial Rome, 5th Century], ‘create from distinct and separate nations a single fatherland’.” Likewise, Russia’s laws and culture provide the normative fabric from which a united country is created from diverse peoples. Possession of citizenship should be the basis to cause individuals to identify with the concerns of others in widely disparate populations among Russia’s republics. Putin wants Russians to be in a “Russian state of mind,” a mental state created when diversity, creativity, and optimism coalesce. A citizen’s attitude, perspective, outlook, approach, mood, disposition, and mindset should stand positively Russian.

Shoigu As Defense Minister: The Shoigu Factor

Appointed on February 15, 2007, former Russian Federation Defense Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov launched a much needed reform effort to make the Russian Federation Armed Forces more effective. However, Serdyukov ran afoul of the defense industry and senior military commanders with failed procurement programs, efforts to import foreign weapons systems as the France’s Mistral aircraft carrier, and purges and unit reorganizations. In addition, there were a series of highly publicized corruption scandals in the ministry. On November 6, 2012, Putin tore Shoigu away from a very short stint as the elected Governor of Moscow Oblast that began on April 5, 2012 and put the armed forces in his hands.

Evidence of the “Shoigu factor” became apparent as soon as Shoigu started the job. While essentially preserving Serdyukov’s reforms, and harnessing expenditures, Shoigu improved military readiness. He created a new corps, the Airspace Forces. He created eight new operational task forces, twenty-five divisions, and fifteen new brigades. He improved the control system of the armed forces by creating the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation. Shoigu ordered soldiers to wear socks instead of cloth foot-wraps (portyaniki). He had Army commanders increase snap inspections and military exercises. Long-range Airspace Force bomber flights and Navy combat patrols steadily increased.  Morale in the armed forces picked-up as a result of these measures and others. Upon becoming Defense Minister, Shoigu improved the control system of the armed forces by creating the National Defense Control Center of the Russian Federation. Within the ranks, Shoigu ordered Army troops to wear socks instead of cloth foot-wraps (portyaniki). He had Army commanders increase snap inspections and military exercises. Long-range Air Force bomber flights and Navy combat patrols steadily increased. These and other measures enhanced military readiness and rejuvenated morale in the armed forces.

Quemad moeum gladis nemeinum occidit, occidentis telum est. (A sword is never the killer, it is a tool in a killer’s hands.) The views of Putin and Shoigu on “the threat” the West poses to Russia are in sync. Shoigu told the TASS news agency in October 2015, “Russia’s sovereignty, which is secured by its army and navy, will always be the obstacle against which during the 1,152 years of Russia’s existence many Western rulers have broken their teeth.” Russia’s strategy toward NATO is based on the premise its’ intent is hostile. Aerial and naval probes into NATO’s defense zones have wreaked havoc on the sense of security of some Member States. In Syria, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russia has been able to boldly and effectively project power. In Syria, Russia Federation Armed Forces have used new weapons systems, including: the sea-based Kalibr 3M-14 cruise missile, launched from surface ships and submarines from as far as 1500 kilometers away from their targets; the air launched KH-101 cruise missile; and, the Sukhoi Su-34 strike fighter. On December 19, 2015, Putin stated: “We see how efficiently our pilots and intelligence agents coordinate their efforts with various kinds of forces—the army, navy, and aviation; how they use the most modern weapons.” Putin continued, “I want to stress that these are by far not all of our capabilities,” adding, “We have more military means. And, we will use them—if need be.” Other military means Shoigu is working on include: greater use of military spetznaz (special service troops) to train allies and support their combat operations, the RS-28 Sarmat Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the RS-26 ICBM, and the PAK-FA T-50. The spetsnaz unit of the Russian Airborne Troops and the Special Brigade of the Serbian Army (above) engage in a joint exercise in Serbia. Putin has discussed their presence in Ukraine. Spetznaz can provide a spectrum of military capabilities to include: advising Russian allies, providing airborne and special operations training, and directly supporting combat operations. Their capabilities have been displayed in Syria. Spetznaz have also provided training to Russian Federation allies in its near abroad.

Spetznaz can advise Russian allies through special operations training and during combat by assisting in the location and designation of targets for air strikes, and engage in direct action by locating, capturing or killing specific leaders and other specific personnel, destroying military facilities leaders and conducting raids and ambushes, and destroying military facilities, and infrastructure, as well as protecting Russian and allied facilities, assisting in providing medical services, and coordinating the distribution of equipment to allies. Their capabilities have been displayed in Syria. Putin has referred to their presence in Ukraine. Spetznaz have also provided training to allies of the near abroad as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Mongolia and as far west as Serbia. The RS-28 “Sarmat” is the newest heavy liquid-propelled ICBM under development for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2018, the Sarmat will replace older Soviet R-36M (SS-18) missiles dubbed “Satan” by NATO, as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear forces. The Sarmat’s twelve heavy thermonuclear warheads will be infividually stearable during reentry.

The Russian Federation deploys an estimated 307 ICBMs which can carry approximately 1040 warheads. They represent only 40 percent of the country’s total arsenal of thermonuclear warheads. The RS-28 Sarmat is the newest heavy liquid-propelled ICBM under development for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2018, the Sarmat will replace older Soviet R-36M (SS-18) missiles, dubbed “Satan” by NATO, as the heavy silo-based component of the Russian nuclear forces. The Sarmat will use the same silos as the Satan, but modified for its specifications. The silos would also be equipped with additional active anti-missile systems that would protect them from a pre-emptive strike. The Sarmat will have a dozen heavy thermonuclear warheads, each individually steerable during reentry. Those warheads are said to have advanced anti-missile countermeasures meant to beat the US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Shield. It is speculated that they would have a conventional variant similar to the US Advanced Hypersonic Weapon and could be used as a precision intercontinental weapon in a non-nuclear conflict.

Referred to as a “doomsday weapon”, the new road-mobile RS-26 ICBM (above) has a potential range of 11,000 kilometers. It can continuously change trajectory, and is far more accurate than current ballistic missiles. It’s four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) are supersonic and carry 300 kiloton warheads.

The RS-26 is a new road-mobile ICBM. It has a potential range of 11,000 kilometers. Its booster stage is down to under five minutes giving NATO little time to register its launch. Far more accurate than current ballistic missiles, the RS-26 travels along a continuously changing trajectory. Its four multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) of the RS-26 carry 300 kiloton thermonuclear warheads and are supersonic. Once fired, they can continuously change course. In Russia, the RS-26 has been referred to as a “doomsday weapon”. Prior to 2010, no mobile Russian Federation ICBMs carried MIRVs. The Russian ICBM force is significantly smaller than the US force of 400 ICBMs. Yet, Russian military planners seek to compensate for this by ensuring all of their ICBMs carry MIRVs by 2020. The PAK-FA T-50 stealth fighter appears quite capable and is a big upgrade for the Russian Federation Airspace Force. The first production models of the stealth fighter will purportedly be put into service in 2016.

The PAK-FA T-50 stealth fighter appears quite capable and viewed in many Western defense circles a big upgrade for the Russian Federation Airspace Force. The first production models of the stealth fighter will purportedly be put into service in 2016. In addition to its stealth capability, PAK-FA will hold 12 types of missiles, some of which will be hypersonic and designed to fit into the fighter’s bays in order not to interfere with its stealth characteristics. It reportedly has the advantage of sensor data fusion along with very advanced avionics.The essence of the “Shoigu factor” is that once he is given a military mission, he never fails. Shoigu will surely have three new Russian Federation Army divisions set up before Putin meets the new US President. As power plays, rivalries and intrigues in the Kremlin are speculated upon in the West with enthusiasm, and as more pursue the practice dubbed “Putinology”, at the Kremlin, officials carefully watch the West and act, and on their faces, there are no smiles.

The Way Forward

In November 2013, a year after he took the helm of the Ministry of Defense, the state-run pollster VTsIOM conducted a survey on the attitudes of Russians toward Shoigu. At the time, 46 percent said that they respected him, 35 percent said that they trusted him, and 15 percent said that they sympathized with him. The poll was conducted among 1600 people with the margin of error not exceeding 3.4 percent. In fact, according to polls by the Independent Levada Center, for the last three years, Russians have named Shoigu “Person of the Year” behind only Putin. Last month, Shoigu took second place behind Putin in a rating of Russian officials and politicians in which respondents were asked to choose several names from a list as the most trustworthy leaders. Shoigu was chosen by 26 percent of respondents, ahead of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was named by 21 percent. Putin was chosen by 60 percent of respondents. Polls were conducted among 1600 respondents with a margin of error not exceeding 3.4 percent.

