China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign Against the US? (Part 2)

The Headquarters of the Ministry of State Security (above). The primary civilian intelligence service engaged in the political warfare struggle against the US is the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Yet, while fully involved in that work, MSS has adhered to its bread and butter mission of stealing national security and diplomatic secrets with specific regard to the US. It has also robustly enhanced another mission of grabbing intellectual property and an array of advanced technologies from the US. This essay’s focus is not the political warfare effort by MSS. Rather, it provides a few insights on this topic from outside the box on MSS tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods used to keep its ears to the ground and to collect what it needs to improve China’s capabilities and capacity to compete and struggle with the US.

This post should be considered a direct continuation of the preceding one. The complete essay focuses on what the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is and what it does, day-to-day, for China. It is presented in two sections. “Part 1,” published on July 31, 2020, provides greatcharlie’s insights from outside the box on the MSS and the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods it believes both help to keep China secure and help to improve China’s capabilities and capacity to compete and struggle with the US. That discussion is buttressed by a few celebrated and trusted sources. This section, “Part 2,” completes discussion begun in “Part 1,” and then it calls attention to how, over recent years, a number of less-familiar, self-inflicted wounds have hindered the prosecution of a successful campaign by US counterintelligence services against the MSS as well as other Chinese intelligence services. The extent to which those same issues concerning US counterintelligence services have impacted the Trump administration is also touched upon. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that there is no reason for it to believe policymakers and decisionmakers in the White House and among US foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence organizations, would have a professional interest in its meditations on MSS intelligence operations in the US. However, it is greatcharlie’s hope that if given some attention, perhaps in some small way it might assist those who work on matters of gravity in this province improve their approach to defeating and displacing the MSS networks and operations as well as those of its sister organizations in the US. Bonus adiuvate, conservate popular Romanum. (Help the good (men) save (metaphorically in this case) the Roman people.)

People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping (above). President Xi Jinping is the man in charge, the top decisionmaker in China, therefore he has ultimate responsibility for what China has done, is doing, and will do. How China has responded to the crisis turned pandemic so far has been a source of curiosity and absolute outrage globally. The Communist Party of China and the National Party Congress were unapologetic and frightfully defensive concerning all discussion of China’s role in what was happening. They became particularly warm toward US President Donald Trump. It seems as if China’s leadership will continue to assail the global media with waves of distortions. In the meantime, around the world, the number of people infected by the coronavirus continues to increase, the death toll rises, and the financial loss is being calculated in the trillions. Hopefully, Chinese President Xi Jinping is genuinely aware of what is transpiring and has set some type of guidance on just how far this whole cabaret should go.

MSS Counterintelligence

A primary mission of the MSS counterintelligence service is the infiltration of all the foreign special service operations: intelligence, counter-intelligence, police forces all over the world. Its primary targets assuredly are its chief competitor, the US, the bordering Russian Federation, and Australia and New Zealand. The advanced industrialized countries of Western Europe would also fall under its watchful eyes although China has not achieved prominence in their space. Second would come Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Mongolia, and Iran which it trusts up to a point.  China must also measure its national interests, and particularly its national security against Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. China has also stepped up intelligence operations throughout Africa to support and facilitate its effort to extend its geopolitical influence and acquire oil, rare Earth minerals, and fish. Africa is estimated to contain 90 percent  of the entire world’s supply of platinum and cobalt, 50 percent of the world’s gold supply, 66 percent of the world’s manganese, and 35 percent of the world’s uranium. Africa accounts for almost 75 percent of the world’s coltan, which is a key mineral required for the construction of electronic devices, including cell phones. Well over 10,000 Chinese firms are operating on the continent with 25 percent located in Nigeria and Angola. China has also expanded its military presence in Africa, rivaling the level of US military equities there.)

Certainly, counterintelligence would do whatever possible to intercept, neutralize, and recruit foreign intelligence officers, as well as their operatives and informants in China and those working in locations close to, and on matters concerning, Chinese interests in other countries. As with almost any other counterintelligence organization worldwide, necessary attributes must be present to initiate a counterintelligence investigation on a suspected “foreign spy.” The primary means to confirm their identity is through careful study and observation of the subject and thorough research of all available information. It is a process similar to selecting a target for recruitment. Covert audio and video monitoring in the residences, vehicles, offices, hotels frequented and homes of friends of the suspected foreign spy. Passive collection by informants will also be used to eavesdrop on the individual’s conversations. The surveillance effort may not always be easy going. A foreign intelligence officer’s trade craft may be superb and all of his or her interactions and moves might appear authentic. The foreign intelligence officer’s movement technique could make maintaining surveillance on the subject difficult. For any counterintelligence services, that type of professionalism in an opponent can pose a challenge. Oddly enough though, it will result in increased suspicion among some.

Chinese intelligence services are capable of constructing a sophisticated profile of the online activities of individuals. It does not appear, however, that the MSS and supporting agencies have established the capability to identify espionage in the offing. Every now and then, though, they are lucky enough to identify espionage underfoot with hum shoe detective work, online. In an excellent essay published May 7, 2014 on Jamestown, Mattis relays that in May 2014, Guangdong State Security Department (GSSD) of the MSS revealed brief details of an espionage case in which the chief suspect received a ten-year prison sentence. An unnamed foreign intelligence service reportedly recruited the suspect, dubbed “Mr. Li,” in an online chat room. Electronic prowling led him to documents of immense value, a variety of classified military documents and publications. Recognizing that a long price could be had for what he might acquire, “Mr. Li” turned to an online contact “Feige.” GSSD counterintelligence discovered that “Feige” had more than 40 other contacts—12 in Guangdong—spread over 20 provinces and provincial-level cities. Additionally, “Feige” had been an active online persona since 2007, collecting information off of military enthusiast (junmi) discussion boards and using services such as QQ to meet others like “Mr Li.” Those who “Feige” recruited collected military information through friends and contacts, subscribed to sensitive and internal military publications, and even took pictures of local military installations. Although a long price could surely have been had for what he had collected and provided the foreign intelligence service, “Mr. Li” was paid only a few hundred renminbi per month. Chinese authorities did not identify the foreign intelligence service behind the theft of the military secrets. Nevertheless, the case compounded an apparent sense of siege in Beijing over what then called US Internet hegemony, and the prevalence of foreign-made communications technology in sensitive Chinese systems. There were also allegations that the US had managed to exploit Huawei’s equipment, a concern that has since flipped the other way. For a state known to be as controlling of information as China, the reality is that an incredible amount of sensitive information was publicly accessible. It was all overwhelming for China which was well-aware of that its counterintelligence services could not stem figurative waves of attempts to penetrate its systems. The MSS will always want Chinese citizens to believe its elements such as the GSSD are as present as “air and water” with “information on everyone.” However, contradicting that, Chinese security officials were also reported at the time that more than 70 percent of state secrets cases involve information being leaked or passed to a foreign intelligence service online It led to changes.

It goes without saying that Chinese military and civilian intelligence services have immensely improved their cyber capabilities. Efforts by the, have tormented advanced industrialized countries. However, lessons learned in the past decade by MSS counterintelligence concerning foreign intelligence services’ cyber operations against China apparently stuck. Perhaps, the main lesson was that it was not safe to continue creating and maintaining secret communications or reports, any truly important documents, electronically. It was the same as leaving an open door to foreign intelligence service penetration. The transition back to paper would be the best answer and easy enough. Indeed, the use of hard documents and files was what the most seasoned foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers were most familiar with using. Moreover, they are very likely individuals of conservative habits, and never became so familiar with computer work as their younger counterparts. The return to paper files would certainly lead to the collection of what would now be thought of as considerable amounts of documents. File rooms and vaults have very likely been rebuilt or returned to service. Urgent issues concerning diplomatic matters were likely communicated via encrypted transmissions. There was very likely a sharp increase in transmissions once the consulate received notice that it was being forced to close. Use of that medium would provide some reasonable assurance that content of the communication would be protected. Nothing of any real importance was likely communicated by telephone given that the US would surely successfully eavesdrop on the conversation. One might venture to say that a move to hard documents was evinced when the world observed presumably Ministry of Foreign Affairs security officers and MSS intelligence officers using fire bins to burn bundles of documents inside the compound of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in Houston, Texas as it prepared to close. It might be the case that burning the documents is standard operating procedure for Chinese diplomatic outposts in such instances as an evacuation. MSS counterintelligence would hardly think that US intelligence and counterintelligence services would pass up the fortuitous opportunity to search through or even keep some or all of the documents consulate personnel might try to ship or mail to China while evacuating the building, even if containers of documents were sent as diplomatic pouches.

Staff burning massive bundles of documents within the compound of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in Houston, Texas (above). Lessons learned in the past decade by MSS counterintelligence concerning foreign intelligence services’ cyber operations against China apparently stuck. Perhaps, the main lesson was that it was not safe to continue creating and maintaining secret communications or reports, any truly important documents, electronically. The transition back to paper would be the best answer. One might say that a move to hard documents was evinced when the world observed presumably Ministry of Foreign Affairs security officers and MSS intelligence officers using fire bins to burn bundles of documents inside the compound of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in Houston, Texas as it prepared to close. MSS counterintelligence would hardly think that US intelligence and counterintelligence services would pass up the fortuitous opportunity to search through or even keep some or all of the documents consulate personnel might try to ship or mail to China while evacuating the building, even if containers of documents were sent as diplomatic pouches.

Once MSS foreign intelligence officers are lucky enough to recruit operatives and informants in the US, federal indictments and criminal complaints against those caught indicate that they task them as intelligence collection requirements demand. However, in almost all of those taskings, certain counterintelligence aspects can also be discerned. Those aspects appear aimed at providing ways to assist MSS counterintelligence in identifying and locating foreign intelligence officers, operatives, and informants, particularly in China, or assist in devising ways to intercept, neutralize, and recruit them. Typical counterintelligence aspects in takings that include collecting information on how the US intelligence services communicate with officers, operatives, and informants overseas. In August 2016, Kun Shan “Joey” Chun, a Chinese-born naturalized US citizen, pleaded guilty to illegally acting as an agent of the Chinese government. Chun, an electronics technician and veteran FBI employee who had a top-secret security clearance, reportedly passed sensitive information to China concerning, among other things, surveillance technologies used by the FBI. Prosecutors said that while working for the agency in New York he sent his Chinese handler, “at minimum, information regarding the FBI’s personnel, structure, technological capabilities, general information regarding the FBI’s surveillance strategies, and certain categories of surveillance targets.” Chun’s Chinese intelligence contacts provided him with financial payments and partially paid for a trip to Italy and France, during which he met with a Chinese intelligence officer.

In order to develop ways to counter FBI efforts against MSS foreign intelligence officers, operatives, and informants, MSS counterintelligence would want to know how the organization is set up to confront adversarial networks of spies, who is who, where they are situated, and what exactly are they doing. Understanding FBI surveillance strategies, would inform MSS counterintelligence of what layers of surveillance are usually being pressed on MSS foreign intelligence officers, operatives, and informants in the US and how to devise better ways to defeat them. Technological capabilities would inform MSS counterintelligence whether all along the FBI has had the capability to monitor its activities or whether they have the capacity and have simply failed to use it effectively. The collection of information on what MSS foreign intelligence has been doing ineffectively in the face of US counterintelligence surveillance strategies and technological capabilities would undoubtedly inspire audits to better assess how closely its operatives were being monitored and how US counterintelligence managed to see a number of MSS efforts straight.

Kun Shan “Joey” Chun, (above). Once MSS foreign intelligence officers are lucky enough to recruit operatives and informants in the US, federal indictments and criminal complaints indicate that they task them as intelligence collection requirements demand. However, in almost all of those taskings, certain counterintelligence aspects can also be discerned. Typical counterintelligence aspects in takings that include collecting information on how the US intelligence services communicate with officers, operatives, and informants overseas. In August 2016, Kun Shan “Joey” Chun pleaded guilty to illegally acting as an agent of the Chinese government. Chun, an electronics technician and veteran FBI employee who had a top-secret security clearance, reportedly passed sensitive information to China concerning, among other things, surveillance technologies used by the FBI. Prosecutors said that while working for the agency in New York he sent his Chinese handler, “at minimum, information regarding the FBI’s personnel, structure, technological capabilities, general information regarding the FBI’s surveillance strategies, and certain categories of surveillance targets.”

In the case of former CIA case officer, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, who, in November 2019, was sentenced to 19 years in prison last year after pleading guilty to conspiring with MSS intelligence officers after he left the agency in 2010. According to the US Department of Justice, Lee had created a document including “certain locations to which the CIA would assign officers with certain identified experience, as well as the particular location and timeframe of a sensitive CIA operation.” Lee also possessed an address book that “contained handwritten notes” related to his work as a CIA case officer prior to 2004. These notes included “intelligence provided by CIA assets, true names of assets, operational meeting locations and phone numbers, and information about covert facilities.” Allegedly, Chun’s espionage activities led to the deaths of a number of the CIA’s Chinese informants.

The damage done to CIA networks and at least one ongoing operation in China, accompanied by the tragic loss of any operatives or informants as suggested by news media reports would create a sense of immeasurable anger and betrayal within CIA. However, the Agency has been through similar situations before with notables such as Edward Howard, Aldrich Ames, and Harold Nicholson. MSS counterintelligence would capitalize on Lee’s efforts by creating an active template based on how its case officers operated, the types of operatives and informants targeted and methods of their recruitment. Further, typical locations for meetings could be plotted and ways and means to surveil new operations and collection efforts could be developed. Most importantly, the information could allow for the conceptualization of the potential moves that CIA might make to resurrect lost networks and activities against China. Countermeasures would put in place to potentially thwart new recruitments and stymie new technologies that could support operations in the field and run alongside human intelligence collection.

Much ado was made in the US Intelligence Community about the espionage case of Ron Hansen. In a May 2019 guilty plea and plea agreement, Ron Hansen acknowledged attempting to communicate, deliver, or transmit to MSS intelligence officers, information concerning US national defense with intent or reason to believe that information would be used to harm the US and provide advantages to China. Hansen was a retired US Army Warrant Officer with experience in signals intelligence and human intelligence and former Defense Intelligence Agency civilian intelligence case officer, fluent in Mandarin as well as Russian, with top secret security clearance, In early 2014, the MSS targeted Hansen for recruitment and he began meeting with them regularly in China. During those meetings, the MSS intelligence officers described the type of information that would interest them. One of the most important taskings Hansen received was collecting  forensic software and sending it to the operatives in Beijing without first obtaining the license from the US Department of Commerce which constituted a crime. As Hansen described events, he partnered with two Chinese nationals, to whom he identified “Amy” and “Robert,” via an office he maintained for his company, H-11 in Beijing. Amy and Robert operated Beijing Hua Heng (Infosec) which partnered with H-11 to sell computer forensic products in their company. Robert informed Hansen that he maintained close connections to several contacts in Chinese intelligence. In November 2016, Amy instructed Hansen to purchase and send to her in China, Recon software from Sumuri LLC, a Delaware based firm. She specifically requested the Recon Mac OS X Forensics with Paladin 6 software, which contained cryptographic capability. Despite being aware of US laws forbidding the export, Hansen did so despite being aware of US laws forbidding the export. In December 2016, Arny instructed Hansen to purchase the Intella 100 software from Vound LLC, a US company that provided products related to forensic search, e-discovery, and information governance. He obediently bought it and had it shipped it to her in China in January 2017. Again, he did so, despite being aware of US laws forbidding the export.

Tasking Hansen to grab forensic software could surely have served a counterintelligence requirement. Software forensics is the science of analyzing software source code or binary code to determine whether intellectual property infringement or theft occurred. Advanced forensic software could allow MSS counterintelligence officers to conduct in depth analysis of user files to collect evidence such as documents, pictures, internet history and more. MSS counterintelligence could use the software to monitor communications and collect information on dissidents, ethnic groups, suspected foreign intelligence operatives and informants, even foreign intelligence officers of some countries, visiting foreign officials, businessmen, and tourists alike. It could support the theft of intellectual property and trade secrets.

Counterintelligence may very well be the greatest manifestation of the paranoia business, but it, as all other elements of the intelligence industry, requires wisdom, reason, and logic to be performed well. A MSS counterintelligence officer was not supposed to be the same as his internal security service or law enforcement counterpart. Unlike such, displeasure and frustration over denials of intercepted foreign intelligence officers and agents in interrogations generally should not manifest in violence.

There is no reason for frustration over denials of intercepted intelligence officers, operatives, or informants to result in violence. If progress through interviews indicates that an investigator is on the right track, there will be an attempt to find another door inside to open and pass through in order to get deeper on matters. Such technique is honed and polished over the years. When MSS managers have determined the situation demands rough treatment, typically some sort of exigent circumstance, and when the decision will align with the thinking and plans of the Communist Party of China leadership, coercive measures are employed to include forms of torture. Expectedly, “good managers” will be ill at ease with that. Much to the grief of foreign intelligence officers, foreign agents, and Chinese citizens, it is that style of pursuit which has been honed and polished over the years by MSS counterintelligence officers.

Sensation seekers might believe that being involved in authentic espionage would be thrilling. However, there is plenty of real danger involved. Once the MSS officer is in the ground working in a foreign land, there is always the chance of arrest while carrying out one’s duties or expulsion of the officer persona non grata. From what has been observed, when US counterintelligence and law enforcement ensure that such interceptions of Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants receive high profile reporting, to include conducting press conferences and widely disseminating press releases, it is akin to hanging out MSS’ dirty laundry for all to see.

MSS counterintelligence officers surely caution their counterparts in MSS foreign intelligence to keep their eyes and ears open. The MSS foreign intelligence officer in the field must be able to intuit when a situation is right and when it is wrong. Experienced hands will take counsel not from their fears, but from their intimations. They know when to seize up and walk away. Still, there would be a natural concern among counterintelligence officers everywhere that as a human habit, sometimes what is obvious is often immediately accepted as true. The result can be catastrophic. MSS took a big hit in October 2018, when Yan Jun Xu, a Chinese citizen and Deputy Division Director, Sixth Bureau of Jiangsu Province of the MSS, was arrested and charged with conspiring and attempting to commit economic espionage and steal trade secrets from multiple US aviation and aerospace companies. US counterintelligence officers were able to lure Xu, a successful MSS intelligence officer, to Belgium in April 2018 where he was arrested pursuant to a federal complaint, and then indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio. Belgian authorities provided significant assistance with the arrest and extradition of Xu to the US. Among Xu’s tasks as a MSS foreign intelligence officer in the US was to obtain technical information, including trade secrets, from aviation and aerospace companies not only in the US but throughout Europe. Xu often cloaked the true nature of his employment, by representing that he was associated with Jiangsu Science & Technology Promotion Association. From December 2013 to October 2018, Xu worked, traveled, and communicated with individuals associated with or employed by MSS and a number of Chinese universities and institutions, particularly Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Xu also actively targeted specific companies in the US and overseas that were acknowledged to be leaders in the field of aviation and aerospace technology, design, and manufacturing. Within these aviation companies, Xu and other individuals, some of whom were already known to law enforcement, would spot individuals who they deemed to be “experts” in those aviation companies, and who could potentially be targeted and recruited to travel to China, manipulated under the belief that they were traveling to China merely for “an exchange” of ideas and to give a presentation at a university. Xu and others would pay the “experts” stipends and would arrange for and pay expenses associated with their travel to China. To achieve their objective of collecting specific aviation technology documents and information, Xu and others exchanged messages concerning the types of information that they desired, and actively discussed methods for obtaining the desired information. That effort would include the use of codes and series of letters in place of the technology being discussed and the name of the company targeted. The arrest of Xu, who handled both Ji Chaoqun and Weiyun Huang, (whose circumstances were discussed in “Part 1” of this essay) preceded their arrests.

Xudong Yao, also known as Yan Jun Xu ( above). MSS counterintelligence officers surely caution their MSS foreign intelligence counterparts to keep their eyes and ears open. The MSS foreign intelligence officer in the field must be able to intuit when a situation is right and when it is wrong. They must know when to seize up and when to walk away. Still, there would be a natural concern among counterintelligence officers everywhere that as a human habit, sometimes what is obvious is often immediately accepted as true. The result can be catastrophic. MSS took a big hit in October 2018, when Yan Jun Xu, a Chinese citizen and Deputy Division Director, Sixth Bureau of Jiangsu Province of the MSS, was arrested and charged with conspiring and attempting to commit economic espionage and steal trade secrets from multiple US aviation and aerospace companies. US counterintelligence officers were able to lure Xu, a successful MSS intelligence officer, to Belgium in April 2018 where he was arrested pursuant to a federal complaint, and then indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio.

Doubtlessly, if MSS officers are caught they will be told what they can say if “pressure” is severe enough. The information would likely be designed as an active measure to help distort a foreign counterintelligence services understanding of MSS tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods. Given estimates by experts on the potential volume of their intelligence activities in the US, a casual observer might expect the impact of a loss here and there would likely be viewed as nominal with respect to the overall picture. However, intercepted MSS officers, who stumble due to poor tradecraft, a simple misstep, or for reasons unknown to MSS counterintelligence, may not recover beautifully if returned to China. To start, the MSS would not at all like having its officers identified in China, identified in the US, or even worse, see them apprehended by US counterintelligence services or law enforcement. Further, it would not appreciate having an entire operation or network in the US detected and effectively neutralized

For the MSS officer, Commandment 11, “Thou shall not get caught!”, applies. Being caught while on the beat will never be chalked up as a sword scratch or a badge of courage. Yet, the greatest problem would be the embarrassment that it would cause the MSS as an organization, the Chinese government, and the Communist Party of China. The intercepted officer would have to face the reality that he failed at his task. Facetious managers and colleagues would likely say he or she was not up to the job. If there was  some error in judgment, failure to do things by the book, or wilful dereliction for failing to attain proper authorization before acting, the size of the failure would grow exponentially. Doubtlessly, the officer would be held out as an example of how an MSS officer should not operate. Concerning the situation of the hypothetical errant MSS officer, Il a foutu la merde dans sa vie.

The manner in which the Communist Party of China might come down on the officer for the failure would likely depend upon the political temperature at the time in Beijing. One could use the Party’s response to the bad news of the coronavirus outbreak as a yardstick. There would be no way to conceal the matter from the Communist Party of China. Even if the attempt was made to do so, informants inside the organization would likely report the matter up to Party leaders, making them familiar with the case before the matter even moved through MSS channels and managers and senior executives there were read-in on everything. The Communist Party of China would be especially interested if it concerns the US. One could only imagine the reaction of Party leaders if they were to find out about the arrest or PNG of a MSS officer via the US news media before hearing from its own government.

Putting aside the reality that a vital MSS intelligence operation may have been disrupted or destroyed and putting aside the potential negative reaction by the Communist Party of China, one might consider that for MSS senior executives and managers at headquarters, the saving grace would be that if the US counterintelligence were doing so, it meant attempts recruit the officer and compel him or her to play the double-game against their former colleagues and bosses as a counterespionage operative for the US failed. To advance a step further on this point, MSS managers would also recognize that burning the MSS offficer would be a palliative step and the only “constructive” option left for US counterintelligence. Holding a captured MSS officer in prison instead of putting them out of the US, PNG, would almost ensure some type of retaliation against an US intelligence officer or merely a suspected officer would be taken in China. In effect, a de facto modus vivendi exists. As for the future of the MSS officer caught, by burning him or her with heavy news media coverage of his or her identification or arrest could possibly destroy the officer’s prospects for receiving another overseas posting or participating in future intelligence operations leaving them in a solitary despair. MSS can always hire and train another.

A considerable concern for any counterintelligence service regarding foreign intelligence officers and their operatives and informants functioning in foreign territory is the threat of betrayal. Indeed, intelligence organizations in general spend much time and energy hunting among their own ranks for foreign spies. Of course, concerns are always raised among Chinese citizens when anyone with whom they may have just met or were in contact for other reasons, suddenly showed what could be considered under the circumstances as an eccentric interest in them. They could imagine that such inquires could be a trick perpetrated by the security services to test their loyalty. That surely causes the most fear. Defections from the MSS do happen, but as aforementioned, they are somewhat rare. Nevertheless, it is guarded against as surely not all MSS officers are gun barrel straight. At least, this would be the most likely presumption of Chinese counterintelligence officers. Certainly, all intelligence services have their share of problems with errant officers. Some, such as MSS, likely have less problems than most. However, even the clean, loyal, and obedient will occasionally look over their shoulders because of that. Bent intelligence can serve any preconceptions, and it often does in many intelligence services; sometimes purposefully and wrongfully to destroy an innocent officer’s career.

MSS counterintelligence managers with practiced hands know the first step of a breakdown in a officer’s sense of duty to China and the Communist Revolution can take place as far back as when an individual is hired who might manifest reactions such as jealousy and envy over the success of others faithfully operating in the field and achieving many victories. The second step of that breakdown usually happens when those less-than qualified hires are placed in a position to monitor, audit, and evaluate the work of those in the field. Those inner rumblings are often more than just a matter of maturity or being uptight. They are character issues that should have been resolved long before those particular individuals met their MSS recruiters. Their varied emotional disorders subsequently became most apparent after they began working.

A satellite image of the imposing MSS Headquarters in Beijing (above). In the abstract, one might conceptualize that a foreign technology analysis office with specialized units likely exists within one of its analytical departments to perform that task. One might consider further how tasks are divided within it and how it logically manages the mass collection of information and data collected. The overall aim of the hypothetical advanced foreign technology assessment unit would be to enhance the analytic capability of the MSS to enable it to more effectively provide to the Communist Party of China, ministers, and MSS senior executives the highest quality intelligence on advanced technological developments in the US and in other advanced industrialized countries. For the obvious security reasons, the workplace of these supposed technology analysts would likely be situated In some prohibited place, if not within the depths of the massive Beijing Headquarters of the MSS, itself.

MSS Large Data Processing of Technologies Stolen from US Conceptualized

Facilius per partes in cognitionem todus adducimur. (We are more easily led part by part to an understanding of the whole.) With dozens of operatives moving about the US with their eyes wide open and ears pinned back attempting to obey instructions from MSS officers either back in China or on the ground in the US, a backlog of information collected would be expected. The volume might be seen as problematic by experts in the US. However, MSS senior executives and managers, much as the MPS and all the parallel PLA and Communist Party of China intelligence services and units and all of the iterations of Chinese intelligence services that came before them, would apply reason to find a way to handle bundles of reports from intelligence operatives and informants. It stands to reason that a division exists which is engaged in piecing together information and data stolen from the US to advance its own technologies. China would hardly vouchsafe such.

In the abstract, one might conceptualize that a foreign technology analysis office with specialized units likely exists within one of its analytical departments to perform that task. One might consider further how tasks are divided within it and how it logically manages the mass collection of information and data collected. The overall aim of the prospective advanced foreign technology assessment unit would be to enhance the analytic capability of the MSS to enable it to more effectively provide to the Communist Party of China, its minister and deputy ministers, and senior executives, the highest quality intelligence on advanced technological developments in the US and in other advanced industrialized countries. For the obvious security reasons, the workplace of these supposed technology analysts would likely be situated In some prohibited place, if not some inner sanctum of the massive Headquarters of the MSS in Beijing, itself. Visualize, in some edifice in China, several MSS analysts, all of whom are experts on US and other advanced industrialized countries’ military, scientific, medical or artificial intelligence technologies, engaged daily in an intelligence practice of uncovering the latest, most advanced, and most desired information of foreign technologies from collected intelligence. In an intelligence tradition from the earliest days of CDSA, they can be imagined mining through foreign sources in a time consuming process akin to sifting through dust, yet enjoying the hunt so to speak.

One might say the work of such prospective foreign technology assessment analysts would be something similar to that of codebreakers of World War II in the United Kingdom, yet they are isolated from the conditions of the past. That art, as with many aspects of intelligence collection, has become electronic. The label analyst should be interpreted widely to include researchers who regularly use secret intelligence. Individuals drawn to and hired for such work would have an acumen for being able to work on what are essentially puzzles. Solving puzzles is actually a science dubbed enigmatology. The analysts turned “enigmatologists,” or visa-versa, would most likely be elated to keep their brains on edge. They would have little difficulty remaining occupied forever long it takes to put together pieces of information to create the picture of a new technology or new research and development project. When such a figurative puzzle is cracked, new ones would very likely be immediately placed before analysts.

Bletchley Park, a country house in Buckinghamshire, was bought by the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in 1938 as a site to which the Government Code & Cypher School and MI6 could be evacuated when war came. However, Bletchley Park’s great success was as a result of the mechanization of the decryption process keeping pace with the mechanization of encryption. Although the decryption of Enigma is the best known of Bletchley Park’s exploits, other successes, such as the decryption of Luftwaffe hand ciphers, and the development of Colossus, the world’s first computer which solved the enciphered German teleprinter, made a significant contribution to the Allied victory. One might say the work of such prospective foreign technology assessment analysts would be something similar to that of codebreakers of World War II, yet they are isolated from the conditions of the past as that art, as with many aspects of intelligence collection, has become electronic.

While the supposition may sound a bit ordinary, perchance there would be some sort of analytical triage by the most experienced analyst, perhaps senior leaders and best experts from the analytical team might gather weekly or daily to perform that task. It would also give the supervisors a good sense of what might be coming down the pike for examination. The participating supervisors, themselves, would reflect countries from which the technologies would be stolen and would be proficient in the respective languages of the industrialized countries from which the reports, plans, schematics, charts, and other data would originate. The final sorting would be done by supervisors intimately familiar with at least one area of the technologies stolen. There may be information gathered on a new US technology or ongoing research and development project that is already in sufficient quality and quality to send up to higher levels of management to create additional collection requirements for MSS officers and operatives in the field to help complete the picture. Even if there is a relative paucity of information on a foreign technology, if it is a technology discovered that is so advanced that it would have the potential to be a game changer in terms of the development of Chinese technologies or might be of the utmost importance regarding China’s defense and national security, it would very likely be brought up to senior executives who would decide how to pursue it. Counterintelligence would also likely be involved to make certain that any miracles are not simply sophisticated material dangled as bait for some elaborate trap. The supervisors speculated upon here would also be the ones to deliver information in formal reports or as presentations and desk-level briefings to customers in government.

After they receive a batch of information, the emphasis of the analysts’ search through it will be to identify and consider new discoveries, as well as determine whether the information is simply interesting or can be given higher meaning. Much as case officers may run more than operative in the field, each analyst or team would likely work on, not many, but very likely more than one puzzle at a time. The foundation of the puzzle would most likely be formed by a pattern of information. Each bit of new information may be a possible missing piece. Each new piece gives one an idea of what the next piece might look like. In a mosaic, stone fragments are cut to for a particular image the artist has in mind, a preconception. With a puzzle, the image is created  with each new piece. There is something to learn every time the image is developed. Eventually the image figuratively begins looking back at the one working on the puzzle telling its story. Priority is likely given to those puzzles closest to solution or those that begin releasing information about some new exquisite US technology that MSS senior executives, and thereby the Communist Party of China wants to get its hands on. As a next logical step, the collection of pieces for the remaining parts of the puzzle by operations departments from Beijing or the provinces can be directed through collection requirements. Perhaps the same analyst or analytical team or a group of troubleshooting technological experts would take over the case at that point.

One exercise would be to find commonalities among reports on a US research and development project. The likely thinking in each unit would be that there is always something in what has been collected, it just needs to be fully twinkled out. Imaginably, instead of having too few clues, in some cases there would be too many. To pull out a particular strand from a mass of information requires a very clear sense of priority. Doing that would also serve a counterintelligence purpose. The analysts would likely be trained to know there are patterns in reporting. A new technology will rarely simply emanate from  a single source, with no other references to it and no communication about it.

When pieces of information might be missing, there would always be the possibility that the next batch of reports from the US might help to do that. If that telling piece of information is not in the next batch, it may be in the batch after that. There are no blind alleys. If a report says something is there then it is there. The analysts would be fully cognizant that a considerable effort is being made within the US to conceal secret projects. Success at their work is likely invigorating, and likely impel more strenuous efforts. No matter how slowly any puzzle would develop, there would unlikely be any case regulated to something akin to a cold case file. If any information exists on a technological project, MSS managers know that there is metaphorically something cooking in the US. With several civilian informants working inside and around technological development centers, the day might come at any time when pieces of puzzle take on greater meaning and the puzzle starts telling the analysts something considerable.

While the image that the puzzle presents may not yet be completely in focus, the most experienced, knowledgeable, and resourceful eyes, masters in the business of sorting these puzzles out will be put on the matter. Such a case would likely become a collaborative focus. After a while of that, the newly discovered technology would very likely come into focus and resources of operations would be directed to the effort to hunt down the remaining elements and get them to China. In some cases, the few stray pieces of the puzzle could be conceptualized and reproduced by technology experts in China. What one can invent, another can surely reproduce.

Students of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics studying in the library (above). One might say the work of such prospective foreign technology assessment analysts would be something similar to that of codebreakers of World War II, yet they are isolated from the conditions of the past as that art, as with many aspects of intelligence collection, have become electronic. Chinese colleges and universities graduate a near endless list of qualified candidates for every year. The Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in particular is a happy hunting ground for MSS recruiters. Given in part to the availability of a highly qualified pool of potentials, Chinese intelligence services surely have the personnel capacity to handle the loads of stolen information coming in from the US and other advanced industrialized countries. The two female students at the bottom right of the photo are apparently taking a short break from all of their serious academic work with a little diversion.

There must be a balance in all of their analyses without a smidge of bias. In their analytical product, they would need to guard against apophenia, seeing patterns in unrelated things. Engaging in informal speculation would be appreciated, some US technologies would possibly seem so advanced as to be called exotic. However, assessing any to have a potential bordering on science fiction would face disapproval. No one would be allowed to attach importance to anything purely arbitrary. Latching on to something definitively trivial will be proven when nothing ever follows to assist in solving the matter.

Reports that the analysts received would unlikely solely focus on technologies although that information would have primacy. Reports that identify government agencies, offices, supporting specific cutting-edge research and development of technologies. Where those government agencies are, that is where the MSS will very likely be prowling. Names of experts from US government departments and agencies or from private organization experts that came up related to a particular technology may among other things help to understand the project’s importance. Reports on how information is kept secure would certainly be useful. Information on security officers associated with protecting a project may be important for operational purposes. It may become necessary to know who they are, what they are doing, what they are saying, and what their routines, interests, habits and health are, particularly if it is determined that the door should be left open to possibly conducting a covert collection effort against the office or facility for which he or she might be responsible.

Assumably, morale would be high in such a foreign technology assessment office given its victories. In terms of supervising performance and ensuring a quality work product, there would very likely be a nose to the grindstone, deadly serious, scholarly approach demanded of analysts in their work. One would unlikely hear much jolly chatter in the workplace. Imaginably, there would unlikely be any of the peculiar infernal squabbling in morning meetings and weekly reviews that has been dubbed part of a creative process within certain Western intelligence and counterintelligence services. It is unlikely that competitive urges, ego and ambition impell the work of the MSS enigmatologist. Again, as they are only human, there may be some elements of each that pushes each to be their best. While there is an urgency to the work, getting things right would be most important and to that extent accuracy would equate to speed. There would surely be one-to-one mentoring, with more experienced team colleagues who offer support, in addition to that offered by line managers. Nearly everyone appreciates acknowledgement for a job well-done and pat on the back from colleagues and managers, coaches and mentors. Respectful, motivated, and dedicated, younger members of teams usually want to make a good impression upon older, more experienced ones, and typically thrive on recognition, attention, guidance, approval, and praise from them. (Supervisors must reinforce good work, extinguish bad habits and that sort of thing.) If Beijing would even discuss the existence of such an analytical group, it undoubtedly has the world believing that the desire to do a good job for China and the Communist Revolution provides all of the impetus needed.

Unlike other analysts who might rotate between operational, analytical and managerial duties, analysts would essentially work in a professional closed shop. Successful analytical work of this kind would require unbroken contact with information on new technologies as it arrives to avoid gaps in specific knowledge and assessment capabilities that would naturally occur if the analysts most familiar with the technology were moved out and replaced with analysts from some other area such as foreign military operational analysis, counternarcotics, or organized crime. Technology assessment would be a high priority specialization and any advancement would take place within it.

Provincial and local departments and bureaus of the MSS often use cover names inside China such as “Shanghai Municipal Government Office number seven.” It could be the case for Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) that Municipal Government Office number seven is actually the Shanghai State Municipal building (above). Two satellite dishes are often found on office building roofs of MSS departments and bureaus. (See the satellite dishes on the left and right sides of the municipal building roof. In a photo in Part 1 of this essay, notice two similar model satellite dishes atop the roof of the Wuhan Hubei National Security Office which is the home of the Ministry of State Security Bureau.) Going out on a rather slender thread, greatcharlie ventures to say the fact that two “MSS-style” satellite dishes sit atop Shanghai State Municipal building, makes it a candidate for being where SSSB resides or at least some shop of the active spy organization resides.

An Ugly Truth the MSS Surely Knows About the US Counterintelligence Services

MSS senior executives and managers have much with which they can be satisfied regarding their organization’s performance against the US. Certainly, their enthusiasm over the performance of their personnel has been ineffectual within the organization. MSS foreign intelligence officers, operatives and informants have amassed a record of considerable success in the US and continue to plow ahead. Some analysts of Chinese intelligence might say the extraordinary success of MSS was partly founded on luck. The organization was smart enough to ratchet up its operations at a time when US concerns over the capabilities and capacity of Chinese intelligence were astonishingly lax especially in person contacts. Employees at lower levels, drivers, housekeepers, managed to insinuate themselves into the offices and homes of US Senators, US Representatives, hotels, resorts, military bases, government departments and agencies, and important offices of major US industries. Needless to say, that is the kind of luck that tends to follow those who usually become pre-eminent in their field. However, MSS managers are comfortable enough to operate so boldly in the US not because they feel their officers, operatives, and informants are so superb. Its managers feel less threatened because, as aforementioned, it recognizes US counterintelligence services have allowed themselves to deteriorate to some degree in nearly all areas, but especially concerning personnel, over recent years.

Multi cives aut ea pericula quae imminent non vident aut ea quae vident neglegunt. (Many citizens either do not see those dangers which are threatening or they ignore those that they see.) US intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement have all but admitted that they are somewhat baffled by what the MSS and its sister Chinese intelligence services are doing. They literally advertise their limitations. Surely, US counterintelligence knows all of this is a part of the reason why it is somewhat in the woods regarding Chinese intelligence operations in the US. They are happy that very few are aware as to why, too! There has been a never-ending rosy US news media narrative about US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement which has influenced the US public’s understanding of how well the counterintelligence job is being done. That new media narrative intensified immediately after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. The US public’s impression of US counterintelligence work has also been shaped for decades by Hollywood via bedazzling images of near supermen and superwoman catching wretched enemy intelligence agents, terrorists, and international organized crime figures. Even greatcharlie must accept some responsibility for creating a certain image of US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement by typically referring to the “somber and astute” professionals among them.

True, the majority of officers within the civilian US counterintelligence services, energetically and earnestly do all they can to thwart and defeat the activities of foreign intelligence services operating in the US. Those proper US counterintelligence officers indeed have their eyes on the MSS and other Chinese intelligence services. Expectantly, the presence of such professionals in US counterintelligence should have been enough to cause concern and caution for the MSS as they ventured into the US. MSS officers should literally tremble as they approach, and as they begin to move about on the beat, they should be constantly and carefully looking over their shoulders. Unfortunately, in the larger world of US intelligence and counterintelligence there are other officers who could hardly be characterized as such.

Fate would have it that there are a number of US counterintelligence officers who do not perform in such a praise worthy way.  While the type of errant officer identified here may not be present in every office of a US counterintelligence organization. The errant officers described do not move around much as gremlins doing wrong at every turn, breaking every rule. Their numbers are still sufficient enough that they are noticeable to their adversaries as much as they are to their colleagues. What the MSS doubtlessly picks up about the errant officers that arguably presents much hope and perhaps even joy when MSS senior executives and managers in charge of US operations. MSS managers have very likely observed the errant officers thinking and behavior either rising to insanity or sinking to imbecility. They have likely heard all of their tales of woe. Most are distraught by the denial of overtime, reductions in allowances for expenses, and relatively modest salary. Some feel benefits such as medical and dental insurance are insufficient. Others are angered not only by those factors, but also by having to distribute significant payments to informants and multiple operatives greatly in excess of their salaries. Trouble really begins when a case or cases allow the errant officers access to funds for the payments to operatives and informants. As it is done under the honor system, the door is opened wide for embezzlement. (The details of the varied devilish artifices used to embezzle are too hefty to detail here. The decision to allow case officers of US intelligence and counterintelligence services access to such considerable amounts of taxpayer dollars in this day and age without the strictest forms of oversight is of questionable judgment.)

MSS managers surely have noticed that when engaged in investigations against their intelligence officers, operatives, and informants, such errant US counterintelligence officers are satisfied in performing poorly and being incompetent. Indeed, when it comes down to identifying, intercepting, neutralizing, and recruiting foreign intelligence officers and operatives, the errant officers are hardly game for the trudge. Typically, a history of rarely being able to get anything started in a recruitment will fill the performance records of their sort. Even when given an opportunity to bring in a foreign intelligence officer or operative, the whole case is usually muffed. It is the practice of most US counterintelligence services to give officers full control of their cases, with supervision from other special agents or case officers on a management track–often with less experience on the field than themselves. Having been given the authority from managers and those novice supervisors, the have no reservations about chasing down a false lead regardless of the fact that they have been read-in on all that indicates there is nothing at all to follow. Interestingly, money somehow never seems to be short for their cases. Bringing a case to resolution would not allow for the use of varied tricks to enrich themselves as the continued reconnaissance and surveillance of a target and use of informants without having any real counterintelligence goals. The operatives or informants in contact with the adversary are kept active enough and encouraged enough to hold their interest and to compel them to stay involved. In some cases, everything might abruptly stop if some change in the office, some feeling–call it intuition–causes the errant officers to be concerned. Most of the time, however, the errant officers become so comforted by the ease with which they managed to collect their ill-gotten gains, they become slow to notice any nuanced changes that may happen around them. Supervisors may push for results but they typically become accustomed to getting nothing from the errant officers. At best, they will push to shut down the case, but the damage will already have been done to the effort against the foreign intelligence service. In some rare exception, the errant officers will collect enough on an innocent citizen to secure an indictment. An offhand remark or joke made to a clandestine contact or false statements signed by the errant officers’ operatives tied to arbitrary evidence wrongfully cooked to take on higher meaning may be enough to prompt eager prosecutors to move against the innocent.

Bewildering to MSS managers but perhaps the most noticeable of the errant officers behaviors that immediately benefits not just the MSS, but all foreign intelligence services operating in the US, is the employment contractors who will bizarrely hire untutored surveillance operatives right off the street even for an intended clandestine operation that is supposed to be finely calibrated. In most foreign intelligence services, great care is placed in the selection of operatives for a task as important as surveillance. Due to the heavy reliance on the competence of observers, reports they produce, and even their immediate impressions. All of that information will impact data extrapolated and inferences made. Nevertheless, money hungry contractors to whom those services often outsource such work could apparently careless about such matters. If one were to put a good spin on the practice, the grand thought behind the practice would ostensibly be that placing more eyes, even nonprofessional, untrained eyes, on the target allows for better coverage of the targets activities, better. Yet, the real result is simply the accumulation of several observations, varied in accuracy and quality. False observation can often be provided by nonprofessionals in an ordinary case seeking to puff themselves up, as if to say: “Hey, look at me! I am a real spy!” Indeed, this lesser form of “spying” may bestow a certain dignity to the mixed bag engaged in it. However, the real magic behind the practice is the potential for dishonor that it creates. Since the hires are essentially transient, not all names on a list of impromptu operatives may be genuine. Errant officers can benefit themselves by collecting the recompense of  nonexistent operatives added to the list. Experienced counterintelligence hands are well-aware that repeated, considerable hiring for surveillance, especially in massive bundles for any case could be a beckoning initial indicia of someone trying “to give themselves a pension.” When that surveillance and investigation results in nothing, it is a red flag.

How MSS has likely benefited from this is obvious. MSS operatives would only need to put themselves in a position to be hired in any more formal process of becoming a surveillance operative for a contractor for US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement. As some will tend to seek a diverse pool of operatives, they will usually consider all applications with scant vetting in part to accelerate the hiring process but mostly to avoid the expense. After making certain they have presented themselves as qualified candidates, the MSS operative is very likely hired. If they can situate themselves in the vicinity of a diplomatic installation of the Chinese government or the proximity of a site in which MSS or another Chinese intelligence service might be operating, like a canary in a coal mine, a call or text from a US counterintelligence contractor request the operative participate in a surveillance nearby will notify the MSS that their people may be under observation. In addition, the MSS operatives can make a few extra dollars courtesy of the US taxpayer. (While it may strike one as daylight madness, one can rest assured that it is actually happening daily!)

What may be shocking and surprising to MSS managers are those occasions when errant officers, in an effort to manufacture a case, will submit knowingly false information to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) to secure warrants and authorizations for warrantless searches and surveillance against a wrongly targeted citizen. It happens more than the average US citizen could imagine. The bigger the lie that they tell about the innocent citizen, the more significant the case will be. That means greater resources will be alloted for it. In the process of obtaining FISA Court warrants and. authorizations, administrative personnel in the errant officers’ counterintelligence organization, particularly attorneys, who have the responsibility to oversee the correctness of applications to the court, have been known to simply rubber-stamp them. As for FISA Court judges, they tend to simply accept whatever is in the applications as valid.

A counterintelligence focus on the innocent US citizen will always be at the errant officers instigation. On one end of the chain are errant officers focused on enriching themselves with taxpayers dollars on the other end is some poor chap, knowing by God that he is innocent, who is nevertheless having his life turned upside down wrongfully. The errant officers will not hesitate to manufacture false information to submit to include tutoring so-called informants in preparing false statements for them. Sadly enough, as mentioned earlier, the errant officers can pick out informants who would be willing to prepare such statements and they will be handsomely paid. To paraphrase a recent remark by US Senator Charles Schumer of New York on the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of the US Intelligence Community, they can come at you six ways to Sunday. Indeed, under the incredible weight of the US intelligence and counterintelligence services and federal law enforcement, some of the innocent are unable to survive without being harmed psychologically and physically. To enlarge on the point of damage done by errant US counterintelligence officers who misused and abused power and the tools provided them to protect the US, there are more than a few cases that are well-known to those who have worked in the intelligence industry. Rest assured, MSS managers have kept track of US news media reporting and collected information about those cases. Among the high-profile cases is that of Wen Ho Lee.

Wen Ho Lee leaving a Washington, DC courthouse in 2000 (above). In a December 1999 federal indictment, Wen Ho Lee was charged in 59 counts concerning the tampering, altering, concealing, and removing restricted data, the receipt of restricted data, the unlawful gathering of national defense information, and the unlawful retention of national defense information. Reportedly, the US Intelligence Community received information from an intelligence source revealing that China had obtained details of the W88, a US nuclear warhead. The FBI investigation into the case erroneously pointed them to Lee. Lee was arrested in December 1999 and held without bail for 278 days. The FBI later eventually determined that Lee could not plausibly have been the source of information on the W88 to China. Still, the FBI moved forward with its investigation of Lee. Lee was charged with the improper handling of restricted data. In September 2000, Lee pled guilty to one count as a part of a plea bargain arrangement. The other 58 counts were dropped. Lee would file and win a lawsuit against the US government and five news organizations for leaking information that violated his privacy.

Circumstances concerning Wen Ho Lee were complicated, but not so much as to evolve into an episode so tragic and regrettable. Boiled down, his life, liberty, his ability to go on quietly pursuing what made him happy as a US citizen was torn to shreds based on a rush to judgment and the wrongful use of the awesome powers provided to the US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement to protect the US public. In a December 1999 federal indictment, Wen Ho Lee was charged in 59 counts concerning the tampering, altering, concealing, and removing restricted data, the receipt of restricted data, the unlawful gathering of national defense information, and the unlawful retention of national defense information. Reportedly, the US Intelligence Community received information from an intelligence source revealing that China had obtained details of the W88, a US nuclear warhead. Allegedly due to certain pieces of evidence, the FBI investigation into the case, Operation Kindred Spirit, pointed them to Lee. Lee was arrested in December 1999 and held without bail for 278 days. The FBI was made aware that Lee, a US citizen and University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) scientist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, travelled twice to China in the 1980s to meet with scientists. During a interview with the FBI, Lee admitted that he had been asked by them to supply information that would assist China in developing a nuclear missile force. On a polygraph test administered by the FBI, it was indicated that Lee was not always being truthful in his responses. An examination of his computer revealed that he had transferred classified documents to an unsecured network and in the process deleted the security classification in the material. Reportedly, the information was accessed 40 times on a computer at the UCLA student union by an unknown user.

As the investigation into his alleged espionage began, Lee was fired from his job at Los Alamos by UCLA on March 8, 1990, under pressure from the US Department of Energy, which oversees the laboratory. The news media was informed of his dismissal by an unknown source and the stories were widely reported. While his alleged espionage was being reported, the FBI had determined that Lee could not plausibly have been the source of information on the W88 to China. The normative hope, yet perhaps a bit optimistic one given the players involved, would be that once exculpatory information existed that should prove one’s innocence, a FBI investigation would be halted. Nevertheless, the FBI moved forward with its investigation of Lee. Although the original espionage charge was dropped by the FBI, Lee was still charged with the improper handling of restricted data. In September 2000, Lee pled guilty to one count as a part of a plea bargain arrangement. The other 58 counts were dropped. Later, Lee filed a lawsuit against the US government and five news organizations–the Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, ABC NEWS, and the Associated Press–for leaking information that violated his privacy. In August 2004, a US District Court judge in held reporters from four of the news organizations in contempt for not revealing the source that identified Lee as a spy. The government would pay over $895,000 to cover Lee’s legal fees and taxes. The news organizations paid Lee $750,000.

From the ostensible professional side of what occurred, one might say FBI investigators may have measured the impact of what they were doing in terms how they looked before managers and whether their case at least had the appearance of being viable. They did not measure their impact in terms of the population of which he was part, Chinese-American professionals working in national security areas, many of whom were left fearful of being looked at or pursued whenever an espionage case had a China nexus. Indeed, Lee and his supporters have argued that he was unfairly singled out for investigation because he was Chinese-American. Wen Ho Lee was not the enemy but has been called a victim of the blind, unfettered power of a few men hiding behind the shadows who possessed a little brief authority. That bit of humanity that should exist in each human heart was in such insufficient quantity in the counterintelligence special agents handling his case. In his book Securing the State, David Omand, former United Kingdom intelligence and security coordinator, wrote security intelligence operations—such as counterterrorism and counterintelligence—require cooperation between security officials and civilian populations among whom threats wish to hide. In the case of Chinese intelligence, this includes ethnic Chinese émigré communities, which, at least in the US, are now suspicious of the FBI. The botched investigation of Wen Ho Lee, in Ormand’s view, appeared to be politically (or racially) motivated witch hints rather than the serious security investigations they were. To Chinese-Americans, these suspicions and resulting investigations are the natural result of an unwillingness to analyze Chinese intelligence more rigorously on the basis of evidence.

For the MSS, the Wen Ho Lee case undoubtedly provided considerable lessons and the possible makings for a countermeasure to thwart efforts by US counterintelligence against its foreign intelligence operations inside and outside of the US. MSS managers would know better than anyone that Wen Ho Lee was not functioning as an intelligence operative for their organization or any other Chinese intelligence service. Given that Lee’s visits to China, professional discussions with scientists, and conversations with MSS, which its officers furtively initiated and to which he did not respond to positively, apparently served as indicia that he was a Chinese operative, US counterintelligence services, in this case the FBI, made the decision to act aggressively toward him. Doubtlessly, repeated authorizations for searches and surveillance were secured from the FISA Court and the pressure placed on Lee was intense. MSS managers surely from a distance, and at times likely up close, monitored how US counterintelligence resources were poured into Lee’s case. Meanwhile, they would smile as MSS officers, operatives, and informants, on the ground in the US, perhaps in the very locations in which US counterintelligence officers were surveiling and investigating Lee, were functioning with seeming impunity. What shrewd MSS managers likely reasoned from the episode was that calling more Chinese-American scientists, engineers, academics, and other scholars to China for conversations with their counterparts, would allow for the creation of dozens of potential decoys, or, to use the parlance of the intelligence industry, unwitting “dangles” out of those visiting experts which US counterintelligence services perchance would chase around whenever true MSS officers, operatives, or informants stole highly-prized information and data from the US. The tactic would be relatively low cost, low risk, and US counterintelligence services would really do all the work to make the effort successful. There would likely also be the hope among MSS managers that US counterintelligence would even chase Chinese-Americans that the MSS had no contact with whatsoever. What is presented here is by no means an unwarranted extrapolation. The question that should really pique interest is whether the MSS had such a countermeasure in place long before Lee first visited China to speak with scientist counterparts. While one might expect they have been interviewed regarding such a possibility, defectors, whose own foreign intelligence activities were likely compartmentalized, would unlikely know about a secret Chinese counterintelligence program such as the one hypothesized.

Robert Mueller (above). Perhaps one of most disturbing abuses of power by US counterintelligence elements was the continued clandestine use of powers and tools designed to deal with terrorists and actual foreign intelligence operatives against candidate Donald Trump to prove that he and his campaign colluded with the Russian Federation. In what was hands down a sham investigation, there was a total breakdown of the rule of law. Facts were manipulated. There were deliberate efforts to defraud the FISA Court to secure warrants, authrizations for warrantless searches and surveillance, and near unlimited powers to use against US citizens. A host of other nefarious acts were committed system wide. One can hardly imagine that one morning a group of civilian US counterintelligence officers from the very top to the rank and file decided to take on the US President and give some new tactics a try. Every step taken against Trump’s campaign and administration was undoubtedly well-rehearsed in prior cases. A significant advancement of their cause occurred when former FBI Director, Robert Mueller was appointed Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters on May 17, 2017.

Perhaps one of most disturbing abuses of power by US counterintelligence elements was the continued clandestine use of powers and tools designed to deal with terrorists and actual foreign intelligence operatives against candidate Donald Trump for collusion with the Russian Federation and the subsequent investigation of the administration of US President Donald Trump. Investigative journalists and concerned Members of the US Congress have informed that the wrongful, ghastly spying was conducted under the name, “Operation Crossfire Hurricane.” In what was hands down a sham investigation, there was a total breakdown of the rule of law. Facts were manipulated. There were deliberate efforts to defraud the FISA Court to secure warrants, authorizations for warrantless searches and surveillance, and near unlimited powers to use against US citizens. A host of other nefarious acts were committed system wide. Incontrovertibly, the activities of US counterintelligence officers, themselves, ironically could have impacted the outcome of the 2016 US Presidential Election. One can hardly imagine that one morning a group of civilian US counterintelligence officers from the very top to the rank and file decide to take on the US President and give these tactics a try. Every step they took against Trump’s campaign and administration was undoubtedly well-rehearsed in a great number of prior counterintelligence cases. The conspirators were seemingly absolutely confident in the prospects for their success. A significant advancement of their cause occurred when former FBI Director, Robert Mueller was appointed Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters on May 17, 2017. Mueller’s office has issued more than 100 criminal counts against 32 people. Among those ensnared in the investigation was Michael Flynn, Trump’s former national security adviser. Flynn was coerced into a plea agreement requiring him to admit gulit to lying to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian Federation ambassador to the US.

As of this writing, much attention is being given to senior executives and managers involved in the illegal activity against both President-Elect Trump and then President Trump. However, the willingness of a number of line officers in US counterintelligence to commit wrongful acts, and failing to report malfeasance and illegal actions of their superiors leaves no doubt about the complicity of more line officers than at least publicly acknowledged on the matter. They operated against a trusting presidential candidate, and that candidate became president, and members of his administration. Hands down, the evidence points to an overarching culture within the US counterintelligence service that it’s members were above the law. It is always far easier for one to betray those who give one their trust. It was the impressive intuition and intimations of Trump over what was happening around him which provided the initial faint signal, largely dismissed by friend and foe alike, that something wrong was going on.

Tragically, concern over the harm caused to the innocent is a feeling senior executives, managers, and supervisors notoriously lack. Typically, when private citizens have been put in such dreadful situations as to be falsely accused or mistakenly identified, one would get the impression that in the minds of senior executives and managers of those organizations that only person who really has a problem is the one to whom all of the wrongful actions are being perpetrated against. Too often senior executives and managers seem in greater fear for the reputation of their organizations if real corruption is unmasked than fear failing their duty to support and defend the US Constitution, to uphold the rule of law, and protect the well-being of US citizens. Further, as long as their organization is considered a trusted, reliable government source, and few would accept the word of an innocent US citizen accused of espionage or worse over their organizations, they tend to behave as if the problem will take care of itself. Much damage has been done to US counterintelligence capabilities today as a result of their delinquency. (Given some of the publicly known facts of the counterintelligence operation against Trump, senior executives and managers of counterintelligence organizations involved actually pushed the case forward despite lacking an authentic legal cause for doing so. That lack of obedience to the law and procedure could lead one to believe they knew that the opportunity would be created for all types of wrongdoing as described to transpire in the field, but senior executives and managers showed little concern over that. The whole enterprise was scandalous. Nemo repente fuit turpissimus. (No one suddenly becomes bad.))

Michael Flynn (above). Among those ensnared in the investigation was Michael Flynn, Trump’s former national security adviser. Flynn was coerced into a plea agreement requiring him to admit guilt to lying to the FBI about his contacts with the Russian Federation ambassador to the US. Tragically, concern over the harm caused to the innocent is a feeling senior executives, managers, and supervisors notoriously lack. Typically, when private citizens have been put in such dreadful situations as to be falsely accused or mistakenly identified, one would get the impression that in the minds of senior executives and managers of those organizations that only person who really has a problem is the one to whom all of the wrongful actions are being perpetrated against. Too often senior executives and managers seem in greater fear for the reputation of their organizations if real corruption is unmasked than fear failing their duty to support and defend the US Constitution, to uphold the rule of law, and protect the well-being of US citizens.

MSS intelligence and counterintelligence officers have had ample opportunities over the years to get an even closer look at personnel and performance of US counterintelligence organizations. Certainly, in planning meetings, strategy and operational reviews, as well as in debriefings of MSS officers upon their return home, much time is spent collecting information that will allow for the construction of an outline of the psychological foundation of adversarial counterintelligence services and law enforcement organizations. However, one could imagine that information most prized is that acquired through passive collection by operatives and agents quietly placed where the counterintelligence officer could easily make the mistake of dismissing them. Surely, that elucidating information, most likely sent directly to Beijing from the US, from an intelligence perspective, would be among the most important collected. It could be counted among the bread and butter operations in the US, having undoubtedly been going on for years. Interestingly, few to none of the fellow case officers or special agents in the errant officers respective offices or organizations ever report them to superiors. MSS managers undoubtedly view that as supportive of the Communist Party of China line about the moral and ethical weaknesses of the US system, and evidence of the figurative cracks that will lead to its eventual collapse.

When MSS managers consider what makes these errant officers tick, collected information would undoubtedly support possible answers as varied as their behaviors. The mindset that makes engaging in corruption so comfortable that may perchance be the result of being exposed to the mindset of senior officers in their organizations who came of age the free-wielding era of War on Terror and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which the manual was often tossed aside by members of the US Intelligence Community. There was a go get ’em mentality in place in which procedures were ignored, wrongful short-cuts were taken, and countless rules were broken. Billions in taxpayer dollars remain unaccounted for. Authority that many legal experts still insist went far beyond what any Member of Congress would normally countenance under the US Constitution were granted under the USA Patriot Act. One might suppose that the exposure of recent generations of counterintelligence officers to such thinking has allowed such negative behavior to become inculcated among those in the field. The thirst to control the lives of others negatively becomes unquenchable. Perhaps the uneven thinking, and aberrant attitudes and behavior of these misplaced errant officers is stimulated by the unique responsibilities, authority, activities, and stressors of intelligence work. Stoicus noster, “Vitium,” inquit, “non est in rebus sed in animo.” (Our Stoic philosopher said, “Vice is not merely in one’s actions but in the mind itself.”)

