Literary Insight: James Risen, The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, the Mafia, and the Kennedys―and One Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown and Company, 2023)

Senator Frank Church holding a poison dart gun developed by the US Intelligence Community (left) and Senator John Tower observing (right) at the Church Committee’s first open session on September 17, 1975. In the wake of Watergate, Church was tasked with investigating abuses of power by the US Intelligence Community. Rather than noting mere oversteps by the Intelligence Community, Church and his  Congressional Committee put forth dark truths about its work that they uncovered. Indeed, Church exposed a myriad of clandestine and covert plots orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as other federal organizations. In many cases, singular actions were taken by the Intelligence Community actually amounted to criminal violations of federal law. This essay is not a book review. Instead, it is a literary insight essay providing meditations of Risen’s The Last Honest Man. In this essay, greatcharlie’s insights are delimited to a discussion of occasional rogue behavior, abuses of law, by members of the US Intelligence Community. The book is remarkably suggestive with respect to contemporary times. Such an edict surely requires examination. In this essay, readers may come upon aspects of issues or view new angles of the discussion they may not have not recognized or perhaps would not have considered after reading the book.

James Risen’s The Last Honest Man: The CIA, the FBI, the NSA, the Mafia, and the Kennedys–and One Senator’s Fight to Save Democracy (Little, Brown and Company, 2023), [ISBN-13 9780316565134] tells the story of how Frank Church, at the the time  Senator of Idaho for almost two decades, attempted to reign in US Intelligence Community activities in 1975 after years of no Congressional oversight. Risen draws upon hundreds of interviews, thousands of pages of recently declassified documents, and reams of unpublished letters, notes, and memoirs, some of which remain sensitive today. The story as told in the 480 page tome is true to reality.

As a Senator, Church promoted, advocated, and vigorously defended the US Constitution. He was guided by US values and supported its interests. Church’s beliefs would compel him to lead congressional opposition to the Vietnam War and had become a scathing, radical critic of what he saw as US imperialism around the world. Yet, Risen suggests the “rebellious” Church was politically ambitious, and sough acceptance from the foreign and national security policy establishment of which he was very skeptical. He was also  interested in running for president. The author indicates that Church was not devoid of faults. In the wake of Watergate Church was tasked with investigating abuses of power by the US intelligence community. Rather than noting mere oversteps by the Intelligence Community, Church and his Committee put forth dark truths about its work that they uncovered. Indeed, Church exposed a myriad of clandestine and covert plots orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and  the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as well as other federal organizations. In many cases, singular actions were taken by the Intelligence Community that actually amounted to criminal violations of federal law.

The course taken seemed right to Church as the Committee’s Chairman. One might imagine he understood there was great pitfall involved with criticism the work of Intelligence Community, however, Church never hesitated. By Risen’s account, Church was in fact persistent in his pursuit of the matter. He would show historic strength in his greatest moment. Risen did not indicate that Church had wasted any of the Committee’s valuable time rooting around in extraneous matters. Church stayed focused on his task. 

This essay is not a book review. Instead, it is a literary insight essay providing meditations of Risen’s The Last Honest Man. In brief, a literary insight essay’s purpose is to express a readers feelings and ideas about a literary work. It is a journey of introspection. In this essay, greatcharlie’s insights are delimited to a discussion of occasional rogue behavior, abuses of law, by members of the US Intelligence Community. The book is remarkably suggestive with respect to contemporary times. Such an edict surely requires examination. In this essay, readers may come upon aspects of issues or view new angles of the discussion they may not have not recognized or perhaps would not have considered after reading the book

In previous times, one might have supposed the understanding, acceptance of what Founding Fathers who authored the US Constitution defined as the unalienable rights of life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were sacrosanct. However, one might be able to comfortably conclude today that far less importance is given to those rights upon which the country’s soul and existence was once firmly based and upon which the US public’s expectation and requirement for the good governance of the democracy has its roots. What seemed so certain about the once lauded strictures–as a sampling, the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendmens of the US Constitution–that would guide the country perpetually, is far less sure today than ever before. There are laws, but very often justice for the people is much harder to find. Breaches of regulations of the US Intelligence Community against ordinary citizen, not responsible for any wrongdoing, must not only be examined but vigorously pursued. Si quid novisti rectius istis, candidus imperti; si nil, his utere mecum. (if you can better these principles, tell me; if not, join me in following them.)

Meeting of the Members of the Church Committee prior to several hearings in autumn (above). Some Members of Congress in 1975 would likely have been more inclined to be dismissive of an investigation of the Intelligence Community than give serious attention to it. The Intelligence Community’s leadership could only hope that matters concerning its operations would be handled by the Church Committee with the same delicacy. The Congress for years had failed for years to put a leash on the Intelligence Community. Consequently, it ran off on its own in the world. Nothing but the foreign opposition, stood in its way. As for what remotely sufficed for “oversight” before the Church Committee was set up, information on Intelligence Community activities was curiously gleaned from the organizations’ directors by senior Members of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They would meet with the directors to occasionally chin-wag likely on the latest activities, resources, personnel, latest activities, troublesome spots, and accomplishments. In those times, save the Congress and the free press, the US public would be assuredly have been kept in the dark regarding the government’s actions in the province of intelligence. The means today by which the US public is kept equally abreast of the Intelligence Community’s activities as then is not as certain. To that extent, what aided the Church Committee’s cause was the fact that certain elements of the national newsmedia, far less then than today, were nevertheless the best and only fount of information about the US Intelligence Community’s performance.

The Church Committee, known formally as the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities established on January 27, 1975. Open sessions were held in September and October of 1975, but incisive research was conducted throughout that year.  Prior to the Church Committee, there had not been any formal Congressional oversight process for what became the US Intelligence Community for nearly 30 years. The CIA was established in 1947, and the NSA was organized in 1952.The FBI has been around since 1924. The intelligence activities of a White House domestic surveillance program and the Internal Revenue Service were also probed. Following up on information reported in a December 22, 1974 New York Times article authored by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, there was plenty sitting in the vaults of the Intelligence Communityfor the Committee to investigate. It was not mere tittle-tattle.

Some Members of Congress in 1975 would likely have been more inclined to be dismissive of an investigation of the Intelligence Community than give serious attention to it. The Intelligence Community’s leadership could only hope that matters concerning its operations would be handled by the Church Committee with the same delicacy. The Congress for years had failed for years to put a leash on the Intelligence Community. Consequently, it ran off on its own in the world. Nothing but the foreign opposition, stood in its way. As for what remotely sufficed for “oversight” before the Church Committee was set up, information on Intelligence Community activities was curiously gleaned from the organizations’ directors by senior Members of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. They would meet with the directors to occasionally chin-wag likely on the latest activities, resources, personnel, latest activities, troublesome spots, and accomplishments. 

There was a danger that as a result of the Church Committee coming off the heels of the Vietnam War, the violent response to the Civil Rights Movement, the assassinations of Martin Luther King , Jr., Senator Edward Kennedy, and the earlier assassination of US President John Kennedy, Watergate, and the country’s continued disfunction on race, equality for women, and gross inequities in wealth establishing large divisions in social class, enabling poverty. the Intelligence Community would not be used as a depository for the ills of US foreign and national security policy.

Omne ignotem pro magnifico. (Everything unknown is magnificent.) In the old-fashion, out-moded sense, the US public at the time appreciated the services provided by its case officers and special agents, had possessed an sense of obligation to its Intelligence Community. However, ultimately,  the Intelligence Community is beholding to the people who expect and deserve its unwavering fidelity.

When evidence of Intelligence Community wrongdoings and abuses became overwhelming, much changed on all fronts. The US had to confront the truth about itself if it was reach the heart of the matter.The Committee soon discovered that there was no possibility to the limits of the Intelligence Community’s operations. It was clearly capable of any fantastic outrage. There was a certain method to the eccentric madness of the Intelligence Community. What was discovered was all outside of the common. There was no outlier so to speak. Nothing revealed could have dare been called trivial. It was essential for the Church Committee Members to be put in the full picture. A priority appeared to be to gain a sense of the scale of those activities. This matter went much deeper than originally supposed.

It required life experience to understand what might be possible, to explore with an open-mind, all that would likely stand much of what Church Committee Members believed to be known on its head. To accept all that was being exposed in Church’s Committee would require one to possess a mind that could view it all with a mixture of imagination and reality. At the same time, many Church Committee Members and staff served overseas during World War II, as well as in the Korean War and in the Vietnam War were not mystified by any of it. It was about killing, death. Nothing was beyond their comprehension. As with other Committee members, Church examined the Intelligence Community’s activities burdened with a rational frame of mind. There were difficulties, but there would always be difficulties.

True, what was done was done. However, there was the chance to prevent the furtherance of such activities, crimes and halt any additional damage to the reputation and standing of the US worldwide . The US is a constitutional federal republic, meaning its government is based on a Constitution which is the supreme law of the country and both citizens and their governing officials are bound to follow the rules established in that Constitution. The Intelligence Community’s actions overseas over the years fell under the jurisdiction of the countries in which the occurred. However, their actions against US citizens inside the US fell under federal and state law. Remarkably, an extraordinary number of operations conducted by Intelligence Community members and other government organizations against domestic targets were discovered.

In those times, save the Congress, as well as a free press, the US public will be assuredly kept in the dark regarding the government’s actions, particularly in the province of intelligence. The means today by which the US public is kept equally abreast of the Intelligence Community’s activities as then is not as certain. To that extent, what aided the Church Committee’s cause was the fact that certain elements of the national newsmedia, far less then than today, were nevertheless the best and only fount of information about the US Intelligence Community’s performance. At least for a generation or two, not too long afterward, certain services of the Intelligence Community would remain dark organizations in the minds of many conscientious US citizens. There has been nothing of such consequence concerning the Intelligence Community beyond the IranContra Affair in which its activities have been put from and center for the US public. As a news story in present times, Church Committee findings unlikely would be of interest to the overwhelming majority.

William Colby, Director of the CIA from 1973 to 1976 (above). Once the Church Committee came prying, the Intelligence Community’s leadership and even White House under US President Gerald Ford appeared to become unsettled. The Intelligence Community’s leadership knew exactly what had been transpiriing in their organizations over the years. A reasonable assessment, completely unbiased, would be that under the strictures of US law, particularly on the domestic front, much of it was wrongful. To that extent, the Intelligence Community’s leadership, particularly the CIA’s leadership, knew members of the Church Committee would light on them once they had the opportunity to become read in on information available and actiually see and handle some of the recherché tools and gadgets the Intelligence Community had developed. Given how the hearings were organized, Intelligence Community executives and senior managers would have a considerable measure of control over their organizations’ fates and their own careers as would provide testimony as key witnesses before the Church Committee in both open and closed sessions. Whatever the Intelligence Community’s leadership hoped to accomplish, particularly with regard to minimizing the shock to the US public over each fantastic outrage revealed, surely failed if disproving newly hatched fears about the Intelligence Community was one goal, their efforts were not successful. Contrary to whatever public relations benefit the Intelligence Community’s leadership may have been hoping to garner as result of the hearings, the Intelligence Community’s reputation instead was decisively sullied. Yet, years later, it is clear that whatever resulted from the Church Committee Hearings hardly held fast. The way that the US public thought about not only the government and the Intelligence Community and also the ability to hold it accountable, would shift, opening the door to abuses that would have been beyond the Church Committee’s wildest imagining.

Once the Church Committee came prying, the Intelligence Community’s leadership and even White House under US President Gerald Ford appeared to become unsettled. The Intelligence Community’s leadership knew exactly what had been transpiriing in their organizations over the years. A reasonable assessment, completely unbiased, would be that under the strictures of US law, particularly on the domestic front, much of it was wrongful. To that extent, the Intelligence Community’s leadership, particularly the CIA, knew members of the Church Committee would light on them once they had the opportunity to become read in on information available and handle some the recherché tools and gadgets the Intelligence Community had developed.

From their view, circumstances of the time, the Cold War, the Modern Age, surpassed the use of ordinary ways and means to defeat threats and assure policy aims. They expoused that extreme circumstances required extreme action. Much more was constantly being required to meet ends covertly. Despite the rather widespread disapproval of its actions, the Intelligence Community’s leadership never believed the use of “ramped up” tactics, techniques, and procedures was not a crime. Through there use, the Intelligence Community could fight adversaries by means other than war to safeguard US national security.

That explanation–that alibi–would not have a steadying effect on the US public, many of whom had been made quite concerned after learning from news media reporting of the open sessions of the Church Committee how the government, honorable and powerful, had been behaving in their name. Again, there was mostly disappointment among the people. A fearful mood had gripped some. If it were only a smattering of odd incidents, any audacious thinking and action perhaps might have seemed slightly tolerable. That by no means was the case. 

The Church Committee Hearings were a moment at time in which the Intelligence Community’s leadership would been behooved to guard against self-deception and delusion to avoid becoming too far a field. However, their conviction over everything the Intelligence Community did, however, was so unwavering that one might imagine a private response among some executives and senior managers was ironically to question the loyalty of Church Committee members. The pretense within the Intelligence Community’s leadsrship was that their organizations were “something above”,” something better”, than the rest of society and thereby they were entitled to do things outside US values,  principles, and laws.

Given how hearings were organized, Intelligence Community executives and senior managers would have a considerable measure of control over their organizations’ fates and their own careers as they would provide testimony as key witnesses before the Church Committee in both open and closed sessions.

If the Intelligence Community’s leadership had any thoughts of avoiding hearings, the Church Committee would brook no denial. Forced to go through the investigative process, they might have left the door open in their minds to the hope that the Church Committee’s findings would allow for the suggestion of a rationale for the behavior of their personnel and all the transpired over the years. They might have hoped to hear a plausible explanation that would circle around notions of the ubiquitous and ceaseless Communist threat posed by the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc countries,, and the People’s Republic of China to the US, its allies and friends, and other democracies worldwide.

A figurative pirate’s chest of the strange, unusual technologies and maccabre tactics, techniques procedures, and methods was unlocked and opened wide. It was trove of horrors. To the overwhelming majority of US citizens who gave their attention to the Church Committee hearings, all that was discovered felt, to turn a phrase of the era, very un-American. Risen describes Church Committee revelations on assassinations targeted at Cuban President Fidel Castro in Cuba, Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. There were others. He reports on the CIA’s MKULTRA program.and the use of LSD. and it’s domestic surveillance program, HTLINGUAL. He tells the shocking story of the FBI’s surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other US activists under COINTELPRO operations. The CIA contacted an organized crime figure, Johnny Roselli, to act as an intermediary to elicit the assistance of  Chicago organized crime boss Sam Giancana, to coordinate CIA efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro with the Mafia. This list barely scratches the surface. 

There was a sense of revulsion among Committee members and staff. Each Committee Member may have felt something private, very intense, very off putting  about matter. Some might say that many of Intelligence Community lurid activities reflected a loathing of the human race. Seemingly, it was the organization’s preferred way to have others to perceive it. The Church Committee did not really warm to any of those who testified. The Intelligence Community’s leadsrship was not always well-collected while offering testimony. Still, among those Church Committee Members who may have felt disgust over the deeds of the Intelligence Community they had funded generously, there was no intention of allowing anger and grief conspire to create a blindness that might interfere with their vital work.

Whatever the Intelligence Community’s leadership hoped to accomplish, particularly minimizing the shock to the US public over each fantastic outrage, surely failed. If mitigating newly hatched fears about the Intelligence Community was one goal, their efforts were not successful. Contrary to whatever public relations benefit the Intelligence Community’s leadership may have been hoping to garner as result of the hearings, the Intelligence Community’s reputation instead was decisively sullied. Yet, years later, it is clear that whatever resulted from the Church Committee hearings hardly held fast.. The way that the US public thought about not only the government and the Intelligence Community and also the ability to hold it accountable, would shift, opening the door to abuses that would have been beyond the Church Committee’s wildest imagining.

Surely, nothing uncovered by the Church Committee was lost upon the Intelligence Community’s opponents overseas. Their opponents overseas were tough and numerous. However, it seems elements of the US Intelligence Community thought of themselves as being tougher, and sought to be rougher still. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China saw or heard anything too shocking or surprising. The Church Committee’s findings were unlikely music to their ears regarding the international front. Clearly, the US was active clandestinely and covertly overseas in a big way. On the domestic front in the US, however, the situation was likely viewed as much better by adversarial foreign intelligence services. News of the Intelligence Community’s history of operations against political targets very likely indicated to the Intelligence Community’s opponents that it was flush with so much cash that it could divert resources and manpower to those efforts. 

Although it was not broached in Risen’s book, those political diversions may have provided enough reason for their foreign intelligence services to sense they were often operating with impunity in the US. Resources and manpower were not just diverted to that mission, but dedicated to it through multiple programs. Conceivably, that may have encouraged the Soviet Union,  Eastern Bloc countries, and the People’s Republic of China to increase their presence and efforts in the US. The Soviet spymaster of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, Oleg Kalugin, indicates in his memoirs that the 1960s and 1970s were heady, fruitful times for Soviet and Eastern Bloc intelligence operations inside the US. (SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2020 post entitled, “Book Review: Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West (St. Martin’s Press, 1994)”) It would have been almost impossible for the Intelligence Community to know the totality of what foreign intelligence services might have been successfully collecting at the time until new political, economic, or financial information allowed some unexplained upper hand or scientific or technological advances would crop up that evinced tell-tales of its origins and that it had been stolen.

Risen explains Church worked after the Committee Hearings to establish Intelligence Community oversight. Steps included the development of the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 and creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on May 19, 1976 and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on July 24, 1977.

James Angleton, Chief of CIA Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975, at the Church Committee Hearings. A figurative box of the strange, unusual technologies and maccabre tactics, techniques procedures, and methods was unlocked and opened wide. It was trove of horrors. To the overwhelming majority of US citizens who gave their attention to the Church Committee hearings, all that was discovered felt, to turn a phrase of the era, very un-American. Risen describes Church Committee revelations on assassinations targeted at Cuban President Fidel Castro in Cuba, Congolese President Patrice Lumumba, and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. There were others. He reports on the CIA’s MKULTRA program.and the use of LSD. He tells the shocking story of the FBI’s surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other US activists under COINTELPRO operations. The CIA contacted an organized crime figure, Johnny Roselli, to act as an intermediary to elicit the assistance of  Chicago organized crime boss Sam Giancana, to coordinate CIA efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro with the Mafia. This list barely scratches the surface. During his testimony at the Church Committee, Angleton was pressed on the CIA’s domestic surveillance program, HTLINGUAL. It was sensed at the time that Angleton had not been completely forthcoming with Committee Members.

Without pretension, what greatcharlie relates in the following discussion is completely true and accurate to the best of its knowledge and belief. The information is simply laid out. There is no insistence that readers accept it. It is what it is.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, practically all curbs of the psyche and actual policy and legal parameters against abuses were not observed to the letter–somewhat overlooked–by the Intelligence Community in favor of a “go get ’em” attitude and offensive posture against “the enemy”. The priority became getting results: killing and capturing terrorists; uncovering and thwarting terrorist plots; destroying terrorist networks; and, seizing terrorist assets. The practice nearly became “anything goes.” The mainstream newsmedia in the US was supportive of just about everything done and a very vocal US public demanded further retribution. The emotional response of the US public was certainly understandable, however, most were abysmally ignorant of the Intelligence Community’s activities were overseas, literally on the high seas, and domestically. Among US public there are those who, even after being introduced to actualities, are unable to would hardly shake their views how their government can often operate. Today, only a fraction might take a firm interest in the misdeeds, violations of rights under the Constitution, or even larceny and outright violent crimes committed by the Intelligence Community.  It is likely the case for members of the US public that as long as the Intelligence Community’s actions do not directly effect them or their own, there is little to be concerned about. To go a step further, some members of the US public may not be willing to accept that rogue elements of the Intelligence Community and their contractors would engage in surveillance and direct acts against innocent US citizens. Nevertheless, it happens, as Risen’s book makes it very clear. 

The Global War on Terror has not ended. However, US President Joe Biden has reorganized resources and manpower in the over two decades long ubiquitous fight. Fewer airstrikes are ordered in fewer countries. US counterterrorism forces appear to be operating overseas in lesser numbers. The tempo of their operations has decreased. One would expect those decisions and others have had a correlative impact of ratcheting down the Intelligence Community’s use of resources and manpower. Looking a bit further on its tasks, no greater evidence of the Russian Federation’s potential for military aggression exists at the present than the Ukraine War. Yet, relative threats posed by the Russian Federation to the US and its interests has lessened. The degree of inefficiency and albeit incompetence that has been displayed by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the intelligence services in the prosecution of operations of or pertaining to the Special Military Operation that the Cold War fears of the untamable and indomitable “”Russian Military Bear” has since faded at bit.. However, concerning the People’s Republic of China, however, its intelligence services have displayed an acumen in their espionage activities within the US that has been seemingly beyond the capacity of US counterintelligence services to combat. US foreign intelligence operations in the People’s Republic of China also have not met with great success. In the aggregate, the People’s Republic of China has delivered wrenching blows against the US. 

The point here is that with relatively reduced threats against some opponents and barely a modicum of success against espionage directed from the People’s Republic of China foreign intelligence services in the US, some unscrupulous individuals in the organizations of the Intelligence Community may feel a “greater flexibility to do other things” undistracted by real work upon which they could fully focus their minds and hone their “skills”. Thereby, in an odd and unhealthy, and criminal twist, they appear to have shamefully preyed upon the average US public. Rogue members of these organizations–and there always have been a few– have engaged have engaged in this behavior for years, but happens not with similar frequency. They generally engage in their wrongful acts well-below the radar.  It is awful to accept that a few personnel of the US counterintelligence services, including not so trustworthy contractors they call upon, to knowingly use the exquisite technical resources of the US and tactics, techniques procedures and methods to crush ordinary citizens who have no interest in doing anything against the US. (On this matter, greatcharlie writes not from study, but rather from personal experience as an innocent target of such wrongful and incredibly costly activities.)

The rogue federal officers and contractors have their own reasons for turning to villainy and own reasons for selecting their victims. The victims names may have been found on some innocuous list within the rogue federal officers organizations. Through wrongdoing, the names are apparently transferred to an active list of targets for the rogue federal officers and contractors to prey upon. Rogue federal officers and contractors will claim to have legitimate cause for their actions them. Warrants from “helpful” judges presiding on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) will be provided based on those claims, allowing electronic surveillance,  physical search, and other forms of investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes. (The FISC was established by Congress in the aforementioned FISA.) More importantly, the warrants will allow the rogue federal officers and contractors to increase available financial resources for activities against their innocent victims. 

Needless to say, cellphone calls, texts, emails of victims are monitored. Letters and other missives are intercepted, extracted from, and occasionally inserted into, the victims mail deliveries. Electronic devices to monitor the victims in their own homes are used. Cable television and high speed internet services are weaponized for use as monitoring equipment. The technologies may have changed, but this practice of monitoring resembles that used against Martin Luther King, Jr. when he was, as noted earlier, the target of a federal surveillance and “dirty tricks” program. Yet, far much more, not relayed here, is done along this track. The individual’s personal life, finances, property, could are targeted. Doors will be closed to employment, association with social and professional groups, membership in organizations. Recognition and awards for achievement and excellent will be denied. Family members and friends will also face attacks designed to separate them from the individual or destroy them. Every effort will be made to shun the victim from society.

To gnaw a bit further on the surveillance of a victim, as a standard practice that task is performed through the use of manpower on the street. The personnel of a contractors are used mostly for this purpose. Some are employeed to engage in electronic surveillance.  To use manpower on the street in a very robust way, contractors, albeit errantly, will hire ordinary individuals from the US public to assist them. Greater budgets allowed once FISC warrants are secured mean bigger operations.  That permits exigent hires  For rogue federal officers and contractors greater budgets through innovative ways mean greater wrongful operations,, but also the potential for increased financial gains for them. (In the past, waggish federal officers were sometimes heard to jest that such improper efforts perfectly allowed for the creation of a “second retirement” much better than the one their organizations were going to provide.) C’est comme ça.

It is rarely difficult to find exigent hires willing for usually modest, but sometimes exhorbitant payment–bribes–to zealously engage in surveillance activities and aggressive, even criminal acts at the behest of rogue federal officers and contractors. Most of the exigent hires only understand “spy work” through Hollywood depictions and exciting novels. Most are thrilled to live out “Walter Mitty” fantasies of being a spy as they disrespect, betray and bully the innocent! The ranks of citizen hires are inflated by the exigent employ of permanent and temporary residents, visitors, tourists, and undocumented immigrants as well. The visitor to the US will receive an unforgettable lesson on the meaning and nature of civil rights in the country courtesy of the rogue federal officers and contractors. Whether a citizen or visitor, the hires receive remuneration. Exigent hires are compensated immediately for their wrongful service. The payments are in essence bribes to encourage and to reward their violation of the law. If prospective hires take the unusual step of asking why such surveillance of the victim is necessary, the rogue federal officers and contractors will offer an apocryphal story that may shock, anger, or outrage the prospect concerning the victim, tell outright, ghastly lies about the victim’s character, or conversely set aside any wrongdoing or any threat posed by the victim and convince the hire that anything done will be to the victims benefit! Intriguingly, the latter actually works exceedingly well.