Commentary on Shoigu in the Western media tends to include speculation over a nonexistent ambition to ascend to the pinnacle of power in Russia. Some journalists and pundits in the Western newsmedia seem to be projecting their own sensibilities upon Shoigu. Such stories are more entertaining than newsworthy. Shoigu is real, not some amusement. Despite his political capital and support from the Russian public, he has consistently stayed away from politics. He has never forgotten that he serves the Russian Federation and his president. The big story about Shoigu is that once given a military mission, he never fails. That is the essence of the “Shoigu factor.” He will surely have three new Russian Federation Army divisions set up before Putin meets the new US President. There is a popular misconception that Putin, Shoigu, and other Kremlin officials are “asking” for the West’s respect. On the contrary, they believe the West “needs” to respect Russia. As power plays, rivalries and intrigues in the Kremlin are speculated upon in the West with enthusiasm, and as more pursue the practice dubbed “Putinology,” at the Kremlin, officials carefully watch the West and act, and on their faces, there are no smiles.

The Pivot to Asia: The Policy Shift That Called Putin’s Attention to Europe’s Unlocked Doors

For the administration of US President Barack Obama, the reset with Russia was a major foreign policy initiative. For three years, a business-like tenor existed in relations, making the administration comfortable enough in 2011 to turn its attention toward Asia under what it called the “pivot to Asia.” Its hopes were dashed when Vladimir Putin returned as Russian Federation president in 2012, seeking to restore Russia’s power and influence. Soon after, there were numerous disagreements between Obama and Putin particularly over Europe. Relations deteriorated, and Europe again faced a threat from Russia.

What is most noticeable about US-Russia relations today is the uncongenial relationship between US President Barack Obama and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. While that relationship may seem in perpetual retrograde, there initially was real potential for positive ties and real progress on a variety of issues if the interests of both countries were considered. The Obama administration approached Russia with the idea that the relationship between the two countries could be “reset.” The reset with Russia was one of the administration’s major foreign policy initiatives. Relations with Russian Federation President Dimitry Medvedev were positive. For three years, a relatively smooth and business-like tenor existed in relations with Russia. That contrasted with the contentious relations that followed the Georgian War in 2008 while Putin served as president. It boded well for Obama’s legacy over which White House officials publicly admitted being absorbed. With its Russia policy on track, the administration was comfortable enough to turn toward an even greater priority at the end of 2011 which was referred to as the “pivot to Asia.” Then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton explained it all in an edifying discourse in the October 11, 2011 edition of Foreign Policy magazine.

In her essay entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” Clinton wrote: “In the next ten years, we need to be smart and systematic about where we invest time and energy, so that we put ourselves in the best position to sustain our leadership, secure our interests, and advance our values. One of most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment—diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise—in the Asia Pacific region.” Bringing to memory the historic US commitment to Europe after World War II, Clinton declared: “At a time when the [Asia-Pacific] region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, [the] U.S. commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over—and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits.” The administration’s plans were ambitious and admirable, but its hopes for a benign pivot to Asia were soon dashed. Europe once again faced a threat from Russia. There were numerous actions and reactions by Obama and Putin particularly concerning Europe. Relations deteriorated. Omnia iam fient quae posse negabam! (Everything which I used to say could not happen, will happen now!)

Candidates in the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, perhaps already considering how to deal with Putin and formulating policy approaches for Russia for their possible administrations, should get beyond us-them simplicities and avoid conceptualizing prospective relations solely on where they are at this moment in time. Rather, the course of the collapse of US-Russia relations and how to repair, and avoid, policy missteps witnessed over the past eight years should be anatomized. Part of that process would entail fully understanding those mistakes. Some of them are reviewed here. Further, it is important to genuinely understand the thinking of Putin and his advisers on Russia’s relations with the US. A truncated analysis, in the abstract, of such thinking inside the Kremlin is also presented here.

Igniting Putin: A New Russian Threat Excites Europe

From 1945 to 1989, US geo-strategists assessed that if a new world war were to occur, the battleground would be Europe. However, in the first term of the Obama administration, it was assessed that Europe had become more tranquil. There was a crisis in the eurozone, but Europe remained the most prosperous and peaceful parts of the world. The threat from China was the new focus of geo-strategists. That threat was ostensibly the underlying rationale for the pivot to Asia. In Europe, the announcement of the pivot to Asia was greeted with ambivalence, even alarm. The Europeans understood the renewed commitment to Asia would come at their expense. Obama administration officials tried to prove that was not the case at the time. However, with planned defense cuts of $500 billion over the next decade and the expressed intent to avoid reducing expenditures in Asia, Europe would be the only place to make cuts. The costs were conceivably higher given the possibility budgetary pressures would increase. Key defense commitments in Europe at the time included a missile defense system being developed with a possible nuclear Iran in mind. The administration had already announced that it intends to withdraw two of the four US Army brigades deployed to Europe—with overall military spending on Europe set to decline by 15 percent. Yet, US Army units stationed in Germany were considered in the context of rotations to the Middle East or Africa, not combat in Europe. There remained the potential threat of a breakdown in relations with Russia which would put Europe’s security at risk, but it was practically considered de minimus, negligible. The Obama administration considered the possibility that if Putin returned to Russia’s presidency, he would seek to exert pressure against the West where and when he felt it would pay dividends. It is unlikely the administration foresaw things would go so badly.

Obama was at ease with Medvedev. He went as far as to declare a new era between the two former Cold War adversaries existed. He seemed to measure all possibilities on relations with Russia on his interactions with him. However, maintaining a constructive relationship with the Russian leader is not a personal matter; it is part of the business of being president. Both the US and Russia possess the unique and mutual capability to annihilate one another, and the world, with their nuclear arsenals. Talks between the leaders of the two countries build confidence, eliminate ambiguities about positions, and prevent guessing over actions, intentions, and motives. Talks allow leaders to “clear the air” regarding any personal concerns they had within their own high-level relationship. A strong personal bond between leaders can develop, but it is not essential. When Putin began his third term as Russia’s president on May 7, 2012, the low yield of the reset and the underestimation of Russia as a potential threat became apparent. Putin returned to the Kremlin on a mission to restore Russia’s global power and influence. He was not interested in anything that might diminish or prevent that effort. Perhaps as a consequence of that, old ills that were part of US-Russian relations began to resurface, and new ones arose with frequency. Among them were: Putin’s decision to allow US National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden to reside in Russia; ongoing espionage efforts between Russia and the US, including the activities of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR officer Anna Chapman and other Russian “illegals” captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 2010, and the allegations of US spying on Russia revealed by Snowden and Wikileaks; and the US admonishment of Russia on human rights issues. Putin fumed over Operation Unified Protector, during which multinational forces including the US, were placed under NATO command and imposed a no-fly zone and destroyed government forces loyal to then-Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi. Putin felt NATO-led forces went beyond UN Security Council Resolution 1973’s mandate by helping local forces overthrow Gaddafi. Gaddafi, who had been a friend of the Soviet Union and Russia, was killed. The world saw how poor the relationship between Obama and Putin was after observing their body language when they met in Northern Ireland on June 17, 2013.

Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Sergei Ivanov (above). Ivanov is an anti-US ideologue. He believes the US has taken a foreign policy course aimed at holding on to US leadership in the world by means of the strategic containment of the growing influence of the Russian Federation and other centers of power.

How Relations with Putin Went Wrong Way

Perhaps the administration did not fully grasp just how poorly things were going with Putin. The Obama administration was confident enough to push agendas for nuclear arms reductions with Russia and EU and NATO expansion in Europe just as the administration of US President George W. Bush, his predecessor had. The administration referred to its effort to attain further nuclear arms cuts before leaving office as a “signature effort.” The reduction of nuclear forces and reductions in conventional forces have been issues US and Russian leaders have dealt with for decades, but Obama was not going to resolve any nuclear issues with Putin. Russia’s strategic nuclear forces are not a mere policy issue or bargaining chip for Putin, but a means of survival for Russia. Putin had no intentions of acceding to proposals for deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal repeatedly sent to Moscow by the administration. It was at this point in 2013 that relations with Putin and Russia truly began to collapse, falling to a very low point when the Obama administration cancelled a September summit meeting between Obama and Putin. The cancellation was in retaliation over Putin’s decision to reject the administration’s nuclear proposals. Administration officials lamented that Putin’s decision ended the president’s “signature effort to transform Russian-American relations and potentially dooming his aspirations for further nuclear arms cuts before leaving office.”

