A Russian Federation BMP-3 crew signals surrender to Ukrainian troops by placing a white flag in the vehicle’s gun barrel (above). Despite any gains that may be emphasized by Moscow, the slaughter of Russian Federation troops continues in Ukraine. Most Russian Federation units that have taken the field in Ukraine have been battered and tattered to degrees well-beyond what most modern armed forces around the world would find acceptable. One might proffer that Russian Federation commanders do not see anything so odd in what they are doing, but their troops indubitably have vastly disparate views from them concerning the bloodshed. From all of this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces early on recognized an opportunity to exploit the situation in a non-lethal way. That effort actually got underway in 2023 in a very public manner through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program managed by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The program has had its share of successes. However, with a thought to enhance ongoing work, greatcharlie suggests an additional approach be developed within the existing program. Russian Federation troops are currently required to be proactive in the effort to become prisoners of war, but to that extent the process is somewhat one-sided. Under a program proposed here, Russian Federation troops would find some greater comfort and more confidence in following through on any plans they may have to escape the war knowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an enemy who can also serve as a rescuer, would be proactively trying to save them amidst the fighting.

If one the top commanders of Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) were to give an honest assessment of the prospects for Russian forces in Ukraine he would likely reply average, meaning they were worse than the year before but likely better than the year to come. Once much vaunted as a titanic war machine, the Russian Federation Armed Forces hardly lived up with their billing. Showing themselves as something less than an authentic 21st century fighting force, they unexpectedly collided with two obstructions in Ukraine: reality and Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) well-assisted by the US, other NATO countries, as well as countries from around the world. Clearly Russian Federation forces were sent into Ukraine with hardly any idea of what they would face or how they could effectively fight a war, and consequently members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have suffered immensely. There has been little evidence of an awareness among Russian Federation commanders of how to effectively organize forces and what minimum-essential control measures should be in place; as well as the general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for offensive and defensive operations. One is left to wonder what most Russian Federation commanders actually know about the art and science of tactics. As in previous posts, greatcharlie does not feel it can overemphasize just how below average the military acumen of Russian Federation commanders really is. Given the way in which the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was designed, greatcharlie will go out on limb and state the task of rolling Russian Federation military formations into Ukraine could have been performed by logistical managers of a large-sized transport or delivery service company with albeit a modicum of military advice but no military experience as effectively or better than Russian Federation commanders. Amoto quaeramus seria ludo. (Jokes aside, let us turn to serious matters.)

One of the most intriguing and horrifying aspects of Russian Federation commanders’ prosecution of the war, is the manner in which they figuratively slam their troops against the wall of Ukrainian defenders with the hope that if they pound hard enough they will break through. The continued slaughter of their troops may have allowed for not much more than the ego stroke of conquest of less than significant objectives relative to the bigger picture. An implication of this tact is that the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces have practically guaranteed they will not have enough experienced troops left to accomplish anything on a larger scale in Ukraine. There are no indications that there is anything Russian Federation commanders plan to do to reduce casualties among their units. Most Russian Federation units that have taken the field in Ukraine have been battered and tattered to degrees well-beyond what most modern armed forces around the world would find acceptable. One might proffer that Russian Federation commanders do not see anything so odd in what they are doing, but their troops indubitably have vastly disparate views from them concerning the bloodshed. From all of this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces early on recognized an opportunity to exploit the situation in a non-lethal way. That effort actually got underway in 2023 in a very public manner through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program managed by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The program has had its share of successes. The noble program has saved the lives of a number of Russian Federation troops who were able to reason things out and recognize the realities of their overall situation.

However, with a thought to enhance ongoing work in this province, greatcharlie would suggest an additional approach be considered for use by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Similar in some way to the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline, it creates a path for the surrender of Russian Federation troops. The existing program was very publicly announced and advertised. As part of the program, a rationale was provided online for why Russian Federation troops should surrender to survive, and a telephone was provided for them to call to arrange their surrender with staff of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. However, under the existing program, Russian soldiers are required to be proactive in the effort to become prisoners of war. To that extent, the process is rather one-sided. Under a program proposed here, Russian Federation troops would find some greater comfort and more confidence in following through on any plans they may have to escape the war with all of its ills and absurdities knowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an enemy who can also serve as a rescuer, would be proactively trying to save them. What is proposed is a concrete plan of action that would give Russian Federation troops the choice of whether to stay and somewhat likely lose their lives for a lost cause or go and live a full life with the help of Ukraine. Perhaps it could be said that greatcharlie has maintained perspective but at the same time has done quite a bit of what some of its readers have characterized as whining about the Ukraine War since it began. Admittedly, only on a handful of occasions has it “deigned” to offer possible solutions. (Rather than just point out problems, it is more constructive to offer ways to defeat them.) Hopefully, the proposed plan is of sufficient potency to have some immediate value to officials in Ukraine and those of other countries who may advise them on the war. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Recruits listen to a Russian Army instructor showing mobilized troops how to use a man-portable missile during a military training at a firing range in the Rostov-on-Don region in the Russian Federation on October 4, 2022. The Russian Federation called up over 200,000 reservists as part of a partial mobilization. The mobilized troops–Mobiks, as the Ukrainians call them–depicted here are very likely in a mental fog as they assemble in their camp. Their uncertainty and fear is palpable even through the photo. Many upon donning their green uniforms for the first time likely wondered if the countdown to their end had begun at that moment. The Scottish psychiatrist, James A.C. Brown, assessed the use of propaganda by the United Kingdom during World War II with the following observation: “Propaganda is successful only when directed at those who are willing to listen, absorb the information, and if possible, act on it, and this happens only when the other side is in a condition of lowered morale and is already losing the campaign.”

Dire Circumstances of Russian Federation Troops 

To address the dire circumstances of Russian Federation troops, some background on just how bad things have been for them on the battlefield in Ukraine. On November 10, 2022, the US Department of Defense announced an official assessment that over 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action or wounded in Ukraine. Thus, the US Department of Defense figures indicated that during 260 days of fighting to that point, an average of 385 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured each day. The official figure issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in September 2022 put the number of Russian troops killed at 5,937, a figure Western officials said grossly underestimated the country’s losses. Further, the US Department of Defense figure suggested that the daily fighting along the 1000-mile front line that winds around the eastern edges of Ukraine is very intense. A significant part of the struggle is being fought from World War I-style trenches in which soldiers dug into muddy fortifications suffer relentless artillery onslaughts until their units are destroyed or displaced. So apparently horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Captured Russians say their comrades face execution on desertion charges if they don’t keep moving.” Reportedly, some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” The Kyiv Post, citing an Agence France-Presse interview of a Ukrainian soldier, provided the quote: “You shoot them and more come.” The indications and implications of what they say is that even incremental advances achieved through localized attacks have come at a high price for the Russian Federation troops. As explained to the Guardian by a United Kingdom intelligence service, the “unprofessional” military practices of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were likely partly to blame for the high casualties.

As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, when soldiers are: uncertain of mission if the overall concept of a military action is unjust, invalid by law; uncertain of the purpose of a military action: the political authority’s concept and intent for the action is unclear and their commander’s concept and intent are unclear; uncertain their leadership is dysfunctional: commanders are hamstrung by superiors and confined to parameters of action by political systems or they are simply delinquent and negligent; uncertain of their capabilities versus the opponent–soldiers are provided poor equipment, their force has readily observable vulnerabilities, their opponent possess superior, seemingly invincible, and unlimited supplies of weapon systems; and, uncertain of victory–on a daily basis, soldiers experience heavy losses in equipment, exceedingly high casualties in their ranks, the regular loss of comrades, the influx of untrained replacements, and they sense their sacrifices will prove to be meaningless. Such strains and trauma placed upon soldiers could prove to be irreparable. 

Reportedly, no figures are publicly available that tally the number of Russian Federation troops that have simply deserted since the start of the Special military operation. In a November 2022 report based on newsmedia stories from the Russian Federation that was published by analysts from the Institute for the Study of War, it was suggested that hundreds of Russian Federation troops had left their units and were evading capture in no less than 7 locations in Donetsk and Luhansk. The report stated: “The morale and psychological state of Russian forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are exceedingly low.” It further explained: “Significant losses on the battlefield, mobilization to the front lines without proper training, and poor supplies have led to cases of desertion.” The Scottish psychiatrist, James A.C. Brown, assessed the use of propaganda by the United Kingdom during World War II with the following observation: “Propaganda is successful only when directed at those who are willing to listen, absorb the information, and if possible, act on it, and this happens only when the other side is in a condition of lowered morale and is already losing the campaign.”