Exigent hires will invariably  approach the surveillance of their innocent victim using the limits of their varied faculties. The results can be atrocious, shocking, and sometimes silly. Exigent hires can often be seen hiding behind pillars, jumping behind cars, and hiding their faces with their hands among a few things. As the vetting of hires is nonexistent, the dysregulated are often employed and they will often vent rage directly at the victim over false reports about them from rogue federal officers and contractors to relieve unbalanced levels of stress and frustration. Occasionally, participation is shamefully impelled not only by remuneration, but by racial, ethnic, religious, and gender prejudice. Those hires will indubitably make their offensive perspectives known to victims when walking by them or loitering near them. Evidence of how they manage racist and otherwise biased hires may offer an indication of whether the rogue federal officers and contractors harbor similar prejudices toward a victim. They can often develop a kinship with such odious individuals. On the odd occasion, one might unexpectedly observe the rogue federal officers and contractors communicating with them in plainview! Those hires surely receive opportunities for contracts and more chances to abuse a victim for payments. There is often a sense great importance and power that conspiring with “secret men” and “secret women” conveys to most hires, this can expectedly lead to hostility, aggression, and violence against an innocent victim.

Since none of the hires employed under these circumstances are not acting against actual officers or operatives of a foreign intelligence service or some other dangerous group, these exigent hires can act with relative impunity against victim. A victim’s response to the hires transgressions must not include acting physically. The rogue federal officers and contractors will use their standing and FISC warrants to ensure local law enforcement will arrest a victim and “friendly” prosecutors will secure fines or sentences against them. Such occurances have indeed been tragedies. Yet, the activities of the rogue federal officers and contractors will not stop even after causing that degree of harm. On s’en fout!

The exigent hiring of “operatives” by rogue federal officers and contractors is not always unsystematic. Some hires are offered contracts to encourage regular service against innocent victims. Often, contract hires are asked rogue federal officers and contractors to log their observations of victims via text or group chat. They often provide the information on what the victim is wearing, the number of the taxi in which the victim is riding, the direction the victim is walking or the activity in which the victim is engaged. (Interestingly, rogue federal officers and contractors always inform their hires of their victims whereabouts, yet they will often insist their hires log their “observations” of the victim by text or group chat. Other than creating activity for the hires, that work amounts to kabuki, hardly serving a useful purpose day-to-day when the rogue federal officers and contractors are watching the victim themselves. Maybe it is more a matter of keeping up appearances.

Some exigent hires are sought out because they are in a position to have opportunities for more than occasional contact with a victim. These “key hires” will,typically be associated with the victim’s personal and professional life, and the victim’s simple daily activities. A short list of such hires would typically include: neighbors; apartment building staff; contractors; locksmiths, municipal civil service workers of all types to include the police and emergency services technicians; dog walkers; taxi cab drivers; car service drivers; barbers; hairstylists; restaurant staff; pizza shop employees; coffee shop staff; street food vendors; conveniance store clerks; department store employees; luxury watch store employees;  supermarket employees; car garage attendants; storage company employees; moving company employees; realty agency staff; funeral directors, movie theater staff, museum staff; performing arts center staff; elementary and secondary school staff; parents of elementary and secondary school students; elementary and secondary school students; visiting professors at nearby universities; sports book authors; content management system employees; bank branch employees; accountants; tax preparers; paralegals; lawyers; medical office administrative staff and technicians; physical therapists; doctors; court house staff; and, judges. (The actions of judges co-opted by the rogue federal offcers and contractors in an US court proceeding against a victim are typically so remarkably corrupt that greatcharlie assures they must be seen to be believed.) It is fascinating to observe just how many individuals are typically made privy to the rogue federal officers and contractors “secret operations” against innocent victims.

Through contact with such key hires, the rogue federal officers and contractors aditionally hope to receive information about the victim through “clandestine conversation”. Usually, they will insist these hires ask victims specific questions about themselves which is most often incongruous with the natter in which they might be normally engaged. The activities of those key hires, along with other hires who have contracts, are controlled through cellphone calls, direct texting, and group chat. Group chat is at the present the most unified way for the rogue federal officers and contractors to assemble and mass their hires to act upon a victim collectively. Essentially, hires are organized for “gang stalking” and out-and-out harassment–bullying. These hires are compensated usually at central locations in the vicinity of their activity: a parked car or a coffee shop.

Interestingly, with warrants from the FISC in hand, rogue federal officers and contractors can also make use of programs created for use by employees of specific service industries to surveil and act against targets of investigations. In New York City for example, a clandestine program–so called a covert program by officials–was developed by federal and local law enforcement and US intelligence services to use taxi cab and car service drivers to surveil and photograph targets when they are on the street and to engage them in clandestine conversations as passengers with the aim of “surreptitiously interrogating” them or passing disinformation to them. Remember, the victims are absolutely innocent, have no special information offer. So, insisting the taxi drivers engage in such a practice, certainly not as training, along with simply using the shed light upon the mental state of the rogue federal officers and contractors. Maybe it is again a matter of keeping up appearances. It is as plain as a pikestaff that the taxi and car service drivers are impelled by pecuniary interest and ego, certainly not intellect. Clearly, most of the drivers take on their “secret work” having received insubstantial educations overseas, possessing a limited vocabulary as English is usually a second language for them, being devoid of sophisticated conversational skills–being tactless, and not knowing what it means to be congenial. One can imagine how awkward, clumsy, and better than annoying their efforts at “clandestine conversations” usually are. Ironically, the drivers must rely upon the politeness and tolerance of the victim to perform their “clandestine” work while lacking any compunction over deceiving a victim or potentially causing them harm.

It might be worth noting that warrants from FISC also allows for the rogue federal officers and contractors to cooperate with members of foreign intelligence and security services of US allies stationed in the US. The officers of some foreign intelligence and security services will make their presence known to victims by behaving overly aggressively, with hostility, and even a threatening them. Indeed, they take on this barbaric posture even against US citizens living in their own country. Officers of somewhat more sophisticated foreign intelligence and security services may make it a point to have an attenuated presence. However, they may deliberately make themselves known if they have been tasked to ask questions of–softly interrogate–the target. Interestingly, that task invariably falls to female officers of the foreign intelligence and security services who, with male colleagues close by, will “noticeably” spend an ordinate amount of time studying the victim before moving in. Such activities fall under the category of transnational repression and are illegal. Foreign intelligence and security services of US allies are surely pleased to receive financial resources from their US counterparts for their cooperation. Warrants from FISC open the financial spigot for such funding. However, what is imaginably most important for the foreign intelligence and security services of US allies who might participate in such activities at the victim’s expense is finding a place for themselves at the “high intelligence roundtable” with the powerful US. Once again, rogue federal officers and contractors more than likely trigger this activity by foreign intelligence and security services stationed inside the US as a matter of keeping up appearances.

Attempts to co-opt a victim’s immediate family members and other relatives are also made by rogue federal officers and contractors. If successful, they will usually forever destroy the victim’s immediate family unit and separate the victim permanently from other relatives. 

The definition of success among the Ancient Greeks was the full use of one’s powers along the lines of excellence. At a minimum, success for the rogue federal officers and contractors against their victims clearly has meant stripping them of anything resembling an ordinary life, completely restricting their liberties in a normal sense by standing between the victims contacts with others, and interfering with any effort to pursue happiness. The whole wrongful process can go on for years or at least as long as the victim lasts. Yet, very often the outcome desired by the rogue federal officers and contractors is far more sinister. The “stress response”, the flight or fight system, is triggered when mind and body are out of balance. When mind and body are out of balance, in stress mode, one is headed for health problems, disease, or breakdown. No organism can stand being in emergency mode all the time. The infliction of daily episodes of gang stalking and harassment can elicit heart disease, heart failure, and psychological disorders. Cases of suicide can also stem from a victims in ability to cope with strains too strong and too alien for “normal living” in an advanced industrial democratic society to countenance. Mere empirical observations of rogue federal officers and contractors actions and the results inflicted upon victims should reasonably assure one that there is not a shred of decency among them. Far more perverse actions are taken against victims. Plainly, the rogue federal officers and contractors have even acted in a variety of ways to cause a victim’s death.

As mentioned, the exigent hires and contract hires of the rogue federal officers and contractors are generally more concerned with how much money they will receive. Typically, hires will hardly notice, or even look to see on their own volition, if the victim were suffering physically or psychologically in some discernible way. As a combination of the hires’ “low-vibrational” character and their receipt of regular abhorrent reports from the rogue federal officers and contractors about the victim usually meant to infuriate their hires or even amuse them, there is generally no empathy shown by hires for the victim. The victim is not recognized as a human being. The victim is seen only as a commodity. Noticeably, hires are quite deliberately directed and bound as a collective through a form of mind control. From the prostitute and drug peddler to the doctor and state court judge, the rogue federal offcers and contractors get their hires to do exactly what they want them to do. The reality is there is no professional side to involving US citizens and so many others in the wrongful–illegal–surveillance and possibly the criminal homicide of anyone, especially an innocent victim. In their own criminal way, the rogue federal officers and contractors are destroying the fabric of the society.

Victims of rogue federal officers and contractors have no voice. The few who would make reports of their maltreatment and entreaties for justice are stifled by the corrupt. Through the use of their standing with law enforcement and judicial systems, FISC warrants, and long exercised technical ways to block a victim’s communications, it is assured that the victim’s pleas will go unheard. Many victims are so despaired by trying and failing to successfully report their mistreatment and circumstances surrounding it that they are led to either very quietly or very publicly self-destruct.

As suggested earlier, it is easy enough for those in the US public who cannot accept corruption and murderous criminality on such great scale among corrupt members of the US security services and their contractors and some will surely to find comforting ways to dismiss it or outrightly rebuke it. Yet, those who would accept this reality may be unwilling to speak against it. The number of other government officials in the organizations who may discover others acting corruptly and may wish to report or to investigate such criminality would be few as the consequences of their detection might be retribution in the form of daily attacks on the job equal or worse than those suffered by the innocent victims.

Leaders of organizations can be changed in response to revelations of wrongdoing at the senior level and within the rank and file. However, a subsequent change in leadership to that could lead to the rejuvenation of such vengeful, aggressive thinking and actions against the previously targeted inedividual found guiltless, incident free will be ordered. The individual’s personal life, finances, property, could once again be targeted. Doors will be closed once again to employment, association with social and professional groups, membership in organizations. Recognition and awards for achievement and excellent once again will be denied. Family members and friends not co-opted by the rogue federal officers and contractors once again will face attacks designed to separate them from the individual or destroy them without fail. Victims will once again be shunned by the society. During the new episode, the most devastating psychological and physiological attacks upon the individuals–by then a few years older and likely less interested in struggling against a tide a wrongdoing–would be launched by authorities with far greater intensity, to achieve their destruction or even deaths through suicide or violence so dearly wanted by others through the original effort. Ironically, the rogue federal officers and contractors who assisted in organizing and managing the individual’s destruction originally, will very likely have retired from their federal security service by then to enjoy the fruits of their wrongdoing. However, others would doubtlessly rush forward to take their place. Où va-t-on à partir de maintenant?

This is in some small part the actual state of affairs for many victims of rogue federal officers and contractors at the moment. It is a whole world invisible to the ordinary citizen. As explained earlier, there is no insistence that anything discussed here be accepted by readers who are unfaniliar with it all. Nevertheless, everything presented is true and can be easily substantiated with the cooperation of honest and thoughtful law enforcement officials. (Note: All that is discussed concerning the mistreatment of citizens by rogue federal officers and contractors is based on the author’s personal experience!) One might suppose that for those who may be interested in how surveillance is conducted on the street level in the US, this discussion may prove instructive. It is unlikely lost upon readers that “one” who might desire to penetrate domestic surveillance activities in the US, not too much would be involved with becoming a “contract hire”. Once onboard as a hire, one would potentially have access to details about the daily surveillance activities of some US intelligence service or law enforcement organization, such as what organization was currently tasked with, who exactly is being targeted, where the target is acting, and who the organization’s street “operatives” are. What could be accomplished by “one”, one in a hypothetical case being a foreign intelligence officer or a team of officers and operatives tasked with the mission of infiltrating surveillance activities of a US intelligence service or law enforcement organization, must be left to the imagination. 

One possibility might be the regular successful “collection” of vital information to protect their country’s foreign intelligence operations inside the US. One can only guess how difficult it would be to launch successful counterintelligence operations against a wily foreign intelligence sserviceoperating inside the US when it knows everyday where its opponent’s officers and operatives are and who and what they are looking at. Perhaps something of the kind is already happening on some scaleg. For that reason, for more than a theory, on-going surveillance operations as discussed here, either sanctioned by authorities or wrongful conducted by the rogue federal officers and contractors, should be immediately rolled up, audited, and assayed. Perhaps doing any of that would be too bothersome. (Curiously, the average individual in the US public may not accept that such wrongful behavior by rogue federal officers and contractors occurs, however foreign intelligence services surely have no doubts about what transpires.) Born Jacques Anatole François Thibault, known as Anatole France (April 16, 1844-October 12, 1924) was a French poet, journalist, and novelist. Considered in his day as the ideal French man of letters. He was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature in recognition of his literary achievements. In Le Petit Pierre (1918), ch. XXXIII, he wrote: “De toutes les définitions de l’homme, la plus mauvaise me paraît celle qui en fait un animal raisonnable.” (Of all the ways of defining man, the worst is the one which makes him out to be a rational animal.)

Martin Luther King, Jr. (above). When King was the victim of FBI’s surveillance and harassment under its COINTELPRO operations, he had committed any federal crimes and was not a threat to US national security. He was an innocent US citizen. To that extent, actions taken against him by Intelligence Community organizations once uncovered by the Church Committee were shocking and surprising. In previous times, one might have supposed the understanding, acceptance of what Founding Father’s who authored the US Constitution defined as the unalienable rights of life liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were sacrosanct. However, one might be able to comfortably conclude today that far less importance is given to those rights upon which the country’s soul and existence was once firmly rooted and upon which the US public’s expectation and requirement for the good governance of the democracy has its foundation. What seemed so certain about the once lauded strictures–as a sampling, the Bill of Rights, the first 10 amendmens of the US Constitution–that would guide the country perpetually, is far less sure today. There are laws, but very often justice for the people is much harder to find. Breaches of regulations of the US Intelligence Community against ordinary citizen, not responsible for any wrongdoing, must not only be examined but vigorously pursued.

Seared in the minds of the authors of the US Constitution, the Founding Fathers, were the extraordinary sacrifices made by thousands of Colonists before and during the Revolution. Attendant to that were acts of tyranny leveled upon colonists by authorities in the Kingdom of Great Britain. There was usually much suffering dealt by the British Army to the rebellious in territory controlled by the British Empire. Methods used by the professionals of the British Army for the purpose of assuring the Kingdom’s grip on the Empire’s many lands overseas were tried and true. Given the that, the victory of the American Colonists, with assistance from France, was spectacular and almost supernatural. The tyranny resulting from the imposition of coercive power by the Kingdom of Great Britain was a manifestation of what was intrinsic in mankind: the desire to control others for self-interest. The despotic intrusion of ones will upon another compelled in some. The Bill of Rights, the initial 10 Amendments of the US Constitution are in part responses of the Founding Fathers. to egregious injustices under which Colonists suffered much of which was intended to break any sense of unity among them.

It is greatcharlie’s firm belief that few in the US public–indeed, relative to the size of the population and to include officers of the court–are aware of the contents of the Bill of Rights and their meaning. There is the real possibility that many in the US may have no interest at all in the matter. Rather than simply utter the term, Bill of Rights, which for many may amount to empty words, greatcharlie offers the concisely authored first 10 amendments of the Constitution passed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified on December 15, 1791.

The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”

The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”

The Third Amendment states: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”

The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

The Fifth Amendment states: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

The Sixth Amendment states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”

The Seventh Amendment states: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”

The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed ttho deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

It must be noted that under the Fourteenth Amendment, which concerns civil rights–as well as Senators, Representatives, and the public debt, citizens in the US, born or naturalized, and other individuals living in the US are entitled to equal protection under the law of the US and the State in which they reside and no person shall be. deprived life, liberty, or property, without due process of law under either jurisdiction.

Two centuries after the Bill of Rights were ratified, power can still corrupt. In the country the Founding Fathers constructed, led by a government formed of the people, for the people, and by the people, the aforementioned intrinsic negative impulses in mankind could nevertheless manifest within those who were members of the citizenry themselves. Despite swearing to an oath to support, protect, and defend the US Constitution and the solemn compact between government and the people, various episodes of corruption have taken their place in the country’s history.

Sojourner Truth was a 19th century African-American abolitionist and activist for civil rights, women’s rights, and alcohol temperance. Truth was born into slavery in Swartekill, New York, but escaped with her infant daughter to freedom in 1826. Sojourner Truth is known for saying “The truth is powerful and will prevail.” The truth will “prevail.” That is as may be. However, without some preconcerted, energetic effort to make certain the truth is heard, understood, and accepted by all who are reasonable and rational, it will unlikely have an impression and be unappreciated. Only a precious few open-minded individuals, following the law and holding firm to their beliefs, spiritual or philosophical, will hold firm to the truth.

Reportedly, the writer, professor, political activist, Nobel laureate, and Holocaust survivor, Eli Weisel, once explained God created man because He loves stories: Weisel would cite the Chasidic tale of the Baal Shem Tov. Accordingly, when misfortune threatened his community, Tov would venture into a certain part of the forest to meditate. There he would light a fire and say a special prayer. In consequence, misfortune would be averted miraculously. During a later time of peril, a despondent Rabbi Israel of Rizhyn addressed God as follows: “I am unable to light the fire. I do not know the prayer; I cannot even find the place in the forest. All I can do is to tell the story: this must be sufficient.” It did suffice, and God saved His People. Dum spiro spero. (While I breathe, I hope.)

By Mark Edmond Clark

The Continued Ascent of Dong Jingwei: After  Succeeding at MSS, His Sights Are Now Set on Opponents in Hong Kong

Dong Jingwei (above). Without a doubt, Hong Kong and its future are issues of great concern for People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping and the Party leadership in general. Likely to Xi’s satisfaction, Dong Jingwei is now in firm control of issues concerning protests and conspiracy against the regime and foreign sponsored efforts to orchestrate and sustain resistance in the city. Having pondered Dong’s posting and its responsibilities, greatcharlie has sought in this essay to dive a bit deeper into Dong’s background to better understand him and to meditate on his likely plans to get a handle on Hong Kong. Interestingly, in the photo image above provided by the Guangxi People’s Congress, conspicuously displayed on center of Dong’s jacket (above) is his official name tag. Readers may note, Dong is the only attendee visible in the photo that displayed both a table placard and a name tag to identify himself. While he apparently saw the need for “maximum” identification to assure recognition, Dong at the time of a photo served in the fairly well-known and powerful positions of Vice Minister of the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence.

On July 18, 2023, the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced Dong Jingwei was appointed as the central government’s commissioner for the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Dong succeeded Zheng Yanxiong was appointed director of the Liaison Office of the of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in January 2023. The Office for Safeguarding National Security was established in 2020 just months after China imposed a national security law in the wake of extended pro-democracy and anti-People’s Republic of China government protests that began in 2019. Protests were attended reportedly by as many as half a million people, In 2022, a HK$508 million ($65 million) headquarters building was constructed in Hong Kong for the organization. Zheng was the first director and.a founding member of Dong’s new office. John Lee Ka-chiu was installed as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on July 1, 2022. Upon the announcement of Dong’s appointment, Lee welcomed him in a statement saying Hong Kong “will continue to work and communicate closely” with the Office for Safeguarding National Security as it seeks to fully implement the 2020 law.

Concerning the 2020 national security law, following the Hong Kong protests from 2019 to 2020, the People’s Republic of China imposed it to enable the prosecution of four major crimes, stamping out dissent. Zheng, at that time, pursued dissenters with vigor and was consequently sanctioned by the US for his activities. Of equal concern was the need to eliminate external influences in the form of foreign intelligence services. Beijing reported with conviction that they were entangled in Hong Kong’s protest activities,  providing both funding and direction to pro-democracy and anti-government activists. His extensive background at Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Guójiā Ānquán Bù (Ministry for State Security of the People’s Republic of China) or the MSS and working alongside Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Gōng’ānbù (the Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China) or MPS, in part gave Dong a leg up for selection to the commissioner’s job.  MSS is essentially the People’s Republic of China’s equivalent to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and is responsible for foreign intelligence worldwide and counterintelligence both abroad and at home. MSS counterintelligence is directly aimed at the infiltration of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services and the neutralization of their operations. MPS is a sort of dual law enforcement and intelligence service under the State Council in charge of the country’s internal and political security and domestic intelligence. MSS and MPS share the counterintelligence mission for the People’s Republic of China. As national security bureaucracies, both organizations are organized under the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, but both have settled lines to the highest realms of power into the Party. Very likely, it was Dong’s successes against foreign intelligence networks and operatives on the mainland in particular as the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence that also caused him to stand out of the best choice.

Interestingly, official sources on Dong’s appointment were especially frugal with their information about his intelligence background, never mentioning his very accomplished previous post as the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence. At the time of the announcement of Dong’s appointment, a representative for the Hong Kong government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Dong’s appointment, including his past experiences at MSS. The China Daily only went as far to state Dong was the director of the political department of the MSS from 2017 to 2018, according to a resume published on the website of the China Law Society, of which he is vice president. It added the he previously served as director of the Hebei Provincial Department of State Security from 2006 to 2017. Omne ignotem pro magnifico. (Everything unknown is magnificent.) 

Without a doubt, Hong Kong and its future are issues of great concern for People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Secretary Xi Jinping and the Communist Party of China’s leadership in general. To what is likely Xi’s satisfaction, Dong is now handling of issues in the city concerning protests and conspiracy against the regime and foreign sponsored efforts to orchestrate and sustain such resistance. In this essay, greatcharlie has sought in this essay to dive a bit deeper into Dong’s background, to include apparent safeguards taken for his security and what may have been external efforts against him, and what he may have in mind for quelling the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China’s opponents’ in Hong Kong. Thoughts are offered not only on decisions he has likely made but also on decisions he may likely make in the immediate future to shape events. Dong may have reason to believe the national security situation in Hong Kong may soon turn considerably in the Communist Party of China’s favor. This essay is relatively brief and could hardly have squeezed issues dry so to speak and put one in the full picture of regarding Dong’s thinking. However, the hope is that greatcharlie’s ideas and insights may lead readers, hopefully to include some practitioners in the field of foreign and national security policy analysis and decisionmaking, to develop new lines of thought on how to proceed concerning this pressing issue. Luce sunt clariora tua concilia omnia. (All your advice is clearer than the light.)

Before July 2021, this photo image of Dong Jingwei (above) was accepted by greatcharlie as authentic. As with all other elements of the intelligence industry, counterintelligence work requires wisdom, reason, and logic to be performed well. It is not the nature of intelligence services to regularly use force and aggression to halt an opponent, shut down its networks, thwart its operations, and intercept its intelligence officers, operatives, and informants. The intellect is the tool used for doing so. Dong is a man who has a deep understanding of how people tick, how they fit in and feel where they live and work, and how they can get the ones they have targeted tangled up in their respective espionage enterprises. In attempting to ascribe certain traits to Dong given his role at MSS, those considered by greatcharlie may appear to be mere abstractions. However, among the few traits listed should be a reliable intuition, further honed when at MSS he coped with challenges posed by foreign opponents. It may have enabled Dong to perceive likely thinking, decision making, planned approaches, and actions of managers within the intelligence services of opponents.

Things To Know about Dong

As reported by greatcharlie in its June 30, 2021 post entitled, “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”, Dong was born on November 18, 1965. At the time of this writing, he is 59 years old. In the People’s Republic of China, it would be of some significance to note that he is of Han nationality. As for his studies, he earned a master of science degree. The only publicly reported member of Dong’s family is his daughter, Yang–also known as Dong HuaHua on social media, She is the ex-wife of Jiang Fan, who at the time was an Alibaba executive, heading the company’s e-commerce platforms, Tmall and Taobao.