There were other very public affronts. The next year, during preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, there was a constant drum beat of doubt expressed by US security experts on the capability of the Russian security services to protect Sochi from terrorism. A leader’s public declaration of his decision not to attend has practically been a tradition among US and Russian leaders during a period of disagreement in international affairs. In addition to the Olympics, Obama would later decide not to attend the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Allies, ending World War II in Europe. The celebration, hosted by Putin, was a time to recall the legacy of cooperation established during the war and a real example of what US-Russian cooperation could be in a common cause. It offered a chance for Obama to privately address his dispute with Putin. It was the best time for him to say that as with the alliance between their countries in World War II, relations between their countries now were important, bigger than both of them. Attending would have required Obama, as Rudyard Kipling would say, to “bite the bullet,” in terms of personal pride, but not in terms of his role as US president. By being absent, that day became one more reminder of the two leaders differences and their uncongenial relationship. Occasio aegre offertur, facile amittitur. (Opportunity is offered with difficulty, lost with ease.)

Between those years, the US and EU took Putin to task for his annexation of the Crimea. Harsh sanctions were levied and Russia was cast out of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies. Even tougher sanctions against Russian interests were threatened by the US if aggression against Ukraine escalated. Putin responded to it all with sanctions against US and EU products. In a March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Putin vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating some Western actions that fostered contempt in Moscow. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he refers to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Incursions of Russian bombers and fighters in NATO airspace and Russian warships in NATO waters were regularized. The only public bright spot in US-Russia relations was diplomacy between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, mainly on Syria and Iran. Still, that activity was more reflective of their countries’ roles on the UN Security Council, not the tenor of relations between Obama and Putin.

Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (above). In response to what Russian officials refer to as “NATO’s preparations along our borders,” Shoigu announced on January 12, 2016 that there would be a major military build-up along its border with Ukraine.

Putin’s Pushes Westward

The poor US relationship with Russia, just as much as the Ukraine crisis, affected Europe’s relationship with Russia concerning business, economics, and security. In the summer of 2013, the EU Council sharply condemned Russia’s mounting pressure on members of the EU Eastern Partnership, countries with association agreements with the EU. In 2012, the EU accounted for 52 percent of Russia’s exports, 68 percent of which consisted of fuel and energy. Following the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the EU suspended virtually all cooperation. Still, Putin’s thinking on the EU was not positive even before the Ukraine crisis. Putin saw the EU as a project of deepening integration based on norms of business, law, and administration at variance from those emerging in Russia. Putin was also concerned that EU enlargement would become a means of excluding Russia from its “zones of traditional influence.” Certain Russian actions indicate Moscow actively seeks to encourage members to withdraw from the EU sphere and discourage countries joining it. Joint projects with European countries have allowed Russia to exploit their differences on political, economic and commercial issues creating a discordant harmony in the EU. As much as making money, a goal of such efforts has been to undermine EU unity on sanctions. The Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline, for example, has provided Putin with the means to disrupt, weaken European unity. A murmur exists in Europe that solidarity ends at the frontiers of some countries. Ad mores natura recurrit damnatos fixa et mutari nescia. (Human nature even reverts to its depraved courses, fixed and immutable)

Regarding NATO, in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin provided insight into his thinking then and now. During the interview, Putin quoted West German Parliamentarian Egon Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and EU as having acquitted themselves of ties to promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. He feels historians have ignored the machinations and struggles of people involved. Putin further stated: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have. You can also see this striving for an absolute triumph in the American missile defense plans.” Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Fortunate is he who understands the causes of things.)

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Foreign Policy Adviser Yuri Ushakov (above). Ushakov, much as Ivanov, is not a fan of the US. He was present at former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s meeting with Putin. Kissinger seemed to confirm many of the worst notions Putin and his advisers held on US thinking.

In the years after the Soviet Union’s collapse, many European countries cut their defense spending, allowed their military preparedness to drop, and reduced the NATO footprint in their own territories and in countries east to occasional drills and small exercises with former Warsaw Pact members. They stood unprepared to confront Russia. Some allowed fear and resignation to infiltrate their perceptions of the matter. They sought to veil the fact that they were intimidated by Putin, and seemingly tried to mollify him, speaking skeptically about the clear threat Russia posed. Others seemed to fear signaling a military reaction to Putin. Yet, they signaled insecurity by appearing ambivalent about committing to the costly requirements of collective security despite: the “Crimea-grab”; the Russian push in the Donbass; a looming threat to the Baltic States; Moscow’s threats to use nuclear weapons; and, Russian military air and naval incursions from Britain to Estonia. (It would be unconstructive to name specific countries regarding this point.)

Putin did not stand by while the EU and NATO expanded. He decided to pull independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Russia’s orbit. Accomplishing that required Putin to create something that did not preexist in most near abroad countries: ethnic-Russian communities forcefully demanding secession and sovereignty. That process usually begins with contemptuous murmurs against home country’s identity, language, and national symbols and then becomes a “rebel yell” for secession. It was seen in Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova, and more recently in Crimea, the Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine. Each time an ethnic-Russian space is carved out of a country, Putin gains a base from which he can exert his influence in that country.

Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council Nikolai Patrushev (above). Patrushev is Russia’s most senior intelligence official. He asserts that the US has always sought to have levers of pressure on Russia by making use of NATO on its own terms and using its political and economic pressure to prevent vacillations by allies and partners.

Inside the Kremlin: Putin’s Advisers Speak

Audiatur et altera pars! (Let us hear the opposite side!) In February 2016, a doyen of US foreign policy, archetypal Cold Warrior, and master architect of détente, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, visited Russia in order to speak at the Gorchakov Foundation. While in Moscow, he met at the Kremlin with Putin, the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Sergei Ivanov and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office and Foreign Policy Adviser, Yuri Ushakov. Ivanov and Ushakov are anti-US ideologues. In his Gorchakov Foundation speech and his meeting at the Kremlin, Kissinger, albeit unintentionally, confirmed many of the worst notions Russian officials held on US thinking. Kissinger stated that “Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily a threat to the United States.” Noting that “divisive issues” existed, Kissinger suggested that rather than establish its own sphere of influence near its border, Russia should share influence in its’ periphery with the West to avoid raising alarms around it. For example, he asserted that “Ukraine needs to be embedded in the structure of European and international security architecture in such a way that it serves as a bridge between Russia and the West rather than an outpost of either side.” To Putin and his advisers, Kissinger’s ideas were hardly acceptable. Enough examples of Moscow’s behavior exist to challenge the suggestion that some sea change in thinking at the Kremlin could occur. Consider the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. In a March 6, 2014, BBC.com article entitled, “Ukraine Crisis: Obama Urges Putin to Pursue Diplomacy,” it was reported Obama told Putin in a phone call that there was a solution available that suited all parties, involving talks between Kiev and Moscow, international monitors in Ukraine, and Russian forces returning to their bases. Yet, Putin would never entertain a solution that would “suit all parties.” What suits Russia in the near abroad was, and remains, Putin’s only concern.

When Kissinger went on to state that there must be a willingness “to move beyond the grievances and sense of victimization . . . ,” Putin and his advisers sat unruffled, but were surely irritated. They likely perceived Kissinger was being dismissive of their strong concerns over EU and NATO expansion eastward. His statement likely supported their perceptions that US officials have an instinctive need to assert moral authority over Russia.

Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev (above). Obama was put at ease when Medvedev was Russia’s president. Obama went as far as declaring a new era existed between the two former Cold War adversaries. Now Medvedev states: “NATO’s policies related to Russia remain unfriendly and opaque—one could go as far as to say we have slid back to a new Cold War.” Medvedev is not a friend of the US. He is Putin’s comrade.

During the final plenary session at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia on October 22, 2015, Putin mentioned the 1973 comedy, science-fiction film from the Soviet Union, “Ivan Vasilyevich Changes Profession.” Putin quoted one of the film’s characters as saying to another: “How am I supposed to understand what you’re saying if you don’t say anything?” Senior Russian political leaders and foreign and defense policy officials have recently made some unambiguous public statements about US, EU and Russian relations. Clearly, their statements were biased by the view that US holds an unyielding hostility toward Russia which is manifested in its policies and actions. Speaking at the Munich Security Conference on February 13, 2016, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, Putin’s political comrade, accused NATO of restarting the Cold War amid increased military maneuvers and troop deployments to Russia’s neighbors. Medvedev told the meeting of national leaders, senior defense officials, and top diplomats that sanctions imposed after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and new moves by NATO “only aggravate tensions.” He argued: “NATO’s policies related to Russia remain unfriendly and opaque—one could go as far as to say we have slid back to a new Cold War.” He went on to state: “On an almost daily basis, we’re called one of the most terrible threats either to NATO as a whole, or Europe, or to the United States.” Medvedev called for lifting sanctions imposed on Russia concerning Crimea, saying they are “a road that leads nowhere.” He suggested the West would only harm itself if it did not lift the sanctions soon. He warned: “The longer the sanctions continue, the more chances fade for Europeans to keep their positions in Russian markets as investors and suppliers.”