Igne natura renovatur integra. (Through fire, nature is reborn whole.) Despite the terrifying and intolerable circumstances they have faced Russian Federation troops, an opportunity has been created for both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the beleaguered Russian Federation troops to bring their situations somewhat closer to a favorable end. As alluded to earlier, an ongoing Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program, the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War has been established for Russian Federation military personnel who wish to exit the war by surrender and perhaps by defection. For Russian Federation troops, the move would mean violating federal law, which likely conjures in their minds all of the frightening prospects of being caught in the act. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Armed Forces seem quite willing to help them do that. In addition to Russian Federation troops using the hotline, their relatives can also access the program. To reach the hotlines by Telegram and WhatsApp, they have been told to contact: +380 95 68 86 888; +380 93 68 86 888; and, +380 97 68 86 888. To reach the holiness by phone, contact: +380 44 35 08 917. From Ukrainian phone numbers, one would only need to dial: 688. Reportedly, information is also available in the chatbot in Telegram. The program goes as far as to instruct Russian Federation troops on how to surrender. To surrender as a group or an entire unit, they are told to: stack all weapons in front of you at a distant distance; stand directly in front of the military equipment. Silence it; it should not be in a fighting position; and, choose a negotiator to notify the Ukrainian military of their desire to surrender. This should be an officer or the most senior in rank. With a white flag and no weapons. To surrender individually, they are told to: unbuckle the magazine and hang the weapon on your left shoulder with the barrel down; raise and show your empty hands; hold up the white cloth; shout loudly, “Zdayusʹ!”; approach on command, and comply with the demands of Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine.

It is apparent that the title of the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline has an acidulous tone from the get-go, which also seems to manifest a deep antipathy. Further, the program was really targeted at the psyche of Russian Federation troops on an individual level. Despite the fact that nearly everyone on the frontline, both Russians and Ukrainians, are aware of the “I Want To Live” program’s existence, activities under it are nevertheless performed in a somewhat clandestine way. There are opportunities to exploit with regard to garnering greater numbers of Russian Federation troops to surrender as well as defect. It would appear that far more could be done in that province. 

It is greatcharlie’s suggestion that perhaps at this point the Ukrainian Armed Forces should go step further than its current effort by standing up new military Teams within the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War with a mission to greatly enhance the effort to encourage–lure–greater numbers of Russian Federation to surrender and defect using a mix of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods. Rather than hoping to bring over one or two soldiers at a time or perhaps even a squad, the objective of the proposed Teams would be to trigger surrenders and defections en masse along the frontline, particularly among Mobiks, the Ukrainian term for Russian Federation citizens hastily mobilized in 2022 for the Ukraine War.

Through the suggested program, the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be able to accomplish reductions of enemy opposition that could only be achieved through high intensity fighting with Russian Federation units during which it, too, would likely suffer losses in precious troops and materiel of which it is reliant upon foreign largess. To the extent that might possible, the proposed program could have a multiplier effect on the battlefield and beyond. 

The Provost Teams would act under the direct authority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff. These teams, formed with officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men called Provosts, could operate along active points on the frontline particularly where Mobiks have been tossed into the line and suffering inordinate numbers of casualties. Sections of the frontline where platoons of Provosts would be deployed would come under the command of a Provost Marshal or company commander. As envisioned, the Provosts deployed along the forward edge of the battle area should not tally in excess of a battalion in strength, and led by a battalion commander, the Coordinating Provost Marshal. (Of course, these titles are mere suggestions and the Ukrainian Armed Forces would know best how to designate troops with the Provost Teams’ table of organization.) As shortages in personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot be overstated, the staffing of personnel in the Provost Teams must be economizedi. However, the proposed Provost Teams must be sufficiently staffed ti do their intensive work rapidly, efficiently and successfully. In their mission, time is of the essence.

What follows is a kernel of the proposed program. A variety of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods are suggested for Provosts to use are outlined. Readers may detect that some suggestions appear repetitive, especially as the discussion covers the implementation of the proposed program during both defensive and offensive operations. As all aspects of the proposed program are harmonized to create a synergistic effect, naturally some overlap exists. However, more importantly, where such repetition appears to occur, there are actually subtle, necessary changes in the text. Equally important, by writing in a seemingly repetitive way, readers are enabled to consider all or individual segments of the proposed program without requiring them to move back and forth to recall elements of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods mentioned in the preceding segments–much as with a legal brief.

The Neptune, employed on September 23, 1870, was first balloon used by the French government during the Siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first documented use of manned balloons as carriers of propaganda leaflets, as well as the mail. As Prussian forces surrounded the city of Paris, the Neptune, a balloon deployed from the city dropped French government proclamations of defiance and indomitability over Prussian troops. During World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps initiated the use of leaflets, dropping them over Imperial German trenches and territory in an attempt to induce German troops to surrender. Messages printed on various leaflets included reports of the humane conditions in the British prisoners of war camps, surrender notices, and anti-Kaiser Wilhelm II material. During World War II, efforts with them were made more effective with disillusioned opposition troops when leaflets also served as safe conduct passes and provided instructions on how to feign illness to avoid frontline service. Leaflets were used in wars afterward to include the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Using this tried and true method of communicating with opposition troops, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery.

I. Reaching Ukrainian Lines to Surrender 

A.  During Defensive Operations

One can be assured that learning how ro surrender is not a segment of the brief training program in which Mobiks participate before heading to the frontlines with their units. That instruction must come from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Instructions on how to surrender provided by a variety of means, should essentially mirror, mutantis mutandis, those provided online through the aforementioned “I Want To Live” program should be printed on the initial iterations of leaflets. The nuance would be that instead of surrendering to Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian Federation troops would be surrendering to Provosts. Russian Federation troops should still be directed to drop their weapons, unlatch their utility belts, and other gear and dash toward large trenches or earthworks created in a clandestine way during the 3rd or 4th watch. The trenches must be concealed to the greatest degree possible from Russian Federation lines but open as much as possible to observation by Ukrainian troops both day and night. From the trenches and earthworks, a concealed path, something akin to a long drainage ditch, should be built for the surrendering Russian Federation troops to crawl along in single file, toward awaiting armed Provosts. More than one crawl could be created from the trench. That would depend on time available ultimately shaped by the assault timetable of Russian Federation commanders. Both the prisoner of war trenches, earthworks, and crawl paths should be covered at all times by sharpshooter and machine guns to both protect them, prevent infiltration through their use, and thwart the efforts of those assigned to harm them. The Russian Federation troops could be processed one by one as prisoners of war right off the crawl paths, and moved out of the forward edge of the battle area through separate and concealed lines of communication. Provosts must closely coordinate with Ukrainian commanders in their sector to ensure the prisoner of war operations would in no way interfere with their defensive operations

B. During Offensive Operations

Different from defensive operations, Russian Federation troops facing eminent attack by Ukrainian troops will at least typically be hunkered down in concealed positions. Soon enough, many will run for their lives lacking the wherewithal to resist and motivation to fight. During a previous Ukrainian counteroffensive, A member of a Ukrainian intelligence unit on the front line told The Telegraph that his unit saw the Russian Federation chain of command collapse before their eyes and troops flee without putting up a fight. The panicked Russian Federation troops reportedly abandoned their tanks, weapons and even clothes amid the chaos  as they “literally” ran from their positions. Indeed, it was alleged that many of them rapidly changed into civilian clothes ostensibly to avoid detection by their superiors. A drone operator returning from the front line told The Telegraph during the Ukrainian Armed Forces counteroffensive in September 2022, that the tempo of the operation had even caught Ukrainian troops by surprise. He stated that he observed Ukrainian troops struggling to recover the mountains of abandoned Russian Federation armored vehicles and ammunition. Monitoring Ukrainian assaults from above, the drone operators reportedly watched engagements and heard communications between Russian Federation troops as their units were being destroyed before they had time to identify their enemy.