Suffice it to say Dong is a member of the Communist Party of China. Highlights of his career include service as the Secretary of the Party Committee and Director of the State Security Department of Hebei Province from 2006 to 2017. He served as Director of the Pokitical Department of the Ministry of State Security from 2017 to 2018. He eventually became a Member of the Party Committee and Vice Minister of the Ministry of State Security and the Chief of MSS Counterintelligence. It was noted in the July 24, 2015 edition of Intelligence Online that Dong’s direction of the State Security Department in Guo’anbu in the Hebei Province was significant for him as that province has reportedly produced many of Xi’s “securocrats.” Loyalty to superiors, age, and regional background apparently put him in good standing with senior party officials under Xi. One could probably safely mention reliability and discretion. By 2015, Dong reportedly became part of the “Xi Jinping Clique”, one of the main political factions within the Communist Party of China. By 2018, Dong was close to Xi. Other important Communist Party of China titles and accolades provided to Dong include: Representative of the 18th and 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China; and, Member of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

Further concerning the MSS, as briefly noted earlier, it is an intelligence service responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security as well. To go a bit deeper, its impact stems mainly from providing consumers in Beijing to include the Communist Party of China leadership, the Party’s key organs responsible for foreign and national security policy, and ministers and senior executives of appropriate ministries and organizations of the State Council, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with data that may shape their foreign and national security policy decisions. The People’s Republic of China’s intelligence services and law enforcement organizations have had considerable success in destroying the networks and intercepting the intelligence officers and operatives of foreign intelligence services operating in their country. Dong surely would had a considerable role in the interception and neutralization of those foreign an local actors. Whatever may have been put in place to ensure those foreign intelligence services networks would not be rejuvenated or replaced in some form has successfully mitigated such efforts. Dong surely had a considerable role in creating such a defense to foreign opponents aims and efforts as well. It would stand to reason that whatever Dong organized while at MSS to hold back the People’s Republic of China’s opponents surely could have been recognized by results as being strong enough, sustainable enough, to allow him to advance to his new position in Hong Kong.

Very likely from the view of the Communist Party of China’s leadership, Dong was much deserving of promotion and greater authority, and should not be held down indefinitely in the MSS as counterintelligence chief. Such has not been an obvious choice for national authorities in many countries to make about an individuals such as Dong. In foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in many countries, individuals such as Dong have been kept in place when they have exhibited great skill and seemingly unique capabilities in their jobs. For instance, Alexander Bortnikov has stood as Director of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB since 2008. During the Cold War, CIA executive, James Angleton held his position as chief of counterintelligence from 1954 to 1975. Further, in the broader sense of counterintelligence as being a element of law enforcement, J. Edgar Hoover led the US Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1924 until 1972.

Dong achieved great success at MSS primarily under the leadersip of its director, Chen Winqing. Apparently, they had an good working relationship  Dong assured for Chen Winqing that MSS would have solid one-two punch against opponents via foreign espionage and counterintelligence. However, through a decision made at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, on October 28, 2022, Chen Winqing was named Party Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, overseeing national security and intelligence. He was additionally made a member of the Communist Party of China’s 24-member Politburo. On October 30, 2022, Chen Yixin was officially appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress as his successor at MSS.

The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission is the Communist Party of China’s highest security body and oversees all legal enforcement agencies, including the police force. As it concerned his preceding service at MSS with Dong at his side, Chen Winqing’s 2022 appointment more importantly placed him in charge of the People’s Republic of China’s national security and intelligence systems. It was only a few months later did Dong receive his opportunity to advance to the national security position in Hong Kong.

It is unclear why Dong did not simply receive to the top job as Minister of the MSS. However, it seems having Dong simply replace Chen Winqing was not likely viewed as the answer at any point. It was likely accepted by decisionmakers that it would be best to promote Dong to a duty of great importance and requiring immediate results that few could handle successfully. The position would require him to immerse himself on critical, exigent, and defined issues and not “just manage” MSS with its broad purview, although he most likely could have performed the top job there well, too. To that extent, Communist Party of China authorities, to include his former chief, Chen Winqing, obviously felt the best choice was to appoint a counterintelligence manager, a spymaster, a blood hound for a spycatcher as Dong to Hong Kong.

Notably, Dong’s appointment was confirmed only after a revamping of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office (HKMAO). The HKMAO is an administrative organization  of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the The State Council of the People’s Republic of China. Dong’s organization with its security role sits under the HKMAO.

This photo image of Dong Jingwei (above) was posted on Wikipedia website at the time greatcharlie wrote its June 2021 essay about his alleged defection. It has since been removed. The public in the People’s Republic of China and the world will never get to see a true photo image of Dong. Perchance the fact that there are discrepancies in those photo images leaves room open for the supposition that the latest official image popularly displayed in the local newsmedia in Hong Kong and beyond may indicate a desire by Beijing authorities or by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to furnish a false clue as to the spymaster’s true identity. For whatever reason, the use of varied photo images may be a national security requirement set for Dong by Chen Winqing and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. It also ostensibly gives the impression that in official foreign and national security policy circles in Beijing and Hong Kong, and particularly in the Communist Party of China, that Dong holds a place of importance to them which surpasses that of any ordinary civil servant posted to the region. To gnaw just a bit further, the use of alternative images of Dong may tindicate the use of decoys is a more commonly used practice by the People’s Republic of China’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services than anyone outside of the country might have imagined. Surely, the sense of security the practice may create perhaps brings comfort to those who would otherwise be under the chronic stress caused by adversaries attempts to surveil and monitor their activities by a variety of means. Mentioned in theis essay in the use of an alias by Sun Qingye, one of Dong’s senior deputies in Hong Kong.

The Photo Image Discrepancy

As the two images have far more similar features of the official than dissimilar, one could very easily understand how it might present a challenge for many to distinguish between their facial features of the individuals in the photographs. Yet, both photographs, in reality, display enough distinct aspects to allow one to discern fairly significant differences between them. To support greatcharlie’s discussion on the discrepancies in the two popular photo images of Dong, two are used, and discussed  briefly within captions of this post. The discrepancies in the two photo images was covered in somewhat ample detail in greatcharlie’s July 15, 2021 post entitled, “”Commentary: Will the Real Dong Jingwei Please Stand Up?: Comparing Features of Popular Images of People’s Republic of China’s MSS Vice Minister”. However, it is not greatcharlie’s intention to re-visit the discussion on the issue of the variance in Dong’s images here

There remains the real possibility that both photographs exist to completely deceive observers, and Dong’s true image is not present in either of them. If that is the case, then in the possible effort to conceal his identity, Dong has done the thing completely. The two photographs focused upon here will continue to be published perhaps until another plausible image, or perchance another two or more, of Dong surface at some time and via some source of Beijing’s choosing.

As the two images have far more similar features than dissimilar, one could very easily understand how it might present a challenge for many to distinguish between their facial features of the individuals in the photographs. Yet, both photographs, in reality, display enough distinct aspects to allow one to discern fairly significant differences between them. Of the two different photo images, one may actually be Dong.

Suffice it to say as discussed in some greater detail in greatcharlie’s July 15, 2021 post, the idea of a director, senior executive, or key operations manager of an intelligence service taking steps to conceal his or her identity would not be unique in the annals of secret intelligence. Turning to a handful of examples, in greatcharlie’s November 13, 2019 post entitled, “Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997),” it was explained that Markus Wolf, chief of the foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA of the erstwhile Deutsch Demokratische Republik (German Democratic Republic) or GDR, lived a life in relative obscurity, brilliantly concealing his presence and the footprint of his organization as both operated against the West. His memoir’s title, Man without a Face, was a direct reference to the fact that at one point, Western intelligence services only had a blurred photograph of Wolf while he attended the Nuremberg Trials from which elements within the CIA managed to identify him in 1959. Unable to collect an up-to-date photograph from which to identify Wolf afterward, for a long-time he was referred to among Western intelligence services as the “man without a face.” As the story goes, only after a GDR defector, Werner Stiller, identified Wolf in a photograph in 1979 for the counterintelligence element of West Germany’s Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) or BfV did that change. The photograph of Wolf was captured by Säpo, Sweden’s National Security Service, during a visit he made with his wife to Stockholm in 1978.

At the time Stephen Dorril wrote his authoritative book, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (Free Press, 2000), Richard Dearlove, then head of the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service–colloquially known as M16–was virtually unknown. A contemporary photograph was not published in the newsmedia. According to a BBC report, when Stella Rimington in 1992 was named the first female chief of the United Kingdom’s Security Service–known colloquially as MI5–her neighbors finally discovered what she did. Even her children learned of true occupation for the first time. No official photographs accompanied her name at that time. However, later, official photos of her were provided after photographers managed to take what was described as “a very blurry picture of her out shopping.” Petit rusé, petit malin!

Interesting also is the fact that Sun Qingye, a deputy head of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, has a background in MSS. More directly, he served in the China International Cultural Exchange Center. When he assume his post in Hong Kong, in July 2020, Sun used the alias “Sun Winqing”.

The public of the People’s Republic of China and the world may never get to see a true photo image of Dong. Perchance the fact that there are discrepancies in those photo images leaves room open for the supposition that the latest official image popularly displayed in the local newsmedia in Hong Kong and beyond may indicate a desire by Beijing authorities or by the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to furnish a false clue as to the spymaster’s true identity. For whatever reason, the use of varied photo images may be a national security requirement set for Dong by Chen Winqing and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. It also ostensibly gives the impression that in official foreign and national security policy circles in Beijing and Hong Kong, and particularly in the Communist Party of China, that Dong holds a special place for them which surpasses that of any ordinary civil servant posted to the region. To gnaw just a bit further, the use of alternative images of Dong may tindicate the use of decoys is a more commonly used practice by the People’s Republic of China’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence services than anyone outside of the country might have imagined. Surely, the sense of security the practice may create perhaps brings comfort to those who would otherwise be under the chronic stress caused by adversaries attempts to surveil and monitor their activities by a variety of means. Recall the aforementioned note on the use of an alias by Sun Qingye, one of Dong’s senior deputies in Hong Kong.

Admittedly, greatcharlie lacks any information that would allow it to judge which photograph holds Dong’s true image. As promised, greatcharlie has only sought to parse out a few possibilities here. What is presented are simply perceptions based on observations made of less than a handful of photographs. Certainly in China, there are more than a few people in the MSS, MPS, the State Council, and the Communist Party of China who know exactly what Dong looks like and which of the two photographs, if either, depicts him. It may very well be that the causaliy for the use of mixed images of Dong is based on an effort to increase security. However, just as greatcharlie, a nonpracticioner, “amateur sleuthhound”–as one reader sardonically  referred to the editor–has examined two reported images of Dong in photographs, Expert, professional analysts in US intelligence services and those of foreign intelligence services allied with the US have doubtlessly examined all of the photographs available that purportedly include Dong using Artificial Intelligence and other advanced technologies, and have reached to their own conclusions. Thus, despite any possible efforts to conceal Dong’s identity, they likely have a fair idea of how he looks, too!

In the end, Dong’s work product will tell volumes about the individual and indicate his presence. Certainly, even if business as usual to date is the best foreign intelligence services may have offer to retain a handle on Hong Kong, with Dong on the beat, they will have to find answers where currently there may be none to simply maintain their grip, big or small, on the situation.

The Defection Rumor

Rumors of the alleged defection of Dong Jingwei, a vice minister of MSS were the subject of intense discussion worldwide, but especially in the US newsmedia and social media in June 2021. The singular story was previously discussed in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled, “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”. Assuredly, as with its July 15, 2021 post regarding Dong’s photo images, there is no intention by greatcharlie to simply rehash in detail territory that it has well-trampled. The aim is to explore a bit deeper for readers.

Allegedly, Dong fled the People’s Republic of China in February 2021 and handed himself over to US intelligence officials. Dong would have been one of the highest-ranking officers from People’s Republic of China’s Intelligence Community, and the Chinese government in general ever to defect to the US. Yet, alas, the rumored defection never occurred.

As reasoned by greatcharlie in its June 2021 post, the nature of the man or woman who would be able to serve as the chief of MSS counterintelligence, it indicated that is was hard to form a mental picture of Dong and how he of all people could had defected to the US, with his daughter in-tow no less. It is harder to envision who among those with any knowledge of the People’s Republic of China government and the national security apparatus would believe, Dong would ever consider defecting to the US no matter what the circumstances may be within the Communist Party of China or in his personal life. One could imagine Dong would be a deadender, sticking with the Party and his country until the rattle. It is also difficult to imagine what individual, organization, or professional organization gave the rumor its wings. Equally hard is understanding how those who ignited the rumor of Dong’s defection intended to benefit from its formulation and promotion. There was always the possibility–though there are absolutely zero newsmedia reports anywhere that suggested some proceeding mental health episode had befallen him–that Dong hypothetically could have been overwhelmed by some cacoethes. Yet again, the defection never happened.

There may be something to learn concerning how such a bold lie took public form. Among those who reported on the defection, there was general acceptance of the sequence of events. The defection scheme as laid out was indeed mad-capped. Dong allegedly defected in mid-February, flying from Hong Kong to the US with his daughter, Dong Yang. Dong supposedly provided the US government with information about the Wuhan Institute of Virology that allegedly impacted the position of the administration of US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris on the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. According to Han Lianchao, a former People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who defected in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre, Dong’s defection was raised by then Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China Yang Jiechi, and then People’s Republic of China Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the US-China Summit in Anchorage, Alaska in March 2021. On June 16, 2021, Han, citing an anonymous source, alleged that in Anchorage, Yang and Wang demanded that the US return Dong to China, but US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken refused. Subsequent reports, coupled with analyses by China specialists continued as Dong’s precise whereabouts remained unknown. Speculation had even reached Chinese social media threads after Dong had not been seen or photographed for several weeks.

Inferred from the odd choice to promote newsmedia stories of a defection was the potential confusion and chaos that might have been created in the minds of MSS, MPS, and People’s Libération Army’s Intelligence Bureau officers operating in the US and in the confines oF US interests overseas. The implications of such a breach in security would have been enormous. Information mined from such a highly positioned executive and director of MSS through interview, and potentially coercive interrogation, could result in the identification of officers, managers and their operatives, the exposing of netwirks, and collective information on sensitive operations conducted in the past and being performed at the moment

Rather than having a deletorious effect on the psyche of such officers, as well as their operations, the move uncovered the fact that they would hardly shrink at the last. In the worst cases scenario for the People’s Republic of China, Dong would have likely been quickly replaced under such circumstances. They as intelligence officers had accepte# the risk that there could the unexpected, things could go terribly wrong in the field. They had to prepare themselves for before travelling to the US or elsewhere.

Nothing about the tricky step would indicate a path upward to strengthen counterintelligence efforts against the People’s Republic of China’s espionage in the US. The People’s Republic of China’s Intelligence services have been steady in the approach to their work. Conceivably, the dismal failure of the suspected psychological operation would embolden if not the People’s Republic of China, but other foreign intelligence services to take bolder steps the Breach US security and ignite recruitment and espionage operations of audacity and  of an extent never considered in the past elsewhere.

Within the foreign and national security bureaucracies in Beijing, the assessment may likely have been that finding itself bereft of ideas, the choice was made by some foreign intelligence service or counterintelligence service to use a gimmick, a deception, a dangle if any specific response or individual were to be caught in a trap. It was likely assessed that the source was a Western counterintelligence service, perhaps one in Washington. 

As a friendly suggestion from a humble observer, it might be best for foreign counterintelligence services to refrain from engaging in such “poorly calculated” and “poorly calibrated” disinformation operations, if one of them was indeed involved in the Dong Jingwei defection hoax. Such action would appear to have the effect of emboldening People’s Republic of China intelligence officers operating overseas. If foreign counterintelligence services might insist upon adding to the chronicle of wasted time, perhaps one of them could send a large, ultra-high altitude balloon over the People’s Republic of China. Surely, it would mimic Beijing’s own actions throughout January and February of 2023. Still, one could imagine that a balloon as such, blithely passing over the country, would at least garner the attention of, and some discernible reaction from, a few officials of the security services there. (It remains difficult for greatcharlie to understand why the People’s Republic of China’s high-altitude balloons were not colored red if not to represent the Communist Movement then for artistic reasons: “Le Ballon Rouge” (1956). In leaving the balloons colorless, perhaps the aim was once again deception. Ostensibly, they could have been any country’s big balloons.) Einen Vogel haben!

This photo image of Dong Jingwei was posted on Twitter on June 16, 2021 by the US based, Chinese pro-democracy activist, Han Lianchao. In the tweet Han discusses how he came upon a rumor from an associate that Dong had defected to the US. If readers could pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, and not to disparage Han’s efforts, but as the rumor in the tweet was false, perhaps the photo that accompanied the tweet was a false image of Dong, too! In the rather diminutive space of Hong Kong–relative to mainland, Dong may be able to once and for all destroy all inroads made by foreign intelligence services. It will be more than a chess piece battle. Dong’s hope appears to be obviating all future possibilities for funding, providing information, and directing protest actions as the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing suggest were organized in 2019 and 2020. Lessons learned in successfully destroying foreign intelligence networks in mainland China will very likely serve as the basis to develop new and far more effective and  efficient tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods best suited for Hong Kong. Successful work by Dong could potentially improve the chances for the Communist Party of China to bring Hong Kong more peacefully back into its fold earlier than it might have envisioned.

Dong as a Threat to Activists and Foreign Intelligence Service Secreted in Hong Kong

As with all other elements of the intelligence industry, counterintelligence work requires wisdom, reason, and logic to be performed well. It is not the nature of intelligence services to regularly use force and aggression to halt an opponent, shut down its networks, thwart its operations, and intercept its intelligence officers, operatives, and informants. The intellect is the tool used for doing so. Dong is a man who has a deep understanding of how people tick, how they fit in and feel where they live and work, and how they can get the ones they have targeted tangled up in their respective espionage enterprises.

In attempting to ascribe certain traits to Dong given his role at MSS, some considered by greatcharlie may appear to be mere abstractions. Among the traits it feels should be listed is a reliable intuition. His intuition was surely exercised when at MSS he handled challenging problems posed by foreign opponents. It may very well have enabled Dong to perceive likely thinking, decision making, planned approaches, and actions of managers within the intelligence services of opponents. Perchance the same trait likely assisted Dong in successfully navigating to the top rung of the People’s Republic of China’s national security apparatus and to perform well at the side of leaders of the Communist Party of China.

Unt desint vires tamen est laudanda. (Even if it is beyond one’s power, the will [to try] is worthy of praise.) If foreign intelligence services are doing their jobs well in Hong Kong, it is almost assured that intelligence officers, their operatives and informants, covert sites, and clandestine lines of communication are well-ensconced in the city. Certainly from the Communist Party of China’s perspective, all foreign intelligence operations in the city are ready to be cracked. As of this writing, Dong has held his new position for nearly six months. Imaginably, in the initial phase of whatever Dong hopes to do, he and his managers will study the problem afresh ad nauseum and mine through existing information collected until with some assurance he can strike with speed, surprise, and–again from the Communist Party of China’s perspective–in some cases, lethality. He would very likely hope that his first big operation against his opponents would have a strong educational effect on them. However, foreign intelligence services would unlikely leave their operations open to defeat with one decisive blow. After all, they likely learned lessons from their intelligence disasters on the mainland.

On October 1, 2023, on the blog of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Dong expressed a philosophical perspective on what his office’s work would entail. In brief, he stated: “The central government has built a comprehensive legislative and enforcement mechanism for the SAR to safeguard national safety, introducing the law, which had provided a solid security guarantee for the long-term prosperity, and started a new era for one country, two systems.” He proffered that Hong Kong has been transformed from chaos to order and was advancing from stability to prosperity but still faced risks and challenges in maintaining long-term prosperity. To help the city along that path, Dong stated that his office will use Xi’s thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era as guidance. That would include upholding a holistic view of national security to implement one country, two systems. He declared: “[The office] will work with the committee for safeguarding national security of the HKSAR and relevant departments, to deeply implement the national security law in Hong Kong, combat all acts that endanger national security, and safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests of the country.” Expressing a holistic view, Dong said that he hoped various sectors of Hong Kong could support the work, strengthen the awareness, and “jointly build a solid dam” of safeguarding national security, to “promote a greater role for Hong Kong in building a great country and rejuvenation of the nation.”

However, before October 2023, Dong spoke more plainly about the counterintelligence task ahead in his country. At the aforementioned 2021 seminar on a counter-espionage regulation, Dong, then an MSS vice minister, spoke plainly about the counterintelligence task in his country. He explained they must catch spies as well as the funders working behind the scenes who carry out anti-China activities, according to the ministry’s summary of the meeting. Two months later, according to an online report by People’s Republic of China’ Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Dong held a press conference and stated the national security departments had “mobilised all forces in the society for a people’s war against spies.” According to the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission’s website, Dong told reporters, “We insist on catching both the foreign spies as well as the hidden traitors.” He added: “We are determined to adopt powerful approaches in order to resolutely safeguard state sovereignty, security and development interests.”

What Will Dong Do?

In Hong Kong’s very crowded and rather diminutive space–relative to mainland, Dong may have a better chance to once and for all destroy all inroads made by foreign intelligence services there. However, it will be no mean feat and much more than a chess piece battle. Dong’s hopes may be to obviate all future possibilities for foreign intelligence services to fund, providing information to, and direct protest actions. One could infere from statement from the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing that they were convinced foreign intelligence services played a role in organizing the protests in 2019 and 2020. How Hong Kong and Beijing came across such information has never been made clear publicly. No clear and convincing evidence of the presence and interference of foreign intelligence services has been put forth. Perhaps the information was gleaned as a result of interviews and interrogations of both detained and arrested Hong Kong activists. Perhaps one of the overseas stations of the People’s Republic of China”s foreign intelligence services was able to secure information about an opponent’s foreign intelligence operations in Hong Kong. In any event, lessons learned through the successful destruction of foreign intelligence networks in mainland China will very likely serve as the basis to develop new and far more effective and efficient tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods best suited for Hong Kong. Despite the stated desire in Beijing to a policy of one country, two systems, successful work by Dong could potentially improve the chances for the Communist Party of China to bring Hong Kong peacefully into its fold politically.

The whole world watched in 2019 and 2020 via broadcast newsmedia and online sources, thousands of people rushed to the streets of Hong Kong to call for greater freedoms and more autonomy from mainland China. Not just governments but ordinary observers everywhere noticed the protests, commonly known as the Anti-extradition Protests, were well-organized and well-orchestrated. Apparently, Beijing was actually unnerved by the spectacle. Its reaction to it all was quite different from that toward the 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2016 Mong Kok Unrest. As part its legal response, Beijing imposed an overarching national security law in 2020, equally effective in Hong Kong, to punish four major crimes: secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign organizations. The offenses carried sentences up to life in prison. Under the 2020 law, People’s Republic of China security service officers were for the first time allowed to openly operate in the city unbound by local laws. The law also allows for suspects to be extradited to the justice system on the mainland. An estimated 260 people have been arrested and 79 convicted under the law, including dozens of Hong Kong’s most prominent democratic politicians and activists.

Under Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is required to implement its own national security law. Once enacted, law known as Article 23, most likely would prohibit not just four, but rather seven offenses in the city: treason; secession; sedition; subversion against the central government; theft of state secrets; the conduct of political activities by “foreign organizations”; and, the forming of ties between local organizations with foreign organizations. As of this writing, the city’s government is reportedly continuing to develop effective legislative options and will have its own law in 2024. La patience, la persévérance et la perspiration forment une combinaison imbattable pour le succès.

Yet, seemingly foremost in minds of most in Hong Kong at the moment of Dong’s posting to the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region was talk about eight pro-democracy activists who fled abroad to evade national security charges. The story has been extensively covered in local newsmedia reports developed local and to a smaller extent within the international newsmedia. Of such great interest is the story that it shared coverage with Dong’s appointment. In July 2023, the city’s Chief Executive, Lee, pledged a lifetime of police pursuit for the eight fugitives. In support of that pledge, Hong Kong authorities have put a HK$1 million bounty on each of them. 

One might have expected that the flight of the eight fugitives normally would have been a matter best investigated by the city’s main law enforcement organization, Xiānggǎng Jǐngwùchù (the Hong Kong Police Force) or HKPF. HKPF is the primary law enforcement, investigative agency, and uniformed force in the city. Much as MPS officers, HKPF investigators would be authorized to travel outside of the city to track down fugitives as a uniform course of action. Typically, to support those efforts, HKPF would make use of the resources of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and national, provincial, and locally police forces worldwide. For the MPS, a huge benefit of such cooperation as essentially a matter of procedure has been the INTERPOL “Red Notice”. INTERPOL defines a Red Notice as “a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal action. A Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant. The individuals are wanted by the requesting member country, or international tribunal.” However, the “forced repatriation” of the eight fugitives would be handled under standard operating procedure by the HKPF. The “forced repatriation” of the eight fugitives would not be looked upon in a similar way to the cases of thousands who absconded from the People’s Republic of China and were returned under the MPS’s Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Sky Net.