In his meeting with Putin, Ivanov, and Ushakov, Kissinger stated that Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium concerning what he dubbed “divisive issues” such as Ukraine. He suggested Russia should share influence in its declared near abroad with the West. He also explained there must be a willingness to move beyond grievances and sense of victimization. Putin and his advisers sat unruffled, but were surely irritated by his statements.

In an interview with the official government newspaper, Rossiskaya Gazeta, the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council, one of Putin’s most important advisers and most senior intelligence official, Nikolai Patrushev, proffered: “. . . Washington has always sought to have levers of pressure on Russia. Thus, in 1974 the famous Jackson-Vanik Amendment was adopted, restricting trade relations with our country. It appeared to have completely lost its relevance immediately after the breakup of the USSR, but it was still in force right up to 2012, when the so-called “Magnitsky List” was promptly adopted in its place.” Referring to current US and EU sanctions against Russia, Patrushev explained: “The current sanctions are in the same category. The US administration’s activity in the Ukrainian sphere is taking place within the framework of an updated White House foreign policy course aimed at holding on to American leadership in the world by means of the strategic containment of the growing influence of the Russian Federation and other centers of power. In this context Washington is actively making use, on its own terms, of NATO’s potential, seeking to use political and economic pressure to prevent vacillations on the part of its allies and partners.”

In response to what Russian officials refer to as “NATO’s preparations along our borders,” on January 12, 2016, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that there would be a major military build-up along its border with Ukraine. Shoigu reportedly stated: “the task of utmost importance for us this year is to form three new military divisions in the western direction.” Shoigu stressed that it was not only a necessity not just to form the bases but also to re-equip locations for permanent deployment, create appropriate training grounds, storage space for equipment and accommodations for personnel. Shoigu further explained that “special attention should be paid to monitoring and analysis of the military-political situation in the world, as well as timely responses to its changes.” One base is being constructed in the town of Boguchar in the Voronezh region, located 45 kilometers from the border of Ukraine’s Luhansk province, now the self-declared, independent Luhansk People’s Republic. The base would accommodate at least 5,000 troops and would be able to house 1,300 pieces of military equipment. A similar base will be constructed near the settlement of Valuiki in the Belgorod region, approximately 20 kilometers from Luhansk.

For the Obama administration, the end is closer than the beginning. Only so much can be done in the amount of time left to halt the trend downward, much less, turn things around with Putin or its Russia policy. The challenge of improving US-Russia relations will likely be left to the next US President. O si sic omnia. (Oh, would that all had been done or said thus.)

The Way Forward

A little more than four years after Clinton provided her 2011 discourse on the pivot to Asia, General Breedlove essentially assessed the path had not been paved for Europe to go without a US presence, US leadership, and significant US support. In the US European Command Posture Statement 2016 presented on February 25, 2016, Breedlove explained: “I cannot emphasize how important European nations, in particular our NATO Allies and Non-NATO Partners, are to ensuring America’s security and safety. Many of our most capable and willing allies and partners are in Europe, playing an essential role in promoting our vital interests and executing a full range of military missions . . . Europe is not the same continent it was when I took command, as new threats and challenges continue to emerge.” The grand notion of pivoting away from Europe to focus more on Asia withered once the clashes between Putin and Obama began. Some may parse out the collision of Obama and Putin as representing the natural balance of things as their worldviews are so divergent. Even if true, some syncretistic existence should have been established for the benefit of their countries and their people. Authentic geopolitical thinking was subsumed by a satisfying substitute for reality concerning long-term US-Russia relations. Indeed, decisions in the Obama administration on Putin and Russia were based on relations with Medvedev early-on and what was best for Obama’s legacy. That got the administration into trouble with Putin from the get-go. Relations languished in misunderstanding.

Discord obtains when things get mixed up. One might speculate, with levity, that Russia experts at the State Department, the Defense Department, and CIA, who understood Putin, were seemingly exiled to isolated garrets on the top floors of their headquarters buildings by the administration to keep their impressions out of the way. Hopefully, there is not an irreversible trend downward for US-Russia relations. Yet, the end is closer than the beginning for the Obama administration. Only so much can be done with time available to halt the slide, much less, turn things around. Improving US-Russia relations will be a challenge left for the next US administration. Kissinger suggested Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium. However, creating that global equilibrium will be tough as Russia will likely remain intransigent over its interests in what Putin calls the near abroad. Some recognition of Russia’s positions would be required to improve relations (although creating an arrangement in Europe that would satisfy Russia may not be possible at this point). Resetting relations would also require a new administration to recognize the limits of US power projection. How much the US will be able to handle in its sphere of influence in the future must be determined through a hard-headed assessment of possibilities based on capabilities both available and in development.

Russia Gloats, US Worries and France Vents Exasperation over Brexit: Can Obama Bolster EU Unity Despite Russian Pressures?

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin shouts back at cheering troops as he walks with Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during the 2015 Victory Day Parade in Moscow. Russia presented itself at the event as a country on the rise. Part of that rise apparently includes encouraging the fall of the EU and NATO. Russia has been accused of using military, economic, and political means to promote a discordant harmony among countries to undermine EU unity on sanctions and unity as a bloc.

According to a February 20, 2016 article in The Times in the United Kingdom entitled, “Russia Gloats, US Worries and France Vents Exasperation”, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is thought to be privately gleeful at the sight of discord within the EU over the possible decision by the British to exit the EU (Brexit). Indeed, the article states whatever undermines the EU—which Russia accuses of meddling in Ukraine and its former European Soviet satellite state—is good for Moscow. Reportedly, in Washington, the prospect of Brexit has set alarm bells ringing about the United Kingdom’s possible retreat to the European periphery, altering its special relationship with London.

In a January 31, 2016 greatcharlie.com post entitled, “In the State of the Union Address, Obama Confronts Americans’ Fears; They Want to See Success on Foreign Policy”, it was predicted that in 2016, Putin may want to maintain an environment of confrontation for the US and EU leaders. He supports countries behind many of the foreign policy problems that the administration of US President Barack Obama faces. Keeping all European allies unified and resolute could become more difficult as some may fear facing greater problems from him. Putin has looked deeply at the US and Europe, discerning many flaws, weaknesses in the transatlantic bond. He particularly noticed the lack of will among European political leaders to maintain it. The initial response to Putin’s battering rams, to include his moves in Ukraine, hybrid warfare threat to the Baltic States, and military build-up, was to bolster the barricades of Europe particularly in London and Berlin. Since then there have been cracks in the armor, precipitated by Putin’s maneuvers. In most cases, any damage to the European unity would appear self-inflicted by EU and NATO Members. In every case, Putin would be a beneficiary. Any member’s departure from the “Group of 28”, or NATO, would be a step in the wrong direction. The Obama administration is urging the EU not to retreat having achieved so much. Causality for this situation may be found in part in the administration’s plans for a “pivot to Asia”, its delinquency in responding to important issues on European policy, and its disastrous relations with Putin. Despite the challenging political, economic, and security issues with which some EU states are wrestling, the Obama administration can bolster European unity, and by-pass military, economic, and political obstacles Russia may be creating. The examples presented in this discussion provide kernels of some approaches. The Obama administration needs to support Europe in its search for answers to buttress unity. Its assistance should not be a mere search for the bromide of a public relations message. The administration should contribute approaches to effectively promote unity in accordance with the stated needs of European allies.

The migrant crisis in Europe began with German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s announcement in the summer of 2015 that Germany would stop expelling Syrian refugees and her agreement with Austria in September 2015 to welcome tens of thousands of migrants who were stuck in Hungary. Hungary rejected their asylum requests. Merkel’s actions were followed by a massive surge in asylum seekers travelling from Turkey to Greece and then up through the Balkans to Hungary, Austria, Germany and northern Europe. The result has been a humanitarian tragedy, and a political, social, and administrative nightmare for capitals created by an external source, but not Putin. Indeed, Putin has said the refugee crisis is “an internal problem of the EU” and added that Russia does not “interfere in these issues.” Given that Russia has had no discernible hand in the matter, the issue is not included in the discussion here.

NATO recently revealed that in 2013, two Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bombers (as above) escorted by four Sukhoi Su-27 jet fighters, came within 24 miles off the island of Gotland, 100 miles from Stockholm, and conducted mock nuclear attacks. The Swedish military was caught completely off-guard causing great concern among Swedish officials.

Stirring Disunity Militarily

Etiam fortes viros subitis terreri. (Even the bravest men are frightened by sudden terrors.)  Putin is genuinely on a mission to restore Russia’s global power and influence and to bring the independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Russia’s orbit. In Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Syria, Putin has shown the will to fight, even after red-lines were crossed and stern warnings were given. His threats of military action are not doubted. Russian intrusions into NATO airspace, flyovers and buzzing by military jets, interceptions at sea and other harassing actions in NATO waters, are designed to have a strong educational effect on leaders in Europe.

