Obama’s Iran Deal Campaign Amasses Support While Stirring Other Public Concerns

Posted on August 12, 2015 by greatcharlie

Above is DigitalGlobe satellite imagery of a suspected Iranian nuclear weapons development site at Parchin analyzed by the Institute for Science and International Security. As shown, Iran appears to have used heavy construction equipment to sanitize the site. Such actions may indicate Iran has not been forthright about its nuclear activities. As the Obama administration campaigns for the Iran deal, Tehran may be engaging in activities that could result in the deal’s collapse.

The administration of US President Barack Obama has spoken with great pride and aplomb the administration about the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed on July 14, 2015. The White House’s infectious enthusiasm has spread far and wide to reach its Democratic political base around the nation. The deal has received support from academics and Hollywood celebrities who produced a video encouraging support for the deal to grassroots organizations and community activists who have held small rallies on sidewalks, in parks and in shopping malls. As Obama explained in his August 5, 2015 speech, the deal defines how Iran’s nuclear program can proceed. The deal curtails Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity to 3.67 percent and limits its stockpile to 300 kilograms for 15 years, thus increasing the time Iran would need to amass enough weapons grade uranium to make one bomb from 2 or 3 months to a year. Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant will be repurposed and its Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor will be modified to reduce its proliferation potential. Iran will be barred from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring has been put in place to deter Iran from violating the agreement. The international community has also enhanced its capability to detect violations promptly, and if necessary, disrupt efforts by Iran to build nuclear weapons at declared and undeclared sites. Before sanctions relief begins, Iran must take major steps such as removing centrifuges and eliminating its stockpiles.

The Israeli lobby in Washington, and many politically influential individuals and groups from the Jewish community around the US, have been the most vocal critics of the Iran deal and have been alarmed by what they view as its far-reaching concessions. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has encouraged their efforts. He believes lifting sanctions without fully halting enrichment and dismantling centrifuges is a terrible mistake. In a riposte to criticism, he recently said, “I don’t oppose the Iran deal because I want war. I oppose the deal because I want to prevent war, and this deal will bring war.” Obama’s Democratic support base may have been infected by the administration’s enthusiasm for the deal, but the US Congress seems inoculated from it. Congress poses the greatest challenge to the Iran deal. The administration believed Congressional Republicans would be ready to vote against it before it was signed. It generally views Republican arguments as specious, used only to support a rejectionist position. It was surprised by a few Congressional Democrats who also indicated they will not support the deal, in defiance of Obama. Many are senior Democratic leaders. Those Members are looked upon as enfants terrible, but have not faced castigation from the White House. Scinditur incertum studia in contraria vulgus. (In wild confusion sways the crowd; each takes a side and all are loud.)

In their messages to Congress, Obama and administration officials have urged Members to take the deal whether they like it or not because it’s the only one the US is going to get. The administration would have one believe that if critics among political opponents were to pick up the figurative palate and brush to create anything similar to its “work of art” would result in the creation of a cartoon. One point emphasized by the administration has been that war would be the only option left if the deal is rejected. The administration has been fairly open about the fact that it is ill-disposed to taking military action. It has gone as far as to say there is nothing that can be done effectively by the military to halt the nuclear program. Military action was once repeatedly threatened and declared on the table by the administration only a couple of years ago. However, perhaps those threats were not genuine. Obama has an apparent aversion toward military action that has become woven into his decision making. It has contaminated thinking coming out of the White House on foreign and defense policy. The Iran deal is in many ways a manifestation of Obama’s discomfort with the US military and its utilization. Administration officials and diplomats, while negotiating the Iran nuclear deal operated with a type of tunnel vision, animated with the idea projected from the White House that reaching a deal would be preferable to walking away, left to make a decision on military action. Real perspective of what was happening was lost. US strength seems to have been somehow negated in the Iran Talks. That is ostensibly evinced by the administration’s capitulation to Iran demands. Negotiating to reach peace at any price will always be a quick step toward appeasement. Moreover, advancing the idea with the US public that the US military cannot effectively demolish the Iranian nuclear program may also have had unintended consequences. In a way, the administration has created the impression that the US can no longer intervene against certain countries of a size and strength approximating Iran’s or greater. That could have a negative impact on the US public’s psyche regarding national security. Pictured here is a US F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. The results of the Iraq War undoubtedly had a strong effect on US President Barack Obama’s understanding of the limits of US military power. However, the results in Iraq say less about the US military and more about the abilities of US political leaders to utilize it. The US military remains unmatched. Advancing the idea that the US military cannot demolish the Iranian nuclear program could have a negative impact on the US public’s psyche regarding national security.

According to a CNN/ORC International poll released on July 28, 2015, overall, 52 percent of the US public says the US Congress should reject the Iran deal, and only 44 percent saying it should be approved. The US public has tended to look at Iran with scrupulosity ever since the fall of the Shah and the US Embassy takeover in 1979. There is a sense of moral superiority over Iran supported by reports human rights violations in Iran and Tehran’s sponsorship of groups as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Iran was also said to have supported Shi’a elements of the Iraqi insurgency and Taliban factions in Afghanistan that fought US troops. Still, Iran had never been depicted as a threat to the US directly. What the US public would expect to hear from the administration is that the US military could peel Iran like a pear and be justified in doing so if Iran ever threatened to develop or actually developed a nuclear bomb. Instead, the administration has announced to the US public and the world, that even thinking about military action is unreasonable given its assay of how little the US military could accomplish against Iran’s nuclear program. This is not a surprising development. The US public has been served a steady diet of negative information from administration officials about its military. Whereas there was once the notion in the US public that the military represented US power and prestige, and was a source of pride, there is now a sense of impotence associated with the military and a resignation that US is on the wane. It should be expected that many in the US public would begin to wonder if the US, itself, is well-protected. Similar feelings surfaced in the US public as it watched the ravenous, pagan Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) move with impunity in Iraq and Syria in 2014, brutally murdering anyone in its way. CNN/ORC International poll results released on September 8, 2014 indicated 90 percent of the US public believed ISIS posed a direct threat to the US. Reportedly, 70 percent believed ISIS had the resources to launch an attack against the US.

The administration’s concerns over military action against Iran seem more of a manifestation of its understanding of US military power. It was apparent in the first term with regard to decision making of Afghanistan and Iraq and remains present in the remnants of the administration’s second term. The results of the Iraq War, in particular, ostensibly had a strong educational effect on Obama with regard to the limits of US military power in general. Still, those results told less about the US military and more about the relative abilities of US political leaders to effectively utilize it. The US military is a well-crafted tool for warfare. However, as with any instrument, it can only perform as effectively as the skill level of the one handling it will allow. Vis consili expers mole ruit sua. (Force without wisdom falls of its own weight.)

When the US acts in a way that conceals its full capabilities as a great military power, it automatically cuts itself down to a size that an opponent may be able to cope with, even if temporarily, thus raising its costs, possibly prolonging a problem.

Obama administration officials are so rapt with the idea of avoiding military action that it glares out of speeches and official statements on the Iran deal and other foreign policy matters as well. Seeing, they do not see. Hearing, they do not hear. Once the Iranians could discern that US negotiators were driven to get an agreement for the White House and sought to avoid war, conditions were created in which there was little remove for maneuver. The deal reached truly became the best one that could be constructed. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated in his 2013 inaugural address, “To have interactions with Iran, there should be talks based on an equal position, building mutual trust and respect, and reducing enmity.” Clearly, Iranian negotiators managed to acquire that “requisite” degree of equality. Acceptance of that equality appeared confirmed by the administration when it began to make comparisons between the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program and the Cold War nuclear standoff with the Soviet Union. In reality, there is no comparison.

During the Cold War, in the year 1963, to which the administration specifically referenced, the US and the Soviet Union had forces deployed to achieve mutual assured destruction. As war between US and Soviet Union meant annihilation, any desire to declare nuclear war would be nihilistic by its very nature. The US has remained a strong, nuclear armed superpower. Despite what has been said by the current administration, the US is fully capable of acting militarily to defeat Iran’s efforts to establish a nuclear program or potentially doing even greater damage to Iran. Iran, on the other hand, has limited conventional capabilities at best and no defense or response available against the US nuclear arsenal. Iran would not even be able to deter a US military response by having a few rudimentary nuclear devices in its arsenal. The threat to attack US interests internationally or domestically using unconventional forces or clandestine operatives should not be an effective deterrent to US military action. Nescire autem quid quam natus sis accident, id est simper esse puerum. Quid enim est aetas hominis, nisi ea memoria rerum veterum cum superiorum aetate contexitur? (Not to know what happened before you were born is to be a child forever. For what is the time of a man except it be interwoven with that memory of ancient things in a superior age.) The IRGC’s interpretation of heroic flexibility may provide clues on how a dual-track approach may have been created to resolve problems concerning the nuclear issue. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif would engage in diplomacy to gain concessions on sanctions, while unbeknownst to them perhaps, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan and IRGC elements achieved all goals for the nuclear program.

The 19^th century Prussian general and military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, was quoted as saying: “The object of war is to impose our will upon the enemy.” In 2013, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, declared “heroic flexibility” to be a key concept in the conduct of Iran’s foreign and defense policy. The phrase was coined by Khamenei, himself, when translating a book on Imam Hassan. Senior leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) explained that heroic flexibility allows for diplomacy with the US and its Western allies, but requires the protection of Iran’s right to pursue a nuclear energy program. In the words of the Deputy Commander of the IRGC, Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami, “heroic flexibility is an exalted and invaluable concept fully within the goals of the Islamic Republic.” He further explained the concept meant “in no way would Iran retreat from fundamental lines and national and vital interests and this right is something that without [sic] concessions can be exchanged.” That meant that only on issues in which Iran had an interest but no rights, could Iranian concessions be negotiated. He went on to state: “Our fundamental framework is permanent and it is inflexible and our ideal goals will never be reduced.” Specifically on the nuclear issue, Salami elaborated by stating: “For instance, the right to have peaceful nuclear energy according to the criteria that has been secured for us, and this right cannot be modified and there is no flexibility on it, however, within this framework a political flexibility as a tactic is acceptable because we do not want to create a dead end in solving the political issue.” According to this IRGC interpretation, there was no possibility of authentic Iranian concessions on the nuclear issue. However, given the possibility that the US and its Western allies, themselves, might be willing make concessions, particularly on sanctions, the talks would allow them the opportunity to do so. It is possible that the IRGC’s interpretation of heroic flexibility provides clues on how a dual-track approach may have been established to resolve problems over the nuclear issue. Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, would engage in diplomacy to acquire concessions, while Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan and IRGC elements would pursue all goals for the nuclear program. Above is commercial imagery of what Der Spiegel reports is a suspected underground nuclear weapons development site operated by Iran and North Korea west of Qusayr in Syria. The nuclear complexes they initially operated in Syria, located at Kibar near Deir al-Zor, were destroyed by Israeli jets and special operations forces in 2007. Recent tests of nuclear warheads in North Korea may have involved Iranian made warheads or warheads made by North Korea for Iran.

A number of different approaches exist to develop material for nuclear weapons beyond what was negotiated in the Iran Talks. Iran has the technological know-how to attempt them. Iran is known to have experimented with laser enrichment in the past at the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center. Iran might be conducting an effective laser enrichment program in secret. Strides have been made by Dehghan’s Defense Ministry to revamp and enhance advanced defense research programs and strengthen Iran’s defense industrial base. Iran has already made great strides in satellite technology, drone, and stealth technology. The application of those new technologies was evident in the reverse engineering of a US stealth drone downed in Iran, the advent of a new anti-ship system and other naval technologies, and Iran’s greatly enhanced cyber capabilities. The administration might say with certitude that Iran has remained in compliance with the agreement. Still, reports of Iran’s effort to sanitize the facility at Parchin prior to the arrival of IAEA inspectors, in a likely attempt to conceal illicit nuclear weapons development there, should be somewhat disconcerting.

It has been reported that Tehran may have taken its nuclear program outside of Iran. One possibility, found in news reports unearthed by Christian Thiels of ARD German TV, is that Iran is working with North Korea in other countries to develop a weapon. The first evidence was their joint operation of nuclear facilities was the complex of structures found at Kibar, just east of Deir al-Zor in Syria. During Operation Orchard, on September 5, 2007, Israeli aircraft, along with special operations forces, attacked and destroyed the facility. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reportedly confirmed that Kibar was a nuclear weapons development site. There is the possibility that other nuclear facilities operated by Iran and Nrth Korea exist in Syria. According to Der Spiegel, there is a suspected underground nuclear weapons development facility west of Qusayr, about 2 km from the Lebanese border. Recent tests of nuclear warheads in North Korea may have involved Iranian made warheads or warheads made by North Korea for Iran.

The Way Forward

Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc beluarum, confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore. (While there are two ways of contending, one by discussion, the other by force, the former belonging properly to man, the latter to beasts, recourse must be had to the latter if there be no opportunity for employing the former.) In a statement on July 14, 2015 regarding the Iran deal, US Secretary of State John Kerry explained, “The President [Obama] has been resolute in insisting from the day he came to office that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon, and he has been equally—equally strong in asserting that diplomacy should be given a fair chance to achieve that goal.” Still, dealing with Iran is tricky. To allay concerns that Iran might violate the deal’s terms, the administration explains doing so would be illogical as Tehran has too much to gain from the deal. In the end, a final decision will be made on the deal one way or the other. However, the virtual abandonment of the option to use military power to urge Iran’s compliance was perhaps an error and the administration should reconsider taking this tack. It has raised concerns in the US public. Apparently, it has built up the confidence of many hardliners in Iran. In the Parliament and at Friday Prayers, the chant “Death to America” is regularly heard again.

