Literary Insight: James Risen, The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, the Mafia, and the Kennedys―and One Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown and Company, 2023)

Senator Frank Church holding a poison dart gun developed by the US Intelligence Community (left) and Senator John Tower observing (right) at the Church Committee’s first open session on September 17, 1975. In the wake of Watergate, Church was tasked with investigating abuses of power by the US Intelligence Community. Rather than noting mere oversteps by the Intelligence Community, Church and his  Congressional Committee put forth dark truths about its work that they uncovered. Indeed, Church exposed a myriad of clandestine and covert plots orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as other federal organizations. In many cases, singular actions were taken by the Intelligence Community actually amounted to criminal violations of federal law. This essay is not a book review. Instead, it is a literary insight essay providing meditations of Risen’s The Last Honest Man. In this essay, greatcharlie’s insights are delimited to a discussion of occasional rogue behavior, abuses of law, by members of the US Intelligence Community. The book is remarkably suggestive with respect to contemporary times. Such an edict surely requires examination. In this essay, readers may come upon aspects of issues or view new angles of the discussion they may not have not recognized or perhaps would not have considered after reading the book.

James Risen’s The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, the NSA, the Mafia, and the Kennedys–and One Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown and Company, 2023), [ISBN-13 9780316565134] tells the story of how Frank Church, at the the time  Senator of Idaho for almost two decades, attempted to reign in US Intelligence Community activities in 1975 after years of no Congressional oversight. Risen draws upon hundreds of interviews, thousands of pages of recently declassified documents, and reams of unpublished letters, notes, and memoirs, some of which remain sensitive today. The story as told in the 480 page tome is true to reality.

As a Senator, Church promoted, advocated, and vigorously defended the US Constitution. He was guided by US values and supported its interests. Church’s beliefs would compel him to lead congressional opposition to the Vietnam War and had become a scathing, radical critic of what he saw as US imperialism around the world. Yet, Risen suggests the “rebellious” Church was politically ambitious, and sough acceptance from the foreign and national security policy establishment of which he was very skeptical. He was also  interested in running for president. The author indicates that Church was not devoid of faults. In the wake of Watergate Church was tasked with investigating abuses of power by the US intelligence community. Rather than noting mere oversteps by the Intelligence Community, Church and his Committee put forth dark truths about its work that they uncovered. Indeed, Church exposed a myriad of clandestine and covert plots orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as other federal organizations. In many cases, singular actions were taken by the Intelligence Community that actually amounted to criminal violations of federal law.

The course taken seemed right to Church as the Committee’s Chairman. One might imagine he understood there was great pitfall involved with criticism the work of Intelligence Community, however, Church never hesitated. By Risen’s account, Church was in fact persistent in his pursuit of the matter. He would show historic strength in his greatest moment. Risen did not indicate that Church had wasted any of the Committee’s valuable time rooting around in extraneous matters. Church stayed focused on his task. 

This essay is not a book review. Instead, it is a literary insight essay providing meditations of Risen’s The Last Honest Man. In brief, a literary insight essay’s purpose is to express a readers feelings and ideas about a literary work. It is a journey of introspection. In this essay, greatcharlie’s insights are delimited to a discussion of occasional rogue behavior, abuses of law, by members of the US Intelligence Community. The book is remarkably suggestive with respect to contemporary times. Such an edict surely requires examination. In this essay, readers may come upon aspects of issues or view new angles of the discussion they may not have not recognized or perhaps would not have considered after reading the book

In previous times, one might have supposed the understanding, acceptance of what Founding Fathers who authored the US Constitution defined as the unalienable rights of life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were sacrosanct. However, one might be able to comfortably conclude today that far less importance is given to those rights upon which the country’s soul and existence was once firmly based and upon which the US public’s expectation and requirement for the good governance of the democracy has its roots. What seemed so certain about the once lauded strictures–as a sampling, the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendmens of the US Constitution–that would guide the country perpetually, is far less sure today than ever before. There are laws, but very often justice for the people is much harder to find. Breaches of regulations of the US Intelligence Community against ordinary citizen, not responsible for any wrongdoing, must not only be examined but vigorously pursued. Si quid novisti rectius istis, candidus imperti; si nil, his utere mecum. (if you can better these principles, tell me; if not, join me in following them.)

Meeting of the Members of the Church Committee prior to several hearings in autumn (above). Some Members of Congress in 1975 would likely have been more inclined to be dismissive of an investigation of the Intelligence Community than give serious attention to it. The Intelligence Community’s leadership could only hope that matters concerning its operations would be handled by the Church Committee with the same delicacy. The Congress for years had failed for years to put a leash on the Intelligence Community. Consequently, it ran off on its own in the world. Nothing but the foreign opposition, stood in its way. As for what remotely sufficed for “oversight” before the Church Committee was set up, information on Intelligence Community activities was curiously gleaned from the organizations’ directors by senior Members of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They would meet with the directors to occasionally chin-wag likely on the latest activities, resources, personnel, latest activities, troublesome spots, and accomplishments. In those times, save the Congress and the free press, the US public would be assuredly have been kept in the dark regarding the government’s actions in the province of intelligence. The means today by which the US public is kept equally abreast of the Intelligence Community’s activities as then is not as certain. To that extent, what aided the Church Committee’s cause was the fact that certain elements of the national newsmedia, far less then than today, were nevertheless the best and only fount of information about the US Intelligence Community’s performance.

The Church Committee, known formally as the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities established on January 27, 1975. Open sessions were held in September and October of 1975, but incisive research was conducted throughout that year.  Prior to the Church Committee, there had not been any formal Congressional oversight process for what became the US Intelligence Community for nearly 30 years. The CIA was established in 1947, and the NSA was organized in 1952.The FBI has been around since 1924. The intelligence activities of a White House domestic surveillance program and the Internal Revenue Service were also probed. Following up on information reported in a December 22, 1974 New York Times article authored by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, there was plenty sitting in the vaults of the Intelligence Communityfor the Committee to investigate. It was not mere tittle-tattle.

Some Members of Congress in 1975 would likely have been more inclined to be dismissive of an investigation of the Intelligence Community than give serious attention to it. The Intelligence Community’s leadership could only hope that matters concerning its operations would be handled by the Church Committee with the same delicacy. The Congress for years had failed for years to put a leash on the Intelligence Community. Consequently, it ran off on its own in the world. Nothing but the foreign opposition, stood in its way. As for what remotely sufficed for “oversight” before the Church Committee was set up, information on Intelligence Community activities was curiously gleaned from the organizations’ directors by senior Members of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They would meet with the directors to occasionally chin-wag likely on the latest activities, resources, personnel, latest activities, troublesome spots, and accomplishments. 

There was a danger that as a result of the Church Committee coming off the heels of the Vietnam War, the violent response to the Civil Rights Movement, the assassinations of Martin Luther King , Jr., Senator Edward Kennedy, and the earlier assassination of US President John Kennedy, Watergate, and the country’s continued disfunction on race, equality for women, and gross inequities in wealth establishing large divisions in social class, enabling poverty. the Intelligence Community would not be used as a depository for the ills of US foreign and national security policy.

Omne ignotem pro magnifico. (Everything unknown is magnificent.) In the old-fashion, out-moded sense, the US public at the time appreciated the services provided by its case officers and special agents, had possessed an sense of obligation to its Intelligence Community. However, ultimately,  the Intelligence Community is beholding to the people who expect and deserve its unwavering fidelity.

When evidence of Intelligence Community wrongdoings and abuses became overwhelming, much changed on all fronts. The US had to confront the truth about itself if it was reach the heart of the matter.The Committee soon discovered that there was no possibility to the limits of the Intelligence Community’s operations. It was clearly capable of any fantastic outrage. There was a certain method to the eccentric madness of the Intelligence Community. What was discovered was all outside of the common. There was no outlier so to speak. Nothing revealed could have dare been called trivial. It was essential for the Church Committee Members to be put in the full picture. A priority appeared to be to gain a sense of the scale of those activities. This matter went much deeper than originally supposed.

It required life experience to understand what might be possible, to explore with an open-mind, all that would likely stand much of what Church Committee Members believed to be known on its head. To accept all that was being exposed in Church’s Committee would require one to possess a mind that could view it all with a mixture of imagination and reality. At the same time, many Church Committee Members and staff served overseas during World War II, as well as in the Korean War and in the Vietnam War were not mystified by any of it. It was about killing, death. Nothing was beyond their comprehension. As with other Committee members, Church examined the Intelligence Community’s activities burdened with a rational frame of mind. There were difficulties, but there would always be difficulties.

True, what was done was done. However, there was the chance to prevent the furtherance of such activities, crimes and halt any additional damage to the reputation and standing of the US worldwide . The US is a constitutional federal republic, meaning its government is based on a Constitution which is the supreme law of the country and both citizens and their governing officials are bound to follow the rules established in that Constitution. The Intelligence Community’s actions overseas over the years fell under the jurisdiction of the countries in which the occurred. However, their actions against US citizens inside the US fell under federal and state law. Remarkably, an extraordinary number of operations conducted by Intelligence Community members and other government organizations against domestic targets were discovered.

In those times, save the Congress, as well as a free press, the US public will be assuredly kept in the dark regarding the government’s actions, particularly in the province of intelligence. The means today by which the US public is kept equally abreast of the Intelligence Community’s activities as then is not as certain. To that extent, what aided the Church Committee’s cause was the fact that certain elements of the national newsmedia, far less then than today, were nevertheless the best and only fount of information about the US Intelligence Community’s performance. At least for a generation or two, not too long afterward, certain services of the Intelligence Community would remain dark organizations in the minds of many conscientious US citizens. There has been nothing of such consequence concerning the Intelligence Community beyond the IranContra Affair in which its activities have been put from and center for the US public. As a news story in present times, Church Committee findings unlikely would be of interest to the overwhelming majority.

William Colby, Director of the CIA from 1973 to 1976 (above). Once the Church Committee came prying, the Intelligence Community’s leadership and even White House under US President Gerald Ford appeared to become unsettled. The Intelligence Community’s leadership knew exactly what had been transpiriing in their organizations over the years. A reasonable assessment, completely unbiased, would be that under the strictures of US law, particularly on the domestic front, much of it was wrongful. To that extent, the Intelligence Community’s leadership, particularly the CIA’s leadership, knew members of the Church Committee would light on them once they had the opportunity to become read in on information available and actiually see and handle some of the recherché tools and gadgets the Intelligence Community had developed. Given how the hearings were organized, Intelligence Community executives and senior managers would have a considerable measure of control over their organizations’ fates and their own careers as would provide testimony as key witnesses before the Church Committee in both open and closed sessions. Whatever the Intelligence Community’s leadership hoped to accomplish, particularly with regard to minimizing the shock to the US public over each fantastic outrage revealed, surely failed if disproving newly hatched fears about the Intelligence Community was one goal, their efforts were not successful. Contrary to whatever public relations benefit the Intelligence Community’s leadership may have been hoping to garner as result of the hearings, the Intelligence Community’s reputation instead was decisively sullied. Yet, years later, it is clear that whatever resulted from the Church Committee Hearings hardly held fast. The way that the US public thought about not only the government and the Intelligence Community and also the ability to hold it accountable, would shift, opening the door to abuses that would have been beyond the Church Committee’s wildest imagining.

Once the Church Committee came prying, the Intelligence Community’s leadership and even White House under US President Gerald Ford appeared to become unsettled. The Intelligence Community’s leadership knew exactly what had been transpiriing in their organizations over the years. A reasonable assessment, completely unbiased, would be that under the strictures of US law, particularly on the domestic front, much of it was wrongful. To that extent, the Intelligence Community’s leadership, particularly the CIA, knew members of the Church Committee would light on them once they had the opportunity to become read in on information available and handle some the recherché tools and gadgets the Intelligence Community had developed.

From their view, circumstances of the time, the Cold War, the Modern Age, surpassed the use of ordinary ways and means to defeat threats and assure policy aims. They expoused that extreme circumstances required extreme action. Much more was constantly being required to meet ends covertly. Despite the rather widespread disapproval of its actions, the Intelligence Community’s leadership never believed the use of “ramped up” tactics, techniques, and procedures was not a crime. Through there use, the Intelligence Community could fight adversaries by means other than war to safeguard US national security.

That explanation–that alibi–would not have a steadying effect on the US public, many of whom had been made quite concerned after learning from news media reporting of the open sessions of the Church Committee how the government, honorable and powerful, had been behaving in their name. Again, there was mostly disappointment among the people. A fearful mood had gripped some. If it were only a smattering of odd incidents, any audacious thinking and action perhaps might have seemed slightly tolerable. That by no means was the case. 

The Church Committee Hearings were a moment at time in which the Intelligence Community’s leadership would been behooved to guard against self-deception and delusion to avoid becoming too far a field. However, their conviction over everything the Intelligence Community did, however, was so unwavering that one might imagine a private response among some executives and senior managers was ironically to question the loyalty of Church Committee members. The pretense within the Intelligence Community’s leadsrship was that their organizations were “something above”,” something better”, than the rest of society and thereby they were entitled to do things outside US values,  principles, and laws.

Given how hearings were organized, Intelligence Community executives and senior managers would have a considerable measure of control over their organizations’ fates and their own careers as they would provide testimony as key witnesses before the Church Committee in both open and closed sessions.

If the Intelligence Community’s leadership had any thoughts of avoiding hearings, the Church Committee would brook no denial. Forced to go through the investigative process, they might have left the door open in their minds to the hope that the Church Committee’s findings would allow for the suggestion of a rationale for the behavior of their personnel and all the transpired over the years. They might have hoped to hear a plausible explanation that would circle around notions of the ubiquitous and ceaseless Communist threat posed by the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc countries,, and the People’s Republic of China to the US, its allies and friends, and other democracies worldwide.

A figurative pirate’s chest of the strange, unusual technologies and maccabre tactics, techniques procedures, and methods was unlocked and opened wide. It was trove of horrors. To the overwhelming majority of US citizens who gave their attention to the Church Committee hearings, all that was discovered felt, to turn a phrase of the era, very un-American. Risen describes Church Committee revelations on assassinations targeted at Cuban President Fidel Castro in Cuba, Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. There were others. He reports on the CIA’s MKULTRA program.and the use of LSD. and it’s domestic surveillance program, HTLINGUAL. He tells the shocking story of the FBI’s surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other US activists under COINTELPRO operations. The CIA contacted an organized crime figure, Johnny Roselli, to act as an intermediary to elicit the assistance of  Chicago organized crime boss Sam Giancana, to coordinate CIA efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro with the Mafia. This list barely scratches the surface. 

There was a sense of revulsion among Committee members and staff. Each Committee Member may have felt something private, very intense, very off putting  about matter. Some might say that many of Intelligence Community lurid activities reflected a loathing of the human race. Seemingly, it was the organization’s preferred way to have others to perceive it. The Church Committee did not really warm to any of those who testified. The Intelligence Community’s leadsrship was not always well-collected while offering testimony. Still, among those Church Committee Members who may have felt disgust over the deeds of the Intelligence Community they had funded generously, there was no intention of allowing anger and grief conspire to create a blindness that might interfere with their vital work.

Whatever the Intelligence Community’s leadership hoped to accomplish, particularly minimizing the shock to the US public over each fantastic outrage, surely failed. If mitigating newly hatched fears about the Intelligence Community was one goal, their efforts were not successful. Contrary to whatever public relations benefit the Intelligence Community’s leadership may have been hoping to garner as result of the hearings, the Intelligence Community’s reputation instead was decisively sullied. Yet, years later, it is clear that whatever resulted from the Church Committee hearings hardly held fast.. The way that the US public thought about not only the government and the Intelligence Community and also the ability to hold it accountable, would shift, opening the door to abuses that would have been beyond the Church Committee’s wildest imagining.

Surely, nothing uncovered by the Church Committee was lost upon the Intelligence Community’s opponents overseas. Their opponents overseas were tough and numerous. However, it seems elements of the US Intelligence Community thought of themselves as being tougher, and sought to be rougher still. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China saw or heard anything too shocking or surprising. The Church Committee’s findings were unlikely music to their ears regarding the international front. Clearly, the US was active clandestinely and covertly overseas in a big way. On the domestic front in the US, however, the situation was likely viewed as much better by adversarial foreign intelligence services. News of the Intelligence Community’s history of operations against political targets very likely indicated to the Intelligence Community’s opponents that it was flush with so much cash that it could divert resources and manpower to those efforts. 

Although it was not broached in Risen’s book, those political diversions may have provided enough reason for their foreign intelligence services to sense they were often operating with impunity in the US. Resources and manpower were not just diverted to that mission, but dedicated to it through multiple programs. Conceivably, that may have encouraged the Soviet Union,  Eastern Bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China to increase their presence and efforts in the US. The Soviet spymaster of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, Oleg Kalugin, indicates in his memoirs that the 1960s and 1970s were heady, fruitful times for Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence operations inside the US. (SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2020 post entitled, “Book Review: Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994)”) It would have been almost impossible for the Intelligence Community to know the totality of what foreign intelligence services might have been successfully collecting at the time until new political, economic, or financial information allowed some unexplained upper hand or scientific or technological advances would crop up that evinced tell-tales of its origins and that it had been stolen.

Risen explains Church worked after the Committee Hearings to establish Intelligence Community oversight. Steps included the development of the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 and creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 19, 1976 and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 1977.

James Angleton, Chief of CIA Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975, at the Church Committee Hearings. A figurative box of the strange, unusual technologies and maccabre tactics, techniques procedures, and methods was unlocked and opened wide. It was trove of horrors. To the overwhelming majority of US citizens who gave their attention to the Church Committee hearings, all that was discovered felt, to turn a phrase of the era, very un-American. Risen describes Church Committee revelations on assassinations targeted at Cuban President Fidel Castro in Cuba, Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. There were others. He reports on the CIA’s MKULTRA program.and the use of LSD. He tells the shocking story of the FBI’s surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other US activists under COINTELPRO operations. The CIA contacted an organized crime figure, Johnny Roselli, to act as an intermediary to elicit the assistance of  Chicago organized crime boss Sam Giancana, to coordinate CIA efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro with the Mafia. This list barely scratches the surface. During his testimony at the Church Committee, Angleton was pressed on the CIA’s domestic surveillance program, HTLINGUAL. It was sensed at the time that Angleton had not been completely forthcoming with Committee Members.

Without pretension, what greatcharlie relates in the following discussion is completely true and accurate to the best of its knowledge and belief. The information is simply laid out. There is no insistence that readers accept it. It is what it is.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, practically all curbs of the psyche and actual policy and legal parameters against abuses were not observed to the letter–somewhat overlooked–by the Intelligence Community in favor of a “go get ’em” attitude and offensive posture against “the enemy”. The priority became getting results: killing and capturing terrorists; uncovering and thwarting terrorist plots; destroying terrorist networks; and, seizing terrorist assets. The practice nearly became “anything goes.” The mainstream newsmedia in the US was supportive of just about everything done and a very vocal US public demanded further retribution. The emotional response of the US public was certainly understandable, however, most were abysmally ignorant of the Intelligence Community’s activities were overseas, literally on the high seas, and domestically. Among US public there are those who, even after being introduced to actualities, are unable to would hardly shake their views how their government can often operate. Today, only a fraction might take a firm interest in the misdeeds, violations of rights under the Constitution, or even larceny and outright violent crimes committed by the Intelligence Community.  It is likely the case for members of the US public that as long as the Intelligence Community’s actions do not directly effect them or their own, there is little to be concerned about. To go a step further, some members of the US public may not be willing to accept that rogue elements of the Intelligence Community and their contractors would engage in surveillance and direct acts against innocent US citizens. Nevertheless, it happens, as Risen’s book makes it very clear. 

The Global War on Terror has not ended. However, US President Joe Biden has reorganized resources and manpower in the over two decades long ubiquitous fight. Fewer airstrikes are ordered in fewer countries. US counterterrorism forces appear to be operating overseas in lesser numbers. The tempo of their operations has decreased. One would expect those decisions and others have had a correlative impact of ratcheting down the Intelligence Community’s use of resources and manpower. Looking a bit further on its tasks, no greater evidence of the Russian Federation’s potential for military aggression exists at the present than the Ukraine War. Yet, relative threats posed by the Russian Federation to the US and its interests has lessened. The degree of inefficiency and albeit incompetence that has been displayed by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the intelligence services in the prosecution of operations of or pertaining to the Special Military Operation that the Cold War fears of the untamable and indomitable “”Russian Military Bear” has since faded at bit.. However, concerning the People’s Republic of China, however, its intelligence services have displayed an acumen in their espionage activities within the US that has been seemingly beyond the capacity of US counterintelligence services to combat. US foreign intelligence operations in the People’s Republic of China also have not met with great success. In the aggregate, the People’s Republic of China has delivered wrenching blows against the US. 

The point here is that with relatively reduced threats against some opponents and barely a modicum of success against espionage directed from the People’s Republic of China foreign intelligence services in the US, some unscrupulous individuals in the organizations of the Intelligence Community may feel a “greater flexibility to do other things” undistracted by real work upon which they could fully focus their minds and hone their “skills”. Thereby, in an odd and unhealthy, and criminal twist, they appear to have shamefully preyed upon the average US public. Rogue members of these organizations–and there always have been a few– have engaged have engaged in this behavior for years, but happens not with similar frequency. They generally engage in their wrongful acts well-below the radar.  It is awful to accept that a few personnel of the US counterintelligence services, including not so trustworthy contractors they call upon, to knowingly use the exquisite technical resources of the US and tactics, techniques procedures and methods to crush ordinary citizens who have no interest in doing anything against the US. (On this matter, greatcharlie writes not from study, but rather from personal experience as an innocent target of such wrongful and incredibly costly activities.)

The rogue federal officers and contractors have their own reasons for turning to villainy and own reasons for selecting their victims. The victims names may have been found on some innocuous list within the rogue federal officers organizations. Through wrongdoing, the names are apparently transferred to an active list of targets for the rogue federal officers and contractors to prey upon. Rogue federal officers and contractors will claim to have legitimate cause for their actions them. Warrants from “helpful” judges presiding on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) will be provided based on those claims, allowing electronic surveillance,  physical search, and other forms of investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes. (The FISC was established by Congress in the aforementioned FISA.) More importantly, the warrants will allow the rogue federal officers and contractors to increase available financial resources for activities against their innocent victims. 

Needless to say, cellphone calls, texts, emails of victims are monitored. Letters and other missives are intercepted, extracted from, and occasionally inserted into, the victims mail deliveries. Electronic devices to monitor the victims in their own homes are used. Cable television and high speed internet services are weaponized for use as monitoring equipment. The technologies may have changed, but this practice of monitoring resembles that used against Martin Luther King, Jr. when he was, as noted earlier, the target of a federal surveillance and “dirty tricks” program. Yet, far much more, not relayed here, is done along this track. The individual’s personal life, finances, property, could are targeted. Doors will be closed to employment, association with social and professional groups, membership in organizations. Recognition and awards for achievement and excellent will be denied. Family members and friends will also face attacks designed to separate them from the individual or destroy them. Every effort will be made to shun the victim from society.

To gnaw a bit further on the surveillance of a victim, as a standard practice that task is performed through the use of manpower on the street. The personnel of a contractors are used mostly for this purpose. Some are employeed to engage in electronic surveillance.  To use manpower on the street in a very robust way, contractors, albeit errantly, will hire ordinary individuals from the US public to assist them. Greater budgets allowed once FISC warrants are secured mean bigger operations.  That permits exigent hires  For rogue federal officers and contractors greater budgets through innovative ways mean greater wrongful operations,, but also the potential for increased financial gains for them. (In the past, waggish federal officers were sometimes heard to jest that such improper efforts perfectly allowed for the creation of a “second retirement” much better than the one their organizations were going to provide.) C’est comme ça.

It is rarely difficult to find exigent hires willing for usually modest, but sometimes exhorbitant payment–bribes–to zealously engage in surveillance activities and aggressive, even criminal acts at the behest of rogue federal officers and contractors. Most of the exigent hires only understand “spy work” through Hollywood depictions and exciting novels. Most are thrilled to live out “Walter Mitty” fantasies of being a spy as they disrespect, betray and bully the innocent! The ranks of citizen hires are inflated by the exigent employ of permanent and temporary residents, visitors, tourists, and undocumented immigrants as well. The visitor to the US will receive an unforgettable lesson on the meaning and nature of civil rights in the country courtesy of the rogue federal officers and contractors. Whether a citizen or visitor, the hires receive remuneration. Exigent hires are compensated immediately for their wrongful service. The payments are in essence bribes to encourage and to reward their violation of the law. If prospective hires take the unusual step of asking why such surveillance of the victim is necessary, the rogue federal officers and contractors will offer an apocryphal story that may shock, anger, or outrage the prospect concerning the victim, tell outright, ghastly lies about the victim’s character, or conversely set aside any wrongdoing or any threat posed by the victim and convince the hire that anything done will be to the victims benefit! Intriguingly, the latter actually works exceedingly well.

Exigent hires will invariably  approach the surveillance of their innocent victim using the limits of their varied faculties. The results can be atrocious, shocking, and sometimes silly. Exigent hires can often be seen hiding behind pillars, jumping behind cars, and hiding their faces with their hands among a few things. As the vetting of hires is nonexistent, the dysregulated are often employed and they will often vent rage directly at the victim over false reports about them from rogue federal officers and contractors to relieve unbalanced levels of stress and frustration. Occasionally, participation is shamefully impelled not only by remuneration, but by racial, ethnic, religious, and gender prejudice. Those hires will indubitably make their offensive perspectives known to victims when walking by them or loitering near them. Evidence of how they manage racist and otherwise biased hires may offer an indication of whether the rogue federal officers and contractors harbor similar prejudices toward a victim. They can often develop a kinship with such odious individuals. On the odd occasion, one might unexpectedly observe the rogue federal officers and contractors communicating with them in plainview! Those hires surely receive opportunities for contracts and more chances to abuse a victim for payments. There is often a sense great importance and power that conspiring with “secret men” and “secret women” conveys to most hires, this can expectedly lead to hostility, aggression, and violence against an innocent victim.

Since none of the hires employed under these circumstances are not acting against actual officers or operatives of a foreign intelligence service or some other dangerous group, these exigent hires can act with relative impunity against victim. A victim’s response to the hires transgressions must not include acting physically. The rogue federal officers and contractors will use their standing and FISC warrants to ensure local law enforcement will arrest a victim and “friendly” prosecutors will secure fines or sentences against them. Such occurances have indeed been tragedies. Yet, the activities of the rogue federal officers and contractors will not stop even after causing that degree of harm. On s’en fout!

The exigent hiring of “operatives” by rogue federal officers and contractors is not always unsystematic. Some hires are offered contracts to encourage regular service against innocent victims. Often, contract hires are asked rogue federal officers and contractors to log their observations of victims via text or group chat. They often provide the information on what the victim is wearing, the number of the taxi in which the victim is riding, the direction the victim is walking or the activity in which the victim is engaged. (Interestingly, rogue federal officers and contractors always inform their hires of their victims whereabouts, yet they will often insist their hires log their “observations” of the victim by text or group chat. Other than creating activity for the hires, that work amounts to kabuki, hardly serving a useful purpose day-to-day when the rogue federal officers and contractors are watching the victim themselves. Maybe it is more a matter of keeping up appearances.

Some exigent hires are sought out because they are in a position to have opportunities for more than occasional contact with a victim. These “key hires” will,typically be associated with the victim’s personal and professional life, and the victim’s simple daily activities. A short list of such hires would typically include: neighbors; apartment building staff; contractors; locksmiths, municipal civil service workers of all types to include the police and emergency services technicians; dog walkers; taxi cab drivers; car service drivers; barbers; hairstylists; restaurant staff; pizza shop employees; coffee shop staff; street food vendors; conveniance store clerks; department store employees; luxury watch store employees;  supermarket employees; car garage attendants; storage company employees; moving company employees; realty agency staff; funeral directors, movie theater staff, museum staff; performing arts center staff; elementary and secondary school staff; parents of elementary and secondary school students; elementary and secondary school students; visiting professors at nearby universities; sports book authors; content management system employees; bank branch employees; accountants; tax preparers; paralegals; lawyers; medical office administrative staff and technicians; physical therapists; doctors; court house staff; and, judges. (The actions of judges co-opted by the rogue federal offcers and contractors in an US court proceeding against a victim are typically so remarkably corrupt that greatcharlie assures they must be seen to be believed.) It is fascinating to observe just how many individuals are typically made privy to the rogue federal officers and contractors “secret operations” against innocent victims.

Through contact with such key hires, the rogue federal officers and contractors aditionally hope to receive information about the victim through “clandestine conversation”. Usually, they will insist these hires ask victims specific questions about themselves which is most often incongruous with the natter in which they might be normally engaged. The activities of those key hires, along with other hires who have contracts, are controlled through cellphone calls, direct texting, and group chat. Group chat is at the present the most unified way for the rogue federal officers and contractors to assemble and mass their hires to act upon a victim collectively. Essentially, hires are organized for “gang stalking” and out-and-out harassment–bullying. These hires are compensated usually at central locations in the vicinity of their activity: a parked car or a coffee shop.

Interestingly, with warrants from the FISC in hand, rogue federal officers and contractors can also make use of programs created for use by employees of specific service industries to surveil and act against targets of investigations. In New York City for example, a clandestine program–so called a covert program by officials–was developed by federal and local law enforcement and US intelligence services to use taxi cab and car service drivers to surveil and photograph targets when they are on the street and to engage them in clandestine conversations as passengers with the aim of “surreptitiously interrogating” them or passing disinformation to them. Remember, the victims are absolutely innocent, have no special information offer. So, insisting the taxi drivers engage in such a practice, certainly not as training, along with simply using the shed light upon the mental state of the rogue federal officers and contractors. Maybe it is again a matter of keeping up appearances. It is as plain as a pikestaff that the taxi and car service drivers are impelled by pecuniary interest and ego, certainly not intellect. Clearly, most of the drivers take on their “secret work” having received insubstantial educations overseas, possessing a limited vocabulary as English is usually a second language for them, being devoid of sophisticated conversational skills–being tactless, and not knowing what it means to be congenial. One can imagine how awkward, clumsy, and better than annoying their efforts at “clandestine conversations” usually are. Ironically, the drivers must rely upon the politeness and tolerance of the victim to perform their “clandestine” work while lacking any compunction over deceiving a victim or potentially causing them harm.

It might be worth noting that warrants from FISC also allows for the rogue federal officers and contractors to cooperate with members of foreign intelligence and security services of US allies stationed in the US. The officers of some foreign intelligence and security services will make their presence known to victims by behaving overly aggressively, with hostility, and even a threatening them. Indeed, they take on this barbaric posture even against US citizens living in their own country. Officers of somewhat more sophisticated foreign intelligence and security services may make it a point to have an attenuated presence. However, they may deliberately make themselves known if they have been tasked to ask questions of–softly interrogate–the target. Interestingly, that task invariably falls to female officers of the foreign intelligence and security services who, with male colleagues close by, will “noticeably” spend an ordinate amount of time studying the victim before moving in. Such activities fall under the category of transnational repression and are illegal. Foreign intelligence and security services of US allies are surely pleased to receive financial resources from their US counterparts for their cooperation. Warrants from FISC open the financial spigot for such funding. However, what is imaginably most important for the foreign intelligence and security services of US allies who might participate in such activities at the victim’s expense is finding a place for themselves at the “high intelligence roundtable” with the powerful US. Once again, rogue federal officers and contractors more than likely trigger this activity by foreign intelligence and security services stationed inside the US as a matter of keeping up appearances.

Attempts to co-opt a victim’s immediate family members and other relatives are also made by rogue federal officers and contractors. If successful, they will usually forever destroy the victim’s immediate family unit and separate the victim permanently from other relatives. 

The definition of success among the Ancient Greeks was the full use of one’s powers along the lines of excellence. At a minimum, success for the rogue federal officers and contractors against their victims clearly has meant stripping them of anything resembling an ordinary life, completely restricting their liberties in a normal sense by standing between the victims contacts with others, and interfering with any effort to pursue happiness. The whole wrongful process can go on for years or at least as long as the victim lasts. Yet, very often the outcome desired by the rogue federal officers and contractors is far more sinister. The “stress response”, the flight or fight system, is triggered when mind and body are out of balance. When mind and body are out of balance, in stress mode, one is headed for health problems, disease, or breakdown. No organism can stand being in emergency mode all the time. The infliction of daily episodes of gang stalking and harassment can elicit heart disease, heart failure, and psychological disorders. Cases of suicide can also stem from a victims in ability to cope with strains too strong and too alien for “normal living” in an advanced industrial democratic society to countenance. Mere empirical observations of rogue federal officers and contractors actions and the results inflicted upon victims should reasonably assure one that there is not a shred of decency among them. Far more perverse actions are taken against victims. Plainly, the rogue federal officers and contractors have even acted in a variety of ways to cause a victim’s death.

As mentioned, the exigent hires and contract hires of the rogue federal officers and contractors are generally more concerned with how much money they will receive. Typically, hires will hardly notice, or even look to see on their own volition, if the victim were suffering physically or psychologically in some discernible way. As a combination of the hires’ “low-vibrational” character and their receipt of regular abhorrent reports from the rogue federal officers and contractors about the victim usually meant to infuriate their hires or even amuse them, there is generally no empathy shown by hires for the victim. The victim is not recognized as a human being. The victim is seen only as a commodity. Noticeably, hires are quite deliberately directed and bound as a collective through a form of mind control. From the prostitute and drug peddler to the doctor and state court judge, the rogue federal offcers and contractors get their hires to do exactly what they want them to do. The reality is there is no professional side to involving US citizens and so many others in the wrongful–illegal–surveillance and possibly the criminal homicide of anyone, especially an innocent victim. In their own criminal way, the rogue federal officers and contractors are destroying the fabric of the society.

Victims of rogue federal officers and contractors have no voice. The few who would make reports of their maltreatment and entreaties for justice are stifled by the corrupt. Through the use of their standing with law enforcement and judicial systems, FISC warrants, and long exercised technical ways to block a victim’s communications, it is assured that the victim’s pleas will go unheard. Many victims are so despaired by trying and failing to successfully report their mistreatment and circumstances surrounding it that they are led to either very quietly or very publicly self-destruct.

As suggested earlier, it is easy enough for those in the US public who cannot accept corruption and murderous criminality on such great scale among corrupt members of the US security services and their contractors and some will surely to find comforting ways to dismiss it or outrightly rebuke it. Yet, those who would accept this reality may be unwilling to speak against it. The number of other government officials in the organizations who may discover others acting corruptly and may wish to report or to investigate such criminality would be few as the consequences of their detection might be retribution in the form of daily attacks on the job equal or worse than those suffered by the innocent victims.

Leaders of organizations can be changed in response to revelations of wrongdoing at the senior level and within the rank and file. However, a subsequent change in leadership to that could lead to the rejuvenation of such vengeful, aggressive thinking and actions against the previously targeted inedividual found guiltless, incident free will be ordered. The individual’s personal life, finances, property, could once again be targeted. Doors will be closed once again to employment, association with social and professional groups, membership in organizations. Recognition and awards for achievement and excellent once again will be denied. Family members and friends not co-opted by the rogue federal officers and contractors once again will face attacks designed to separate them from the individual or destroy them without fail. Victims will once again be shunned by the society. During the new episode, the most devastating psychological and physiological attacks upon the individuals–by then a few years older and likely less interested in struggling against a tide a wrongdoing–would be launched by authorities with far greater intensity, to achieve their destruction or even deaths through suicide or violence so dearly wanted by others through the original effort. Ironically, the rogue federal officers and contractors who assisted in organizing and managing the individual’s destruction originally, will very likely have retired from their federal security service by then to enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing. However, others would doubtlessly rush forward to take their place. Où va-t-on à partir de maintenant?

This is in some small part the actual state of affairs for many victims of rogue federal officers and contractors at the moment. It is a whole world invisible to the ordinary citizen. As explained earlier, there is no insistence that anything discussed here be accepted by readers who are unfaniliar with it all. Nevertheless, everything presented is true and can be easily substantiated with the cooperation of honest and thoughtful law enforcement officials. (Note: All that is discussed concerning the mistreatment of citizens by rogue federal officers and contractors is based on the author’s personal experience!) One might suppose that for those who may be interested in how surveillance is conducted on the street level in the US, this discussion may prove instructive. It is unlikely lost upon readers that “one” who might desire to penetrate domestic surveillance activities in the US, not too much would be involved with becoming a “contract hire”. Once onboard as a hire, one would potentially have access to details about the daily surveillance activities of some US intelligence service or law enforcement organization, such as what organization was currently tasked with, who exactly is being targeted, where the target is acting, and who the organization’s street “operatives” are. What could be accomplished by “one”, one in a hypothetical case being a foreign intelligence officer or a team of officers and operatives tasked with the mission of infiltrating surveillance activities of a US intelligence service or law enforcement organization, must be left to the imagination. 

One possibility might be the regular successful “collection” of vital information to protect their country’s foreign intelligence operations inside the US. One can only guess how difficult it would be to launch successful counterintelligence operations against a wily foreign intelligence sserviceoperating inside the US when it knows everyday where its opponent’s officers and operatives are and who and what they are looking at. Perhaps something of the kind is already happening on some scaleg. For that reason, for more than a theory, on-going surveillance operations as discussed here, either sanctioned by authorities or wrongful conducted by the rogue federal officers and contractors, should be immediately rolled up, audited, and assayed. Perhaps doing any of that would be too bothersome. (Curiously, the average individual in the US public may not accept that such wrongful behavior by rogue federal officers and contractors occurs, however foreign intelligence services surely have no doubts about what transpires.) Born Jacques Anatole François Thibault, known as Anatole France (April 16, 1844-October 12, 1924) was a French poet, journalist, and novelist. Considered in his day as the ideal French man of letters. He was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature in recognition of his literary achievements. In Le Petit Pierre (1918), ch. XXXIII, he wrote: “De toutes les définitions de l’homme, la plus mauvaise me paraît celle qui en fait un animal raisonnable.” (Of all the ways of defining man, the worst is the one which makes him out to be a rational animal.)

Martin Luther King, Jr. (above). When King was the victim of FBI’s surveillance and harassment under its COINTELPRO operations, he had committed any federal crimes and was not a threat to US national security. He was an innocent US citizen. To that extent, actions taken against him by Intelligence Community organizations once uncovered by the Church Committee were shocking and surprising. In previous times, one might have supposed the understanding, acceptance of what Founding Father’s who authored the US Constitution defined as the unalienable rights of life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were sacrosanct. However, one might be able to comfortably conclude today that far less importance is given to those rights upon which the country’s soul and existence was once firmly rooted and upon which the US public’s expectation and requirement for the good governance of the democracy has its foundation. What seemed so certain about the once lauded strictures–as a sampling, the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendmens of the US Constitution–that would guide the country perpetually, is far less sure today. There are laws, but very often justice for the people is much harder to find. Breaches of regulations of the US Intelligence Community against ordinary citizen, not responsible for any wrongdoing, must not only be examined but vigorously pursued.

Seared in the minds of the authors of the US Constitution, the Founding Fathers, were the extraordinary sacrifices made by thousands of Colonists before and during the Revolution. Attendant to that were acts of tyranny leveled upon colonists by authorities in the Kingdom of Great Britain. There was usually much suffering dealt by the British Army to the rebellious in territory controlled by the British Empire. Methods used by the professionals of the British Army for the purpose of assuring the Kingdom’s grip on the Empire’s many lands overseas were tried and true. Given the that, the victory of the American Colonists, with assistance from France, was spectacular and almost supernatural. The tyranny resulting from the imposition of coercive power by the Kingdom of Great Britain was a manifestation of what was intrinsic in mankind: the desire to control others for self-interest. The despotic intrusion of ones will upon another compelled in some. The Bill of Rights, the initial 10 Amendments of the US Constitution are in part responses of the Founding Fathers. to egregious injustices under which Colonists suffered much of which was intended to break any sense of unity among them.

It is greatcharlie’s firm belief that few in the US public–indeed, relative to the size of the population and to include officers of the court–are aware of the contents of the Bill of Rights and their meaning. There is the real possibility that many in the US may have no interest at all in the matter. Rather than simply utter the term, Bill of Rights, which for many may amount to empty words, greatcharlie offers the concisely authored first 10 amendments of the Constitution passed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791.

The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

The Third Amendment states: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”

The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

The Sixth Amendment states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”

The Seventh Amendment states: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed ttho deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

It must be noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment, which concerns civil rights–as well as Senators, Representatives, and the public debt, citizens in the US, born or naturalized, and other individuals living in the US are entitled to equal protection under the law of the US and the State in which they reside and no person shall be. deprived life, liberty, or property, without due process of law under either jurisdiction.

Two centuries after the Bill of Rights were ratified, power can still corrupt. In the country the Founding Fathers constructed, led by a government formed of the people, for the people, and by the people, the aforementioned intrinsic negative impulses in mankind could nevertheless manifest within those who were members of the citizenry themselves. Despite swearing to an oath to support, protect, and defend the US Constitution and the solemn compact between government and the people, various episodes of corruption have taken their place in the country’s history.

Sojourner Truth was a 19th century African-American abolitionist and activist for civil rights, women’s rights, and alcohol temperance. Truth was born into slavery in Swartekill, New York, but escaped with her infant daughter to freedom in 1826. Sojourner Truth is known for saying “The truth is powerful and will prevail.” The truth will “prevail.” That is as may be. However, without some preconcerted, energetic effort to make certain the truth is heard, understood, and accepted by all who are reasonable and rational, it will unlikely have an impression and be unappreciated. Only a precious few open-minded individuals, following the law and holding firm to their beliefs, spiritual or philosophical, will hold firm to the truth.

Reportedly, the writer, professor, political activist, Nobel laureate, and Holocaust survivor, Eli Weisel, once explained God created man because He loves stories: Weisel would cite the Chasidic tale of the Baal Shem Tov. Accordingly, when misfortune threatened his community, Tov would venture into a certain part of the forest to meditate. There he would light a fire and say a special prayer. In consequence, misfortune would be averted miraculously. During a later time of peril, a despondent Rabbi Israel of Rizhyn addressed God as follows: “I am unable to light the fire. I do not know the prayer; I cannot even find the place in the forest. All I can do is to tell the story: this must be sufficient.” It did suffice, and God saved His People. Dum spiro spero. (While I breathe, I hope.)

By Mark Edmond Clark

The Plight of Surovikin and Other Russian Generals Reveals More of What Is Wrong with the Russian Federation Government

A still image from the June 2023 video of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–implorng Wagner Group troops to halt their rebellion. As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion, that according to the common wisdom, nearly sent the regime of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin spiraling down the drain, may have been an effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would be remiss for Putin’s most loyal subordinate, the Russian Federation security services, and possibly Putin himself, not to see the possibilities. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely have been the case that a decision to investigate military officers would have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Here, greatcharlie parses out the circumstances of the detention of several Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services, with an emphasis on handling of Surovikin.

Except for some possible changes in the efficiencies in the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ prosecution of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation).  So much outside of good reason appears to have guided top officials in the Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Ministry) and top commanders of the General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff), that hardly anything should be discounted as impossible at this point. For some in the West, that reality props open the door for potential moves that could be made by those same top commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces in the near future that would be positively unsettling to the government of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin. 

The private military organization, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) has fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of the invasion. The organization’s  owner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, of poorly conducting the then 16 month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus’ President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.”

As suggested in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 and August 1, 2023 posts mutually entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Parts 1 and 2)”, hypothetically attendant to the Wagner Group Rebellion may have been a hypothetical effort to twinkle out dissenters and threats to the current Russian Federation government within the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It would have been remiss for someone as the most loyal Putin subordinate, the Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, and possibly for Putin, not to see the possibilities. The FSB’s monitoring of responses to Prigohzin’s actions and possible communications with him should have been expected at least. The fact that several Russian Federation generals were detained by the security service in great part bears out greatcharlie’s supposition. If this was the case, it would also very likely be the case that a decision to investigate military officers would likely have been impelled more by political dogma than authentic national security needs. Indeed, in the Russian Federation security services, names have changed and so have technologies, but in the end that old chestnut from the Soviet days of “weeding out reactionaries and counterrevolutionaries” who supposedly pose a never-ending internal threat is apparently at the root and drives many of their activities. History has provided more than enough evidence of how well that turned out.

It is greatcharlie’s purpose here to parse out the circumstances of the detention of Surovikin and other Russian Federation generals by the Russian Federation security services to gain a better understanding of what is truly at the root of the action, what is likely occurring, and why the potential outcome for the Kremlin may very well be against its interests in more ways than one. Apparently suspected from the start of the whole Wagner Group episode was Commander in Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin, the deputy commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. Emphasis is placed on his detention and what surrounds it essentially as a yardstick to consider the plight of others. It is not concealed that greatcharlie believes the detention is a monumental injustice, a fantastic outrage. Human rights are available equitably to all humans, even Russian Federation generals. Hopefully, there will not be too much argument against that among a few readers. Some of what is discussed about the handling of Surovikin is written in the abstract but founded on long-reported treatment experienced by political activists, disfavored officials, and ordinary citizens alike whose interests “did not align with those of the government” and were thereby detained by the Russian Federation security services. It is greatcharlie’s contention that there is no reason to “search” for the truth. The true and pertinent is already known to all following the matter. No alternate facts to those generally reported in the Western newsmedia are revealed. No legal arguments based on Russian Federation law are offered here. Logic and reason are the tools brought to bear on the matter. Security service investigators surely have their “convictions”. Surovikin’s detention is hardly a subject that anyone could expect to discuss rationally with managers of the security services. Still, one might hope that at the top of the Russian Federation government, the light of good reason will eventually shine upon the matter. Quid leges sine moribus vanæ proficiunt? (what good are laws when there are no morals?)

On June 24, 2023, a video appeared on Telegram that depicted “talks” between Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, and the Deputy Commander of the GRU, Vladimir Alekseyev, at the Southern Military District’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don of which the Wagner Group had taken control. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were made out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories had the less noble aim of rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, an audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. Those outbursts and, even more, the Wagner Group Rebellion, did much to provide such evidence.

Regarding Sedition and Insurrection in the Russian Federation

When asked during an interview broadcasted on CBS News “Face the Nation” in May 2023 what he thought was really behind the very public feud between Prigozhin and both Shoigu and Gerasimov, former Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency and US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded: “My view is, this is all taking place, with Putin’s approval.” Gates went on to explain the following: “This is- this is Putin, dividing and conquering. Putin, given how badly the war has gone, has to worry, at some point, that his military decides he’s a problem. By giving Prigozhin power and strengthening Prigozhin and letting him criticize the Ministry of Defense, Putin keeps them divided. If the two came together and decided Putin was a problem, then Putin would have a really big problem. So, my view is that- that Putin is sort of orchestrating this to a degree in the sense- or at least letting it go forward, because it serves his interest in keeping these two powerful forces at each other’s throats, rather than potentially beginning to collude against him.”

Imaginably, Gates, forever the consummate intelligence analyst, might appreciate fragments of an alternative perspective in the abstract on the perceptions of Prigozhin and his Wagner Group’s commanders and Russian Federation Armed Forces operations and senior operational commanders of the circumstances in Ukraine. For the most part, Prigozhin’s noisome outbursts on his media channel on Telegram and in newsmedia interviews were out of concern for the the outcome and outlook for the special military operation, the incompetence of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff in prosecuting the war, and certainly the well-being of his troops. However, Prigozhin’s wailing was not solely out of his concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin was vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad Shoigu and Gerasimov have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. It is also likely the case that Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling the cages of many elites of the Russian Federation who did not favor him at all. However, Prigozhin’s decision to have a bit of fun at the expense of elite circles was very much ill-timed. An audience beyond the country’s borders starving for any information that would point to cracks in the wall of Putin’s regime. 

There is a perspective expressed in foreign and national security policy circles in the West that the time for Putin to leave power has come. Indeed, such is the intensity of negative feelings about Putin among many in West that the long-remembered words spoken by Oliver Cromwell in the House of Commons in 1653 concerning his ejection of the remaining members of the *Long Parliament” used famously on other occasions in the United Kingdom’s Parliament, well-expresses their sentiment: ‘You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!” Gates’ comments about the Russian Federation Armed Forces or the Wagner Group or both posing a threat to Putin’s power were nuanced and derive from a depth of understanding on the situation in the Russian Federation externally matched by few, it would fall in line not only with a multitude of mainstream analyses that have explored that possibility, and now feel their assessments were proven on-track with the advent of the Wagner Rebellion. 

It is very important for those thinking along those lines to consider how the insurrection truly end. It did not end with the return of Wagner Group troops to their ans some leaving for Belarus with Prigozhin. That was one stage of the whole show. It ended when Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

With regard to prospective plotters among Russian Federation Armed Forces  commanders, surely they understand that the special military operations’ present outcome was actually due to their failures and those of the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders. Surely, they were aware or should have been aware, just how deficient their forces truly were. This is hard saying for them, but the Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders of the conventional forces were and still are inadequately suited to defend their country or to successfully invade a country such as Ukraine, especially when it is receiving robust support from NATO member countries and other countries with an interest in the matter. Due their own colossal failure to consider eventualities of such an enterprise, they did not foresee the deluge of Western military aid and training or what a huge impact it would have on the special military operations course. Strategic failures by Russian Federation General Staff and senior operational commanders and the inability to recognize opportunities for decisive action and turn failure into success continue to the point where its too painful for those concerned with the wastage of human lives to watch. Among the Ukrainian people, whose country the Russian Federation wrongfully and illegally invaded, maybe those failures might be viewed [as a relative blessing from on high. (Yet, what really can ever be called a blessing during a war: survival?) 

If one might believe that what has transpired in Ukraine since February 2022 was all a deliberate act of subversion by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff, the question would then be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous extent in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing upright and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This allegation shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round. 

Certainly, Putin had authority over what transpired but had no expert role in the technical management of any of it. Imaginably, top Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders could still hold Putin accountable for all that has occurred in Ukraine or dare to say such things in public or private, however they should guard against such delusional thinking even in their darkest moments. With the idea of overthrowing Putin being bandied about, doubtlessly, the security services have been very much on the prowl, more so now than ever, watching, listening, and hoping to pick up the trail on anything even slightly out of order. 

Putin (left) and Director of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, talk along a corridor followed by stout securitymen. From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. The Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow. Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by an a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of the Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the disturbance.

Background on the Russian Federation Security Services

During his July 27, 2023 address at the Kremilin’s Cathedral Square, Putin enumerated the organizations that fall under the heading, the security services of the Russian Federation He included the following: the Federal Security Service; National Guard; Interior Ministry; Federal Guard Service; and, the Defense Ministry.

Federal Security Service

Federal’naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) or FSB, is the principal security service of the Russian Federation. The primary responsibilities are within the country and in certain circumstances,, externally,, are: counterintelligence, internal and border security, counterterrorism, surveillance and the investigation all other capitol crimes, violations of federal law violations, and unenumerated and unforeseen national security matters.

The National Guard

Federal’naya sluzhba voysk natsional’noy gvardii Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Service of the Troops of the National Guard of the Russian Federation) or Rosgvardiya is the country’s internal military force, comprising an independent agency that reports directly to Putin under his powers as Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. The National Guard is not an element of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. In 2016, Putin signed a law establishing the federal executive bureaucracy. The stated mission of the National Guard is securing the Russian Federation’s borders, serving as the lead agency on gun control, combating terrorism and organized crime, protecting public order and guarding important federal properties.

Interior Ministry

Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation) or MVD is responsible for law enforcement within the country by performing tasks as described I n the names of its main agencies: the Police of Russia, Migration Affairs, Drugs Control, Traffic Safety, the Centre for Combating Extremism, and the Investigative Department.

Federal Guard Service

Federalnaya sluzhba okhrany (the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation) or FSO, is the federal government agency concerned with the tasks related to the protection of the most senior national officials as mandated by the relevant law, to include Putin. The FSO is also responsibile for the physical security of certain federal properties.

Defense Ministry

With regard to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it is not a security service per se, but technically plays an in security service role, being able to provide supporting ground, air, and navalnavalNaval assets when needed to support the main security organizations. Penultimately, the Defense Minister exercises day-to-day administrative and operational authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Russian Federation General Staff executes the Russian Federation President’s and the Russian Federation Defense Minister’s instructions and orders. Ultimately, the Russian Federation President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and directs the activity of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry.

From a security service perspective universally, the handling of the Wagner Group Rebellion could be looked upon as an abysmal fiasco. The Russian Federation security services flubbed it. To all intents and purposes, the Russian Federation security services stood seemingly immobilized, flat-footed on the ground, while thousands of ostensibly angry mercenaries drove toward Moscow Amazingly, Putin has praised their rapid action on the matter more than once. (Perhaps that was an expression of his crni humor and it escaped the vast majority of listeners.) In the aftermath, there was what greatcharlie characterizes as a frenzied rush by the security services to throw the blame on others for the singular happenings in late June 2023 which resulted in the detention and dismissal of several senior military officers. In that action, there has not been too much talk from the Kremlin. Yet, that aspect was somewhat foreshadowed by a June 25, 2023 address given by Putin at the end of Wagner Group Rebellion. That address created the prospect that a new wave of aggressive anti-subversion projects would be forthcoming as a consequence of the “disturbance”.

As greatcharlie noted in its aforementioned August 1, 2023 post, in his June 25, 2023 address to the Russian Federation on the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Putin then fired something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to those similar to “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he described players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. To that extent, it would be expected for the security services to single out examples from the senior ranks of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to terrorize them into believing none would be safe from their watchful eyes and protective hands. If even the slightest scent of sedition or insurrection emanated from their direction, the security services would much like a tiger in the jungle at its prey.

As the Wagner Group Rebellion took shape, many officials and observers in the West proffered that Prigozhin and his troops would not have been able to take over military facilities in southern Russia so easily and mount his rapid march on Moscow without collusion with some members of the military’s elite. It is possible that such assessments and even the words of Gates spoken about a possible military insurrection drove top officials into such a frenzy that they became more determined to light on any officer over the slightest suspicion. It is fairly unlikely that the security services could say for certain that any military officers were absolutely involved in the Wagner Group Rebellion or any other apparent plots. Nevertheless, action was expected, and action was taken. The noble pagan of Ancient Rome, the renown statesman and scholar Marcus Tulius Cicero (106 BC to 43 BC), attributed to the Athenian statesman Solon (c. 630 BC to 560 BC), the quote: “Rempublicam duabus rebus contineri dixit, præmio et pœna.” (A state is regulated by two things, reward and punishment.)

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. There was evidently no reason for any of the officers to believe they were guilty of anything. All were apparently devoid of any instant fear. Apparently, not one attempted to act first by using resources available to general officers to take refuge from the security services or evade investigators upon their arrival to detain them. For each, the discovery that they were subjects of an investigation by the security must have come to each as a bolt out of the blue. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release. In Act 2 Scene 1 of William Shakespeare’s tragedy, The Life and Death of Julius Caesar (1599), the character Brutus, considers, in a soliloquy, his reasons for assassinating Caesar on the Ides of March, states words surely pertinent to thinking of the security services regarding the subjects of their investigations ostensibly for treasonous acts though such behavior was unseen: “And therefore think him as a serpent’s egg / Which, hatch’d, would, as his kind, grow mischievous, / And kill him in the shell.” With its own hand, the Russian Federation government is gutting its own military of premium commanders. Que puis-je dire? 

The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

As it was reported in the Moscow Times on July 13, 2023, the Russian Federation security services began their search for suspected reactionaries by detaining at least 13 senior military officers and suspended or fired 15 others. These actions were taken in relation to Wagner Group Rebellion. Citing the Wall Street Journal, the Moscow Times stated “The detentions are about cleaning the ranks of those who are believed can’t be trusted anymore.” Indeed, although many of the military officers investigated began their careers in loyal service to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, and had excellent records of service since, ties to the Wagner Group, no matter how attenuated, provided ample cause for singling them out. Among the generals detained were Russian Air Force Lieutenant General Andrei Yudin, Deputy Commander of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone, and, Russian Army Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev, the Deputy Commander of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or the GRU. Both generals were suspended from duty after their release.