Convincing Russian Federation troops to leave their trenches and foxholes to run toward Ukrainian troops to surrender would be very difficult. They know doing so would leave them open to extra judicial execution for voluntary surrender and desertion by fire from their own lines. Additionally, it might prove difficult for them to know where to run as Ukrainian units preparing to advance would do everything possible to avoid revealing the locations of their lines of departure. Certainly, there would not be the opportunity or ability to prepare anything similar to earthworks or trenches for surrendering and deserting Russian Federation troops to make a break for and secrete themselves as would hypothetically be the case during defensive operations under the proposed program. Given such, Provost Teams would be required to make efficient use of a combination of leaflets, online messages, and loudspeakers to communicate with Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender or defect. Proper timing in the use of all three approaches would be critical to the survival of Russian Federation troops and the ability of Provosts to provide for their safe conduct in the midst of what to them would most likely be the very confusing circumstances of a high-intensity,  highly-mobile, and very violent Ukrainian Armed Forces’ assault. As during defensive operations, Provosts must coordinate with Ukrainian commanders in their sector to ensure the prisoner of war operations would in no way interfere with their assault.

Becoming a prisoner of war is ordinarily undesirable. Yet, for these Russian Federation troops the fighting is over. They were not killed or gravely wounded on the frontline. They will live to see another day (above). Using a tried and true method of communicating with opposition troops, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery. The messages on leaflets could go as far as to suggest Russian Federation troops abandon their frontline positions or use advances ordered by their commanders to run toward Ukrainian lines. Leaflets could explain, with the aim of connecting with the inner thinking of the Russian Federation troops, that the frontline key offers death. In following, they should be explained that rather than waiting to see if they will make it through unscathed, be gravely wounded or be killed, the best alternative would be to surrender or defect. The leaflets should explain that their rights as prisoners of war will be fully recognized and respected, and that once they surrendered, they would be treated with dignity. Additionally, the leaflets must tell them that they will moved away from the frontlines, out of harm’s way, immediately after they surrender.

Ii. Leaflets

A. During Defensive Operations

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first documented use of manned balloons as carriers of propaganda leaflets, as well as the mail. As Prussian forces surrounded the city of Paris, the Neptune, a balloon deployed from the city dropped leaflets baring forceful French government proclamations of defiance and indomitability over Prussian troops. During World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps initiated the use of leaflets, dropping them over Imperial German trenches and territory in an attempt to induce German troops to surrender. Messages printed on various leaflets included reports of the humane conditions in the British prisoners of war camps, surrender notices, and anti-Kaiser Wilhelm II material. During World War II, efforts with them were made more effective with disillusioned opposition troops when leaflets also served as safe conduct passes and provided instructions on how to feign illness to avoid frontline service. Leaflets were used in wars afterward to include the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In the present Ukraine War, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery. The messages on leaflets could go as far as to suggest Russian Federation troops abandon their frontline positions or use advances ordered by their commanders to run toward Ukrainian lines. Leaflets could explain, with the aim of connecting with the inner thinking of the Russian Federation troops, that the frontline key offers death. In following, they should be told that rather than waiting to see if they will make it through unscathed, be gravely wounded or be killed, the best alternative would be to surrender or defect. The leaflets should explain that their rights as prisoners of war will be fully recognized and respected, and that once they surrendered, they would be treated with dignity. Additionally, the leaflets must tell them that they will be transported away from the frontlines, out of harm’s way, immediately after they surrender. The leaflets should explain that the surrendering and defecting troops received clean water to drink, hot food, warm blankets, and coffee or tea.

Important to add on each leaflet, in type that would stand out, should be the promise to protect Russian Federation troops from unstable commanders who have recklessly thrown them across no man’s land without regard for their lives. They must be told that the whole world knows about their plight. It must be explained that if they so choose, they will be allowed to safely return to the Russian Federation via prisoner of war exchanges negotiated During the war or prisoner of war exchanges after the war. If any Russian Federation troops make the choice to defect, they should be informed in the leaflets that they will be allowed to remain in Ukraine via immigration or be assisted in efforts to immigrate to countries in the West that may be willing to accept them 

As for how to surrender, the leaflets should provide instructions that closely parallel those provided online through the aforementioned “I Want To Live” program. This is especially true with regard to the handling of their weapons. The nuance would be that instead of surrendering to Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian Federation troops would be surrendering to Provosts. (Perhaps Provosts could affix an embroidered badge to their uniforms with Provost Team title on it in both Ukrainian and Russian so that Russian Federation troops could readily identify who they were once in contact. Of course, Russian Federation troops should not be discouraged from surrendering or defecting on any occasion. All military formations and security services would be open to receive them. Those formations should be issued orders to turn all captive Russian Federation troops over to the custody of the Provosts.)

Russian Federation troops must be instructed to retain and present leaflets essentially as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The success of the proposed program would rely in great part on the credibility of the Provost Teams. Their credibility would be best established with Russian Federation troops by their actions. To that extent, the effort must be made to follow through on promises printed on the leaflets without fail. Russian Federation troops must be moved away from the forward edge of the battle area, out of harm’s way immediately after capture. They must be provided with clean water, hot food, warm blankets, and coffee and tea. More than one design of leaflet should be produced. The message akin to a memorandum of understanding concerning safe conduct discussed earlier as a requirement should be printed on every leaflet and perhaps could even be titled as such on the leaflets.

Drones could be used as a way to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions upon which leaflets could be dropped. Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. An organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. If creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. This method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. However, given shortage in pilots and shortages of airframe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Leaflets dropped on Russian Federation troops could also serve a purpose similar to infrared reflective patches, chemlights, VS-17 panels or signal panel markers, and colored smoke typically used by military organizations to mark friendly personnel and locations. Leaflets should provide instructions on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection before their lives are ended or they are gravely wounded as a result of being wastefully slammed against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Online, Russian Federation troops could be told that every effort would be made to spare them from the firepower that would surely be used to halt their respective unit’s assault.

Russian Federation troops must be instructed within the leaflets’ message to collect at least one from among the thousands strewn across their lines and secrete it on themselves or keep it close at hand. As leaflets, dropped in astronomical numbers, would likely be drifting all about Russian Federation lines in great numbers and landing just about everywhere, Russian Federation troops seeking to surrender or defect would be afforded a plausible reason to have leaflets in or near their positions. As a guise, Russian Federation troops could stack the leaflets nearby or in their positions in preparation for their use, yet claim they have done so with the purpose of policing their areas

If not possible during the daytime, at night, Russian Federation troops should place as many leaflets as possible in front of their positions. Russian Federation troops should be instructed even in mild weather conditions to weigh leaflets down with rocks, stones, or branches, or any combination of those materials as made available on the terrain. The objects used to weigh the leaflets down must be placed on the corners of the leaflets

In inclement weather, Leaflets could be weighted down in a crossing pattern on the leaflets with rocks, stones, tree branches, mud, and dirt the terrain provides or with pieces of their military gear. What would be most important for the Russian Federation troops to avoid is obscuring the leaflets with whatever they might use to weigh them down in front of their positions. It would be critical not to obscure the observation of their piles of leaflets from above. Ukrainian sharpshooters along the rapidly shifting frontlines would need to be informed that Russian Federation’s troops might be seen placing piles of leaflets In front of their positions as instructed by Provosts via leaflets online messages and loudspeakers. and they must not be be fired upon. Paradoxically Ukrainian sharpshooters should be directed to provide overwatch for the Russian Federation troops engaged in that activity with the leaflet by firing upon Russian Federation sharpshooters who may be ordered to fire upon their own comrades engaged in placing leaflets in front of their positions as instructed by Provosts.

Russian Federation troops must be told not to be concerned about leaflets gathered coincidentally in clumps in their lines that resemble their own manufactured piles. Such occurrences would be expected if hypothetical leaflets are dropped upon their positions almost daily. It will be important for Provosts or members of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to correctly distinguish between piles of leaflets created from the pollution of paper in Russian Federation lines and the piles constructed by Russian Federation troops.

B.. During Offensive Operations

Using leaflets during offensive operations would likely be a bit trickier for Provosts, but certainly possible. Drones could be used as means to reconnoiter and surveil far forward of Ukrainian frontlines to identify Russian Federation defensive positions upon leaflet could be dropped. Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. As suggested earlier, an organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. If creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. 