Reading and hearing reports from the local reporters and commentators, it seemed almost certain that interested authorities in Hong Kong and Beijing, in the name of providing justice, would insist that Dong run down the rabbit hole of pursuing the eight fugitives. The case of the eight fugitives indeed achieved such prominence as a national security matter that it rose to a level of importance requiring the “full” attention” of Dong’s new office. Subsequently, a “good number” of its investigators were surely dedicated to the puzzle. (It is the best “figure” greatcharlie can come up with in the abstract.)

Certainly, Dong would have been very satisfied with tracking down the fugitives so early in the game. Their capture would certainly make quite a splash for the newsmedia and a feather in Dong’s cap. He surely will not hesitate to have the national security police detain pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians and journalists under national security law. However, chasing down the eight fugitives who are now essentially smaller actors on the larger stage of foreign inspired and supported activities to destabilize the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region would hardly be a matter upon which Dong would prefer to focus. 

Directly on the matter from his first day, it very likely would have viewed as most important by Dong to study and make strong and ample observations on the pattern of activities, contacts, communications, and external influences, that allowed for the popularized “eight fugitives” to slip away That, as a start, would have assisted him in understanding how it was established and eventually shutting down the network that facilitated their actions and shutting down other networks that were in place. Such work would likely include to use of the latest technology advances in electronic surveillance developed in the People’s Republic of China. Some innovative combined use of existing technologies and manpower may provide a surprising new wrinkle to Dong’s counterintelligence effort in the city. Dimidium facti qui coepit habet. (Half is done when the beginning is done.)

Still, that work would hardly have diverted Dong’s focus on what has been professed as the bigger picture of the activities of foreign intelligence services and their varied contacts in Hong Kong for the past six months. As aforementioned, Dong’s tacitly declared the objective of People’s Republic of China’s counterintelligence efforts is not just to frustrate, seriously inconvenience, or hamper efforts by foreign intelligence service, but rather, to destroy them completely. That is a priority. Utilizing what he may likely uncover from his studies and observations of the activities of pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians, journalists, and other elements, as well as using what the People’s Republic of China”s foreign intelligence services might collect about foreign intelligence operations in Hong Kong from their overseas stations, he would likely develop a strategy to level a decisive blow against his opponents. What would put him on track would be the successful identification of foreign intelligence officers operating in Hong Kong. From that point, he could monitor their efforts to: create clandestine linkages with pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians and journalists; recruit and run operatives and informants in the city; and, develop multiple, sustainable, networks of operatives and informants there. Ostensibly, Dong would look in those particular directions as he would expect foreign intelligence services by tradecraft to take steps in those same directions. Les petits ruisseaux font les grandes rivières.

Dong in uniform (above) while serving in his previous post as Vice Minister for State Security. Dong once declared the objective of People’s Republic of China’s counterintelligence efforts is not just to frustrate, seriously inconvenience, or hamper efforts by foreign intelligence service, but rather, to destroy them completely. That is a priority. Utilizing what he may likely uncover from his studies and observations of the activities of pro-democracy activists, former opposition politicians, journalists, and other elements in Hong Kong, as well as using what the People’s Republic of China”s foreign intelligence services might collect about foreign operations in Hong Kong from their overseas stations, he would likely develop a strategy to level a decisive blow against his opponents.

The Way Forward

Out of academic interest, one might consider in the abstract that rather than being the former fount of acumen and success at MSS counterintelligence, Dong may have merely been the benefactor of the excellent work of bright and capable members of his team. If so, it might account for any decision revealed that he brought members of his MSS counterintelligence team in Beijing with him to Hong Kong. Of course, if he did take a few with him that may not at all have been his reason for doing so. In any event, whether Dong succeeds or suffers shipwreck in Hong Kong will truly tell if he is Communism’s greatest spymaster, albeit post-Cold War. With some hesitancy, greatcharlie is willing to go out on an attenuated thread, likely to the disagreement and dismay of some foreign intelligence services–if its humble opinion is of interest to members of any of them, and state Dong is the real deal!

As it is now likely been the case, managers of foreign intelligence services and counterintelligence services responsible for Hong Kong as well as the People’s Republic of China may now wake up in the morning wondering: “We know Dong has been doing something. What could that  possibly be?” They would want to avoid chasing shadows, but they would want to find out, peering into figurative darkness, if Dong is “getting close.” Putting Dong and his clandestine operations in the spotlight would seem the best way to concentrate resources and talent on thwarting him. However, until enough of his organization’s clandestine counterintelligence steps in Hong Kong are identified and studied, some pattern of its activities in the city takes shape, and its efforts become predictable to a sufficient degree–if any of that ever happens–that task will not be so easy. Sine ira et  studio. (Without animosity, without favoritism.)

The Death of Prigozhin: Whether Nature’s Course or a Heinous Crime, It Closed a Trying Chapter of Putin’s Presidency (Part 2)

Yevgeny Prigozhin (above). On August 23, 2023, the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin and nine other passengers were killed in a jet crash north of Moscow. The crash came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the  Russian Federation Defense Minister Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. A deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it was certainly not enough to prove he ordered albeit a not-so-unique form of execution. As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. There remains be much to understand regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s life. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

This essay should be considered a continuation of the preceding greatcharlie post.

On August 23, 2023, a private Embraer jet flying to St. Petersburg crashed north of Moscow killing all 10 passengers onboard. Onboard was the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin, two other top Wagner Group officials, to include Dmitry Utkin, Prigozhin’s four bodyguards and a crew of three. The crash garnered international attention as it came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However, a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid what all sides feared would be the further “shedding Russian blood.” The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow.

Assuredly, if Prigozhin’s deadly jet crash was not accidental and ordered by the highest authorities in the Russian Federation government, the decision was most likely multifactorial. Many opinions have offered by analysts and experts on the Russian Federation on how Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin benefitted from the action were also offered. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it is certainly not enough to prove he ordered such a not-so-unique form of execution in authoririan regimes, also occasionally witnessed in democracies. Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non pœna, perire. (Death claims all things. It is law, not punishment, to die.)

The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood,by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. The 2023 North Korea–Russia summit between Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jung-un was held in Moscow on September 23, 2023. Putin in his first foreign visit after the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest visited Kyrgyzstan on October 12, 2023. Putin then visited People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Bejing on October 17, 2023. Each event provided ample opportunity to further assess Putin’s words and behavior to construct a firmer understanding of the man and his decisionmaking. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. After all, Putin and Prigozhin, at least for a time, were true friends. That was somewhat evident in Putin’s initial public comments on the crash. In many respects, for Putin, the deadly episode amounted to a private tragedy within what seemed a public conflict. Many details will likely remain kept from both the public and the newsmedia. Still, from what has been been presented to the public, there remains be much to gain regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s presidency. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

Unless there is additional information so newsworthy concerning Prigozhin that it cannot be dismised or avoided, greatcharlie believes this will be it last entry on the passed-on Wagner Group owner. Still, as has been the case with its previous posts, greatcharlie hopes this essay will stimulate among readers, particularly students, new lines of thought, even kernels of ideas on how US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other governments might proceed concerning the Russian Federation. Certainly, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Though, for greatcharlie, it would be satisfying enough to have this commentary simply stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy. Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus omnibus est vitæ; sed famam extendere factis, hoc virtutis opus. (Each one has his appointed day; short and irreparable is the brief life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the work of virtue.

Putin in a pensive mood (above). Part 1 of this essay, the discussion revolved around the dynamics of Prigozhin’s personal and professional relationships with Putin. When Putin met Prigozhin, he was already a relatively successful businessman, energized by connects created by a school chum Boris Spektor. After Putin became the Russian Federation President, he presented Prigozhin with lucrative business opportunities, chances of a lifetime. Prigozhin broke with those initial business partners and struck on his own, working primary via Concord Management and Consulting services. From a successful businessman, Prigozhin moved into realm of the country’s oligarchs. That was a circumstance not too unusual in Putin’s Russia. Between Putin and loyal associates, unique professional opportunities were developed on the basis of the quality of their personal relationships with him. Breaks between Putin and associates would more often be the result of personal differences that cropped up, unpredicted and unacceptable. Often those former associates completely vanished, quietly from the scene in the Russian Federation. There are those in the West who would insist that Putin nothing more than a black hearted snake, unable to have lasting, enjoyable relationships with associates. Equally, they would likely proffer that all of his relationships have been based on their utility for him. In that vein, there had to be some advantage gained or there would be no reason to know someone. The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, when it began, was hardly based on utility.

Putin’s Personal Relationships Versus Professional Relationships: Some Nuance

In Part 1 of this essay, the discussion revolved around the dynamics of Prigozhin’s personal and professional relationships with Putin. An acute example of individuals in the Russian Federation with solely professional relationships with Putin are the oligarchs. Oligarchs managed over the years to amass great wealth and great power and influence within the country to the extent possible under the oversight and control of Putin. Their support of regime and its policies is explicit. A number of those who have failed to meet Putin’s expectations, even to the extent of ostensibly posing a political threat to his regime, have found themselves arrested on charges such as fraud, tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, and embezzlement. Trials of such individuals have been very public. Putin’s professional relationships with the oligarchs may be useful and at times convenient, but hardly friendly. PUtin’s relationship with Prigozhin was personal. When Putin met Prigozhin, he was already a relatively successful businessman, energized by connects created by a school chum Boris Spektor. After Putin became the Russian Federation President, he presented Prigozhin with lucrative business opportunities, chances of a lifetime. Prigozhin broke with those initial business partners and struck on his own, working primary via Concord Management and Consulting services. From a successful businessman, Prigozhin moved into realm of the country oligarchs. That was a circumstance not too unusual in Putin’s Russia. Between Putin and loyal associates, unique professional opportunities were developed on the basis of the quality of their personal relationships with him. Breaks between Putin and associates would more often be the result of personal differences that cropped up, unpredicted and unacceptable. Often those former associates completely vanished, quietly from the public scene in the Russian Federation.

There are those in the West who would insist that Putin nothing more than a black hearted snake, unable to have lasting, enjoyable relationships with associates. Equally, they would likely proffer that all of his relationships have been based on their utility for him. In that vein, there had to be some advantage gained or there would be no reason to know someone. The idea is essentially slander. The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, when it began, was hardly based on utility. By the accounts from the majority of observers to include the independent newsmedia and independent research groups as well as the opposition political parties in the Russian Federation, their friendship grew from initial social contacts tied to Putin’s visits to Prigozhin’s restaurants. 

Many long-term personal relationships that have also had professional links to Putin tended to be low profile and given relatively scant newsmedia coverage in the country. Some Russian Federation analysts and experts might point out is Putin’s long-term relationship with Sergei Roldugin.

Sergei Roldugin has been friends with Putin since the late 1970s  Since In those days, Roldugin has affectionately referred to Putin with the diminutive “Volodya”, and still does so today. Putin met Roldugin via his older brother, Yevgeny, who attended the KGB training with Putin. Allegedly it was Roldugin who introduced Putin to his wife Lyudmila. Putin chose Roldugin as the godfather of his first daughter, Maria, born in 1985. Roldugin is known to be a celebrated cellist based in St Petersburg, but he has also been labeled a businessman. The label has some meaning to the extent that Roldugin is a key figure in the covert efforts “to hide Putin’s fortune.”

Due to his low-key presence, some believe Roldugin has actiually been excused from serving Putin in some way financially. However, investigative journalists in the Russian Federation estimate that nearly $2 billion have moved through accounts in his name. With direct concern to the music arts, Roldugin was allowed to open and operate a “Musical House” in an opulent 19th-century palace in St. Petersburg which was not a mean financial feat.

There is also Putìn’s ex-wife, Lyudmila Putina, now remarried and named Lyudmila Ocheretnaya (hereinafter referred to as Lyudmila). Putin married Lyudmila on July 28, 1983. At the time, she was a flight attendant for the Kaliningrad branch of Aeroflot. The couple had two daughters, Maria, aforementioned,  born in Leningrad on April 28, 1985 in Leningrad, and Katerina born on August 31, 1986 in Dresden, East Germany. After 30 years of marriage, Putin and wife publicly announced their divorce publicly before the Russian Federation newsmedia at the State Kremlin Palace during the intermission of a performance by the Kremlin Ballet.

In January 2016, Lyudmila was remarried to Artur Ocheretny. Reportedly Ocheretny, health and fitness expert, owns luxury real estate in Europe. Presumably with blessing of her ex-husband and his support Lyudmila has generated millions through the Centre for the Development of Inter-personal Communications (CDIC) which she created and supports. CDIC’s offices are located in the center of Moscow, on Vozdvizhenka Street in the building previously known as Volkonsky House. Rents in the building wich amount to about $3–4 million are paid to the company Meridian, which is in turn owned by a company known as Intererservis. Intererservis is wholly owned by Lyudmila. The chairman of CDIC’s management board is Lyudmila’s second husband Ocheretny.

As with Prigozhin, there were business transactions and opportunities earn income involved in the relationships between both Sergei Roldugin and Lyudmila Ocheretnaya that only the Russian Federation President could create. To that extent, the difference between a personal and a professional relationship with Putin might appear nonexistent for many observers. However, it does exist. When Putin makes the choice to ask a favor, a special task, of a friend, he imaginably makes the assessment that he can expect a degree of trust and dependability of that individual. For the friend entreated to assist the Russian Federation President, nothing more would expected than to follow Putin’s instructions to the letter. Any rewards, meager or of great magnitude would be for Putin to decide. Suffice to say the offer of “assistance” from Putin would require close friends to walk out on thin ice. The last thing the wise amount them would want to do is disappoint Putin even by happenstance. In particular, one would not want to act on any wherewithal provided from Putin’s largess behind the Russian Federation President’s back, so to speak The consequences would certainly been severe. Their involvement with his enterprises is something to fear. Whether a friend of Putin can, through their own actions, expiate for his or her betrayal of Putin’s trust is unknown to greatcharlie. Perhaps that has hardly been the case. Prigozhin may have been the rare exception on couple of occasions, likely over matters unrelated to the Wagner Group. However, that can only be supposed in the abstract. One might consider the apposite Act V, scene 4 of William Shakespeare’s play The Two Gentlemen of Verona (1589-1593) in which Valentine discovers his best friend Proteus attempted, unsuccessfully, to curry the affections of his beloved, Sylvia. In response to the outrageous act by Proteus, the much wounded Valentine states: “I am sorry I must never trust thee more, / But count the world a stranger for thy sake. / The private wound is deepest: O time most accurst, / ‘Mongst all foes that a friend should be the worst!.” Remarkably, despite what was said, the two men reconcile at the end of the play after Proteus repents and Valentine forgives him. However, Putin once betrayed has hardly been forgiving.

Prigozhin failed to meet Putin’s expectations with regard to the Wagner Group and possibly Concord. Prigozhin did not object or seem to worry about accepting opportunities he surely had never foreseen or handled before. Not so quietly, he amassed a great degree of wealth. Many other professional relationships did not blossom to the size of Prigozhin’s multi-billion dollar empire. It was perhaps a measure of his friendship with Putin. However, a not so apparent or expected development at the time was a considerable degree of control and power Prigozhin chose to exercise over assets Putin made available to him. In this way, Prigozhin’s handling of money from Putin was indeed quite different than theirs. Prigozhin became exceptionally hands-on at the Wagner Group. Seemingly lost upon him was the reality was that everything came from Putin. As aforementioned, Putin went to some pains to explain that he was the engine behind the Wagner Group as well as Prigozhin’s lucrative Concord. Without Putin, the Wagner Group would never have existed, at least in the robust form that it did by 2023. As for his presence in the newsmedia, Prigozhin had far exceeded what could have been called high-profile. His role had become disastrous within the Wagner Group and for the Russian Federation government. As admitted in previous posts and in the introduction of this essay, Prigozhin was largely in the right when he complained about the inept handling of combat operations and the astronomical loss of Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine. 

Putin tried to mitigate matters by regaining control of the professional aspects of his relationship with Prigozhin as they concerned the Wagner Group. Particularly after the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin insisted more than once that Wagner Group troops sign an oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation and contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Rather than cooperate, Prigozhin rejected the idea of signing oaths and agreement as he did when it was first broached in early June 2023. He publicly expressed his concern he would lose control of “his” organization to the Defense Ministry and especially his nemesis Shoigu. He did not view resting formal control of the Wagner Group to the government as a shift of control to Putin. The friendship between Putin and Prigozhin had surely gone off the rails. There was much on Putin’s plate at the time, but his troublles with Prigozhin were doubtlessly frustrating, worrisome, and angering.

As noted earlier in Part 1, Prigozhin had lost perspective completely. By the end, he was out of control. He was not “acting”, putting on a show, which very well may have been part of the image he publicly presented during the Wagner Group Rebellion as discussed in greatcharlie’s July 1, 2023 post entitled “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)”. Prigozhin was being his true self.

Respecting Boundaries

Cuiusvis est errare, nullius nisi insipientes, in errore perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.) There are limits, boundaries in relationships which should not crossed. Normally, among the mature, those boundaries do not need to be put forth. Often there are those seemingly drawn to violate those boundaries, consciously despite knowing the consequences. Those individuals are poor choices for friends. There also those who may violate those boundaries of friendship unconsciously. (In civilized societies, advanced countries, a consequence for the violation of such boundaries of friendship should not be death. That would be unacceptable behavior, unreasonable, and typically against established law.) One or the other may have been the case with Prigozhin. Month after month, he trampled so aggressively on the vineyard of friend both he and Putin nutured for more than two decades. Assuredly, he placed himself on dangerous ground with his barage of publicized statements.

There were many close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. A number of theories have been suggested by greatcharlie in previous posts, particularly Part 1 of this essay, for Putin’s apparent patience. At least publicly, Putin is a devout Russian Orthodox Catholic. At the core of Putin’s faith is the injunction to forgive. Perhaps something about Prigozhin and few others sparked Putin to act to some degree within the stricture of his faith with regard to forgiveness. Perhaps, as suggested in Part 1, the cause for his forgiving nature at times has been his sense of humor. Yet with Prigozhin, specifically, he appeared to display a level of tolerance that even then too many friendly observers appeared against his own self-interests. It was clear to anyone observing worldwide that while Prigozhin rambled on about the special military operation in Ukraine beginning in 2022, Putin would only hold him at arms length.

Perhaps Putin recognized that Prigozhin was too gravely wounded by what transpired in Ukraine that it was beyond his capacity to regulate his behavior on the matter. While greatcharlie has no training or expertise in identifying or diagnosing mental health issues, from its layman’s eye, it appears to have been some prominent symptom from a form of  post traumatic stress Prigozhin was suffering that was left untreated. It is possible that Putin understood early on that Prigozhin was not fully aware, or could not comprehend, the trying situation in which he had placed the Russian Federation President. Even greatcharlie would assess without equivocation that Prigozhin went too far. Putin could forgive him no more. He could not save him. It is in this vein the Putin’s comments concerning Prigozhin’s mistakes, made the day after the jet crash, take on additional meaning. A few of those mistakes were discussed in Part 1 of this essay.

Indeed, in Part 1, Putin broke his silence on Prigozhin’s jet crash on August 24, 2023 during a meeting with the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, in the Kremlin. If readers can cast their minds back to Putin’s initial remarks, they may recall that Putin stated: “First of all, I want to express my sincere condolences to the families of all the victims, this is always a tragedy.” Putin went on to say: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He described him as “a talented man, a talented businessman.”

Putin intriguingly then added: “He was a man of difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results needed both for himself and when I asked him about it–for a common cause, as in these last months.” There were indeed many mistakes that Prigozhin made while ostensibly assisting Putin. Prigozhin had required but had not always warranted Putin’s forgiveness many times. Putin had forgiven much. To that extent, such is not so apparent as Putin mentioned that Prigozhin always did what he asked him to do. Often, Putin had to hold him at arms length. The list of disappointments is far lengthier than one might imagine as it concerned the failure to optimally serve Putin’s interests. It went far beyond Prigozhin’s ramblings about Ukraine. A small number are listed here.

Surely, Prigozhin was aware that in the Russian Federation or anywhere else in the world, he may have chosen to go, without the protection of Putin, he would have had little chance of survival against a considerable number of adversaries. Doing anything to lose Putin’s protection would have been tantamount to suicide. (Of course, if any had decided to harm Prigozhin while he was under Putin’s protection, nothing could have done to change what may have had occurred. However, certainly Putin would have used available resources to retaliate aggressively.) Still, despite the great meaning Putin’s protection as well as financial support meant for Prigozhin’s survival, he bizarrely proceeded to denigrate Putin’s special military operation, and consequently, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff, and ministers and senior generals leading those organizations.

Prigozhin’s ego not intellect very likely convinced him that his attacks upon Shoigu and Gerasimov and the special military operation following the Wagner Group Rebellion were well-nuanced, laser focusing attention those matters. They were not well-nuanced. They were in greatcharlie’s humble judgment, insultingly obvious. To that extent, Prigozhin could not fathom the degree to which he dangerously undermined his dear friend and dear leader. To consider the matter in even more simplistic terms,, maybe in his mind, all Prigozhin was doing was something akin to taking his toys and leaving Ukraine. However, to Putin, and in fact in reality, the Wagner Group and all that Prigozhin possessed belong to him. One might imagine that in Putin’s mind, the successful and wealthy Prigozhin, a Russian oligarchs, was his creation, his Frankenstein.

In a way, through his last moves on the grand stage and certainly through many of his previous “mistakes” as Putin described his fumbles on the national and international scene, Prigozhin was actually exercising power over the Russian Federation President. He squeezed dry all that energized the bond of friendship between the two men. As these situations sometimes go–based on word of rare survivors, it is possible that when Prigozhin found himself hurtling to the ground in his catastrophically disabled lear jet–if he survived the alleged grenade blast, he may had an epiphany. He may have finally realized that he had gone too far with his public, dysregulated behavior. Rules are rules. Everyone in the Russian Federation at his level knew them with regard behavior toward Putin’s interests and he broke them He broke the rules repeatedly.

Although not directly paralleling the story-line of the erstwhile relationship between Putin and Prigozhin, pertinent conceptually is the plot of Lohengrin a Romantic opera in three acts composed and written in 1848 by Wilhelm Richard Wagner (May 23, 1813 to February 13, 1883). As mentioned previously in Part 1, Wagner  was a German composer, conductor, and ptolemicist, known mainly for his operas. Lohengrin premiered in Weimar, Germany, on August 28, 1850 at the Staatskapelle Weimar under the direction of Franz Liszt, the father-in-law, close friend and early supporter of Wagner. Wagner himself was unable to attend the first performance, having been exiled because of his part in the 1849 May Uprising in Dresden. The story is derived from the Parzival of Wolfram von Eschenbach, a medieval German romance, and its sequel Lohengrin, inspired by the epic of Garin le Loherain. It is part of the Knight of the Swan legend. Set in Antwerp during the first half of the 10th century, the story’s plot revolves around Elsa, the daughter of King Heinrich of the Brabant dynasty. Briefly, in Act I, Elsa has been accused by the evil Ortrud of murdering her own brother, Gottfried, the heir to the dynasty. Ortrud is the wife of Count Telramund, giving her standing to level such an accusation. However, it is revealed that Gottfried was not killed by Elsa but enchanted by Ortrud. When King Heinrich arrives in Antwerp from a journey, he insists upon an explanation for the difficulties that have beset Brabant. Beweeping her outcast state, Elsa dreams of a knight in shining armor who will rescue her. Called to defend herself, she prays and manifests a knight, who arrives in a boat guided by a swan. The knight, Lohengrin, pledges his loyalty to Elsa on the condition that she never questions his name or origin (“Nie sollst du mich befragen, noch Wissens Sorge tragen, woher ich kam der Fahrt, noch wie mein Nam’ und Art!”). Challenged by Telramund, Lohengrin defeats but does not kill him with his sword. Thereby, Elsa’s innocence is established and Lohengrin becomes her defender. In Act II, the malevolent Ortrud and the shamed and banished Telramund conspire to seek revenge. Ortrud tries to sow seeds of doubt in Elsa’s mind, but Elsa responds with innocence and extends friendship to Ortrud. When Lohengrin is named the guardian of Brabant, Telramund in response quietly marshals noblemen to plot against him. In Act III, Elsa and Lohengrin are being wed, but Ortrud and Telramund arrive at the cathedral entrance, seeking to disrupt the wedding. Ortrud alleges that that Lohengrin is an impostor. Telramund accuses him of sorcery. Elsa remains faithful despite the doubts. Afterward, in their bridal chamber, Elsa and Lohengrin express their love, but Elsa’s growing doubts cause her to inquire about her husband’s origins and identity. Suddenly, Telramund and his co-conspirators break in. In the struggle that ensued, Telramund is killed by Lohengrin. Then, returning to Elsa’s inquiry, Lohengrin reveals that his home is the distant temple of the Holy Grail at Monsalvat (“In fernem Land”), that his father is Parsifal, and his name is Lohengrin. Yet, as a result of what has transpired, Lohengrin must return to his sacred home, abandoning Elsa. With prayers, he returns Elsa’s brother, Gottfried, who was actually the swan that led Lohengrin’s boat to human form, and declares him Duke of Brabant. A dove descends from heaven and, taking the place of Gottfried at the head of Lohengrin’s boat and then departs. Ortrud rejoices over Elsa’s betrayal, but meets her demise, sinking into the lake. While calling for her departed husband, Elsa, as Lohengrin forwarned, collapses lifeless, having violated the conditions of his union with her.