By any authentic assessment, the US military is unmatched. Yet, it can only be as effective as the commander-in-chief utilizing it will allow. There may be genuine doubt about what the US military can accomplish vis-à-vis Iran in the administration. However, its near predilection toward denigrating US military capabilities to avoid considering military action as an option must be curbed. Fate might soon play a role in that anyway. A response to overseas activities by Iran most likely related to its nuclear program might soon be required. Other than tolerating denials and succumbing to Tehran’s will, there might be little choice but to halt those activities with military action.

Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal: The US Public Must Judge the Deal as Best as Possible

Posted on May 26, 2015 by greatcharlie

Seated to the right of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei are Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari, Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi and former Iranian Defense Minister, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Ahmad Vahidi. Seated to Khamenei’s left is IRGC Deputy Commander, Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami. Khamenei will decide whether there will be a final nuclear agreement and whether Iran will fully comply with it.

According to a May 14, 2015 Reuters article entitled, “Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal,” US President Barack Obama, meeting with leaders from Persian (Arabian) Gulf States at Camp David, updated them on international efforts to forge a nuclear deal with Iran. US Deputy National Security Adviser Benjamin Rhodes stated that the US would welcome support from Gulf States for the deal, which many Arab leaders are concerned would empower Iran to work in destabilizing ways in the region. Rhodes indicated that none of the leaders present had signaled they would pursue a nuclear program that would raise concerns.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action signed on April 2, 2015 met core policy goals of the Obama administration for the nuclear negotiations: potential pathways Iran could take toward a nuclear weapon using highly enriched uranium and plutonium were blocked; and safeguards were established to prevent Iran from conducting a covert nuclear weapons program. With safeguards, the administration believes the framework agreement will cut down Iran’s breakout time capacity to the point that it would take at least 12 months to amass enough uranium enriched to weapons grade for one bomb. The number of centrifuges enriching uranium will be greatly reduced by requiring the removal of its installed but non-operating machines and cutting back the stockpile of enriched uranium gas by 97 percent. Uranium enrichment will be performed only at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The underground facility at Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant will be repurposed for non-uranium research activities. Limits set will require Iran to operate no more than 5060 centrifuges for 10 years. Further measures will ostensibly ensure Iran’s breakout time is markedly reduced before the 10 years lapse. Iran agreed to cap enrichment to reactor-grade (3.67 percent) for 15 years and not to build any new enrichment facilities in that same timeframe. Iran would be required to modify its Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor to greatly reduce its proliferation potential. Iran would be restricted from developing any capability for separating plutonium from spent fuel for weapons. Enhanced international inspections and monitoring would be set up to help discourage Iran from violating the agreement. If it is found Iran has been in noncompliance, enhanced monitoring will increase the international community’s ability to promptly detect and disrupt future efforts to build nuclear weapons at declared or potential undeclared sites.

Obama will sense ineffable glory if a final agreement is signed on June 30, 2015 and the agreement holds throughout the remainder of his presidency. However, the specter of potential noncompliance of a final agreement looms despite the best efforts of negotiators. The threat that a nuclear armed Iran would present in part drives the negotiation effort of the P5+1 (US, the United Kingdom, France, China Russia and Germany). Prudent US officials and negotiators set what they wanted to accomplish and how to do it in the talks. Yet, securing a perfect agreement with Iran will not be possible. Deterrence is used in response to the threat of a course of action by an opponent. Economic sanctions have all but been declared as the sole consequence to noncompliance with an agreement, but sanctions might not be enough to restrain hardliners determined to build a weapon. Truly controlling a nuclear ambitious Iran may not be possible.

The Iran Talks have not absorbed the national attention of the US public, yet there is support for Obama’s effort. An April 27, 2015 Quinnipiac Poll reported 58 percent of the US public supported the April 2^nd agreement on Iran’s nuclear program and 77 percent preferred negotiations to military action against Iran. However, only 35 percent of were very confident or somewhat confident the agreement would prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. These statistics are intriguing. Unlike Gulf leaders, when the US public hears senior administration officials speak on Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions in the news media, the matter is oft covered with an artificial mystification. Their words are usually perplexing, and fail to impart any certainty that Iran will comply with the agreement long-term. Accepting what has been achieved by diplomats to reach an agreement so far may create faith that things will work out. Yet, in this case, faith is not a substitute for recognizing the truth. By looking deeper, one may see flaws in the agreement and what it may lack to make it lasting. The mind must process what one sees to surmount what one sees, and animate the intellect in a methodical or formulaic way. Using a simple methodology for examining the Iran Talks will allow those in the US public without professional or specialized knowledge to better evaluate for themselves their progression. The goal would be to reach an objective truth about the talks, not just an opinion.

Discernment

The Roman dictator Gaius Julius Caesar has been quoted as saying: “Fene libenter homines id quod volunt credunt.” (Men readily believe what they want to believe.) It is also true that illusion is the recipe for heartache. Intelligence agencies have countless methodologies available to assess situations such as Iran’s potential to adhere to a final agreement. Developing accurate assessments would require judging well from a set of facts, actions, or behaviors what is genuine and what is false. That is discernment. According to the Greeks, at the most basic level, two actions must occur in the process of discernment. Anakrino is the process of careful study, evaluation, and judgment. It requires one to scrutinize an issue, looking down to up and down again at it, judging, and making careful observations. One must be honest about what is being observed. One must be certain that a preferred outcome is not being imagined. The integrity of one’s observations must be measured. Diakrino is the process of learning by discrimination. It requires separating observations thoroughly by comparison. Comparisons must be made with what is known to be counterfeit with what is accepted as genuine. What is discerned as counterfeit should be rejected and what is authentic should be accepted. Applying anakrino and diakrino to analyze information on the Iran Talks can assist laymen in assessing their outcome.

In 2013, hardline elements in Iran sensed that newly elected President Hassan Rouhani could capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Rouhani’s choice as Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, was thought to have the ability to push his Western counterparts toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering Iran’s nuclear rights. Both officials have performed remarkably well at promoting Iran’s interests.

Anakrino

Before the Iran Talks began and initially during the negotiations, Obama and officials in his administration were unambiguous about their willingness to act militarily against Iran over its nuclear program. While denying any link between US threats and their response, Iranian officials seemed to become more vocal in their effort to disabuse Western leaders of the idea that Iran seeks a nuclear weapon. In talks with US negotiators, Iranian officials and diplomats repeatedly expressed the position that Iran did not pose a threat to the US or its interests. Hardline officials in Tehran were ready for a struggle. Draconian economic sanctions as part of as US policy of coercive diplomacy against Iran, the degree to which the US has pressed Iran on its nuclear energy program, the US denial of Iran’s right to enrich uranium, and the US condemnation of Iran for allegedly sponsoring terrorism, previously convinced Iranian leaders that the US is a threat to Iran. Threats of regime change and threats to impose a US form of democracy on Iran from the administration of US President George W. Bush still ring in the ears of Iranian leaders. In 2013, hardline leaders in Tehran sensed that newly elected Iranian President Hassan Rouhani could capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Moreover, there was a sense among Iranian leaders that their new Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, had capabilities as a diplomat and advocate that were superior to his Western counterparts and he would be able to push them toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering Iran’s nuclear rights. While rifts between hard-line elements in Iran with Rouhani and Zarif over the Geneva talks were highlighted in the West, an understanding existed among Iranian leaders of the need to support the negotiations team. Indeed, concerning Zarif and the negotiations team, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Commander General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari stated: “All must help the negotiations team of our country and the foreign policy apparatus in order to create consensus and public unity at the current time in order to help them demand the fundamental rights of the nation of Iran in the nuclear field and stand against Arrogant [US] blackmail and greed during negotiations.”

As the talks progressed, US officials noted that Iran never failed to comply with all terms of the agreements their negotiators signed on to. In Lausanne, Switzerland on April 2^nd, Kerry stated: “It is important to note that Iran, to date, has honored all of the commitments that it made under the Joint Plan of Action that we agreed to in 2013. And I ask you to think about that against the backdrop of those who predicted that it would fail and not get the job done.” That statement mirrored one Kerry made while discussing the November 24, 2014 extension. Kerry said Iran had been living up to its “Joint Plan of Action” commitments. He stated further: “Many were quick to say that the Joint Plan of Action would be violated, it wouldn’t hold up, it would be shredded. Many said Iran would not hold up its end of the bargain. Many said the sanction regime would collapse. But guess what? The interim agreement wasn’t violated, Iran has held up its end of the bargain, and the sanctions regime has remained intact.” Adde parvum parvo magnus acervas erit. (Add a little to a little and there will be a heap.)

Obama administration officials unceasingly heralded progress made on the negotiations. In addition to a successful result, a goal of the administration was to engage in talks that were tactful and decorous and avoid having them turn down a confrontational path. Officials have sought to allay concerns that Iran could not be trusted expressed by political opponents in the US Congress and by media pundits with regular reminders that rigorous monitoring measures will stay in place not just for the time frame of the agreement but even after its core restrictions expire. Any movement toward a nuclear weapon will supposedly be detected early, allowing for decisive intervention to prevent the completion of such efforts. However, things may not have been going as well as Obama administration officials indicated. True, there was an apparent understanding among hardline elements in the Iranian leadership of the need to support the negotiations team, and they have seemingly lent their support for what has been achieved so far. Yet, there is an obtuseness among hardliners regarding the deal. They refuse to succumb to the international community’s demand for Iran to make its nuclear program verifiably peaceful. There is blindness among hardline elements to terms of the agreement requiring Iran to halt aspects of its program for 10 or 15 years. They do not want hear anything that other parties to the talks are saying about it. Factus, tactus, visus in te fallitur. Sed auditu solo tuto creditor. (Taste, and touch, and vision to discern the fail. Faith that comes by hearing pierces the veil.)

Despite months of talks, there is still considerable divergence between perspectives on what has been achieved and projected outcomes. The differences were reflected in the respective reports US and Iranian negotiators prepared on the April 2^nd agreement. The Iranian report omits several restrictions and limits that all parties to the talks agreed upon.

Perhaps the need to satisfy hardliners in Tehran was reflected in how negotiators in the US and Iran prepared their respective reports on the negotiations. In the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs report entitled “A Summary of the Solutions Reached as an Understanding for Reaching a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and the US report entitled “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program”, there is considerable divergence between perspectives on what has been achieved and projected outcomes despite months of talks. The Iranian report omits a dramatic number of provisions which all of the negotiating parties agreed upon and the US duly records in its report. The Iranian report begins by stating the solution reached was not legally binding and only provide conceptual guidelines while the US report explained that the April 2^nd agreement was a framework laying out solutions from which the final text of a final agreement would be written. The Iranian report only notes a 10 year period of restriction on uranium enrichment, uranium production, and the construction of new centrifuges after which all activities could resume. No mention is made of Iran’s agreement to curtail enrichment over 3.67 percent for 15 years, to reduce its current stockpile of 10,000 kg of low enriched uranium to 300 kg for 15 years, and not to build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.

Further, no mention is made of Iran’s agreement not use the Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant for enrichment for 15 years. The Iranian report claims the restriction is 10 years. The Iranians report they can continue to research and development on new centrifuges while the US report claims a restriction on centrifuge research and development will be in place for 10 years. The Iranian report does not mention Iran’s agreement to adhere to a research and development plan submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian report says that the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor will be redesigned and rebuilt so it will not produce weapons grade plutonium. However, no mention is made of the provision that P5+1 must agree to the design, and that the original core reactor must be destroyed or shipped out of the Iran for the reactors lifetime. Absent also was any mention of Iran’s commitment not the reprocess spent fuel or engage in the research and development in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The Iranian report does not include the provision that grants the IAEA access to suspicious sites or facilities about which allegations might be made of covert enrichment activity, conversion, and yellowcake production anywhere in Iran. That stipulation grants the IAEA inspectors access to military facilities as well. Regarding sanctions, the divergence in positions is huge. The US reports Iran agreed sanctions would be suspended. Iran says it only agreed to their elimination.

IRGC Commander, General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari has offered cautious support for Iran’s nuclear negotiations team, but grumblings among his commanders indicate a final deal would not represent their goals. The IRGC would welcome continued opposition and clashes with the West, especially the US.

Diakrino

The value of the promise depends on character of the promiser. By the admission of Obama himself, Iran has a questionable history as a player on the world stage given its designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Making comparison with Iran’s past behavior, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action contradicts all that is disordered, all that is dishonest about Iran. Despite the longstanding claim of Iranian leaders that they would never seek a nuclear weapon, for both practical and religious reasons, it is now known those claims were counterfeit. Iran actually conducted activities relevant to weapons development as part of an organized program prior to 2003. The IAEA laid out its allegations regarding those activities in November 2011. The IAEA previously claimed it had made some progress with Iran in the investigation of this matter between November 2013 and August 2014, that process is now stalled. US and European negotiators want Iran to answer the IAEA’s questions and allow access to the individuals and sites necessary to complete the investigation. This delay has occurred even though Iran has only been asked to implement a set of measures to address the IAEA’s outstanding questions. Moreover, the removal of UN Security Council sanctions will not occur until and unless Iran cooperates with the IAEA investigation and past questions are resolved. Even supporters of the nuclear negotiations do not believe Iran will make any full confession on its previous weapons related work given statements by senior Iranian officials on the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and nuclear weapons. Iran may very well be concealing a weapons program while negotiating now. Falsus in unis, falsus in omnibus! (False in one thing, false in everything!)