The misfortune of having such misanthropes as the errant officers in what should be an elite organization is something with which MSS officers are somewhat familiar. Indeed, the corruption of those sworn to protect their nation, and in China’s particular case, those sworn to uphold the values and ideals of the Communist Movement, and obey the edicts of the Communist Party of China, is a deficiency that has been dealt with in China on occasion. by MSS, sometimes at the very top of the organization. In April 2015, Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Zhengfawei) between 2007 and 2012, was formally charged in April with taking bribes, abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets. As Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Zhou oversaw China’s security apparatus and law enforcement institutions, with power stretching into courts, prosecution agencies, police forces, paramilitary forces, and intelligence organs, to include the MSS. At the end of a closed door trial that began on May 2015 in the Tianjin No.1 Intermediate People’s Court, it was ruled that Zhou and his family had taken bribes totaling 129.7 million yuan (approximately $18,835, 317) from his close allies. The court declared that Zhou abused his power by requesting Jiang Jiemin, the former head of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission and former chairman of the state-run China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), where Zhou was a top official for 10 years. Li Chuncheng, former Sichuan deputy party chief, directed more than 2.13 billion yuan of illegal gains to his son and other businessmen, causing a loss of 1.48 billion yuan to the Chinese economy. Zhou also provided Cao Yongzheng, who is a “qigong (ancient Chinese exercise and healing technique) master,” six classified documents, of which five were top secret. Since some evidence of his crimes involved state secrets, the trial was not open to the public. The maximum punishment for bribery is death; both the abuse of power and the state-secret charges each carry up to seven years in prison. However, the court stated that although Zhou had accepted a “huge” amount of bribes, but given the mitigating circumstances that he had confessed his crimes, pleaded guilty, and most of the bribes had been taken by his relatives, he had asked them to hand back the money, and all the money had been confiscated, he was given a “lenient” punishment. On the charge of abuse of power, he received seven years’ imprisonment. For the charge of leaking state secrets, he received four years’ imprisonment. Zhou, 74 at the time, was essentially sentenced to life imprisonment by the court. Further, Zhou was stripped of all political rights for life and all his personal assets were confiscated.

Former Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Zhou Yongkang, in court (above). The misfortune of having such misanthropes as the errant US counterintelligence officers in one ranks is something with which MSS officers are familiar. In April 2015, Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee and Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission between 2007 and 2012, was formally charged in April with taking bribes, abuse of power and intentionally leaking state secrets. As Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Zhou oversaw China’s security apparatus and law enforcement institutions, with power stretching into courts, prosecution agencies, police forces, paramilitary forces, and intelligence organs.

Returning to the matter of errant officers in US counterintelligence, make no mistake, however, the errant officers’ disregard of the counterintelligence mission are characteristics doubtlessly most favored among MSS senior executives, managers, and officers in the field. MSS would surely try to collect concrete information on them such as their education and employment experience, financial reports, family relations, friends, personal habits, tastes, and dislikes. MSS would very likely possess some of the most thorough studies prepared on the capabilities and capacity of US intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement, and put enough faith in what they have amassed and know, given it has committed such enormous numbers of officers to the great intelligence game being played inside the US.

MSS managers, while still cautious, may have deduced that due to the presence of so many bad apples in the US counterintelligence services, they cannot pose any real threat to their operations. Any portion of the figurative noose US counterintelligence organizations might try to put around the neck of MSS officers, operatives, informants, or overall operations would surely be frayed because of the errant officers presence. To go an adage further, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Certainly, in planning meetings, strategy and operational reviews, as well as debriefings of MSS officers when they return home, time is spent attempting to outline the psychological foundation for US counterintelligence officers that opposed them and the nuance of tradecraft they observed being used against them. MSS would likely make assessments of the extent to which any of the errant officers encountered might allow for small gaps or gaping holes in the US defense and how they deplete morale. Perhaps they are even familiar with their names and postings. Assumably, they would want to be familiar with those among that sort of errant officer who have actually moved up to become managers.

MSS managers may determine that the errant officers display all the telltale signs of being misanthropes. There is a palpable bitterness of spirit in their hearts. They loathe their organizations. Everyday, they condescend in order to even sit with the other officers in their organization. They likely feel an aberrant sense of sacrifice. Professionalism, collegiality, gentleness seen in supervisors is viewed as a weakness. They look upon their adversaries with disdain, too! That sensibility would not be expressed with gymnasium locker room joviality, but rather a red hot mean spirit. They typically are unwilling to respect their adversaries capabilities. They do not try to understand their adversaries. They certainly never attempt to learn from their adversaries. In their offices, a MSS operative or informant might also passively hear them speak poorly of operatives and informants. One might ponder when seeking to insult, ridicule, humiliate, and bully, ever become required aspects of counterintelligence work. Officers of such stripes will typically speak far worse of subjects of investigations. Perhaps they spend so much effort doing down their adversaries, operatives, and informants in order to make up for their own lack of self-esteem.

Ralph Waldo Emerson has been misquoted as stating: “What lies behind us and what lies before us are tiny matters compared to what lies within us.” The correct provenance is Henry S. Haskins in his book, Meditations in Wall Street (William Morrow & Company, 1940). Nonetheless, the adage holds true. Since the errant counterintelligence officers have already proven themselves willing to go so far in the wrong direction for such things, imaginably the affections of a few could still change. Uncovering the nucleus of the wrongful behavior is not the goal, or should not be. The chief feature to be found is some aspect or aspects of the errant officers’ character that can be capitalized upon for MSS purposes. On this particular point, it could be imagined that MSS counterintelligence officers will never cease keeping their eyes open and ears perked up for opportunities. It would be a dereliction of their duty not to do so. From one perspective, it might be assumed that although they have recruited US counterintelligence officers, albeit paltry numbers, they would not bank on catching such breaks on some regular basis. They understand that a usual part of the errant officer’s line of thinking is to have more and to have something better, not to have something different somewhere else. On the other hand, the temptation of easily acquired wealth could be too difficult for some errant officers to resist. Semper avarus eget. (A greedy man is always in need.)

While there is no public evidence that would allow one to allege either engaged in the behavior ascribed to errant officers discussed here while they worked in their respective US intelligence services, the cases of both Kevin Mallory and Rob Hansen provide further support to the idea that US traitors will generally place their own financial gain over their country’s national security and well-being. Mallory’s case was outlined in “Part 1” of this essay. However, adding to what was already relayed from the US Department of Justice criminal complaint stating on May 5, 2017 is the fact that Mallory used a special phone that he received from his MSS handler. With it, he sent the message: “Your object is to gain information, and my object is to be paid for.” In the case of Ron Hansen, mentioned earlier here, prosecutors claim he was paid as much as $800,000 over several years.

Former MSS operative Ron Hansen (above). There is no public evidence that would allow one to allege he engaged in the behavior ascribed to errant officers discussed here when he worked in the Defense Intelligence Agency. However, the case of Rob Hansen, mentioned earlier here, provides further support for the idea that US traitors will generally place their own financial gain over their country’s national security and well-being. Prosecutors claim Hansen was paid as much as $800,000 over several years.

In the case of errant officers, MSS managers may deduce that the pursuit of money would certainly be a weakness to exploit, considering how secure most of them likely feel after being allowed for so long to pursue cunning schemes to acquire personal gain through the system wrongfully. A clever MSS manager could potentially devise a scheme to make them anxiously grab for more. MSS may even apply patience, and decide to approach the errant officer after retirement. In retirement, the money and gifts might have greater meaning for them. For MSS counterintelligence, recruitment of US intelligence and counterintelligence officers, active or retired, with access is always the matter at hand when specifically conducting research on a US counterintelligence officer. Bringing in a US counterintelligence officer is always a huge victory for the MSS and for China. Note that MSS would hardly be the only foreign intelligence service aware of problems in the US apparatus.  However, circumstances may be worse than leaders, senior executives, and managers in some US counterintelligence services might imagine or care about. Again, the caveat must be expressed that the ugly characteristics discussed cannot be attributed to all US counterintelligence officers in the field. However, the point is being made that they have likely been observed enough to convince decision makers in the MSS that officers deployed in the US may act boldly, ubiquitously, voraciously, and with greater intensity everyday in their efforts to collect all technologies China lacks as well as any other information demanded by their masters in Beijing.

The Desultory Pursuit of the MSS by US Counterintelligence

Quidquid dicendum est, libere dicem. (Whatever must be said, I shall say freely.) As noted earlier, the trickle of successes publicly announced are perhaps soothing to an unknowing public, creating the appearance that the US is pushing back on Chinese intelligence operations. However, everything that has been announced has hardly been enough to put the US on track to defeat, disrupt, the networks of the Chinese Intelligence services relative their size and strength in the US.  It would seem that senior executives in the US intelligence, counterintelligence services and law enforcement have not expended much time on pondering the unanswered question of why MSS has proceeded with such confidence in the US. When leaders of civilian US counterintelligence services and law enforcement go as far as to publicly admit lacking a knowledge of how severe an adversaries efforts and successful penetration has been, it almost seems as if they try to convince all that their adversaries were using some sort of witchcraft to accomplish all that they have. However, they are really only discussing symptoms of an illness that is making their organizations sickly and may eventually incapacitate them.

The preceding discussion on errant US counterintelligence officers does not depend upon any detailed inside story. While there will doubtlessly be endless knee-jerk reactions rebuking the expression of this reality, it is nevertheless a reality sufficiently known in the intelligence industry inside and outside the US. The US might have a better chance defeating MSS operations with Chaldean Numerology as long as enough errant counterintelligence officers are discussed here within the system. What has been happening so far concerning leaders, senior executives, and managers of US counterintelligence services is that they usually satisfy themselves by striking a happy medium between stellar work by those officers who are determined to do their jobs right and bring down adversaries’ intelligence operations in the US and the poor performance of others for reasons unknown. Indeed, while problems as those emphasized here concern day-to-day performance in the ranks, leaders, senior executives, and managers will more often look at the overall performance of officers in the organization statistically, by which everything likely evens out nicely.

Where there is some indication of problems being caused by errant officers, supervisors and managers will often compound the wrongdoing of errant officers not only by sitting on their hands on the matter, but by denying and covering it up. Such responses have had their impact. One might imagine colleagues, officers working the same shop, or close, at a workstation neighboring that of the errant officers, passively acquiring information about what they are doing, observing attitudes and behavior might become aware that unseemly and illegitimate activities are afoot in their cases. However, it is also hard to imagine them coming to supervisors or over their managers’ heads knowing how little is actually done to deal with such situations. There is also the potential threat of finding themselves being investigated for being too interested in the work of a fellow officer or in retaliation for trying to make the supervisors, the managers, the office and perhaps even the counterintelligence organization look bad. One might imagine that officers of other counterintelligence services, working the same area of operation, against the same target country, might occasionally get wind of something foul going on in a sister service in activities against an US adversary. However, if not an inquisitive officer’s supervisor, perchance managers would become dismissive or even angered at the news, and express the view that it is neither their organization’s job to point out deficiencies in, nor to investigate, sister organizations. With regard to innocent US citizens being targeted by errant officers, few to none of the fellow case officers or special agents in their respective offices or organizations, upon discovering what is transpiring, will make even the slightest effort to establish the wrongfully targeted citizen’s innocence. The climate is never really right in US counterintelligence organizations to report any wrongdoing. The miracle of the citizen’s rescue will need to come from an external source if that rescue comes at all.

One might imagine that local police departments in large cities in which counterintelligence activity may be taking place might come across some stories of aberrant federal activities given their ears are closer to ground listening to everything than anyone else. It may actually be the case that an innocent US citizen may go into the local police department to complain about odd surveillance activities or the harm of “dirty tricks” being played on them as part of the errant officers false counterintelligence effort. Typically, the local police officers, much as officers of sister counterintelligence organizations, will not desire to get involved, pointing to fact that it is not the responsibility of the local police department to point out deficiencies in, or investigate, federal counterintelligence organizations. In fact, those officers in local police departments, not so worldly wise that they would know to keep their distance from such wrongful activities, might find themselves sucked into them after some convincing by the errant officers. They would perhaps unwittingly make themselves co-conspirators and place their own careers in local law enforcement in jeopardy. Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes? (But who will guard the guards?)

Each one of these typical and expected responses will with some certainty aid adversaries operating in the US more than one might imagine. The type of counterintelligence officer described here will be stopped by higher authority only if somehow someone shines a great light on their activity that might be seen by the news media or the US Congress. However, no one should count on that as a means to curb such wrongful, wasteful behavior.

The French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte explained, “In war, three-quarters turns on personal character and relations; the balance of manpower and materials counts only for the remaining quarter.” One must recognize that in any organization, when elements such as good oversight, employee satisfaction, dedication, and motivation, comradeship, an overarching esprit de corps, and mentoring and encouragement from senior leaders who are present on the line, just to name a few, some employees may begin to fall out of step, not in the form of lateness and absenteeism, but drift away from rules and regulations, practices and procedures. Very often, that reality about employee performance can remain unknown to managers and senior executives of the organization. They may only know what is reported on paper and what little they may see. The choice of what to believe is often limited to the most convenient answer. Performance reports, even if read, may contain anything glaring depending on the nature of relationships between line employees and the supervisors; levels of performance may likely be evaluated as nominal generally. In some cases, levels of performance might even exceed expectations. (That was the case with a number of prominent US pharmaceutical companies recently.) After enough time passes, the organization’s policies on how employees are to perform their tasks, that have been crafted with due consideration of how to respond to a variety of seen and unforeseen contingencies, may be matter-of-factly ignored, supplanted by a collection of employee-styled practices that hardly reflect what managers and senior executives originally put in place, want, or should expect. When the organization’s situation looks good enough, and work is certainly getting done to some acceptable degree, a complacency can set in at the top and performance problems can continue to persist for an unimaginably long time until there is some sort of breakdown, perhaps catastrophic. The employee-styled approach, based on what looks good rather than what is good, may offer no answers, no solutions when a crisis ensues at that organization.

The honor system does not work so well in today’s world. Ambition and the need for immediate gratification turn one’s mind to taking short-cuts, bending the rules, to get what is desired quickly. In today’s intelligence industry, which exists in today’s world, too, the threat to the system is not simply disloyalty and defection, founded on corrupted thinking and moral ambiguity similar to that lately found in civilian businesses. There will be those case officers and special agents who, after a time in service, may not want to accept what they are given but take what they believe they deserve. Certainly, not all embody maturity and secure, friendly, unflappable authority as one might expect. Even if those few errant case officers and special agents are able feign the possession of such qualities by emulating their betters. Given enough time, they will find the way back down to their true “Animal House”-level, and disappoint to the fullest. If you take away their gas allowance, stipend for use of privately owned vehicles and other property they may take something else. If you cut reimbursement levels for meals with informants and operatives, they may take something else. If they are not allowed overtime for late night work as meetings with informants and operatives, they may skim off payments to informants and operatives for services rendered. (This particular wrongful practice, embezzlement, has been called “making a extra pension for oneself!”) Certainly, the human mind tends to struggle with the incomprehensible.  However, that should not be the case. Again as mentioned not all civilian US counterintelligence are the same. Others are in cracking form, and work diligently and professionally.

As it directly concerns relations between rank and file with senior executives and managers, much as a virus, those on the beat who begin to act on contemptuous feelings may soon find others to take down the same destructive path. The “us-them” mentality that can develop among those in the field toward managers and bureaucrats in the upper echelons makes the decision of errant, dishonorable officers and special agents to engage in and conceal malfeasance easier, more comfortable. Not to offer an excuse, but such insouciance toward right and wrong at the lower levels may actually be learned by errant officers in their respective organizations. It very likely became inculcated in their organizations perhaps because managers as a practice for years may have turned a blind eye to wrongdoings.

As witnessed during the years of the repugnant US counterintelligence attacks against Presidential Candidate and President-Elect Trump as well as during the attack against Wen Ho Lee, both aforementioned, a private citizen is typically falsely accused and made a subject for investigation with little real evidence except surmisal, animus, or worse bigotry. Management must keep an eye out for that sort of thing. Admonishment from managers and supervisors in both cases expectedly should have been to stick with the primary problem instead of rooting around at extraneous matters. Nothing was done. Apparently, nothing out of the ordinary was happening. Attendant to having a counterintelligence investigation levelled against them, the innocent citizen can become a target for dirty tricks by US counterintelligence organizations and their contractors as well. Further added to the citizen’s problems is the willingness of federal, state, and local counterparts working as a task force on other matters as counterterrorism will usually make their manpower and other resources available to support the efforts of the counterintelligence organization. Regarding the federal case against Carter Page, which was directly linked to the inarguably fraudulent investigation of Trump, it was revealed by investigative journalists and Members of the US Congress that US counterintelligence officers engaged in what is apparently a regular practice of dragging friendly foreign intelligence services and counterintelligence services into their wrongful investigations. Under cooperative arrangements, foreign intelligence services, not knowing the true nefarious nature of a case, are often asked to engage in surveillance activities and initiate clandestine contacts with innocent US citizens outside and  inside the US. (Many foreign intelligence services of other countries, particularly medium to small sized organizations actually love being brought into US intelligence operations of any kind. It gives them the opportunity to have a place at the table with the US, there will usually be important lessons learned, supposedly good relationships with US counterparts will be enhanced or created, and most of all, there will be financial benefits courtesy of the US taxpayer.) Once a single individual’s freedom is trodden on, everyone’s freedom is lost! When all of this wrongdoing occurs, every employee’s work in a US counterintelligence organization has less value, meaning, purpose. The organization ceases being a force for good and simply becomes a pit of evil.

Carter Page (above). In the federal case against Carter Page that was directly linked to the inarguably fraudulent investigation of Trump, it was revealed by investigative journalists and Members of the US Congress that US counterintelligence officers engaged in what is apparently a regular practice of dragging friendly foreign intelligence services and counterintelligence services into their wrongful investigations. Under cooperative arrangements, foreign intelligence services, not knowing the true nefarious nature of a case, are often asked to engage in surveillance activities and initiate clandestine contacts with innocent US citizens outside and inside the US!

When leaders are delinquent in cracking down on such “malfeasance,” or actual criminality, the dishonorable act as if dishonor is sanctioned. The errant officers engaged in odious behavior would only feel protected by the belief that no one wants to find out whether they are doing their jobs right, and no one will know as long as they keep their activities concealed. When a Procrustean bed of standards and practices exists, deviation from the correct path is essentially assured. Sadly, much damage has been done to US counterintelligence capabilities today as a result of the delinquency of many senior executives and managers over the years. As a result of these ugly situations, counterintelligence organizations have suffered, too, albeit not remotely to the degree of the innocent citizen.

Virtus est vitium fugere, et sapienta prima stultitia caruisse. (To flee vice is the beginning of virtue, and the beginning of wisdom is to have gotten rid of folly.) It is essential that senior executives and managers ensure that all of their line officers are performing their duties correctly at all times and the system is working optimally. They must travel to field offices of their organizations and find out what is really going on. That does not mean going to the offices of the organization to skylark, taking a cursory glance at everything, asking prosaic questions, merely accepting glowing reports of how great every is and being satisfied. That sort of desultory examination would serve no purpose. Instead, with whatever powers they may possess, they must engage in gumshoe detective work to see what they can see. Usually, where there is smoke, there is fire. Embers can serve as evidence of some activity hastily halted or What leaders and senior executives cannot see or confirm with their own eyes during such tours of their respective organization’s field offices, they must use all concrete indicia to conceptualize what may be happening. When everything is right, everything will be gun barrel straight. To be successful in an intelligence or counterintelligence service, a leader must know a lot about humanity. The leader must especially know a lot about human relationships. The leaders have got to know “how people tick.” There are said to be certain secrets and knowledge of human existence, human circumstance. Whatever knowledge a leader of such an organization might possess, full use of it must be made, too, along the lines of excellence. Visits “downstairs” by leaders should not be allowed to devolve into self-serving investigations into their own popularity among line officers and administrative personnel.

As a suggestion, leaders might look through files of officers in search of exorbitant numbers of payouts, massive distributions of gifts, and relatively excessive expenditures on contractors surveillance activities for cases that ended up being marked failed and closed. The errant officers often provide a cloak of legitimacy for unsuspecting eyes is the establishment of cooperative arrangements between their organization and counterintelligence elements of sister organizations to pursue their cases. The fact that money would be coming in from an additional source and that there were managers of other organizations who saw value in the case, would usually be enough to confirm for errant officers’ managers that the decisions, activities, and expenditures by them were viable. Another place for auditors to look in the errant officers files would be code names for both the subjects of investigations as well as informants and surveillance operatives. With the intent of being discreet and not providing a tutorial, suffice it to say that often there will be multiple code names used for one informant or operative. Payments secured for the multiple code names from finance offices may be deposited in multiple personal bank accounts.

Ad mores natura damnatas fixa et mutori nescia. (Human nature ever reverts to its depraved courses, fixed and immutable.) During the Cold War, it was the case in the US Intelligence Community that a highly suspicious senior CIA official, James Jesus Angleton, reigned as the figurative high priest of counterintelligence. He conducted vigorous and plentiful internal investigations against case officers, defectors, and informants, creating a frightful degree of apprehension and insecurity within the rank and file of intelligence and counterintelligence services. This is certainly not a call for a return to those days.

Many members of US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement would very likely be touchy if they came across the meditations of greatcharlie presented here. However, far more than anything else, those feelings would be due to an emotional response. A manifestation of the thinking that has prevented those organizations from finding what is wrong and being satisfied with the 1870 attitude similar to that of the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”). Those leaders of those organizations are too comfortable living a superficial existence, underestimating their own destiny, dignity, and nature. Ideally, they would be able to put their pride in their pockets and properly see it all as an opportunity to make use of an examination from outside the box as presented by this essay to make real, positive change to greatly improve their capabilities.

Taking simple steps as those mentioned here will do more than anything else to help close the distance between US counterintelligence and the MSS to allow for the leveling of more successful and decisive blows against their networks and operations. Given half the chance, US counterintelligence would perform far better. Given the unforgivable, illegal treatment and great harm civilian US intelligence and counterintelligence services have caused Trump, one would reasonably think that they would attempt to do as much as possible, perform well beyond expectations in the right way, to make amends for their sins. One should not be able to presume comfortably that such thinking is a degree of humanity that may be lacking within the heads and hearts of leaders of the respective organizations. Plus novisti quid faciendum sit. (You have learned more what has to be done.)

The Way Forward

Rapiamus, amici, occasionem de die. (Friends, let us seize the opportunity from (of) the day.) As stated earlier, the fact that the Chinese government initiated all of the ongoing difficulties cannot be credibly argued against. However, very sadly, Beijing so far has not demonstrated any interest in acting voraciously concerning the present matter of the coronavirus. Surely, the two countries are not at a point yet when the dark waters of despair have overwhelmed their leaders. When diplomats from both sides meet, they must approach each other with a certain buoyancy and hope. In the face of that the US, as the true dominant power in the world must maintain its poise. There remains a plethora of bilateral and some multilateral issues of great importance between the US and China that are seemingly distanced enough from all that is happening in the forefront and are in the process of being resolved. There are the issues of: trade, intermediate nuclear weapons, North Korea denuclearization, the border dispute with India, Hong Kong, Taiwan, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, counternarcotics policy, and space. Of course, there are adverse matters that may arise related to the coronavirus that cannot be ignored. The US must not react to them. It must always act in a measured way using effective means, at a time and place of its choosing. For the US Intelligence Community, the political warfare effort tied to the coronavirus being pressed on the US from the Chinese intelligence services may hold primacy on the agenda given the diplomatic and political importance given to it. However, for it, defeating and displacing the networks and operations of Chinese intelligence services in the US, as permanently as possible, is job one.

When unexpected and unfamiliar things are explained the romantic sense of mystery stirred in readers about their nature can be smothered. The world is not always as one would have it. What is required is seeing beyond appearances to what is truth. No one is making a mountain out of a molehill here. Leaders, senior executives of US counterintelligence services might really want to take a deeper look, perform their own empirical studies of the actions of their respective organizations, to discover how other organizations with which they should be cooperating, such as military ones, and how adversaries of the US, likely see their organization. Perhaps the combined sense of sadness, anguish, betrayal, and anger might coalesce to prompt questions about what is really going on in the rank and file.

Reading federal indictments, criminal complaints, and judgments of those caught engaging in espionage for MSS over the past decade, one develops a picture of US counterintelligence having some success intercepting those who had already delivered a considerable amount of classified information concerning US national security equities, projects, strategies, operations, and policies, US tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods and US defenses against foreign intelligence penetration, and of course, cutting-edge technologies had been put in MSS officers’ hands. One can discern US counterintelligence has had great difficulty in devising ways to deter, disrupt, and destroy the intelligence efforts of MSS and other Chinese intelligence services before any secret government information or intellectual property of private firms and academic institutions that is the product of intense and gifted research and development work is lost. What should really be happening is MSS recruitment efforts should be leading over and over to traps. Information to which very costly, devious maneuvers might capture should prove to be cooked and valueless. MSS networks should be regularly penetrated by US counterintelligence, they should be rolled up in waves at times chosen by US counterintelligence services. Ongoing and developing MSS operations should have already been heavily infiltrated and those infiltrated operations which are not destroyed should be used as conduits to push disinformation back to China. As for individuals recruited by MSS, many should have already been identified as a result of US counterintelligence infiltration of MSS networks and at appropriate moments, those operatives and informants should have been intercepted, neutralized, and recruited as counterespionage agents. These tacks have been successfully performed to defeat the efforts of foreign intelligence services operating in the US going as far back as World War II.

Perchance the notion of setting out to attain such goals may seem pie in the sky, even Quixotic to those in US counterintelligence who may albeit be tired and uninspired, but such can be accomplished. Such things have been accomplished in the past against other foreign intelligence services under a similar set of circumstances. Smart people are known for being able to find answers to very difficult problems. An immediate thought is that new ideas for achieving such goals might be acquired from new types of sources. A reality about any system is that dogma exists, it can color the thinking of members of an organization, and it can insinuate itself into analysis. Additionally, supervisors in the analytical departments, knowingly and occasionally unknowingly because it would only be human, may place limitations on what directions, albeit even reasonable and logical ones, that analyses can move along. New thinkers may rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. From the inside, one might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outsiders as mere surmisals and suppositions from those perceived lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to an issue. With no intent to condescend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. The purpose of using such perspectives is to have a look at issues from other angles. Outside the box thinking would hopefully move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in special cases that may be hard to crack. Indeed, what outsider brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside the box thinker. One could say the length and breadth of that knowledge and experience allowed for an alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been sought through personal study. Well-worn thinking would still have its place in other simpler issues. Hiring individuals for such out of the box assistance should be done with delicacy. There should be a certain exactness about the selection process. Those sought should be already known and possess the ability to present what may be unorthodox innovative, forward-looking perspectives. Hiring eccentric, whimsical, and outlandish thinkers would be unhelpful and undesirable. The projects on which the individuals would work on would be very compartmentalized and limited in scope and duration. The worst possible outcome would be to create some dreadful security problems. (Not that anyone would ask, but alas, greatcharlie’s editor is now a bit too long in the tooth to provide such outside the box assistance.) The actions of the MSS and other Chinese intelligence services, stealing away cutting-edge technologies and research and development, if left unchecked, could cause the US to face a difficult and reduced future. It is not just a scare story, designed to terrify US citizens. That is reality. The choice is to allow a set of unfortunate circumstances against US interests to slowly take shape or act now and begin to shape events in a manner that will ensure the US will retain its place as the world’s leader as time goes on. Deus hæc fortasse benigna reducet in sedem vice. (Perhaps God by some gracious change, will restore things to their proper place.)

China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is this Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign against the US? (Part 1)

The Headquarters of the Ministry of State Security (above). China’s primary civilian intelligence service engaged in the political warfare struggle against the US is the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Yet, while fully involved in that work, MSS has adhered to its bread and butter mission of stealing national security and diplomatic secrets with specific regard to the US. It has also robustly enhanced another mission of grabbing intellectual property and an array of cutting-edge technologies from the US. This essay provides a few insights from outside the box on the MSS, the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods, it believes, help to keep China secure and help to improve China’s capabilities and capacity to compete and struggle with the US.

There was a time not so long ago when discussion in US foreign policy circles concerning China centered on issues such as trade, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the South China Sea, North Korean denuclearization, and human rights. Now the primary focus of discussion is the coronavirus. China is where the virus originated and was surely ineptly handled, setting the stage for the current pandemic. How China has responded to the crisis turned pandemic has been a source of curiosity and absolute outrage globally. Despite preening about its own advances in science and medicine, China proved not to be up to the task of handling the outbreak that most experts agree more than likely began disastrously in a Wuhan laboratory. It is difficult to fully comprehend what on Earth went on in the minds of China’s leadership upon learning about their country’s coronavirus epidemic. Shutting down cities and restricting travel was among the means to control the spread among their own citizens but China’s government was quite derelict in ensuring the virus would not break out around the rest of the world. Worse, the Communist Party of China and the National Party Congress were unapologetic and frightfully defensive concerning all discussion of China’s role in what was happening. China very quickly became exercised with the US over the matter. They became particularly warm toward US President Donald Trump. The words of official spokespeople were certainly not seasoned in grace. Although it has found itself in an unpleasant, contentious relationship with the US as a result of its own doing, Beijing has nevertheless effectively doubled-down on the behavior that exacerbated the situation. China’s government spokespeople will most likely continue to assail the global media with waves of distortions. At the same time around the world, the number of people infected by the coronavirus continues to increase, the death toll rises, and the financial loss is being calculated in the trillions. Hopefully, People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping is well-aware of what is transpiring and has set some type of guidance on just how far this whole cabaret put on by Beijing should go. Numquam enim temeritas cum sapienta commiscetur. (For rashness is never mixed together with wisdom.)

The figurative hammer of the foreign and national security policy apparatus swung by the arm of the Communist Party of China against the US is China’s intelligence services. They are the ones on the front lines of the political warfare struggle. Among those intelligence services, the primary element engaged is the Ministry of State Security (MSS). The Ministry of State Security is the embodiment of the logic that created the Chinese system’s intimidating, authoritarian order and for years has choreographed events to accomplish the Communist Party’s purposes. To that extent, the Communist Party of China has entrusted the defense of “their creation,” the modern Communist Chinese state, to this complex government organization. China has only offered soupçons about the MSS, and even less than that lately. Unless one is engaged in diplomatic, intelligence, defense, military, or law enforcement work, MSS is an elements of the Chinese government with which most outsiders when engaged in their normal business related to China, whether inside the country, in a country near by, or even at home, will have contact, but will often be completely unaware. The ostensible purpose and task of MSS is to defend China against external as well as internal threats. By performing its mission of collecting vital information about China’s friends, allies, competitors and adversaries MSS gives the leadership of the Communist Party of China time to make decisions and space to take action. To that extent, the MSS has adhered to its bread and butter mission of stealing national security and diplomatic secrets with specific regard to the US. However, it has also robustly enhanced another mission of collecting intellectual property and an array of cutting-edge technologies from the US. The Communist Party of China is surely counting upon it to successfully take on China’s adversaries in a large way with a small footprint. Interestingly though, there has been far greater discernment worldwide of MSS political warfare activities than Beijing might have imagined. The immediate implication of that has been the infliction of considerable damage to China’s reputation as a world leader. Veritas nimis saepe laborat; exstinguitur numquam. (The truth too often labors (is too often hard pressed); it is never extinguished.)

This essay does not focus on the political warfare effort by MSS, the nuts and bolts of which are somewhat straight forward, and compressed into summary form in the March 31, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “Commentary: Beijing’s Failed Political Warfare Effort Against US: A Manifestation of Its Denial Over Igniting the Coronavirus Pandemic”. It focuses on what the Ministry of State Security (MSS) is and what it does, day-to-day, for China. It is presented in two sections. This section, “Part 1,” provides greatcharlie’s insights from outside the box on the MSS and the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods it believes both help to keep China secure and help to improve China’s capabilities and capacity to compete and struggle with the US. That discussion is buttressed by a few celebrated and trusted sources. “Part 2” continues that discussion and, without an ax to grind, greatcharlie calls attention to how, over recent years, a number of less-familiar, self-inflicted wounds have hindered the prosecution of a successful campaign by US counterintelligence services against the MSS as well as other Chinese intelligence services. The extent to which those same issues concerning US counterintelligence services have impacted the Trump administration is also touched upon. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that there is no reason for it to believe policymakers and decisionmakers in the White House and among US foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence organizations, would have a professional interest in its meditations on MSS intelligence operations in the US. However, it is greatcharlie’s hope that if given some attention, perhaps in some small way it might assist those who work on matters of gravity in this province improve their approach to defeating and displacing the MSS networks and operations as well as those of its sister organizations in the US. Bonus adiuvate, conservate popular Romanum. (Help the good (men) save (metaphorically in this case) the Roman people.)

People’s Republic of China Chairman Mao Zedong (left) and Kang Sheng (right). After the defeat of Imperial Japanese forces in China and prior to 1949, the Communust Party of China’s main intelligence institution was the Central Department of Socialism Affairs (CDSA). CDSA was placed under the control of Kang Sheng, a longtime political associate of Mao with a linkage from the past to Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. With the Communist Party’s victory over Chang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces, CDSA became one among a full array of government intelligence organizations that were created to supplement Party-based intelligence services. CDSA would draw information from foreign news agencies and open sources. It was hardly a very rewarding business.

Chinese Intelligence Under the Communist Party: The Beginning

The foundation of the Chinese intelligence services was laid during the revolutionary period in which the Communist Party of China sought to establish its rule. In the early 1930s, two intelligence services existed. One was centered in Shanghai and the Communist Party, the other was based in the Chinese Communist government that existed in Shaanxi where Mao Zedong established his base after the Long March. The later intelligence service proved to be the stronger of the two. By the late 1930s, it was replaced by a newly created Social Affairs Department (SAD) within the Communist Party. Within the years of struggle against Imperial Japanese forces in China, there was the Yan’an Rectification, from 1942 to 1944, in which Mao consolidated his paramount role in the Communist Party of China. Yan’an was also the part of the ten year period in which: Mao established his premier role in the Party; the Party’s Constitution, endorsing Marxist-Leninism and Maoist thought as its guiding ideologies, was adopted (Mao’s formal  deviation from the Soviet line and his determination to adapt Communism to Chinese conditions); and, the postwar Civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang. Prior to 1949, the Communist Party of China’s main intelligence institution was the Central Department of Social Affairs (CDSA). CDSA was placed under the control of Kang Sheng, a longtime political associate of Mao with a linkage from the past to Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. With the Communist Party’s victory over Chang Kai-shek’s nationalist forces, CDSA became one among a full array of government intelligence organizations were created to supplement Party-based intelligence services. CDSA would draw information from foreign news agencies and open sources. It was hardly a very rewarding business.

The Ministry of Public Security was established as China’s principal intelligence service at the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It, too, was placed under the leadership of Kang Sheng. CDSA fell into the hands of Li Kenong, a deputy chief of staff to People’s Liberation Army (PLA) chief of staff Chou Enlai and a vice minister for foreign affairs. The main role of the MPS, as with all previous Chinese intelligence services, was to serve the interests of the Communist Party of China. However, as time passed, it was also officially given jurisdiction over counter subversion, counterintelligence, and conducting espionage in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Overseas during the 1950s, most Chinese diplomatic missions accommodated the MPS with an Investigation and Research Office for intelligence collection staffed by CDSA personnel, with analysis performed by the Eighth Bureau, publicly known in 1978 as the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations. In 1953, CDSA became the Central Investigation Department (CID). In China, the MPS presence was nearly ubiquitous, as it kept a watchful eye on China’s population. It was energetically engaged in monitoring Chinese who returned from abroad. To cope with what it determined to be errant citizens, MPS ran labor reform camps. MPS personnel were known for behaving harshly among its own citizens. That behavior was said to be reflective of the violent mentality of its initial leader, Kang. Despite his alleged romance with Mao’s wife, Kang was far from a charming man. Rather, he was known for being an absolute brute. He would move on to become a member of the Communist Party of China Political Bureau, and Li Kenong moved up to take command there. In 1962, the decision was made to move Ministry of Public Security counterespionage functions over to the CID.

The 1960s were a volatile time for Chinese intelligence services as with all military institutions in China. Li Kenong died in 1962 and in 1966 he was succeeded by Luo Quinchang, who had been adopted by Kang in 1958 and ushered into the MPS. However, the MPS became involved in the power struggles that embroiled the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution. Mao, feeling his power base was threatened mainly as a result of his failed Great Leap Forward, implemented the “Four Cleans Movement,” with the objective of purifying politics, economics, ideas, and organization of reactionaries, led by a one time ally, Luo Quinchang of MPS. His staff files were seized and mined for candidates for criticism and banishment to the lao jiao prison system.

Kang Sheng (above). The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) was established as China’s principal intelligence service at the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. It, too, was placed under the leadership of Kang Sheng. The main role of the MPS, as with all previous Chinese intelligence services, was to serve the interests of the Communist Party of China. As time passed, it was also officially given jurisdiction over counter subversion, counterintelligence, and conducting espionage in Macau, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. MPS personnel were known for behaving harshly among its own citizens. That behavior was said to be reflective of the mentality of Kang, who was known for being an absolute brute.

Most of the leadership of the CID was sent to the countryside for reeducation and the organization, itself, was abolished for a time. Its activities and assets were absorbed by the Second Department of the PLA’s general staff taking over its duties. The Second Department oversaw human intelligence collection to include military attachés at Chinese embassies overseas clandestine collection agents sent to other countries to collect military information, and the analysis of overt sources of information. Mao turned to Kang to ensure that his ideological and security directives were implemented. Kang, Mao’s wife Jiang, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao, dubbed the “Gang of Four,” worked together in a campaign to renew China’s revolutionary spirit. With the assistance of the Red Guards, a mass student led paramilitary movement mobilized and guided by Mao from 1996 to 1967, the Gang of Four set out to destroy the “Four Olds” of society: old customs, old culture, old habits, old ideas. The Red Guards were particularly disruptive. Apparent moral confusion caused the base student army to rise and nearly wreck China by attacking senior Communist Party leaders such as Deng Xiaoping and by conducting mass executions. There were reports that the Red Guards cadres had engaged in cannibalism, eating students. They destroyed approximately 66 percent of China’s famous temples, shrines, and heritage sites. These included nearly 7,000 priceless works of art in the Temple of Confucius alone. The Red Guards would face resistance in major cities. Often the PLA was forced to violently put down their destructive attacks. The organization having fully flown off the rails, Mao instructed leaders of the Red Guards to end their movement.

Meanwhile, Kang had returned to the intelligence service from on high to assume responsibility for the CID cadres that remained left in limbo. Eventually, a new organization, the Central Case Examination Group, composed of CID cadres under Kang was created. That organization was instrumental in the removal of Deng Xiaoping from power. The CID was reestablished in 1971 following the death of Lin Biao and then again became entangled in another power struggle as Hua Kuo-feng and Deng Xiaoping vied for control of the party. By then, Kang had receded into the distance, viewed as too connected to the untidiness of the Cultural Revolution.

Following Mao’s death in 1976, the new leadership under Hua Guofeng initially tried to return to the pre-Cultural Revolution years and strengthen the CID. When Hua Kuo-feng and Wang Dongxing assumed power in 1977, they tried to enlarge the CID and expand the Communist Party of China intelligence work as part of their more general effort to consolidate their leadership positions. However, their hopes and dreams met their fate. Deng Xiaoping, having steadily ascended within the leadership ranks of the Communist Party of China, was uncertain of CID loyalties and his opinion of it was unfavorable. Circumstances indicated that he should order the shut down of all Investigation Offices in Chinese embassies. Although it remained part of the Chinese intelligence services, the CID was officially downgraded. According to Anne-Marie Brady in Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People’s Republic (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), the impact of the CID’s downgrade was softened by the fact that its intelligence efforts  were being paralleled and to some degree occasionally outmatched by the extraordinarily secret International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, which became deeply involved in inciting and assisting international revolution by moving weapons, financial support, and other critical resources to numerous Communist and non-Communist insurgencies worldwide.

The emblem of the Ministry of State Security (above). In 1983, there was considerable frustration in the Communist Party of China with the high volume of secret information being leaked to the West. This was particularly true with regard to information about debates occurring within the Communist Party and reports of poor economic and social conditions within China. In reaction, counterespionage responsibilities were transferred from the MPS to the new Ministry of State Security (MSS). Known as the Guojia Anquanbu or Guoanbu, the MSS was stood up in July 1983 to rectify the deficiencies of the previous iterations of the intelligence function in the Chinese national security apparatus.

The Inception of the Ministry of State Security

The story of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) began thoroughly in July 1983. That year, there was considerable frustration in the Communist Party of China with the high volume of secret information being leaked to the West. This was particularly true with regard to information about debates occurring within the Communist Party and reports of poor economic and social conditions within China. In reaction, counterespionage responsibilities were transferred from the MPS to the MSS. Known as the Guojia Anquanbu or Guoanbu, the MSS was stood up to rectify the deficiencies of the previous iterations of the intelligence function in the Chinese national security apparatus. When the reorganization of the MPS was completed in 1983, it was temporarily left with only traditional police functions. Nevertheless, the change turned out to be quite positive as both organizations were allowed a new beginning so to speak. MSS represented a reimagination of the intelligence collection process abroad and the counterintelligence struggle against outside powers. It eventually bring new dimensions to China’s foreign intelligence scheme. The creation of MSS freed MPS to revamp existing capabilities and explore and adapt a new as well as more technological set of cards to play in the domestic intelligence game so to speak. It represented a reimagination of the intelligence collection process abroad and the counterintelligence struggle against outside powers.

At its nascent stage, the ranks of the MSS were filled with longtime MPS who transferred over to the office. MSS provincial branches were often staffed predominantly with PLA and government retirees. Despite the declaration of its raison d’être as a foreign intelligence organization, the MSS was initially asked to do what its rank and file knew how to do best, which was to perform as police. For that reason, the most important task that it was given after its inception, focusing on students in both China and abroad after the Tiananmen Square protests, was a natural fit. Tiananmen Square, in addition to being frightfully embarrassing to the Communist Party of China leaders, caused them to remain greatly concerned over a possible follow on move by students. That concern was thoroughly evinced when Chinese authorities announced that some 200 Chinese had been accused of spying for the Soviet Union. One might say that the counterintelligence purpose of the assignment made giving it to the MSS plausible. However, MPS had the domestic counterintelligence mission covered. Redundantly taking on the assignment concerning the student–surely MPS was on it–was a turn in a wrong direction. The MSS would eventually develop into an authentic foreign intelligence service, but it would take time. It would be an evolutionary process.

An ocean of student protesters in Tiananmen Square in May 1989 (above). At its nascent stage, the ranks of the MSS were filled with longtime MPS who transferred over to the office. MSS provincial branches were often staffed with People’s Liberation Army and government retirees. Despite the declaration of its raison d’être as a foreign intelligence organization, the MSS was initially asked to do what its rank and file knew how to do best, which was police work. For that reason, the most important task that it was given after its inception, focusing on students in both China and abroad after the Tiananmen Square protests, was a natural fit. The protests, in addition to being frightfully embarrassing to the Communist Party of China leaders, caused them great concern regarding a possible follow-on move by students.

As aforementioned, a paucity of quality information exists publicly from the Chinese government about the present-day MSS in primary or secondary sources. No official Chinese government website exists for the intelligence organization. There have been no press releases distributed or press conferences held by the organization’s public relations department. Access to information from the organization is essentially nonexistent. No significant writings have been published  by security scholars in China on the MSS. Precious few defections from MSS have occurred, so little has been provided from an insider’s view. What is best known generally about MSS in the US has been superbly relayed in I.G. Smith’s and Nigel West’s celebrated Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence (Rowman & Littlefield, 2012).

The MSS headquarters is located in Beijing in a large compound in Xiyuan, on Eastern Chiang’an Avenue, close to Tiananmen Square. Within the security perimeter is snowing apartment block, Qian Men, where many of the MSS staff and their families live. The MSS is a civilian intelligence service and operates independently from the People’s Liberation Army General Staff Second and Third Departments, which also conduct military intelligence and counterintelligence operations. Although it has a central headquarters, the MSS actually was not built up as a centralized organization. It is composed of national, provincial, and local branches much as the MPS from which it sprang. Even the initial CDSA and later CID units of the MPS operated domestically under a decentralized and autonomous structure throughout China that was supported by the Communist Party of China. Their structure somewhat resembles that of the erstwhile regional and Soviet republic KGB bureaus. The provincial, and local branches receive directives from headquarters in Beijing and are financed by National Security Special Funds. Yet, only to the extent that provincial and local branches receive “administrative expenses,” could they be considered accountable to headquarters. They are largely autonomous in reality, reportedly acting as essential adjuncts to the local administration. The formal chief of the MSS holds the title Minister of State Security. As of this writing, the minister is Chen Wenqing. However, from the national level to the local levels, the MSS and its subordinate departments and bureaus report to a system of leading small groups, coordinating offices, and commissions to guide security work while lessening the risk of politicization on behalf of Communist Party of China leaders. Initially, the most important of these was the Political-Legal Commission (Zhongyang Guoja Anquan Weiyuanhui). The Political-Legal Commission was chaired by a Politburo member at the Central level with the title Secretary, who serves essentially as China’s security czar. There are Deputy Party Secretaries at the lower levels. The lower-level commissions oversee all state security, public security, prisons, and procuratorate (judicial) elements for their levels. Currently, there is a Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (Zhengfawei) who oversees China’s security apparatus and law enforcement institutions, also with power reaching into the courts, prosecution agencies, police forces, paramilitary forces, and intelligence organs  Xi announced the creation of the Central State Security Commission (CSSC) in the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2013. The CSSC held its first meeting on April 15, 2014. The purpose of this new commission was twofold. First, it was intended to balance internal political power created by the expansion of the security services and their capabilities in the 2000s. Second, the commission orient’s the MSS and other security forces toward planning and preempting threats to the party-state. At lower levels, provinces, counties, and municipalities have state security leading small groups (Guoja Anquan Lingdao Xiaozu). The political-legal Commissions and State Security leading small groups overlap in personnel but not perfectly. They combine with defense mobilizations committees and 610 offices to create a kind of system of systems that oversees local security and intelligence work. Headquarters is surely kept apprised of what the provincial and local branches are doing. Each level reports to the next MSS level up and the Political-Legal Committee at that level. This florid arrangement of horizontal and vertical relationships often creates bureaucratic competition that encourages pushing decisions upward while hiding information from elements of equal protocol rank.

Intellect, will, and hard earned experience drove MSS leaders forward as they molded the MSS into a truly effective intelligence organization. What compelled the domestic focus of its initial work is further apparent in that process. The first two ministers, Ling Yun and Jia Chunwang, faced the challenge of turning a small Ministry with only a handful of outlying provincial departments into a nationwide security apparatus. The expansion occurred in four waves. In the first wave during MSS’ inaugural year, the municipal bureaus or provincial departments of state security for Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shanghai were created. A second wave appeared shortly thereafter between 1985 and 1988, including Chongqing, Gansu, Hainan, Henan, Shaanxi, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. The third wave from 1990 to 1995 completed the expansion of the Ministry across at the provincial levels, bringing in Anguilla, Hunan, Qinghai, and Sichuan provinces. The fourth wave the provincial-level departments exoanded vertically, taking over local public security bureaus or established subordinate municipal or County bureaus. The MSS policy of expanding representative offices in most major towns and cities was reversed in 1997. Nevertheless, when MSS minister Jia left in 1998 for the MPS, the MSS was a nationwide organization at every level. Presently, the MSS’ thirty-one major provincial and municipal sub-elements. Interestingly, as MSS moved through each growth spurt, it did not ignite efforts to rename the organization, to divide it into pieces and parcel out some of its departments among other Chinese intelligence services, or to disband it altogether in the way CDSA and MPS suffered in the two previous decades. There seemed to be an understanding system wide that the need existed for a solid civilian foreign intelligence as well as counterintelligence capability.

The Wuhan Hubei National Security Office in China, home of the provincial Ministry of State Security Bureau (above). The expansion of MSS provincial departments occurred in four waves.  In the first wave, during MSS’ inaugural year, the municipal bureaus or provincial departments of state security for Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and Shanghai were created. A second wave appeared shortly thereafter between 1985 and 1988, creating the Chongqing, Gansu, Hainan, Henan, Shaanxi, Tianjin, and Zhejiang bureaus. The third wave from 1990 to 1995 completed the expansion of the Ministry across at the provincial levels, bringing in Anguilla, Hunan, Qinghai, and Sichuan provinces. The fourth wave the provincial-level departments expanded vertically, taking over local public security bureaus or established subordinate municipal or County bureaus. Presently, the MSS has thirty-one major provincial and municipal sub-elements.

As relayed previously, MSS was initially staffed with personnel drawn largely from the MPS. Many local MPS officers transitioned overnight from being police to MSS officers. The MSS foreign intelligence capability was built up when intelligence cadres from the Communist Party of China were brought into its ranks. The new MSS was also funded in part by the MPS. The fact that MSS, in a similar way to MPS, established provincial offices, which operated under cover names, such as “Unit 8475,” has been completely uncloaked and was made fairly well-known courtesy of the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence. To help MSS take on its mission, MPS passed some networks to the new organization. Yet, with some uncertainty that existed as to the political nature of MSS, MPS was reportedly reluctant to make such transfers. Weariness and disappointment was also apparently felt among some of the old MPS professionals who opted to move to the MSS. While there were far greater opportunities for foreign travel, the financial side-benefits of working closely with industry were no longer available to them.

Employment on the MSS staff continues to hold considerable social status and is generally thought of as a desirable career. MSS intelligence officers are usually recruited before or during their university education, and a large proportion are graduates of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), the Beijing Institute of International Relations, the Jiangnan Social University, or the Zhejiang Police College. Those requiring technical skills usually attend the Beijing Electronic Specialist School. These establishments provide training for MSS recruits, who usually come from families with MSS links or otherwise are influential and beneficiaries of guanxi. Nevertheless, however well connected the candidates are, they will have to be dedicated and disciplined although not yet necessarily Party members. Guanxi is often exercised to facilitate entry into the MSS.

Promotions aee endorsed at both the bureau and headquarters levels. Senior branch positions require the approval of the local administration, although, in practice, the will of headquarters usually goes unchallenged. The quality of performance during the information war over the coronavirus pandemic will also likely play a considerable part in future promotion. Interestingly, although thoroughly part of the MSS, branch personnel are regarded as employees of the local government. More than half the MSS staff recruitment takes place in the region’s where the officers will be posted for the breath of their careers and where they have family links. Those family links are quite important. This structure enables the MSS to fulfill the increasingly large responsibility of ensuring social stability, considered a significant operational priority. There is no equivalent to this system in the West. Training takes place in the branches. There are no centralized, formal training academies, and new personnel are expected to learn their profession on the job by reading old and current operational files, by working with mentors, and attending occasional lecturers and conferences. Expectedly in the Communist country, during training, a heavy emphasis is placed on political indoctrination, and although probably less than 15 percent of MSS staff are women, they tend to be almost entirely Communist Party of China members. Internal transfers, and secondments are routine and occur mainly from the law and political departments of local government. There a tacit understanding that one could find a home in the MSS with all of the care and comfort imaginable during and after active service.

Mao (left) and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin (right). Immediately following Mao Zedong’s Communist forces defeat of General Chang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Nationalist forces, China and the Soviet Union stood as the two prominent Communist countries. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin saw the victory in terms of Soviet interests, however Mao, saw the Communist Revolution in China as an achievement of the Chinese people. Despite reservations, Mao welcomed assistance from Moscow in the form of physical aid but experts and advisers. Soviet intelligence officers assisted the burgeoning Chinese intelligence service with the intention of creating a capable, parallel organization in a “brother” Socialist country, with hope of exploiting it to the greatest degree possible. However, cooperation that was established between Chinese and Soviet intelligence services ended with the split between Chinese and Soviet leaders.

Residual Impact of Soviet Intelligence Upon Chinese Intelligence?

Naturally, the once significant impact and influence of the Soviet intelligence service on Chinese intelligence has faded more and more with the coming of each new generation into the system. Yet, fragments from that past past still remain. Immediately following Mao Zedong’s Communist forces defeat of General Chang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang Nationalist forces, China and the Soviet Union stood as the two prominent Communist countries. Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin saw the victory in terms of Soviet interests, however Mao, saw the Communist Revolution in China as an achievement of the Chinese people, and to that extent was only interested in formulating the best path to Socialism for China. Mao had held reservations about overlaying China with the Soviet model, but nonetheless welcomed assistance from Moscow in the form of physical aid but experts and advisers. Nevertheless, an agreement was established between Mao and Stalin to have a Soviet advisory mission providing physical aid and significant guidance and advice on nearly all aspects of government. Concerning intelligence, Chinese and Soviet services liaised significantly and comfortably. Soviet advisers used their own service as a model to structure the organization, staffing, training, intelligence operations, and resources of Chinese intelligence services. In the end, Chinese intelligence services mirrored those of the Soviets. It became an effective tool for China’s security. What happened with the Chinese also happened with intelligence services of Eastern Bloc and other Communist governments’ intelligence services in the late 1950s. However, also much as in the Eastern Bloc, Soviet intelligence officers assisted the burgeoning Chinese intelligence service with the intention of creating a capable, parallel organization in a “brother” Socialist country that Soviet intelligence could exploit to the greatest degree possible.

Consequently, for decades after World War II, the Chinese intelligence service, even without Soviet direction, evinced some organizational and operational aspects similar to those of the Soviet intelligence services of the past. To that extent, the KGB has remained a fully useful yardstick from which one could measure, understand, and conceptualize the structure and functions of the Chinese intelligence services as they evolved. Interestingly, the period in which Chinese intelligence services received advice and closely liaised the Soviet counterparts was also a period of evolution of Soviet intelligence. As soon as one intelligence organization was opened for business in the Soviet Union, it was replaced by another with added responsibilities. Those organizations included: Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) or NKVD; 1938-1946, Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (People’s Commissariat for State Security) and Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) or NKGB-NKVD, placing police and security functions under one chief; and, 1946-1953, Ministerstvo Vnuirennikh Del (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) or MVD-MGB. Eventually, in 1954, all of the non-military security functions were organized in what was dubbed the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or the KGB. It was under odd circumstances that Soviet intelligence services would identify themselves as models for those of other countries to follow. Interestingly enough, there was a lesson for the Chinese to take away from that period of the growing pains felt by Soviet intelligence services. In effect, the evolution of the Chinese intelligence services was inevitable if it was to meet the evolving needs of the leadership in a changing world. Without wanting to declare or insinuate some causality, or proffering that there was some curious act of imitation, it must be noted that Chinese intelligence services, following the years of close contacts with the Soviet counterparts, went through a similar period of near continuous organizational and name change.

Cooperation that was established between Chinese intelligence services and Soviet intelligence services could not survive the split between Chinese and Soviet leaders. The cause was gaping differences in outlook. Mao’s perception of the right relationship between the Soviet and Chinese Revolutions was influenced by his profound identification with the Chinese national tradition, which led him to reject conceptions and political lines not sufficiently suited to the mentality of the Chinese people and to their originality and creativity. Such were the sensibilities behind the “Great Leap Forward.” Not even quiet liaison through a virtual cross border masonry between field officers of the two intelligence services would have been allowed.  

Unlike its sister civilian intelligence service, the MPS, the MSS generally appears to have adhered to the non-politicization  of the service. MSS senior executives have evinced an acumen for being clever with politics. Occasionally, they have not been pristine in avoiding any mix up between their true task and purpose and extraneous political matters. Indeed, MSS elements, particularly at local levels, often have provided protection services for the business dealings of Communist Party of China officials or their well-connected friends. The purges of Beijing Party secretary Chen Xitong in 1995 and Shanghai Party secretary Chen Liangyu in 2006 were understood to have involved the ministry. Following the fall of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, the Beijing State Security Bureau chief Fang Ke and Vice Minister Qiu Jin were ousted in rather widespread purges as a consequence of their use of MSS resources to support certain leaders in their political tussles.

How MSS Is Organized

In terms of operations and functional (administrative) duties, a common understanding has been that MSS is divided into bureaus, each assigned to a division with a broad directive and each bureau is given a specific task. On a Weibo account, reportedly associated with the MSS, a suitable outline of the first 11 bureaus was posted in November 2016. A description of that organizational structure of the MSS is easy enough to find online. The bureaus on that list, along with an additional six bureaus, was discovered on the common yet only moderately reliable source, the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia: Confidential Communication Division: Responsible for the management and administration of confidential communications; International Intelligence Division: Responsible for strategic international intelligence collection; Political and Economic Intelligence Division: Responsible for gathering political, economic, and scientific intelligence from various countries; Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Division: Responsible for intelligence work in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau; Intelligence Analysis Division: Responsible for analysing and reporting on intelligence and collecting guidance on how to handle intelligence matters; Operational Guidance Division: Responsible for directing and supervising the activities of provincial level MSS offices; Counterintelligence Division: Responsible for gathering counterintelligence information; Counterintelligence Division: Responsible for monitoring, investigating, and potentially detaining foreigners suspected of counterintelligence activities. This Bureau is reported to primarily cover and investigate diplomats, businessmen, and reporters; Internal Security and Anti-Reconnaissance Division: Responsible for protecting the MSS from infiltration by foreign entities by monitoring domestic reactionary organizations and foreign institutions; External Security and Anti-Reconnaissance Division: Responsible for monitoring students and institutions abroad in order to investigate international anti-communist activities; Information and Auditing Division: Responsible for the collection and management of intelligence materials; Social Research Division: Responsible for conducting public opinion polling and surveying the population; Science and Technology Investigative Division: Responsible for managing science and technology projects and conducting research and development; Science and Technology Investigative Division: Responsible for inspecting mail and telecommunications; Comprehensive Intelligence Analysis Division: Responsible for the analysis and interpretation of intelligence materials; Imaging Intelligence Division: Responsible for collecting and interpreting images of political, economic, and military targets in various countries through both traditional practices and through incorporation of satellite imagery technologies; and, Enterprises Division: Responsible for the operation and management of MSS owned front companies, enterprises, and other institutions. (Additionally, In 2009, the MSS was reported by a former official to have a Counterterrorism Bureau.)

Since leaving the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) where he was a highly-regarding analyst on China, Peter Mattis has published a number of superlative essays on Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence. Among a number of issues, Mattis expressed a view compatible with greatcharlie’s here in a 2012 article, “The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 2012) 47, that “Protecting the integrity of US intelligence and policy processes is an important task for the US Intelligence Community, but clear understanding of Chinese intelligence serves more than the CI [counterintelligence] mission. At the core, analysis of Beijing’s intelligence institutions is about trying to understand systematically how the Chinese government uses information to inform its policy formulation, guidance to diplomats and security officials, and the execution of its policies.” Along with a former military intelligence officer and diplomat, Matthew Brazil, Mattis published Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (United States Naval Institute Press, 2019), a book which is nothing less than brilliant. In covering the web of Chinese intelligence services that engage in intelligence operations, Mattis and Brazil present a great deal about the super secret MSS which one can be sure is cutting edge stuff. For many analysts in defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence worldwide, it presents nothing less than a treasure trove and should find a permanent place in syllabi in college and university courses worldwide for years to come. (Regular reference is made to Mattis’ writings in this essay.)

Mattis and Brazil share the view that MSS headquarters is organized into numbered bureaus. They further explain that it is spread across at least four compounds in Beijing. However, in their assessment, they believe MSS is organized a bit differently than in the outline of its departments aforementioned. They state that at the present, the MSS is believed to possess at least eighteen bureaus. Unlike the People’s Liberation Army  (PLA) where military unit cover designators offer a way to track units, MSS elements, they explain, are not so readily identified. In Mattis’ and Brazil’s own words, “The following designations are ones in which we possess a modicum of confidence”: First Bureau: “secret line” operations by MSS officers not under covers associated with Chinese government organizations; Second Bureau: “open line” operations by MSS officers using diplomatic, journalistic, or other government-related covers; Third Bureau: unknown; Fourth Bureau: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau Bureau; Fifth Bureau: Report Analysis and Dissemination Bureau; Sixth Bureau: unknown; Seventh Bureau: Counterespionage Intelligence Bureau, gathers information and develops intelligence on hostile intelligence services inside and outside of China; Eighth Bureau: Counterespionage Investigation,  runs investigations to detect and apprehend foreign spies in China; Ninth Bureau: Internal Protection and Reconnaissance bureau, supervises and monitors foreign entities and reactionary organizations in China to prevent espionage; Tenth Bureau: Foreign Security and Reconnaissance Bureau, manages Chinese student organizations and other entities overseas and investigates activities of reactionary organizations abroad; Eleventh Bureau: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations,  performs open source research, translation, and analysis. It’s analysts also meet regularly with foreign delegations and spend time abroad as visiting fellows; Twelfth Bureau: Social Affairs or Social Investigation Bureau, handles MSS contributions to the United front work system; Thirteenth Bureau: Network Security and Exploitation (also known as the China Information Technology Evaluations Center (Zhongguo Xinxi Anquan Ceping Zhongxin) may manage the research and development of other investigative equipment; Fourteenth Bureau: Technical Reconnaissance Bureau conducts mail inspection and telecommunications inspection and control; Fifteenth Bureau: Taiwan operations linked to the broader Taiwan Affairs work system. It’s public face in the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the China Academy of Social Sciences; Sixteenth Bureau: unknown; Seventeenth Bureau: unknown; and, Eighteenth Bureau: US Operations Bureau for conducting and managing clandestine intelligence operations against the US.

