Commentary: The Hanoi Summit: What Kim Did Wrong and What Trump Is Doing Right

US President Donald Trump (left) and North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un (right). Before the Hanoi Summit, Trump insisted that if he became unsatisfied with the meeting’s progress, he would walk away from the table. That was precisely what he did. It is not easy to comprehend what might have impelled Kim’s decision not reach a common understanding with Trump in order to create a denuclearization agreement. Yet, regardless of what drove Kim, the question of what will come of all the diplomatic work done to this point remains. Of particular interest might be how Trump might assess Kim’s actions and intentions in Hanoi’s aftermath.

The strains placed on both US President Donald Trump and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Chairman Kim Jong-un in their February 27-28, 2019 meeting in Hanoi were quite significant. The intended outcome of the meeting, that primarily being an agreement on denuclearization and North Korea’s economic rejuvenation, would have been positive for both sides. Before Hanoi, Trump put considerable energy into considering the type of partnership with Kim that would be largely economic, and certainly serve the interests of the US and its regional allies. He remained optimistic despite being bombarded by the voices of pessimism heard from naysayers and dream killers of all political stripes. For Kim, moving North Korea along a path toward the economic miracle that Trump proposed would require a well-planned, monumental project to restructure the only world he and his people have known. Surely, it was worth the candle for both Trump.and Kim to make a go at it. However, it may very well be that Kim did not fully understand that everything North Korea is, and everuthing it has, was actually at stake. To that extent, North Korea may not have been properly invested in the move toward denuclearization. It appears even Kim’s purported percipience of Trump and US foreign and national security policy making was also lacking. (Perhaps that knowledge was simply not being properly applied in practice.) .

Trump insisted before the Hanoi Summit, much as he had before negotiations with other national leaders on agreements, that if he became unsatisfied the meeting’s progress, he would walk away from the table. That is precisely what he did. It is not easy to comprehend what might have impelled Kim’s decision not to reach a common understanding with Trump and create a denuclearization agreement. Given Kim’s human rights record, some might suggest may have been influenced by ingenious telepathy from Hell. Sardonics aside, the talk’s outcome provides indicia to support a few reasonable theories. Thinking outside of the box in order to find causality for Kim’s decision, one might conclude on a basic level, that the whole negotiation soon became too rich for his blood and rather than take a giant step forward and risk making the wrong choice, he held pat on his position. On higher tier, one might assess that there may have been senior advisers in Pyongyang who convinced Kim that he could get Trump to eat out of his hand, and in a leap of faith, he tossed everything into an effort to twist Trump’s tail and get him to accept a deal shaped by North Korea’s terms. Additionally, there is the possibility that some self-doubt might have found a place in Kim’s thinking. Despite his leadership through iron rule, one might also politely conclude that Kim possesses a sort of 50-50 mentality. That would mean that Kim can see the potential of all arguments, even those made by the US. From that, it might be considered that he would typically need more time to reach a decision that would best suit North Korea long-term. In whatever way Kim may have been driven, the question now is what will come of all the diplomatic work done to this point. Of particular interest might be how Trump might assess Kim’s actions and intentions in the aftermath of Hanoi. Having apparently gotten things mixed up in Hanoi, hopefully Kim will not mess things up from this point on with Trump. Si sapis, alterum alteri misce: nec speraveris sine desperatione nec desperaveris sine spe. (If you are wise, mingle these two elements: do not hope without despair, or despair without hope.)

Is Kim Missing the Bigger Picture?

Right on the heels of the summit’s closing, Trump held a unilateral press conference in Hanoi on February 28, 2019, essentially to explain why an agreement could not be reached. Trump told reporters that the crux of the matter was sanctions. In summarizing the situation, Trump stated Kim wanted sanctions lifted to a degree in which they would be rendered ineffective. In exchange, Kim would be willing to denuclearize portions of critical areas. Yet, Trump said those testing areas Kim was willing to break down were not the ones the US wanted. They were hardly enough to elicit the cessation of sanctions. Since Kim held firm to that position, Trump explained that there was little choice but to walk away from that proposal. However, Trump never indicated the conversation on the denuclearization had been exhausted.

Indeed, Trump expressed the belief, “I think we’ll end up being very good friends with Chairman Kim and with North Korea, and I think they have tremendous potential.” He insisted that the US despite the outcome has not “given up on anything.” His sense that progress on denuclearization was bolstered by the fact that Kim even had an interest in closing down parts of the nuclear program. Additionally, Trump reminded that, “There’s no more testing. And one of the things, importantly, that Chairman Kim promised me last night is, regardless, he’s not going to do testing of rockets and nuclear. Not going to do testing.  So, you know, I trust him, and I take him at his word.  I hope that’s true.” As for how the parties might move forward with the diplomatic process following Hanoi, Trump explained: “In the meantime, we’ll be talking. Mike [Pompeo, US Secretary of State] will be speaking with his people. He’s also developed a very good relationship with the people — really, the people representing North Korea. I haven’t spoken to Prime Minister Abe yet. I haven’t spoken to President Moon of South Korea.  But we will, and we’ll tell them it’s a process and it’s moving along.”

There was no legitimate cause for any confusion in Pyongyang as to what Trump wants in return for a prospective partnership is the same prize that was at the root of his decision to talk with Kim: denuclearization, the end of long-range missile development, the continued return of US remains from the Korean War, and dependability. As one can see, progress made on some of these matters was mentioned by Trump during his Hanoi press conference. In exchange, Kim would be assured that economic pressure, sanctions, would be mitigated, and a robust path toward economic renewal, backed by the experience of Trump and the largess of the US would be initiated.

The Trump administration officials, particularly US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, have sought to engage in very open, honest, and frank communications with their DPRK counterparts. That would include making inquiries regarding what is happening within the chambers of decision making of North Korea. From that information, the administration has been able to proceed with a good idea of whether success is possible. There have also been letters from Kim to Trump that have provided a sense of where things stand in North Korea regarding denuclearization. There was also no ambiguity over the fact that the Trump administration certainly does not want to give up the strengths and equities of its alliances with allies. Those ties that bind allies in the region are the same ties that assure unity when dealing with China. Alas, at the table, the maximum that Kim could possibly collect about Trump, in order to make a good decision on the deal offered, was put before him, for all answers concerning the US position, concept and intent, ultimately resided in Trump, himself. Kim and his aides and advisers in Pyongyang could not reasonably ask for anything more.