Sweden

It has been reported by NATO in February 2016 that the Russian Federation Air Force conducted a mock nuclear attack against Sweden during war games. The March 2013 exercise saw Russian aircraft cross the Gulf of Finland and approach Swedish airspace. The NATO report claimed that Russian military drills have now reached levels unseen since the height of the Cold War. During the military exercise on March 20, 2013, two Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bombers escorted by four Sukhoi Su-27 jet fighters came within 24 miles off the island of Gotland, 100 miles from Stockholm. They conducted dummy bombing runs against targets thought to include a military base in southern Sweden and the headquarters of the country’s signals intelligence agency outside Stockholm. The incident caused controversy at the time because the Swedish military was caught unprepared and to rely on Danish Air Force jets operating as part of NATO’s Baltic air policing mission to respond. Sweden has since remilitarized an old Cold War frontier base on the island of Gotland because of the rising threat from Russia. The Obama administration has sought to expand US military spending in Europe four-fold to about $3.4 billion in an effort to reassure allies unsettled by Russia’s military actions. Such efforts affirm the US commitment to Europe. Yet, Sweden and other NATO members must be dissuaded from the view that peace can exist without significant, tangible investment in Europe’s mutual defense. They must work cooperatively with the US to bolster Europe’s defense.

Norway

In its National Threat Assessment presented in February 2016, the Norwegian Police and Security Service (PST) reported that Russia is a threat to Norway. While presenting the report, the Head of PST Marie Benedicte Bjornland explained Russian Federation intelligence services have made targets of Norway’s capabilities in defense, security, and preparedness. Bjornland said, “Our assessment is that the aim of these activities is to facilitate Russian military dispositions in a future security policy scenario.” The PST report explains that such intelligence activities could ultimately threaten key Norwegian interests and the country’s control over its own territory. The report claims that intelligence operatives have been sent to Norway with official covers as diplomats at the embassy or consulates. The main task of those diplomats, as observed by PST, is to establish relations of trust with Norwegian government employees or any other individuals who can provide sensitive information. The PST report explained that such intelligence operatives also make use of other tools such as the extensive use of operations to spread information and propaganda and influence opinion in other countries with a view to weakening confidence in the authorities of the target state or sowing division between difference groups in the society or in different regions. The PST warned that these methods are particularly used during periods of tension concerning security, and Norway should prepare itself to cope with such methods. PST head Bjornland further explained that large scale digital espionage against Norway and Norwegian interests was already underway. Businesses and educational institutions would undoubtedly be targets of such attacks. Crux est si metuas quod vincere neques. (It is tormenting to fear what you can’t overcome.)

Above are Russian “green men” in Crimea in 2014. In its National Threat Assessment presented in February 2016, the Norwegian Police and Security Service (PST) reported that Russian Federation intelligence services have made targets of Norway’s capabilities in defense, security, and preparedness. Fear exists in Oslo that one morning green men may appear in Norway’s streets.

Denmark

In March 21, 2015, Russia went on a public relations offensive on the Baltic. Denmark was warned that if it joined the NATO’s missile defense shield, its navy would become a legitimate target for a Russian nuclear attack. The Russian Federation Ambassador to Denmark, Mikhail Vanin delivered that message during an interview with a Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. He was quoted as follows: “Denmark would be part of the threat against Russia. It would be less peaceful and relations with Russia would suffer. It is, of course, your own decision—I just want to remind you that your finances and security will suffer. At the same time Russia has missiles that certainly can penetrate the future global missile defense system.” Denmark’s Foreign minister, Martin Lidegaard, reacted strongly to the comments, calling the Russian ambassador’s statement “unacceptable.” However, Nicolai Wammen, Denmark’s Defense Minister went to pains to calm Russia, saying the move [toward a defense shield] is not targeted toward Russia but at “rogue states, terrorists organizations and others who would have the capacity to fire missiles at Europe and the United States.” Concerning such statements by Russian officials, NATO Supreme Allied Commander US Air Force General Philip Breedlove has already provided some answers which the Obama administration should echo. Breedlove said: NATO must challenge Russia’s current policies and demonstrate that Putin’s current approach will not be allowed to damage security. He further stated the alliance must also deter Russia “by carefully shaping Moscow’s choices and managing Putin’s confidence.” Nord Stream-2 will include two new pipelines that will deliver an additional 44 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland. Germany, the greatest consumer of Russian gas, supports Nord Stream-2. Some EU countries say it contradicts the sanctions policy against Russia, and accuse German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her government of putting their country’s economic needs ahead of collective diplomacy.

Stirring Disunity Economically

Nihil tam muitium quod non expungari pecunia posit. (No fort is so strong that it cannot be taken with money.) Some EU countries have established new deals with Russia, an activity inconsistent with placing sanctions on Moscow over its behavior toward EU or EU-backed countries. Perhaps those states really believe such breakdowns in unity are unavoidable, especially regarding oil and gas. However, regardless of the genuine economic benefits of any deals with Russia, the economic carrots held by Moscow enable it to use EU and NATO members as tools against each other.

Germany

In September 2015, the Russian state owned gas giant, Gazprom, began preparing for the construction of Nord Stream-2. It will include two new pipelines that will deliver an additional 44 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea, bypassing Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland. Nord Stream-2 doubles the capacity of Nord Stream-1 built in 2011 which passes through Ukraine. Running the new pipeline through Ukraine was viewed unsafe. The new pipeline is especially important to Germany, the greatest consumer of Russian gas. Some EU countries fear the new pipeline will allow Germany to dominate the European gas market, Germany says politics should be left behind in the building of the pipeline. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker echoed that view saying the project should be considered not as a political issue, but as a commercial one. In December 2015, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi was the first to speak out against the pipeline in the context of security saying it contradicted the sanctions policy against Russia. Italy also accused Germany of putting its economic needs ahead of the bloc’s collective diplomacy. (Note Italian firm Eni had large investment in a South Stream gas pipeline from Russia cancelled by Gazprom in 2014) Italian concerns over the Nord Stream-2 have since been quieted. A group of Eastern European countries sent a letter to the European Commission calling for it to block the Nord Stream-2. They are headed by Slovakia and Poland, who are believed to have initiated the campaign, and supported by the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Greece. They say Nord Stream-2 goes against the EU energy diversification and security policies. Berlin might explain claims by other EU and NATO countries are small relative to the German commitment to European defense and security and its role as the EU’s economic engine. The Obama administration has not publicly admonished or discouraged Germany on Nord Stream-2. It could insist Germany demonstrate how the gas deal is a matter of energy security, not adverse  with sanctions policy, and maybe assist it in doing so. During the final plenary session at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia on October 22, 2016, Putin seemed to deliberately sow seeds of suspicion regarding the solidarity of two main members the EU with the other 26 members by saying: “I believe that the Federal Chancellor of Germany and the President of France are being sufficiently objective today, and though it is obvious for political reasons they support the current Kiev authorities, in my opinion they have a sufficiently fair assessment of the situation. They already have an understanding that the problems that have accumulated there are not only black and white—it is much more complicated.”

Observing Germany’s moves, other EU countries have rushed to strengthen ties with Russia. During a visit to Moscow in February 3, 2016, Austrian Vice Chancellor Reinhold Mitterlehner confirmed Austria’s commitment to Russia’s Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project to Europe at a meeting with Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev.

Austria

Observing Germany, other states contributing far less to the EU and NATO, have visited Putin, seeking to strengthen their business and economic linkages with Russia. During a visit to Moscow in February 3, 2016, Austrian Vice Chancellor Reinhold Mitterlehner stated that EU sanctions against Russia have made no political progress and brought negative effects to Austria’s economy. Recent statements from Putin support the Vice Chancellor’s claim. Putin explained: “Concerning our possibilities on the international financial markets, the sanctions are severely harming Russia. But the biggest harm is currently caused by the decline of the prices of oil and gas, which we can partly compensate for elsewhere.” Putin added: “The trade balance, however, is still positive.” For Mitterlehner, the low impact of sanctions on Russia and their reverse impact on Austrian firms put the continued implementation of them in question. On that, Mitterlehner complained: “We have over a thousand companies doing business with Russia from Austria, and another 500 Austrian firms working in Russia. 40,000 employees are being affected.” He confirmed Austria’s commitment to Russia’s Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline project to Europe at a meeting with Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev.