Chairman Deng Xiaoping (above). Under the Second Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping, China began authentic economic reform partially opening China to the global market. China’s economy grew rapidly soon afterwards. In a five-year economic plan 2006-2010, the Communist Party of China outlined that China must maintain fast and stable economic growth and support the building of a harmonious society. However, countries such as India and Vietnam had begun competing with China to offer cheap manufacturing bases for Western companies. Chinese industry needed to retain a competitive edge. Espionage has offered a relatively cheap, quick, and easy method to obtain information that could help Chinese companies remain competitive. Many of China’s largest companies are state owned, or have close linkages to the government. They receive intelligence collected by Chinese intelligence services. They undertake commercial espionage for their own benefit as well.

Intelligence Targets of Today’s MSS

Having created the space and acquiring the flexibility over the past few decades to allow the service to evolve into the elite, very capable intelligence service the Communist Party of China originally wanted it to be, it would seem MSS senior executives and managers have now figuratively declared “game on!” to China’s competitors and adversaries. The mission, as originally intended, has not changed much since 1983. Overall, it is now defined as collecting solid intelligence from the inner workings and the very top of foreign military, diplomatic, political, economic, financial, scientific, educational, media, communications, and social institutions. That is primarily what Beijing wants and that is what MSS is chasing after. Its tactics, techniques, procedures and methods are surely more refined. By conventional wisdom, one would proffer that as a priority, Chinese intelligence services target a broad range of US national security actors, including military forces, defense industrial companies, national security decision makers, and critical infrastructure entities. Infiltration of these operations by an adversary as China would certainly have far-reaching implications for US national security. Although the PLA would most interested in US military equities in its region and elsewhere in and around Asia, the MSS would expectedly support that work by collecting what it could on the instruments that the US uses to make conventional war and nuclear war. The intelligence threat China has posed to US national security further extends overseas, as China’s foreign intelligence service seeks to infiltrate the systems of US allies and partners. This particular aspect is seen as potentially having grave implications for US alliance stability and the security of US national defense information. Lately, the chief feature of the intelligence war between the US and China has been the economic front. Indeed, economic espionage, one might venture to say, holds perhaps a prominent place among the bread and butter activities of the MSS and is best known to industries around the world most of which could easily become one of its victims.

Deng Xiaoping and the Emphasis on Economic Espionage

Under the Second Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping, China began authentic economic reform partially opening China to the global market. China’s economy grew rapidly soon afterwards. In a five-year economic plan 2006-2010, the Communist Party of China outlined that China must maintain fast and stable economic growth and support the building of a harmonious society. The Communist Party of China’s aim was to raise the country’s gross domestic product by 7.5% annually for the next five years. In order to achieve such rapid economic growth, However, countries such as India and Vietnam had begun competing with China to offer cheap manufacturing bases for Western companies. Further, the increased demand for raw materials such as oil and iron ore, and new environmental and labor laws led to cost increases, making manufacturing in China more expensive which caused some factories to close. China sought to diversify its economy, for example, through the manufacture of better made high end products. However, that diversification of the economy required the Chinese to increase their knowledge of design and manufacturing processes. Espionage has offered a relatively cheap, quick, and easy method to obtain information that could help Chinese companies remain competitive. Many of China’s largest companies are state owned, or have close linkages to the government, and receive intelligence collected by Chinese intelligence services. Those firms have also proved to be capable of engaging in commercial espionage themselves.

During the administration of US President Barack Obama, economic espionage by Chinese intelligence gained real traction. Startled US government officials began to sound the alarm particularly over the destructive impact of Chinese commercial espionage upon US national security. Intrusions by Chinese actors into US companies and other commercial institutions harm both the individual companies and the overall US economy, to the benefit of China. Indeed, in July 2015, Bill Evanina, who was the National Counterintelligence Executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and remains in that position as of this writing, stated point blank, “Economic security is national security.” Nevertheless, the vociferous statements of those tasked with China’s operations had no real effect on the Obama administration’s course and Chinese intelligence activities steadily intensified. The leadership of the Communist Party of China has not concealed the fact that they recognize the link between economic and national security, and its commercial and national security espionage efforts function in tandem to exploit it.

US Attorney General William Barr (above). The present US Attorney General William Barr is both troubled and angered by China’s espionage efforts against the US and he intended to defeat those efforts. Barr insists China is working to supplant the US as the leader in technology in all areas, by literally stealing away the future of the US. He explains that to accomplish that, China has continuously sought, through a variety of clandestine ways, to grab whatever about US technologies,  developmental practices, and manufacturing practices. Barr wants the US business community to accept these realities and become part of the answer. In making deals with China, US businesses are often selling out their own long-term viability of us companies sold out for short term gain. As dangerous, China has been able to cultivate relationships with their employees and recruit them for spying.

US Attorney General William Barr, in a June 21, 2020 interview on FOX NEWS “Sunday Morning Futures,” proffered that the US for decades has been a leader in technology. China would like to overcome US dominance in the field. To that end, China has been stealing all us technologies developmental practices, manufacturing practices. Barr stated: “The way I look at is, this is a fundamental challenge to the United States. Since the late 19th century, our opportunity and our growth, our prosperity as a country has come from our technological leadership. We have been the technological leader of the world. In the last decade or so, China has been putting on a great push to supplant us, explicitly. They want to be the leader in all the future technologies that are going to dominate the economy. And so what’s at stake is the economic opportunity of our children and our grandchildren, whether we can continue to be the technological leader of the world. The Chinese have embarked on a very aggressive program during this time of stealing and cheating in order to overtake us. They have stolen our intellectual property. When they steal our secrets about future technology, they’re stealing the future of the American people.”

Barr left no doubt that China was quite some distance from competing fairly. He insisted that it was the intention of the Trump administration to put a halt to China’s very open efforts at robbery. Barr explained: “The Chinese efforts run the gamut from more traditional espionage of recruiting people to work for them, explicitly, to cultivating relationships that they are then able to use. And the people frequently are not completely attuned to the fact that they are being used as essentially stooges for the Chinese. So, it runs the gamut of things. And, sometimes, some of these programs, high-sounding programs, are used to the advantage of the Chinese.” Barr expressed concern over how educational programs have been used by Chinese intelligence services to penetrate US academic institutions and take away the knowledge, training, and research offered for use in China’s efforts to overwhelm the competitive edge the US possesses. Barr explained: “We are clearly cracking down on researchers and others that are sent over here to get involved in our key technological programs. And, by the way, this is not just weapons systems. This is agriculture. This is medicine. This is robotics. This is artificial intelligence and so forth. It’s the whole gamut of important technologies going forward.”

Dimensions of MSS Intelligence Collection

In its intelligence campaign against the US, EU Member States, and other advanced industrialized countries, the MSS has taken a multidimensional approach. Three more apparent dimensions include: illicit technology procurement, technical collection (cyber attacks), and human intelligence collection. Assuredly, the illicit procurement of specific technology by MSS is executed through the use of Chinese front companies. It is a relatively soft approach to intelligence collection, but it has had a devastating impact. According to Mattis in his 2012 article, “The Analytic Challenge of Understanding Chinese Intelligence Services” cited earlier here, FBI analysts reported that over 3,200 such companies had been quietly set up as fronts for intelligence collection purposes. Other relative short-cuts in espionage included tasking scholars, and scientists to purchase information before they travelled to countries that possessed targeted technologies. MSS has also encouraged Chinese firms to buy up entire companies that already possessed the desired technology.

With regard to the cyber attack, it is perhaps the most prolific type of attack against industry in the US, EU, and within other advanced industrialized countries. This dimension of Chinese intelligence collection is perhaps the most aggressive, and hackers locate doors that they can rapidly pass through and grab whatever might be within reach. It is by no means a supplemental or mere attendant method of espionage relative to running human agents. It is a full-fledged dimension of China’s intelligence campaign strategy. If human intelligence were the only focus, constraints on manpower resources would always be a big problem to overcome. Cyber collection complements all other forms of penetration and collection very well.

By far, the most complex and risky dimension of MSS intelligence collection are its human intelligence operations. Least challenging are MSS operations in China. No resource constraints hinder the MSS in terms of both manpower to use against foreigners there. The efforts of foreign counterintelligence services typically face great limitations in terms of ways and resources to stem Chinese efforts against their foreign intelligence colleagues on the ground. The close proximity of other countries in the Far East would appear to make operating in these countries easier, too! Difficulties begin when tries to take a bite out of more advanced industrialized countries in the region. Japan, for example, has historically been a difficult country for Chinese intelligence services to operate within. Against Japanese targets, attempts to cultivate operatives and informants still occur, but a greater reliance is surely placed on technical collection by MSS. Outside of its region, in target rich US, EU Member States, and other advanced industrialized countries, even the Russian Federation, Chinese intelligence services as a whole initially some difficulty figuring out how to go about approaching a target using officers. They would also naturally be concerned over facing considerably stiffer resistance from more adept counterintelligence services such as those of Japan. Interestingly, as time went on, they managed to find a number of sweet spots from which, and methods with which, they could conduct human intelligence collection operations with some degree of success. Lately, it seems to have been easy enough for Chinese intelligence services to establish networks of operatives and informants, and reportedly even sleeper agents, in the US, placing them in locations from which they could do considerable harm.

Collection through Front Companies and Operatives

As mentioned, a very quiet approach to intelligence collection is ubiquitous and pernicious form of inteloigence collection operations in the US. Most US citizen can look direct at the activities of what appear to be benign companies and not observe or discern that it is firm of foreign attack against their country. With little threat of being discovered, Chinese front companies set up where they can best acquire companies, technologies, brain power in the form of students, and even intelligence operatives and informants. Some US firms that have unwittingly linked themselves to seemingly innocuous, but actually nefarious institutions in China, business, academic, scholarly, or otherwise, that are tied to the government, particularly the Chinese intelligence services, may often have Chinese intelligence operatives working out of them, thus providing a convenient cover for their activities. In July 2019, a federal grand jury in Chicago indicted Weiyun “Kelly” Huang, a Chinese citizen, on fraud charges, charging her with providing fake employment verifications. A grand jury indicted her two companies, Findream and Sinocontech, on charges of conspiracy to commit visa fraud. The two companies incorporated by Huang did not exist, except on paper. Federal authorities allege the Findream and Sinocontech were front companies used to provide false employment verification for Chinese students, convincing immigration officials that they were here legally. Huang made use of a website based in China, chineselookingforjob.com, and the China-based “WeChat” platform, as well as Job Hunters of North America, to recruit for her companies. Court records explain that over 2,600 Chinese students declared themselves as employees for either Findream or Sinocontech from September 2013 to April 2019. In a bungling oversight Huang claimed to have employed so many young people that according to a 2017 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement list, Findream and Sincocontech ranked among the top US-based companies that hired students under the federal Optional Practical Training program. Findream ranked number 10, just behind Facebook. Sinocontech ranked number 25, just behind Bank of America. Surely, that served to call some attention from US counterintelligence services to its activities. Tragically, on LinkedIn, it is indicated that great numbers of graduates from schools from around the country wrote in their online biographies that they were employed by either Findream or Sinocontech as data analysts, web developers, consultants and software engineers. Huang compiled approximately $2 million from the alleged fraud scheme. Prosecutors state that the citizen of the Communist China indulged herself lavishly in Neiman Marcus, Louis Vuitton, Prada, Chanel, Hermes, and other luxury retail stores.

In a September 2018 criminal complaint from the US Department of Justice, Ji Chaoqun, a Chinese citizen, was charged with one count of knowingly acting as an agent of a foreign power, China. While Ji was still in school in China, an intelligence officer from the Jiangsu State Security Department, a provincial bureau of the MSS, approached him at a recruitment fair. They recruited Ji and tasked him with gathering biographical information on eight naturalized, ethinc-Chinese, US citizens after he arrived in Chicago to begin his studies. Reportedly, Chinese intelligence wanted to recruit those individuals, most of whom “worked in or were recently retired from a career in the science and technology industry, including several individuals specializing in aerospace fields.” Ji performed the task of collecting the information. After graduating with a master’s degree in electrical engineering from the Illinois Institute of Technology in 2015, he remained in the US through a temporary work program known as Optional Practical Training. That program allows international students to stay for up to two extra years if they have earned degrees related to science, technology engineering and mathematics. After Ji graduated with a master’s degree in electrical engineering in 2015, he remained in the US through a temporary work program known as Optional Practical Training. The program allows international students to stay for up to two extra years if they have earned degrees related to science, technology engineering and mathematics. Ji stated that he was employeed as a software engineer for a company called Findream LLC. According to court records, Ji’s responsibilities included writing “well designed, testable, efficient code by using best software development practices.” Although Findream was advertised as a startup technology company based in Mountain View, California, the company did not exist, except on paper. In April and May of 2018, the FBI made clandestine contact with Ji via an undercover agent. During the May meeting, Ji revealed that he was first approached by the MSS. In October 2017, email and MSS messages exchanged between the MSS officer and Ji were uncovered by the FBI.

Technical Intelligence Collection and Cyber Attacks

MSS technical collection can include the use of high-tech tools covering phone calls and all forms of messaging to relatively low level actions against electronic equipment such as mobile phones and computer networks. While technical intelligence collection, cyber attacks by Chinese intelligence services upon targets in the US, have been deplorable, the skill displayed and their list of accomplishments has been impressive. What have essentially been standard targets of cyber attacks from Chinese intelligence services in recent years have been those levelled against US national security decision makers and government organizations, particularly during the Obama administration. The objective of that targeting has been to access any classified information they might possess. Through that information, MSS would surely hope to develop insight into highly sensitive US national security decision making processes. Several instances of such cyber attacks have been made public, among them: in 2010, China reportedly attempted to infiltrate the email accounts of top US national security officials, including then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen and then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead; in July 2015, the US Office of Personnel Management announced that hackers had extracted personnel records of roughly 22 million US citizens. The hackers were reportedly affiliated with the MSS. Some of the stolen files contained detailed personal information of federal workers and contractors who have applied for security clearances. Among the information extracted were the fingerprints of 5.6 million people, some of which could be used to identify undercover US government agents or to create duplicates of biometric data to obtain access to classified areas; and, in May 2016, the then Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated there was indicia supporting a concern that foreign actors had targeted the 2016 US Presidential Campaigns with cyber operations. Those foreign actors plausibly included Chinese intelligence services, as well as actors in the Russian Federation and other countries. During the 2008 US Presidential Election, evidence existed that indicated China infiltrated information systems of the campaigns of then Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain. The experience gained and the lessons learned by MSS in those cyber operations primarily against national security and political targets during the Obama administration allowed for a rapid development of the organization’s cyber warfare capabilities and capacity. Rather than figuratively apply the law of lex talionis and a bit more to knock MSS back on its heels, defensive actions and push back by the Obama administration was so slow and so frightfully slight that the MSS was allowed the space and the time to even ratchet up its cyber game. An indictment unsealed in October 2018 revealed that US was made aware of at least a portion of MSS directed cyber operations aimed at swallowing up technologies researched and developed by firms in the US and other advanced industrialized countries.

In October 2018, the US Department of Justice unsealed charges leveled on 10 Chinese nationals, alleging a persistent campaign by Chinese intelligence officers and their recruits to steal aerospace technology from companies in the US and France. In a thoroughly complex operation, from January 2010 to May 2015 a provincial bureau of the MSS, the Jiangsu Province Ministry of State Security (‘JSSD”), headquartered in Nanjing, China, conspired to steal sensitive commercial technological, aviation, and aerospace data by hacking into computers in the US and other advanced industrialized countries. According the indictment, MSS officers managing the operation included Zha Rong, a Division Director in the JSSD, Chai Meng, a JSSD Section Chief, and other MSS officers who were not named. Both Zha and Chai supervised and directed human intelligence and activities by one or more members of the conspiracy aimed at hacking into the computers of targeted firms that were used in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce and communications, and steal information, to includie intellectual property and confidential business data, and to use these companies’ computers to facilitate further computer intrusions into other companies.

As for their computer savvy MSS operatives, Zhang Zhang-Gui, a computer hacker who operated at the direction of the JSSD, tested spear phishing messages and established and maintained infrastructure used in multiple intrusions. Zhang also coordinated hacking activities and shared infrastructure with Liu Chunliang, a fellow computer hacker who operated at the direction of the JSSD, and coordinated the activities of other computer hackers and malware developers, including Gao Hong Kun, Ma Zhiqi, and an identified unindicted co-conspirator (‘UCC-1″). Among his activities, Liu established, maintained and paid for infrastructure used in multiple intrusions, deployed malware, and engaged in domain hijacking in connection with the intrusion of a San Diego-based technology company. The hacker Gao Hong, who operated at the direction of Liu and was an associate of Zhang, engaged in the computer intrusions into Capstone Turblne, a Los Angeles-based gas turbine manufacturer and an Arizona-based aerospace company. Ma Zhiqi, also mentioned, a computer hacker who operated at the direction of LIU, was a personal acquaintance of Liu and UCC-1 as well. Zhuang Xtaowei, a computer hacker and malware developer, who also operated at the direction of Liu, managed malware on an Oregon-based aerospace supplier’s systems and stole the firm’s data from no earlier than September 26, 2014, through May 1, 2015. On February 19, 2013, one or more members of the conspiracy hacked into a second French aerospace company’s server affiliated with Liu, using credentials Liu had provided to Ma on December 14, 20L2. Gu Gen, the Information Technology Infrastructure and Security Manager at the French aerospace manufacturer with an office in Suzhou initially mentioned, provided information to JSSD concerning the firm’s internal investigation into the computer intrusions carried out by members of the conspiracy while under the direction of an identified JSSD intelligence officer. Tjan Xi, an employee of the same French firm who also worked in its Suzhou office as a product manager, unlawfully installed Sakula malware on a computer of the firm at the behest of the same unidentified JSSD Intelligence Officer.

In July 2020, the US Justice Department indicted two Chinese nationals, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi (above), for participating in a decade-long cyber espionage campaign that targeted US defense contractors, COVID researchers and hundreds of other victims worldwide. Experience gained and the lessons learned by the MSS in those cyber operations primarily against national security and political targets during the Obama administration allowed for a rapid development of the organization’s cyber warfare capabilities and capacity. Rather than figuratively apply the law of lex talionis and a bit more to knock MSS back on its heels, defensive actions and push back by the Obama administration was so slow and so frightfully slight that the MSS was allowed the space and the time to even ratchet up its cyber game.

In July 2020, the US Justice Department indicted two Chinese nationals, Li Xiaoyu and Dong Jiazhi, for participating in a decade-long cyber espionage campaign that targeted US defense contractors, COVID researchers and hundreds of other victims worldwide, stealing terabytes of weapons designs, pharmaceutical research, software source code, and personal data from targets that included dissidents and Chinese opposition figures. The 27-page indictment alleges that both Li and Dong were contractors for the Guangdong State Security Department of the MSS. Prosecutors also allege that the MSS, prosecutors said, supplied the hackers with information into critical software vulnerabilities to penetrate targets and collect intelligence. The indictment mostly did not name any companies or individual targets, but The indictment indicated that as early as January 2020, the hackers sought to steal highly-valued COVID-19 vaccine research from a Massachusetts biotech firm. Officials said the probe was triggered when the hackers broke into a network belonging to the Hanford Site, a decommissioned US nuclear complex in eastern Washington state, in 2015. US Attorney William Hyslop in public statement on July 21, 2020 emphasized that there were “hundreds and hundreds of victims in the United States and worldwide.” Indeed, their victims were also located in Australia, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The MSS has been known to utilize contractors for its cyber espionage operations. Clearly, MSS is not adverse to putting its faith in the young hackers to compromise security and deeply penetrate US systems to steal untold amounts of information. Integrating contractors in its cyber espionage operations allows the MSS access a much desired wider pool of talent. Under China’s National Security Security Law, they obligated to serve the needs of the government of course with some remuneration, a point which will explained later in this essay. To some degree, it provides some plausible deniability of the hackers work against some countries, but as demonstrated by this case it provides MSS a limited shield from US capabilities. Li and Dong both studied computer application technologies at the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, in Chengdu. As a modus operandi, Dong would research victims and find potential methods of remotely breaking into computer systems. Li would then compromise the networks and steal the information. The truth is rarely pure and never simple in the intelligence arena, so it remains uclear whether US counterintelligence, following the indentification of these hackers and their activities, has managed to neutralize them and set up satisfactory defenses to prevent further Interference by MSS hackers. Oddly enough, there was some benefit gained by Beijing, perchance unknowningly by the Communist Party of China. To the extent that the hackers are young and ingenious, they are somewhat relatable to contemporaries and even younger people fascinated by Internet technology inside and outside of China. Presumably, Li and Dong still reside safely in China.

MSS Human Intelligence Collection

As human intelligence collection in the field is perhaps the most complex dimension of MSS operations, it is presented here in greater detail than those aforementioned. It has been generally understood in the West for some time that the standard approach to human intelligence collection by MSS has been to co-opt low-profile Chinese nationals or Chinese-American civilians to engage in the acquisition of mid-level technology and data. Travellers businessmen, students, and visiting researchers are often approached to undertake intelligence tasks, and the MSS maintains control of them through inducements and personnel connections (guanxi) and the potential threat of alienation from the homeland. Members of the Chinese diaspora residing in Western countries, especially new émigrés, who possessed the requisite expertise and appropriate positions in a public or private organization and family members remaining in China, would be compelled to perform tasks and to steal information of interest that they came across for the intelligence services. This method of intelligence collection also followed the concept of keeping things simple. It is still being put to use.

In August 2020, Alexander Yuk Ching Ma (above), a 15-year veteran of the CIA and a former Chinese linguist in the FBI’s Honolulu Field Office, was charged with violating US espionage laws. It has been generally understood in the West for some time that the standard approach to human intelligence collection by MSS has been to co-opt low-profile Chinese nationals or Chinese-American civilians to engage in the acquisition of technology and data. This method of intelligence collection also followed the concept of keeping things simple. It is still being put to use.

In August 2020, Alexander Yuk Ching Ma, a 15-year veteran of the CIA and a former Chinese linguist in the FBI’s Honolulu Field Office, was charged with violating US espionage laws. According to court documents, twelve years after he retired from the CIA in 1989, Ma met with at least five MSS officers in a Hong Kong hotel room, where he “disclosed a substantial amount of highly classified national defense information,” including facts about the CIA’s internal organization, methods for communicating covertly, and the identities of CIA officers and human assets. After providing that information to MSS officers in March 2001, Ma and a relative that assisted him, also worked for the CIA, were paid $50,000. Prosecutors were not full aware of how much Ma was paid the MSS following the initial payment. They are aware, however, that Ma returned from one trip to China with $20,000 and a new set of golf clubs. In an effort to gain access additional sensitive information, Ma secured a position in 2004 as a contract Chinese linguist for the FBI. He used his new position and security clearance to copy or photograph classified documents related to guided missile and weapons systems and other US secrets and passed the information to his Chinese intelligence handlers. In 2006, Ma arranged for his wife to travel to Shanghai to meet with his MSS contacts and pass a laptop to them. (Interestingly, Mao’s wife was not named in the criminal complaint.) The FBI eventually saw Ma straight and according to court documents, special agents intercepted Ma using an undercover FBI employee posing an MSS officer conducting an audit of his case. The undercover operative also claimed to be tasked with looking “into how Ma had been treated, including the amount he had been compensated.” In a clandestine video recording a of a meeting with the FBI undercover operative, Ma is seen counting $2,000 in cash the operative gave his supposedly to acknowledge his work on behalf of China. Ma, who was born in Hong Kong, is recorded saying that he “wanted ‘the motherland’ to succeed” and admitted that he provided classified information to the MSS and that he continued to work with some of the same intelligence officers who were at the 2001 meeting. Prosecutors stated that the relative of Ma, who assisted him, is now 85-years-old and suffers from “an advanced an debilitating cognitive disease.” Given that mitigating circumstance, he was not charged.

In February 2019, Zhao Qianli, a 20-year-old Chinese national, pleaded guilty in court for taking photos of the US Naval Air Station Key West in Florida. He received a sentence of one year in prison. Zhao came to the US as an exchange student, however, the record of his activities indicates that the young operative was not in the US to just brush up his English. When Zhao was actually arrested in September 2018, investigators discovered photos and videos of government buildings and an antenna field on his digital camera and smartphone. Eyewitnesses saw Zhao ignore a sign clearly indicating the area was restricted and walk directly toward the antenna field and take photos. Although Zhao had actually studied in a summer exchange program that ended in September 2018, his is visa had already expired when he was arrested. In his defense, Zhao alleged that he was just a tourist who got lost. By successfully denying that he was engaging in espionage, Zhao avoided being expelled from the US, persona non grata, but that did not prevent his prosecution for taking photos in a prohibited place. Court documents indicate none of the photos and videos found on his cell phone and digital cameras were of any tourist attraction sites in Key West. Reportedly, Zhao was in touch with Chinese intelligence officers inside the US before he took photographs at the base. During his interrogation, Zhao told the FBI that he was the son of a high-ranking Chinese military officer and that his mother worked for the Chinese government. The fact that the young spy was tasked to take photographs at an extremely high security location with the great risk of being detained perhaps meant that there was a certain urgency to collect the information. (With so many internal political squabbles remaining largely unknown, it seems odd that the young man would be sent on a near Kamikaze mission into the figurative dragon’s lair, knowing that there was better chance than not that he would be caught, very likely causing some embarrassment for his father and mother.)

In February 2019, Zhao Qianli, a 20-year-old Chinese national, pleaded guilty in court for taking photos of the US Naval Air Station Key West in Florida. He received a sentence of one year in prison. Zhao came to the US as an exchange student. Travellers businessmen, students, and visiting researchers are often approached to undertake intelligence tasks, and the MSS maintains control of them through inducements and personnel connections (guanxi) and the potential threat of alienation from the homeland. Particularly with regard to students, Chinese intelligence agencies often use the “flying swallow” plan, whereby overseas Chinese students who serve as spies work with a single contact in China—just as swallows pick up only one piece of mud at a time to build their nests. The students do not have their personal files inside China’s intelligence system, so if they are caught, there is little information to be revealed.

As this approach has resulted in a reasonable degree of success, and MSS officers could continue to capitalize on a cultural and language affinity, a preconception had actually developed in the minds of interested parties in the US that the MSS would continue to take that course. Support could also found for that view looking at the success of MSS in Taiwan, with its ethnic Chinese population. Most recently, in May 2020, Taiwanese authorities detained Major General Hsieh Chia-kang, and a retired colonel, Hsin Peng-sheng, for allegedly passing classified defense information to China. Hsieh once served as the deputy commander of the Matsu Defense Command and had overseen the Air Defense Command when apprehended. He reportedly had access to the specifications for the US-made Patriot missiles as well as the Taiwanese Tien-kung III and Hsiung-feng 2E cruise missiles. Reported, Chinese intelligence officers recruited Hsieh’s comrade  Hsin with all of stops out while he was in China, leading a Taiwanese tour group. Hsin, a former colleague, allegedly first approached Hsieh about working for Chinese intelligence. According to the prosecutors, Hsieh traveled to Malaysia and Thailand to meet his handlers. The indications and implications of Hsieh’s pattern of travel are that he may have been working for Chinese intelligence since 2009 or 2010. In addition to collecting and passing classified materials, both Hsieh and Hsin agreed to assist Chinese intelligence in spotting and recruiting other sources.

In March 2010, Wang Hung-ju, who was arrested because of his connections to an espionage case. Wang was a former official in the Special Service Command Center in the National Security Bureau, and served for a short period as the bodyguard for Taiwanese Vice President Annette Lu before retiring in 2003. The Taiwanese press repeatedly reported that Wang was uncovered as part of the investigation of a Taiwanese businessman, Ho Chih-chiang. MSS intelligence officers, plausibly from the MSS bureau in Tianjin, recruited Ho in 2007 and used him to approach Taiwanese intelligence officials. Ho’s handlers instructed and empowered him to offer money and other inducements to recruit serving officials. Supposedly, Ho was in contact with Wang, which led to his travelling to China where he was recruited by the Tianjin State Security Bureau. Wang reportedly attempted to recruit two friends into his intelligence network, including an officer in the Military Police Command. While the shift to recruiting a broad base of foreign recruits in China was an important step in the evolution of Chinese intelligence, the process still had its limitations. Nearly all foreign-born operatives were recruited within China, rather than their home countries or elsewhere.

Retired Taiwanese Major General Hsieh Chia-kang (center) MSS officers continue to capitalize on a cultural and language affinity in the recruitment of ethnic Chinese worldwide. Most recently, in May 2020, Taiwanese authorities detained Major General Hsieh Chia-kang, and a retired colonel, Hsin Peng-sheng, for allegedly passing classified defense information to China. Hsieh once served as the deputy commander of the Matsu Defense Command and had overseen the Air Defense Command when apprehended. He reportedly had access to the specifications for the US-made Patriot missiles as well as the Taiwanese Tien-kung III and Hsiung-feng 2E cruise missiles.

However, while ostensibly being a satisfactory solution, MSS found itself simply working on the margins targeting ethnic Chinese as a priority. It proved too reserved, too limiting. Not wanting to confine themselves to a small set of targets for recruitment, the logical next step was to attempt the recruitment of operatives and agents from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. According to William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi in Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (Routledge, 2013), cases at the time of the book’s writing suggested that was exactly what Chinese intelligence services did as a whole. Tradecraft was observably broadened to include the recruitment non-ethnic-Chinese assets as well. MSS still uses this method. One can better estimate how active and well MSS officers and operatives are performing by who has been recently caught among their recruits and what they have been discovered doing.

In April 2020, Candace Claiborne, a former US Department of State employee, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the US. The criminal complaint against her alleges that Claiborne, having served in a number of posts overseas including China and having held a top-secret security clearance, failed to report contacts with suspected intelligence officers from a bureau of the MSS. Claiborne’s MSS handler used the cover of operating an import-export company with a spa and restaurant on the side. The MSS tasked with collecting and passing information on US economy policy deliberations and internal State Department reactions to talks with China. They more specifically told Clairborne that her reporting on US economic policy was “useful but it is also on the Internet. What they are looking for is what they cannot find on the Internet.” In accord with her instructions, prosecutors claim Claiborne provided copies of State Department documents and analysis. In return, Claiborne and a co-conspirator received “tens of thousands of dollars in gifts and benefits,” including New Year’s gifts, international travel and vacations, fashion-school tuition, rent, and cash payments.

In May 2019, Kevin Mallory was charged under the Espionage Act with selling US secrets to China and convicted by a jury last spring. In May 2020, sentenced to 20 years in prison; his lawyers plan to appeal the conviction. Mallory’s troubles began in 2017 when his consulting business was failing and he was struggling financially. In early 2017, prosecutors said, he received a message on LinkedIn, where he had more than 500 connections. It had come from a Chinese recruiter with whom Mallory had five mutual connections. That recruiter, Michael Yang, according to the LinkedIn message, worked for a think tank in China, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and was interested in Mallory’s foreign-policy expertise. Mallory was deployed to China for part of his career and was fluent Mandarin. The message led to a phone call which led to Mallory boarding a plane for Shanghai to meet Yang. Mallory would later tell the FBI he suspected that Yang was not a think-tank employee, but a Chinese intelligence officer, which apparently was okay by him. Yang was an MSS intelligence officer. Mallory’s visit to China initiated an espionage relationship with the MSS by which he received $25,000 over two months in exchange for handing over government secrets. Reportedly, the FBI eventually caught him with a digital memory card containing eight secret and top-secret documents that held details of a still-classified spying operation.

Kevin Mallory (above). Mallory was charged in May 2019 under the Espionage Act with selling US secrets to China. In targeting ethnic-Chinese for recruitment, MSS found itself simply working on the margins. The method was too reserved, too limiting. Not wanting to confine themselves to a small set of targets for recruitment, the logical next step was to attempt the recruitment of operatives and agents from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. Tradecraft was observably broadened to include the recruitment non-ethnic-Chinese assets as well. In early 2017, prosecutors said,  Mallory received a message on Linkedin from a Chinese recruiter, who allegedly worked for the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and was interested in Mallory’s foreign-policy expertise. He was actually an MSS intelligence officer. Other communications led to Mallory’s visit to China and the creation of an espionage relationship with MSS. When the FBI eventually caught him, he possessed a digital memory card containing eight secret and top-secret documents with details of a still-classified spying operation.

In the wild kingdom, ambush predation, a behavior displayed by MSS officers in the instances just presented, works well instinctively for many animals, but it requires possessing an innate patience. The prey must enter a well-set trap of some kind. The haul of victories will be determined by how target rich the environment in which the trap set is with the prey the predator wants. Increasing the number of those targets would mean becoming proactive, going out a hunting that desired prey down. Thus, in the third and most recent step in the evolution of Chinese intelligence, MSS officers have become willing to recruit agents while abroad. The risk was greater, but the potential fruits would be greater, too! According to Mattis, the new approach was first identified by Sweden in 2008, when its intelligence services and law enforcement determined Chinese intelligence officers operating out of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Stockholm, had recruited a Uyghur émigré to spy on fellow émigrés inside as well as outside of Europe. German intelligence and counterintelligence services identified a second instance in 2009, alleging the existence of a spy ring controlled by a Chinese intelligence officer operating out of the Consulate of the People’s Republic of China in Munich.

Once determined to go after even a broader pool, MSS naturally thought strongly about collecting intelligence with might and main throughout the US. A smattering of examples MSS operations a decade later uncovered by US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement provides an ample sense of that. Fast forward three years and one will discover how successful Chinese human intelligence penetration has been at some of the finest academic institutions in the US: in January 2020, the chair of Harvard’s Department of Chemistry and Chemical Biology, Charles Lieber, was alleged to have violated federal law by failing to disclose his involvement in China’s Thousand Talents Plan to Harvard administrators, who allegedly then passed along false information to the federal government. Lieber was reportedly paid more than $1 million by China in exchange for agreeing to publish articles, organize international conferences and apply for patents on behalf of a Chinese university; in December 2019, a Chinese Harvard-affiliated cancer researcher was caught with 21 vials of cells stolen from a laboratory at a Boston hospital; in August 2019, a Chinese professor conducting sensitive research at the University of Kansas was indicted on charges he cloaked his links to a university in China; and, in June 2019, a Chinese scholar at the University of California, Los Angeles was convicted of shipping banned missile technology to China. The National Counterintelligence Executive, Evanina, has explained, “A lot of our ideas, technology, research, innovation is incubated on those university campuses.” He further stated, “That’s where the science and technology originates–and that’s why it’s the most prime place to steal.” However, MSS does not limit itself to seeking big things from big places such as Harvard. Desired information on national security matters can be found just about anywhere in the US. Consider, in April 2016, a Florida woman was charged by the US Department of Justice, in an 18-count indictment for conspiracy to illegally export systems, components, and documents on un-manned underwater vehicles, remotely operated vehicles, and autonomous underwater vehicles to China.

Selecting Prospective Recruits

Visits to China by foreigners may be viewed by Ministry of Tourism as opportunity to display China’s cultural richness and advancements in all areas. The MSS would only characterize those visits by foreigners as intrusions into China. The foreigner, to them and their sister intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement organizations, will always represent a potential threat. MSS could only imagine exploiting the situation by seeing opportunities to recruit new operatives. Commonly acknowledged among experts in this province is that domestically, the MSS exercises responsibility for the surveillance and recruitment of foreign businessmen, researchers, and officials visiting from abroad. The MSS Investigation Department surveillance of dissidents and foreign journalists is often quite obvious. It is supported by more clandestine measures taken by state ministries, academic institutions, and the military industrial complex. The various Chinese intelligence services can identify foreigners of interest in China through a number of means such as trade fairs, exhibitions, and business visas. Once identified, an intelligence officer using a cover may try to develop a friendship or business friendship often using lavish hospitality and flattery. The Chinese intelligence services have also been known to exploit relationships such as sexual relationships and illegal activities to pressure individuals to cooperate with them. Sometimes efforts will be made via social media to spot potential recruits. A variety of ploys will be used to get to the target to travel to China where the meat and potatoes of the recruitment process will get underway.

In the current environment, US citizens especially will be closely investigated by a provincial MSS office. That kind of investigation would not be conducted with a view to recruit immediately. For the MSS, it was important to construct a psychological profile of a person, his political orientation, his attitude towards his home country and towards the country he was visiting for some reason. What is very clear about the recruitment of foreign operatives and informants by the MSS in China is that rigor is used in the selection process. The ostenibly way MSS to determine whether a foreign official should be targeted would be to investigate whether they ticked certain boxes through evaluating their actions and other information available. Among those boxes were likely the following examples: standing and influence within his organization, access to required information; standing and influence own people given position; standing and influence among specific people given position and access to decision making process and required information; and, the ability to provide secure access to information for MSS officers.

The likes and dislikes of the target and observed particular appetites of the target that may have left the door open to manipulation by seduction or blackmail are vigorously investogated. If a file secreted from the target organization can be collected by MSS agents in a position to grab it. It would be copied or stolen and included in the target’s file. A background that included an exceptional interest in China, left-leaning sympathies, and even affiliation with Socialist or Communist groups would make the target even more attractive for MSS to recruit for China’s case and the Communist Revolution. Particularly useless are observations and “insights” that merely verify generalizations, derivative, or even bigoted preconceived ideas about the target. After accumulating a sizable amount of material using plain observation, clandestine contacts and conversations, and use of a suite of technical tools for audio- and video-surveillance of the places of residence, all the information is analyzed and conclusions are reached on it. A decision is then made about transforming the investigation into a recruitment. The MSS officer who attempts the recruitment in China will exploit whatever has been collected about the target. Information acquired while the recruitment is underway will also be made available to the officer and his manager. The MSS officer will appeal to the target’s discretion. Ideally, the target wil be led to voluntarily agree to work for MSS. However, under exigent circumstances, compromising materials might be used, however, in this day and age it is hard to determine what behavior is recorded would qualify as compromising–”Goodness knows, anything goes!.”

The same rigorous selection process of operatives and informants would be used overseas as in China. By the time of their recruitment of a target, MSS would be fully aware of their recruits’ particulars. Productive operatives are a true sign of a successful recruitment. Sometimes, the prospective recruit will be asked to travel to another country where MSS officers will more formally bring in the target and introduce him or her to the world of espionage. Additionally as in China, the objective of an overseas recruitment may not always be collection. The goal can also be to educate a foreigner, conveying a favorable image of China and how it represents the best future for the world.

Within the Chinese intelligence services, the belief is that foreigners lack the strength of connection, patriotism, that Chinese have for their country is dogma. With ethnic Chinese émigrés, the belief is that the strength of their connection to China can be exploited. For decades the line emanating from Beijing has been that the people of the West for that matter are rich, sick, and filthy. With specific regard to the US, world’s chief superppwer, a guiding idea in China’s geopolitical and geostrategic struggle with it has been that the US is terminal empire. The belief that the US is collapsing from within flourishes despite the country’s decades long record of economic success and steady ascent. In current times, Beijing’s line has become nuanced to express the view that the US is spiraling downward under the weight of racism endemic to all institutions and neo-fascism. To that extent, the liberal democracy is suffocating on its own self-aggrandizement. China sees its quest for dominance over the US further aided by the fact that the US citizen, in the face of an ever encroaching China, would prefer to enjoy an easy life, a lazy existence, and would hardly be concerned with providing any resistence. So far, MSS has been able to add one successful recruitment after another to its tally.

The Minister of State Security, Chen Wenqing (above). The male MSS officer deployed from Beijing Headquarters or a provincial bureau who one might encounter in the US will not appear as a run of the mill joe. He or she will be well-spoken, well-mannered, well-minded, well-built, well-dressed, well-groomed, and well-knowledged, certainly leaving a target well-impressed. Their comportment resembles that of the MSS Minister Chen Wenqing, seen above. All of that is done to have an added impact among targets that they are dealing with someone special, becoming part of something special, and doing something special. However, shrewd MSS managers are aware that taking a “one size fits all” approach to doling out assignments to recruit and run agents in the field would be self-defeating. Managers, when resources are available will consider which officer on the team would best be able to recruit the target and complete the task at hand. While one target may respond well to the gun barrel straight male MSS officer with a commanding presence, another target may be assessed to be likely more responsive to a female officer with a lighter touch.

Some Specifics on How It Is Done: The MSS Officer on the Beat in the US

Based on information gleaned from defectors, MSS personnel are usually assigned overseas for up to six years, with a few remaining in post for 10 years if required. In most countries, the local MSS officers are accommodated by the embassy. In the US, there are seven permanent Chinese diplomatic missions staffed with intelligence personnel. Having stated that, it is also very likely that far greater numbers of MSS officers as well as officers from the PLA and Communist Party of China intelligence units are operating without official cover throughout the West. Instead of embassies and consulates, they operate out of nongovernmental, decentralized stations. More often than not, they operate out of front companies created solely for intelligence missions or out of “friendly” companies overseas run by Chinese nationals, “cut outs“, who are willing to be more heavily involved with the work of MSS and other Chinese intelligence services than most Chinese citizens would ever want to be. This approach may be a residual effect of pollination with Soviet intelligence in the past. There is a common misunderstanding about the Soviet KGB Rezidentura. While it is generally believed that all intelligence activity by KGB in another country was centralized through the Rezidentura in the embassy or consulate, under a Rezident with an official cover, as fully explained by former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin in his memoir, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994), there were also nonofficial Rezidenturas that operated away from Soviet diplomatic centers. Those nonofficial Rezidenturas had their own Rezident or chief of station, chain of command, missions, and lines of communication to Moscow. One might suppose that when the relationship during the Cold War was still congenial, had doubtlessly demonstrated to the Chinese, the benefits of operating two types of Rezidentura overseas, official and nonofficial.

Possunt quia posse videntur. (They are able because they appear able.) The MSS officer deployed from Beijing Headquarters or a provincial bureau who one might encounter in the US will not appear as a run of the mill joe. He or she will be well-spoken, well-mannered, well-minded, well-built, well-dressed, well-groomed, and well-knowledged, certainly leaving a target well-impressed. All of that is done to have an added impact among targets that they are dealing with someone special, becoming part of something special, and doing something special. MSS is results oriented, and that is always foremost in the minds of good managers. Actions taken will never be perfunctory, and situations should not be forced. In the field, operating against an opponent, nothing can be thought of as too trivial to disregard. After being read-in on reports, must let nothing escape a manager’s consideration. Every target for recruitment is unique, requiring some nuance. Thus, shrewd managers in MSS are aware that taking a “one size fits all” approach to doling out assignments to recruit and run agents in the field would be self-defeating and counterintuitive. Managers, when resources are available will consider which officer on the team would best be able to recruit the target and complete the task at hand. While one target may respond well to the gun barrel straight male MSS officer with a commanding presence, another target may be assessed to be likely more responsive to a female officer with a lighter touch. That might make the target more comfortable and easier to handle once the collection process begins. This is not any reference to sexual enticement or manipulation. Rather, the touch of a female officer may prove more effective. For some operatives, the female officer may be able to effectively take a “motherly approach,” comforting them and making them more responsive. Having stated that about female officers, in some cases, it may be discovered after the initial approach that a woman may prove to be, for a variety of reasons, too intimidating for a target and make the interaction difficult and likely unsuccessful. The target may simply hold a bias against women, and perhaps may find working for a woman disagreeable. Such are the realities of human interactions.

Among scientists, technicians and engineers, it may be the case that the target would be best approached by a more compatible, “bookwormish,” reserved and understanding officer, who can connect with the target not only on a professional level, being able to discuss technical details of information sought and the work in which the target may be engaged, but on a social level, perhaps having many of the same interests as the target. In every case though, the main pitch to the target would include something along the lines that Just as humanity has no nation, science has no nation. The line that would soon follow is how China would be the dominant power and be the country to lead humanity to excellence and so on.

As mentioned earlier, possessing a diverse team of male and female officers for operations is not likely to be the case for most MSS managers operating under either official cover or non-official cover. For this reason, it has become necessary for MSS to seek to the cooperation of scientists, technicians and engineers from other government branches or civilian enterprises who would be directed to attend lectures, conferences, conventions trade shows and the like, and make contact with targets and establish an interaction that could lead to passing the target of to an MSS officer or actually engaging in the tradecraft necessary to recruit the target and manage the target’s activities, use tradecraft to collect information procured and provide requirements collection and solutions to problems.

For an intelligence officer recruiting agents, speech is everything. Word choices must build confidence, create trust, console, assure, inspire, and comfort. To create compliant agents, the right word choice must be made every time. Some submission of operatives and informants to the words of the officer must take place, causing the operatives and informants to put aside what they may know or imagine and accept the new knowledge the officer puts before them. While of course in reality, all operatives and informants are being manipulated and corrupted by their foreign intelligence officer handlers, a relationship akin to a teacher and student or mentor and mentee is established in optimal cases. As in those sort of relationships, the operative or informant becomes the responsibility of the officer. Further, as in such relationships, it should be the hope of the officer that the operative or informant perfirms superbly and exceeds all expectations.

The less certain the recruit is about the objective truth, the more likely the individual will be drawn to a false reality. Many who are successfully recruited ultimately would believe that their actions were humanitarian contributions to peace. It is very unlikely that the operative will ever know the degree to which that furtive bit of information he or she is stealing will support any nefarious plans the officer and his country may have cooked up for the US or another country. That is always thrown into the bargain. The MSS officer’s relationship with the operative is only professional. Friendship is established due to necessity. All appearances will be false. Intriguingly, the intellects of the majority of recruits are unable to confound insincerity. Targets of MSS recruitment indeed often fail to realize that if it were not for the officer’s need to collect information from, or pass the Communist Party of China-line to, the operative, the officer would hardly have anything to do with anyone of such character that they would willingly betray their own homeland. The only reality for the recruit is that they are being molded, groomed to do nothing more than committing treason at the behest of a hostile intelligence service of a foreign country. It is all certainly not some childish parlor game. Quid est turplus quam ab aliquo illcieli? (What can be more shameful than to be deceived by someone?)

In a number of cases in the US in which economic espionage has occurred identified as having a Chinese nexus, indications were that nontraditional actors have been used in Chinese intelligence operations for quite some time. Just how many nontraditional actors are in a position and willing to serve the interests of the Chinese intelligence services could only be known based on intercepted information, informants working for US intelligence and counterintelligence and after they may be activated to collect information or materials. A conversation on the margins of a professional gathering that begins with innocuous banter. There could be a clandestine contact, an email or letter, sent to the target requesting to discuss a matter in the target’s field to assist with the writing of an article or book, to assist with academic or other scholarly research, or to discuss a grant or prize from an overseas nongovernmental organization of some type. The next contact, if any, might include leading comments or questions on technical matters or one’s work, might appear odd. That would be an almost sure sign that the inquisitive interlocutor, if not simply socially inept, was probing. If the target had even the slightest awareness of the efforts of Chinese intelligence services to recruit spies, it is at that point the individual should realize that he ir she is in a bad situatupion and break that contact immediately. If the MSS officer notices that the target realizes his or her the questions were compelled by more than a thirst for knowledge and does not run, the officer knows he may have hooked his fish.

As part of their tradecraft, MSS officers would prefer hole-in-corner meetings with prospective recruits in small, quiet locations such as cozy, dimly lit establishments, conversing over coffee or tea, perhaps a dash of brandy or even a bite to eat. It would be far better site for a furtive discussion than some crowded establishment or a spot nearby some busy thoroughfare. Other sites usually selected are hotel rooms, gardens, and parks. The MSS will also want to have an unobstructed view of passersby and other patrons to at least determine whether observable surveillance activity is being directed upon the meeting. The MSS officer will want to eliminate as many distractions as possible as he or she will want to focus wholly of communicating with the prospective recruit and have reciprocate with the same level of attention. The officer will want to analyze the individual close-up and personal and every response to his or her remarks. If a full-on recruitment effort is not made right away, everything will be done to establish a close association for the moment with the target. The figurative “contracted specialist,” will engage in similar activities, and much as the MSS officer, would also try to become a close associate of the prospective recruit. Much as an intelligence officer would be, the contracted agent would doubtlessly be placed under the close supervision of an MSS manager most likely operating under non-official cover, but potentially under officer cover. If a prospective “contracted specialist” left no doubt in the minds of MSS officer that he or she would be unable to perform the more hands-on job of recruiting operatives and informants, they might be called into service to “spot” experts at professional gatherings or even at their workplaces who MSS desires or to collect information from available databases and files there.

The Tianjin State Security Bureau (above). The thirty-one major provincial and municipal sub-elements of the MSS more than likely possess most of the officers, operatives, and informants and conduct the lion’s share of the operations, taking into account that they perform mostly surveillance and domestic intelligence work. These provincial and municipal state security departments and bureaus are now essentially small-sized foreign intelligence services. They are given considerable leeway to pursue sources. In Mattis’ view, that independence accounts for variation across the MSS in terms of the quality of individual intelligence officers and operations.

Overseas Espionage by the Provincial Bureaus: A Dimension within the Human Intelligence Dimension

It is important point out that although the bureaucratic center of gravity may reside in its Beijing headquarters, in a July 9, 2017 National Review article entitled “Everything We Know about China’s Secretive State Security Bureau”, Mattis explains that the MSS’ thirty-one major provincial and municipal sub-elements of MSS more than likely possess most of the officers, operatives, and informants and conduct the lion’s share of the operations, taking into account that they perform mostly surveillance and domestic intelligence work. These provincial state security departments and municipal state security bureaus are now essentially small-sized foreign intelligence services. They are given considerable leeway to pursue sources. In Mattis’ view, that independence accounts for variation across the MSS in terms of the quality of individual intelligence officers and operations. He further explains that unless specific units are referenced, reality will contradict general assessments. The indication and implication of this is that defeating MSS efforts in the US will require a broad-based strategy that accounts for the scale of the intelligence organization and compartmentation.

The Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB) has surfaced in several US espionage cases. The record its uncloaked operations leaves no doubt that SSSB is constantly looking for opportunities to collect foreign intelligence. It was actually SSSB intelligence officers that approached Clairborne and requested that she provide information on US economy policy deliberations and internal State Department reactions to talks with China. It was SSSB that recruited Mallory. It was SSSB that approached a freelance journalist focused on Asian affairs received SSSB requests for short, interview-based papers related to US policy in Burma, US contacts with North Korea, and US talks with Cambodia related to the South China Sea. Away from the US, in a case involving South Korean diplomats in Shanghai, a Chinese woman, in exchange for sex, requested and received telephone and contact information for senior South Korean government officials. Beyond government documents, the woman also used her influence to help Chinese citizens acquire expedited visa approvals to South Korea. SSSB reportedly blackmailed a Japanese code clerk working in the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai in 2003 and 2004 over his relationship with a prostitute. Allegedly, the illicit relationship began at a karaoke parlor that may have been owned by the SSSB and that catered to Japanese diplomats and businesspeople. Once the code clerk in the grips of the SSSB, its intelligence officers demanded background information on Japanese diplomats posted to the consulate and the schedule for diplomatic pouches going back to Tokyo. Counterintelligence plays a key role in SSSB efforts, too! When the SSSB blackmailed the Japanese code clerk, the organization reportedly asked him to name all of the Chinese contacts of the Japanese consulate in Shanghai.

Other evidence available indicates the SSSB is responsive to the global needs of the MSS and China’s central decision makers. A job announcement errantly circulated publicly around Shanghai universities in 2015, encouraged students who spoke English, Japanese, German, French, Russian, Taiwanese, or the languages of China’s recognized minorities to apply to the SSSB. Mattis proffers that the request for those specific language skills are suggestive of foreign-intelligence targets, counterintelligence coverage of foreigners inside China, and domestic intelligence work for monitoring the party-state’s internal enemies. The job announcement also emphasized that skills in information security, computer software programming and telecommunications as being desirable. In its recruitment efforts, SSSB benefits from a local pool that includes some of the best universities in China, including Fudan and Shanghai Jiao Tong. Shanghai’s universities, think tanks, businesses, and modern infrastructure draw a large, high-quality pool of foreigners from which the SSSB can recruit operatives. Shanghai Jiaotong University, one of China’s most prestigious universities, has been linked to military thefts in cyberspace, leaving open the possibility that such students also might seek work with state security. Admittedly, the job announcement did not describe whether such skills were required in technical support or operational positions. A recently-passed intelligence law prescribes “[combining] open work and secret work” in intelligence operations. Thus, SSSB capabilities very likely exceed human-intelligence operations to include computer network operations.

As the Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence revealed it to be the pattern within the provincial departments  and municipal bureaus, the SSSB leadership appears to come from within the bureau or at least the MSS. The current bureau director is Dong Weimin, who has run the organization since 2015. Unlike the Beijing State Security Bureau’s leadership, service in the SSSB unlikely provides for upward mobility to other parts of the MSS. The directors of the Beijing State Security Bureau regularly move into the MSS party committee and become vice ministers. The most notable among these are Qiu Jin and Ma Jian. The only example of an SSSB director promoted upward in recent memory seemingly is Cai Xumin. He led the SSSB from 2000 to 2004, when he was promoted to MSS vice minister. Cai would return to Shanghai to serve as the city’s deputy procurator in late 2006.

Away from the economic espionage and technology theft in particular, MSS officers regularly have operatives engage in something akin to a Hollywood depictions of “secret agent spying” by taking photographs of restricted areas, gaining entry into restricted areas, and collecting documents, materials, and other property from a restricted area. Those types of activities are perhaps more commonplace that most ordinary citizens might believe. It is only after an MSS officer is captured, or officer of another Chinese foreign intelligence service such as the Second Department of the PLA, that they are made aware that such activity is taking place. Greater awareness that is occurring is the only chance of thwarting suspicious activity when it occurs. When Chinese nationals engaged in such activity are occasionally captured, usually found in their possession is a cache of surveillance equipment. There is typically so much that it evinces the agent believed, with a high degree of confidence that he or she would be able to act without relative impunity in or around a targeted restricted area. It may also very well have been the precedence of previous success spying on the site that helped fashion that notion. Despite the regularity of such activity, the use of MSS officers to recruit agents to do the dirty work of spying has been a fruitful approach.

MSS Informants: Motivations

Attendant to any discussion of the use of actual research scientists across the spectrum of advanced technologies as operatives, as surrogates for MSS officers in the field, would be the discussion of civilian informants and responsibilities of Chinese citizens under China’s National Security law. In the West there usually would be a variety of motivations for citizens to more than likely violate their own Constitution to engage in surveillance and higher levels of activity on behalf of US intelligence and counterintelligence services and law enforcement. Against a foreigner, they might see it as a Patriotic duty. To surveil another citizen might cause pangs of dismay anxiety for there would be the real possibility of violating the 1st Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights of a fellow citizen under the US Constitution. Sadly the motivations of money ideology, conspiracy, and excitement, as well as a healthy dose of indifference will often cure any anxieties or nervousness about another citizens Constitutional rights. Different from Western democracies, however, for the Chinese citizen, such motivations do not factor in such a decision to come to call of their country’s intelligence services. The law requires them to do so. If any motivations at all could be said to factor in a Chinese citizen’s decision to obey the direction of the intelligence service, expectedly the Communist Party of China would list faith and adherence to the ideals of the Communist Revolution, the Communist Party of China, patriotism, the homeland. Supposedly, revolutionary zeal drives the heart of China as one beating heart so to speak.

The National Security Law of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the 15th session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress declares under Article 9 that in maintenance of national security, priority shall be given to prevention, equal attention shall be paid to temporary and permanent solutions, specialized tasks shall be combined with reliance on the masses, the functions of specialized authorities and other relevant authorities in maintaining national security shall be maximized, and citizens and organizations shall be extensively mobilized to prevent, frustrate, and legally punish any conduct that compromises national security. Article 11 decrees that there will be no tolerance shown for the failure to meet one’s obligation to maintain national security. The article states: “All citizens of the People’s Republic of China, state authorities, armed forces, political parties, people’s groups, enterprises, public institutions, and other social organizations shall have the responsibility and obligation to maintain national security.” Authorities in China understand that extraordinary powers are entrusted in the hands of many, such as MSS officers, who work on national security matters. Contractors, and even informants, who might work on their behalf are placed under the same scrutiny. Those who have attempted to cross the Chinese government have faced stiff reprisals. The shadow of sudden death can hang over the head of any individual arrested for such betrayal. As stated under Article 13: “Whoever as an employee of a state authority abuses power, neglects duty, practices favoritism, or makes falsification in national security work or any activity involving national security shall be held liable in accordance with the law.” The article further declares: “Any individual or organization that fails to fulfill the obligation of maintaining national security or conducts any activity compromising national security in violation of this Law or any relevant law shall be held liable in accordance with the law.” The furtive work of Chinese citizens at home and abroad under the direction of the MSS does not need to be without guerdon. As explained under Article 12: “The state shall commend and reward individuals and organizations that have made prominent contributions to maintaining national security.”

On MSS Informants Overseas

The immediate impression created when one learns that China regularly makes full use of Chinese nationals to support the intelligence collection process is the mind boggling prospect of a multitude of adults from China’s population, which according to the World Population Review as of this writing is put at nearly 1,439,239,000. While there may very well be several Chinese national informants moving around Western countries on a given day, that number is certainly not in the millions. Certainly, not every adult in China will be directly asked to be an informant overseas. Seasoned members of the service have decades of experience approaching young Chinese travelers. Usually prospective informants are approached just before travelling overseas for busuness or tourism or early in their overseas education or career. The younger the informant more time they might have in place and more likely they might be responsive to an MSS officer’s entreaties to take on the job. It is not a matter of taking anyone who comes along. MSS officers are looking for a safe pair of hands; those with cool heads, who can comfortably kick around foreign parts. They must be the very soul of discretion and not easily rattled.

Glenn Duffie Shriver (above). Often in the recruitment of US operatives, as well as those of other countries, prospective targets will be approached who may not at the present time have much by way of an access but potentially could establish that access in time. The recruitment is conducted quietly and low-key to successfully avoid raising suspicion or pose concerns to anyone. The relationship between the MSS officer or contractor and the recruit, seemingly having no importance, will evolve gradually on a schedule set by observant, diligent, and patient MSS managers. A number of cases that conform to this type of recruitment have been made public. In a notable one, Glenn Duffie Shriver after graduating college decided to live in China after a short period of study there from 2002–2003. MSS officers convinced him to assist their efforts in the US for pay. Shriver reportedly received more than $70,000 from the Chinese intelligence to apply to the US Foreign Service and the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. In October 2010, pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide US national defense information to the MSS.

Recruiting Spies for the Long-Run: MSS Style

Often in the recruitment of US operatives, as well as those of other countries, prospective targets will be approached who may not at the present time have much by way of an access but potentially could establish that access in time. This was also a method that Soviet intelligence was famous for. To that extent, the recruitment process is conducted quietly and low-key to successfully avoid raising suspicion or pose concerns to anyone. The relationship between the MSS officer or contractor and the recruit, seemingly having no importance, will evolve gradually on a schedule set by observant, diligent, and patient MSS managers. As for the recruit, the motivation is typically emotional, somewhat ideological. For example, from the moment of contact with the MSS, they may sense that they are able to shape the fate of the world through their furtive activities. If the recruitment takes long enough, the target will even be passed on to another officer for development. When the recruit “matures” to the point of getting into position in a business, think tank, government organization, academic institution, or some other targeted location, the MSS officer handling the individual will begin full-fledged tasking. All forms of espionage and active measures will get under way full throttle. All in all, the speed differential with other forms of recruitment is not as critical as the depth of penetration by the recruit. What MSS gets from the effort is a highly prepared mole buried deep within the US foreign and national security policy apparatus.

A number of cases that conform to this type of recruitment have made public. In a notable one, in October 2010, Glenn Duffie Shriver pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide US national defense information to SSSB intelligence officer. Shriver, a recent US college graduate decided to live in China after a short period of study there from 2002–2003. Apparently finding Shriver to be a viable target, Chinese intelligence officers successfully pitched him the idea of assisting their efforts in the US for pay. Shriver reportedly received more than $70,000 from the Chinese intelligence to apply to the US Foreign Service and the CIA’s National Clandestine Service. If he managed to be hired by either, he would have been obligated to communicate classified US national defense information to their organization. The apparent intent of the SSSB’s was to collect a stream of reporting on US foreign policy. It was seemingly inconsequential that only some of a portion of it would have been directly related to Asia and particularly China.

Honey Traps

As noted in the discussion on the overseas intelligence operations of MSS provincial bureaus, Chinese human Intelligence officers have also been known to exploit relationships such as sexual relationships and illegal activities to pressure individuals to cooperate with them. Indeed, a bog-standard method of snagging traveling businessmen is the honeytrap. As defined more specifically in Henry S. A. Becket, The Dictionary of Espionage: Spookspeak into English (Stein & Day, 1986), a honey trap is a method of sexual entrapment for intelligence purposes, usually to put a target [such as Kalugin] into a compromising position so that he or she can be blackmailed. The approach would be made once MSS intelligence or counterintelligence managers believed enough had collected enough about the target and the target’s activities, that they understood how the foreign national thought, and whether he would respond favorably to an effort to make that sort of clandestine contact with him, the approach is made by a selected female or make operative.