It would say much if Kim could not see that real empathy may have come from Trump, understanding how heavy a burden such a decision might be for the young leader. Previous deals with North Korea of great significance were last reached with his father, Kim Jong-un, and they crumbled under the insistent strain within North Korea, in Kim regime to pursue the goal of his father and grandfather, Kim Il-sung of developing nuclear weapons. That goal has been achieved.  There may still be the strain within Kim to ignite an economic development akin, or even beyond, the Chollima Movement, as initiated by Kim’s grandfather and hero, Kim Il-sung. There is much that needs to done in North Korea, and as Trump has repeated, great potential exists within its workforce.

Trump’s critics and detractors insisted that Trump was out of court to even attempt to reach agreement with Kim that would meet the requirement of serving the interests of the US and its allies in the region. Surely, the Trump administration would never surrender  the strengths and equities of its alliances with allies. Those ties that bind allies in the region are the same ties that assure unity when dealing with China. Those critics and detractors, upon discovering that Trump was unfazed by their persistent negative voices and was going to make the effort anyway, eventually turned to the standby criticism concerning any of Trump’s efforts on foreign and national security policy: he is unqualified. Further, they would also insist that behind everything Kim has done was a hostile DPRK plot, a “Red plot”, to lure Trump and the US to destruction.

The Snare of Insufficient Analysis

Attacks by critics and detractors of Trump have manifested more than elementary cynicism. The dark shadows of their machinations gathered as the Hanoi Summit came near. Their efforts did more more than serve to tear those in the US public who are supportive of Trump away from him. Despite claims from Trump’s political adversaries, and the usual critics and detractors that what was happening in Washington had no impact on what occurred in Hanoi, nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, it would seem that Pyongyang, unfortunately chose to do what was expedient. That meant believing Trump was stressed from the potential release of a final report of the Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters. There have been repeated insinuation that Trump faced the threat of investigations by the Deputy US Attorney for Southern District of New York and the New York State Attorney General. Pyongyang might have believed that Trump, caught in the wave of excitement concerning the 2020 US Presidential Campaign, mystifying reports of supposed gains by Democrats in polls versus Trump, and the reported mayhem that exists within the mainstream political parties. There may have been the belief that Kim could capitalize on some forecasted by the intelligence services on the impatience on the part of Trump. Reports commentaries, and opinion pieces in the US news media surely would have rung a bell for Kim’s aides and advisers and analysts in North Korea’s intelligence services. From that, it would follow that Trump’s political difficulties at home would likely distract him. If any of this was the case, it may explain why Pyongyang seemingly went all in on an effort to force Trump’s hand.

What Trump confidently knew, but Kim and his aides and advisers in Pyongyang would have unlikely been able to discern clearly, was that the hearings of the Judiciary Committee of the US House of Representatives and in camera testimony before the Intelligence Committee of the US House of Representatives in which Trump’s erstwhile attorney Michael Cohen testified, in essence amounted to vanity projects undertaken by political opponents of Trump in his rival Democratic Party. Although the hearings grabbed headlines in the US news media while Trump met with Kim in Hanoi, the new information gained from them was for the most part already widely known. As it has been repeatedly counseled by greatcharlie, reacting, and much worse, inferring how Trump’s mind moves on an issue from stories, iniquitous commentaries, and opinion pieces in the US news media. For the most part, US news media houses have done a complete job presenting themselves as Trump’s adversary, not simply critics and detractors. In either case, they are not playing the impartial watchdog role in which the fourth estate is supposed to serve.

Leaders often take unimaginable risks under stress. One could surmise that Kim must have been under some stress at home. Indeed, looking at Kim objectively, the question would be whether Kim was being ambitious or desperate in Hanoi. There is the possibility that in the intelligence services or the Workers’ Party of Korea, it may have posited that Trump could be manipulated into accepting a deal far less than he originally wanted. Lending support for the idea would be that Kim managed to secure a second meeting and that Kim was the actual master at the negotiation table with Trump, and he could take US President down whatever path he wanted. Although it may all sound like daylight madness, it is actually the sort of colorization of policy with delusional notions of an all powerful supreme leader that has underpinned many prior ham-handed decisions by Pyongyang. Nam qui peccare se nescit, corrigi non vult. (If one doesn’t know his mistakes, he won’t want to correct them.)

Kim’s 50-50 Personality?

One might theorize that Kim’s failure to return home with a constructive answer may not have driven as much by politics but by the possibility that he possesses a 50-50 personality. This is not intended as a disparagement or an affront. It is not to suggest that Kim is a mixed bag, or worse, indecisive. It does not mean Kim is regularly afflicted by the paralysis of analysis. The 50-50 personality is the one able to see beyond black and white to the grey areas of significance. Kim cannot be pegged as one extreme or the other. Kim’s trained ability to project calmness and authority in all circumstances publicly has little relation to what might be stirring within. In private, he may in reality be as much the introvert as the extrovert, he may entertain his sense of things as much as use a honed intuition. He may try to feel through issues and situations coupled with thinking them through ad infinitum. He may be willing to use his perception of matters taking into account his experience and much as making calibrated judgments based on available facts and methods of analysis.

New Problems or a Curious Attempt to Ignite Further Talks?

Kim has created an additional problem himself at this point. Reportedly, he has sought to reconstruct a disassembled testing facility for long range rockets at Tongchang-ri. On first blush, it certainly does seem there is nefarious purpose behind his actions. It is hard to see how anyone could view Kim as anything but an aggressor. Trump has invested in diplomacy to resolve matters in contention: North Korea’s nuclear program and its long range delivery systems. Tactical moves must have payoffs or they are useless exertions, often opening the door for opponent to act. Kim, having met Trump, should not be under any illusion that Trump would not respond fiercely to moves he might find aggressive and or threatening. Kim does not need to extrapolate and infer anything from overt or covert sources that his intelligence services may be relying upon to understand and predict Trump’s moves. The suspension of military exercises should not have signalled to Kim that Trump is not interested in a military option. As he indicated in words he has since set aside in the spirit of negotiating some resolution, North Korea’s aggression would met with “ fire and fury the world has never known!” Pardon greatcharlie’s freedom, but military exercises with conventional forces would hold less significance on the North Korea front if an attack conceived by Trump would include the use of scores of nuclear weapons.

Does Kim Really Know What Is Best for North Korea?