Whatever may have actually transpired, much as the aforementioned Lohengrin of Wagner opera sought to protect Elsa from spiritual death, Putin was unable to protect Prigozhin from his indiscretions, from himself. To describe it in a less graceful way,, Prigozhin became a figurative rogue elephant, stomping through the higher realms of Russian Federation foreign and national security policy, trampling on all of working being done by the Kremlin to get a handle on the Ukraine matter.

Prigozhin at Troyekurovskoye cemetary in St. Petersburg in April 2023 (above). Prigozhin was aware that in the Russian Federation or anywhere else in the world, he may have chosen to go, without the protection of Putin, he would have had little chance of survival against a considerable number of adversaries. Doing anything to lose Putin’s protection would have been tantamount to suicide. (Of course, if any had decided to harm Prigozhin while he was under Putin’s protection, nothing could have done to change what may have had occurred. However, certainly Putin would have used available resources to retaliate aggressively.) Still, despite the great meaning Putin’s protection as well as financial support meant for Prigozhin’s survival, he bizarrely proceeded to denigrate Putin’s special military operation, and consequently, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff, and ministers and senior generals leading those organizations. Prigozhin’s ego not intellect very likely convinced him that his attacks upon Shoigu and Gerasimov and the special military operation following the Wagner Group Rebellion were well-nuanced, laser focusing attention those matters. They were not. They were in greatcharlie’s humble judgment, insultingly obvious. To that extent, Prigozhin could not fathom the degree to which he dangerously undermined his dear friend and dear leader. 

Prigozhin’s Denouement

Erat hiems summa. (It was the very depth of winter.) As aforementioned, on the first occasion Putin spoke of Prigozhin’s jet crash, he stated: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He went on to describe him as a “talented businessman” but added that he had “complicated fate.” To many, those remarks were likely perceived at first glance as a small commentary. They may have been easily overlooked. However, the comments were small much as the small movement of the needle of an old style seismogragh would indicate that a great earthquake was occurring. If Putin had anything to do with Prigozhin’s jet crash, taking such a step would hardly have been something he wanted to do. He unlikely would have done anything harsh against him if he thought that he had some alternative. 

Additionally as aforementioned, Putin sought to quell matters by taking control of the professional aspects of his relationship with Prigozhin as they concerned the Wagner Group. The method devised was to have Wagner Group troops sign an oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation and contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, thereby giving his government reigns over organization and giving Prigozhin nothing to complain about. However, the time had passed for anything such as that with him. Other than that tack, the system in the Russian Federation that he spent 25 years to shape provided no alternatives for Prigozhin’s behavior. There could only be one boss.

Putin, being human, is allowed to feel sadness. However, what is churning in his Iinner-self is hardly stuff for public view and consideration. Surely, Putin has a morbid fear of his enemies at home and abroad getting the chance to peek, to gaze within on him. He would likely assess the possibilities of how they could use observations of such to harm him as limitless. Still, there was the crack in his armor, only for a brief moment is his comments on Prigozhin’s jet crash made on August 24, 2023, that spoke volumes about his long-time connection to his former friend.

Of course, Putin has a need to mask any sense in those he directs, those he through force must control, and perhaps those he holds at bay, that he has weaknesses, that he is human. Such that would typically be recognized as virtue in others, would be a liability,, anathema to him, under his circumstances. To that extent, Putin never appears tortured at all about his circumstances. He has never appeared suffocated by decisions that require aggressive act as most national leaders are not so much effected by such.

It may have been decided among the most powerful in Moscow that if Prigozhin had to be “put down”, it would need to be done in a way that would have a sound educational effect on all others whose loyal, even friendship, toward Putin was uncertain. In a CNBC report dated August 24, 2023, former US Navy Admiral James Stavridis, who served as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander from 2009 and 2013, said Prigozhin’s death was a dog whistle to those who dissent from Putin’s absolute rule. He added: “He [Putin] needed to demonstrate who really is running the joint.” Stavridis described the attack as a “public execution.” He went on further to state: “No real surprise here, it’s a marker of how lethal, and how deadly and how unscrupulous Vladimir Putin is.”

The same CNBC report included that statement to MSNBC from Ben Rhodes, a tormer deputy national security adviser in the administration of US President barack Obama, explaining that the attack “was not a mysterious accident.” He continued: “This has all the hallmarks of appearing like a military-style takedown,” Rhodes added that Prigozhin’s fate was eminent following a short-lived mutiny about two months ago.

It would seem that missed by Prigozhin was the possability that he may have been brought back from Moscow by the prearrangement of those who would perform the highly clandestine task of terminating him. As greatcharlie is in the dark regarding the truth of the matter, it supposes in the abstract that Prigozhin was much disturbed by whatever information from Moscow that got him to reportedly rapidly board his private jet to get there. One might presume the subject of the communicate concerned the well-being of the Wagner Group. The matter would likely have been made more grave if it had been the case that he was called to meeting of a very senior political authority. Prigozhin being Prigozhin may have rushed to Moscow to demand a meeting with a senior political authority. So far, no mention has been publicly reported on a meeting set between a very senior political authority and Prigozhin, Whether a meeting was set with a considerably senior political authority or an impromptu was insisted upon by Prigozhin would not have been important in this case. Important would have been getting Prigozhin back to his country. Whatever communication was sent to him in Africa managed to get that ball rolling. Patria est ubicumque est bene. (The homeland is where there is good.) Á peine dans ce cas.

One might imagine that those individuals performing the hypothetical heinous task may have been aware through a flight plan or calculations that Prigozhin would leave Moscow in the direction toward St. Petersburg  Yet, in the end, as alluded to earlier, how the murderous task may have been carried out is not important. The ones who ordered the act and, to an extent, those physically committed the act, and why it was done is of greater significance. As of the time of this writing, it seems unlikely that any urgency or any effort at all is being placed into finding answers on those points is underway in the Russian Federation or in Western capitals. 

Mostly lost in the discussion of Prigozhin’s jet crash was the loss of Dmitry Utkin. In the nascent years of the Wagner Group, he was the face of the organization. The military acumen of the decorated former Spetsnaz officer that served to shape the Wagner Group into a formidable force. Utkin, who seldom spoke publicly and offered no notable opinions about the special military operation in Ukraine or the Russian Federation Defense Ministry–at least nothing negative, nonetheless suffered the same fate of Prigozhin. It may have been a case of guilt by association in the truest sense of the term.

Putin, hand on head, taking a moment to think matters through (above). Behind the scenes in the higher realms of politics and power in the Russian Federation there very well could be individuals actually conspiring against not only Prigozhin but Putin in some silent, convoluted way to to seek revenge. There may have been an effort to sow seeds of doubt in Putin’s mind about Prigozhin,  in response to which for the lonest time possible he reject believeing in Prigozhin’s innocence and went a bit further by extends friendship to him after the Wagner Group Rebellion. The somewhat obvious suggestion might be that Shoigu desperate to rid himself of the annoying Prigozhin, slowly but surely wore away at Putin’s trust in him. This idea was initially hinted at in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1).

 Cui Bono?: Flights of Fancy?

As in Act II of the aforementioned Lohengrin, behind the scenes in the higher realms of politics and power in the Russian Federation, mutatis mutandis, there very well could be individuals much as Ortrud and Telramund who were actually conspiring against not only Prigozhin but Putin in some silent, convoluted way to to seek revenge. There may have been an effort to sow seeds of doubt in Putin’s mind about Prigozhin,  in response to which for the lonest time possible he reject believeing in Prigozhin’s innocence and went a bit further by extends friendship to him after the Wagner Group Rebellion. The somewhat obvious suggestion might be that Shoigu desperate to rid himself of the annoying Prigozhin, slowly but surely wore away at Putin’s trust in him. This idea was hinted at in greatcharlie’s July 31, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)”

In national capitals, Shoigu has been known for his equanimity and sangfroid. He has been described in most accounts by analyst, experts, and newsmedia commentators internally and externally as a discreet and reliable confidant of Putin to the extent one could be. He has managed the Russian Federation Defense Ministry for over a decade. Recognizably, given evidence of the challenges of the special military operation his ministry has faced, he has not proven to be the most qualified one in wartime. As explained in Part 1, Shoigu, much as Prigozhin, never received formal military training. He was appointed to the rank of major general in the National Guard by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin in 1991 toward the end of events associated with the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-proclaimed Gosudárstvenny Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency). Shoigu did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School, the Frunze Military Academy, or the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation. Shoigu spent nearly a decade as the Minister of Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM. In November 2012, Putin appointed Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister.

Prigozhin is not the only one who for whatever reason was moved out of the way of Shoigu as they were ostensibly a hindrance to his efforts to achieve success in Ukraine. General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 was sacked in September 2022 He was deemed ineffective. General Aleksandr Dvornikov was labelled the first senior commander but not the overall commander of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine. He was sacked between July and September 2022. Colonel General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine was sacked in September 2022 due to the lack of progress and significant losses in his area. He died suddenly in 2023. Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in its September 2022 offensive in the east. Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, was removed from his post in February 2023. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.” Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin was replaced by Gerasimov as commander of the Joint Group of Forces in the Special Military Operation zone in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”.  Surovikin became Gerasimov’s deputy commander in the Southern “Grouping”. At the start of the Wagner Rebellion on June 23, 2023, Surovikin was detained by the security services and was reportedly released some time in September 2023. Then of course there was Prigozhin.

Given how many Russian Federation senior military commanders have been sacked by Shoigu with Putin’s blessing of have suddenly died away from the battlefield since the special militsry operation began, one might argue that it is uncertain whether he will emerge the winner in his ostensible struggle to stay top and in good stead and uncertain whether he is simply a survivor weaken severely by endless internal maneuvers. With Prigozhin out of the way, Shoigu was made better able to direct the Wagner Group not around the world–a mission that may be maintained–but in Ukraine in a way that satisfies him. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units and possess exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations. Shoigu will likely take the organization’s troops and use them essentially as infantry formation with no greater tasks than those of basic infantry units.

Left with few or no rivals, for the first time, Shoigu stands exposed. He will unlikely be able future mistakes and failures on others. He made find himself stalling Russian Federation forces or creating great difficulties for them against repeated Ukrainian counteroffensives or rapid defeat. It is unlikely that he along with Gerasimov could completely manipulate Putin, get him to move wildly in a new, unplanned direction. Plainly, they lack the faculty to manipulate him or develop any bold plans. It is nearly assured Putin would reject any inordinate plans and see them straight as the .inept leaders they are. He would either warn them off tactfully, or respond ruthlessly to their potential crass subterfuge.

In the abstract, one might consider the possibility that beyond the forward edge of the political battlefield n the Russian Federation are those who sought to separate Prigozhin from Putin. Such powerful individuals, hiding behind the façade of respectability, have considered what the transition from Putin to a new leader might appear. Their number would doubtlessly be kept small as they would surely want to eliminate the possibility of being detected over inordinate levels of communication. With a silent hand, perhaps they have already begun to shape events hoping to ensure any future transition in leadership would favor their interests. To that extent in this hypothetical situation, Prigozhin loyal to Putin and quite formidable, could have potentially posed a threat in response to any plans and audacious moves that they might make at a given time. He certainly no. onger poses any threat to them Such ideas are purely speculative, but not so fanciful that they are unworthy of some modicum of consideration. This is not meant to suggest or hint that such individuals would have carried out or had a hand in the death of Prigozhin. Rather, through their means to influence others and a few subtle efforts, they may have caused the ball to begin to roll in the right direction.

There is the possibility that the cause of Prigozhin’s death was multifactorial, having, involving, or produced by a compound of hostile elements mentioned here, creating a bizarre murderous, synergistic effect. Perhaps one might speculate that Prigozhin did not really have a chance of living beyond August 23, 2023, the fated point of confluence. 

Whatever may have transpired, it seems Putin was unable to protect Prigozhin from himself. He became a figurative rogue elephant, stomping through the higher realms of Russian Federation foreign and national security policy, trampling on all of the work being done by the Kremlin to get a handle on the Ukraine matter.

Putin (left) meeting with Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov (1st right) and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander (2nd right) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin. Putin’s inner circle, though one man short, generally seems no worse for wear. Dare one say, the entire environment is quite a bit less noisy as a consequence of Prigozhin’s demise. However, efforts to replace Prigozhin and Utkin and rejuvenate what remains of the Wagner Group will likely pose some problems for the immediate future  Efforts by Putin to reinvigorate the organization in some effective form have been public. Readers may cast their minds back to reports that on September 29, 2023, Putin met with a number of former senior commanders of the Wagner Group ostensibly to discuss how “volunteer units” could best utilized in Ukraine. On state television, Putin was shown meeting Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander known by the cognomen, “Sedoi” (Grey Hair) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin. The trick for Putin’s newly appointed leaders would be to put the pieces of Wagner Group back together again to his satisfaction without Prigozhin’s charisma and special touch, and the force of Utkin’s reputation as a fighting leader. Back in June 2023, the Wagner Group’s troop strength was tens of thousands. As aforementioned, it is widely understood in the Russian Federation that since the Wagner Group Rebellion, that many Wagner Group veterans have joined other private military companies and have returned to Ukraine under individual contracts with Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Some of the Wagner fighters have signed up for service with the Russian Army.

The Impact of Prigozhin’s Loss to the Wagner Group Appears Greater than Putin Estimated

Putin’s inner circle, though one man short, generally seems no worse for wear. Dare one say, the entire environment is quite a bit less noisy as a consequence of Prigozhin’s demise. However, efforts to replace Prigozhin and Utkin and rejuvenate what remains of the Wagner Group will likely pose some problems for the immediate future  Efforts by Putin to reinvigorate the organization in some effective form have been public. Readers may cast their minds back to reports that on September 29, 2023, Putin met with a number of former senior commanders of the Wagner Group ostensibly to discuss how “volunteer units” could best utilized in Ukraine. On state television, Putin was shown meeting Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and with Andrei Troshev, a former Wagner Group commander known by the cognomen, “Sedoi” (Grey Hair) on September 28, 2023 in the Kremlin.

Yevkurov, a few months prior to the meeting, had reportedly travelled to several countries where Wagner mercenaries have operated. Troshev, a decorated veteran of Russia’s wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya and a former commander in the SOBR interior ministry rapid reaction force, is from St Petersburg, Putin’s home town. He was awarded Russia’s highest medal, Hero of Russia, in 2016 for the storming of Palmyra in Syria against ISIS militants. Both men were pictured with Putin in the television broadcast.

In the video of the meeting, Putin addresses Troshev stating that they had spoken about how “volunteer units that can perform various combat tasks, above all, of course, in the zone of the special military operation.” He continued: “You yourself have been fighting in such a unit for more than a year,” Putin went further: “You know what it is, how it is done, you know about the issues that need to be resolved in advance so that the combat work goes in the best and most successful way.” Additionally, Putin remarked that he wanted to speak about social support for those involved in the fighting. No comments were heard from Troshev during the broadcast. Following the meeting, Russian Federation Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told the Russian Federation’s RIA news agency that Troshev had become a Russian Federation Defense Ministry official. The publicized Kremlin meeting appeared to signal at that juncture that the Wagner Group would be directed by Troshev and Yevkurov.

The trick for Putin’s newly appointed leaders would be to put the pieces of Wagner Group back together again to his satisfaction without Prigozhin’s charisma and special touch and the force of Utkin’s personality and reputation as a fighting leader. Back in June 2023, the Wagner Group’s troop strength was tens of thousands. As mentioned in Part 1, it is widely understood in the Russian Federation that just before and especially after the Wagner Group Rebellion, many Wagner Group veterans reportedly joined other private military companies and have returned to the fight in Ukraine under individual contracts with Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Some of the Wagner fighters signed up for service with the Russian Army. Sources from the United Kingdom’s military intelligence have explained: “The exact status of the redeploying personnel is unclear, but it is likely individuals have transferred to parts of the official Russian Ministry of Defence forces and other PMCs [private military companies].”

What greatcharlie assessed at the time as an extraordinary turn of event, six days after the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses in June 2023, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.”

Some readers may recall Putin’s rather gracious speech concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion given on June 27, 2023, in which he focused on the future disposition of Wagner Group. He did not indicate at the time that there would be further problems for its members ahead. Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was ostensibly a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

In the minds of the Wagner Group troops, they had already pledged their allegiance to the Russian Federation not only in words but with the shedding of their blood. They watched their Wagner Group comrades die on many battlefields on foreign lands for the Russian Federation. Imaginably, in their minds, they were free and independent fighting men, not longer serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The allegiance of the Wagner Group appeared to be unambiguous to the Kremlin

However, as hinted on in Part 1 of this essay, dealing with Putin often means hearing promises from him that were not sure at all. Putin turned on his promises to merely maintain his trust in the loyalty of Wagner Group troops. Putin made it crystal clear following the death of Prigozhin that he was unwilling to brook further opposition to his will from anyone in the organization.

After August 25, 2023, volunteer fighters working on behalf of the Russian Federation were required to swear an oath to the Russian Federation flag. A decree was signed by Putin on that very day, which was just two days after the death Prigozhin. According to the Kremlin website, the oath applied to groups “contributing to the execution of tasks given to the armed forces”–members of volunteer formations, private military contractors–and territorial defense units. The website went on to state: “Fighters were required to pledge “their loyalty to the Russian Federation . . . strictly follow their commanders and superiors’ orders, and conscientiously fulfill their obligations.” The step was allegedly designed to help in the “forming the spiritual and moral foundations for the defense of the Russian Federation.” Not every volunteer fighter was a Russian Federation citizen, so the oath was a considerable requirement for many. Prigozhin strenuously objected to the idea of a loyalty oath when it was first suggested believeing it would essentially bring about the end of the Wagner Group. When asked about the future of the Wagner Group at the time of the decree was signed, Peskov made the surprising and shocking public statement that: “legally the Wagner private military group does not exist.”

Wagner Group Headquarters in St. Petersburg (above) In the minds of the most Wagner Group troops, they had already pledged their allegiance to the Russian Federation not only in words but with the shedding of their blood. They watched their Wagner Group comrades die on many battlefields on foreign lands for the Russian Federation. Imaginably, in their minds, they were free and independent fighting men, not longer serving in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The allegiance of the Wagner Group appeared to be unambiguous to the Kremlin. Putin promised as much in speeches and meetings with Wagner Group commanders and officials. However, as hinted on in Part 1 of this essay, dealing with Putin often means hearing promises from him that were not sure at all. Putin turned on his promises to merely maintain his trust in the loyalty of Wagner Group troops. Putin made it crystal clear following the death of Prigozhin that he was unwilling to brook further opposition to his will from anyone in the organization. After August 25, 2023, volunteer fighters working on behalf of the Russian Federation were required to swear an oath to the Russian Federation flag. A decree was signed by Putin on that very day, which was just two days after the death Prigozhin. Prigozhin strenuously objected to the idea of a loyalty oath when it was first suggested believeing it would essentially bring about the end of the Wagner Group. When asked about the future of the Wagner Group at the time of the decree was signed by Putin, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov made the surprising and shocking public statement that: “legally the Wagner private military group does not exist.”

The Way Forward

Western Russian Federation analysts and experts and mainstream newsmedia on commentators on foreign affairs have often been frightfully querulous about Putin’s decisions and actions to the point at which some have more occasionally appeared dysregulated. That has had no constructive impact upon their assays on his management of complex issues in which the Russian Federation is involved. In their public the aforementioned assessments, analysts, experts, and commentators typically include observations of him behaving in ways that are abberant. 

The rather dramatic way in which Putin had distanced himself from staffs and guests at the Kremlin during a following the COVID-19 pandemic–it is uncertain whether Putin still engages in this practice–is popularly pushed out by the Western newsmedia as evidence of some unusual, unhealthy shift in his thinking. On this popular point, greatcharlie conversely suggests there is the real possibility that unbeknownst to all but those closest to Putin that he was successfully poisoned recently, and his extremely cautious behavior has been spurred on by such an unpleasant, perhaps life-threatening, episode. If such a hypothesized event occurred in truth, having his most senior advisers, in photographs and videos of meetings in the Kremlin, sit rather naturally though seated somewhat distant from him would surely be more understandable. Certainly, they would be fully understanding and support his need and efforts to show greater vigilance for his personal safety. Yet, returning to Western perspectives, what makes Putin’s behave appear strange can be viewed as enough to go as far as to conclude he cannot be judged as a trustworthy interlocutor and reliable party to any talks.

The relatively efficient functioning of the Russian Federation government is dependent upon Putin’s strong presence, hands-on management, and dynamic leadership. Surely, no one in Putin’s inner circle would feel too comfortable facing the world without him. (Imaginably, some observers in the West might dismissively and facetiously remark that in Putin’s world, they have little choice to do otherwise.) Additonally, if a life-threatening incident actually occurred sometime recently, it might expected that HIS personal security detail–to the extent that anyone might insist Putin do anything–would insist upon dramatic precautions such as the very seating arrangements in Kremlin that the world has observed.

Without pretension, greatcharlie states that it never presumed that the discussion here would offer the degree of clarity or stimulate a degree of lucidity that would allow readers through insights presented to unravel the truth of the mystery of Prigozhin’s jet crash. Perhaps for some it strangely enough has. However, with regard to Putin In many ways, the course of his relationship with Prigozhin holds up a mirror to the nature of his relationships not only within his inner circle, but with the Russian people and with foreign allies and partners

Putin generally seeks to develop personal bonds among national leaders and greater bilateral ties where there at best can be mutual interests and goals from a position of strength. He will be generous as part of his efforts foster relations at those various levels, but holding superior position always remains paramount.  In that course, Putin will emphasize boundaries .Putin has appeared tolerant of their occasional violation, but ultimately he has acted in response of such. An exception to this course would be China with which the Russian Federation only holds a stronger position due to its nuclear arsenal. That could potentially change in the near future but that remains to seen.. The US is not a friend of the Russian Federation. Under the best circumstances, Putin over the years has sought cordial ties, an entente cordiale with it.

As was the case with Prigozhin, after losing Putin’s “trust”, countries seeking to reach some reasonable and sustainable agreement with him on anything should only expect subterfuge and betrayal. Capitals in the West are not ignorant of this reality. Based on all that has been presented to Moscow by the West, it does not appear that any constructive end state is apparent. To that extent, nothing go is reasonably expected. Moreover, what appears uncertain with them is how far things might go with Putin’s behavior. The danger of the situation is compounded by the fact that Putin doubtlessly views the conflict with Ukraine as a conflict between the Russian Federation with the US and its NATO allies. The conflict may be one fought indirectly by the two sides, the Rubicon has been crossed. The die has been cast. As military theorists and planners in the 20th century, many long departed, calculated decades ago, a conflict of this kind could put the East and West on a collision course in a nuclear way.,The best hope to avoid that would having the reasonable take steps right now. However, it would seem the Russian Federation is not being led by wholly reasonable thinkers. Looking back, their choice to invade Ukraine, and carry out military operations in the way they did, was truly counterintuitive.

While many may rebuff and reject what is stated here, greatcharlie remains firm in its belief that the course of relations between the Russian Federation with the US, the rest of the West, eastern powers other than China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that the current vector of policy is toward eventual disaster. The only aspect unknown to all but clairvoyants is the timing of a future conflict. If greatcharlie is in not in error, and the reality of Putin’s attitude and behavior escapes political authorities in the US and its allies following this episode between Putin and Prigozhin discussed here, they are displaying a disregard for their respective countries’ self-interests which is daylight madness. Analysts and forecasters in the foreign and national security bureaucracies in Western countries who find such an outcome too difficult to imagine and would prefer continuing to proffer assessments under which Putin would eventually submits to the will of the US and its allies–pardon greatcharlie’s frankness–are simply whistling in the wind. Only realistic thinking and planning on the matter may bring forth viable solutions if any exist. Solum ut inter ista certum sit nihil esse certi. (In these matters the only certainty is that there is nothing certain.)