As the negotiations progressed there was also a discernible change in Obama’s attitude toward taking military action against Iran. The threats vanished. Hardliners in Tehran discovered Obama was ill-disposed to using military force. They learned of difficulties his officials and advisers had in getting him to come to terms with proposals for using force in Syria, Ukraine, and Iraq. Sanctions have never been enough to deter Iran. While facing military threats and being walloped by sanctions in the past, Iran advanced its nuclear program so far that Iran now needs to be pushed back from a break out capacity. Perhaps some hardliners feel that they can secure the lifting of sanctions now and even some continued sanctions relief later through more talks if activity restricted under the agreement is completed and the ability to create a weapon is acquired. Evincing a conviction among officials in Tehran that Obama will not use force, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in part, seemed to mock Obama over his previous pronouncements about using military strikes to destroy Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei, according to Iranian state television, recently declared Tehran would not take part in nuclear talks to reach a final deal by June 30, 2015 if threatened with military force. Khamenei was quoted as saying by Iran’s English language Press TV as saying: “Holding nuclear talks under the shadow of threat is unacceptable for Iran . . . Our nation will not accept it . . . Military threats will not help the talks.” Khamenei said, “Recently two US officials threatened to take military action against Iran. What does negotiation mean under the shadow of threat.”

According to the Fars News Agency, IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Yekom) Hossein Salami described a hypothetical war against the US as “No big deal.” He went on to explain: “We have prepared ourselves for the most dangerous scenarios and this is no big deal and is simple to digest for us; we welcome war with the US as we do believe that it will be the scene for our success to display the real potentials of our power.” Salami added Iran would set fire to any airbase used by enemies to strike the country, and declared, “We warn their pilots that their first flight [to strike Iran] will be their last one and no one will be allowed to go back safe and sound and they should call their flights as their last flights.” Salami also stated: “When the arrogant powers [US, EU] grow united in different directions to weaken the Islamic community, we should use our different capacities to fight against the enemy, and the Islamic [State of] Iran has gained many experiences in fighting against the enemy so far.” Sounding as if he were expecting an attack over some impending revelation that Iran had violated the terms of agreements signed, Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi, has warned that Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah would respond to attack by Israel on Iran by launching of a firestorm of missiles on Israeli targets. Hezbollah allegedly possesses 80,000 rockets. Iranian State television quoted Safavi as saying: “Iran, with help of Hezbollah and its friends, is capable of destroying Tel Aviv and Haifa in case of military aggression on the part of the Zionists.”

Signing on to a final nuclear agreement with the P5+1 would become a nightmare for Khamenei if he later felt doing so in some way disrespected or disregarded the sacrifices of martyrs of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Sacred Defense. Regardless of any benefits of sanctions relief, that concern weighs heavily on his mind.

There was once the idea that the suspension of sanctions might lead to investment, opportunities for Iranians, and the strengthening of moderate leaders. Yet, a recent statement from Jafari has dampens hope that gradual political change might occur and a nuclearized Iran might become less likely. Jafari stated the IRGC will be taking on even greater roles in various fields. Sepah News quoted him as saying: “The capacity, quality, and increasing role of the IRGC in various fields in the mission of defending the Islamic Revolution and system is a decisive role—which friends and enemies admit too; also, according to the emphasis which the Supreme Commander in Chief [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei] put on the qualitative and quantitative development of the IRGC and the transformative and internal aspects of it in the better implementation of the missions. Updated services to personnel can play an important role in this regard.”

As for the final agreement, both hardliners and moderates would oppose any provision that would allow the IAEA to inspect Iran’s military facilities. Iran argues “no global authority exists to inspect a country’s military facilities. There is no treaty to do so, and the IAEA is not in a position to carry out such [a] task.” As for sanctions, Iran wants what the US and Europeans will not give: the permanent lifting sanctions. On April 4, 2015, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated, “During the talks, we [both sides] always talked about lifting economic, financial, and banking sanction. We never talked about the suspension of the sanctions, and if that were the case no agreement would form.” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator at the nuclear talks, on April 4^th said: “The American fact sheet stipulates that the US and EU suspend sanctions against Iran . . . . [However], the entirety of the economic and financial sanctions, and the [UN] Security Council resolutions, will be removed the first day of the implementation of the agreement. This agreement exists and is the solution that we reached.”

US and European negotiators are well-aware of the great incongruence between their countries’ positions and those of Iran on these issues. To have a final agreement, one side must give way. The IRNA news agency quoted Khamenei as saying, “Our negotiators should continue the talks with respect to our red lines. They should not accept any imposition, humiliation and threat.” Whatever decision Khamenei makes on the final agreement, he must be certain his decision in no way disrespects or disregards the sacrifices of martyrs of the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War and Sacred Defense. Regardless of any benefits from sanctions relief, that concern weighs heavily on his mind.

What Can Be Discerned

It is difficult to surmise where members of the US public might fall on the Iran Talks if they had more facts on it. Assurances of officials speaking from a source, the US government, with all of the information available to it, are hard for the average citizen to judge well or refute. On its face, there is no evidence that the nuclear talks in a type of graveyard spiral now that very difficult issues are being broached. When officials on all sides speak they evince what appears to be a bold curiosity for the adventure ahead. The manner in which officials have presented information about the nuclear talks to the US public has obscured realities. Right now, the distance both sides must travel to reach the same place in the negotiations may be too far to travel. One can hardly believe that Iranian leaders want the same agreement the Obama seeks. US officials have well-outlined how they could discern, or what they might do if they discover, Iran has violated the agreement. The US public should realize, given the chance to use the analysis here, would realize that although Iranian negotiators signed the agreement with Tehran’s authority, US officials can only trust that Iran intends to adhere to all of its aspects for the long-term. Parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. (Mountains will be in labor, and a ridiculous mouse will be born.)

Iran, Powers Make Limited Progress at Nuclear Talks; Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Remains Focus, But Lasers May Bring Iran the Bomb

Posted on January 27, 2015 by greatcharlie

The construction of new facilities at the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center, once an undeclared laser uranium enrichment site, has allowed Iran to engage in more advanced laser work. The notated Google Earth photo of Lashkar Ab’ad, above, is from the Institute for Science and International Security. Laser uranium enrichment is a subtle aspect of the nuclear talks. Iran has pledged to forgo laser enrichment activity, but if it is still engaged in that work secretly, detecting it will be difficult.

According to a January 18, 2015 Reuters article entitled, “Iran, Powers Make ‘Limited’ Progress at Nuclear Talks, To Meet in February”, five days of diplomacy in Geneva and Paris between the P5+1 (US, United Kingdom, France, Russia China, and Germany) and Iran ended without an agreement. It included meetings between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Hope remains among diplomats that a political understanding can be reached by the end of March and a comprehensive deal can be reached by June 30, 2015. Reuters quoted Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister and negotiator Abbas Araqchi stated the discussions were “good” and “extensive.” French negotiator Nicholas de la Riviere was quoted as saying “the mood was good,” but he also said, “I do not think we made a lot of progress.”

The later view expressed by de la Riviere perhaps best described the situation. The January meeting’s outcome was disappointing given hopes raised in December 2014 that the talks would progress faster and more smoothly. In December, negotiators even created a catalog outlining areas of potential accord and differing approaches to remaining disputes. Among the catalog’s requirements, much of Iran’s enriched uranium would be shipped out of the country. The administration of US President Barack Obama wanted to reduce Tehran’s ability to make nuclear arms by committing it to ship to Russia much of the enriched uranium needed for weapons. However, diplomats are now debating how much enriched uranium to leave Iran. Iran has a stockpile for several bombs, and the US wants cuts well below that level. Other issues being debated apparently include the size of Iran’s future enrichment output. The US wants it cut in half, leaving Tehran with about 4,500 of its existing uranium enrichment centrifuges, or less if it replaces them with advanced models. Tehran is ready for a reduction of around 20%, or about 8,000 machines. Issues remaining to be resolved include action on Iran’s underground Fordow (Shahid Alimohammadi) Fuel Enrichment Plant and its incomplete Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40). The P5+1 wants Fordow repurposed to a non-enrichment function. Fordow is allegedly impervious to airstrikes. The P5+1 wants Arak re-engineered from a model by which it could yearly produce plutonium for several nuclear bombs to a less proliferation-prone one.

In the meantime, Iran is still complying with restrictions on research and development required under the November 24, 2014 extension. According to documents outlining the extension, these provisions are designed to resolve ambiguities regarding permitted and prohibited research activities, and especially “limit research and development on advanced centrifuges that move the machines to the next level of development.” Iran agreed not to test the IR-5 centrifuge with uranium hexafluoride gas. Iran also agreed not to pursue testing of the IR-6 centrifuge on a cascade level with uranium gas, or semi-industrial scale testing of the IR-2M. Iran also agreed not to complete installation of the IR-8 centrifuge, which is only partially installed at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. The IAEA will also have greater access to Iran’s centrifuge production sites under the extension. According to the terms, the agency’s inspections visits will double and be conducted with very little notice. The goal of limiting research and development and creating regular access to monitor centrifuge production facilities was to prevent Iran from refining and mass-producing efficient machines that would allow it to rapidly enrich material for bombs.

Discussing the November 24, 2014 extension, US Secretary of State John Kerry said “We would be fools to walk away from a situation where the breakout time [for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon] has already been expanded rather than narrowed and the world is safer because the program is in place.” He noted skeptics who predicted the interim agreement [Joint Plan of Action] would collapse and Iran would break its promises were proven wrong. He further stated “Guess what? The interim agreement wasn’t violated, Iran has held up its end of the bargain, and the sanctions regime has remained intact.” Through the nuclear negotiation process, the US and its P5+1 partners have focused most on centrifuge uranium enrichment. However, Iran’s nuclear program does not fit into a single, very clear and well defined picture of centrifuge enrichment. Iran has the technological know-how and the human resources to take its nuclear program in many different directions. It puts into the question the choice not to give added attention to other paths to uranium enrichment. Iran has a proven capability to engage in uranium enrichment using laser isotope separation. If Iran’s work with lasers is not properly addressed before the end of the negotiation process, the world may soon face a very advanced, nuclear capable Iran.

On Centrifugal Uranium Enrichment, Iran Is Compliant

What best supports the argument proffered by Kerry and others that Tehran’s intentions on the nuclear issue may be positive is the significant effort Iran has made to comply with its agreements on centrifugal uranium enrichment. Reviewing that compliance, one would discover that the January 20, 2014 IAEA Report stated Iran halted production of near-20% enriched uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6) and ceased operating its interconnected centrifuges that were enriching to 20% UF6. The February 20, 2014 IAEA Report said Iran was using the four cascades at Fordow to enrich uranium to only 5%. Regarding its stockpile of enriched uranium, in the July 20, 2014 IAEA Report, it was explained Iran completed the process of converting half of its stockpile of 20% enriched UF6 gas (~104 kg) to uranium oxide powder. Iran’s dilution of half of its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium was confirmed in the April 2014 IAEA Report.

With respect to research and development, in the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report, it was verified that Iran was continuing its safeguarded research and development practices at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant and was not using the research to accumulate uranium as it tested advanced models. Iran submitted details on site selection for 16 nuclear power plants to the IAEA, its initial plans for 10 future enrichment sites, and a light water reactor. Those plans included: descriptions of buildings located on nuclear sites, the scale of operations for each location, and information on uranium mines and mills.

On source materials, a May 23, 2014 IAEA Report explained that Iran granted the agency access to the Gchine Mine, the Saghand Mine and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant. Iran provided the IAEA with information about source material on April 20, according to the May 23, 2014 IAEA Report. Iran also submitted an updated Design Information Questionnaire for the reactor at Arak (IR-40) on February 12, 2014, according to the IAEA’s February 20, 2014 Report. On May 5, 2014, IAEA and Iranian officials met to discuss a safeguards approach with the IAEA for the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor, and according to the IAEA’s June 20, 2014 Report, Iran reached an agreement with the agency on the safeguards.

Regarding IAEA access and monitoring, the requirement for Iran was to allow daily IAEA inspector access at Fordow and Natanz, including scheduled and unannounced inspections and access to surveillance information daily. As of its February 20, 2014 Report, the IAEA installed surveillance measures at Natanz and Fordow to facilitate daily monitoring and reached an agreement on facilitating daily access. (Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, the IAEA had visited Fordow on a weekly basis, and Natanz on a biweekly basis.) The February 20, 2014 Report noted the IAEA made its first monthly visit to the Arak Heavy Water Reactor on February 12, 2014. It visited Arak between February 3, 2014 and February 7, 2014, to inspect the centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production and workshops, and storage facilities.

Issues concerning mines and mills were covered by May 23, 2014 IAEA Report. It explained that Iran granted the IAEA access to the Gchine and Saghand Uranium Mines and the Arkadan Milling Facility. While Iran was required to provide figures that would allow the IAEA to verify that centrifuge production will be dedicated to the replacement of damaged machines, the IAEA was granted access to Iran’s centrifuge workshops and facilities, allowing it to collect such data firsthand. Regarding the capping of Iran’s 5% enriched UF6 stockpile, the November 24, 2014 IAEA Report on implementation of the Joint Plan of Action indicated that Iran’s stockpile of UF6 gas was 7,400 kg, below January’s level of 7,560 kg.

Iran has complied with agreements to refrain from certain actions with its program. In a January 18, 2014 letter to the IAEA, Iran pledged not to engage in reprocessing or build a reprocessing facility over the six months of the deal. Then, the January 20, 2014 IAEA Report confirmed reprocessing was not taking place at the Tehran Research Reactor or the Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility). The January 20, 2014 IAEA Report confirmed Iran also has not installed a reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide powder to 20% UF6.

With regard to Natanz, Iran has refrained from making any further advances of its activities there. According to a February 20, 2014 IAEA Report, Iran had not installed any new centrifuges and was not feeding UF6 into the roughly half the centrifuges at Natanz that were already installed but were not engaged in uranium enrichment.

Concerning Fordow, Iran has also refrained from further advancing the plant’s activities. The February 20, 2014 IAEA verified that Iran has not installed any new centrifuges, and is not feeding UF6 into the three quarters at Fordow that have also been installed but not engaged in uranium enrichment. Additionally, the cascades have not been interconnected. To the extent Iran has replaced centrifuges, the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report indicated that Iran limited itself to replacing existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. The report made clear that surveillance has been set up to monitor any changes.