Even with the notion that he has a type of 50-50 mentality, and with all of his revolutionary zeal and his commitment to the Communist movement taken into consideration, Kim must realize that Trump’s deal was too good to pass on. Nevertheless, he did so. Looking at the matter purely from the perspective of an external observer, Kim made a big mistake. As a national leader concerned with his people’s real future and being much more than a functionary within the system, logic should have driven him toward it. One stands on shaky ground saying anything positive about Kim given the sensitivity of government agencies in the US to such comments, nonetheless, failing to engage Trump for a bit longer in Hanoi on the development of a fitting agreement for both parties was not a surprising error for a national leader who is new to such high stakes diplomacy. Errant consilia nostra, quia non habent quo derigantur; ignoranti quem portum petat nullus suus ventus est. (Our plans miscarry because they have no aim. When a man does not know what harbor he is making for, no wind is the right wind.)

A logical next step for Kim and his aides and advisers, if they are truly interested in, and dedicated to, this important diplomatic process, might be to try to get the toothpaste back into the tube. A sign that such an effort could already be underway might be official statements by the foreign ministry of North Korea insisting that there was a desire in Pyongyang for a partial denuclearization. Indeed, on February 28, 2019 in Hanoi, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho explained that Kim’s regime sought only “partial” sanctions relief in return for dismantling the North’s main enrichment capabilities for fissile material. As for continued negotiations, Ri stated, “It is difficult to say whether there might be a better agreement than the one based on our proposal at current stage.” He continued authoritatively, “Our principal stance will remain invariable and our proposal will never be changed, even though US proposes negotiation again in the future.” Ri also confirmed that the North would be willing to “permanently dismantle all the nuclear material production facilities” at the main Yongbyon nuclear site and allow U.S. nuclear experts to observe. He went on to complain that North Korea had sought an end to “sanctions that hamper the civilian economy, and the livelihood of all people in particular,” citing five out of 11 sanctions packages imposed by the UN Security Council. As mentioned earlier, sanctions relief along those lines would have amounted to a significant easing of the pressure on North Korea.

Although some somber and astute analysts might reach the conclusion that the foreign ministry’s bold, inaccurate statements, with their familiar antagonistic cadence, was simply a pretension, one more dramatic expression of Pyongyang. The odd hope of it all would appear to be influencing opinion among senior officials of the Workers Party of Korea and other elites of business circles of the society that Trump was not sincere about sanctions relief and he failed to respond to what is likely extolled in Pyongyang as Kim’s “generous offer”. It may very well have been the case that Pyongyang had the foreign ministry’s statement “locked and cocked” even before Kim left by train for Hanoi in the event that Trump would not accept the terms he planned to offer him.

The Agony of Negotiating with North Korea

It is interesting how North Korean officials have spoken so obstinately of Trump’s openhandedness toward their country. Perhaps Pyongyang has forgotten that Kim is not exactly everyone’s cup of tea. (That is unlikely something anyone in Pyongyang would ever say in Kim’s presence.) Among industrialized countries, ruling out the Russian Federation and China, few governments hold a favorable opinion of North Korea. Pyongyang should rest assured that a number of capable US allies have likely suggested in confidence that Trump should move on from diplomacy and simply use military force on North Korea and indicated the willingness to join that effort. Trump, the one that North Korean Foreign Ministry officials now criticize, is the national leader who truly has the military power to destroy North Korea, yet he has given it a chance to prove its positive intentions to the world. Trump has sought to create the circumstances in which the entire world could begin to think well of North Korea and consider ways to work well with it. Trump’s description of his contacts and communications with Kim and public statements about his friendship and chemistry with him, have made him far less the threat that deservedly made headlines with angry words and aggressive moves in 2017 when the administration began. Trump kept his promise to work directly with Kim on the diplomacy, although it would unlikely have gone any other way as he has become the administration’s talisman on bilateral diplomacy, trade talks, essentially every kind of dealmaking. More than half way through his term as of this writing, Trump has amassed a record of making things happen; getting things done.

Not under any circumstances would the reconstruction of the testing site fall under the category of a benign act. It would hard to see where Pyongyang, having had two bites at the diplomacy apple, might hope to have some understanding of its move to reconstruct it’s long-range rocket testing site in a positive way in Washington or anywhere in the US for that matter. In reconstructing the testing site, Kim is doing precisely what Trump said he did not want North Korea to do. Nonetheless, taking a second look purely out of academic interest and with a dose of optimism at the matter of Kim’s move to reconstruct the testing site from another angle, one could say that the effort, albeit poorly conceived, was designed to create a position of perceived strength and encourage Trump to talk with Kim again. After all, that step was less threatening than other available options to garner immediate attention, create urgency. Kim could have begun reconstruction on a shuttered nuclear facility or begun building a new one. Kim could have made unsubstantiated public claims of possessing new nuclear technologies to enrich uranium for weapons such as the ability to separate isotopes through laser excitation (“SILEX”). (Note, this is just a hypothetical. There is no effort here to suggest that North Korea possesses such capabilities.) For Pyongyang, the danger in engaging in such tricky stuff is that the wrong signal may be sent to Washington. By and large, Pyongyang has asked the Trump administration to be patient and to recognize that on the world stage, North Korea is going to display a lack of sophistication, savoir faire, and present itself as the isolated, authoritarian “hermit kingdom” it has always been. While it may have hoped to move things in a specific way, it is possible that what might be intended through such moves could be lost in the labyrinth. Perhaps even unknowingly, Pyongyang has placed its best hope in Trump’s willingness to interpret its moves in a somewhat positive way and view the diplomatic effort as being worth the trouble.

It is apparent that Trump along with those foreign and national security policy officials who were optimistic about a deal being reached on denuclearization with North Korea, reasoned that it would be worth giving Kim the benefit of doubt.  However, one could never be completely clear on how denuclearization would fit into the worldview of the Workers’ Party of Korea or Kim’s inner thinking. Shots have not been fired at anger across the border. There has been no testing over nuclear devices and no testing of long-range or short-range rockets. If a chance might be taken in the name of finding a peaceful agreement, right now is certainly the time to take them. It certainly would be a ashame if the positive spirit which had been discern in the White House from Kim’s thoughts, words, and deeds from Singapore until Hanoi, was simply imputed by the administration to greater degree than warranted. Admittedly, it is hard to understand why Pyongyang would at this point, hope for peace while reconstructing a testing facility for long-range rockets.