According to Kalugin in First Directorate, to further the KGB’s mission, he loosed those alluring qualities his personal appearance and attributes and those of other handsome males and females as weapons very effectively against Western officials and especially secretaries working in key offices in the US foreign and national security policy apparatus when he believed something considerable could be gained by doing so. If lucky, the target may already have become in contact with a woman from a house of elegant pleasure, and the recruitment of the prostitute is what is required. However, there are cases in which the prostitute may not have the background to engage the target in a way that is best for the MSS to establish appropriate level of contact to move forward toward effectual recruitment.

Prospective MSS intelligence officers?: Freshmen of Nanjing Campus of China Communications University in military training in 2015 (above). The MSS has been known to exploit relationships such as sexual relationships and illegal activities to pressure individuals to cooperate with them. It is a bog-standard method known as the honeytrap. While prostitutes and “contractors” are often used for this purpose, female officers may be put in a position to take on a honey trap role. Insisting that female officers surrender themselves to act as lures for potential targets for recruitment is surely not in line with that goal. MSS officers, particularly to young female officers, have been forced to choose whether to engage in such behavior to support the MSS mission. The question is posed, “Which comes first, love of self and honor or love of country and dedication to the Communist Revolution?”

The true humanist by the Marxist definition, seeks to understand human nature with the notion that all can be brought into an ideal Communist World. Insisting that female officers surrender themselves to act as lures for potential targets for recruitnent is surely not in line with that goal. Nevertheless, when MSS officers, particularly to young female officers, are forced to choose whether to engage in such behavior to support the MSS mission, the question is posed, “Which comes first, love of self and honor or love of country and dedication to the Communist Revolution?” The female officer would certainly need to consider what her family would say and what her community would say about her taking on such an assignment. The final answer would be founded on the officer’s own self-respect, dignity, self-worth, conscience. In a system where the desires of the individual must be subordinated to the needs of the state, the only answer is to give primacy to love of country and support the Communist Revolution. That being the case, for the majority of female officers, engaging such work would still be simply outside the realm of possibility. Ad turpia virum bonum nulla spies invitat. (No expectation can allure a good man to the commission of evil.)

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later

Book Review: Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994)

In The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, published in 1994, Oleg Kalugin, a former major general in the erstwhile Soviet Union’s KGB details the realities about the KGB foreign intelligence service and to a great degree provides a good framework for understanding what Russian Federation intelligence services are doing right now. It also provides a framework by which readers are enabled to peer into the future, with all of its mysteries, and better conceptualize what those intelligence services might do under the present leadership in Moscow. Most of all, First Directorate provides a look into the art that moved the mind of one of the most capable spymasters of the 20th century. Kalugin’s work surely earned him a place among the era-defining geniuses of the intelligence industry of the Eastern Bloc.

The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West is the memoir of Oleg Danilovich Kalugin, a former major general in the erstwhile Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. The KGB was responsible for Soviet internal security, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence during the greater part of the Cold War era. It is fairly well-understood now that the KGB was the embodiment of the Soviet systems intimidating, inhumane, authoritarian order. The book’s title First Directorate referred to Pervoye Glavnoye Upravieniye (First Chief Directorate) or PGU of the KGB which was the element responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities. The manner in which Kalugin details the realities about the KGB foreign intelligence service in First Directorate provides a good framework for understanding what Russian Federation intelligence services are doing right now. To that extent, First Directorate better enables readers to peer into the future, with all of its mysteries, to better conceptualize what those intelligence services might do under the present leadership in Moscow. Most of all, the book provides a good look into the art that moved the mind of both a superlative foreign intelligence officer and a foreign counterintelligence officer. Kalugin was one among of a number of era-defining geniuses within the intelligence industry of the Eastern Bloc. Surely, he could be rated alongside luminaries such his mentor, former Chairman of the KGB and eventual Soviet Premier, Yuri Andropov, and the chief of the German Democratic Republic’s Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (Main Directorate for Reconnaissance) or foreign intelligence service, Colonel General Markus Wolf. Based on information that has been made public from US intelligence services and law enforcement records since the end of the Cold War, Kalugin was viewed by them as an extremely clever antagonist. While Kalugin was on the beat, the US tried to play down the degree of damage Kalugin’s success had inflicted but it could hardly be denied that his efforts left US intelligence services limping back to the barn a bit. One would be completely off the mark if one expected a diatribe from Kalugin in First Directorate about his former US adversaries of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The US not only became the host of Kalugin and his family, but granted them US citizenship.

In First Directorate, Kalugin does not engage in an esoteric discussion of the strong-arm security apparatus of the Soviet Union, what 20th century US philosopher and political theorist, Hannah Arendt, best described as a totalitarian and authoritarian Communist regime in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Indeed, he discusses it in a manner easily perceived from a KGB-officers-eye-view, from junior worm up to the top of the heap, effectively illustrating how completely alien the KGB culture was to Western attitudes and inclinations. At the same time, Kalugin offers readers a reality a bit different from what are very common perceptions of the activities and inner workings of the KGB foreign intelligence service and to a large extent, present-day foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation. He achieved much in terms of recruiting spies who were already well-placed in the US national security apparatus and collecting some the most secret information concerning the defense of the US and Western Europe. Although Kalugin considers fair the assessment notion among many Western experts of an ultra-labyrinthine structure and system that existed within the KGB that thwarted even officers’ understanding of how the organization worked, he knocks it down describing how it’s system worked with a certain simplicity and consistency, once one became accustomed to it. Condensed, everyone had a particular job, and knew their responsibilities. However, he notes that the manner in which some KGB officers performed their jobs would vary from what was expected. Therein lies the rub. Indeed, the peculiar behavior of some officers ignited a near catastrophic end to Kalugin’s career. It became an inflection point in his life story. While narrating a story, Kalugin explores such situations with readers and provides edifying answers. One might go as far as to state that he takes on the role of instructor, introducing nuanced details about certain matters in his lecture as if he were trying to impart the full benefit of his experience to nescient, young KGB officers at the erstwhile Yuri Andropov Training Center housed at Leningrad State University or Red Star in the Yasenevo District of Moscow, preparing them for what they might face on the beat overseas. Of course, he certainly is not part of that anymore.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a deluge of information put out about the KGB. Numerous books were written by the organization’s former intelligence officers. Given the quantity and quality of a big portion of what has been made available about Soviet and Russian Federation foreign intelligence services, it was surprising how many self-declared and presumptive experts on this subject, ignored or were blissfully unaware of the realities about such work that rather casually accused US President Donald Trump of being an agent for Moscow. (If the basis was his four visits to Moscow over a 25 year period, once for a beauty pageant, then potentially any US citizen could be vacuously accused of spying for any country they may have visited more than once for tourism, business, or any other Innocuous reason. All countries have intelligence services and all are interested in the US at all levels.) Surely, Trump’s accusers believed that they fully understood as much as they needed about the Russian Federation intelligence services to reach that conclusion. Surely, in all seriousness, that purported knowledge was augmented with what they may have extrapolated from James Bond and Jason Bourne films, as well as streaming television programs about spying. They are all banal amusements, mere jumped up versions of 19th century penny dreadfuls and “adventure stories for boys.” Even Members of both chambers of the US Congress among Trump’s political adversaries, who actually receive briefings from the US intelligence community, hold hearings in committees in order to get questions about any information answered, and are allowed access to intelligence, appear more influenced by such “data” from Hollywood. Such is the state of national politics and political discourse in the US today. A problem arising from it all is that many US citizens have been bewildered by such absurd propositions from supposedly reliable sources as Members of Congress. Argumentum ad veracundiam. (Argument from authority.)

In The Second Book of his work, The History of Britain, That Part Especially Now Called England, (1670), the great 17th century English poet and intellectual, John Milton, explains: “Worthy deeds are not often destitute of worthy relators; as for a certain fate, great acts and great eloquence have most commonly gone hand in hand, equalling and honoring each other in the same age.” As is the case with his memoir, Kalugin is a worthy relator of his own actions. Surely, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to enumerate all of the mistakes, the poor choices, Kalugin made. With regard to that, Kalugin clearly was willing in the text to consider the propriety of his choices and actions or at least at that point he seems to have begun that sort of post-mortem self-evaluation. That process takes place on paper as he candidly conveys his personal experience within the system that turned against him. As one learns about Kalugin through First Directorate, not creating his own record of what he did in the KGB, what KGB had done, and what the Soviet system was really all about, would have been tantamount to admitting to never having had a spark of dignity or decency.

In First Directorate, Kalugin creates a sense of immediateness to what he writes. He would often build tension on the book’s pages while doing that. Indeed, many anecdotes he relates, great and small, are truly edge of seat, nail-biting stuff. Of the cases that he selected to detail, each had its own set of intriguing complications, stirring and engaging the interests of the reader. As for what he shares, his style of presentation, his pace, Kalugin’s efforts are nothing less than brilliant, and greatcharlie has come across nothing better. He beautifully provides the mise en scène using crisp descriptions of surroundings. He marvellously constructs in the mind’s eye of readers a certain atmosphere and desired theatrical effect.

About the Author

Kalugin was born in Leningrad on September 6, 1934. He is of medium height, and for his age, which as of this writing is 85. He has maintained an excellent build, and was at least at one time, quite athletic. Even into his 60s and 70s was known to go on long distance ocean swims. In public, he keeps himself well-groomed, well-attired. Apparently, he is appreciative of a good suit. He has been also blessed with being handsome for a lifetime, possessing what would be popularly described as “manly good looks.” Indeed, it is hard to imagine how anyone would hire Kalugin as an intelligence officer, believing he would be able to avoid notice in public or fade into the background. However, by his countenance, one could immediately recognize his was not just “a pretty face.” Beyond his becoming smile, there has always been a discernable depth to Kalugin even during his earliest years. Nearly everyone who has met Kalugin has called him a charming man with a big and ready laugh and an attractive wit. In conversation, he is talkative, but does not dwell long on unpleasantries. In the US, Kalugin lived in a suburb north of Washington in Silver Spring, Maryland. His wife Ludmila was part of that life for 47 years. They fell in love in 1951, the same year that he made the firm decision to join the intelligence service. She saw Kalugin through all of the rough days of his career, particularly the false allegations, his demotion, the transfer to Leningrad, his stand against the KGB after retirement, his difficulties with Putin’s regime, and the self-imposed exile. His wife was also at his side in the US when she died of cancer in 2001. Doubtlessly, at least at some point, it was difficult for Kalugin to keep it together over her loss. Kalugin is known to entertain visitors to his home by showing off mementos of his intelligence career. When Kalugin first arrived in the US, he served as a lecturer at Catholic University. Since then, Kalugin has become a much sought out speaker, and has lectured at a multitude of venues, traveling his new homeland, from state to state “without papers,” enlightening audiences primarily on Putin’s Russia and the often stunning actions of his intelligence services. Currently, he is a professor at the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

Kalugin’s connection with Soviet intelligence began at an early age. After graduating from high school in Leningrad in 1952, and completing his mandatory military service, Kalugin was admitted to study at the Institute of Foreign Languages in Leningrad run by the Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) or MGB, the precursor of the KGB foreign intelligence service. After graduation from there in 1956, with honors, he was sent as a young officer to study at the Higher Intelligence School No. 101 of the KGB in Moscow which actually fell under the USSR Council of Ministers. The KGB leadership selected Kalugin for assignment to the First Department of First Chief Directorate which concerned foreign intelligence operations in and against the US and Canada. In 1958, Kalugin, who was considered a graduate of the faculty of journalism, was deployed to New York to undertake journalism studies at Columbia University. After briefly returning home, he was deployed again to New York, working in the early 1960s as a journalist for Moscow Radio at the UN. Kalugin was very competent as a reporter. He was not just a spy, but a successful one. One might say that spying seemed to be Kalugin’s metier. His working habits as a KGB officer, as he describes in First Directorate, were to be envied. He was always honorable and discreet, using mental agility and memory, acting gradually and with a certain gentleness. Kalugin let nothing escape his examination. In 1964, due to the threat of being arrested, he was recalled to the Soviet Union, and assigned as press officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, he was not in Moscow long. He was soon sent back to the US, on that occasion to Washington. There, Kalugin would serve as the equivalent of the deputy KGB station chief under the guise of a deputy press attaché of the Soviet Embassy. In 1971, according to Kalugin, he was suspected of treason, but the Chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, knocked the matter down deciding the case in his favor. Andropov, as elaborated upon further later in this review, was a mentor for Kalugin and took an interest in his career trajectory. He was transferred to the external counterintelligence service. By 1974, at the age of 40, Kalugin received the rank of KGB Major General. It was at this stage that the Kalugin’s activities were more reflective of Soviet behavior that caused most to deem the country as an immoral, worldwide menace, and threat to global peace and security.

For Kalugin, there was unlikely any real opportunity, in the midst of his work against the West, to view matters from a broader or humane perspective. Comparing Kalugin’s efforts side-by-side versus his opposite numbers in the West boil down to efforts to apportion wickedness. There was a balance of terror in the Cold War. Deception, subversion, and countersubversion was what it was all about. The 18th and 19th century French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte was quoted as saying: “In war, as in politics, no evil–even if it is permissible under the rules–is excusable unless it is absolutely necessary. Everything beyond that is a crime.” It was easy enough in the West to understand that during the Cold War, intelligence services fought under the conundrum of knowing how much could be done to defend a free and decent society while remaining a free and decent society worth defending. The Soviet Union was governed under an authoritarian, Socialist and Marxist-Leninist system directed under the auspices of the de facto one-party rule of the Communist Party. As aforementioned, instrumental in maintaining order to allow for the implementation of revolutionary precepts was the KGB, which often in the performance of its domestic security mission showed little regard for the human rights of Soviet citizens. To that extent, its behavior observed domestically would be reflected in its foreign intelligence activities overseas. Yet, despite what may have been the concept and intent of KGB headquarters concerning the conduct of its officers, not all, but many performed, without ethics, without any moral creed. Certainly, Kalugin had well-served the Soviet Union and the Communist Movement. There was never any indication in First Directorate that Kalugin had a sense that he had sacrificed his own humanity during his career. In Kalugin’s mind, whatever he did for the service, even if it skirted what was morally questionable by his own ethics, was for the greater good, not to soothe his own ego. If Kalugin caused anyone any suffering through this process, he most likely would say it was regrettable but the best option at the time.

Facilis descensus Averni: Noctes atque dies patet atri ianua Ditis; Sed revocare gradium superasque evadere ad auras, Hoc opus, hic labor est. (The gates of hell are open night and day; Smooth the descent, and easy is the way: But to return, and view the cheerful skies, In this the task and mighty labor lies.) While there was a tacit understanding that a recruit could find a home with all the care and comfort imaginable during and after active service in the KGB, the Soviet government made no real promises that the link would be permanent through thick and thin. When things were going well, there was a duplicity between Kalugin and the KGB that he loved. That meant that he, as with others, would support and tolerate what he knew was wrong. When things were not going well, especially between managers and a staff or field officer, Kalugin demonstrates that the KGB could become a very brutal place internally for that officer. By the time Kalugin had been demoted and sent to Leningrad, long since renamed St. Petersburg following the collapse of the Soviet Union, he had become jaded by what he experienced on the front line of the Cold War. Alas, all of his efforts may have felt futile to him. Indeed, in the end, his struggles with the West, his extertions over the years, proved to be Sisyphean. Kalugin metaphorically was left standing alone on a dark and stormy night, apparently feeling abandoned by the Soviet government that he loved so dearly, to which he was loyal to the core. Due to all of this, Kalugin had to face the painful reality of many loyal Soviet citizens, which was that the hand of the Soviet state that they were taught early on, was benign, caring, comforting, encouraging, and infallible, as not always extended open palmed toward them and their needs. Kalugin had to lift his head above those of his adversaries. He would eventually recognize the need to make up for quite a sin of promoting such an organization. Kalugin retired from the KGB on February 26, 1990, and became a vocal independent critic of the Communist system. When one who lacks political power is unable to implement change, one can still voice opposition. Levels of success and failure will vary due to circumstances. It was Kalugin’s inability to stand by quietly that brought down upon him the full weight of the intelligence industry, the oppressive reputation of which he helped to build. Kalugin’s continuous attacks on the KGB garnered him notoriety and a political following. In 1990, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was rash enough to sign a decree stripping Kalugin of his rank, decorations, and pension. If Gorbachev only had a hint of what was coming his way from the same KGB management that his decision supported, perhaps he most likely would have made another choice. Gorbachev would restore all that was taken from Kalugin in August 1991, after the coup attempt. Kalugin loved his homeland, Mother Russia and the Soviet Union, and presumably still does today. Certainly, he does not love the regime that controls it. After retirement, Kalugin served as a deputy in the Supreme Soviet, representing the Krasnodar region from September 1990 to December 1991. Kalugin ventured into politics to change the security apparatus, reform it. That was simply not in the cards. Doubtlessly, Kalugin never planned to become an expat, or more accurately, live in a self-imposed exile. He had little choice otherwise for existential reasons. He could not change his circumstances, so he had to change his perspective. Kalugin conquered the uncertainties of his life in Russia by leaving his homeland and embarking on a new journey in the US. It is from the US that he produced his memoir.

Nullius addictus lurare in verba magistri. (No master can make me swear blind obedience.) Vladimir Putin came on the scene ostensibly as a reformer, hand picked by Yeltsin. Apparently, Putin came highly recommended by other self-declared reformists and he managed to curry favor with President Boris Yeltsin of the nascent Russian Federation. Yeltsin, known for being earnest, was a bit too trusting. Putin ostensibly embraced the idea of a new beginning for Russia. At that point, it would have been counterintuitive for Putin to bemoan the Soviet Union’s collapse. What lurked beneath the surface would eventually set the path upon which he placed his country. Kalugin was able to see Putin straight. Alarm bells started to ring in his head, and he could see what was coming. By the time he wrote First Directorate, he was already feeling terribly apprehensive. Little was done directly by Kalugin to set himself up for what became a near David and Goliath schema of independent, capable man taking on the monstrous Evil Empire as well as its second-self, Putin’s Russia. Indeed, left in control of the Russian Federation by Yeltsin after 1999, Putin, rather than reform the system, gradually made it look more and more as the old Soviet one, particularly with regard to the intelligence services. Putin wanted all of the former KGB men, many of whom had become extremely popular among the Western think tanks, academia, the news media and law enforcement and intelligence services, to become Lotus Eaters. Much milk had been spilled concerning Eastern intelligence operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dutiful Kalugin had been tasked one more time by his “former” masters in Moscow, to get some of it back into the bottle. Putin felt that there was a threat posed by revelations by KGB officers eager to please book publishers, magazine editors, and television producers than an effort to establish power over the intelligence service left over from Soviet times, including the old boy network of retirees. If any talking had to be done, Putin likely would have preferred pushing out a message strictly controlled by the Kremlin amounting to a curious sort of ventriloquism. Active measures had come home. Kalugin came to the personal attention of Putin himself. Kalugin from what was presented was the very soul of discretion. There was presumably nothing to fear from him. He was not snooping round corridors. However, there was an apparent sense of anger toward Kalugin in the Kremlin not only because he ostensibly traded in on his knowledge of the service, but that he told enough to stir a sense of betrayal. Among Kalugin’s former KGB colleagues who would eventually people Putin’s government, were the same adversaries from the organization who could not hold a candle to him in the industry. They did not have his stature, only reputations for wrongdoing, oppression. Thus, envy and jealousy were also the likely culprits for their odium toward Kalugin as much as anything else. Kalugin would be solely portrayed in a negative light by Putin and his senior aides and advisors. To hear Kalugin speak of Putin, it is clear that he became a perfect monster in his eyes. While Kalugin was lecturing in the US in 2002, he was put on trial for treason in absentia in Moscow, in part for certain revelations placed in First Directorate, and consequently sentenced to 15 years in prison. Kalugin now appears relatively serene. Through his words, one recognizes that he has come to terms with his role in an extremely dangerous and dynamic organization. Kalugin became a US citizen on August 4, 2003. Kalugin would insist that Putin would love to send a message to the US by harming him. At the present, with Donald Trump as US President, the harsh consequences of Moscow doing such would with assurity far outmatch any possible gain, psychic or otherwise.

Critiquing First Directorate

Perhaps it may be revealing too much, but without pretension, greatcharlie must admit initially feeling somewhat ambivalent about reviewing First Directorate, unsure of being knowledgeable enough to judge the written work of such an extraordinary professional as Kalugin. Suffice it to say that it must be left to readers of this review, who will hopefully also read First Directorate, to determine whether greatcharlie got it right. Seeking out Kalugin’s memoir, one might discover as greatcharlie did that his1994 book was published in English under two titles: First under First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West published by St. Martin’s Press, as it is reviewed here; and, Spymaster: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West published by Smith Gryphon Publishers. In a 2009 revised edition of Spymaster: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West, rev. ed. (Basic Books, 2009), in which the text is enhanced with greater details about his cases. In a new Epilogue, discusses developments in his personal life since the book’s first publication. Upon examining the text of each edition, one cannot help but be impressed by the care invested in the creation of this work. As indicated on the cover of both titles, Kalugin completed the book with the assistance of the journalist and former head of theMoscow Bureau of the Philadelphia Inquirer, Fen Montaigne. Surely Montaigne’s contribution was useful and important. Still, anyone fortunate enough to have heard Kalugin speak publicly or review recordings of his many news media interviews and presentations at colleges, universities, think tanks, foreign policy associations and societies on YouTube, could attest that his command of the English language is superb. Indeed, he writes First Directorate in a way that is clear, concise, and flawless grammatically. Surely, Kalugin would have had little difficulty actually establishing himself as a novelist or nonfiction writer in the West if he had chosen to do so. Kalugin initially developed his proficiency in English to serve as an element of his tradecraft overseas. It did, as he used the unofficial cover in the US of Soviet journalist. He had to comfortably communicate with others and fully comprehend the world in which he was immersed. Kalugin was also proficient in German and Arabic.

Kalugin hangs what he provides In First Directorate’s 374 pages on two chronologies: the chronology of his career; and a historical chronology, neatly pairing events of his times and experiences he had which were directly connected to them. The titles of books chapters mark milestones of a life lived. They include: “A Stalinist Boyhood”; “Washington Station”; “The Spy Game”; and, “Exile”. Kalugin jumps into his story as early as the Prologue with an anecdote from his formative years as a KGB officer, working in the US under non-official cover. Indeed, Kalugin offers readers bits and pieces on the Cook case, which involved a US scientist from the US defense contractor, Thiokol, who became his and the KGB’s prize recruit. It proved to be a particularly important episode for Kalugin. He later discusses how the echoes of that case ultimately shaped the outcome of his career. Having set the reader off on that track, Kalugin then formally begins the memoir, allowing the reader to learn about his formative years. Readers are provided an understanding of how he came to accept Communism from top to toe in the traditional sense, how that shaped his worldview, his choice for a career, and how he got into the KGB. As he retraces his steps, he begins skillfully peopling the world in which he allows his readers. For instance, readers learned about his father and the psychic influence that he had on Kalugin due to his position in the the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, a forerunner of the KGB. He provides enough about each personage, allowing for the creation of a full image of the individual in the reader’s mind. Having shared memories from his early years, Kalugin begins discussing his career in Soviet foreign intelligence. Interestingly, his connection to the intelligence service began as early as the years of his formal education. It all neatly blends together.

First Directorate is far from dull, plodding, or pedantic. As for the mechanics of his method, once Kalugin decided what he is going to offer, he did so with a pace that could be called a very smooth and normalized ejection fraction–stealing a term from the medical industry concerning the measure of blood pumped out with each heartbeat. The anecdotes told are the blood which keeps makes Kalugin’s story lively, informative, edifying, and satisfying. Kalugin does not simply unload ideas and hope the reader does not get lost in the weeds when they encounter what seems to be abstraction, due perhaps to a lack of in-depth knowledge about the spy business. One will discover that as the situations he describes evolve, characters evolve, and Kalugin evolves. Kalugin makes no assumptions about the reader’s ability to grasp all that is going on in the text in terms of tradecraft and the spy business. He does not take for granted how much the reader can absorb from what he teaches. Rather, he takes control of that process, apportioning how much of the story he feels would be appropriate. When he feels the reader should be ready for more, Kalugin increases quantity and complexity in his anecdotes. To that extent that he does all of this, Kalugin uses what could be best described as a pedagogy for developing the reader’s understanding of the world he is moving them through.

Kalugin creates a sense of immediateness to what he writes. He would often build tension on the book’s pages while doing that. Indeed, many anecdotes he relates, great and small, are truly edge of seat, nail-biting stuff. Of the cases that he selected to detail, each had its own set of intriguing complications, stirring and engaging the interests of the reader. As for what he shares, his style of presentation, his pace, Kalugin’s efforts are nothing less than brilliant, and greatcharlie has come across nothing better. He beautifully provides the mise en scène using crisp description of surroundings. He marvellously constructs in the mind’s eye of readers a certain atmosphere and desired theatrical effect. Unless greatcharlie is extremely mistaken, he paints with words in a way that will cause First Directorate’s readers to find themselves, at the same time while fortunately sitting in at some safe spot, feeling as if they are actually present on the scene that he describes, watching everything transpire perfectly through the mind’s eye.

It would be an understatement to say First Directorate did not have paeans written about in 1994 when published in the US. Indeed, Kalugin’s book was not really appreciated or welcomed. Through book reviews, one can pick up on a reviewer’s disposition generally, and can gain a good insight about a reviewer’s perceptiveness and thinking. (In that vein, readers can perhaps gain some degree of insight into how greatcharlie thinks given what is noted here as important about First Directorate.) Perhaps 1994 reactions were due to the proximity of the book’s publishing to the so-called end of the Cold War, marked with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Feelings within journalistic and literary circles about the Soviet Union and all connected to it were still decidedly negative, even hostile. It was likely those sensibilities that influenced the thinking of reviewers of First Directorate. The following is a sample of the reviews it received. In a October 13, 1994 review in the Washington Post, Amy Knight did little to conceal her disdain for Kalugin. Knight wrote: “Though he proclaimed himself a democrat in 1990 and denounced the KGB, Kalugin had spent more than three decades determinedly trying to undermine Western democracies. His book tells us a great deal about the KGB’s operations during the Cold War, but it also raises anew the question of how we should react to the confessions of erstwhile enemies.” Distrustful of his intentions in the foregoing statement, she evinced her concern over Kalugin’s integrity with the words: “Kalugin can hardly be criticized if he wrote this book simply to make money. After all, we in the West have been encouraging Russians to become entrepreneurs. But did he have another, darker purpose? Is it possible that Kalugin’s much-publicized denunciation of the KGB was stage-managed to give him credibility in the West, so that he would be believed when he told people that he knew of no KGB moles in the CIA?” In a December 25, 1994 review in the Baltimore Sun, entitled, “The Spy Who Loved It: Tales from a KGB Life”, Scott Shane begins by stating: “In ‘The First Directorate,’ written with the assistance of former Philadelphia Inquirer Moscow correspondent Fen Montaigne, Mr. Kalugin tells his engrossing story and tells it well. Focusing on Kalugin as KGB intelligence officer, he notes: “A spy lives by his powers of observation and memory, and they equally serve the autobiographer.” Shane reveals his suspicions of Kalugin, writing: “Mr. Kalugin, whose perpetually raised eyebrows give him a look that is at once untrusting and untrustworthy, nicely illustrates the habit of lying spies naturally develop. Indeed, Mr. Kalugin is so candid about the cheerful Iagoan malice with which he did his dirty work that his occasional, self-described twinges of conscience come across as unconvincing. As his story almost unconsciously makes clear, it was not the KGB’s brutality that turned him against the agency.” Having stated that, Shane completes his review somewhat positively, saying: “One need not wholeheartedly admire Mr. Kalugin, however, to enjoy his story. It is a reminder that in the wake of the Soviet collapse, we have learned a good deal more about the KGB than we have learned about the CIA and its sister agencies on the other side of the Cold War.” On November 9, 1994 in composite review of post-cold-war scholarship on Lenin, the atomic bomb, and KGB espionage in the Christian Science Monitor, Leonard Bushkoff stated about First Directorate: “After the beautifully crafted books by Holloway and Kapuscinski, there is a letdown in The First Directorate: My 32 Years In Intelligence and Espionage Against the West, the bureaucratic memoirs of Oleg Kalugin, a retired KGB major-general whose authoritative visage has graced American television. His book–written with Fen Montaigne–is filled with lively tidbits about operating in the United States, recruiting agents, roaming the world on this or that mission – and enjoying the perks. Bushkoff goes on the say: “The ideological disillusionment that Kalugin insists began in the 1980s is unconvincing in this ambitious career-minded official, who now presents himself as a liberal, democratic political figure.” Among professional reviewers, there seemed to be more of a willingness to beg off on uncoated expressions of suspicion over Kalugin’s intentions and actions, and even more, his character as with the foregoing. In Booklist, a book-review magazine that has been published by the American Library Association for more than 100 years, Gilbert Taylor wrote in August 1994: “After he had been cashiered from the KGB in 1990, Kalugin blazed into prominence as a critic of the pervasive spy empire. But oddly enough, he remains a professional loyal to the spook’s ethos: tell no tales out of school. Although frank about generalities, he ventures few blockbusting specifics that haven’t popped up elsewhere in the post-cold war wave of espionage books, but this memoir of a stellar career in the secret service is, nonetheless, engrossing for aficionados.” Taylor finishes his review noting: “Filled with anecdotes linked by personal journey from Stalinist true believer to champion democrat, Kalugin’s account of life in the secret world will haul in all spy buffs–a number to be augmented by a full-press publicity push.”

Given Kalugin’s former profession, spying, it would be fair to ponder whether the book relates truth, fiction, or something in between. Indeed, some readers may wonder whether one of the main elements of spying, promoting fraud, influenced his writing of First Directorate. As aforementioned, Kalugin has the skills to provide a colorful description of a man, and ascribing vibrant characteristics, impressive associations, and intriguing experiences to him. It also cannot be stated with absolute certainty by greatcharlie Kalugin actually loosed-off a full-frontal on himself as well as the KGB. However, greatcharlie is convinced that while there may very likely be certain omissions from his anecdotes, Kalugin presents the truth about himself in First Directorate. That truth about himself is rich enough, and would hardly require any embellishment. Although Kalugin’s intelligence career was amazing and his superb work in the KGB that made him more desirable to his new country’s government, there was more to Kalugin than his work. Some might feel Kaligin does quite a bit of preening in First Directorate. However, perhaps a second thought might be given to that idea backed by the consideration that among specialists, masters of a particular craft, there is typically a desire to look over their shoulders, to detail what has transpired, and to scrutinize themselves and their actions technically and tactically. Chronicling the past on paper, the convivial Kalugin also seemed to recount it all in his soul and spirit. As Kalugin dredges around himself, to discuss his contacts with people and memories of events, he willingly opens the kimono on his conscience. In the Preface of The Cenci: A Tragedy in Five Acts, the 18th century English romantic poet, Percy Bysshe Shelley, wrote: ”The highest moral purpose aimed at in the highest species of drama is the teaching the human heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself.”

The symbol of the KGB (above). It should not be overlooked that all that Kalugin discusses in First Directorate is actually couched in an overarching discussion of the operations of the giant Soviet state security service, the KGB. The KGB was gloriously called the Soviet Union’s ”Sword and Shield” and the “Vanguard of Communism.” Its  primary responsibilities of the KGB were: foreign intelligence; counterintelligence; operatives investigatory activities, protecting the Soviet border, protecting the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; organization and security of government communications; and combatting nationalism, dissent, and anti-Soviet activities.

What Was the KGB?

It should not be overlooked that all that Kalugin discusses in First Directorate is actually couched in an overarching discussion of the operations of the giant Soviet state security service, the KGB. At the risk of being perceived as tiresome to those who already know much on the subject, some of the basics about the behemoth Soviet security organization are laid out here by greatcharlie for those less-familiar with it. The KGB was gloriously called the Soviet Union’s ”sword and shield” and the “Vanguard of Communism.” Its  primary responsibilities of the KGB were: foreign intelligence; counterintelligence; operatives investigatory activities, protecting the Soviet border, protecting the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government; organization and security of government communications; and combatting nationalism, dissent, and anti-Soviet activities. Headquartered at Lubyanka Square, 2 Moscow, the KGB was well-situated, well-equipped, to cope with external, foreign threats to the system, counterrevolutionaries and reactionaries internally, as well as organized criminals and the black market. Its manpower would steadily grow in parallel with its activities and influence, reaching a total of 496,000. A large portion of that number included the Pogranichnyie Voiska KGB CCCP (Border Troops of the KGB USSR), a defense against threats from land, air, sea to Soviet territory. In 1989, the organization’s strength was estimated at 230,000 covering 63,000 kilometers of the Soviet border. There were additional smaller formations and independent units. Its land air and maritime troops and sailors functioned under the Main Directorate of the Border Troops which was subordinated to the First Deputy Chairman of the KGB. The Vtoroye Glavnoye Upravleniye (Second Chief Directorate) or VGU was the Internal Security Service of the KGB. Among Soviet citizens at home and abroad, it was the KGB’s Second Chief Directorate in a paranoid search for Soviet enemies and never ending quest to maintain total control over the Soviet Union’s population that unnerved and struck terror in their hearts as they tried innocently going about their daily business. In Hollywood, a sure-shot way to create a dark, mystifying picture of life in the Soviet Union was to depict scenes in which ordinary Soviet citizens would occasionally be taken aside by the KGB and asked: “Show me your identity card” or, make the more polite request, “Identity card please.” It would capture the flavor of Soviet rule and have the chilling effect on audiences, accurately illustrating how alien and atrocious life was in the Soviet Union and under Communism in general. The KGB was to be avoided by the ordinary Soviet citizen as best as possible. During Kalugin’s time, the KGB truly had a grip on everything except the Communist Party organization. Even then, the KGB was also known to play an important part in the allocation of power and authority by Soviet leaders after Stalin’s death, being drawn into the arena of internecine conflict among them. Perhaps it could be said that all Soviet citizens sailed the same sea but KGB members did so in different boats. The nomenklatura in the Soviet Union, or high ranking management of government bureaucracies and Communist Party functionaries, reigned as the main authorities in the country, ironically becoming the de facto aristocracy in its society, and entitled themselves to opportunities and privileges unavailable to ordinary citizens. The apparatchiks, or government bureaucrats, who actually oversaw the KGB’s abhorrent work of keeping the Soviet people under the thumb of their government, saw themselves as being indispensable members of an indispensable Soviet instrumentality. Most generally believed that as a benefit of being a member of the KGB, there was little chance that the conditions which beset ordinary Soviet citizens would impact their circumstances until discovering otherwise. Nimia illæc licentia profecto evadet in aliquod magnum malum. (This excessive license will most certainly eventuate in some great evil.)

The history and organization of the KGB’s foreign intelligence service, which directly concerns Kalugin’s career, well reflected the nature of its global mission and how that mission was performed. In 1917, the post-Bolshevik Revolution Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) secret police was founded and designated Vserossiyskaya Chrezvychaynaya Komissiya Po Borbe S Kontrrevolyutsiyey I Sabotazhem Pri Sovete Narodnykh Komisarov RSFSR (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution, Speculation and Sabotage under the Council of People’s Commissary of the RSFSR) better known as the Cheka. It was Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin, himself, who characterized the Cheka as the sword and shield of Communism. In those postwar years, Soviet internal security, foreign intelligence, and counterintelligence organizations went through a period of transformation donning an alphabet soup of titles. As outlined in Henry S. A. Becket, The Dictionary of Espionage: Spookspeak into English (Stein & Day, 1986), its various iterations included: 1922-1923, Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (State Political Administration) or GPU; 1923-1934, Obedinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenye (Unified State Political Administration) or OGPU; 1934-1938, Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) or NKVD; 1938-1946, Narodnyi Komissariat Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (People’s Commissariat for State Security) and Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) or NKGB-NKVD, placing police and security functions under one chief; and, 1946-1953, Ministerstvo Vnuirennikh Del (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) or MVD-MGB. Eventually all of the non-military security functions were organized in what was dubbed the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or the KGB. Founded upon the experiences of other iterations of Soviet state security, the new KGB had no need to shed baby fat as it were. It was populated by men and women made of the same solid stuff of those who around 20 years before defended Leningrad and Stalingrad and drove Germany and its allies eastward until they reached Berlin. However, things are seldom perfect in any organization.

KGB’s leadership included its Chairman, the First Deputy Chairman (there could be more than one), Deputy Chairman (as many as 4 to 6), a policy Collegium, which included a chairman, a deputy chairman, the directorate chiefs, and the KGB chairmen of the Soviet republics. As aforementioned, Pervoye Glavnoye Upravieniye (First Chief Directorate) or PGU of the KGB which was the element responsible for foreign operations and intelligence activities and concerned Kalugin’s work. As such, the First Chief Directorate would provide for the training and management of covert agents, intelligence collection administration, and the acquisition of foreign and domestic political, scientific and technical intelligence. According to Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Comrade Kryuchkov’s Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanford University Press, 1993), the KGB included the following directorates, services and departments during Kalugin’s years there. Included among the directorates and services were: Directorate R: Operational Planning and Analyses; Directorate S: Illegals (agents inserted into societies, blending in, but carrying out orders from Moscow.

Forged documents, establishes themselves as citizens of the host country.); Directorate T: Scientific and Technical Intelligence (collected scientific, technological, and military information through espionage. Targets were in the Western industrial sector.); Directorate K: Counter-Intelligence: (infiltration of all the foreign special service operations: intelligence, counter-intelligence, police forces worldwide); Directorate OT: Operational and Technical Support; Directorate I: Computers; Directorate RT: Operations in USSR; Directorate V: “Wet affairs” (track down traitors, sabotage, assist international revolution, terrorism, and act in time of war.); Service A: Active Measures (disinformation, propaganda, forgery; support of front organizations, underground movements, revolutionary insurgencies, criminal and terrorist groups; Service R: radio communications; and, Service A of the 8th Chief Directorate at the First Chief Directorate (the code section).

Operations broke down regionally and functionally in the following departments: First Department: US and Canada; Second Department: Latin America; Third Department: United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, Malta; Fourth Department: East Germany, West Germany, Austria; Fifth Department: Benelux countries, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania; Sixth Department: China, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea; Seventh Department: Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines; Eighth Department: non-Arab Near Eastern countries including Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Israel; Ninth Department: English-speaking Africa; Tenth Department: French-speaking Africa; Eleventh Department: liaison with Socialist states; Thirteenth Department: direct action, “assassination,” of enemies abroad and at home; Fifteenth Department: registry and archives, security of government installations; Sixteenth Department: signals intelligence and operations against Western code clerks; Seventeenth Department: India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma; Eighteenth Department: Arab Near Eastern Countries and Egypt; Nineteenth Department: Soviet Union Emigres; and, Twentieth Department: liaison with Third World states. It must be noted that special attention was given to the UN by the First Chief Directorate. The UN provided a peaceful, respectful, diplomatic forum for international dialogue, yet it was the site of extensive Soviet activities inside the UN during the Cold War. Impartial UN employees from Eastern Bloc also employed by KGB. Ideals and goals of the UN not followed. The orders that they would obey only came from KGB.

Beyond its own operations, the First Chief Directorate very successfully directed and controlled other Eastern Bloc intelligence services that were very often operating under the radar in many countries around the world. The officers of those aligned intelligence services certainly did not in any form akin to the Malgré-nous of the Alsace-Moselle performed for the German Waffen-SS during World War II. The product of many Eastern Bloc intelligence services actually far exceeded expectations as well as the capabilities of their Soviet task masters. Case in point was the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), the foreign intelligence service of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic). Under the skilled leadership of Markus Wolf, its Western foes even had to acknowledge that it was probably the most efficient and effective such service on the European continent

The author as a teen (above). As a teen, Kalugin devoured the books of Arkady Gaidar, which included stories of young characters doing courageous and noble deeds for Motherland. It planted seed in Kalugin’s mind of becoming a secret service officer. Those feelings were intensified when he attended camp for children of secret police. He met with university students attending the Security Ministry’s Higher School. Kalugin saw them as confident, fun loving. Kalugin stated: “I wanted to be like those dashing officer trainees, and a career in the Intelligence Service beckoned.” At 17, he decided to join the intelligence service. With an English proficiency and strong academic capabilities, he was well qualified.

Kalugin’s Early Years and Career Choice

In illo viro, Tatum robur corporis et Naomi fuit, it quocunque loco Angus esset, Fortuna facturus. (In that man there was such oak-like strength of body and mind that whatever his rank by birth might have been, he gave promise of attaining the highest place in the lists of fortune.) As has been the case with previous reviews, greatcharlie most enjoys examining a memoir to understand what sort of individual develops into who the author became. In its review of First Directorate, greatcharlie explores how, from youth to his earliest years in the KGB, how Kalugin evolved into the man he is today.

At least from what he shares, his early life was entertaining, pleasurable to recall rather than filled with dissatisfaction, disappointment, and hard lessons. Indeed, Kalugin relates the days of his youth with a subtle humor, recounting the efforts of a young man trying to make his way through life. Kalugin was raised in a “sleeping district” outside of Leningrad, something akin to a French banlieue. His circumstances seemed relatively ordinary, however, his father worked for the NKVD. Kalugin’s father, Danil, was a dark haired, handsome man with facial features revealing a Tartar blood trace. He was not well educated, but by Kalugin’s description a solid man, who cared for his family. After serving In the Red Army in the 1920s, he sought work in Leningrad, and that is when he landed a job as security guard for the secret police, then known as the NKVD. When Kalugin grew up, his father was working at the Headquarters building in Smolny. (Interestingly, in the KGB, officers who were the children of officers and former officers of the security services are affectionately referred to as Chekisty (Chekists), a name derived from the first security service in Communist Russia mentioned earlier, the Cheka. Some would come from families whose “roots” go back to the beginnings of the Communist Party as Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. Children raised in the Chekist community, attending schools and a university Chekists’ progeny typically attended.)

Kalugin’s mother Klavdia, came from a family of skilled factory workers from St Petersburg for more than a century. Based on the manner in which he described himself, Kalugin was clearly a bon garçon, born with a good soul, nourished by a fine family and appropriate associations in his youth. Unfortunately, he was born during a wave of terror in which 29 to 40 million Russians were killed, and a dark shadow hung over Russia. When Nazi Germany invaded Russia, Kalugin travelled wuth his mother to stayed in Omsk, Siberia. His father remained in Smolny, guarding Party elite. Kalugin and his mother returned to Leningrad after a 900 day siege. Only her sister survived the war. Other seven members among 27 million lost during war. This clearly had an impact on the young Kalugin. Dogma among Russians in the immediate postwar period was to say that Russia’s victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War proved Communist system was best. The defeat of the Nazis proved to Kalugin and his young compatriots that Soviet Union was invincible. Still, it went much further for Kalugin. He confirms in First Directorate that from the days of his youth he was absolutely subsumed by Communism; he was a true believer, and that perspective colored every decision he made. He yearned for the opportunity to defend his political ideals, defend his country, and fight on behalf of the Communist Movement. Kalugin’s political leanings did not make him a zealous firebrand.

Unless greatcharlie is terribly mistaken, as he grew, Kalugin appears to have been gentle in temperament, but at the same time a mature boy, not showy, but within possessing a burning ambition with an idea of where to place it. Kalugin undertook the path toward excellence as a Communist with a great sense of ritual. He joined the Young Pioneers at an early age, and in his teens, he became involved with Kommisol. These were the sort of activities that types such as Kalugin went for. One could posit that as a result of his indoctrination in the Soviet Union, Kalugin genuinely viewed Communism as a coherent ideology and provided a clear direction. For the Communist, too, hope supported imagination and drove the individual’s faith in the system. Faith supported and drove the individual’s action to achieve. Despite violent outcomes of KGB dealings with his fellow citizens, Kalugin would have likely confided that there was no reason to argue the point. In his heyday during Staliin’s era of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, Kalugin likely would have looked any Western accusers directly in the eye and declared it all as Western disinformation, compelled by their bourgeoisie sense of morality to falsely critique the “superior” Soviet system any way they can. Much of what Soviet citizens were told about their country’s government, its security apparatus, its leaders, and its place in the world was filtered out by Moscow leaving what was reasonably bad out. Given the Kremlin insistence on concealing the truth about the country, many indoctrinated adherents of the system would contribute to their misunderstanding of it by doing their own filtering. Thus, the rest of what was understood of the Soviet Union, typically shaped by the desire to create the best picture of their country as possible, was usually just conjecture. It also made reasonable sense to those as Kalugin, psychically bound to the Soviet system, that there would always be the occasional differences of opinion over how efficiently something was done or how the government might have handled a matter more effectively under the Socialist framework. Amabilis insania. (Fond illusion.)

As a teen, he devoured the books of Arkady Gaidar, which included stories of young characters doing courageous and noble deeds for Motherland. It planted seed in Kalugin’s mind of becoming a secret service officer. Those feelings were intensified when he attended camp for children of secret police. He met with university students attending the Security Ministry’s Higher School. Kalugin saw them as confident, fun loving. They sang songs in English and Russian to campers to younger students. Kalugin stated: “I wanted to be like those dashing officer trainees, and a career in the Intelligence Service beckoned.” Kalugin had never assumed that he would have an ordinary life. Kalugin saw possible work in the state security service as more than a job. For him, it was a grand opportunity to support and defend his political ideals. Kalugin and his cohorts believe they were born to be men of action. Each wanted to be a pride to his fellow countrymen. For Kalugin, as with most of his young colleagues, the KGB offered a solid basis for believing that the Soviet system could be protected and sustained. The KGB, as a central organ of the government, ostensibly had the know-how and the resources to prevent the Soviet Union, and the contiguous countries of the Eastern bloc that it led, from falling into a chaotic condition. There was a perspective once common in the Soviet Union, and perhaps holds a place today in the Russian Federation, that in an heroic way, Kalugin and his KGB comrades were making good on the sacrifices of the previous generation of Soviet citizens in the Motherland’s defense. Kalugin explained that at 17, he decided to join the intelligence service, then called the MGB. With an English proficiency and strong academic capabilities, he felt qualified. Kalugin’s father, Danil strongly objected. As he worked for the NKVD, his father knew only too well what happened in the Soviet Union under Stalin, and. Indeed, he witnessed first-hand–from the screams he heard as a jail guard to the countless Communist Party bosses he saw disappear during his days at Smolny–what the glorious security services were doing to the Soviet people. Danil Kalugin secretly told his son about what he had seen and heard in the security forces. He explained to Kalugin that was what the NKVD was really all about; violence, torture, death. He did not want his son involved with the dirty work of the NKVD.

Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeking that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.) Strangely enough, Kalugin explains that his father’s stories made the life of a secret policeman seem even more intriguing. Kalugin put it this way: “After all, wasn’t the KGB on the front line of the battle against capitalism and world imperialism? The thought of dying for one’s country and the Socialist ideal stirred my blood. His talk of screaming prisoners didn’t sound nice, but I asked myself, What else can you expect in a bitter struggle with our enemies?” Kalugin was held captive by the idea and ideals of Communism and too easily overcome by the seeming prestige, the power, and the draw of it all. With his romanticized visions of a career in the state security service, he was too excited to look both ways, too young and inexperienced to intuit where it all might lead. While Kalugin’s very caring father did his level best to dissuade his son from joining the security service but  was not able to fully comprehend what he was telling him, that the security service was not something ideal, not an organization of “superheroes,” but a real place with real people, and certain unusual men worked in the state security service.  As he moved through the years at KGB, Kalugin would slowly come to realize exactly what his father told him about the security service’s horrors. Four decades later, Kalugin, more mature, more experienced, more insightful, explained to readers much as his father tried to explain to him what he unexpectedly experienced in the intelligence service. What Kalugin expresses sometimes plainly, but most often subtly, throughout in First Directorate, is that from his first days of training to the day of his retirement, some KGB personnel, not all, did not appear to be well-vetted psychologically to perform their function given the behaviors they displayed. Surely, among the KGB’s internal security elements, there were acts of undue severity and abominable cruelty committed, bordering, if not fully manifesting, sadism. Such monstrous individuals appeared absolutely unhinged from the reality that they were serving the Soviet government, not themselves, and that their authority came from the government, not themselves. Much of that was already well-known.

In the more elite KGB formations, officers were engaged in more complex and challenging tasks, were further vetted and had received extensive training However, Kalugin also gets across that problems similar to those that impacted the internal security section also existed among some employees of the more elite intelligence sections. (Examine the text very closely; such statements are really there!) Surely, this was a very important matter for Kalugin as he repeatedly makes a point of describing the many different personalities that he encountered in the KGB. His depiction of them left no doubt that they had no business being in the organization. As readers will discover late in the book, such individuals got the ball rolling in the right direction to lower the curtain on Kalugin’s career. The indications and implications of the insights Kalugin shares concerning the KGB’s organizational well-being were that a nexus existed between the decaying performance of the KGB and the eventual collapse of the Soviet system. True, KGB recruits were strenuously vetted through training, yet some who did not openly manifest any deficiencies while under the watchful eyes of instructors apparently got through. More than a few violent, overzealous, under motivated, dishonorable, and vengeful individuals, suffering from a wide range of other pathologies, would move up through its ranks. As the success of each directorate, department, and service of the KGB was dependent on the quality and consistency of the performance of individuals in their respective positions, these bad hires given their troubling actions and the ugly environment they would create, managed to have a damaging impact upon the organization over time. (The uneven thinking and anomalous behavior Kalugin reports was exhibited by some clearly misplaced KGB officers, is actually a phenomenon common to many large intelligence services. It is very possible that deep-seated emotional difficulties or disorders are stimulated and amplified in the individual working in an intelligence services due to the unique responsibilities of the job, rather broad authority one possesses, unusual and morally questionable activities required, and potent stressors that strain. The thinking and behavior noted here was recently evinced in the record of activities undertaken by members of the US Intelligence Community who vigorously sought to destroy reputations and the lives of several innocent individuals inside and outside of the Trump administration. It was an apparent venomous, mentally unbalanced quest to force the collapse of Trump’s presidency. The exact reasons for their behavior will likely be difficult to identify until facts about them and their actions are fully known. Unfortunately, honorable men and women in the intelligence services run up against such damaged individuals in their organizations more often than they should.)

After graduating from high school in Leningrad, Kalugin passed four entrance exams with high marks and qualified for service in the MGB. In 1952, Kalugin began his studies at the Institute of Foreign Languages ​​of the MGB in Leningrad. There was only one other school similar to it for MGB officer training in the Soviet Union, the Higher School in Moscow. As mentioned earlier, in the immediate postwar period, Ministerstvo Vnuirennikh Del (Ministry for Internal Affairs) and Ministerstvh Gosudarstvennoe Bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security) were combined to form the MVD-MGB. Kalugin graduated from the Institute of Foreign Languages with honors. Kalugin notes that at time of his graduation, his father was suffering as a result of a sharp decrease in KGB wages ordered by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in an effort to reign in the heavy-handed security service and he was subsisting with partition employment offered by friends. Yet, despite his own situation and his expressed misgivings about his son’s career choice, Kalugin’s father told him that he was proud of his achievement. By then the MVD-MGB had become the KGB.  The next step for Kalugin was more specialized training at the KGB Higher Intelligence School No. 101 or Advanced Spy School in Moscow. At the Advanced Spy School–later renamed the Andropov Red Banner Institute by the KGB and now called the Academy of Foreign Intelligence–Kalugin was trained as an Arabist, and in the course of his education, he studied the Middle East in detail. Kalugin was trained in tradecraft and prepared for technical work in the field. He learned how to set up radio transmitters, to use and detect bugging devices, to make microfilm and how to conceal microfilm and microdots in household items, how to cultivate intelligence assets, coding/decoding and cryptology, location orienting when dropped into unfamiliar locations, how to use a gun, how to tail people invisibly, how to detect when being tailed, how to evade all kinds of surveillance, and how to pass a package without being noticed even when being tailed. As his training came to a close, the leadership identified him for distribution to the most complex and prestigious First Foreign Intelligence Department, which, as aforementioned, dealt with the US and Canada. He was also informed that he would be joining a group of young people to take a graduate course in the US. As he relates the early days of his career, Kalugin appears to be transported to a place of happiness. The 20th century US philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer, John Dewey said: “To find out what one is fitted to do, and to secure an opportunity to do it, is the key to happiness.”

Kalugin (center right) with Soviet cohorts at Columbia University. Kalugin initially came to the US in September 1958 to attend the Columbia University School of Journalism as one of 17 ostensible students from the Soviet Union to arrive under the Fulbright exchange program. In reality, half of them, including the 24-year-old Kalugin, were officers from Soviet intelligence services. Before going to the US, Alexander Feliksov, Head of the KGB’s North American Department instructed Kalugin: “Just lay the foundation for future work. But don’t overstep the line. Now that you’ve been picked to go to America, make it your business to learn more about the country. Buy yourself good maps. Improve your English. Find out about their way of life. Communicate with people and make as many friends as possible.”

Kalugin’s First Visit to the US

Kalugin initially came to the US in September 1958 to attend the Columbia University School of Journalism as one of 17 ostensible students from the Soviet Union to arrive under the Fulbright exchange program that year, and the first Soviet citizens to study in the US since the end of World War II. In reality, half of them, including the 24 year old Kalugin, were actually representing Soviet intelligence services. He was already a lieutenant in the KGB. Before he left, Alexander Feliisov, the Head of the KGB’s North American Department instructed Kalugin: “Just lay the foundation for future work. But don’t overstep the line. Now that you’ve been picked to go to America, make it your business to learn more about the country. Buy yourself good maps. Improve your English. Find out about their way of life. Communicate with people and make as many friends as possible.” In New York, Kalugin came in contact with a culture alien to him. He tried to better understand it by experiencing as much of it as possible. Kalugin was impressed by Manhattan; the power, the beauty, the bustle. Other worldly creations, skyscrapers, the Empire State Building. He travelled throughout the city, no restrictions were placed on his movement. He would ride the subway for hours. He saw 100 films and visited clubs in Greenwich Village. Soon enough, the haunts and pleasures of the elite class became his stomping ground, too! He attended Broadway musicals, the Metropolitan Opera, and visited Manhattan’s many museums. Extremely impressive to Kalugin were giant department stores well stocked with a diversity of items and supermarkets with their abundance of fresh food, unheard of in the Soviet Union, known for shortages of everything and long breadlines. It is here, early on in the book that the reader has the opportunity to enjoy the vividness of Kalugin’s descriptions. One can imagine him taking in the sights, the sounds, the smells, the touch, the impact of the city on the young Soviet citizen. His level of thrill and enjoyment, though expressed on paper, is all made so palpable

Kalugin recognized that FBI operatives sought to make clandestine contacts with him at Columbia University, but did not experience such problems outside the school. At Columbia, he wrote for the school newspaper. He was elected to the Student Council. Kalugin curried enough curiosity by his presence in New York that the New York Times interviewed the young Fulbright Scholar for a human interest article which was given plenty of page space and garnered a lot of attention. Kalugin would venture outside of New York to Philadelphia, Chicago, New Orleans, and Washington. He also travelled through Iowa and Wisconsin. People were mostly very friendly to him. He admitted his happiness with all that was good gave him joy, but it also created a spark of doubt about his own world back home. His prescience, however, served him well as he kept his eyes wide open. He never took any experience to its furthest extreme to consider how he would fit into such a world. He would take note that the US had visible flaws. He noticed problems of poverty in Bronx Bowery, and Harlem. Kalugin also discovered endemic racial prejudice and ethnic and social discrimination. He learned about clashes over civil rights as well as voting rights and labor laws. He kept in his head that Soviet Union had a longer way to go, given what he saw in the US, but its vitality would overcome the US which would very likely stumble over its own deficiencies.

As his experience at Columbia University evinced, counterintelligence officers of the FBI and CIA likely had eyes on Kalugin as soon as he arrived in New York. What was akin to present-day FBI SSG surveillance teams and their typically maladroit surveillance contractors, would have been assigned to watch his every move. The insistence of his superiors that he remain untangled with anything before him was presumably based on their judgments on that strong likelihood. The alert sounded over FBI counterintelligence efforts was intriguing as it indicated that somber and astute KGB officers would heavily factor in FBI surveillance and attempts at clandestine contacts in all activities in the US to include mundane tasks of daily life such commuting, shopping, exercising, visiting museums, attending the opera, going to the movies and engaging in other recreational activities. Aa Kalugin goes on to explain, the rather heavy hand of FBI counterintelligence would prove most apparent at social events, receptions, dinners, cocktail parties, and gatherings in private homes.

While Kalugin’s contact with Soviet émigré named Anatoly that he gave the pseudonym Cook, who was a scientist at Thiokol has regularly been chalked up to luck, there is the possibility that it was not so unusual. Kalugin was not the only one involved in the recruitment; Cook had a say in the matter. There was an awareness in the US, especially among educated US citizens, as Cook–who it turned out was a Stalinist–that the Soviet Union was an authoritarian, Communust regime. As such, its citizens did not move freely overseas. Those travelling abroad with the approval of the regime would very likely be tethered to it via the KGB. Contact with a Soviet citizen visiting New York and attending an event on technology at the once famous New York Coliseum, would almost guarantee creating a potential link to the KGB. Kalugin’s level of success with Cook albeit was frightfully high. To borrow from cricketing parlance, Cook was a lolly, an easy catch. However, Kalugin did not struggle afterward to duplicate that first success. Rather than focus on trying to capture lightning in a bottle twice, he focused on simply doing his job as best he could. Esse quam videri bonus malebat; ita quo minus petebat gloriam, eo magis illum sequebatur. (He chose to be good rather than to seem good; and so, the less he strove for fame, the closer it followed after him.)

His First Deployment: New York

During his first full operational deployment, Kalugin went back into the US, returning to New York. From June 1960 to March 1964, operated out of the Rezidentura at the Soviet UN Mission, using the cover of Radio Moscow UN correspondent. Kalugin’s true purpose was political intelligence work. Kalugin  would send communications with information necessary for the leadership in Moscow under the pseudonym Felix. He spent time cultivating US citizens and diplomats and citizens of other countries at the UN and in New York, who he foresaw could supply the KGB with classified or unclassified information about US foreign and domestic policy. Those in contact with Kalugin were imaginably unaware that he was a KGB officer, collecting useful information from them. Kalugin would also utilize his contacts for active measures. Indeed, active measures activities were not something apart from, but integral to the KGB officer’s day-to-day efforts in the field. Paralleling efforts to determine the political leanings and the degree of compatibility and favorability toward the Soviet viewpoint was spotting, developing, assessing, recruiting and even handling agents. While engaged in active measures, KGB officers would reflexively spout “the party line” on issues of the day with those they encountered while making their social rounds. The intention of injecting the Soviet line and disinformation into conversations in this way was to infect the opinion making process in the US. New York was fertile ground for that activity as it was the center of publishing, newsmedia, writers and “agents of influence,” that would set the US political agenda. He, indeed, had conversations with luminaries in US society from all fields. Not every KGB agent performed this work well. Kalugin did. Indeed, in First Directorate, Kalugin provides an ample idea of how that work transpired in real terms operationally, bringing him triumph and bringing grief to adversarial US counterintelligence officers. Active measures, however, included much more than exchanges of knowledge and sharing news stories. More intense activities, as Kalugin recounted, would include paying for, and helping write, ads in the New York Times signed by prominent and unsuspecting political activists protesting the US involvement in Vietnam. The KGB sent racist letters, supposedly from US citizens, to African diplomats at the UN and has operatives paint swastikas on synagogues and desecrate Jewish cemeteries. Kalugin would visit the site of the vandalism and write reports for Radio Moscow on how anti-Semitism was sweeping the US.

What is particularly interesting about active measures is the double-edged impact the work may have had ultimately. Essentially, all of the information relentlessly propagated by the KGB in the US and the rest of the world, though ostensibly the Soviet line, was false information or disinformation. It was designed not to authentically inform but to shape thinking in a pro-Soviet direction or forment dissatisfaction and social and political unrest in the target country. To that extent, most likely consciously but perhaps subconsciously in the minds of the KGB officer engaged in such work was that the Soviet line, the same one Soviet citizens were hearing at home, was full of lies. Certainly KGB officers were worldly wise enough to know that no strategy should have been necessary to present the truth, for it stands for itself. Activities such as active measures were really being used to defend against or counter the power of the truth. Perchance it was never calculated or officially considered what type of destabilizing impact requiring KGB officers to engage in active measures might have on morale, esprit de corps, honor, loyalty. The impact of KGB officers’ sensibilities may have also played a role in decisions by some to defect. While the ultimate ends of active measure may have justified the means in Moscow Center, the collateral effects of the activity on its personnel may not have. (This causes one to consider what impact former senior and mid-level US intelligence and law enforcement officials who, every ten seconds wrongfully and repeatedly argued in the news media and elsewhere in public that Trump and members of his administration, in truth all guiltless, had colluded with the Russian Federation Government, but meanwhile testified under oath in US Congressional Committees that there was no evidence that they had actually seen that indicated such. In this instance, one could genuinely ruminate on whether one of the main elements of spying, promoting fraud, influenced their perjurious behavior. Ultimately, the conscience of each may by their undoing. In Act V, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play The Life and Death of Richard the Third, King Richard, on Bosworth Field, confesses: “My conscience hath a thousand several tongues, / And every tongue brings in a several tale, / And every tale condemns me for a villain. / Perjury, perjury, in the high’st degree / Murder, stem murder, in the direst degree; / All several sins, all used in each degree, / Throng to the bar, crying all. Guilty! guilty!”)