On Arak, the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report said Iran had not commissioned the reactor and had not conducted any activities to further it. Iran, as promised, according to the report, has refrained from transferring fuel or heavy water to the Arak reactor. Iran has also refrained from testing additional fuel or producing more fuel. Indeed, the February 20, 2014 IAEA Report said that Iran had not manufactured or tested any reactor fuel, and the number of fuel rods produced remains at 11. Iran has refrained from installing any additional reactor components at the Arak site. Centrifuge production has been limited to those needed to replace damaged machines. That has been confirmed by the IAEA’s regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops.

Regarding the construction of any new locations for enrichment, in a January 18, 2014 letter to the IAEA, Tehran said it would not pursue any new uranium enrichment sites during the six months of the agreement which has now been extended. Iran also agreed to forgo uranium enrichment using other methods, including laser enrichment. While it is unlikely that Iran could move quickly to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels using these alternative methods, the commitment to refrain from testing any of these methods is positive and should mitigate concerns about covert enrichment activities involving such technologies. Iran is known to have experimented with laser enrichment in the past, and as part of its agreement to cooperate with the IAEA’s investigation into inconsistencies with its nuclear declaration and alleged activities with past military dimensions, Iran provided the agency with information about its laser enrichment activities. Iran also gave the IAEA access to the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center on March 12, 2014.

Laser Uranium Enrichment: A Genuine Concern

A number of laser enrichment processes have been developed. One process is molecular laser isotope separation, conceived at Los Alamos Laboratories in 1971. Under that process, carefully formed photons, from an infra-red laser system, operating near the 16mm wavelength, irradiate UF6. The lasers selectively excite the molecules of 235 UF6, not the molecules of 238 UF6. The molecules of the excited 235 UF6 then become easier to differentiate from those of the 238 UF6. Photons from a second laser system selectively dissociates the excited 235 UF6 to form 235 UF5 and free fluorine atoms. The 235 UF5 formed from the dissociation precipitates from the gas as a powder that can be filtered from the gas stream. An advanced laser enrichment technology known as separation of isotopes by laser excitation (SILEX) was developed in Australia by Michael Goldsworthy and Horst Struve. Details of SILEX are classified under the US Atomic Energy Act. In 2006, GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy signed an agreement with Silex Systems Ltd. Of Australia and eventually built a SILEX demonstration loop. In September 2012, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board granted GE-Hitachi Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) a license to build a first-of-its-kind laser enrichment facility in Wilmington, North Carolina. The license allows GLE to produce up to 6 million single work units per year. Silex has completed the Phase 1 Test Loop Program the facility. GLE promotes laser enrichment as a less costly, less energy-intensive enrichment process.

Nonproliferation analysts and specialists for year have expressed concern over the proliferation threat posed by laser enrichment. If properly engineered, it has the potential to dramatically advance the capabilities of countries to secretly enrich uranium. Princeton University atomic expert Scott Kemp noted that a number of countries already have a workforce specialized in laser technologies. He stated further, “That expertise does not exist for centrifuges, which are a bit esoteric.” Although enriching uranium with lasers on a production-scale appears extremely complicated, laser uranium enrichment is as a potential way for a country to acquire significant quantities of highly enriched uranium. A covert laser uranium enrichment facility might escape detection by the IAEA and Western intelligence agencies because of the relatively small size and few external indicators of such plants. Further, several required research and development activities of laser uranium enrichment can be conducted under a non-nuclear cover.

While visiting an exhibition sponsored by Iran’s National Center for Laser Science and Technology in February 2010, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (center) made a public statement about Iran’s laser uranium enrichment capability that troubled the international community. Ahmadinejad indicated that Iran possessed an advanced and effective laser uranium enrichment capability. Since then, the IAEA has sought data on Iran’s laser work.

Iran has far more than a pilot laser enrichment program. It has developed advanced lasers suitable for isotope separation and highly enriched uranium production. In February 2010, then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a public statement about Iran’s laser uranium enrichment capability. At an exhibition sponsored by Iran’s National Center for Laser Science and Technology, Ahmadinejad stated “Today, we are capable of enriching uranium with lasers. It is now possible to do this using the same devices which are on display here at the exhibition” and that “using the laser technology for enriching uranium would lead to carrying out the enrichment process with higher quality, accuracy, and speed.” He further stated “Iranian scientists have acquired the laser-operating, uranium enrichment know-how, but would put the technology on the shelf for now.” New facilities recently constructed at the Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center, once undeclared as a laser enrichment site, have supported Iran’s advanced laser efforts.

The IAEA, itself, has displayed concern over Iran’s laser enrichment capability. On February 8 and 9, 2014, the IAEA and Iran held technical meetings under the terms of the November 2013 Framework for Cooperation. As a result, Iran and the IAEA reached an agreement on seven practical measures that Iran had to implement by May 15, 2014, including one provision where Iran agreed to provide “mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab’ad Laser Center.” That agreement reinforced the terms of the Framework for Cooperation in November 2013. Iran agreed to further clarify Ahmadinejad’s 2010 statement on laser enrichment also, but the February 2014 IAEA Report stated Iran only partially explained it.

Would Iran Seek Breakout Capacity Through Laser Enrichment?

Many US allies still fear Iran’s diplomatic initiative is a delaying tactic designed to allow other Iranian government elements to bring the nuclear program to breakout capacity, which means acquiring the knowledge and means to develop a nuclear weapon without actually doing so. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the idea that Iran’s diplomatic efforts were legitimate, and rebuffed Obama for even entertaining Iranian overtures. When the talks began, the Wall Street Journal quoted Israel’s Minister of Intelligence and International Affairs, Yuval Steinitz, as saying, “Israel is interested in a diplomatic solution, like anyone else. But we don’t want to cheat ourselves.” Steinitz went on to state, “Some people are willing to be cheated.”

To put into perspective the possibility that Iran might be conducting an effective laser enrichment program in secret, consider strides made by Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan to revamp and enhance Iran’s advanced defense research programs and strengthen Iranian defense industrial base will greatly enhance Iran’s warfighting capabilities presently and into the future. Iran has already made great strides in satellite technology, drone, and stealth technology. The application of those new technologies was evident in the reverse engineering of a US stealth drone, the advent of a new anti-ship system and other naval technologies, and Iran’s greatly enhanced cyber capabilities. Per aspera ad astra! (Through difficulties to the stars!)

Dehghan is an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Air Force brigadier general (Sartip). He is fearless, devout, dedicated to the Islamic Revolution and sworn to defend the Islamic Republic. His efforts on the Expediency Council helped it best advise Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on conventional and unconventional ways Iran could use its military to accomplish political goals in the face of US and Western opposition. Dehghan’s descent to Rouhani’s cabinet, after serving as a committee secretary on the Expediency Council, did not occur because his administrative skills were sorely needed in the Defense Ministry. Rather, Dehghan was selected in order to manage projects of such importance to Iran’s security that only someone as capable and reliable as him could be counted on to direct.

On January 7, 2015, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, made it clear he was no longer concerned about ending sanctions through the nuclear talks, and warned the government that “efforts must be made to immunize Iran against the sanctions” so that “the people will not be hurt.”

Maintaining the nuclear program and the right to enrich was the requirement Khamenei gave to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani when he released him to engage in a dialogue with the US and Western powers on economic sanctions, and consequently, Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei saw the negotiation process primarily as an opportunity to counter economic sanctions while progressing in the area of nuclear technology. While occasionally supportive of government efforts in the nuclear talks, he often expressed some skepticism about them. On January 7, 2014, Khamenei made it clear that he was no longer as concerned about ending sanctions through the nuclear talks, and warned the government that “efforts must be made to immunize Iran against the sanctions” so that “the people will not be hurt.” He went on to state: “No one should imagine that the enemy may stop its enmity and maliciousness.” He then said, “Once you forget and trust the enemy, then the enemy finds the chance to pursue his goals in the country. But if you identify the enemy and you are strong, ready, arrogance [US] will inevitably stop its enmity.”

The Way Forward

The first successful attempt at gas centrifuge process of uranium enrichment, over which the P5+1 and Iran have primarily been negotiating, was performed in 1934 at the University of Virginia. The work was based on a 1919 proposal. Two chlorine isotopes were separated through a vacuum ultracentrifuge. It was the first process utilized in the renowned Manhattan Project of World War II, but abandoned because the process would unlikely allow for the production of material for a bomb rapidly enough. Electromagnetic separation, initiated at the Oak Ridge, Tennessee facility and eventually, gaseous diffusion, were pursued instead. The Soviet Union successfully used the gas centrifuge process in its nuclear program and during the Cold War, it was the most effective supplier of enriched uranium. Since those years, the gas centrifuge has been considered an economical means for separating uranium-235 from uranium-238 compared to gaseous diffusion. To achieve high degrees of separation of these isotopes, several individual centrifuges must be arranged in cascade to achieve higher concentrations.

Although little is said about it publicly, it sounds exotic, and details on it are relatively obscure, laser enrichment is certainly real. The details are not embellished here. Over eighty years after the first successful attempt gas separation by centrifuge, laser separation has become a viable means for countries to engage in uranium enrichment. It is also a less costly and less energy-intensive process for enriching uranium to fuel atomic energy reactors and making nuclear bombs. Iran’s scientific and technological prowess makes cogent the idea that Iran might be engaged in an advanced laser enrichment effort while negotiating over centrifuges. When decision was made to keep Iran away from nuclear weapons, the international community believed that it would monitor and eventually halt Iran’s centrifugal uranium enrichment, the path taken by countries that had already acquired a nuclear capability. It now appears that line of thinking is driven more by nostalgia than realism. While none of the current nuclear powers may have reached their nuclear capability with lasers, Iran certainly could. Visionaries might be able to provide hints about what Iran is doing. Only divine vision knows for sure.

US Must Pursue Iran Talks Before Considering Going to War, But If Talks Fail, Iran Will Be Attacked, Eventually!

Posted on March 8, 2014 by greatcharlie

Pictured above are two of Iran’s most senior leaders, President Hassan Rouhani (right) and IRGC Commander (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari (left), in an impromptu discussion of security issues.

According to a February 26, 2014, Reuters article entitled, “Kerry: US Must Pursue Iran Talks Before Considering Going to War,” by Lesley Wroughton and Arshad Mohammed, US Secretary of State John Kerry reportedly told a group of reporters that the US has an obligation to pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran before attempting to force Tehran to give up its nuclear activities with military action. Kerry further explained, “We took the initiative and led the effort to try to figure out if before we go to war there actually might be a peaceful solution.” On November 12, 2013, Iran reached a landmark preliminary agreement with the P5+1 (US, Britain, France, Russia China, and Germany) to halt what were alleged to be its most sensitive nuclear operations in exchange for some relief from economic sanctions. The interim deal was completed on January 12^th, and the parties set forth to continue negotiations for six months after which, it is hoped, a final accord will be signed. However, a positive outcome is not guaranteed. The Reuters article’s authors explained that when he states all options are on the table with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, US President Barack Obama is using diplomatic code for the possibility of military action. His predecessors and a long line of US officials have held out that same threat. Yet, when Kerry spoke to the reporters, he apparently left no doubt that the US would seriously consider a strike on Iran if the diplomatic talks breakdown.

Kerry’s public comments concerning the Geneva talks were uncharacteristic of him. Kerry is an extremely capable Secretary of State, and he has a genuine interest in improving relations with Iran. He is a discreet person who would hardly want to do anything to derail the Geneva process. The Reuters article’s authors asserted that Kerry’s statements were in reaction to pressure placed on the Obama administration by Congressional Republicans who threatened to revive a bill that would impose new sanctions on Iran. The Obama administration has cautioned Congress that such action could interfere with delicate nuclear talks to find a lasting agreement. The article’s authors also assert that pressure from Republican lawmakers will likely increase with signs that the easing of sanctions is allowing for the boost in Iran’s oil exports. However, Kerry’s comments on going to war with Iran were doubtlessly also heard in Tehran. As Iranian Foreign Minister and lead Iranian negotiator for the Geneva talks, Mohammad Javad Zarif, stated in December 2013, “When Secretary Kerry talks to the US Congress, the most conservative constituencies in Iran also hear him and interpret his remarks. So it’s important for everyone to be careful what they say to their constituencies because others are listening and others are drawing their own conclusions.” Kerry’s comments were very threatening in nature. Yet, at this point, it is that the leadership in Tehran probably did not become too concerned about US military action. Indeed, they feel that such action is unlikely.

Among the key power centers in Iran, to include the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani, the leadership of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and hard-line political and religious leaders, there was an understanding that Iran would be negotiating in Geneva from a position of strength as a military power. Such power was in part the basis of their belief that the US needed to negotiate with Iran as an equal. Iranian leaders likely reached this conclusion as a result of an assessment of the “capabilities and possibilities” for likely US military action. Certainly, Iranian leaders regularly receive a wealth of detailed reports from official and unofficial sources, including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, on information such as US approaches to the nuclear negotiations, policy and decision making and statements made by senior US political, diplomatic, and military officials on Iran. Yet, the consideration of capabilities and possibilities is a standard procedure and favored methodology for foreign affairs, defense, and intelligence organizations in Iran to assess, in the abstract, capability to effectively perform a proposed action and the real possibility for success. It also allows for an assessment of an opponent’s capability to respond to that action and possible decision making and reaction to it. By wrongly giving higher meaning to certain facts and assumptions and incorrectly weighing relative strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s military power versus the US, it becomes clear how Iranian policy analysts and decision makers would reach the conclusion that they would not face a military response if talks failed or if they took the step to develop a nuclear weapon. Based on one member’s experience working with Iranian officials on the nuclear issue, a truncated assessment of capabilities and possibilities, comparable to those done in Tehran, is presented here by greatcharlie.com in order to demonstrate how the Iranian leaders most likely acquired certain views, and why they have taken certain approaches toward the US. If Iranian leaders decide to drop the Geneva talks and actually develop a nuclear weapon, its decision will be based on a flawed understanding of US capabilities. There is a real possibility the US will attack Iran. However, there is also the possibility that as the Geneva talks advance, and greater contacts occur among US and Iranian officials and diplomats, some prevailing views in Tehran on US military capabilities may be modified. Those contacts may also create interest among Iranian leaders to seek a sustainable final agreement on economic sanctions and their nuclear program, if a final decision on how to proceed on the nuclear issue has not already been made.