As noted with regard to defensive operations, this method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. Yet again, given shortage in pilots and shortages of airframes in the Ukrainian Armed Forces inventory, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Leaflets should be used by Russian Federation troops during offensive operations launched in their direction in a similar way to their proposed use in defensive operations. The concept for the use of leaflets in both cases should parallel the concept behind marker panels. Leaflets should be piled up in front of Russian Federation troops’ defensive positions. Russian Federation troops should be instructed to collect as many leaflets as possible to make certain they will be able to create a visible pile. Leaflets dropped should explain to the greatest extent possible given space available on the sheet made of paper or some other more durable material, how Russian Federation troops could best protect their piles of them from being dismantled or destroyed by weather conditions. Russian Federation troops must be told that every effort would be made to identify their positions through piled up leaflets. It also must be explained that Russian Federation troops emerging from positions marked with leaflets that they will be given every opportunity to surrender or defect safely

Since the frontlines will likely shift constantly with every bound by advancing Ukrainian units during offensive operations, Ukrainian troops will surely come across various iterations of them. To avoid adverse reactions to seeing images they might perceive on leaflets as Russian Federation troops which they are fighting and being killed and injured by, practically being treated as honored guests. In advance of Ukrainian assaults, commanders must explain to their troops on the march about the leaflets they will surely encounter and what they as well as Provosts’ loudspeaker announcements they will hear are all about. Ukrainian troops should be told that it is all part of an important program under the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, why there are so many leaflets, and their possible role in helping bring a faster, favorable end to the war. (It is very likely that while Ukrainian units are in defensive operations, leaflets may drift over to their positions in large numbers. Russian Federation lines will be polluted with leaflets. Winds should be expected to occasionally carry the leaflets in the Ukrainian’s direction. Ukrainian commanders should explain on such occasions what the purpose of the leaflets and loudspeaker announcements are and how they work to their troops advantage.)

A sort of “online leaflet” posted for Russian Federation troops by the Association of Lawyers in Ukraine urging them to surrender and explaining how to do so (above). In conjunction with the production and distribution of leaflets, Provosts could post messages on multiple online sites, perhaps creating new ones each week–perhaps sooner if necessary–to thwart Russian counterintelligence efforts to block access to information that must be provided to support the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops. To ensure Russian Federation troops would receive the messages or at least make certain the messages were available to them could be supported by the capabilities of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As with leaflets, online messages should provide information on alternative ways Russian Federation troops must act and tasks they must perform to ensure their survival and safe conduct to and through Ukrainian lines. Online messages must explain that Russian Federation troops’ rights as prisoners of war will be fully observed once they surrender and that they will be treated with respect. 

III. The Enhancement of Online Efforts

A. During Defensive Operations

In conjunction with the production and distribution of leaflets, Provosts could post messages on multiple online sites, perhaps creating new ones each week–perhaps sooner if necessary–to thwart Russian counterintelligence efforts to block access to information that must be provided to support the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops. To ensure Russian Federation troops would receive the messages or at least make certain the messages were available to them could be supported by the capabilities of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As with leaflets, online messages should provide information on alternative ways Russian Federation troops must act and tasks they must perform to ensure their survival and safe conduct to and through Ukrainian lines. Online messages must explain that Russian Federation troops’ rights as prisoners of war will be fully observed once they surrender and that they will be treated with respect. They must be assured that they will receive clean water, hot food, coffee and tea, and warm blankets. They should be told that immediately after surrender–unless conditions prevent such movement, they will be extracted from the forward edge of the battle area and out of harm’s way well to the rear. They must also be told that they will be protected from the wrath of unstable commanders who have willingly sacrificed their fallen comrades for a questionable military invasion. As with leaflets, online messages should inform the Russian Federation troops that they will be allowed to return to their homeland via prisoner exchanges negotiation during the war or at the end of the war, if they desire to return on the occasion of either. They should also be informed that if they seek to defect, they would be allowed to remain in Ukraine through the process of immigration or be assisted in immigrating to countries in the West that would be willing to accept them either during or after the war. The Ukrainians promise to assist with these matters must be a solemn pledge. All important is the requirement that Russian Federation troops be instructed online to try as best as possible to collect at least one leaflet dropped on their lines. They must be told to retain leaflets and present them as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. To facilitate the collection of leaflets by Russian Federation troops, a regular deluge of leaflets should be dropped on Russian Federation positions 

As the proposed prisoner of war program develops, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, attendant with online messages on the sites should be videos and photographs of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered. Not just for the photo opportunity, Actual Russian Federation prisoners of war could be depicted wearing clean and neat clothes, in safe, hygienic detention centers.. Appropriate videos and photos should depict the Russian Federation prisoners of war engaged in daily activities at detention centers. To that extent, some videos and photos of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered should be posted after their capture, depicting them drinking clean water, tea, and coffee, and wearing clean dry clothes and covered in warm blankets. Authentic videos and photos of those who surrendered in inclement conditions, should also display them a few short hours after capture being held clean dry spaces, well-protected from cold, wind, rain and snow.

Within a couple of weeks after the proposed program might be launched, it might be useful for Provosts to include images of a handful of Russian Federation prisoners of war, with their consent, with vetting, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, might be flown with selected Provosts to European capitals for tours with the support of the respective host countries. The Geneva Convention forbids the public display of prisoners of war. However, foreign travel for tourism could be declared to be recreational and intended to have a therapeutic effect upon war weary Mobiks and as an effort. In genuine travel videos and photographs, the prisoners of war could be shown wearing civilian clothes, uniform in style and color–for example they could all be seen wearing black pants and lavender shirts, sweaters, and gray plaid trench coats–calmly enjoying tourist attractions, museums, and cafes in the daytime, and a bit of the nightlife available. In all videos and photographs,  the faces of the prisoners of war must be obscured. During these tours, the prisoners of war will be under guard of elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. They should coordinate with, and hopefully receive the support of, national, provincial, and local police forces, and the host countries’ security services. True videos and photographs of Russian Federation prisoners of war in such positive circumstances should have an overwhelmingly positive impact on Russian Federation troops still serving under dreadful circumstances on the frontlines.

All online messages, videos, and photos must be produced by Provosts as part of their duties. To that extent, the need to fulfill that task should be taken into account during staffing. Videos and photographs of Prisoners of war at detention centers or traveling to Western capitals, would likely need to be produced by other elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

With regard to communicating messages to Russian Federation troops who want to surrender and defect, a greater amount of space to present information would certainly be available online. Through the websites of the Provosts, more thorough online instructions on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection before their lives are ended or they are gravely wounded as a result of being wastefully slammed against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian Federation troops should be told online that every effort would be made to spare them from the firepower that would surely be used to halt their respective unit’s assault.

Online messages could additionally provide illustrations of where and how Russian Federation troops should place leaflets before their positions. Illustrations posted with online messages could explain how to place leaflets before their position in inclement weather. Further, illustrations could be posted that would explain the necessity of placing leaflets before their positions so that they are visible from the air and how to do so. The message that every effort would be made to identify the positions of Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect should be reinforced online. Added to that, it must be emphasized in messages that Russian Federation troops emerging from positions marked with piles of leaflets shall be given every opportunity to come toward Ukrainian lines and surrender and defect  safely.

B. During Offensive Operations

During offensive operations by Ukrainian units, in one instance, Russian Federation troops should be instructed online to try as best as possible to collect at least one leaflet dropped on their lines. They must be told to retain and present leaflets essentially as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In another instance, in a way paralleling their use during defensive operations, leaflets dropped on Russian Federation troops could be used by them to indicate their intentions to either surrender or defect. Again, given the greater amount of space to present information online, through the websites of the Provosts, more thorough instructions could be provided on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection in the face of a counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Online, Russian Federation troops could be told that every effort would be made to spare them from the onslaught of firepower that would surely be part of an assault.

As during defensive operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, illustrations could be posted online demonstrating for Russian Federation troops where to best place aggregated leaflets in a pile in front of their positions  Illustrations could be posted on multiple websites of the Provost Teams explaining how exactly to aggregate leaflets before their positions. Illustrations on how Russian Federation troops should place leaflets before their positions during inclement weather could be posted. Additionally, illustrations on how Russian Federation troops can ensure that the leaflets in front of their positions can be seen by air should be posted. Positions built up in wooded areas would present some difficulties in creating visible piles of leaflets, but that problem could likely be overcome with ingenuity. By creating enormous patterns collections of leaflets at night only that would not escape detection. If it becomes most apparent to Provosts that the Ukrainian advance would bring units before Russian Federation positions in wooded terrain, leaflets could be modified to bear a reflective material on one side and messages concerning surrender, defection, and using leaflets on the other. The illustrations mentioned should be published only when an assault will soon be launched by Ukrainian forces. Of course, no specified date should be offered.