It is worth noting that in a more forceful, less grateful statement than Ri’s on February 28, 2019, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, explained: “The impression I got observing this summit from the side was that our chairman seems to have difficulty understanding the US way of reckoning.” Choe, offering her own assessment, declared: “I felt that our chairman has lost the will to engage in dealmaking, with the US saying that even a partial lifting of sanctions for the civilian economy is hard.” Conditions surely will not change through diplomacy if Pyongyang refuses to negotiate. If anything positive could be gleaned from Choe’s statement, itself, it is the fact that the harshest words were delivered by a vice foreign minister, not Kim or a very senior Workers’ Party of Korea official. That may have left the door open for Kim or a senior officials to walk back from those words, making diplomacy with the hope that cobbling together a denuclearization agreement might still be viable. Apparently, Trump mercifully brushed off pretentious statements by DPRK’s officials on their country’s power relative to that of the US, and the great disproportion between them with reality. It is difficult to determine how long Trump’s patience will last though. Given a third chance, Kim might goof again.

Trump certainly has not indicated that he feels the time has come to tie things off. It may be that Trump is more concerned with the prospect of millions of lives being lost if he does not give it every chance. When asked in Hanoi whether the bridge could be gapped between Kim’s desire to have all or a significant portion of sanctions removed and his desire to more significant denuclearization, he responded: “With time.  It’ll be bridged, I think, at a certain point.  But there is a gap.  We have to have sanctions.  And he wants to denuke, but he wants to just do areas that are less important than the areas that we want.  We know that — we know the country very well, believe it or not.  We know every inch of that country.  And we have to get what we have to get, because that’s a big — that’s a big give.” Oculis de homine non credo, habeo melius et certius lumen quo a falsis uera diiudicem: animi bonum animus inueniat. (I do not trust my eyes to tell me what a man is: I have a better and more trustworthy light by which I can distinguish what is true from what is false: let the mind find out what is good for the mind.)

Commentary: Will the Trump-Kim Summit Yield an Agreement That Is Cosmetic or Consequential?

If an agreement is reached between US President Donald Trump and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Chairman Kim Jong-un in Hanoi, it would certainly be a great leap forward not only in terms of US-North Korea relations, but also in terms of establishing true global peace and security. Smart money says both Trump and Kim will come through for their people, and the essence of an agreement as initially desired will be put together. The world should wish them well.

If some agreement is reached between US President Donald Trump and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea  (North  Korea) Chairman Kim Jong-un when they meet February 27-28, 2019, in Hanoi, the hope is that it will be more consequential than cosmetic. Since his first meeting with him in Singapore, Trump has been thinking through a new type of partnership with Kim that would be largely economic, and certainly serve the interests of the US and its regional allies. What he has also been doing, however, is creating the circumstances in which the entire world could begin to think well of North Korea and consider how to work well with it. Hopefully, Kim has been preparing his people for a big change, a new path forward. Some observers have demanded to see tangibles, commenting specifically that there are no signed documents agreeing to any plan of action with concrete steps. The reality is that on this monumental undertaking, change will take time. One might refer those impatient observers to the words of the Greek Stoic philosopher of Ancient Rome, Epictetus, which explained: “No thing great is created suddenly, any more than a bunch of grapes or a fig. If you tell me that you desire a fig, I answer you that there must be time. Let it first blossom, then bear fruit, then ripen.”

What Trump wants in return for a prospective partnership is the same prize that was at the root of his decision to talk with Kim: denuclearization, the end of long-range missile development, the continued return of US remains from the Korean War, and dependability. In exchange, Kim would be assured that economic pressure to include sanctions would be mitigated, and a robust path toward economic renewal, backed by the experience of Trump and the largess of the US would be initiated.

Accepting that has most likely been tough for the North Koreans on many levels. The enormous uplift and national pride, the sense of power and control, that comes with possessing nuclear weapons and the means to use them, elevates their importance in Pyongyang. To that extent, resistance to Kim’s effort could have been expected from many senior officials. Certainly, Kim is well equipped to cope with stubborn resistance to his new efforts in his own way. However, quite different from resistance to a deal, but still threatening enough to it, would be almost inherent lack of desire in Kim or any other official in Pyongyang to be “subsumed” by Washington just to gain advantages or considerations being offered. It must always be remembered that the North Korean government is authoritarian in nature and underpinned by a revolutionary movement. It will be reluctant to trust and slow to accept change. There would unlikely be a desire to integrate with what North Koreans may have for so long demonized as a Western-led international order.

It would be a mistake to believe that reaching an agreement would be seen by North Koreans as a means to acquire some sense of affirmation. For the North Koreans, particularly members of the Workers’ Party of Korea, affirmation can only result from loyalty to Kim, to country, and adherence to revolutionary ideals. That all lies deep within. Reaching an agreement would find greatest acceptance among North Koreans as a decision driven by revolutionary impulse. Additionally, North Koreans would want to know what they might create as a result of an economic revival will rightfully belong to them alone. There would be joy in knowing that whatever they might build would be the product of their own hands, not something given to them or done for them by external agents. Support from Trump must be viewed as being actuated by his humanism, and not negatively perceived as a cloaked manipulation or a quest for US dominance. As noted in Pensées, the collected works of 17th century French mathematician and philosopher, Blaise Pascal: “We are generally the better persuaded by the reasons we discover ourselves than by those given to us by others.”

What may also prove challenging for Pyongyang, if an agreement is reached, will be exercising the restraint required when working within the international order. The parameters of of bilateral and multilateral agreements, rules, regulations, and procedures, will need to be obeyed. Pyongyang should not equate using restraint as surrendering control. Rules, regulations, and procedures both established and understood in the international order, allow for sense of certainty, assurance, and safety. If anything, control resides in Pyongyang’s ability to make the decision to enter and to remain in the global economic fray as a genuine player. What is being presented is an authentic opportunity for North Korea to choose to be something other than a stranger to the rest of the world.

Given the great economic and financial benefits expected of a Trump-Kim deal, the question would likely remain in Washington on whether the life condition of the North Korean people would be changed by steps taken by it. Only Kim would be able to decide that. The best hope Washington might have on the matter would be that Kim will accept with “revolutionary zeal and patriotism” that the transformation of the country should touch all levels of North Korean society. Interestingly, if Kim follows through on a deal with Trump, the economic effort could very well be viewed as the greatest attempt to take DPRK’s Revolution to new heights since the Chollima Movement initiated by his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, decades ago.