In the ordinary sense Kalugin was not engaged in laborious toil as an foreign intelligence officer. Yet, surely, the work was strenuous, high-pressure, and anxiety-filled. The risks were never trivial. For his daily work, within the limitations of his cover assignment, Kalugin was on the street, working agents and performing technical intelligence tasks. From what can be ascertained from Kalugin’s description of his work in the US played out, generally, he, just as other officers, would handle four or five agents or targets under development. He was not expected to spread his range of intelligence activities further, although he was still encouraged to develop a large circle of casual contacts among whom he could conduct active measures and from whom a relatively small number of serious targets might be selected at some point. As Kalugin describes his work, he undoubtedly demonstrated his flexibility and adaptability, ensuring the collection of valuable information from sources reached his managers. There was a particular case in which Kalugin made the unconventional choice. He came into contact with a 25 year old Columbia University graduate student who held extreme left-wing political views. Thinking he could be motivated to work for Soviet Union to promote Socialist state. However, he could not deliver anything really of value. His parents, both of whom were Communist  told him to stop working with Kalugin because it was too dangerous. Kalugin was insistent but to no avail. Despite that breakdown, the young student’s father contacted Kalugin and asked him to leave his son alone and offered to help him instead. Kalugin, convinced he was genuine, told his manager at the UN Mission. When his manager contacted the Center, in a reply Kalugin was admonished not to deviate from procedure again but to continue with the recruitment. Further, the cable ended with the instruction: “Allowing for the initiative and courage shown by Comrade Felix–as aforementioned Kalugin’s codename, I suggest he be promoted to the rank of senior case officer.” The father turned out to be a good KGB asset, and was used on numerous occasions to run messages and deliver materials to agents outside the 25 mile city radius to which Soviet Mission staff were restricted. By Kalugin’s own admission, the Center displayed a considerable degree of patience over that move. It did not want Kalugin to be inventive. It wanted officers to strictly adhere to procedures. Yet, the Center also very much wanted good results. Ostensibly, while deviations from procedures were greatly frowned upon, apparently if no damage was done to a case and the efforts of the officer and his station were not detected or harmed in any other way, and success was achieved, nothing punitive beyond a bit of admonishment resulted. Indeed, KGB case officers were held strictly to account for the results of their actions. Yet, they were not expected to report on day-to-day developments to the Center. KGB officers were expected to be on the beat and usually did not spend much time at the desk writing reports, reading guidance from headquarters or maintaining his files. When he had a problem he took it up with his boss, but was supposed to know the difference between what he really needs consultation about and what he ought to be able to handle on his own. There was virtually no lateral distribution of communications and an extreme emphasis on compartmentation. His boss in turn has the responsibility of not only guiding the case officers that work for him, but of ensuring that vital information pertinent to the work of one case officer but acquired through another is made available. The custom that each officer prepares his own reports and kept them brief, made it possible for their reports to actually be read all the way up the chain.

Kalugin (center) on the beat in New York. During his first full operational deployment, from June 1960 to March 1964, Kalugin operated out of the Soviet UN Mission, using the cover of a Radio Moscow UN correspondent. Kalugin would send communications with information necessary for the leadership in Moscow under the pseudonym Felix. He spent time cultivating US citizens and diplomats and citizens of other countries at the UN and in New York, who he foresaw could supply the KGB with classified or unclassified information about US foreign and domestic policy. Within the limitations of his cover assignment, Kalugin was on the street, working agents and performing other intelligence tasks. Appreciation of Kalugin’s work by headquarters resulted in further promotions. From 1965 to 1970, he would be assigned to Washington as deputy rezident with the cover of deputy press officer, and then acting chief of the Rezidentura at the Soviet Embassy.

Recruiting KGB Spies

When tested by unexpected challenges in the field, Kalugin would assess the situation, then begin to act based on his training. A big lesson gleaned from Kalugin’s anecdotes is to “Trust your training.” Still, the most devastating weapon stored in Kalugin’s figurative armoire as a KGB intelligence officer was his mind. Kalugin possessed an intellect that stood out a mile (and still does now). There were never too many moving parts in a situation. What Kalugin could not see or confirm with his own eyes, he was clearly able to conceptualize better than most. Even more, Kalugin’s intellect was continuously animated concerning his work. To be successful at running agents in the field, an intelligence officer must know a lot about humanity. One must know a lot about human relationships. There are said to be certain secrets and knowledge of human existence, human circumstance. Whether Kalugin managed to acquire that hidden bit of information is unknown to greatcharlie. However, little doubt is left that Kalugin very much wanted to better understand, to put it sort of whimsically, “what made people tick.” Clearly, he successfully acquired that knowledge and experience as evidenced by all of his interactions recounted in First Directorate. Concerning prospective recruits, Kalugin would parse out all that is made available to him about the subject at hand. The minute Kalugin observes something, he knows what can happen. Kalugin would know the answer; he knows the usual result. Kalugin could feel a good recruitment on the tips of his fingers. As aforementioned, the Center left no doubt in its instructions and communiques to Kalugin that it was not looking for immediate success, dicey efforts. It repeated that guidance often. It may appear that the Center was figuratively hanging on Kalugin’s gun arm, but it certainly was not. The Center was adverse to chasing miracles. The Soviet intelligence service possessed a great deal of patience and determination to wait for years before the source, led along the way, would join the Department of State, the CIA, or some other entity, and attain a position useful to it. According to Kalugin some US recruits were approached even before reaching college. It was the understanding of KGB that US intelligence services were unable to wait that long. There were some US citizens apparently recruited for a long-term plan. For instance, in the event of war between the US and the Soviet Union, they would be directed to sabotage Washington’s power lines or poison drinking water sources.

Earlier here, greatcharlie mentions how Kalugin takes the reader to school concerning KGB spying, particularly running agents in the field. This was particularly true of his in-depth discussion of the recruiting process. One also learns from Kalugin in First Directorate that each recruitment effort is a little different.  There are always different triggering motives leading to cooperation with an intelligence service, especially, one from another country. The psychological contact of the intelligence officer with the prospective recruit is key. In recruiting agents, speech is everything. Word choices must build confidence, create trust, console, assure, inspire, and comfort. To create compliant agents, the right word choice must be made every time. To that extent, Kalugin could not conceal his ebullience, recalling occasions when all he collected about a prospective recruit would coalesce and he formulated, once again taking from cricketing parlance, a jaffa, a particularly good pitch. Whether a recruiting target signs something at the time of being recruited (using the KGB terminology) about cooperation or not, really depends on the preceding circumstances. A written agreement was required when a recruitment was based on some compromising materials. If there was a later refusal by an operative to cooperate, the agreement could be used for blackmail. Yet, despite how well Kalugin laid out his discussion of recruitment, the process was far from a simple matter or easy to do. When the Soviet Union looked like the wave of the future, its best spies came to its  intelligence services out of ideological convictions. In the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, their recruitment service among such individuals was counted upon. Kalugin posited that after 1956 when Khrushchev exposed the cruelty of the Stalin regime and showed that “ ‘Soviet achievements’ had been built on the bones of our own people,” true believers in the Communist Movement began to dry up and disappear. Kalugin explained further that after Czechoslovakia was invaded in 1968, “only the most fervor ideologue could hold any illusions that the Soviet Union was striving to build a Socialist utopia.”

Both directly and delicately, Kalugin indicated that what drove recruits to spy boiled down to four primary motivations: money; ideology; conspiracy; and excitement. Concerning those recruits interested in money, spying was little more than service offered through a business transaction. There were many such cases. Perhaps the most infamous was that of the notorious US Navy traitor, John Walker, who was able to spy for the Soviet Union for 19 years. His recruitment and handling was Kalugin’s greatest achievement at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Walker was a walk-in, came to the Soviet Embassy with a treasure-trove of secrets. He was in it for the money. The entrepreneur spy included his son, brother, and best friend in his spy ring. He tried to bring in his daughter, but she refused. Walker needed no physical contact with his Soviet handlers, pep talks, and no hand holding. He in fact operated 10 years without meeting one. Nearly everything done after the initial set of meetings was done with dead drops. His wife finally reported his activities to authorities. There were others such as a CIA officer in Washington who claimed to have been recently fired. He made it clear from the start that he was looking for money. He would eventually pass a considerable amount of material. However, the most valuable document was a long paper entitled “Detection and Approaches to Psychologically Vulnerable Subjects of the Enemy,” which cited US efforts to recruit Soviets worldwide and painted a portrait of Soviet citizens most likely to become spies.

Regarding ideology, Kalugin indicated that when a recruits motivations were ideological, they were typically pro-Soviet, adherents of Socialism and the Communist Movement, fellow travellers. At other times, they were simply left-leaning in that era of protest. The Soviets could recruit such agents in the US and provide them no remuneration. Some even refused it. An example was that of left-wing publisher, M.S. Armoni, editor of a journal Minority of One, who would do the bidding of the KGB by publishing articles allegedly written by Kalugin. They were actually written by the KGB propaganda department in Moscow. The KGB supplied money for Armoni to run several ads in the New York Times criticizing the US involvement in  Vietnam and signed by leading liberals at the time. When Armoni had financial difficulties, Kalugin provided him with nearly $10,000 in funds for being “So faithful in presenting the Soviet view of world affairs.” The money broken down into smaller sums was falsely attributed by Armoni to anonymous US donors. Kalugin also gives the example of a diplomat at a Western European embassy who furnished the KGB with diplomatic cables, top secret reports, recording with the US State Department. The same diplomat was approached without immediate result when posted to Bonn, West Germany. Kalugin met with him in Washington under orders from the Center. He convinced the diplomat to provide classified materials for very little money. His motivation was ideological because he held leftist political leanings.

Relating to conspiracy, such recruits were most often vengeful toward the government, scientific, or technological organization that employed them. An extraordinary case was that of an FBI special agent with considerable access. He first approached the KGB station chief one day and said he wanted to help the Soviets. He immediately supplied the station chief with some information about FBI activity against several Soviet citizens in New York City. The KGB was suspicious, but the FBI man proved reliable. Through personal meetings and by mail, the FBI recruit sent other portions of information about the FBI’s counterintelligence work against the KGB. the mysterious FBI recruit, as Kalugin refers to him, never asked for money.

As to excitement, there were the sensation-seekers, driven by the excitement of spying, self-gratification, or amusement. Kalugin recalls a female diplomat from what Kalugin characterized as “a major European country,” who, after being posted in Moscow for two years and becoming involved with a KGB officer, made contact with Kalugin in Washington. She would supply information to him, as Kalugin suggested, to support the work of her romantic interest still in Moscow. Kalugin would meet with her frequently in restaurants and receptions. When asked to provide cables from  her Foreign Ministry, she refused but recited what was in those she read when they met. Kalugin would also gift her with jewelry, scarves, and other presents. Kalugin deduced that the woman likely knew he was a KGB officer, but enjoyed the sensation of meeting in cozy restaurants and being treated well by him. What the woman provided was valuable political intelligence. There was also the curious case of I.F. Stone, a well-known left-leaning Washington journalist. The Center had informed Kalugin that Stone had been a useful contact who broke off after the invasion of Hungary in 1956. It wanted Kalugin to reestablish the connection. Stone would meet with Kalugin a half-dozen times a year for lunch. During those meetings, he would share insightful views on the US political scene. Kalugin referred to Stone merely as a former “fellow-traveller. However, having meetings with someone he likely suspected was a KGB officer was undoubtedly intriguing to Stone. Stone abruptly ended their acquaintance, however, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Big Promotions

Appreciation of Kalugin’s work by the Center resulted in further promotions. From 1965 to 1970, he would be assigned as deputy rezident at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, with the cover of deputy press officer, and then acting chief of the Rezidentura at the embassy. He was invited to serve in Washington initially by an eventual mentor of a sort, Boris Solomatin, who was taking over as rezident there. As defined in The Dictionary of Espionage, the KGB section of a Soviet Embassy was the Rezidentura. The ranking officer of the embassy was the rezident, who operated under diplomatic cover, and this had diplomatic immunity. The rezident’s equivalent in the US Embassy was the CIA chief of station. As the rezident would hold senior status in the KGB, his identity in the foreign intelligence service was known to Western intelligence services and law enforcement. To that extent, the rezident engaged in almost no espionage activities while deployed abroad. What is curiously noted in The Dictionary of Espionage is that some residents did roam the cocktail circuit where posted “for hard drinking seemed to be a prevalent trait.”

Interestingly, KGB officers were promoted through the service on bicameral tracks. Being essentially a military organization, an officer was promoted from junior lieutenant up to lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and then, if fortunate enough, through the general ranks, major general, lieutenant general, colonel general, and general of the army. The KGB officer’s formal rank was largely based on his time in service up to lieutenant colonel. Concurrently,  the officer receives the classification as a junior case officer, case officer, or senior case officer, and then progresses further as a deputy rezident or rezident. Those operational designations were based on the officer’s experience and performance as an operator in an assigned field. The chain of command was determined by operational positions rather than rank. Indeed, a major could be reassigned from one part of the KGB to the First Chief Directorate and be designated as a junior case officer for lack of experience and be subordinate to a senior lieutenant who was a case officer or senior case officer. Pay was determined by where the officer was ranked in both hierarchies. Kalugin’s title at the Soviet Embassy was acting rezident, and not fully the official rezident. Kalugin explains that the cause for this was sensational editorial columns aimed at exposing Kalugin as a KGB officer. It was an act completely estranged from tradition among journalists in Washington. First, there was a Washington Post article referring to a Soviet intelligence officer’s work with a Greek agent. The name of the officer published was Victor Kraknikovich, the alias Kalugin used for the Greek case. The Center was informed. Kalugin suspected the story was fed to the Washington Post by the FBI and the beginning of a campaign. Then, Jack Anderson published an article naming Kalugin as a Soviet agent. The article’s opening paragraph stated: “His name is Oleg Kalugin, second secretary at the Soviet embassy. For some time, he has been trying to place a female acquaintance of his as his agent in the State Department. He also instructed an aide to cultivate a girl who works at the FBI. Neither attempt succeeded. Both girls have been leading him under the direction of the FBI.” Anderson followed up on the Kalugin story in his “Washington Merry-Go-Round” column, headlined “Soviet Spy Allowed To Remain in U.S.”, “His [Kalugin] undercover activities in this country are known to the FBI.” Anderson included: “But only the State Department knows the reason he is still here. Other spies caught in the act have been declared persona non grata and have been given 48 hours to leave the country.” On first impression, the Center took it all very calmly, telling Kalugin “Curb your activities just a bit but do not worry.” Nevertheless, the Center was concerned that Kalugin would be deported, a headache the KGB did not need. Kalugin was not deported. An intriguing reality was that KGB operations in the US were not solely dependent on the work of the rezident at the Embassy in Washington. As noted in the aforementioned The Dictionary of Espionage, along with the official rezident, an illegal rezident was deployed who lived abroad without any official cover, usually with an assumed identity, responsible for controlling subordinate illegal agents who worked in his area. The illegal rezident would have no contact with the Soviet Embassy or any of its personnel, and he maintained his communications with the Center. In terms of authority, the illegal rezident had the rank of the official KGB rezident. If the illegal rezident was arrested, the officer could not plead diplomatic immunity and would go to prison.

On the Threat of Defections

Once operating in foreign territory, a considerable concern regarding intelligence officers and their agents was the threat of betrayal. Concerns were almost always raised among Soviet citizens when anyone with whom they may have just met or were in contact for other reasons, suddenly showed an eccentric interest in them. One had to be resolute regarding personal and collective loyalty. There had to be a defined sense of what you owed to your country, what you owed to your own sense of ethics and morality. For some KGB officers, deployed overseas, even while facing-off with their Western counterparts, it often became the same old trudge day in, day out. Some of Kalugin’s fellow KGB foreign intelligence officers would struggle mightily to develop informants, find bona fide targets with access to considerable information to recruit, and get anything started from which they could develop concrete proposals for a foreseeable recruitment at their postings. Others figuratively shuffled along, hoping to go unnoticed and evade the behests of the Center along much as the theatrical comic relief of an aged butler seeking to avoid the master and mistress of the house hoping to keep his exertions to a minimum. Causality for such difficulties often resided in those KGB officers, themselves. Personal and professional inadequacies, having gone undetected during the vetting process and training, often found their way to the surface, and would provide an open door to inappropriate indulgences and improprieties. Embezzlement was a problem. There were those who would keep hundreds of dollars of payments intended for KGB operatives for themselves. A number would outrightly make personal use of KGB funds. Some had already displayed the most deplorable carnal behavior while still in the Soviet Union. Then deployed to Western countries, they would indulge in all that had to be offered. They would set aside their defensive training. In the end, a number of them would be caught flat footed in rather fatuous, fairly obvious honey traps set by US counterintelligence. They most likely were obliged to play the double-game against their bosses at Moscow Center. Kalugin explains that there was a particularly nasty problem in Canada in which a half dozen KGB personnel were left open to blackmail by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and all were recalled and disciplined. (An individual is tracked by an intelligence or counterintelligence organization with the goal uncovering evidence for a case or investigation. To endlessly surveil an individual, or subject as one would be dubbed, using mountains of taxpayer dollars, with no real goal, is not just inept, it is malfeasance. The subject, who may not be guilty of anything, is essentially being harassed, and very likely some dishonorable individuals in the intelligence or counterintelligence organization violating their oath to the country and highly likely, in nasty surreptitious ways, attempting to build an extra pension for themselves. It happens in Intelligence services more than one might imagine.)

FBI counterintelligence, Kalugin’s main opponent in the US, engaged in near endless  attempts to intercept him and perhaps neutralize and recruit him, came in the form of clandestine contacts. Those attempts confirmed that he had actually been under surveillance as the FBI would only have undertaken such an effort if counterintelligence managers believed that special agents had collected enough about him and his activities that they were convinced he was a Soviet intelligence officer, that they understood how Kalugin thought, and that he would respond favorably to an effort to make clandestine contact with him. The method used by FBI counterintelligence to reach Kalugin was its bog-standard employment of women as honey traps. As defined in The Dictionary of Espionage, a honey trap is a method of sexual entrapment for intelligence purposes, usually to put a target [such as Kalugin] into a compromising position so that he or she can be blackmailed. Perhaps it would be enough to say Kalugin displayed restraint and elegance in the face of advances by the female FBI counterintelligence operatives. Indeed, as he describes his response, he displayed a sensibility akin to what the French call “bof” (whatever) to it all. One might simply chalk that up to Kalugin’s self-discipline, his Apollonian nature. In the field, Kalugin was always dedicated to his country, the Communist Movement, and his mission. He was laser focused on his responsibilities as a KGB officer to spot potential recruits, collect information, even passively, and report observations, engage in active measures, and not fall prey to the women used against him. Beyond consideration of Kalugin’s professional response to what to him were far less than enticing honey traps, consideration should be given to his response simply as an individual. There exists a line of thinking which notes unless one has already thought, deliberated, pondered, or meditated on certain behavior, one will be hardened to it. One would not be going out on a slender thread to presume Kalugin was neither ignorant of nor surprised by attempts at such manipulations, carnal behavior among adults. Perchance, he simply never considered getting involved with such nonsense  or pondered having anything to do with such women while on the beat.

Perhaps proof and precedence of previous successes with less capable, less adroit, or simply inept KGB officers, along with some likely unsupported, doctrinaire, Cold War era preconceptions concerning the Russian male libido, convinced FBI counterintelligence of the correctness and efficaciousness of that method of clandestine contact with Kalugin. The focus was on the physical, the carnal, not the intellectual. The underdeveloped mind can rarely get beyond physical facts. Even at the most basic level of decisionmaking on the matter, some recognition that a mental attraction, some cerebral connection between Kalugin and a female operative foisted upon him might be required. That was apparently ignored or disregarded by the FBI, presumably counting upon some id-explosion that would overwhelm him. It was a considerable oversight. Based on how he described the women involved, such a connection under any circumstance, would have been near impossible. In the intelligence game, nothing about making contact with an opponent in the field can be considered too trivial to disregard. under the leadership of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover, Special Agents in counterintelligence were genuinely tough. Kalugin admits to that in the book. Yet, they could hardly be judged as being socially conscious by current standards. Their record of responses on a variety of other issues, the Civil Rights Movement and Anti-War Movement for instance, indicates they were in fact quite the opposite. The use of honey traps and similar artifices by FBI Special agents, surveillance specialists or contractors, continues today.

Although as he recounts them, Kalugin indicates that he was cautiously amused by the FBI honey traps, but he also seemed to take a professional interest in why in US society in which there were far more better things to do, would a woman even entertain the idea of serving as a seductress for the FBI. Recognizing that the use of the method was a gauge, a manifestation of the thinking among serious US government intelligence and law enforcement officers, Kalugin very likely began at that time to contemplate how Soviet foreign intelligence in the US could effectively turn the ploy against them and other targets in the US. That is exactly what he did. Kalugin used his personal attributes and charm and those of other handsome males and females to further the KGB’s mission by loosening those attractive qualities as weapons against unsuspecting Western officials and especially secretaries working in key offices in the US foreign and national security policy apparatus, when he believed something considerable could be gained by doing so. The Ancient Greek comic and playwright, Aristophanes in The Birds (414 B.C.) wrote: “Men of sense often learn from their enemies. Prudence is the best safeguard. This principle cannot be learned from a friend, but an enemy exorts it immediately. It is from their foes, not their friends, that cities learn the lesson of building high walls and ships of war. And this lesson saves their children, their homes, and their properties.”

Kalugin (right) standing with Kim Philby (left). In reaction to increasing defections by KGB officers, Yuri Andropov, the Chairman of the KGB, ordered KGB foreign counterintelligence to develop a new program that would make defection to the Soviet Union attractive. He ordered that life for existing defectors made to be envied and to make certain to let the world know about it. Kalugin was directed to handle the matter. A defector that Kalugin devoted time to was Kim Philby, the United Kingdom MI6 traitor. Philby’s life in the Soviet Union was awful and Kalugin found him in a terrible state. He had faced considerable mistreatment, particularly psychological torture. Kalugin set forth on a genuine course to rehabilitate Philby. Yet, reversing the damage to those mistreated by intelligence and counterintelligence services is extraordinarily difficult. If anything, Kalugin salvaged the best of what was left of the Soviet spy. In the photo above, relative to Kalugin, Philby appears as if he had the Hell posted out of him.

At KGB Foreign Counterintelligence

In 1971, having returned from the US, Kalugin became deputy chief of the Second Service of First Chief Directorate, which meant a two-step increase in the hierarchy of the central intelligence apparatus. However, the counterintelligence service proved to be broken, unprepared, and understaffed. The counterintelligence function was pivotal to KGB operations and its mission, but it was not given the status and attention it truly required. Even housing made available for its officers was undesirable. Kalugin had a negative immediate impression of the director of the Second Service of First Chief Directorate, Vitaly Boyarov. However, his concerns were resolved over time. Concerning the other deputies Kalugin had nothing greater good to say. One was a chain smoking, profane man who constantly berated his subordinates. Kalugin described another deputy as a fussy, indecisive man who had “no business being in the KGB let alone in relatively high position.” Kalugin depicted the third as an “utter nonentity.” All three were at least a decade older than Kalugin. The decline for KGB foreign counterintelligence operationally was also apparent. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign counterintelligence, according to Kalugin, had managed to penetrate deeply into the French, United Kingdom, and Italian intelligence services. Concerning the US, the KGB had Walker, their superspy. However, by the 1970s, it was clear to many that the Soviet Union really was not the model society of the future, both politically and socially, and the Soviet system could do nothing to reverse that impression. As disillusionment with the Soviet Union set in, the number of KGB defectors also began to skyrocket, further damaging its operations.

When Kalugin first started working in foreign counterintelligence in 1970, the KGB was only experiencing a trickle of defections from the ranks. However, the rate steadily increased. However, the defection of Oleg Lyalin of Department V, tasked with preparing contingency plans for sabotage and assassination in time of war, defected after working for the United Kingdom’s intelligence services for six months. The story of his activities as presented by Kalugin would surely be astonishing to any readers. His revelations resulted in the expulsion of 105 Soviets from the country, personal non grata. Visas for known KGB officers were denied. In reaction to Lyalin’s defection and the many others, Yuri Andropov, the Chairman of the KGB, ordered Kalugin’s director at counterintelligence, Boyarov, to develop a new program that would make defection to the Soviet Union attractive. He suggested using large amounts of money, fancy apartments and country homes, and complete freedom of movement in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. He also ordered that life for existing defectors made to be envied and to make certain to let the world know about it. Boyarov put Kalugin on the case. That led to perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of that period of Kalugin’s career, his contact with the infamous double agent Kim Philby, formerly of the United Kingdom’s MI6, Secret Intelligence Service. While Kalugin met with a number of the defectors, to include the infamous George Blake, also from the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service, and Donald Maclean, but Philby was the most interesting case. Suffice it to say, greatcharlie sense that it is going out on a slender thread in discussing the matter of Philby, but it is critical to the process of understanding and characterising Kalugin. Philby is a delicate and painful subject in some Western intelligence services even today. Harold Adrian Russell “Kim” Philby, was a member of “The Magnificent Five.” Others included two diplomats, Guy Burgess and the aforementioned Donald Maclean, and the former officer of MI5, the  domestic focused Security Service, and leading art historian, Anthony Blunt. The identity of the fifth member was never confirmed. The intelligence officer, John Cairncross, was suspected. All but the fifth member defected to the Soviet Union. Kalugin had heard rumors of Philby’s life in Moscow–”drinking, womanizing, hours of depression, and squalid existence.” Most of it proved to be true.

For Philby, defection to the Soviet Union did not pan out as he had hoped. It was nothing near the paradise he likely envisioned. He had a relatively decent apartment, but had few possessions in it worth having. The big problem he faced though was not so much being deprived of material things, but rather his treatment. Philby was subjected to repeated house arrests over regular suspicions of KGB as to his “activities.” His every movement, even in his home, was considered suspect. For instance, when he was heard writing over hidden microphones, it was determined that he was composing reports to pass to Western agents. The overall surveillance was ham-handed, guaranteed to harass and cause discomfort. The only element that was missing from his treatment was the rough stuff, physical torture, though there was plenty of psychological torture. The deep grief felt by Philby over the death of his image of a Soviet wonderland, coupled with his mishandling was likely made somewhat less painful by his daily practice of soaking himself in alcohol. For those in the KGB who were acting against him, that likely provided a sense of accomplishment. They were clearly the types. Philby’s behavior was rumored to have been questionable–”drinking, womanizing, hours of depression, and squalid existence,” but little was placed in official reports about his treatment. For this reason, Kalugin did expect to find what he did when he contacted him. As things were, there was no chance of showcasing Philby’s situation as reflective of that of defectors. If the truth of Philby’s actual treatment had gotten out to the rest of the world, it would have choked the Soviet voice on defections. A singer with fine pitch would notice something wrong with a note that an ordinary or amateur might not. However, everything Kalugin observed was plain as day, actually absolutely over the top. The inhumanity, illogica, and incompetence of Philby’s handling screamed out. As Kalugin described what those KGB officers involved in what had been done to Philby were further examples of how deep seated psychological issues of some officers would drive them to engage in odious acts. Kalugin set forth on a course of attempting to rehabilitate Philby. There was nothing superficial about his efforts. He essentially debriefed him again under calm, informal conditions. He began to visit him somewhat regularly. He then brought other friendly KGB officers to talk to him, ask his opinion on professional matters, tradecraft, trying to give him a sense of being useful, capable, and needed. Kalugin used the authority granted to him by Boyarov to involve Philby in KGB training. He brought him to the KGB Higher School to lecture young officers who were set to be deployed to Western countries. Philby would help with active measures by inserting sins poster passages in US State Department and CIA documents. Kalugin would genuinely ask Philby for input into programs being formulated for defectors and prospective recruits. For all in which Philby was becoming involved, Philby was amenable and did not want payment. Kalugin did what he could to remunerate him by boosting his ongoing payments. He had repairs made to his apartment and replaced the furniture. Kalugin would also arrange for Philby to travel outside of the Soviet Union to Socialist Countries in the Eastern Bloc and beyond to Cuba and Mongolia. In doing all of this, Kalugin followed his orders, but his noble and humane effort did credit to both his head and his heart.

The damage intelligence and counterintelligence services can do to an individual’s psyche is well understood to be grave and considerable. To paraphrase a recent remark by US Senator Charles Schumer of New York on the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of the US Intelligence Community, they can come at you six ways to Sunday. The soul and the spirit of the target of such efforts is typically seared. Surely, some having suffered similar harsh treatment from their own side as in Philby’s case, have been able to have renewal of mind. Yet, rehabilitating those mistreated by intelligence and counterintelligence services, reversing the damage, is extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible. That is a reality that is rarely understood or dismissed. Perhaps there is such a strong desire to believe otherwise by those who might engage in such efforts, that the mere notion, itself, that it can be done, becomes true. As for the individual, supposedly being rehabilitated, it is likely that when placed regularly under inhumane treatment, physical or psychological, a valiant effort is made to hold on to all of the many aspects of themselves. However, self-discernment would more likely cause them to face the reality that much has been lost after enduring such terrible experiences. Kalugin, at the time, appears unable to fully fathom that although he was interacting with someone who looked, sounded, and moved as original Philby, the zealous member of the Komintern, the Soviet spy, the proud defector, but that man was gone, no longer intact. The psychological capsule that Philby likely created to hold on to the remainder of himself, to protect himself, to survive, would never have been so easy to break open in an effort to find him. The original Philby may have had far more to offer. If anything, what Kalugin did was salvage the best of what was left. The trust that Kalugin sought to create was not really possible either. Doubtlessly, Philby noticed Kalugin, for whatever reason, was authentically trying to be congenial and helpful. Understanding that, he may likely have displayed an outward modification of attitude and behavior perhaps even to satisfy Kalugin. To that extent, he understood that Kalugin was the source of better things than before, and with the hope this does not sound indelicate, he responded to Kalugin, though not obsequiously, but much as stolid hound that recognizes its owner as the source of its nourishment and shelter. Perchance, there was much more in all of this. In an uncanny way, Philby’s situation foretold a similar future for Kalugin. Indeed, perhaps Kalugin had an extra sense, a presentiment that he might find himself in a similar boat in another country. Both men experienced somewhat similar types of betrayal by the same monstrous Soviet system and the same organization, the KGB, in which that they placed so much faith and for which were ready to surrender their lives. Luckily for Kalugin, when his day of reckoning came, he ran into individuals in the US possessing sensibilities much as his own, and not the sort that Philby dealt with upon arrival in the Soviet Union.

In March 1973 Kalugin became head of the Directorate KT, KGB Foreign Counterintelligence. In the process he became the youngest leader at that level in the KGB. In 1974, the 40-year-old Kalugin received the rank of major general, making him the youngest general in the KGB. A KGB officer was promoted from junior lieutenant up to lieutenant, senior lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and then, if for nature enough, through the general ranks, major general, lieutenant general, colonel general, and general of the army. The KGB officer’s formal rank was largely based on his time in service up to lieutenant colonel. Concurrently, the officer receives the operational designation as a junior case officer, case officer, or senior case officer, and then progresses further as a deputy rezident or rezident. Those designations were based on the officer’s experience and performance as an operator in an assigned field. The chain of command was determined by operational classification rather than rank.

In March 1973 he became head of the Directorate KT, foreign counterintelligence. In the process he became the youngest leader at that level in the KGB. In 1974, the 40-year-old Kalugin received the rank of major general, making him the youngest general in the KGB. Such career leaps, Kalugin believes, were primarily due to the personal patronage of Andropov. Kalugin refers to Andropov his “guardian angel”, and writes that “the relations of father and son” developed between them. Made aware of Kalugin’s success, as all of the most senior managers of KGB doubtlessly had, Andropov surely recognized that the KGB had a gem in their midst, a “bright red” carbuncle. Andropov was a rather intriguing player in the history of Soviet Intelligence. As it was detailed in Robert Pringle’s Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), from the Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence series, much as Kalugin’s career at KGB, Andropov’s career moved up rapidly in Soviet political sphere. His advancement began after being appointed Soviet ambassador to Hungary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1954. While at that post, the November 1956 Hungarian Uprising ignited. A segment of the society demanded independence from the socialist state. The upright morphed into an armed conflict. Andropov called the uprising “counter-revolutionary, an anti-social riot” and informed the Kremlin that he supported the idea of sending Soviet troops to aid the Hungarian socialist government to quell the protesters. Andropov directly coordinated the activities of pro-Soviet forces in Hungary, which managed, with the support of Soviet forces, to keep all of Hungary socialist. More than 2,500 people died during the conflict.The Hungarian Uprising shaped Andropov’s thinking, after leaving his post in 1957, he reportedly kept on speaking about it. Soviet diplomat Oleg Troyanovsky remembered: “Andropov of 1956 in Hungary. He often said: ‘You can’t imagine what it is – hundreds of thousands of people flooding the streets, completely out of control’.” Troyanovsky believed that Andropov feared to see such a scene in the USSR – and did all he could to prevent it. Still, his advisors recall that when he led the department on relations with the socialist parties within the Communist Party’s Central Committee from 1957-1967, he was a “liberal leader.” According to renowned political scientist, Georgy Arbatov, Andropov would supposedly say: “In this room, we all can speak our minds, absolutely openly. But the second you leave it–play by the rules.” During Leonid Brezhnev’s tenure as Soviet leader from 1964 to 1982, Andropov, efficient and professional, became one of the most important figures for the regime. Named Chairman of the KGB in 1967, Andropov took on several urgent and important issues, with a predictable hardline approach, to include:  international crises in the Middle East; Czechoslovakia; Afghanistan; regional conflicts in the Soviet Union; and, suppressing Soviet dissident movements, putting dozens in asylums and deporting hundreds of others. On November 12, 1982, Andropov would become General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and on June 16, 1982, he became Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. However, he died on February 9, 1984, serving just under fifteen months in power.

Kalugin reasoned that Andropov trusted him. Still, knowing Andropov’s history, Kalugin knew exactly who he was dealing with. Developed from that understanding appears to have been an invaluable intuition about his own organizations’ moves on issues and regarding personnel. Anecdotes included indicate that he was able to intuit the decisions of managers and executives allowing him to think ahead to how he could satisfy their next steps, and new requirements. The very positive impression with Andropov enabled Kalugin, at least until late in his career, to survive the danger that KGB managers would pose to him. An eventual cause of problems for Kalugin was another protégé of Andropov, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

KGB Chairman and later Soviet Premier, Yuri Andrpov (above). Kalugin believes his career leaps were primarily due to the personal patronage of Andropov. Kalugin refers to Andropov his “guardian angel.” Made aware of Kalugin’s success, as all of the most senior managers of KGB doubtlessly had, Andropov surely recognized that the KGB had a gem in their midst. Kalugin reasoned that Andropov trusted him. Still, knowing Andropov’s history, Kalugin knew exactly who he was dealing with. From that understanding, he appears to have developed an invaluable intuition about his own organizations’ moves on issues. The very positive impression left with Andropov enabled Kalugin, at least until late in his career, to survive the danger that other KGB managers would pose to him. An eventual cause of great problems for Kalugin was another protégé of Andropov, Vladimir Kryuchkov.

The primary mission of the Soviet Foreign Counterintelligence Service was infiltration of all the foreign special service operations: intelligence, counter-intelligence, police forces all over the world. The primary target was the US. Second came NATO and Western European countries. As chief of counterintelligence, Kalugin had control of the most significant cases due to the possibility that potential success was merely pretense by the FBI. What appeared interesting may merely have been dangled before KGB with the hope of entrapment of its officers and their networks. The counterintelligence unit, Directorate K of the First Chief Directorate, would take charge of a case from the regular chain of command of the foreign intelligence service whenever an agent appeared to be doubled, compromised, or on track to be compromised. The field case officer may remain the same, but in Moscow the Counterintelligence Service assumes full authority for directing the case. Deception and some types of complex political action operations often were run directly by the headquarters element, Department A, that prepares the operation in Moscow. In such cases, of course, local assets of a Rezidentura may well be employed in support, but the operations are frequently run by specialists. In the Soviet Union, foreigners, especially, US citizens, were closely investigated by the local internal KGB office. That kind of investigation was not conducted with a view to recruit immediately. It was important to identify the psychological profile of a person, his political orientation, his attitude towards his home country and towards the country he was visiting for some reason. After accumulating a sizable amount of material (based on a whole array of undertakings: plain observation, audio- and video-surveillance of the places of residence, agency-level scrutiny, including “honey traps”), on the basis of the analysis, a decision is made about a transforming the investigation into a recruitment with appropriate conditions (such as through compromising materials or a voluntary agreement) or about wrapping up the whole thing by “educating” a foreigner in order to convey a favorable image of a country that investigated him, in his home country.

As his record at counterintelligence indicated, Kalugin could hardly have been judged as being too kind-hearted in his job. In 1975, Kalugin was directly related to the operation to abduct and rendition Nikolai Artamonov, alias “Lark,” to the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Artamonov died along the way. Kalugin claimed that the reason was an error with the dosage of the anesthetic. Kalugin was one of only three men in a meeting in which the KGB sanctioned the assassination of Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov in London in 1978. Kalugin explains that the KGB’s science and technology directorate had the weapon designed and constructed in Japan. It was an umbrella that fired a small dart into Markov’s leg. Kalugin would pass the orders from his KGB bosses along to subordinates to provide the poison-tipped umbrella used in the assassination. Kalugin would also organize and execute the 1981 bombing of Radio Liberty headquarters in Munich.

Kalugin indicated that his Foreign Counterintelligence Service was not organized to carry out assassinations. According to the KGB table of organization provided earlier, that dirty work was the shared responsibility of Directorate V and the Thirteenth Department. Work as a KGB foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officer, however, required an understood pledge to commit certain violent undertakings. It would be a leap to call Kalugin an ordinary cutthroat due to his obedience to facilitate that action. There is a classic expression heard in organizations: “One is either in or one is out.” Kalugin certainly was “all in.” Nonetheless, many in the KGB began to doubt that.

Reversal of Fortune

In a sudden pivot in his story, Kalugin’s luck would change at what was for so long his beloved KGB. Kalugin’s reporting of observed lawlessness and arbitrary rule and cronyism within the KGB created friction within its leadership. Shadows gathered. In response to his vocal disagreements with how the KGB was operating, the Center threw Kalugin a dip that caught him by surprise. Telling that part of his story, Kalugin positioned himself as the protagonist, and rightly so in greatcharlie’s humble opinion. Although acting with the best intentions, Kalugin incurred the worst. Soon enough, he found himself facing great difficulties. Despite his near impeccable record, Kalugin’s work was placed under “special scrutiny.” Senior executives of KGB, to whom Kalugin was loyal and obedient, loosed counterintelligence investigators, headhunters who relished ruthlessly destroying officers’ careers, even innocent ones, upon him. They were dishonorable individuals who willingly bore false witness on Kalugin and breathed out lies. Kalugin explained that at first he was a bit bemused by it all, then disgusted as his whole world seemed to come crashing down around him. Nothing would be the same again.

The 18th century French Enlightenment writer, historian, and philosopher François-Marie Arouet, known as Voltaire, wrote in a August 8, 1736 letter to the Prince Royal of Prussia who later became Frederick the Great: “Such is the destiny of great men that their superior genius always exposes them to be the butt of the enveloped darts of calumny and envy. “ Undoubtedly, there were quidnuncs in the KGB who would happily push out scuttlebutt on what was going on everywhere in it and occasionally exacerbating situations, despite all the secrecy and efforts at classification and compartmentalization. Employees within an intelligence service would surely understand the need to keep watch against efforts by adversaries to recruit spies among their organizations ranks. With the right manipulations and pressures, such breakdowns can often be forced. There is also the need to stand guard against the possibility of betrayal and defections impelled by a variety of reasons. However, stories of management’s undue suspicions of officers and internal investigations, seen and unseen, would have conceivably created apprehension within the organization as to what was actually transpiring within the KGB. Consequently, it also became more difficult for officers to know who to trust among their colleagues. Thus, in his career, Kalugin had to become expert in figuring out how to avoid garnering the negative attention of KGB managers who, due to nothing greater than their own disposition or paranoia, would occasionally see innocent officers as potential security risks. As aforementioned, due to his superb work, his good relations with KGB senior executives, he had no normal reason to feel his position was threatened. Aforementioned as well, Kalugin believed that he was close to Andropov, not only due to his official position, but simply because he trusted him. Yet, knowing all that he did about the organization’s quirky leaders, problematic officers in the ranks, doing his job right, and how to look good, it was only a matter of time before his fate would change. As long as Vladimir Kryuchkov, another Andropov protégé, was still Head of the First Chief Directorate, Kalugin had to keep his eyes open and ears pinned back. Kryuchkov had a reputation for acting against perceived rivals for power. Turning to Robert Pringle’s Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Rowman and Littlefield, 2015) as a source on Kryuchkov, one learns that he initially began working not in the Soviet intelligence services, but rather in its justice system as a prosecutor’s assistant in Stalingrad. However, Kryuchkov began moving in the direction of foreign intelligence after graduating from the Diplomatic Academy of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and becoming a diplomat. Kryuchkov met Andropov in Budapest in 1955 while he was serving as the Soviet ambassador, and got to know him closely supporting his activities during the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. From then on, Andropov became Kryuchkov’s main patron. He joined Andropov at the Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries in 1959. When Andropov was selected as a Secretary of Communist Party’s Central Committee in 1962, he eventually brought Kryuchkov on from 1965 to 1967 as his aide. Then, when Andropov was selected as Chairman of the KGB on May 19, 1967, he brought Kryuchkov to Moscow with him to serve as Head of the Secretariat, KGB. He allowed Kryuchkov to gain experience with intelligence operations, including covert activities by placing him in charge of foreign intelligence operations under his tutelage starting in 1971. Then, in 1974, Andropov appointed Kryuchkov as head of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, and he remained there until 1988. (In 1988, he would become Chairman of the KGB, where he would remain until the failed coup of 1991.) During Kryuchkov’s years in the KGB’s foreign intelligence service, it was involved in funding and supporting various communist, socialist and anti-colonial movements across the world, some of which came to power in their countries and established pro-Soviet governments; in addition, under Kryuchkov’s leadership the Directorate had major triumphs in penetrating Western intelligence agencies, acquiring valuable scientific and technical intelligence and perfecting the techniques of disinformation and active measures. At the same time, however, during Kryuchkov’s tenure, the Directorate became plagued with defectors, had major responsibility for encouraging the Soviet government to invade Afghanistan and its ability to influence Western European Communist Parties diminished even further.

Vladimir Kryuchkov, Head of the First Chief Directorate and later KGB Chairman (above). Having caused a stir by pointing out troubles in the KGB First Chief Directorate, fertile ground was created for Kalugin’s rivals to take him down. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Head of the First Chief Directorate became Kalugin’s biggest problem. He suggested Kalugin was possibly a US spy. According to Kalugin, Kryuchkov’s reasons for wanting to destroy him was his strong relationship with Andropov. Kalugin said Kryuchkov likely thought that he would be sent somewhere, leaving him to become the head of the First Chief Directorate. Kryuchkov’s anxieties would manifest in the sort of unsettling hostile and destructive behavior that Kalugin repeatedly pointed out had rotted away at the soul of the KGB. Kalugin could not avoid problems by staying well back from him. Kryuchkov, after all, was his manager. Kalugin could not escape his fate.

Having caused a stir by pointing out troubles in the KGB First Chief Directorate, fertile ground was created for Kalugin’s rivals to take him down. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the Head of the First Chief Directorate became Kalugin’s biggest problem. He suggested Kalugin was possibly a US spy. According to Kalugin, Kryuchkov’s reasons for wanting to destroy him was his strong relationship with Andropov. Kalugin said Kryuchkov likely thought that he would be sent somewhere, leaving him to become the head of the First Chief Directorate. Consequently, Kryuchkov’s anxieties would manifest in the sort of unsettling idiosyncratic behavior that Kalugin repeatedly pointed out had rotted away at the soul of the KGB. Kalugin could not avoid problems by staying well back from him. Kryuchkov, after all, was his manager. He could not escape his fate. As part of Kryuchkov allegations, he claimed Kalugin was possibly instrumental in allowing the flow of what was characterized as dicey intelligence from a questionable source to the Center. He determined that an intelligence source, who was Cook from Thiokol, Kalugin’s earliest recruitment in the US, was a supposed means by which the US was enabled to channel chicken feed through the Soviet system. No one really cared about Cook who was arrested for possessing and selling foreign currency and making hostile statements about the Soviet regime. He was simply used as the predicate for taking the drastic step of insinuating that Kalugin had been compromised, despite a mountain of exculpatory evidence to the contrary. Wrongful preconceptions can always be supported by bent intelligence.

Kalugin explains that things were made far worse because the matter was investigated by General Victor Alidin, head of the Moscow KGB. Kalugin explained that Alidin was an abominable KGB officer, with a solid reputation for brutality and widely reviled. Yet, he was extremely close to Soviet Premier Brezhnev. In Washington, Kalugin had caught Alidin’s son-in-law embezzling hundreds of dollars of payments intended for KGB operatives. Kalugin recommended tough action, but Solomatin, his rezident, limited the response to a reprimand to avoid all of the trouble with Alidin that likely would have followed any stronger action. Alidin and his men, to whom Kalugin refers as “Alidin & Company,” set out to find spies! As Kalugin described how their reports on the case were written, they seemed as mad as March hares, concocting a bizarre parody of a nonexistent relationship between Cook and Kalugin. It emphasized the Cook’s job as a mole was to string the KGB along and make Kalugin look good. There were leading questions asked of Cook. Those questions  concerned Kalugin’s alleged recruitment by the CIA. Alidin & Company engaged in the worst possible behavior as investigators. Using their well-exercised nefarious stratagems, they were able to make right look wrong and good look bad. One might suppose that it was relatively easy for Kalugin’s adversaries to question that an officer, so early in his career, could stumble upon such a find as Cook. Many officers with far more years and experience never came close to such an achievement. To an extent, Kalugin’s success proved to be his undoing. After being surreptitiously interviewed formally by Alidin and his investigators under the guise that they were fact-finding and needed his help in investigating Cook of Thiokol, It did not take Kalugin long to figure out what they were driving at. Kalugin’s description of the moment when he became conscious of his KGB investigators’ plans against him was chilling. After twisting and turning facts, Kalugin’s rather sophomoric investigators were able to bear false witness against him, breathing out lies. As Kalugin depicted the matter, it all seemed surreal-to-the-point-of-silliness. Again, not a bit of evidence supposedly collected on Cook or Kalugin was conclusive. Certainly, the presumption of innocence was a principle alien in the Soviet Union. Erring on the side of liberty was not something done in its system. Kalugin’s treatment ostensibly could have been chalked up as a lesson to others that all intelligence activities were subject to scrutiny. Perhaps the real lesson was that in the KGB there was an ever-present danger of certain peccant officers, petty tyrants, who, having been provided with brief authority by the Soviet state, were willing to abuse it. Within such officers, there was typically a need through harsh and disruptive behavior to prove, mainly to themselves, that they have power over others and to soothe some uneasiness over what they may recognize as their own shortcomings. They were imaginative in their thinking but in all the wrong ways. Dead ends would only open doors to more illusions and thereby their pursuits were never exhausted.

As Kalugin related this whole tragic episode, there was a duality of emotions manifested in his words. Surely there was disdain, but there was also great pity. Kryuchkov had attained one of the most important positions in the KGB. Rather than relate to Kalugin as one his successful managers and display his competence to possibly take on the position KGB Chairman, he shrunk to reveal the idiosyncrasies of a paranoid KGB official, who could think only of his own personal interest and attempt to destroy two innocent men in the process. Ironically, Kryuchkov would become KGB Chairman in 1988. Unable to accept the ideals of perestroika and glasnost implemented by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, he participated in  the 1991 coup attempt, the consequence of which was triggering the rapid dissolution of the Soviet Union. Kryuchkov was a major part of the problem that led to destruction of the KGB, and a major part of the problem that led to the Soviet Union’s collapse. If anything could be said about Kryuchkov’s nefarious plan to undo Kalugin, he was quite thorough leaving nothing to chance, even the likely response of his mentor, Andropov. He moved Kalugin out of the Center into what was then a relative nether region of the Soviet Union, Leningrad. He would become First Deputy Chief of the Leningrad KGB, second-in-command there. In what turned out to be their final meeting Andropov in a friendly manner: “You have stirred up too much dust here at headquarters. I just want you to go away until things settle down. You go to Leningrad and when things calm down, you’ll be back. I promise you. It will take a year or so. No longer than that. You’ll be back soon.” However, Andropov died in two years, and Kalugin remained in Leningrad for seven years.

Certainly, Kalugin knew that Andropov was quite shrewd, and made endless calculations in his decision which all had to be made in the context of Soviet politics. Kalugin was invaluable to Andropov when it came to being set straight on what was happening on the ground versus the West and what was happening among the rank and file on foreign intelligence inside the KGB. Yet, from where he was situated, Kalugin likely understood Soviet politics to a limited degree. The interplay between Andropov and Kryuchkov surely included efforts to discern the Communist Party political scene. Indeed, in the years following the 1956 Hungarian Uprising on which they worked together closely, Kryuchkov, the former prosecutor and diplomat, may have served as more than a loyal confidant who could provide bits of information, but an invaluable sounding board on political developments for Andropov. With his ears always pinned back, Kryuchkov surely had an appreciation of what was happening in the Communist Party and the Soviet system in general. His political awareness and sensitivity likely enabled him, much as that of an attorney to a client, to illuminate for Andropov, ways to finesse responses to Kremlin requests, particularly politically charged ones, to avoid any pitfalls, to ensure his survival and to create possibilities for his advancement within the political realm. Kryuchkov, while twenty years younger than Andropov, was ten years Kalugin’s senior, though he appeared about ten years additional, and spent more time observing senior Communist Party leaders and had more experience formulating nuanced responses to them, given their sensibilities. (Perhaps no better example existed Kryuchkov’s political savvy than the way in which he knocked the career of Kalugin, another Andropov protégé, completely off track while incurring no consequences for himself.) Andropov most likely thought that if he were moved up in the hierarchy and a choice had to be made for a new KGB Chairman, it would be good to have his protégé Kryuchkov to be in the running for the post. By interceding for a second time on Kalugin’s behalf, and thereby blatantly undermining Kryuchkov, Andropov may have sent the wrong signal concerning his confidence and impressions about him in the KGB and the Communist Party, potentially making Kryuchkov a weaker candidate for the top KGB post later. When Andropov was actually promoted to Deputy Chairman in 1978, Kryuchkov was not elevated to KGB Chairman but remained at the First Chief Directorate. (Kryuchkov eventually assumed that post on October 1, 1988, almost five years after Andropov’s death.) Again, Kalugin’s father warned him about the Soviet system, the state security service, the people within it.

Demoted from his post as head of KGB Foreign Counterintelligence, Kalugin was sent to the Leningrad KGB branch. There, Kalugin witnessed first-hand the true nature of the KGB’s activities as a domestic political police. He discovered that the KGB’s internal functions had precious little connection with state security but rather, benefitted corrupt Communist Party officials by keeping them in power. Indeed, from Leningrad, Kalugin could see more clearly the wretchedness of the Soviet system, and real socialism at its fullest. Further, he was authentically in touch with Soviet people for the first time and began to understand how they lived. Kalugin concluded the Soviet system was unworkable and needed to change.

At Leningrad KGB

In the end, Kalugin was demoted to serve as first deputy chief of internal security in Leningrad. Regardless of the circumstances, Kalugin did his job in his new post. One interesting case he was involved with in Leningrad was a counterespionage operation, the handling of a double agent. According to Kalugin, the KGB ran double agents to gather knowledge on hostile intelligence services. The KGB could learn a great deal by the kind of questions a hostile intelligence service was asking a double agent such as what kind of intelligence was required and what type of assignment it was giving to the double. To illustrate that point, he provides the theoretical circumstance of a CIA officer outlining what he was seeking from a Soviet agent. The officer might say a bit too much in explaining the matter and let slip some interesting information. Double agents could passively pick up valuable material just by being in the presence of hostile intelligence officers. Kalugin then gives a real life example of how a Soviet double agent grabbed a roll of microfilm that his CIA handler had forgotten. Dozens of intelligence documents, shedding light on the CIA Tokyo station were on that microfilm. Kalugin explains that the KGB also used double agents to plant disinformation and confuse hostile intelligence agencies. And running a double game could be extremely valuable in the propaganda battle with the West. On several occasions when the KGB was sure the CIA or other agency had been duped by its double, it would then nab the CIA agent for espionage. The KGB would then go about revealing details of the CIA’S spying operation, and expel the US case officer in a great fit of publicity.

Concerning the counterespionage case he became involved with while in Leningrad, the KGB elicited the cooperation of a Leningrad scientist named Pavlov who frequently traveled the world on a Soviet research ship. Ostensibly, he had access to information about Soviet science and the Soviet military industrial complex. Instructions were given to him to express dissenter views, engage in some black market operations, and do everything possible to attract the attention of the CIA and other intelligence services. For two years Pavlov was dangled at the CIA, doing everything that he was told. The KGB was surprised, for it expected the CIA to show interest in a man who had so much access. Then out of the blue, the KGB received a cable from the KGB’S station chief in Buenos Aires, Argentina stating that Pavlov had come to the Soviet Embassy and reported that the CIA tried to recruit him. He talked to the CIA agent, passed along some information, undoubtedly chicken feed, and agreed to meet him in Leningrad upon his return home. Kalugin said that his boss in Leningrad was skeptical, but the Center told them to go ahead with the meeting. And indeed such a meeting took place. Our surveillance people observed Pavlova and a diplomat from the US consulate in Leningrad–clearly a CIA case officer–rendezvous ingredients on a remote street in the city. Pavlov took money from the CIA case officer in exchange for scientific information. A second meeting was scheduled 25 miles outside of Leningrad. Pavlova was to give the CIA agent documents in exchange for another payment. As it turned out, however, the meeting came only days after the September 1, 1983 Soviet shoot down of Korean Airlines Flight 007. The Center made the decision not to continue to pursue the counterespionage operation. It ordered the arrest of the CIA case officer when he met with Pavlov and use of the incident to counter the storm of controversy that swept over the Korean Airlines fiasco. The CIA officer was caught red handed. He was expelled, but the incident while hyped did not make a dent in the bad publicity suffered over the shoot down. However, it also turned out that Pavlov was not being honest about the money he received from the US, pocketing more than he reported. As a result of suspicions over Pavlov’s honesty, his apartment was searched and the KGB found large sums of money proving he was pocketing payments. Pavlov confessed and was sentenced to 13 years in jail. He was granted amnesty in Yeltsin’s era.

In the Leningrad KGB branch, Kalugin also witnessed first-hand the true nature of the KGB’s activities as a domestic political police. He discovered that the KGB’s internal functions had precious little connection with state security but rather, benefitted corrupt Communist Party officials by keeping them in power. Indeed, from Leningrad, Kalugin could see more clearly the wretchedness of the Soviet system and appreciate real socialism at its fullest. Further, in Leningrad, he was authentically in touch with Soviet people for the first time and began to understand how they lived. Kalugin concluded the Soviet system was unworkable and needed to change. It was a conclusion from inside the Soviet Union and was not prompted by any outside ideas or reports. The disintegration of what were once considered the indestructible foundations of the KGB, as outlined by Kalugin, placed it on the road to destruction. In this segment, Kalugin provides a stark warning about what can happen to a state security organization that has lost its way. In vinculis etiam audax. (In chains yet still bold.)

Concerning the story of how his career ended, no one could be as sound on the details of the matter as Kalugin, himself. In the section of this review dubbed “About the Author,” may have been a bit of a spoiler, telling the story of how things progressed to the present very briefly. Kalugin was forced into retirement but seemed content to break free of the suffocating chains of the KGB bureaucracy, and daylight madness of a few power wielding superiors or equals in other departments. Kalugin then took a very active part in the rallies of Democrats. His disillusionment culminated in a sensational appearance at a political gathering in Moscow in the summer of 1990. He gave a speech from the abundance of the heart at the “Democratic Platform in the CPSU” conference. The former KGB general reports that he struggled to steady his voice and said: “Some people may think that I have jumped on the democratic bandwagon with evil intentions. I understand that there may be suspicions in your m8nds, but let me tell you that you’re wrong. I am from the KGB. I worked in that organization for more than thirty years, and I want to tell all of you how the KGB works against the best interests of democratic forces in this country.” Kalugin then describes an utter silence in the hall as he talked about himself and explained why the KGB must be radically reformed and the number of agents drastically reduced. He stated:  “We cannot begin a serious restructuring of society until we rid ourselves of the restraints imposed by an organization which has penetrated every sphere of our lives, which interferes with all aspects of state life, political life, the economy, science, arts, religion, even sports. Today, just as ten or twenty years ago, the hand of the KGB is everywhere. And any real talk of perestroika without reforming the KGB is nothing but a lie. All the much-ballyhooed changes in the KGB are cosmetic, a disguise upon the ugly face of the Stalin-Brezhnev era. In fact, all elements of the old dictatorship are still in place. The chief assistant and handmaiden of the Communist Party remains the KGB. In order to secure genuine changes in our country, this structure of violence and falsehood must be dismantled.” The speech was met with roars of approval, and a standing ovation. Requests for interviews and speeches followed in the weeks afterward. What also followed was a predictable KGB attack. A statement was released by the KGB press office declaring in effect: “The KGB is going to have its say about Kalugin, who he is and what he stands for.” Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev dealt the heaviest blow, issuing a decree on July 1, 1991, stripping Kalugin of his rank of major general, revoking all of his KGB awards, and cutting off his pension. Kalugin persisted against the odds. He was soon elected People’s Deputy of the USSR from the Krasnodar Territory. He remained a very vocal independent critic of the Communist system. His continuous attacks on the KGB garnered him notoriety and a political following. Political courage had to replace physical courage in the field as a KGB officer, though the real threat of violence, his assassination, existed. Nevertheless, he continued to protest KGB abuses.

Following an attempted 1991 coup against Gorbachev led by Kalugin’s nemesis, Kryuchkov, along with seven others, a popular movement under the Mayor of Moscow Boris Yeltsin emerged to subdue coup supporters. Watching events transpire in Russia as the Soviet Union collapsed and failing to act in some way would have been tantamount to accepting and admitting that he never had a spark of dignity or decency. Kalugin manned the barricades, serving as an inspirational leader for protesters. He jumped on top of Soviet tanks to address protesters. It was Kalugin who supposedly persuaded Yeltsin to address crowds before the Russian White House and elsewhere.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union

Following an attempted 1991 coup against Gorbachev led by Kalugin’s nemesis, Kryuchkov, along with seven others, a popular movement under the Mayor of Moscow Boris Yeltsin emerged to subdue coup supporters. Watching events transpire in Russia as the Soviet Union collapsed and failing to act in some way would have been tantamount to accepting and admitting that he never had a spark of dignity or decency. Kalugin manned the barricades, serving as an inspirational leader for protesters. He jumped on top of Soviet tanks to address protesters. It was Kalugin who supposedly persuaded Yeltsin to address crowds before the Russian White House and elsewhere. In September 1991, Gorbachev restated Kalugin’s ranks along with all decorations and his  pension. Yeltsin took control of the Soviet Union from Gorbachev and dissolved it, breaking it down to constituent republics. It was widely seen as a change for the better for the Soviet people and the world.  Though the new and smaller Russian Federation filled the vacuum of the Soviet space and got off to a very rocky start, reformists such as Kalugin who followed Yeltsin could be satisfied that they at least put it on the right track with an energetic shove. Kalugin decided to become a part of the reconstruction. He believed that Russia could eventually meet its full potential. His sensibilities then were representative of those times. He became an unpaid advisor to reformist KGB Chairman Vladimir Bakatin. Bakatin became famous for issuing a pattern of listening devices at the US Embassy in Moscow. However, Bakatin was only able to dissolve the old system but not reform it. As time went on, he was wise enough to recognize that possibility had passed beyond his view.

It would be easy to say that it should not have been terribly difficult for an intelligent man to predict the future of an authoritarian regime that sought to crush the spirit of its people with deceptions, crimes, and evils. Long ago, as a child, he had reached one set of conclusions on those matters. However. his experiences and intelligence provided him with the capability to discern why his initial conclusions might not have been correct. As he collected more information and experienced more of the darker side of what the Soviet system had to offer, he found that he was able to refute his long held views. Thus, he could no longer press any of his ideals about Soviet Union, the Communist Movement, the Communist Party, Socialism and the geopolitical struggle with the West forward with a degree of confidence. There was nothing puzzling about it all to Kalugin as he made that transition in his thinking. The death of Kalugin’s life in Russia opened the door to a new life in the US. Arguably, to that extent, Kalugin in the long-run oddly benefitted from the wrath of his enemies, and in a way benefited from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The righteous was separated from the unrighteous.