Instructions for Russian Federation troops on what to do should be reinforced in the field with loudspeakers. It must be explained in the leaflets, online, and through loudspeakers–discussed here later–that every effort will be made to identify the positions of Russian Federation troops no matter how trying the circumstance. It should emphasized the Russian Federation troops who have marked their position will be tracked by observers and given every opportunity to surrender or defect when the Provost move forward to place them in custody

During offensive operations by Ukrainian units, identification of the positions of Russian Federation troops ready to come over to the Ukrainian lines would be critical in order to avoid a tragedy of erroneously placing devastating fire on them and killing and injuring individuals that only wanted to get out of the war and survive. Marked positions must be well-reconnoitered before an attack is launched toward Russian Federation lines. To accomplish that, positions of Russian Federation troops that want to surrender and defect must at a minimum position leaflets to ensure they could be observed clearly from the air. Daytime identification of the positions of such troops would allow Provosts to mark them out and inform commanders of units about to advance that resistance would unlikely come from their point along the Russian Federation and the Provosts would move on foot or in their vehicles to make contact with them and process them as prisoners of war. However, it would also much safer for Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect to place leaflets as markers before their positions and facing Ukrainian lines at night during the 3rd or 4th watch, than put piles of leaflets out in the daytime and risk detection by their commanders, counterintelligence, and by Russian Federation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets flying above the frontlines or any Russian Federation military aircraft operating in their vicinity.

As aforementioned in the segment on leaflets, drones could be used as means to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation defensive positions forward of Ukrainian frontlines to identify locations upon which leaflet could be dropped. (This process of identifying locations and dropping leaflets upon Russian Federation positions should have an unnerving and sound educational effect on the troops within them as it would inform them the Ukrainians knew where they were and could actually strike at them whenever they wished.) Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. An organic capability to perform that task would facilitate operations. If any drones hypothetically operated by Provosts could be provided with a night vision capability, it will facilitate their operations. They would be able more confidently to provide evidence to Ukrainian commanders of the desire of those Russian Federation troops to surrender and formulate plans to move forward to detain those Russian Federation troops.

Again, as noted in the segment on leaflets, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. This method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. Yet, given shortages in pilots and shortages of airframe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be a drain of resources and too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Russian Federation troops in custody immediately after capture. Depicting Russian Federation troops being held in this manner may have value domestically but such images.certainly would not serve the purposes of the proposed program (above). Another aspect of the Provosts duties could be to use loudspeakers to communicate announcements and positive messages to Russian Federation troops along the forward edge of the battle area. Loudspeaker announcements encouraging Russian Federation troops to surrender should be used in coordination with the distribution of leaflets and online messaging. Loudspeaker announcements allow greater flexibility with regard to altering messages to fit an immediate circumstance. Loudspeaker announcements may best serve Provosts’ efforts to encourage the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops when made at night, perhaps most effective at the top of fthe 3rd watch. Other times at which such announcements may be very effective might be holiday celebrations, in the aftermath of artillery fire missions and after Russian Federation advances that have been repulsed. Provosts should exploit information volunteered by Russian Federation prisoners of war such as names of unit commanders and noncommissioned officers. That information should be incorporated in a pertinent way as quickly as possible in loudspeaker messages.

IV. Loudspeakers

A. During Defensive Operations

Another aspect of the Provosts duties could be to use loudspeakers to communicate announcements and positive messages to Russian Federation troops along the forward edge of the battle area. Loudspeaker announcements encouraging Russian Federation troops to surrender should be used in coordination with the distribution of leaflets and online messaging. Loudspeaker announcements allow greater flexibility with regard to altering messages to fit an immediate circumstance. Loudspeaker announcements may best serve Provosts’ efforts to encourage the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops when made at night, perhaps most effective at the top of the 3rd watch. Other times at which such announcements may be very effective might be holiday celebrations, in the aftermath of artillery fire missions and after Russian Federation advances that have been repulsed. Provosts should exploit information volunteered by Russian Federation prisoners of war such as names of unit commanders and noncommissioned officers. That information should be incorporated in a pertinent way as quickly as possible in loudspeaker messages.

Concerning the positioning of loudspeakers, they should be placed away from positions of Ukrainian troops but toward Russian Federation lines. (It is likely a manual has been published by the Ukrainian Armed Forces that provides guidance on the placement of loudspeakers for psychological warfare operations.) If possible, to assist in communicating with Russian Federation troops, actors, both male and female, could be contracted for their talents. The actors would hopefully be able to successfully deliver messages in the correct tone and most effectively to induce weary or newly arrived, terror stricken Russian Federation troops to surrender. If feasible, actors among troops already serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be sought out. They could be considered for transfer to the Provost Teams on a voluntary basis or, out of absolute necessity, under orders.

Just as drones could be utilized to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions to discover the locations of Russian Federation units upon which leaflets could be delivered, drones could potentially be modified to carry loudspeakers that at variable altitudes could effectively broadcast audible messages to Russian Federation troops below them. An organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. To greatcharlie’s knowledge, the utilization of loudspeaker drones is a technique that has not been practiced before. If creating an organic capability to communicate with Russian Federation troops with drones might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing that capability, but that may repeatedly delay urgent action.

B. During Offensive Operations

Placing loudspeakers near Russian Federation positions to enable troops to receive audible messages from the Provost pertaining to their possible surrender or defection would indeed be a dangerous undertaking during offensive operations. Ostensibly, if time were available, Provists could move forward of Ukrainian positions to stealthily place loudspeakers before Russian Federation defenses. Provost would need to do this following every advance of Ukrainian troops that displaced Russian Federation units and soon enough before the next assault. Given how fluid the situation has become on the battlefield during previous counteroffensives, being able to act fast enough might become problematic. To that extent, Provosts may only be able to act when adequate opportunities present themselves. Again, this would be dangerous work. For that reason it understandably may not be authorized. If Provosts are detected, Russian Federation commanders may assess that an advance was coming in their direction and in some way stiffen resistance at those points. Given the devastating impact the work of the Provosts might have upon Russian Federation operations, if they are captured they may face reprisals. This is especially true as the Provosts’ duties require them to encourage Russian Federation troops to violate their country’s federal laws. Show trials should be expected if they are captured. Additionally, as the work of the Provosts requires highly skilled operators, even slight losses of Provosts may have a devastating impact on the Teams’ operations.

With the aim of minimizing the chance for losses among Provosts during challenging infiltration missions, drones could be used as an alternate and safer means to get loudspeaker messages to Russian Federation troops. Albeit with perhaps a somewhat greater chance of loss, drones could move well-forward of Ukrainian frontlines to Russian Federation positions and broadcast messages on surrender and defection. These would be the same hypothetical drones modified to carry loudspeakers and operate at variable altitudes could provide audible messages to Russian Federation troops below them. Again, as in defensive operations, the “loudspeaker drones” would be flown forward only after other drones have reconnoitered and surveilled Russian Federation positions and dropped leaflets upon them. As mentioned earlier, an organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. Again, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations.

Loudspeaker drones flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who have indicated the desire to surrender or defect could be used to issue instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward. That would surely facilitate their capture for processing. Everything would need to be done rather rapidly but in calibrated ways before the frontlines are overcome by the fog of war and in the worst case scenario no one is able to determine “who is who and what is what.”

Again, it would be much safer for Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect to place leaflets as markers before their positions and facing Ukrainian lines at night, than put piles of leaflets out in the daytime and risk detection by their commanders and by Russian Federation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets flying above the frontlines or any Russian Federation military aircraft operating in their vicinity.

Working with Ukrainian commanders and having the best information available, Provost could also more confidently formulate plans to move forward to detain those Russian Federation troops. As aforementioned, if any drones hypothetically operated by Provosts can be provided with night vision optics, it will facilitate their operations. They would truly be better informed of what is happening within Russian Federation lines in real-time much as the commanders, be better enable able to act swiftly, and be enabled to more confidently provide evidence to Ukrainian commanders of the desire of those Russian Federation troops to surrender as those commanders are in the process of planning their assaults. Once Ukrainian commanders have developed their plans, issued orders, and positioned units for an assault it is unlikely that they would willingly alter their plans in response to the Provosts. Ukrainian commanders certainly are focused on fighting to win the war. That is their priority. In that same vein, it would be both expected and prudent for Ukrainian commanders to target Russian Federation positions that Provost may report are holding Russian Federation troops who seek to surrender and defect, and level a devastating blow against them if any aggressive behavior is observed from them. On the other hand, if after coordinating with commanders, leaflets have already been dropped on Russian Federation positions, and Russian Federation troops have begun piling leaflets as instructed, a commander who has developed a plan of attack must take steps to alter it by creating an opportunity for Provosts to bring them in. Any attack on Russian Federation troops who tried to surrender and defect in accord with instructions from the Ukrainian Armed Forces would send a very negative message along Russian Federation frontlines that the Ukrainians cannot be trusted and no faith should be placed in their promises. That could potentially destroy the proposed program no matter how fruitful or far along it might get.