“Capabilities”

The IRGC and Iranian Armed Forces have declared their willingness to defend Iranian territory with military power, and are convinced that they have such capabilities. IRGC Commander General (Sarlashkar) Mohammad Ali Jafari has explained: “[The US and Israel] know well that they have been unable to take any military action against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and if they make any foolish move of this sort, there are many options on the table for Iran and deadly responses will be received.” Regular displays of military strength through exercises and parades, along with hubristic declarations regarding Iran’s power, serve to assure the Iranian people that their government has the capability to defend them, and are also intended to serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors. Although the impact of US directed international sanctions on Iran’s economy has been considerable, Iranian leaders have vowed not to allow US sanctions prevent Iran from pursuing a nuclear program. Concerning sanctions, Jafari explained: “Today, Americans and Westerners have understood that pressure on Iran not only does not lead to the advancement of their desires but also has the opposite effect. Iran has progressed day by day.” Jafari’s statement is indeed accurate. Regardless of the state of negotiations between the US and its Western partners and Iran over the years, and the ferocity of the US threats, advances would continue to be made on the nuclear energy program. Iranian leaders have also appreciated the deterrent effect created by Western intelligence assessments that Iran is close to breakout capacity with its nuclear program; some estimates are that Iran is only six months away from having the technology to develop a bomb.

Iranian leaders feel Rouhani can capture the imagination of the US and its European partners making them more pliant to compromise. Regarding negotiations, there is a sense among Iranian leaders that Zarif has capabilities as a diplomat and advocate that are superior to his Western counterparts and is capable of driving them toward compromise on sanctions without surrendering nuclear rights. While rifts between hard-line elements in Iran with Rouhani and Zarif over the Geneva talks have been highlighted in the West, there is actually an understanding among Iranian leaders of the need to support the negotiations team. Indeed, concerning Zarif and the negotiations team, Jafari stated: “All must help the negotiations team of our country and the foreign policy apparatus in order to create consensus and public unity at the current time in order to help them demand the fundamental rights of the nation of Iran in the nuclear field and stand against Arrogant [US] blackmail and greed during negotiations and meetings.”

On regime change, a threat posed by the administration of US President George W. Bush against Iran, Iranian leaders are certain their security apparatus is too strong for the US to ever defeat and the US has backed away from that effort. Addressing the issue of regime change, IRGC Quds Force Commander General (Sarlashkar) Qassem Suleimani stated: “the important side of your [US] attempts today have been to confront the Islamic Republic. Your [Obama] statement [at the UN] that ‘We are not seeking the Islamic system’s overthrow’ is not a statement of kindness, but rather an announcement of incapability. You have been and will remain unable to be successful in overthrowing the Republic’s system.”

There is a sense among Iranian leaders that Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan’s efforts to revamp and enhance Iran’s advanced defense research programs and strengthen Iranian defense industrial base will greatly enhance Iran’s warfighting capabilities at the present and in the future. Iran has already made great strides in satellite technology, drone, and stealth technology. Iran has successfully used a base in Venezuela as a test bed for new technologies. Regarding application of those new technologies, in the Gulf, Iran believes it can establish dominance with the advent of new anti-ship system and naval technologies. Ali Shamkani, the new Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council directed the IRGC attempts to realize Iranian dominance in the Gulf while serving as IRGC Commander. He retains a strong interest in that effort.

On its borders, Iran has demonstrated its capability to effectively combat narcotics traffickers and rogue Islamic militant groups such as al-Qaeda and Jundallah, as well as the Peoples’ Mujahedeen, a group some Western policy analysts suggest that the US use as a means to weaken the government in Tehran. In Iraq, Iran has trained and equipped Iraqi Shi’a militiamen and sent them into Syria to support the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In Syria, Iran has demonstrated its capability to project power beyond its borders, deploying significant numbers of IRGC, Quds Force and regular Army forces there in support of the Assad regime. Iran has trained and equipped Syria’s shabiha (militiamen), and organized them into the National Defense Front. It is known that Iran has sent at least 330 truckloads of arms and equipment through Iraq to support the Syrian Armed Forces in 2013. An air corridor over Iraq has also emerged as a major supply route for Iran to send weapons, including rockets, anti-tank missiles, mortars, and rocket propelled grenades to Assad. Iran has also armed, equipped, and enabled Hezbollah to join the fight in Syria. Further, Iran has facilitated the deployment of Iraqi Shi’a militiamen trained by the Quds Force to Damascus. To further supplement the Syrian Armed Forces, hundreds of Shi’a, among the Arabs in Yemen and Pashtun in Afghanistan, have been recruited for combat duty in Syria. In Yemen, Iran’s Quds Force has supplied arms to Houthi rebels fighting government forces in the northern part of the country. In Bahrain, Iran has capitalized on ties established with Shi’a groups back in the 1990s. Calling themselves the Bahraini Rebellion Movement, some have carried out small-scale attacks on police. Bahraini rebels are operationally controlled by Bahraini opposition leaders, but typically trained in Iran. Iranian leaders feel they could utilize these diverse forces against the interests of the US and its friends and allies in retaliation for US military action.

As events and issues in the Middle East do not align with US President Barack Obama’s new vision of its national interest, some Iranian leaders feel the US has become disinterested in the region. Most also recite the global mantra that the US has been traumatized by its interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan both in which Iran supported opponents of the US. Obama, himself, appears to Iranian leaders as being skeptical about the use of the US military anywhere to create desired outcomes other than actions where participation by US personnel is very limited in scope as in Libya. Iranian leaders observed the Obama administration’s decision to make steep reductions in US conventional forces, leaving them somewhat less able to project robust power, take and hold ground in a non-permissive environment or engage in sustained ground combat operations in defense of the interests of the US, its friends, and allies. They have also observed Obama administration effort to make steep reductions in its nuclear forces, the crown jewels of its military power, only to be thwarted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin refused to negotiate on the matter concerned with the efficacy of taking such an audacious step. Additionally, they were amused over the way in which the Obama administration buckled under pressure from academics, policy scholars, and activists over drone use.

Iranian leaders have noted the Obama administration’s insistence on deploying a European based missile defense system to defeat an imagined Iranian nuclear-tipped missile attack. To Iranian leaders, the deployment of the missile defense system indicates that there is a willingness within the US to rely on defense and deterrence rather than offensive military action to cope with Iran’s nuclear program.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration’s behavior has been perceived by Iranian leaders as being very awkward. Regarding those military operations, Suleimani stated: “What achievements did the American army have with $700 billion budget . . . They expended approximately $3 trillion for the war in Iraq but the American army was unable to gain immunity in Iraq for [even] a single flight and exited Iraq with disgrace. The result of all war in the region was the Iranian nation’s victory.” In the view of some Iranian leaders, the Obama administration withdrew from Iraq as a result of a promise made during Obama’s first presidential campaign rather than strategic considerations. Consequently, Iranian leaders surprisingly found themselves left with an opportunity to strengthen Iran’s position in Iraq. However, the door was also opened for a growth of al-Qaeda’s presence there. The initial increase in force in Afghanistan after a long, agonizing decision by Obama in 2009 was made with the goal to create the opportunity for the US and NATO to succeed there. Iranian leaders have observed how that approach transformed into a decision to withdraw. Indeed, the US has now declared its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan by December 2014 without a security agreement with the Afghan government. Iranian leaders have been presented with an opportunity to further Iran’s dominance in the region, but recognize the US withdrawal may open the door to a growth in al-Qaeda’s presence there.

Among experts and advisers on foreign and defense policy in Tehran, the popular view espoused was that the Obama administration was forced into an aggressive stance against Iran with manipulation from Israel. Senior Military Advisor to the Supreme Leader and Former IRGC Commander General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi stated, “It is sad that the US President is under the influence of [Netanyahu’s] pressure and lies about Iran to such an extent, that he changed his tune and stance towards the Iranian issue. This leads to the US President’s weakness of independent thought and policy and has shown the power and influence of the Zionist lobby . . . .” Jafari stated in September 2013, “We hope that the Americans let go of their intransigence with Iran and become less affected by the Zionist lobby.” However, Iranian leaders now believe the US has retreated from its aggressive stance toward Iran fearing further military engagement in the Middle East. Iranian leaders want to believe that the Obama administration has very negative relations with Israel, and has pursued the Geneva negotiation process, despite Israel’s objections. They are convinced that uncongenial relations between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has served to stymie Israeli plans to take any action against Iran.

In Syria, the US has not interfered with Iran’s efforts to establish itself as the state with predominant military force on the ground and the complete capability to shape events, with the financial support from Russia and China. Despite declaring red-lines on the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the Obama administration hesitated and backed away from military action after very publicly accusing the Assad regime of using chemical weapons. Iranian leaders’ views of Obama’s unwillingness to take military action anywhere were confirmed when the Obama administration expressed “fears” over placing troops on the ground and was indecisive in choosing targets in Syria for military strikes before eventually declining to act altogether. That actually compelled many Iranian officials, IRGC commanders in particular, to publicly deride the US government as being indecisive and predict it would be pliant to Iran’s demands. Suleimani made the following statement about the US: “There was day when the US used three options: political, economic, military. Today they lie and say ‘we have forced Iran to negotiate with sanctions’ or the Islamic system is weaker.’ Really, today, the US has the most debt of any country in the world. The US has also failed everywhere they have interfered militarily. From a political perspective, they are not accepted anywhere in the world. In a situation in which the US is considered the world’s greatest power, they are ruined in every dimension.”

Iranian leaders watched as Democratic and Republican Members of the US Congress failed to support Obama’ s plan to take military action in Syria. They recognized that as being indicative of a greater problem between Obama and Congress. Iranian leaders feel the Congress would likely deny Obama support for military action elsewhere. The willingness of opponents in Congress to inflict harm on the US military, the security apparatus, and the US public, through sequestration and a government shutdown, convinced to Iranian leaders that there is outright hostility from Congress toward the Obama administration akin to an animus toward an enemy. The Iranian view of the Obama administration were supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his now infamous September 12, 2013, New York Times Op-Ed entitled, “A Plea for Caution from Russia.” Putin’s negative perceptions of Obama’s motives and the US have very likely found their way into Russia’s dialogue with Iran and have had an impact. Russia’s most recent military action in Ukraine demonstrates to Iranian leaders that there is little reason to be concerned or intimidated by a possible response from the Obama administration. Iranian leaders’ views on the role of the US in the world as a predominant power were also supported by China. Chinese views were represented in an editorial by the Chinese official news agency, Xinhua, calling for a “de-Americanized” world.

“Possibilities”

On the Geneva talks, Khamenei from the beginning made statements such as: “We had announced previously that on certain issues, if we feel it is expedient, we would negotiate with the Satan [US] to deter its evil.” Maintaining the nuclear program and the right to enrich were the main requirements that he gave to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani when releasing him to engage in a dialogue with the US and Western powers on economic sanctions, and Iran’s nuclear program. Khamenei viewed the Geneva process primarily as an opportunity to counter economic sanctions while progressing in the area of nuclear technology. Jafari has stated: “The people expect their officials to demand the complete nuclear rights of the nation of Iran, including the nuclear fuel cycle, complete and official recognition of the right to enrich, and the elimination of all unjust sanctions.”

Given the nature of relations between Obama and Netanyahu, Iranian leaders felt it was unlikely the US would agree to Israeli demands for Iran to cease all uranium enrichment and to remove all enriched uranium from its territory; dismantle its Fordow nuclear facility hidden in a mountain near Qum; dismantle its newest generation of centrifuges at Natanz; and, stop construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak. They know that the US has engaged in an effort to quell very audible concerns expressed by Israel and other Middle East allies over concessions made to Iran, particularly on sanctions. Iranian leaders truly believe Zarif is the best diplomat possible to promote the legitimacy of Iran’s positions. The popular notion, that the Obama administration’s foreign policy was initially driven in great part by the White House’s desire to establish Obama’s legacy, signaled to Iranian leaders that the US may be willing to make concessions in talks to reach an agreement. Zarif could deliver success at Geneva on Iran’s terms, exploiting the US desire to make a deal.

It may very well be that Iranian leaders want to use the Geneva talks to gain time to make greater advances in the nuclear program. Continued progress in the program has been a feature of Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the US and its Western partners since such talks`began with the Bush administration despite the ferocity of threats of military intervention and the imposition of sanctions. From a darker perspective, true conservatives among Iranian leaders may wish to use the diplomatic efforts of Rouhani and Zarif simply to misdirect the US and its European partners, enabling other elements of the Iranian government to pursue the covert weaponization of the nuclear program. Iran has the possibility to engage in a dual-track approach to resolve problems over the nuclear issue with the US and its Western partners within the parameters of Khamenei’s concept of heroic flexibility. Rouhani and the Iranian Foreign Ministry would take a path toward diplomacy to acquire concessions from the US while the IRGC, the Ministry of Defense, and other government elements take a path toward accomplishing the military goals of the nuclear program.