Kalugin always remained resolute in disappointment. He never lost his way. In his mind, he organized and synthesized the conditions that beset him. He never resembled what has been whimsically called “spiritual roadkill.” He had his own ethics, buttressed by a creed of what is right and wrong, fair and unfair inculcated within his soul at home with his parents. Ethics without such a creed are only a hollow shell. Bereft of the Soviet system that was once his mighty and faithful, shining beacon of light, upon which he could place all of his hopes and dreams for his future and the future of the world, over a few short years, as mentioned earlier, Kalugin was forced to make a series of never before imagined, new choices about his future, and his family’s future. Even through that, his heart remained stout and strong. Still today, he has refused to concede defeat to his enemies back in Moscow. How poetry manages to connect is really its classic role in culture. It provides an emotional vocabulary, putting into words what one may be sensing. When thinking about Kalugin’s struggles, wanting to achieve much for his country and do the right things, Arthur Hugh Clough’s “Say not the Struggle nought Availeth” (1849) comes to mind. It connects well with Kalugin’s persistence in humility:

Say not the struggle nought availeth,

The labour and the wounds are vain,

The enemy faints not, nor faileth,

And as things have been they remain.

If hopes were dupes, fears may be liars;

It may be, in yon smoke concealed,

Your comrades chase e’en now the fliers,

And, but for you, possess the field.

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking

Seem here no painful inch to gain,

Far back through creeks and inlets making,

Comes silent, flooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only,

When daylight comes, comes in the light,

In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly,

But westward, look, the land is bright.

Kalugin always remained resolute in disappointment. He never lost his way. In his mind, he organized and synthesized the conditions that beset him. He never resembled what has been whimsically called “spiritual roadkill.” He had his own ethics, buttressed by a creed of what is right and wrong, fair and unfair inculcated within his soul at home with his parents. Ethics without such a creed are only a hollow shell. Bereft of the Soviet system that was once his mighty and faithful, shining beacon of light, upon which he could place all of his hopes and dreams for his future and the future of the world, over a few short years, as mentioned earlier, Kalugin was forced to make a series of never before imagined, new choices about his future, and his family’s future. Even through that, his heart remained stout and strong.

It is imaginable that greatcharlie’s enthusiasm over First Directorate may lead some to simply write this review off as a hopelessly oleagic encomium. However, nothing presented here is expressed with pretension. What one finds in First Directorate is of the highest quality and remains steady from beginning to end. Readers are also enabled to see the world through the lens of a man with years of experience in the world and a thorough understanding of humanity. Information from the text that is presented here, though it may wet the palate, only represents a mere fraction of what “things, wonderful things” the reader will find in First Directorate. In the genre of fiction and nonfiction spy stories, there is an artistic milieu in which writers seek to position themselves amidst. It cannot be denied that human nature instinctively finds entertainment more compelling than edification. While there is plenty in First Directorate to be entertained, in focusing on such, the depth of Kalugin, the man, might be missed. There is much that explains KGB tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in First Directorate. When dealing with details as well as publishers and editors, one may likely find inconsistencies with previous accounts told by Kalugin of people and events. While there are many facts in First Directorate to scrutinize, in focusing on such, the mosaic of Kalugin, the man might be missed. Of course, readers should enjoy First Directorate as they wish. It is nice to get hold of a book that allows readers many ways to enjoy it. For greatcharlie, it was an absolute pleasure to read. As would be expected, greatcharlie wholeheartedly recommends First Directorate to its readers. It is definitely worth the read.

By Mark Edmond Clark

George VI’s Royal Christmas Message of 1939: Words of Hope for Humankind in Tumultuous Times

George VI, King of the United Kingdom and the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, seated at a table before two microphones and wearing the uniform of the Admiral of the Fleet (above). The staged photo was taken on September 3, 1939 at the Royal residence at Buckingham Palace. It resembles a similar scene on December 25, 1939 at the Royal country house at Sandringham, when George VI delivered the Royal Christmas Message via radio. His message was so inspiring that it established the broadcast as an annual tradition. During his message, the King shared four lines from Minnie Haskins’ poem “God Knows” which since has been popularly referred to as “At the Gate of the Year” or “The Gate of the Year.”

King George VI of the United Kingdom and the Dominions of the British Commonwealth, never imagined being king nor had any ambitions to be monarch. Born Albert Frederick Arthur George, he was second in line to the throne to his brother, Edward Albert Christian George Andrew Patrick David. As a consequence of the decision of his brother, crowned Edward VIII, to abdicate on December 10, 1936 in order to marry Wallis Simpson, a US citizen and socialite, who was twice divorced. Despite his misgivings, George VI became the very king of that his people needed in the tumultuous years of World War II. He established himself as a true leader in broadcast speeches in 1939. Among the most memorable was his Christmas message in which he recited lines from the poem “God Knows” written by Minnie Haskins in 1908 and expanded in 1912. The poem has been popularly referred to since George VI’s 1939 message as “At the Gate of the Year” or “The Gate of the Year.” As all countries whether facing challenges from external or internal elements peering into the New Year, there must the same degree of hope, as expressed by George VI, that they will see their way through to a positive, prosperous, and peaceful 2020. In a post published on December 8, 2014, greatcharlie shared the lines spoken by George VI in the Royal Christmas Message, broadcasted in 1939. Cognizant that the people of many countries will continue to face crises from varied internal and external sources going into 2020 and desiring to offer words of comfort, greatcharlie is again presenting the lines from George VI’s Christmas message along with some background that will hopefully help put the speech in context.

Traveling back to the Fall of 1939, one finds Germany under Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler already on the march in Europe, overwhelming neighboring countries. Through the Anschullus of March 12, 1938, Germany annexed Austria. Under Hitler’s threat to start a war with Czechoslovakia, United Kingdom Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier capitulated to Hitler’s whims and signed the Munich Agreement of September 29, 1938, allowing Germany to freely occupy Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland from October 1, 1938 to October 10, 1938. The agreement sent all of the wrong signal to Hitler. In Hitler’s view, might made right. Will stood in place of reason. After seeing how easily the United Kingdom and France ceded to his will on the Sudetenland, he was convinced he could pursue his plans of conquest without real opposition from the other European powers. The Munich Agreement was a consequence of a dreadful policy of appeasement. The notion was that through diplomacy and agreements, Hitler could be contained. The main aim of the policy was to keep the United Kingdom out of harm’s way, out of another war, before Hitler’s pursuit of the sovereign territory of other countries truly got to a gallop. However, rather than mollify Hitler, he was emboldened by the appeasement policy and essentially encouraged him to pursue his ambitions.

The main proponents of appeasement in Parliament were the Tories, led by Chamberlain. However, there was divergence among political leaders on the manner in which to cope with Hitler. Although he too was a conservative Member of the House of Lords, Winston Churchill challenged Chamberlain’s assertions about Hitler. He saw Hitler as a positive serpent who would not adhere to any agreement that might be reached wits him. From a bad mind only bad designs could be expected. Churchill suggested that an abundance of caution should be exercised with Hitler, and that considerable preparations should be made to deal with him militarily. Opponents of Churchill’s point of view, characterized him as a warmonger, and gratuitously reminded everyone that he was the mastermind of debacle at Gallipoli during World War I. The reality was that Hitler posed more than a danger to Europe, but an existential threat to civilization. Very publicly, Hitler expressed a belief that the German people were a special Aryan race, and thus superior to all others. Even darker and more foreboding was Hitler’s insistence that it was the German people’s destiny to rule over the lesser people of the world. He declared that the German people’s confinement to the limits of Germany frustrated their ability to flourish, and exercise their will and power. Up from the ashes of defeat after the World War I, Hitler promised that under his leadership, the German people would reach the height of their greatness to include world domination. Yet, despite this and more, Chamberlain, Edward Wood, Lord Halifax, who became his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in February 1938, Nevile Henderson, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Germany, Horace Wilson, Chamberlain’s closest advisor and head of the British Civil Service, and many others, saw nothing but what they pleased. They failed to draw rational inferences from what Hitler was saying and doing.

Much as Churchill warned, Hitler proved too dodgy for Chamberlain and Lord Halifax to understand. Chamberlain’s diplomacy with Hitler failed. The remainder of Czechoslovakia was occupied by Hitler’s Army. With Germany’s invasion of Poland, the United Kingdom was plunged into war a very sinister adversary. Churchill would eventually assume the proud place as prime minister that his merits had won him on May 10, 1940. Yet, as 1939 ended, Chamberlain was still prime minister. Making amends for the sin of appeasing fascism proved impossible for Chamberlain. He would never be absolved of his responsibility for the crisis. Among the people of the United Kingdom, the prayer was that God by some gracious change would restore the situation to the condition it was in before Hitler and Germany went on the march.

Although Chamberlain and his following among Members of Parliament were left dazed and confused over events on the continent, George VI was determined to stand upright and with sangfroid in the face of danger. He was ready to bear whatever fate might bring with a firm and equal mind, resolved and confident. The radio broadcast of the Royal Christmas message was tradition had been started in 1932 by George V, the father of George VI. In his Christmas message in 1939, George VI raised his gaze toward what is most important to monarchs of the modern era, the people of the United Kingdom and across the Commonwealth. He would offer a message of reassurance and encouragement. He wanted them not to surrender to despair but rather to hold fast and stay strong. There was a potential obstacle to his aims. George VI suffered from a speech impediment, a stutter, and severe anxiety over public speaking. His struggle to overcome that problem was immortalized in the 2011 American Academy Award-winning film for Best Picture, “The King’s Speech.” Yet, on December 25, 1939, George VI rose to the occasion. The message was broadcasted from the Royal Residence at Sandringham, England. The King’s 5 feet 9 inch frame was immaculately dressed in the uniform of the Admiral of the Fleet as he sat before two microphones. While he could not be seen by listeners, on that day, in the minds of his subjects, George VI stood about 8 feet tall. He superbly united king and country in a common cause.

George VI began his nine minute Christmas message by explaining that while no one wanted war, others who sought conquest insisted upon tearing their country away from peace. He informed that they were at war with a very different enemy whose evil ideas were contrary to those of the civilized world. He stated: “it is the tragedy of this time that there are powerful countries whose whole direction and policy are based on aggression and the suppression of all that we hold dear for mankind.” On the point, he went on to say: “We feel in our hearts that we are fighting against wickedness, and this conviction will give us strength from day to day to persevere until victory is assured.”

Speaking to soldiers and sailors in France and across the Commonwealth, he offered words of inspiration reminding them that they in the thoughts of everyone. While so much was expected of them, the king let them know that he had confidence in them that the people were aware that they were serving with valor, and he knew those would soon face battle would do the same. George VI relayed: “The gallant Air Force, which, in cooperation with the Navy is our sure shield of defence. They are daily adding laurels to those that their fathers won.” He continued: “I would send a special word of greeting to the armies of the Empire, to those who have come from afar, and in particular to the British Expeditionary Force. Their tasks is hard.” On that point, he remarked further: “They are waiting, and waiting is a trial of nerve and discipline. But I know that when the moment comes for action they will prove themselves worthy of the highest traditions of their great Service.”

Speaking across the territories of the Commonwealth  creating hope but also tempering expectations. He explained: “I believe from my heart that the cause which binds together my peoples and our gallant and faithful Allies is the cause of Christian civilisation.” Going further, he urged the people to remain resolved to stand together no matter what comes. George VI entreated: “A new year is at hand. We cannot tell what it will bring. If it brings peace, how thankful we shall all be. If it brings us continued struggle we shall remain undaunted.”

Added at the end of his broadcast was its most memorable aspect when the King read lines from the Haskins poem. As the story is often told, his 13-year-old daughter, Princess Elizabeth, shared the poem with him. However, according to the Telegraph, contrary to popular belief, the poem was brought to the attention of the King by Queen Elizabeth. The lines were recited again at her own funeral 63 years later. The poem was from a collection, The Desert, published in 1908. Neither the poem nor its author were popular at the time. The few lines recited by the King were chosen to stand on their own. The remaining lines do not possess such a compelling quality.

George VI introduced the poem in his message by stating: “I feel that we may all find a message of encouragement in the lines which, in my closing words, I would like to say to you:

I said to the man who stood at the Gate of the Year,

‘Give me a light that I may tread safely into the unknown.’

And he replied, ‘Go out into the darkness, and put your hand into the hand of God.

That shall be to you better than light, and safer than a known way.’ ”

George VI concluded his speech with the blessing: “May that Almighty Hand guide and uphold us all.” Hopefully, the blessing of George VI has managed to echo through the years to our time, and it is greatcharlie’s wish to all of its readers in particular that all will be well and that all will receive the very best of everything in the new year.

Commentary: Trump Withdraws US Troops from Syria: What Considerations Impelled His Decision?

The US military base in Al Asaliyah village near Manbij, in northern Syria (above). After US President Donald Trump announced that US troops would be withdrawn from Syria, critics and detractors surmised that he reached the decision from thin air, and hastily announced it at the end of 2018 in order to “check off” a campaign promise. It was also said Trump had disregarded US allies and friends in Syria. In truth, the decision was well-mulled over by US decision makers. Far more factors were part of the decision than the short-list reported in the US news media.

There was a storm of disagreement, and in some foreign policy circles in Washington, outrage, following the decision by US President Donald Trump to withdraw US forces from Syria. Fault with the decision was supported by the claim that Trump was acting against the best advice of his top military commanders and other foreign and national security officials. It was also said that Trump was displaying a certain insouciance toward allies and friends on the ground in Syria, to include Kurdish Forces (the People’s Protection Units or YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (Arab and Assyrian fighters, as well high numbers of YPG units). Additionally, it was widely surmised that Trump reached the decision to withdraw US troops from thin air, and hastily announced the decision at the end of 2018 in order to “check off” a campaign promise. Some news media commentators even went as far as to claim that the decision signalled a new US isolationism and the beginning of a contraction under which certain US interests worldwide would be abandoned. In truth, the decision was thoroughly mulled over in a decision making meeting prior to being announced. Moreover, far more factors, in particular factors that tied to reality, were part of the decision, than the short-list reported in the news media. The aim here is to enumerate and examine, from an out of the box perspective, some of the likely considerations made by Trump and his aides and advisers prior to making the Syria decision public. Hopefully, the examination here will contribute in some way to the policy debate in the US on Syria.

The Syria situation was not a problem of Trump’s making. US President Barack Obama and other national leaders poorly interpreted information concerning an opposition movement that had organised against the regime of Syria Arab Republic President Bashar Al-Assad in March 2011. They believed that opposition movement made Assad regime ripe for change, however, opportunity was seen by Obama and his foreign and national security policy decision makers where there was none. The conclusion was that with a modicum support for the right opposition groups, the Assad regime would face collapse and be forced to the negotiation table, where Assad, himself, would agree to an orderly and immediate transition of power. Among a long list of negative consequences that have resulted from that policy approach have been: a seemingly never ending civil war in which millions of civilians have become casualties, millions more have been displaced, Russia and other countries who are potential adversaries of the US have strengthened their presence in Syria and increased their influence on the Assad regime; and, extraordinarily dangerous terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, have established strongholds. Along with the US, European and Middle Eastern countries, have invested troops and other resources in Syria in what has been a successful effort to destroy terrorist groups in particular.

The contradiction between the desire to continue the fight alongside allies and friends, (that resulted in what now appear to have been ill-advised promises by US officials that the US would remain in Syria), and the requirements of force protection and the need to respond to rapidly evolving geostrategic realities in the region, made the decision to withdraw undoubtedly agonizing. Trump, however, was not marginal about the matter. Some of Trump’s top advisers were very disappointed over where the final decision fell. A couple top officials, having determined that continuing to work in support of Trump’s choice would compromise their personal values, their consciences, resigned. Perhaps an effort to keep US allies and friends invested in Syria militarily or otherwise of the decision to withdraw, even in camera, was a missing step. However, the decision will not be judged right or wrong here. Homines enim cum rem destruere non possunt, iactationem eius incessunt. Ita si silenda feceris, factum ipsum, si laudanda non sileas, ipse culparis. (Such is the disposition of mankind, if they cannot blast an action, they will censure the parade of it; and whether you do what does not deserve to be taken notice of, or take notice yourself of what does, either way you incur reproach.)

The announced withdrawal of US military units from Syria came as a surprise when Trump first made it on Twitter and then with a public statement on the White House lawn. There was an immediate rush by critics and detractors of Trump to pure negatives on the decision such as calling it an abandonment of allies and friends in the field. Other observers, uncertain about the future of Syria and uncertain of the future course of the US in the region, joined in the chorus against the decision. As promises were made by US officials other than Trump to stand alongside and support allies and friends, did as much to convince many observers that the US commitment to Syria was essentially open-ended, the disappointment and harsh reactions were stronger when that belief was dashed. Yet, with an assessment made that the main mission of destroying ISIS and other terrorist groups in Syria, and correlatively degrading their ability to act elsewhere, reaching toward its terminus, keeping US forces in the combat zones of Syria, keeping them in harm’s way, became questionable to Trump. All along, it was a calculated risk to deploy and allow US  forces to operate in Syria. Having spent months crossing his fingers concerning the well-being of US troops there, Trump made the decision to withdraw. Although US troops, themselves, expect to be in harm’s way whenever they are deployed in combat zones overseas, value judgments must be made by the civilian leadership on the returns or benefits from such dangerous deployments. It would seem Trump determined that the return on the US investment of troops in Syria, no longer justified placing their lives at risk. In making this decision, Trump likely felt some satisfaction knowing that he has robbed potential adversaries of the freedom to include an attack on US forces in Syria in their calculus of how they might hurt the US in the region.

US troops deployed in Syria are among the best trained in the US armed forces. As expected, they accomplished a tremendous amount. Yet, although extremely effectual in their performance, the size of their deployment, 2600 troops, is lean relative to those deployed in Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, or Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Their numbers are also meager relative to the presence of potential adversaries in Syria. Expectations from those troops should not be placed too high. For those rightfully concerned with worldwide impressions of Trump’s decision to withdraw US forces, there should be an awareness that the force of 2600 troops was too few to do too much on the ground anyway. Change in Syria in the interest of the US and in a way that reflects US values would mean: allowing for the return of refugees and displaced persons; the establishment of transparent democratic governance in some form at the local, provincial, and national levels in Syria; providing all people of Syria with residences, more than just temporary shelters; an adequate, regular supply of sustenance; a means to sustain the delivery of sustenance; sufficient sources of potable water; continuous power and electricity; a highway and road systems that will allow for freedom of movement; reconstruction bridges, tunnels, airports, harbors, dams, parks, and waterways; schools for children; hospitals and health clinics; sanitation system; law enforcement at the local, provincial, and national level; a courts system; effectual employment bureaus, a secure banking system; the rebuilding of factories and other workplaces; an agribusiness development program; and, a multitude of other necessities that will support the development of a viable society. Given the size of the force, it would not be able to guarantee the top five items enumerated on this list, particularly the safety and security of Syrian returnees from the Assad regime and other potential adversaries. The Assad regime would invariably want all returnees to fold neatly under its cruel subjugation. There would also be the requirement of protecting the Syrian people from Islamic militant groups seeking to reestablish their Caliphate or some new Islamic State from which they could launch terrorist attacks globally.

There is a broader picture concerning US capabilities and capacity to conduct military-style operations. Wars can be fought even when formations of US troops are not present. Other less visible ways and means to support the Kurdish Forces and Syrian Democratic Forces can be provided by elements of the US intelligence community to include the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (“DIA”). Invariably, some US troops could be used covertly, in specialized technical role for those agencies. By integrating themselves among local military units, they can provide assistance in the form of supply, training, and guidance to local senior leaders, support special reconnaissance, aid local commanders with command and control of units, and engage in direct action when required. A few historical examples of the success of such operations include: CIA operations in Military Region 3 in South Vietnam; the employment of Special Forces Operational Detachments in Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait; operations in support of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council during both Operation Sana and Operation Oluja during Bosnia War; and, CIA and DIA operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. Arguably, engaging in a covert operation with paramilitary trained case officers, special activities operators, and special forces soldiers working in tandem with local troops may not be as effective as having US military units perform tasks, but it is a viable option when the decision has been made to no longer make formal use of the US military. On the particular matter of providing forward control for airstrikes to defend allies and friends against attacks, resources would exist among operatives of those agencies on ground to perform that task. Moreover, with concentrations of US troops no longer on the ground in Syria, US air assets and the US-led anti-ISIS Coalition, while still maintaining parameters for safety for allies and friends, could pursue ground targets more vigorously with less concern that retribution from a malign actor against US troops would be possible. That retribution could take the form of a surprise military attack or an act of terrorism.

Many of the immediate impressions expressed about Trump’s decision to withdraw US troops from Syria ignored certain realities of the evolving situation in the Middle East. There is a broader picture of foreign and national security policy for the US and other countries in the region of which US troops deployed to Syria had become a part. To understand that bigger picture, one only needs to listen closely to the persistent anti-US grumblings voiced from the capitals of potential adversaries within the region. National leaders and other top officials of those countries insist more directly that they have the will and inclination to assert themselves in Syria. In addition to those grumblings are tests of missiles of considerable range and latent warnings concerning the reinitiation of an ostensibly dormant nuclear weapons program. Perhaps through miscalculation, they might decide to act against US forces not simply to destroy them, but rather as a means to force them out. Fresh in the minds of many in the region are the 1983 attack on the US Marine Barracks in Beirut, Lebanon and the 1996 attack on US troops at the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, and the responses by the US. Perhaps a few US political leader, though surely well-meaning, have forgotten that the enemy will have a say in the outcome of the best laid plans of Washington. (With all of the “what ifs” considered, force security has been optimized through the employment of a suite of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods by US force commanders in Syria. Yet, only the clairvoyants can walk with an assured step in the opaqueness of the Levant. There, one must always expect the unexpected.) Lessons learned from past US military deployments to support allies in the region, which were also relatively limited in scope, have undoubtedly left Trump determined to avoid the disasters that US Presidents have faced in the past. It is far preferable for the US to act, not wait until it must react in response to such possibilities. Further, if Trump, using his experience with, and understanding of, other national leaders has felt vibrations, intimations that US forces were facing an increased danger from a certain direction in Syria, it would only be prudent him to be safe rather than sorry by moving those troops elsewhere. Correlatively, Trump would never be willing to take the chance of having the US plunged into a conflict on an adversaries terms.

The possibility must be considered that a clash between US forces and a prospective adversary on the ground in Syria could put US troops in real jeopardy. True, numbers are not everything, and the outcome of a military engagement that would include very capable US troops cannot be determined by simple bean counting. To avoid such clashes, since 2015, the US and Russia have maintained a “deconfliction line” to communicate the locations of their respective air and ground forces in Syria. Still, US troops have exercised their right to self-defense and clashes have occurred. When pro-Syrian regime fighters, mostly Russian mercenaries, attacked 40 US troops at their military base at a refinery near the town of Deir al-Zour in February 2018, around 200 of the attackers were killed. There were no US casualties. Despite that favorable outcome, circumstances may not stand in the favor of US troops on some other occasion. Russian military forces and the forces of other potential adversaries on the ground in Syria are actually formidable given their size and strength. They are close enough to US troops to pose a danger that should not be dismissed.

The order to withdraw US troops from Syria might have equated to the sounding of retreat if it had occurred following a very public threat from an adversary, or had occurred in the face of an adversary’s deployment of its forces on the ground precisely to threaten US forces. A decision not to withdraw in response to such military threats from adversaries would likely require the deployment of greater numbers of US troops in Syria and perhaps preparation for a larger war in the region. This consideration has rarely been a factor discussed by Trump’s critics and detractors and other observers in the US news media. However, it would only be a natural concern for any US president who has placed US troops in harm’s way. Quod dubites, ne feceris. (Never do a thing concerning the rectitude of which you are in doubt.)

As with other US troops in the region, US forces in Syria face a significant threat from attack by potential adversaries in the region with long-range artillery and rockets in country and precision rockets from their countries or other locations in the region in which their forces are operating. The spectrum of possible attacks indeed goes beyond frontal assaults on the several small US bases in Syria’s northeast. This consideration has also failed to find its way into the  commentaries of Trump’s critics and detractors and other observers in the US news media. The enemy has the ultimate say in how it might strike. Projections that fail to ascribe all probabilities and limit consideration to only some possibilities, perhaps the top five or top ten, while dismissing those they may feel are unlikely or de minimus, are flawed. To make a decision without the complete picture would be akin to walking down a blind alley.

There has always been the reality that Assad could attempt to strike US forces in Syria using his remaining chemical weapons stockpile, the same stockpile that the Russian Federation had confirmed that he had removed. Such an attack could be conducted as a suicide attack or “martyrdom operation”. Assad could potentially conduct such an attack even if his regime was placed in complete jeopardy. Assad is a study in miscalculation and irrationality especially when it comes to military action. A surprise chemical attack against a US base in Syria could have a devastating effect, harming a great number of troops. US troops have guarded against any effort by Assad to put his forces in positions near their bases. Away from the combat zone of Syria, comfort may be found in the thought that US forces could respond to such a chemical strike with an immediate, devastating strike upon the regime, essentially destroying it. Still, a massive retaliatory against the Assad regime would do little to help any US troops lost or injured in such an attack. The US certainly cannot rely upon Moscow to keep Assad in check regarding his chemical weapons. In reality, the door has been left open to his madness for some time. Non omnes eadem amant aut easdem cupiditates studiaque habent. (Not all men love the same things or have the same desires and interests.)

The notion that the presence of US troops in Syria should remain to serve as a barrier or trip wires in case of attacks against US allies and friends by potential adversaries and also by other US allies and friends is abhorrent. With regard to dealing with US allies, the capabilities of US diplomats should not be underrated to the extent that military force posed against allies must suffice for skilled negotiation. As for potential adversaries, it is uncertain what would be the fate of US forces if an adversary launched a swift, concerted attack with combined arms against them. It would appear that many US political leaders, policy analysts, and particularly Trump’s critics and detractors in the US news media are willing to wait and see what happens. Leaving US troops in Syria to continue as they have until the time that they might actually be attacked by an adversary could be called questionable judgment. It would essentially boil down to waiting around until casualties are suffered by US forces. Such thinking does not flow from the concept of America First. If having an available response in Syria is absolutely necessary, US military planners could develop a scheme, for example, to encamp US troops in nearby Iraq, Jordan, or perhaps even Turkey, arrange, determine ways to synchronize surprise deployments or powerful blows from vertical and ground assaults against an attacking force at a time and place of the choosing of US commanders. It might actually be a more effective way to place US forces in a position superior to that of an adversary in order to destroy it as effectually as possible.

If US troops in Syria were attacked in a concerted military way or were hit with some massive terrorist attack and losses were suffered, there is no guarantee that public support would exist nationally and that political will would exist in the US Congress for a large military build up in Syria and perhaps the start of a wider war in the region. Trump administration plans might very well be waylaid by a rebuff from the Congress given that control of the US House of Representatives has gone to the Democrats, the political party in opposition to Trump and his Republican Party, following the 2018 US Congressional Election. All indications are that the intention of the Democrats is to be activist, questioning decisions on foreign and national security policy of the US president and possibly uprooting some. (As these things go, the focus of Trump’s political foes would likely be the tragedy of the attack, itself, and why more consideration had not been given, and why more had not been done, to ensure their safety and security. It might be then that the decision of keeping US troops in Syria would be lambasted as questionable judgment given the mission was so limited.) It would seem best for Trump to act now to ensure the safety and security of US troops, rather than face what could very well be: a tragic situation of unknown consequences; the need to make a decision under duress on whether to remain and fight or withdraw; and, if he decides to remain, almost ensure that he will contend with an enormous political battle over the fight in Syria with Congress. To act now, by withdrawing US troops, rather than wait for an adversary to decide their fate, could be considered prudent. Iniqua raro maximis virtutibus fortuna parcit; nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest, quem saepe transit casus, aliquando invenit. (Unrighteous fortune seldom spares the highest worth; no one with safety can long front so frequent perils. Whom calamity oft passes by she finds at last.)

Israel, Jordan, Turkey, and other regional actors, as well as European allies such as the United Kingdom and France, are already taking steps through airstrikes, ground incursions, raids, and other direct attacks to degrade well-known terrorist groups lurking in strongholds in Syria. Israel, in particular has focused also on placing severe limitations on the capabilities and capacity of a certain country that is also potential adversary of the US in the region. Yet, while such actions have been useful in curating the diverse ecosystem of military forces and terrorist groups on the ground, they have also increased the chances that those elements would attempt to lash out in retribution against US forces in Syria. Thus, as a result of the US troop presence in Syria, US allies have doubtlessly acted in a manner that would avoid precipitating such retribution. Planning for airstrikes in Syria, for example, was done by allies through the Coalition Air Operations Center at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar and independently at their respective national air operations headquarters with US troops on the ground firmly in mind.

The primary and strongest US ally in the region, Israel, has been somewhat restrained in its operations in Syria against some longtime adversaries, who have been malign actors not only in the region, but around the world. Upon the departure of US troops from Syria, Israel will be provided an opportunity, a freer hand, to engage in more effectual and perhaps more robust action there. No longer hamstrung by the potential misstep of provoking its adversaries to strike against US forces ostensibly in retribution for its attacks, Israel may decide to finally crack the problem of the presence of its adversaries being based so close to its sovereign territory. With likely the same minimum of attention its operations in Syria have attracted so far in the global news media, Israel can engage in concentrated operations to degrade its adversaries and eliminate threats with a tempo and ferocity such that those adversaries could no longer face losses inflicted upon them. To borrow a phrase from former US President Richard Nixon, Israel will have the opportunity to “sock it to them!”  If those adversaries would choose to resist exiting Syria, in order to survive, they would very likely be required to redeploy in a way that would make them ineffective on the ground. Indeed, Israel might be able to create the type of environment in Syria that would cause pause among Islamic militant groups hoping to establish themselves in Syria. The extent to which the US might support or assist Israel with any efforts in Syria is uncertain. That would likely be decided sub rosa. However, the US would most likely step up and provide whatever might be possible. Turkey would also have a similar opportunity to respond more robustly against Islamic militant groups in Syria. Turkey’s military capabilities, though, are somewhat limited in comparison to those of Israel and its increased efforts would likely require incurring greater risks.

With regard to impressions the withdrawal of US troops from Syria might have made upon the global audience, few capitals worldwide would likely equate their sovereign countries, whose nationhood and history they extol, to the autonomous Kurdish areas in Syria. While feelings of empathy may be felt by national leaders toward the Kurds situation, most would hardly commit anything too significant from their own resources in support of them. In fact, some national leaders would likely agree with the notion that US troops should be kept out of harm’s way to avoid at least for now, a greater conflict in the region. Cito enim arescit lacrimal praesertim in alienis malis. (A tear quickly dries when shed for the misfortunes of others.)

The withdrawal of US troops from Syria will ostensibly eliminate all financial costs for the US related to that deployment. At the same time, Russia and other countries remaining in Syria will need to keep a robust military and security presence there in order to reasonably maintain control of the situation, or at control of that area referred to as “Useful Syria”. They would most likely need to engage in many more operations against Islamic militant groups to secure peace as such groups may attempt to violently reestablish themselves in the country. The job of “restoring Syria to its past glory” through reconstruction will be incredibly difficult as Russia and one of the countries remaining in Syria are contending with punishing sanctions for misdeeds on other matters. They would surely be precluded collecting the amount of financial resources necessary to engage in such an undertaking successfully. As months and possibly years pass, the effects of wind and rain will make bomb-damaged, dilapidated buildings and other derelict structures even less appealing to the eye. The same global audience whose views on the US troop withdrawal were a concern for Trump’s critics and detractors, would have an excellent opportunity to observe and assess what might be in-store for them if they too relied on the patronage of those countries. They could judge for themselves what leadership from those countries is really worth.

Removing the conventional US military footprint in Syria would place the responsibility to develop a complex comprehensive plan for reconstruction and peace-enforcement in the country squarely in the court of Russia and other countries who remain there. Any attempt to proceed without such a plan would be a huge blunder. Moving too slowly to repair Syria will allow ideal conditions to exist for an Islamic militant groups to attempt to fill the vacuum of power around the country. That is what occurred in Iraq after US forces were withdrawn. It was all pretty much foreseen by many US intelligence analysts. Unfortunately, the histories of Russia and other countries in Syria include no authentic success in such a reconstruction effort in contemporary times. As mentioned already, the economic circumstances of those countries are dire, shaped in great part by sanctions. That factor might do much to hinder them from gathering resources to engage in such an undertaking.

Conditions in Syria may not be optimal for the US, but Trump recognized that he was in a relatively favorable position to make the decision to withdraw, and he did so. Despite all of the bdelygmia, the decision appears to be the result of an in-depth examination of the realities of the Syria mission by Trump and his closest aides and advisers over time. The factors presented here reflect Trump’s pattern of well-considering the short-term and long-term interests of the US, before taking any steps. With so many actors on the stage in Syria doing so many disparate and discreet things, it is also possible that some rarefied, furtive bit of information marked “for the president’s eyes only” may have been behind the choice made. At the risk of unsettling readers by injecting in a bit of levity in the subject matter, one could say that Trump, the erstwhile owner of a plethora of casinos, is expert at knowing “when to hold up, when to fold up, when to walk away, and when to run!”

Commentary: Trump’s Foreign Policy May Dismay Critics Today, But Future Analysts May View It Favorably

US President Donald Trump (right) awards the Medal of Honor to retired US Marine Corps Sergeant Major John Canley (right) for “unmatched bravery” in Vietnam in 1968. Those responsible for handling the record of his heroic actions wrongfully left it inert in official files. After decades passed, the forgotten record was found. The Marine Corps, the Pentagon, and Trump moved to honor Sergeant Major Canley. Presently, it is de rigueur in the US news media to pan Trump’s foreign policy decision making. In Washington policy circles, thinking is mostly negative about it. Perhaps in time, his efforts will be recognized as having well-served US interests worldwide.

In discussing of treatment of Trump by the media in recent posts, the aim of greatcharlie has certainly not been to simply compile its complaints with hope of discouraging the news media from freely expressing itself. After all, it is the moral duty of the “Fourth Estate”, the virtual fourth branch of government, the press, to speak truth to power, look behind the curtain. Offering opinions and judgments are not wrong. In the US, free thinking is a right. However, using the platform of the news media to promote a singular view or sentiment of an administration’s foreign policy is wrong. Even before the Trump administration began on January 20, 2018, the atmosphere was poisoned by exceptionally negative reports and commentaries about Trump from those known as: expert political observers; his admitted political foes, both Democrat and Republican; veterans of the administration of US President Barack Obama; and, other critics and detractors. If it were only a select few critics, perhaps it could be presumed that some strong psychological disturbance was the cause for their venomous reports and commentaries. However, the numbers of those in the resistance grew daily. Nothing about Trump was too small to find flaw with. Anti-Trump news media pundits were even willing to engage in fiery, banal, on the air colloquia over crowd size at his inauguration. There was an insistence by a considerable number of such individuals that a “resistance” against Trump had to formed. All of his potential decisions, works, and anything he said would be the target of vicious, and very often malicious, attacks. Commentaries and other opinion pieces via television, newspapers and magazines–the legacy platforms, and online, have been used to thoroughly question Trump’s intention and to depict him as amoral and proffer how that shapes his thinking and action. For the resistance, an important goal has been to create a divide and separate Trump from the US public. The strategic objective has been to remove Trump from office.

Still, Trump’s focus has not been the so-called resistance. While serving as US President, he is determined to create a country and a world far better for the US public, and will exert himself as he struggles to accomplish what he feels needs to be done. The Ancient Roman Stoic Philosopher, Gaius Musonius Rufus is quoted as stating: “The man who is unwilling to exert himself almost always convicts himself as unworthy of good, since we gain every good by toil.” However, in order for him achieve the maximum with his capabilities, space must be created for Trump that would allow him to construct something positive. Critics and detractors do not want Trump to have that sort of creative space. They have sought to essentially smother him with “slander, defamation, insult, vituperation, malediction, and curse.”

In hac re ratio habenda est ut monitio acerbitate careat. (Reason should be applied to this matter so that the admonition may be without harshness.) Certainly there are many reasons for critics to harbor such strong, negative opinions of Trump. Some critics have doubtlessly joined their bandwagon and criticize without any authentic feelings of despair about him or his administration’s actions. Theirs is a form of avant garde expression that serves to draw attention and entertain more than anything else. To that extent, the suggestion has even been made for greatcharlie to be more practical, and regardless of its own thinking on issues and follow the popular tact of examining the US president with bitterness. That will not happen, as greatcharlie will never subject its readers to essays designed only to gain its blog a place at the metaphorical “cool kids table”. Its readers are provided essays of varied, out of the box points of view, something different than they are getting everywhere else, with the main hope to contribute to the foreign policy debate. Hopefully, it may encourage some to question what are commonly proffered as certainties about current US foreign and national security policy,  If doing that will ensure greatcharlie’s popularity will be somewhat limited, so be it. Perhaps some solace is found in the fact that just because ones work is not popular today, does not mean one will not receive all due recognition later. When historians in the future look at the complete picture of his success, he may be looked upon more favorably and placed far higher among US Presidents than his present critics and detractors could ever imagine. Hyper-critical reports and commentaries today of his policy approaches, his techniques and methods, may very well become figurative dust in the wind. History is replete with examples of how the works of some renown figures were widely panned in their day and then extolled by future generations.

What should have long ago awakened the consciences of the many critics and detractors who attack Trump is the fact that he is a human being, an individual in a challenging position. Examinations of Trump are more akin to ruthless vivisections than commentaries. There are never any expressions of softness or sentimentality mixed in. As things usually wind up, it is discovered that the trouble critics predict will come from Trump is the trouble that does not happen. One may disagree with Trump, but that is no reason to tear everything about him to pieces, sully the Office of the President of the US in ways that will last beyond him, and disassemble anything left that was special about the office. Eventually, attacking Trump with such venom and adolescent exuberance will recognized by at least some critics as a mistake. Humans are humans and they make mistakes. An alert actually should have been sounded by conscience and heard by the body, soul, and spirit of all of his critics. It leads one to wonder whether their consciences have been seared, no longer able guide them on right from wrong or help them know how much is too much. Rarely have critics turned off their figurative  blow torches and made genuine efforts to be constructive, to support, to encourage, or to comfort Trump. Detractors certainly would have no intention to do so. Making things better would require authentically engaging Trump. Few are open-minded enough to do that or would want to be seen publicly doing so. One cannot solve a problem with the same thinking one used when one created the problem. Perhaps the more reasonable among Trump’s critics and detractors would admit that what they are doing is not designed to correct, but rather only damage and destroy. Once time moves on, their actions will stand as their legacy.

Perhaps some attacks on Trump are efforts by critics and detractors to contend with their emotions on: US policies, Obama’s departure, and Hillary Clinton’s election loss. Trump’s victory has caused them so much emotional harm that there is a desire to strike back, to take vengeance. There is the possibility that their varied attacks may just be projections of character flaws that critics see in themselves. This situation brings back the memory of lyrics from a song that greatcharlie learned in his secondary school years at the Horace Mann School in New York City in the late 1970s. The song “Carry on Wayward Son” by Kerry Livgren was performed by the then very popular Rock group Kansas. Some might conclude that the lyrics only tenuously support greatcharlie’s point here, but the mere knowledge of them should at least serve as evidence that greatcharlie was not always a fuddy-duddy. The second stanza states: “Masquerading as a man with a reason/ My charade is the event of the season/ And if I claim to be a wise man,/ it surely means that I don’t know.”

Many might disagree with the following statement, but the reality is that Trump has a wonderful brain. Those who can discern this regularly stand somewhat in awe of his thinking while in action. Facing constant waves of invective, even calumny, Trump has dug deep inside himself and always found a way. In his election campaign, he left his opponents, very qualified and capable candidates, trailing in his wake. Indeed, this stands in stark contrast to the notions of Trump’s alleged vacuity, which is more often deceitfully served up by a variety of angry, aggressive, envious, and ambitious sources camped in all directions. To secure and promote US interests worldwide, Trump adroitly makes use of “guarantors” of US power which include: its economic solidité, the grand puissance of the US military; intelligence services on the qui vive; trés compétent trade representatives and diplomats; and, various law enforcement branches that surveillait l’horizon d’un œil vigilant. To negotiate effectively and successfully in his personal diplomatic efforts with other national leaders, Trump masterfully utilizes a suite of skills, honed and polished after decades of business experience, Trump likes to have room maneuver, innovate, make rapid value judgments on issues and acceptable outcomes, as well as use his intuition and intimations and often combine issues, shape them in a way in the middle of talks that is mutually beneficial to all parties involved. Indeed, on the spot, a remarkable quid pro quo, can be realized.

Except for patriotism and his admitted desire to always win, personal feelings do not impel Trump’s official actions, no matter how his comments on Twitter are interpreted. He acts with logic and reason in the interests of US for both the present and the future. At times, very difficult and even unpleasant choices must be made, choices that can often haunt a president once out of office. However, as the words of Trump’s 2016 Presidential Campaign theme song explained: “You can’t always get what you want.” A decision on an issue is of no value if it creates more problems than it solves. It is not Trump’s intention to make decisions and moves that create more problems, some that may be beyond the sight and impressions of the US public, and then kick those problems down the road for the next president to hopefully resolve. Too much of that has already been done by his predecessors. Moreover, Trump understands well from his business experience that there is usually more than one route to get to a “desired destination”. An alternate route may take longer, it may not be an efficient way to travel, but one ends up in the same place, and typically in far quieter fashion. This notion is certainly applicable to foreign and national security policy issues.

It is apparent that brainstorming is a decision making technique in which Trump often initially engages on an issue with advisers and aides. As a practice, he clearly tends to stoke brainstorming sessions by making suggestions at the far ends of the spectrum. It has the effect of creating intense debates, drawing out explanations from subordinates of their perspectives of a situation as well the basis for their thinking on what might be best. Unfortunately, Trump’s suggestions for action from those sessions are very often leaked and taken out context. His words become the target of criticism, used as examples of Trump’s “extreme” or “dangerous” thinking on issues.

Sola virtus praestat gaudium perpetuum, securum; etiam si quid obstat, nubium modo intervenit, quae infra feruntur nec umquam diem vincunt. (Virtue alone affords everlasting and peace-giving joy; even if some obstacle arise, it is but like an intervening cloud, which floats beneath the sun but never prevails against it.) If Trump can be said to absolutely control anything in the diplomatic and deal-making process, it is ensuring that morality is vested in his own aim. This is another matter with which many would likely disagree. The high standards of his own behavior in negotiations as US President are actually becoming apparent through the success of his diplomatic efforts. Trump is indeed measured and diligent in his interactions with other national leaders. However, what stands out is an honesty, and a forthrightness that opposite parties to negotiations pick up on. Trump’s morality does not serve as method. His morality guides him based on spiritual beliefs, tenets, and instruction on right and wrong received long ago. Trump has a need for God. His conscience may not be perfect, but it has neither been seared nor taken away from him. It may very well be that in the past Trump occasionally strayed from “good ol’ fashioned values.” However, Trump has made the effort to change for the better. Much as the iconic saints, high examples of Godly behavior. Perhaps to some, Trump may not appear to have started well, but he is certainly trying to finish well.

As with the blind men in the allegory of the 13th century Sufi mystic and poet Jalāl Din Muhammed Rūmī, The Elephant in the Dark, no two individuals will have the exact same view. One perceives what one perceives, and it can be difficult for one to convince another of a different opinion. Not even complete awareness of Trump’s successes on the foreign policy front would likely cause critics and detractors to surrender their existing beliefs. As greatcharlie discussed in two previous posts, “Building Relations between Trump and Putin: Getting beyond the ‘Getting to Know You’ Stage” and “Trump Achieved More at Helsinki than Most Noticed: Putin Is Not a Challenge for Him”, that has clearly been the case concerning Trump’s efforts on the US-Russia “front.” When Trump came into office, he had to contend with the legacy of the Obama administration’s work issues. Through its actions and reactions on Russia, for example, the Obama administration greatly polluted and obscured what was already a difficult path to travel. The Obama never put together the right recipe for working well with Putin. He acted on what compelled him personally and incorrectly assessed what would be immediate and long-term benefits and consequences. Indeed, the doors were left open to some aggressive actions by Russia. Seeing those openings, Putin blindsided him more than once. Examples included his actions on Ukraine and on the 2016 US Presidential Election. Obama was caught off-guard and did not have effective responses. Nostalgia is a selective editing of the past. Those who discuss how well Obama’s Russia policy was conduct are not recounting history but engaged in nostalgia. When comparisons are made between the policy approaches during the Obama years and the policies of Trump, memories are flawed. There really is no need for memory because the unsatisfactory conditions in countries and regions in which failed approaches were implemented are more telling of the so-called success than anything else. The failure of veterans of the Obama administration to acknowledge what occurred, the poor planning and disastrous results, has allowed them the wrongly perceived standing to suggest the Trump administration make the same errors in confronting Putin.

Homines libenter id credunt quod volunt. (Men willingly believe that which they wish.) Expressing anger may be gratifying for the psyche short-term, but it is a very poor substitute for the use of intellectual power to resolve a diplomatic matter. This is especially true in diplomacy. Reproaching competitors, opponents, adversaries on the world stage by nagging and striking out with repeated slights accomplishes nothing positive, even when there is some viable follow-on approach to transform the situation over which one is angry. Typically, it will cause the target of that behavior to lash out, sometimes unexpectedly, and in a disproportionate way. The odd insistence of Trump’s political opponents, that he is too soft on world leaders that they find loathsome, is not grounded in real world thinking. It is the same thinking that seems to support their freewheeling, destructive attacks on Trump’s domestic policies, likely hoping that by acting as early as possible, they can shape the outcome of the 2020 US Presidential Election. Seemingly lost in it all is the reality that the 2020 campaign will be won with winning ideas, solutions to problems concerning the US public, not bullying efforts to see if one could both figuratively and literally make Trump cry. Consilio melius contendere atque vincere possumus quam ira. (We can compete and prevail better through wisdom than through anger.

Opinionem quidem et financial eo loco habeamus, tanquam non ducere sed sequi debeat. (As for rumor and reputation, let us consider them as matters that must follow, not guide, our actions.) Nothing stated about Trump has managed to impede him. He sees himself as complete, competent, and worthy of the US presidency. Trump accepts that such will most likely be the course of coverage him. There is very little that he can do to defeat it in the short term. At times, Trump’s best efforts to remain disciplined in the face of the harshest invective and often childlike taunts, every now and then, he emits a reactionary expression of anger on Twitter. That more than anything else confirms that he is only human. The fact that Trump has not allowed himself to be debilitated by incessant polemical news reports, broadcasts, commentaries, speeches, and “resistance” marches has been a key element in his success. He has grown in self-confidence, in wisdom statutory, and in favor with average citizen. He has seemingly begun to glory in performing well in the face of opposition and persecution. Interesting enough, Trump has conversely become the torment if critics and detractors. Their souls were seared first by his election victory, and are further now charred by his mere appearance, his every word, and his accomplishments.

Within Thomas Paine’s extraordinary January 10, 1776 pamphlet, Common Sense, is found the sentence: “Time makes more converts than reason.” If the cause for the refusal to acknowledge Trump’s achievements is simply comprehension diffidence, it is possible that the reality of his accomplishments will themselves challenge, knock down negative as well as hostile premises about Trump, not at the moment, but perhaps in the near future. This was the case for many great Western musical composers. Ludwig van Beethoven, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, and Béla Bartók provide good examples. Contemporary reviewers of their work, so eager to offering a jarring, eye catching reviews, stated nothing positive, and seemingly sought to silence composers or convince audiences to reject their artistry. Those reviewers escaped the real challenge of encouraging audiences to enrich their perspectives by exposing themselves to what is new, different.

In August 1823 in London, Harmonicon published a trenchant review of Beethoven’s final piano sonata. The Harmonicon reporter declared the sonata a musical disaster, and cruelly assessed that the failure was due to Beethoven’s inability to hear. The review stated: “Beethoven is not only still numbered amongst the living, but is at a period of life where the mind, if in corpore sano, is in its fullest vigor, for he has not yet completed his fifty-second year. Unfortunately, however, he is suffering under a privation that to a musician is intolerable – he is almost totally bereft of the sense of hearing; insomuch that it is said he cannot render the tones of his pianoforte audible to himself. The Sonata, op. 111 consists of two movements. The first betrays a violent effort to produce something in the shape of a novelty. In it are visible some of those dissonances the harshness of which may have escaped the observation of the composer….” While it was true that by the time Beethoven wrote the sonata, he had lost his hearing. However, as for the quality of the piece, today it is recognized as being innovative and brilliant, well ahead of its time. Experts today point to the second movement that includes variations towards the end that resemble Ragtime, a music style that would be developed 80 years later.

On October 31, 1898, a Boston Evening Transcript review attacked Tchaikovsky’s 6th Symphony. It was the master composer’s final completed work. He died nine days after its 1893 premiere. In the review, the symphony is compared to the French novelist and playwright Emile Zola’s 1865 book, La Confession de Claude (Claude’s Confession). In his “experimental novel”, the main character destroys himself by remaining with a demimondaine with which he fell in love and sought to rescue. The book was banned in the US and the United Kingdom. The review also compares the symphony in quality to Tchaikovsky’s decomposing corpse. The review stated: “The Pathetique Symphony threads all the foul ditches and sewers of human despair; it is unclean as music well can be. One might call the Zola’s Confession de Claude set to music! That unspeakable second theme may tell of what Heine called ‘Die verschwundene, susse, blode Jugendeselei‘: the impotent senile remembrance of calf love. But of what a calf love! That of Hogarth’s lazy apprentice. Indisputably there is power in it: who but Tchaikovsky could have made the vulgar, obscene phrase powerful? The second movement, with its strabismal rhythm, is hardly less ignoble; the third, sheer billingsgate. In the finale, bleary-eyed paresis meets us face to face; and that solemn closing epitaph of the trombones might begin with: ‘Here continues to rot…'” Even today, some experts describe the 6th symphony’s ending as depressive, point to the controversy of its implied program. Still, most also call the symphony Tchaikovsky’s greatest musical work.

On May, 13th 1923 in London, a review in The Observer cruelly and severely attacked Bartók’s compositions as well as his abilities on the piano. The review stated: “”I suffered more than upon any occasion in my life apart from an incident or two connected with ‘painless dentistry.’ To begin with, there was Mr. Bartok’s piano touch. But ‘touch,’ with its implication of light-fingered ease, is a misnomer, unless it be qualified in some such way as that of Ethel Smyth in discussing her dear old teacher Herzogenberg – ‘He had a touch like a paving-stone.’ I do not believe Mr. Bartok would resent this simile . . . If Bartok’s piano compositions should ever become popular in this country, there will have to be established a special Anti-Matthay School to train performers for them, and I believe that it will be found that piano manufacturers will refuse to hire out pianos for the recitals of its alumni, insisting that these shall always be bought outright, and the remains destroyed on conclusion . . . .” Although many of Bartók’s contemporaries misunderstood his style of music composition, today, Bartok is generally understood to be one of the greatest composers of the 20th century. He is renowned for being a pioneer of ethnomusicology, the study of different cultural approaches to creating and composing music. Thematic material from the folk songs of other cultures were incorporated into Bartók’s compositions. They were mixed with 20th Century classical music techniques.

Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. (If one doesn’t know his mistakes, he won’t want to correct them.) The foreign and national security policy of the US is in pretty good shape, but that would be difficult for some to discern given what is generally being broadcasted, published, and posted about it. Trump’s successes so far have been unheard of in the past. They seem like mirages, but his accomplishments are very real. To that extent that situation is very different, the US public can hardly imagine that their world has improved so much. Instead, many have a sense that there is too much insecurity in the world. Indeed, the world seems to be moving too fast for some, everything appears harder to control, and ones life, money, children, everything, seems transient. The world also seems to be a wilderness in which predators, in the form of telemarketers, government officials at federal, state, and local levels, and political leaders, ruthlessly exercise powers of manipulation, lurk. No one wants to become one of their victims. Such concerns among the US public have been tapped into by Trump’s critics and detractors. The negative monologue of their critiques and complaints about Trump is that he should not serve as US President. It is very easy to jump to conclusions about the thoughts, beliefs, motivations and actions of others based solely on one interpretation. The width of the spectrum of human behavior is great, one should not be perfect limited especially to the prism of those who are admittedly disappointed, discontented, and discouraged. They may very well be on the wrong side of history. On its own, the US public must recognize the unappealing penchant of Trump’s critics and detractors to more or less amplify this sentiment. The public will not be able to get anywhere near the whole picture until it gets clear of the destructive voices of critics and detractors which can be found everywhere and seek out, and take into consideration, different points of view; solid, well-considered reports and discussions that are positive and optimistic. (In that process, may God protect them from Russian operatives and operatives of other countries attempting to influence US public opinion.) Examinations and analyses that might look deeper and with some empathy with regard to what Trump is doing and why, will likely be more complete and far more edifying.

A Link between Trump’s June 2018 Letters to European Allies and His July 2018 Summit with Putin: A View from Outside the Box

US President Donald Trump (right) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) at the G7 meeting in Charlevoix. Trump believes NATO should deploy a combined force under its collective security arrangement that truly has the capability and capacity to deter, and if necessary, fight and defeat attacks from all directions, but especially an attack from their most likely adversary: Russia. He believes the time to rebuild NATO is now. The degree to which the Europeans invest in the build up of their defense will impact how Trump will handle situations concerning Europe with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

The renowned US foreign policy scholar and former US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, stated that sophisticated US leadership is sine qua non of a stable world order. US President Donald Trump has set forth to serve in the leadership role as prescribed. Serving that role entails meeting with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to discuss matters concerning the world’s strongest nuclear powers and the threat posed by Russia to European security. As the leader of West, he must also serve as the steward of NATO and ensure transatlantic security is effectively maintained. On its face, there is a link between these matters as concerns of the president. However, the tie is much greater.

Trump plans to meet with Putin both one-on-one and in a formal meeting with delegations of aides in Helsinki, Finland on July 16, 2018. The meeting will be the first formal summit talks between them. They have met previously on the sidelines of conferences. They have also had a number of telephone conversations. The decision by the two leaders to have summit meeting was actually reached through phone conversations on March 20, 2018 and April 2, 2018. US National Security Adviser John Bolton explained in an televised interview, “The goal of this meeting really is for the two leaders to have a chance to sit down, not in the context of some larger multilateral meeting, but just the two of them, to go over what is on their mind about a whole range of issues.” In a conversation with reporters aboard Air Force One on June 29, 2018, Trump said that he planned to talk to Putin about everything. He further stated: “We’re going to talk about Ukraine, we’re going to be talking about Syria, we’ll be talking about elections. And we don’t want anybody tampering with elections. We’ll be talking about world events. We’ll be talking about peace. Maybe we talk about saving billions of dollars on weapons, and maybe we don’t.” (There is also a good chance that the ears of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un will be burning once the one-on-one session is underway.) At the same time news broke about the planned summit, reports that Trump sent letters in June 2018 to several European leaders concerning NATO surfaced. The letters also arrived one month before the July 11-12, 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels. Trump purportedly explained in the letters that after more than a year of public and private complaints that allies have not done enough to share the burden of collective security. Trump hinted that in response, he might consider a significant modification in how US forces are deployed in Europe. The letters have indeed been the latest figurative ladle Trump has used to stir billows in the pot with European leaders. While most might view it as doubtful, Trump means well, and at least from his perspective, he has done everything for all the right reasons. Indeed, a closer look at the situation, or a look at the situation from outside the box, indicates that the situation is not as bad as it may seem to other European leaders and their advisers.

Trump wants to get a handle on the important matter of Europe’s defense and transatlantic collective security. He wants to actually do something about the threat that Russia poses to Europe, and contrary to everything critics have stated, make NATO a genuine defense against potential Russian aggression posed by Putin or any other leaders. Trump believes the time to rebuild NATO is now. He would like to have European leaders move away from staid thinking and somewhat superficial action on their security, and deploy a combined force under NATO’s collective security arrangement that truly has the capability and capacity to deter, and fight and win if deterrence fails. The rather restrained efforts of the Europeans so far will have a direct impact on how he might handle situations concerning Europe with Putin. Trump wants them to stop making it so difficult for him to work with them. The purpose here is to take a deeper look, from outside the box, at Trump’s approach to enhancing Europe’s defense and transatlantic security. It illustrates that main task for Trump is not simply to garner increases in spending on NATO, but encourage the Europeans to change their relatively relaxed perspectives and take more energetic approaches toward their own security. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Finding a way to establish an authentic positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would give his best effort to finding a solution.  He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. Trump has already met with Putin and by Putin’s admission, he and Trump regularly discuss matters by phone. However, everything is not perfect yet; rough patches exist.

Trump-Putin Summit: A Chance to Investigate Possibilities

Finding a way to establish an authentic, positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would give his best effort to finding a solution.  He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. Trump logically concluded that accomplishing these things would first require establishing a positive relationship with Putin. Trump has already met him and so far their chemistry has been good. By Putin’s admission, he and Trump regularly discuss matters by phone. However, everything is not perfect; many rough patches exist. In assessing the possibility of improving relations with Russia, albeit in the abstract, Trump has taken a good look inside. He has not missed what has been happening there. He is aware that Russia is an authoritarian regime with all of the authoritarian tendencies at home and abroad. That authoritarianism is harnessed by a quest for economic development. Commingled with that is the politicization of local economic activity. What creates the slightest possibility that economic development may pan out in some way is the fact that Russia is oil rich. Still, that possibility has been dampened somewhat by the reality that Russia is a criminalized state. In terms of foreign policy, the goal of authoritarian Russia is to supplant Western power, diminish Western influence, and weaken stability promoted by the West. Russia has also sought to increase its influence in Eastern and Central Europe. In the previous US administration, that region was not a priority. The previous US administration introduced policy approaches such as “Pivot to Asia” and the “reset with Russia” which sent the wrong signals to Moscow. Russia had kept its sights on the region. It was have very senior leaders visit the region frequently.To the extent that it could, Russia would invest in infrastructure, provide military assistance, and support pro-Russian political parties and movements. Occasional visits from US officials supported a perception in Washington that is was engaged. The vacuum created by the delinquency of the previous US administration in the region was filled by Russia.

After Moscow grabbed Crimea and began to shape Eastern Ukraine, the US made it clear that it did not accept what occurred and set clear boundaries for Russia in Ukraine. Expectations were laid out. Still, Russia has continued to engage in aggressive behavior. Over 10,000 Ukrainians have been killed in the struggle in Donetsk and Luhansk. In the Trump administration, no doubt has been left in public statements and messaging. Sanctions remain in place. The US is willing to engage with Russia where there are shared interests. Counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation are examples of that. However, nefarious Russian moves, as seen in Montenegro, Moldova, Bulgaria, and threatening language toward States as Macedonia, Norway, and Finland, have drawn and will prompt harsh language from the US. Russia has even sought to antagonize Trump through efforts such as boasting about the strength of Russia’s arsenal and using computer graphics to illustrate the ability of hypersonic weapons to reach his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida. Trump broached that matter with Putin during his phone call with him on March 20, 2018. US efforts to counter Russian moves have not only included pressing for greater burden sharing on defense, but also weakening support for Nord Stream II.

An additional factor for Trump to consider is the influence of Russia’s intelligence industry–the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security from Russia’s Soviet past, the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB; the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR; and, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU–has on the society. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia really became a criminal country. By successfully navigating through the banality, incompetence, and corruption of the Soviet government, the intelligence industry managed to stand on top of all that was good, the bad, and ugly in the new Russia. Intelligence officers have  always been fully aware of what was transpiring in their country. Soviet intelligence officers recognized when the collapse of their country was underway. Yet, they viewed it as a duty to keep the truth from the people. Information control was also used as the justification for such action. Prevaricating remains part of the government’s life system and survival system. Perhaps the primary goal of such mendacity now is to “make Russia great again.” When the truth plays a role, it is misused. Facts are distorted to cloak some scheme. The truth will many times threaten Moscow’s efforts. When Russian untruthfulness is encountered by the West on issues great and minor, often the response is surprise and disappointment. Confronting Moscow on the truth will not bring a satisfactory result. There will be no admissions, no confessions, no mea culpas. That being said, Trump should still meet with the leader who sits on top of it all to find out what is happening in Russia.

As explained in a February 28, 2018 greatcharlie post entitled, “A Russian Threat on Two Fronts: A New Understanding of Putin, Not Inadequate Old Ones, Will Allow the Best Response,” Putin prepares for his meetings or any other official contacts in advance, by mining available information about his scheduled interlocutors and by considering all possible angles of how they might challenge him and how he would explain himself in a plausible, satisfying way. Such is the nature of politics as well as diplomacy. Putin is super observant. It is a quality that stirs admiration from some and or elicits terror in others. If any one could detect a hint of anger or dissention in the eyes, in mannerisms, in bearing and deportment, in the words of another, it would be Putin. Usus, magister egregius. (Experience, that excellent master.)