This photograph purports to depict Russian Federation troops in rather neat condition surrendering to Ukrainian troops who are dressed quite immaculately during the wet, muddy, and cold winter fighting (above). Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect must know exactly what to do in the midst of an assault by Ukrainian units. Leaflets could be delivered to Russian Federation troops via artillery canisters and aircraft and loudspeakers stealthily placed nearby and the direction of Russian Federation positions. Most important would be to move rapidly and act effectively. If drones are used to communicate with Russian Federation troops, leaflets should be dropped first. Loudspeaker drones should next be flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who with leaflets have indicated the desire to surrender or defect.  The loudspeaker drones could broadcast messages with instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward.

V. Protecting Surrendering and Defecting Russian Federation Troops

A. During Defensive Operations

Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect must know exactly what to do in the midst of an assault by Ukrainian units. Leaflets could be delivered to Russian Federation troops via artillery canisters and aircraft and loudspeakers stealthily placed nearby and the direction of Russian Federation positions. Most important would be to move rapidly and act effectively. If drones are used to communicate with Russian Federation troops, leaflets should be dropped first. Loudspeaker drones should next be flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who with leaflets have indicated the desire to surrender or defect.  The loudspeaker drones could broadcast messages with instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward.

Russian Federation troops coming over to the Ukrainians must be told by the Provosts through leaflets, online posts, and loudspeakers that they will do their very best to cover their movements toward Ukrainian lines with firepower if their commander might decide to open fire on them. To provide such protection, Provosts should be provided with written authority to direct Ukrainian artillery units and counterbattery systems, not already engaged in fire support missions, to launch artillery and rockets onslaughts to suppress fire directed at surrendering Russian Federation troops or Russian Federation batteries that might be used for that purpose. When processing Russian Federation troops who have surrendered and defected, Provosts should ask each: “How can we improve our program to rescue more guys such as you?” (Sardonically, a few may likely say: “Offer big cash payments in US dollars!”) A more important query inquiry would concern information they might possess on Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets, and heavy machine gun emplacements that could be used to punish surrendering troops. Positions that those troops might identify could be targeted with fire missions by Ukrainian artillery and rocket batteries. 

As noted earlier, drones could also be used during offensive operations by Provosts as means to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions to confirm reported locations of Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets that earmarked for use against surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops. As suggested with regard to leaflets and loudspeakers, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations of mortars, artillery, rockets and heavy machine gun emplacement that might by used the thwart the surrender of Russian Federation troops. If Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets and machine gun emplacements are identified only after striking at surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops, marshals among the Provost Teams at the company and battalion levels must have the immediate, unencumbered ability to call for fire against them. 

If the suppression and destruction of Russian Federation mortars, artillery, rockets and machine gun emplacements could be performed frequently enough along the frontlines, particularly where Mobiks are being slaughtered, it would very likely have a marked, or perhaps even a very considerable impact on Russian Federation troop discipline, unit cohesion, offensive movement, and overall combat operations in Ukraine. The more intense the effort to halt surrenders and defections might become, the greater the Provosts efforts to disrupt and destroy them must become. The response of the Provosts should be of such intensity to the extent that efforts to thwart surrender and defection might very well become so unfruitful and costly that mission itself might be obviated.

B. During Offensive Operations

In addition to dealing with retributive fire from Russian Federation lines directed at punishing, but destroying any surrendering Russian Federation troops, it may be the case that blocking units have been regularly positioned to prevent Russian Federation troops from escaping their ominous fate by retreating. There may be military counterintelligence units operating in the frontlines to monitor the movements of Russian Federation troops. Similarly with Russian Federation firepower assets that might be directed at surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops, once in custody, some might be able to provide detailed, credible information concerning blocking units positioned to prevent Russian Federation troops from retreating, their assistance should be accepted and rewarded.

If Russian Federation blocking units can be identified before a Ukrainian Armed Forces advance, officers among the Provost Teams must be enabled to call for fire against them. If that proves not feasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be directed to support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations of blocking units placed in the rear of advancing Russian Federation troops or those holding defensive positions. Accordingly, officers among the Provost Teams must be enabled to call for fire against them.

In a twist, loudspeaker announcements as well as leaflets could also be used to warn Russian Federation commanders not to try in any way to halt efforts by their troops to surrender and defect. Such announcements should fix in the minds of the Mobiks and any other Russian Federation troops on the frontline that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are the dominant force on the battlefield. It may even have a sound educational effect on those Russian Federation troops, who for a variety of reasons to include patriotism, a sense of duty, and fidelity, at that particular moment, would be unwilling  Popular Western music could also be played toward Russian Federation on loudspeakers to remind them that life for the rest of the world goes on while they are trapped on the frontlines of an absolutely atrocious war.

Loudspeaker announcements as well as leaflets must never reveal the names of Russian Federation prisoners of war.  This will help minimize the possibility that reprisals will be carried out against their family members by the Russian Federation security services under the direction of the Kremlin. There would remain the possibility that Russian Federation troops who might decide to return to their homeland would face reprisals after the war. That situation would be out of the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it is something the Provost Teams proposed here and existing elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War might urge Russian Federation prisoners of war to consider. After World War II ended, reprisals against reprisals against Soviet Army troops for conduct on the battlefield was a practice among the Soviet security services.

A Russian Federation self-propelled 152.4 mm howitzer firing during combat at an undisclosed location in Donetsk region, Ukraine (above). Russian Federation troops coming over to the Ukrainians must be told by the Provosts through leaflets, online posts, and loudspeakers that they will do their very best to cover their movements toward Ukrainian lines with firepower if their commander might decide to open fire on them. To provide such protection, Provosts should be provided with written authority to direct Ukrainian artillery units and counterbattery systems, not already engaged in fire support missions, to launch artillery and rockets onslaughts to suppress fire directed at surrendering Russian Federation troops or Russian Federation batteries that might be used for that purpose. When processing Russian Federation troops who have surrendered and defected, Provosts should ask if they possess information on Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets, and heavy machine gun emplacements that could be used to punish surrendering troops. They do not need to answer under the Geneva Convention. Positions that those troops might identify could be targeted with fire missions by Ukrainian artillery and rocket batteries.

VI. Defeating Likely Russian Federation Countermeasures

The successful implementation of the proposed program would become a profound cause for alarm in Moscow. The ability to favorably impact the will of Russian soldiers to fight would be crucial to the larger objective of causing the Russian Federation to halt its invasion and withdraw its troops from Ukraine. It is greatcharlie’s contention that great numbers of Russian troops may very well be susceptible to an outside force able to suspend the control commanders have over them. The Kremlin seems quite aware of the situation. To that extent, in September 24, 2022, Putin signed the federal law “On Amendments to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses” which greatly enhanced that penalties for desertion during mobilization or wartime. Offenders could face as much as ten years in prison. Conscientious objectors could be subject to 3 years imprisonment. The law signed on September 24th additionally criminalized “voluntary” surrender, making it punishable by sentences up to 15 years. However, law has not deterred Russian Federation troops willing to risk the possibility of criminal charges in order to survive. Among possible stronger actions, already mentioned was retributive mortar, artillery, rocket, and heavy machine gun fire from Russian Federation lines directed at destroying any surrendering Russian Federation troops and blocking units positioned to the rear of Russian Federation units to prevent troops from escaping their ominous fate by retreating. Here are further examples of sort of actions to expect and some hint on how defeat them.

A. Infiltration

Among possible schemes to thwart efforts to cause Russian Federation troops to surrender and defect would almost certainly be implemented by Moscow. One very ordinary approach might be to seed counterintelligence troops within units on the frontlines to collect information on who is planning to surrender or defect and detain those troops. Russian Federation counterintelligence troops,  indeed at great risk, could potentially advance with units and fire on whoever moves toward the Ukrainian lines with their hands up. Russian Federation troops could be directed by loudspeakers to move forward rapidly toward trenches concealed to the greatest degree possible from Russian Federation lines. From there, they could one by one, crawl along a concealed path, something akin to a long drainage ditch, toward awaiting provosts. Both the prisoner of war trenches and paths discussed earlier could be covered at all times by sharpshooter and machine guns to both protect them, prevent infiltration through their use, and thwart the efforts of those assigned to harm them. The Russian Federation troops could be processed one by one as prisoners of war right off the crawl paths, and sent toward the rear through separate and concealed lines of communication.