Hungary

In a press conference at his Novo-Ogaryovo residence with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on February 17, 2016, Putin referred to Hungary as an “old and faithful partner.” Orban returned with similar pleasantries, but contrary to thinking within the EU of which Hungary is a member, Orban also stated that the time for the automatic extension of the sanctions on Russia had passed, and that more EU countries are starting to oppose the restrictions on Moscow. Orban and Putin had signed a number of agreements two years earlier to include the expansion of Paks-2, Hungary’s only active nuclear power plant, built by the Soviet Union. The four Paks reactors are currently producing up to 50 percent of Hungary’s electricity. However, the remaining reactors will go off-line between 2032 and 2037, and Hungary would lose the bulk of its electricity. The €12.5 billion contract, partly aided by Moscow’s €10 billion loans, would add two new 1,200 megawatt reactors to nuclear power plant. The Orban and Putin also agreed to extend a gas deal which will see Russia supply Hungary until the end of 2019. About 85 percent of Hungary’s gas flows from Russia. Orban and Putin already signed a gas agreement in 2015 that replaced a 20 year contract that expired in December 2015. Under the agreement, Budapest is paying only for the gas it actually consumes, as opposed to the volume it contracts, making it a lucrative offer for the low-demand client. Putin said: “We are satisfied even despite a well-known drop in trade turnover. We are content with the nature of our relationship.” In 2015, Orban told Putin “Hungary needs Russia.” In 2014, Orban said Europe “shot itself in the foot” as the sanctions policy pursued by the West “causes more harm to us than to Russia.” Putin said that the Kremlin is convinced that the “normalization of Russia-EU ties will happen sooner or later.”

There is discernible frustration among Georgia’s elites and the public with the slow pace of Western integration. Russian propaganda has influenced Georgia’s disillusioned. Despite tension between Moscow and Tblisi, the prospect exists that Georgia might slow or suspend efforts toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration and abandon closer EU and NATO ties.

Stirring Disunity Politically

What galls the US and EU is the considerable effort they say Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has invested in grabbing territory in what he refers to as Russia’s “near abroad”. Each time an ethnic-Russian space is carved out of a country, Putin is provided with additional space from which he can exert his influence in the home country. In the Crimea and the Donbass in Ukraine, Russia moved in with its forces, under the causality of rescuing ethnic-Russian lives. So far, Russia has refrained from taking military action in other near abroad countries. However, Russia has used state-controlled media outlets to beam programs and reports into near abroad countries attacking the notion of European unity.  News stories on Europe on RT_com and Sputnik in particular are usually negative, designed to stoke cynicism citizens may feel toward their leaders. Eventually, such propaganda will be structured to drive citizens in those countries away from European economic and security structures. Vulpem pilum mutat, non mores. (A fox may change its hair, not its tricks.)

Georgia

In February 2016, US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress that Georgia could reverse its strategic orientation toward the West under Russian pressure. The rethinking of its Euro-Atlantic orientation would be due in part to Russian efforts. According to Clapper, “even as Georgia progresses with reforms, Georgian politics will almost certainly be volatile as political competition increases. Economic challenges are also likely to become a key political vulnerability for the government before the 2016 elections. In 2008, Putin first tested NATO, moving against countries that are part of Russia’s “near abroad.” Pro-Russian separatists in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia, along with Russian Federation troops, fought a war for independence against the Georgian Government. Once peace was established between the warring parties by then-French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Russia occupied the two rebellious regions and continues to do so today. Russia also recognized their independence. There are now nearly 5,000 Russian Federation troops based in South Ossetia and 5,000 based in Abkhazia. There was little Georgia could do then, or can do now, to recover those regions, yet it had the support of the US, and the EU. The big change that has occurred is the growth of a discernible frustration among Georgia’s elites and the public with the slow pace of Western integration. Russian propaganda has also been effective in Georgia and the prospect exists that Tblisi might slow or suspend efforts toward greater Euro-Atlantic integration and abandon closer EU and NATO ties. That could occur despite the fact that tension between Tblisi and Moscow remains high. A similar assessment was made about Georgia in 2015, but the risk is now increasing. At best, Russia could ask Georgia to join a Russia-led customs union and sign up for the Moscow dominated Eurasian Economic Union. That might be countered by increased public visits by senior US and EU officials to hear Tblisi’s ideas on accelerating the pace of integration.

Moldova

In 2008, Putin forced Armenia to break off its agreements with the EU, and Moldova was placed under similar pressure. Moldovans in response elected a pro-EU government in 2009. It was a pro-EU government that in 2014, which against Russia’s wishes, signed an Association Agreement with the EU. However, Moldova entered 2016 without a government and mired in a deep political crisis following a corruption scandal which forced the ruling pro-EU government of Prime Minister Valeriu Strelet to resign in late October. Earlier revelations concerning the same scandal knocked down his predecessor, Chiril Gaburici, in June 2015. The crisis began early 2015 when it was discovered that over $1 billion, equivalent to about 15 percent of the country’s GDP, had disappeared from three Moldovan banks in 2014 following parliamentary elections. When Gaburici’s administration fell,  the question was raised whether leaders in Chisinau would ever be able to enact reforms needed to bring the country in line with EU standards. Despite the fact the a pro-European government was eventually approved by lawmakers, Moldovans engaged in street protests, discontented over its right wing and pro-Romania elements. Officials in power feared that if early elections were called, Moldovans would vote for representatives of the left, who are pro-Russian, and who seek to develop political and economic ties with Russia. In addition to other benefits such as trade, the coming to power of a pro-Russian government in Moldova would be a public relations coup for Moscow. It could claim that Moldova was a state that experienced all of the charms of European integration and decided to return to orient itself toward the tried and proven path toward Russia and long-established Russian markets.

Regarding Transnistria–an unrecognized republic which declared independence in 1990 and defended it in the War of Transnistria in 1992. It has been governed since as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, a pro-Russian government in Chisinau could help diffuse the crisis, but very likely in Moscow’s favor. To firm up agreements that ended the war, talks that include the US, EU, and Russia, are underway on the Transnistria Peace Settlement. Chisinau, along with Kiev, has blockaded Transnistria, preventing not only trade but the entry of citizens with Russian passports into its territory. After the War of Transnistria of 1992, the Russian Federation stationed 2,500 troops in the republic. Today, 1000 Russian Federation troops remain there ostensibly as peacekeepers. In 2014, Transnistria announced it hoped Russia would annex its territory into Russia following the Crimea referendum. As a sign of support, in 2015, Moscow had 400 Russian Federation troops there to hold military exercises using armored personnel carriers and live ammunition. Still, Moscow always considers the big picture, and apparently does not believe annexing Transnistria would be advantageous. It does not want the Transnistria issue to negatively impact its efforts to bring Moldova into its Eurasian Economic Union. Discernable steps to bring Moldova closer have included: the courtship of pro-Russian political elements; efforts to create stronger economic ties; and, diplomatic overtures on establishing a new security relationship. If Moldova moved closer to Russia, security risks might increase for Europe, especially with regard to Ukraine and Romania. In a calibrated way, the US and EU might invest directly into Moldovan communities, focusing on schools churches, community centers, and infrastructure projects. Supporting Moldovan economic growth by seeking more international markets for Moldovan goods and services worldwide might take some dtrains off of Chisinau. The US and EU could enable Moldova to better integrate itself militarily with Europe by providing its forces equipment and training from US and European military advisers. Diplomatic efforts could relax pressures on Chisinau from Ukraine and Romania.

It was the United Kingdom that raised European awareness of the importance of interventionist foreign and security policy and has kept the concept alive. United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron has urged Europe to stand up to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine and to potential threats elsewhere on the continent. Nothing would make Putin happier than seeing the United Kingdom give-up on its Western partners.

Brexit

Nothing would make Putin happier than seeing the United Kingdom give-up on its Western partners. It was the United Kingdom that raised European awareness of the importance of interventionist foreign and security policy and has kept the concept alive. United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron has urged Europe to stand up to Putin’s aggression in Ukraine and potential threats elsewhere on the continent. Cameron has been frank in expressing mutual positions of the Western powers to Putin in meetings. It has also been the United Kingdom that has argued for the liberalization of European markets and global free-trade in unison with the US. The Obama administration is agonizing over the possibility of the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU on its watch. It would create unsettling changes in the US dynamic with the United Kingdom and EU as well. It was on January 23, 2013 that Cameron made his renowned “Bloomberg speech”, in which he promised an in/out referendum on the United Kingdom’s EU membership. Cameron said the referendum would follow a period of negotiation with other EU countries on the internal working of the EU and the United Kingdom’s relationship to it. Those negotiations occurred, and despite some firm resistance from France, Cameron got most of what he wanted. Four main points sum it up: an opt out from the ambition of an “ever closer union” (The phase appeared in the Treaty of Rome, which the United Kingdom is not a signatory and the non binding preamble of the Treaty of Lisbon.); greater powers for national parliaments block EU legislation; safeguards to ensure the single market cannot be rigged in favor of eurozone members; and, reducing access to social benefits to EU nationals, which is tied to concerns about immigration. Next comes the national referendum on June 23, 2016. “In/out” campaigning is underway. During the Greek, news about the crisis on the Russian state news channel, Russia-24, was accompanied by the graphic declaring “Greece—almost over.” The Russian daily Kosmomolskaya Pravda ran the headline: “Greek tragedy. Divorce already near.” The Greek crisis was perceived then as just the start of the EU’s problems, suggesting Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy could be next if Greece left the eurozone. It should be expected that Russian media houses roll out similar coverage on Brexit.