The Death of Prigozhin: Whether Nature’s Course or a Heinous Crime, It Closed a Trying Chapter of Putin’s Presidency (Part 1)

Photo and roses laid at St. Petersburg gravestie of Yevgeny Prigozhin during his funeral on August 29, 2023. On August 23, 2023, the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known in the Russian Federation as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin and nine other passengers were killed in a jet crash north of Moscow. The crash came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the  Russian Federation Defense Minister Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. A deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it was certainly not enough to prove he ordered albeit a not-so-unique form of execution. As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. There remains be much to understand regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s life. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior.

On August 23, 2023, a private Embraer jet flying to St. Petersburg crashed north of Moscow killing all ten passengers onboard. Onboard was the owner of ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group), Yevgeny Prigozhin, two other top Wagner Group officials, to include Dmitry Utkin, Prigozhin’s four bodyguards and a crew of three. The crash garnered international attention as it came only two months after the Wagner Group Rebellion in the Russian Federation. For those unfamiliar with that episode, on June 23, 2023, Prigozhin drove elements of his military organization into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing by force the Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Defense Minister) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and ostensibly Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov, from their posts. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However, a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck that caused the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid what all sides feared would be the further “shedding Russian blood.” The Wagner Group, a private military corporation, had fought alongside the Russian Federation Armed Forces since the first day of its special military operation in Ukraine. Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow. 

Assuredly, if Prigozhin’s deadly jet crash was not accidental and ordered by the highest authorities in the Russian Federation government, the decision was most likely multifactorial. Many opinions have offered by analysts and experts on the Russian Federation on how Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin benefitted from the action were also offered. If not the evidence itself, the manner in which the air disaster transpired, and a history of reported behavior by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, led many see logic behind the common wisdom that he was involved. Yet, it is certainly not enough to prove he ordered such a not-so-unique form of execution in authoririan regimes, also occasionally witnessed in democracies. Omnia mors poscit. Lex est, non pœna, perire. (Death claims all things. It is law, not punishment, to die.)

The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

As of the time of this writing, many major events have occurred since the Prigozhin’s jet crash. The 2023 North Korea–Russia summit between Putin and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jung-un was held in Moscow on September 23, 2023. Putin in his first foreign visit after the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant for his arrest visited Kyrgyzstan on October 12, 2023. Putin then visited People’s Republic of China President Xi Jinping in Bejing on October 17, 2023. Each event provided ample opportunity to further assess Putin’s words and behavior to construct a firmer understanding of the man and his decisionmaking. Yet, there seems something more unique about the Prigozhin jet crash story. After all, Putin and Prigozhin, at least for a time, were true friends. That was somewhat evident in Putin’s initial public comments on the crash. In many respects, for Putin, the deadly episode amounted to a private tragedy within what seemed a public conflict. Many details will likely remain kept from both the public and the newsmedia. Still, from what has been been presented to the public, there remains be much to gain regarding Prigozhin’s denouement and the closing of another tragic chapter of Putin’s presidency. Examining the facts of this episode, greatcharlie has sought to provide a better picture in particular of the interplay of light and dark forces that guide Putin’s behavior. 

Unless there is additional information so newsworthy concerning Prigozhin that it cannot be dismised or avoided, greatcharlie believes this will be it last entry on the passed-on Wagner Group owner. Still, as has been the case with its previous posts, greatcharlie hopes this essay will stimulate among readers, particularly students, new lines of thought, even kernels of ideas on how US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other governments might proceed concerning the Russian Federation. Certainly, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Though, for greatcharlie, it would be satisfying enough to have this commentary simply stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy. Stat sua cuique dies; breve et irreparabile tempus omnibus est vitæ; sed famam extendere factis, hoc virtutis opus. (Each one has his appointed day; short and irreparable is the brief life of all; but to extend our fame by our deeds, this is the work of virtue.)

Police guard site of crash of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s private jey in the Tver region of the Russia, Feration, August 24, 2023 (above). The media cycle on the untimely death of Prigozhin and senior commanders of his Wagner Group appeared to reach it apogee by the start of September 2023. However, Putin seemingly sought to pry the door to it open. For reasons that are not completely clear, and a timing not easily understood by greatcharlie, on October 5, 2023, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin suggested that the investigation of Russian Federation’s investigative Committee was not barren, and its head reported to him that evidence was found indicating that the jet crash which killed Prigozhin was caused by hand grenades detonating inside the aircraft, not by a missile attack. Although frugal with information immediately following the air disaster and days that followed, the extraordinary and surprising revelations by Putin of additional information garnered during the investigation was provided in a very public setting. Similarly surprising was the fact that Putin also went as far as to make disparaging suggestions about the use of narcotics among passengers on his jet, ignoring Prigozhin’s family’s pain and disregarding the couteousy of displaying respect for the dead. For those interested observers interested in Prigozhin’s demise, the way in which it occurred provided a proper mystery.

The Grenade Gambit

(Beware the man who offers answers when no questions are asked, excuses when their is no apparent misstep or error, an alibi when there is no allegation, or a most apparent contrived defense when there is no accusation, as such virtual confessions often indicate the individual is so tormented by the possible discovery of their own errant or surreptitious behavior to the extent they can only see the world from their own anxiously insecure or unrepentantly deceitful mindset, and perhaps seeks to manipulate what they imagine others likely think.) As aforementioned, on October 5, 2023, meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in the Black Sea resort of Sochi. Putin suggested the jet was blown up from inside, basing his comments on a report he received from the head of Russia’s investigative committee a few days before. Putin stated: “Fragments of hand grenades were found in the bodies of those killed in the crash.” He continued: “There was no external impact on the plane–this is already an established fact.” Putin cut short his comments concerning a grenade or grenades that may have been detonated on board. Yet, in support of the idea of any mishandling of ordinance onboard, Putin stated that he thought investigators remiss in failing to perform alcohol and drug tests on the bodies of those who died in the jet crash. Regarding his reason for that concern, Putin noted that in the past, quantities of cocaine had been found in the Wagner Group’s headquarters in St. Petersburg. With regard to Putin’s comments on any external impact, he was apparently rebuffing assertions made by anonymous US sources just after the jet crash suggesting it had been shot down. Russian Federation officials investigating the jet crash have not reported publicly on the cause as of this writing. Ad calamitatem quilibet rumor valet. (Any rumor is sufficient against calamity (i.e., when a disaster happens, every report confirming it obtains ready credence)

With little else to go on, it is assessed by greatcharlie that concerning the grenade fragments being found, Putin may have actually been presenting the truth. In the abstract, surely, such an explanation is not too far from possible. (Surely “evidence” now exists to fully support the Russian Federation President’s statements. It is hard to imagine who would be so daring in the Russian Federation to challenge Putin’s word on what may have transpired.) What remains unclear is why Putin would publicly express such derogatory information on one who was a prominent member of his retinue for some time. Those willing give Putin the benefit of the doubt might accept his negatuve comments as an odd, yet understandable and natural expression of his anxiety. To that extent, the public exposition may have assisted Putin in exercising the ghosts. Maybe they would proffer that it was an effort by Putin to persuade himself that there was some logic in the senseless, troubling circumstance of Prigozhin’s loss. Anger is a stage of grieving. Born Jacques Anatole François Thibault, known as Anatole France (April 16, 1844-October 12, 1924) was a French poet, journalist, and novelist. Considered in his day as the ideal French man of letters. he won the 1921 Nobel Prize in Literature in recognition of his literary achievements. In Part II, chapter 4, of The Crime of Sylvestre Bonnard (1881), Thibault wrote: Tous les changements, même les plus so ont leur mélancolie, car ce que nous quittons, c’est une partie de nous-mêmes; il faut mourir à une vie pour entrer dans une autre. (All changes, even the most longed for, have their melancholy; for what we leave behind us is a part of ourselves; we must die to one life before we can enter another.)

Under another line of thought, it might be considered that because he is always politically minded, and posturing to present the best picture of himself possible, Putin’s remarks were most likely–doubtlessly–curated, calculated, but mainly so as part of an effort to convince the Russian people that he could not have committed such as heinous act. Indeed, conceivably Putin offered the new facts with the hope of better shaping the Russian people’s conclusions on the incident and opinion of his government. He seems on a quest to create a more favorable image of himself on the matter given so much bad has resulted from his Ukraine enterprise. It is surely an uphill battle. After all, few in the world seemed to doubt that he ordered or members of his regime were complicit in  responsible for the crash of Prigozhin’s jet.

Interestingly enough, if Putin initially believed what he offered in Sochi was logical, he went a long way to make connections that were hardly certain. It would require perhaps too much imagination think senior commanders of the Wagner Group, having traveled together for years without incident, were doing any more than discussing important matters in camera onboard the jet as they made their way in the direction of St. Petersburg. It would require too little imagination to believe Prigozhin’s private jet was nothingless than le bateau iver–the boat of drunks–aboard which passengers werante perhaps in an inebriated state playing “hot potato” with a live grenade and soething went terribly wrong or tempers flared during a heated argument and disregulated party to the exchange well-beyond making a deadly threat, pulled the pin on a grenade. Even that would seem possible if Putin believes the imagination of the Russian people is boundless. Evidently, the passengers had traveled on more than one occasion on similar jets, perhaps the self-same one, without any fatal incidents with ordinance. In any event, Putin apparently does not want to leave the matter for the Russian people to reach their own conclusions on what is true or not.

If in some moment of intense quiet reflection, Putin should conjer any additional insights on the Prigozhin case, one would imagine that he might be less likely to share it publicly it as the story now thoroughly belongs to the past. Quand on ne peut revenir en arrière, on ne doit se préoccuper que de la meilleure façon d’aller de l’avant.

Common Wisdom in the West: The Prigozhin Jet Crash Was a “Mafia Style” Act by Putin

Comparisons with what some in the mainstream Western newsmedia have alleged as Putin’s Mafia act and his behavior as a Mafia Don as often depicted in novels and Hollywood films of the organized crime genre, are too much for greatcharlie to contenance. It acknowledges that it was all most inappropriate given that ten individuals died in a jet crash and not a fictional event. Such thinking is perfectly understandable as nearly everything discussed for mass public consumption is reduced to banal amusement. While this popular explanation of Mafia tactics, technique, procedures, and methods in drawn from the abstract, in most cases, such expertise, expressed with confidence, is drawn from novels and Hollywood films, “The Godfather”, “Goodfellas”, and “The Sopranos.” Then again, perchance some commentators are signalling a desire to reveal even greater information made known to them through unnerving contacts with organized crime groups, but that would be unlikely. Knowing how deadly such organize crime figures can be, they would hardly seek on such a point to reveal confidences of ghastly acts shared with those sadistic individuals.

As of the time of this writing, early October 2023, the return to secondary school–rentrée–is complete. At that level, nothing less could expectedly be heard at the cafeteria tables as students who might have a passing interest in world affairs. Any similar theories of this kind offered by serious analysts, journalists, and newsmedia commentators, could at best be recognized as faulty humor, pretension, or some unfortunate internal response to the cognitive collective imperative rather than investigated facts. Such surmisal could  certainly not be viewed as an informed opinion. It is stated again that there are no publicly reported facts that indicate there was an effort to disable or down Prigozhin’s jet. Even if such existed, there is nothing that would point to Putin as being behind the air tragedy directly or indirectly. There is no proof of orders being issued from Putin or others in the Kremlin. There certainly has been no mea culpa from covert operatives from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the security services, or “contractors”. Furthermore, no offical information released publicly indicates ordinance was detonated onboard the jet.

Putin and Prigozhin as Associates

Wilhelm Richard Wagner (May 23, 1813 to February 13, 1883) was a German composer, conductor, and ptolemicist, known mainly for his operas. He is categorized as part of the 19th century musical movement of nationalism. In his compositions, Wagner would synthesize elements of disciplines such as music, poetry, architecture, painting, and others. Wagner described his inclusive vision in a series of essays published between 1849 and 1852 as the concept of Gesamtkunstwerk, or “total work of art.” Over the years his concept has influenced work in diverse fields to include in some part, intelligence analysis where accepted, in support of the examination of individuals, events, and policy decisionmaking beyond the surface. To that extent, in making use of what it feels is an apropos use–at least a pinch–of the artistic genre of film to conceptualize, greatcharlie takes into consideration the profound remarks of Austrian film director Marie Kreutzer. (It must be noted that no connection at all is implied between the talented and inspiring Kreutzer and Wagner.) As a result researching through history for her films, Kreutzer has stated often, “Every biography is an interpretation of the facts.” Developing a credible character, in the relative in the abstract, she suggests it is paramount to stay true to the personality one reads about than presenting just the facts, not simply ticking historical boxes. Using those available facts and guided by its understanding of the personalities of both Putin and Prigozhin, greatcharlie offers a new analysis, a well-grounded interpretation of their relationship to create pertinent, credible and useful insights, 

The relationship between Putin and Prigozhin began with friendship and cordially, and not at least solely or primarily, a mutual effort to seek respective gain. The two men appreciated each other. During the initial years of his pesidency, Prigozhin was observed often in Putin orbit, but he certainly was not a typical member of his retinue. Prigozhin was neither siloviki, formerly employed in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, nor Chekisty, having a father or grandfather who worked in the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD–an earlier iteration of the security services, famed during World War II and the start of the Cold War–as Putin is. (Surely, not everyone close to Putin today possess such attributes. As time goes on, that will doubtlessly become more the case.) Quite the opposite of possessing security service background, in the 1980s and bit of the 1990s when any of that might have been possible. In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution.  Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad. In 1990, Prigozhin studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

However, from that point, Prigozhin by fate, received the firm support of his family, joining its street food vending business. Having knack for the work he successfully expanded the business and gained some notoriety. From street vending, Prigozhin entered the established food service industry. Next, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. In that realm, he linked up with a school chum, Boris Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St. Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by the Russian Federation independent news source, Novaya Gazeta, that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good acquaintance. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story. In 1997, Prigozhin and a business partner, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city. In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000 when the newly minted Russian Federation President brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003.

In those initial halcion years of their burgeoning friendship, Prigozhin been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand Putin’s thinking and feelings. Beyond just liking Prigozhin, Putin displayed his feelings for his friend before everyone. The Russian Federation independent newsmedia source Meduza reported Putin welcomed Prigozhin as “one of the boys.” The five-act grand opera composed originally in French by Giuseppe Verdi “Don Carlos” is based on the dramatic play Don Karlos, Infant von Spanien (Don Carlos, Infante of Spain) by Friedrich Schiller. Verdi additionally borrowed portions of Eugène Cormon’s 1846 play Philippe II, Roi d’Espagne. In Act I, Carlos’ dear friend Rodrigue, Marquis of Posa, who has just arrived from the oppressed land of Flanders, enters. The two greet each other joyfully with the aria: “J’étais en Flandres”. Posa asks for Carlos’ aid on behalf of the suffering people there. Carlos reveals that he loves his stepmother. Posa is first shocked, but then sympathetic. He encourages Carlos to leave Spain and go to Flanders, and to forget his pain by focusing on political activity there. The two men through a tenor/baritone duet swear eternal friendship in French titled, “Dieu, tu semas dans nos âmes”, and in Italian titled, “Dio, che nell’alma infondere”. The lyrics of the duet in Italian are: “Dieu, qui de nos coeurs sincères / As fait les coeurs de deux frères, / Accepte notre serment! / Nous mourrons en nous aimant! / Ah! Dieu, tu semas dans nos âmes, etc” (“God, who of our sincere hearts / has made the hearts of two brothers, / receive our vow! / We will die loving each other! / Ah! God, you scattered in our souls, etc.”)

A reasonable assessment by experts or an informed guess by any keen observer before the special military operation began in 2022 would have been that Prigozhin would unlikely be separated from Putin anytime too soon. Having observed Prigozhin closely during their earliest interactions, Putin obviously concluded that he could well-serve his needs. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. They were opportunities of a lifetime. Bien mal acquis ne profite jamais.

Putin (center) visits Prigozhin (right) at a Concord Management and Consulting facility in 2010. In the initial halcion period of their burgeoning friendship in the early 2000s, Prigozhin been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand Putin’s thinking and feelings. Beyond just liking Prigozhin, Putin displayed his feelings for his friend before everyone. The Russian Federation newsmedia source Meduza reported Putin welcomed Prigozhin as “one of the boys.” A reasonable assessment by experts or an informed guess by any keen observer before the special military operation began in 2022 would have been that Prigozhin would unlikely be separated from Putin anytime too soon. Having observed Prigozhin closely during their earliest interactions, Putin obviously concluded that he could well-serve his needs. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. They were opportunities of a lifetime.

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. Сonсord received multiple contracts under that program. Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin was linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry were alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. It has been suggested that Prigozhin was advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, was a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. 

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera–the Wagner Group. Although private military companies were not permitted under law in the Russian Federation at the time, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Concerning the special military operation in Ukraine or any matter in which both men’s interests were concerned, Prigozhin never publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He hHd always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with recent events most firmly in mind. Yet, as aforementioned, Prigozhin, became greatly frustrated over the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces during the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). On June 23, 2023, however, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Shoigu and Gerasimov of poorly conducting by then a 16-month-long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. Prigozhin then set off with elements of the Wagner Group to attack the Defense Minister in Moscow.

Prigozhin should have been savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. Putin showed considerable regard for Prigozhin but even greater regard for Shoigu both professionally and privately for a longer time. Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements.

It might have been plausible enough for Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically in advance of committing his Wagner Group troops to ensure that he and his unit commanders would play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities would be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. His démarche might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed on the ground, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. Apparently nothing of  the kind happened.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigohzin likely knew that Putin really did not need at any point during the flailing special military operation was an extra problem that from one angle might boil down to him, at least initially, as mere in-house bickering between two close associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin was someone seemingly well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin was always the priority. What Putin thought was of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. There can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin greatly concerned himself with the trying times Putin had been facing following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. Going out on a limb, greatcharlie states that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever intentionally acted in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life. That being stated, he was not always on target when it came to understanding Putin’s perspective. It appears that the more complex a situation was, the less effective Prigozhin’s “foresight” and “intuition” became. It seems something went terribly wrong around the time of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Le bon critique est celui qui raconte les aventures de son âme au milieu des chefs-d’œuvre. Ernst Julius Günther Röhm (November 28, 1887-July 1, 1934) was a close friend and early ally of Adolf Hitler, A former military officer and senior member of the Röhm co-founded and led the Sturmabteilung (SA), thel paramilitary wing of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei  (National Socialist German Workers’ Party or Nazi Party) , from 1931 to 1934. The SA played a key part in Hitler’s ascension. The are many intriguing parallels, mutatis mutandis, concerning the two relationships between the two national leader and two  paramilitary heads, to the extent that much as Prigozhin fell out with Putin, Rõhm fell out with Hitler. In 1919, Röhm joined the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (German Workers’ Party), the precursor of the Nazi Party formed in 1920, and became a close associate of Adolf Hitler. When he joined the German Workers Party, Röhm had already begun using his military ties to develop paramilitary groups across Germany in service of Hitler. Leading the most prominent group, the SA,  Röhm participated in Hitler’s failed 1925 Munich Beer Hall Putsch aimed at seizing governmental power. Röhm was arrested but received a suspended prison sentence. Afterward Röhm became a Reichstag deputy, but broke with Hitler in 1925 over the future direction of the Nazi Party. Resigning from all positions Rõhm traveled to Bolivia to serve as an advisor to the Bolivian Army. However, at Hitler’s insistence, Röhm returned to Germany in 1930 and was officially appointed Chief of Staff of the SA in 1931. The organization then numbering over a million members, waa reorganized by Röhm. Its mission remained the same, engaging in campaigns of political violence against Communists, rival political parties, Jewish communities, and other groups. Despite praise from the party for his efforts with the SA, as public knowledge of his homosexuality gradually increased via the newsmedia, opposition to Röhm grew. Note that there was no issue with regard to homosexuality–essentially a crime in the Russian Federation–concerning Prigozhin. Yet, what has surfaced is an issue concerning him and narcotics abuse. Röhm maintained Hitler’s trust to the extent that once Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933, he made Röhm Reichsleiter, the second highest political rank in the Nazi Party, and appointed him to the Reich Cabinet as a Reichsminister without portfolio. However, more problems arose from Röhm. In the years 1933 and 1934 when the Nazi government was consolidating it power,  Röhm engaged in noisy rhetoric, calling for a “second revolution” that would transform german society that worried Hitler’s industrial allies. Further, Röhm  continually demanded more power for the SA. The Reichswehr (German Armed Forces) saw the SA as a growing threat to its position. Hitler eventually saw his long-time friend as a threat to everything he was building and a potential political rival. Under Hitler’s orders, Reichfuhrer-SS Heinrich Himmler and the Deputy Reichfuhrer-SS and Director of Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo) Reinhard Heydrich purged the entire SA leadership during the infamous Night of the Long Knives on June  30,1934. Röhm was reportedly executed in a Munich prison on July 1, 1934

Prigozhin’s Mistakes

Putin broke his silence on Prigozhin’s jet crash on August 24, 2023 during a meeting with the head of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, Denis Pushilin, in the Kremlin. If readers can cast their minds back to Putin’s initial remarks, they may recall that Putin stated: “First of all, I want to express my sincere condolences to the families of all the victims, this is always a tragedy.” Putin went on to say: “I’ve known Prigozhin for a long time, since the early ’90′s.” He described him as “a talented man, a talented businessman.” Most relevant, Putin intriguingly added: “He was a man of difficult fate, and he made serious mistakes in life, and he achieved the results needed both for himself and when I asked him about it–for a common cause, as in these last months.” There were indeed many mistakes that Prigozhin made while ostensibly assisting Putin. Prigozhin had required but had not always warranted Putin’s forgiveness many times. Putin had forgiven much. To that extent, such is not so apparent as Putin mentioned that Prigozhin always did what he asked him to do. Often, Putin had to hold him at arms length. The list of disappointments is far lengthier than one might imagine as it concerned the failure to optimally serve Putin’s interests. It went far beyond Prigozhin’s ramblings about Ukraine. A small number are listed here.

Food Poisoning of Schoolchildren

As aforementioned, in 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

Fumbled Effort To Interfere with the 2016 US Elections.

By 2016, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. As noted earlier, a portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

In November 2017, Putin surely went to Hanoi G20 Summit within interest in discussing with the new US President, Donald Trump, a variety of issues to include, very important to him, the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (The Magnitsky Law), which had a devastating impact on the ability of oligarchs and other business leaders to operate in the US and alongside US businesses. Yet, as a consequence of the foul-up of Prigozhin’s organization in its effort to impact national elections in the US in 2016, Trump reportedly bombarded Putin with questions about the Russian Federation’s interference in Hanoi. It was to a degree, an embarrassment for Putin. As with other Western newsmedia sources, on November 11, 2017, in Agence France-Presse, it was headlined that Putin and Trump talk Syria, election meddling at their brief meeting. No mention was made of the Magnitsky issue

US President Donald Trump (right) speaks with Putin (left) during a stroll  in Hanoi Vietnam on November 11, 2017. By  2016, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry were alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, was a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 was offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. In November 2017, Putin surely went to Hanoi G20 Summit with an interest in discussing with the new US President, Donald Trump, a variety of issues to include, very important to him, the Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (The Magnitsky Law), which had a devastating impact on the ability of oligarchs and other business leaders to operate in the US and alongside US businesses. Yet, as a consequence of the foul-up of Prigozhin’s organization in its effort to impact national elections in the US in 2016, Trump reportedly bombarded Putin with questions about the Russian Federation’s interference in Hanoi. It was to a great degree, an embarrassment for Putin.

Wagner Group Attrocities in Bucha, Ukraine

The Kremlin could barely suggest that it had acted in the interest of international peace and security when it invaded  Ukraine or took previously in just about any other intervention externally during Putin’s era of leadership. Nonetheless, it made every effort to sell its case, pressing its narrative on Ukraine. The last thing the Kremlin wanted to contend with were reported large scale atrocities, with evidence alleged caught by Western newsmedia cameras. That was the circumstance Prigozhin created, after the Wagner Group left the town of Bucha. 

Via the Agence France-Presse on April 7, 2022, the Times of Israel published a report that German intelligence services intercepted radio traffic of Russian soldiers discussing the killings of civilians in Bucha. The Agence France-Presse used the renowned German newmedia source, Der Spiegel, which cited a closed-door briefing given by Germany’s foreign intelligence service BND. In the Bundestag. Der Spiegel reported that the audio files ofthe BND gleaned at the Bundestag briefing provided evidence of the Wagner mercenary group’s role in the atrocities. Der Spiegel said the audio files intercepted by the BND also provide evidence of the Wagner mercenary group’s role in the atrocities. The German government said its satellite images from last month from the period of March 10, 2022 to March 18, 2022, and reliable evidence showed that Russian Federation forces and security units were deployed in this area from March 7, 2022 until March 30, 2022. The Kremlin denied the accusations of mass killings. It claimed that the images emerging from Bucha were “fakes” or that the deaths occurred after Russian Federation troops withdrew from the town.