If Trump and Kim reach an agreement in Hanoi, it would certainly be a great leap forward not only for the US and North Korea, but also in terns of establishing true global peace and security. The world should wish them well. China, Vietnam, and Mongolia have gone through similar, yet respectively unique, economic transformations. If some written accord is not reached by the two leaders at the summit, there will be other opportunities to meet. However, if everything goes thoroughly bad at the meeting and this mighty diplomatic effort collapses, both leaders will face a dilemma that could take two forms. One may include cobbling together an agreement to maintain some semblance of the status quo. The other may be to go war. The latter is certainly far more distressing than the former, as it may result in the loss of millions of lives. Smart money says both Trump and Kim will come through for their people, and the essence of an agreement as initially desired will be put together. In his work, Meditations, the renowned Ancient Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus, provides apt marching orders for Trump and Kim: “Concentrate on what you have to do. Fix your eyes on it. Remind yourself what nature demands of people. Then, do it, without hesitation, and speak the truth as you see it. But with kindness. With humility. Without hypocrisy.”

The Second US-DPRK Summit: A Few Additional Things Trump and Kim Might Consider

US President Donald Trump (left) and DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un (right) in Singapore. It has been easy for some even in the US Government to muse over the intentions, concepts, policies, ideals and even personality traits of the leadership DPRK, and then enumerate reasons why the denuclearization process would likely fail. What is more difficult is to gather all information available and put good minds to work at developing ways to cope defeat those problems in order to achieve the President’s goals. Trump is working hard to make denuclearization a reality. Hopefully, Kim is working hard in Pyongyang to do the same. 

Regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and denuclearization, US President Donald Trump has pursued what he perceives to be an opportunity for the US to change things for the better. Since his meeting with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un, Trump has expressed the view that relations between the US and DPRK are the best that they have ever been. He explains that is evinced by the fact that: his communication with Kim has been very positive; there has been no nuclear weapons or missile testing; US citizens being held in the DPRK have been returned; and, the US is receiving remains of its soldiers lost in the Korean War. It has been easy for some even in the US Government to muse over the intentions, concepts, policies, ideals and even personality traits of the leadership DPRK, and then enumerate reasons why the denuclearization process would likely fail. What is more difficult is to gather all information available and put good minds to work at developing ways to cope with or even defeat those problems. That is what the Trump is trying to do. Hopefully, Kim is working hard in Pyongyang to do the same. Now is the time to advance toward the actual realization of denuclearization as well as have the US enumerate what it and the rest of the world will actually do for the DPRK.

Naturally, success, while wished for from the second meeting, is not guaranteed. Trump has been acknowledged both directly and obliquely in eloquent phrases on Twitter, speeches, and press conferences. This next meeting must be the inflexion point of the negotiation process on denuclearization. If satisfactory results in the form of guaranteed, concrete steps from Kim are absent, abandoning the effort would be completely in step with Trump’s “America First” concept. The purpose of this rather “lean” essay is to look briefly at some issues both Trump and Kim might be already contemplating before the next meeting, along with other, small thoughts that might also be worth considering. At points, it highlights some impediments that were very likely responsible for decelerating the pace of the negotiation process, and calls attention to those obstructions that could be removed in the second meeting. It is not orotundity to state that it is not greatcharlie’s intention, as the 2020 Presidential Election Campaign begins, to serve as some conseiler isolaté d’un aspirant president from which attacks against the Trump administration could be formed. The hope is to simply contribute in some balanced way to the policy debate on the DPRK and denuclearization. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Kim seated during his 2019 New Year’s Address (above). It is very likely that both Trump and Kim will find in that face-to-face encounter that they are respectively not the exactly same as on June 12, 2018. Much as Trump has expected Kim to have evolved somewhat in terms of his thinking on the US and on the potential of his country following their Singapore Meeting, Trump, having gone through much concerning international affairs, has surely evolved since.

Some Things Kim Might Discern about Trump

Trump and Kim have already shared their elaborations of how the other troubled them in Singapore. The connaissance suffisante that they acquired of one another then has served as the basis upon which continued communications between them was comfortably founded. That communication was mainly conducted by using their top officials as envoys and letters. What they truly understand about each other, their chemistry, will be verified by the results their next meeting. It is very likely that they will find in their next face-to-face encounter that they are respectively not the exactly same as in Singapore. Trump already seems to feel Kim has evolved in terms of his thinking on the US and on the possibility of transforming his country. Kim will discover that Trump, having gone through much in the realm of international affairs since, has also evolved.

Objective observers of Trump would say that if one is able to get a sense of Trump’s inner thinking, one would become better able to parse out or simply have better sense of his decisions on foreign and national security policy.  Otherwise, he may often appear to be doing nothing when he is actual doing a plethora of things, step by step. In his efforts, Trump does not act as if he were tinkering figurative tools in his political maneuverings and deal making. Rather, he uses certain “instruments” to methodically, and rapidly, tailor a situation, to craft things. The vocal “bang and boom” often heard while he takes action is typically used as distraction and even amusement at times. Within, he approaches matters with a rhythm that is smooth and unbroken, steady and strong. He always has a plan and knows where he is going. His true target is not always one that others would immediately discern. He prefers to accomplish many things at once. When warned about advancing on a matter, Trump may often boldly push ahead. In his current position, much as during business life, Trump will treat important what he intuits on how to proceed. US Government foreign and national security policy professionals may appreciate his ideas, but requirements that they much adhere to regarding diligence will invariably demand that generally refrain including his “gut reactions” in their analyses. Yet this contrast in approach in no way serves as indicia that the relationship between Trump and the US intelligence community has been corrupted.

Critics and detractors within the US news media and among scholars, policy analysts, political opponents, and leaders of the Democratic Party, have had Trump on the brain continuously from the time he became a Presidential Candidate in 2015. Unfortunately, it seems that some mud brought into the campaign by a few self-interested others, unbeknownst to Trump, was tracked into the White House on the bottom of his shoes. However, it has long since been swept out of the building despite continued efforts to impute upon Trump whatever behaviors in which others were engaged behind his back. Trump is certainly not totally insensitive to his opponents attacks. Admittedly, there is some aggressiveness. The attacks of his critics and detractors should not be underestimated for they surely would have smothered or destroyed other national leaders of less strength and fortitude. In a way undisclosed, Trump still finds space to grow and evolve as president, despite the weight and nature of criticisms levelled against him. It may sound a bit soupy, but the reality is that Trump becomes stronger, vitalized by the adversity he faces; he draws from the potential energy and kinetic energy manifested from the power of his struggles. The Ancient Roman Senator and historian Marcus Porcius Cato, known as Cato the Elder, once expressed: “We cannot control the evil tongues of others; but a good life enables us to disregard them.”