A long espoused, jejune criticism of Trump is that he has a self-enchantment with tyrants, strongmen, rogue leaders such as Putin. His comments about Putin have been decried by critics as being unduly pleasant and oleaginous particularly in light of reports from the US Intelligence Community that Russia interfered in the 2016 US Presidential Election. Trump dismisses the obloquy of critics. In reality, Trump, rather than finding Putin intoxicating, has developed his own reservations about him having had a number of disappointing experiences with him in the past year. Indeed, while engaged in diplomacy, the Trump administration has observed hostile Russian moves such as continued interference n US elections, as well as those of other countries, efforts to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and the effort to tighten Moscow’s grip Crimea and the Donbass. Nevertheless, with optimism spurred by having found some areas of agreement and given the degree of mutual respect between Putin and himself, Trump still seeks to engage Russia in a way that will improve relations long-term. As one cause for the summit meeting, Trump hopes he might find some touch that he could put on the situation to knock everything into the right direction. As another cause for the summit, Trump is investigating the degree to which Putin is a threat to European defense and transatlantic collective security. Much as it is the case in any legitimate investigation, Trump, is interviewing its subject: Putin. Trump also has system of evaluation people developed from his experience as a business negotiator. Trump has an understanding of human nature, and even sympathy for human frailty. One of his greatest strengths is his capacity for listening. However, when necessary, he can be stubborn and stone-hearted. After the one-on-one session, Trump will better understand Putin’s thinking and intentions from what he hears and what he does not hear. Through well-crafted questions, he should collect enough information to satisfy his own concerns. His skilled observations of Putin’s behavior will also serve to inform. Surely, Trump is fully aware the Putin will attempt to glean information from him. Res ipsa repperi facilitate nihil esse homini melius neque clementia. (I have learned by experience that nothing is more advantageous to a person than courtesy and compassion.)

Trump aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier (above) To immediately field a NATO force that would be genuinely capable of deterring and if necessary fight, repel, and defeat Russian forces the US would need to cover any gaps in NATO’s strength, earmarking a sizeable portion of its forces primarily for that task. Trump cannot rightly increase US spending and invest more US troops in NATO, if the Europeans intend to simply sit back and let the US carry the load, and potentially cut back on defemsr. The Europeans can build stronger armies and field more advanced weapon systems.

Trump Sought to Energize, Not Antagonize with His Letters

The US commitment to NATO is extant. Even after all that has been said, Trump absolutely understands that NATO is essential to the defense of the US and its interests in Europe. Although Trump has not made a grand display of his concern, he actually sees Russia not only as a competitor, but as a genuine threat. The US  will take the lead in handling Russia during his administration, but he wants the European to genuinely stand beside the US in its efforts. In 2017, the Trump administration explained that taking the lead internationally and advancing US military, political and economic strength is a vital US interest. To that extent, the Trump administration has promised to greatly increase the capabilities and capacity of the US military. Additionally, it has sought to bolster US power by strengthening its alliances and its partnerships with economically thriving partners. It has done so while ensuring that those alliances and partnerships are based on mutual respect and shared responsibility. In the US National Security Council’s summary under, ”Preserve Peace Through Strength”, steps the administration stated it would take were outlined as follows: “We will rebuild America’s military strength to ensure it remains second to none. America will use all of the tools of statecraft in a new era of strategic competition–diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to protect our interests. America will strengthen its capabilities across numerous domains–including space and cyber–and revitalize capabilities that have been neglected. America’s allies and partners magnify our power and protect our shared interests. We expect them to take greater responsibility for addressing common threats. We will ensure the balance of power remains in America’s favor in key regions of the world: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.” Trump’s letters to European leaders manifested his determination to get them to significantly increase their military expenditures, make NATO an authentic deterrent to potential Russian aggression, and along the way, take greater responsibility for addressing common threats. Some might find it confusing, but the letters also evinced the degree to which Trump is genuinely concerned about the well-being of Europe and NATO. According to the New York Times, the actual number of letters sent by Trump has not been revealed. The White House explained that it does not comment on presidential correspondence. Other sources apparently informed the New York Times that at least a dozen were sent. Supposedly, recipients included: Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

Each letter reportedly echoed Trump’s complaint that the NATO allies are not living up to the commitment they made at their Wales summit meeting in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense. US National Security Adviser John Bolton said in an televised interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation” that “The president wants a strong NATO.” He went on to state: “If you think Russia’s a threat, ask yourself this question: Why is Germany spending less than 1.2 percent of its GNP? When people talk about undermining the NATO alliance, you should look at those who are carrying out steps that make NATO less effective militarily.” However, shortly before the letters were sent, Europeans officials sought to defend their respective failures to meet the 2 percent pledge. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, for example, said Germany will increase defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2024. She further explained that Germany and all NATO allies, however, only committed to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. In her view, there was no pledge in the text of the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration to spend at least 2 percent by 2024. At Wales, it was only agreed that NATO countries aim to move toward the 2 percent guideline within a decade. Some military analysts argue that tying defense spending to GDP makes no sense. Moreover, it leads to issues concerning changes in GDP, a country’s respective spending on defense, and how a country’s defense budget is spent. Semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixens, cognitandum. (A promise must be kept not only in the letter but in the spirit.)

Excerpts of Trump’s letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel was shared with the New York Times by someone who saw it. Trump allegedly wrote to Merkel: “As we discussed during your visit in April, there is growing frustration in the United States that some allies have not stepped up as promised.”  He continued: “The United States continues to devote more resources to the defense of Europe when the Continent’s economy, including Germany’s, are doing well and security challenges abound. This is no longer sustainable for us.” Regarding frustration over NATO in the US, Trump explained: “Growing frustration is not confined to our executive branch. The United States Congress is concerned, as well.” Trump also posited in the letter that Germany deserves blame for the failure of other NATO countries to spend enough, writing: “Continued German underspending on defense undermines the security of the alliance and provides validation for other allies that also do not plan to meet their military spending commitments, because others see you as a role model.” Most likely in a further effort to light a fire under the Europeans, the Trump administration made it known that the US had been analyzing a large-scale withdrawal of US forces from Germany.

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis expressed concern over the direction that the United Kingdom was moving regarding defense in his own letter to the United Kingdom’s Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson. The United Kingdom has cut defense spending over the past decade in line with an austerity program that has also seen cuts to domestic spending. London and Paris still field far and away the most powerful militaries in Europe. While Mattis noted that the United Kingdom, a NATO allies that has met the alliance’s target of 2 percent spending of GDP on the military, he insisted it was not good enough for a country of its status. Regarding the United Kingdom’s global role, Mattis proffered that it “will require a level of defense spending beyond what we would expect from allies with only regional interests.” Mattis went on to state: “I am concerned that your ability to continue to provide this critical military foundation … is at risk of erosion.” Supporting his position, Mattis explained: “The reemergence of the great power competition requires that we maintain vigilance and the ability to operate across the full combat spectrum, notably at the high end.” He continued: “While we must sustain military capabilities to deter, and win if deterrence fails . . . we must also improve and enhance those capabilities if we’re to carry out our obligations to future peace.” As part of process of turning the situation around, Mattis asked for a “clear and fully funded, forward defense blueprint” from the United Kingdom. Mattis stated that “It is in the best interest of both our nations for the UK to remain the U.S. partner of choice.” However, he noted that France was increasing its spending, and wrote: “As global actors, France and the U.S. have concluded that now is the time to significantly increase our investment in defense.” Some Members of Parliament have called for spending to increase to 2.5 or 3 percent of national output from 2 percent.

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis (left) and Gernan Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen (right). Shortly before Trump sent letters to European leaders, a number of European officials have sought to defend their respective failures to meet the 2 percent pledge. Von der Leyen, for example, said Germany will increase defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2024. She further explained that Germany and all NATO allies, however, only committed to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. In her view, there was no pledge at Wales to “spend at least 2 percent by 2024.”

An Awful Experience for the Europeans

In his first book, De Officiis (on Duties) written in 44 B.C., the renowned Roman orator and statesman of Roman Republic, Marcus Tullius Cicero explained that individuals do not exist to be in constant antagonistic contest. Instead, individuals exist to help each other in peaceful cooperation to the mutual benefit of all. He stated: “Consequently, we ought in this to follow nature as our leader, to contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone together and, by exchange of dutiful services, by giving and receiving effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other.” Europeans leaders unlikely sensed from his inauguration Day on January 20, 2017, that working with Trump would not be a passeggiata. However, there appears to be more than the usual occasions of disappointment and discord with their ally across the Atlantic. Trump’s statements directed toward European leaders on NATO has resulted in an emotional mangle. Real feelings of trepidation exist among them. When national leaders are fogged in on an issue and cannot get a handle on a situation in a satisfying way, there is an anxiety, a sense of panic that ensues. Not being able to answer big questions on foreign policy, especially when they are dealing with such a powerful and influential country as the US will often obstruct, even thwart efforts to formulate and implement policies, strategies, and nuanced approaches.

The popular response of European leaders toward Trump has been to react intemperately and to figuratively march against him, banners of their countries flying. They are well-aware that by reproaching Trump, they will be feted in their respective national news media and within the public of their countries. However, the small benefits derived from pleasing crowds at home is far outweighed by the bigger picture of their countries respective relationships with the US. Many European leaders have not looked beyond the surface by trying to better discern Trump’s words and deeds, by ratcheting up diplomatic and other contacts with US, and devising fresh approaches to work better with the Trump administration. They have failed to view these quarrels as opportunities to develop new, better, enriching paths to take with the US.  What they have done is create the danger of driving their countries’ relations with the US down to lower points. A notable exception to all of this has been German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Although still bearing the brunt of Trump’s admonishments of the Europeans, her approach to Trump has evolved in a very sophisticated, constructive way. She now takes a solution oriented, not a reactionary, approach to issues at hand, taking a hopeful tone with Trump and encouraging him to consider what she is relaying . On the matter of trade, she has offered thoughtful options particularly on economic issues that could mitigate an exchange of harsh tariffs. Merkel is aware that when there are confrontations between European leaders and Trump, “in the heat of battle”, a tigerish performance will be seen from him. That has only had a deleterious effect on relations with US, decelerating the process of finding solutions to issues. Merkel will very likely accomplish much as she moves in a methodical way toward the US president. Given the attitudes and behavior of some European leaders toward him, Trump undoubtedly appreciates the sangfroid and steadfastness displayed by Merkel, and the good rapport he has been developing with her.

Trump’s own responses on social media to reactions in European capitals to his admonishments, not only by letter, but via official statements and messaging, represent his immediate perceptions and his frustration that his counterparts are not seeing issues in the same way he does. At a deeper level, Trump is most likely very disappointed that such discord has been obtained as a result of his words. His goal is certainly not to defeat or lay seize to his allies on the issue of of defense spending. The European allies are definitely not his foes and not perceived as such by him in the slightest way. His actions are not part of some decision to engage in endless campaigns of finger wagging against European allies to achieve some strange, vacuous sense of  superiority over them as has been suggested by some critics. Words have flown back and forth, and critics have described it as chaos. However, order could still be found in that so-called chaos. There is structure underpinning every foreign policy tack taken by Trump.

When deciding to approach European leaders on what he believes NATO must do to defeat that threat, Trump clearly did not feel the situation would allow for some longer term effort in which he would try to cultivate their affections. Trump’s letters to European leaders evince that he doubts they are ready to act on their own volition in a way that cause any real strain. Trump also apparently feels that time is the essence and that facts, not sentiment, support that view. Those NATO Members whose borders are closest to Russia sense the threat. However, it appears that the farther west NATO Members are situated from that virtual “boundary line” with Russia, the weaker their sense of immediate emergency becomes. European leaders may fulminate against Russia in public speeches, creating the optics of being resolute on defense during election campaign or otherwise. Yet, they are less energetic in using their countries’ tools of national power–military, diplomatic, economic, political, and information–to make the situation better. Trump may complain but, they will still hesitate to invest in defense. It may very well be that the alarms set off by Russia’s move into Crimea have been somewhat quieted and nerves are less frayed in capitals over what occurred. Still, Russia has not gone away.

The conceptual sixth-generation US fighter, the F-X (above). Trump has not made a grand display of his concern, but he likely sees Russia as a threat, not just a competitor. In 2017, the Trump administration explained that the US would take the lead internationally and advance US military, political and economic strength. The capabilities and capacity of the US military would be greatly increased. New fighters such as the F-X would be built. Alliances and partnerships based on mutual respect and shared responsibility would also be strengthened.

A Deeper Dive Regarding Trump’s Concerns

Quod dubites, ne feceris. (Never do a thing concerning the rectitude of which you are in doubt.) Likely uppermost in Trump’s mind is how he would ever be able to make progress on NATO when the mindset, the psyche of the allied leaders, evinces a somewhat limited interest in genuinely making the situation better. By all that is being said by national leaders, it sounds as if they want a strong defense, but they are acting quite differently. Indeed, Trump hears Europeans complain about Russian actions and potential actions in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and even the Baltic States, a fellow NATO Member. However, complaining and repositioning a modicum of forces will not allow Trump to legitimately tell Putin how energized and prepared NATO Members are ready to act against any aggression especially when its members still will not meet politically agreed goals of spending. Their will and readiness to act must real if their efforts are to have any meaning in the military sense, not the domestic political sense.

Trump is frustrated by the fact that the wrong signals are being sent to Putin by the casual attitude and relaxed behavior of the Europeans. Putin has little reason to be impressed with NATO. The Europeans can be assured that he watching events far more carefully than they would like. He has noticed the degree to which European leaders actually care for Ukraine. Perhaps European leaders would argue that they are providing arms and advisers to Ukraine and have bolstered the defense of the Baltic States and have had their armed forces participate in greater numbers in NATO exercises as well. However, looking good by doing a few good things is not the same as being good, by doing everything at the levels required. Putin may very well be wondering whether European leaders may go soft if he “supports” pro-Russian activity deeper or elsewhere in that Ukraine, if he takes more of Georgia, if he builds up its military and naval bases in Kaliningrad, or if he positions Russian ground forces in a way that threatens the Suwalki Gap. Putin has been engaged in a campaign of probes, investigating, testing the resolve of European leaders with aerial and naval intrusions into NATO airspace and waters. Such prospective moves on the ground would make the Russian threat three dimensional, and leave little doubt in the minds of NATO military analysts that his campaign of probes would best serve the purpose of preparing for military action. To field a NATO force genuinely capable of deterring and if necessary fight, repel, and defeat Russian forces, the US itself would need to cover any gaps in NATO’s strength, earmarking a sizeable portion of its forces primarily for that task.

Trump cannot rightly increase US spending, invest more US troops in NATO, if the Europeans intend to simply sit back and let the US carry the load, and potentially cut back and actually do less. That would hardly be in the interest of the US, especially when the Europeans could build stronger armies and field more advanced weapon systems and gear. What would likely happen is that the Europeans would let the US do all the heavy lifting. The US military cannot be allowed to be a surrogate army for the Europeans.

Given NATO’s current capabilities and capacity, in reality, it may not be able to successfully defend any threatened territory. Trump wants to know why any European leader would think that he should deploy US troops overseas in a somewhat likely untenable defense of countries, particularly when those countries are not fully committed to their own security. Trump wants Europeans leaders to see and understand his position. European leaders successfully transmitted the message that they want Trump and US government to be more understanding of the political considerations that has hamstrung them from taking robust action on NATO. However, they have not publicly expressed empathy or compassion for the position of the US. Recognizing the need to bolster NATO on the ground in Europe, and the great value it has placed in its ties to European allies, the US had consistently bit the bullet over many years and committed its military wherewithal to Europe knowing the Europeans would not do their fair share. Omnes sibi malle melius esse qualm alteri.  (It is human nature that every individual should wish for his own advantage in preference to that of others.)

When deciding how to approach European leaders on what he believes NATO must do to defeat the threat posed by Russia, Trump apparently did not feel the situation would allow for a long term effort in which he would try to cultivate their affections. Trump’s letters to European leaders evince that he doubts they are ready act on their own volition in a way that cause any real strain. Trump seems to feel that time is of the essence and that facts, not sentiment, support his view. On a deeper level, Trump is likely disappointed that such discord was obtained as a result of his words.

Although he has not been a politician for long, Trump has discovered much since his full immersion into the world of politics.  It would seem that based on what he has learned so far, which can be added to the considerable experience in human interactions that  he has already acquired, he most likely has a sense that political expediency, not pragmatic thinking, not a genuine concern about national defense, could inevitably be shaping their sense of reality.  Trump understands that those leaders are under pressure to find more money for health, education, the police, immigration, financial pressure created by economically weaker EU members. They will offer explanations, arguments, and occasionally nod the heads and agree that more must be done, then return to doing whatever is expedient. Therefore, Trump is pushing the Europeans hard on the matter. Trump is aware of the fact that while it is a commendable decision, it is not an easy decision for a citizen to engage in the process to become a national leader. Perhaps is could decision could be driven by a calling for some to serve the respective interest of their people and their countries. The job itself, for those who do it well, can become a living sacrifice. The business of politics can be heteroclite. Horse trading is at the very heart of interactions between politicians. If the opportunity arises, they will negotiate preferred conditions, protect and possibly improve the status of their political realms, better things for their constituents and their benefactors, secure their interests. It is often during that negotiating process that things can get mixed up. What is declared a satisfactory outcome becomes relative to the situation. This point can be sardonically illustrated as follows: Politicians may accept as true that the sum of 2 plus 2 equals 4, but after horse trading, many might be willing to agree that the sum is 5! Something that is not quite right is accepted as the new reality. During the next opportunity to negotiate, 2 plus 2 might equal 4 again! This is not corruption, it is simply nature of give and take that is part of the job. “You can’t always get what you want!  Yet, given that apparent mindset, what is evinced from the decisions by European leaders on defense is more style than substance, full of sound and fury that signifies nothing to a threatening adversary. Utque in corporibus sic in imperio gravissimus est morbus, qui a capite diffunditur. (It is in the body politic, as in the natural, those disorders are most dangerous that flow from the head.)

Trump has a sense that European military commanders are well-aware that greater efforts are needed by their respective countries in order provide for an authentic defense of Europe. Moreover, they know the matter is not black and white and cannot be corrected by simply increasing spending. An approach to defense, genuinely based on the idea of deterring an opponent, and fight and defeat the opponent if deterrence fails, must exist. However, they are subordinated to civilian authority, political leadership. Defense officials and military commanders that may insist on expressing such concerns, in the past have been rebuffed, scorned, called paranoid is potentially destabilizing, creating undue uncertainty and insecurity in the minds of the public. They may also be admonished for unnecessarily creating concerns among potential enemies or direct threats to potential adversaries which leaders hope to relax by being cautious and calibrated in their decisions on defense. Denied what they need to succeed by political leaders, their civilian authorities, absent a decision to resign from their respective armed forces, military commanders have little choice but to submit to that authority and fight and likely fail with whatever is given to them. This behavior was evinced in NATO discussions on considering how to organize the NRF and smaller VJTF. In the creation of the force, the well-considered, educated assumption was made that Russia, advancing westward militarily once more, would again use the tactics seen in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in Ukraine. In the best case scenario for NATO, it would be alerted before Russian forces rushed into a neighboring country using heavy armored and mechanized units, highly mobile infantry, combat service units, and combat service support units, by observing it painstakingly massing along the mutual border with the country or countries it threatens. However, it would be counter-intuitive for Russian military commanders to do that. It would be similarly counter-intuitive for Russia to use the hybrid warfare tactic which NATO is best organized to oppose in any future moves. In the Zapad 2017 exercises, Russian forces displayed the capability to rapidly mass and quickly and successfully engage an opposing force. If instead of a hybrid attack, Putin ordered a Russian force, truly overwhelming in size and combat power, to rapidly mass and roll into a neighboring country and quickly engage and drive through elements the VJTF on the ground, it might be futile for the VJTF or NRF fly into a non permissive environment in an attempt to reinforce those vastly outnumbered or overrun elements. The quantity of pre-positioned weapon systems and ordinance that made available to it might be of little consequence. NATO forces deployed on the ground must be of sufficient size and power that such a move by Russia would be unthinkable.

Trump is frustrated by the fact that the wrong signals are being sent to Putin by the casual attitude and relaxed behavior of the Europeans. Putin has little reason to be impressed with NATO. The Europeans can be assured that he watching events far more carefully than they would like. Putin may be wondering whether European leaders may go soft if he “supports” pro-Russian activity deeper orelsewhere in that Ukraine, if he takes more of Georgia, if he builds up military and naval bases in Kaliningrad, or if he positions ground forces in a way that threatens the Suwalki Gap.

The Europeans Must Take a Winning Perspective Regarding Their Defense

Meminimus quanto maiore animo honestatis fructus in conscientia quam in fama reponatur. Sequi enim gloria, non appeti debet (I am sensible how much nobler it is to place the reward of virtue in the silent approbation of one’s own breast than in the applause of the world. Glory ought to be the consequence, not the motive of our actions.) Trump seeks to accomplish much for Europe. Some of his goals would have been unheard of in the past. His effort to achieve them is not a mirage. Critics have so desperately tried to convince the world he seeks to do more harm than good. A common, casual, and dastardly way to take down a patriotic citizen of any country is to bring one’s loyalty into question. To the extent that the ongoing investigations into alleged collusion of the 2016 US Presidential Campaign and the Russian Federation government that impression has been created. Even if the outcome of it all goes Trump’s way, the impression of wrongdoing will likely stick to some degree in the US public.

Trump has the will to persevere, to continue until he gets the outcome he wants. Perhaps Trump’s approach is a bit unconventional. Yet, additionally,, there is also an optimism about Trump. He imagines the positive. He anticipates success in what he does. If Trump’s goals for European defense and transatlantic collective security are achieved, and it is very likely they will be, European capitals will appreciate all of it.

Trump is well-aware that being a NATO Member State does not simply mean fulfilling certain obligations of the collective security arrangement, such as: posting an ambassador to the headquarters; attending ministerial meetings; leaders summits; “paying dues” as critics purposely misconstrued his words; committing some troops to occasional military exercises; allowing officers and troops to take advantage of education programs; and other activities. NATO is considerably more than an arrangement that provides for a combined military force designed to deter, and if necessary fight and defeat its most likely adversary: Russia. NATO is an expression of European solidarity. It is essentially an expression of the ties of Western countries as a family. Indeed, the US from the beginning was colonized by many of the same Western countries it now helps to defend. There is in many cases a common history, traditions, culture and well as common values and beliefs. Unity among them in NATO is based on common values and interests. There is no rational reason turn it all asunder. The US, Canada, the European countries, and now Colombia, must stick together and work through issues together as a transatlantic family. Families can always heal over an issue. Things can always get better in a family, especially when good thinkers are engaged on a matter.

Even in family relationships, there are always irritants. Little issues can linger and nag, negative statements are magnified. The role that the US plays on the NATO family should not be minimized or taken for granted. Under U.S. leadership for nearly 70 years, the alliance has accomplished great things while regional peace and security was maintained.. Responding to US leadership certainly does not require submission, subjugation, kowtow, even simply showing deference. It also does not entail expecting the US to carry Europe, or at least it should not. Hopefully, in European capitals, a sense of being entitled to heavy US assistance does not exist. Europe has brought itself up since the end of World War II, through the Cold War, and to the present with US help. Europe now must truly stand side by side with the US, facing forward and not standing behind or in the shadow of their powerful ally. A decision to make that adjustment would truly demonstrate that US efforts on European defense and transatlantic collective security are appreciated and being built on and not simply being taken advantage of. Many leaders in European capitals have shown no indication that they understand or are even trying to understand how things look from the other side of the Atlantic. That kind of broader perspective is not apparent in the public statements and messaging. If those leaders perspectives can change a bit, and the effort is made to work alongside the US as real partners and not as dependents, the security picture will become better for everyone. Trump is likely quietly optimistic about that.

Many European leaders have provided no indication that they understand or are even trying to understand how European defense and transatlantic collective security looks from the other side of the ocean. A broader perspective is not apparent in their public statements or messaging. If those leaders perspectives can change a bit, and the effort is made to work alongside the US as real partners and not as dependents, the security picture will become better for everyone. Trump is likely quietly optimistic about that.

The Way Forward

In Act IV, Scene iii of William Shakespeare’s The Life and Death of Julius Caesar, civil war has broken out and Octavius and Mark Antony are in Rome setting forth to retaliate against all who plotted against Caesar. Brutus and Cassius, who were among Caesar’s assassins, are camped with an army away from Rome, hoping to finish their work of reclaiming the Republic.  Brutus and Cassius are in their tent, formulating a strategy to defeat the army of Octavius and Antony. Cassius suggests waiting for Octavius and Antony move to nearby Philippi, hoping the march will wear out their army, making them less effective if they tried to attack their camp. out along the way. Brutus fears Octavius and Antony may gain more followers during that march and believed their own army was at its peak and needed to strike immediately to exploit that advantage. Brutus states: “Under your pardon. You must note beside, That we have tried the utmost of our friends, Our legions are brim-full, our cause is ripe: The enemy increaseth every day; We, at the height, are ready to decline. There is a tide in the affairs of men, Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat; And we must take the current when it serves, Or lose our ventures.” On occasion, Trump will appear driven in a particular situation by the idea that bold action, when appropriate, can turn situations around. His goal is to exploit success, preserve his freedom of action on immediate matters, and reduce vulnerability from action by his competitors. He acts in a manner designed to gain advantage, surprise, and momentum over his competitors, achieving results that would normally require far more time and would be more costly to the US. This has been observed repeatedly in his interactions with foreign leaders. Trump’s discernment of events and situations as well as his planning and execution of actions against competitors greatly resembles what military thinkers define as maneuver. He rushes to place himself in superior position in order to overcome and defeat his opponents efforts. Trump wants to deal with European defense and transatlantic collective security and the Russian threat to Europe while he is president. He feels that now is the time to act. Unlike his predecessors, he does not want to pass the problem on to another president after his second term ends. He likely sensse that as time passes, the matter will only become more urgent.

For Trump, a robust military build up is the best answer to deal with the Russian threat to Europe. He is also trying his best to connect with Putin to change his perspective and establish long-term peace and stability for Europe. Putin will readily exhibit an openness to diplomacy and his words create the impression that he can be flexible, However, Trump knows that may all be lip service. Given Putin’s record of behavior even during the short span of his administration, it is difficult to trust that Putin will behave. As a next step, if diplomacy does not bring satisfactory results fast enough Trump might boldly push back on Russian advances, reclaiming territory for partners as Ukraine and Georgia. That might inform Putin that he will not be allowed to have a free hand in Europe under his watch and that his latest acquisitions in Europe are vulnerable. However, Trump would still need to wait until sufficient military power in place to thwart attempts by Russia to respond militarily before such moves could ever be executed. That brings the matter back to the Europeans. Right now, European leaders do not seem too interested in building up sufficient military power to defend themselves. Some European leaders are willing to adhere to a position on defense, even if it is wanting, and then fully accepted it as satisfactory because it was determined to be the best or only recourse available. Trump’s letters have called those leaders  out on that behavior. Trump is unwilling to simply accept the status quo. In his view, the time for half-measures has come to an end. Europeans must open their minds to new facts and thoughts. New perspectives on defense must arrive in their thinking.

There is said to be a temper of the soul that wants to live in illusion. Militarily, it has accounted for the limited war in Korea, the war of attrition in Vietnam, the liberation of Iraq, and many errors in between. Some European leaders have turned the reality of what is happening concerning European defense on its head by positing that whatever they might commit to NATO is all it really needs from them. However, the danger their countries face is real. Just as Trump sees opportunity in the moment, they should discern the opportunity that Trump presents. His words may discomfit and it may feel as if he is moving the goalposts. However, he is really offering an invitation. It is an invitation to rise up, to accomplish more, to be more. Hopefully, the Europeans will be willing to accept it. Iniqua raro maximis virtutibus fortuna parcit; nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest; quem saepe transit casus, aliquando invenit. (Unrighteous fortune seldom spares the highest worth; no one with safety can long front so frequent perils. Whom calamity oft passes by she finds at last.)

US-Led Military Strikes in Syria Were a Success: Was a Correlative Political Warfare Success Achieved, Too?

Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-Assad (left) and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (right). Given all that transpired in Syria surrounding the US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes, Putin, Assad and their respective senior advisers may very well have begun to ask questions about future of relations between their countries. Relations between Moscow and Damascus may have begun moving in a new direction to the dissatisfaction and disappointment of Putin, and the dismay and anger of Assad.

Correlative effects can result from airstrikes, cruise missile strikes, drone strikes, and artillery attacks. Those effects could include damage to surrounding structures, or could mean unfortunate harm to civilians, in or near a target struck. Correlative effects can sometimes include shaping the attitude and behavior of an opponent targeted, his ability think, what he thinks, his ability to fight, and even his interactions with individuals with which he is allied or tenuously unified can be others. A correlative result of the April 13, 2018 US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes in Syria may have been a hard blow upon the ties between Russia and Syria. Indeed, perhaps far more was accomplished by that US-led coalition than the Trump administration could have imagined. On April 13, 2018, US military forces, acting in coordination with military forces from the United Kingdom and France, took decisive action against the chemical weapons infrastructure of the Syria Arab Republic. It was in response to an April 7, 2018 chemical weapons attack against his own citizens in Douma. According to the Trump administration, the US has vital national interests in averting a worsening catastrophe in Syria, and specifically deterring the use and proliferation of chemical weapons. The military strikes took out “the heart” of the Syrian chemical weapons enterprise, but there were other facilities that were not struck due to concerns about civilian casualties. He declined to say exactly how much of the chemical weapons program was taken out. US Defense Secretary James Mattis explained that the strikes were “a one-time shot.” US Marine Corps Lieutenant General Kenneth McKenzie, the director of the Joint Staff, explained in an April 18, 2018 press conference at the Pentagon that the US carefully plotted out the strength, length of time, and target set of the strikes. Efforts were made to minimize the potential for chemical weapons to leak out of the facilities, with McKenzie saying “we believe we successfully mitigated” the risk. He explained that while it is possible that some material and people were moved from the site in the lead-up to the attack, there were certain pieces of equipment that the regime would not have been able to relocate. McKenzie acknowledged that the three sites did not represent the totality of the Syrian chemical weapons program known to the US. However, McKenzie and Pentagon spokeswoman Dana White emphasized that future strikes in the region could not be ruled out, saying that it is entirely up to the Assad regime. They went on to explain that the use of chemical weapons in the future could lead to more strikes.

After everything, Syrian Arab Republic President Bashar al-Assad sits ostensibly in relative safety and comfort in Damascus as the leader of all of Syria, even though he only controls a small part of the country’s territory. He only holds on to that with the assistance of Russia and Iran. Even more, he wields as much power as Russia will grant him to wield. To observers, there appears to be a blindness in Moscow about Assad. Yet, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is well aware of his Syrian counterpart’s merits and deficits. He has an intellectual understanding of Assad, his habits, his ways. Indeed, at this point, Putin, with albeit some effort, very likely can track his thoughts, and likely has intimations about his moves whenever he thinks about Syria. For some, the optics of their interactions would support the idea that Assad is something akin to a ventriloquist’s dummy for Putin. Others would insist that they have a strong personal bond. Imdeed, there are Western foreign policy analysts and scholars would go as far as to say the relationship with Assad is indissoluble. Putin would likely assert that the two men simply have a better than average friendly rapport based on mutual interests and military, diplomatic, and economic arrangements. It would be practically impossible for the truly experienced not to see that in their relationship, Putin is the top, the leader, the senior party and Assad is the bottom, the follower, the junior party. Often, Putin displays choreographed support for Assad. When relationships are built on mutual interests and useful arrangements, and not a higher bond, sometimes conditions can change to such a degree that the relationship might be altered or ended.

Given all that transpired in Syria surrounding the US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes. Putin, Assad and their senior advisers may very well have begun to ask questions about future of relations between their countries. The interior thoughts, emotions officials in Moscow and Damascus play an important role in all that is happening with Syria. There was nothing but negative feedback for Assad regarding Putin. Assad likely had no doubt that Putin would stand with him against the West. Yet, as the Western military strikes were executed on April 13, 2018, Assad watched as Putin did nothing. The lesson for Assad was that he should not be so trusting of Russia and his other somewhat powerful allies. After all, when desires action from them, he has almost no way to aafely shape their behavior. While Assad did not publicly brood over what transpired on April 13th, he was likely resentful and bitter about it. Postulating that the military strikes in Syria were designed to have the effect of sowing seeds of mistrust and dissent between Russia and Syria would go a bit beyond conjecture. However, there may have been coincidental, correlative political warfare effects resulting from the April 13th military strikes. A glut of information about Assad is held by the intelligence services of the US, United Kingdom, and France. Amid what has been collected is undoubtedly information about the dynamics of Assad’s relationship with Putin. It may confirm that their relationship is now a bit different. The tons of information coming in from Syria may be at a constipation point. Information of that sort may not have been synthesised yet. Nothing has been made public or provided newsmedia reports on whether the April 13, 2018 military strikes had either a deliberate or correlative effect of rocking the boat between Moscow and Damascus has been produced. Still, one can ruminate, outside of the box, that a ball may have begun rolling in a new direction to the dissatisfaction and disappointment of Putin, and the dismay and anger of Assad. The possibility that the relationship may take a new direction is briefly examined here. Opinionis enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat. (Time destroys the figments of the imagination, while confirming judgments of nature [God].)

Assad (left) and Putin (right). From all that is publicly known, scoring a political warfare victory was not part of the concept and intent of the US. Unless one was involved in the planning of the military strike, it would be impossible to posit with certainty that some consideration was given to how the military strikes would affect the Russia-Syria relationship. Still the features of a political warfare effort, even if coincidental, are discernible.

Detecting Political Warfare

Again, from all that is publicly known, scoring a political warfare victory was not part of the concept and intent of the US and did not factor into the planning of the military strikes in Syria. Unless one was involved in the planning of the military strike, it would be impossible to posit with certainty that some consideration was given to how the military strikes would affect the Russia-Syria relationship. Still the features of a political warfare effort, even if coincidental, are discernible. Under a definition offered by the RAND Corporation, political warfare consists of the international use of one or more of the implements of power–diplomatic, information, military, and economic–to affect the political composition of decision making within a state. Political warfare is often, yet not necessarily, carried out covertly, but must be carried out outside the context of traditional war. In the broadest sense, it could take the form of anything other than military operations. It could for example include: economic subversion; propaganda–not tied to the military effort; psychological warfare–as part of a military effort; conditional aid to a state; aid to political parties; aid to resistance groups; political accommodation; and, assassination. Brian Jenkins, a security affairs analyst at RAND has explained that political warfare reverses the famous dictum of the 19th century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz that “war is the extension of politics by other means,” political warfare is the extension of armed conflict by other means. Political warfare does not focus exclusively on enemies who are at large or end with their capture. It targets those on their way in to enemy ranks, those who might be persuaded to quit, and those in custody. Political warfare sees the enemy not as a monolithic force, but as a dynamic population of individuals whose grievances, sense of humiliation, and desire for revenge, honor, status, meaning, or mere adventure propel them into jihad and resistance. Political warfare accepts no foe as having irrevocably crossed a line, but sees enemy combatants as constantly calibrating and recalibrating their commitment. It sees every prisoner not merely as a source of operational intelligence, but as a potential convert. Political warfare is infinitely flexible and ferociously pragmatic. It accepts local accommodations to reduce violence, offers amnesties to induce divisions and defections, and cuts deals to co-opt enemies.

Until recently, things have typically gone relatively well between Putin and Assad. There has rarely been reason for them to think too negatively of one another. However, as circumstances develop in which their perspectives grow in variance on matters of mutual concern. The atmosphere has already changed a bit. It will change even more if Assad decides to use chemical weapons again. Common wisdom in the West is that Assad would unlikely use chemical weapons again, not because his known chemical capability has been denigrated, not because he has been punished him excessively, but because Assad, according to Western thinking, Assad has already won the war with the assistance of Russia and Iran. Dropping more chemical weapons would have no strategic value any Western military analysts can think of. Moreover, it would not make sense to incur the wrath of the US and other Western powers as a result of using such weapons. All of that being stated, it appears the West must learn over and over again that Assad thinks differently than most national leaders, and military analysts as well. Assad has embraced his role as a tyrant. He is concerned mainly with holding power. In his conscious or unconscious mind, he may be haunted by the fear of facing retribution for violent acts ordered in defense of his power and atrocities committed against his own people. Everyone does not think the same and Assad is a perfect example of that. Putin, however, is certainly aware of how different Assad is.

The chief foreign linkage of Syria under Assad and his father, Hafez al-Assad, before him, have been the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union, respectively. The present Assaf has been useful to Russia as a figurehead, a symbol of resistance to the Syrian opposition, ISIS and Islamic terrorist groups  and the West.  He is undoubtedly viewed in Moscow as Putin’s man, and his ball to play with. It was the strength and realities of those ties between Damascus and Moscow  that were poorly considered when the US injected itself in Syria in support of the anti-Assad opposition movement during the Arab Spring in 2011. By the Fall 2015, Assad appeared to lack the ability to remain in power against ISIS and perhaps US-backed Syrian Opposition forces. The military situation began recurvate after Russia, with the urging of Iran, moved its forces into Syria in September 2015 and supported Syrian military operations.

It is interesting how Putin and Assad, two men from desperate backgrounds have established a very positive relationship that goes beyond mutual courtesy and civility. Putin rose from humble beginnings, raised by a mother and father who respectively managed to survive the siege of Leningrad and violent battles during World War II. Assad, on the other hand, was the privileged, eldest son of the former President of Syria, General Hafez Al-Assad, who ruled from 1971 to 2000. Putin completed his studies in law at Leningrad University before embarking on a successful career in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. Along with the well-earned praise of his colleagues and positive evaluations from his superiors, he had a record of service that led others to support his rise to the pinnacle of power in Russia. Assad was educated as a doctor, trained as a surgeon, and lived a comforrable life in London before being called home to take the reigns in Syria after his father’s death. Indeed, one man, Putin, was self-made, with his knowledge and capabilities shaped and polished by every obstacle and adversity he managed to overcome. The other man, Assad, had everything in life laid out in front of him, and there were few character shaping struggles. Ignis aurum probat, miseria fortes viros. (Fire provides proof of gold, misery, proof of strong men.)

In crafting a fruitful relationship with Assad, Putin seems to have handled him much as he would have handled an operative during his days in the intelligence industry. During his one-on-one contacts with Assad he has likely spent time motivating, befriending, briefing, advising, counselling, debriefing, and perhaps paying and welfaring him. It has served to establish the bridge between them. It is the sort of interaction to which Putin is attracted. It has helped to shape the dynamic and apparent congenial nature of their exchanges. It is likely that somewhere, Putin keeps notes that are part of a personal study of Assad. At age 65, Putin as a man and a leader, and in terms of capabilities and shrewdness, is far more advanced than Assad who is 52. For Putin, there certainly would be advantage in maintaining the relationship as is, if he can. There is an expediency in working with something, someone that you understand, who has been predictable. It is hard to imagine Putin might be overly concerned with Assad’s feelings. Yet, while Putin might only relate to other leaders much as strangers on a train, his relationship with Assad has been something more. In all the years until this point, whenever he met with Assad, they likely simply picked up wherever they leave off. Assad was granted a ticket to the high table international affairs by Putin. Contrarily, Assad cannot do much independently to enhance Putin’s life.

Putin (left) and Assad (right). In crafting a fruitful relationship with Assad, Putin seems to have handled him much as he would have handled an operative during his days in the intelligence industry. During his one-on-one contacts with Assad, he has likely spent time motivating, befriending, briefing, advising, counselling, debriefing, and perhaps paying him. It has served to establish a bridge between them.

Putin almost never fails to publicly cover Assad’s actions that reach the world’s gaze. He has supported Assad with strong words, diplomatic maneuvering at the UN and bilaterally with a handful of receptive countries, mostly it neighbors. He has of course, supported him by deploying Russian military forces to his country to protect his regime. Moscow’s initial response to the Assad’s chemical attacks in Douma was a grand denial that the Assad regime had anything to do with it. Russia, a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, sought to fight fire with oil, giving credence to the idea that Assad did not and would not use chemical weapons and the entire matter was a hoax. This was made worse by Russia’s futile attempt make the investigation of the chemical attacks a joint venture in which Russia would work alongside the UN Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at the site of the attack and in their research labs. It must not be forgotten that Assad should not have access to chemical weapons at all, but an intriguing diplomatic tact taken by Moscow in 2013 left the door open to that. On September 14, 2013, Moscow and Washington reached an agreement under which Russia guaranteed Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile and all equipment for producing, mixing, and filing chemical weapons would be destroyed before the end of the first half of 2014. The OPCW would implement the agreement.  The genesis of the agreement was an August 21, 2013 chemical attack by the Assad regime against several towns of the Ghouta agricultural belt to the West and East of Damascus.  Reportedly the administration of US President Barack Obama was nearing a decision to launch US-led punitive strikes against Syria. A suggestion was made by the US Secretary of State John Kerry stated offhandedly at a press conference on September 9, 2013 that the US might not conduct military strikes if Assad placed Syria’s enture chemical weapons stockpile under international control within a week. Hours after that statement, Russian Federation Foreign Minister managed to have Syrian Arab Republic Foreign Minister Walid Muallem agree to the idea. On April 13, 2018, and back on April 6, 2017, the Trump administration, based on clear and convincing evidence took action against Assad contrary to decision of the Obama administration when it had the opportunity. Most importantly, however, action had to be taken because both Russia and Syria clearly failed to meet their responsibility under the 2013 agreement. There has been little no mention of the September 14, 2013 agreement by Moscow or Damascus after the April 13, 2018 chemical attacks. Moreover, rather expressing of concern over the use of chemical weapons, as could be expected, prevarications emanated from Moscow and Damascus concerning the attacks.

Moscow also made false claims that the majority of cruise missiles fired into Syria were shot down. Russian news outlets, as well as social media from the region, had claimed as many as 70 percent of coalition weapons were shot down by Syrian or Russian air defenses. But the Russian systems did not attempt to intercept the incoming weaponry, and the Syrian system launched around 40 surface to air missiles after the last targeted weapon hit its target, Referring to this type of activity by Moscow as information warfare perhaps gives it too much respectability as its purpose is to position it as master of the mob: anti-US, anti-EU, anti-West, and pro-Russian elements worldwide. Even Moscow must realize that in each case, all of its falsehoods would be overcome by the truth over time. Assad clearly had no concern over having frightful clouds hang over himself for atrocities committed before and during the Syrian War. There is not much that could further vulgarize his reputation. From experience of the Soviet Union as well as that of their own Russian Federation, officials in Moscow should have learned that the wounds Russia’s image suffers from such antics are all self-inflicted, deleterious, and all very unnecessary. Russia is reduced to a level akin to a “Fourth World” dictatorship, a so-called “Banana Republic”, when it prevaricates on matters concerning the US.

Every time Moscow distorts the truth, it confirms the worst about itself. The ugly image many policy makers, decision makers, and analyst in the West long since have had seared in their minds about Russia are reinforced. Few anywhere in the world can be confident what’ Moscow says is true, except those willing to be deceived. When Putin and his officials make claims on other occasions to the effect that Russia is a land of the mind, this questionable behavior, along with a lot of other things, puts that notion in doubt.

Intriguingly, Moscow puts significant effort into improving its image as a world leader, yet undermines that effort by backing Assad and destroying its image in the minds of many. There are consequences to the way one lives. He who walks with wise men will be wise, but a companion of fools will be destroyed. On April 11, 2018, Trump wrote on Twitter: “You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!”, referring to Moscow’s alliance with Assad. Assad, by his actions, has repeatedly immobilized Putin. He is left unable to smoothly move on to better things. If there are future chemical attacks by Assad, it is uncertain what the future of his relationship with Putin will be. A number possible scenarios exist based on questions Putin and Assad might ask themselves as well as steps they might take as the situation between them develops. Those steps would likely fall under the category of political warfare.

US President Donald Trump (above). It is intriguing to observe Moscow put significant effort into improving its image as a world leader, and then undermine that effort by lending unwavering support to Assad after he has acted against the norms of civilized world. On April 11, 2018, Trump wrote on Twitter: “You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his people and enjoys it!”, referring to Moscow’s tie with Assad. By his actions, Assad immobilizes Putin, leaving him unable to move on to better things.

Is Assad Worth the Trouble?: Scenario for Putin

Due to flaws in his government, his own deficiencies as a leader, and perhaps a lack of empathy, Assad failed to spare the people of the old ills of war and crime. Without the support of Putin and Russia, one could reasonably conclude that Assad would have been brushed aside awhile ago. Indeed, in 2015, Assad appeared to lack the ability to remain in power against both ISIS and other Islamic terrorist groups and the US-backed Syrian Opposition forces. Policy makers and decision makers in Moscow and Tehran doubted Assad could hold on to power in Damascus without assistance. They mainly feared the real possibility that Syria would fall in the hands of ISIS. One could only imagine what would have been needed to regain and retain control of the country if ISIS had forced the regime out of Damascus. Putin provided a rational for Russia’s intervention in Syria in a speech at a meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in Dushanbe Tajikistan, on September 15, 2015. In response to Western criticism of Russia’s move, Putin explained, “We support the government of Syria in its opposition to terrorist aggression. We have provided and will provide necessary military and technical support and call on other nations to join us.” Putin noted the exodus of refugees toward Europe and the crisis in Syria was a result of the support foreign powers provided the Syria opposition rebels. He said, “I would like to note that people are fleeing Syria because of the military actions that were largely imposed externally by deliveries of weapons and other special equipment. People are fleeing to escape the atrocities committed by terrorists.” Putin went on to state, “[The refugees] are fleeing from radicals, above all. And if Russia had not supported Syria, the situation in this country would have been worse than in Libya, and the stream of refugees would have been even greater.”

Speaking to Western and Arab capitals, Putin declared, “We must sideline geopolitical ambitions, refrain from so-called double standards, from the policy of direct use of separate terrorist groups to achieve opportunistic goals, including the change of governments and regime that may be disagreeable to whomever.” Concerning Assad, Putin relayed that he might be willing to enter a power-sharing agreement with opposition but that the fight against terrorism was the priority. To that extent, Putin explained, “The Islamic State is providing ideological indoctrination and training to fighters from different countries including, unfortunately European countries and the Russian Federation, and many former Soviet republics. And of course, we are worried with the possibility of them returning to our territories.” As explained in a December 30, 2015 greatcharlie post, commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces reportedly believed the military objective of any ground operations in Syria should first be to create a regime stronghold in what is referred to as “Useful Syria” (Suriya al-Mufida) from Damascus up to Aleppo through Homs. That would require Russia and its allies to sweep up the Western part of Syria. The objective was to take pressure off Latakia, a pro-Assad, Alawite heartland and locale of an important airfield and take pressure off Tartus, a long-time Soviet Naval port passed on to the Russian Federation Navy. It is key for the delivery of military material to Russian and Syrian forces and important for the conduct of military operations in support of Syria. After reaching Latakia, Russia and its allies would turn toward Idlib. Part of the force could have pushed farther north to gain control of the Syrian-Turkish border west of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) territory, blocking the US coalition and ISIS from access to it. In an additional phase of their offensive, Russia and its allies would press eastward. A key objective was to take Palmyra from ISIS and the oil and gas resources around it. Russia began to gain control of the situation on the ground in Syria soon after deploying significant forces there in September 2015. At this point, the fight to secure “Useful Syria” has essentially been won. Syria, however, is still reliant upon a military and security umbilical cord tied from Moscow to Damascus.

Discord obtains when things get mixed up. Assad would likely disagree with any assessment that described him as a follower, or stated that his existence is contingent upon Russian power. He would likely describe himself as partner with Putin and other leaders and that Syria is working jointly with its allies. It is imaginable that Assad believes he is delegating part of the job of using military power to defeat Syria’s enemies to Russia and others. For Assad, all arrows point his way, for he almost always thinks and acts in terms of self-interest. Assad would likely proffer that Syria in the aggregate has the capability and capacity fend off threats to its security. Trouble comes when Assad sets out to confirm his thinking with heinous acts of violence, such as the chemical weapons attacks, which he knows are antithetical to norms of the civilized world, counter international law, and in defiance of demands made of his regime by the UN Security Council through resolutions. Assad apparently has much to prove to his fellow countryman, to other regional leaders, to his allies such as Russia, and the rest of the world. When he has lashed out, and he has done so regularly during the war, he proves that he is truly a despot. Errare humanum est, perseverare diabolicum. (To err is human, to persist in it, is diabolical.)

Assad (left), Putin (center), and Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (right). Commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces reportedly believed the military objective of any ground operations in Syria should first be to create a regime stronghold in what is referred to as “Useful Syria.” Once Russian forces moved into Syria in September 2015, the military situation began to recurvate. The fight to secure “Useful Syria” has essentially been won. Syria, however, is still reliant upon a military and security umbilical cord with Russia.

In Syria, the Assad regime, through an unending propaganda campaign, projects an image of its president in a way in which he is in firm control. That image also serves to assure the Syrian people that they still live in a sovereign state and that they have control over their own destiny. That image is completely inaccurate. Yet, there is little in Syria to interfere with that imaginative process as the government has strict control over media. True, Syrians can see that Putin has provided thousands of Russian advisers, troops and airmen who are engaged in daily operations to fend off and destroy the regimes adversaries. Yet, Syrians supportive of the Assad regime would likely assure that the tie between their leader and Putin was unbreakable. Rather than feel threatened, they, in fact, welcome Russia’s presence and taken refuge in the umbrella of the added security provided by the Russians. They are happy to believe they need not fear for their survival as long Putin and Russia are working hand in hand with their country. Simultaneously, those same Syrian’s would argue that Assad is still the real power in Syria. Moreover, they are likely ignorant or unconcerned with the problems Assad’s actions have caused Russia. Vivit et est vitae nescius ipse suae. (Man lives in ignorance of his own life.)

Assad very likely believes his self-crafted, virtual image truly mirrors his real life. Looking at newsmedia video clips of Assad in Damascus, one might be bemused by the artificial size of his life. Syria is an authoritarian regime ruled by Assad much as, but albeit far less orderly and competently than his father before him. Politically, Syria is an odd hybrid, a quasi-national socialist, Islamic state. Assad is accepted by his beloved Alawites as well as elites from his own Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, other like-minded political groupings, business leaders, and leadership of the Armed forces and the security services. The People’s Council–the national legislature of Syria–and the Syrian judicial system cannot even provide a fig leaf of democracy for Assad regime. Syria’s elites appear satisfied with conditions in “Useful Syria”. It is something akin to a kingdom of gold for them. The coffers of Syria have serve the purposes of the elites and Assad. It is a type of larceny Assad inherited from his father. Those in Syria who have money, power are celebrities, heroes of the society, having what the majority can never attain. The Presidential Palace on Mount Mezzah is emblematic of Assad’s efforts to provide a venir of prosperity and power over a broken country in unimaginable suffering has visited countless homes.

None could doubt at this point that the life, happiness of the common man means nothing in Assad’s Syria. Assad does not have the type of government that elevates human beings. Assad has never used his words or events in the outside world to encourage Syrian to raise themselves up, to be more, to accomplish more. Assad uses words to stimulate nationalism, to cause Syrians to accept that the source of their country’s problems is the aggressive, greedy, external world, the West as opposed to any cause that comes from within, such as himself. An appropriate understanding among all Syrians about of what is happening in Syria will never be obtained as long as they are fed contradictory or insufficient facts. Even if the “have nots” in proximity of elites demanded some changes, an almost inexhaustible number of agencies among the security services would subdue them, punish those who do not revere the masters of their society. When the war is over, Syrians who can, would like to love the simpler lives they had once before. Syrians want to return to Assad’s version of peace and tranquility: the peace of submission to the regime; the tranquility of working in a secure position within the narrow confines of the regime’s dictates. Assad’s vision for future of Syria is most likely based on self-interest, his own well-being. The hope that anchors him is that he will remain in power, and the problems that have seized him since the civil war in Syria began in 2011 would eventually go away. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniusta s, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. (For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.)

Perhaps it would not be judged as a fair comparison, but compared with countries in the West, Syria could hardly be viewed as a normal, functioning, sovereign country. A sovereign country that cannot defend its borders is not authentically sovereign. Moreover, Syria could be labelled derelict given the condition of most of its towns and cities. To Putin, who, unlike Assad, is thinking realistically about the future of Syria, it is very apparent that reconstruction in Syria will be another huge hurdle to overcome. The bellwether of Syria’s future condition can be observed in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Donetsk People’s Republic, and the Luhansk People’s Republic. Lacking any significant resources from the US and the rest of the international community to rebuild, that would be the only viable long-term condition that Syria could reach with Moscow’s assistance alone. Syria would simply become a larger version of those political, economic, and social disasters. Few other countries or international organizations appear willing to dive in to help Syria with signigicant financial assistance or investment. Few countries are in a rush to reopen or fully staff their embassies in Syria. They most lilely believe there would no benefit, but only difficulties in working with Assad. As a result, the Syrian people are shut off from those in the rest of the world who might be able to truly help them.

Optimists would hold out some hope that the situation would improve. However, no international conference, no guarantees from Russia to keep him in check, no surgical procedure even, could make Assad palatable to the West at this point, or to any government in the Middle East other than Iran. Manipulations that might ordinarily knock things back on track with Assad would likely have been exhausted or be seen as useless. It may be safe to say the Assad will never develop, never change. Luckily for Moscow, Assad is actually at its disposition. Given the strong influence Russia has on the Assad regime’s main elements of his power, the Syrian Arab Armed Forces and the security services, at the very least, the effort might be made to remder Assad’s presidency symbolic. In a more virile approach, Russia, perhaps in sync with Syria’s foreign benefactors, might seek to replace Assad with a leader who would be more acceptable among the Syrians, more palatable for themselves. As far as Assad’s well-being was concerned, the basing arrangements for Russian naval, air, and ground forces, and the relationship developed with Putin would no longer have meaning.

Assad would likely disagree with any assessment that would describe him as a follower, or that his existence is contingent upon Russian power. He would likely describe himself as partner with Putin and other leaders and that Syria is working jointly with its allies. It is imaginable that Assad believes he is delegating part of the job of using military power to defeat Syria’s enemies to Russia and others. For Assad, all arrows point his way, as he nearly always thinks and acts in self-interest.

Keep the Status Quo or Assert Himself?: Scenario re Assad

So far, Assad has been able to have his cake and eat it, too! He has defiantly launched chemical weapons against his own people, while savoring the general protection and support of Russia and others. How long this situation will last is uncertain. Surely, the Russians will have a say in that. There are still a lot of hand shakes and pats on the back from Putin meant to encourage. Yet, a handshake or pat on the back cannot supplant rejection. It cannot correct a problem or resolve a serious disagreement.

If Assad were to sense an undercurrent of dissention toward him inside Syria, he would undoubtedly physically thin out the ranks of those he would deem potential plotters and replace them immediately with a more loyal sort. He would do so taking care not disturb the defined ecosystem of power elites, sending the message that he demands loyalty but avoid starting another uprising particularly among those who have supported him.

Such events would certainly catch the attention of the Russians. Assad might conclude that Moscow may see some benefit in aiding an group of Syrian elites willing to remove him. An “organic rebellion” that could remove Assad would be more agreeable to Putin and elites in Russia who might have already concluded that his removal will lead to more beneficial outcome of Russia’s investment there. He may fear that removing him under such conditions might be more understandable to tyrants in rogue regimes worldwide who may also rely upon Russia to back them with military force, some level of economic wherewithal or payments. However, Assad would not willingly step aside for a successor albeit selected by friendly, outside power, even if he had some say in who would replace him. He surely would not sit idly by as the plot developed to put his reign to an end.

Looking at the US, United Kingdom, and French military strikes in the aggregate, it somewhat understandable that some analysts doubt that Assad and his advisers in Damascus would be so spun up by them. The US-led coalition has conducted airstrikes in Syria against ISIS and targets threatening coalition ground forces for many months. The Israeli Air Force has conducted regular strikes in Syria so precise and effective and with impunity, that one could say with some humor that the Israelis were using parts of Syria as a bombing range. The issue is that the military strikes of April 13th were the second time the US has deliberately attacked Syrian targets and the second time Russia did not act. That is the rub. Prior to the Western military strikes, Russia urged the US to avoid taking military action in response to an alleged chemical attack in Syria. On April 10, 2018, the Russian Federation Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily Nebenzia stated: “I would once again beseech you to refrain from the plans that you’re currently developing.” He warned Washington that it will “bear responsibility” for any “illegal military adventure.” A threat from Moscow to down US missiles came from the Russian Federation’s Ambassador to Lebanon, Alexander Zasypkin, who said his comments were based on previous statements by Putin and the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov. The Russian Federation Armed Forces stated on March 13, 2018, that it would respond to any US strike on Syria by targeting any missiles and launchers involved. However, Russian air defense systems did not attempt to intercept the incoming weaponry, and the Syrian system launched around 40 surface to air missiles after the last targeted weapon hit its target, according to the Pentagon. The Pentagon noted that the S-400 systems were not turned off, simply not activated, leaving open the option their radar systems were used to tracking incoming threats but the weapons systems were not fired. The fact that those systems were active but not used may serve as evidence that the deconfliction line between the US and Russia, which was used to urge Russia not to escalate the situation, had been effective.

Within his own close circle in Damascus, it may very well be that Assad’s grievances are well-expressed. There may be lung busting exertions of his sense of being betrayed once again by Putin, driven by a nagging sense at this juncture that his relationship with him does not have much future. Assad may wish to take matters into his own hands. Seeing Assad interact with Russian emissaries in Damascus, he left little evidence of being riled emotionally by actions by his benefactors. The Interfax News Agency quoted Natalya Komarova, governor of Russia’s autonomous Khanty-Mansiysk district, made it a point to state: “President Assad was in absolutely positive spirits. He is in a good mood.,” To date, Assad has not publicly proffered any fevered dreams of conspiracy about the military strikes. His own officials and advisers are likely impressed by a type of controlled schizophrenia he displays. Nevertheless, the April 13th military strikes, and events surrounding them, may have set the stage for counteractions by Assad. It may very well be that Assad will launch additional chemical attacks to demonstrate that his regime does not feel threatened by US power, prove to himself that he is not being led by the nose by Putin, and ironically to pull Russia deeper into the situation as it has sought to full back by failing to act April 13th. To foreign policy and military analyst, it may all seem irrational, and that would be a reasonable response. Still, everyone does not think the same. Assad, the trained surgeon, has done so much that would be deemed improbable, it would seem counterintuitive to assume he will act in accord within any norms in the future. Scenarios for other ways in which Assad might seek retribution might include the following:

1) Assad might decide to establish some simulacrum of the US Lend-Lease arrangements of World War with China. Under it, China could possibly build its own military base or port. Assad could receive guarantees of significant assistance from China in Syria’s reconstruction efforts. China could also agree to provide Syria advanced command, control, communication and surveillance systems and agree to allow Syrian forces create garrisons and store Syrian military hardware on its new bases. Assad’s goal in that hypothetical situation would not be to allow a build-up in Syria by China that would establish it as a counterbalance to Russian military power. Assad’s goal in allowing a enough of a build-up that would lead Putin to better the value and importance of his ties to Syria. A decision by Assad to reach out to China might be viewed as injudicious given the possible consequences. Chinese ambitions in Syria might be difficult for Damascus to tame. The opportunity to build bases so close to Europe would present an I exhaustive list of possibilities for Chinese military planners. Putin may overreact to the decision and strongly suggest that Assad to rescind the invitation to China creating a genuine, visible rift between the two countries. Under circumstance, for Assad it would simply be a existential choice to create some counterbalance to Russia power in his country or at least convince Putin that he was willing to do so in order to better position himself with the Russian leader.

2) Assad may attempt to strike US or other Western troops with chemical weapons. Assad may seek to do this even if a suicide mission is required. While he and his advisers may view the operation as risky. Yet, they may also wrongfully believe that as long as the US-led coalition’s response does not result in a direct attack against him,  they may view it as a calculated risk. If Russia decides not to respond in defense of it ally, Syria, Assad might be able to convince himself that he has proved at least to the Syrian people in Useful Syria that he is strong and that he can do powerful things. The US has about 2,000 troops on the ground in Syria, supporting the ongoing US-led Coalition mission to defeat ISIS militants that remain in the region. The April 13th military strikes have created some concern at the Pentagon that those troops could be vulnerable to retaliation from Syrian forces. Efforts by Assad to put his forces in a position near US-led coalition ground forces must be scrutinized and keep in the coalition’s cross-hairs. If multiple streams of intelligence indicate those forces pose a danger, they should be pushed back or destroyed. There is always the possibility and the danger of miscalculation by Assad. As long as Assad thinks rationally, logically, this scenario could never materialize, as he would be deterred by the thought that an attack on US or another coalition ground forces would be met by an immediate, devastating military response. The targets of the US attacks would hardly be limited to the forces that launched them. Attempts at deconfliction for such attacks might be made, but they would take place regardless of whose forces might be nearby or mixed in with Syrian forces. Depending the response of Russia if its forces were caught in the middle of it all, Assad might manage to drag Moscow into what was likely the worst nightmare it thought of when it deployed its forces to Syria.