Obama is counting on Cameron to capture the imagination of the United Kingdom and not let it recede further into the distance. The United Kingdom has been an important intermediary between the US and Europe. It is not near the center of European power, which is now concentrated around Germany and France. The United Kingdom has become weaker militarily and increasingly paralyzed by domestic issues. Washington fears that the United Kingdom is moving out of the international power game. Keeping an active United Kingdom in the EU is central to US efforts to keep Europe united. Obama might visit Cameron at Number 10 Downing Street to signify his support. Obama could ask Cameron then what exactly he can do as the US president to support the campaign to keep the United Kingdom in the EU. Cameron might just accept his offer and present Obama with a laundry list of requests. Nothing on that list should be subject to political bargaining. The special relationship between the US and the United Kingdom is genuine. By supporting Cameron, the Obama administration may leave the most positive legacy regarding US-United Kingdom relations since World War II.

Since Obama supports the campaign to keep the United Kingdom in the EU, perhaps he could visit London, and ask Cameron directly what he could do as the US president to assist him. If Cameron wants his help, he might just provide Obama with a laundry list of requests. Not one item should be subject to bartering. The special US relationship with the United Kingdom is real. By supporting Cameron on Brexit, the Obama administration may leave the most positive legacy regarding US-United Kingdom relations since World War II.

The Way Forward

The Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus was quoted as saying: “Because your own strength is unequal to the task, do not assume that it is beyond the powers of man; but if anything is within the powers and province of man, believe that it is within your own compass also.” It is good the Obama administration in its final year has taken an interest in European unity and pressures from Russia. The administration has clearly indicated that it is not conceding to anything that is difficult, uncertain, and perhaps even disconcerting in international affairs.

Among Europeans in 2015, Obama received strong support, although his ratings dropped slightly over the past seven years. To give an example, he has the confidence of 83 percent of France, 76 percent of the United Kingdom, and 73 percent of Germany. Yet, perhaps there may be less interest in what Obama says at this point. He is, after all, a lame duck president with months left in office.   Europeans may be transfixed on the very interesting candidates of the Election of 2016, pondering who the next US president will be. Perhaps pride may cause them to reject what Obama may offer. Yet, whether Europeans want to hear from Obama or accept his help or not, they must recognize the need to remain united and maintain the Atlantic bridge to the US. Outside of the EU, European countries would have a superficial existence, underestimating their destiny, dignity, and nature. To that extent, a dialogue with Obama about capabilities and possibilities for assisting their countries in 2016 should be sought.

Big Guns in East Ukraine Fall Silent: Will the Donbass See Peace or Surreptitious Moves by Putin?

Pictured above is a sniper from the Azov Battalion of the National Guard of Ukraine on the front line in the Donbass. The Azov Battalion is a far-right neo-Nazi all volunteer infantry unit, armed by Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. The vicious fighting seen in the Donbass, Putin’s record of moves elsewhere, and portrayals of him cast doubt that peace can be found in the region. However, the prospect for peace still exists.

According to a September 1, 2015 Reuters article entitled “Big Guns in East Ukraine Fall Silent, Two More Die from Wounds in Kiev,” a fragile ceasefire agreed to by the Ukrainian Government and pro-Russian separatists on August 26, 2015, appears to have held. The agreement appealed to the human side of the belligerents, required a halt in fighting in recognition of the start of the school year on September 1st. The Minsk Agreement, signed on February 12, 2015, was supposed to have established just such a ceasefire once signed. However, following its signing, a succession of violations reportedly occurred in both the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts—administrative divisions—in which artillery and other weapons were used. Both sides accused the other of violations in which Ukrainian soldiers and pro-Russian separatist fighters were killed. The September 1st ceasefire was arranged under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The three-party Contact Group, which includes representatives of the Ukrainian Government, the Russian Government, and pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk hammered out the document.

The Minsk Agreement represents the beginning of the real peace in the Donbass region. Its terms include: an immediate ceasefire; a buffer zone separating heavy weapons of both sides, with a minimum buffer zone of 50km for 100mm artillery and up to 140km for rockets; effective verification by the OSCE; amnesty and release of all hostages and illegally detained people; safe access, storage, delivery, and distribution of humanitarian aid to the needy; restoration of government pensions and other welfare payments for civilians in the east; the restoration of Ukrainian control of the banking system in areas affected by the conflict, pull out of all foreign military formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from Ukraine under OSCE monitoring; the disarmament of illegal groups; full Ukrainian control over the eastern border, after local elections under Ukrainian law and a constitutional deal on the future of Donetsk and Luhansk by the end of 2015. For now, the contested areas will remain “bricked in.” The direction which the region may turn will be determined either by the US, EU and Ukrainian Government, intent to keep all of the Donbass in Ukraine, albeit with part of its population reluctant to live under Kiev’s control and by Russia and pro-Russian separatists intent on establishing the region’s independence and aligning it more closely with Moscow. What nettles the US, EU and the Ukrainian Government, now committed to a westward orientation, is the considerable effort they say Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has invested in grabbing territory in the Donbass and eventually all of Ukraine as it sits in Russia’s “near abroad.” To them, Putin has created something from nothing that preexisted: contemptuous murmurs against Ukrainian identity, language, and national symbols suddenly became rebel yells for secession. They feel Putin now has additional space in Ukraine from which he can exert his influence in the region. (The US, EU and Ukraine claim Putin illegally swallowed up Crimea in 2014.) Conversely, Putin insists the administration of US President Barack Obama caused the conflict in the Donbass. He remarked after meeting US Secretary of State John Kerry on May 12, 2015, “They [the US] should not have supported the anti-constitutionalists’ armed coup that led to a violent confrontation in Ukraine, a civil war in fact.” He also views US efforts in Ukraine as part of an attempt to isolate Russia. Facinus quos inquinant aequat. (Guilt equates all who share in guilt.)

Members of Putin’s comitatus such as Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov have reportedly expressed the same sentiment that Russia is only acting in response to Western behavior toward it. Now that the parties appear to be adhering to the Minsk Agreement’s terms, and after a year and half of extremely violent battles and firefights, Moscow would unlikely use the same “hybrid warfare” approach—the blend of unidentified troops, propaganda and economic pressure—seen in Crimea, or some other military approach to capture the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk. Due to the Minsk Agreement, Putin is no longer encumbered by having to do everything in secret. Putin may engage in diplomatic moves and decisive action in the Donbass akin to that seen in Georgia to gain firmer grip on pro-Russian separatist held territory.

In 2008, pro-Russian separatists in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia, along with Russian Federation troops, fought a war for independence against the Georgian Government. Once peace was established between the warring parties by then-French President Nicholas Sarkozy, Russia occupied the two rebellious regions and continues to do so today. Russia also recognized their independence. There was little Georgia could do to recover the regions, yet it had the support of the US, and the EU. On March 3, 2015, a Russian-South Ossetian Treaty of Alliance and Integration was signed, effectively granting Moscow control of South Ossetia’s foreign policy, border, and security. In November 2014, Putin signed a similar accord with Abkhazia entitled the Russia-Abkhazian Agreement of Alliance and Strategic Partnership which meant in practice Moscow is responsible for the customs, defense, and security of the breakaway republic. When the Russian-South Ossetian agreement was revealed, the EU Foreign Policy Coordinator Federica Mogherini declared, “The agreement undermined efforts to strengthen security and stability in the region.” She further stated, “This ‘treaty’—which includes references to a transfer of powers in some areas—clearly violates Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Some observers believe the treaty set the region up for annexation by Russia. Most recently, pro-Russian separatist security forces moved border fences in the South Ossetia and Abkahzia further into Georgia’s territory.  By parsing out the events observed in South Ossetia alone, a possible approach Putin might use in the Donbass is revealed. Three main steps of that approach could include: 1) securing territorial gains via humanitarian assistance; 2) legitimizing independence and Russian influence via “diplomacy”; and, 3) quiet expansion.