On that basis, an understanding of Trump’s approach to foreign and national security policy can also be founded. A fairly common belief globally, but not always admitted in more recent times, is that the US is the beacon and the ballast for the world. Trump holds to that belief, and knows that it would be a moral failing to be remiss or delinquent in dealing with urgent and important issues  However, unlike his predecessors, while he sees all the needs around the world, Trump is not inclined to hand anything to anyone. He would like the other party to demonstrate, through some exchange, of goodwill even, an appreciation for what the US may give. Me rendez-vous heureux?

From what is collected by the intelligence services of both countries, strands must be pulled from what is synthesized to support the requirements of decision makers. That information must also be accurately portrayed. Seeking to collect as much as possible about Trump to prepare Kim for the next meeting, to develop something new, there may be the temptation to infer and extrapolate information from derisive US news media reports of recent events concerning the US President. Reading that might lead Pyongyang to erroneously believe that Trump’s range of action and ability to do big things on foreign and national security policy might be restrained somewhat by his rather curious domestic political struggles. Nothing could be further from the truth. Observing reporters almost instantaneously receive approval from editors and producers in broadcast, published, and online media to pursue stories on the Trump administration only after developing an immediate impression of their veracity shocks the system. The overwhelming nature of its incredulity can even amuse as it is the juxtaposition of two ideas: “all the news that is fit to print” versus “anything goes!” Still, as long as such reporting and commentaries sell advertising space, there most likely will be a lot more of it. Is qui scit plurimum, rumor. (That most knowing of persons: gossip.)

Once Trump has determined what he desires from a matter, he finds a path to get where he wants to be, regardless of how rocky. With the knowledge of how he can successfully proceed firmly in mind, Trump often will initially be patient, allowing an opposite party to try to better understand and find some agreement with his positions. The value of that would be to facilitate any negotiations. Intriguingly, Trump prefers and usually seeks to reach a mutually acceptable agreement through negotiations. Yet, at the same time, Trump will allow the path he charted to develop further. If a deal cannot be reached, he will travel that path to his goal. Interestingly, his clashes with political opponents have underlined that “they do not get Trump.” They seem to have no desire to examine him in an objective way. Kim should avoid the mistakes they have made in negotiating with him.

Most important to know is that what Trump does on one issue may serve to positively shape what he is doing on another. He economically exerts his energy, squeezing the maximum benefit from his decisions. Persistent, iniquitous, coverage of Trump’s handling of the very important political debate on border protection, the border wall, the government shutdown and even the State of the Union Address, obscured the reality that there were other important and urgent matters on his plate. A sampling of what Trump was working on at the same time included: agreeing to a new meeting with Kim on denuclearization, throwing full US support behind the interim president of Venezuela, Juan Guaido, drawing down US troops from Syria, watching peace talks and the US drawdown in Afghanistan, and working in trade with China. National unity and expressions of goodwill in the US were necessary for the world to see, not a partisan battle. By the way, the outcome of that partisan battle on border security, even though it may not be generally accepted, is certainly assured to go Trump’s way.

The Vice Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim Yong-chol (left) hands Trump (right) a letter from Kim. Trump and Kim have already shared their elaborations of how the other troubled them in Singapore. The comfortable level of connaissance suffisante they acquired of one another has served as the basis upon which continued communications between them was founded. That communication was mainly conducted by using their top officials as envoys and letters. What they truly understand about each other will be verified by the results their next meeting.

Some Thoughts Trump May Be Having about Kim

The initial meeting in Singapore allowed Trump and Kim to get a sense for one another, discuss expectations, and essentially figure out whether denuclearization was even feasible with all things considered. In the second meeting, some tangible steps toward denuclearization must result or the entire process will be largely seen as a failure. If a memorandum of understanding, outlining requirements, responsibilities, and time lines for action to which officials from both sides could later add flesh out, that would be very encouraging. If Kim came to the meeting and then left having offered nothing new, he would make a huge mistake. If Trump feels in the end that he has been led down the garden path on denuclearization, and would be left standing before the world with nothing, he would not react well at all.

As discussed in a January 19, 2019 greatcharlie post entitled, “Trump Uses Prior Experience, Flexible Thinking, and Even Empathy, to Make Foreign Policy Decisions Fit for Today’s World”, when mulling over a new approach on a matter in negotiation with another country or countries, the foreign and national security policy machinery of countries as the DPRK will very often move with the same speed as the massive naval dreadnoughts of early and mid-20th century. Wheeling those giant ships port or starboard took real effort. Self-interested bureaucracies will champion their points of view on a matter and guard their turf. Their devotion to ensuring the primacy of their organizations’ partisan interests can even surpass their enthusiasm over the matter at hand. It is more than likely that by now, Kim has dealt with any issues of that nature. Bureaucratic issues concerning denuclearization, if they ever existed, are by now nonexistent in the truest sense of the term. Kim definitely has a strong grip on his government. Political rivals are essentially nonexistent. He most certainly would have been “on his way” after presenting the mere idea of denuclearization to the leadership of the Workers Party of Korea. What is more likely is that Kim may be concerned with being profoundly disappointed by Trump, who is in fact a relative stranger to him and initially an adversary from the US. (One must look from Kim’s perspective, not one’s’ own lens, not one’s’ wishes.)

Given the militaristic culture and security mindset that undergirds the DPRK’s society, Kim naturally may still harbor fears over being outmaneuvered by the US in a way that leads to military invasion. A new window of opportunity has been opened for US-DPRK relations and for the DPRK directly, and the world. Still, due to that, one must not treat the fact that after July 27, 1953 armistice ending a horrific three year war on the Korean Peninsula, tens of thousands of troops on both sides of a Demilitarized Zone remained heavily armed and on alert in a stand-off with less care than it deserves. The 65 years following the war were a time of anger, aggression, deception and betrayal between the US and the DPRK. What emerged from that period within both governments was a vast paranoia.  That paranoia eventually hardened, became somewhat ordinary, and seemingly gave rise to intractable negative beliefs and harsh convictions of both nations respective intentions. This defacto bigotry in thinking on both sides colored personal and institutional  perceptions, doubtlessly insinuating itself into studies, observations, and varied other reports on both sides. This was particularly so in the military and intelligence and other security services. Having for years regularly diagnosed one another as bad, to be fair, it is now hard for them to turn on a dime because one wants them to do so. Great unease, suspicion would naturally exist.