Background on Surovikin

Holding the rank of General of the Army, Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin has served as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine from October 8, 2022 to January 11, 2023, during which time helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year. He was replaced as the top commander in January 2023 by Gerasimov but retained influence in running war operations while in command of the Southern Group Forces in the Special Military Operation zone.

He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the medal and title Hero of the Russian Federation and the Order of St. George. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when on November 22, 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces. It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), under one command. 

Surovikin was born in Novosibirsk in Siberia on October 11,1966. He is currently 56, married, and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, unknown to greatcharlie is the degree to which he is observant. After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during the last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency. Fighting in the Afghan War in the latter stages when the US was conducting its covert operation to support the Soviet’s main opponent, the Mujahideen at full-bore was most likely a very challenging experience for Surovikin.

Surovikin discussing the situation in Ukraine during his period of service as the overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone. The Moscow Times was first to report that General Sergei Surovikin had been detained. Surovikin, the highest-ranking general among the many commanders held, was likely “target number 1” of the security services. Citing the Financial Times, Bloomberg, and Russia’s independent investigative outlet iStories published similar reports to the effect that , which said Surovikin had either been detained or only questioned and then later released. Yet, according to the Moscow Times, sources of the Wall Street Journal revealed that Surovikin was undergoing “repeated interrogations” and was not being held at a detention center, where reportedly Russian prison monitors have been unable to locate the general. Surovikin’s whereabouts are still unknown now weeks after the Wagner Group Rebellion. Neither the Kremlin nor the Russian Federation Defense Ministry have revealed anything concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts or his well-being.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain and commander of the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division. When the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-declared Gosudarstvennyj Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP., orders were sent down by the GKChP requiring Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into the barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. Shortly after that, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, prompted by politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior decided to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the RussianFederation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

The security services were surely ready and willing to grab those that both their sister national security bureaucracies and elites as Shoigu and Gerasimov could point a finger at. If some document had been created listing those officers that the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff had doubts about, Surovikin’s name would surely have been placed on the top of that list. For those who might have thoughts of seditious thoughts or considering insurrection, they would surely suggest that Surovikin be their role model: “Dein Vorbild!”

Surovikin (left) proudly receives Order of St. George, 3rd degree, from an apparently satisfied Putin (right). For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. 

How Jealousy and Envy Likely Poisoned the Thinking of Shoigu and Gerasimov on Surovikin

US officials briefed on intelligence concerning Surovikin’s detention have said they do not know if his was actively involved in the Wagner Group plot to abduct Shoigu and Gerasimov. Searching for reasons behind Surovikin’s detention, the Western newsmedia as well as Russia scholars and policy analysts have repeatedly noted that when he was selected as the commander of Russian Aerospace Forces in 2022 and as the Russian Federation’s overall commander in Ukraine, none other than Prigozhin very publicly welcomed his appointment to those posts, calling him a “legendary figure” and “born to serve his motherland”. These quotes and other supportive ones, along with a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin, have fuelled rumors in the West that Surovikin may have been “purged” or put under investigation for his ties to the Wagner Group Rebellion. Alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, even if fuelled by rumor, would indeed be more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into.

Still, despite any perceived ties between Surovikin and Prigozhin, it is more likely the case that he was a fitting target for the security services because he was, and presumably still is, disfavored by Shoigu and Gerasimov for, all of things, possessing a military acumen that surpassed theirs by leaps and bounds. No one could have been more aware of how inept Shoigu and Gerasimov were than Surovikin. No one did more to make the duo’s inadequacies readily apparent just by doing his job right. Rather treasure their subordinate as someone who gets things done in the midst of the Russian Federation’s conundrum in Ukraine, at the nub of their concern over him was very likely jealousy, envy, and insecurity. Shoigu and Gerasimov have respectively demonstrated themselves to be very flawed men in their thinking and actions. It is conceivable that they would go a bit further and prove themselves prone to punish subordinates because of their talents. Que l’enfer est faux avec vous?

When Surovikin was promoted to overall commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone on October 8, 2022, he began to make moves that brought some positive results and good news for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Surovikin surely understood that leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer, although he may have wanted to do so in many areas. Despite shortcomings of his forces in the field and accepting the situation as it actually was, Surovikin sought to solidify the position of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. Fully in his element in ground warfare, he stepped up better organized localized attacks to have a cumulative effect and push back on advances by Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) at that time. His defensive moves reportedly raised worries among US military officials and officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden that Russia Federation troops might be able to withstand renewed Ukrainian offensives.

Yet Surovikin’s efforts, which were bearing fruit, did not appear to be enough to impress or satisfy his military superiors. One might wonder whether Surovikin was intentionally given a fool’s errand when given overall command in Ukraine. One might speculate it was part of a pre-concerted effort conjured up by his superiors, hoping to brand him with a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission to correct a near Intractable situation before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Readers may recall that it was greatcharlie’s prediction in its October 30, 2023 post entitled, “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, that the situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) According to Thucydides’ own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1 of The History of the Peloponnesian War, he was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because he had “great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland.” However, the renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports that it was firmly under Spartan control were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

It also could have been the case that Surovikin’s ability to establish order from chaos convinced others they could grab glory from his success and claim his successful actions as their own. Surovikin’s replacement as overall commander in Ukraine was none other than Gerasimov. When Gerasimov arrived to take command of the special military operation from him, Surovikin was not dismissed as was the case with Thucydides. He became one of three deputies subordinate to Gerasimov in the Special Military Operation zone, which meant Surovikin’s sound military thinking,  good insights, and reliable intuition would be at his disposal. Further, by keeping Surovikin in the mix, any negative feelings Putin might have developed over a dismissal would be avoided. At that time, he still appreciated Surovikin, and would have unlikely tolerated his dismissal and would likely have responded negatively to efforts to dismiss him. However, if his superiors were truly “gunning for him”, as suggested by greatcharlie, their efforts would hardly end with his demotion. It seems they managed to set up a better aimed second shot at him during the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Surovikin with laser pointer (left) and Shoigu (right). Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, Putin, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk, implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . . ] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

Putin is hardly oblivious to the dearth of true military talent among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as well as among his closest military advisers. Interestingly, even while he supported Shoigu’s decision to subordinate all private military contractors, militias, and volunteers fighting alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine, at the meeting with bloggers in Russian Federation on June 23, 2023, Putin implied that criticism of his country’s military had been for the most part correct. He stated:. “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly.” Putin continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.” For quite some time, Putin appeared to appreciate Surovikin and must have acknowledged that he was a sort of diamond in the rough. In its October 30, 2022 post, greatcharlie explained that politics of the highest realms of the Russian Federation likely played a considerable role in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation. On the face of it, one might have imagined Putin and the general would have a very harmonious relationship, Both were devout servants of the Soviet Union and desired to preserve their erstwhile country. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability became most apparent to Putin through his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded.

The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

A matter that might presumably have caused Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness, particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin needs to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity. Vana quoque ad veros accessit fama timores. (Idle rumors were also added to well-founded fears.)

Surovikin (left) and Gerasimov (right). It would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. The thought could not have escaped Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

By countenancing the detention of Surovikin, Shoigu and Gerasimov would have essentially given their blessing to the actions of the security services. When the guilt of an individual is near assured by such authority, and results are expected at the top, the faculty of thought can often be suspended, even lost every step of the way. By observation–empirical data gleaned from years of newsmedia reporting–this appears true for almost every country, sorry to say. (If this faulty practice at all sound familiar to readers from security services of other countries, change your ways today! (More easily said than done one would suppose.)) Sufficit unum lumen in tenebris. (A single light suffices in the darkness.)

Surovikin appears to have found himself in a pickle with Putin similar to that of Ancient Roman military leader Belisarius (c. 500 AD to 565 AD) with Roman Emperor Justinian I (482 AD to 565 AD). Far more than simply a military commander, Belisarius was one of the greatest of Antiquity. He has been dubbed by historians as “the Last of the Romans.” He conquered the Vandal Kingdom of North Africa in 9 months, then turned to conquer much of Italy. He was victorious against the Vandals at Tricamarum and Ad Decimum. He recaptured the city of Rome for the Empire and held on to it under siege despite the fact that in both seizing the city and defending it, his force was outnumbered. Although subsequently defeated by the Persians at Callinicum, he won a great victory against their forces at Dara. Belisarius repulsed invasion attempts by the Huns at Melantias and by the Persians at Ariminum by causing them to lift the siege of the city. Skilled at using deception in warfare, he led the Persian commander to withdraw without a fight. However, having accomplished all of this and more, in 562 AD, toxic advisers, jealous and envious of Belisarius’ success and favor with Justinian, managed to convince the emperor that his loyal commander was conspiring to overthrow him. He was found guilty at trial, stripped of rank, publicly humiliated, and imprisoned. After reconsidering the matter, Justinian pardoned Belisarius and demanded his release. He restored him to favor at the imperial court. Belisarius died very shortly afterward.

It would seem the security services are very much troubling Surovikin with a lengthy examination. One might imagine if the security services had a clear cut case against the Surovikin, they would have readily thrown a light on all that is dark to everyone about the matter by making some complacent public statement in a very grand way. Certainly, that would happen, albeit only if Putin sanctioned it. Out of sheer curiosity, it would be interesting to hear what sort of ragbag of dissonant trifles the security services have in their possession about Surovikin. In the aggregate, their evidence would unlikely amount to anything managers in any legitimate law enforcement organization elsewhere would find satisfactory or acceptable. Conceivably, any evidence possessed by the security services could hardly be more than circumstantial and unlikely exact, but surely whatever it possesses would be near enough for the security services to believe their case is solid. Each bit of nothing in their minds would presumably rate higher meaning. To that extent, one might assess in the truest sense, the supposed crimes of the suspected officers were featureless ones. Nos hæc novimus esse nihil. (We know that these things are nothing (i.e., mere trifles.)

Snakes are able to unhinge their jaws, which allows them to swallow animals much larger than their heads. After they devour the animal, their jaw hinge goes back into place. Much as with snakes, right or wrong, security service officials, whether in the Russian Federation or governments of freedom loving democracies of the West, will figuratively unhinge their jaws to devour “larger prey” such as Surovikin or any subject of an investigation for whatever recherché rationale or due to an investigator’s some very apparent mental abnormality, highly valued by them. Often too easily given the authority by their superiors who are usually eager to receive results, investigating security service officials are usually reluctant to release the subjects of their investigations even if it requires busting budgets by increasing staff and hours on the beat and increasing the use of technical resources to include contractors to collect evidence that unlikely existed. Errant investigators will continue to clamp down on their victim even when it is clear there are no substantial leads, or trifles, to follow up on. Curiously, superiors in most security service do not appear to  circulate in a way to observe such aggressive investigative practices or hear from subordinates whether anything inordinate is transpiring. Typically, managers in the security services have come up from the same system and are unwilling to push too hard on anything thoroughly. They know the deal! To be sure, the behavior of investigators in the security services can be unhinged not as much in a physical way as with the snake’s jaw, but psychologically. Once its victim is completely figuratively devoured, broken in a real sense, their jaws will return to their original position.

Gerasimov (above) moves through a well-protected bunker to the rear of the frontlines in Ukraine. A matter that might presumably cause Putin to look at Surovikin with a jaundiced eye would be his trustworthiness particularly with regard to his management of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces. Putin wants to be certain whether the commander of the crown jewels of the Russian Federation’s defense would be ready to carry out his orders to use the country’s most powerful forces without question. Control over the actions of his commanders has likely become the most uneasy matter for Putin to cope with. Surely Putin does not want to be placed in the situation he has faced for months with his commanders in the field in Ukraine who he surely feels have failed to perform in a satisfactory manner. The poisonous words of Putin’s most senior military advisers would have been able to do the most damage to Surovikin on this matter. It would be overly generous and perhaps unreasonable to think Shoigu and Gerasimov would refrain from attacking Surovikin from that angle if given the opportunity.

On Bullying Surovikin

Turning to the Bard again, in Act 3, scene 3 of Shakespeare’s play Othello, the Moor of Venice (1603), the consummate antagonist, the ensign Iago, acting full bore in a dastardly campaign to destroy the commander, Othello, psychologically, seeks to create doubt in his mind about his wife Desdemona’s fidelity and that she could possibly be in love with his captain, Cassio, his most loyal subordinate. In convincing Othello that it would be a tremendous blow to his reputation if word of what was in reality a nonexistent relationship between the two, became widely known, Iago states the famous passage: Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, / Is the immediate jewel of their souls: / Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; / ‘Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands: / But he that filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not enriches him / And makes me poor indeed.” While likely embarrassed, disheartened and potentially humiliated initially by the public spectacle and dishonor of his detention, the brave soldier, a former spetsnaz officer, will not so easily be driven past hope and into despair despite the worst the security services might be able to dish out. True, the message Surovikin recorded urging the Wagner Group troops to halt their “mutiny” was likely made at the suggestion of the security service which likely had him in their possession at the time. Yet, the possibility is greater than not that Surovikin truly wanted the whole episode with the Wagner Group to end in order to prevent an atrocious “blue on blue” clash, save the lives of much needed troops, and avoid doing anything that would give the Russian Federation’s opponents an advantage. Surovikin likely saw it as one more chance to be a good commander and patriot despite his difficult situation. Doubtlessly in their interrogation of Surovikin, investigators are very likely repeatedly testing every link of their conceivably defective and possibly contaminated chain of evidence. However, no fabricated disclosures or incriminating false confession under duress should be hoped for from Surovikin. A likely denouement would be the general’s call to higher service unless he is released. The security services would of course assure all that Surovikin had met his fate by his own hand if he were to die in their custody. Hopefully, none of that will transpire.

For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars.. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Perhaps every Western capital, as well as the capitals in other regions concerned about Ukraine, was aware of it. Western intelligence appears to have been more fully informed on the details of what was transpiring on the border than the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff and the security services in the aggregate. It brings to mind how difficult it seemed for the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services to monitor Prigozhin’s movements between Belarus and the Russian Federation after the rebellion. Time and effort was spent raiding empty homes garnering little more than wigs and some old gag photos, gold bars and automatic weapons, all of which were returned to their owner. In the meantime, Western intelligence had been monitoring every move he made by satellite. One might hazard a guess that the US Intelligence Community knew details such as what he was typically having for breakfast and lunch and how much time he was spending watching television. The juxtaposition of the respective approaches to investigating the two subjects by the security services is almost comical.

Surely, the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services themselves had a more than adequate opportunity to monitor and disrupt any plan of the Wagner Group, to prevent if from assembling and rolling out against the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, and long before the “mutineers” left their line of departure and reached Rostov-on-Don. The reason why they failed to act, robustly or discreetly, is anyone’s guess. The failure of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and security services to interfere with the Wagner Group before the situation took a grave turn was surely a worse act of enabling the rebellion than any other. If Surovikin is being held over any knowledge potentially possessed and withheld by him, he could hardly have concealed anything that everyone did not already know on the matter. As the whole saw how the whole episode played out, one might wonder what sort of special piece of information he could have held back. Recalling the dialogue from the 1979 blockbuster film “Apocalypse Now!”, a portion of a line spoken by the character US Army Captain Benjamin L. Willard is apropos in this case. With that line added on here, one could then state with considerable accuracy that charging anyone with having foreknowledge of the Wagner Group Rebellion would be “like handing out speeding tickets at the Indy 500.”

If Surovikin is being held over some possible errant words spoken by him, then, as suggested earlier, the time has long passed since the security services should have let Putin, the Russian people, and the world know they have got it out. However, such is surely not the case. Everything made publicly known so far points to the likelihood that they have no real case against Surovikin. Perchance the best case for which the security services are actually providing strong evidence is the case proving what an absolute abomination the Russian Federation government is. Some might argue that too is an “open secret”.

Regarding the inadequacies of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services, greatcharlie need not go as far as to call attention to just how wrong their respective pre-invasion conclusions were about the Ukrainian people welcoming invading Russian Federation troops with open arms. One might infer from the quality of their previous work product, in the minds of security service investigators, no matter how implausible or off-kilter their cause for holding Surovikin might be, they believe there is good reason to detain Surovikin. They can “rest assured” that they have got the right man. Again, they have got it out! Complètement folle!

Interestingly, while Russia scholars and policy analysts will never recognize the sovereign territory of Ukraine in the Donbass as Novorossiya, it is supposedly a reality for the Russian Federation government. That being the case, if the Wagner Group on territory that was in the minds of Russian Federation officials now their country’s sovereign territory, whatever the Wagner Group was doing was a matter that fell primarily if not solely within the security services’ province. How inelegant it is for the security services to foist their responsibilities upon commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield who at that moment were swamped, struggling to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from delivering a crushing military blow, sending the entire enterprise in Ukraine from swiftly spiraling downward into a defeat on a scale not seen since World War II. (Undoubtedly, with regard later offensives that have lead to grand defeats, some might call attention to the May 4, 1975 spring offensive (Chiến dịch mùa Xuân 1975), officially known as the General Offensive and Uprising of Spring 1975 (Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy mùa Xuân 1975), which was the final North Vietnamese campaign of the Vietnam War that led to the capture of Saigon on April 30, 1975, and the surrender and dissolution of Republic of Vietnam. Others might call attention to the May 2021 offensive of the wretched Taliban in blatant violation of a peace agreement that led to the capture of Kabul, the complete collapse of the internationally backed government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and subsequent dissolution of the robustly supported the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces on August 15 2021.)

Putin (center top) meeting with select members of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, Russian Federation security services, and the Security Council during the Wagner Group Rebellion. For the security services, among a hypothetical list of causes for continuing their questioning Surovikin would perhaps be an insufficient response from his headquarters on whether there was “ample” reason to be concerned over the Wagner Group in his area or whether he prepared to respond to any provocation by Wagner Group units, Surovikin should bear no guilt for having any knowledge about the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is likely that most, if not all the causes listed, would appear nonsensical to reasonable individuals, and particularly legal scholars. The build up of Wagner Group units on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation was an open secret, open to the whole wide world.

Pitfalls for Military Officers Who Get Too Close to Political Matters

With Prigozhin being a very close associate of the Russian Federation President and, by reports, ostensibly under the control of the GRU and the Russian Federation General Staff, it is not too difficult to imagine Surovikin was most likely reluctant, or strongly desired, to stay out of matters closely concerning Prigozhin’s activities outside of military matters. By doing so, one could only bring unneeded trouble upon oneself. It would be impossible, without all of the facts of what was really the case, what was in play. One of the other aforementioned commanders detained and questioned by the security services, Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of the GRU, military intelligence, certainly would have known prying into whatever the Wagner Group was doing off the battlefield would be counterintuitive. He too would know just getting too close could result in trouble as the situations for Yudin, Alekseyev, and Surovikin clearly demonstrate.

In greatcharlie’s June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, a true picture of the thinking among the Russian people concerning service to the state–to the best understanding of greatcharlie–was outlined with frankness. At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, some citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances even following what could reasonably be called the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. (On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) For certain, laws concerning the people’s well-being can be legislated with some regularity in most countries but justice is very often harder to achieve.

To that extent, greatcharlie supposed that scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would unlikely be quick to assist the Russian Federation government by providing any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. Indeed, there perhaps would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively depicted or impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. It would be enough of a tragedy to simply find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, those among the Russian people who might have something of real value to contribute may decide, or their respective families and friends might advise, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

Putin (left) and Shoigu (right). Behind Putin to the left is Alexei Dyumin, Acting Governor of the Tula Region of the Russian Federation. Behind the pensive Shoigu, to the left, is Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister and State Secretary, General of the Reserve Army, Nikolai Pankov. Dyumin holds the rank of lieutenant general in the Russian Army. He once served as the chief security guard and assistant of Russian Federation President  before Putin promoted him to lead the Russian Federation’s Special Operations Forces which he oversaw during the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The following year, he became Deputy Defense Minister. He was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation. It has been suggested within the Western newsmedia that Dyumin would likely replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister if the need arose. Politics at the highest realms of the Russian Federation are complicated and dangerous. Those who really do not have “hold any cards” or are not “covered” politically much as Icarus of Ancient Greek mythology tend to get burned and fall whenever they intentionally or incidentally get too close to the fire.

Beyond being shocked and surprised, Surovikin was likely horrified upon initially discovering that the entire political cabaret of the Wagner Group Rebellion was being launched in the eastern sector of his area of responsibility. If he had not been, he might have supposed the security services, to include the Border Guard and the National Guard, would be in the best position to put the brakes on the matter. He then might have expected the FSB would have the situation “well in hand”, going about interviewing Wagner Group commanders and detaining them if necessary. None of that happened. It turned out none of the security services took on the task of dealing with the Wagner Group. (Still, one might suggest in their own way, FSB managers did have the matter covered alright. They would select suspected, not necessarily guilty, co-conspirators after the fact, and deflect any culpability for their own failures.) One could imagine Surovikin’s facial expression upon hearing from security service investigators. Perhaps he was stoic. 

Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely putting too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his real job, fighting an illegal war initiated by the Kremlin. The security services, however, are unable to see that. They exist in an alternate reality–a cognitive bubble–much as they do in every country. That is something that legislatures and executive authorities in democracies must do far more to guard against.

The mainstream opinion reported in the West generally is that Surovikin is a skilled commander who would likely continue to pose problems for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The New York Times described Surovikin as a respected military leader who helped shore up defenses across the battle lines after Ukraine’s counteroffensive last year, analysts say. He was replaced as the top commander in January but retained influence in running war operations and remains popular among the troops. Perhaps he is looked upon as something far less formidable by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff on which he served. A common theme heard during the Wagner Group Rebellion was that the action was benefitting the enemies of the Russian Federation. Among the points made in his July 24, 2023 “Address to the Nation” concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin explained that external threats–tacitly understood to be the US and other Western countries–would exploit anything that might provide advantage for them against the Russian Federation. Putin stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history. Putin continued: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Oddly enough, in a dark, cynical twist, Surovikin, in a relatively unkempt state–for the first time seen unshaven publicly and in an unpressed uniform sans insignia–and propping himself in a chair against a wall in an unmilitary fashion, spoke briefly on a video recording. Surovikin remarked: “We fought together with you, took risks, we won together,” He then entreated:  “We are of the same blood, we are warriors. I urge you to stop.” Surovikin added: “The enemy is just waiting for our internal political situation to deteriorate.” He  then implored the Wagner Group troops: “Before it is too late . . . you must submit to the will and order of the people’s president of the Russian Federation. Stop the columns and return them to their permanent bases.” It is almost certain that when the video was produced, Surovikin was already being held–and likely being roughly handled–by security service investigators.

Readers may compare Surovikin’s typically appearance depicted in this photo (above) with his deportment in the June 24, 2023 video and judge for themselves the general is doing well. In the video broadcasted on June 24, 2023, Surovikin as aforementioned, appears in an unkempt state, unshaven and wearing an unpressed uniform. Focused on his main task, fighting the illegal war Putin started, Surovikin was unlikely to put too much time into the political theater that transpired nearby. In less distracting circumstance, experience in the service of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation would likely have caused Surovikin to brace himself for the worst possibility of being suspected of collusion speciously based upon the geographical relation of his command and the assembly area of the Wagner Group for its rebellion as well as for “allowing” the insurrection to transpire in the area under his command. In the armed forces of a normal country, there would scarcely be an expectation for Surovikin to lend concern to whatever the Wagner Group was doing. There would really be no professional side to doing so. Again, at the time when everything took flight, he was doing his job.

With regard to what the Moscow’s perceived enemies were actually thinking and saying about the Wagner Group Rebellion, the New York Times on June 27, 2023 reported that US officials interviewed, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive intelligence, explained concerning Surovikin and the Wagner Group Rebellion that they have avoided discussing what they and their allies know publicly to avoid feeding Putin’s narrative that the unrest was orchestrated by the West.

At the same time, US officials admitted to the New York Times that US has “an interest in pushing out information that undermines the standing of General Surovikin, whom they view as more competent and more ruthless than other members of the command.” Reportedly, they further stated: “His removal would undoubtedly benefit Ukraine, whose Western-backed troops are pushing a new counteroffensive that is meant to try to win back territory seized by Moscow.” This statement alone would hardly serve as striking proof that the secret Western agencies were working around the Russian Federation to sabotage its efforts in Ukraine, efforts on the world stage, and efforts to maintain national unity. Still. destroying Surovikin is viewed as desirable among the Russian Federation’s declared opponents–enemies, then given the Russian Federation security service investigators’ actions, one might ask of them: “Je suis désolée, de quel côté es-tu?”

It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone even near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, if not certainly, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Russian Federation Deputy Defense Ninister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Russian Federation Defense Ministry post. He has since been released. Expectedly, Putin would have insisted upon Prigozhin’s release if he had been quietly detained.  However, that would likely have been late under any circumstances as the Russian Federation security services can do an incredible amount of damage to one’s person in a very short period of time. Prigozhin, a convict in a Soviet prison in the 1980s while in his 20s, likely would have had no desire to experience such treatment in 2023 while in his 60s.

One must also remember that service to Putin, Prigozhin, would do just about anything if Putin told Prigozhin it was part of his plan or simply said that was what he wanted. That would be all he needed to hear. If the choice had to be made between Surovikin’s well-being and Putin’s satisfaction, there would be no contest. Prigozhin’s choice would be to satisfy Putin. Such is the nature of Prigozhin’s relationship with Putin. Prigozhin is dedicated to Putin, No one should make a mistake about that. He is also quite beholden to him for his largess and position within the highest realms of Russian Federation society. Putin likely came to recognize Prigozhin’s rather flattering attachment to him long ago. Absent such dedication, he likely would have shaken Prigozhin well before. It would doubtlessly be a strain for Prigozhin to swallow such an act of betrayal against Surovikin or arduous for him to carry that truth until the end of his days, but surely he will attempt to do it. Thinking about how Prigozhin has been so willing to offer his opinion, his predilection for talking too much, and his penchant for flying off the rails of logic during his fiery ravings, what comes to mind is “Bigmouth Strikes Again”, a 1986 song from the third album of the English rock band The Smiths. Written by Johnny Marr and Morrissey, the lyrics of the refrain are: “Bigmouth [La-la, la, la, la-la!] / Bigmouth [La-la, la, la!] / Bigmouth strikes again / And I’ve got no right to take my place / To the Human race.”

Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin leaving Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. It may be improbable, yet all the same grotesquely conceivable, that the well-known antagonist in the story of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin, may have passed some derogatory information to authorities about Surovikin in an ostensible act of loyalty to Putin and his regime, thereby landing the general, a man he reportedly admires, in hot water. As stated in previous posts, greatcharlie is loath to cast aspersions on anyone without some considerable evidence, strong indications. Yet, one might consider that in the midst of all that transpired during the relatively smooth course of the Wagner Group Rebellion–true Russian Federation Armed Forces aircrews were reportedly killed, everyone near the matter in the Russian Federation was aware that the security services were clearly looking to grab someone over the “insurrection”. Imaginably, from Prigozhin’s view, it would be far better for the security services to round up commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces as suspects than any of his men or himself for that matter. Reportedly, the security services detained Mikhail Mizintsev, a former Deputy Defense Minister in Charge of Logistics, who signed on with the Wagner Group in April 2023 after being removed from his Defense Ministry post. He has since been released.

No Little Lamb Driven to Slaughter: Surovikin’s Violent Antecedents

Virtus præmium est optimum. Virtus omnibus rebus anteit profecto. Libertas, salus, vita, res, parentes, patria et prognati tutantur, servantur; virtus omnia in se habet; omnia assunt bona, quem penes est virtus. (Virtue is the highest reward. Virtue truly goes before all things. Liberty, safety, life, property, parents, country, and children are protected and preserved. Virtue has all things in herself; he who has virtue has all things that are good attending him) In truth, as an officer in the Russian Federation Armed Forces,, and the Soviet Army before that, Surovikin has by no means comported himself as virtuous man. To be certain, greatcharlie does not want to leave readers with the impression that Surovikin is an innocent lamb being driven to potential slaughter. A number of violent antecedents are associated with his name. Indeed, in Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. 

As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring, where three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders.  In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. During his tours in Syria, Surovikin received the nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” At one time there were supposedly whispers in the Russian Federation that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source. Surely, others following his career more closely could perhaps enumerate more “bumps in the road”.

Who Wins, Who Loses?

While wanting to develop a better picture of Surovikin’s likely treatment, greatcharlie admits without pretension that diving into what might be the “low vibrational” thinking of those holding him is a disquieting and distasteful journey of exploration through the grotesque. Perhaps greatcharlie’s “tirade” in this post on the enormous injustice against Surovikin comes as a result of studying Prigozhin’s videos on Telegram too closely during research for its preceding post. (Can mere association with behavior via video recording breed similarity?) After reviewing what is presented here, a small number of readers might minimize in a well-meaning way as intelligent speculation. In the introduction, greatcharlie admitted there was a small degree of that. Noticeably, there is no effort to predict future events concerning Surovikin’s detention. Those who may believe they have gained by it are surely powerful enough with the system and intent on having their way with him. However, who gains and who loses on the matter perhaps has not been considered in the round by those who have some part in it.

Following his grand victory over the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin’s dominion over the Russian Federation very likely felt more secure to him at least to some satisfactory level. It could be the case that the detentions and dismissals of Russian Federation general officers could reverse that sense of success. Putin may not have considered all of the possible effects of the action taken by the security services upon his situation. Under immense pressures, fending off distractions, Putin is likely to make mistakes, misunderstand situations, ignore his intuition and intimations. This is true despite his considerable knowledge and experience. In fact, Putin would know that. What is overlooked and misread will remain as elements of failure unless time permits successful correction. It might be worth noting that when Nazi Germany’s Fuhrer und Reichkanzler (Leader and Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler, following an assassination attempt in July 1944, feared plots were being made to remove him from power and that the end was near, he had his top henchman Reichführer-SS (Reich Leader-SS) Heinrich Himmler unleash the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) against the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) which resulted in the destruction some of his most capable generals, such as Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel and Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge when he needed them most on the battlefield. Parallels, mutatis mutandis, are found between what transpired years ago in Nazi Germany and what is transpiring today in the Russian Federation. Perchance Putin has not considered this.

Tanto est accusare quam defendere, quanto facere quam sanare vulnere, facilius. (It is just so much easier to accuse than to defend, as it is easier to inflict than to heal a wound.) Putin should be aware that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them. 

.Putin must not act–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–out of fear but confidence in his commanders. His public demand for Surovikin’s return to service would send an extraordinary signal of support to his commanders from the most junior lieutenant to Gerasimov. The positive impact on their psyche would likely be immeasurably positive. Among the Russian people, surely a Solomonesque act of justice would send a signal of unity during the crisis and favorable response–a boom–in terms of his popularity ratings. At the same time, taking such corrective action would not be a matter of becoming, or proving himself to be, a virtuous man. It is really just a matter of putting his house in order. As aforementioned, Justinian I released Belisarius, but a bit too late. By all indications, it is not too late for Putin to order the release of Surovikin. “Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant”

On August 15, 2023, Elisa Braun and Zoya Sheftalovich of Politico reported their discovery of information dated August 13, 2023 on the VChK-OGPU blog–known to closely associated with the Russian Federation security services–explaining on that Surovikin is now “under a kind of house arrest” by which he is restricted to an “apartment” in which he being detained. However, the blog indicated has been permitted visitors, including several of his subordinates. As aforementioned, in response to inquiries from journalists, the Kremlin still has neither made an official public statement concerning Surovikin’s whereabouts nor offered anything more than vague references of “speculations, allegations” about his awareness of the Wagner Group’s plan to revolt as of this writing. 

Putin (above) might consider that his commanders are already under extraordinary pressures and having to “watch their backs”, even when completely innocent, makes one wonder how each has held himself together. Surovikin’s detention under such unseemly political circumstances could have the reverse effect on their psyche than the security service or Putin might presume. It is very possible, though loyal soldiers to their government and obedient to civilian authority, as trained and experienced warriors, the reaction trained within them might be to strike before they are attacked wrongfully. That does not mean they are a threat to the government as many have been treated by the security service, but simply human beings having a human reaction. Putin still has time to correct this situation. In particular, he has time to correct the ugly situation concerning Surovikin. In fact, being presented to Putin may actually be a real opportunity for Putin to express solidarity with his commanders by doing something far more substantial than giving them well-curated speeches on how much he appreciates them.

The Way Forward

In the abstract, one might presume the likely accepted wisdom of members of the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies from the most junior military analyst or Ukraine specialist to the most senior military officers and diplomats or state secretaries and ministers, even if only tacitly accepted, is that poor intelligence analysis and deplorable performance by military planners and commanders in the field were the main sources of problems that have hampered the special military operation. However, at the nub of it all is the reality that a country in which so much negative energy could be devoted to destroying its most capable commanders over petty personal biases and grumblings of their superiors, could never muster the dynamic, synergistic, positive power to act in unity and in the case of Ukraine, in a true military fashion, to accomplish what has been asked of it by national authority, Putin, in the Kremlin. The Russian Federation government appears rotten at its core, and that rot contaminates whatever it engages in. In its most important responsibility, providing for national defense–if illegally invading Ukraine could fall under the rubric of national defense–the whole world can see just how rotten it all is. No national government, not even friends in Beijing, Minsk, Pyongyang, New Dehli, Johannesburg, Brasilia, Yerevan, Ashgabat  Tashkent, Astana, Dushanbe, Bishkek, Damascus, Havana, Caracas, or elsewhere would likely say so plainly to Putin just how surprisingly bad the Russian Federation Armed Forces have performed, but they see it and think it nonetheless. What all of this means is that despite how much victory might be wished for in the Kremlin, no matter what gimmicks might be used and shortcuts taken, will never come. That was the case from the start. The greatest opponent the Russian Federation government faces is itself. Destroying its operation in Ukraine will prove to be its greatest victory over itself. On this point, greatcharlie does not believe it is in error. However, surely it would fully accept that if Surovikin were to be immediately released near the time of this writing, error upon it would be proved to some considerable degree. Certainly, greatcharlie, with some trepidation, will publish a more than apologetic retraction of it all once news of Surovikin’s release is reported. Est enim unum ius quo deuincta est hominum societas et quod lex constituit una, quae lex est recta ratio imperandi atque prohibendi. Quam qui ignorat, is est iniustus, siue est illa scripta uspiam siue nusquam. (For there is but one essential justice which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.)

Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (center), takes a moment to gather himself while seated between Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Glavnokomanduyushchiy Voyenno-morskoy Flot Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Naval Force or Russian Navy) Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov (right). The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s way; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have had their impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individua he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, a lack of good solutions, options for action when trouble began was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters, his willingness to try novel ideas that make sense, may have changed. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies for insights and options and could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches. That possibility is discussed here.

The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have even had a profound impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individual he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, when trouble began, a lack of good solutions, viable options for alternative actions, was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition to develop better answers. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters may have changed, and there might be a willingness, not to go off the rails, but to try novel ideas that make sense. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to garner ideas, insights and options that could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches unexpected in Western capitals. That possibility is discussed here. In Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies one might expect some well-accepted and well-used approaches to understanding Putin’s decisionmaking and rationalizing Russian Federation action based on what is known about its tactics, techniques, procedures and methods of doing things. Due to this, unexpected changes in his thinking might throw the West off-track to some degree, depending on what on-going approaches he hypothetically might change and how. The implications could be enormous. There remains a place for the bog standard analyses of Putin on some matters. However, with regard to Ukraine,  it is essential to get beyond thinking along well-worn lines and the expected and consider all possible eventualities.

For a over a decade, some of officials of the US foreign and national security policy apparatus have made their intense dislike greatcharlie and disapproval of its plainly innocuous scribblings well known to it. Nevertheless, for others, greatcharlie hopes its efforts here are not value neutral, particularly with regard to students. Although greatcharlie would be satisfied enough to have this commentary stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem. (I should prefer ineloquent good sense to loquacious folly.)

A confident Putin (above) at the February 21, 2023 Security Council meeting regarding Ukraine. Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin, expectations for future fruitful talks would be far lower now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. Facing such trying circumstances daily, Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 24, 2022. Putin has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that he, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster, at least until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

A New Putin?: Transformed by His Circumstances

Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin. there would be far lower expectations of future fruitful talks now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. They might find words from the play Henry the VIII. a collaborative effort between William Shakespeare and John Fletcher  might find most apposite concerning him. In Act IV, scene iii, Katherine, Henry VIII’s ex-wife, reduced to princess dowager, converses to her attendants about the death of Cardinal Wolsey. Wolsey, a once trusted advisor to the king, having failed to secure an annulment of Henry VIII’s first marriage, was removed from government, arrested for treason, grew ill, and died a broken man. Katharine though saying she will speak of him with charity proceeds to characterize him in the following negative way, saying: “His own opinion was his law: i’ the presence / He would say untruths; and be ever double / Both in his words and meaning: he was never, / But where he meant to ruin, pitiful.”

Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 2022. He has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that for, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

It is very likely that even Putin as much as anyone else was surprised by the limited level of control he could exercise over his use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces especially once they were placed on the battlefield in great numbers. Indeed, events have been so far off from anything Putin most likely wanted or foresaw in Ukraine, that one could hardly believe genuinely that he ever had full control of the situation and reasonably make only an attenuated argument in support of that belief. The poor thinking of Russian Federation commanders and the positively horrible outcomes of their actions was most likely another eye-opener for Putin.

Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.) In its preceding post, greatcharlie stated that the Russian Federation would unlikely win the Ukraine War based on the record of performance of Russian Federation commanders to date. However, it must be explained further that the situation they face is not impossible to crack. Military commanders of other countries, such as the US for instance, would more than likely readily see the correct course of action to “breakout” of the Western and Southern fronts. One might hypothesize that a zealous emphasis on Russian military history in the course of studies in the 30 schools of Voyenny uchebno-nauchny tsentr Sukhoputnykh voysk “Obshchevoyskovaya ordenov Lenina i Oktyabr’skoy revolyutsii, Krasnoznamennaya, ordena Suvorova” (The Combined Academies Order of Lenin Order of the October Revolution Red Bannered Order of Suvorov of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation-Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Russian Ground Forces), the equivalent of Western command and general staff schools and Voyennaya akademiya General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), what suffices for Western war colleges, and an apparent failure to encourage student officers to examine in the round the strategy, tactics, and the operational art displayed by other countries armed forces in other wars, has left Russian Federation commanders without the slightest idea of how closely their current situation in Ukraine parallels that of a number of commanders in other larger conflicts of the past. Case studies of such done by student officers that would have familiarized them with those past foreign commanders’ successful combined arms actions that allowed them to maneuver their forces out of trouble and gain and retain the initiative would have likely changed the course of the current war.

Spectemur agendo. (Let us be judged by our acts.) Still, even if Russian Federation commanders hypothetically came upon an historical or novel way to storm through the frontlines of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and put themselves in a position to do some “open field running,” it is hard to conceive of what would be their follow through to exploit success. Given their aberrant moves from the first day of the special military operation, it is difficult to imagine what for them would be priority objectives they would have in mind and why, whether they would intend to conquer all of Ukraine or limit themselves to securing certain useful territory. They surely would know by experience–disco inferno–or at least intimate that the Ukrainians would never tolerate any additional territorial gains in their country and in response to such a loss, build up stronger with the support of their allies, and strike back harder than ever before. Another rapid “dagger thrust” at Kyiv would be counterintuitive. One would expect Putin would have the most say in what to do next. Under this hypothetical situation, he would likely publicly or through classified orders, express his objectives for the next phase of the war, and from that, the concept and intent for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would be established. 

Equally difficult to imagine in this hypothetical circumstance is what could potentially be planned under Putin’s concept and intent, given the likely remaining strength of units in contact with the Ukrainians, shortages in weapons systems, ammunition, other supplies, and authentic forecasts of future casualties and expenditures of military resources. All of that would likely preclude plans to do anything big. To that extent, it is hard to see even under the most favorable circumstances where this whole enterprise is going for Putin. (Discernibly, greatcharlie to a great degree here mimics the worst sort of strict (toxic) instructor. However, no lessons are being offered.)

Assuredly, Putin had influenced some decisions in the field such as the move against Kyiv early on in the invasion. In preceding posts, greatcharlie previously discussed what it felt was his likely role in that fiasco. However, Putin more than likely had no idea what in actual fact needed to be done to succeed, and worse, was completely unaware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces were to successfully perform the mission he gave them. Likely believing everything else had been planned in a proper manner and prepared in the appropriate way, he doubtlessly could not have imagined that any “minimal input” from him on taking Kyiv could have so negatively shaped the entire picture of the operation.

To gnaw a bit further, if Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Maybe Putin could have micromanaged the military if he had earnestly made the effort after becoming Russian Federation President to develop the acumen to act as a quasi strategist and tactician, at least at a level greater than Shoigu and at a proficiency somewhat better than Gerasimov. Perhaps he could have accomplished this in the model of the guerilla fighters, Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi-Minh, or build on the military or paramilitary experiences that he had in government resemblant of US President Franklin Roosevelt, who, for seven years and throughout World Wat I, was an assistant secretary of the Navy, or United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who albeit he was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, a decorated British Army officer, twice served as First Lord of the Admiralty. However, none of that happened for Putin. (Goodness, greatcharlie can only imagine what the backlash of some readers would have been if it had suggested there was some firm comparison of Roosevelt and Churchill with Putin. Á la Berezina!)

Although it is not discussed in this manner much in the newsmedia, it possibly could have been a terrible emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when he has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine to hear that an insider, his fidus Achates Prigozhin, was ready to take his Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) out of Ukraine. The Wagner Group, Putin’s ride or die–as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. As described briefly in greatcharlie’s May 15, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries. The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

A screenshot from a video published on May 5, 2023 depicting Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin (above) announcing the organization’s planned exit from the fierce struggle in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Although it has not been parsed in the round in the international newsmedia, it surely must have been an emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine that Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) was ready to leave Ukraine. The Wagner Group–Putin’s “ride or die”, as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. The organization expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would surely say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

Where Is the Good Advice?

Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual may be facing, often the presumption from the outside is that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his “trauma smile” does its job of hiding what is going inside.. Satisfied with appearances, few would investigate further into the matter with vigor, especially if what might result from that exploration would not “harmonize” with recognized perceptions of said individual at high-levels of management. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. For a deeper dive, one would only need to consider in real terms what the inner conversation must be for the individual in question. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie took a look at what Putin’s inner conversation might have been at the time examining an historical example from Antiquity. (Usually, the potency of works from Antiquity is immediately apparent.) In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3 of The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 B.C. – c. 425 B.C.), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle, Demaratus. 

Herotodus writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.” This passage of The Histories underscores the reality that even in a past age when leaders were viewed as something just short of gods, or actually as gods, there was the recognition that no matter how wise, there were things they could not know, things they could not control. 

The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before. The course of the invasion of Ukraine, the result of which he was certain of, may have left less doubt, if any, on the correctness of this hypothetical hope of his. 

True, Putin could choose to stumble forward against all the odds and eke-out whatever existence life presents after the Ukraine War at great personal loss for himself and the Russian Federation. However, that appears unlikely. If the records can serve as evidence, he will likely continue on the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022. That may mean triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West–that began during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the death of which he mourned with considerable grief.

Putin (above) attends the Collective Security Treaty Organization Leaders Meeting in Yerevan, Armenia on November 23, 2022. If Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have fully recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Unlike the aforementioned Xerxes of Persia, for Putin there is no uncle and general as Demaratus, to put him in the full, genuine picture of what he faces and authentic possibilities for action. Perhaps even more, someone to stimulate genius. Holding its focus upon the Ancient World, greatcharlie is unaware of any equivalents of the Ephors of Sparta to whom Putin can turn. An Ephor (Overseer) discussed in intermittently–yet too often to properly cite here–in the Hellenica (c. 362 BC) by the Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC), was a member of a board of five magistrates in Sparta, annually elected by the body of eligible voting citizens. They were experienced and wise individuals whose advice was worth a king’s ransom. Ephors had an extensive range of judicial, religious, legislative, and military powers, and could shape Sparta’s domestic and foreign affairs. Their primary responsibility, however, was to oversee the actions of Spartan kings. They could critique a ruler’s plans for war,use their extra powers to reel in a ruler, and reproach them for the unsound actions. This had greater necessity and meaning due to the fact that Sparta was ruled by two hereditary kings of the Agiad and Eurypontid families, both supposedly descendants of Heracles and equal in authority, so that one could not act against the power and political enactments of his colleague. In concept, the Ephors’ purpose was akin to that of a US Congressional Oversight Committee, mutatis mutandis, for executives of foreign and national security bureaucracies who must often face withering inquiries on their policy plans or ongoing initiatives, among many other issues. In greatcharlie’s May 15. 2023 post entitled “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, it was briefly mentioned that the US Congress established the War Powers Act of 1973 in the wake of the Vietnam War to gain a better handle on the ability of the US President to intervene with the armed forces. In the Congress, stronger action toward chief executives whose actions were deemed out of bounds by the majority of Representatives has included impeachment proceedings. (Recognizably, Congress unfortunately in more recent times has overreached on simple matters as simple as phone calls preferring to react upon impressions, presumptions, and political and public pressure, than actualities. Perhaps it could be chalked up to human nature, human fallibility.)

The situations presented in the two examples from past and present noted here are quite different from that of Putin. In accord with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President is elected directly by popular vote, is head of state, and chief of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government, headed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President with a legislature’s approval. Legislative power is vested in the two houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, an upper house of appointed representatives from each of Russia’s administrative divisions, and the State Duma, a 450-member popularly elected lower house. Still, it is the President’s office and the government ministries which issue numerous legally binding by-laws. 

All of this being stated, the common wisdom is that Putin is an autocrat who holds near limitless power under the system he created. On foreign and national security policy, he faces no obstructions concerning his decisionmaking on diplomacy and war. Putin has no need to end-run the Federal Assembly, no need to heed advice as precious as that of the Ephors from Senators of the Federal Council of Representatives of the State Duma. He runs the whole show. Managing the internal affairs of the Russian Federation on its own is a colossal task, and surely as a one man show, Putin has made his share of mistakes and is bound to make more mistakes into future. He is not a deity; as aforementioned, he is only human. Taking on not only Ukraine militarily but the wherewithal of nearly every Western country and others, without relinquishing on scintilla of responsibility for normal duties, there would be the likelihood that he would drop an almighty clanger. Perhaps the Ukraine venture could best be described as a blunder of a lifetime.

Beneath the Surface

Alios ego vidi ventos, alias prospexi animo procellas. (I have seen other winds and faced other storms.) Putin may secretly worry that good answers may never be found, not even mere acceptable ones to his problems regarding Ukraine. As already hinted, everything he has, his hopes, his future, the future he has planned for his country, are under the real threat of dissolution. His imagination would not be at work overtime on these points. Indeed, such thoughts may be unfixed, moving about freely in his mind, perhaps billowing up at inconvenient moments. Among ordinary individuals, such thoughts can break through the strongest defense the mind can raise against them. Putin is not outwardly despondent, although there have been public moments when he was not exactly his usual self.

Surely, it would be one thing if Putin had brought disaster and suffering upon himself alone by his actions. That would pain him, but he would almost certainly be able to carry it well.  Casualty lists from Ukraine are likely far more difficult for him to carry. Unless one has faced similar circumstances, one might safely say it is hard to imagine–surely impossible for greatcharlie to imagine–how it all must feel. Perhaps the situation would be made far worse if the Russian people had decided to light on him over the war’s progress, but that has not happened. 

In a poll of Russian Federation citizens on the direct question of whether they supported the war conducted by the independent and well-known research group in the country, the Levada Center, it was found that respondents who said yes fluctuated between 74 and 76 percent in April 2022 and August 2022, declined to about 71 to 74 percent in September 2022 and December 2022, and climbed back to around 75 percent to 77 percent in January 2023 and February 2023. The Levada Center utilizes face-to-face polling. In a poll on support for the war conducted by The Chronicle, a one year-old polling group, it was found that support rose in the first months of the war from 59 to 66 percent. Support then declined to 51 percent, its lowest point, at the end of September 2022. Yet, by February 2023, support rose upward again to 59 percent. The Chronicle conducted its polling by telephone. The Chronicle also offered respondents the option “I do not want to answer” in addition to the usual “undecided” option, which reduced the share of both war supporters and war opponents. The recent polling start-up, The Russian Field, conducted a survey which indicated support for the war rose to nearly 60 percent at its start and then stabilized at about 66–68 percent.  The Russian Field also used the telephone survey method.

Clearly, support for the war is nowhere near overwhelming, yet given its progress it still appears rather high. Any external effort to create the impression that there is no support for the war among Russian Federation citizens or an effort to stir sentiment against Putin would most likely fall flat. There is likely no greater priority for Borrnikov than to make certain that is the case. While considering Putin’s effort to get a hold of his thinking on all that has transpired and what he must do next, the lyrics of singer-songwriter James Taylor’s 1970 hit “Fire and Rain” were brought to mind. The apposite lines are: “Been walking my mind to an easy time / My back turned towards the sun / Lord knows, when the cold wind blows / It’ll turn your head around / Well, there’s hours of time on the telephone line / To talk about things to come / Sweet dreams and flying machines in pieces on the ground.”

A somber Putin (above) attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual has been facing, it is often the presumption from the outside that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his trauma smile does its job of hiding what is going inside them. Satisfied with appearances, few would invest much more into the matter. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside of the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before.

Throwing a Curveball at the West

As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given the Kremlin’s Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. At the same time, individuals as Putin can often have unique reasons for singular choices. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might cause him to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be the state of Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing but nevertheless distressing curveball at the West. 

If only out of academic interest, greatcharlie considers how seeking answers from outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies could potentially be useful to Putin, and what the potential outcome of quietly taking such an unexpected course might assist in fostering new ideas and approaches in the Kremlin. No matter how unorthodox, disagreeable, or round the bend as they might seem, it might behoove some managers in US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to consider it and other possible, albeit recherché, eventualities and apply them in analyzing Putin’s decisionmaking process. Doing so might serve to improve the chances at accurately predicting any “unexpected” moves. (In previous posts concerning the conundrum of the very successful and unhindered Chinese intelligence operations within the US, greatcharlie benignly made the suggestion that US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies make use of those capable of performing analyses of the situation from outside the box.)

Over the years of Putin’s leadership, a small number of organizations in the Russian Federation have been invited to share their views through studies and presentations with the government on foreign and national security policy issues. At the top of the heap are: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Russian International Affairs Council, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Given their size, political contacts, and financial means, these organizations are able to dominate the think tank scene in the Russian Federation. As aptly put by the Atlantic Council in a November 12, 2019 report, they represent albeit from different ideological angles, the rather volatile mainstream. If novel ideas and insights are being developed those organizations, it would seem they are being put forward at glacial speed. Indeed, the indications and implications of what Moscow continues to do are that nothing Putin has received so far from what might suffice for “outside the bureaucracies advice” has had the power to moved events forward Moscow’s way in a manner befitting a power of the size, strength, and prominence in the world–at least from Putin’s lens.

Putin signing documents, including a decree recognizing two Russian-backed breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine as independent entities, during a ceremony in Moscow, Russia, February 21, 2022. As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given their Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might lead Putin to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing, but nevertheless distressing, curveball at the West.

As aforementioned, greatcharlie, without pretension, states that it doubts anyone at the Kremlin is aware of, or would  have the slightest interest in, its scribblings. However, there is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide advice for Putin concerning the prosecution of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. If any readers feel that anything as such is being offered to Putin, then it would surely be unreasonable for them in particular to continue reviewing this commentary with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

A reality about analytical departments of foreign and national security bureaucracies worldwide is that certain dogma insinuates itself in work produced within them, and it can color the thinking of consumers of that product. Supervisors in the analytical departments, knowingly and occasionally unknowingly because it would only be human, may place limitations on what paths, albeit even reasonable and logical ones, that analyses can move along. By using perspectives from outside of the foreign and national security bureaucracies, one could possibly garner a fresh look at issues from other angles. New thinking might rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. Condescendingly, some from the inside Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outside of the bureaucracies thinkers as mere shots in the dark, guesswork, and suppositions, from those perceived as lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to the Ukraine issue. With no intent to offend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. 

One looking for fresh, viable solutions would expect and perhaps want “outside of the bureaucracies” thinking to move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in singular cases such as Ukraine that may be hard to crack. What the outside of the bureaucracies thinker brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies thinker. One might suppose the length and breadth of the outside of the bureaucracies thinkers’ distinctive knowledge and unique life lessons are what found their alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been acquired through personal study. Of course, bog-standard thinking would still have its place in other simpler issues.

Each reason shared here concerning a hypothetical decision by Putin to seek assistance for ideas and insights outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies is suggestive of itself. Together they have a cumulative force. At the same time, one could also conjure more than one reason to doubt this outcome. As mentioned, Putin has not as yet taken any unorthodox approaches in his handling of the Ukraine matter or any other foreign or national security policy matters. Some observers might argue that there are distinct patterns in his decisionmaking. Deviations from his standard course would be as shockingly noticeable, to steal a phrase from one of Arthur Conan Doyle’s 56 Sherlock Holmes short stories, “The Adventure of the Bruce-Partington Plans” (1917): “as if you met a tram-car coming down a country lane.” (One could easily imagine seeing such in a film created by Austrian director Marie Kreutzer.) To double-dunk on Doyle’s work, one might say that Putin has his rails and he runs on them, so to speak. However, perhaps one disappointment after another in Ukraine may not have derailed him, but may have stirred some interest in possibly switching at the points to an alternative rail untravelled by him before. What is being considered here is not just Putin’s attitudes and behaviors in spite of his experiences with Ukraine, but the possibility of some alterations in such because of those experiences. To that extent, one might also argue that the record of his two decades of leadership in the Russian Federation actually shows that Putin’s mind has its quirks, and in that respect it is as individual and curious as any other. As Maurice de Saxe (October 28, 1696-November 20, 1750) the famed military commander of the 18th century stated in the preface of his Mes Rêveries (My Reveries) (1757), “routine and prejudices are . . . a natural consequence of ignorance.”

At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, its citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances following even the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. (Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) 

To that extent, perhaps scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. 

Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. In the end, it would be enough of a tragedy to find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

File photo of Putin as a young KGB officer (above). At an early age, Putin revealed to his parents that he wanted to work in the security services. The genesis of the idea were books and spy movies. Putin says his mother and father, with the help of his martial arts coaches, tried to dissuade him from his career choice given the nature of the work and people within such organizations, but to no avail. A few years later, his dream became a reality. Perhaps today scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing its possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them.  Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

In Part 2, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that at an early age, he wanted to serve in intelligence. His family was dismayed, but not shattered by his decision. His father, given his experience in the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, was painfully aware of the grave nature of work in that field. However, once they became fully apprised of the extreme nature of his ambition to join the intelligence service, his parents sought to discourage him as best they could. When Putin’s martial arts coach, Anatoly Rakhlin, who he fondly called “Semyonovich”, went to see them to say that as an athlete, their son could get into an Institute practically without passing exams, that led his parents to pressure the coach to encourage him to go into an Institute. Putin, however, disagreed with the idea. Semyonovich could not fathom why Putin resisted. Another coach from Putin’s martial arts club, Leonid Ionovich, came to visit, fully informed of his decision to join the intelligence service. As Putin explained it, “He was a clever guy.” Recounting the exchange with Ionovich over his career choice, Putin said the following: “‘Well,’ he [Ionovich] said to me, ‘Where are you going?’ Of course he already knew. He was just acting sly. I said, ‘To university.’ ‘Oh, that’s great, good for you,’ he said. In what department?'” Putin says he only replied, “The law school.” Then, Ionovich roared: “What? To catch people? What are you doing? You’ll be a cop. Do you understand?” Insulted, Putin yelled back, “I’m not going to be a cop.” (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.) Putin would hardly be surprised if very few who truly had much to offer would come forward knowing they were hearing similar things about serving his government that those who cared deeply about him said concerning his interest in getting anywhere near the Soviet intelligence service

Quomodo in perpetua pace salvi et liberi esse poterimus? (How (in what way) will we be able to be safe and free in everlasting (an enduring) peace?) Returning to the idea of seeking answers from analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, on the face of it,  surely it would  be unwise for Putin not to avail himself of their services if they could be of assistance. Additionally mentioned in Book 2, Chapter 4, Section 31, Book 3, Chapter 4, Section 11, and  Book 4, Chapter 5, Section 6 of Xenophon’s Hellenica are the embassies. (The role of the embassies is also discussed in Herodotus (c. 484-c. 425 BC) The Histories (c. 426 BCE-c. 415 BCE) in Book 5, Chapter 49-51 and in Thucydides (c. 460 BC–400 BC) The History of the Peloponnesian War (c. 430 BC) Book 2, Chapter 12, Section I and Book 8, Chapter 5, Section I.)