Whether through the current course of research or a covert program, Iranian leaders are aware that once a significant level of competence with nuclear technology is successfully acquired and tested, the genie will be out of the bottle and a new situation will immediately exist. Iranian leaders believe that threats of further sanctions or military action against Iran would unlikely be viewed as constructive internationally, other than by Israel. Iranian leaders believe particularly that it would less likely face any consequences if it achieves nuclear weapons technology when US mid-term Congressional elections occur in 2014. Democrats in the US Senate and House of Representatives, especially those seeking re-election, would not want to have to explain a new war in the Middle East declared by a president from their party.

What Has Occurred So Far

Under the agreed pause of its nuclear activities, Iran has suspended its nuclear program to the extent that enrichment of uranium would be halted beyond 5 percent, a level deemed sufficient for energy production but not for developing a nuclear device. Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched to 20 percent, a step toward weapons grade fuel, would be diluted or converted to oxide, preventing it from standing prepared for military purposes. Iran already produced more than 20,000 pounds of enriched uranium gas that is three quarters of the way to weapons grade material. Iran also agreed not to install any new centrifuges, or start up any that were not already operating. Between 2009 and 2013, Iran’s inventory of installed centrifuges increased from 5,500 to 19,000. Iran agreed not to build any new enrichment facilities. An undeclared enrichment facility at Fordow, buried inside of a mountain and outfitted with centrifuges over the last several years, was exposed by US and allied intelligence efforts prior to the negotiations. Iranian officials indicated that their program had not been curtailed at all. They claimed that Iran by its own volition, reached an interim agreement with the P5+1, but did not give up the right to enrich or the ability to return to enriching at any time. To them, the interim agreement did not prevent Iran from enriching uranium above 3.5 percent or to dismantle any existing centrifuges. Iranian deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs as well as lead negotiator, Abbas Arachi, made it clear that while Iran would separate connections between centrifuges that have been used to enrich uranium to 20 percent, the interconnections could be reconnected in a day. The entire feed stock for producing nuclear weapons fuel and infrastructure remains intact. Additionally, the Iranians were able to retain achievements made through their development of a heavy water reactor in Arak which provides a plutonium pathway to producing nuclear weapons fuel.

However, the agreement, more importantly, has reversed the momentum of sanctions and provided some relief from the threat created by the notion of impenetrable sanctions. Some US policy analysts may believe that Iran may be buying time in order to advance its nuclear program while giving key concessions on the sanctions front. Yet, what may really be happening is that Iranian leaders are giving new consideration to the Geneva process. Considering how to proceed against the US and its European partners in the abstract, is quite different from engaging with US officials in actual negotiations. Information gleaned from US officials and diplomats should provide fresh information about US actions and intentions. It is difficult to say whether such information from the talks might have an impact on thinking among Iranian leaders. Nonetheless, while enduring Kerry threats of war, Iran has actually kept its end of the deal under the November 24^th agreement by reducing its stock of 20 percent enriched uranium, not enriching uranium above a purity of 5 percent and not installing more centrifuges in addition to other things. Kerry, himself, told reporters that “Generally speaking, they have done I think everything that they were required to do with respect to the reductions.” Kerry further explained that “There’s no centrifuge challenge. They haven’t put any in. They … have reduced their 5 percent. They have reduced the 20 (percent),” he added. “They are in the middle of doing all the things that they are required to do.”

The Way Forward

Khamenei and other Iranian leaders believed an agreement favorable to Iran’s interests, particularly on sanctions and Iran’s nuclear rights, would be rapidly constructed. As the negotiation process dragged on, they were recognized as a complicated and deliberate process, the outcome of which is uncertain. Khamenei began expressing doubts that an agreement acceptable to Iran could be constructed. Nevertheless, once an interim deal was reached, and Khamenei and Iran so far have adhered to it. There is real hope among negotiators that a final agreement can be reached. However, the talks could also fail, and that would not be a simple matter at all. Iranian leaders may conclude the US will not attack, given the predilection of the Obama administration to shy away from military action, and speculation on the US included in some analysis of “capabilities and possibilities” developed in the abstract by policy experts in Tehran. Yet, the US military, in reality, possesses the capability to successfully execute a decisive blow against the Iranian nuclear program and effectively deal with Iran in the aftermath of any strikes.

US military planners develop concepts for operations using their expertise based on a long career in their respective branches of the armed forces that includes continuous military education and training and considerable experience warfighting. They would be the ones responsible for developing plans for military action against Iran for the Obama administration. They know the capabilities of specific individuals and units, the effectiveness of their weapons systems, and what the real possibility for success of any given operation would be. All tools, both conventional and nuclear, would be available to them. If ordered by the president to present a plan for such an attack, senior US military planners will more than likely produce something that displays a high level of acumen and creativity, utilizing advanced technologies in a manner that neither analysts nor the potential opponent could foresee. A plan to put the full panoply of security measures in place not just in the region but in the US and territories of friends and allies to thwart retaliation would also be produced and implemented. The worst way for Iranian leaders to discover the US military’s capabilities would be through an attack.

Iranian leaders must realize that when dealing with the US, ultimately, issues do not center on whoever occupies the Oval Office at any given time. Term-limits set by the US Constitution prevent Obama for serving a third term. Striking a balance between demands for relief from economic sanctions and the gradual cessation of the nuclear program may not be at issue for the next US president. To the extent that the US is a staunch ally of Israel and to a similar extent, Saudi Arabia, the next US president might decide to ameliorate the US approach, requiring new concessions from Iran, to include an immediate halt of all its nuclear activities. The demand could possibly be made for Iran to surrender its nuclear program or face military action.

Another realization that must be reached is that rather than focus on comments that are meant for domestic political consumption in the US, Iranian leaders must stay focused on what is best for Iran and what can truly be achieved through the nuclear negotiations. Relations between the US and Iran are at a new stage as are the nuclear negotiations. The P5+1 Talks have provided a unique opportunity for US officials and their Iranian counterparts, through close contact, to acquire a better understanding of various aspects of one another’s thinking. Much of what has been learned since surely contradicts Iranian leaders’ prior assessments of capabilities and possibilities regarding the US. For the US and Iran, the improved understanding of mutual positions was further strengthened by back channel talks, some conducted by officials from the US National Security Council. Those talks also allowed very senior officials to “clear the air” regarding any personal concerns and relations between the two countries. The new dialogue has built confidence, eliminated many ambiguities about positions, and lessened the guessing over actions, intentions, and motives. Jafari has been quoted as saying, “Anti-Westernism is the principle characteristic of the Islamic Republic.” However, Iranian leaders at this point may be able to see, even with such slogans in mind, the real possibilities of a final agreement. Adhering to the interim deal, as Kerry himself has confirmed, is a good first step and serves as recognition by Iranian leaders that a peace agreement has promise. Although it has been dogma among US policy analysts and think tank scholars to view Iran as determined to pursue nuclear weapons through its nuclear program, it may very well be that a final decision on how to proceed has not been made in Tehran. Recall that Khamenei has stated repeatedly that Iran does not want a nuclear weapon. If Iran were trying to develop a nuclear weapon, the effort could only be justified by Iranian leaders as a matter of absolute necessity for Iran’s security. Evidence does not exist that the nuclear program has been militarized. Whether Iranian leaders truly believe a nuclear weapon would make them more secure is not certain. With great expenditure, Iranian leaders may be both creating a nuclear energy program, and simply creating the option to weaponize if it became necessary.

If a final decision truly has not been made on developing a nuclear weapon, it may still be possible, in Geneva and through back channel discussions, to convince Iranian leaders that pursuing a weapon would not be necessary. Zarif, Kerry, and all parties to the negotiations may very well be able to deliver a deal that satisfies Tehran and all parties to the negotiations. It is certainly worth the try. If they fail, then a war will likely be declared, if not immediately, in the near future.

Kerry Presses Iran to Prove Its Nuclear Program Is Peaceful; The White House Presses Kerry to Make a Deal

Posted on November 22, 2013 by greatcharlie

In a November 18, 2013 Reuters article entitled “Kerry Presses Iran to Prove Its Nuclear Program Peaceful,” Lesley Wroughton reported that US Secretary of State John Kerry appeared to lower expectations for the next round of talks in Geneva on Iran’s nuclear program. Kerry’s comments, which were made at a press conference in Washington DC, ran counter to the optimism expressed after the previous round of talks one week before. Currently, the talks seek to reach an interim agreement to allow time to negotiate a comprehensive, permanent agreement that would end a ten year impasse and provide assurances to the US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China that Iran’s nuclear program will not produce weapons. Wroughton quoted Kerry as stating “I have no specific expectations with respect to the negotiation in Geneva except that we will negotiate in good faith and we will try to get a first-step agreement.” Wroughton reported Kerry hoped “Iran will understand the importance of coming there prepared to create a document that can prove to the world this is a peaceful program.” Kerry declined to discuss details of the proposal under discussion. Kerry was also reported as stating: “I am not going to negotiate that in public. We all need to be respectful of each others’ processes here and positions—and so it’s best to leave that negotiation to the negotiating table.”

The restraint Kerry wisely displayed by refusing to discuss the substance of upcoming talks contrasted greatly with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif’s public discussion of the talks. On November 17, 2013, Zarif presented his idea for overcoming the stumbling block of enrichment in the upcoming round of negotiations. The US argues that Iran does not intrinsically have the right to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iran claims that it retains that right. To get around this sticking point, Zarif reportedly explained to the ISNA news agency in Iran, “Not only do we consider that Iran’s right to enrich is unnegotiable [sic], but we see no need for that to be recognized as ‘a right,’ because this right is inalienable and all countries must respect that.” In Zarif’s statement lies a major problem concerning trust among the negotiating parties. Unless the necessary work is done on uranium enrichment at the talks in Geneva to a concrete agreement, the negotiations may be in jeopardy. Moreover, unless the US takes a consistent course of assertive diplomacy toward Iran, it will most likely end up with an agreement it does not really want and may not be sustainable. Even if a nuclear agreement of some type is preferred by the Obama administration over military response or further economic sanctions, the best agreement possible within the interests of the US and its allies still must be sought.

Geneva: An Assertive Posture Morphs into Acquiescence

There was considerable expectation created in Washington over the potential of negotiations with Iran given the eloquent case Iranian President Hassan Rouhani made for opening a dialogue with the US before and after his inauguration. There was also skepticism expressed in the US, mainly by Kerry. He made it clear that the warming a relations between the US and Iran did not mean that the US would back off its demands on Iran’s nuclear program. Kerry was also unequivocal about his willingness to shut down any talks if he discerned an effort to stall, misdirect, or deceive through the process. When Zarif suggested that the US should bring proposals to an October bargaining session, Kerry bristled and rejected the idea, stated at a press conference that the Islamic Republic still had not responded to the last offer put forth by the US, Russia, and others in February. In some quarters of the US government, the increased requests for proposals and other deliverables from the US by Iran and the effort to shift nuclear away from bilateral engagement with the US talks to broader negotiations with the Europeans and Russia was itself an Iranian effort to stall the negotiations.

However, as the process got underway, there was a perceptible shift in the US position. US negotiators seemed to fall over themselves just to reach a nuclear deal with Iran. Talk of military action against Iran’s nuclear program became a distant memory. Regarding the use of further economic sanctions, the Obama administration officials made it clear to the US Congress that they would not convince the Iranians to accede to US wishes. The White House wanted to reach a deal. Things proceeded in this way regardless of any further skepticism or even doubts Kerry might possess over Iran’s intentions and actions. Kerry, a discreet and honorable man, who is bound by a sense of loyalty to his president as a secretary of state and to Obama personally, was prepared to press forward as directed. The veil of skepticism that draped initial US efforts to establish dialogue with Iran was lifted. Zarif apparently recognized the change in US attitude. He was correct when he declared in the Iranian media, “There are indicators that John Kerry is inclined [to advance the nuclear matter in Iran’s interests].”

According to a November 18, 2013, New York Times article, weeks before the Geneva meeting at which hopes for an accord first soared and then sank, the US and Iran had opened a quiet two-way negotiation on a six-month interim deal. Officials close to Laurent Fabius, the French Foreign Minister, told the New York Times that those bilateral discussions had produced an agreed US-Iranian text (with caveats) by the time the Geneva talks opened. When French officials became cognizant of it they were distressed.

When the US delegation arrived in Geneva on November 7, 2013, they explained that they wanted to construct a deal that would freeze the Iranian nuclear program, to buy some time to negotiate a more ambition deal, and to stop two separate methods of developing a bomb: one involving uranium and, the other plutonium. In return, the Iranians would receive modest relief from sanctions, but not what they desperately desire, the ability to again sell oil around the world. That would come only later as part of a final agreement that would require the Iranians to dismantle much of their nuclear infrastructure. Talk at the bargaining table focused on those three areas: The heavy-water plant at Arak that the Iranians are building, where the outline agreement seemed to allow continued construction; language that appeared to concede prematurely an Iranian “right to enrich” or something close to it; and, what measures exactly Iran would take to dispose of its stockpile of 20 percent-enriched uranium. France, gravely concerned with all that had transpired, sought to close any loopholes. French changes to the proposed agreement proved unacceptable to the Iranian delegation

The Way Forward: US Allies Are Flummoxed

According to a November 19, 2013, New York Times article, based on what is known about the agreement, it neither froze the Iranian program nor rolled it back. Rather, only some elements are frozen, and the rollbacks in the initial agreement are relatively minor. Iran would continue adding to its stockpile of low-enriched uranium, meaning uranium enriched to reactor grade or less than 5 percent purity. The US maintains that the overall size of Iran’s stockpile would not increase. The November 19^th article also explained that the reason for that is Iran would agree to convert some of its medium enriched uranium—fuel enriched to 20 percent purity is bomb grade—into an oxide form that is on the way to becoming reactor fuel. Yet, that process can be easily reversed.