If Assad wants to maintain conditions that will allow the march of time to move forward in his favor, he should be reluctant to bother Putin about matters surrounding the April 13th chemical attacks. Doing so would very likely raise even greater concern in Putin. Assad’s circumspection itself may have already awakened Putin’s curiosity. Putin, after all, is super observant. It is a quality that stirs admiration from some and or elicits terror in others. If any one could detect a hint of anger or dissention in the eyes, in mannerisms, in bearing and deportment, in the words of another, it would be Putin. If he manages to discern a new uneasiness in Assad, that might trigger Putin to take steps against him or at least begin peering into the regime with a nearly zoological interest in its main players, searching for a plot against its main ally. Yet again, it may be that Assad is not worried at all about Putin’s reaction. Rather, Assad’s primary concern may be managing Putin’s behavior. Assad may believe that he has been successfully doing that. A mistake in that possible “management effort”, however, would be to attempt to convince Putin that he can count on him. It would be an even bigger mistake for Assad to try to get the pulse of Putin, to find out what he is thinking about him. No one should ever ask Putin if he loves them. The answer in nearly every case would be “No!”

If Assad wants to maintain conditions that will allow the march of time to move forward in his favor, he should be reluctant to bother Putin about matters surrounding the April 13th chemical attacks. Doing so would very likely raise even greater concern in Putin. Assad’s circumspection itself may have already garnered Putin’s curiosity. Putin, after all, is super observant. If he manages to discern a new uneasiness in Assad, intimate trouble, it might cause him to take steps against him.

Is It Time to Wrap Things Up with Assad?: Scenario re Putin

Fata volentem, ducunt, nolentem trahunt. (Destiny carries the willing man, and drags the unwilling.) Moscow entered into all of its deals with Assad, strengthened links to him, with its eyes open. Putin would unlikely have engaged with Assad in a search for areas of common ground on handling chemical weapons. Putin is not conciliatory. He very likely set rules for Assad on the matter. However, leaving the door open for Assad somehow to use the weapons has come back to haunt him. Given what has transpired, Putin surely can reasonably be viewed as being complicit in Assad’s use of chemical weapons. Yet, while Putin may find Assad’s attitude toward those in the West, in the Middle East, and in his own country who oppose him to be understandable, he may also view his approach as reckless.

Syria is broken, and with someone such as Assad at its helm, hardly any outside of the country, capable of supporting its reconstruction, would be willing to do so. In Moscow, there must be some authenticity in its examination of Assad and what it will be able to do with him in the future. Putin most likely sees that there is nothing about Assad that would indicate he can be transformative, creative, or productive. After the April 2017 cruise missile strikes by the Trump administration, a discourse should have been initiated in Moscow on how to better handle the remnants of Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal and how to defeat their use against Russian Federation Armed Forces in Syria. If Putin can truly discern what billows in Assad’s mind, he may have already made the decision to move against him. Finding a leader or group of very senior leaders among elements of power in Syria may not be too difficult. Most in Damascus who are in the best position to know what is happening in Syria understand they live in privileged times. They may not speak of, or whisper, about being called on to be part of a change in leadership. Still, they may be considering where they will stand and how they will act if the situation arose.

To this point, nothing has been stated to indicate that there was anything time sensitive about Putin’s relationship with Assad. Syria’s standing internationally has not been good to say the least. Assad has not used any time or exploited any opportunities to make improvements in his situation. It is unknown whether Assad is ignorant, willfully ignores, or perhaps even suppresses thoughts about reconstruction, something Russia, by jumping into Syria may have committed itself to as a duty. Assad does not appear emotionally devastated by what has befallen his country. This was observed in his very congenial newsmedia appearances the day after the April 13, 2018 military strikes.

Assad is not a shy man, and is unlikely frozen in fear contemplating what Putin might respond the fact that he has rocked the boat so thoroughly. Even if only unconsciously, though, he likely has felt an elevated level of concern over his future since April 7, 2018 chemical attacks. Putting himself in Assad’s shoes, perhaps Putin could imagine that Assad is feeling a bit betrayed by his unwillingness to deter or defeat the Western military strikes in Syria, no matter how unreasonable that would have been. Putin can be sure Assad knows him well enough to realize that expressing his disappointment through impotent snarling will accomplished nothing useful or good. Yet, he also may sense that in the long run that Assad may not be truly able to move on. Putin might consider that when one is angry for a long time, one in a way becomes comfortable with that anger. Soon that anger becomes so familiar that the individual forgets feeling any other way. Assad is a calculator, although he albeit uses an odd calculus. Sed tamen ira procul absit, cum qua nihil recte fiery nec, considerate potest. (But still anger ought be far from us, for nothing is able to be done rightly not judiciously with anger.)

Putting himself in Assad’s shoes, perhaps Putin could imagine that Assad is feeling a bit betrayed by his unwillingness to deter or defeat the Western military strikes in Syria, no matter how unreasonable that would have been. Putin can be sure Assad knows him well enough to realize that expressing his disappointment through impotent snarling would have accomplished nothing useful or good.

Putin may eventually need to make a decision if Assad cannot restrain himself from using chemical weapons again. As mentioned earlier, It is possible that Putin has already has plan for responding to Assad’s future actions. Big issues likely remaining are exactly when and how to set things up. It is also possible that given the gravity of the decision to remove Assad from power, he has not made a final decision. He may prefer to mull things over until he is left with no choice. To decide exactly how to proceed, Putin would unlikely need to refer to any notes or look among huge piles of information collected from Syria to find pieces that answered his questions. He would only need his knowledge, experience, insights, intuition, and instincts. Putin would review what Russia really wants with Syria, what its goals are. He would then need to thoroughly consider how exactly removing Assad will better able Russia to reach those goals. Putin may decide to give Assad the benefit of doubt. He knows the margin between being very clever and being very stupid is very thin. If in some odd way, alien to most reasonable thinkers, the goal of Assad’s behavior only been to strengthen his position with Putin and ensure Russia’s investment and commitment to his well-being and the well-being of the country.

However, if Assad seems to be on the road to doing something spectacular, going astray and lashing out against its long time ally, Putin would invariably choose to act first and decisively. Assad would not have any lobby available to advocate for him in the Kremlin. Money is short in Russia. Decision makers would hardly sign on to allowing Syria to languish without end in a difficult and dangerous situation given the moves of its leadership. While Assad created an image of himself as a strong leader in Damascus, in Moscow, a portrait has most likely been painted that depicts him a being bad for the long-term interests of Russia and Syria. Russia never had the intention of sacrificing its own image to make Assad look good. As mentioned earlier, Assad has no problem with acting in a way that makes Russia look bad. Among likely steps Putin would consider are the following three:

1) After some convincing, have Assad voluntary depart Syria to begin exile somewhere in Russia. The Syrian people would be informed via a video recording that Assad is completely fine and well-aware for, and it was necessary to move him to Russia due to an imminent threat from Western powers to capture him and usher him to the Hague for War Crimes trial. Once, in Russia, it could be said Assad would never be surrendered to anyone and, that he would indeed be returned to Syria once Russia resolves the matter. In the meantime, the Syrian people would have an interim, acting president. In fact, Assad would never return to Syria. If Putin were to ask Assad to leave Damascus, he would have no need to ask twice. Damascus would become a far more dangerous place for him if he does not go.

2) Through a coup de main, Putin could have Assad suddenly captured and relocated to an undisclosed site in Russia. This would be done after making appropriate arrangements furtively with Syrian military officers, security service officials, and other elites in Damascus. Again, he could be brought to an undisclosed location in Russia. After some He would be strongly encouraged to made a video recording for broadcast in Syria indicating that he is safe, doing well, and was brought to Syria’s main ally, Russia, temporarily for his own safety. The specific threat Assad would not need to be disclosed. For security reasons, the source of the information would not revealed. Forcing Assad to leave would be an alternative to having him eliminated.

3) There is the possibility that after appropriate arrangements have been made again with Syrian military officers, security service officials, and other elites, Assad might be assassinated. Russia would be the arbiter of the matter with likely nods from Iran and Turkey,

With Assad removed, Putin would move quickly to install his successor. It would be necessary for Russia to have a central figure, a strongman, one in charge in Syria to assure it has a central conduit through which it could impose its will. Assad’s successor, certainly an Alawite, would be enabled to hold a degree of power similar to that Assad held as long as Russia remains in strength in Syria, and is willing to mitigate pressure placed on the regime from Islamic extremist groups as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the battered and tattered Syria Opposition forces as well. The change, no matter how necessary or expected, would be traumatizing to many in Damascus and in every capital that has supported him. It would be the end of a sad story concerning the misuse of power, the poor stewardship of a country. Moscow would likely dub the successor’s acting presidency as a caretaker government. Only with the insistence of the US and other P5 Members, would new elections be held.to replace him.  The acting Leader’s presidency would be tainted by the irregular nature of his installment. At the UN Security Council, there would be reminders of Resolution 2254 (2015) concerning free and fair elections in Syria. Moscow would dance around it claiming there that new constitution had not been drafted as also required under the resolution. Moreover, Moscow would explain that conditions were not right for elections as the war was not over. Meanwhile, it would argue Syria was on the right path and seek aid for its reconstruction.

A more tense relationship may eventually ensue if possible future military strikes from a US-led coalition, or even Israel, are met with inaction by Russia. If Assad is able to detect real trouble from his benefactor, he might draw back, and walk back any statements. However, if he fears for his life, anything is possible.

Will He Bite the Hand That Saved Him?: Scenario re Assad

Although Putin has not heard grumblings from Mount Mezzah, he surely recognizes that his relationship with Assad has not been not perfect since the April 13th missile strikes. Putin cannot be sure that Assad accepts that he is concerned with him or Syria or that he has any real compassion for what has befallen his regime. Putin knows that he too would feel somewhat betrayed by any ally who promised to stand by him against an adversary, yet did nothing during an attack. Putin may sense that Assad, after constantly hearing rhetoric from Moscow about curbing the power and defeating its adversary, the US, has not seen any significant efforts in that direction even when opportunities present themselves, such as the April 13th military strikes. Putin cannot deny that he completely and correctly, abandoned his ally in the face of US diplomatic pressure and military power. Under such circumstances, Putin’s promise after the April 13th missile strikes to provide Assad with new, high performance weapons amounted to a bromide. It could not resolve problems facing the Russia-Syria relationship.

It seems unlikely that Assad will remain quiet if there were future Western military strikes in response to his further use of chemical weapons or other dark moves, and as on April 13th, Russia fails to act. Conspiracy theories are an element as ubiquitous as rumors in statements of officials and common conversation among citizens within rogue, authoritarian regimes. It is a corrupted version of thinking out of box preferred mostly because it typically points to behavior of external elements, enemies and false friends, as causality for a regimes disappointments and failures. Assad and his advisers may be discussing whether Russia even considered defending Syria from the military strikes of the US, the United Kingdom, and France. Some might postulate in confidential meetings that Russia may have been hoping the US would destroy Syria’s remaining chemical weapons inventory. Assad and his advisers know that Moscow was in contact with Washington in the days and hours before the military strike. US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff USMC General James Dunford explained that normal deconfliction channels were used to deconflict the airspace that we were using. Dunford further explained that the US did not coordinate targets or any plans with the Russians. Yet, in Moscow, the head of a Russian parliamentary defense committee, Vladimir Shamanov, said Russia was in direct contact with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff about the situation. Hearing this view from Russia would likely satisfy Damascus as it would support surmisals there that Russia assisted the US in identifying targets as the Russians certainly did not use any countermeasures interfere with US efforts to target sites. In an inner monologue, Assad may ponder whether the failure of Russia to act may mean that there was some truth to expressions made by Moscow and Washington in 2017 that there was a new, cooperative era in US-Russia relations. That would contradict what Russia insists in private, and what is strongly hinted public statements, that the US is its adversary. Assad could conclude that in the crafting of the April 13th military strikes, Russia had a figurative vote!

A more tense relationship may eventually ensue if possible future military strikes are met with more inaction by Russia. It is in that environment that Putin would very likely consider moving against Assad. He would most likely act without warning. If Assad is able to detect trouble, he would draw back, and walk back any statements. However, if he fears for his life, he will likely act. Indeed, there could be a final demonstration of his power. He will make a stand or lash out with vigor before he goes. His concealed stockpiles of chemical weapons might even allow him to strike any erstwhile allies with some effect.

Surely, Assad comprehends that Russia commands great power. However, Assad may also feel that there are limits to Putin’s ability to respond to his aggressive moves. Putin would be remiss not to explore whether that is Assad’s thinking. Assad may believe even now that as long as he has chemical weapons and has demonstrated a willingness to use them, he can deter the few allies he has from turning against him. People with the most absolute power in history have tried to hold on by their fingernails knowing when they let go, all will be gone. They have often self-destructed. Misused power is always built upon lies. Tyrannical figures redefine what exists into projections of their egos. There are no noble thoughts. They become wrapped up in themselves. Assad seems to find pleasure in what is evil. As time goes on, the more tragic he becomes as a figure.

Surely, Assad comprehends that Russia commands great power. However, Assad may also feel that there are limits to Putin’s ability to respond to his aggressive moves. Assad may believe that as long as he has and has demonstrated a willingness to use chemical weapons, he can deter the allies he has from turning against him. He could also use them in a final self-destructive act. Putin would be remiss not to consider that possibility.

The Way Forward

In Act I, scene iv, of William Shakespeare’s The Tragedy of Macbeth, Generals Macbeth and Banquo have already defeated two separate invading armies, from Ireland and Norway. Following that, they encounter three witches as they cross a moor. The witches prophecy that Macbeth will be made thane of Cawdor and eventually King of Scotland, and Banquo, will beget a line of Scottish kings. Once the witches vanish, Macbeth and Banquo speak skeptically of their prophecies. However, some of King Duncan’s men arrive to thank the generals for their victories and tell Macbeth, just as the witches prophesized, that he has been named thane of Cawdor. The previous thane was executed for betraying Scotland by fighting for the Norwegians. Arriving at King Duncan’s castle, Macbeth and Banquo profess their loyalty and gratitude toward him. King Duncan announces Malcolm will be named heir to his throne. Macbeth declares his joy but notes to himself that Malcolm, the Prince of Cumberland, stood between him and the crown the witches also said he would have. Standing aside, Macbeth says to himself: “The Prince of Cumberland! that is a step On which I must fall down, or else o’erleap, For in my way it lies. Stars, hide your fires; Let not light see my black and deep desires: The eye wink at the hand; yet let that be, Which the eye fears, when it is done, to see.” Regarding the military strikes from the US, United Kingdom, and France, the most effective way for Assad to deal with the matter and maintain the status quo is accept that what happened, has happened, and no matter how upsetting it might be, it cannot be changed. Retribution is not a reasonable or rational option. Creating difficulties in Syria’s relationship with Russia by advancing the idea will only lead to additional problems  does not need. Negative feedback from the Assad regime’s experience when it fought alone in Syria without Russia assistance may have helped convinced Assad not to make waves. Still, as the situation on the ground has changed somewhat with the US-led coalition’s efforts against ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other Islamic militant groups, he may feel that regime forces are in a better position to do more by themselves. Syrian elites and some average citizens may be welcoming, supportive of the Russian partnership and presence at the moment. However, after observing the effects of few months of rain and wind on the ruins of cities and towns, they may eventually recognize that Moscow cannot support “Useful Syria” in a way that would allow for its rebuilding. The situation would only worsen if pressure was placed on Russia over Syria through future sanctions.

If Assad continues launching chemical attacks, Russia will need to keep justifying his actions and its failure to control him. It may very well be that Putin has developed a negative outlook on Assad, particularly concerning his reliability and trustworthiness. Given Assad’s nature, perhaps Putin has foreseen that the time will come to wrap things up with him. Assad’s wrongs have been too big to successfully cover up using the usual public relations methods. His inadequacies have become stark. Russia is not dealing with a brush fires in Syria, but a serial arsonist in Assad. Syria exists in a condition that the Syrian people would not have too much difficulty moving forward and getting past Assad’s loss. They have been doing that for seven years now. They have faced one tragedy after another. Many Syrians may have been concerned about Assad’s safety after the April 13th military strikes. They only knew he was safe when they saw him on national television the next morning. If the Syrian people were to learn that Assad was gone, those outside of the regime’s good graces in Syria, those displaced, and those who live as refugees worldwide would likely roar and dance in celebration. Those in Useful Syria would be very likely be disappointed, distraught, and likely some in the North Mezzah and Ar Rabwah neighborhoods where he has resided, would be devastated. Still, the old, Assad, would be replaced by the new. With little choice otherwise, all Syrians would move on to the next phase. Omnia autem quae secundum naturam fiunt sunt habenda in bonis. (Whatever befalls in accordance with Nature [God’s will] should be accounted good.)

A Russian Threat on Two Fronts: A New Understanding of Putin, Not Inadequate Old Ones, Will Allow the Best Response

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Putin, himself, appears to be the cause for difficulties that  the Trump administration has encountered in improve relations between the US and Russia. One might accuse Putin of playing a cat and mouse game with Trump. Why Putin would act in this manner is uncertain. An assay of Putin from outside the box may provide a framework from which the Russian President’s complexities can be better understood.

According to a March 3, 2018 New York Times article entitled, “A Russian Threat on Two Fronts Meets an American Strategic Void”, US President Donald Trump has remained silent about his vision to contain Russian power, and has not expressed hope of luring Moscow into new rounds of negotiations to prevent a recurrent arms race. Indeed, the article, largely critical of the Trump administration, explains that “most talk of restraint has been cast to the wind” over the past few months. What purportedly envelopes Washington now is a strategic vacuum captured by “Russian muscle-flexing and US hand-wringing.” A cyberchallenge has enhanced the degree of tension between the two countries. The article reports that top US intelligence officials have conceded that Trump has yet to discuss strategies with them to prevent the Russians from interfering in the midterm elections in 2018. In striking testimony on February 27, 2018 on Capitol Hill, the director of both the US National Security Agency and the US Cyber Command, US Navy Admiral Michael Rogers explained that when he took command of his agencies, one of his goals was to assure that US adversaries would “pay a price” for their cyberactions against the US that would “far outweigh the benefit” derived from hacking. Rogers conceded in his testimony that his goal had not been met. He dismissed sanctions that the US Congress approved last year and those that Trump had not imposed as planned would not have been enough to change “the calculus or the behavior” of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

What was reported by the March 3rd New York Times article presaged a shaky future for US-Russian relations. At the start of the Trump administration, Putin convincingly projected an interest in working toward better relations through diplomacy. Areas of agreement and a degree of mutual respect between Trump and Putin have been found. Yet, agreements reached should have served to unlock the diplomatic process on big issues. Putin appears to be the causality for a figurative draw on the scorecard one year into the Trump administration’s exceptionally pellucid, well-meaning effort. Putin seems to be playing a cat and mouse game with Trump–constant pursuit, near capture, and repeated escapes. It appears to have been a distraction, allowing him to engage in other actions. While engaged in diplomacy, the Trump administration has observed hostile Russian moves such as continued interference n US elections, as well as other countries, and efforts to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and to tighten Moscow’s grip Crimea and the Donbass. Those actions greatly diverge with US policies on Syria and Ukraine. Putin and his officials have shown their hand too completely over time for anyone in Washington to allow themselves to be seduced by Putin’s guise of wanting to improve ties. In the recent greatcharlie post, it was explained that Trump and foreign and national security policy officials in his administration, who were good-naturedly referred to as “stone hearts”, were well-aware from the get-go that Putin and his government could more often than not be disingenuous.  If Putin truly does not want positive to change in relations, the Trump administration’s diplomatic project with Russia is likely moribund. If there were some touch that Trump could put on the situation right now that would knock the project in the right direction, he certainly would. At the moment, however, the environment is not right even for his type of creativity and impressive skills as a negotiator. For now, there may very well be no power in the tongue of man to alter Putin. Since no changes in relations are likely in the near future, it would be ideal if Putin would avoid exacerbating the situation between the US and Russia by suddenly halting any ongoing election meddling. The whole matter should have been tied-off and left inert in files in the Kremlin and offices in the Russian Federation intelligence and security services. However, Putin seems to going in the opposite direction. The threat exists that Putin, seeing opportunity where there is none, will engage in more aggressive election meddling, and will also rush to accomplish things in its near abroad, via hybrid attacks at a level short of all out war, with the idea that there is time left on the clock before the US responds with a severe move and relations with the Trump administration turn thoroughly sour. That possibility becomes greater if the Kremlin is extrapolating information to assess Trump’s will to respond from the US newsmedia.

Putin’s desire, will, and ability to act in an aggressive manner against the US, EU, and their interests must be regularly assessed in the light of new events, recent declarations,  and attitudes and behaviors most recently observed by Western leaders and other officials during face to face meetings with him. Undoubtedly, Trump is thoroughly examining Putin, trying to understand him better, mulling through the capabilities and capacity of the US and its allies to respond to both new moves and things he has already done. Since Trump is among the few Western leaders who have recently met with Putin–in fact he has met with him a number of times, there might be little unction for him to be concerned himself with meditations on the Russian President made in the abstract. Nevertheless, an assay of Putin from outside the box may provide a framework from which the Russian President’s complexities can be better understood. Parsing out elements such as Putin’s interests and instincts, habits and idiosyncrasies, and the values that might guide his conscious and unconscious judgments would be the best approavh.to take. A psychological work up of that type on Putin is beyond greatcharlie’s remit. However, what can be offered is a limited presentation, with some delicacy, of a few ruminations on Putin’s interior-self, by looking at his faith, pride, ego; countenance, and other shadows of his soul. What is presented is hardly as precise as Euclid’s Elements, but hopefully, it might be useful to those examining Putin and contribute to the policy debate on Russia as well. Credula vitam spes fovet et melius cras fore semper dicit. (Credulous hope supports our life, and always says that tomorrow will be better.)

Putin has publicly declared his faith and has been an observant member of the Russian Orthodox Church. By discussing his faith, Putin has developed considerable political capital among certain segments of the Russian public. Putin’s political opponents and other critics at home, however, would question where faith has its influence on him given some of his policy and political decision, particularly concerning territorial grabs, overseas election meddling, and reported human and civil rights violations in his own country.

Faith

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines faith as complete trust or confidence; a strong belief in a religion, based on spiritual conviction rather than proof. Faith guides the mind. It helps the mind conclude things. Simple faith, involves trusting in people and things. Communists mocked faith in the church, but still had faith in Marx. In that vein, faith allows for the acceptance of the word of another, trusting that one knows what one is saying and that one is telling the truth. The authority being trusted must have real knowledge of what he or she is talking about, and no intention to deceive. Faith is referred to as divine faith when the one believed is God. In discussing Putin’s divine faith, greatcharlie recognizes that to convey a sense of religiousness makes oneself spooky to some. Writing publicly, one of course opens oneself up to constructive criticism at best and obloquy at worst. Still, a discussion tied to faith might be feared by readers on its face as being one more expression of neurotic religiosity, an absurdity. That presents a real challenge. Nonetheless, the effort is made here.

Putin has publicly declared his faith on many occasions. He has been an observant member of the Russian Orthodox Church. Putin was introduced, to religion, faiith, and the church early in his life. In Part 1 of Putin’s 2000 memoir, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that his mother, Mariya Ivanovna Shelomova, attended church and had him baptized when he was born. She kept his baptism a secret from his father, who was Communist Party member and secretary of a party organization in his factory shop. Putin relates a story concerning her faith as well as his own in Part 1’s final paragraph. He explains: “In 1993, when I worked on the Leningrad City Council, I went to Israel as part of an official delegation. Mama gave me my baptismal cross to get it blessed at the Lord’s Tomb. I did as she said and then put the cross around my neck. I have never taken it off since.” Religious formation must start at childhood discussing ideas as being kind, obedient, and loving. They must be told of the world visible and invisible. Children are buffeted by many aggressive, strange, harmful ideas, and must able to surmount them by knowing what is right and doing what is right. Children tend to gravitate toward prayer, which strengthens their faith and helps their devotion grow. One tends to resemble those in which one is in regular conversation, and prayer helps bring children closer to God. The very brief life God bestows to one on Earth is lived more fully with faith. On his death bed, the renowned French philosopher, playwright, novelist, and political activist, Jean Paul Sartre, stated: ”I do not feel that I am the product of chance, a speck of dust in the universe, but someone who was expected, prepared, prefigured. In short, a being whom only a Creator could put here, and this idea of a creating hand refers to God.” Est autem fides credere quod nondum vides; cuius fidei merces est videoed quod credis. (Faith is to believe what you do not see the reward of this faith is to see what you believe.)

Faith does not replace the intellect, it guides the mind. Whether Putin’s faith has shaped his views or his Ideology is unclear. By discussing his faith, Putin has developed considerable political capital among certain segments of the Russian public. It has allowed Putin to cloak him in something very positive, very healthy, and would provide citizens with a good reason to doubt and dismiss negative rumors and reports about his actions. Many Russian citizens have responded to Putin’s introduction of faith to the dialogue about his presidency by coming home to the Orthodox Church. Perhaps that is a positive aspect that can be found in it all. Members of Russia’s opposition movement and other critics at home, however, would question where faith has its influence on him given some of his policy and political decision, particularly concerning territorial grabs, overseas election meddling, and reported human and civil rights violations in his own country. They would claim that rather than shaping his policy decisions in office, his faith is shaped by politics. They would doubt that he would ever leverage influence resulting from his revelations about his faith in a beneficial way for the Russian people or any positive way in general. They could only view Putin’s declaration of divine worship as false, and that he is only encouraging the superficial worship of himself among the intellectually inmature who may be impressed or obsessed with his power, wealth, lifestyle, and celebrity.

Putin commemorates baptism of Jesus Christ in blessed water (above). On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor in chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.”

Putin is certain that his faith has provided a moral backing for his decisions and actions as Russian President. On June 10, 2015, Putin was asked by the editor in chief of the Italian daily Corriere della Sera, “Is there any action that you most regret in your life, something that you consider a mistake and wouldn’t want to repeat ever again.” Putin stated, “I’ll be totally frank with you. I cannot recollect anything of the kind. It appears that the Lord built my life in a way that I have nothing to regret.”

Having humility means to be honest about ones gifts and defects. The true source, the real hand in ones accomplishments, is God. Once one recognizes this, one can be honest about the need for God’s assistance. Putin’s, to a degree, seems to indicate that he has humility and appears assured that he has been placed in his current circumstances, and has given him the ability to do all that he has done, as the result of God’s will. However, Putin should keep in mind that evil can quiet all suspicions, making everything appear normal and natural to those with the best intentions. To that extent, his decision and actions could truly be the augur of his soul, but perhaps not in a positive way. Evil can go into the souls without faith, into souls that are empty. Once evil insinuates itself in one’s life, there is chaos, one becomes bewildered, confused about life, about who one is. Due to the threat of evil influence one must be willing to look deeper at oneself to discern flaws, to see what is lacking. Having a sense of balance in this world necessitates having an authentic knowledge of oneself, the acceptance of daily humiliations, avoidance of even the least self-complacency, and humble acknowledgement of ones faults. The virtue of temperance allows one to give oneself a good look. Once one gets oneself right, then one can get God right. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. (No one is born without faults.)

Putin seemingly surmises that he is satisfying God through his religious observance and by obeying religious obligations. Yet, one cannot approach God simply on the basis of one’s “good deeds.” Indeed, simply doing the right things, for example, following the law does, not grant you salvation. It does not give you guidance. Approval, recognition, obligation, and guilt are also reasons for doing good. The motive behind your actions is more important than your actions. To simply believe also does not put one in a position to receive. Your heart must be right.

Putin celebrating Christmas in St Petersburg (above). Wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. Putin’s conscience should be able to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong. It should urge him to do that which he recognizes to be right. It should restrain him from what he recognizes to be wrong. Ones conscience passes judgment on our actions and executes that judgment on the soul.

All those who have worked for Putin, and those who have come up against him, would likely agree that he has a wonderful brain, and his intellect must be respected. His talents were first dedicated to his initial career as an officer in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security. The job took root in him. As a skilled KGB officer, he was proficient at lying, manipulation and deception. It was perhaps his métier.  Putin would likely say he engaged in such behavior for all the right reasons, as a loyal foot soldier. Subsequently, he would serve in a succession of political positions in the intelligence industry that were thrust upon him. In 1997, he served as head of the Main Control Directorate. In 1998, he was ordered to serve as director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB. Later that same year, he was named Secretary of the Security Council. Through those positions, he was educated thoroughly on the insecurity of the world. It was a world in which things in life were transient. He discovered the width of the spectrum of human behavior. Putin applies that knowledge of humankind, sizing-up, and very often intimidating interlocutors, both allies and adversaries alike. The 16th century English statesman and philosopher, Sir Francis Bacon said that “knowledge itself is power,” but Intellect without wisdom is powerless. One matures intellectually when one moves from seeking to understand the how of things to understanding the why of things. Through the conquest of pride can one move from the how to the why. One can only pray for the wisdom to do so. In The New Testament, Saint Paul explains: “Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind, that by testing you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect. For by the grace given to me I say to everyone among you not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but to think with sober judgment, each according to the measure of faith that God has assigned. Beatus attempt esse sine virtute nemo potest. (No one can be happy without virtue.).”

The Catechism of the Catholic Church explains that the inclination toward sin and evil is called “concupiscence”. Baptism erases original sin and turns a man back towards God. However, the inclination toward sin and evil persists, and the man must continue to struggle against concupiscence. Sin leads to sin. Acts of sin tend to perpetuate themselves and result in additional acts of sin. Sin can become a way of life if it goes unchecked. When Putin approaches the altar of the Russian Orthodox Church, his purpose should be to expiate sin.

Wrong is wrong even if everyone else is doing it. Right is right even if nobody is doing it. Putin’s conscience should be able to distinguish between what is morally right and wrong. It should urge him to do that which he recognizes to be right. It should restrain him from what he recognizes to be wrong. For the spiritual, conscience is formed by God’s truth. God’s truth creates order. In addition to knowing God’s truth, one must embody His truth which is inspired by love. The truth is a great treasure, a satisfactory explanation of the world and heaven that should speak to the individual. One should love God, love one’s neighbor, and remain virtuous by choice because it is the right thing to do. The reason for ones existence is best understood once one connects with the Creator of life. One can be happy with what makes God happy. Sub specie aeternitatis. (Under the aspect of eternity.)

Ones conscience passes judgment on our actions and executes that judgment on the soul. One should not do things that do not fit one. Conscience will send warning signals ahead of time. One should not ignore ones conscience. One should not violate it. The conscience should serve as Putin’s protection. Despite everything, it could very well be that Putin has a seared conscience. A less sensitive conscience will often fail an individual. Perhaps his conscience is dead. In following, his ability to know what is right may be dead. Putin declared his faith. He did not declare that he was a moral paragon. Quodsi ea mihi maxime inpenderet tamen hoc animo fui semper, ut invidiam virtute partam gloriam, non invidiam putarem. (I have always been of the opinion that infamy earned by doing what is right is not infamy at all, but glory.).

Putin at the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade (above). Putin would likely be delighted to know there was a general understanding that his pride and patriotism go hand in hand. To that extent, all of his moves are ostensibly made in the name of restoring Russia’s greatness, to save it from outsiders who have done great harm to the country and would do more without his efforts. Some Russian citizens actually see Putin as ‘the Savior of Russia.”

Pride

Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae. (If the world should break and fall on him, it would strike him fearless.) The OED defines pride as a feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived from achievements, qualities or possessions that do one credit, or something which causes this; consciousness of one’s own dignity or the quality of having an excessively high opinion of oneself. Pride has been classified as a self-conscious emotion revolving around self and as social emotion concerning ones relationship to others. It can be self-inflating and distance one from others.

In terms of being conscious of the qualities, the positive nature of one’s country, surely national leaders must have a cognitive pride, an attitude of pride in their countries, their administrations, and missions. They will express their pride with dignity, regardles of how big or small, powerful or weak, that their countries are. Putin insists that all Russian have pride in their country. Putin wants all Russian citizens to be part of their country’s rise to greatness. Divisions based on race, ethnicity, religion and origin hinder that. It is worth repeating from the greatcharlie post, “Russia Is Creating Three New Divisions to Counter NATO’s Planned Expansion: Does Shoigu’s Involvement Assure Success for Putin?”, that much as the orator, poet, and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero, concluded about his Ancient Rome, Putin believes that loyalty to the Russian Federation must take precedence over any other collectivity: social, cultural, political, or otherwise. As noted by Clifford Ando in Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire (University of California Press, 2013), in the hierarchy of allegiances outlined by Cicero, “loyalty toward Rome occupied a superordinate position: her laws and her culture provided the normative fabric that would, to borrow a phrase of Rutilius Namatianus [Poet, Imperial Rome, 5th Century], ‘create from distinct and separate nations a single fatherland’.” Likewise, Russia’s laws and culture provide the normative fabric from which a united country is created from diverse peoples. Possession of citizenship should be the basis to cause individuals to identify with the concerns of others in widely disparate populations among Russia’s republics. Putin wants Russians to be in a “Russian state of mind,” a mental state created when diversity, creativity, and optimism coalesce. A citizen’s attitude, perspective, outlook, approach, mood, disposition, and mindset should stand positively Russian.

From a theological perspective, the prideful individual acts as if their talents, possessions, or achievements are not the result of God’s goodness and grace but their own efforts. When pride is carried to the extent that one is unwilling to acknowledge dependence on God and refuses to submit ones will to God or lawful authority, it is a grave sin. While not all sins source from pride, it can lead to all sorts of sins, notably presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, hypocrisy, strife, and disobedience. In that vein, pride is really striving for a type of perverse excellence. That type of pride can be embedded deeply in ones being. 

1. Patriotism

Putin’s emotional pride is also expressed in the form of profound patriotism. Patriotism is defined as having or expressing devotion to and vigorous support for ones country. In reading Part 1 of Putin’s First Person, one can begin to understand why patriotism permeates everything Putin does. Given the rich history of his family’s service to the homeland gleaned from his parents and grandparents, it is hard to imagine how he would think any other way. It was gleaned because according to Putin, much of what he learned about his family was caught by him and not taught directly to him. Indeed, he explains: “My parents didn’t talk much about the past, either. People generally didn’t, back then. But when relatives would come to visit them in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), there would be long chats around the table, and I would catch some snatches, so many fragments of the conversation.” Putin’s grandfather, Spiridon Ivanovich Putin, was a cook. However, after World War I he was offered a job in The Hills district on the outskirts of Moscow, where Vladimir Lenin and the whole Ulynov family lived. When Lenin died, his grandfather was transferred to one of Josef Stalin’s dachas. He worked there for a long period. It is assumed by many that due to his close proximity to Stalin, he was a member of the infamous state security apparatus, the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD. Putin notes that his grandfather came through the purges unscathed unlike most who spent much time around Stalin. Putin also notes that his grandfather outlived Stalin, and in his later, retirement years, he was a cook at the Moscow City Party Committee sanatorium in Ilinskoye. As for Putin’s mother, she refused to leave Leningrad as the Germans were blockading it. When it became impossible for her to remain, her brother, under gunfire and bombs, took her out along with her baby, Albert, Putin’s brother, to Smolny.  Afterward, she put the baby in a shelter for children, which is where he came down with diphtheria and died. (Note that in the 1930s, Putin’s mother lost another son, Viktor, a few months after birth.) Putin’s mother nearly died from starvation. In fact, when she fainted from hunger, people thought she had died, and laid her out with the corpses. With God’s grace, she awoke and began moaning. She managed to live through the entire blockade of Leningrad.

Putin at the War Panorama Museum in St. Petersburg (above). Patriotism is defined as having or expressing devotion to and vigorous support for ones country. Patriotism permeates everything Putin does. Given the rich history of his family’s service to the homeland gleaned from his parents and grandparents, it is hard to imagine how he would think any other way.

As for Putin’s father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, he was on the battlefield, serving in a NKVD demolitions battalion, engaged in sabotage behind the German lines. There were 28 members in his group. Recounting a couple of experiences during the war that his father shared with him, Putin explains that on one occasion after being dropped into Kingisepp, engaging in reconnaissance, and blowing up a munitions depot, the unit was surrounded by Germans. According to Putin, a small group that included his father, managed to break out. The Germans pursued the fighters and more men were lost. The remaining men decided to split up. When the Germans neared Putin’s father, he jumped into a swamp over his head and breathed through a hollow reed until the dogs had passed by. Only 4 of the 28 men in his NKVD unit returned home. Upon his return, Putin’s father was ordered right back into combat. He was sent to the Neva Nickel. Putin says the mall, circular area can be seen, “If you stand with your back to Lake Ladroga, it’s on the left bank of the Neva River.” In his account of the fight, Putin said German forces had seized everything except for this small plot of land, and Russian forces had managed to hold on to that plot of land during the long blockade. He suggests the Russians believed it would play a role in the final breakthrough. As the Germans kept trying to capture it, a fantastic number of bombs were dropped on nearly every part of Neva Nickel, resulting in a “monstrous massacre.” That considered, Putin explains that the Neva Nickel played an important role in the end.

That sense of pride and spirit Putin seeks to instill in all Russians echoes the powerful lyrics of Sergei Mikhalkov in the National Anthem of the Russian Federation. They are not just words to Putin, they are his reality. As if the vision in Verse 3 could have been written by Putin, himself, it reads: “Ot yuzhykh morei do poliarnogo kraia Raskinulis nashi lesa i polia. Odna ty na svete! Odna ty takaia – Khranimaia Bogom rodnaia zemlia! (Wide expanse for dreams and for living Are opened for us by the coming years Our loyalty to the Fatherland gives us strength. So it was, so it is, and so it always will be!) Putin would likely be delighted to know that there was a general understanding that his pride and patriotism go hand in hand. To that extent, all of his moves are ostensibly made in the name of restoring Russia’s greatness, to save it from outsiders who have done great harm to the country and would do more without his efforts. Some Russian citizens actually see Putin as “the Savior of Russia.”

2. Self-esteem

Pride can cause an individual to possess an inordinate level of self-esteem. They may hold themselves superior to others or disdain them because they lack equal capabilities or possessions. They often seek to magnify the defects of others or dwell on them. The Western country that has been the focus of Putin’s disdain, far more than others, is the US. An manifestation of that prideful attitude was Putin’s response to the idea of “American Exceptionalism” as expressed by US President Barack Obama. In his September 11, 2013 New York Times op-ed, Putin expressed his umbrage over the idea. So important was his need to rebuff the notion of “American exceptionalism”, that he sabotaged his own overt effort to sway the US public with his negative comments about it. The op-ed was made even less effective by his discouraging words concerning US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This would not be his last effort to sway the US public on important matters, nor the last one to backfire. Putin is not thrilled by the Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again,” or the concept “America First.” He has expressed his umbrage in speeches and in public discussions. Subordinates such as Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Russian Federation Presidential Spokesperson Dimitry Peskov, using florid rhetoric, have amplified Putin’s views on the matter.

As an officer in the KGB, the main adversary of Western intelligence and security services during the Cold War, Putin would naturally harbor negative sentiment toward his past, now present, opponents. Perhaps if there were some peace dividend at the end of the Cold War that Russia might have appreciated, and his ears were filled by Donna Nobis Pacem (Give US Peace), his attitude may have been different. In fact, the world might never have known Putin, or would known a different one. However, that was not the case. Putin did not inherit an ideal situation in Russia when he became president. While on his way to the top of the political heap, Putin saw how mesmerising “reforms” recommended to Yeltsin’s government by Western experts drastically impacted Russia’s economy in a way referred to somewhat euphemistically by those experts as “shock treatment.” Yeltsin was unaware that Western experts were essentially “experimenting” with approaches to Russia’s economic problems. His rationale for opening Russia up to the resulting painful consequences was not only to fix Russia’s problems but ostensibly to establish comity with the West. The deleterious effects of reforms recommended by Western experts’ could be seen not only economically, but socially. In the West, alarming statistics were reported for example on the rise of alcoholism, drug addiction, birth defects, HIV/AIDS, a decreased birth rate, and citizens living below the poverty line. Russia’s second war in Chechnya which was brutal, and at times seemed unwinnable, had its own negative impact on the Russian psyche. As Russia’s hardships were publicized internationally, perceptions of Russia changed for the worst worldwide. However, Putin saw no need for Russia to lose any pride or surrender its dignity as a result of its large step backward. Putin believed Russia would rise again, and that some acceptable substitute for the Soviet Union might be created, and never lacked faith about that. Putin was loyal and obedient while he served Yeltsin, but saw him tarry too long as Russia strained in a state of collapse.

US President Donald Trump (left) and Putin (right). Intelligence professionals might say that the correct and expected move in response to a covert operation that has failed very publicly, so miserably, would be to “tie it off”. Instead, as reported by US Intelligence agencies and the White House, Russia’s effort to meddle in the US elections has become recursive. Putin declined to be upfront with Trump about the matter. Russia must exit any roads that could lead to disaster.

Putin has not hesitated to use force when he believed there would be some benefit in doing so. Still, he has shown that he would prefer to outthink his rivals in the West rather than fight them. That notion may in part have influenced his responses in contentious situations. It may also account for the sustained peace with the US that Russia has enjoyed under his stewardship. However, it may be possible that this line of thinking was born out of necessity rather than by choice. Except for its long-held, unquestioned ability to engage in a nuclear war with the US, Russia has lacked the capability and capacity to do other big, superpower-type things successfully for nearly three decades. True, Moscow’s Crimea-grab and moves in Eastern Ukraine were swiftly accomplished and significant. Russian Federation military operations in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia garnered the full attention of the West. However, both moves, though important, actually caused more disappointment than create a sense of threat to the interests of the US and EU. To that extent, the US, EU, and NATO were not convinced that there was a need for direct military moves in Ukraine to confront Russia, no positioning of NATO troops in Crimea or Eastern Ukraine to counter Russia’s moves, to make things harder for Moscow. To go a step further, there is no apparent balance between Russia’s self-declared role as a superpower and the somewhat moderate military, diplomatic, economic, political, and communication tools available to it. The more territory Moscow acquires through conquest, the less capable it is to care for territory already under its control as well as tend to Russia’s own needs. In particular, greater economic pressures will be placed on Russia’s already fragile economy. Despite his efforts to make things right in Russia, Putin must spend an inordinate amount of time mitigating existing hardships and the effects of malfunctions across the board in Russia’s government system and its society.

3. Chasing the Unattainable

Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia is unattainable, not by some fault of his own, but rather because its problems are too great, run too deep. He may have run out of answers to put Russia on real upward trajectory given the capabilities and possibilities of the country. Not being remiss, he has used all tools available to him, yet big improvements have not been seen. Putin’s pride may have been a bit marred by this reality. He, better than anyone, knows what Russia is and what it is not. For all that he has done, he has not led Russia, to use a phrase from John Le Carré, “out of the darkness into an age reason.” In a significant endeavor, there is always the potential to become lost. It would seem, consciously or unconsciously, Putin may simply be moving at a deliberate speed or even procrastinating a bit. When he cannot swim forward, he would prefer to tread water than sink. By continually displaying the strength, and the will, to keep his head above water in tough situations, Putin has become an inspiration to those around him. Most senior Russian officials are unwilling or are unable to take a complete look at the situation. Rather, they seem enamored with Putin, and would likely follow him no matter what. Knowing that has perhaps fed into his sense of accomplishment and confidence

Putin once said that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He believes Western governments are driven to create disorder in Russia and seek to make it dependent of Western technologies. Theories propagated by Moscow that the struggle between East and West is ongoing have been energized by the whirlwind of anger and aggressive verbiage concerning the 2016 US Election meddling issue. The story of the meddling, confirmed and revealed by US intelligence community and political leaders on the national level, has been propelled by a strong, steady drum beat of reports in the US news media. Perhaps the election meddling, a black operation, should have been considered an unsurprising move by Putin. Perhaps due to his experience in the the intelligence industry, hseems to lead him to turn to comfortable tactics, technique, procedures, and methods from it when confronting his adversaries. The Kremlin vehemently denies any interference in the US elections. That may simply be protocal. Russian officials, such as Lavrov and Peskov, have gone as far as to say that insistence of various US sources that the meddling took place is a manifestation of some mild form of hysteria or paranoia. Yet, the Kremlin must be aware that such denials are implausible, and in fact, unreasonable. To respond in such a brazenly disingenuous manner in itself raises questions not just about the conduct Russia’s foreign and national security policy, but the true motives and intent behind Moscow’s moves. It appears that Putin’s personality and feelings influence policy as much as well-considered judgments.

Putin, better than anyone, knows what Russia is and what it is not. Perhaps the type of success Putin really wants for Russia is out of reach, unattainable, not by some fault of his own, but rather because it’s problems are too great, run too deep. He may have run out of answers to put Russia on a true upward trajectory. His pride may have been a bit marred by this reality. Despite his aptitude as a leader, he has failed to lead Russia, as a whole, “out of the darkness into an age reason.”

4. Tying-off the Election Meddling

Intelligence professionals might say that the correct and expected move in response to a covert operation that has failed very publicly, so miserably, would be to “tie it off”. Instead, as reported by US Intelligence agencies and the White House, Russia’s effort to meddle in the US elections has become recursive. This would mean that Putin, himself, wants it to continue. Although the meddling operation has been almost completely exposed, and one would expect that those responsible for it would feel some embarrassment over it, Moscow seems gratified about how that matter has served as a dazzling display of Russian boldness and capabilities. To that extent, the carnival-like approach of some US news media houses to the issue well-serves Moscow. Perhaps Putin has assessed that successive meddling efforts will last only for so long until US cyber countermeasures, awareness programs, retaliatory actions, and other steps eventually blunt their impact or render such efforts completely ineffective. Thus, he may feel that he has no need to stop the operation, as the US will most likely do it for him. Still, continued efforts to interfere in US elections may not end well. Russia must exit any roads that could lead to disaster.

Putin at 2018 campaign rally (above). Putin can be proud of his many accomplishments, of his rise to the most senior levels of power in Russia, eventually reaching the presidency, and of being able to make full use of his capabilities as Russia’s President. Yet, having an excessively high opinion of oneself or ones importance, is not conducive to authentic introspection for a busy leader. Putin’s unwillingness or inability to look deeply into himself has likely had some impact upon his decisions on matters such as Russia’s meddling in US elections.

Ego

The OED defines ego as a person’s sense of self-esteem or self-importance; in psychoanalysis, it is the part of the mind that mediates between the conscious and the unconscious mind, and is responsible for reality testing and a sense of personal identity. Ego, as first defined in the OED, can be useful in calibrated doses. A bit of an ego is needed in order for one to believe that new or far-reaching objectives can reached and tough, difficult things can be achieved. When it gets beyond that, problems tend to ensue. The ego is the voice inside an individual that really serves one purpose, and that is to make one feel better about whom one is, to lift oneself up. It will do whatever it needs to do to make that happen. The ego is also the voice inside of an individual that may drive one to kick another when he or she is down, causing them to feel bad about themselves. An example of Putin’s ego pushing beyond what some experts might call the normal parameters was the October 7, 2015 celebration of his 63rd birthday. Putin participated in a gala hockey game in Sochi, Russia, alongside former NHL stars and state officials. Putin’s team reportedly included several world-renowned players, such as Pavel Bure, formerly a member of the National Hockey League’s Vancouver Canucks. Putin’s team won the match 15-10. Putin scored 7 of his team’s 15 goals!

From a theological  perspective, ego, much as pride, separates one from God. s the work of the devil, it is his tool that is used to separate us from God. The ego (Edging-God-Out) is considered the most powerful tool the devil has. It is deceiving in its ways, and makes one feel that one is serving others, when in reality one is serving oneself. Ego has no home is God’s creation. It is a distractive, impure thought, that leads to the destruction of self and others.

Putin can  proud, in the ordinary sense, of his many accomplishments, of his rise to the most senior levels of power in Russia eventually reaching the presidency, and of being able to make full use of his capabilities as Russia’s President. With no intention of expressing sentimentality, it can be said that Putin went from a working class to middle class background in the Soviet Union to very top of Russia’s elite. As he recounts in First Person, and as his critics in the West remind without fail, Putin spent his spare time as a child hunting rats in the hallways of the apartment building where his family lived. To a degree, he was an upstart who alone, with the legacy of honorable and valorous service of his father and grandfather in the intelligence industry only available to inspire him, struggled to the highest level of the newly established Russian society. The arc of his story is that the professional and personal transformation of his life came with the fall of the Soviet Union. That event created the circumstances for his life to be that put him on the path to his true destiny. All of that being stated, humility would require that Putin recognize that his achievements are the result of God’s goodness and grace, not simply his own efforts. Ego would urge him not to think that way.

Perhaps Putin would be better able to understand the source of all good things in his life if he engaged in true introspection, a look within from the context of his faith. It appears that Putin’s unwillingness or inability to look deeply in himself has allowed him to develop an excessively high opinion of himself, a potent confidence that he alone is responsible for all positive outcomes. Holding a distorted sense of self-importance certainly would not facilitate introspection by a busy leader. His attitude of pride has also likely influenced his responses in contentious situations. All of this should not be used to conclude that Putin’s declarations about his faith have been counterfeit. Rather, there appears to be an imbalance between the influence of faith, particularly the restraining virtue of humility and the influence of a willful pride, an seemingly unruly desire for personal greatness. In time, a through his faith, he may find his value in God alone. God can work in mysterious ways.

Often, moves by Putin against the West resemble responses in a sport where there are challenges made and the challenger gains points when able to stand fast against his opponent’s counter moves and gains points based on the ability to knock the challenger back. In that vein, Russia’s move into Ukraine appeared to represent a dramatic victory. There was no military effort to push back against his move. There was no available capability among Western countries to defeat Russia’s challenge in Ukraine short of starting a war. Putin remains adamant about the correctness of that action. His position was amply expressed in his March 14, 2014 speech, declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He noted that Russia’s economic collapse was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple his country.  However, Putin’s moves in Ukraine likely brought him only limited satisfaction. He still has been unable to shape circumstances to his liking. He would particularly like to  knock back moves by the West that he thinks were designed to demean Russia such as: the Magnitsky law, NATO Expansion (NATO Encroachment as dubbed by Moscow), the impact of years of uncongenial relations with Obama, and US and EU economic sanctions. His inability to change those things, and some others, has most likely left his ego a bit wounded.

An example of Putin’s ego pushing beyond what some experts might call the normal parameters was the October 7, 2015 celebration of his 63rd birthday. Putin participated in a gala hockey game in Sochi, Russia, alongside former NHL stars and state officials. Putin’s team reportedly included several world-renowned players. Putin’s team won the match 15-10. Putin scored 7 of his team’s 15 goals.

1. Magnitsky

In the West, particularly the US, there is a belief that in recent years, Putin has simply been reactive to the Magnitsky Act. It was not only a punitive measure aimed at Russia’s economy and business community, but struck at the heart of Putin’s ego. Through Magnitsky law, the West was interfering in Russia’s domestic affairs, good or bad, as if it were some second or third tier country, not as a global superpower with a nuclear arsenal. In retaliation, he would do the best he could to harm Western interests, even those of the US, not just over Magnitsky but a lot of other things. Counter sanctions would be the first step. Suffice it to say, election meddling took that retaliation to a new level. The Magnitsky Act, the official title of which is the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012, is named after Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer and auditor who in 2008 untangled a dense web of tax fraud and graft involving 23 companies and a total of $230 million linked to the Kremlin and individuals close to the government. Due to his efforts, Magnitsky became the target of investigations in Russia. When Magnitsky sued the Russian state for this alleged fraud, he was arrested at home in front of his kids, and kept in prison without charges, in filthy conditions, for nearly a year until he developed pancreatitis and gallstones. In November 2009, Magnitsky, at 37 years old, was found dead in his cell just days before his possible release. The Magnitsky Act was signed into law by Obama in December 2012 in response to the human rights abuses suffered by Magnitsky. The Magnitsky law at first blocked 18 Russian government officials and businessmen from entering the US froze any assets held by US banks, and banned their future use of US banking systems. The Act was expanded in 2016, and now sanctions apply to 44 suspected human rights abusers worldwide. William Browder, a US hedge fund manager, who at one time the largest foreign investor in Russia and hired Magnitsky for the corruption investigation that eventually led to his death, was a central figure in the bill’s passage. Two weeks after Obama signed the Magnitsky Act, Putin signed a bill that blocked adoption of Russian children by parents in the US. Russia then also imposed sanctions on Browder and found Magnitsky posthumously guilty of crimes. Supporters of the bill at the time cited mistreatment of Russian children by adoptive US parents as the reason for its passage. What made Russian officials so mad about the Magnitsky Act is that it was the first time that there was an obstacle to collecting profits from illegal activities home. Money acquired by rogue Russian officials through raids, extortion, forgery, and other illegal means was typically moved out of Russia were it was safe. Magnitsky froze those funds and made it difficult for them to enjoy their ill-gotten gains. The situation was made worse for some officials and businessmen close to Putin who had sanctions placed on them that froze their assets. All news media reports indicate that getting a handle on Magnitsky, killing it, has been an ongoing project of Russian Federation intelligence agencies.

2. NATO

Regarding NATO, in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin essentially explained that he felt betrayed by the actions taken in Eastern Europe by the US, EU, and NATO at the end of the Cold War. Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and EU as having acquitted themselves of ties to promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. He feels historians have ignored the machinations and struggles of people involved. Putn further stated in the Bild interview: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have. You can also see this striving for an absolute triumph in the American missile defense plans.” Putin also quoted West German Parliamentarian Egon Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin’s view has not changed much since the interview. However, despite Putin’s certainty on this position, no former-Soviet republic wants to return to Russia or Moscow’s sphere of influence. Putin appears unwilling to accept today’s more complex reality. Pro-Russian movements and political circles in former Soviet republics do not represent the modern day trend.

Putin with binoculars at Zapad 2017 Military Exercises (above). Putin perceives the US and EU as having turned their backs on promises made to avoid expanding further eastward, and arrogating for themselves the right to divine what would be in the best interest of all countries. Despite Putin’s certainty of the West’s intrusive behavior, actually, no former-Soviet republic wants to return to Russia or Moscow’s sphere of influence. Putin appears unwilling to accept today’s more complex reality.

3. The EU

Putin has always viewed the EU as a project of deepening integration based on norms of business, law, and administration at variance from those emerging in Russia. Putin was also concerned that EU enlargement would become a means of excluding Russia from its “zones of traditional influence.” Even today, certain Russian actions indicate Moscow actively seeks to encourage members to withdraw from the EU sphere and discourage countries from joining it. Joint projects with European countries have allowed Russia to exploit their differences on political, economic and commercial issues creating a discordant harmony in the EU. A goal of such efforts has also been to undermine EU unity on sanctions. Even away from the former Soviet republics, Russia has engaged in efforts to undermine democratic processes in European countries. One method, confirmed by security experts, has been meddling in elections in a similar way to that widely reported to have occurred in the US.

4. Obama-Putin

Poor US-Russia relations were exacerbated by the uncongenial relationship between Putin and Obama. Indeed, Putin clashed repeatedly with the US President. Sensing a palpable weakness and timidity from Obama, Putin seemed to act more aggressively. The Russian military move that stood out was the capture of the Crimea and movement of troops into Eastern Ukraine to support pro-Russia separatists. There was nothing to encourage Putin to even try to negotiate beyond Magnitsky after Crimea. There was no room for him to turn back with ease or he would be unable to maintain his sense of dignity in doing so. Crimea would prove to be a useless chip to use in bartering a deal on Magnitsky. The US still views Magnitsky and Crimea as separate issues. Putin recognized from the attitudes and behavior of Obama administration officials that even the extreme measure of using subtle threats with nuclear weapons would not be emphatic enough to elicit a desired response from Washington because Obama administration officials would unlikely accept that such weapons could ever be used by Russia which was a projection of a view, a mental attitude, from their side. The Obama administration insisted that Putin negotiate them in the summer of 2013 and when he refused to do so, the administration cancelled a September 2013 summit meeting in Moscow between Putin and Obama. From that point forward, there was always “blood in water” that seemed to ignite Putin’s drive to make the Obama administration, and de facto the US, as uncomfortable and as unhappy as possible short of military confrontation.

5. US and EU Sanctions

As far as Putin sees it, painful sanctions from the US and EU, on top of the Magnitsky law, have damned relations between Russia and the West. Putin rejects the idea that the Trump administration is pushing for additional sanction against Russia and has explained new sanctions are the result of an ongoing domestic political struggle in the US. He has proffered that if it had not been Crimea or some other issue, they would still have come up with some other way to restrain Russia. Putin has admitted that the restrictions do not produce anything good, and he wants to work towards a global economy that functions without these restrictions. However, repetitive threats of further sanctions from the US and EU will place additional pressure on Putin’s ego and prompt him to consider means to shift the power equation. Feeling his back was against the wall, he has previously acted covertly to harm US and EU interests. A very apparent example of such action was his efforts to meddling in the 2016 US Presidential Election process. The US and EU must be ready to cope with a suite of actions he has planned and is prepared to use.

Convinced his behavior was an expression of ego, some Western experts believe that Putin may have succumbed to the vanity of his metaphoric crown. In effect, to them, Putin has been overwhelmed by his sense of the great power that he wields in Russia, and that he wants to convince other countries that he can wield power over them, too!

6. Succumbing to the Vanity of “His Crown”

Convinced his behavior is an expression of ego, some Western experts believe that Putin may have succumbed to the vanity of his metaphoric crown. To that extent, Putin has been overwhelmed by his sense for the great power that he wields in Russia, and wants to convince other countries that he can wield power over them, too! If Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces were snatched from Kiev and fell firmly under the control of pro-Russian quasi-states of those entities and Russia, perhaps Putin would erect a statue of himself somewhere there or in Crimea much as one was erected of Zeus in Jerusalem by the Greek ruler of Syria, Antiochus IV. As for the people of those territories, and others in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, they may become the 21st century version of the malgré-nous, with many perhaps serving in the military against their will under the control of Russia. These scenarios are viewed by greatcharlie as long shots. It would surely raise Putin’s ire if he ever heard it. Although he is a dominant leader, he would likely prefer that his power was accepted, understood, and feared if need be, than depicted in such a monstrous or preposterous fashion. Yet, Putin may have behaved in a similar way recently when he announced an array of new “invincible” nuclear weapons.

On February 27, 2018  in a Moscow conference hall, with the back drop of a full-stage-sized screen protecting the Russian Federation flag, Putin gave one of his most bellicose, militaristic speeches since his March 14, 2014 regarding Crimea’s annexation. He told an audience of Russia’s elites that among weapons either in development or ready was a new intercontinental ballistic missile “with a practically unlimited range” able to attack via the North and South Poles and bypass any missile defense systems. Putin also spoke of a small nuclear-powered engine that could be fitted to what he said were low-flying, highly maneuverable cruise missiles, giving them a practically unlimited range. The new engine meant Russia was able to make a new type of weapon, nuclear missiles powered by nuclear rather than conventional fuel. Other new super weapons he listed included underwater nuclear drones, a supersonic weapon and a laser weapon. Putin backed his rhetoric by projecting video clips of what he said were some of the new missiles onto the giant screen behind him. Referring to the West, Putin stated, “They have not succeeded in holding Russia back,” which he said had ignored Moscow in the past, but would now have to sit up and listen. He further stated, “Now they need to take account of a new reality and understand that everything I have said today is not a bluff.”

Putin was speaking ahead of the March 18, 2018 Russian Federation Presidential Election. He has often used such harsh rhetoric to mobilize voter support and strengthen his narrative that Russia is under siege from the West. Yet, oddly enough, Putin emphasized that the new weapons systems could evade an Obama-era missile shield, which was designed to protect European allies from attacks by a specific rogue country in the Middle East and possibly terrorist groups, not Russia’s massive nuclear arsenal. He spoke about Moscow being ignored which was really a problem he had with the Obama administration. Indeed, most of what Putin said seemed to evince that lingering pains were still being felt from harsh exchanges with Obama. With Obama off the scene, and apparently developing military responses to cope with a follow on US presidency under former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Putin simply projected all of his anger toward Trump. Metaphorically, Putin seemed to “swinging after the bell.” So hurt was his ego that he has acted by building Russia’s nuclear arsenal up in a way the no US leader could ever deny the threat to US security that Russia poses. Being able to make that statement likely soothed his ego somewhat.

Religious scholars might state that Putin’s strong, perceptible ego contradicts his declaration of faith. The ego does not allow for the presence of God in ones life. Many have self-destructed as a result of their veneration of self. The ego needs to be overcome and removed from ones heart in order to allow God to fill that space.

In the form of Putin’s face can be found much that is telling about the Russian leader. As of late, its countenance has been far from serene and kindly. The countenance of ones face, smiling or frowning, can effortlessly communicate to others how one is feeling, thinking. Photos of Putin’s face more often reveal a deep, piercing, consuming stare, reflecting the strong, self-assured, authori