As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracies thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than a mouse and as solid as Stonehenge. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, ideas and insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. 

Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

Again, this is all hypothetical. It is possible that defeating any hypothetical outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies approaches potentially taken by Moscow would only require the energetic preparation for such a possibility by repeatedly considering and working through all of the “what-ifs”, the possible eventualities, on an appropriate schedule.

Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov (above). As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracy thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than mouse and as solid as Stonehenge, that may help resolve the Ukraine conundrum. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

The Way Forward

It remains to be seen what will come next. In Act II, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play, All’s Well That Ends Well (1623), standing in the King’s Palace, Lafeu, an old lord at the court of France, opens the scene with the comment regard the king’s miraculous recovery: “They say miracles are past; and we have our / philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, / things supernatural and causeless. Hence is it that / we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves / into seeming knowledge, when we should submit / ourselves to an unknown fear.” While greatcharlie has not come across a cogent argument proving that events in Ukraine represent something supernatural or that one should submit to fears of the unknown, there is pertinence in the statement that trifles should not be made of terrors, especially as they regard nuclear war or that feel assured at all about Putin’s next moves. 

What stands near certain is whatever measurable degree of peace and security existed before the invasion of Ukraine will unlikely be restored. Each side in this conflict seems bent upon ensuring the other will not find satisfaction with any agreement that would obviate complete victory. An authentic forecast for the situation could only project a situation worse than before or the worst thing imaginable. When things are very wrong, one must remember they can always be worse. One only needs to imagine the possibilities. At least, there is a clear choice for both sides: take an albeit uncomfortable step toward peace; or, let things play out as they are moving now. Neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quit non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. (There is no one who loves pain itself, who seeks it and wants to have it, simply because it is pain, but because sometimes circumstances arise in such a way that with effort and pain they can obtain some great pleasure.)

A Proposal for the Ukrainian Armed Forces Concerning Russian Federation Prisoners of War That Supports Military Objectives while Sowing Seeds for Peace

A Russian Federation BMP-3 crew signals surrender to Ukrainian troops by placing a white flag in the vehicle’s gun barrel (above). Despite any gains that may be emphasized by Moscow, the slaughter of Russian Federation troops continues in Ukraine. Most Russian Federation units that have taken the field in Ukraine have been battered and tattered to degrees well-beyond what most modern armed forces around the world would find acceptable. One might proffer that Russian Federation commanders do not see anything so odd in what they are doing, but their troops indubitably have vastly disparate views from them concerning the bloodshed. From all of this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces early on recognized an opportunity to exploit the situation in a non-lethal way. That effort actually got underway in 2023 in a very public manner through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program managed by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The program has had its share of successes. However, with a thought to enhance ongoing work, greatcharlie suggests an additional approach be developed within the existing program. Russian Federation troops are currently required to be proactive in the effort to become prisoners of war, but to that extent the process is somewhat one-sided. Under a program proposed here, Russian Federation troops would find some greater comfort and more confidence in following through on any plans they may have to escape the war knowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an enemy who can also serve as a rescuer, would be proactively trying to save them amidst the fighting.

If one the top commanders of Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) were to give an honest assessment of the prospects for Russian forces in Ukraine he would likely reply average, meaning they were worse than the year before but likely better than the year to come. Once much vaunted as a titanic war machine, the Russian Federation Armed Forces hardly lived up with their billing. Showing themselves as something less than an authentic 21st century fighting force, they unexpectedly collided with two obstructions in Ukraine: reality and Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) well-assisted by the US, other NATO countries, as well as countries from around the world. Clearly Russian Federation forces were sent into Ukraine with hardly any idea of what they would face or how they could effectively fight a war, and consequently members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have suffered immensely. There has been little evidence of an awareness among Russian Federation commanders of how to effectively organize forces and what minimum-essential control measures should be in place; as well as the general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for offensive and defensive operations. One is left to wonder what most Russian Federation commanders actually know about the art and science of tactics. As in previous posts, greatcharlie does not feel it can overemphasize just how below average the military acumen of Russian Federation commanders really is. Given the way in which the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was designed, greatcharlie will go out on limb and state the task of rolling Russian Federation military formations into Ukraine could have been performed by logistical managers of a large-sized transport or delivery service company with albeit a modicum of military advice but no military experience as effectively or better than Russian Federation commanders. Amoto quaeramus seria ludo. (Jokes aside, let us turn to serious matters.)

One of the most intriguing and horrifying aspects of Russian Federation commanders’ prosecution of the war, is the manner in which they figuratively slam their troops against the wall of Ukrainian defenders with the hope that if they pound hard enough they will break through. The continued slaughter of their troops may have allowed for not much more than the ego stroke of conquest of less than significant objectives relative to the bigger picture. An implication of this tact is that the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces have practically guaranteed they will not have enough experienced troops left to accomplish anything on a larger scale in Ukraine. There are no indications that there is anything Russian Federation commanders plan to do to reduce casualties among their units. Most Russian Federation units that have taken the field in Ukraine have been battered and tattered to degrees well-beyond what most modern armed forces around the world would find acceptable. One might proffer that Russian Federation commanders do not see anything so odd in what they are doing, but their troops indubitably have vastly disparate views from them concerning the bloodshed. From all of this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces early on recognized an opportunity to exploit the situation in a non-lethal way. That effort actually got underway in 2023 in a very public manner through the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program managed by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The program has had its share of successes. The noble program has saved the lives of a number of Russian Federation troops who were able to reason things out and recognize the realities of their overall situation.

However, with a thought to enhance ongoing work in this province, greatcharlie would suggest an additional approach be considered for use by the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Similar in some way to the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline, it creates a path for the surrender of Russian Federation troops. The existing program was very publicly announced and advertised. As part of the program, a rationale was provided online for why Russian Federation troops should surrender to survive, and a telephone was provided for them to call to arrange their surrender with staff of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. However, under the existing program, Russian soldiers are required to be proactive in the effort to become prisoners of war. To that extent, the process is rather one-sided. Under a program proposed here, Russian Federation troops would find some greater comfort and more confidence in following through on any plans they may have to escape the war with all of its ills and absurdities knowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an enemy who can also serve as a rescuer, would be proactively trying to save them. What is proposed is a concrete plan of action that would give Russian Federation troops the choice of whether to stay and somewhat likely lose their lives for a lost cause or go and live a full life with the help of Ukraine. Perhaps it could be said that greatcharlie has maintained perspective but at the same time has done quite a bit of what some of its readers have characterized as whining about the Ukraine War since it began. Admittedly, only on a handful of occasions has it “deigned” to offer possible solutions. (Rather than just point out problems, it is more constructive to offer ways to defeat them.) Hopefully, the proposed plan is of sufficient potency to have some immediate value to officials in Ukraine and those of other countries who may advise them on the war. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Recruits listen to a Russian Army instructor showing mobilized troops how to use a man-portable missile during a military training at a firing range in the Rostov-on-Don region in the Russian Federation on October 4, 2022. The Russian Federation called up over 200,000 reservists as part of a partial mobilization. The mobilized troops–Mobiks, as the Ukrainians call them–depicted here are very likely in a mental fog as they assemble in their camp. Their uncertainty and fear is palpable even through the photo. Many upon donning their green uniforms for the first time likely wondered if the countdown to their end had begun at that moment. The Scottish psychiatrist, James A.C. Brown, assessed the use of propaganda by the United Kingdom during World War II with the following observation: “Propaganda is successful only when directed at those who are willing to listen, absorb the information, and if possible, act on it, and this happens only when the other side is in a condition of lowered morale and is already losing the campaign.”

Dire Circumstances of Russian Federation Troops 

To address the dire circumstances of Russian Federation troops, some background on just how bad things have been for them on the battlefield in Ukraine. On November 10, 2022, the US Department of Defense announced an official assessment that over 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action or wounded in Ukraine. Thus, the US Department of Defense figures indicated that during 260 days of fighting to that point, an average of 385 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured each day. The official figure issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in September 2022 put the number of Russian troops killed at 5,937, a figure Western officials said grossly underestimated the country’s losses. Further, the US Department of Defense figure suggested that the daily fighting along the 1000-mile front line that winds around the eastern edges of Ukraine is very intense. A significant part of the struggle is being fought from World War I-style trenches in which soldiers dug into muddy fortifications suffer relentless artillery onslaughts until their units are destroyed or displaced. So apparently horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Captured Russians say their comrades face execution on desertion charges if they don’t keep moving.” Reportedly, some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” The Kyiv Post, citing an Agence France-Presse interview of a Ukrainian soldier, provided the quote: “You shoot them and more come.” The indications and implications of what they say is that even incremental advances achieved through localized attacks have come at a high price for the Russian Federation troops. As explained to the Guardian by a United Kingdom intelligence service, the “unprofessional” military practices of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were likely partly to blame for the high casualties.

As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, when soldiers are: uncertain of mission if the overall concept of a military action is unjust, invalid by law; uncertain of the purpose of a military action: the political authority’s concept and intent for the action is unclear and their commander’s concept and intent are unclear; uncertain their leadership is dysfunctional: commanders are hamstrung by superiors and confined to parameters of action by political systems or they are simply delinquent and negligent; uncertain of their capabilities versus the opponent–soldiers are provided poor equipment, their force has readily observable vulnerabilities, their opponent possess superior, seemingly invincible, and unlimited supplies of weapon systems; and, uncertain of victory–on a daily basis, soldiers experience heavy losses in equipment, exceedingly high casualties in their ranks, the regular loss of comrades, the influx of untrained replacements, and they sense their sacrifices will prove to be meaningless. Such strains and trauma placed upon soldiers could prove to be irreparable. 

Reportedly, no figures are publicly available that tally the number of Russian Federation troops that have simply deserted since the start of the Special military operation. In a November 2022 report based on newsmedia stories from the Russian Federation that was published by analysts from the Institute for the Study of War, it was suggested that hundreds of Russian Federation troops had left their units and were evading capture in no less than 7 locations in Donetsk and Luhansk. The report stated: “The morale and psychological state of Russian forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are exceedingly low.” It further explained: “Significant losses on the battlefield, mobilization to the front lines without proper training, and poor supplies have led to cases of desertion.” The Scottish psychiatrist, James A.C. Brown, assessed the use of propaganda by the United Kingdom during World War II with the following observation: “Propaganda is successful only when directed at those who are willing to listen, absorb the information, and if possible, act on it, and this happens only when the other side is in a condition of lowered morale and is already losing the campaign.”

Igne natura renovatur integra. (Through fire, nature is reborn whole.) Despite the terrifying and intolerable circumstances they have faced Russian Federation troops, an opportunity has been created for both the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the beleaguered Russian Federation troops to bring their situations somewhat closer to a favorable end. As alluded to earlier, an ongoing Prisoner of War/Psychological Operations program, the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War has been established for Russian Federation military personnel who wish to exit the war by surrender and perhaps by defection. For Russian Federation troops, the move would mean violating federal law, which likely conjures in their minds all of the frightening prospects of being caught in the act. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian Armed Forces seem quite willing to help them do that. In addition to Russian Federation troops using the hotline, their relatives can also access the program. To reach the hotlines by Telegram and WhatsApp, they have been told to contact: +380 95 68 86 888; +380 93 68 86 888; and, +380 97 68 86 888. To reach the holiness by phone, contact: +380 44 35 08 917. From Ukrainian phone numbers, one would only need to dial: 688. Reportedly, information is also available in the chatbot in Telegram. The program goes as far as to instruct Russian Federation troops on how to surrender. To surrender as a group or an entire unit, they are told to: stack all weapons in front of you at a distant distance; stand directly in front of the military equipment. Silence it; it should not be in a fighting position; and, choose a negotiator to notify the Ukrainian military of their desire to surrender. This should be an officer or the most senior in rank. With a white flag and no weapons. To surrender individually, they are told to: unbuckle the magazine and hang the weapon on your left shoulder with the barrel down; raise and show your empty hands; hold up the white cloth; shout loudly, “Zdayusʹ!”; approach on command, and comply with the demands of Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine.

It is apparent that the title of the “I want to Live” 24-hour hotline has an acidulous tone from the get-go, which also seems to manifest a deep antipathy. Further, the program was really targeted at the psyche of Russian Federation troops on an individual level. Despite the fact that nearly everyone on the frontline, both Russians and Ukrainians, are aware of the “I Want To Live” program’s existence, activities under it are nevertheless performed in a somewhat clandestine way. There are opportunities to exploit with regard to garnering greater numbers of Russian Federation troops to surrender as well as defect. It would appear that far more could be done in that province. 

It is greatcharlie’s suggestion that perhaps at this point the Ukrainian Armed Forces should go step further than its current effort by standing up new military Teams within the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War with a mission to greatly enhance the effort to encourage–lure–greater numbers of Russian Federation to surrender and defect using a mix of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods. Rather than hoping to bring over one or two soldiers at a time or perhaps even a squad, the objective of the proposed Teams would be to trigger surrenders and defections en masse along the frontline, particularly among Mobiks, the Ukrainian term for Russian Federation citizens hastily mobilized in 2022 for the Ukraine War.

Through the suggested program, the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be able to accomplish reductions of enemy opposition that could only be achieved through high intensity fighting with Russian Federation units during which it, too, would likely suffer losses in precious troops and materiel of which it is reliant upon foreign largess. To the extent that might possible, the proposed program could have a multiplier effect on the battlefield and beyond. 

The Provost Teams would act under the direct authority of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff. These teams, formed with officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men called Provosts, could operate along active points on the frontline particularly where Mobiks have been tossed into the line and suffering inordinate numbers of casualties. Sections of the frontline where platoons of Provosts would be deployed would come under the command of a Provost Marshal or company commander. As envisioned, the Provosts deployed along the forward edge of the battle area should not tally in excess of a battalion in strength, and led by a battalion commander, the Coordinating Provost Marshal. (Of course, these titles are mere suggestions and the Ukrainian Armed Forces would know best how to designate troops with the Provost Teams’ table of organization.) As shortages in personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces cannot be overstated, the staffing of personnel in the Provost Teams must be economizedi. However, the proposed Provost Teams must be sufficiently staffed ti do their intensive work rapidly, efficiently and successfully. In their mission, time is of the essence.

What follows is a kernel of the proposed program. A variety of tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods are suggested for Provosts to use are outlined. Readers may detect that some suggestions appear repetitive, especially as the discussion covers the implementation of the proposed program during both defensive and offensive operations. As all aspects of the proposed program are harmonized to create a synergistic effect, naturally some overlap exists. However, more importantly, where such repetition appears to occur, there are actually subtle, necessary changes in the text. Equally important, by writing in a seemingly repetitive way, readers are enabled to consider all or individual segments of the proposed program without requiring them to move back and forth to recall elements of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods mentioned in the preceding segments–much as with a legal brief.

The Neptune, employed on September 23, 1870, was first balloon used by the French government during the Siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first documented use of manned balloons as carriers of propaganda leaflets, as well as the mail. As Prussian forces surrounded the city of Paris, the Neptune, a balloon deployed from the city dropped French government proclamations of defiance and indomitability over Prussian troops. During World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps initiated the use of leaflets, dropping them over Imperial German trenches and territory in an attempt to induce German troops to surrender. Messages printed on various leaflets included reports of the humane conditions in the British prisoners of war camps, surrender notices, and anti-Kaiser Wilhelm II material. During World War II, efforts with them were made more effective with disillusioned opposition troops when leaflets also served as safe conduct passes and provided instructions on how to feign illness to avoid frontline service. Leaflets were used in wars afterward to include the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Using this tried and true method of communicating with opposition troops, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery.

I. Reaching Ukrainian Lines to Surrender 

A.  During Defensive Operations

One can be assured that learning how ro surrender is not a segment of the brief training program in which Mobiks participate before heading to the frontlines with their units. That instruction must come from the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Instructions on how to surrender provided by a variety of means, should essentially mirror, mutantis mutandis, those provided online through the aforementioned “I Want To Live” program should be printed on the initial iterations of leaflets. The nuance would be that instead of surrendering to Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian Federation troops would be surrendering to Provosts. Russian Federation troops should still be directed to drop their weapons, unlatch their utility belts, and other gear and dash toward large trenches or earthworks created in a clandestine way during the 3rd or 4th watch. The trenches must be concealed to the greatest degree possible from Russian Federation lines but open as much as possible to observation by Ukrainian troops both day and night. From the trenches and earthworks, a concealed path, something akin to a long drainage ditch, should be built for the surrendering Russian Federation troops to crawl along in single file, toward awaiting armed Provosts. More than one crawl could be created from the trench. That would depend on time available ultimately shaped by the assault timetable of Russian Federation commanders. Both the prisoner of war trenches, earthworks, and crawl paths should be covered at all times by sharpshooter and machine guns to both protect them, prevent infiltration through their use, and thwart the efforts of those assigned to harm them. The Russian Federation troops could be processed one by one as prisoners of war right off the crawl paths, and moved out of the forward edge of the battle area through separate and concealed lines of communication. Provosts must closely coordinate with Ukrainian commanders in their sector to ensure the prisoner of war operations would in no way interfere with their defensive operations

B. During Offensive Operations

Different from defensive operations, Russian Federation troops facing eminent attack by Ukrainian troops will at least typically be hunkered down in concealed positions. Soon enough, many will run for their lives lacking the wherewithal to resist and motivation to fight. During a previous Ukrainian counteroffensive, A member of a Ukrainian intelligence unit on the front line told The Telegraph that his unit saw the Russian Federation chain of command collapse before their eyes and troops flee without putting up a fight. The panicked Russian Federation troops reportedly abandoned their tanks, weapons and even clothes amid the chaos  as they “literally” ran from their positions. Indeed, it was alleged that many of them rapidly changed into civilian clothes ostensibly to avoid detection by their superiors. A drone operator returning from the front line told The Telegraph during the Ukrainian Armed Forces counteroffensive in September 2022, that the tempo of the operation had even caught Ukrainian troops by surprise. He stated that he observed Ukrainian troops struggling to recover the mountains of abandoned Russian Federation armored vehicles and ammunition. Monitoring Ukrainian assaults from above, the drone operators reportedly watched engagements and heard communications between Russian Federation troops as their units were being destroyed before they had time to identify their enemy.

Convincing Russian Federation troops to leave their trenches and foxholes to run toward Ukrainian troops to surrender would be very difficult. They know doing so would leave them open to extra judicial execution for voluntary surrender and desertion by fire from their own lines. Additionally, it might prove difficult for them to know where to run as Ukrainian units preparing to advance would do everything possible to avoid revealing the locations of their lines of departure. Certainly, there would not be the opportunity or ability to prepare anything similar to earthworks or trenches for surrendering and deserting Russian Federation troops to make a break for and secrete themselves as would hypothetically be the case during defensive operations under the proposed program. Given such, Provost Teams would be required to make efficient use of a combination of leaflets, online messages, and loudspeakers to communicate with Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender or defect. Proper timing in the use of all three approaches would be critical to the survival of Russian Federation troops and the ability of Provosts to provide for their safe conduct in the midst of what to them would most likely be the very confusing circumstances of a high-intensity,  highly-mobile, and very violent Ukrainian Armed Forces’ assault. As during defensive operations, Provosts must coordinate with Ukrainian commanders in their sector to ensure the prisoner of war operations would in no way interfere with their assault.

Becoming a prisoner of war is ordinarily undesirable. Yet, for these Russian Federation troops the fighting is over. They were not killed or gravely wounded on the frontline. They will live to see another day (above). Using a tried and true method of communicating with opposition troops, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery. The messages on leaflets could go as far as to suggest Russian Federation troops abandon their frontline positions or use advances ordered by their commanders to run toward Ukrainian lines. Leaflets could explain, with the aim of connecting with the inner thinking of the Russian Federation troops, that the frontline key offers death. In following, they should be explained that rather than waiting to see if they will make it through unscathed, be gravely wounded or be killed, the best alternative would be to surrender or defect. The leaflets should explain that their rights as prisoners of war will be fully recognized and respected, and that once they surrendered, they would be treated with dignity. Additionally, the leaflets must tell them that they will moved away from the frontlines, out of harm’s way, immediately after they surrender.

Ii. Leaflets

A. During Defensive Operations

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 saw the first documented use of manned balloons as carriers of propaganda leaflets, as well as the mail. As Prussian forces surrounded the city of Paris, the Neptune, a balloon deployed from the city dropped leaflets baring forceful French government proclamations of defiance and indomitability over Prussian troops. During World War I, the British Royal Flying Corps initiated the use of leaflets, dropping them over Imperial German trenches and territory in an attempt to induce German troops to surrender. Messages printed on various leaflets included reports of the humane conditions in the British prisoners of war camps, surrender notices, and anti-Kaiser Wilhelm II material. During World War II, efforts with them were made more effective with disillusioned opposition troops when leaflets also served as safe conduct passes and provided instructions on how to feign illness to avoid frontline service. Leaflets were used in wars afterward to include the Korean War and the Vietnam War. In the present Ukraine War, leaflets with nuanced messages printed on them that encourage Russian Federation troops to surrender or defect could be dropped on them via aircraft, drones, or artillery. The messages on leaflets could go as far as to suggest Russian Federation troops abandon their frontline positions or use advances ordered by their commanders to run toward Ukrainian lines. Leaflets could explain, with the aim of connecting with the inner thinking of the Russian Federation troops, that the frontline key offers death. In following, they should be told that rather than waiting to see if they will make it through unscathed, be gravely wounded or be killed, the best alternative would be to surrender or defect. The leaflets should explain that their rights as prisoners of war will be fully recognized and respected, and that once they surrendered, they would be treated with dignity. Additionally, the leaflets must tell them that they will be transported away from the frontlines, out of harm’s way, immediately after they surrender. The leaflets should explain that the surrendering and defecting troops received clean water to drink, hot food, warm blankets, and coffee or tea.

Important to add on each leaflet, in type that would stand out, should be the promise to protect Russian Federation troops from unstable commanders who have recklessly thrown them across no man’s land without regard for their lives. They must be told that the whole world knows about their plight. It must be explained that if they so choose, they will be allowed to safely return to the Russian Federation via prisoner of war exchanges negotiated During the war or prisoner of war exchanges after the war. If any Russian Federation troops make the choice to defect, they should be informed in the leaflets that they will be allowed to remain in Ukraine via immigration or be assisted in efforts to immigrate to countries in the West that may be willing to accept them 

As for how to surrender, the leaflets should provide instructions that closely parallel those provided online through the aforementioned “I Want To Live” program. This is especially true with regard to the handling of their weapons. The nuance would be that instead of surrendering to Ukrainian Armed Forces troops and other Ukrainian military formations such as the Territorial Defense Forces, the National Police, the National Guard, and the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian Federation troops would be surrendering to Provosts. (Perhaps Provosts could affix an embroidered badge to their uniforms with Provost Team title on it in both Ukrainian and Russian so that Russian Federation troops could readily identify who they were once in contact. Of course, Russian Federation troops should not be discouraged from surrendering or defecting on any occasion. All military formations and security services would be open to receive them. Those formations should be issued orders to turn all captive Russian Federation troops over to the custody of the Provosts.)

Russian Federation troops must be instructed to retain and present leaflets essentially as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The success of the proposed program would rely in great part on the credibility of the Provost Teams. Their credibility would be best established with Russian Federation troops by their actions. To that extent, the effort must be made to follow through on promises printed on the leaflets without fail. Russian Federation troops must be moved away from the forward edge of the battle area, out of harm’s way immediately after capture. They must be provided with clean water, hot food, warm blankets, and coffee and tea. More than one design of leaflet should be produced. The message akin to a memorandum of understanding concerning safe conduct discussed earlier as a requirement should be printed on every leaflet and perhaps could even be titled as such on the leaflets.

Drones could be used as a way to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions upon which leaflets could be dropped. Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. An organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. If creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. This method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. However, given shortage in pilots and shortages of airframe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Leaflets dropped on Russian Federation troops could also serve a purpose similar to infrared reflective patches, chemlights, VS-17 panels or signal panel markers, and colored smoke typically used by military organizations to mark friendly personnel and locations. Leaflets should provide instructions on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection before their lives are ended or they are gravely wounded as a result of being wastefully slammed against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Online, Russian Federation troops could be told that every effort would be made to spare them from the firepower that would surely be used to halt their respective unit’s assault.

Russian Federation troops must be instructed within the leaflets’ message to collect at least one from among the thousands strewn across their lines and secrete it on themselves or keep it close at hand. As leaflets, dropped in astronomical numbers, would likely be drifting all about Russian Federation lines in great numbers and landing just about everywhere, Russian Federation troops seeking to surrender or defect would be afforded a plausible reason to have leaflets in or near their positions. As a guise, Russian Federation troops could stack the leaflets nearby or in their positions in preparation for their use, yet claim they have done so with the purpose of policing their areas

If not possible during the daytime, at night, Russian Federation troops should place as many leaflets as possible in front of their positions. Russian Federation troops should be instructed even in mild weather conditions to weigh leaflets down with rocks, stones, or branches, or any combination of those materials as made available on the terrain. The objects used to weigh the leaflets down must be placed on the corners of the leaflets

In inclement weather, Leaflets could be weighted down in a crossing pattern on the leaflets with rocks, stones, tree branches, mud, and dirt the terrain provides or with pieces of their military gear. What would be most important for the Russian Federation troops to avoid is obscuring the leaflets with whatever they might use to weigh them down in front of their positions. It would be critical not to obscure the observation of their piles of leaflets from above. Ukrainian sharpshooters along the rapidly shifting frontlines would need to be informed that Russian Federation’s troops might be seen placing piles of leaflets In front of their positions as instructed by Provosts via leaflets online messages and loudspeakers. and they must not be be fired upon. Paradoxically Ukrainian sharpshooters should be directed to provide overwatch for the Russian Federation troops engaged in that activity with the leaflet by firing upon Russian Federation sharpshooters who may be ordered to fire upon their own comrades engaged in placing leaflets in front of their positions as instructed by Provosts.

Russian Federation troops must be told not to be concerned about leaflets gathered coincidentally in clumps in their lines that resemble their own manufactured piles. Such occurrences would be expected if hypothetical leaflets are dropped upon their positions almost daily. It will be important for Provosts or members of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to correctly distinguish between piles of leaflets created from the pollution of paper in Russian Federation lines and the piles constructed by Russian Federation troops.

B.. During Offensive Operations

Using leaflets during offensive operations would likely be a bit trickier for Provosts, but certainly possible. Drones could be used as means to reconnoiter and surveil far forward of Ukrainian frontlines to identify Russian Federation defensive positions upon leaflet could be dropped. Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. As suggested earlier, an organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. If creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. 

As noted with regard to defensive operations, this method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. Yet again, given shortage in pilots and shortages of airframes in the Ukrainian Armed Forces inventory, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Leaflets should be used by Russian Federation troops during offensive operations launched in their direction in a similar way to their proposed use in defensive operations. The concept for the use of leaflets in both cases should parallel the concept behind marker panels. Leaflets should be piled up in front of Russian Federation troops’ defensive positions. Russian Federation troops should be instructed to collect as many leaflets as possible to make certain they will be able to create a visible pile. Leaflets dropped should explain to the greatest extent possible given space available on the sheet made of paper or some other more durable material, how Russian Federation troops could best protect their piles of them from being dismantled or destroyed by weather conditions. Russian Federation troops must be told that every effort would be made to identify their positions through piled up leaflets. It also must be explained that Russian Federation troops emerging from positions marked with leaflets that they will be given every opportunity to surrender or defect safely

Since the frontlines will likely shift constantly with every bound by advancing Ukrainian units during offensive operations, Ukrainian troops will surely come across various iterations of them. To avoid adverse reactions to seeing images they might perceive on leaflets as Russian Federation troops which they are fighting and being killed and injured by, practically being treated as honored guests. In advance of Ukrainian assaults, commanders must explain to their troops on the march about the leaflets they will surely encounter and what they as well as Provosts’ loudspeaker announcements they will hear are all about. Ukrainian troops should be told that it is all part of an important program under the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, why there are so many leaflets, and their possible role in helping bring a faster, favorable end to the war. (It is very likely that while Ukrainian units are in defensive operations, leaflets may drift over to their positions in large numbers. Russian Federation lines will be polluted with leaflets. Winds should be expected to occasionally carry the leaflets in the Ukrainian’s direction. Ukrainian commanders should explain on such occasions what the purpose of the leaflets and loudspeaker announcements are and how they work to their troops advantage.)

A sort of “online leaflet” posted for Russian Federation troops by the Association of Lawyers in Ukraine urging them to surrender and explaining how to do so (above). In conjunction with the production and distribution of leaflets, Provosts could post messages on multiple online sites, perhaps creating new ones each week–perhaps sooner if necessary–to thwart Russian counterintelligence efforts to block access to information that must be provided to support the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops. To ensure Russian Federation troops would receive the messages or at least make certain the messages were available to them could be supported by the capabilities of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As with leaflets, online messages should provide information on alternative ways Russian Federation troops must act and tasks they must perform to ensure their survival and safe conduct to and through Ukrainian lines. Online messages must explain that Russian Federation troops’ rights as prisoners of war will be fully observed once they surrender and that they will be treated with respect. 

III. The Enhancement of Online Efforts

A. During Defensive Operations

In conjunction with the production and distribution of leaflets, Provosts could post messages on multiple online sites, perhaps creating new ones each week–perhaps sooner if necessary–to thwart Russian counterintelligence efforts to block access to information that must be provided to support the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops. To ensure Russian Federation troops would receive the messages or at least make certain the messages were available to them could be supported by the capabilities of the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. As with leaflets, online messages should provide information on alternative ways Russian Federation troops must act and tasks they must perform to ensure their survival and safe conduct to and through Ukrainian lines. Online messages must explain that Russian Federation troops’ rights as prisoners of war will be fully observed once they surrender and that they will be treated with respect. They must be assured that they will receive clean water, hot food, coffee and tea, and warm blankets. They should be told that immediately after surrender–unless conditions prevent such movement, they will be extracted from the forward edge of the battle area and out of harm’s way well to the rear. They must also be told that they will be protected from the wrath of unstable commanders who have willingly sacrificed their fallen comrades for a questionable military invasion. As with leaflets, online messages should inform the Russian Federation troops that they will be allowed to return to their homeland via prisoner exchanges negotiation during the war or at the end of the war, if they desire to return on the occasion of either. They should also be informed that if they seek to defect, they would be allowed to remain in Ukraine through the process of immigration or be assisted in immigrating to countries in the West that would be willing to accept them either during or after the war. The Ukrainians promise to assist with these matters must be a solemn pledge. All important is the requirement that Russian Federation troops be instructed online to try as best as possible to collect at least one leaflet dropped on their lines. They must be told to retain leaflets and present them as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. To facilitate the collection of leaflets by Russian Federation troops, a regular deluge of leaflets should be dropped on Russian Federation positions 

As the proposed prisoner of war program develops, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, attendant with online messages on the sites should be videos and photographs of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered. Not just for the photo opportunity, Actual Russian Federation prisoners of war could be depicted wearing clean and neat clothes, in safe, hygienic detention centers.. Appropriate videos and photos should depict the Russian Federation prisoners of war engaged in daily activities at detention centers. To that extent, some videos and photos of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered should be posted after their capture, depicting them drinking clean water, tea, and coffee, and wearing clean dry clothes and covered in warm blankets. Authentic videos and photos of those who surrendered in inclement conditions, should also display them a few short hours after capture being held clean dry spaces, well-protected from cold, wind, rain and snow.

Within a couple of weeks after the proposed program might be launched, it might be useful for Provosts to include images of a handful of Russian Federation prisoners of war, with their consent, with vetting, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, might be flown with selected Provosts to European capitals for tours with the support of the respective host countries. The Geneva Convention forbids the public display of prisoners of war. However, foreign travel for tourism could be declared to be recreational and intended to have a therapeutic effect upon war weary Mobiks and as an effort. In genuine travel videos and photographs, the prisoners of war could be shown wearing civilian clothes, uniform in style and color–for example they could all be seen wearing black pants and lavender shirts, sweaters, and gray plaid trench coats–calmly enjoying tourist attractions, museums, and cafes in the daytime, and a bit of the nightlife available. In all videos and photographs,  the faces of the prisoners of war must be obscured. During these tours, the prisoners of war will be under guard of elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War. They should coordinate with, and hopefully receive the support of, national, provincial, and local police forces, and the host countries’ security services. True videos and photographs of Russian Federation prisoners of war in such positive circumstances should have an overwhelmingly positive impact on Russian Federation troops still serving under dreadful circumstances on the frontlines.

All online messages, videos, and photos must be produced by Provosts as part of their duties. To that extent, the need to fulfill that task should be taken into account during staffing. Videos and photographs of Prisoners of war at detention centers or traveling to Western capitals, would likely need to be produced by other elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

With regard to communicating messages to Russian Federation troops who want to surrender and defect, a greater amount of space to present information would certainly be available online. Through the websites of the Provosts, more thorough online instructions on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection before their lives are ended or they are gravely wounded as a result of being wastefully slammed against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Russian Federation troops should be told online that every effort would be made to spare them from the firepower that would surely be used to halt their respective unit’s assault.

Online messages could additionally provide illustrations of where and how Russian Federation troops should place leaflets before their positions. Illustrations posted with online messages could explain how to place leaflets before their position in inclement weather. Further, illustrations could be posted that would explain the necessity of placing leaflets before their positions so that they are visible from the air and how to do so. The message that every effort would be made to identify the positions of Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect should be reinforced online. Added to that, it must be emphasized in messages that Russian Federation troops emerging from positions marked with piles of leaflets shall be given every opportunity to come toward Ukrainian lines and surrender and defect  safely.

B. During Offensive Operations

During offensive operations by Ukrainian units, in one instance, Russian Federation troops should be instructed online to try as best as possible to collect at least one leaflet dropped on their lines. They must be told to retain and present leaflets essentially as a memorandum of understanding between them and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In another instance, in a way paralleling their use during defensive operations, leaflets dropped on Russian Federation troops could be used by them to indicate their intentions to either surrender or defect. Again, given the greater amount of space to present information online, through the websites of the Provosts, more thorough instructions could be provided on what to do in order to facilitate a safe surrender or defection in the face of a counteroffensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Online, Russian Federation troops could be told that every effort would be made to spare them from the onslaught of firepower that would surely be part of an assault.

As during defensive operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, illustrations could be posted online demonstrating for Russian Federation troops where to best place aggregated leaflets in a pile in front of their positions  Illustrations could be posted on multiple websites of the Provost Teams explaining how exactly to aggregate leaflets before their positions. Illustrations on how Russian Federation troops should place leaflets before their positions during inclement weather could be posted. Additionally, illustrations on how Russian Federation troops can ensure that the leaflets in front of their positions can be seen by air should be posted. Positions built up in wooded areas would present some difficulties in creating visible piles of leaflets, but that problem could likely be overcome with ingenuity. By creating enormous patterns collections of leaflets at night only that would not escape detection. If it becomes most apparent to Provosts that the Ukrainian advance would bring units before Russian Federation positions in wooded terrain, leaflets could be modified to bear a reflective material on one side and messages concerning surrender, defection, and using leaflets on the other. The illustrations mentioned should be published only when an assault will soon be launched by Ukrainian forces. Of course, no specified date should be offered.

Instructions for Russian Federation troops on what to do should be reinforced in the field with loudspeakers. It must be explained in the leaflets, online, and through loudspeakers–discussed here later–that every effort will be made to identify the positions of Russian Federation troops no matter how trying the circumstance. It should emphasized the Russian Federation troops who have marked their position will be tracked by observers and given every opportunity to surrender or defect when the Provost move forward to place them in custody

During offensive operations by Ukrainian units, identification of the positions of Russian Federation troops ready to come over to the Ukrainian lines would be critical in order to avoid a tragedy of erroneously placing devastating fire on them and killing and injuring individuals that only wanted to get out of the war and survive. Marked positions must be well-reconnoitered before an attack is launched toward Russian Federation lines. To accomplish that, positions of Russian Federation troops that want to surrender and defect must at a minimum position leaflets to ensure they could be observed clearly from the air. Daytime identification of the positions of such troops would allow Provosts to mark them out and inform commanders of units about to advance that resistance would unlikely come from their point along the Russian Federation and the Provosts would move on foot or in their vehicles to make contact with them and process them as prisoners of war. However, it would also much safer for Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect to place leaflets as markers before their positions and facing Ukrainian lines at night during the 3rd or 4th watch, than put piles of leaflets out in the daytime and risk detection by their commanders, counterintelligence, and by Russian Federation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets flying above the frontlines or any Russian Federation military aircraft operating in their vicinity.

As aforementioned in the segment on leaflets, drones could be used as means to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation defensive positions forward of Ukrainian frontlines to identify locations upon which leaflet could be dropped. (This process of identifying locations and dropping leaflets upon Russian Federation positions should have an unnerving and sound educational effect on the troops within them as it would inform them the Ukrainians knew where they were and could actually strike at them whenever they wished.) Drones could be modified to deliver leaflets upon Russian Federation troops. An organic capability to perform that task would facilitate operations. If any drones hypothetically operated by Provosts could be provided with a night vision capability, it will facilitate their operations. They would be able more confidently to provide evidence to Ukrainian commanders of the desire of those Russian Federation troops to surrender and formulate plans to move forward to detain those Russian Federation troops.

Again, as noted in the segment on leaflets, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations. This method of leaflet delivery may not provide the capacity of distribution artillery shells or delivery from aircraft. Yet, given shortages in pilots and shortages of airframe in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, using aircraft to deliver leaflets may be determined to be a drain of resources and too risky given the low priority of the mission versus combat air support and transport operations.

Russian Federation troops in custody immediately after capture. Depicting Russian Federation troops being held in this manner may have value domestically but such images.certainly would not serve the purposes of the proposed program (above). Another aspect of the Provosts duties could be to use loudspeakers to communicate announcements and positive messages to Russian Federation troops along the forward edge of the battle area. Loudspeaker announcements encouraging Russian Federation troops to surrender should be used in coordination with the distribution of leaflets and online messaging. Loudspeaker announcements allow greater flexibility with regard to altering messages to fit an immediate circumstance. Loudspeaker announcements may best serve Provosts’ efforts to encourage the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops when made at night, perhaps most effective at the top of fthe 3rd watch. Other times at which such announcements may be very effective might be holiday celebrations, in the aftermath of artillery fire missions and after Russian Federation advances that have been repulsed. Provosts should exploit information volunteered by Russian Federation prisoners of war such as names of unit commanders and noncommissioned officers. That information should be incorporated in a pertinent way as quickly as possible in loudspeaker messages.

IV. Loudspeakers

A. During Defensive Operations

Another aspect of the Provosts duties could be to use loudspeakers to communicate announcements and positive messages to Russian Federation troops along the forward edge of the battle area. Loudspeaker announcements encouraging Russian Federation troops to surrender should be used in coordination with the distribution of leaflets and online messaging. Loudspeaker announcements allow greater flexibility with regard to altering messages to fit an immediate circumstance. Loudspeaker announcements may best serve Provosts’ efforts to encourage the surrender and defection of Russian Federation troops when made at night, perhaps most effective at the top of the 3rd watch. Other times at which such announcements may be very effective might be holiday celebrations, in the aftermath of artillery fire missions and after Russian Federation advances that have been repulsed. Provosts should exploit information volunteered by Russian Federation prisoners of war such as names of unit commanders and noncommissioned officers. That information should be incorporated in a pertinent way as quickly as possible in loudspeaker messages.

Concerning the positioning of loudspeakers, they should be placed away from positions of Ukrainian troops but toward Russian Federation lines. (It is likely a manual has been published by the Ukrainian Armed Forces that provides guidance on the placement of loudspeakers for psychological warfare operations.) If possible, to assist in communicating with Russian Federation troops, actors, both male and female, could be contracted for their talents. The actors would hopefully be able to successfully deliver messages in the correct tone and most effectively to induce weary or newly arrived, terror stricken Russian Federation troops to surrender. If feasible, actors among troops already serving in the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be sought out. They could be considered for transfer to the Provost Teams on a voluntary basis or, out of absolute necessity, under orders.

Just as drones could be utilized to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions to discover the locations of Russian Federation units upon which leaflets could be delivered, drones could potentially be modified to carry loudspeakers that at variable altitudes could effectively broadcast audible messages to Russian Federation troops below them. An organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. To greatcharlie’s knowledge, the utilization of loudspeaker drones is a technique that has not been practiced before. If creating an organic capability to communicate with Russian Federation troops with drones might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing that capability, but that may repeatedly delay urgent action.

B. During Offensive Operations

Placing loudspeakers near Russian Federation positions to enable troops to receive audible messages from the Provost pertaining to their possible surrender or defection would indeed be a dangerous undertaking during offensive operations. Ostensibly, if time were available, Provists could move forward of Ukrainian positions to stealthily place loudspeakers before Russian Federation defenses. Provost would need to do this following every advance of Ukrainian troops that displaced Russian Federation units and soon enough before the next assault. Given how fluid the situation has become on the battlefield during previous counteroffensives, being able to act fast enough might become problematic. To that extent, Provosts may only be able to act when adequate opportunities present themselves. Again, this would be dangerous work. For that reason it understandably may not be authorized. If Provosts are detected, Russian Federation commanders may assess that an advance was coming in their direction and in some way stiffen resistance at those points. Given the devastating impact the work of the Provosts might have upon Russian Federation operations, if they are captured they may face reprisals. This is especially true as the Provosts’ duties require them to encourage Russian Federation troops to violate their country’s federal laws. Show trials should be expected if they are captured. Additionally, as the work of the Provosts requires highly skilled operators, even slight losses of Provosts may have a devastating impact on the Teams’ operations.

With the aim of minimizing the chance for losses among Provosts during challenging infiltration missions, drones could be used as an alternate and safer means to get loudspeaker messages to Russian Federation troops. Albeit with perhaps a somewhat greater chance of loss, drones could move well-forward of Ukrainian frontlines to Russian Federation positions and broadcast messages on surrender and defection. These would be the same hypothetical drones modified to carry loudspeakers and operate at variable altitudes could provide audible messages to Russian Federation troops below them. Again, as in defensive operations, the “loudspeaker drones” would be flown forward only after other drones have reconnoitered and surveilled Russian Federation positions and dropped leaflets upon them. As mentioned earlier, an organic capability to perform that function would facilitate operations. Again, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation positions might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations.

Loudspeaker drones flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who have indicated the desire to surrender or defect could be used to issue instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward. That would surely facilitate their capture for processing. Everything would need to be done rather rapidly but in calibrated ways before the frontlines are overcome by the fog of war and in the worst case scenario no one is able to determine “who is who and what is what.”

Again, it would be much safer for Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect to place leaflets as markers before their positions and facing Ukrainian lines at night, than put piles of leaflets out in the daytime and risk detection by their commanders and by Russian Federation intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets flying above the frontlines or any Russian Federation military aircraft operating in their vicinity.

Working with Ukrainian commanders and having the best information available, Provost could also more confidently formulate plans to move forward to detain those Russian Federation troops. As aforementioned, if any drones hypothetically operated by Provosts can be provided with night vision optics, it will facilitate their operations. They would truly be better informed of what is happening within Russian Federation lines in real-time much as the commanders, be better enable able to act swiftly, and be enabled to more confidently provide evidence to Ukrainian commanders of the desire of those Russian Federation troops to surrender as those commanders are in the process of planning their assaults. Once Ukrainian commanders have developed their plans, issued orders, and positioned units for an assault it is unlikely that they would willingly alter their plans in response to the Provosts. Ukrainian commanders certainly are focused on fighting to win the war. That is their priority. In that same vein, it would be both expected and prudent for Ukrainian commanders to target Russian Federation positions that Provost may report are holding Russian Federation troops who seek to surrender and defect, and level a devastating blow against them if any aggressive behavior is observed from them. On the other hand, if after coordinating with commanders, leaflets have already been dropped on Russian Federation positions, and Russian Federation troops have begun piling leaflets as instructed, a commander who has developed a plan of attack must take steps to alter it by creating an opportunity for Provosts to bring them in. Any attack on Russian Federation troops who tried to surrender and defect in accord with instructions from the Ukrainian Armed Forces would send a very negative message along Russian Federation frontlines that the Ukrainians cannot be trusted and no faith should be placed in their promises. That could potentially destroy the proposed program no matter how fruitful or far along it might get.

This photograph purports to depict Russian Federation troops in rather neat condition surrendering to Ukrainian troops who are dressed quite immaculately during the wet, muddy, and cold winter fighting (above). Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect must know exactly what to do in the midst of an assault by Ukrainian units. Leaflets could be delivered to Russian Federation troops via artillery canisters and aircraft and loudspeakers stealthily placed nearby and the direction of Russian Federation positions. Most important would be to move rapidly and act effectively. If drones are used to communicate with Russian Federation troops, leaflets should be dropped first. Loudspeaker drones should next be flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who with leaflets have indicated the desire to surrender or defect.  The loudspeaker drones could broadcast messages with instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward.

V. Protecting Surrendering and Defecting Russian Federation Troops

A. During Defensive Operations

Russian Federation troops desiring to surrender and defect must know exactly what to do in the midst of an assault by Ukrainian units. Leaflets could be delivered to Russian Federation troops via artillery canisters and aircraft and loudspeakers stealthily placed nearby and the direction of Russian Federation positions. Most important would be to move rapidly and act effectively. If drones are used to communicate with Russian Federation troops, leaflets should be dropped first. Loudspeaker drones should next be flown above the positions of Russian Federation troops who with leaflets have indicated the desire to surrender or defect.  The loudspeaker drones could broadcast messages with instructions on how to behave as Ukrainian units move forward.

Russian Federation troops coming over to the Ukrainians must be told by the Provosts through leaflets, online posts, and loudspeakers that they will do their very best to cover their movements toward Ukrainian lines with firepower if their commander might decide to open fire on them. To provide such protection, Provosts should be provided with written authority to direct Ukrainian artillery units and counterbattery systems, not already engaged in fire support missions, to launch artillery and rockets onslaughts to suppress fire directed at surrendering Russian Federation troops or Russian Federation batteries that might be used for that purpose. When processing Russian Federation troops who have surrendered and defected, Provosts should ask each: “How can we improve our program to rescue more guys such as you?” (Sardonically, a few may likely say: “Offer big cash payments in US dollars!”) A more important query inquiry would concern information they might possess on Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets, and heavy machine gun emplacements that could be used to punish surrendering troops. Positions that those troops might identify could be targeted with fire missions by Ukrainian artillery and rocket batteries. 

As noted earlier, drones could also be used during offensive operations by Provosts as means to reconnoiter and surveil Russian Federation positions to confirm reported locations of Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets that earmarked for use against surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops. As suggested with regard to leaflets and loudspeakers, if creating an organic capability to identify Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets might prove to be unfeasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations of mortars, artillery, rockets and heavy machine gun emplacement that might by used the thwart the surrender of Russian Federation troops. If Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets and machine gun emplacements are identified only after striking at surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops, marshals among the Provost Teams at the company and battalion levels must have the immediate, unencumbered ability to call for fire against them. 

If the suppression and destruction of Russian Federation mortars, artillery, rockets and machine gun emplacements could be performed frequently enough along the frontlines, particularly where Mobiks are being slaughtered, it would very likely have a marked, or perhaps even a very considerable impact on Russian Federation troop discipline, unit cohesion, offensive movement, and overall combat operations in Ukraine. The more intense the effort to halt surrenders and defections might become, the greater the Provosts efforts to disrupt and destroy them must become. The response of the Provosts should be of such intensity to the extent that efforts to thwart surrender and defection might very well become so unfruitful and costly that mission itself might be obviated.

B. During Offensive Operations

In addition to dealing with retributive fire from Russian Federation lines directed at punishing, but destroying any surrendering Russian Federation troops, it may be the case that blocking units have been regularly positioned to prevent Russian Federation troops from escaping their ominous fate by retreating. There may be military counterintelligence units operating in the frontlines to monitor the movements of Russian Federation troops. Similarly with Russian Federation firepower assets that might be directed at surrendering and defecting Russian Federation troops, once in custody, some might be able to provide detailed, credible information concerning blocking units positioned to prevent Russian Federation troops from retreating, their assistance should be accepted and rewarded.

If Russian Federation blocking units can be identified before a Ukrainian Armed Forces advance, officers among the Provost Teams must be enabled to call for fire against them. If that proves not feasible, the military intelligence services of the Ukrainian Armed Forces could be directed to support Provost Teams by providing intelligence on confirmed and suspected locations of blocking units placed in the rear of advancing Russian Federation troops or those holding defensive positions. Accordingly, officers among the Provost Teams must be enabled to call for fire against them.

In a twist, loudspeaker announcements as well as leaflets could also be used to warn Russian Federation commanders not to try in any way to halt efforts by their troops to surrender and defect. Such announcements should fix in the minds of the Mobiks and any other Russian Federation troops on the frontline that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are the dominant force on the battlefield. It may even have a sound educational effect on those Russian Federation troops, who for a variety of reasons to include patriotism, a sense of duty, and fidelity, at that particular moment, would be unwilling  Popular Western music could also be played toward Russian Federation on loudspeakers to remind them that life for the rest of the world goes on while they are trapped on the frontlines of an absolutely atrocious war.

Loudspeaker announcements as well as leaflets must never reveal the names of Russian Federation prisoners of war.  This will help minimize the possibility that reprisals will be carried out against their family members by the Russian Federation security services under the direction of the Kremlin. There would remain the possibility that Russian Federation troops who might decide to return to their homeland would face reprisals after the war. That situation would be out of the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it is something the Provost Teams proposed here and existing elements of the Coordinating Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War might urge Russian Federation prisoners of war to consider. After World War II ended, reprisals against reprisals against Soviet Army troops for conduct on the battlefield was a practice among the Soviet security services.

A Russian Federation self-propelled 152.4 mm howitzer firing during combat at an undisclosed location in Donetsk region, Ukraine (above). Russian Federation troops coming over to the Ukrainians must be told by the Provosts through leaflets, online posts, and loudspeakers that they will do their very best to cover their movements toward Ukrainian lines with firepower if their commander might decide to open fire on them. To provide such protection, Provosts should be provided with written authority to direct Ukrainian artillery units and counterbattery systems, not already engaged in fire support missions, to launch artillery and rockets onslaughts to suppress fire directed at surrendering Russian Federation troops or Russian Federation batteries that might be used for that purpose. When processing Russian Federation troops who have surrendered and defected, Provosts should ask if they possess information on Russian Federation mortars, artillery, and rockets, and heavy machine gun emplacements that could be used to punish surrendering troops. They do not need to answer under the Geneva Convention. Positions that those troops might identify could be targeted with fire missions by Ukrainian artillery and rocket batteries.

VI. Defeating Likely Russian Federation Countermeasures

The successful implementation of the proposed program would become a profound cause for alarm in Moscow. The ability to favorably impact the will of Russian soldiers to fight would be crucial to the larger objective of causing the Russian Federation to halt its invasion and withdraw its troops from Ukraine. It is greatcharlie’s contention that great numbers of Russian troops may very well be susceptible to an outside force able to suspend the control commanders have over them. The Kremlin seems quite aware of the situation. To that extent, in September 24, 2022, Putin signed the federal law “On Amendments to the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses” which greatly enhanced that penalties for desertion during mobilization or wartime. Offenders could face as much as ten years in prison. Conscientious objectors could be subject to 3 years imprisonment. The law signed on September 24th additionally criminalized “voluntary” surrender, making it punishable by sentences up to 15 years. However, law has not deterred Russian Federation troops willing to risk the possibility of criminal charges in order to survive. Among possible stronger actions, already mentioned was retributive mortar, artillery, rocket, and heavy machine gun fire from Russian Federation lines directed at destroying any surrendering Russian Federation troops and blocking units positioned to the rear of Russian Federation units to prevent troops from escaping their ominous fate by retreating. Here are further examples of sort of actions to expect and some hint on how defeat them.

A. Infiltration

Among possible schemes to thwart efforts to cause Russian Federation troops to surrender and defect would almost certainly be implemented by Moscow. One very ordinary approach might be to seed counterintelligence troops within units on the frontlines to collect information on who is planning to surrender or defect and detain those troops. Russian Federation counterintelligence troops,  indeed at great risk, could potentially advance with units and fire on whoever moves toward the Ukrainian lines with their hands up. Russian Federation troops could be directed by loudspeakers to move forward rapidly toward trenches concealed to the greatest degree possible from Russian Federation lines. From there, they could one by one, crawl along a concealed path, something akin to a long drainage ditch, toward awaiting provosts. Both the prisoner of war trenches and paths discussed earlier could be covered at all times by sharpshooter and machine guns to both protect them, prevent infiltration through their use, and thwart the efforts of those assigned to harm them. The Russian Federation troops could be processed one by one as prisoners of war right off the crawl paths, and sent toward the rear through separate and concealed lines of communication.

With the purpose of protecting them from retaliation by their commanders or harm from infiltrators, Russian Federation troops that have surrendered or defected should be asked to assist the Ukrainian troops in protecting them.by identifying those who are newly arrived to their units or not part of their units at all. Captured Russian Federation troops could be asked to assist in monitoring those troops who were not part of their units–not as a job, but to avoid any unpleasant surprises from infiltrators–without becoming aggressive or engaging in physical violence. Provosts should be prepared to respond to any situation that may arise among the prisoners of war by positioning armed guards around the clock by their holding pens in the rear

B. The Potential Weaponization of Prisoner Exchanges and Repatriations

It would never be suggested by greatcharlie that the opportunity to repatriate captured troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should ever be passed up. The impact on morale would surely be deleterious. For Ukrainian commanders it would be anathema. Yet even more, as the promise sent to Russian Federation troops was that they would be protected if they surrendered or defected, it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to send them back to their better than disappointed commanders and very likely the Russian Federation’s security services. Just as the message of the positive treatment of Russian Federation troops would most likely reverberate back in their homeland, the message sent by their return would most likely be shattering, confirming the worst impression of the Russian people about the Ukrainians. If not imprisoned or executed for desertion, the Russian Federation would face the prospect of being sent back to whatever was left of their former units and driven into “no man’s land” toward Ukrainian frontlines. Unless there was a unit deployed at that point on the frontline, they would surely be driven through mortar, rocket, and artillery fire, and withering high-rate machine gun fire. Some effort must be made to hold them safer in some judicious way.

To that extent, prisoners of war who were promoted to surrender or defect due the efforts of the proposed program would be asked whether they wanted to participate in a prisoner exchange. Those who might choose to return, despite the risks, would be included on the list of prisoners of war for exchange. It is presumed by greatcharlie the number of Russian Federation prisoners of war willing to return might be small, although that ,at not be the case. Hoping readers will pardon greatcharlie’s frankness or any perceived indelicacy, it seems appropriate to suggest that to ensure sufficient numbers of Russian Federation troops are available for exchanges, soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, and regular Wagner Group troops should be held in separate prisoner of war camps and that all negotiated changes should limited to them. To that extent, a dedicated effort should be made by the proposed Provosts to recover wounded and abandoned Wagner Group and professional Russian Federation troops from the battlefield. That will help ensure that there would be sufficient numbers of Russian Federation assets to exchange. Performing that task may entail having the Provosts take risks that may in the end be deemed too dangerous, if not unwarranted. However, given the potential benefits this aspect of the proposed program may bring with regard to the bigger picture of diplomacy and postwar relations between the two countries, some consideration of how such duties could be performed at reduced risk should be given. Hopefully, the war will not drag on for so long that prisoner of war exchanges will need to be chalked out into the foreseeable future. That potentiality nevertheless must be planned for.