Based on the US effort, the French are convinced that the US seems a bit disinterested in the Middle East. French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius expressed his dismay in a recent speech, stating: “The United States seems no longer to wish to become absorbed by crises that do not align with its new vision of its national interest.” He suggested this explained “the non-response by strikes to the use of chemical weapons by the Damascus regime, whatever the red lines set a year earlier.” Fabius stated further that a redirection of US interests may be a manifestation of the “heavy trauma of the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan” and what he perceived as the current “rather isolationist tendency” in American public opinion. He was concerned that no state could replace the US on the world stage. Fabius lamented that without US engagement, the world would find “major crises left to themselves,” and “a strategic void could be created in the Middle East,” with widespread perception of “Western indecision” in a world less multipolar than “zero-polar.”

In other Western capitals, the foreign policy of the Obama administration is driven by US President Barack Obama’s desire to establish his legacy. The perception of a “legacy quest” approach taken by Obama and his administration on foreign policy has more than perturbed Putin. In many capitals around the world, this signaled the US may be willing to make risky concessions in talks to reach agreements.

The Israelis are the most vocal critics of the proposed agreement and alarmed by its terms. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s opposition to the agreement has been reported by some Israeli analysts as being both substantive and political. Reportedly, he truly believes that a deal lifting sanctions without fully halting enrichment and dismantling centrifuges would be a terrible mistake. Netanyahu speaks as if he had some type of “intimation” based on his “dominant knowledge” of the Middle East, that Iran was engaged in a major deception. Some Israeli security analysts disagree with Netanyahu’s views. Yet, the weight of maintaining the security of Israel falls on his shoulders. Perhaps it would behoove Netanyahu to consider that the US decision may have been impacted by his own uncongenial relationship with Obama despite the strong ties between the US and Israel. He should consider the possibility that difficulties the Obama administration has had getting Israel to agree on Arab-Israeli peace process, Palestine, the occupation, settlements and other issues has influenced US actions. Netanyahu must not be dismissive of the stinging memory of what some US analysts have described as a manipulation of the Bush administration policymakers by Israeli security officials on the Iraq issue. Israeli intelligence findings, claims and pleas regarding Iraq supported the invasion that led to a very difficult period in US foreign and defense policy and a national nightmare for the American people. There is also the somewhat expedient argument that Israel has “cried wolf” too often.

Divergence in Outlook

Two of the most imminent members of the foreign policy establishment, former US national security adviser in the administration of President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and former national security adviser in the administrations of Presidents Gerald R. Ford and George H. W. Bush and US Air Force lieutenant general, Brent Scowcroft, issued a joint statement on November 18, 2013. They explained, “should the United States fail to take this historic opportunity, we risk failing to achieve our nonproliferation goal and losing the support of allies and friends while increasing the probability of war.” They repeated Obama’s central argument, “Additional sanctions now against Iran with the new the view to extracting even more concessions in the negotiations will risk undermining or even shutting down the negotiations.”

The joint statement was significant, given the knowledge and experience of Brzezinski and Scowcroft in international affairs. However, while they centered their argument on negotiating in support of nuclear nonproliferation and to avoid the need for war, in Iran the argument for negotiations centered on the economic harm resulting from US coercive diplomacy. The goal of the negotiations from Tehran’s view is not as much to find compromise on its nuclear program as it is to gain some compromise from the US on economic sanctions. The nuclear program is seen by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as well as hardline political leaders and clerics, rightfully Iran’s to keep, and a necessity, even though it was the pursuit of the essentials for a nuclear capacity that has made Iran much poorer.

Assessment: A Lack of Confidence

There is a sense among US allies that negotiations with Iran have reached this point as result of the White House’s desire to seek political expedient solutions rather than well-considered approaches based on analysis. To date, no publicly released US government data has indicated that Iran intends to develop a nuclear weapon. Yet opinion among US allies who have assessed the situation falls mostly on the side that there are too many loopholes in the proposed agreement, and Iran could potentially run in the open field toward developing a nuclear device at will. Israel in particular has been very vocal about its concerns over US attitude and effort regarding the Geneva negotiation process. Iran is not pleased by Netanyahu’s statements regarding its negotiation efforts, but has left it to the US to manage its relationship with Israel on the matter. To Iran’s satisfaction, the US has essentially ignored Israel’s concerns, as well as resisted calls for caution from allies, and has pushed forward with the Geneva talks and the current proposed interim agreement.

In addition to his joint statement with Brent Scowcroft on the Obama administration’s efforts in Geneva, Zbigniew Brzezinski used Twitter o November 19, 2013, to proffer that Obama and Kerry were the best foreign policy team since President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker. However, to be forthright, there are differences. George H. W. Bush was elected to two terms as a Member of the US House of Representatives much as Obama was a elected to one term as a Member of the US Senate. Yet, Bush also served as a diplomat (US Ambassador to the UN), an intelligence expert (Director of the CIA), and, a US Navy aviator (a combat torpedo bomber pilot in World War II). Together with Secretary Baker, his chief diplomat, was amassed a tremendous wealth of knowledge and experience that has not been matched since. This is in stark contrast with the understanding of world affairs in the abstract from intelligence and the first-hand reports of others which Obama has acquired. That may be the source of much concern in Paris, other European capitals, Tel Aviv and within the US Congress.

Indeed, there may very well be doubt whether Obama is able to fully synthesize the issues at hand concerning Iran’s nuclear program beyond the pure legalities of it. At this point, the French appear to have appraised the Obama administration as unwilling to use military action to respond to Iran’s nuclear program. The Iranians, themselves, may have also concluded that Obama was not predisposed toward declaring war regardless of how they might proceed. The Iranians essentially see Obama as lacking the will to fight. Given that perspective, eliminating sanctions, even if for six months would be preferred maintain the status quo. While its figures were debunked by the US State Department given sanctions relief would be in effect for only six months and not a year, Israel continues to state the proposed deal would directly erase $15 billion to $20 billion of what was $100 billion the current sanctions are costing Iran annually, and lead to relief of up to $40 billion because of indirect effects. In the meantime, with whatever short-term concessions on sanctions that might be allowed, the hardliners in Iran, particularly IRGC commanders, who are unfortunately convinced Obama is timorous, given recent declarations, may see a golden opportunity to develop a nuclear device. Perhaps they believe what they would undoubtedly characterize as their “bold and decisive action,” could be reconciled with rest of the world through the negotiation powers of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. They would call it all a spectacular victory for the Islamic Republic. Whether the world truly faces that possibility remains to be seen.

Kerry Appears to Reject Iran’s Call for New Nuclear Proposal, But Iran’s Leaders Were Unlikely Frazzled by That

Posted on October 9, 2013 by greatcharlie

In an October 7, 2013 Washington Post article entitled “Kerry Appears to Reject Iran’s Call for New Nuclear Proposal,” Anne Gearan reported US Secretary of State John Kerry feels that warming relations between the US and Iran do not mean that the US will back off its demands about Iran’s nuclear program or roll back missile defenses in Europe aimed at intercepting an Iranian attack. Back in September, Gearan notes, Kerry met with his Iranian counterpart, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at the UN General Assembly in New York and US President Barack Obama telephoned Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the end of the event. Kerry reportedly stated on October 7th that “We’re waiting for the fullness of the Iranian difference in their approach now.” He further explained, “But we’re encouraged by the statements that were made in New York, and we’re encouraged by the outreach.” However, included in the article was a quote from Zarif, also Iran’s chief negotiator on the nuclear issue, extracted from Iran’s state media. Zarif stated the US should bring new proposals to a multi-party nuclear bargaining session in Geneva next week. According to Gearan, Kerry appeared to reject that idea. He explained Iran still has not responded to the last offer put forth by the US, Russia and others, in February.

Such increased requests for proposals and other deliverables from the US by Iran and any effort to shift nuclear away bilateral engagement with the US talks to a broader negotiation with the Europeans and Russia may create the impression that an effort to stall the negotiations could be underway. That would come as a huge disappointment in Washington given expectations created by the eloquent case Rouhani made for opening a dialogue with the US before and after his election as president. Zarif is astute enough to know that Kerry will shut the talks down if he discerns an effort to stall, misdirect, or deceive through negotiations. It might be expected this would be viewed as disastrous in Iran, but the reality is that achieving nothing through the nuclear talks might be acceptable within Iran’s power elite. Indeed, in Iran, the talks are not nuclear talks as much as talks on the economic sanctions. If there is not an outcome on economic sanctions acceptable in Tehran, then an agreement may not be reached. The US would need to prepare to act with either further coercive diplomacy or military action, or simply wait for Tehran’s next step, which may be the acquisition of the capability to build a nuclear device.

Does Tehran Want an Agreement on Its Nuclear Program?

The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been supportive of Rouhani and has given him the authority to act in negotiations with the US. However, the goal of the negotiations from Iran’s view is not as much to find compromise on its nuclear program as it is to gain some compromise from the US on economic sanctions. The nuclear program is seen by Khamenei, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), as well as hardline political leaders and senior clerics, rightfully Iran’s to keep, and a necessity, even though the pursuit of the essentials for a nuclear capacity has made Iran much poorer. Although for years, Khamenei and the Iranian leadership have rejected the idea of Iran wanting a nuclear weapon, US policy makers suspect that Iranian leaders actually believe nuclear weapons will make Iran stronger. This situation has placed both Rouhani and Iran’s negotiator, Zarif, in a difficult position. They must try to end economic sanctions, but manage to hold on to Iran’s nuclear program, with all of its potential, knowing the US will not agree to those demands..

In Iran, there have been shrill responses by key players over the talks with the US and strong condemnations of the Obama administration threats over Iran’s nuclear program. During a speech before Friday prayer in Tehran, the adviser to IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Jafari and Expediency Discernment Council Member, Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi, (and former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) discussed events in New York during the UN General Assembly. As translated from the Iranian Students News Agency by Will Fulton and Amir Toumaj of the American Enterprise Institute, Harandi reportedly stated “Our president went to the UN to solve problems with all options open from the Supreme Leader and a framework of red lines. The American Secretary of State, in opposition to the commitments and statements he made, did not recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium, said that none of the officials had agreed on Iran’s right to enrichment, and said that no changes had taken shape in this area when he spoke to news agencies and the media.” His statement raised the ire of prayer attendees who began to shout “Death to America.”

According to Fars News, Harandi also proffered the view in his address that the negotiations would unlikely succeed; therefore, there was no real possibility that economic sanctions would be lifted anytime soon. What Harandi knew, but presumably did not reveal to prayer attendees was that beyond the demand that Iran not enrich uranium, US demands went much farther to require Iran to remove enriched uranium from its territory; dismantle its nuclear facility hidden in a mountain near Qum; dismantle its newest generation of centrifuges at Natanz; and, stop construction of a heavy-water reactor at Arak. Meeting those demands would be tantamount to surrender and represent a humiliating defeat from the perspective of Iran’s leadership. Harandi expressed this view by stating: “These days our people have hoped for the opening of a path under the title of ‘heroic flexibility’ that leads to the realization of their demands, but I am confident that in every respect the conduct of America will continue in this malicious direction of the past and failing to evaluate national rights, and certainly their slogans will echo more loudly.”

As explained in the greatcharlie.com September 26, 2013 post entitled, “Hossein Dehghan’s Concealed Hand in Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policy Efforts”, “heroic flexibility,” particularly as understood by Harandi and his close compatriots in the IRGC allows for diplomacy with the US and its Western allies, but requires the protection of Iran’s right pursue and nuclear energy program. Indeed, the joint diplomatic campaign of the president’s office and the Foreign Ministry may actually be just one part of larger plan being implemented by Iran. Much as US and other Western analysts have suspected, Iran’s leaders likely have decided that while Rouhani is heroically negotiating with the US and its Western partners or even after he might reach an understanding with them on the nuclear issue, other elements of power in Iran, away from Rouhani’s purview, would continue efforts on Iran’s nuclear energy program, until all goals of the nuclear program are reached. It has been assessed by the same analysts that Iran is already close to breakout capacity when it will be able to finish a device in a matter of weeks, without technically testing or possessing a bomb. For Iranian leaders, turning back now, after getting so close, would be counterproductive and counterintuitive.

The notion that Iran’s goals regarding economic sanctions would unlikely be met was also heard from Mashhad Friday Prayer Leader Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda. As translated from the Iranian Students News Agency by Will Fulton and Amir Tourmaj of the American Enterprise Institute, Alamolhoda explained, “The country’s officials at the management rank must use foreign policy capacities to resolve economic issues and no one must create obstacles against the administrative measures.” However, Alamolhoda went on to state, “The reality is that the country is stricken with the enemy’s nefarious sanction and issue, but paying attention to these realities must not cause the neglect of revolutionary ideals and strategies.” Going further regarding his mistrust of the US, Alamolhoda explained that “America’s intention will never change and that view is corroborated by the American president’s act of prohibiting nuclear weapons and calling the use of nuclear energy the Iranian nation’s right. According to [US National Security Adviser, Ambassador Susan] Rice’s statement, Obama acted knowingly in speaking, because he has given the right to use nuclear energy to Iran and not its enrichment.”

Most important in Alamolhoda’s speech, was his statement that “In the span of two days, America’s strategy changed against Iran, therefore [settling with] a government that destroyed and annihilated an Iranian aircraft on the Persian Gulf has no meaning.” His rejection of forthright negotiations with the US gives one a sense of the rationale behind a possible dual-track effort regarding its nuclear program. The echo of mistrust of the US could also be heard from Expediency Discernment Council and Assembly of Experts member Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami when discussing US-Iran relations and Obama’s comments on military options against Iran. As translated from Fars News by Will Fulton and Amir Tourmaj of the American Enterprise Institute, Khatami stated: “From the beginning, America had problems with us, and if the nuclear story ends they will introduce human rights [as a new issue]. Therefore, America’s issue is the issue of dominance.” He asserted, “Americans lie when they say they do not seek the overthrow of Iran’s government, rather they wanted to do so but could not. Therefore, relying on the smiles of Westerners and of this nation’s enemies is an error.” He explained “There are rumors that some have said to abandon the death to America slogan, but they must know that the death to America slogan is the slogan of Iran’s resistance.” Khatami went on to state, “The most idiotic type of speaking with a nation is threatening a nation. With complete obscenity, Obama says that ‘we will put all options on the table’ and we also tell them we have all options on the table, which one of those choices is Eight Years of Sacred Defense.” Khatami pointed to the fact that “Morsi called Shimon Perez a brother, consulted with Obama, and did something for America. Therefore, those who seek to back down should look closer at Morsi’s fate. Of course, we do not accept the current government that has come to power in Egypt and consider it corrupt.” Lastly, Khatami stated, “Today, the enemy is not trustworthy at all because we are facing an enemy that is not bound to any principles. Of course, we do not say that we should not have diplomatic negotiations.”