Above is a satellite image of Russian Federation weapon systems being moved into Ukraine. The US, EU, and Ukrainian Government accuse Russia of arming pro-Russian separatist forces in the Donbass. Given the Minsk Agreement, Putin would unlikely use the “hybrid warfare” approach seen in Crimea. He will no longer need to do things in secret. Putin may engage in diplomatic moves and decisive action to gain a firmer grip on the Donbass.

Securing Territorial Gains via Humanitarian Assistance

Et genus et formam Regina Pecunia donat. (Money like a queen bestows both rank and beauty.) In addition to economic support provided by Kiev to Donetsk and Luhansk in the near term under the Minsk Agreement, Russia may provide a considerable amount of aid in Russian rubles to the Donbass, perhaps initially cloaked. It could also continue to provide humanitarian aid using truck convoys. Russia could provide financial support to pro-Russian separatist political organizations. To encourage ethnic-Russians to remain in Donbass, Russia may assist directly in the reconstruction of ethnic-Russian communities, focusing on the robust reconstruction of schools churches, community centers, and infrastructure projects that meet the needs of those communities. Comparable aid would likely fail to reach ethnic-Ukrainian and other communities not linked to, or falling within the territorial lines of, the pro-Russian separatist movement. Nations aligned with Russia could be encouraged to provide recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent regions. Russia could enable pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk to defend themselves even better with new Russian armaments and training from Russian military advisers acting covertly given that under the Minsk Agreement, the two regions remain the sovereign territory of Ukraine. (The US, the EU, and Kiev have already accused Russia of arming the separatists.) Russia would unlikely withdraw its forces bordering the Donbass and could possibly increase the measure of those forces to create the capability to rush into the region to secure the peace if fighting resumed between the opposing parties.

In a similar way, Russia had already invested 43 billion rubles in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the past six years. The border between South Ossetia and Georgia was closed, precluding the Georgian Government from influencing events in its former territory. Russia had considerable influence in the pro-Russian separatist political organizations. Western observers view South Ossetia leadership a puppet government under Moscow’s control. The ethnic-Georgians in South Ossetia drifted off. With the border closed, those who wanted to return could not. The loss of South Ossetians opposed to independence eliminated meant there were no opposing political movements, and internal security and stability could be maintained more easily. The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia has obviated the possibility that Georgia might retake its territory. Russian troops there have remained on a war-time footing and have not moved to prewar locations as Georgian forces have. Moscow had Nicaragua, Nauru, and Venezuela join it in recognizing the independence of South Ossetia as well as Abkhazia.

What nettles the US, EU, and the Ukrainian Government is the considerable effort they say Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has invested in grabbing territory in the Donbass. They feel Putin now has space in Ukraine, in addition to Crimea, from which he can exert his influence in the region. Conversely, Putin insists the administration of US President Barack Obama caused the conflict in the Donbass.

Legitimizing Independence and Russian Influence via “Diplomacy”

Et mihi res, non me rebus subjungere conor. (I suit life to myself, not myself to life.) Even under the best conditions created for Kiev as the terms of the Minsk Agreement are fulfilled, Putin may still move to establish treaties with both the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic” giving Russia control over their economic activity. Residents in both oblasts would be provided with easier access to Russian citizenship. If the balance of the two regions’ populations were to swing more heavily in the pro-Russian separatists favor, or even if not, Russia may formally guarantee that salaries of government workers in the Donbass would be paid by Russia, “to kindly take the financial strain off of Kiev.” Despite the terms of the Minsk Agreement, both the Donestsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic governments would be directed by Russia to push hard to turn border control over to Russia through talks, also ostensibly to make things more convenient for Kiev. Russia could formally take charge of the military operations of the pro-separatist security forces in Donetsk and Luhansk. A joint security zone could be created between Russia and the two “governments.”

Analogously, the Russian-South Ossetian Treaty of Alliance and Integration allowed Russia to formally take charge of South-Ossetia’s economy and military. South Ossetia will receive 9 billion rubles ($147 million or €140 million) in aid over three years. Government salaries and pensions were raised to a level comparable with those received in Russia’s North Caucasus. Putin himself stated a joint defense and security zone would be created between the two countries. South Ossetian leader Leonid Timorov explained: “Russia could guarantee security from Western reaction.” Border crossings for customs agencies would also be integrated. That was made easier because the border crossings with Georgia were already closed.

By parsing out the events observed in South Ossetia following its 2008 war for independence against the Georgian Government, a possible approach Putin might use in the Donbass is revealed. Three main steps of that approach could include: 1) securing territorial gains via humanitarian assistance; 2) legitimizing independence and Russian influence via “diplomacy”; and, 3) quiet expansion.

Quiet Expansion

Alitur vitium vivitque tegendo. (Vice is nourished by being concealed.) After a few short years of the ceasefire and other urgent and important matters may capture Kiev’s attention, pro-Russian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk may find opportunities to encroach into territory perhaps no longer vigilantly guarded by the Ukrainian Armed Forces or volunteer units. If Russia and the new “people’s republics” were to reach some defense and security treaty by that time, Russian Federation troops would be able to stand beside pro-Russian separatist forces in the expanded territory. Russia could also begin to provide economic and humanitarian aid to those segments of Ukrainian held territory of the Donbass the Kiev may not be able to support sufficiently. Freedom of movement may allow for inhabitants of the region who have applied for Russian citizenship, or possess it, to move into heavily damaged villages and abandoned areas, where Ukrainian combatants have withdrawn. They could resettle and begin reconstruction in them. Russia could declare its intention to defend its “compatriots” entering those areas. Russian and pro-Russian separatist flags would soon be seen further eastward in the Donbass. When possible the expansion of pro-Russian territory may also be aimed at encompassing important infrastructure facilities, particularly gas and energy related sites, and key roadways.

Likewise in South Ossetia, Russian backed security forces reportedly moved a border fence with Georgia, taking more territory for Russian control. Those same security forces armed with assault rifles were also seen crossing into Georgian controlled territory and tearing down a Georgian flag. As a result of pro-Russian separatists moving border fences deeper into Georgia, some villages have been cut in half by Russian separatist forces. Reportedly, people have gone to sleep Georgian and have awakened as members of a breakaway territory. By moving one fence, pro-Russian separatists managed to place 1.6 km of the Baku-Supsa pipeline in the pro-Russian separatist territory. One fence was moved far enough to grab 500 meters of Georgia’s E60 Highway, which is the main road linking the Black Sea to Azerbaijan.

Ukrainian Government faces an economic crisis and a variety of other domestic difficulties to include challenges from a far-right neo-Nazi movement. The Donbass is a net consumer of foreign imports, is dependent on Russian gas, and is a rustbelt requiring trillions of dollars in investment. Those realities along with seeing the effects of a few years of rain and wind on the ruins of cities and towns in the Donbass may make Kiev less eager to wrestle with Moscow for the hearts and minds of its inhabitants.

The Way Forward

Omni mutantur nos et mutamur in illis. (All things change, and we change with them.) For Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, it will be torturous enough to lead an emerging European nation that is facing an economic crisis, and a variety of other domestic difficulties to include challenges from a far-right neo-Nazi movement. Keeping all of the Donbass in Ukraine is the cause of honor now. Yet, after focusing on additional issues over time, numbness may develop toward the intractable situation in the region. New moves by pro-Russian separatist and Russia in the Donbass may no longer be alarming enough to pierce that numbness. The Donbass is a net consumer of foreign imports and is dependent on Russian gas. It is considered a rustbelt needing to be refitted at the cost of trillions of dollars Kiev does not have. Despite receiving economic aid from the West, Ukraine, itself, may never see an economic upturn. After seeing the effects of a few years of rain and wind on the ruins of cities and towns in the Donbass, Kiev may no longer be eager to wrestle with Moscow for the hearts and minds of the oblasts’ inhabitants. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are not a spent force, but they could hardly surmount a genuine threat posed by Russian Federation Armed Forces. US and EU efforts to train and equip the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot change that. Further regarding the West, it is difficult to determine how much pressure it would be willing to exert against Russia over Ukraine through sanctions in the future.

It has been said that the cynic knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. The analysis presented in here may appear cynical. It imputes on Putin a lust for power and the intent to simply acquire greater territory and control in Russia’s near abroad. However, Putin has been portrayed that way here for the purpose of debate. There is value in the Minsk Agreement. That value is a ceasefire, lives saved, and ability of the region’s inhabitants to contemplate peace. Adherence to the terms of the Minsk Agreement by Russia and pro-Russian separatists nudged by Russia is not a notional idea; it is reality. The Minsk Agreement and the September 1st ceasefire represent positive change and a genuine restart to diplomatic activity over the Donbass. Much more is required of the agreement’s signatories. Through regular communication via the Contact Group and the good offices of the OSCE, perhaps peace will develop in the Donbass.