These captured Russian Federation troops, dressed in layers and lacking any military insignia or patches, are likely mercenaries or contract fighters from the Wagner Group (above). It would never be suggested by greatcharlie that the opportunity to repatriate captured troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces should ever be passed up. The impact on morale would surely be deleterious. For Ukrainian commanders it would be anathema. Yet even more, as the promise sent to Russian Federation troops in hypothetical communications under the proposed program would be that they will be protected if they surrendered or defected, it would be counterproductive and counterintuitive to send them back to their better than disappointed commanders and very likely the Russian Federation’s security services. Just as the message of the positive treatment of Russian Federation troops would be expected to reverberate back in their homeland, the message sent by handing them over to angered Russian Federation authorities would most likely be shattering, confirming the worst impression of the Russian people about the Ukrainians. If not imprisoned or executed for desertion, the Russian Federation would face the prospect of being sent back to whatever was left of their former units and driven into “no man’s land” toward Ukrainian frontlines.

C. Deceptive Use of Leaflets

One of the oldest tricks one might expect to see is Russian Federation military counterintelligence units feigning as Russian Federation troops who want to surrender or defect. They could closely follow the instructions on leaflets, online, and heard over loudspeakers on how to indicate their desire to come across lines to Ukrainians. However, when Provosts approach their position in offensive operations, the counterintelligence units operating in such a manner would surely attempt to destroy the Provost team. Given this possibility, Provosts, working alongside Ukrainian commanders, must be willing to target all Russian Federation positions with troops expressing the desire to surrender and be willing to destroy their positions if aggressive action is observed. Nothing should be considered settled until the Russian Federation troops are placed themselves in the Provosts’ custody.

To additionally help protect Provosts and advancing Ukrainian troops, any Russian Federation position that via images collected from aerial reconnaissance and surveillance that appear  to have leaflets piled in front of them but also appear to inordinately conceal heavy machine guns or inordinate numbers of shoulder fired rockets or anti tank guns within them images of such positions must be closely analyzed and targeted for attack when the battlefield is being prepared for Ukrainian advances or whenever Ukrainian commanders may deem fit.

As alluded to prior, it may be prudent to direct Ukrainian sharpshooters to provide overwatch for the Russian Federation troops engaged in placing piles of leaflets before their positions  by firing upon Russian Federation sharpshooters who may very likely be ordered  to fire at their own comrades engaged in placing leaflets in front of their positions as instructed by Provosts.

D. Other “What-ifs” Regarding Likely Countermeasures

Those in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who have acquired relatively considerable experience in the management of matters pertaining to prisoners of war would be best able to do the “what ifs” and figuratively billow up with a ladle more potential pitfalls and countermeasures that could be faced in the implementation of the proposed program. At the same time, those same members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be best able to plot ways to avoid those pitfalls and defeat any countermeasures that may be applied. Interestingly, if the Russian Federation commanders could be caused to get thoroughly involved in applying countermeasures against efforts made under the proposed program, the disruptive impact of doing so upon its military operations could potentially have a deleterious effect sufficient enough to create more favorable conditions for the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the battlefield. Omnia conando docilis solertia vincit. (By application a docile shrewdness conquers every difficulty.)

Again, not all Russian Federation troops facing the Ukrainian Armed Forces will respond to efforts under the proposed program. However, if enough do so, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, through mostly non-lethal means, might be able to make their mark in ending the war on mostly better terms and with less negative sentiment of both sides than could be expected in the current environment.  Ironically, Russian Federation troops may in effect be able to assist in ending a war in which they are among those who have suffered most.

Russian Federation prisoners of war being held in dreary cells at a detention center (above). With regard to detention center conditions, every effort must be made to create hygienic, well-maintained centers. Prisoners should be supplied with clean clothes, the opportunity to bath, recreation, and healthy meals. Having reviewed countless videos and photographs made public by the Ukrainian government for the writing of this essay, it became very clear that some Russian Federation prisoners of war are being kept in conditions that are unacceptable. (Ukrainian prisoners of war are probably being held in far worse conditions, but with the hope of promoting higher thinking behind the proposed program, the notion of responding “tit-for-tat” with regard to the treatment of Mobiks is anathema. Any notion of treating Russian Federation prisoners of war with respect and dignity hypothetically promised in messages and advanced in the handling of their capture will simply be washed away. If improvements in conditions at detention centers for Russian Federation prisoners of war are determined to be unwarranted, then the Ukrainian government, right before the world will display its disinterest in an opportunity to improve, in some part, the environment for a sustainable peace with its neighbor. Peace will be reached at some point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Efforts must be made to hasten that day and ensure that peace will be one all parties can live with

VII. Suggestions for Adjustments in Current Methods of Detention

To touch briefly on what is likely a delicate subject, reportedly, Russian Federation prisoners of war held in 500 detention centers in Ukraine. Russian Federation prisoners of war appear to be lumped together regardless of whether they are Mobiks, professional soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, regular Wagner Group troops, Wagner Group penal troops, and mercenaries This practice must end. It is quite deleterious with regard to the proposed program. To a great degree, Mobiks are victims of the unjustified war in Ukraine, too. They should not be held with Russian Federation troops that have volunteered to fight in Ukraine to include the professional Russian Federation troops, the regular Wagner Group troops, and mercenaries apparently from all over the world.

The suggestion was already made here that Mobiks who surrender under the proposed program should not be held with soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops and regular Wagner Group troops with regard to facilitating the aggregation of prisoners for exchanges. In the Russian Federation, Russian Federation troops that voluntarily surrender are deemed as criminals. Even more so, Mobiks among Russian Federation prisoners of war certainly should not be held in cells with confirmed hardened criminals from Wagner Group penal units. True, some Wagner Group penal troops sought to overcome the ills of prison life by going to war in Ukraine. However, there are likely hardened convicts from the depths of Russian Federation prisons among the Wagner Group troops who, when aggregated in detention centers, could make life far worse for Mobiks, the overwhelming majority of whom were literally torn from lives of peace and thrown into an unjustified war which many unlikely supported. The hardened criminals could surely reproduce in detention center cells all of the ills of prison life in the Russian Federation. If the purpose of handling Russian Federation prisoners of war in this manner has been was to intentionally create the potential for some prisoners of war, such as the Mobiks, to be subjected to such ugliness, it must be made clear that such thinking and practices under the proposed program is forbidden, will be tolerated, and must be halted immediately under the threat of punishment. 

With regard to detention center conditions, every effort must be made to create hygienic, well-maintained centers. Prisoners should be supplied with clean clothes, the opportunity to bath, recreation, and healthy meals. Having reviewed countless videos and photographs made public by the Ukrainian government for the writing of this essay, it became very clear that some Russian Federation prisoners of war are being kept in conditions that are unacceptable. (It may very well be the case that Ukrainian prisoners of war are being held in far worse conditions, but with the hope of promoting higher thinking behind the proposed program, the notion of responding “tit-for-tat” with regard to the treatment of Mobiks is anathema. Any notion of treating Russian Federation prisoners of war with respect and dignity hypothetically promised in messages and advanced in the handling of their capture will simply be washed away. If improvements in conditions at detention centers for Russian Federation prisoners of war are determined to be unwarranted, then the Ukrainian government, starkly before the whole wide world, will display its disinterest in a genuine opportunity to improve, in some part, the environment for a sustainable peace with its neighbor. Peace will be reached at some point between Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Efforts must be made to hasten that day and ensure that peace will be one all parties can live with.

The owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin (right), at Russian Federation prison recruiting civilian inmates for combat service with his organization in Ukraine. To touch briefly on what is likely a delicate subject, reportedly, Russian Federation prisoners of war held in 500 detention centers in Ukraine. Russian Federation prisoners of war appear to be lumped together regardless of whether they are Mobiks, professional soldiers of the Russian Army and Russian Naval Troops, regular Wagner Group troops, Wagner Group penal troops, and mercenaries This practice must end. It is quite deleterious with regard to the proposed program. To a great degree, Mobiks are victims of the unjustified war in Ukraine, too. They should not be held with Russian Federation troops that have volunteered to fight in Ukraine to include the professional Russian Federation troops, the regular Wagner Group troops, and mercenaries apparently from all over the world.

VIII. Funding the Proposed Program: A Shot in the Dark

This segment of funding of this proposed program is quite naturally the most brief as, greatcharlie freely admits to knowing less than nothing about the budget of the Ministerstva Oborony Ukrainy (Ukrainian Ministry of Defense) or the budget of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Still, as the program would need a line of support, it has a suggestion that might prove useful or worthless. There may understandably be considerable reluctance in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Armed Forces to divert appropriated resources, that could be used more confidently to support all of the requirements of Ukraine’s Defense in the field right now and keeping Ukrainian troops alive, to a proposed program that would save the lives of Russian Federation troops in the name of peace and stability. That being the likely case, perchance through some singular arrangements made by the national authorities in Kyiv and the Ministry of Defense some hybrid line of funding and supply of special equipment needed by Provosts in the field, such as modified drones, could be provided by friendly foreign governments, foreign businesses, and foreign nongovernmental organizations. Drones might be easier to get a hold of than tanks and fighter jets and could very likely be secured much faster, from completely different sources. Again, this recherché hybrid funding idea is just a shot in the dark and may be completely off the mark.

IX. Pro Mundi Beneficio

Les chefs-d’oeuvre ne sont jamais que des tentatively heureuses. If implemented, at least in some very close form, the program proposed here would figuratively represent an offensive by the Ukrainian Armed Forces of a different kind, aimed at supporting military success by saving lives and dampening the spirit of evil that supported aggressive action. It would further serve as an additional footing for the foundation upon which a sustainable peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation could be established. The proposal is neither pie in the sky, nor worse, delusion. It has a real chance of promoting peace. This is only a proposal based on evidence available to greatcharlie.  It is not presumed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces or any other government organizations  would have an interest in greatcharlie’s meditations on the subject of prisoners of war. Yet, it is hoped, if anything, that the proposal might serve as a basis for the Ukrainians to further advance their efforts on the matter.

If through the implementation of the proposed program, the Ukrainian Armed Forces might be able achieve some success even in one area of the battlefield, the actions of one unit of troops might influence those of others, creating a cascading effect. There might be a real chance of collecting a huge bag of Prisoners of War before Russian Federation commanders could respond to the situation. Even then, whatever they might decide to do to halt the mass surrenders would be unlikely by thoughtful and surely be heavy-handed. Despite reservations of taking such action, Ukrainian Armed Forces commanders must keep perspective and remember the priority cannot simply be to kill the enemy but winning the war by getting the Russian Federation Armed Forces out of their country through forceful ejection or a withdrawal using every means possible. Everything reasonable that might support that cause should at least be considered, or better, given a try. Difficilius est sarcire concordiam quam rumpere. (It is more difficult to restore harmony than sow dissension.)

As alluded to earlier, this propitious option is not a hodge-podge of novel suggestions, but rather a more effective program of a tried and true methods at drawing in Russian Federation troops who are disposed to surrender and defect. Given that, one might read about this proposed program and respond that it is all very interesting but nothing new. That would be exactly the point. Some of the approaches suggested here are well-known, well-trodden in the history of contemporary warfare. The fact that some of what is proposed was practiced in the past does not obviate their use in the present. The tacit, popular belief that all new approaches must be rooted in high-tech might be characterized as the hobgoblin of the rigid and parochial.

Among those in the Ukrainian Armed Forces who have worked on prisoner of war matters, surely some have demonstrated intrinsic capabilities in the field. Their talents have by now have become well-harnessed by their knowledge and experience. Their use of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods suggested here should prove to be very fruitful. As noted, implemented with nuance injected by members of the existing Ukrainian Armed Forces prisoner of war program, it may support the achievement of military objectives that would have likely come at considerable cost in terms of troops and materiel while paradoxically sowing seeds for peace. The possibility of manifesting those outcomes alone, should be enough to warrant giving it a try. Those who would implement this proposed plan would surely see very difficult days often and deal with very trying moments. However, the rewards may be great enough to overcome those troubling occasions. Their role in creating the opportunity for better ending of the war would potentially be enormous.

Russian prisoners of war constructing garden furniture at a workshop in a Ukrainian Armed Forces detention center. The BBC reportd that the prisoners of war earn some money for their labor which they spend on cigarettes and sweets (above). As the proposed prisoner of war program develops, and within the strictures of the Geneva Convention, attendant with online messages on the sites should be videos and photographs of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered not just for the photo opportunity, Actual Russian Federation prisoners of war could be depicted wearing clean and neat clothes in safe, hygienic detention centers. Appropriate videos and photos should depict the Russian Federation prisoners of war engaged in daily activities at detention centers. To that extent, some videos and photos of Russian Federation troops who have surrendered should depict them drinking clean water, tea, and coffee, and wearing clean dry clothes and covered in warm blankets should be posted as soon as possible online. Authentic videos and photos of those who surrendered in inclement conditions, should also display them a few short hours later being held clean dry spaces, well-protected from cold, wind, rain and snow.

The Way Forward

There should be little question about the practicality of what is proposed here. Still, given omnidirectional calls for revenge still heard within Ukraine, any effort to enhance the existing prisoner of war program in a way that could potentially save the lives of additional of Russian Federation troops perhaps in the hundreds, even thousands, would hardly be well-received at first blush or after a superficial examination of it. Yet, amidst the anger and rage, the light of reason must be allowed shine through if a path out of this disaster is to be found After the war, if it can come to a rational end, it appears that Ukraine will find itself “leap-frogged” to a place among top tier powers in the world. Its economic, social, political, and military advancements will continue to be nurtured by allies and friends. However, despite all of the sacrifices made during the war there will likely be some further costs, consideration, in terms of engaging in the efforts to promote a lasting peace. Those efforts do not always need to be prompted by allies and friends

If as a result of some reasoning voiced in Kyiv, an operation to encourage the surrender of Russian soldiers cannot be implemented closely resembling the plan proposed here, as alluded to earlier, perhaps what is proposed could still serve as a basis for the development of their own impressions and plans for a similar tact. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando, quam rationis momenta quærenda sunt. (In every disputation, we should look more to the weight of reason than to the weight of authorities.)

Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?

A small unit of young Russian Army soldiers being transported to the frontlines in Ukraine (above). While greatcharlie has spoken against the Russian Federation’s wrongful invasion of its once peaceful neighbor, it does not look stony-hearted at the reality that Russian conscripts, dubbed Mobiks, rushed into Ukraine’s frontlines, are victims of the Kremlin’s caprice, too. Using soldiers repeatedly in ways that guarantee massive losses with little gain on the battlefield, as commanders of Russian Federation Armed Forces have, is the worst sort of negligence and points to possible incompetence. If poor acumen is not the case, one is left to imagine what sort of odd line of thought resides in the minds of Russian Federation commanders that would allow them to use their troops so carelessly and callously. Despite the nearly 160 year span that exists between the two circumstances, by briefly examining the Battle of the Crater alongside the Russian Federation’s special military operation in Ukraine, aspects are revealed from which some perspective might be gained.

As a result of the wrongful decision of the Kremlin to invade Ukraine, members of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) have suffered immensely. Interestingly, there is a strange buoyancy and caustic ebullience that seems to have overcome some in the Western newsmedia over the video recorded slaughter of members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. It broadcasted and streamed online by several newsmedia houses without end. (At the time of this writing, one would need to make a serious effort to evade news about Ukraine in the US.) The fact that greatcharlie’s sympathies are with the people of Ukraine has not been concealed. Still, while greatcharlie has spoken against the Russian Federation’s wrongful invasion of its once peaceful neighbor, and wants the war and all its attendant ills to end, it does not look stony-hearted at the reality that Russian conscripts, dubbed Mobiks by the Ukrainians, who have been imprudently, ruthlessly and reportedly in some cases, illegally rushed into Ukraine’s frontlines, are victims of the Kremlin’s caprice, too. Through its often morbid coverage, the newsmedia has done well to cast light on just how bizarrely Russian Federation forces are being handled in the war. Using soldiers repeatedly in ways that guarantee massive losses, estimated at 100,000 by the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Army General Mark Milley in November 2022, with little gain on the battlefield is the worst sort of negligence and possibly points to incompetence. If the absence of acumen is not the case, one is left to imagine that some odd line of thought resides in the minds of commanders of Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield that would allow them to use their troops so carelessly and callously.

On first blush, the comparison of wastage of human lives in war that initially comes to mind for greatcharlie is the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), a calamitous episode of the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865), remembered for over 150 years, and well-trodden by historians. So horrifying is the story that for many years it was labeled as fiction by some. Surely, there are countless cases in military history when frightfully high casualties have been suffered in actions on the battlefield that never held hope of accomplishing anything except the destruction of the units sent out to fight. However, the Battle of the Crater stands out as an epic display of a commander’s negligence and inexplicable disregard for his soldiers’ well-being. Despite the nearly 160 year span that exists between the two circumstances, by briefly examining the Battle of the Crater alongside the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) in Ukraine, aspects are revealed from which an image emerges of what it is that leads to such.

Covering this subject, greatcharlie understands there is a thin line between parsing the problem and suggesting a better way forward and subsequently providing advice to the Russian Federation Armed Forces in its effort in Ukraine. Although greatcharlie does not believe that anyone in Moscow would be interested in its scribblings, it nonetheless states unequivocally that nothing which could possibly provide advice or solutions, is offered here. What is provided are a few brief reflections resulting in all truth from greatcharlie’s near daily, unintended contemplations on the Ukraine War. The hope of greatcharlie is that its readers will remain willing to follow along, even stumble along, with its cautious discussion on this subject.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation General Valery Gerasimov. Putin’s singular emotional wants and wishes were the cause of the war. Pursuit of his much desired objective of eliminating the government in Kyiv, repeatedly expressed before the February 24, 2022 invasion and afterward, caused obedient military commanders to put their forces in impossible situations and on occasion at the mercy of their Ukrainian opponents. Well-understood now by most is the fact that everything was organized in a dimidium gluteus maximus way! Much of what was done initially by his top commanders was beyond what was strategically logical and apparently militarily unachievable for the Russian Federation Armed Forces despite their size, strength, and given its quality.

Overview of the Situation of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine

No easy answers are available to Moscow that would allow it to repair or reverse its situation in Ukraine. There is no possibility to put the toothpaste back in the tube. It seems necessary to note, without the intention of delving too deeply on the matter, that Putin’s singular emotional wants and wishes were the cause of the war. Pursuit of his much desired objective of eliminating the government in Kyiv, repeatedly expressed before the February 24, 2022 invasion and afterward, caused obedient military commanders to put their forces in impossible situations and on occasion at the mercy of their Ukrainian opponents. Well-understood now by most is the fact that the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was organized in a dimidium gluteus maximus way! Much of what was done initially by his top commanders was beyond what was strategically logical and was apparently militarily unachievable for the Russian Federation Armed Forces despite their size, strength, and given its quality. Much vaunted once as a titanic war machine, the Russian Federation Armed Forces hardly lived up to that billing. Showing itself as something less than an authentic 21st century fighting force, it unexpectedly collided with two obstructions in Ukraine: reality and Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces), well-assisted by the US, other NATO countries, as well as countries from around the world.

Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end ) Planning the invasion of Ukraine may have actually been beyond the faculty of those deemed to be the best trained, experienced, and informed senior officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces today. Though inconceivable, It is apparent that there were no contingency plans drawn up by senior officers for the invasion of Ukraine, that would have made available a variety of good solutions for possible challenges, all of the what-ifs. Such contingency should have been thoughtful, calibrated, well-calculated for redirecting military resources in a measured way, and possibly creative ways, to achieve more favorable outcomes. Apparently, nothing of the kind was likely kept close at hand by the Russian Federation General Staff. Perchance, the possibility of failure and the need for contingency plans were subjects that could not be openly expressed within the likely tense and certainly authoritarian political environment in which the original plans were developed. (The thought occurs, given what has been observed since the withdrawal from Kyiv; is that some contingency plans have been implemented, but they were all worthless. If one always does what one always did, one will always get what one always got.) Once the poor performance of Russian Federation Armed Forces became undeniable, even Putin was compelled to address the matter of its deficiencies in a December 21, 2022 video message to Russia’s security services. Referring to unspecified problems in the military, Putin said that constructive criticism should be given attention. He stated: “I ask the Ministry of Defense to be attentive to all civilian initiatives, including taking into account criticism and responding correctly, in a timely manner.”

As explained to the Guardian by a United Kingdom intelligence service, Russia’s unprofessional military practices were likely in part to blame for the high casualties.. It is understood by commanders in US Armed Forces, the key to achieving success is the integration of combined arms warfare with air power, electronic warfare, deception, speed, maneuver, and concentration of power. Armored and mechanized systems remain essential tools on today’s battlefield, despite the threat that armed drones can pose to them proven in Ukraine. In a primitive way, Russian Federation commanders continually attempt to overrun Ukrainian positions through the use of masses of troops, ensuring huge losses of troops daily. Yet, in addition to the failed, near criminally incompetent utilization of troops and weapon systems by commanders of Armiya Rossii (Russian Army, hereinafter referred to as such) and Morskaya Pekhota Rossii (Russian Naval Infantry, hereinafter referred to as Russian Naval Troops) in Ukraine, too many other pieces appear to be missing from the Russian Federation Armed Forces prosecution of the war and may likely prevent it from ever being effective. Assuredly, Russian Federation failures on the battlefield have not come merely as a result of some string of miscalculations and mistakes or persistent unfortuitous coincidences in the conduct of a war. When denuded of all political aims, strategy, tactics, science, and so on, at its nub, war amounts to the wastage of human life. As a reality, men and women are certain to die unnaturally during war. Still, it is difficult to comprehend how in the Russian Federation, an ostensibly advanced industrialized country with, to all intents and purposes, a civilized society, apparent profligate decisions concerning the use of soldiers could be made. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that any of it could at all be deemed permissible by top military commanders and, on the face of it, be sanctioned by national authorities. Contra naturam. (Against nature.)

When Russian Federation General of the Army Sergei Surovikin was promoted to overall commander of the special military operation, he began to make moves that brought some positive results and good news for the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Surovikin surely understood that leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer, although he may have wanted to do so in many areas. Despite shortcomings of his forces in the field and accepting the situation as it actually was, Surovikin sought to solidify the position of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. His defensive moves reportedly raised worries among US military officials and officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden that Russia Federation troops might be able to withstand renewed Ukrainian offensives. Perhaps his efforts, which were bearing fruit, were not enough to satisfy his superior, or maybe his apparent ability to establish order from chaos, convinced others they could grab glory from his success, claim his success as their own. Either way, Surovikin was replaced on January 11, 2023 after only three months as overall commander in Ukraine by none other than the Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff) Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov. When Gerasimov arrived to take command of the special military operation from him, Surovikin, now one of three deputies to Gerasimov, had begun the process of stepping up better organized localized attacks to have a cumulative effect and push back on recent advances by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. While that tactic continues, it would seem the valve has again been shut on the flow of big ideas from commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One should at best expect a return to the idea of overrunning Ukrainian frontline positions with masses of troops with predictable results in terms of killed and wounded.

Destroyed Russian Federation military vehicles and casualties strewn across a Ukrainian street in 2022 (above). In a primitive way, Russian Federation commanders continually attempt to overrun Ukrainian positions through the use of masses of troops, ensuring huge losses of troops daily. Still, in addition to the failed, near criminally incompetent utilization of troops and weapon systems by Russian Federation Army and Naval Ground Force commanders in Ukraine, too many other pieces appear to be missing from the Russian Federation Armed Forces prosecution of the war and may likely prevent it from ever being effective. Assuredly, Russian Federation failures on the battlefield have not come merely as a result of some string of miscalculations and mistakes or persistent unfortuitous coincidences in the conduct of a war. 

The Battle of the Crater

Military actions of decades ago are often difficult for one to fully understand with certainty when one is so far away from where and when those decisions were made, and how it all fit into the way of life of the period. Examining much of the material concerning the Battle of the Crater in preparation for this work, greatcharlie was astounded by how stirring, nuanced, edifying, illuminating, and instructive the bulk of the work is on that tragic battle and that dreadful war in general. So impressive were the impeccably researched and elegantly written works of Douglas Freeman, Shelby Foote, James McPherson, William Marvel, Drew Faust and lots of others reviewed that greatcharlie at one point was convinced it should halt its attempt to cover the battle, feeling unable to meet their standard. However, as its aspects so readily offered an apposite measure to examine the wasteful use of Russian Federation troops in the Ukraine War, the choice was made to carry on. With that being stated, without pretension, greatcharlie asks that those Civil War scholars among its readers look upon this effort with sympathy. (A few superb academic and state government online sources were used here to ensure readers could quickly follow-up on information provided and would have easily accessible points from they could start their own research on the battle. )

The Plan of Attack

In May 1864, an offensively-minded Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant, who US President Abraham Lincoln had appointed the commander of all Union Armies in March, launched a series of costly battles in an effort to move his forces south. Though little was attained by those battles, the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, and, especially, Cold Harbor (collectively known as the Overland Campaign), they would be given greater meaning if Grant could find a way maneuver his forces to cut the Confederate supply and communication lines through Petersburg. If Petersburg fell, so would Richmond. However, Grant was apprehensive about mounting a frontal attack against 9,500 Confederate troops in well-fortified positions even though by late June, he had successfully covered most of the eastern approaches to Petersburg with the 16,500 troops he had available. Interestingly enough, in a rather prescient June 21, 1864 Richmond Examiner commentary, it was suggested that Grant “plunge with his whole force into the crater of the volcano and make an end of it—Let not the campaign linger. All parties are tired of this monotonous slaughter of Yankees.”

Grant was open to suggestions, and came across a recherché proposal from Lieutenant Colonel Henry Pleasants of the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry, in the Union Army’s IX Corps Major General Ambrose Burnside. Pleasants’ regiment was composed of anthracite miners from Schuylkill County. One of his men looked out at the Confederate position from his trench and declared, “We could blow that damned fort out of existence if we could run a mine shaft under it.”  Pleasants’ proposal was passed up the chain of command to Burnside, who (on June 25, 1864, enthusiastically recommended it to Major General George Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Meade reacted with austerity upon learning of Pleasant’s proposal. It was hardly conventional and perhaps the use of the was too alien for Meade’s ears. He already had little faith in Burnside’s military judgment or ability to manage a complex operation. (Burnside’s reputation as a commander had suffered from his 1862 defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg and his under performance earlier in 1864 at the Battle of Spotsylvania Court House.) On top of that, Meade and Burnside, as commander and subordinate, had a toxic relationship. Burnside had seniority, and had previously commanded the Army of the Potomac, but lost his command, and Meade had it. Meade’s chief engineer, Major James Duane, dismissed the project as “claptrap and nonsense.” He believed it was impossible to dig a military mine of the proposed length—more than 500 feet from the mine-head behind the front line to the salient opposite. At the same time, even if a breach were created at that point, the ground would remain in the sights of Confederate artillery batteries located north and south of the salient. Yet, still eager to do something, Grant apparently viewed Pleasants’ project as being clear, logical, and plausible, and green-lit it. Aware of the nature of their relationship, Grant issued separate orders to the two commanders in order not to avoid having Burnside receive direct commands from Meade. On Meade’s orders, the miners would receive no support from Army headquarters. Thus, on June 25, 1864, without the help of the Union Army’s professional engineers, his troops began digging, using improvised tools. 

The Picture As Seen From The Top

Despite his ambivalence about the plan, Meade began creating a battle plan with Burnside once orders were given. As Burnside envisioned the attack, on  July 30, 1864, it would be led by his freshest soldiers, the 4th Division USCT, “United States Colored Troops”–Black Union Army soldiers–in two segregated brigades with a strength of 4,300, under Brigadier General Edward Ferrero. (Interestingly, Ferrero was a ballroom dance instructor who, as Meade, was born in Spain.) The 4th Division USCT  would have to pass through or around the crater and the large debris field left by the mine; re-form for attack on the far side; then advance to seize the high ground along the Jerusalem Plank Road against whatever reserves of infantry and artillery the Confederate force might have at that point. Burnside consulted with the 4th Division USCT ’s brigade commanders in planning the assault, and arranged for the regiments that would lead the attack to receive special training in maneuvers required to pass the breach such as using ladders and by fighting around it and storming the high ground. Meade did not think Black soldiers were good enough soldiers, and he feared political repercussions if he gave them such an important and dangerous task. If they failed with heavy casualties, expectedly Radical Republicans in the US Congress would condemn his use of Black soldiers as cannon fodder. Democratic politicians would likely find fault with him no matter what happened. Democrats opposed the recruitment and use of Blacks in combat; the more extreme demanded that those already in service be dismissed. They reportedly sought to stir racial hatred as an aspect of the 1864 US Presidential Campaign. The Democratic Party’s platform, as described by one of its partisans, was “the Constitution as it is, the Union as it was, and the niggers where they are.” Meade consulted with Grant about the 4th Divisions role in the plan of attack. Grant conceded to his wishes, and the day before that attack, he overruled Burnside’s plan to have the 4rh Division lead the assault.

There were three other understrength divisions in the IX Corps. Three other divisions consisted of White troops; but these divisions had been exhausted and demoralized by months of combat and heavy losses. In compliance with his new orders, Burnside asked for one of his three other divisional commanders—James Ledlie of the 1st Division, Robert Potter of the 2nd Division, and Orlando Willcox of the 3rd Division–to step forward and accept the mission. None would volunteer for it, thus the commanders were ordered to draw straws. The short straw went to Ledlie. Ledlie, a New York railroad engineer, was considered the least competent of IX Corps four divisional commanders. He had been accused by some of being drunk during the Battle of North Anna, fought from May 23, 1864 to May 26, 1864. Burnside ordered Ledlie’s 1st Division to charge through the breach made by the detonation, and take the high ground along the Jerusalem Plank Road. By achieving that, they would split the Confederate Army, and Union Army guns would command Petersburg. However, Ledlie never sent such orders to his brigade commanders. He simply instructed them to take and hold the ground around the breach, and wait for the 4th Division USCT to assault the heights. Apparently in the confusion of changing arrangements, Burnside and his staff also failed to detail engineers to accompany the assault troops, to assist them by fortifying the high ground once they had seized it, and to make pathways through the trench lines so that artillery could be sent forward. Absent those arrangements, holding the high ground if reached, would be made more challenging.

Likely presuming all else was being done correctly, Grant sought to assist and exploit the attack following the detonation by negating an apparent Confederate advantage with a tactical ploy. Grant ordered 25,000 infantry and cavalry under his most aggressive commanders, Major General Winfield Hancock and Major General Phillip Sheridan, to attack north of the James River to Deep Bottom on July 28, 1864 and July 29, 1864. Hancock and Sheridan attacked with such strength that General Robert E. Lee, Commander of the Confederate States Army, believed Richmond was in danger, and sent his entire reserve north of the James to defend it. That left the trenches directly opposite Burnside’s 16,000 infantry (IX Corps and a division from X Corps) held by 4,400 soldiers in Confederate States Army Major General Bushrod Johnson’s Division. The only available reserves were three brigades of Confederate States Army Brigadier General William Mahone (approximately 2,300 men), who would need an hour or more to reach Johnson’s front. Once Union Army Intelligence reported that Lee’s reserve had gone north of the James, Grant issued orders for the mine to be blown and for Burnside to launch his attack.

An inset from Alfred Waud’s pencil sketch of the Battle of the Crater (above). The image courtesy of the Library of Congress–shows Union Army soldiers advancing into the breach created when four tons of gunpowder exploded beneath the Confederate lines. Most likely as a result of last minute changes by Union Army Major General George Meade, Commander of the Army of the Potomac. to a well-planned operation by Union Army’s IX Corps commander, Major General Ambrose Burnside, the attack was doomed from the start.

The Engagement

After a delay of an hour and thirty-five minutes from when the fuse in the mine was lit, at 4:44AM on July 30, 1864. the earth below Confederate States Army Brigadier General Stephen Elliott’s South Carolina brigade reportedly bulged and broke, and an enormous mushroom cloud rose up. As one Union soldier described the scene, the sky was filled with “Earth, stones, timbers, arms, legs, guns unlimbered and bodies unlimbed.” The explosion blasted a crater 130 feet long, 75 feet wide, and 30 feet deep, with sheer walls of jagged clay. The bottom was ‘filled with dust, great blocks of clay, guns, broken carriages, projecting timbers, and men buried in various ways . . . some with their legs kicking in the air, some with the arms only exposed, and some with every bone in their bodies apparently broken.”

An estimated 278 Confederates troops were killed instantly. At the same time, 110 Union Army guns and 54 mortars all opened fire. The delay had actually been to the artillerymen’s benefit; as the dawn allowed them to see what they were firing at. This is the moment when Ledlie’s men were supposed to advance, but just as the surviving Confederate troops, they were briefly paralyzed by the force of the blast. Still, despite creating the breach and inflicting losses upon the Confederate defenders, the effect of the explosion was not what Burnside hoped. The Crater itself was an impassable barrier, and the debris-clogged trenches to either side did not permit swift forward movement. When Ledlie’s soldiers finally reached it, they discovered that the earth that had fallen back into the Crater had become a mash that trapped the men who attempted to march through it. One New Hampshire soldier described his struggling comrades as “a mass of worms crawling over each other.” Ledlle’s soldiers also spent time attempting to rescue Confederate defenders buried in the dirt. 

Although a third of Elliott’s South Carolina brigade, which manned the strongpoint, was destroyed in the blast, behind the main line, Confederate troops rallied in the communication trenches and the ravine half-way up the slope. To reinforce them, Lee ordered the three brigades of Mahone’s Division forward. On the north side of the breach, Elliott’s survivors were joined by units of Confederate States Army Brigadier General Matt Ransom’s North Carolina Brigade, and on the south side by elements of the Virginia Brigade led by Confederate States Army Colonel David Weisinger. Confederate artillery batteries placed heavy cross-fire of canister and case shot that pinned Ledlie’s division in the breach. The Confederate troops fully capitalized on Ledlie’s mistake of advancing the 1st Division through the Crater and his soldiers slow movement.

What had previously been mere glimmers of problems within the Union Army’s command structure began to shine effulgently as the battle commenced. Once the situation began to break down with Union Army troops charging directly into the Crater, there was a need for authentic leadership and necessary corrections. However, the commanding officer of the imperiled soldiers of the 1st Division, Ledlie was well to the rear of the frontlines in a sandbagged bunker, sharing a bottle of rum with Ferrero, commanding officer of the 4th Division USCT. As the situation worsened, Meade and Burnside began trading angry telegrams, with Meade implying that Burnside was not telling him the truth and Burnside accusing Meade of insulting his honor.

At 7:30AM, in an effort to get a handle on the situation, Burnside ordered the 4th Division USCT to charge and carry out its original mission. In order to attack they were required to cross what became a no-man’s-land under fire, then force their way forward through the mass of demoralized 1st Division troops around the Crater. Nevertheless, the assault of the 4th Division USCT accomplished that and far more. Lieutenant Colonel Seymour Hall and Colonel Delavan Bates, commanding the two leading regiments in Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Sigfried’s first brigade, improvised a pincer attack that drove the Confederate troops back, capturing 150 prisoners. The regiments in Colonel Henry Thomas’ second brigade also worked their way through the maul and under heavy artillery fire and tried to advance in conjunction with some 1st Division regiments. Small groups of soldiers from both divisions managed to rally, side-by-side, in the trenches,

The Battle of the Crater was the first combat experience of soldiers of the 4th Division USCT , and reportedly some of them cried as they sensed triumph, “Remember Fort Pillow!”, in reference to an April 1864 battle in Tennessee during which USCT soldiers had been murdered by their Confederate captors. That cheer seemed to almost “summon demons on to the scene” and manifest far greater monstrous behavior during their own battle. US President Jimmy Carter, during a Nobel Lecture, in Oslo, Norway, on December 10, 2002, explained: “War may sometimes be a necessary evil. But no matter how necessary, it is always an evil, never a good. We will not learn how to live together in peace by killing each other’s children.” As events unfolded in the battle, Carter’s words, uttered nearly 150 years later, stand most apposite regarding the Battle of the Crater.

Once two of the three Confederate brigades from Mahone’s Division established themselves at the Crater, they counter-attacked. Though at first, in the morning,, the Union Army soldiers holding the outer berm of the Crater and the trenches around it checked Mahone’s charge, they lacked the strength to mitigate a stronger Confederate push in the afternoon. The Confederate troops displaced the soldiers of the 1st Division and 4th Division USCT. The Union Army soldiers pulled away from the trench line and down towards the Crater with Confederate troops in hot pursuit. With the aid of Confederate artillery, Mahone’s troops kept the Crater under fire. They fired down into the Crater and reportedly in some instances even hurled their muskets with bayonets-fixed at the Union Army soldiers. Except for those soldiers of the 1st Division and 4th Division USCT who at that point were falling back, between 800 and 1,000 soldiers had remained packed at the bottom of the Crater. Most were demoralized, having been trapped in an indefensible position, without food or water, in oven-like heat, unable to fight but vulnerable to mortar-fire. 

Grant, himself, visited the front in the morning, observed and evaluated the situation, and then ordered Burnside to pull everyone back. Grant supposedly stated: “It is slaughter to leave them here.” Amazingly, for whatever reason, Burnside ignored the commanding general’s order. Refusing to admit his attack had failed despite the overwhelming evidence of routed troops and broken organizations, Burnside rode to Meade’s headquarters to demand reinforcements. It was then that the two generals got into a furious argument over the need to retreat and Burnside’s honor. Meade being Burnside’s superior, gave the peremptory order for Union Army units to withdraw in order to avoid further losses. Reportedly, at 10:30AM, Grant and Meade just packed up and left the scene. Instead of developing a plan for withdrawal, Burnside left the matter to his officers struggling in the Crater.

As the battered and tattered Union force retreated, many of the wounded or surrendering Black soldiers of the 4th Division USCT were singled out for murder by Confederate troops wherever they found them. Based on its research of near impeccable sources, Encyclopedia Virginia states that the Confederate troops viewed the deployment of Black soldiers of the 4th Division USCT as an ugly provocation. Reportedly one Virginia officer stated as the Confederate troops charged: “Boys, you have hot work ahead; they are negroes and show no quarter.” At 2:30PM, the Confederates launched their final assault, during which the attackers chanted, “Spare the white man, kill the nigger.” Encyclopedia Virginia further revealed Major Matthew Love of the 25th North Carolina wrote, “such Slaughter I have not witnessed upon any battlefield anywhere. Their men were principally negroes and we shot them down until we got near enough and then run them through with the bayonet . . . we was not very particular whether we captured or killed them, the only thing we did not like to be pestered berrying[sic] the Heathens.” Additionally Encyclopedia Virginia cites Major John Haskell of the Branch Battery (North Carolina) observed, “Our men, who were always made wild by having negroes sent against them . . . were utterly frenzied with rage. Nothing in the war could have exceeded the horrors that followed. No quarter was given, and for what seemed a long time, fearful butchery was carried on.” Some of the officers tried to stop the killing, “but [the men] kept on until they finished up.” Reportedly, 1st Division soldiers witnessed Confederate troops killing wounded or surrendering 4th Division USCT soldiers as they retreated from the berm of the Crater. At the moment the defense at the berm and in the trenches completely collapsed, a number of 1st Division soldiers astoundingly turned against their comrades-in-arms in the 4th Division USCT , shooting or bayonetting them, ostensibly believing, as explained by Encyclopedia Virginia, that Confederate troops would not grant quarter to Blacks in arms, or to White troops serving with them. As one Union Army soldier reportedly stated, “we was not about to be taken prisoner amongst them niggers.” Records indicate the killing went far beyond the excesses that occur in the heat of battle. Many wounded and prisoners of war from the 4th USCT soldiers under escort were shot, bayoneted or clubbed to death as they were moved to the rear. The Confederates would eventually sweep the Union Army units from man-made gully moving from the right side by late afternoon. N’importe qui trouverait cela cruel et sauvage. Peut-être Alexis de Tocqueville ne trouverait guère surprenant. Certains en Amérique diraient: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!” Quel dommage!

The Battle of the Crater was a demoralizing defeat. After eight and a half hours of fighting, Union Army casualties were 3,798 (504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured). Confederate casualties were 1,491 (361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured). The 1st Division was engaged for the entire eight and a half hours and suffered 18% casualties. The 4th Division USCT  was engaged for less than half that time, but lost 31%. Since many of its wounded were murdered, the ratio of killed to wounded was more than double that of any Union Army unit. Meade brought charges against Burnside, and a subsequent court of inquiry censured Burnside along with Ledlie, Ferrero, Willcox, and Colonel Zenas Bliss. Burnside was never again assigned to duty. Although he was as responsible for the defeat as Burnside, Meade escaped immediate censure. However, in early 1865, the US Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War exonerated Burnside and condemned Meade. Although Meade was against the operation, it was recognized by. Congress that he very likely sabotaged it by disturbing carefully laid plans Burnside formulated for it,

What began as a well-planned military operation devolved into a haphazard manifestation of a feud between Meade and Burnside with the soldiers being used as pawns. Burnside lost his head in his struggle with Meade. If he had kept his head, he more likely would have selected his best divisional commander for the assault, ensured that commander understood the concept and intent of the operation and issued him clear orders for the mission. On top of that he could have counseled the divisional commander and his subordinates with suggestions on how to tackle challenges. Ledlie proved to be a worse commander than originally thought. He had little concern for the well-being of the soldiers of his 1st Division or the terrible predicament in which they found themselves. The notion of inspirational leadership in battle was clearly alien to him. The lack of discipline and fratricidal behavior displayed by Ledlie troops also spoke volumes about Ledlie’s leadership. One cannot say Ledlie never gave a thought to his mission as he knew when the fighting would be underway, stationed himself safely away from the shooting, and made the effort to pay no heed to events. Ferrero, never having led his 4th Division USCT in combat, seemed to follow Ledlie’s lead. He, too, remained safe from bullets, bombs, and any sudden shock in Ledlie’s bunker while his soldiers suffered immensely and needed him the most. If Ferrero had observed their advance, he could have made the necessary adjustments. If he had observed what the soldiers of the 1st Division were doing to his men, he may have been able to resolve the matter. The errors are too many to recount in this essay, and one might imagine a possible list of likely and possible challenges the attacking forces would face and solutions for them. However, most may agree that the central problem during actual battle was the failure of those in charge to be leaders and do their jobs.

Photo of the Crater battleground taken in 1864 (above). The Battle of the Crater was a demoralizing defeat. After eight and a half hours of fighting, Union Army casualties were 3,798 (504 killed, 1,881 wounded, 1,413 missing or captured). Confederate casualties were 1,491 (361 killed, 727 wounded, 403 missing or captured). The 1st Division was engaged for the entire eight and a half hours and suffered 18% casualties. The 4th Division USCT was engaged for less than half that time, lost 31%. Since many of its wounded were murdered, the ratio of killed to wounded was more than double that of any Union Army unit.

Preempting Likely Reactions to the Aforementioned Discussion

True, as alluded to earlier here, throughout history, there have been battles in which losses were far greater than that of the Crater. Attention would very likely be called to the battles of annihilation, usually part of the course of study of the military academic institutions. Among those usually examined are the following.

The Battle of Cannae

At the Battle of Cannae during Second Punic War, a force of Carthaginians and their Libyan, Numidian, Spaniard and Celt mercenaries, all under the command of Hannibal, faced off against a larger Roman and Italian force along the River Aufidus on August 2, 216 B.C., near Cannae in Apulia, Italy. The Roman force was led by both Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Giaus Terentius Varro, who exchanged overall command of the force daily. When Hannibal discovered Varro was the more aggressive commander, he moved his force of 40,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry into position against the Romans while he was in command. Upon engaging the Romans’ 80,000 troops and 6,000 cavalry, Hannibal had his force feign collapse, anticipating the more aggressive Varro would rush his troops forward. When the Romans reached the appropriate depth Hannibal’s forces proceeded to double-envelop and annihilate the Roman force. An estimated 60,000 to 70,000 Romans were lost.

The Battle of Tannenberg

At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. Consequently, the Russians were essentially knocked out of World War I until the Spring of 1915.

The Minsk-Smolensk Pockets

As the story of the Minsk-Smolensk Pockets during World War II goes, immediately following the launch of Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941, the German 2nd Panzer Group under Colonel General Heinz Guderian and the 3rd Panzer Group under Colonel General Hermann Hoth destroyed Soviet frontier defenses, received and defeated Soviet attempts to counterattack, and subsequently encircled four Soviet Armies near Bialystock and Minsk by June 30, 1941. By July 9, 1941, Soviet forces within the pocket were decimated, resulting in the loss of 420, 000 troops. Between July 10, 1941 and September 10, 1941, during the second phase of Operation Barbarossa, the German 2nd Panzer Group and the 3rd Panzer Group rapidly advanced on Smolensk. In a pincer movement, mirroring their action at Minsk, encircled the Soviet 16th, 19th and 20th Soviet Armies. Though many troops of the 19th and 20th Soviet Armies exfiltrated the German encirclement successfully, the battle left the Soviet Union’s defenses in the West in tatters a lá Tannenberg.

The Falaise Gap

At the Falaise Gap in World War II, the Allied Armies developed a multi-phase plan to break out of Normandy following their successful landings in France on June 6, 1944. On July 18, 1944, under Operation Goodwood, British and Canadian Armies would attack along the eastern line around Caen. On July 25, 1944, under Operation Cobra, US forces would drive forward into a corridor created by thousands of US heavy and medium bombers on the western end of the German lines around Saint-Lô. Against Goodwood, the German Army responded by committing a large portion of its armored reserves to the defense. Against Cobra, disoriented German defenders could not establish an organized defense. Seizing the opportunity created, the Ground Forces commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe British Army Field Marshal Bernard Mongomery ordered Allied armies in the vicinity of Goodwood to converge on the Falaise–Chambois area to envelop the German 7th Army and 5th Panzer Army of Army Group B. The Germans began to withdraw on August 17, 1944 but the Allied Armies completed the encirclement two days later at Chambois. Although the Germans managed to force through gaps in Allied lines via counterattacks, by the evening of 1 August 21, 1944, the gap was closed. An estimated 50,000 Germans were sealed inside the “Falaise Pocket.”. Remnants of Army Group B outside of the pocket retreated across the Seine.

A portion of the “Corridor of Death” in the Falaise Pocket (above). Seizing the opportunity created while breaking out of Normandy two months after the June 1944 landings, the Ground Forces commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe British Army Field Marshal Bernard Mongomery ordered Allied armies in the vicinity of Goodwood to converge on the Falaise–Chambois area to envelop large elements of the German’s Army Group B. The Germans began to withdraw on August 17, 1944 but the Allied Armies completed the encirclement two days later at Chambois. Although the Germans managed to force through gaps in Allied lines via counterattacks, by the evening of August 21, 1944, the pocket was closed. An estimated 50,000 Germans were trapped inside. Remnants of Army Group B outside of the pocket retreated across the Seine.

Among the commonalities of these battles beyond the successful enveloping of opponent by the victorious commanders, their outcomes were mainly shaped mainly by the well laid plans of the commander on one side allowing for the proper use of resources, information, communication, speed, mobility, terrain, time available, superior maneuver, well-placed fires, decisive action, the exploitation of opponent’s confusion resulting from the fog of war, the friction of battle, and the opponents failure to expect the unexpected and to act accordingly in response to what was unforeseen and unpredictable. More apt parallels to the Battle of the Crater and the Russian Federation special military operation in Ukraine, mutatis mutandis, are battles in which losses are self-inflicted as a result of poor and very often rash decisions made by those in charge of units in a battle. A seemingly never-ending list of battles blaze on the pages of history in which such behavior was at the crux of their tragic outcomes for one side. Among those that come to greatcharlie’s mind most immediately are the following. 

The Charge of the Light Brigade

The Charge of the Light Brigade on October 25, 1854, at the Battle of Balaclava during the Crimean War was a tragic attack by the cavalrymen of charge was made by the Light Brigade of the British Army cavalry, which consisted of the 4th and 13th Light Dragoons, the 17th Lancers, and the 8th and 11th Hussars commanded by Major General James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan

against an estimated 20 battalions of infantry supported by over 50 artillery pieces under the Russian commander, General Pavel Liprandi. Obedient to orders–ex post facto called a miscommunication–from the overall commander of the British Army Cavalry,General George Bingham, 3rd Earl of Lucan, with whom he had a toxic relationship, Cardigan led a frontal assault with his 670 troops against a Russian force organized in a semi-horseshoe defense of the Russians who enjoyed excellent line of sight over a mile in length and supported on the left and right side sides of the Horseshoe by artillery batteries providing enfilading fire from elevated ground. Although Cardigan’s troops scattered some of the defenders, they were too badly battered and tattered to complete their mission and retreated without any decisive gain at the cost of 110 killed and approximately 161 wounded.

The Battle of the Little Big Horn

The Battle of the Little Big Horn on June 25, 1875, was an engagement of what was known as the “American Indian Wars” during which US Army Colonel George Armstrong Custer of the US 7th Cavalry led his battalion in an attack on the main Sioux Tribe encampment at Little Bighorn. Ignoring the advice of scouts, dividing his force into three parts, and expecting the Sioux to scatter at his approach, Custer, at the head of one element of his divided force, was surprised to encounter a Native American force of 3000 warriors from Lakota Sioux, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho Tribes under the dual command of Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull. Custer’s element was destroyed, suffering 268 killed and 55 severely wounded, with Custer, himself, among the dead. Native American losses were reported to be 18 killed.

The Second Battle of Ypres

The Second Battle of Ypres fought from April 22, 1915 to May 25, 1915 during World War I was ignited by an diversionary attack by the German Fourth Army against British Second Army, several French divisions and the Belgian Army, planned an attack towards Ypres, not to capture the city, but merely to cover the transfer of German troops to the Eastern Front where Germany had achieved great success in the aforementioned Battle of Tannenberg and Battle of Masurian Lakes. Notably, the diversionary attack was used to test a deadly chlorine gas weapon,secretly installed in chemical tanks across their front line and did so with great effect, collapsing unprotected Allied forces before the German advance. The success of the chemical attack was unexpected, and no reinforcements were made available to exploit it, and the battle ended after only minor territorial gain with 35,000 German troops lost and 60,000 Allied forces lost primarily due to the chlorine gas.

The Battle of the Somme

The Battle of the Somme fought from July 1, 1916 to November 18, 1916 during World War I by the armies of the United Kingdom and France against the Germany was initiated on the upper reaches of the River Somme in France. as a means to reduce Intense German pressure being placed on the French at Verdun. The advance of a force of 11 divisions of the British 4th Army advanced along a 15-mile front north of the River Somme, while five French divisions advanced on an eight-mile front to the south, was preceding by a week-long heavy artillery bombardment, using some 1.75 million shells, which aimed to cut the barbed wire guarding German’s trench defenses and destroy the enemy’s positions. Although German positions, many of which were in trenches deep underground, proved to be stronger than anticipated, and the barbed wire remained intact at many points, British Army Field Marshal Douglas Haig decided to press on with the attack. Along the line, German machine gun and rifle fire cut down thousands of the attacking British troops, many of them caught in “no man’s land” between the two sides, British casualties on the first day numbered over 57,000, of which 19,240 were killed. Over the next 141 days, the British advanced a maximum of seven miles, even after an attack on September 15, 1916 of 12 divisions accompanied by 48 Mark I tanks which made their first-ever appearance on the battlefield. More than three million men fought in the battle, of whom one million were either wounded or killed.

The Schweinfurt Raids

The First Schweinfurt–Regensburg raid on August 17, 1943 was a “double-strike mission” strategic bombing mission during World War II carried out by 376 B-17 heavy bombers of the US Army’s 8th Air Force to cripple German ball bearing production and the German aircraft industry. Without fighter escort for force protection, two large forces of bombers attacked Schweinfurt and Regensburg respectively in order to disperse fighter reaction by the Luftwaffe, but subsequently 60 B-17s out of 376, each crewed with 10 airmen at a minimum, were lost over German-controlled territory, in Switzerland, or ditched at sea, and despite some success at Regensburg, the commander of the 8th Air Force, General Ira Eaker assessed the Schweinfurt raid was a failure. On October 14, 1943, a second long-range unescorted raid on Schweinfurt was launched despite the fact that everyone who flew the mission stressed the importance of the escorts, which were not available, in reducing losses. Another 60 B-17s, this time out of 291, were lost during the attack, resulting in the suspension of deep raids for five months.

Japanese Banzi Attack on Saipan

There were countless wasteful Banzi attacks of the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Marines in the Pacific Theater during World War II. After the third week of fighting on Saipan, the 2nd Marine Division, the US Army 27th Infantry Division, and the 4th Marine Division had put the Japanese defenders backs against the wall, driving them into the northern corner of the island. For Imperial Japanese Army Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito, the overall commander of Japanese forces on Saipan, the only choice was to order his remaining 4,000-plus troops and all civilians to participate in a final Banzai attack before daybreak on July 7, 1944. The Banzi attack continued for some 12 hours before the Japanese were wiped out. The Japanese had advanced over 1,000 yards before they were stopped. By the evening of July 7th, the soldiers and Marines had regained all of the ground lost during the Japanese attack. A total of 4,311 Japanese troops were killed. US losses were high, too. The first and second battalions of the 105th Regiment od the 27th Division suffered 406 killed and an additional 512 wounded.

The Battle of Arnhem

The Battle of Arnhem fought from September 17, 1944 to September 26, 1944 during World War II was the result of a plan proposed by British Army Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, that an airborne assault would support a single drive north over the branches of the Lower Rhine River,which would  permit the British Second Army to bypass the Siegfried Line and attack the industrial Ruhr. Before the airborne assault, planned as Operation Market Garden, was launched, it was discovered that would likely land on top of two German divisions, the remains of the 9th SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and  the 10th SS Panzer Division “Frundsberg” from the Eastern Front as well as several smaller German units. However, the commanding officer of 21st Army Group dismissed the information. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force upon receiving the information via Ultra intercepts choose to ignore it as well. The mission failed as planned and Allied losses were approximately 1,984 killed, 6,854 captured, while German losses were approx 1,300 killed and 2,000 wounded. (The Battle of Arnhem was recently discussed briefly in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled, “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)

Russian Federation troops in Ukraine appear to have experienced many of the worst aspects of not only the Crater, but every example here, except contending with chlorine gas as in the second Battle of the Somme. Yet, looking over this relatively short list of abysmal actions that compounded tragedies of war in which they occurred, greatcharlie believes that in selecting the Battle of the Crater to focus upon in order to find parallels with the situation of Russian Federation troops in Ukraine given the many choices, it may very well have selected the ugliest of the lot given the blue-on-blue hen house racial murder spree that was part of it.

German troops positioning themselves to engage Allied airborne units at Arnhem in September 1944 (above). Before the Allied airborne assault, planned as Operation Market Garden, was launched on September17, 1944, it was discovered that would likely land on top of two German divisions, the remains of the 9th SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and  the 10th SS Panzer Division “Frundsberg” from the Eastern Front as well as several smaller German units. However, the commanding officer of 21st Army Group dismissed the information. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force upon receiving the information via Ultra intercepts choose to ignore it as well. The mission failed as planned. By September 26, 1944, Allied losses were approximately 1,984 killed, 6,854 captured, while German losses were approx 1,300 killed and 2,000 wounded.

Poor Circumstances of Russian Troops in Ukraine

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Delinquent, seemingly feckless Russian commanders who failed to properly train their troops to face conditions on today’s battlefield for months have looked with shock and awe at the environment in which their soldiers are being slaughtered. Any blame and shame concerning their overall performance falls squarely on the commanders at the top rungs of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. So unaware was the Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces of the situation that Russian Federation troops were thrown into since February 24, 2022, that Ukrayinska Pravda, on January 23, 2023, that Gerasimov, seeing for himself how intense the hostilities were, and “being immersed in the newness of it all,” complained the special military operation has put Russian troops in conditions that they have never encountered in the history of modern Russia. Gersaimov was sent down from his perch as Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces by Putin on January 23 2023. Rather examine one of the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ many catastrophic engagements with Ukrainian troops, as done with the Battle of the Crater, a measured picture of the désastre de trés grande ampleur is presented.

Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide

As aforementioned, on November 10, 2022, the US Department of Defense announced an official assessment that over 100,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in action or wounded in Ukraine. Thus, the US Department of Defense figures indicated that during 260 days of fighting to that point, an average of 385 Russian soldiers had been killed or injured each day. The official figure issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense in September 2022 put the number of Russian troops killed at 5,937, a figure Western officials said grossly underestimated the country’s losses. Further, the US Department of Defense figure suggested that the daily fighting along the 1000-mile front line that winds around the eastern edges of Ukraine is very intense. A significant part of the struggle is being fought from World War I-style trenches in which soldiers dug into muddy fortifications suffer relentless artillery onslaughts until their units are destroyed or displaced. So apparently horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Captured Russians say their comrades face execution on desertion charges if they don’t keep moving.” Reportedly, some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” The Kyiv Post, citing an Agence France-Presse interview of a Ukrainian soldier, provided the quote: “You shoot them and more come.” The indications and implications of what they say is that even incremental advances achieved through localized attacks begun by Surovikin have come at a high price for the Russian Federation troops.

Disco inferno. (I learn by suffering.) According to Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at Center for Naval Analyses and a fellow at the Center for New American Security, and Rob Lee, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program, in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, conscripts receive most of their training from the units to which they are sent rather than centralized training bases. (The Mobiks are offered only the most basic lessons during a reported short two weeks at their initial training bases.) However, given exigent circumstances, officers and non-commissioned officers that would provide that training in units have mostly been redeployed and in some cases they have likely been used to form additional battalions. Thereby, Russian Army regiments and brigades have unlikely had the personnel in their remain-behind elements available to properly train newly arrived Mobiks. There is apparently no crawl, walk, run training for the Mobiks. Such methods of training that could be used even under the very challenging circumstances they face appear to be alien to Russian unit commanders. It seems that even lessons on what to expect and what not to do are rarely applied in the Mobiks training in their units. At least Burnside initially had a viable plan for the Crater attack and well-prepared the troops that he originally planned to use in the assault for their specific task.

One might imagine that when casualty figures presented by the West reached the ears of those 300,000 Russians mobilized for the Ukraine War surely created a greater sense of uncertainty among troops being mobilized for the Ukraine War long before reaching the battlefield. En tremblant! The likely indications and implications of the figures to most Mobiks were that they would have a small chance of surviving the war unscathed. Once on the battlefield and seeing the realities of the situation, the sense of uncertainty and fear surely increased exponentially and appears by accounts to have put a good number of them in a state of shock. Poorly trained, unable to escape their circumstance, they have only had their commanders with whom to turn. To the misfortune of the Mobiks, that better enabled their commanders to exert influence on them that was strong enough to compel them to charge into death in an instant. For those who have refused to do so, reportedly death threats would serve to coerce them to advance, a positively nightmarish Sylla and Charybdis scenario. Peior est bello timor ipse belli. (Worse than war is the very fear of war.

Mobiks during their brief training at a Russian Army base (above). So horrible is the situation for Russian Federation troops on the frontlines that Ukrainian soldiers have expressed empathy for them. They have witnessed firsthand how Russian Federation troops–invaders in their country–have been forced to sacrifice themselves when ordered to advance on their lines. A word often heard from Ukrainian frontline soldiers commenting on how Russian Federation troops were handled by their commanders is “cruel.” Ineffective frontal assault tactics are endlessly repeated. Ukrainian troops typically remark that “Russian soldiers advance, Ukrainian artillery destroys them, then more come the next day. Some Ukrainian soldiers have gone as far as to describe Russian Federation troops as being “like zombies.” 

The Professionals Saw Trouble Coming

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) The received wisdom often heard from military analysts in the West is that what is being observed is the way “Russia conducts a lot of its warfare — by overwhelming the enemy with volume, with people.” Moreover, it is accepted that “The Kremlin view, unfortunately, is that soldiers’ lives are expendable.” In a report from the Institute for the Study of War assessed that Moscow is not properly utilizing the reservists it began calling up last September. As for the cause, it was explained that “Systemic failures in Russia’s force generation apparatus continue to plague personnel capabilities to the detriment of Russian operational capacity in Ukraine.”

Yet, professional members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would likely disagree that there has been anything standard or normal about the manner Russian Federation Armed Forces have handled their soldier Marines, airmen, and sailors in Ukraine. As the war reached the 100-day mark, there was evidence that high-level casualties were growing. Professional soldiers in the Russian Army were making public appeals to Putin to investigate battlefield conditions. Units have faced exhausting tours on the frontlines. In a June 7, 2022 article, the Guardian cited two videos, fighters from Russian Federation-controlled east Ukraine complaining about poor conditions and long terms of duty at the front leading to exhaustion. the Guardian quoted one soldier from the Russian-controlled 113th regiment from Donetsk from one of the videos as commenting: “Our personnel have faced hunger and cold,” The soldier was quoted further as saying: “For a significant period, we were without any material, medical or food support.” The soldier reportedly went on to state: “Given our continuous presence and the fact that amongst our personnel there are people with chronic medical issues, people with mental issues, many questions arise that are ignored by the higher-ups at headquarters.”

Another Russian Federation soldier who had fought near Kyiv, Kharkiv, and was now in eastern Ukraine in an interview complained of exhaustion, saying he had even contacted a lawyer and complained that he had not seen his wife for months. He was quoted as saying: “I have been fighting in Ukraine since the start of the war, it has been over three months now.” A soldier from the 37th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade headquartered in Buryatia in Siberia, told the Guardian. “It is exhausting, my whole unit wants a break, but our leadership said they can’t replace us right now.” The soldier continued: “The three months of fighting already feel longer than the four years I spent serving in the army during peacetime.” The soldier boldly admitted: “I have already contacted a lawyer online who told me that by law the general can keep us here until our contract runs out so there isn’t much we can do.” Russian Federation Armed Forces do not have sufficient numbers of troops available to adjust or to rotate forces. Once units became heavily engaged with the Ukrainians, they were usually left in contact with them. 

Meanwhile, casualties among Russian Federation  officers keep mounting. Western officials have said that the Russian Federation’s mid and junior ranking officers have also taken heavy casualties “because they are held to an uncompromising level of responsibility for their units’ performance.” Company grade officers, lieutenants and captains, have had to lead the lowest level tactical actions, as the Russian Army does not staff units with highly trained and empowered noncommissioned officers. Western armies typically have such senior leaders staffed in units who can fulfill that role. At the time those interviews were made, four Russian Army generals were reportedly killed in combat. Professional Russian Army units have been more fortunate than others, particularly those soldiers recruited from the Russian Federation-controlled republics in Donetsk and Luhansk. They say their units were thrown into battle with little training at all. Videos have shown that some fighters have lacked basic gear for combat Kevlar vests and they are armed with older rifles. A soldier allegedly serving in Donetsk’s 107th Regiment complained to the Guardian: “Our mobilization was done unlawfully, without medical certification.” Another soldier from Donetsk said: “Over 70% of those here were previously decommissioned because they physically can’t fight. Over 90% have never fought before and saw a Kalashnikov for the first time. We were thrown on to the frontlines.”

When weary and weakened, mistakes become more commonplace among  commanders and soldiers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and that has become a significant part of Russia’s problems in Ukraine. Ukrainian commanders have often capitalized on those mistakes, creating even greater losses among Russian Federation troops. At the turn of the new year, on January 4, 2023, Ukrainian Armed Forces claimed a strike upon a vocational school building in Makiivka where hundreds of Russian Federation troops were reportedly clustered carelessly in a building close to the frontline. The Ukrainians claimed that around 400 Russian soldiers of one regiment were killed and around 300 more were wounded. The Russian Federation Armed Forces sought to blame the soldiers for their own deaths. Russian Army Lieutenant General Sergei Sevryukov said in a statement that their phone signals allowed Kyiv’s forces to “determine the coordinates of the location of military personnel” and launch a strike. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry, in a rare admission of losses, initially said the strike killed 63 troops. However, as emergency crews searched the ruins, the death toll mounted. The deputy commander of the regiment struck was among the dead. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence revealed on Twitter: “Given the extent of the damage, there is a realistic possibility that ammunition was being stored near to troop accommodation, which detonated during the strike, creating secondary explosions,” United Kingdom intelligence officials said: “The Russian military has a record of unsafe ammunition storage from well before the current war, but this incident highlights how unprofessional practices contribute to Russia’s high casualty rate.” It would seem that many Russian commanders are made with the same substance as Leslie and Ferrero

In their analysis of the Russian Federation Armed Forces capabilities mentioned earlier, Kofman and Lee also explained that the Russian military is well suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery.” They explained further that “By contrast, it is poorly designed for a sustained occupation, or a grinding war of attrition, that would require a large share of Russia’s ground forces, which is exactly the conflict it has found itself in.” Yet, even troops trained for short, high-intensity actions as the Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, have faced great challenges against the Ukrainian Armed Forces while performing that role. According to reports based on what was observed, the Russian Federation Armed Forces plan of attack against Hostomel Airport included its rapid occupation, with the intention of using it as an assembly area for Kyiv’s encirclement and capture. The airport is a bit over 6 miles north of Kyiv. The Initial February 24, 2022 assault on Hostomel Airport was a success, catching its Ukrainian defenders by surprise apparently due its speed. Mi-35 and Ka-52 attack helicopters operating out of Belarus struck the airport’s defenses and opened a way for helicopter-borne VDV units in Mi-8 transport helicopters that followed. However, despite being caught off guard by the initial assault by the attack helicopters, the attack itself was ineffective as the Ukrainian defenses were left largely intact.  Without any meaningful air support–it was very likely not included in formulation of the attack plan, VDV units on the ground faced counterattacks by Ukrainian forces almost immediately. 

Having secured Hostomel Airport to the extent possible on February 25, 2022, the VDV and Russian Army unit that linked up with them, proceeded to push into the nearby town and then  advance to Bucha and Irpin. Their poorly organized movement encountered ambushes in Hostomel and Bucha which resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment. When those in command decided to hold their positions, digging in on the roadsides, they became sitting ducks to night attacks by special forces units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and  suffered heavy casualties. On March 29, 2022, the order was given for the Russian Federation forces at Hostomel to withdraw from the Kyiv oblast, but they did so under continuous artillery fire from Ukrainian forces. Left with little choice if they were to survive, Russian Federation troops damaged equipment that had to be abandoned and made a break for it. What was supposed to be an organized withdrawal became a hasty retreat.

Russian Federation Airborne Ttroops during their verticle assault on Hostomel Airport (above). The received wisdom expressed is that Russian military is well suited to short, high-intensity campaigns defined by a heavy use of artillery, and is poorly designed for a sustained occupation, or a grinding war of attrition, that would require a large share of Russia’s ground forces as in Ukraine. Yet, even troops trained for short, high-intensity actions as the Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, have faced great challenges against the Ukrainian Armed Forces while performing that role. The Russian Federation Armed Forces plan of attack against Hostomel Airport, a bit over 6 miles north of Kyiv, nearly became a complete disaster. Professional members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would likely say that there has been anything standard or normal about the manner Russian Federation Armed Forces have handled their soldier Marines, airmen, and sailors in Ukraine. 

The Wagner Group

A most apparent act of archaic wartime callousness is the Russian Federation’s tactic of throwing units from Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) against Ukrainian positions. The Wagner Group is a private military contractor owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a millionaire restaurateur and entrepreneur, nicknamed “Putin’s chef” due to his close ties with the Russian Federation President. Wagner Group units have been deployed to bolster the number of Russian Federation forces in Ukraine. Moscow has used paid fighters to bolster its forces since the start of the special military operation. It was estimated in April 2022 to have initially deployed between 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries, including Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas.

To increase the organization’s strength even further, Prigozhin began to create new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. Much as the Union Army soldiers at the Crater, typically, the penal units are rushed into withering fire by Russian Army commanders perfunctorily without real the goal of attaining true military objectives or even success against their opponents most of the time. To that extent, the Wagner Group troops can rightfully be characterized as mere cannon fodder rather than trained and organized assault units. If there is any “worthwhile” purpose in sending the Wagner Group units to attack Ukrainian positions in such a manner, it is to allow them to identify defenses for Russian Army artillery to bombard. To a degree, this tactic has proven effective, but nonetheless it is a most apparent display of archaic wartime callousness. The Wagner Group troops’ display remarkable courage and obedience to authority, but their acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting hard because they have nothing left to lose. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, More than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut. There have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.

Special Problems of Winter

Weather conditions in eastern and southern Ukraine have been unfriendly to Russian Federation troops since the start of the special military operation. However, in the winter, “troops on the frontlines moved from being cold and wet to frozen and drenched.” They reportedly have inadequate sleeping bags, inadequate clothing and suffering from the cold. but they are kept in fight. Citing an interview of security expert in the United Kingdom, Robert Fox in the Daily Express, FoxNews reported “For the Russian troops, there is now quite significant evidence of ill-equipped, particularly recruits getting . . . even in the training camps, dying of hypothermia.” Fox commented further to the Daily Express: “That is really quite something. Inadequate sleeping bags, inadequate clothing and suffering from the cold. They find it difficult fighting in the cold but the fighting is going on.” Quoting Rebekah Koffler, a former DIA intelligence officer, FoxNews reported: “Russian soldiers dying from hyperthermia in winter is nothing new.” Koffler continued: “This is what happens when you have a fashion designer, such as Valentin Yudashkin [designer for former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s wife Raisa Gorbacheva], develop Russian military uniforms.” Koffler further stated: “Unlike the Soviet Army uniforms that were designed for severe Russian winters, modern Russian military uniform is not optimized for freezing temperatures.” Koffler additionally remarked: “Instead of using natural textiles like cotton, linen, and heavy and coarse wool, synthetic materials were used, which kept the soldiers cold in winter and hot in summer,” and “Bulky and baggy style was replaced with fitted styles.” When Shoigu was appointed Russian Federation Minister of Defense, he halted use of the traditional Russian footwear made of felt, valenki, which was worn by military and civilians for hundreds of years.

Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) fighters pose before rode sign at Bakhmut (above). The Wagner Group is a private military contractor operating in Ukraine that is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin, nicknamed “Putin’s chef” due to his close ties with the Russian Federation President. In a clear act of archaic wartime callousness, Russian Army commanders often send the Wagner Group units to attack Ukrainian positions in frontal assaults, allowing them to identify defenses for the artillery to bombard. Wagner Group units have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, More than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut.

Leadership Attributes Seemingly Absent among Russian Federation Commanders 

An important feature that top Russian Federation commanders by all appearances repeatedly walked past in every training exercise, either as vast as Zapad and Vostock or in independent training exercises at the division, brigade, regiment, and battalion levels, prior to February 24, 2022: was the lack of authentic military leadership displayed by officers at the field and company levels. While de rigueur as it may have been for decade, the absolute dependence upon the direction of superiors and voiding officers any freedom to be agile in thinking and flexible in action, to name only two impactful ills from a long list that beset the Russian Federation Armed Forces, would assure the death of fighting force on today’s battlefield. Such ways doubtlessly manifest the overly controlling and strict authoritarian government for which the Russian Federation Armed Forces serve and reflective of the nature of the country’s despotic political leadership.

To outline the attributes and expectations of military officers in a 21st century fighting force, on its face it would seem most efficacious to examine US Army leadership manuals online. (Seeking up-to-date expressions on military leadership, greatcharlie has refrained from using the leadership guides it retained after it military service far more than three decades ago! Wie die Zeit vergeht!). In reviewing materials available, an essay entitled “Eight Essential Characteristics of Officership” posted on a positively enlightening military blog, The Field Grade Leader, caught greatcharlie’s attention as it provides a superb, concise explanation of the pertinent attributes and expectations. Much of the information presented in the essay would very likely be alien to the ears of commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Presumably, there would also unlikely be a point of reference upon which officers in the Union Army or Confederate Army in the US Civil War, would have been able hypothetically to fully comprehend much of it. 

The eight characteristics are paraphrased here: 1) Lead: Being a leader and being in charge are often conflated, but they are really two different things. Beyond knowing where you are, where you want to go, and how you are going to get there, officers must inspire soldiers to take the journey with you. Officers must be prepared to make decisions, move the mission forward, and lead by example, never ordering a subordinate to make a sacrifice that he or she is unwilling to make. All officers no matter what their assignment must be leaders; 2) Listen: As nearly every team will have a resource of experienced senior leaders, officers should listen to their insights and suggestions wi/h an open mind and at times seek their advice. members that are an extremely valuable resource. Stories of their experiences in situations can provide examples of decisionmaking from which one can learn, be guided, and possibly mimic. To that extent, subordinates should not feel they are walking on a knife’s edge when approaching the leader with their ideas, but instead should feel comfortable doing so; 3) Support Your Commander: A leader must have clarity concerning the commander’s concept and intent for a mission. Once a legal and lawful order is issued, it must be executed within the parameters of the authority given. Commanders make decisions and assume the risks. Orders for action from commanders must not be questioned, or worse be disobeyed, but it should be permissible for officers to advise or make recommendations to superiors; 4) Learn and Improve: Officers must be acutely aware of their own strengths and weaknesses. To that extent, they must work hard to build on their strengths and correct their weaknesses. Goals for improvement should be realistic and achievable. Officers should never find comfort in remaining stagnant. Complacency is a fatal leadership flaw in the profession of arms; 5) Require Minimum Supervision: High operational tempo organizations that perform in complex environments suffer when officers within them require constant supervision. Officers in such organizations must understand their responsibilities and execute them without continual oversight. Commanders should not be overly burdened with questions from subordinates that should be able to answer themselves. The time for asking questions about performing tasks is the classroom and training exercises, not the actual battlefield; 6) Counsel Subordinates: Officers must well-communicate expectations and standards to subordinates for doing so provides a baseline for measuring performance and ensures that both the rater and rated officer understand what they should be doing. The most important tool that leaders have at their disposal to accomplish that is counseling; 7) Serve Those You Lead: Officers who take a genuine interest in their subordinates will see their teams achieve exceptional feats. Empathetically listen to what others are saying. Taking such interest must be attendant to counseling. Officers should circulate and be in contact with their soldiers. Getting to know one’s soldiers includes being ready to assist them not only professionally, but personally. Once an officer discovers a soldier’s goals, it is advisable to assist them in developing a course of action to reach them. Taking care of your soldiers leads to them taking care of the mission; and, 8) Be a Student of History: Professional officers must immerse themselves in their profession. Military history is replete with episodes that will relate to nearly every situation in which an officer may be in and offer much for them to learn from. By taking the opportunity in the present to learn from the past, officers can better prepare themselves to respond to situations, expected and unexpected, when they arise in the future. These characteristics must be worked at.

Russian Army commander prepares Mobiks to move to the frontlines (above). The visage of the young commander (center) says it all. There must be a true purpose for the sacrifices soldiers make on the battlefield. Soldiers should know what that purpose is. Any sort of logic that would cause a commander to so absolutely toss aside the sacred duty to care for the welfare of the troops they command, to violate the trust their soldiers have put in them,and throw them without purpose into the terror of the battlefield, is not faulty, but rather daylight madness. Committing them cavalierly to hopeless and meaningless offensives, localized attacks, and counterattacks could at best be attributed to delinquency and incompetence, and at worse, brutality, something very wrong up top, or telepathy from Hell, the despotic intrusion of Satan’s will.

Likely Professional Thinking Behind the Respective Commanders’ Choices at the Crater and in Ukraine

Omnia mala exempla ex rebus bonis orta sunt. (Also, omnia mala exempla orta sunt ex bonis initiis.) (Every bad precedent originated as a justifiable measure.) Available to officers of both the Union Army and Confederate Army before the Battle of the Crater was The Officer’s Manual Napoleon’s Maxims of War. The book provides a translation of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s maxims by Sir George Charles D’Aguilar, British Army officer serving as the Lieutenant Governor of Hong Kong, The entire manual reflects the received wisdom on the conduct of warfare at the time of its publication. The book’s “Recommendation”, included in the text’s first published in the US in 1861, was written by none other than Winfield Scott. Known as the Grand Old Man of the Army for his many years of service, US Army Major General Winfield Scott’s military talent was highly regarded by contemporaries, and viewed by historians as one of the most accomplished generals in US history. In 1855, he received a brevet promotion to the rank of lieutenant general, becoming the first US Army officer to hold that rank since US President George Washington. Scott was popular not only as a soldier among the public, but also as a statesman–in 1859 he resolved the Pig War, peacefully halting the last of a long series of US-United Kingdom border conflicts–and as a politician–a 4-time presidential candidate for the Whig Party. When the Civil War began, Scott, a Virginia native, stayed loyal to the Union, and served as an important adviser to US President Abraham Lincoln during the opening stages of the war. He developed a strategy known as the Anaconda Plan, but retired in late 1861 after Lincoln increasingly relied on General George McClellan for military advice and leadership. In his comments on Napoleon’s Maxim’s of War, Scott wrote: “After refreshing my memory by looking over again, ‘Re Officer’s Manual,’ or ‘Maxims of Napoleon,’ I think I may safely recommend republication, in America, of the work in English, as likely to be called for by many officers, regular and volunteer. It contains a circle of maxims deduced from the highest source of military science and experience, with practical illustrations of the principles taken from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. The study of the book can not fail to set all young officers on a course of inquiry and reflection greatly to their improvement.”

Among the maxims in the work, most apposite to the discussion here is Maxim XV which states: “The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair, while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by the means we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.” Napoleon expressed similar sentiments earlier in the book in Maxim VI in which Napoleon states: At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance, is a matter for grave consideration; but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skillful the manœuvers in a retreat, it will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and material than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle, the enemy’s loss is nearly equal to your own–whereas in a retreat, the loss is on your side only.” Napoleon left no doubt in his writings that he believed war was governed by principles. Yet, as with the principles in other fields, no matter how rare they may be, circumstances can arise in war which may pose challenges to strictures developed from its accepted principles.

Fallacies non causae it causae. (Fallacy to accept something as fundamental when it is not.) There are often situations that require more than just barreling ahead regardless of losses. To crack on en masse into oblivion is just madness. In modern armies in 2023, one would imagine commanders in modern armies have trained and fully grasp the need to rely upon one’s training and studies in military philosophy but also one’s talents, practicality, flexibility, creativity, and ingenuity. As discussed in greatcharlie’s  August 31, 2022 post entitled “Would the Ejection of Russian Forces from Ukraine Lead to a Thermonuclear Response by Moscow?: Some Meditations on Putin’s Likely Thinking”, Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another. Most relevant here is the fact that Ukrainian commanders fully comprehend the benefits of  withdrawing their units when conditions are most unfavorable instead of demanding troops hold on to untenable positions until they were forced to retreat in order to survive or surrender.

Remaining dedicated to the unit’s mission and the overall mission of the team as a priority is an idea driven into the minds of all soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers in basic training and throughout their careers. For officers,, in terms of priority, first comes the mission, next the soldiers come, then themselves. It is true a mission can only be achieved through high morale, aggressive action and perseverance. The spirit must be indomitable. Through great displays of such tenacity, battles are won. Fortis est non pertussis in revise asperis. (The strong do not falter in adversity.)

Reputation and honor have also been motivating factors among officers. To display audacity, gallantry before peers has typically been an objective of utmost importance. In accounts of battles in the lyrics military marches, it is most often expressed that the indications and implications of such qualities are of utmost importance. The Régiment de Sambre et Meuse (1870), for example, is a song about a French regiment that fought against the Austrians in 1794 to defend the fledgling Republic. It was written in 1870 to try and boost French patriotic feelings after the rather ignominious defeat against Germany that would deprive France of the Alsace and Lorraine provinces until the end of WWI. Sambre et Meuse is the name of a former French province that is currently part of Belgium. The poignant, pertinent third verse of the march is as follows: “Le choc fut semblable à la foudre / Ce fut un combat de géants / Ivres de gloire, ivres de poudre / Pour mourir, ils serraient les rangs ! / Le régiment par la mitraille / Était assailli de partout, / Pourtant, la vivante muraille / Impassible, restait debout.” (The clash was like a lightning strike, / it was a struggle of giants. / Drunk with glory, drunk with gunpowder, / they closed ranks to perish together! / The regiment was assailed / by a hail of bullets from all sides. / And yet the living wall, / impervious, remained standing.) It seems apropos to make note of a more renowned piece about patriotism, war, and glory also from France, composed by Claude-Joseph Rouget de Lisle in 1792,  that begins as follows: Allons enfant de la patrie / Le jour de gloire est arrivé! (Let’s go children of the fatherland, / The day of glory has arrived!)

Attendant to the preceding, often political leaders and senior commanders have insisted upon the continued astonishing sacrifices of soldiers in a battle, believing the reputation and honor of their armed forces and their country was at stake.

All of that having been stated, at the Crater, Grant saw the horror of it all and ordered Burnside to retreat, but oddly he disobeyed his command. Meade also saw the futility of the attack and refused to reinforce failure by agreeing to Burnside’s request to commit additional troops to it. In one episode in October 2022 in Ukraine, Surovikin made the unpopular decision to pull Russian troops away from Kherson to more stable positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. According to Reuters, Surovikin explained: “I understand that this is a very difficult decision, but at the same time we will preserve the most important thing – the lives of our servicemen and, in general, the combat effectiveness of the group of troops, which it is futile to keep on the right bank in a limited area.” Despite his honorable and noble intentions, Surovikin was at first denigrated by conservative political leaders and by conservative newsmedia outlets as being defeatist and unnecessarily ceding captured territory to the Ukrainians.

There must be a true purpose for the sacrifices soldiers make on the battlefield. Soldiers should know what that purpose is. Any sort of logic that would cause a commander to so absolutely toss aside the sacred duty to care for the welfare of the troops they command, to violate the trust their soldiers have put in them,and throw them without purpose into the terror of the battlefield, is not faulty, but rather daylight madness. Committing them cavalierly to hopeless and meaningless offensives, localized attacks, and counterattacks could at best be attributed to delinquency and incompetence, and at worse, brutality, something very wrong up top, or telepathy from Hell, a despotic intrusion of Satan’s will.

Recognizably, Russian Army commanders are known, expected, and applauded in their organization for displaying sternness or severity of manner or attitude. A feature of Surovikin’s record as he rose as a commander was his behavior in that regard. Some might point to the fact that several Russian Army generals and colonels have lost their lives while serving as inspirational leaders in attacks against Ukrainian positions. However, such efforts, though impressive and admittedly valorous, seemed to be less acts of committed leaders, and more acts of desperation as responsibility for the success or failure of their units’ actions rested on their shoulders. It would appear such actions by generals and level commanders ever did much to change outcomes on the battlefield. The situations of the respective units were rarely made much better after the sacrifices. It would seem fortunate enough for them if the situation remained essentially the same. After their tragic loss, the situation for those units for the most have deteriorated in their absence. The Ukrainian advance has not been effectively slowed or stalled following their actions..The indications and implications of results on the battlefield are that Russian Army commanders reeled in 2022  from effects of their dereliction concerning training and preparing their units. While they may not have expended fuel and petroleum oil lubricants and other resources to training not ordered from above, they could have regularly scheduled sand table and map exercises with officers and noncommissioned officers in their respective units in case something akin to he “special military operation” were launched. Noncommissioned officers could have counseled soldiers on movement technique in the field and reviewed as many “what ifs” as time allowed. The idea of the Russian Federation invading Ukraine was hanging in the air in January and February of 2022. It would be a charitable assumption to say Russian commanders were unaware that action was possible and they needed to begin thinking “even more” about the soldiers’ well-being.

Mobiks in Crimea receiving blessings from a Russian Orthodox priest as part of a departure ceremony In November 2022 (above). In 2023, a young man or woman who volunteers, is conscripted, or is pressed into service via conscription to serve in the armed forces of their country in war has much to reasonably expect from their faithful service. Soldiers of every country should be able to believe their political leaders have concluded that some objective of great value, that is just, will be attained by the selective application of their fighting skills. They should be able to believe when they are sent into harm’s way that the decision was founded on the best advice of senior military leaders. Soldiers must believe they are being utilized by senior commanders in the best possible way to achieve victory in battle. Further, soldiers must feel assured that their commanders, in planning military action, will attempt to increase their chances of survival and minimize, to the greatest degree possible, to potential loss of life.

On Soldiers

As has been the case for centuries, citizens have chosen to serve their countries when at war due to a variety of motivations. Surely, greatcharlie is not breaking any new ground in explaining that. The following list offers a mere handful of 14 likely motivations based on empirical evidence: 1) Exigence circumstance: seeing understanding actual need to protect their families and communities and country; 2) Allegiance: Duty respond to their country’s call, perhaps while uncertain and fearful of outcome; 3) Honor: refusal to avoid the call to serve their country in war regardless of whether most citizens view find the need to fight reasonable and just or based on disagreeable political objectives of their government; 4) Patriotism: a love of country in general and willingness to protect it; 5) Romanticism: rushing off to war with a romanticized view of serving ones country in war based on stories of the past deeds of others on the battlefield; 6) Escape from unpleasant circumstances; the opportunity to serve one’s country at war provides reason to escape an environment or undesirable circumstances an individual may be in; 7) Venal: impelled by monetary gain or promises of other gains no matter how meager; 8) Insecurity: going to war impelled by the feeling one have something to prove to family, community,, or the world, desperately seeking validation in other people’s approval; 9) Excitement: Seeking some personal thrill from wartime experience and the chance to engage in daredevil activities; 10) Obedience to authority: obeying the demand of government to report for service in war due to a fear of reprisal; 11) Nationalism: an excessive or prejudicial support of country’s interests or historic enmity toward another country or other countries, that may lead to the support of expansionist actions as much as, as dictated by political leadership that are to exclusion or detriment of other countries interests; 12) Ethno-religious nationalism an excessive or prejudicial support of country’s interests or historic enmity toward citizens of another country or other countries based primarily on respective ethnic, racial, religious differences that would cause one serve in an expansionist military action against the other country, or support for one’s own ethnic, racial, religious group to the extent that one would be willing to go war to defend or support the expansionist aims of those of one’s group in other countries against an opposing ethnic racial or religious group; 13) Revolutionary zeal: being impelled by a country central revolutionary philosophy to serve in war to defend one’s country thus ensuring the survival of the ideals of one’s country or support one country’s expansionist aims to ensure the propagation of the central revolutionary philosophy of one’s country or group, being certain of the philosophy’s correctness; and, 14) Recherché or outré reasoning, philosophy, or ideate: to welcome the chance to fight in war for anomalous, eccentric, perhaps even unsound, personal reasons.

Whatever the underlying motivation or rationale for their choice, even those of whom reasonable individuals could hardly call noble, those choosing to serve in war are placed under the authority of their respective country’s political leadership, under the control of the military chain of command from the country’s top generals and admirals down to the commanders of their respective organizations and units, and under the complete direction of their immediate organization and unit officers. However, they were not born with an intrinsic purpose to have their lives extinguished, bodies torn to pieces, at their officers’ whims and megrims. In his renowned work New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. by W. J. R. Sproutt (W. W. Norton & Company, 1933), Sigmund Freud, the 20th century Moravian born neurologist and founder of psychoanalysis, explains: “It is asking a great deal of a man, who has learnt to regulate his everyday affairs in accordance with the rules of experience and with due regard to reality, that he should entrust precisely what affects him most nearly to the care of an authority which claims as its prerogative freedom from all the rules of rational thought.” Nevertheless, Herr Doktor, near complete submission to the control of superiors has been an essential, immutable requirement of military service throughout the ages.

In 2023, a young man or woman who volunteers, is conscripted, or is pressed into service via conscription to serve in the armed forces of their country in war has much to reasonably expect from their faithful service. Soldiers of every country should be able to believe their political leaders have concluded that some objective of great value, that is just, will be attained by the selective application of their fighting skills. They should be able to believe when they are sent into harm’s way that the decision was founded on the best advice of senior military leaders. Soldiers must believe they are being utilized by their commanders in the best possible way to achieve victory in battle. Further, soldiers must feel assured that their commanders, in planning military action, will attempt to increase their chances of survival and minimize, to the greatest degree possible, to potential loss of life. Of course, big mistakes can be made even by the most experienced and best prepared commanders in prosecuting a war. Additionally, no commander can possibly promise that none of their soldiers will not be wounded, captured, or killed in war.

Not only will morale suffer, but performance will surely degrade when soldiers are: uncertain of mission if the overall concept of a military action is unjust, invalid by law; uncertain of the purpose of a military action: the political authority’s concept and intent for the action is unclear and their commander’s concept and intent are unclear; uncertain their leadership is dysfunctional: commanders are hamstrung by superiors and confined to parameters of action by political systems or they are simply delinquent and negligent; uncertain of their capabilities versus the opponent–soldiers are provided poor equipment, their force has readily observable vulnerabilities, their opponent possess superior, seemingly invincible, and unlimited supplies of weapon systems; and, uncertain of victory–on a daily basis, soldiers experience heavy losses in equipment, exceedingly high casualties in their ranks, the regular loss of comrades, the influx of untrained replacements, and they sense their sacrifices will prove to be meaningless. Such strains and trauma placed upon soldiers could prove to be irreparable.

One can only imagine thoughts churning within the minds of so many young conscripts, nel massimo dolore, most having barely discovered what life has to offer. Many young soldiers at the Crater and in during other battle in other wars have surely felt the same. What comes to mind are the words of the character Floria Tosca in Act II of Giacomo Puccini’s opera, “Tosca” (1899). The Chief of the secret police, Scarpia, has thrown Tosca’s beloved into prison for treason and tortures him. She vehemently protests. Scarpia tells her she could save him by submitting completely to his ugly amorous advances. Tosca sings “Vissi d’Arte” after avoiding dodging him repeatedly she asks God why has He abandoned her during this terrible time. A portion of the haunting soprano aria is as follows: Vissi d’arte, vissi d’amore, / non feci mai male ad anima viva!… / Con man furtiva / quante miserie conobbi, aiutai… / Sempre con fe’ sincera, / la mia preghiera / ai santi tabernacoli salì. / Sempre con fe’ sincera / diedi fiori agli altar. / alzandosi / Nell’ora del dolore / perché, perché Signore, / perché me ne rimuneri così? (I lived for art. I lived for love: / Never did I harm a living creature! … / Whatever misfortunes I encountered / I sought with secret hand to succour … / Ever in pure faith, / My prayers rose / In the holy chapels. / Ever in pure faith, / I brought flowers to the altars. / In this hour of pain, why, / Why, oh Lord, why / Dost Thou repay me thus?)

The Way Forward

For the Russian Federation, the Ukraine War is a war of conquest. The tissue of lies leaders tell their citizens, and tell themselves about the war, has become further attenuated. With the Russian Federation Armed Forces being exposed for the inefficient forces they truly are conventionally, little is left in the way of words alone for the country’s political leadership to sway any listeners, much less their armed forces. Nevertheless, as they now despotically control their soldiers through threats of reprisals, promise to destroy the whole wide world if the war in Ukraine is lost, they have also turned those techniques upon the global audience, threatening thermonuclear war and encouraging fear mongering, while insisting the Russian Federation is the victim, the country threatened. 

Even before the special military operation began, political leaders, newsmedia political commentators and bloggers touted the prowess of the Russian Federation Armed Forces pointing to the indomitable spirit and durability of its fighters while denying the Ukrainians had any real capabilities to prevent the Russian Federation’s inevitable victory. Yet, they now ironically point to the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against theirs to prove that the US and NATO are the engines behind the Ukraine threat, and prove it is all part of a longstanding US and NATO plan to encroach on Russian Federation with their sights trained on its natural resources, and eventually take full control their country. Hyperbolic to the end, political leaders in Moscow insist that Ukraine, the US, the  EU, and NATO will be destroyed. Flashing a bit of optimism, they view keeping the US directly out of the fight is in itself a victory, and a sign Washington fears the Russian Federation’s true power: its nuclear arsenal. It all seems to have real meaning for them, yet it all rings very hollow. Putin promises to replenish the arsenals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and insists a new era of weapon systems development has been embarked upon during which the world will witness Russian Federation industries produce systems “decades ahead of their foreign counterparts.” To students and scholars familiar with the German Third Reich’s history, Putin’s rhetoric on superweapons–Wunderwaffe–surely sounds terribly familiar. It is all stupefying to the eyes and ears of the reasonable. It would have been “cheaper” for Putin to pay the full price of training and fully equipping his Russian Federation Armed Forces and ordering an orderly mobilization of an additional 100,000 conscripts and preparing them for war in a military fashion. Yet, Russian Federation commanders might even have been the wild card in all of that. It is hard to know if they are really capable of anything impressive or even average militarily, given the shortcomings they have put on display in Ukraine..

Soldiers cannot hold much hope to be treated fairly, for victory, or survival fighting for a country whose political leadership makes fantastic claims about unseen super-weapons and secret military capabilities and regularly makes false statements on the situation in war they are fighting. Naturally, a close eye must be kept on what Putin is saying and doing regarding Ukraine, to include expressions of that kind. Equally naturally, focus must be kept on what will most likely come next. In all honesty, it has become increasingly difficult for greatcharlie to see how this entire episode will end “peacefully” for any country involved.

Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan

US airmen and marines (above) load M777 artillery pieces marked for delivery to the Ukrainian Armed Forces on an US Air Force transport plane. Many weapon systems sent into Ukraine have had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. Firepower in the form of multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled artillery, and heavy caliber guns, transported possibly along the now heavily traveled supply lines from both Poland and Romania enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to launch two highly-successful counteroffensives. Presented here are some ruminations on Russia’s failure to initially shut the door to the massive levels of military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the US, other NATO Member States and the EU via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Emphasis is placed on the likely reasons why Russia went into Ukraine militarily without addressing the potential impact of Western resupply of Ukrainian forces. To that extent, issues considered include: whether the Russian Federation General Staff was responsible for this considerable delinquency or was the Kremlin near criminally remiss for not heeding likely recommendations of the military chiefs and their war planners.

Intriguingly, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin launched the Ukraine War lacking a strategy that took into consideration of what Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) would come up against. What was seemingly completely missed or misunderstood was the degree of support from the US and NATO Member States that Kyiv would receive. No effort, that was apparent, was made to obviate the ability of the US and its NATO allies to supply Ukraine at will as part of the military strategy. From the start, conquering Kyiv was the focus as if Putin, his foreign and national security policy team at the Kremlin, and his senior commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Perhaps, for Putin, the conquest of Ukraine was a dream on which he could feast his imagination. That was at least until the matter was reduced to reality. If one might think of Putin at all as a rational actor, it would seem Putin has painted himself into a corner. That is quite unlike Putin. Some might say that after all the years of accomplishments and successes, and all the experience, he was bound to make one big mistake. It is a real head rubber.

Presented here are some ruminations on Russia’s failure to initially shut the door to the massive levels of military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the US, other NATO Member States and the EU via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Emphasis is placed on the likely reasons why Russia went into Ukraine militarily without addressing the potential impact of Western resupply of Ukrainian forces. To that extent, issues considered include: whether the Russian Federation General Staff was responsible for this considerable delinquency or was the Kremlin near criminally remiss for not heeding the recommendations of the military chiefs and their war planners; whether the door was left wide open between Poland Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania with Ukraine because they were hamstrung by Putin’s concept that a successful “lighting strike in Ukraine” could be achieved even though the idea was apparently developed in the abstract; and, whether they had little choice but to acquiesce to the manifestations of Putin’s sense of vulnerability over Ukraine’s close ties to the US, the EU, and NATO. Unless one was actually behind closed doors of conference rooms in the Kremlin and the national security bureaucracies in Moscow, or “reading someone’s mail,” one cannot know for certain how the decision concerning resupply from western Ukraine was made or maybe not made. The best informed guess would inevitably be an interpretation. While “ruminating”, greatcharlie sought to stay grounded within the realm of what would actually be possible in Putin’s regime given what is known about it. Insights offered here are occasionally supported with historical examples of timeless relevance that immediately came to mind or actually helped to generate ruminations. Causa latet, vis est notification. (The cause is hidden, the result is obvious.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General Colin Powell (above) at press conference at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991. When a military campaign is launched, often an objective becomes separating an opposing army from what gives it support and what allows it to continue to generate combat power. Acting in this manner against an opponent is referred to as acting decisively. During the Persian Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, the concept of separating Iraqi forces in Kuwait from resupply as well as command and control from the Iraqi military and political leadership was expressed without ambiguity by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General Colin Powell during a press conference at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991. He famously stated: “Our strategy to go after this army is very, very simple. First, we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it.”

Why Is Resupply an Issue?

When sent to war, the purpose of an army is to use its trained troops to deliver calculated lethal violence in protection of their country and its values wherever they are ordered to go. Not to be forgotten, is the necessity that the army’s troops place their very lives on the line in that pursuit. Equally important to note, not all countries have the same values. The values of the Russian Federation, particularly those that compelled the invasion of Ukraine, are quite different, for example, from those of the United Kingdom, France, or Germany. As professionals, army commanders act to the best of their knowledge and experience, use their troop in accordance with their army’s doctrine and in obedience to the concept and intent laid out by the army’s senior leadership. When it is the case, the army leadership acts in fol)owing with the concept and intent of their country’s political leadership. Such was the case when the Russian Federation Armed Forces were directed by Putin and ordered by the Russian Federation General Staff to invade Ukraine.

Today, armies can deploy with a considerable amount of supplies, but supplies begin to deplete as soon as the fight is underway. Nevertheless, to keep the army going, long before it becomes engaged, considerations and arrangements are made by planners and logistical (supply) officers to transport supplies wherever they are needed. Losing the ability to be resupplied means an army can fight only until the point when it metaphorically and literally, as one element of resupply, runs out of gas. To that extent, the most extreme of human endeavors becomes an even greater challenge for troops in that army. Whether resupply is possible can more often mean the difference between victory and defeat. 

To be a useful, effective fighting force on the battlefield, critical items such as bullets, grenades, rifles, other small arms, Kevlar vests, phones, petroleum, oil lubricants, and all and elements as replacement troops, and troop medical evacuation must get up to where the fight is. As shortages become problematic, commanders must begin to economize, their ability to act will be reduced, and subsequently their army becomes far less effective. The commander of the opposing army, if a capable commander, will discern the change, recognize the advantage presented and seek to exploit it as best as possible. The decision would need to be made on whether the army with dwindling supplies should be withdrawn. If the situation reaches the point when the commander can no longer act to alter the army’s situation, his army is being battered, or his army is cut off and has no available means of egress, he may be forced to surrender. While this description is somewhat oversimplified, it lends support for the idea that when a military campaign is launched, often an objective becomes separating an opposing army from what gives it support and what allows it to continue to generate combat power. Acting in this manner against an opponent is referred to as acting decisively.

During the Persian Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, the concept of separating Iraqi forces in Kuwait from resupply as well as command and control from the Iraqi military and political leadership was expressed without ambiguity by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General Colin Powell during a press conference at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991 alongside the US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. In the hour-long briefing, which detailed the first week of operations of the 28-nation coalition against Iraq, Powell famously stated: “Our strategy to go after this army is very, very simple. First, we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it. To cut it off, that began last week when we started to go after the nerve center, the brains of the operation, the command and control of the operation, and the lines of communication that come out of Baghdad and other places in the country.”

One might have expected that Russian Federation Armed Forces top commanders and planners, in a similar vein, might have taken a similar tack toward the Ukraine Armed Forces. It might have been expected that they would have recognized that resupply not so much from Ukrainian arsenals but from those of US, other NATO Member States, and other countries in the EU would need to be blocked, cut off in some way. Yet, nothing remotely similar to what Powell expressed in 1991 was heard from theMinisterstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation) or General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), or from Putin, himself, about cutting Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) off from resupply. There were no feigned movements such as moving Russian Federation forces to points outside Ukraine from which a blocking operation could best be launched in order to signal the intention to cut the Ukrainian Armed Forces off from resupply. Nothing was done sufficiently enough to cause supporters of the government of Kyiv to second guess any planned efforts to resupply the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In view of the potential decisive impact from contributions by the 30 countries in NATO,  particularly the US with its military largess, it would seem some Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and planners thinking logically would urge the Russian Federation General Staff to suggest scrapping the operation until the problem of the Western resupply threat was resolved. 

A near endless list of situations during wars in which resupply determined the outcome of battle or even the war, itself. For example, armies have often encountered difficulties in cutting off resupply on a strategic level when fighting a determined opponent. Occasionally political leaders and army commanders have been slow in recognizing the opportunity to act decisively to mitigate resupply efforts on a strategic level. Armies have faced difficulties on the tactical level against a smaller force of well-trained, well-organized, and well-led opposing troops, even during a siege, when sufficient resupply has been made available to them

Ho Chi Minh Trail

The Ho Chi Minh Trail (Đường mòn Hồ Chí Minh) was a supply system that provided support, in the form of manpower and materiel, to the Communist insurgency, Viet Cong, and the People’s Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese Army) during the Vietnam War. It comprised a logistical network of roads and trails that ran from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Initially troops, pushing heavily laden bicycles, driving oxcarts, or carrying supplies on their backs, moved hundreds of tons of supplies along it. However, trucks would become the primary means of moving supplies and troops. By 1969, tgere was even a pipeline crossed the Lao frontier through the Mu Gia Pass and, by 1970, it reached the approaches to the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam. The plastic pipeline, equipped with numerous small pumping stations, managed to transfer diesel fuel, gasoline, and kerosene all through the same pipe. By the end of 1970, the number of pipelines entering Laos increased to six that year. As a whole, supply efforts through trail were quite effective, which no mean feat given US efforts to thwart effort through trail included attacks from a CIA-raised clandestine army and the most intense air interdiction campaign in history. Mitigating the effects of US operations to destroy the trail was an existential effort. One might say the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the “center of gravity” for the Communists. Its loss probably would have led to their defeat in the war. As long as supplies could get to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, their war effort could continue with vigor which complicated US-led efforts to secure South Vietnam for the government in Saigon. South Vietnam would eventually surrender to North Vietnam.

Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945

During World War II, Germany acted robustly to prevent merchant ships from carrying food, raw materials, troops and their equipment from North America to the United Kingdom. If they had succeeded, the outcome of war might have been radically different. The United Kingdom might have been starved into submission, which would have been complete strain on the morale. Its forces and those of its allies worldwide likely would have been deeply impacted. The supply line from the US was essentially the beating heart, the center of gravity, of the United Kingdom’s war effort. The threat to the movement of ships across the Atlantic came in the form of German submarines, the “Unterseeboot” or U-boat. United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill once wrote that, “The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.”

At the start of World War II, the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (Commander of the Submarines) was Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) Karl Dōnitz. Dönitz pushed for a German fleet that consisted almost entirely of U-boats, claiming that depriving Germany’s enemies of vital supplies such as food and oil would be the most effective way to achieve victory. He claimed that given 300 U-Boats of the latest design, the Type VII, he could defeat the entire Royal Navy. He would utilize them in tactical formations that would later be called “wolfpacks”. Dőnitz’s  superior, Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) and Großadmiral, Oberkommando der Marine (the Naval High Command) Erich Raeder, was uninterested in his theories. Raeder was a traditionalist whose focus was surface warfare. Raeder also judged that Germany could not contest the Royal Navy for control of the sea. Even more, Raeder believed submarine warfare was cowardly. By 1941, although relatively small in number, U-boats under then Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral) Dőnitz were threatening Allied shipping as far as the US east coast. By the end of 1942, U-boat “wolfpacks” were achieving considerable success in sinking merchant ships. By early 1943, the United Kingdom’s resources, especially oil, were running out, and it became a question of whether Allied shipyards could build merchant ships fast enough to replace the tonnage that was being sunk. 

Finally recognizing the value of then Admiral Dönitz concepts on the effective conduct of submarine warfare, in January 1943, German Führer und Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler saw to it that he was advanced to the rank of Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) and replaced Großadmiral Erich Raeder as Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine and Großadmiral, Oberkommando der Marine. Interestingly, he retained his post as Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote. Dőnitz was given the authority to act as he saw fit with German naval forces too late. At that juncture, Dőnitz had 200 operational U-boats. By April 1943, his U-boats were clearly struggling to make an impact. The Allies were sinking German submarines in greater numbers, with 45 being destroyed in the months of April and May. Aggressive Allied anti-submarine tactics were aided by the introduction of new technology. Long-range aircraft were equipped with centimetric radar and directed based on Ultra intelligence from intercepts of Kriegsmarine Enigma code communications. The mass production of Liberty Ships in US shipyards would ensure that the Allies would overcome attrition rates and win the Battle of the Atlantic. Without the victory, the Allies would not have been able to land forces ashore in the Mediterranean Theater or at Normandy.

In Operation Sonnenblume, in 1941, the German Afrika Korps‘ first offensive in North Africa, it sought to advance on Alexandria and Suez. In that advance, the capture of Tobruk was a priority as it was the only deep water port in Eastern Libya and would have provided the Germans with the closest supply port to the Egypt–Libya border. Of some significance is the fact that the one the renowned military commanders to emerge from the war led the attack on Tobruk: Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Erwin Rommel. In 1940, Rommel commanded the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France where he demonstrated skill in the new tactic of blitzkrieg. He was a military officer who knew his business. When Rommel struck, he achieved complete surprise against British Army units in Libya’s eastern coastal region. The British Army was forced to retreat several hundred miles across the desert toward Tobruk. At Tobruk, the British Army and its allies held on. The Germans frequently bombarded the port. A blockade had been organized to thwart British resupply and reinforcement efforts. However, ships of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Station ran the blockade, and provided Tobruk’s defenders gunfire support, supplies, fresh troops and by ferrying out the wounded. The defenders of Tobruk received enough resources to keep up the fight. Rommel was stopped and the siege was lifted in December 1941.

Tobruk Siege 1941

In Operation Sonnenblume, from February 6, 1941 to May 25,1941, its first offensive in North Africa, the German Afrika Korps sought to advance on Alexandria and Suez in that advance, the capture of Tobruk was a main objective. Tobruk was the only deep water port in Eastern Libya and would have provided Rommel a supply port closer to the Egypt–Libya border than Benghazi, 900 kilometers or 560 miles west of the Egyptian frontier, which was within the range of Royal Air Force bombers; Tripoli was 1,500 kilometers or 930 miles to the west in Tripolitania. Of some significance is the fact that the one the renowned military commanders to emerge from the war led the attack on Tobruk: Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Erwin Rommel. A veteran of World War I, from 1929 through 1933, Rommel served as an instructor at the Dresden Infantry School and from 1935 at the Kriegsakademie (German War Academy) at Potsdam. In 1940, Rommel commanded the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France where he demonstrated skill in the new tactic of blitzkrieg. He was a military officer who knew his business. When Rommel struck, his Afrika Korps achieved complete surprise against British Army units in Libya’s eastern coastal region of Cyrenaica. The British Army was forced to retreat several hundred miles across the desert towards Tobruk.

Recognizing that he had the opportunity to capture Tobruk before the British Army and its Allies had time to organize an effective defense, Rommel advanced aggressively to exploit it. The 9th Australian Division, dubbed “The Rats of Tobruk”, supported by British Army armor and artillery, repulsed initial German assaults on April 10, 1941 to April 14, 1941, and even when the fresh 15th Panzer Division was committed to the attack on April 30, 1941, the defenders held on. The Germans frequently bombarded the port with artillery and Luftwaffe (German Air Force) dive-bombers and medium bombers. A blockade had been organized to thwart British resupply and reinforcement efforts. However, ships of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Station–to include the Inshore Squadron–ran the blockade. Indeed, known as the “Tobruk Ferry Service”, Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy warships provided gunfire support, supplies, fresh troops and by ferrying out the wounded. The defenders of Tobruk were provided enough resources to keep up the fight. The Royal Air Force flew defensive sorties from airfields far away in Egypt. The siege of Tobruk was the first occasion in the war that German Panzer units had been stopped. The siege was lifted in December 1941. It must be noted that via Operation Crusader, launched on November 27, 1941, Tobruk was relieved by the British Eighth Army which after September 1941, controlled British Army and other Allied ground forces in the Western Desert. It seems worthwhile to note the Fall of Tobruk occurred when Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel  commanding Panzerarmee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) which controlled the Afrika Korps and additional German units deployed to Africa as the 90th Light Infantry Division), as well as the Italian X Corps and XX Corps, attacked  on June 20, 1942 with massed air support, broke through a weak point on the eastern defensive perimeter, and captured the port. Although the garrison on the western perimeter had not been attacked, it was cut off from supplies and transport. Lacking the means to escape, the majority had to surrender; 33,000 prisoners were taken. Rommel had indeed learned lessons during the 1941 siege.

Être Voué à L’échec dès le Début

Even if everything else had been planned and arranged in the correct manner in every other aspect for the invasion, the viability of the entire plan would still rest on the ability of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to at best destroy, acceptably disrupt, or at the absolute minimum, delay resupply from the US, EU, and NATO. Without being able to control the movement of resupply in the West, the plan for the invasion should have been scrapped or the attack should have been postponed until that was nailed down. The reasoning behind such a decision has already been made abundantly clear looking at the circumstances of the handful of examples presented here already. As it was, the “special military operation” was launched, half-baked, and billions of dollars in military assistance has reached the Ukrainian Armed Forces via their country’s western border. Many weapon systems sent into Ukraine have had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. Firepower in the form of multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled artillery, and heavy caliber guns, transported possibly along the now heavily traveled supply lines from both Poland and Romania enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to launch two highly-successful counteroffensives. On August 29, 2022, a counteroffensive was launched to eject Russian forces occupying the Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts (provinces). On September 6, 2022, a counteroffensive was launched to eject Russian forces occupying the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. Given the unsatisfactory nature in which the Russian invasion was arranged and indeed, has been prosecuted, the decision to go into Ukraine was the sort that if made during an instance of saber rattling and war fever in a highly-industrialized democracy, would very likely lead to the impeachment of a national leader.

Ruminations

To set the record straight from the outset, greatcharlie believes that if Russian Federation forces were selectively positioned in Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would have likely used their formidable and quite impressive drone arsenal to bombard them. They might have achieved the same relative success that they have achieved with Russian Federation forces in the east and south and around Kyiv. Once aptly prepared, Ukrainian special forces would likely do their part to hunt down and displace and destroy any Russian Federation troops settled in their country’s Western region. 

Commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces would unlikely have known or believed any of that would have been possible before the invasion. One would need to consider other reasons for the omission of a mission to thwart, to an extent blockade resupply to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the West.The Romania-Ukraine border is 649 kilometers or around 403 miles, but it is discontinuous. The. Moldova-Ukraine border is 1,222 kilometers or 759 miles. However, along the Dniester River, between Moldova and Ukraine, is the autonomous Republic of Transnistria.  Thereby, 454 kilometers or 282 miles of the Moldova-Ukraine border stand as the de factor border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

To the left of the above map are all countries situated on Ukraine’s western border. As Ukraine is looked upon in Europe as a very large country, perchance the area in western Ukraine that would need to be covered was judged by military commanders and planners in the Russian Federation General Staff as too large and deemed too difficult to control or monitor, surveil, and launch successful interdiction attacks and raids from. The Polish–Ukrainian border has a total length of 529 kilometers or 329 miles to 535 kilometers or 332 miles according to different sources. The Romania-Ukraine border is 649 kilometers or around 403 miles, but it is discontinuous. The Slovakia-Ukraine border is 97 kilometers or a bit over 60 miles. The Hungary-Ukraine border is roughly 103 kilometers or 60 miles long. It its located in Hungary’s Tisza river valley of its northeast. The Moldova-Ukraine border is 1,222 kilometers or 759 miles. However, along the Dniester River, between Moldova and Ukraine, is the autonomous Republic of Transnistria.  Thereby, 454 kilometers or 282 miles of the Moldova-Ukraine border stand as the de factor border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

Omission or De-emphasis?

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Imaginably, there is a moderately rational reason behind the decision to attack the second largest country in Europe, 603,500 square kilometers or 233,000 square miles, without being fully prepared. Ukraine is second largest in size to Russia, which is 17,098,246 square kilometers or 6,601,670 square miles. As Ukraine is looked upon in Europe as a very large country, perchance the area in Western Ukraine that would need to be covered was judged as too large by military commanders  and planners in the Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) and commanders and planners at the lower level in Yuzhnyy Voyennyy Okrug (the Southern Military District) and the Zapadnyy Voyennyy Okrug (the Western Military District) and deemed too difficult to control or monitor, surveil, and launch successful interdiction attacks and raids into. The Polish–Ukrainian border is the state border between Poland and Ukraine. It has a total length of 529 kilometers or 329 miles to 535 kilometers or 332 miles according to different sources.