Having kept the DPRK in isolation, much as his father, Kim Jong-un, and his grandfather, Kim Il-sung had for so long before him, Kim might certainly concern himself with having his society become rapidly “contaminated” by stealthy  Western efforts to influence his people or simply by philosophies and lifestyles that loyal members of the Workers’ Party of Korea would consider anathema. With this alone in mind, it would be unreasonable for anyone to complain that a change in the mindset of the DPRK on interacting so closely with the West on denuclearization or any transformative matter should have come more rapidly. Trump did not leave Singapore feeling a need to dictate the tempo of the negatiation process. It has been left to Kim to guide his country across the many figurative intellectual and emotional pickets lines that exist to denuclearization.

However, what could be legitimately characterized as a resistance and reluctance by Kim to advance toward an agreement may indicate that he may fear an invasion of another sort. He may fear that economic development effort will lead to invasion in the form of multinational corporations which are accountable to no one. Multinational corporations would argue well that they are good global citizens doing much that is not publicized. A general impression in many capitals, however, is that help from them is not really help. They are viewed as operating solely with pecuniary interest in a country. One only needs to recall the experience of Russia following the fall of the Soviet Union a Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin regularly laments. Undoubtedly, Moscow has reminded Kim of that. The massive multinational corporations have budgets greater than the DPRK itself. They are well staffed by very intelligent and capable development professionals who diligently look for what to exploit in weak countries. They can engage in nearly formulaic efforts to self-enrich themselves leading to dreadful damage to societies even if it is unintentional. It can become a plundering of countries struggling to pick themselves up and trying to organize themselves. Kim may believe that opening the DPRK to assistance on economic development may make his country vulnerable to corporate intrusion as it tries to emerge. It is unlikely that the idea of creating linkages between US based multinational corporations and DPRK industries to foster their development, as was done in South Korea many decades ago, will not fly in Pyongyang. The DPRK will most likely want to move along its way without corporate intrusion. If Kim expresses such a concern in the next meeting, Trump will likely guarantee that he would not even hint to any multinational corporation that some right or protection will be provided to seize DPRK resources.

If in the aftermath of the Trump administration, multinationals attempt the move in on the DPRK in well-worn, predictable ways, that will almost guarantee an ugly response in which the multinationals will be most likely be violently forced from the scene. Ultimately, that might lead to the collapse of everything positive achieved. It is highly recommended that Trump should have a solution available to address that likely concern to share with Kim at the negotiation table.

Among the advantages that would supposedly be created by the DPRK’s cooperation with Trump, would be the betterment in the standard of living and ostensibly, through an improved economy, the empowerment of the Workers’ Party of Korea which itself would presumably go through some change. Through its transformation, the DPRK would no longer be “The hermit kingdom”, but rather, find itself invited to the grand table of countries. It too would be able to wield real influence internationally; it, too, would be involved in decisions made on urgent and important matters. Yet, regarding economic development, Kim may reason that the same economic levers that Trump may use to ratchet up the DPRK’s economy and greater industrialization can be used conversely to supplant his government’s freedom of action. It may even be used to undermine Kim’s present unrestricted, authoritarian control his country. If a reliance on the help of the US, or the international community in some collective effort, to subsidise the DPRK’s organization were to develop, the US and others would be able to control the spigot from with the society’s revitalization flows. Kim will be fully responsible for that circumstance, that loss of independence, self-determination, and control.

Realistically, the long-term process of the DPRK’s economic development will go beyond his time in office and the mission of transforming the DPRK would be assigned to future US administrations. Trump should consider Kim’s possible concern that while he has an exceptionally good relationship with him, perchance, relations between himself and another US President soon to follow may be problematic. If that turned out to be the case, rash behavior might once again be seen from Kim. Indeed, the need to break any perceived “chains” of Western economic and financial subjugation, and the need to regain full control of its destiny, may impel the most aggressive responses possible by Pyongyang. A mechanism must established to make sure that the US-DPRK relationship will continue to be handled with empathy and nuance.

Trump displays letter from Kim Jong-un in Cabinet Room of the White House (above). Beyond their communications, Trump might reassure Kim by presenting him with a discussion of concrete, enumerated steps that would be taken to economically energize the DPRK in exchange for denuclearization. A new DPRK, economically viable enough to find a place at the table with other successful economies in the region, may all sound well as part of a prospective process. Nevertheless, Kim, if his intentions are positive, will want to know how it all would actually pan out for him in the real world.

What Might Facilitate Negotiations

Conceivably, more so than less, Kim feels that he can rely on what he might call Trump’s “humanism.” Still, reassurance, most important in negotiations between adversaries, cannot come simply from engaging in more talk with Trump. Trump has already expressed much to exhort Kim to move toward denuclearization. Kim knows very well that Trump now wants to see genuine steps that will complete the dismantling and elimination of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Assuredly, Trump will not present a partial version of himself through which he would intend to deceive Kim. There would not be some sort of “secret world” stuff going on that might possibly be discovered in his words, mannerisms, and attitude. Beyond ongoing communications, Trump might reassure Kim by presenting him with a discussion of concrete, enumerated steps that would be taken to economically energize the DPRK in exchange for denuclearization. A new DPRK, economically viable enough to find a place at the table with other successful economies in the region may all sound well as part of an imaginative prospective process. Nevertheless, Kim will still want to know, if his own intentions are positive, how it all would actually pan out for him in the real world.

Trump must bring tangibles to the negotiation table during the second meeting developed from his own shrewd thinking and knowledge of resources that he can commit to a deal. When mulling over what to present to Kim that would serve as the making of a plan of action, Trump’s aides and advisers likely determined what the relative value of a tangible might be to the other side. It must be useful enough to create some sense of equity, balance, and perhaps if a side is lucky, it might represent some real gain. Many of Trump’s suggestions might be steps that Kim and his aides and advisers in Pyongyang never considered. Despite what may be the wish of Pyongyang, no suggestions that may shift the security framework that exists between the US and its allies in Northeast Asia should be brought to the table with reasonable hope of seeing change. Indeed, Trump certainly must not give up the strengths and equities of its alliances with allies. Although the DPRK would the focus of talks, those ties that bind allies in the region are the same ties that assure unity when dealing with China. Indeed, given the concerns of the US and its allies to China’s actions and intentions in the Asia Pacific region, a reaffirmation of cooperation and commitments on security among them should be expected. Overall, Kim can rest assured that Trump will not offer rotten apples for him to choose from.