In the West, Putin’s regime is looked upon as one in which the powers of evil are exalted. Under the leadership of Prigozhin, the Wagner Group in Bucha helped to hammer in that idea with the West and much of the world. Prigozhin did not help the Kremlin’s situation.

Prigozhin’s Refusal To Have the Wagner Group Sign an Oath of Allegiance and Contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry 

Before the Wagner Group Rebellion transpired, seemingly many of the organization’s troops sensed big trouble ahead. That sense stemmed from controversy stirred over an order from the Federation Defense Minister on June 10, 2023 requiring all “volunteer detachments” to sign contracts with his ministry by the end of that month. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry explained that order was given by Shoigu in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of “volunteer detachments”, all such units–or their men–would have to sign a contract with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry by July 1, 2023. The order did not mention the Wagner Group by name. However, it was understood then that it routinely referred to the organization as “volunteer assault detachments”. As for the rationale behind the order, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry claimed“This will give the volunteer formations the necessary legal status, create unified approaches to the organisation of comprehensive provision and fulfilment of their tasks. Russian Federation Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Pankov shared: “These measures will increase the combat capabilities and effectiveness of the armed forces and their volunteer detachments.”

The following day, Prigozhin publicly stated that his Wagner Group troops would not sign any contract with Shoigu. Prigozhin viewed the order as an attempt by Shoigu to take control of the Wagner Group.  Prigozhin suggested that the Defense Ministry might use the failure to comply with the order as a reason to deprive Wagner of supplies. Prigozhin stated: “What could happen after this order is that they will not give us weapons and ammunition. We will figure it out, as they say.” He went on to say: “But when the thunder breaks, they will come running and bring weapons and ammunition with a request to help.” The entire episode created a further rift between Shoigu and Prigozhin. It surely caused Putin additional distress. Most of the Wagner Group troops did not sign the Defense Ministry contracts then. However, some in a bid to distance themselves from the dangerous controversy, left the Wagner Group, moving away from the situation, and signed the contracts in order to ply their trade with other private military companies and the Defense Ministry, too. Chacun voit midi à sa porte.

Prigozhin’s Bizarre Video Recordings from Rostov-on-Don during the Wagner Group Rebellion 

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have beenmay very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Still, there were also unnecessary ad-libs Prigozhin made on video recordings from Rostov-on-Don broadcast and posted online during the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some were dangerously threatening and perceivably seditious. As the matter continued,which naturally appeared grave, Prigozhin’s continued comments dipped into the realm of the absolute absurd. Well over the top were his remarks on video on the morning of June 24, 2023 from Roostov-on-Don in which he rashly stated: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.”  He went further off the mark when he bizarrely declared: “Once again I’m warning everyone: we will … destroy everything around us. You can’t destroy us. We have goals. We are all ready to die. All 25,000 of us.”

Prigozhin was putting his unique “golden touch” on the whole matter likely creating some concern and considerable stress among many in the Kremlin as to whether everything would come together as planned. that stress was doubtlessly felt by Putin at the time. If Prigozhin and the Wagner Group would have had hypothetically driven into Moscow and would have taken control of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the outcome for them would not have reminded anyone who would have observed their march much as the renowned final stands of glory such the The Alamo (1836 )in what was then the Texas Territory or the Battle of Camerone (1863) in Mexico. It most likely would have closely resembled something akin to Colonel Armstrong Custer’s Last Stand at the Battle of Little Big Horn (1876), a complete massacre with no appreciable positive ououtcome. With his words, he had what his troops could not have, a damaging psychological impact on the psyche of the Russian people. He made the government appear vulnerable.

The Appearance of Complicity with Russian Federation General Sergei Surovikin.

A real tragedy that cropped from Prigozhin’s position as owner of the Wagner Group was his seemingly unfettered engagement with the general staff and other senior generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces due to his close association with Putin more so than his ownership of the organization. Such a political association in the Russian Federation and just about any country is very tricky business for a senior military commander. It must be handled tactfully and delicately. If not, a fine career can easily be shipwrecked. One association which Prigozhin spoke of often was that with the Commander-in-Chief of Vozdushno-kosmicheskiye sily (the Russian Aerospace Forces) or VKS General of the Army Sergei Surovikin. During the invasion of Ukraine, Surovikin who was once commander of the Joint Group of Forces in  the Special Military Operation zone later became Deputy commander in the Southern “Grouping” of the Special Military Operation zone where the Wagner Group operated and has bases. Surovikin had also worked with the Wagner Group while serving two tour in Syria in 2017. Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. On June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. Among Russians who welcomed the appointment of Surovikin when he took command in Ukraine was Prigozhin. In a statement put out at the time by Concord, Prigozhin said: “Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian Army.” He called Surovikin a “legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.” He noted: “Having received an order [in 1991], Surovikin was that officer who without hesitation got in his tank and went forward to save his country.”

However, beyond being a friend of Putin and owner of Wagner Group which often operated with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, there were no personal reasons and perhaps no reasons for to be a close associate of Surovikin or any general. Prigozhin was not a professional soldier. He owned the Wagner Group just short of 10 years and training as it’s commander was on the job and surely limited. Unlike Surovikin, Prigozhin did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School. He did not begin his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. He did not graduate from the renowned Frunze Military Academy.. He did not graduate from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Discussions with him on military matters must be somewhat trying at times. Surovikin certainly was not a billionaire oligarch much as Prigozhin. From what was known publicly, he had no obvious prospect of ever becoming one. Prigohzin could not make him one. The relationship between Prigozhin and Surovikin was likely superficial for the most part. Yet, because it was enough that the two were talking at all was enough to cause sufficient suspicion on Surovikin with regard to Prigozhin’s thinking during the Wagner Group Rebellion. To that extent, Surovikin was to suffer as a result of guilt by association. Indeed, ostensibly in great part due to a number of well-publicized links between Surovikin and Prigozhin that fuelled rumors of the general’s alleged strong ties with the Wagner Group, there was apparently more than enough for security service investigators to sink their teeth into. There was also the fact the Wagner Group Rebellion was unluckily launched from Surovikin’s Southern sector in Ukraine into the Russian Federation. Surovikin was detained by the security services on June 23, 2023. It was the starting date of the Wagner Group Rebellion. Reports of Surovikin’s release from detention surfaced in the newsmedia in the West on September 4, 2023. It was reported at the same time that his service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces was terminated.

Prigozhin created an “unsafe” environment for Surovikin, politically. Perhaps Putin had a good idea of how and why the general had gotten entangled with Prigozhin and the Wagner Group Rebellion. However, he did not stop what transpired, at least not right away. Putin did not take any chances. The regime still worked against the general–particularly with endless “interviews”–in the way that is does. Being heavy-handed as they typically, no thought was likely given the dynamics of the relationship between Prigozhin, a friend of Putin, and Surovikin. No consideration given to that fact that Surovikin was already swamped by the need to handle an on-coming counteroffensive of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and could not dedicate any real time Prigozhin’s puzzle. No concern was likely given to the significant gap between Surovikin’s military knowledge, experience and education, with Prigozhin, who relatively was lacking on the subject. There could not have been any great discussion between the two on dealing with Shoigu–who also never receive formal military training and education–and Gerasimov or the Russian Federation’s struggle in Ukraine in general. Based on information from various sources, the newspaper of record in the US, the New York Times, reported on September 4, 2023, the security services seemed to open their eyes wide enough to notice there was reason, not even a good imaginary one, for Surovikin to remain in detention. The Russian Federation security services released him.

Prigozhin looks over maps of the tactical situation in Bakhmut, Ukraine in 2023 (above). A real tragedy that cropped from Prigozhin’s position as owner of the Wagner Group was his seemingly unfettered engagement with the general staff and other senior generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces due to his close association with Putin more so than his ownership of the organization. Such a political association was very tricky business for a senior military commander in a regime such as Putin’s, and had to handled tactfully and delicately. Beyond being a friend of Putin and owner of Wagner Group which often operated with the Russian Federation Armed Forces, there were no personal reasons and perhaps no reasons for to be a close associate of any general. Prigozhin was not a professional soldier. He had owned the Wagner Group for just short of 10 years and his training as its commander was “on the job” and surely limited. Unlike Surovikin, Prigozhin did not graduate from the Omsk Higher Military School. He did not begin his career serving in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. He did not graduate from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. He did not graduate from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). Discussions with him on military matters must be somewhat trying for senior military officers at times.

Embezzlement at Concord or the Wagner Group Specifically?

There may very well have been issues aggravating Putin concerning the skimming of profits from government payment to the Wagner Group for its contract services. Putin oddly hinted at this possibility in a speech, but did not offer much evidence on the villainy. For him to even broach to matter publicly was a powerful act in itself. On June 27, 2023, Putin’s fourth of four major addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion, initially he spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry,.However, as explained in greatcharlie’s August 1, 2023 post entitled, “The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)”, what began as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly became an effort by Putin to lay out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Putin explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Putin admitted plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. In its operations, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot farther.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About “his Wagner Group”, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. If the allegations of Embezzlement were true, the implications were tremendous. There would ne punishment. Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address. Looking at the speech today, there was no pretension. Nothing good was in the making by that time.

Prigozhin’s Final Mistake?

It remains possible that there was some new mistake, some new transgression, unknown to the public, over which Putin reached his peak. Conceivably, in the not so distant future, that hypothesized mistake might be made known by Putin, himself. In all honesty, greatcharlie believes that is somewhat unlikely for as it was suggested earlier, Putin surely wants the matter of Prigozhin to remain closed forever. He will unlikely be the one to dredge it up again. Perhaps such any imaginable that independent newsmedia houses may hear whisper about some new and final mistake by Prigozhin. Such whisper might very well become a popular topic of among journalists and well-known Kremlin watchers in the Russian Federation. It might also become known those in the opposition movement, the fount of all juicy rumor and gossip about Putin. Yet, then again, it may be the case that they, too, have had their fill on the Prigozhin matter. Prigozhin and his men were engaged in a dark, dangerous business, in which the deaths of others and monetary gain were the only “rewards.” He and his commanders met their fate while engaged in that work, and perhaps only a precious few in the independent newsmedia as well as in opposition political circles in Russian Federation might be moved enough to shed tears for them. 

More likely, however,  the last on the possible list of mistakes are actions by Prigozhin that could only have left Putin better than annoyed with him.  Indeed, in the abstract, greatcharlie can only presume Putin was particularly displeased with Prigozhin’s continued counter messaging on Ukraine well after the Wagner Group Rebellion. He suggested Africa was where the Wagner Group should direct its talents. He declared that Africa should be the Wagner Group’s priority. Prigozhin publicly stated that he wanted to recruit Bogatyrs-rough men–for Africa. He expressed no desire to have his organization serve in Ukraine. He made it clear that Ukraine was a non-issue for the Wagner Group. It is possible that he believed in speaking this way, he was very apparently lashing out at Shoigu and Gerasimov and not Putin’s government or Putin, himself. Yet, at this point, Putin unlikely wanted to hear too much more about the Wagner Group and what it could not do for him. After all, the Wagner Group Rebellion was settled.

When meeting with Prigozhin after the Wagner Group Rebellion,, Putin most likely made it clear to Prigozhin that he want he wanted no more negative, noisy talk on Ukraine. it would have been delinquent for him to do otherwise. One might imagine that Putin warned that there would be no second chance as too much was at stake. There was indeed a line that could not be crossed and it might be said by observers, inside and outside the Russian Federation, that Prigozhin had already crossed it more than once. Putin’s likely issuance of a warning to Prigozhin takes greatcharlie’s thought to the fateful discussion between the Great Shawnee Tribe Chief, Tecumseh and the Governor Willian Tyler in 1811 concerning White settlers further westward expansion into Native controlled land. Beginning in 1808, the Shawnee leader Tecumseh travelled throughout the US gathering supporters and allies to form a native confederacy that could resist westward expansion by white settlers. In August 1811, Tecumseh met with Governor William Henry Harrison to discuss the recent treaties, land purchases, and violence throughout the Indiana territories. At their meeting, Tecumseh spoke for a large group of natives along the Great Lakes, and told Harrison, “that piece of land, we do not wish you to take it,” indicating that his allies wanted “the present boundary line to continue.” Should the whites continue their expansion into the region, Tecumseh warned, “I assure you it will be productive of bad consequences.”

Putin is no longer a young president filled with thoughts and excitement about a bold future ahead. He has accomplished much. There were close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. Perhaps the cause for that in part has been Putin’s sense of humor. In the case of Prigozhin, however, there was every indication that any further association with him had to end. His behavior could have potentially marred all that the Russian Federation President created and was creating. Putin may have logically concluded that all he had achieved and surely wanted to complete before his end was being put in some jeopardy by Prigozhin.  Far more was at stake than friendship and nostalgia. At stake for Putin and others operating at the highest levels of government  were the Russian Federation’s interests and aims, its survival. There was every indication that any continued association with Prigozhin or any attempt to further countenance of his behavior might potentially have been further disruptive, if not destructive.

To be sure, the impact of Prigozhin’s final verbal blows, albeit unintended to harm Putin, were certainly felt by the Russian Federation President. Surely behind the Kremlin’s walls, it was likely apparent that Prigozhin was out of control. Perhaps all elites with real influence in Moscow could see that and were flummoxed by events since February 24, 2022, the starting date of the special military operation.

It seems that by the time Prigozhin was going off on further tangents following the Wagner Group Rebellion, telling his troops to focus on Africa and the need for the organization to recruit bogatyrs for Africa, he had likely passed everyones point of no return except Putin. Putin being Putin, however,, was not going to be forever disposed to hang on a knife’s edge over what fantastic outrage Prigozhin would utter or engage in next. Putin needed the Russian people to support the special military operation, the invasion of Ukraine. Casting doubt about the special military operation for any selfish reason, for any reason, particularly after the Wagner Group Rebellion was over, was unacceptable to him. Putin was not going to wait to find out if new, greater damage was being done by Prigozhin’s declarations on Ukraine and disparagement of the war effort.

Annum iam tertium et vicesimum regnat. (He has been reigning for twenty-three years.) To gnaw a bit further on the matter, Putin, is no longer a young president filled with the thoughts and excitement about the future ahead. He has accomplished much. There were close associates, friends, who came with him for the ride onward and upward, to include Prigozhin. Most were kept close even with all of their mistakes. Perhaps the cause for that in part has been Putin’s sense of humor. In the case of Prigozhin, however, there was every indication that any further association with him had to end. His behavior could have potentially marred all that the Russian Federation President created and was creating. Putin may have logically concluded that all he had achieved and surely wanted to complete before his end was being put in some jeopardy by Prigozhin.  Far more was at stake than friendship and nostalgia. At stake for Putin and others operating at the highest levels of government  were the Russian Federation’s interests and aims, its survival. There was every indication that any continued association with Prigozhin or any attempt to further countenance of his behavior might potentially have been further disruptive, if not destructive. Order must be maintained in the Russian Federation. Prigozhin managed to become a strain that he could no longer tolerate. He could not allow the special military operation to flounder as result of Prigozhin’s problems with Shoigu and Gerasimov and simply his continued stupidities. There was nothing even slightly humorous about any of it.

Putin could no longer hope to save his friend. He could only go one direction on the matter. That did not necessarily mean Prigozhin had to be killed. Perhaps it would be enough to state fate stepped in.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)

“Official” company photo of veteran Wagner Group troops in Ukraine (above). Was their rebellion about their well-being, the war’s management, or something deeper? The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only neeed to be the possibility for their wishes to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

This post should be considered a continuation of the preceding one

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refer to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

In a photo released by Prigozhin’s Press Service, the Wagner Group owner is seen recording one of several video addresses in Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

The Wagner Group Rebellion

As things moved, on the morning of June 23, 2023, Prigozhin alleged Russian Federation forces had launched a fire mission on Wagner Group troops in Ukraine causing considerable casualties. Prigozhin announced he had launched an armed effort with his Wagner Group to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Wagner Group troops crossed from Ukraine into Russia and entered Rostov, meeting no resistance by border guards. Just after 12:00AM on June 23, 2023, it was reported in the newsmedia that the FSB issued a warrant for Prigozhin’s arrest. 

About 8 hours after that, morning newsmedia reports showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin posts a public announcement by video on Telegram from the captured base to report events. Prigozhin stated: “We are inside the [Russian Army] headquarters, it is 7:30AM. Military sites in Rostov, including an aerodrome, are under control. Prigozhin then issued what amounted to warning and intriguingly foreshadowing certain events by saying: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.” Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee. About 2 hours after that, Putin made a national address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 6 hours after that, Prigozhin is seen in a video widely broadcasted and posted online, discussing a deal to halt the rebellion and withdraw. On the heels of that, reports from the newsmedia indicated that Belarus President, Lukashenko, brokered the deal between the Kremlin and Prigozhin to end the “mutiny”. Wagner Group troops who participated in the rebellion would not be prosecuted, while those who did not join–presumably only those operating in Ukraine and not referring at all to those operating in African countries, in Syria, or elsewhere–would be offered contracts by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would leave the Russian Federation and remain in Belarus. Prigozhin ordered his troops back to their field camps in Ukraine. About 3 hours after that, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had completely withdrawn from Rostov-on-Don. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. In Rostov-on-Don, crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on.

About 48 hours after that, Putin made a late evening address broadcasted and posted online by the Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia concerning the rebellion in which he provided “more detail” regarding his decisionmaking and the “bigger picture.” About 12 hours after that, at an afternoon event held with much fanfare at the Kremlin’s Cathedral Square with some 2,500 members of the military, the security forces, and the National Guard in attendance, Putin expresses his appreciation for the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. Lukashenko’s role did not receive mention on that occasion. He expresses sorrow and praise for the Russian Federation aircrews that lost their lives confronting the “mutineers.” About 2 hours after that, Putin in a smaller setting indoors, again addressed Defense Ministry, National Guard, FSB, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service units who reportedly “ensured law and order during the mutiny.” Putin again thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 48 hours later, in the evening in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan in the Russian Federation, after the totality of the weekend’s events had a chance to settle well in the minds of the Russian people, Putin is shown in a video widely broadcasted in the country’s state-run and independent newsmedia greeting a very excited, sizable cheering crowd. The sense of genuine joy on his face upon engaging with the cheering Russian Federation citizens was most apparent.

Wagner Group troops in a company truck travel from the chaos of the frontlines to the serenity of Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. On the morning of June 24, 2023, newsmedia reports across the Russian Federation showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don, 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation Armed Forces, which was directing a considerable element of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee.

Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

Surely there were relatively significant attendant events in between the key events that occurred within the 24-hour news cycle. For example, the FSB seized the Wagner Group Headquarters. The Russian Federation military without fanfare established a protective posture in the southern portion of Moscow. The commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, who was once the overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine, addressed the rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. The first deputy chief of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev appealed to rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. Shoigu and Gerasimov vanished from public view during the entire period. Perhaps the most chilling moment during the rebellion was when Wagner Group troops actually advanced just 200 kilometers (120 miles) from Moscow, according to Prigozhin. A column Wagner Group troops that reportedly included mounted tanks, armored vehicles, at least one self-propelled rocket launcher and numerous personnel trucks. had reached the Lipetsk province, about 360 kilometers (225 miles) south of Moscow. The downing of six Russian Army helicopters occurred while that column was en route to Moscow and the shoot-down of a Russian Air Force surveillance plane at some point. Surely, under the circumstances, the Russian people were hungry for information on events. The beginning of the day when Prigozhin was seen and when Putin made the first of his appearances during the episode, end of the day, when Putin made second appearance are times when the majority of the Russian people receive their news. Those moments turned out to be main events that did much to signal the direction the story was taking. Yet, the many pieces in-between as the few highlighted here also fit well within what could be characterized as the complex puzzle that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Once Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops agreed on June 24, 2023 to withdraw from Rostov-on-Don, they departed immediately. Crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and speedily returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarusian President AlexanderLukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.

The Narrative Putin Wanted the Russian People To Garner Regarding the Wagner Group Rebellion

Certainly, it never would have been considered sufficient in the eyes of the senior Kremlin officials to allow the Russian people to simply receive a well-paced flow of events on the Wagner Rebellion to decipher in many ways. State-run and independent newsmedia broadcasts did the job of letting them know events were taking place concerning the Wagner Group, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff and the special military operation. What they needed to hear and grasp about those matters would be explained to them by the ultimate source in the country, the Russian Federation President. To that extent, Putin provided four well-crafted addresses, one during and three immediately on the heels of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Given the nature of the lens through which Putin apparently views the world, considering past public addresses, interviews, decisions and actions, his concise and succinct addresses in addition to well-communicating the required facts to the Russian people, had to meet what were his specific priorities. To that extent they reflected his mindset, emotions, state-of-being, reasoning, and intentions. He did not exactly offer water-tight explanations, but there was probably scant concern among Putin and his advisers that the overwhelming majority in the targeted audience would dive too deeply into his explanations or energetically question any aspect of them. Indeed, it was likely expected in the Kremlin that for the audience in the Russian Federation, it would be enough just to have some answers on the rather unique development.

Putin’s First Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 24, 2023

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin emphasized that challenges to the government of any kind would not be tolerated. For the first time, he characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Putin, wearing a solid black suit and black pindot tie, stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.” He added: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Offering a flash of his personal outrage over the rebellion, he went on to say dramatically: “Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.” However, far from eliminating the threat based in Kyiv, the Russian Federation Armed Forces have barely held on to initial gains made since the initial weeks of the war before Ukraine was better armed. The odds of it advancing further into Ukraine now are slim to none. Prigozhin ostensibly was acting in response to what perceived were actions by Shoigu and Gerasimov that would eventually cripple the Russian Federation’s ability to defend itself. Perhaps Putin had not been listening closely to Prigozhin’s tantrums after all.

Ever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events. Putin stated: Any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people. He then said: “A blow like this was dealt to Russia in 1917, when the country was fighting in World War I. But the victory was stolen from it: intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, and the loss of vast territories, ultimately leading to the tragedy of the civil war.” One might argue that the Russian military was a spent force by 1917 and poorly led. At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. The country’s forces were resuscitated to some degree by the Spring of 1915. However, those huge initial  losses essentially knocked Russia out of World War I. As for the 1917 Revolution, it garnered support under the guise of offering the people a better existence, an alternative to penury. Misled and misguided, many followed the revolutionaries.

Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin stated: “The Armed Forces and other government agencies have received the necessary orders. Additional counterterrorism measures are now in effect in Moscow, the Moscow Region and several other regions. Resolute action will also be taken to stabilize the situation in Rostov-on-Don. It remains difficult; in effect, the work of civil and military authorities has been blocked.” These were certainly strong and comforting words for the Russian people. However, Putin’s government to that point had not been successful in handling very apparent threats to the country’s security. Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) had launched several successful drone attacks and helicopter attacks on Russian Federation targets, including on Moscow, and as aforementioned in Part 1, there had been more than one attack on Russian Federation territory by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian militant groups near the border with Ukraine. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin had to emerge unconditionally victorious.

Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Putin stated: “Any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people. Our actions to defend the Fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people.” However, Putin rather than dealing with “rebels” harshly, he directed Wagner Group troops to sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Recognizably, under that arrangement, the Wagner Group, as it once stood in Ukraine, was essentially disbanded. The organization’s troops elsewhere in the world were apparently unaffected by the ruling. Yet, the Wagner Group right before the very eyes of the Russian people were being provided ample means to avoid prosecution and all penalties.

Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Although these remarks may not appear inordinate from Putin given inflamed sentiments of the moment and the fact that under his authoritarian regime, he had established limitless for himself. However, it also could have been something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to others, “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he remarked about players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. It would seem the world has yet to see the regime’s tyranny touch bottom.

Prigozhin went unnamed directly by Putin in his first address. Yet, presumably, even though he was not mentioned, Putin’s words in this first iteration of his addresses nevertheless may have sounded harsh enough to Prigozhin. Certainly, Prigozhin is not a fragile man. However, perhaps these initial words were spoken by Putin, an individual who he clearly holds in very high esteem pinched just a little. “Enjoy the Silence” is a song by English electronic music band Depeche Mode. Recorded in 1989, it was released on their album, Violator (1990). It is pertinent here to the extent that on June 25, 2023,  Putin moved from near complete silence on the spat between Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to a veritable roar in his address to his nation. For Prigozhin, no matter what was altogether transpiring, they must have had their impact. The lyrics of the first verse are: “Words like violence / Break the silence / Come crashing in / Into my little world / Painful to me / Pierce right through me / Can’t you understand?”