With the purpose of protecting them from retaliation by their commanders or harm from infiltrators, Russian Federation troops that have surrendered or defected should be asked to assist the Ukrainian troops in protecting them.by identifying those who are newly arrived to their units or not part of their units at all. Captured Russian Federation troops could be asked to assist in monitoring those troops who were not part of their units–not as a job, but to avoid any unpleasant surprises from infiltrators–without becoming aggressive or engaging in physical violence. Provosts should be prepared to respond to any situation that may arise among the prisoners of war by positioning armed guards around the clock by their holding pens in the rear

B. The Potential Weaponization of Prisoner Exchanges and Repatriations

It would never be suggested by greatcharlie that the opportunity to repatriate captured troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should ever be passed up. The impact on morale would surely be deleterious. For Ukrainian commanders it would be anathema. Yet even more, as the promise sent to Russian Federation troops was that they would be protected if they surrendered or defected, it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to send them back to their better than disappointed commanders and very likely the Russian Federation’s security services. Just as the message of the positive treatment of Russian Federation troops would most likely reverberate back in their homeland, the message sent by their return would most likely be shattering, confirming the worst impression of the Russian people about the Ukrainians. If not imprisoned or executed for desertion, the Russian Federation would face the prospect of being sent back to whatever was left of their former units and driven into “no man’s land” toward Ukrainian frontlines. Unless there was a unit deployed at that point on the frontline, they would surely be driven through mortar, rocket, and artillery fire, and withering high-rate machine gun fire. Some effort must be made to hold them safer in some judicious way.

To that extent, prisoners of war who were promoted to surrender or defect due the efforts of the proposed program would be asked whether they wanted to participate in a prisoner exchange. Those who might choose to return, despite the risks, would be included on the list of prisoners of war for exchange. It is presumed by greatcharlie the number of Russian Federation prisoners of war willing to return might be small, although that ,at not be the case. Hoping readers will pardon greatcharlie’s frankness or any perceived indelicacy, it seems appropriate to suggest that to ensure sufficient numbers of Russian Federation troops are available for exchanges, soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, and regular Wagner Group troops should be held in separate prisoner of war camps and that all negotiated changes should limited to them. To that extent, a dedicated effort should be made by the proposed Provosts to recover wounded and abandoned Wagner Group and professional Russian Federation troops from the battlefield. That will help ensure that there would be sufficient numbers of Russian Federation assets to exchange. Performing that task may entail having the Provosts take risks that may in the end be deemed too dangerous, if not unwarranted. However, given the potential benefits this aspect of the proposed program may bring with regard to the bigger picture of diplomacy and postwar relations between the two countries, some consideration of how such duties could be performed at reduced risk should be given. Hopefully, the war will not drag on for so long that prisoner of war exchanges will need to be chalked out into the foreseeable future. That potentiality nevertheless must be planned for.

These captured Russian Federation troops, dressed in layers and lacking any military insignia or patches, are likely mercenaries or contract fighters from the Wagner Group (above). It would never be suggested by greatcharlie that the opportunity to repatriate captured troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should ever be passed up. The impact on morale would surely be deleterious. For Ukrainian commanders it would be anathema. Yet even more, as the promise sent to Russian Federation troops in hypothetical communications under the proposed program would be that they will be protected if they surrendered or defected, it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to send them back to their better than disappointed commanders and very likely the Russian Federation’s security services. Just as the message of the positive treatment of Russian Federation troops would be expected to reverberate back in their homeland, the message sent by handing them over to angered Russian Federation authorities would most likely be shattering, confirming the worst impression of the Russian people about the Ukrainians. If not imprisoned or executed for desertion, the Russian Federation would face the prospect of being sent back to whatever was left of their former units and driven into “no man’s land” toward Ukrainian frontlines.

C. Deceptive Use of Leaflets

One of the oldest tricks one might expect to see is Russian Federation military counterintelligence units feigning as Russian Federation troops who want to surrender or defect. They could closely follow the instructions on leaflets, online, and heard over loudspeakers on how to indicate their desire to come across lines to Ukrainians. However, when Provosts approach their position in offensive operations, the counterintelligence units operating in such a manner would surely attempt to destroy the Provost team. Given this possibility, Provosts, working alongside Ukrainian commanders, must be willing to target all Russian Federation positions with troops expressing the desire to surrender and be willing to destroy their positions if aggressive action is observed. Nothing should be considered settled until the Russian Federation troops are placed themselves in the Provosts’ custody.

To additionally help protect Provosts and advancing Ukrainian troops, any Russian Federation position that via images collected from aerial reconnaissance and surveillance that appear  to have leaflets piled in front of them but also appear to inordinately conceal heavy machine guns or inordinate numbers of shoulder fired rockets or anti tank guns within them images of such positions must be closely analyzed and targeted for attack when the battlefield is being prepared for Ukrainian advances or whenever Ukrainian commanders may deem fit.

As alluded to prior, it may be prudent to direct Ukrainian sharpshooters to provide overwatch for the Russian Federation troops engaged in placing piles of leaflets before their positions  by firing upon Russian Federation sharpshooters who may very likely be ordered  to fire at their own comrades engaged in placing leaflets in front of their positions as instructed by Provosts.

D. Other “What-ifs” Regarding Likely Countermeasures

Those in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who have acquired relatively considerable experience in the management of matters pertaining to prisoners of war would be best able to do the “what ifs” and figuratively billow up with a ladle more potential pitfalls and countermeasures that could be faced in the implementation of the proposed program. At the same time, those same members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be best able to plot ways to avoid those pitfalls and defeat any countermeasures that may be applied. Interestingly, if the Russian Federation commanders could be caused to get thoroughly involved in applying countermeasures against efforts made under the proposed program, the disruptive impact of doing so upon its military operations could potentially have a deleterious effect sufficient enough to create more favorable conditions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield. Omnia conando docilis solertia vincit. (By application a docile shrewdness conquers every difficulty.)

Again, not all Russian Federation troops facing the Ukrainian Armed Forces will respond to efforts under the proposed program. However, if enough do so, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, through mostly non-lethal means, might be able to make their mark in ending the war on mostly better terms and with less negative sentiment of both sides than could be expected in the current environment.  Ironically, Russian Federation troops may in effect be able to assist in ending a war in which they are among those who have suffered most.

Russian Federation prisoners of war being held in dreary cells at a detention center (above). With regard to detention center conditions, every effort must be made to create hygienic, well-maintained centers. Prisoners should be supplied with clean clothes, the opportunity to bath, recreation, and healthy meals. Having reviewed countless videos and photographs made public by the Ukrainian government for the writing of this essay, it became very clear that some Russian Federation prisoners of war are being kept in conditions that are unacceptable. (Ukrainian prisoners of war are probably being held in far worse conditions, but with the hope of promoting higher thinking behind the proposed program, the notion of responding “tit-for-tat” with regard to the treatment of Mobiks is anathema. Any notion of treating Russian Federation prisoners of war with respect and dignity hypothetically promised in messages and advanced in the handling of their capture will simply be washed away. If improvements in conditions at detention centers for Russian Federation prisoners of war are determined to be unwarranted, then the Ukrainian government, right before the world will display its disinterest in an opportunity to improve, in some part, the environment for a sustainable peace with its neighbor. Peace will be reached at some point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Efforts must be made to hasten that day and ensure that peace will be one all parties can live with

VII. Suggestions for Adjustments in Current Methods of Detention

To touch briefly on what is likely a delicate subject, reportedly, Russian Federation prisoners of war held in 500 detention centers in Ukraine. Russian Federation prisoners of war appear to be lumped together regardless of whether they are Mobiks, professional soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, regular Wagner Group troops, Wagner Group penal troops, and mercenaries This practice must end. It is quite deleterious with regard to the proposed program. To a great degree, Mobiks are victims of the unjustified war in Ukraine, too. They should not be held with Russian Federation troops that have volunteered to fight in Ukraine to include the professional Russian Federation troops, the regular Wagner Group troops, and mercenaries apparently from all over the world.