Simulatio delet veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. (Pretense obliterates the truth, without which the name of friendship cannot survive.) Kim would do well to focus on his own country’s relations with the US as well as neighbors in the region. If he is negotiating with some pretence of serving certain interests of China at the same time, he will essentially throw away an opportunity as the US and its regional allies would surely detect that effort. Kim must no longer allow his country to remain a prisoner of what most in the world views as an ignoble momentum.

Speculating on what might be offered, there might be some type of Marshall Plan tabled by Trump. Development programs similar to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization must be organized for the DPRK’s many industries. Using its own wisdom, and the external assistance it chooses to receive, the DPRK must in a more efficient way enrich itself with its own natural resources. Improved trade opportunities with other countries worldwide, facilitated by guarantees by the US, could be established following the removal. Rather than to multinational, linkages could be made to the economics departments and business school of specified US colleges and universities. There may be some small-scale variante of the Peace Corps with well-defined parameters encompassing state-run industries and other economic activity within the DPRK, narrow in scope, curated in a way that recognizes the extraordinary internal security concerns of the DPRK. Those concerns will not go away overnight.

Trump is certainly not a political hack being led from the nose by his political party, not a creature of some financial interest due to subsidization, and not a corporate pawn as his enemies portend. or as a number of other US political leaders reportedly have been alleged to be. The potential threat that he could be lobbied or coerced to acquiesce to demands from some external source, political, financial, or corporate, is nonexistent. Nothing of that sort could possibly undermine what might be achieved.

If the second meeting is successful, it would be a dramatic moment. The years of struggle would be about to come to an end. There would need to be the call for collective retreat from hostile thinking if the two countries are to move forward successfully. Thinking and emotions must flow in a new direction. What is read and heard in the public from officials at the highest level on both sides should reflect that. There must be an insistent voice that proclaims the time for change has come. It must be expressed from the top and must be heard repeatedly. If encouraging satisfactory change in the DPRK proves to be insurmountable for Trump, or if there is an unwillingness of the DPRK leadership to be truly open to taking a new path, displaying ambivalence or equivocation in talks, the denuclearization process will most likely collapse. If the DPRK undertakes the effort to transform, it must be dedicated to it completely. Kim is essentially facing a binary choice. If Pyongyang could pardon greatcharlie’s freedom, returning to the unreality that the DPRK has the military wherewithal to take on the a military superpower would be a tragic mistake. Perhaps for him, reason might again be found in the words of Cato the Elder who stated: “Wise men profit from fools than fools from wise men; for the wise men shun the mistakes of fools, but fools do not imitate the successes of the wise.”

Trump feels unfettered by what was not accomplished in the past, or what has been called impossible. He has the vision and spirit to achieve news things. In this case, it is denuclearization and the DPRK. He knows how to support its industrial development, and usher it to a positive place in the international order. What drives Trump to get this deal is not his purported tendencies toward social ambition and aggressiveness. This is actually Trump putting his best foot forward. Although the values and interests of the US will be satisfied, it is predominantly about doing what is right for both the people of the US and the DPRK as well.

The Way Forward

In Act 1 scene 3 of William Shakespeare’s play The Taming of the Shrew, a story in the story of tinker abused as part of a local lord’s practical joke upon a poor tinker, Christopher Sly. He is convinced that he is a lord, and troupe of actors performs a play before him which makes up the main story of The Taming of the Shrew. Their play takes place in Italian city of Padua, a rich young man named Lucentio there to attend university, instantly falls in love with Bianca, a beautiful, mild young woman. However she already has two suitors, Hortensio and Gremio, and Bianca’s father has declared that no one may court Bianca until first her older sister, Katherine, an ill-tempered  is married. That problem is ostensibly resolved when Hortensio’s friend Petruchio, a audacious young man from Verona, arrives in Padua seeking a wealthy woman to marry. Believing he has found what he was looking for, he agrees to marry Katherine sight unseen. Several characters add to the warnings Petruchio hears about her. However, rather than back away, he views marrying her as a challenge, not just a money making opportunity. He explains that living with Katherine could not possibly be worse than the hardships he  endured in war and at sea. Petruchio exhorts: “Think you a little din can daunt mine ears? / Have I not in my time heard lions roar? / Have I not heard the sea puff’d up with winds / Rage like an angry boar chafed with sweat? / Have I not heard great ordnance in the field, / And heaven’s artillery thunder in the skies? / Have I not in a pitched battle heard / Loud ‘larums, neighing steeds, and trumpets’ clang?” In the same vein as young Petruchio, Trump feels unfettered by what was not accomplished in the past, or what has been called impossible. (By the way Shakespeare’s Petruchio proved his capabilities and eventually became happily married to Katherine.) the vision and spirit to achieve news things. In this case, it is denuclearization and the DPRK. He knows how to support its industrial development, and usher it to a positive place in the international order.

What drives Trump to get this deal is not his purported tendencies toward social ambition and aggressiveness. There is the real possibility that Kim’s aides and advisers might associate with that notion in their reports to their Chairman as it is one of the more popular analyses propagated about Trump worldwide. Yet, rather, this is actually Trump putting his best foot forward. He has acquitted himself exceedingly well. The better angels of Trump’s nature, so to speak, are guiding him on this matter. Rather than do what Trump is doing, other political leaders, some vying for the highest office in 2020, would perhaps be content to allow a long time adversary that they no answers for dealing with, drown in economic destitution under a continued “maximum pressure campaign” of sanctions. Although ultimately the values and interests of the US will be satisfied through the present process to establish a sustainable peace, it is predominantly about doing what is right for both the people of the US and the DPRK as well. An optimal way to confirm veracity of both sides at the moment, as the noncommissioned officers likely would have said at the New York Military Academy when Trump was a cadet, is to “snap to it!” Again, words alone simply will not do the trick on this second occasion. Both leaders, mens sana in corpore sano, must come through by constructing a draft upon which a sustainable agreement can be rooted. Ornat haec magnitudo animi, quae nihil ad ostentationem, omnia ad conscientiam refert recteque facti non ex populi sermone mercedem, sed ex facto petit. (To all this, his illustrious mind reflects the noblest ornament; he places no part of his happiness in ostentation, but refers the whole of it to conscience; and seeks the reward of a virtuous action, not in the applauses of the world, but in the action itself.)