Concisely and admirably described by the Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (Transfrontier Operational Mission), an association that was set up in 1997 by the government of France to resolve issues for entities concerned with cross border issues, the Poland-Ukraine border begins at the tripoint formed by the Ukrainian, Polish and Slovak borders, in the middle of the Eastern Carpathian mountains. The demarcation runs initially towards the east, arriving at the Ushok Pass and the source of the San River, whereupon it turns north-west to follow the river for around 50 kilometers or 31 miles. It subsequently leaves the river to take a north-easterly direction, crossing the region known as the “Przemyśl Gate”, where mountains meet lowlands. The border then crosses large swathes of agricultural land, to reach the Bug River, which forms the last third of its demarcation. It ends at the tripoint formed by the borders of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. Poland is a NATO Member State and an EU border state.

The Romania-Ukraine border is 649 kilometers or around 403 miles, but it is discontinuous. Again using a description from the Mission Opérationnelle TransfrontalièreThe Republic of Moldova separates the border into two segments. The first in the west, at the tripoint between the Hungarian-Romanian and Hungarian-Ukrainian borders. That segment then continues across the East Carpathian mountains and terminates at the tripoint formed by the Moldovan, Romanian and Ukrainian borders. The second segment begins at the second tripoint between the Moldovan, Romanian and Ukrainian borders, on the north bank of the Danube River, and terminates as it reaches the Black Sea. Romania is a NATO Member State and an EU border state. The Slovakia-Ukraine border is 97 kilometers or a but over 60 miles long. Slovakia is also a NATO Member State and an EU border state. The Hungary-Ukraine border is roughly 103 kilometers or 60 miles long. It is located in Hungary’s Tisza River Valley in the country’s northeast. As with the preceding three countries discussed, Hungary is a NATO Member State and an EU borderstate. The. Moldova-Ukraine border is 1,222 kilometers or 759 miles. However, along the Dniester River, between Moldova and Ukraine, is the autonomous Republic of Transnistria.  Thereby, 454 kilometers or 282 miles of the Moldova-Ukraine border stand as the de factor border between Transnistria and Ukraine. Transnistria is an autonomous republic aligned since 1992 with the Russian Federation. Russian Federation Armed Forces units have also been garrisoned there since 1992. To that extent, anyone providing military assistance to Ukraine would hardly choose to move anything through Moldova as Russian Federation intelligence services posted in Transnistria would likely be able to position themselves to monitor such resupply activities. Moving through Moldova would very likely be deemed too risky, unsafe. To an extent, one might say any effort by Russian Federation Armed Forces to monitor resupply efforts for Ukraine would indicate commanders and planners were covering the matter. Perhaps the Russian Federation General Staff sold that notion to Putin. However, while a few things could be done from Transnistria, given the sheer size of its border with Ukraine, and its position south and toward the east with respect other bordering countries, it would unlikely be enough to make a real difference. It would seem Putin did not want to stir trouble over Transnistria issue. The Russian Federation Armed Forces there have remained relatively quiet, and the West has more or less left the autonomous republic alone. If covert monitoring has been transpiring along or across the Transnistria border, it is apparently not having an impact. Thus, the focus here is on resupply from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (center), Russian Federation Defense Minister General Sergei Shoigu (right), and Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov (left). Commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces apparently “wholeheartedly” accepted the idea that the Ukrainians would acquiesce as in 2014. Despite losses inflicted upon Ukrainian defenders and territorial gains, in eastern and southern Ukraine as well as Kyiv, the mission to completely snuff out the combat power and resolve of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and force a sort of mass capitulation was not achieved. The losses of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have been exponentially higher. It seems most apparent that the Russian Federation General Staff had moved forward without a satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion. Indeed, by results alone, one might infer that there were actually no contingency plans to draw upon for the invasion of Ukraine.

Folly, Doctor-Like, Controlled Skill

Commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces apparently “wholeheartedly” accepted the idea–fiction–that the Ukrainians would roll over and play nice doggie à la 2014. Tomaten auf den augen haben. Despite losses inflicted upon the Ukrainian defenders and territorial gains, in eastern and southern Ukraine, the mission to completely snuff out the combat power and resolve of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and force a sort of mass capitulation was not achieved. In the end, the losses of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have been exponentially higher. It seems most apparent that the Russian Federation General Staff had moved forward without a satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion. Indeed, by results alone, one might infer that there were actually no contingency plans to draw upon for the invasion of Ukraine, with solutions for all conceivable challenges. Doing the “what-ifs” beforehand was probably viewed as walking out on thin ice “politically”. While the idea might be difficult for the reasonable to reconcile, it appears the massive enterprise was  truly undertaken by Moscow on the fly. 

Allowing the Russian Federation Armed Forces to perform in such a way would be very much unlike Putin given the record of his past behavior. True, over the past two decades, he has dropped some clangers. Even the most knowledgeable and experienced can make mistakes they learned to avoid long ago. That is human nature; the human element. Still, Putin’s actions are usually thoughtful, calibrated, well calculated, with the use of resources in a measured way to achieve the most favorable outcomes. Putin can surely tell the difference between real and unreal. He has not managed to stay in power since 2000 by engaging in Quixotic pursuits. This is something new. One wonders what could possibly come next for Ukraine and for the world.

Putin was oddly hooked on the idea that among the officers, men, and women of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there was a lingering sense of Soviet unity equal to his own. This in itself was quite interesting as Putin was hardly known for truly displaying brotherly love toward former Soviet republics. He would create an environment of fear in his relationship with their respective leaders. After Euromaidan, the Ukrainians did not want any part of that. In his invasion day television broadcast of February 24, 2022, Putin would go as far as to implore the Ukrainian Armed Forces to submit to his will and allow Russian troops to again simply march into their country. There appeared to be a singular emotional commitment on his part to the ideas of Russian-Ukrainian unity and the fealty of the officers, men, and women of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to Moscow, to him. Putin “appealed” to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as follows: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” If the matter were not so grave, his words might be looked upon as comical.

Putin seemed forgetful of, or totally oblivious to, the fact that he was responsible for the greatest humiliation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces when he ordered the “green men” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces into Crimea to seize Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Further, without firing a shot, the green men first corralled members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces much as sheep in their own garrison and then herded them out of Crimea. Knowing the Ukrainians as well as he claimed he did in the February 24, 2022 broadcast, Putin should have known the Ukrainians are not sheep. He should have been well-aware that there would be payback for what happened in 2014 and everything that has happened since. He surely knows that now.

In its ill-designed aspects influenced by the political leadership, the Russian Federation’s special military operation on a macro-level much resembles the failed German campaign, Operation Barbarossa, launched on June 21, 1941. Hitler provided empty assurances resulting from his baseless analyses to Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the Army) to the effect that “We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten edifice will come tumbling down.” Oberkommando des Heeres went along with Hitler’s concept that the campaign would be a short one, and that the Soviets would give in after suffering the shock of massive initial defeats. As a result, it did not develop a satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion.  The shock and awe of the initial Blitzkrieg was dissipated by the vast distances, Supply challenges could not be overcome. There was a lack of sufficient manpower resources. German losses could not be sustained. After initial contact, there was stiff resistance from Soviet forces. Despite the serious losses inflicted on the Soviet Army the mission to completely destroy Soviet fighting power and force a capitulation was not achieved by January 7, 1942, and the operation was terminated 20 kilometers short of Moscow. Interestingly enough,a number er of fitting comparisons between Putin and a national leader whose blunders came as a result of being closed to the recommendations and entreaties of his or her top advisers, are those made with Hitler.

Delinquency

There is the real possibility that commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, attempting to hastily organize the massive Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) were not even aware that the opportunity to destroy and disrupt the resupply effort for Ukraine was missed. Everything truly started off on the wrong foot from the get-go. By logic, at first glance this would seem unlikely. After all, the well-trained senior officers and planners of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would not be aware of the danger posed by Ukraine’s open western border. Perhaps there may have been some understanding among military planners that the situation there would be played-down in order to line up with thinking from the Kremlin. In the realm of conjecture, anything becomes possible. If such was the case, from that point onward, they could only hope nothing bad would come of that considerable  omission.

The US educator and organizational theorist, Russell Ackoff was a pioneer in the field of operations research, systems thinking, and management science. In a research article entitled “A Major Mistake That Managers Make” in Handbook of Business Strategy, volume 7, number 1, January 2006, pages. 225-227, Ackoff wrote: “Errors of omission, lost  opportunities, are generally more critical than errors of commission. Organizations fail or decline more frequently because of what they did not do than because of what they did.” Although the December 7, 1941 surprise attack of the Imperial Japanese Navy on Pearl Harbor was a tactical victory, it was also a strategic blunder, as the Japanese failed one of their most critical objectives: destroy the US aircraft carriers. Even worse, the Japanese failed to destroy the strategic oil reserves at Oahu, and the damage to docks and yards was slight. That oil reserve fueled the US Navy through the remainder of the war against Japan.

A well-intervaled column of German vehicles moves through the Ardennes Forest in 1940 (above). At the top of the list of historical causes for military blunders has been insufficient intelligence analyses as well as the failure of consumers to include valuable forecasts in their appraisals of situations. Consider for example how the military high command of France failed their government three times in 70 years by minimizing warnings about the intentions of Prussian and German Governments. In 1870, the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army, with its attitude of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”), did not heed signaling that the Prussian Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1914, the French Grand Quartier Général (General Headquarters) did not heed indicia signaling that the Imperial German Army, to avoid French defenses on the Franco-German border, would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, relying on the defenses of the Maginot Line, did not heed indicia signaling that the German Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. Even with this history, in 1944, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe ignored idicia signaling that the German Army might attempt to move via the Ardennes Forest into Belgium in an attempt to reach Antwerp and cut Allied Forces into two pieces. The result was the Battle of the Bulge in which US forces suffered an estimated 75,000 casualties.

Was Faulty Intelligence to Blame?

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus, auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando? (Who, what, where, with what, why, how, when?) Very pertinent here is the attendant influence of faulty intelligence in understanding the situation of an opponent, strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and possibilities in the development of the concept and intent of an operation in terms of supply. It becomes a factor of some magnitude in planning support operations. It is imprudent for political leaders and top military commanders to ignore information from intelligence services that confirms some action by an adversary is very likely, imminent, or has been taken. Well at the top of historical causes for military missteps has been insufficient intelligence analyses as well as the failure of consumers to include valuable forecasts in their appraisals of situations. 

Consider for example how the military high command of France failed their government three times in 70 years by minimizing warnings about the intentions of Prussian and German Governments. In 1870, the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army, with its attitude of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”), did not heed signaling that the Prussian Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1914, the French Grand Quartier Général (General Headquarters) did not heed indicia signaling that the Imperial German Army, to avoid French defenses on the Franco-German border, would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, relying on the defenses of the Maginot Line, did not heed indicia signaling that the German Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. Even with this history, in 1944, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe ignored idicia signaling that the German Army might attempt to move via the Ardennes Forest into Belgium in an attempt to reach Antwerp and cut Allied Forces into two pieces. The result was the Battle of the Bulge in which US forces suffered an estimated 75,000 casualties.

Referring again to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a newly discovered official US Government memorandum has revealed that intelligence collected about the activities of the Imperial Japanese Navy, led to assessments that Japan might attack the US on the West coast, the Panama Canal, and the US naval and military bases in Hawaii some time in December 1941. The Japanese Imperial Navy would eventually execute a devastating surprise, aircraft carrier-based, aerial attack and submarine attack on the US Naval Base and Headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and aerial attacks against the US Army Base at Schofield Barracks and the US Army Air Corps Base at Hickam Field. Most US military commanders were bewildered by the successful attack which they never would have believed Japan could execute before it actually happened. By leaning into those beliefs, they were caught flat-footed by the attack. Their immediate responses were meager and ineffective.

In the case of Ukraine, it would seem Putin was provided faulty information. Some intelligence services apparently did more in the direction of providing fabrications than others.. From what can be gathered by newsmedia reports about its findings, the foreign intelligence service of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) or FSB, known as the organization’s 5th service. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Apparently, the 5th Service laid it on thick. There were allegedly many unproven, torrid statements on the nature of Ukrainian society made concerning the destructive impact of the West on the culture, morality, spiritually, self-image of the people, ultranationalists, and the leadership in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian people’s willingness to stand fast against an invasion. 

Are Russian Federation Satellites Functioning?

One might imagine that there was a chance that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities by Russian Federation satellites could have assisted in covering the space and monitor and act against assistance efforts by supporting calibrated attacks on supply trains, especially readily observable ones  traveling along roads and rails. Intriguingly, only a few short years ago, there was great concern expressed in the US about formidable Russian Federation satellites that were interfering with US satellites. As discussed in greatcharlie’s July 6, 2017 post entitled, “Trump to Meet With Putin at G-20 Gathering: Trump Seeks an Authentic Relationship with Russia”, there was the belief that Russia was developing the ability to approach, inspect, and potentially sabotage or destroy US satellites while they orbited the Earth. 

Now, it seems, Russian Federation satellites must be able to provide a picture of the situation in Ukraine. True, as stated here, Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe, but, if many will pardon this expression, in greater terms, it is smaller than the State of Texas in the US, which has been regularly, intensely surveilled by the Russian Federation as it was before by the Soviet Union due mainly to the many massive US military and NASA bases and other facilities there. De quoi s’agit-il ici? It appears that a breakdown in Russian ISR capabilities from space much as its military, naval, and intelligence capabilities generally, had occurred long before the special military operation was launched.

Having been responsible for the preparedness of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Russian Federation General Staff had to have known something was awry. it had to have known whether they were up to the job in Ukraine. While the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ Zapad and Vostok exercises perhaps indicated that they were ready for war, surely the Russian Federation General Staff was fully aware of how numbers of troops, actions, reports were, to be frank, falsified. The most senior commanders may not have been sure themselves what the true capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were. If they were living in an illusion about how mighty their forces were, that  Illusion was destroyed in the face of reality.

Snapshot of the initial wave of Ukrainian refugees (above). There is the possibility the commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces may have believed there was more to gain by having a great flow of refugees pouring out of Ukraine to create problems, chaos and confusion, hostile reactions from populations of countries inconvenienced by overflows of Ukrainian refugees, and frustration among NATO, EU Member State capitals. Conceivably, the thinking from the Kremlin and subsequently the Russian Federation Armed Forces that if the roads out of Ukraine to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova were clogged, potentially military assistance could not get through, at least not efficiently. By weaponizing refugee flows an invasion would cause, it may have been believed a way found to split the seam between two possibilities. However, even in the best case scenario, the refugee exodus would be a temporary problem. If Western powers could not resolve the matter, they would at least be able to mitigate its immediate effects. Once the invasion began, humanitarian and refugee organizations of almost every kind jumped in feet first. The West could do more with assistance to stem the crisis than the Russian Federation could do by creating a refugee overflow crisis. As it turned out, the refugee crisis as the Kremlin might have envisioned and hoped did not materialize.

The Pitfalls of Creative Thinking

There is the possibility the commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces may have believed there was more to gain by having a great flow of refugees pouring out of Ukraine to create problems, chaos and confusion, hostile reactions from populations of countries inconvenienced by overflows of Ukrainian refugees, and frustration among NATO, EU Member State capitals. That belief would very likely have been in following with the concept and intent disseminated from the Kremlin. The impact of a refugee surge was witnessed while war raged in Syria. During the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis, an estimated 1.3 million refugees seeking asylum literally jammed roads leading to Europe. European countries, especially the first ones along the refugees route that encountered them, were unable to handle their numbers immediately. Some capitals panicked. Many political, social, financial, and security issues subsequently arose. The refugee flow eventually subsided. 

The Weaponization of Refugees

Conceivably, the thinking from the Kremlin and subsequently the Russian Federation Armed Forces that if the roads out of Ukraine to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova were clogged, potentially military assistance could not get through, at least not efficiently. By weaponizing refugee flows an invasion would cause, it may have been believed a way found to split the seam between two possibilities. Zwei fliegen mit einer klappe schlagen. However, even in the best case scenario, the refugee exodus would be a temporary problem. If Western powers could not resolve the matter, they would at least be able to mitigate its immediate effects. Once the invasion began, the UN with its many aid organizations as well as and other international and regional intergovernmental humanitarian and refugee organizations jumped in feet first. The US would work with capitals in Europe, especially Warsaw, and encourage through diplomacy and support with its wherewithal, a multilateral effort by government aid agencies. The EU acted in a similar way. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, CARE and other international and regional nongovernmental humanitarian and refugee organizations. Nongovernmental refugee and displaced persons organizations, and a variety of humanitarian organizations from around the world made their way to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova to get a handle on the problem. 

As things went, the Russi­an Federation’s special military operation triggered a “regional forced displacement crisis.” By September 30, 2022, seven months after the invasion began, 7,536,433 Ukrainian refugees were registered outside of Ukraine. Reportedly, Poland and Germany received the most refugees; more than a million each. The Czech Republic took in the next highest number 438,926, followed by the US, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Italy, and Spain, each of which accepted from 100,000 to 300,000 refugees. Smaller numbers escaped to Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Moldova. 

Interestingly, and doubtlessly to the consternation of the Kremlin and Russian Federation Armed Forces, not only is military assistance flowing freely into Ukraine from Poland but so are “returnees”. Clear data that documents how many of the 7.5 million Ukrainian refugees have returned home permanently, reportedly is unavailable. However as of September 20, 2022, over 6 million cross-border movements were made back into the country. Border crossing points in Poland as well as Romania are said to be receiving most of the returnees, with nearly 4.5 million crossings from Poland and nearly 1 million from Romania. In the aggregate, one might conclude that the West could do more with assistance than Russia could do by creating a refugee overflow crisis. In the end, the refugee crisis that the Kremlin may likely have envisioned and hoped for did not materialize. Vide et credere. (See and believe.)

Where Was the GRU?

As a military matter, intelligence on the situation in Ukraine to the extent it would impact the special military operation had to be of great interest specifically to Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU  The GRU could not have missed the potential problem of resupply routes into Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania being set up. Perhaps the GRU was unable to convince the Russian Federation General Staff of the necessity to close the door to assistance from the West. Maybe there was at first a thought to use the same act twice with “green men” in the Western Ukraine. However, GRU planners may have been concerned about being unable to redeploy or evacuate troops placed perhaps at border crossings, highways, train junctions, road intersections, bridges, heights, airports, military airfields, and so on deep in Ukraine in large numbers if a major problem was encountered.

It was suggested in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, one could conceive that concerning Western military assistance, a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things: monitor the delivery, stockpiling of stinger, javelin, and other weapons systems to Ukrainian forces; maintain real-time knowledge of the distribution and location of those weapons; destroy those weapons systems; and, destroy or support actions by other Russian military units to destroy Ukrainian military units to which those weapons were distributed. That hypothetical task force would also likely be tasked to monitor–covertly monitor the intelligence activities and military operations of–Western countries as they relate to supplying Ukraine with special military capabilities. It would seem that suggestion made by greatcharlie then was well-off the mark. Maybe they were concerned about potential for great casualties and huge losses of materiel.

Where Was Spetsnaz?

Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union, are trained, and tasked as special forces units and fielded in wartime as part of the GRU. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency. The GRU may have been unable to conjure up a viable plan to use spetsnaz in western Ukraine. Again, GRU planners may have been concerned about being unable to deploy or evacuate troops placed even on raids so deep without a solid means of egress. Even if it had been possible to monitor and act in the Western region from Belarus, again, distances that needed to be traversed may have been too great.

One might wonder whether the GRU had been aware that there was someone else in Western Ukraine, covert foreign forces from governments very friendly with Kyiv, already holding the most useful entrances and exits to and from Poland, Slovakia,, Hungary,, and Romania open in case of an attack. It is the sort of thing US Special Operations Units, the Special Activities Division of the US Central Intelligence Agency, the British Army’s Special Air Service, and the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service would be very capable of doing and would likely do, covertly. Surely, this idea is drawn from the realm of conjecture, however, it would be a smart move and their hypothetical presence would hardly be reported in the Western newsmedia. If, hypothetically, such forces had been there covertly since 2014, they may have been well-engaged in successful clandestine and covert activities in the region.

Perhaps what happened in Syria may have been an issue at all in GRU Headquarters. A battle between US Special Forces and Russian private military contractors from the infamous Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) may have had a long-lasting educational effect in Yasenevo. Present in Syria as part of the campaign to destroy the so-called Islamic Caliphate created by the Islamic jihadist terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) that cut across iraq and Syria, US Special Forces, in self-defense at their own base, decimated a formation of Gruppa Vagnera that attacked them. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Even if commanders and military planners had been certain that spetsnaz could well-handle any foreign forces that hypothetically might have detected in the Western region of Ukraine, there imaginably would have been a wish in the Kremlin to avoid being seen as, and being accused of, attacking those foreign troops. In dubio abstinence. (When in doubt, sustain.)

Where Were the Russian Airborne Forces?

As for the Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, surely the Ukrainians might have expected missions launched by them to hold territory in-depth. Yet, as with the GRU, commanders and planners in the VDV may have been concerned about being unable to redeploy or evacuate troops placed perhaps at border crossings, highways, train junctions, road intersections, bridges, heights, airports, military airfields, and so on deep in Ukraine in large numbers if a major problem was encountered. Maybe they were concerned about potential for great casualties and huge losses of materiel. That happened without an operation to block Western assistance coming in from the West: 50,000+ killed. 

Surely, they were made more certain that the VDV would unlikely have been able successfully operate in the Western region of Ukraine after what transpired when its units attacked Hostomel Airport in the first days of the special military operation. The VDV faced considerable troubles there. One might view the capture of an airport a sort of bread and butter target for airborne units in armies worldwide

Russian Airborne Forces landing at Hostomel Airport (above). Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and planners may have been concerned about the potential for huge losses if a blocking operation in the West were attempted. Surely, they were made more certain that the VDV would unlikely have been able successfully operate in the Western region of Ukraine after what transpired when its units attacked Hostomel Airport in the first days of the special military operation. After securing Hostomel Airport to the extent possible, the Russian Federation Army and VDV there tried to push into the nearby town and then  advance to Bucha and Irpin. Their poorly organized movement encountered ambushes in Hostomel and Bucha which resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment. Those in command of the Russian Federation Army and VDV troops, decided to hold their positions, digging in on the roadsides to defend themselves against Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. They also suffered heavy casualties from night attacks by special forces units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On March 29, 2022, the order was given for the Russian Federation forces at Hostomel to withdraw from the Kyiv oblast. Under continuous artillery fire from Ukrainian forces, the Russians damaged equipment that had to be abandoned and made a hasty retreat.

According to reports based on what was observed, the Russian Federation Armed Forces plan of attack against Hostomel Airport included its rapid occupation, with the intention of using it as an assembly area for Kyiv’s encirclement and capture. The airport is a bit over 6 miles north of Kyiv. The Initial February 24, 2022 assault on Hostomel Airport was a success, catching its Ukrainian defenders by surprise apparently due its speed. Mi-35 and Ka-52 attack helicopters operating out of Belarus struck the airport’s defenses and opened a way for helicopter-borne VDV units in Mi-8 transport helicopters that followed. However, despite being caught off guard by the initial assault by the attack helicopters, the attack itself was ineffective as the Ukrainian defenses were left largely intact.  Without any meaningful air support–it was very likely not included in formulation of the attack plan, VDV units on the ground faced counterattacks by Ukrainian forces almost immediately.

Luckily for the VDV troops struggling with Ukrainian forces for control of the airport, Russian Federation Army units originating in Belarus broke through Ukrainian defenses near Ivankiv and rapidly drove toward Hostomel. Although the advancing Russian Federation troops faced attrition from several Ukrainian ambushes en route, they reached Hostomel Airport and assisted the VDV in securing it on February 25, 2022. The Russian Federation Army units and the VDV sought to establish Hostomel into a forward operating base from which the larger push on Kyiv could be initiated. However, it was at this juncture that the special military operation began facing fierce resistance from the Ukrainians and became stalled. Logistical problems impacted operational tempo. The most visible sign was well-televised coverage of a 40-mile-long convoy that halted due to lack of fuel. Securing Hostomel Airport to the extent possible, the Russian Federation Army and VDV there tried to push into the nearby town and then  advance to Bucha and Irpin. Their poorly organized movement encountered ambushes in Hostomel and Bucha which resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment. Those in command of the Russian Federation Army and VDV troops, decided to hold their positions, digging in on the roadsides to defend themselves against Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. They also suffered heavy casualties from night attacks by special forces units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On March 29, 2022, the order was given for the Russian Federation forces at Hostomel to withdraw from the Kyiv oblast. Under continuous artillery fire from Ukrainian forces, the Russians damaged equipment that had to be abandoned and made a hasty retreat.

A Matter of Military Science

To the extent of everything mentioned here, perhaps a hypothetical concern over sending a relatively large sized force into Western Ukraine was a matter of Russian Federation commanders and military planners remembering what they learned while studying in military educational institutions. To that extent, they wanted to avoid the circumstance faced by Allied troops during Operation Market Garden during World War II.

The story of the Battle of Arnhem, part of Operation Market Garden, a massive Airborne ground assault in from from September 17, 1944 to September 26, 1944 during World War II. remains fairly well-known, however greatcharlie will humbly seek to recount it to the extent that is pertinent here. Under the plan proposed by British Army Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, the Airborne assault would support a single drive north over the branches of the Lower Rhine River,which would  permit the British Second Army to bypass the Siegfried Line and attack the industrial Ruhr. US Airborne troops were dropped in the Netherlands to secure bridges and towns along the line of the Allied advance. Farthest north, the British 1st Airborne Division was dropped at Arnhem to capture bridges across the Nederrijn (Lower Rhine). Their assault was supported by the Glider Pilot Regiment and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade. The British XXX Corps were assigned to reach the British-led contingent in two to three days. The division was told to expect only limited resistance from German reserve forces. However, information collected by the British Army’s 21st Army Group in Belgium and Dutch resistance that German armor units were present around Arnhem. That intelligence was supported by aerial reconnaissance. However, the commanding officer of 21st Army Group, dismissed the information. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was made aware that almost certainly two Panzer divisions were situated at Arnhem but received the information from Ultra intercepts so close to the Operation Market Garden’s launch that it chose to ignore it. Intriguingly, the First Allied Airborne Army was not made privy to information from Ultra.

The information was very accurate. German Army Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, the commander of Army Group B, had moved his headquarters to Arnhem and was re-establishing defenses in the area and co-ordinating the reorganization of the scattered units. Thus, at the time of Operation Market Garden’s launch, several units would be present in the vicinity of Arnhem to oppose them. Most threatening among them were the II SS Panzer Corps comprising the remains of the 9th SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and  the 10th SS Panzer Division “Frundsberg”. It was the bad luck of the airborne force that both German SS divisions, during their formation, had undergone month-long anti-airborne exercises and had also spent the last 15 months studying how best to act against a parachute assault in classroom and field exercises.

The 1st Airborne Division was dropped a distance from its objectives and encountered unexpected resistance, mainly from elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division and the 10th SS Panzer Division. A small force managed to reach the Arnhem road bridge, but the advance of the main body of the division was halted on the outskirts of the town. As for XXX Corps, it was forced into a struggle at Nijmegen, and advance north was delayed. As a result, the British airborne troops were not relieved as scheduled. After four days, the small British force at the bridge was overwhelmed and the rest of the division trapped in a small pocket north of the river. Lacking reinforcement and resupply, remnants of the 1st Airborne Division, after nine days of fighting, were withdrawn in Operation Berlin. Without secure bridges over the Nederrijn and the front line stabilized south of Arnhem, the Allies were unable to advance further. The 1st Airborne Division lost almost three quarters of its strength. Battered and tattered, the division was not sent into combat again.

Concern over a Potential Panicked Response by Ukraine’s Neighbors

The Kremlin may have been uneasy about how the US, its NATO allies, and the EU would respond militarily if Russian troops landed in Western Ukraine, “danger close” to the Polish border. Even more, it may have been the case that  they were concerned political leaders in Poland, potentially panicked at observing Russian forces landing practically on its border, might have responded first by ordering Polish Armed Forces to unilaterally drive inside Ukraine border, take positions inside its Western region, and then refer the matter to NATO. Such hypothetical unilateral action might have included an armored and mechanized drive into Ukraine to create a buffer, and landing troops on border crossings, highways, train junctions, road intersections, bridges, heights, airports, military airfields, and so on before they would all fall completely into Russian Federation hands. To that extent, they would likely go after the same targets in Ukraine that the Russian Federation Armed Forces would likely want. In the worst case scenario, Polish troops could have fired heavy artillery and launched missile attacks on targets to deter air landings by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Where Was the Russian Air Force?

Concerning Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces), particularly the Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force) element, one might have presumed commanders and planners of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces would have organized air power assets of the force to strike strategically and tactically to make a positive difference in the war effort. Strategically, disrupting its supply of weapons from external sources and destroying Ukraine’s ability to construct weapons would likely be a priority. Tactically, a priority would likely be coordinating efforts by Russian Air Force assets with ground forces as they advanced. One might have expected that with the support of the Russian Federation’s ISR capabilities, a plan would have been in prepared for the Russian Air Force to shut the door on the transport of supplies through Ukraine, interdicting supply lines as fast as they were organized. However, that has not been the case. As the situation stands in the Ukraine campaign, the Russian Air Force has been near nonexistent relative to its size, supposed power, and the expectations of military analysts worldwide. Its best fighters and fighter-bombers have been regularly blasted out of the skies by the Ukrainian Armed Forces using both pricey sophisticated air defense weapons systems provided to Kyiv by Western powers as well as javelins and stingers, shoulder fired rockets operated by individual soldiers in the field. In response to the Ukrainian air defense threat, Russian Federation warplanes are not evading by flying sorties at 15,000 to 20,000 feet as they had over Syria. Russian aircraft are often remaining above Russian airspace and firing air launched cruise missiles into Ukraine. Since aircrews cannot identify targets across the border, airstrikes are made in areas where air intelligence reports the enemy is located. In attacking urban centers, that will always result in collateral damage in the form of civilian deaths and injury and the destruction of nonmilitary structures.

The Unwillingness to Speak Truth to Power

Commanders in all branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are surely unwilling to speak truth to power and inform Putin of what needed to be done in the West and that they were uncertain that their forces could achieve such an objective. One might imagine that suffering Putin’s coup de gueule would be the least of their worries. It has been a symptom common among those in service of authoritarian regimes throughout history. Skilled commanders are eventually bled dry of their strength to speak out about ill-laid military plans conjured in the minds of tyrannical leaders who are convinced of the certitude of their ideas. Many have been willing to bring reprisals against those commanders, even their best, who, for the sake of the forces they command and country, might step forward to disagree with them. It causes greatcharlie to cast its mind back to the 1981 pop song Der Kommisar“, essentially a scare story originally performed in both German and English by the Austrian artist Falco (Johann Hölzel). In the penultimate chorus of the English version, are the lyrics: “Don’t turn around, wa-uh-oh (yeah-yeah) / Der Kommissar’s in town, wa-uh-oh / He’s got the power and you’re so weak / And your frustration will not let you speak / La la la la la la.”

Commanders in all branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were surely unwilling to speak truth to power and inform Putin of what needed to be done in Western Ukraine and that they were uncertain that their forces could achieve such an objective. One might imagine that suffering Putin’s coup de gueule would be the least of their worries. This has been a symptom common among those in service of authoritarian regimes throughout history. Skilled commanders are eventually bled dry of their strength to speak out about ill-laid military plans conjured in the minds of tyrannical leaders who are convinced of the certitude of their ideas. Many of those leadsrs have been willing to bring reprisals against those commanders, even their best, who, for the sake of the forces they command and country, have stepped forward to disagree with them.

The Military Assistance Misread

On a more political level, perhaps Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff were certainly completely wrong in their most likely conclusions about the degree of assistance the West would provide, what type of weapons and the impact they would have on the battlefield. The US has committed billions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Relative to what the Ukrainians would eventually receive, what they had been provided to that point would hardly have been viewed as impressive by the Russian Federation General Staff.

Much as it had been planned by the US during the days of the Cold War, much of what would be used to repel a Warsaw Pact rampage through Western Europe would be taken from prepositioned stocks of supplies or they would be flown in and shipped in. During the Cold War, from 1969 to 1993, the annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) Exercises rehearsed that reinforcement and resupply to a great degree. It seems apparent now that thinking along the same vein in the Pentagon may have driven planning for the support of Ukraine in event of an attack. This idea would very likely be a kick-in-the-head to Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and planners who had not have recognized the parallels as yet, never foresaw the possibility that the US and its NATO allies would essentially come at them, via the Ukrainians, in a similar way.. How obvious it all might seem now.

A Miscalculation on the Political Will of the West

Perchance Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff miscalculated with regard to the degree of political will in the administration of US President Joe Biden and the US Congress to support Ukraine. Mixed messages regarding US commitment. The “No US boots on the ground” talk came a tad too early perhaps. It probably was music to ears in Moscow. It may have very well created the impression the US was pulling away or could potentially abandon Kyiv if Russia invaded. It may reasonably seem a bit of an overreach to impute to Putin and his acolytes, but one would only need to look at the varying degrees of overreach they have demonstrated with regard to the Ukraine matter.

Maybe Putin and his advisers concluded that European countries could become rankled enough to lend military support to Ukraine but perhaps they were a bit better than less concerned with the quality and quantity of their potential assistance and financial giving. They would expect the US to have the matter well-covered.

Perhaps they considered that Western European resolve to be engaged robustly, wholeheartedly in Ukraine would hinge on the resolve of the US to back its NATO allies. As for the US, much as alluded to earlier, its resolve would hinge on the success or failure of Russian forces in Ukraine, which really meant the capabilities demonstrated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Thereby, as long as the Russian Federation Armed Forces performed well, robust military assistance beyond javelins and stingers would not be sent into Ukraine. (Based on that suspected line of thought, one might compare how that situation for Ukraine as the invasion got underway to a degree paralleled, mutatis mutandis, the situation of the fledgling US in 1777. The decisive Battle of Saratoga in which the Continental Army defeated the British Army gave the French government the confidence to sign treaties of alliance and trade with the US government and joined its war against Great Britain.  Both countries agreed to fight the war until the US was truly independent, and neither would agree to a separate peace.)

As the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces became desultory, ineffective, and proved surprisingly lacking at Kyiv and Kharkiv, it became easier for the US to give more to an Ukrainian cause with the real potential for victory and convince other NATO Allies to do the same albeit to far lesser degree. Panicked efforts by Kyiv to muster support and acquire weapons were practically wasteful as they clearly had the matter covered.

Misperceptions on Zelensky: A Force To Be Reckoned With

Of likely concern for Putin’s advisers, if not Putin, was surely Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky who in the months before the invasion was already burning a bit brighter than the Kremlin expected. There were hints that he potentially could display all the qualities ascribed to great leaders. Doubtlessly, it was hoped in the Kremlin that Zelensky would find himself cutting a figure not unlike Felicia Hemans’ “Casabianca” (1826), crying out for an answer, in Zelensky’s case from Washington, that would never come and his world would go up in flames. As it was, Zelensky proved to be a lion of a man, stalwart of the Ukrainian cause, and a force to be reckoned with once the Russian Federation’s special military operation began. Western government officials and news media commentators alike would view Zelensky as having galvanized the Ukrainian people to resist Russia’s effort to swallow up their country. Zelensky also impressed with his entreaties to the world to come to the aid of his fellow countrymen in the best ways that they could. One might safely assume that his efforts influenced how countries with the wherewithal to respond to the Ukraine in its time of need, worked with him, and rapidly developed and implemented plans to provide considerable support for his country. Indeed, such positive perceptions of Zelensky, his impact, helped to attract aid groups, humanitarian volunteers, foreign fighters, helpful weapons, and financial resources to support Ukraine’s cause.

Ukrainian artillerymen fire US made and gifted M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) (above) at Russian Federation forces holding Ukrainian territory. On a more political level, perhaps Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff were certainly completely wrong in their most likely conclusions about the degree of assistance the West would provide, what type of weapons and the impact they would have on the battlefield. The US has committed billions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Relative to what the Ukrainians would eventually receive, what they had been provided to that point could hardly have been perceived as impressive by the Russian Federation General Staff. Much as it had been planned by the US during the days of the Cold War, much of what would be used to repel a Warsaw Pact rampage through Western Europe would be taken from prepositioned stocks of supplies or would be flown in and shipped in. The annual Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) Exercises rehearsed that reinforcement and resupply to some degree. It seems apparent now that thinking along the same vein in the Pentagon may have driven planning for the support of Ukraine in event of an attack.

The Distorting impact of Putin’s Kyiv Obsession

Surely, Putin’s singular emotional wants and wishes beyond what was militarily and strategically logical what drove the planning of the operation or was it formulated to the best of the abilities of trained, experienced, informed military officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To Putin, everything about the government in Kyiv was anathema. Recall as aforementioned that in a very perplexing way, Putin stated in his appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast: “You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” He would go on to say: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.” The indication s and implications of such statement are that Kyiv was indeed an obsession. To that extent, among those wants and wishes was toppling the government in Kyiv. Accomplishing that apparently became a priority with Kyiv in the planning of the invasion or whatever sufficed for its planning that distorted the picture Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff of the battlespace. When examined in the context of this situation, how apposite the second quatrain of William Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116 becomes: “What wretched errors hath my heart commited, / Whilst it had thought itself so blessed never! / How hath mine eyes out of their spheres been fitted / In the distraction of this madding fever!”

If one might imagine Putin was a bit more pragmatic in his thinking and approach on Kyiv, it might be believed Putin may have thought the quickest road to victory was to cut off the head, the government in Kyiv and the command and control Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff, from their forces in the field. If that could be achieved, Putin likely believed the mass surrender of Ukrainian troops in the field would come next. If that was the case, and what has transpired in Ukraine evinces to some degree that it was, then quite a bit of creative thinking was clearly involved in the invasion’s planning. 

However, by the time of the invasion, the government in Kyiv under Zelensky was well-tied in with its Western supporters. Thorough plans to provide escalating levels of military and financial assistance were surely already in place. Even though Zelensky initially displayed a great degree of uneasiness concerning the way in which the needs of Ukraine in the crisis would be met, it might be the case that what has come Ukraine’s way has far exceeded what he might have been reasonably expected. The shortsightedness apparent in thinking that the Kyiv government could be decapitated is stark. An informed guess is that the Ukraine enterprise was not hashed out with the best foreign and national security thinkers in Russia. One would get the idea it all was the result of the thinking of one man, certain of its roundness. Such impetuous schemes and boldness are at first sight alluring, but are difficult to handle, and in the end result in disaster.

Perhaps the real problem for Putin was not just that he relied on fortune, but was driven by blind rage and to a further extent blind ambition. Ukraine was one the bigger pieces he needed to pull together a respectable number of former republics into some simulacrum of the Soviet Union. While it may seem daylight madness for the reasonable to attempt that, for Putin, it makes perfect sense.

The Distraction of Covetous Thoughts?

As discussed in greatcharlie’s May 30, 2022 post entitled, “Putin the Protector of the Russian People or the Despoiler of Ukrainian Resources: A Look at War Causation and Russian Military Priorities in Ukraine”, long before he became the legendary Russian President that he is today, Putin was a doctoral candidate at Leningrad State University (now the University of St. Petersburg.) it was at the very end of his KGB service. (A fuller discussion of that period of Putin’s life can be found in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2017 post entitled “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)). The rector at the St. Petersburg State Mining University as of this writing, Vladimir Litvinenko, chaired the committee that awarded Russian President Vladimir Putin his doctorate in Economics in 1997. He recently stated that Putin’s thesis was titled “Strategic Planning of the Reproduction of the Mineral Resource Base of a Region Under Conditions of the Formation of Market Relations.” Putin’s economic studies, at what was then Leningrad State University, were most likely heavily doused in Marxian theory. Even more pertinent here, his research made him quite knowledgeable about the resources of countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. He would be very aware of Ukraine’s wealth in minerals, particularly in the eastern and southeastern regions. Indeed, Ukraine has a large supply of many valuable mineral and raw material resources. Ukraine in fact holds approximately 5 percent of the world’s mineral resources. Its significant mineral resources include: iron ore, coal, manganese, uranium ore, natural gas, oil, salt, sulfur, graphite, titanium, magnesium, kaolin, nickel, mercury. As for stocks of iron, manganese, titanium and uranium ore Ukraine is ranked first among European countries. As for mercury ore reserves, it is second only to Spain. Attendant to capturing sovereign territory in Ukraine, much as he grabbed Crimea eight year before, Putin may have wanted possession of its supply of many valuable mineral and raw material resources. Thinking in that direction may also have distorted his picture of what would be most important in invading Ukraine successfully. 

If this was Putin’s thinking and actions on this matter, at a more detailed level than discussed earlier, it would very much mirror that of Hitler during Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. As explained by the Imperial War Museum, industrialists in Germany most likely influenced Hitler’s decision to seize the Southern Caucasus in the Soviet Union and Stalingrad despite the concerns and entreaties of Oberkommando des Heeres with undertaking an operation of such distance from where the German Army was situated. As aforementioned, Operation Barbarossa, launched in June 1941, failed to achieve Hitler’s objective of decisively defeating the Soviet Union in a single campaign. German forces managed to occupy vast swathes of Soviet territory and industry. However, the audacious invasion finally ground to a halt in December 1941 on the forested outskirts of Moscow, the exhausted German Army stabilized its winter front in a line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. The strain of the harsh winter campaign upon the ill-prepared Wehrmacht, as well as the severe strain placed on the Luftwaffe in its prolonged efforts to air-supply the army’s string of city-bastions along the front, was tremendous. The Germans suffered a staggering 850,000 casualties. Interestingly, despite such considerable setbacks, the Germans believed the war was still going fairly well.

However, the following year, Hitler decided to go on the offensive. A decision by Hitler to launch a campaign in the Southern Caucasus region, south of the German front was spurred on by flawed information provided to him by economic advisers. They told Hitler that Germany would be incapable of sustaining the war without the resources in the Caucasus. North of the mountains was a center of agricultural production, which also held significant coal and metal reserves; to the south, was the region of Transcaucasia, a densely populated industrial center which produced some eighty percent of the Soviet Union’s annual oil production.Responsive to the wishes of the political leadership, by February 1942, the Oberkommando des Heeres was planning an offensive in the Caucasus region. 

On April 5, 1942, Hitler issued  Führerbefehle Nr. 41 (Fűhrer Directive No. 41), laying out the basic plan for the new offensive in the Soviet Union. The new plan would become known as Fall Blau (Case Blue). The main objectives were the major oilfields in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia: Maikop, Grozny and Baku. Senior German commanders were concerned about undertaking such a deep thrust into the opponent’s territory, fearing for the safety of their flank. Hitler’s remedy was to include in the plan the occupation of Stalingrad by Germany’s Italian, Hungarian and Romanian allies. The city would initially be taken by Germans. They would also establish a defensive line along the Don River and Volga River, which would be taken over by allies, too. Capturing Stalingrad would have the additional benefit of blocking all enemy traffic on the Volga, a crucial transport artery. To Hitler, the operation, which he deemed to be “of limited scope,” made perfect sense. Events proved otherwise.

A postage stamp from the erstwhile Deutsche Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, also known as the GDR or East Germany) circa 1963, that includes portraits of the Prussian military leader August Neidhardt von Gneisenau (left), Prussian field marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (right). In war, the value of a reliable, knowledgeable, skilled, and open-minded adviser who truly understands the concept and intent of his commander, cannot be underestimated. A model for interaction between a political leader or military commander with his advisers was the one between the renowned 18th century Prussian Army Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher with his chief of staff General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau. In Clausewitz: (Scarborough, 1979), author Roger Parkinson quotes von Blücher with regard to his relationship with his brilliant chief of staff as follows: “Gneisenau, being my chief of staff and very reliable, reports to me on the manoeuvres that are to be executed and the marches that are to be performed. Once convinced that he is right, I drive my troops through hell towards the goal and never stop until the desire goal has been accomplished–yes, even though the officers trained in the old school may pout and complain and all but mutiny.” Regarding an offer for von Blücher to receive an honorary degree at Oxford University following the Napoleonic War, Parkinson quotes him as saying: “Well, if I am to become a doctor, you must at least make Gneisenau an apothecary, for we two belong together always.”

Eyes Wide Shut

“A lion does not lose sleep over the opinion of sheep. ” is a quote often attributed to others, but it is very likely the words of Abū ʿAbdullāh Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (28 August 767 — 19 January 820) was a Palestinian-Arab Muslim theologian, writer, and scholar, who was the first contributor of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-fiqh). Often referred to as ‘Shaykh al-Islām’, al-Shāfi‘ī was one of the four great Imams, whose legacy on juridical matters and teaching eventually led to the Shafi’i school of fiqh (or Madh’hab). In his thoughts, Putin is surely completely alone. He appears indifferent to whether the rest of the world sees him as a bit out of touch or strange, apart from everything else. Outside of his super fans in Russia–many of whom have been unfortunate enough to meet their end, so very young, on fields, hills, and woods in Ukraine as questionably trained conscripts–certainly does not appear gallant or chivalrous. Putin is holding the course on Ukraine, not yielding in any way that might allow for authentic and substantive negotiations to end the conflict to begin. There still does not appear to be a line of talk available to even his closest advisers that could put a different complexion on the matter.

In war, the value of a reliable, knowledgeable, skilled, and open-minded adviser who truly understands the concept and intent of his commander, cannot be underestimated. A model for interaction between a political leader or military commander with advisers was the one between the renowned 18th century Prussian Army Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher with his chief of staff Prussian Army General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau. In Clausewitz: (Scarborough, 1979), author Roger Parkinson quotes von Blücher with regard to his relationship with his brilliant chief of staff as follows: “Gneisenau, being my chief of staff and very reliable, reports to me on the manoeuvres that are to be executed and the marches that are to be performed. Once convinced that he is right, I drive my troops through hell towards the goal and never stop until the desire goal has been accomplished–yes, even though the officers trained in the old school may pout and complain and all but mutiny.” Regarding an offer for von Blücher to receive an honorary degree at Oxford University following the Napoleonic War, Parkinson quotes him as saying: “Well, if I am to become a doctor, you must at least make Gneisenau an apothecary, for we two belong together always.”

An informed guess by greatcharlie is what has likely been a reliable intuition that had served him well along the way and allowed him a leg-up in giving subjects light were darkened with regarding parsing out the many aspects of this massive enterprise in Ukraine. Imagining Putin with his mind set on invading Ukraine come hell or high-water and refusing hear any suggestion that he delay until Russian forces were fully prepared to act, maximize every advantage and exploit the liabilities of Ukrainian forces to the fullest extent, and cope with all contingencies, if one might dare discuss such with him as noted earlier. 

One can only imagine Putin’s outward attitude and behavior at that time. The thought of it all curiously reminds greatcharlie a song sung by the renowned comic, Groucho Marx in the comedy film “Horse Feathers” (1932), not that there is anything remotely humorous about any aspect of the Ukraine War. When Marx’s  character, Professor Quincy Adams Wagstaff, is made the new head of Huxley College, and asked to offer some suggestions for his administration, the first verse of his musical response was: “I don’t know what they have to say / It makes no difference anyway / Whatever it is, I’m against it / No matter what it is or who commenced it / I’m against it.”

Putin Was Blinded by Rage

A dislike of Biden administration members inflamed the ardor of Putin and closest acolytes and they became determined to hurt Kyiv for siding with them. Imagining Putin’s mindset, he likely firmly believed before the invasion of Ukraine that he had a good understanding of the way many senior foreign and national security policy officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden, many of whom had held senior posts in the Obama administration, would respond to a move toward Ukraine. As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, Putin had experienced considerable dissatisfaction and disappointment in his dealing with Obama administration officials, particularly on Ukraine. As he may have perceived their actions in the past, they found it rather piquant to interact with him as if he were a lesser party, and given his positions and concerns no consideration. He likely believed they saw him as undeserving of respect. Communications were condescending, actions were often insulting. In an explosion of aggression, in part a response to his treatment, he grabbed Crimea with military force and fomented civil war in the Donbas. He engaged in other destabilizing efforts. Apparently, he was not completely satisfied with those actions, and held in his mind the idea of doing more. Seeing the appointment of many of those same officials in even higher posts in the Biden administration, most likely inflamed his sense with ardor to lash out violently. Everything those officials did in the Biden administration, Putin surely viewed with their past actions firmly in mind.

One might theorize that although he could not conventionally strike directly at those officials, Putin could reach the Zelensky government, members of which he may view as something worse than traitorous. He could well imagine the the fall of the Zelensky government would beset the Biden administration officials that he despised with a sense of loss and failure. Secondly, he would hope to cause torment and anguish among their “Ukrainian followers”. To that extent, perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that given current attitudes and behaviors of Putin, the invasion of Ukraine may also have been in part an opportunity for Putin to have a return engagement, a rematch, with former senior Obama administration officials serving in the Biden administration and settle an old score. 

Putin (seated left) during a Russian Federation Security Council meeting just days before the special military operation was launched. A dislike of senior members of the administration of US President Joe Biden likely inflamed the ardor of Putin and closest acolytes and they became determined to hurt Kyiv for siding with them. Imagining Putin’s mindset, he likely firmly believed before the invasion of Ukraine that he had a good understanding of the way many senior foreign and national security policy officials in the Biden administration, many of whom had held senior posts in the administration of US President Barack Obama, would respond to a move toward Ukraine. One might theorize that although Putin could not conventionally strike directly at those officials, he could reach the Zelensky’s government, members of which he may view as something akin to “traitorous”. He knew what anguish and loss the fall of Zelensky’s government would cause those US officials and secondly, their “Ukrainian followers”. To that extent, perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that given current attitudes and behaviors of Putin, the invasion of Ukraine may also have been in part an opportunity for Putin to have a return engagement, a rematch, with former senior Obama administration officials in the Biden administration and settle a score.

The Way Forward

It certainly appears to many reasonable people around the world since the Ukraine War began that currently there is a dearth of rational thinkers in the Kremlin. As is so often the case in the history of warfare, perception, better still, misperception, and not reality, drove the decisionmaking of Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and war planners. Intriguingly, in parsing out the possibilities of this pivotal moment in the war’s planning, it would seem Putin’s special military operation did not necessarily have to turn out as it has.

Too many human lives have been lost in this war. The common wisdom is that the war never should have transpired, and no one should have died. No amount of gain in Ukraine would match the degree of loss in the cold terms of blood and treasure by Russia which started the war. Nevertheless, it will likely go on and plenty more dying will be done.

Conforming to the concept and intent of their political leader, Putin, senior commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces mistakenly thought that the campaign would be a short one, and that the Ukrainians would give in after suffering the shock of massive initial defeats. Being responsive to the concept and intent of their political leadership was, by their training and oath, the correct thing to do, but the very wrong thing to do at the same time. Res ipsa loquitur! Perhaps the only real hope for its end on the battlefield is Ukraine’s capture of every bit of sovereign territory, to include Crimea. As mentioned here, that is within the realm of possibility. Yet, Putin would hardly find that outcome satisfactory. If a satisfactory solution cannot be found for both sides on Ukraine, there will be good reason for the world to fear the worst from him. In the cavernous assembly halls of the Kremlin where Putin speaks before top officials of his government, the Russian Federation Duma, other key political leaders at the federal provincial and local levels–nationalists, ultranationalists, and Communists–prominent supporters of the United Russia Party, and business leaders, one will not spy happy faces, filled with optimism over the future ahead. There are mainly the morose visages of people who likely whisper among themselves that the genuine end to everything may be near. Perhaps Putin is equal to his rhetoric, and Russian Federation ICBM’s will make their way out of their kennels. His supporters would likely believe that. A solution to the Ukraine War must be found soon. Utere, non numera. (Use the hours, do not count them.)

Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success

Russian Federation General of the Army Sergei Surovikin (above). In an announcement on October 8, 2022, stated: “By the decision of the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Surovikin has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation.” At 56, Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces) in 2017. However, he has been called upon to take on further assignments to include his current one in response to the Russian Federation ever changing national security needs. He has now taken on a great challenge in Ukraine. To better understand this important change in command for Russian Federation forces in Ukraine, one must find out more about Surovikin, and even more, try to understand what is going on in the mind of the individual responsible for the invasion: Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) of 2022 was born of ill will and bad intentions. Whatever sense of certainty Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin may have held concerning the ultimate success, perhaps even expectant of lightning success by  Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii or the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) when he green-lit the invasion has doubtlessly fizzled down from flames to cinders. Clearly, he was dreadfully incognizant of what a discordant harmony of circumstances very likely could and would do his plans and hopes. Since the early days of success after February 24, 2022, nothing has been working well for the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield. At this point, res ad triarios venit, the matter has come to triarii. Triarii were the reserve soldiers of the Roman Army. When it reached the point in a war that they were called upon, most or all the front line troops had fallen. Putin in fact, mobilized all male Russian citizens eligible to serve on the front lines in Ukraine. Their performance has been something better than terrible. 

In other countries at war, facing such circumstances, leaders and their advisers come to recognize that intractable decisions, all very difficult ones, lie ahead. Among the choices, Putin could further escalate, resolve to hold any gains while minimizing further losses, negotiate inequitable peace terms, or simply withdraw. US President Richard Nixon found himself in a similar predicament, mutantis mutandis, regarding the US military operations in Southeast Asia. In the end, his Secretary of State “managed” to negotiate what was referred to as “peace with honor” with the North Vietnamese government. Selecting from the choices mentioned would be fine for other countries, however, Putin’s Russia is not like other countries. Still, finding a solution, given how things have panned out, is not simply a matter of satisfying one man’s thinking. The Kremlin is hearing ever increasing criticism for the abominable losses in Ukraine, particularly from elites with close ties to it. Nationalist and ultranationlist political parties and personalities began reacting to the situation in Ukraine with asperity. They, too, know the truth. The change in commander was ostensibly designed to send the message both inside Russia and worldwide that Russia still intends win and will emerge victorious in Ukraine. The Kremlin might hope to convince its perceived audience that with a few adjustments, albeit major changes, everything will be on track and the Kremlin has found the commander who will make things right. The impact of the change, at least around the world, has been akin to a misspelled placard at a protest. The time and energy in the Kremlin put into appointing Sergei Surovikin to direct the war and promote the change publicly as a new beginning, may have been a wasted effort.

Surely, foreign and national security policy bureaucracies worldwide have parsed out Surovikin’s appointment in the round and using logic, have reached their respective conclusions. Yet, what seems logical is not always right. To best understand this important change in command for Russian Federation forces in Ukraine one must learn more about Surovikin, and even more, try to understand what is going on in the rather unique mind of Putin. Whatever he does he does for  his ownly reason. Whatever he has done, invading Ukraine and suffering heavy losses for example, has never troubled him. Though nearly isolated, he does not appear to beweep Russia’s outcast state. Putin’s decisionmaking and probable moves must remain the subject of indispensable speculations and the development of prospective scenarios. 

As has been the pattern with preceding posts, historical examples are used to demonstrate that no matter how recherché and bizarre events have been in this present-day episode, which hopefully will somehow end diplomatically to the satisfaction of all parties involved, humankind has been beset and strained by parallel issues. Some examples reach back to Antiquity to provide apposite examples of thinking and behavior that most resemble that of Putin and his top acolytes on the Ukraine matter. Additional supportive examples are drawn from the Napoleonic era. In his satirical monthly magazine Les Guêpes (The Wasps), the 19th century French writer Alphonse Karr expressed the apt phrase: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” (The more things change, the more they remain the same.) How often is that the case.

Surovikin’s official Russian Federation Ministry of Defense photo (above). Surovikin has a reputation for being a hard-as-nails, no-nonsense commander who did not suffer subordinates lightly. Any feelings that he might have had, were never allowed to get in the way of his decisionmaking. In his military career, there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. In June 2021, Surovikin reached the rank of Generál Ármii (General of the Army), the second highest military rank in Russia, second only to a marshal. One year later, in June 2022, it was revealed that he was named the commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. Four months later, it was announced that he would be commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine.