Assessment

Leaders in Tehran state that Iran has not sought to threaten the US or its interests. Yet, they fully sense both pressure and a real threat from the US in the form of: draconian economic sanctions as part of a US policy of coercive diplomacy against Iran; the US desire to reign in Iran’s nuclear energy program and refusal to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium; the US condemnation of Iran for allegedly sponsoring terrorism worldwide; and, a powerful US naval and military presence in and around the Persian Gulf. The previous US administration’s declaration of that Iran was a member of the “Axis of Evil”, its repetitive threats of regime change, and it threat to impose a US form of democracy on Iran, still rings in the ears of Iranian leaders. They will not tolerate any further expressions of US views on what is best for the Iranian people. Thoughts that Obama may lack the will to use force after his somewhat awkward effort to use force in Syria, are offset by deeply engrained feelings that Iran could be attacked. The Iranians are not yet able to rely on promises from the US. To that extent, Iranian leaders feel they must do whatever is necessary to ensure their nation’s security and interests.

The long awaited diplomatic opening has occurred through the meeting between Kerry and Zarif in New York, and the phone conversation between Obama and Rouhani. However, Kerry explains that it is too early to say whether the thaw begun at the UN in September will lead to a change in US policy. For the US, time is certainly of the essence, as Iran’s nuclear capabilities are ever increasing. Small diplomatic steps must continue. Yet, Iran wants both countries step to each other at the same time. That may have much to do with Zarif’s call for a US proposal. It was noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski that enduring nuclear accords with the Soviet Union involved compromise, not demands for one-sided capitulation. It may very well be that the nuclear issue will not be resolved with this new dialogue. An agreement with Iran that halts its nuclear program may not be part of Obama’s legacy. Legacy seems to be a very important consideration within the White House and among US pundits. If the US were to refrain from military action against Iran even after any further nuclear developments by Iran were revealed, the US and Iran might still be able to slowly resolve issues though contact and communication. Through cooperation with other countries, the US and Iran could possibly engage in efforts to establish greater security and stability in the Middle East.

The Adviser to Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander-in-Chief Major General Mohammad-Ali Jafari and Expediency Discernment Council Member, Mohammad Hossein Saffar Harandi (center)

US and Iran Agree to Speed Talks to Defuse Nuclear Issue, But Trust Will Determine Its Pace

Posted on October 1, 2013 by greatcharlie

In a September 27, 2013 New York Times article entitled, “US and Iran Agree to Speed Talks to Defuse Nuclear Issue,” it was reported that the long-fractured relationship between the US and Iran took a turn on September 26^th when US President Barack Obama reached Iranian President Hassan Rouhani by phone for a fifteen minute conversation. The call came to Rouhani while enroute to the airport from New York City following a whirlwind of diplomatic meetings and news media events at the UN General Assembly. The conversation, explained the article, was the first between the US and Iranian leaders since 1979 when the Islamic Revolution in Iran toppled the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and led to the seizure of the US Embassy and a 444-day hostage crisis. The two countries have been at odds ever since.

According to the article, a senior Obama administration official, who briefed reporters on the condition of anonymity due to diplomatic sensitivities, revealed the White House had expressed to the Iranians that Obama was interested in meeting Rouhani during the initial week of activities of the General Assembly but was surprised the Iranians had suggested the phone call. According to that same anonymous official, Obama placed the call from the Oval Office around 2:30PM, joined by aides and a translator. The article quoted Obama as saying during a press conference that same afternoon, “Resolving this issue obviously could also serve as a major step toward a new relationship between the United States and Iran, one based on mutual interests and mutual respect.” The New York Times reported a Twitter account in Rouhani’s name stated later that day, “In regards to nuclear issue, with political will, there is a way to rapidly solve the matter.” Rouhani’s Twitter account was also reported as tweeting that Rouhani had told Obama, “We’re hopeful about what we will see from the US and other major powers “in coming months.”

Obama’s phone conversation with Rouhani, and the thirty minute meeting between US Secretary of State John Kerry and his counterpart Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif the day before, were truly historic moments, and have been sources of much reveling within the Obama administration. If a US-Iranian accommodation over the nuclear dispute could be reached now, it might also serve to prevent a regional explosion in the Middle East. However, the president should only be cautiously optimistic about future relations with Iran. Any radical shift in the bilateral relations should not be expected anytime soon. Luckily for both sides, the key players in this very fluid scene, Obama and Rouhani, and Kerry and Zarif genuinely want to reach an agreement. The biggest hurdle in the process will be establishing trust after years of uncongenial relations. The greatest constraint will be time as the Iranians move closer to their nuclear goals.

Those Best Able to Reach an Agreement Are in Place

While the door has been opened for the potential of a new chapter between the two nations, a key to its success will be the individuals involved in the negotiations. The first impressions between Obama and Rouhani and Kerry and Zarif were very positive. As it was discussed in at August 3, 2013 greatcharlie.com post entitled “President-Elect Stirs Optimism in the West But Talks With Iran Will Likely Be Influenced By the Syrian War,” Obama’s involvement in the process could only have a positive impact. Obama’s aides prepared for the General Assembly by laying the groundwork, making overtures to Iran according to a September 28, 2013 article in the Wall Street Journal. White House officials began privately signaling a potential presidential level meeting at least two weeks ago. The White House offered a carefully framed message that the US sought to engage Iran with “mutual respect,” signaling it was taking Rouhani seriously. Before he was sworn in a president, Rouhani indicated a willingness to have direct talks with the US. Upon taking power Rouhani and his aides engaged in what the New York Times referred to as an extraordinarily energetic campaign to prove that they are moderate and reasonable partners and to draw a stark contrast with his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Before leaving New York, Rouhani was quoted by the New York Times as stating at a press conference, “I expect this trip will be the first step and the beginning of constructive relations with countries of the world.” He also explained his government would present a plan in three weeks on how to resolve the nuclear standoff.

As for Kerry and Zarif, both are well equipped for the task ahead. They both know that diplomacy works and they are great at it. As discussed in an August 3, 2013 greatcharlie.com post entitled, “Iranian President Is Sworn In and Presents a New Cabinet of Familiar Faces, Including Javad Zarif,” Kerry is a discreet person and has proved himself as a very capable Secretary of State. He has a genuine interest in improving relations with Iran. Zarif is someone with whom Kerry would be able to have a dialogue and with which Kerry would be able to form a good relationship. That will require continued contact and communication. There might be efforts both in Washington and Tehran to put barriers to further dialogue. For example, the proposal by the US House of Representatives to impose further sanctions on Iran just before Rouhani took office ostensibly could have harmed the chance at dialogue. However, it is most likely that Kerry and Zarif would be more than able to work through such incidents and other encumbrances coming from both sides.

A Matter of Trust

While much optimism was expressed after the events of the September 26^th and 27^th, the reality is that the US policy on Iran has not changed, nor has Iranian policy toward the US. The two nations find themselves on opposite sides of a multitude of issues beyond Iran’s nuclear program, including Syria. Ostensibly, the negotiators are meeting in good faith, bringing a certain degree of mutual trust for their counterpart to the table. However, Zarif should know what Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discovered negotiating with Kerry on Syria. Kerry is a long-time political leader in the US, serving as a Member of both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate. Kerry has seen every political move, tactic, or deception, and perhaps used a few, himself, over the years. He would be quick to discern any effort to any unusual or questionable approaches. While it is hoped Zarif will be forthright in every contact and communication, if Kerry intuits or actually recognizes an effort to delay or stall for time, he will most likely bring the talks to a sudden stop.

If Iran has come to the table truly seeking a new relationship with the US, it needs to change. The process will require some concessions on Iran’s part very soon. For Iran to act as if that were not the case will raise concerns. This is troubling because it is clear that Iran may not be as ready to make concessions. This is particularly true with regard to its right to enrich uranium and its right to have a nuclear program. The US would prefer to curtail Iran’s rights to both. The US ostensibly will demand that Iran cease all enrichment of uranium and agree to the removal of all enriched uranium from its territory. It will likely demand that Iran dismantle its Fordow nuclear facility hidden in a mountain near Qum, and dismantle the newest generation of centrifuges near Natanz. Further, the US will likely demand that Iran stop construction of a heavy water reactor at Arak. However, Iran will undoubtedly refuse to surrender it rights to enrich uranium and its right to have a program wherever it chooses on its territory, and in any way it might decide to construct it. Such demands will feed into the mutual distrust, and to a great degree in Iran, the anger that exists. In the US, Iran’s demands will play into the idea that its diplomatic initiative was designed as a delaying tactic to allow for other elements of the government to drive the nuclear program forward until breakout capacity is reached, which means acquiring the knowledge and means to develop a nuclear weapon without actually doing so. US allies in the region, especially Israel, which rejects the idea that Iran’s diplomatic efforts are legitimate, and have rebuffed Obama for even entertaining Iranian overtures. Israel’s Minister of Intelligence and International Affairs, Yuval Steinitz, was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as stating, “Some people are willing to be cheated.” In Iran, US demands will be seen as an attempt to have Iran retreat from protecting itself and its vital interests and that promises from the US must be looked upon with skepticism. In certain quarters of the Iranian government, US demands will harden the belief that developing a nuclear weapon is the surest way to protect Iran from US and Israeli attacks.

The Importance of Time

It still takes a long time to reach an accommodation with a country with which you have been opposed for so long. In following, it will take years to thaw the icy divide formed between the US and Iran as a result of the events of 1979 and there was a re-chilling after Iran was included as part of the “Axis of Evil” during President George W. Bush’s administration. Under normal circumstances, small steps will be seen from both directions, and confidence building measures will serve to enhance the health of the overall relationship. Unfortunately, the US does not have years available to resolve the matter diplomatically. If Iran’s nuclear program is not halted in the immediate future, within a matter of months, Iran will acquire the weaponization capability that the US has been striving so hard to block them from getting. Very injurious sanctions are already in place against Iran. Pressuring Zarif and his delegation at the table will not yield faster results.

In this situation, Obama once again demonstrated what good things can come from thoughtful, direct presidential involvement in foreign policy efforts. Obama has discussed the phone call but wisely restrained in what he has said about the current situation in Iran. As long as he is involved, he may bring fresh thinking to the process and keep things moving forward. The same may be said of Rouhani, whose public support of Zarif’s efforts have given more weight to Iran’s negotiation efforts. Rohani’s involvement may also help things move forward at a faster pace.

Unless one is privy to sub rosa planning meetings of the most senior government officials in the Tehran, it is difficult to say with certainty that Iran is being deceptive or legitimate. That type of tasking must be left to the intelligence community. However, what may be helpful in this process to discern Iranian intentions is for Kerry to query Zarif on the meaning of the concept of heroic flexibility which Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, proffered in the context of Iran’s negotiations with the US on the nuclear issue. Rouhani explained that he has been given the authority to fully act with regard to negotiations. It must be made certain by the US that other elements of the Iranian power have not also been given the authority conversely to engage in a rapid effort to reach the goals of Iran’s nuclear program. A dual-track approach would not be unthinkable. Zarif should freely ask similar questions of US intentions during the talks. Receiving acceptable answers to any inquiry itself will not guarantee that a verifiable agreement with appropriate transparency will not be circumvented. However, in the context of the negotiations, it may give Kerry and US negotiators a better understanding of Iran’s thinking and actions and give them the confidence to formulate solutions that can overcome demands that amount to stumbling blocks. Yet, as long as enough doubt exists, there is little chance an agreement will be signed between the two countries.

Inside a meeting of very senior officials in Tehran. Please see the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (at left), President Hassan Rouhani (second from left), and Minister of Defense Hossein Dehghan (in military uniform at right).

	Obama Urges Putin to… on Ties Fraying, Obama Drops Puti…
	Russia Calls on US M… on Ties Fraying, Obama Drops Puti…
	Russia Calls on US M… on Obama, Putin Discuss Olympics…
	Obama, Putin Discuss… on Putin Vows to Annihilate Terro…
	bet365 free bet on Politics and a Ruptured Tendon…

greatcharlie

Commentary for foreign and national security policymakers, political and business leaders, and policy enthusiasts worldwide.

Category Archives: Fordow Nuclear Facility

Obama’s Iran Deal Campaign Amasses Support While Stirring Other Public Concerns

Obama Updates Gulf Leaders on Iran Talks, Seeks Support for Deal: The US Public Must Judge the Deal as Best as Possible

Iran, Powers Make Limited Progress at Nuclear Talks; Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Remains Focus, But Lasers May Bring Iran the Bomb

US Must Pursue Iran Talks Before Considering Going to War, But If Talks Fail, Iran Will Be Attacked, Eventually!

Kerry Presses Iran to Prove Its Nuclear Program Is Peaceful; The White House Presses Kerry to Make a Deal

Kerry Appears to Reject Iran’s Call for New Nuclear Proposal, But Iran’s Leaders Were Unlikely Frazzled by That

US and Iran Agree to Speed Talks to Defuse Nuclear Issue, But Trust Will Determine Its Pace