The suggestion was already made here that Mobiks who surrender under the proposed program should not be held with soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops and regular Wagner Group troops with regard to facilitating the aggregation of prisoners for exchanges. In the Russian Federation, Russian Federation troops that voluntarily surrender are deemed as criminals. Even more so, Mobiks among Russian Federation prisoners of war certainly should not be held in cells with confirmed hardened criminals from Wagner Group penal units. True, some Wagner Group penal troops sought to overcome the ills of prison life by going to war in Ukraine. However, there are likely hardened convicts from the depths of Russian Federation prisons among the Wagner Group troops who, when aggregated in detention centers, could make life far worse for Mobiks, the overwhelming majority of whom were literally torn from lives of peace and thrown into an unjustified war which many unlikely supported. The hardened criminals could surely reproduce in detention center cells all of the ills of prison life in the Russian Federation. If the purpose of handling Russian Federation prisoners of war in this manner has been was to intentionally create the potential for some prisoners of war, such as the Mobiks, to be subjected to such ugliness, it must be made clear that such thinking and practices under the proposed program is forbidden, will be tolerated, and must be halted immediately under the threat of punishment. 

With regard to detention center conditions, every effort must be made to create hygienic, well-maintained centers. Prisoners should be supplied with clean clothes, the opportunity to bath, recreation, and healthy meals. Having reviewed countless videos and photographs made public by the Ukrainian government for the writing of this essay, it became very clear that some Russian Federation prisoners of war are being kept in conditions that are unacceptable. (It may very well be the case that Ukrainian prisoners of war are being held in far worse conditions, but with the hope of promoting higher thinking behind the proposed program, the notion of responding “tit-for-tat” with regard to the treatment of Mobiks is anathema. Any notion of treating Russian Federation prisoners of war with respect and dignity hypothetically promised in messages and advanced in the handling of their capture will simply be washed away. If improvements in conditions at detention centers for Russian Federation prisoners of war are determined to be unwarranted, then the Ukrainian government, starkly before the whole wide world, will display its disinterest in a genuine opportunity to improve, in some part, the environment for a sustainable peace with its neighbor. Peace will be reached at some point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Efforts must be made to hasten that day and ensure that peace will be one all parties can live with.

The owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin (right), at Russian Federation prison recruiting civilian inmates for combat service with his organization in Ukraine. To touch briefly on what is likely a delicate subject, reportedly, Russian Federation prisoners of war held in 500 detention centers in Ukraine. Russian Federation prisoners of war appear to be lumped together regardless of whether they are Mobiks, professional soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, regular Wagner Group troops, Wagner Group penal troops, and mercenaries This practice must end. It is quite deleterious with regard to the proposed program. To a great degree, Mobiks are victims of the unjustified war in Ukraine, too. They should not be held with Russian Federation troops that have volunteered to fight in Ukraine to include the professional Russian Federation troops, the regular Wagner Group troops, and mercenaries apparently from all over the world.

VIII. Funding the Proposed Program: A Shot in the Dark

This segment of funding of this proposed program is quite naturally the most brief as, greatcharlie freely admits to knowing less than nothing about the budget of the Ministerstva Oborony Ukrainy (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense) or the budget of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Still, as the program would need a line of support, it has a suggestion that might prove useful or worthless. There may understandably be considerable reluctance in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Armed Forces to divert appropriated resources, that could be used more confidently to support all of the requirements of Ukraine’s Defense in the field right now and keeping Ukrainian troops alive, to a proposed program that would save the lives of Russian Federation troops in the name of peace and stability. That being the likely case, perchance through some singular arrangements made by the national authorities in Kyiv and the Ministry of Defense some hybrid line of funding and supply of special equipment needed by Provosts in the field, such as modified drones, could be provided by friendly foreign governments, foreign businesses, and foreign nongovernmental organizations. Drones might be easier to get a hold of than tanks and fighter jets and could very likely be secured much faster, from completely different sources. Again, this recherché hybrid funding idea is just a shot in the dark and may be completely off the mark.

IX. Pro Mundi Beneficio

Les chefs-d’oeuvre ne sont jamais que des tentatively heureuses. If implemented, at least in some very close form, the program proposed here would figuratively represent an offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces of a different kind, aimed at supporting military success by saving lives and dampening the spirit of evil that supported aggressive action. It would further serve as an additional footing for the foundation upon which a sustainable peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation could be established. The proposal is neither pie in the sky, nor worse, delusion. It has a real chance of promoting peace. This is only a proposal based on evidence available to greatcharlie.  It is not presumed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces or any other government organizations  would have an interest in greatcharlie’s meditations on the subject of prisoners of war. Yet, it is hoped, if anything, that the proposal might serve as a basis for the Ukrainians to further advance their efforts on the matter.

If through the implementation of the proposed program, the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be able achieve some success even in one area of the battlefield, the actions of one unit of troops might influence those of others, creating a cascading effect. There might be a real chance of collecting a huge bag of Prisoners of War before Russian Federation commanders could respond to the situation. Even then, whatever they might decide to do to halt the mass surrenders would be unlikely by thoughtful and surely be heavy-handed. Despite reservations of taking such action, Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders must keep perspective and remember the priority cannot simply be to kill the enemy but winning the war by getting the Russian Federation Armed Forces out of their country through forceful ejection or a withdrawal using every means possible. Everything reasonable that might support that cause should at least be considered, or better, given a try. Difficilius est sarcire concordiam quam rumpere. (It is more difficult to restore harmony than sow dissension.)

As alluded to earlier, this propitious option is not a hodge-podge of novel suggestions, but rather a more effective program of a tried and true methods at drawing in Russian Federation troops who are disposed to surrender and defect. Given that, one might read about this proposed program and respond that it is all very interesting but nothing new. That would be exactly the point. Some of the approaches suggested here are well-known, well-trodden in the history of contemporary warfare. The fact that some of what is proposed was practiced in the past does not obviate their use in the present. The tacit, popular belief that all new approaches must be rooted in high-tech might be characterized as the hobgoblin of the rigid and parochial.

Among those in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who have worked on prisoner of war matters, surely some have demonstrated intrinsic capabilities in the field. Their talents have by now have become well-harnessed by their knowledge and experience. Their use of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods suggested here should prove to be very fruitful. As noted, implemented with nuance injected by members of the existing Ukrainian Armed Forces prisoner of war program, it may support the achievement of military objectives that would have likely come at considerable cost in terms of troops and materiel while paradoxically sowing seeds for peace. The possibility of manifesting those outcomes alone, should be enough to warrant giving it a try. Those who would implement this proposed plan would surely see very difficult days often and deal with very trying moments. However, the rewards may be great enough to overcome those troubling occasions. Their role in creating the opportunity for better ending of the war would potentially be enormous.

Russian prisoners of war constructing garden furniture at a workshop in a Ukrainian Armed Forces detention center. The BBC reportd that the prisoners of war earn some money for their labor which they spend on cigarettes and sweets (above). As the proposed prisoner of war program develops, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, attendant with online messages on the sites should be videos and photographs of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered not just for the photo opportunity, Actual Russian Federation prisoners of war could be depicted wearing clean and neat clothes in safe, hygienic detention centers. Appropriate videos and photos should depict the Russian Federation prisoners of war engaged in daily activities at detention centers. To that extent, some videos and photos of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered should depict them drinking clean water, tea, and coffee, and wearing clean dry clothes and covered in warm blankets should be posted as soon as possible online. Authentic videos and photos of those who surrendered in inclement conditions, should also display them a few short hours later being held clean dry spaces, well-protected from cold, wind, rain and snow.

The Way Forward

There should be little question about the practicality of what is proposed here. Still, given omnidirectional calls for revenge still heard within Ukraine, any effort to enhance the existing prisoner of war program in a way that could potentially save the lives of additional of Russian Federation troops perhaps in the hundreds, even thousands, would hardly be well-received at first blush or after a superficial examination of it. Yet, amidst the anger and rage, the light of reason must be allowed shine through if a path out of this disaster is to be found After the war, if it can come to a rational end, it appears that Ukraine will find itself “leap-frogged” to a place among top tier powers in the world. Its economic, social, political, and military advancements will continue to be nurtured by allies and friends. However, despite all of the sacrifices made during the war there will likely be some further costs, consideration, in terms of engaging in the efforts to promote a lasting peace. Those efforts do not always need to be prompted by allies and friends

If as a result of some reasoning voiced in Kyiv, an operation to encourage the surrender of Russian soldiers cannot be implemented closely resembling the plan proposed here, as alluded to earlier, perhaps what is proposed could still serve as a basis for the development of their own impressions and plans for a similar tact. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. (In every disputation, we should look more to the weight of reason than to the weight of authorities.)