Some Background on Surovikin

In an announcement on October 8, 2022, stated: “By the decision of the defense minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Surovikin has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation.” Note the announcement stated the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, not Putin, made the decision. With the announcement, Surovikin became the first overall commander of Russian forces committed to Ukraine. With the aim of providing readers with a decent sense of Surovikin’s experience and expertise, greatcharlie has provided a tour d’horizon of his rather event filled military career.

Surovikin, age 56, was born in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk on October 11,1966. He is married and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, the degree to which he is observant is unknown to greatcharlie. He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the Hero of the Russian Federation. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when in 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces). It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Ministerstvo oborony Rossijskoj Federacii or Minoborony Rossii (the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), were placed under one command. However, he has been called upon to take on further assignments to include his current one in response to the Russian Federation ever changing national security needs.

After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain in the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division in August 1991 when the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-proclaimed Gosudárstvenny Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP. Orders were sent down from the GKChP that would require Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. A short time afterward, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior saw enough potential in him to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

By this point in Surovikin’s career, he had acquired a reputation for being a hard as nails, no nonsense commander who did suffer subordinates lightly. Any feelings that he might have had, were never allowed to get in the way of his decisionmaking. In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. 

In 2004, according to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’s website, Surovikin commanded the 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division stationed in Chechnya. He was the chief of staff of the 20th Guards Army from 2005. In April 2008, he made the meteoric rise to army commander. In November 2008, Surovikin became Chief of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation), essentially the General Staff’s think tank. In January 2010, he became chief of staff of the Volga–Urals Military District, which soon became part of the Central Military District. Reportedly, from November 2011, he headed the working group charged with creation of the Military Police. The Russian newsmedia indicated that Surovikin had already been selected to head the new organization. Though delayed as a result of the intervention of Voyennoy Prokuratury Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the  Russian Federation Military Prosecutor’s Office), apparently, the discussion on the potential creation of the Military Police stirred a parochial struggle between the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Military Prosecutor’s Office, Glavnoye upravleniye voyennoy politsii Minoborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Main Directorate of the Military Police Ministry of Defense Russian Federation) with a strength of 20,000 was stood up. In October 2012, he became the chief of staff of the Eastern Military District. In October 2013, he was appointed commander of the district. On December 13, 2013, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of colonel general. 

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian Federation Group of Forces in Syria and Syrian Arab Army forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In a June 2022 Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper article explained that Surovikin received this unofficial nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” in the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and directing the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

While all of that was transpiring, at the end of November 2017, It was the journal of Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’) Krasnaya Zvezda that reported Surovikin’s appointment to Commander of the Aerospace Forces by a presidential decree of November 22, 2017. Interestingly, TASS made special note of the fact that Surovikin became the first combined-arms commander in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union to be put in charge of the Russian or Soviet Air Forces. According to a report published by RBK Group on November 2, 2017, Surovikin had been appointed Commander of the Aerospace Forces in spite of his initial objections.

From January to April 2019, Surovikin again took command of Russian military forces in Syria. It was during that period Surovikin directed the operation against Idlib which included countless air and ground attacks on civilian objects and infrastructure. A 2020 Human Rights Watch report states that Russian forces under his command struck Syrian “homes, schools, healthcare facilities, and markets – the places where people live, work, and study”.

In June 2021, Surovikin reached the rank of Generál Ármii (General of the Army), the second highest military rank in Russia, second only to a marshal. One year later, in June 2022, it was revealed that he was named the commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. On October 8, 2022, it was announced that he would be commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine.

In Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. As a result of his action, three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders. He was promoted to the rank of major afterwards. In September 1995, while Surovikin attended the Frunze Military Academy, he was sentenced to a year of probation by the Moscow garrison’s military court for illegally selling weapons. However, allegations were made that he had been framed. After an investigation, the conviction was overturned. It was concluded that Surovikin had provided a fellow student a pistol for use in a competition, unaware of its intended purpose. One might speculate that Surovikin either had such connections in very high places who were also benefiting from his sideshow that he was allowed to avoid any severe repercussions beyond a very public arrest or he managed to convince authorities that he was cured of his covetous mind.

On dit, there are supposedly whispers in Russia that that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source.

Surovikin is an emblem to the Russian military for its “prowess.” The same was said to be true of Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who Putin appointed commander of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on April 9, 2022. Russian commanders at different levels have often been made to sound too good to be true, only to have their “gold complexions” dimmed in Ukraine. The latest announcement did not mention Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who Putin appointed commander of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on April 9, 2022. While some Western newsmedia sources insist Russian Army Colonel General Gennady Zhidko.was Surovikin’s predecessor, Moscow had not publicly specified that anyone had been placed in overall control of the operation until the announcement concerning his new command.

Surovikin, much as Dvornikov, had the opportunity to become familiar in Syria with the ways in which the US provides assistance to foreign forces on the battlefield. Moscow’s likely hope in that regard would be better understand how US and other NATO military minds might have special operations forces working in Ukraine, what to expect as a result of their “suggestions to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as to planning and operations,” and how to counter their assistance operations. If that were the case at all, perhaps Dvornikov never really discerned enough in Syria to exploit. He certainly failed grasp the role deception plays in US military operations and that failure played a role in opening captured territory up to rapid liberation by Ukrainian forces via a counteroffensive. Surovikin has the opportunity to demonstrate that he learned quite a bit more.

In March 2017, Surovikin (above) began the first of his two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last only three months and was part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In a June 2022 Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper article explained that Surovikin received this unofficial nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” On December 28, 2017, he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

Surovikin’s Appointment Shows the World Moscow Has a Handle on Ukraine

Fallaces sunt rerum species. (The appearances of things are deceptive.) As alluded to initially here, one could reach the conclusion at first blush that this change in command amounts to a bromide, an unoriginal idea intended to soothe or placate and have the illusion of problem solving. On the other hand, one might imagine the wisdom in putting a former Russian Federation Aerospace Force commander in charge are that air power will be better applied in Ukraine. Many in the Western newsmedia have assessed Surovikin’s appointment may have been an effort by the Kremlin to mitigate criticism from nationalists who have accused the army of mismanaging the war in Ukraine and of failing to use Russian military power overwhelmingly to force the government in Kyiv to submit. To that extent, close Putin ally and leader of Russia’s North Caucasus region of Chechnya, Raman Kadyrov, has publicly demanded that many top generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces be sacked. Reportedly, many pro-Russia military bloggers have harshly criticized the prosecution of the war. 

Perhaps it would be reasonable to suspect that Surovikin came highly recommended for the Ukraine job by the same sort behind the scenes that likely lended him a helping hand whenever he landed himself in trouble in the past. Among Russians who welcomed the appointment of Surovikin was Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group), a private military company and a vocal critic of the military leadership. According to a statement put out by Concord, Prigozhin said publicly: “Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian army.” He called Surovikin a “legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.” He noted: “Having received an order [in 1991], Surovikin was that officer who without hesitation got in his tank and went forward to save his country.” His appointment was also very vocally welcomed by Kadyrov,

However, Putin’s control and his choices and the relative influence of his inner circle was put succinctly in a January 12, 2020 interview in The New Yorker magazine of Masha Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst who has written extensively on Putin’s regime. (The interview came on the heels of Putin’s proposals of Constitutional reforms that ultimately extended his years in power in Russia.) Asked about the degree of Putin’s control in Russia, Lipman responded: “The issue of control is tricky. If one talks about whether government management is efficient in Russia, then no, it is not. And Putin has repeatedly, over his very long time in office, spoken about the need to increase the productivity of labor and quite a few other very important goals. I wouldn’t say he has delivered so well on those. But, if we define control as control over the élite, over making the decisions, of course Putin’s fully in control. And the developments of the past few days are very clear and persuasive evidence of him being in control of making decisions.” Responding to a question about his moves at that time [Constitutional reforms], Lipman said; “This is a demonstration of how Putin is ultimately in charge and how he can make very important decisions by himself in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. We still do not know who was aware of what was in store for the country three or four days ago, and to what extent there is anyone who can actually challenge his decisions, even verbally.” Lipman continued: “Putin rarely consults with anyone, and, even if he does, it is done in a totally opaque way. He’s rarely explicit. Even if he consults with some people in his circle, people leave without having a clear idea of what his goal is and have to guess. Sometimes they guess right. Sometimes they guess wrong. Sometimes they try to curry favor and succeed, sometimes not. At the end of the day he is the ultimate decision-maker. And the strategy and the grand plans that he has for Russia, in their entirety, exist only in his mind.”

Given Lipman’s expert view and  the views that have been expressed by greatcharlie on Putin for quite some time–they may hold water for generous readers, it would only be reasonable to believe Putin naturally has morbid fear of anyone desiring to remove him from power. Equally naturally, he acts aggressively and often eccentricity to potential threats to his power, both real or imagined. No one should hope to get too close. Sometimes holding power too long breeds a familiarity that breeds contempt in many. Envy like fire always makes for the highest points. The Roman historian Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17), known as Livy, provided in Greek, a history of Rome that begins with the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional founding in 753 B.C. through the reign of Emperor Caesar Augustus during his own lifetime. In Book XXXV, section 10 of that history Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), Livy discusses the campaign for consul that pitted Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of Gnaeus, who had recently returned from Spain after performing great deeds, and his brother Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, who had commanded the fleet in Greece. Herodotus writes of the challenges facing Scipio: But the eyes of all men were turned upon Quinctius and Cornelius; for both were patricians, contending for one place, and recently-won military glory lent favor to each. But before all else, the brothers of the candidates11 increased their rivalry, since they were the two most celebrated commanders of their age. The greater fame was Scipio’s, and the greater it was, the more it was exposed to jealousy; that of Quinctius was fresher, inasmuch as he had triumphed that very year. There was also the fact that the other had been for about ten years constantly in the public eye, a fact which renders prominent men less venerated from sheer surfeit of seeing them: he had been consul for the second time after the defeat of Hannibal and censor . . . .”

Admittedly, greatcharlie went the long way about presenting this passage from Ad Urbe Condita. However, Livy admirably presents the depth of thinking that led to the challenge to the well-known, long-serving, heroic leader, Scipio, for a newcomer, who could only offer a list of promises and seem so willing, despite his record of service, to challenge the incumbent leader with no apparent reservations. Surely, if this could be used as any measure. Putin always has much to keep his eye on politically.

Putin launched the Ukraine War lacking a worthwhile strategy and recognition of what Russian Federation forces would come up against. What was seemingly completely missed or misunderstood was the degree of support from the US and NATO Member States that Kyiv would receive. No effort, that was apparent, was made to obviate the ability of the US and its NATO allies to supply Ukraine at will as part of the military strategy. From the start, conquering Kyiv was the focus as if Putin and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were blinded by rage. The door was left wide open between Poland and Ukraine. Such impetuous schemes and boldness are at first sight alluring, but are difficult to handle, and in the result disastrous.

Perhaps the real problem for Putin was not just that he relied on fortune, but was driven by blind ambition. What has likely been a reliable intuition that had served him well along the way and allowed him a leg-up in giving subjects light were darkened with regarding parsing out the many aspects of this massive enterprise in Ukraine. Polybius (c. 204-122 B.C.), the Greek “pragmatic historian,” and intriguingly an eyewitness to the siege and destruction of Carthage accompanying none other than Cornelius Scipio Aficanus as one of his commanders. In his noted work, The Histories, Polybius covers the period from 264 BC to 146 BC, focusing primarily on the years 220 BC to 167 BC, and detailing Ancient Rome’s conquest of Carthage, which allowed it to become the dominant force in the Mediterranean. In his discussion of the causes for the start of the Carthaginian War, the Second Punic War in Book I, section 8, Polybius cites the work of the Roman analyst Quintus Fabius Pictor (born c. 270 BC, fl. c. 215–200 BC) . Reportedly, this choice may have been based more in homage than irrefutability given concerns even in his time that his work on the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) on Carthage was highly partisan towards the Roman Republic, idealizing it as a well-ordered state loyal to its allies. Fabius was the earliest known Roman historian. His writings, presented in Greek and now mostly lost besides some surviving fragments, were highly influential on ancient writers. He participated in introducing Greek historiographical methods to the Roman world.

Polybius writes: “Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal’s ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal’s principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer–how opportunity could have better favored the Carthaginians’ wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal’s action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offense, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution–if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal’s decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.”

As an experienced judoka, Putin knows that there are occasions when one competitor is simply outmatched by another. It is hard to accept when one is the outmatched competitor or the competitor’s loyal supporter. Still, no matter how unpleasant, it is a reality that must be faced with level-headedness. It would seem Putin has not reached that conclusion yet.

(From left to right) Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Putin, and Surovikin at a presentation on aerospace weapon systems. On first impression, one might imagine the wisdom in putting the former Russian Federation Aerospace Force commander in charge is that air power will be better applied in Ukraine. Many in the Western newsmedia have assessed Surovikin’s appointment may have been an effort by the Kremlin to mitigate criticism from nationalists who have accused the army of mismanaging the war in Ukraine and of failing to use Russian military power overwhelmingly. In a January 2020 interview in The New Yorker magazine of Masha Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst who has written extensively on Putin’s regime, explained: “At the end of the day he is the ultimate decision-maker. And the strategy and the grand plans that he has for Russia, in their entirety, exist only in his mind.”

Surovikin’s Appointment Provides Putin with Some Relief Personally

Choice of Surovikin may have been made simply to provide some measure of relief for Putin. By appointing an overall commander, something that most senior military and political advisers in Moscow might have urged Putin to do earlier or had begun to do once things went poorly, the move would feel something far different than a bromide. Putin would be acting proactively, putting fresh eyes on the matter and hopefully a more successful line of thinking.

Imaginably, there are many things Surovikin can now do under his new title that he could not do as Commander of the Aerospace Forces or commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. Perhaps it might be more directly the case that they see something in the way in which Surovikin thinks. Much as with the commanders of air, ground, naval, and space components of  armed forces worldwide, one might presume in the abstract that intelligence preparation of the battlefield, providing predictive intelligence at the right time for use in planning and executing operations, has been a critical aspect of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces efforts to deliver information superiority to its chiefs, and wing and squadron commander’s operating forces over Ukraine. Perhaps in strategy sessions of the armed forces general staff on the Ukraine operation, he proved more familiar with the battlespace as it stands than his counterparts and was thereby tapped for the top Ukraine job. So, he was given the job.

Perhaps in a conversation, an opportunity as his interview with Surovikin for the Ukraine job, Putin expressed concerns about the outcome of the war and Surovikin offered words that provided some measure of relief for him. That would be the conversation leaders who were in desperate situations or facing uncertainty have had with commanders for centuries. In The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 BC-c. 425 BC), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period known for that aforementioned masterwork which mainly discusses the struggles between Greece and Persia. In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3, Herotodus reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle,  Demaratus following the king’s conversation with counselors. He writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.”

Surely, Putin is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination cannot coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply iack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Hoping Ukrainian commanders might drop some almighty clanger that will provide an advantage–friction in battle and that sort of thing–would be futile given they are doubtlessly being “advised” by the some of the best military minds that NATO’s 27 Member States can supply respectively. The assistance in terms of weapons systems, training, and gear alone from NATO Member States has been breathtaking. Putin must have accepted by now that the Russian Federation armed forces are just not good enough to successfully execute the special military operation he chose to launch on February 24, 2022. Perhaps he has muttered to himself in private that all the talent is I n the other side. The Russian Army rejoiced in reputation of the post-war and Cold War Soviet Army. it was an illusion. Putin fell for it. It is all very tragic, especially for the soldiers and civilians on both sides caught up in the fighting and dying.

An army can not change overnight. What Russian top commanders can do is ensure that the many parts of the Russian Federation’s Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Naval Forces work to their utmost in harmony to achieve success, but that still might not be enough to change the course of things. One should hardly expect to observe any maneuvers by Russian commanders to represent “an ingenious jesting with [the operational] art.” The Russians unit commanders in Ukraine continue to feign good intentions by ordering the use of overwhelming brute force, incredulously pretending they can muster any approximating power of that kind the field, with the respective objectives of overcoming Ukrainian strength now in what Putin has just recently declared Russian Federation territory. All those commanders are actually doing is sending their troops, the bulk of which are frightfully ill-trained and inexperienced, to near certain defeat. Numerous newsmedia reports in the West, impossible for any following the Ukraine War story to have missed, tell of field grade level commanders, gung-ho on the war and Putin, and eager to make their mark and possibly catch the attention of leaders Moscow, have sent their troops into better than questionable assault on well-armed and well-positioned Ukrainian units. Such assaults are being repulsed at the cost of extraordinarily high tallies of killed and wounded. Some Russian Army companies and battalions have been obliterated in this way. Many of those zealous commanders have ended.up on casualty.lists themselves. Surely such actions may later be found to be a main ingredient of a recipe for what may turn out to be a great military disaster. There may likely be a decisive clash ahead that will mark the end of the Russian presence in Ukraine, and end the myth that Russia is a conventional military power impossible to reckon with, a challenge to the combined forces of NATO.

The situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) As fate would have it, Thucydides was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because, by his own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1, of The History of the Peloponnesian War (hereinafter referred to as the Peloponnesian War):  “He possessed the right of working the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and thus had great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland” He wrote in Book I, chapter 104, section 4: “The general who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day’s sail from Amphipolis” The renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) As it was Thucydides’ fate, one might wonder whether Surovikin has been given a fool’s errand, destined to receive a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission that had become moot before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Whatever Surovikin manages to do, he will have to cut it a bit fine given the rapid progress of Ukrainian forces in reducing Russian gains, and their well-demonstrated ability to do a lot more. Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another, withdrawing their units when conditions were most favorable more often than demanding troops hold on to untenable positions until they were forced to retreat in order to survive or surrender. The ability of Ukrainian commanders to think fast and soundly has been key to their relative success as time is always of the essence. They relentlessly seek to take ground and gain and retain the initiative. More often than not weaker Ukrainian units have been pitted against stronger Russian ones, stronger at least on paper. French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never.” With continued expert advice and robust levels of assistance from the US and NATO, Ukrainian forces could potentially displace and destroy Russian forces at many points before winter sets in proper.

Putin (right) decorating Surovikin (left) with the Hero of the Russian Federation medal for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria. If one might consider the role politics might have played in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation, it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. Unlikely lost on Putin is the fact Surovikin, as a captain commanding an armored unit, was a defender of his beloved Soviet state in the truest sense during the 1991 coup d’état attempt launched by Soviet hardliners, driving through barricades erected by pro-democracy protesters. As noted in the discussion here on his military career, three men were killed in the clash, including one who was crushed.

The Role Played by Political Likes and Dislikes in Surovikin’s Appointment

In greatcharlie’s humble opinion, now is certainly not the best time in Moscow for anyone but Putin to worry about image or petty politics. It is a very odd situation that this persists in the midst of calamity. Even though there is a war going on in which Russia is not performing so well as an invader, image apparently still matters in Moscow. There are ceremonies, speeches in the Kremlin, scholarly foreign and national security policy conferences still being held around Russia all attendended via special invite only. For the elites, it is all more about status than security. The elites still want to improve their relative proximity to Putin and his inner circle. They want to know, who has what title, who is in charge of this or that, who has the lead, who takes orders from whom

To that extent, if one might consider the role of politics might have played in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation, it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. Unlikely lost on Putin is the fact Surovikin, as a captain commanding an armored unit, was a defender of his beloved Soviet state in the truest sense during the 1991 coup d’état attempt launched by Soviet hardliners, driving through barricades erected by pro-democracy protesters. As noted in the discussion here on his military career, three men were killed in the clash, including one who was crushed.

Certainly Surovikin is not starting from scratch, coming in from outside the centers of power. As mentioned, he served as the Commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, a rung few have reached since, as aforementioned, the Russian Air Force, the Air and Missile Forces, and the Space Forces were placed under his responsibility. Few have demonstrated the ability to manage as many operational organizations as he has. Although one might point out that the Russian Air Force at war in Ukraine is the one for which he was responsible for many years. Perhaps its performance has been the least impressive among the armed forces.

The thought could not have escaped Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement as Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

On the eve of the special military operation’s launch, Russian Federation forces situated near Ukraine’s border were still considered quite formidable. This belief was based not just on numbers and their fierce appearance, but on the assumption that Russia had undertaken the same sort of root-and-branch military reform that the US underwent in the 18-year period between Vietnam and its victory in the first Gulf War. Not all,, but many military analysts in the West speculated that the Russian operation would be something akin to a one act drama with an early curtain. The US Intelligence Community concluded that Kyiv would fall in days. Some European officials thought it might just hold out for a few weeks. However, starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. As greatcharlie has stated in preceding posts, the Russian Federation General Staff was fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Russian forces were not organized for war with precision. Units were not ready for battle. Soldiers had no idea of what to expect. Ukraine was allowed to use its strengths against Russian weaknesses. Ukraine’s smaller units were able to achieve relative superiority force on force initially in the field. One might have expected that occasionally good fortune would shine upon the relatively lightly-armed Ukrainian forces, and a Russian Army or Russian Naval Troops patrol rolling around or crossing into a danger zone might face ambush, a well-organized ambush, and losses would be suffered. With so many patrol ordered in the different avenues of attack by Russian forces, the greater the chance there would be losses. However, Ukrainian forces outrightly routed Russian units over and over on the battlefield and line of successes would force Russia to adjust its strategy.. The possibility of endsieg, victory against the odds, has become all the more real for the Ukrainians.

As discussed earlier to some extent, Putin surely felt the Russian Federation Armed Forces were well-trained and well-equipped to bring swift victory. To be fair, even to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their actual strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use. Imaginably, the truth was deliberately kept from Putin. No matter what was really going on at Zapad, their true value of the exercises can now be discerned by all. Military commanders simply during each exercise went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. The bigger and better Zapad exercises since 2017, lauded by the leadership of the Russian Federation armed forces, were surely “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” Putin, himself, had regularly observed the Zapad exercises and everything seemed fine enough.

One NATO commander caught on to what had been happening at Zapad and other Russian military and naval exercises before the invasion and could predict Russian military action in Ukraine might prove for Moscow to be catastrophic. When he was commander of US naval forces in Europe and Africa, US Navy Admiral James Foggo had the duty to plan US military exercises recognized that planning the huge Russian exercises were enormous undertakings. As Russia was planning the Vostok exercises in September 2021 in Siberia, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, declared it would be the largest since the Soviet Union’s Zapad exercise of 1981. It would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships. However, Foggo discovered there was quite a bit of deception involved. Rather than actually field large numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, a company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok, for example, was inflated and counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons.

How spectacularly did the illusion created by Russian commanders disintegrate when challenged by reality! It is a sad lesson for commanders in all armies to learn from. Beyond the seemingly deliberate desire to create an illusion of capabilities, the impression left is that the Zapad hoax over the years is that a certain disinvoltura apparently plagued the Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders, that has manifested itself at the worst possible time in the worst possible way. Clearly, Gerasimov was the main one who fed Putin’s illusion concerning the capabilities and  readiness of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Maybe Putin has reached a point at which he could see some benefit in making a change. The easiest way is to bring forward other faces from the Russian Federation General Staff. It is somewhat surprising that in the West, investigative journalists have not gotten the hint that Gerasimov is being slow-walked out the door and have not tried to pick up the scent of blood. Some may have. A good guess would be that Surovikin is being advanced piecemeal by Putin to where he wants him to be. Interestingly, the indications and implications of such would also be that Putin has the sense that he has a future as leader of Russia.

Removing Gerasimov would cause some stir, perhaps both plus and minus, even among Putin’s nationalist and ultranationalist following. He has been viewed as a very loyal Putin acolyte for nearly a decade. However, if Putin is acting in that direction, it would surely be “business as usual in the Kremlin” with regard to military commanders at all levels. Putin has already replaced a number of top commanders in its armed forces. In an October 8, 2022 story, RFE/RL expressed from available public reporting, a list of prominent Russian commanders that have been sacked. Reportedly, the head of Russia’s North Caucasus region of Daghestan, Sergei Melikov, wrote on Telegram on October 7, 2022, that North Caucasus native Lieutenant-General Rustam Muradov had replaced the commander of the Eastern Military District, Colonel-General Aleksandr Chaiko. The RBK news agency on October 7, 2022 cited sources close to the Russian military as saying Muradov replaced Chaiko without giving any details. Much of the Eastern Military District’s personnel are engaged in the special military operation in Ukraine, despite the fact that the district is based in Russia’s Far East. Muradov previously led troops in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, parts of which have been under Russia-backed separatists’ control since 2014. He also commanded Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

An October 3, 2022 RBK report stated that the commander of the Western Military District, Colonel-General Aleksandr Zhuravlyov, had been replaced shortly after dramatic Russian losses in northeastern Ukraine in September and the strategic city of Lyman in the Donetsk region had been recaptured by Ukrainian forces. In September 2022, Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev replaced. General Dmitry Bulgakov as deputy defense minister in charge of logistics.  Curiously, Mizintsev is accused by the European Union of orchestrating a siege of the Ukrainian port of Mariupol early in the special military operation that reportedly killed thousands of civilians. In August 2022, state media outlets in Russia said the commander of the Black Sea fleet had been sacked after Ukraine carried out several successful attacks, including the sinking of Russia’s missile cruiser Moskva and the loss of eight warplanes in an attack on a Russian base in Crimea. As Ukraine continues to liberate settlements in its eastern region from occupying Russian troops, Moscow will likely continue to replace top commanders in its armed forces.

However, Putin apparently appreciates Gerasimov as a grand strategist, a military thinker of some talent. He has well-expressed, in military terms, the imaginings of Putin and his acolytes on the US ambition to conquer Russia for its abundant resources. Worth noting is the very strong and pertinent 2013 military statement which was noted in greatcharlie’s November 16, 2016 post entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?”. Far more than a military analysis on NATO expansion, the document which was the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, assessed that future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” The basis of that assessment was that the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believed outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. Putin accepted the threat assessment of the Russian Federation General Staff which as aforementioned essentially paralleled his own thinking, and signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The notion that Russian borders were being threatened by the US and NATO and adequate defensive measures needed to be taken has nearly controlled Russian military thinking since the plan was developed. It might be reasonable to conclude that such thinking culminated, at least so far, into Moscow’s great blunder in Ukraine.

Suggestions that Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General of the Army Sergei Shoigu has concerns over General Surovikin would be almost baseless. As Shoigu and Surovikin have interacted on countless occasions while he commanded Russian Federation Aerospace Forces. No friction between them has been publicly reported at least. Many new weapon systems critical to Russia’s strategic defense have been introduced by the Aerospace Forces under his leadership. One might in this case again harken back to 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union to give life to such a suggestion. At the time, Shoigu, fairly senior in the Russian Rescuers Corps, was a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Republic, leading protests against the coup d’etat that forced Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from office. However, the fact that Surovikin and Shoigu were on opposing sides at the time should not hold much significance in an analysis. It 8s very unlikely that Shoigu has borne some grudge against Surovikin over the matter. While greatcharlie cannot swear that Surovikin’s rise is nothing to signify concerning Shoigu’s perch at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, any suggestion that Surovikin’s appointment has meaning in that direction would seem by the by. The reality is that Shoigu’s role in the rise of Putin and his place in the regime is quite firm and rather singular.

One might recall that in 1999, Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia, and his supporters were shifting to the opposition. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party, with a new face, loyal to him: Unity. Shoigu, who was serving as Minister of  Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, and part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996, was named the leader of the pro-president party. He was partnered with Alexander Karelin. Elements of Unity’s economic policy were akin to Thatcherism. It included, for example, the promotion of low inflation, the small state and free markets via tight control of the money supply, and privatization. That said, Unity also supported the reliance on powerful police and security structures and media control. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency.

While Yeltsin called Shoigu “our greatest star,” he chose Putin. Yeltsin first saw promise in Putin when he selected him on July 25, 1998 to serve as head of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Federal Security Service) or FSB. At the time, Putin was an unemployed deputy-mayor from St. Petersburg. He served at the FSB until August 9, 1999, when Yeltsin called him to the post of acting prime minister. Late that same month, there was a bomb blast in a luxury shopping mall by Red Square which was the first in a series of blast resulting in casualties. In September 1999, there were apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, Dagestan, and Volgodonsk, in Rostov. They collectively killed 300 Russian civilians and wounded hundreds more that were reportedly the responsibility of Chechen Islamic militants. Putin acted forcefully against the mall bombing, the apartment immolations, and a bold Islamic militant incursion from Dagestan into Chechnya, led by Shamil Basayev. The first of 100,000 troops were sent to the northern Caucasus within weeks. In a famous September 24, 1999 speech, Putin spoke with determination in explaining his approach to defeating terrorism: “We will pursue the terrorist everywhere. If they are in an airport, then, in an airport, and forgive me, if we catch them in the toilet, then we will waste them in the outhouse . . . The issue has been resolved once and for all.” Putin marked his rise in power by acting viciously against terror. Shoigu’s Unity Party then served as the instrument for Putin’s rise to the presidency. The Unity Party eventually entered into an alliance with the Fatherland-All Russia political bloc. The Party later morphed into United Russia, the country’s current ruling party that rubber stamps Putin’s initiatives in the Duma. Putin has remained in power by confounding insincerity, and he does not suffer fools lightly. Having observed him closely, Putin obviously feels Shoigu well-serves his needs. Shoigu was neither in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB nor worked in St. Petersburg with Putin. He has been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand his leader’s thinking and feelings. An informed guess by greatcharlie is that Shoigu is unlikely going anywhere, anytime too soon.

As remarked earlier, it is not publicly known which particular aspects of Surovikin’s military background, as seen through the singular lenses of his superiors, took on significance in the decision to select him to tackle the “Ukraine conundrum.” Perhaps those aspects would not be those leaders of other countries might seek in an ideal overall commander of a military campaign. Recalling here how Putin acted in Chechnya when brand new to the post of Russian Federation President, it would not be difficult to understand why Surovikin, with his background, would be the commander he would want handling Ukraine.

One might wonder whether Surovikin (above) has been given a fool’s errand, destined to receive a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission that had become moot before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Whatever Surovikin manages to do, he will have to cut it a bit fine given the rapid progress of Ukrainian forces in reducing Russian gains, and their well-demonstrated ability to do a lot more. Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another, They relentlessly seek to take ground and gain and retain the initiative. More often than not weaker Ukrainian units have been pitted against stronger Russian ones, stronger at least on paper.

Surovikin: The Prospective Savior of Russia?

It is very possible that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov, and the others on the Russian Federation General Staff authentically feel there is a real chance that under Surovikin’s command, Russian forces can beat back Ukrainian forces tearing through their lines, gain and retain the initiative, and somehow obviate the effects of US, NATO, and other foreign military assistance to Kyiv. The initial Western newsmedia commentaries of what Surovikin would bring to war as the new joint commander of Russian forces was that he would bring “his violent Syria playbook closer to home.” Reporting focused on a rush of heavy rocket attacks against civilian targets across Ukraine. Naturally, Surovikin’s main challenge in Ukraine, will be to solve the structural problems plaguing the Russian military as it faces fierce Ukrainian forces hell bent on liberating every speck of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Many Western Military experts have expressed that view.

Yet, equally naturally, Surovikin has the grand opportunity to apply his thinking–within the limits of the Russian government system–of what has been done wrong, what has been done right, and what can best be accomplished. As broached in-brief earlier, Surovikin may have expressed a singular interpretation of the battlespace. To be succinct and express it as it might still be taught in military educational institutions at the command and staff level, the battlespace is the mental picture a commander establishes in order to analyze and choose courses of action to apply his military assets in relation to time, tempo, and depth. Perhaps Surovikin’s superiors at this point are hoping that his way of thinking will make a difference on the battlefield and they may be turning to him as a last, best resort. Moreover, it could be that the results of the ongoing Ukrainian drive in fact proved Surovikin’s conceptual view of the situation in what was previously his southern front and his neighboring eastern front were correct. He may have expressed what turned out to be the best understanding of how factors as the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian forces to include new weapon systems being introduced via Western assistance. He may have sounded the alarm that firepower in particular would allow them “the upper hand” on the battlefield. He may have demonstrated a better understanding, reliable intimations, on how, where, and when to apply the combat power of Russian forces. He may have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces and, since their power has dwindled so dramatically, how they could be more effectively and perhaps economically mustered, how those forces could be better protected, and how they might be able to take a stab at making some respectable gains more immediately. Much as noted previously, being commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, since 2017 has perchance allowed Surovikin to gain experience, an expertise in managing multidimensional aspects of warfare to create a harmonious or synergistic whole. To that extent, he conceivably would lend an expertise applicable to managing the multidimensional aspects of air, sea, space, land, and information operations in his planning and execution of military operations.

Concerning Russian Federation Aerospace Forces specifically, more than simply contributing to the Ukraine campaign as the situation stands as of this writing, they could play an effective role, indeed have a multiplier effect. With his experience as Commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, Surovikin presumably would know best how to manage all assets of the force to strike strategically and tactically to make a positive difference in the war effort. Strategically, destroying Ukraine’s ability to construct weapons and disrupting its supply of weapons from external sources would likely be a priority. Tactically, a priority would likely be coordinating efforts by Russian Federation Aerospace Force assets with ground forces currently facing great pressure or extremely challenging situations almost everywhere on the frontlines from well-armed, well-supplied, and highly-motivated Ukrainian forces.

Dediscit animus sero quod didicit diu. (The mind is slow in unlearning what it has been long learning.) For many, it might understandably be difficult to conceive exactly how under the same leadership, with an additional title, the situation could be altered for its better. With specific regard to the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, large scale exercises of recent years appear to have been nothing more than staged acts, performances that presented illusions about the capabilities of its different branches. Indeed, those performances were full of sound and fury, but reality signified nothing. In the Ukraine campaign, the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces so far have had little impact to the degree that they were present. The Russian Federation Aerospace Forces have been near nonexistent relative to its size, supposed power, and the expectations of military analysts worldwide. Its best fighters and fighter-bombers have been regularly blasted out of the skies by Ukrainian forces using both pricey sophisticated air defense weapons systems gifted to Kyiv by Western powers and shoulder fired rockets operated by individual soldiers in the field. Russian Federation Ground Forces could be assessed as fighting much as one of a third tier power, seemingly lacking sophisticated aircraft and possessing no close air support assets, and they have resultantly suffered losses the same as an trained observer might expect of a type of third tier force against a high-tech force of a military superpower. In this case, it would appear that with the combined support of the US, the United Kingdom, EU, and NATO member countries, Ukraine, to a degree, is fighting much as that very sort of military superpower described. As greatcharlie has stated in preceding posts, one could only imagine the loss Russian Federation forces would have suffered if they had clashed directly with US forces. If any units sent into battle under that scenario would have been spared, it would have been purely a matter of happenstance.

Still, Putin would unlikely put all of his hopes in the hands of these military men. To go a bit further with the hypothetical, perhaps during one of his summit meetings and bilateral talks with Putin, People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping diplomatically and encouragingly shared the suggestion that he might adopt “a new way of thinking about warfare.” Perhaps he discussed the concept of combined warfare without boundaries emphasizing that a complementary level of energy be placed on matters that could not only greatly influence, but even more, have a decisive impact on its outcome. While it may also include the use of armed force, under the concept of combined warfare without boundaries prioritizes the use of non-military forms of warfare: psychological, media, information, technology, cyber, financial, political, social, and espionage. The aim of combined warfare without boundaries is to weaken the US internally and to exploit its vulnerabilities. Since under combined warfare without boundaries the battlefield is everywhere, everything can be weaponized. On a short list of things weaponized, Xi could have told Putin in this hypothetical situation that, optimistically, there still was time to put things right, but certainly there was no time to waste. It is all hypothetical, imagined from the abstract.

In the past, the activities undertaken as part of combined warfare without boundaries would have fallen under the category of intelligence. Perhaps, they still do. Intelligence services engage in open and clandestine, and covert activities, using appropriate tools and available resources, to create or exploit opportunities to act in support of the policies and the interests of their countries. As part of those activities, the everyday can often become weaponized. Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen around today having served in the KGB and as head of the FSB. He would very likely see value and potential in that tack, and would surely have a stream of ideas on what he could do away from the battlefield in a robust way. 

Under such a scenario, one could reasonably expect his mind to harken back to the heady days of the Cold War when he served as an officer in the KGB in the former Deutsche Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, also known as GDR or East Germany). Putin and his KGB comrades cooperated–“oversaw”–the work of their HVA counterparts who were infiltrating West Germany and countries beyond in the West to not only collect intelligence but to a great extent prepare as best as possible for a likely conflict between Warsaw Pact forces and NATO Member States in Central Europe. For 34 years, Generaloberst Markus Wolf was the very successful head of GDR’s foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA. With frightening efficiency, he developed an array of tactics, techniques, procedures and methods for operating against his Western opponents in advance of any eventual conflict in Europe between East and West, or to break down the societies of opponents of the Eastern Bloc. Throughout the Cold War, his agents poured into West Germany and when possible countries beyond, secured positions, reported about, and influenced the activities of a multitude of organizations in a broad spectrum of areas, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational. (For those interested in more on Wolf and the HVA, see the November 13 2019 greatcharlie post entitled Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997) for a bit more detail on the matter.)

With a dearth of good ideas, some interest could possibly arise in mining benefit from what might seem as an outre thought on first impression. If such a hypothetical exchange on the matter of combined warfare without boundaries were at all true, and under such a scenario, Putin might have put any thought into the matter, he would likely have begun to think beyond the battlefield in a big way. Some might suggest that Putin already was engaged in such activities as observed in Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks in Europe which began in 2014.

Hybrid warfare has been associated with Gerasimov who developed what has been dubbed the Gerasimov doctrine. The Gerasimov Doctrine, an operational concept for Russia’s confrontation with the West, is also a whole-of-government concept that combines military power and soft power across many domains, transcending boundaries between peace and war. However, there is a distinction between combined warfare without boundaries and the Gerasimov Doctrine. When combined warfare without boundaries is applied, the purpose is not to prepare or support the use of force. What is accomplished by non-military means should offset the use of force. To that extent in Ukraine, what is transpiring on the battlefield should not be looked upon as determining the final outcome of the confrontation. 

In a robust application of some simulacrum of combined warfare without boundaries, alterations in a few aspects of Russia’s behavior would likely signal the change. There would likely be greater emphasis on garnering assistance from allies with the wherewithal to contribute assets of high value. That list of allies would likely include: China, Belarus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and perhaps Cuba. Applying combined warfare without boundaries, top diplomats of Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del Rossijskoj Federacii (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation) would approach each to secure the maximum level of assistance. Reports surfaced in September 2022, that Russia was in the process of buying millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea to use in Ukraine. That information was reportedly sourced from the US Department of Defense. In August 2022, US officials disclosed that Russia received shipments of Iranian-produced drones. 

Top diplomats would also be tasked with keeping the negotiations door open without leaning too far that way as to encourage bolder action on the battlefield by Kyiv and its NATO backers. It may be the case that when Western representatives approach Putin about peace, he may very well get the sense that he is slowly wearing down their countries and Ukraine. Thereby, his resolve to fight on may be strengthened.

As part of Putin’s twist on an hypothetical implementation by him of a combined warfare without limits strategy similar to that of China might be to green-light direct action of a calibrated nature in a top tier Western country whose foreign and national security bureaucracies surely will not be expecting but actually should have been prepared for once the Ukraine war ignited over some preposterous reasoning began.

Russian Federation intelligence services would be called upon to collect all they can on the level of will Western countries possess on investing in the war: concerns expressed in capitals on capping assistance expenditures, Ukraine’s use of all forms of assistance, and the effects of Moscow’s nuclear threats. Sweet to the ear of Putin would surely be any true Intelligence collected that shows some decay in the united front of the NATO Member States. As the situation stands now, it would seem illusory for the Kremlin to put hope in some deterioration of Western unity or loss of will or concern over the drain funding the war has had on national budgets or an actual pull back of support for Kyiv. Further, if the Russian Federation could hastily organize and task Its respective intelligence services to impact Western countries lined against it in some significant way as to influence events in Ukraine, there would unlikely be enough time to get any operations going before events on the battlefield rendered their fruits meaningless.

As for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, they would still be implored to hold on territory gained. However, in the use of their weapon systems, they would need to be a bit more creative. In the May 30, 2022 greatcharlie post entitled, “Putin the Protector of the Russian People or the Despoiler of Ukrainian Resources: A Look at War Causation and Russian Military Priorities in Ukraine”, it was suggested that ideally for Putin, inhabitants of Ukrainian cities and towns will be displaced due to Russian attacks at such a level that the cities and towns themselves would more or less resemble the southern portion of the city of Famagusta in Cyprus or the village of Oradour-sur-Glane in France. (Given results, it almost seems as if Russian engineering officers, artillery officers, air power officers, and ordnance officers, have drawn up plans for the systematic demolition of Ukrainian cities and towns, district by district, block by block, using ordnance fired from a variety of weapon systems.) The intermittent attacks on populated areas may indeed have some psychological warfare, punitive, or perhaps even a tactical purpose. Yet, something of far greater conception may be behind them. Perchance Russian commanders, as part of a preconceived plan, seek to displace Ukrainians from their homes, out of the cities and town through “massive evacuations” to make them easier to “manage,” easier to control. Surely, Putin would appreciate having the West finance and supply for their care on the other side of the Dnieper River. Destroying certain parts of cities and towns would also make them far less desirable. At the time of this writing, UN estimates are that over 4.1 million Ukrainians have moved into other countries. When Ukrainians move west, the better things become concerning Putin’s likely plans for Ukraine. In that same May 30, 2022 post, it was imagined that following the capture of Ukrainian cities and towns, “There might be the chance that citizens of the Russian homeland would be ‘invited’ to relocate and settle in those cities and towns to participate in their reconstruction and, particularly in the southeast, reside in cities and towns in order to reconstruct and work at ports on the Azov Sea and in the many mineral mines. Veterans of the military operation who were so inclined could be invited to relocate to the cities and towns they ‘liberated,’ in effect to enjoy the spoils of the war.”

Hypothetically under an overarching combined warfare without boundaries concept insisted upon by the Kremlin, Russian forces would act more directly to break the will of the Ukrainians throughout the country. While propaganda would likely have limited effect, there would be the possibility of attempting to break the morale of the Ukrainian people and as important, their will to fight on. To that extent, Ukrainian civilian infrastructure would be targeted with the purpose of terrorism the population, albeit the of terrorizing civilians in this manner would be a war crime. As of this writing, Russian forces reportedly have been bombing Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, to include energy facilities. As put by Amnesty International, the intent of these attacks–somewhat in line of combined warfare without boundaries–is “to undermine industrial production, disrupt transportation, sow fear and despair, and deprive civilians in Ukraine of heat, electricity and water as the cold grip of winter approaches.”

Surovikin (center), Gerasimov (left), and Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (right). It is very possible that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov, and the others on the Russian Federation General Staff authentically feel there is a real chance that under Surovikin’s command, Russian forces can beat back Ukrainian forces tearing through their lines, gain and retain the initiative, and somehow obviate the effects of US, NATO, and other foreign military assistance to Kyiv. It could be that the results of the ongoing Ukrainian drive in fact proved Surovikin’s conceptual view of the situation in what was previously his southern front and his neighboring eastern front were correct. He may have expressed what turned out to be the best understanding of how factors as the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian forces to include new weapon systems being introduced via Western assistance. He may have sounded the alarm that firepower in particular would allow them “the upper hand” on the battlefield. He may have demonstrated all along a better understanding, reliable intimations, on how, where, and when to apply the combat power of Russian forces. He may have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces and, since their power has dwindled so dramatically, how they could be more effectively and perhaps economically mustered, how those forces could be better protected, and how they might be able to take a stab at making some respectable gains more immediately.

Surovikin: The Invaluable Multilateral Operations Expert

The renowned 19th century Irish poet and playwright Oscar Wilde explained: “To expect the unexpected shows a thoroughly modern intellect.” Surovikin surely gained experience with multilateral operations as a result of his experience in Syria. Ukraine has doubtlessly put him in contact with operational commanders of allies assisting Russia in various ways. Given the DPRK’s arms shipment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and persistent murmurs of its troops assisting the Russian with the deployment of their troops, the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff, with the permission of DPRK Chairman Kim Jung-un, by now surely has observers on the ground in Ukraine, examining everyday of the conflict and gleaning every lesson possible. Surely, those lessons learned will manifest in alterations of DPRK armed forces tactics, perhaps even the configuration of certain units, and use of their weapon systems to create whatever advantages they could possibly muster as well as mitigate any apparent weaknesses across the board. That might also include any structural changes their system of government might allow. From the Russian side, the work entailed in establishing interoperability with DPRK ordnance might be developed as a foundation for further areas and levels of cooperation. 

It was suggested at the time when the situation for the Russian forces in the Donbass began to seriously deteriorate that Kim might send 100,000 troops  of the KPA to Ukraine. On first impression, one might view such talk as part of Russia’s political warfare operations. If their suggested deployment should occur, the DPRK expeditionary force could potentially accomplish enough to offset the somewhat grandiose plans of Kyiv to raise a force of 1,000,000 soldiers to eradicate Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, to include the liberation of Crimea. The DPRK’s military is reported to be the world’s fourth largest, with nearly 1.3 million active personnel, and an additional 600,000 serve as reserve soldiers. Noteworthy is the fact that the DPRK has also offered to send over 1,000 workers to assist Russia in rebuilding postwar Ukraine. It has also been reported that Moscow would provide energy and grain in return for the deployment of DPRK troops. According to UN Resolution 2375, passed in 2017, countries are prohibited from supplying the DPRK all condensates and natural gas liquids (paragraph 13). UN Resolution 2397, passed in 2017, limits the annual amount of crude and refined petroleum that can be provided to North Korea (paragraphs 4 and 5). The former resolution also precludes any joint ventures or cooperative entities with North Korea (paragraph 18). The latter resolution reiterates the prohibition of any DPRK national from earning income in other states (paragraph 8). At this point, it would be unreasonable to think that such UN Resolutions have any meaning. Russian forces in Ukraine are already receiving the DPRK weapons shipments. As for prohibitions on the DPRK regarding arms shipments, its military assistance to Russia would also violate UN resolutions. UN Resolution 1718, passed in 2006, prohibits North Korean exports of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and missiles, and requires UN member states to prevent their transfer (paragraph 8). UN Resolution 1874 (paragraph 9), passed in 2009, and UN Resolution 2270 (paragraph 6), passed in 2016, expanded the export ban to include all DPRK arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as “technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel.” Further, under UN Resolution 2270, paragraph 8), the DPRK is also prohibited from any military exports that “support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State.” Pyongyang has established a record of totally disregarding UN Resolutions.

Napoleon is quoted as saying: “Unity of command is essential to the economy of time. Warfare in the field was like a siege: by directing all one’s force to a single point a breach might be made, and the equilibrium of opposition destroyed.” If DPRK troops, conceivably a combined arms force, were deployed to Ukraine, they would likely be applied as a decisive unified force on the battlefield, rather than separating them into individual units and dole them out as replacements for battered and tattered Russian battalions  Under the latter scenario, the likely command, control, and communications problems might be enormous. Further, the fact that Russian and DPRK have not trained together, at least in recent years, in such great numbers, surely would almost immediately become apparent despite Surovikin’s best efforts. How he would manage that would likely require summoning up answers from the depths of his knowledge, experience and talent. Perhaps the common wisdom is that if Surovikin is hoping to make any decisive moves, they would be planned for the Spring of 2023. However, there is the possibility that he plans to act in the mid-to-late Winter when weather conditions might obviate advantages provided to Ukrainian forces through the use of drones. Astonishingly, Russian forces seem to lack the appropriate equipment to monitor the skies electronically or a frightful lack of competence to do so.

One might recall weather was a key factor in the planning of Germany’ Oberkommando der Wehrmacht for its Ardennes Offensive that was launched on December 16, 1944. As the attack was envisioned, a heavy winter storm would prevent Allied attempts to provide air support and resupply to beleaguered US troops caught head on in the German armored and mechanized rampage through Belgium and Luxembourg, determined to reach the sea at Antwerp. For several days during the offensive, considerable progress was made, causing a huge bulge westward on the US frontlines. The battle was thereby given the name the “Battle of the Bulge.” Eventually, the winter storm that was vital to the German advance cleared enough for Allied air assets to fly in and have a devastating impact against the German attackers. They also managed to deliver much needed supplies–manna from heaven–to US troops. Certainly, it is possible that the drone technology Ukrainian forces possess might be able to overcome any challenges caused by weather conditions. If not, such technologically equipped drones could perhaps be rapidly supplied to them by Western powers

Though DPRK troops hypothetically sent into Ukraine would certainly be prepared to do business and make a good showing on behalf of their Dear Respected Comrade [Kim], it is possible that the hypothesized DPRK force could unexpectedly find themselves caught in a situation with Ukrainian forces similar to what their Russian comrades had in Kyiv and Kharkiv. After all, this hypothetical DPRK expeditionary force, imaginably combined arms,  could hardly expect more close air support from the Russian Federation Aerospace Force than Russian troops have received. They might deploy their own fighters and attack helicopters and fly them out of Crimea or even the Donbas only to find the skies over Ukraine no safer than the Russian pilots had. A disastrous assistance effort to support an ally that comes to mind is that of the British Army which sent a force under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore into Spain to support the United Kingdom’s Spanish allies against the forces of Napoleon in 1809 during the Peninsular War. The French campaign, initially led by Napoleon himself, defeated the Spanish armies. Moore attempted to attack the French force, a corps under Marshal of the Empire Jean de Dieu Soult with the objective of diverting it. The strength of Moore’s forces was 16,000, which included 15,000 infantry and 9 to 12 guns. Soult’s corps in near parity included 16,000 troops, of which 12,000 were infantry, 3,200 were cavalry. He also had 20 guns

When the plan as conceived failed. Moore withdrew his force, but Soult’s corps relentlessly pursued it. The British retreat, under harsh winter conditions, took Moore’s force across northern Spain while their rearguard fought off repeated French attacks. Both the British and French troops suffered from the severe weather. With the exception of the elite Light Brigade under Robert Craufurd, much of the British force suffered from a loss of order and discipline during the retreat. Having managed against tremendous odds to reach the port of Corunna on the northern coast of Galicia in Spain, a few days ahead of the French, Moore’s troops found their transport ships had not arrived. When the fleet arrived a couple of days later, Soult’s forces also arrived and launched an attack on the British who were embarking. The British had no choice but to fight another battle before leaving Spain, the Battle of Corunna. In the fight which took place on January 16, 1809. Moore’s force repeatedly repulsed attacks from Soult’s force until nightfall, when both sides disengaged. However, during the battle, Moore was mortally wounded, but he died after learning that his men had successfully repelled the French attacks. That night, British forces resumed their embarkation. The last troops sailed away in the morning under French cannon fire. Soult would capture the port cities of Corunna and Ferrol. The outcome of the withdrawal of British forces from Galicia was the fall of northern Spain to the French.

Perchance General Surovikin would also has the solution to avoid a similar catastrophe. Perhaps the hypothetical intervention by DPRK troops would more resemble that of the Prussians at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815. As it is fairly well-known, during the battle, over 30,000 Prussians under General Der Infanterie Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr Graf Bulow von Dennewitz and General-Leutnant Otto Karl Lorenz von Pirch shaped the outcome at the Battle of Waterloo. The Prussians desperately sought to capture the strategic point of Plancenoit on the right flank of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Army. Much of the Prussian’s fight against the 10,000 French defenders in Plancenoit was in the streets of the town itself. Though the battle at Plancenoit was to be hard fought, the Prussians eventually overran the French right, causing the French army to turn and flee. Their success sealed the fate of Napoleon. The Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Army, Generalfeldmarschall Gerhard Leberecht von Blücher was famously to meet British Army Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington on the battlefield between 9:00PM and 10:00PM, close to the Belle-Alliance farm, where history records, the Prussian general conjured up in French: “Quelle affaire !” Given the battering the Allied army had received throughout the day, the relatively fresh Prussian troops were to take the lead in pursuing the fleeing French troops. The Prussians had neverthless lost 7,000 men. Napoleon’s carriage was to be seized by Prussian cavalry at Gemappes, and the routed French were to be given no quarter by the furious Prussian pursuit. Blücher’s advance guard was finally to reach the outskirts of Paris on June 29, 1815. With Napoleon’s abdication on June 22, 1815, the war would officially end upon the signature of the Convention of St-Cloud on July 3, 1815.  Surely, this would be the sort of outcome that Moscow and Pyongyang would be hoping for.

Surovikin (left), Shoigu (seated right), and Russian Federation Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy (center). Surovikin gained considerable experience with multilateral operations as a result of his experience in Syria. Ukraine has doubtlessly put him in contact with operational commanders of allies assisting Russia in various ways. Given the DPRK’s arms shipment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and persistent murmurs of its troops assisting the Russian with the deployment of their troops, the DPRK General Staff, with the permission of Kim, by now surely has observers on the ground in Ukraine, examining everyday of the conflict and gleaning every lesson possible. Surely, those lessons learned would manifest in alterations of DPRK armed forces tactics, perhaps even the configuration of certain units, and use of their weapon systems to create whatever advantages they could possibly muster as well as mitigate any apparent weaknesses across the board. That might also include any structural changes their system of government might allow. From the Russian side, the work entailed in establishing interoperability with DPRK ordnance might be developed as a foundation for further areas and levels of cooperation. It was suggested at the time when the situation for the Russian forces in Ukraine began to seriously deteriorate that Kim might send 100,000 DPRK troops to Ukraine. Surely, Surovikin would be best suited to manage a multilateral effort with the DPRK.

The Way Forward

Ultimately, it was Putin who created the Ukraine War. Still, commanders are responsible for what was happening to young soldiers in the field. Surovikin expectedly understands the situation in Ukraine. He has been part of the military decisionmaking on the special military operation from its inception. The loss in troops and materiel in Ukraine even to the of top Russian Federation commanders’ eyes must also be absolutely astounding. They are after all only human. All of the ills of the forces they have led have been exposed to the world. The walls have come down. 

Included among root causes for troubles that have surfaced, with which Surovikin or anyone who might come after him must contend, are extremely poor soldier discipline and terrible fieldcraft. Training has likely been lax for decades. Leadership has likely been poor at the lower level leadership for just as long. It is unlikely that senior leaders were circulating or doing so in a meaningful way. One might presume there was a lack of standards particularly among the ground forces and very low morale. If morale was not low in the past, it is surely low now. Russian military technology appears crude as well as corroded in some cases. The world is not discovering how capable NATO has been to confront what was formally understood to be a Russian military juggernaut. Indeed, the world is seeing just how corroded the Russian system is and how that corroded system likely for years had grabbed hold of and mangled the armed forces. What has been manifested from that system in Ukraine has been a longtime in development. Weapons systems which are designed for US military and naval personnel to go to war and win must be robust. This approach is in stark contrast to that of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. An army that operates under the archaic notion that troops are expendable and can be casually sacrificed to achieve objectives will be overcome and overrun in the present era. No one should knowingly be sent to war without being given every chance with regard to their survival and the performance of their equipment.

The above are symptoms of an affliction of corruption that has beset and poisoned authoritarian regimes throughout history. Embezzlement becomes ubiquitous, the powerful feel entitled to spoils befitting their rise. And their countries are bled dry strength and wherewithal stealthily and it is all uncovered in unexpected crises. In every way, the Russian Federation Armed Forces appear to have all along been a paper tiger, emblematic of the very flawed government they serve. William Shakespeare, in Sonnet 66 (1609), provides a short list of ingredients that best describe the realities of authoritarian regimes so appropos concerning the thinly veiled current one of Russian Federation. In the third quatrain, he writes: “And art made tongue-tied by authority, / And folly, doctor-like, controlling skill, / And simple truth miscalled simplicity, / And captive good attending captain ill.”

Suggestions for Resolving the Conundrum of Chinese Intelligence Operations in the US: Fragments Developed from a Master’s Precepts

The People’s Republic of China Consulate in San Francisco (above). The Consulate has been a bit troublesome. On occasion, it has been linked to suspected Chinese espionage efforts on the West Coast. However, Chinese intelligence operations in the region, which holds world-leading science and tech firms, have more often been tied to state-owned businesses, private firms, academic institutions, or research institutes than the Consulate. In a January 31, 2021 post, greatcharlie reviewed James Olson’s To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence. In Chapter Six, Olson lists 10 “benefits of a counterintelligence operation” and explains how to reap them. In this essay, greatcharlie presents some suggestions on how Olson’s precepts might be applied to help defeat Chinese espionage efforts throughout the US.

In its January 31, 2021 post, greatcharlie reviewed James Olson’s To Catch a Spy: The Art of Counterintelligence (Georgetown University Press, 2019. In Chapter Six “Double-Agent Operations,” Chapter Seven, “Managing Double-Agent Operations,” and Chapter Eight “Counterintelligence Case Studies,” in particular, Olson provides a generous amount of information on how counterintelligence operations have been conducted by US counterintelligence services. Readers are also favored with many of the logical principles that Olson would practice and expound during training during his service in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) counterintelligence. Included among what he presents is a list of benefits US counterintelligence seeks to gain from a double-agent operations: spreading disinformation; determining the other side’s modus operandi; identifying hostile intelligence officers; learning the opposition’s intelligence collection requirements; acquiring positive intelligence; tying up the opposition’s operations; taking the oppositions money; discrediting the opposition; testing other countries; and, pitching the hostile case officer. Many of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods of US counterintelligence are laid out. Some portions are couched in anecdotes illustrating practices used in the past. Each to an extent is a display of the imagination and creativity. One discovers how double-agents were dangled to garner interest from adversarial intelligence services, false information spiked with just enough truths, “chicken feed,” was transmitted, and nuanced communications between the double-agent and his handler were managed. In 12 case studies, Olson finally presents a classical series of demonstrations along with lessons learned. He tells it all in an apposite way. Virum mihi, Camena, insece versutum. (Tell me, O Muse,of the skillfully man.)

In fairness, Olson’s work should not be judged in terms of his reaction to the prevailing national security crisis at the time of this writing: Chinese intelligence penetration into the foundations of US power. A criminal strain is observed running through the thinking of the Communist Party of China as it dispatches Chinese foreign intelligence services to steal volumes, tons of information from the most secure locations in the US. Perhaps what the future may hold is made darker by the fact that among its central members, are individuals of immense intellect, making them a far more dangerous threat to US interests. In greatcharlie’s view, there is much that can be extracted from To Catch a Spy that might constructively provide some suggestions on how to address this crisis. With the objective of being transparent, greatcharlie must disclose that on the matter of Chinese espionage in the US it is partisan, giving its complete support to the US, the homeland. That does not imply that a bias colors its discussion. No information is skewed or bent with preconceived ideas. What it does mean is that readers will likely discern facts are interpreted from that perspective.

In Chapter Six of To Catch a Spy, Olson lists the 10 “benefits of a counterintelligence operation” related in particular to double-agent operations and explains, in brief, how to reap them. In this essay, greatcharlie may albeit step out on shaky ground to present some discreet suggestions on how 9 of Olson’s 10 precepts might be applied in efforts to defeat Chinese espionage activities in the US. The suggestions are the result of some creative thinking on what if anything new might be said on the matter. In the essay’s discussion, greatcharlie hopes to avoid any appearance of instructing counterintelligence officers on what to do. Rather, the only desire is to offer all readers its suggestions, leaving it up to those in US counterintelligence to observe, reflect, and act as they may. It would be satisfying enough to know that some of what is presented here might  resonate with a few of them. It is presumed by greatcharlie that Olson’s precepts harmonize to a great degree with those that currently guide US counterintelligence officers in active service and thereby anything resulting from them would not be deemed too fanciful or even recherché. Applying Olson’s precepts to developments on the Chinese intelligence front in greatcharlie’s would have been beyond its scope of its preceding review of To Catch a Spy –although some readers noting the review’s length might sardonically query why there might be any concern over a few thousand words extra. In response to such concerns, greatcharlie has attempted to apply Olson’s teachings to the discussion here without making it an exercise in “large data processing.” It should also be noted that from the corpus of work on Chinese intelligence, a great influence upon greatcharlie are the writings of Peter Mattis. Since leaving the CIA, where he was a highly-regarding analyst on China, Mattis has published a number of superlative essays on Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence. Mattis, along with a former military intelligence officer and diplomat, Matthew Brazil, published Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer (United States Naval Institute Press, 2019), a book which is nothing less than brilliant.

Additionally, upon consideration of what it could offer to support the development of more effective approaches to defeat Chinese human intelligence and electronic intelligence collection activities against the US, greatcharlie bore in mind that it would need to be somewhat Delphic in its discussion. Therefore, what is offered are fragments of ideas with the aim of leaving a figurative trail of breadcrumbs that  a few officers in the US counterintelligence services might pick up. Hopefully, after testing their virtue, they will find something useful. Given this approach, greatcharlie apologies in advance to other readers who may find the discussion somewhat cryptic or a bit “undercooked” at places. De minimis grandis fit magnus acervus. (From the smallest grains comes a big heap.)

Chinese Foreign Intelligence Versus US Counterintelligence

Resolving the problem of halting the torrent of successful Chinese intelligence operations against targets inside the US has hardly provided mental exaltation for the rank and file in US counterintelligence services operating in the field. US counterintelligence has lived with failure too long. Surely, a great cloud has covered any happiness of their work. The inability to put an appreciable dent in Chinese efforts has likely had some measurable impact on the morale of earnest US counterintelligence officers. Indeed, the abstruse puzzle that Chinese intelligence operations pose has most likely been an anxiety generating challenge that has pressed those given to believe it is their purview to know things others cannot know. At the top, senior executives and managers must account for the failing of their respective US counterintelligence services. Imaginably, they resent the deficiency. Surely, they are feeling terribly unsettled by regular reports of so much being blown, so much intellectual property and classified material being lost. They have certainly had a bellyful of the failure rate against the Chinese intelligence networks. There has been so much scandal–or at least what should be scandal–with US political leaders becoming entangled with Chinese intelligence operatives, from interns, drivers, fundraisers, to “camp followers.” Expectedly, senior executives and managers should be wondering whether the rank and file of US counterintelligence has gone on hiatus. To use contemporary sports vernacular in the US, US counterintelligence services “have not shown up” in the struggle with China. They may also be wondering, given the array of tools and considerable resources available to them, whether the rank and file, led by squad, shop, or unit supervisors and commanders, have told them the whole story. Perhaps harshly, they would question whether the rank and file were organizing valid plans or going off on profitless “school boy larks,” not remotely sufficient to defeat a most cunning opponent. Against the Chinese style intelligence operations, it may very well be the case that the ordinary principles of trade craft and security have gone to the wall. French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “You must not fight too often with one enemy, or you will teach him all your art of war.” Directors and commanding officers of US counterintelligence services can only come to the US Congress for hearings on oversight and appropriations seeking sympathy not approval or report any real success.

Perchance little has really been provided in any official assessments of why US counterintelligence efforts have been so unsuccessful. Perhaps senior executives are not asking the right questions or any questions. When one is overmatched, one will usually lose. Some enhanced intelligibility in the discussion of what has been occurring would help to bring at least the US public around to a better understanding of what where things stand and the prospects for success. Without that, policy analysts and other observers are left to presume that the Chinese are that much better. Indeed, as of this writing, the suggestion that has frequently been voiced in certain quarters concerned with the crisis, and has even spilled out into the newsmedia, is that the professional, diligent officers of the US counterintelligence services–and sadly those qualities cannot be ascribed to the entire group–are simply unable to get a handle on the Chinese threat. That suggests there has been a complete eclipse of their faculties. However, that should not be taken as the gospel truth. Surely, the men and women of the US counterintelligence services, correctly focused, will be able to gain and retain the initiative and start pulling apart Chinese intelligence networks. The renowned US industrialist Henry Ford once remarked: “Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again, this time more intelligently.” The US counterintelligence services maintain their vigil.

Olson’s Precepts from To Catch a Spy

On “Spreading disinformation”

Olson begins his veritable “mini manual” by explaining double-agents can be used to provide the opposition service with false or misleading disinformation, but this a relatively infrequent objective. Deceiving the enemy in this manner requires tremendous planning and subtlety because adversarial foreign intelligence services are not easily deceived. Very often they possess the means to verify the provenance of the double-agent’s reporting. Moreover, if the double-agent reports that some action will take place in the future and it does not, the double-agent’s credibility is seriously undermined. According to Olson the use of disinformation in a double-agent operation would only make sense when the stakes are unusually high or the opposition has limited means of verification.

With reference to “Determining the other side’s modus operandi”

Olson explains that a double-agent is in a perfect position to report back on the opposition’s modus operandi. For any counterintelligence officer responsible for monitoring and thwarting hostile services operations, it is invaluable to know how the service conducts its business. Olson recalls that when he was tasked with developing counterintelligence programs at CIA field stations, the first thing he did was review all of the double-agent operations that any US government agency had run in that location. What he wanted to learn was how the target services operated. Among the questions that he would ask were the following: “Did they meet their agents in safe houses, cafes, parks, vehicles, or some other location? What time of day did they prefer for agent meetings? Were there sections of the city they overused? Did they incorporate initial contact points into their modus operandi, and if so, what kind? What kind of equipment and training did they provide for their agents? Did they use electronic communications of any kind? Where were their dead drops and what did their concealment devices look like? What type of signal device did they prefer?”

Olson remarks that It was especially helpful to have double-agent history in the same city that you are operating, but there was value in reviewing any foibles of double-agent operations run by the target service anywhere. As Olson explains, the case officers of the service have all had the same training and follow the same operational doctrine. They tend to fall into habits and use operational techniques that have worked for them elsewhere. The result can be predictability–a major vulnerability in spying that can and should be exploited by the opposition’s counterintelligence. 

Concerning “Identifying hostile intelligence officers”

Foreign intelligence services take great pains to hide their case officers under a variety of covers according to Olson. They can pose as diplomats, trade officials, journalists, students, businessmen or businesswomen, airline representatives, employees of international organizations, and practically any other profession that gives them an ostensible reason for being in the country. US counterintelligence is tasked with piercing those covers and identifying the spies. One of the best tools available for this task is the double-agent.

In some cases the handling officer is the recruiting officer. If the recruiting officer first met our double-agent dangle when he was providing the dotting and assessing venues in true name, then the double-agent can provide a positive identification from the beginning. As standard practice, however, the case officer will use an alias in meeting with the double-agent. The double-agent can still provide a detailed description of his or her handler and can often make an identification through a photo spread. Also, since counterintelligence service running the double-agent operation knows when and where the case officer will show up, for example to meet to meet the double agent, to service a dead drop, or to mark a signal, it has technical options to assist in identification. The case officer usually comes from a known pool of officials from the local embassy, consulate, the UN, a trade mission, or some other official installation. Olson claims that it never takes long “to make” who the handler is.

Double-agent operations that go on for an extended period, as many of them do, Olson explains that they will lead usually to additional identifications of hostile intelligence personnel. Case officers rotate regularly to other assignments, and their agents doubled or otherwise, are turned over to a new case officer for handling. Other case officers are sometimes introduced into the operation as a back-up or as a subject expert. The primary case officer may handle the day-to-day operational aspects of the operation but may not have the in-depth knowledge required to debrief the double-agent effectively on a highly technical subject. Olson says it is not uncommon in these cases for intelligence services to insert a more knowledgeable debriefer into an operation from time to time. He continues by explaining that If the primary case officer may not be able to get a surveillance break to pick up a dead drop, for example, or may not have cover to mark or read a given signal. In that event a colleague from the residency is called on to help out–and can be identified by employed cameras or other surveillance techniques nearby. Olson states that in some long term double-agent  operations, as many as twenty or thirty opposition case officers and support personnel have been exposed in this manner.

Olson warns that things get funny when the handling or servicing officer if a double-agent operation is an illegal or nonofficial cover officer (NOC). Case officers in these categories face arrest or imprisonment if caught. For that reason, illegals or NOCs are used carefully and as a rule only handle or support a case in which the bona fides of the operation are considered airtight.

With respect to “Learning the opposition’s intelligence collection requirements”

In what Olson calls “the cat-and-mouse game” of counterintelligence, even the slightest advantage can be the difference between winning and losing. A good double-agent operation can provide a winning edge by alerting the sponsoring service to the opposition’s collection requirements. Knowing what the double-agent is being asked to provide the handler is a valuable window into what the opposition’s priorities and gaps are. A question posed would be “How much pressure is being put on the double-agent to collect intelligence in a certain area?” He says that the range of tasking is limited, of course, to what the double-agent professes his access to be,  but a good double-agent might hint at the possibility if expanded access to smoke out the opposition’s response. For example, a high technology double-agent might tell his handler that his future duties might include research in high technology devices. Olson says the question then would be: “Does the opposition service respond either alacrity or lassitude?” According to Olson, the latter reaction could indicate that this requirement is being covered by another agent.

Olson demonstrates another ploy that can be used to learn the adversary’s collection priorities which was to have a military double-agent, for example, announce to his handler that he is up for reassignment and is about to put in his wish list for a new posting. Olson says the double-agent would be prompted to ask his handler: “Where would the service like him to go?  Where does the service not want him to go? For what kind of bullet should he be applying?” Olson explains that how the handler responds can indicate the services collection priorities and gaps in locations where it thinks it can handle the double agent safely.

Olson further explains that intelligence services do not task their agents haphazardly. The requirements are generated by a systematic process that includes input from all the interested parties. In the US, for example, requirements for the intelligence community result from an elaborate consultation and give and take managed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The process is far from casual. Any intelligence service can learn a lot by analyzing the requirements given to its double agents. There is significant meaning in what the opposition service is asking for and what it is not.

Regarding “Acquiring positive intelligence”

Olson reveals that occasionally, a foreign intelligence service so believes in the trustworthiness of a double agent that it shares with that double-agent positive intelligence information. The purpose may be to give the founder agent background information to assist in his or her collection efforts. Another reason for doing so might be that the case officer-double-agent relationship may become so critical that the case officer assumes the double-agents ironclad loyalty and “talks out of school.” Olson also says a case officer may try to enhance his or her standing with the double-agent by boasting about past or current accomplishments.

With reference to “Tying up the opposition’s operations”

Every minute an opposition case officer spends on a double-agent, proffers Olson, is a wasted minute. The handlers time is wasted. Also tied up in the operation for no productive purpose are technical teams, linguists, surveillance, and analysts. Olson goes on to note that It is perhaps a perverse but still undeniable pleasure for a US counterintelligence officer to sit back to survey his or her double-agent operations and to gloat about owning a big chunk of that adversary’s time and energy. Every useless thing that a foreign intelligence service does in handling one of our double agent operations leaves less time for it to hurt us with real operations. In the great game of counterintelligence, these are gratifying victories.

As to “Taking the oppositions money”

Foreign intelligence services vary tremendously in how much they pay their agents, but Olson admits that with the right kind of material, a good double-agent can command big money. He explains that the willingness of an adversarial service to pay our double-agents large amounts of money is a good indicator of how deeply we have set the hook. 

About “Discrediting the opposition”

Commenting generally, Olson says intelligence services hate to lose face. Enough of them around the world have acquired such bad reputations for violating human rights, torture, other violent acts, and murder, that there is not too much for the many to lose in terms of good standing. They want to project to the world an image of competence, professionalism, toughness and discipline. Olson explains that any publicity that highlights their failures can undermine their support from their government and demoralize their troops. He notes that in closed societies like the Soviet Union, East Germany, China, and Cuba, intelligence services were hardly accountable to the press and public as those of Western democratic societies. However, he maintains that they still did everything they could to protect their reputations. Olson says that the same is true today of our major counterintelligence adversaries.

The US is reluctant to publicize expired double-agent operations out of fear of revealing sensitive methodology or subjecting the American principal of notoriety. In selected cases, Olson states that he would like to see US counterintelligence be more proactive in capitalizing on the other side’s failures. He believes that by doing so the US can make them gun shy about engaging in future operations against its citizens. He asserts that the US could publicize how they fell into our trap and how much they gave away to us in the process. He suggests that once they are lured into operating inside the US, counterintelligence services can do a splashy expulsion of case officers who have diplomatic immunity and arrest those who do not. As a benefit, Olson suggests the hostile service looks bad for letting itself be duped by our double-agent operation, and should pay a price for it. It loses some of its operational staff, its reputation for professionalism suffers. He feels that no mistake by the opposition should go unexploited. 

The People’s Republic of China Minister of State Security, Chen Wenqing (above). Resolving the problem of halting the torrent of successful Chinese intelligence operations against targets inside the US has hardly provided mental exaltation for the rank and file in US counterintelligence services operating in the field. US counterintelligence has lived with failure too long. Surely, a great cloud has covered any happiness of their work. The inability to put an appreciable dent in Chinese efforts has likely had some measurable impact on the morale of earnest US counterintelligence officers. Indeed, the abstruse puzzle that Chinese intelligence operations pose has most likely been an anxiety generating challenge that has pressed those given to believe it is their purview to know things others cannot know.

Suggestions Drawn from Olson’s Precepts

Do Not Fume, Think!

In Greek Mythology, there was Até, an unpredictable figure, not necessarily personified, yet represented rash, chaotic, ruinous responses by both gods and men to a situation. She was famously mentioned in Act 3, Scene 1 of  William Shakespeare’s play The Tragedy of Julius Caesar, when Mark Antony addresses the body of Caesar and predicts civil war: “And Caesar’s spirit ranging for revenge,/ With Até by his side, come hot from hell,/ Shall in these confines, with a monarch’s voice,/ Cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war.” Até has been described as a chain reaction, a mechanism in which evil succeeds evil. In finding a handle to the current espionage crisis with China, it is not a time for a “gloves off” attitude. Minds should be directed toward getting at the opponent to send a message, to bully or even to overwhelm, The requirement in this situation is subtlety, nuance, thinking, not any heavy-handed business. If any US counterintelligence officer involved cannot sustain that, he or she is working the wrong target. Informed by experience, greatcharlie is aware that it is a predilection among not all young special agents in a particular US counterintelligence service, but some, to be frightfully eager to prove something to their cohorts and to themselves. Ira furor brevis est; animum rege. (Anger is a brief madness; govern your soul (control your emotions)).

Practicing what is compulsory for all investigations in the Chinese crisis is sine qua non. However, if one’s thinking is not yielding satisfactory outcomes, then one must focus upon how and what one thinks. A corrective step must be to concentrate to enhance one’s ability to summon up new ideas and insights, study, understand, and consider the deeds of personalities. It is one thing to supposedly see everything–certainly the tools available to US counterintelligence services allow them to see an extraordinary amount of things, but another thing to properly reason from what one sees. US counterintelligence officers must think harder and conceptualize better. They must ruminate on events in relation to those that proceed them and meditate on what the future may bring. They must practice forecasting decisions by their adversary that may shape what might come and then proof their efforts by watching events unfold in reports. 

The question that must beat the brain of every US counterintelligence officer working on the matter is most likely: “Where will they strike next?” As a practical suggestion, the focus of many investigations–if not all investigations–of Chinese intelligence networks send operations might be placed on two points: those controlling networks and running operations in the field; and the composition of operations in the field.

Know Who Controls the Chinese Intelligence Networks

As it was discussed in the July 31, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign against the US? (Part 1),” personnel of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the civilian foreign intelligence service of China, are usually assigned overseas for up to six years, with a few remaining in post for 10 years if required. In most countries, MSS officers are accommodated by the embassy. In the US, there are seven permanent Chinese diplomatic missions staffed with intelligence personnel. MSS personnel are usually assigned overseas for up to six years, with a few remaining in post for ten years if required. In most countries, the local MSS officers are accommodated by the embassy. Having stated that, it is near certain that presently far greater numbers of MSS officers as well as officers from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Communist Party of China intelligence units are operating without official cover throughout the West. (Note: The four key bodies of the Communist Party of China’s bureaucracy at the central level for building and exercising political influence outside the party, and especially beyond China’s borders are the United Front Work Department, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the International (Liaison) Department, and the Propaganda Department.) Instead of embassies and consulates, they operate out of nongovernmental, decentralized stations. They are known to often operate out of front companies created solely for intelligence missions or out of “friendly” companies overseas run by Chinese nationals, “cut outs“, who are willing to be more heavily involved with the work of MSS and other Chinese intelligence services than most Chinese citizens would ever want to be. This approach may be a residual effect of pollination with Soviet intelligence in the past. 

There is a common misunderstanding about the Soviet KGB Rezidentura. While it is generally believed that all intelligence activity by KGB in another country was centralized through the Rezidentura in the embassy or consulate, under a Rezident with an official cover, as fully explained by former KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin in his memoir, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994), there were also nonofficial Rezidenturas that operated away from Soviet diplomatic centers. Those nonofficial Rezidenturas had their own Rezident or chief of station, chain of command, missions, and lines of communication to Moscow. One might suppose that when the relationship during the Cold War was still congenial, had doubtlessly demonstrated to the Chinese, the benefits of operating two types of Rezidentura overseas, official and nonofficial. In a July 9, 2017 National Review article entitled “Everything We Know about China’s Secretive State Security Bureau”, Mattis explains that the MSS’ thirty-one major provincial and municipal sub-elements of MSS more than likely possess most of the officers, operatives, and informants and conduct the lion’s share of the operations. For some time, those provincial and municipal sub-elements performed mostly surveillance and domestic intelligence work. These provincial and municipal state security departments and bureaus By the time of Mattis’ writing, they had become small-sized foreign intelligence services. They were given considerable leeway to pursue sources. In Mattis’ view, that independence accounted for variation across the MSS in terms of the quality of individual intelligence officers and operations. At the present, the provincial and municipal state security departments and bureaus may be operating entire networks of their own in the US with appropriate guidance from MSS Headquarters and the Communist Party of China.

There are likely many unexplored possibilities that perhaps should be considered about the managers of Chinese intelligence networks in the US. Anything that can be gathered or inferred about the individuality of such a person must be put forth for study. A constant effort must be made to understand what makes the network manager tick. Using some of what is publicly known about how Chinese intelligence services have been operating in the US from a variety of sources, to include US Department of Justice indictments and criminal complaints, one might conceptualize traits that could be ascribed to those managers possibly on the ground in the US, controlling operations day-to-day, are: energy, enthusiasm, and creativity. Among their traits, one might expect that they would exude a positive attitude that encourages officers, operatives, and informants to do their utmost in the field. That energy is transmitted to US citizens and Chinese émigrés being recruited to serve the purposes of their intelligence services and, of course, the Communist Party of China. There would very likely be the hope among Chinese intelligence services and the Communist Party of China that following the detection of each of their victories by US counterintelligence services there is an opposite effect upon the officers of those organizations. Chinese intelligence services would surely hope that a sense of defeat reaches deep into the psyche of US counterintelligence services rank and file and firmly sets within them a sense of disponding woe, sorrow, and discouragement. They doubtlessly want them to feel gutted.

The managers controlling operations of Chinese foreign intelligence networks in the US have undoubtedly been selected due to their proven mental alertness, quick thinking, adaptability, and curiosity. They surely have the right stuff to be open-minded and imaginative, within authorized parameters, and are willing to adapt. Surprisingly given the iron-grip culture among managers and executives in Beijing, these “field managers” have apparently been given some leeway to use their initiative to achieve progress. It likely accounts for how the Chinese are able to react quickly to any changing circumstances. To an extent, it may also explain why Chinese intelligence services may appear to some to be so disdainful of any danger that US counterintelligence efforts might pose to their operations despite knowing that they are actively being pursued by them by the hour. To be on top of everything, the network managers are likely sharp as a tack and no doubt endlessly study what is known by Chinese intelligence about US counterintelligence tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods, concepts and intent, and the latest counterintelligence tools US counterintelligence has fielded. Among such individuals, a solid foundation of information likely allows for the development of viable inferences and strong insights which in turn allows for confidence in using their intuition on what may come or what is coming their way. These network leaders are also likely able to identify any “bad habits” that may have ever brought US counterintelligence services too close for comfort. 

There remains the possibility that the network manager may not even be located in the US. Still, someone must be present on the ground in the US, to relay, with authority, directions from the manager and respond to inquiries and urgent matters from those operating in the field. It could be the case that they maintain modest lodgings not only to reduce costs and keep a low-profile in general. However, the presumption of a low-profile manager could also be entirely incorrect. It may very well be that they are individuals who have achieved considerable success and prominence in areas such as business and finance. As such, they, as a professional requirement, would both have access to and daily accumulate knowledge far beyond average boundaries of the latest events in industry and government. They would know what is important and urgent, what is moving things forward, what is the next big thing, who and where are the individuals influencing events and how to make contact with them and get connected to all of it. In their fields, they may be among the most capable at doing that and may have the recognition, awards, and the financial benefits that would confirm it. It would appear that they avoid engaging in any surreptitious or malign efforts in their own companies or in their own fields. However, it is still a possibility.

Such prospective network managers would very likely be untainted by any apparent or questionable affiliation with Chinese universities, the PLA, and the Communist Party of China. (That does not mean family members who may reside in China would not be thoroughly connected to such organizations.) If the individuals have family ties back to China, there would be nothing apparent about them that would make them suspicious. They would likely have no overseas travel or contacts that would create suspicion. Doubtlessly, an endless list of notables from their fields might be prepared to vouch for them. All the while, though, they would be managing intelligence operations of their networks in an exquisite fashion, and feeding back information to China vital to US national security and the key to helping US businesses maintain their competitive edge against foreign rivals. (If the manager is situated in the US, oddly enough, there may actually be a number of creative ways to draw out such senior managers of field operations. As aforementioned, greatcharlie will never offer any insights even from its position outside the bureaucracy that it believed might result in any negative outcomes for the US as it seeks to resolve the China crisis. That being stated, as stated in the December 13, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “Meditations and Ruminations on Chinese Intelligence: Revisiting a Lesson on Developing Insights from Four Decades Ago,” if one were to mine through the US Department of Justice’s very own indictments and criminal complaint against those few Chinese officers, operatives, and informants that have been captured, reading between the lines very closely, one can find to more than few open doors that might lead to successes against existing but well-cloaked Chinese intelligence networks and actors. Not one case has been a “wilderness of mirrors.”)

Perchance those of a younger generation would say that Chinese intelligence network managers in the US, as described here, as being  “woke,” or as the Germans would say, “wach,” both words roughly refer to them as being awake. In greatcharlie’s view, spying on the US is not woke. Nonetheless, everyday, the network managers place their keen eyes on the world around them and have a deep understanding of how people tick, how they fit in and feel where they live and work, and how they can get the ones they have targeted tangled up in their respective espionage enterprises.

Perhaps reading this, one might get the impression that greatcharlie was attempting to convince readers that Jupiter himself was running the Chinese intelligence networks. That is surely not the case. However, it must be recognized that the sort controlling those networks are likely of a very special nature. Surely, with regard to politics which is all so important in the regime of the Communist Party of China, one would expect that network managers deployed against the US, despite not having much physical contact with anyone in Beijing, would be the fair-haired boys or gals among one or more of the senior executives in MSS or even a senior leader of the Party, itself. 

Whatever any US counterintelligence service may attempt to do in an effort to break Chinese intelligence operations, its officers must be mindful that this may likely be the sort of individual they are seeking to maneuver against. Without the ability to get up close to these managers, it might be enough to conceptualize them, given the pattern of activity and interrogations of intercepted officers, operatives, and informants and reinterviewing the handful of “recent” defectors in US hands. (It is wholly plausible that the officers, operatives, and informants working in the US have never seen and do not know the identity of their network manager on the ground. They may only recognize the individual by code via orders, rectifications, responses to inquiries and requests, and inspirational messages.) If the abstract entity, de créature imaginaire, constructed here is, by coincidence, correct in every particular, there may be the rudiments to get started on trying to “steal a march” on perhaps a few of the Chinese intelligence network managers. Shaping one’s thinking against thinking and conceptualized tratits of de créature imaginaire, may be enough to open new doors. Perhaps in time, such in-depth study of these aspects will allow informed counterintelligence officers to develop true intimations, not valueless surmisals or absurd speculation, of what may be occurring and what is about to occur. In “A Story of Great Love,” published in the Winter 2011 edition of the Paris Review, Clarice Lispector writes a sentence that is amusing yet conceptually germane to what is discussed here: “Once upon a time there was a girl who spent so much time looking at her hens that she came to understand their souls and their desires intimately.”

The People’s Republic of China Consulate in Houston (above). From this now closed building, China directed government, economic, and cultural activity across the southern US. Ministry of State Security (MSS) personnel are usually assigned overseas for up to six years, with a few remaining in post for 10 years if required. In most countries, the local MSS officers are accommodated by the embassy. Having stated that, it is certain that presently far greater numbers of MSS officers as well as officers from the People’s Liberation Army and Communist Party of China intelligence units are operating without official cover throughout the West. Instead of embassies and consulates, they operate out of nongovernmental, decentralized stations.

Discover the Composition of Network Operations

One might suppose the Chinese intelligence networks in the US, as a primary purpose, unlikely conduct operations in which they blithely seek out new targets day-after-day, although there are perhaps some operations underway that serve to monitor individuals in positions that might be interest and sites of information of interest with the guidance of MSS headquarters, provincial bureaus and municipal departments based on available intelligence. The settled, more fruitful networks that have nettled US counterintelligence services the most are likely set up to run operations on targets of a certain type, rich with prospects at locations in  which Chinese intelligence operatives and informants are well ensconced. One could reasonably expect that there will be a commonality in location for both predator and prey. (Although, nothing can really be certain for espionage is a deke business.) The Chinese intelligence operation will be set up in proximity of a figurative “happy hunting ground,” a high-tech firm, laboratory, academia, political network, foreign, national security, economic, trade policymaking office, agribusiness, and aviation, and energy business to list only a handful. In addition to propinquity, there will be a common functionality of any Chinese owned business that may establish themselves in the hunting ground, and very apparent efforts to create employee links by them with their likely targets. 

Control remains essential in the authoritarian (totalitarian) regime of the Communist Party of China and therefore there is a certain specificity intrinsic to every operation–despite nuance in design, methods, and other imaginative approaches attendant–that will presumably allow for monitoring, oversight, and audits. If it ever was detected that an odd Chinese intelligence network was skillfully mixing tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in operations conducted following an aggregate rollup of known Chinese intelligence efforts in the US, it is unlikely that particular network’s approach, while perhaps creative to the extent possible, will never stray too far from any observances that would be laid down by their respective Chinese intelligence services. If the tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods used by Chinese intelligence networks are really so similar, one could say their operations will likely have a common “DNA.” The adversary’s known practices are undoubtedly cataloged by US counterintelligence services. It will be necessary to more closely study the common functionality of networks and operations. As much information on their operations must be collected as possible. Study what has been learned by allies. Identify common vulnerabilities in every network. Identify, study, and exploit their deficiencies.

As much of what the networks Chinese intelligence services are exactly doing day-to-day in the US remains unknown publicly at least, it is impossible to say with certainty how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted their operations. One can imagine there has been some impact. Nevertheless, given that reality, in considering how COVID-19 factors into their efforts, one must again enter the world of supposition in which one analysis of how those networks are not only operating, but more specifically, how managers of those networks are communicating with Beijing and with their officers, operatives, and informants, can be just as good as another.

Even before COVID-19 hit, for Chinese intelligence networks on the ground in the US, managing communications in any direction was imaginably no mean feat. As it was discussed in the August 31, 2020 greatcharlie post entitled, “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is This Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign Against the US? (Part 2).” Perhaps, the main lesson for Chinese intelligence services was that it was not safe to continue creating and maintaining secret communications or reports, any truly important documents, electronically. It was the same as leaving an open door to foreign intelligence service penetration. The transition back to paper would be the best answer and easy enough. Indeed, the use of hard documents and files was what the most seasoned foreign intelligence and counterintelligence officers were most familiar with using. Moreover, they are very likely individuals of conservative habits, and never became so familiar with computer work as their younger counterparts. The return to paper files would certainly lead to the collection of what would now be thought of as considerable amounts of documents. File rooms and vaults have very likely been rebuilt or returned to service. Urgent issues concerning diplomatic matters were likely communicated via encrypted transmissions. There was very likely a sharp increase in transmissions once the consulate received notice that it was being forced to close. Use of that medium would provide some reasonable assurance that content of the communication would be protected. Nothing of any real importance was likely communicated by telephone given that the US would surely successfully eavesdrop on the conversation. 

One might venture to say that a likely move to hard documents may have been evinced when the world observed presumably Ministry of Foreign Affairs security officers and MSS intelligence officers using fire bins to burn bundles of documents inside the compound of the People’s Republic of China Consulate in Houston, Texas as it prepared to close. It might be the case that burning the documents is standard operating procedure for Chinese diplomatic outposts in such instances as an evacuation. MSS counterintelligence would hardly think that US intelligence and counterintelligence services would pass up the fortuitous opportunity to search through or even keep some or all of the documents consulate personnel might try to ship or mail to China while evacuating the building, even if containers of documents were sent as diplomatic pouches.

From what is publicly known, it appears that Chinese intelligence networks do not recruit after simply spotting a potential operative or informant. If that were the case, the success rate of US counterintelligence services against them would be far higher given the opportunities such activities would present and given the experience of their organizations in dealing with such a basic set up. Chinese intelligence services clearly work wholly on their own terms, investigating only those “targets” who they choose to investigate, essentially ignoring anyone that may have the slightest appearance of being dangled before them. It is a benefit for them to operate in what could be called a target rich environment in the US. Recruitment is “by invitation only.” If one is not on the figurative guest list, one does not get in! As part of their investigations of targets for recruitment, doubtlessly it is important to identify the psychological profile of a person, his political orientation, his attitude towards his motherland, China or towards the US, where he or she has become a citizen or visiting for school or long-term employment. And then, after accumulating a sizable amount of material (based on a whole array of undertakings: plain observation, audio- and video-surveillance of the places of residence, agency-level scrutiny, including “honey traps”), on the basis of the analysis, a decision is made about a transforming the investigation into a recruitment with appropriate conditions (such as through compromising materials or a voluntary agreement) or about wrapping up the whole matter by “educating” a foreigner, conveying a favorable message on China and the wave of the future, Chairman Mao Zedong’s vision of Communism.

After studying what is being specifically done by a network long enough, one will begin to see dimly what a network or specific operation is driving at. After finding a few missing links, an entirely connected case will not always, but can be obtained. Once a clear picture emerges, one can start developing attack vectors against Chinese intelligence networks with a forecast of nearly assured fruits. Lately, the identification and aim at any networks has clearly been far less than accurate. Do not use individuals lacking good judgment and sanguine required based on one’s own standard. Create the best team possible. Know your people well. Keep a close eye on neophytes. (As touched on in the discussion of Olson’s “Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence” of Chapter Four in greatcharlie’s review of To Catch a Spy, a supposition verging on the ridiculous must be seen as such by a supervisor and appropriately knocked down. A keen interest must be kept on how subordinates, especially novices, are reasoning with facts. A supposition verging on the ridiculous might involve imputing criminal motive or involvement on a party that could not have been part of a criminal conspiracy or ascribing characteristics to an individual who could not possibly possess them or has not displayed them. A good case could be blighted by such wrongheadedness.)

Gnawing a bit further at the matter of using young, novice counterintelligence officers on such delicate cases concerning Chinese intelligence, one should avoid the pitfall of allowing them to manage surveillance work for a case and turn it into something that might more reflect the work of a security service in a totalitarian country to soothe their egos. Be mindful of the use of time, energy, and budget by them such as placing heavy, wasteful surveillance on the street not to advance the casework but to prove some immature point of power. Casting some wide net will bring in nothing but a lot of extra things that time, energy and money cannot be wasted upon. Differ nothing to their judgment. Every mistake or misstep made by US counterintelligence, whether the result of a manager’s use of some clever misdirection or whether self-inflicted, represents a success for a Chinese intelligence network manager. Keep firmly in mind the managers of Chinese intelligence networks are flexible enough in their thinking that they appear to be able to change horses in midstream while maintaining the metaphoric helm on a steady heading so to speak. 

Concerning contractors, by their nature, they are owned and managed by businessmen out to make money as priority. That focus among many of them can be boiled down to the  precept, “minimum effort, maximum gain” and that can be most apparent in how they conduct their so-called operations on the street. As already alluded to here, their “operatives,” often poorly vetted before being “hired,” many times find it difficult in the field, physically surveilling a target or trying to open a clandestine conversation, to be their higher selves. They are often too aggressive, even ruthless, and engage in what could politely be called “aberrant behavior.” Strangely enough, for many contractors, the reality that their operatives display these characteristics is a point of pride.. As it was discussed in greatcharlie’s January 31, 2020 review of To Catch a Spy, the negative behavior of contractors witnessed in the field by an adversarial intelligence service’s officers, operatives, and informants could very likely have an impact on their impressions of US counterintelligence services beyond what has already been inculcated within them by their masters. It should be expected that any negative impressions could have the deleterious effect of negatively impacting a decision to defect or be recruited if the idea might ever cross their minds. It is impossible to calculate, but it surely can be imagined that a number of potential defectors and recruits may have been deterred from taking the first step over this very issue. Recognizably, there is a reduced ability to effectively oversee what contractors are doing at all times on behalf of US counterintelligence services. At best, the managers of a particular counterintelligence operation that they may be hired to support will only know what the contractors divulge about their efforts. Close observance of them in operation, done furtively by managers of US counterintelligence services, would doubtlessly substantiate this.

Those in US counterintelligence services considering what is noted here might cast their minds back to the observation of the renowned 17th century French philosopher Blaise Pascal in Pensées (1670): “Justice without power is inefficient; power without justice is tyranny. Justice without power is opposed, because there are always wicked men. Power without justice is soon questioned. Justice and power must therefore be brought together, so that whatever is just may be powerful, and whatever is powerful may be just.”

Surely at one time the relationship between contractors and US counterintelligence services was quite beneficial as they provided real assistance through manpower and talent, but again, the situation has since changed considerably. They are shadows of what they once were in terms of quality.  Beyond some possible invaluable assistance they may be providing through precious outside of the bureaucracy analysis and advice on Chinese intelligence activities in the US, in the China case, US counterintelligence services should severely minimize or eliminate contractors if possible. There may be a place for such contractors and their ways in counternarcotics, organized crime control, human-trafficking or some other kind of criminal investigations. However, up against the sophisticated intelligence services of a determined adversary as China, those contractors are not a credit to US counterintelligence services. They are nothing but a liability. The China case is too important to indulge in any uncertainties. On an additional point, technical intelligence tools must be utilized effectively and appropriately. Monitor only those who need to be monitored. Resist the urge to play George Orwell’s “Big Brother.” That urge is another weakness. Nimia illæc licentia profecto evadet in aliquod magnum malum. (This excessive license will most certainly eventuate in some great evil.)

The continued success Chinese intelligence services and counterintelligence services in being able to conceal their massive espionage efforts may suggest that conceptually, they may approach establishing their presence in the US with the thought of “peacefully coexisting” in the same environment as US counterintelligence services. The relationship that they seem to have sought with US counterintelligence services in order to ensure the security of their networks and operations is not “cat and mouse” or combative. It is strangely, but logically, symbiotic. 

That symbiotic relationship, however, is malignant, and designed to be parasitical. To that end, managers of Chinese intelligence and counterintelligence services in the US likely respond to any detection of the presence of US counterintelligence personnel or activity not by avoiding them, but by connecting in some smart way to them. Connecting to them, to give a couple of simple examples means having operatives work for a contractor engaged in physical surveillance, or take on low level employment in or around offices of those contractors. From such positions and similar ones, they would enable themselves to monitor the most well-orchestrated, well-conducted activities from the inside. Some operatives, finding work as operatives in the agencies of contractors for US counterintelligence services  could actually become, and have very likely actually been, part of those operations. Note that operatives of Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services directed to get close to US counterintelligence services personnel and activities may not necessarily be ethnic Chinese. (For a fuller discussion of that matter, see the July 31, 2020 greatcharlie post “China’s Ministry of State Security: What Is this Hammer the Communist Party of China’s Arm Swings in Its Campaign against the US? (Part 1).”) Such a precaution would likely be deemed less necessary by managers of Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services for operatives placed within or close proximity of contractors offices and personnel as those managers have likely become well-aware of the astonishing lack of due diligence and security practiced by them. Surely, US counterintelligence activities of greatest interest would be those against Chinese foreign intelligence networks and operations. However, there would undoubtedly be significant and considerable value in being aware of physical surveillance activities by US counterintelligence services against the other adversaries of those services. There is every reason to believe cooperative relationships exist among the intelligence services of US adversaries. To say the least, there would be some monetary value in information collected by China of that kind.

Much as some parasites, those operatives who might successfully penetrate any organizations of or pertaining to US counterintelligence services would never act directly  to destroy those personnel or organizations but would rather only nourish themselves off  of them by collecting critical information from them for the security and survival of Chinese Intelligence activities in the US. Reminding again of what might be called Olson’s maxim from To Catch a Spy, “Penetration is the best counterintelligence.” One can almost be certain that senior executives and managers in adversarial foreign intelligence services surely believe that, too! That is something for US counterintelligence services to be very concerned about.

With regard to working with quantitative data, broken down to the essentials, it must continually be used to keep US counterintelligence officers cognizant and well appraised of activity by confirmed Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants tied to diplomatic missions. With quantitative data, users ought to drill down on data concerning their daily and hourly activity from communications to commuting. One must be able to discern even the slightest changes in activity, whether increased or decreased. Data should be reviewed daily to identify the slightest changes from the aggregate numbers. Revisiting data that has already been rolled up and aggregated is also advised. It should be mined through for more details, clues. (One should never get so caught up with data to believe that an opponent’s actions can be reduced to an algorithm. The opposition’s leaders are living, breathing, agile, flexible and–despite working in Communist China–potentially unconventional thinkers.)

Getting Results

Measures of success of the practices suggested here may hopefully be a marked increased prospective opportunities to: neutralize; displace; and, intercept, even recruit, from a targeted Chinese intelligence network.

1. Displace

If the purpose of US counterintelligence is to displace a Chinese intelligence network or operation, the rapid shutdown of an operation would be a sign of success in that endeavor. The threat of intercept or the very public revelation that an officer, operative, or informant in the network has been apprehended would naturally spur such an action. If the environment is made hot enough for the network, its managers and the remainder of their string of officers, operatives, and informants will indubitably go to ground with the hope of resurrecting their network with its diffuse operations at a more favorable point in time. However, if an operation has packed up and moved out, there will be a palpable change in the working atmosphere for the counterintelligence officer who has had their noses to grindstone working the case. In a frenzied rush to exit the US, individual suspected Chinese intelligence officers, working in academia or industry, in physical isolation from their compatriots, or ones that may appear to be operating independently and farthest away from their network compatriots and resources, may no longer see the need to carry on with any pretenses. It is also interesting to see that there is never mention of any effort by Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, or informants to figuratively throw dust in the eyes of those investigating, plant false leads or use other means to misdirect, as they make their escape.

Interviews can be used as a psychological tool to prompt displacement. For the network manager who is logical, visits to the residence or workplace of a subject of investigation by US counterintelligence officer to invite them for an interview in the respective office of their service, or to interview them at that location, may be viewed as probing based on some insight possessed by the adversary. There is the odd chance a network manager might believe a US counterintelligence service was on to something. However, it would seem they would more likely think a US counterintelligence service would “hold its cards a little closer” if it had something solid to act on. If the network manager is thinking in that way, it would mean  he or she has been trying to see through all things cooked up by US counterintelligence. Surely, for the Chinese intelligence  services as much as those of the US, studying their oppositions modus operandi is as important a task as anything else.

Operatives and informants, on the other hand, may become jittery. However, such a visit may not unnerve the network manager. The reaction of a network manager may be no visible  reaction at all. He or she will likely continually display nerve and knowledge. The possibility of such interviews has likely already crossed the managers mind. The network manager has likely already assessed how officers, operatives, and informants in his or her retinue will act or react when approached. The task of the network manager will be to deduce what triggered the interview, reason from cause to effect what is the likely course of events to follow, and act accordingly. That being stated, activities and especially the communications of those approached for interviews must be monitored. New travel plans by individuals with some association to those interviewed, scheduled closely by date, must be examined.

2. Neutralize

To assist in determining where to interdict, stand up a “Red Team” on a non-stop basis, using templates properly constructed from everything known and insights and inferences on Chinese operations and to continue to build up a legend for de créature imaginaire with the objective of achieving increasing accuracy. Among tools that should be made available for use in neutralizing Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, and informants, should be heavy financial rewards for “coming forward”; and whistle-blower-like protections. Casting one’s mind back to the “Chieu Hoi” program used to contend with the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, US counterintelligence services, using an approach certainly not the same but conceptually similar to that, may very well be able net a few long-time operatives and informants of China see intelligence services with deep involvement in their efforts, who may have had their fill of the whole business and want to get out, but safely. Cela n’a rien d’évident. (The fact that the Chieu Hoi program was implemented in an Asian country is purely coincidental. No deliberate connection regarding a region, race, or political philosophy was made. The parallel is that much as the Viet Cong, Chinese foreign intelligence officers in particular, but any operatives and informants as well are often “true believers,” who act out of conviction. Similar to the Viet Cong, they are driven by a deep-seeded ideology. In their unique case, it is usually the erroneous belief that China is the champion of the oppressed and will become the dominant power in the world.) In case the point has been misunderstood, heavy financial rewards for them would mean steep rewards. Ideally, the result will be to threaten the rewards structure, financial and psychological, of the Chinese foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services. If money would not be the elixir to turn any Chinese intelligence officers, operatives, or informants, US counterintelligence services would only need to pose the question to themselves: Deployed to the US and caught in the business of spying, what else would truly satisfy them enough to cause them to  defect or to become a double? If the situation becomes desperate enough, ask the targeted Chinese intelligence officer, operative, or informant: “What do you want? Name it!” (In other words, at least to get things moving, do whatever it takes, but within reason!) Turning Chinese operatives and informants should ideally take on the appearance of something akin to a business enterprise while actually being a counterintelligence task, if successful. Cela encore n’a rien d’évident. (Note, however, that money can become poisonous in both directions, creating temptation among those in service ranks unfortunately disposed to transgressions. Therefore, its distribution must be very carefully supervised.)

To be succinct, the hope of US counterintelligence should be to come in contact with an officer, operative, or informant with an albeit idealistic vision of China as the dominant power and shape of the world for the future, but with reservations, serious reservations. Those sentiments would need to be worked on. The next best hope would be to find the officer, operative, or informant who is not doing things for an ideal, and whose reasons for turning on China would be venal. Pretio parata vincitur pretio fides. (Fidelity bought by money is overcome by money)

3. Intercept

Non capiunt lepores tympana rauca leves. (Drumming is not the way to catch a hare.) This could be entirely off the mark, but it appears that aggressive counterintelligence appears to have been directed at targets of opportunity versus the industry-centric networks of Chinese intelligence in the US. While there may be a meretricious benefit to this practice, it accomplishes nothing in terms of tearing down Chinese intelligence networks or smothering greater espionage operations. Again, elevated thinking is required. There must be an inflexion point at which US counterintelligence services become the fox, and the days of being the chicken come to an end. Better use must be made of tools available and good practices. There must be better use of deception. To lure Chinese intelligence networks into traps, network managers and higher ups in the Chinese system must be convinced that the figurative cheese in the trap is something worth the risk of trying to take. Psychological operations must be used to draw them closer to targets US counterintelligence can cover while remaining concealed. As part of the information warfare campaign with China, an effort must be made to surreptitiously “assist” Beijing in discovering a novel target worth pursuing. Chinese intelligence services have enjoyed a halcion season of success. They apparently have no intention of being thrown off their pace and streak of victories by what they in all likelihood suspect are attempts by US counterintelligence to score a victory against their effort during their moment of glory.

US counterintelligence officers must do their utmost to go beyond the normal scope in determining what will attract Chinese intelligence network managers. They must not proceed by pretending to know. There is no room for guesswork. Approaches developed must not be derivative. They must put as much time as necessary into developing them to become as certain as humanly possible that any new approaches will work. Any enticement or manipulation must not give off any indication of being a plant nor chicken feed. It must appear as genuine gold dust. Under extremely controlled circumstances, it may need to be actual gold dust! What is left is to wait for the network to show itself. There is nothing else to do otherwise. Efforts to stoke or prompt the adversary will lead to blowing the entire set up. Impatience is what the Chinese will look for because that is what every other foreign intelligence service expects of US counterintelligence.

Logically, it would be a capital mistake for Chinese Intelligence services to adulterate what could likely be characterized as an operation in which every aspect was well-known with individuals of ultimately unknown character, loyalties, or reliability and targets of likely no immediate unknown value and of no prior interest or desire. As senior executives and managers in Beijing might assess, if anything suddenly put before them was truly of any immediate value or desirable to China, the individuals or the information would have respectively been recruited or stolen already. Assuredly, that is the pinch for US counterintelligence services when it comes to getting decent double-agent operation off the ground.

John le Carré, the renowned author of espionage novels of the United Kingdom who served in both both the Security Service, MI5, and the Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, during the 1950s and 1960s, offers the statement in The Honourable Schoolboy (Alfred A. Knopf, 1977): “A desk is a dangerous place from which to view the world.” US counterintelligence officers must be mindful of what may be perceived in the conference room as an advantage over the opposition intelligence network manager may be the ugly product of groupthink. They must judge perceptions in view of what is  actually known about that opponent, even if he or she remains de créature imaginaire and how that manager may act in response to what they plan to put in his or her way. Use of aggressive tactics or overwhelming superiority can be turned into a liability by an agile thinker. It is also important to understand that no matter how the Chinese intelligence network or operation may be approached, everything done, particularly if successful, will be studied by superiors in Beijing so that all gaps that may have been exploited in a disrupted, displaced, or destroyed network will be rapidly and quietly set right in all remaining networks. Operational missteps that might have been exploited will be identified and never made again. (Be observant for changes in practices among networks and operations being traced.) In view of what Beijing may learn from an initial attack, adjustments in the next US counterintelligence strike against a Chinese intelligence network or operation must be considered even before the first is executed. In a cycle, this approach to attacking Chinese intelligence networks and operations must be adjusted for each new situation and repeated.

To go a step further, one might speculate that having achieved countless victories with near impunity inside the US, Chinese foreign intelligence services now very likely conduct counterintelligence exercises in the field, likely in a nondisruptive way vis-a-vis ongoing operations, to ensure that in their present state, their intelligence networks are free from US counterintelligence detection and interference and that no intelligence service from anywhere could play havoc with them. 

It is unlikely that the senior executives and managers of Chinese foreign Intelligence services are sitting back and gloating about their victories. Rather, it is very likely that everyday they work harder and harder to make their networks and operations better and more effective, pushing their espionage capabilities far-beyond the reach of the counterintelligence services of the countries in which they operate. All of that being said, one might still imagine that soon enough, in a gesture aimed at figuratively putting some dirt in the eyes of US counterintelligence services, the Chinese foreign intelligence services may spend some hours planning some upheaval that their networks could cause in the US to embarrass US counterintelligence services. It would imaginably be designed to knock them well-off track and symbolically mark China’s domination of their opponent on his own home ground. China would also be sending a message concerning its dominance throughout the espionage world. Of course, despite its meretricious effect, whatever such a potential ploy might be, it would doubtlessly be conducted in such a way that the government in Beijing and the Communist Party of China would feel enabled to plausibly deny China’s connection to the action. (These are only some thoughts, ruminations, on the situation. Hopefully, this should not cause any undue concern. Or, cela n’a rien d’évident.)

The Chinese have likely concluded US foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services are under stress and are bound to take risks to score a victory or win the whole ball game. To that extent, it is unlikely Beijing wants its intelligence services reaching after anything when their plates are already full follow up on leads they created for themselves. It is possible that the Chinese foreign intelligence services have never seen US counterintelligence services get anything substantial started against their networks in terms of penetration. However, the Chinese will unlikely mistake quiet for security. They probably never really feel secure in the US. It is hard to imagine what might ever be worth the candle to Chinese intelligence services to reach after. Assuredly, impatience in any US operation would be anathema.

People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping (above). Given the success of Chinese intelligence services in the US, China might soon enough choose to send a message to symbolically mark China’s domination of their opponent on his own home ground. and its dominance in the espionage world. Chinese foreign intelligence services operating in the US may spend some time planning an upheaval that would figuratively put some dirt in the eyes of US counterintelligence services. Despite any meretricious effect such an act might have, whatever such a potential deplorable ploy might be, it would doubtlessly be conducted in such a way that the government in Beijing and the Communist Party of China would be able to plausibly deny their connection to the action.

The Way Forward

Month after month, US counterintelligence services discover another set of occasions when China has incommoded a federal agency, a private firm, an academic institution, or research institute by stealing from them classified information or intellectual property most often vital to the national interest. Leave it to say, having engaged in an empirical study of public facts coming in what has been transpiring, the potential trajectory of China’s malign efforts is breathtaking. By 2021, it should have been the case that MSS networks were being regularly penetrated by US counterintelligence and rolled up in waves at times chosen by US counterintelligence services. Ongoing and developing MSS operations should have already been heavily infiltrated and those infiltrated operations which are not destroyed should be used as conduits to push disinformation back to China. As for individuals recruited by MSS, many should have already been identified as a result of US counterintelligence infiltration of MSS networks and at appropriate moments, those operatives and informants should have been intercepted, neutralized, and recruited as counterespionage agents. However, that is not the case. Perhaps in some allied country, success against China will be achieved showing US counterintelligence services the way forward. With a long history of successfully defending the United Kingdom from foreign spies, it may very well be that MI5 will not have the Cabinet, the Prime Minister, the exalted person herself, wait much longer for good news.

Whether this essay for some will cause a journey from unawareness, curiosity, or a lack of clarity to knowledge, remains to be seen. There has been more than enough talk about how bad the problem with China is. That becomes by the by. There must be more talk about how to defeat it. The US must move from the defensive to the offensive, and take the game back to China and destroy all of its networks. It could be the case that US counterintelligence officers must relearn and hone the skill of lying before the water course and awaiting the big game. Many plans can be developed to advance against a problem. However, choosing the right plan, the one that will work, is the challenge. Much as with physicians, for investigators, every symptom must be told before a diagnosis can be provided. In a very small way here, greatcharlie has sought to contribute to development more effective approaches to defeat Chinese intelligence collection efforts in the US. Before writing this essay, greatcharlie fully understood and accepted that there are those singular US counterintelligence services that would be completely uninterested in, and even shun, any voice or meditations from outside the bureaucracy that would dare offer assistance to them in their struggle with China’s intelligence services. (It must be stated that greatcharlie has either been retained to supply any imaginable deficiencies of US counterintelligence services nor has it been retained for anything by any of them.) Often in the US national security bureaucracy, perspectives on adversaries can become too austere. Over time, even unknowingly, walls are built around those perspectives, fending off an effort to more accurately understand an adversary at the present that may shake the foundations of them. That sort of mindset, as suggested,, perhaps an unconscious bias, can creep its way in and become comfortable. That can spell disaster. This may very well be the case with Chinese foreign intelligence activity in the US.

With a near endless chain of losses, the following theft sometimes being a greater defeat than the one proceeding it, greatcharlie feels compelled to ingeminate the position expressed in the conclusion of its August 31, 2020 greatcharlie post US counterintelligence services should consider hiring individuals from outside the bureaucracy who are already known due to demonstrated interest in the subject matter and recognized as possessing some ability to present what may be unorthodox innovative, forward-looking perspectives. New thinkers can rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. From the inside, one might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outsiders as mere surmisals and suppositions from those perceived lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to an issue. With no intent to condescend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. The purpose of using such perspectives is to have a look at issues from other angles. Thinking outside the bureaucracy would hopefully move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in special cases that may be hard to crack. Indeed, what outsider brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside the box thinker. One could say the length and breadth of that knowledge and experience allowed for an alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been sought through personal study. 

The suggestion should not seem so exotic at this point. Even the adversaries of the US would likely imagine the possibility that some assistance from an unexpected source and direction could pose the greatest threat to their success. Perhaps some US counterintelligence services will never brook the idea of receiving such assistance from outside the bureaucracy. However, in the end, the US counterintelligence service which opens itself up to new, thinking, new insights, new approaches, will very likely bag its tiger. Vigilando, agendo, bene consulendo, prospera omnia cedunt. (By watching, by doing, by consulting well, these things yield all things prosperous.)