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin, for the first time, characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Forever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events.Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits.

Putin’s Second Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 26, 2023

Among the top five points Putin wanted to communicate n his second address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, he wanted to assure the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized that departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters and handling them swiftly and diligently and all other parts continued to perform their functions without interruption. Putin, wearing a solid dark navy blue suit and solid dark navy blue tie, stated: “I will repeat–society and the executive and legislative branches of government at all levels displayed high consolidation. Public organizations, religious denominations, the leading political parties and actually all of Russian society held a firm line, taking an explicit position of supporting constitutional order. The main thing–responsibility for the destiny of the Fatherland–has united everyone, brought our people together.” He said further: “I will emphasize that all necessary decisions to neutralize the emerged threat and protect the constitutional system, the life and security of our citizens were made instantly, from the very beginning of the events.” These comments would be expected of Putin–or any leader in his situation–in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, if his government actually “had been on the case” as he suggests, the Wagner Group Rebellion hardly would have gotten off the ground. The conspirators, as he refers to the Wagner Group leadership, would presumably have been twinkled out and approached for questioning by the security services. 

In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Putin stated: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people. He continued: “It was exactly this outcome, fratricide, that the enemies of Russia–the neo-Nazis in Kiev, their Western patrons and other national traitors–wanted to see. They wanted Russian soldiers to kill each other; they wanted the military and civilians to die; they wanted Russia to lose eventually, and our society to break up and perish in a bloody feud.” All of this was said despite Prigozhin’s earlier expressions indicating the rebellion was an impromptu emotional reaction–originally understood to be the result of an attack on the organization’s camp in Ukraine by Russian Federation troops under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov–Putin in his address alters that narrative by explaining that it was the threat of the cudgel and not good brains that brought the matter to close. That his ever-vigilant government, particularly the work of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services–that allowed the Wagner Group to cross the border into the Russian Federation untouched–crushed the plot. One might consider that plots that are part of false flag operations tend to be the easiest plots to sort out. “Go figure!”

Adding to perceptions that the Wagner Group Rebellion was the opponent, yet at the same time paradoxically weakening the notion that there was anything too deep in the thinking of the “conspirators”, Putin emphasized the reckless nature of the conspirators’ undertaking. Putin stated: “An armed mutiny would have been suppressed in any event. Mutiny plotters, despite the loss of adequacy, were bound to realize that. They understood everything, including the fact that their actions were criminal in nature, aimed at polarizing people and weakening the country, which is currently countering an enormous external threat and unprecedented pressure from the outside. They did this at a time when our comrades are dying on the frontline with the words “Not a step back!” There was irony in this idea as the crux of Prigozhin’s ire for months was the reckless and incompetent manner in which his Wagner Group troops and Russian Federation troops had been used in the special military operation how ironic and bizarre it was for him to undertake such a monumentally reckless and hopeless action as to march on Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from power. If the lives of Russian Federation Armed Forces’ aircrews had not been reportedly lost in the near final stage of the impromptu rebellion, the whole enterprise could be chuckled at for being comical.

Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all Russian lives matter, the indication and implication being  that the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Still, he indicated that his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin stated: “We knew before and know now that the majority of Wagner Group soldiers and commanders are also Russian patriots, loyal to their people and their state. Their courage on the battlefield when liberating Donbass and Novorossiya proves this. An attempt was made to use them without their knowledge against their comrades-in-arms with whom they were fighting shoulder to shoulder for their country and its future.” He went on to explain: “That is why, as soon as these events started to unfold, in keeping with my direct instructions, steps were taken to avoid spilling blood. It required time, among other things, as those who made a mistake had to be given a chance to change their minds, to realize that their actions would be strongly rejected by society, to understand what tragic and devastating consequences for Russia, for our country the reckless attempt they had been drawn into, was leading to.” Despite the fact that Putin, by displaying restraint during the “crisis” did save Russian lives, ironically and incredulously, as a result of his special military operation, astronomical and abominable losses had been suffered by Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine over 16 months to that point in time. One might suppose the careless loss of those troops could be set down as occasional mistakes.

Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

With regard to allowing the Wagner Group troops to move to Belarus, to greatcharlie that seemed a curious decision. Belarus is hands down the Russian Federation’s closest ally. One might call the relationship Putin has established between the two countries as the most successful effort in his quest to bring the former republics of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation’s fold. Putin recently placed several nuclear warheads in storage in Belarus. To that extent, many of the erstwhile Rebel Wagner Group troops possess exquisite special operations capabilities and could pose a threat in terms of potentially capturing those warheads. One might suppose the weapons are secured so well in their new homes that a build up of the Wagner Group troops was nothing to signify. Intriguingly, one might consider that Belarus borders Ukraine and a number of NATO countries. Sending the Wagner Group troops there could have been predicted to cause considerable alarm in the capitals of those bordering countries and in NATO Headquarters. (Interestingly, it is now understood that Wagner Group troops in Belarus, far from a spent force, are providing tactical training to Belarusian troops.) Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his second address.

Among the top five points Putin communicated, he assured the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters, handling them swiftly and diligently, and all other parts continued to function without interruption. In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers, who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He claimed his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin then informed the Russian people about his somewhat remedy for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders.

Putin’s Third Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Seemingly speaking to the newsmedia’s audience, not in attendance physically, Putin, wearing a solid navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: Today, standing here on the historic Cathedral Square of the Moscow Kremlin are the service personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, soldiers and officers of the National Guard, the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Guard Service. They are the ones who, together with their comrades-in-arms, at a time of challenge for the country, threw themselves in the way of trouble which would have inevitably led to chaos. More directly addressing the assembled audience of some 2,500 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard, Putin stated: “You have defended the constitutional order, as well as the life, security and freedom of our citizens, steering our Motherland clear from upheavals and de facto stopping a civil war in its tracks. He continued: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.”

Revealing what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Putin stated: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.” Pointing to exactly what was daunting about their activities that it compelled special praise, Putin explained: “Defense Ministry units, the National Guard, officers of the Interior Ministry and special services ensured reliable operation of all critical decision-making bodies, strategic facilities, including the defense ones, ensured the security of border regions, the rear lines of our Armed Forces, of all combat units which carried on with their heroic frontline operations during that time. We did not have to withdraw any combat troops from the special military operation zone.

Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. Putin stated: “Our comrades-in-arms–pilots–lost their lives while confronting the mutineers. They held their ground and fulfilled their orders and their military duty with honor. I am asking you to observe a minute of silence in tribute to their memory.” silence.” One might say Putin was making an extra effort to get a message across here that was not so easy for the Russian people to accept from him given the events in Ukraine that Russian soldiers’ lives matter.

In his first and second addresses, Putin excoriated the Wagner Group’s leaders, going as far to say in the first address: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people.” That noisome tack was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts. Putin stated: “Your resolve and courage, along with consolidation of Russian society, played an essential and decisive role in bringing the situation back to normal. Those who were drawn into the mutiny saw that the army and the people were not with them.”

Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically. Putin stated: “The swift and well-managed deployment of defense, security and law enforcement units helped prevent the situation in the country from going down a very dangerous road and ensure that there were no civilian casualties. He then remarked: “I extend my gratitude to you and all the personnel of the Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and security services for your service, courage and valor, for your devotion to the people of Russia.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his third address.

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Among his top five point, he revealed to the Russian people what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. His noisome tack of excoriating Wagner Group leaders was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts.Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically.

Putin’s Fourth Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. He ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. The address would reach the Russian people via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. This final iteration of his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses presented almost immediately following his address in Cathedral Square.

Putin was a bit less formal in thanking those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. Putin began his address by once again expressing his thanks and appreciation for the efforts of the armed forces and security services. Putin, still wearing a navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: “You and your comrades had a special part to play in this. Special words of gratitude go to you. I want us all to understand what happened and what could have happened if you hadn’t done what you did and hadn’t fulfilled your military duty and hadn’t shown loyalty to your oath and the Russian people. As is always the case during such developments – the same thing happens every time and everywhere – armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now.”

Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. Putin stated: “As is always the case during such developments–the same thing happens every time and everywhere–armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now. He went on: “Regrettably, you had to work in difficult circumstances in order to avoid civilian casualties, because you had to work on busy motorways.” Speaking of them and their well-being so often, it would appear that a primary takeaway from the whole episode that Putin wanted the Russian people to garner was that they were always on his mind and that they were what mattered most to him. It could not be missed by any who heard any of his four addresses.

While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Putin stated: “The fact that we have losses is even more regrettable. These are, of course, combat losses. There is no other way to put it. Our comrades died defending the Fatherland. It is not an overstatement or an exaggeration. I want to stress once again that chaos in the country would have been inevitable, and the enemy would have surely taken advantage of it. He continues: “The enemy is trying to do so anyway–I will get to that a little later–but nothing is coming out of it, and, I hope, nothing will come out of it, I am even sure of that. But it is absolutely clear that they would have taken advantage of it. No one knows what would have become of the country in the end, but all the achievements that have been made during the hostilities, many of them, anyway, would have been lost. And you prevented it.” In a way, the shift in whom Putin focused on as the opponent marked the close of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the issue of primacy. For members of the Wagner Group there may have been some sense of relief having suffered his bombardment of obloquy.

What started as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly appeared to become an example of why one should elegantly limit how much one should talk if the goal is to control information. Putin laid out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Perhaps he was in a very transparent way attempting to create a greater schism between the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group by disparaging the latter. Perhaps he wanted to convince members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces that although he liked the Wagner Group troops, they were his favorites. Perhaps he was having a little too much fun with it all. Perhaps Putin was concerned some in the Russian Federation might have imagined the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group colluded on the rebellion. That would be a dangerous idea that he would urgently need to knock down.

Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Surely, it was an odd set of statements to make before a group of military officers and security service members. Gone were the days of plausible deniability for the Russian Federation government with regard to the Wagner Group’s activities worldwide. Yet, more importantly, Putin admits plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord–discussed in some detail in Part 1, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot one day further. These were surely sensitive matters that Putin’s audience of individuals who had successfully moved up in their careers by avoiding did not want to hear or be involved with, especially since it concerned the highest realms of politics in the country. Putin, nevertheless, gave them the details, and likely measured their uneasiness in the process.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About his Wagner Group, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. To be certain, greatcharlie would not attempt to cast aspersions on anyone concerning who among the powerful in the Russian Federation might have been profiting from government payments to Concord or Voentorg. The better prosecutors and litigators in Western courts would surely light on Putin’s statement: “The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address.

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. Among his top five points, he ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter” Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Then Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. While clearly putting Prigozhin in the spotlight, Putin never mentioned his dear friend’s name.

The Wagner Group Rebellion: A Staged Crisis?

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Happy is the one who is able to know the causes of things.) To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in the whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions, many hardly thought through, were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that the Putin regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories, Hopefully it was done due to some internal collective cognition imperative, but possibly under official external influence. Remarkably, it was the same picture of Putin presented by national capitals and many mainstream media outlets of their respective countries that for years have defamed him as some awkward, insecure leader, a throwback from another era. Currently, the perception in the West and much of the world is that the Wagner Group Rebellion marked the beginning of the end for Putin. All of greatcharlie’s instincts are against such an explanation. 

Putin’s Priorities

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Everyone who was able in Rostov-on-Don took a photo with their Wagner Group “occupiers”. To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in a whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that Putin’s regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports from other newsmedia houses seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories.

To discerning eyes, the Wagner Group Rebellion actually had the appearance of a “controlled crash” creating the simulacrum of change without any real change at all. The situation was never so difficult that it had the potential to capsize the regime. Despite predictions have been voiced by those less than clairvoyant on Putin’s downfall, he still sits in the Senate Building of the Kremlin. His government was never genuinely in peril, neither was his person. Putin, himself, was hardly tested. In its June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, greatcharlie suggested observers might expect some recherché, outside the box move by Putin in the midst of everything. The wily and for the most part intuitive Russian Federation President might very well have demonstrated that he has.more than a few tricks to pull from his sleeve. 

Putin is first and foremost the steward of the Russian Federation. However, before Putin could begin to address vicissitudes besetting his country, first and foremost he had to stabilize his own position. That was in greatcharlie’s view the main purpose of this giant artifice perform on the international stage. Often mentioned when suggesting one first ensure their own safety and stability before helping others is the pre-flight safety directions–briefing–given by flight attendants. Among those given is, “In the case of a change in cabin pressure, be sure to place the resulting oxygen mask over your own face first before assisting anyone else, even your own children.” Surely, this runs counter to the “3M principle” of “mission, men me” for military leaders. In order of priority the mission must be the focus of efforts and all must be done to accomplish it. The well-being of one’s soldiers must be kept in mind. They must not be wasted and use them in a way to exploit their optimal effectiveness. Lastly, a leader must consider his or her well-being having covered the essentials, two other priorities. However, a leader must not carelessly place them in mortal danger knowing his or her role is to think through and direct the actions of troops to achieve the objective. (It would be interesting if Putin, having made several flights over the years, found such directions instructive. Perhaps his detractors would insist that for him self-interest has always been his priority and he would only be compelled to act by it.)

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023. During the latter, Putin was able to have a true connection with the people. The tide has begun to come back in and the waters have risen again. Soon enough skewed perspectives expressed of Putin somehow losing ground politically in the Russian Federation following the Wagner Group Rebellion will most likely disintegrate in the face of reality. Certainly, this is a hard saying for some to hear. Hopefully, polls will be conducted on the public response to the Wagner Group Rebellion by independent research groups in the Russian Federation such as the Levada Center, The Chronicle, and The Russian Field that may shed light with regard to any boom in support for Putin.

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023.

For those unfamiliar, Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of the Russian Federation’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it. Putin also served as Sekretar’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser for Yeltsin. A long-time intelligence operator and intelligence manager such as Putin knows many a dodge. To that extent, it would not be too far off to suggest if Putin has actually taken the course suggested by greatcharlie here would fall under the category of maskirovka. 

The Russian term maskirovka or masking originally had military pertinence as it regarded the use of camouflage. However, maskirovka eventually expanded in meaning to concerning battlefield masking through the utilization of smoke and other screening methods. The meaning would evolve further as a reference to the utilization of military deception against an opponent, and expand from there refer to full-scale denial and deception operations. Maskirovka would transcend military operations to refer to the use of a clever gimmick to create ambiguity and uncertainty and to give Russian Federation’s foreign and national security policy actors the freedom of action to achieve their country’s objectives in the diplomatic economic arenas. Further, maskirovka has been used to create a picture of events in the Russian Federation for the outside world.. As it appears to greatcharlie, what transpired from June 23, 2023 to June 26, 2023 resembled maskirovka, and perhaps a bit more than that. One thing for certain, the plan laid out under greatcharlie’s supposition, could not be allowed to fail. Putin’s reputation, his world, his future, hung in the balance. Part 1: The Tragedy of Birlstone in The Valley of Fear, Arthur Conan Doyle’s fourth and final Sherlock Holmes novel published by George H. Doran Company in New York in 1915, the esteemed author has Holmes in Chapter 1, The Warning deliver a notable quote, quite apposite to readers who have grasped what is being suggested about Putin’s actions here. Holmes explains: “Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius.”

Naysayers might point out that events turned out the way they did by happenstance and there was hardly any orchestration of them behind the scenes. If one might choose to stand firm on the idea that the Wagner Group Rebellion was an authentic expression of outrage by the organization and nothing more, greatcharlie says to them that the unlikely must never be confused with the impossible, and would suggest they take a second look. Once reviewed in light of the artifice hypothesized by greatcharlie, but not coloring them with its theory, events of the Wagner Group Rebellion take on greater meaning and quite on their own appropriately to fall into place. To that extent, they arouse suspicion.

For instance, it is interesting how the whole Wagner Group Rebellion went off so relatively cleanly. A starting point for examining that angle would be the Wagner Group’s marshaling of resources on the Russian Federation’s border with Ukraine for some time prior to the start of the rebellion. Reports in the Western newsmedia state the even US intelligence Community managed to collect information indicating that Prigozhin had been assembling his forces near the border with Russia over a period of time. Yet, there was no interference with the Wagner Group’s build up by the Russian Federation government. The Russian Federation Armed Forces, and the FSB, did not take serious interest in or move a jot to reign in the Wagner Group before anything got off the ground, This was the case even though there was concern over all activities on the border given the actions of pro-Ukraine, anti-Putin, ethnic-Russian militias and cross border incursions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The entire event unfolded right before the very eyes of the government. The build up on the border in preparation for the rebellion was surely out of sync with Prigozhin’s claim that the Wagner Group’s Rebellion was in response to an attack on his camps in Ukraine on June 23, 2023 by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Ibit, ibit eo quo vis qui zonam perdidit. (The one who has lost his money belt will go where you wish.) It remains fascinating to greatcharlie is that the Wagner Group troops were still receiving remuneration during their rebellious eastward march. What persistently nags at greatcharlie is how Prigozhin was allowed access to his financial assets to pay them. If the Wagner Group’s financial assets had been frozen by order of the Kremlin, Prigozhin would have found himself in a pickle with those rough men. He had to be able to pay them as guaranteed. 

During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don, were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and made certain all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord –Prigozhin’s billion dollar catering firm discussed in Part 1–has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

The troops of the Wagner Group are not international freedom fighters and revolutionary mercenaries in the mold of the 19th century Italian patriot and soldier Giuseppe Garibaldi (July 4, 1807 to June 2, 1882). They are driven by money not a desire to save the world. During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don. They were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord, which is the billion dollar catering firm owned by Prigozhin–discussed in Part 1, has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

Difficult to understand also is how the Wagner Group, which Prigozhin regularly complained was left short of resources by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, was apparently swimming in such an abundance of petroleum and oil lubricants that it could ostensibly squander those resources to move a number of the organization’s tanks and other vehicles east. 

It is hard to see how Wagner Group troops would have been able to appropriately resupply themselves if they would have become engaged with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services in Moscow even under the most favorable terms for them. If they failed to immediately seize their objective in Moscow, they eventually would have run out of steam and would have had to surrender or fight to the bitter end. Thereby, it would seem that upon all else that was inordinate about their rebellion, one is asked to believe that the Wagner Group troops, individuals who joined the organization to earn money, were knowingly participating in a kamikaze-style action. In a burst of complete illogic during his initial video address from Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin curiously uttered: “After we finish what we started, we will return to the front to defend our Motherland.” That was a moment when Prigozhin was either frighteningly detached from reality or being facetious, adding one more over-the-top absurdity to the hoax that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Reportedly, Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched by Putin. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Russian Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarus President,, Lukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.. Conveniently, Lukashenko was able to put all else aside that weekend and immerse himself in the matter.

Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB (above). Bortnikov sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no initial indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were all but branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Interestingly, only at a late hour during “the crisis” was a very visible effort made in Moscow to prepare for a visit of the Wagner Group by erecting checkpoints with armored vehicles and by positioning troops on the city’s southern edge. About 3,000 Chechen troops were reportedly pulled from fighting in Ukraine and rushed to Moscow on Saturday morning. State television in Chechnya reported that Russian Federation troops armed with machine guns had established checkpoints on Moscow’s southern outskirts, and engineers had dug up sections of highways to slow the Wagner Group’s advance.

The Chechen troops are under the control of Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov, mufti of Chechnya and a colonel general in the Russian Federation Armed Force.the, who publicly condemned the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is interesting how the Chechens, in considerable numbers, arrived in Moscow so much faster than the Wagner Group. Perhaps they used a faster route from Ukraine or special vehicles. What would be truly difficult for greatcharlie to accept is that the Chechens sped past the “rebellious” Wagner Group troops on the same road to Moscow. If there was a quicker route from Ukraine to Moscow which the Chechens were able to take advantage of, it is difficult to see why the Wagner Group, supposedly in a rush to get to Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from their respective posts, conspicuously chose not to travel on it.

The Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin declared Monday, June 26, 2023 a non-working day for most residents as part of the heightened security. Curiously, the declaration, a now seemingly superfluous measure, was allowed to remain in effect even after the total withdrawal of Wagner Group troops was completed. All in all though, there was no significant alteration in the federal government’s course. Certainly, there was an atmosphere–stimmung–in the Russian Federation of everything being under control despite what was visible. Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end )

If one were to take a second look at Putin’s four Wagner Rebellion addresses, as noted earlier, in each address one would discern how he laid out the narrative on events he wanted the Russian people to take from the whole show. Yet, in the context of the suggested artifice, it would have been of the utmost importance for Putin to provide all of the insights the Russian people would need to ruminate upon his handling of on the Wagner Group Rebellion or to exchange in their own discussions with family, friends, classmates, and colleagues on the crisis. In each well-crafted, concise address, each given at what were very likely predetermined points in time, there appeared to be specific issues that Putin wanted to reveal in digestible pieces to the Russian people. For the most part–at least until the fourth address, there was nothing so outré or too complex spoken by him that might have acted as a distraction. To that extent, this aspect of the suggested artifice could be characterized as a preconcerted, well-organized information campaign, carried out predominantly by the Russian Federation’s “Communicator-in-Chief.”

With further regard to his four Wagner Group Rebellion addresses, one might discern that Putin seemed to take pains to ensure his punches at Prigozhin were very heavy even without mentioning his name. Perhaps it was a reflection of his known penchant for engaging in acidulous humor with close associates. He doubtlessly was aware that all of the bombastic rhetoric concerning Prigozhin would definitely reach the ears of his dear friend and other close associates filled in on the artifice. When the words of Putin’s fourth address captured Prigozhin’s attention, as aforementioned, he had no reason to be cheerful, but in the end the Wagner Group owner assumedly would have smiled and would have shaken his head in response to the very noisy overkill, fully understanding that Putin needed to do what he did, needed to say what he said, in accord with the aims of the artifice suggested by greatcharlie here. The greater cause was firming up public opinion about Putin’s presidency, his leadership. Prigozhin would fully recognize and accept that what is best for Putin is best for the Russian Federation and that would surely include himself as a citizen and an ultra-loyal subordinate. Perchance there would even be a considerable reward not too far down the road for his fealty.

Fascinatingly, based upon depictions in both detective fiction and spy fiction literature and film, Putin appears to mimic, mutatis mutandis, an assassin’s method of leaving three to five suicide notes to ensure the victim’s death would be accepted as suicide and not his or her murderous handiwork. Perhaps some might be willing to agree, may be with some reservations, that Putin gave all four addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion with an underlying, surreptitious purpose of furnishing a false clue. The notion may not be too way out.

It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes for use in plain sight, troop movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia. While the news cycle everywhere is 24-hours, it seemed the most important announcements were issued to best serve morning and evening newsmedia readers, listeners, and viewers. Enough time was allowed to lapse between almost everything released for the state-run newsmedia to process and parrot the Kremlin’s well-curated narrative of events and the domestic audience to absorb. That absorption rate would likely have been calculated by Kremlin public information specialists who would have been deeply immersed in the project. Enough time would also be allowed to lapse from one event to the other to convince the independent newsmedia to draw “the right conclusions” and publish surprisingly similar accounts of what was occurring and so on. The whole show was likely set up to transpire on a weekend which meant businesses did not have to be concerned over their weekday commerce being interfered with, and the Russian people generally would be better able to follow events  on what for most were days of leisure, off from work and days for associating with family and friends, and visiting dachas.

The Wagner Group troops rapidly loading up a tank in order to ride out of Rostov-on-Don (above). It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes, movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia.

The Degree to which Wagner Group Troops Were Likely Aware of the Supposed Artifice

If this scenario staked here was at all possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

It would be enough for the Wagner Group troops to follow orders to the letter as they have always done and were paid to do. To that extent, this may account for the downing of six Russian Army helicopters and an electronic warfare plane by Wagner Group troops on their march to Moscow. Those in the Russian Federation Armed Forces who sent the Russian Army helicopters would also unlikely have been aware of what was transpiring. Those aircrews that encountered the Wagner Group could not have known everything was staged and how surprising and threatening their arrival on the scene would be to the Wagner Group troops. The Wagner Group’s, no matter what they may have been told about how “safe” everything would be, were way out on a limb and necessarily quite tense and on the alert, ready to deal with any immediate danger. Prigozhin, negotiating at the time in Rostov-on-Don to end the rebellion, likely had less knowledge of his troops’ actions way up front. Perhaps he was informed about it all after the fact just as everyone else. Still, one might recall what Prigozhin specifically stated on the first video he posted from Rostov-on-Don: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads.

Far be it for greatcharlie to make light of, or denigrate the loss of a soldier in defense of his or her homeland, but it posits that while unlikely, it is possible the helicopters shot down over the Russian Federation during the rebellion were already counted among those lost in the Ukraine fight. One might imagine that far beyond morbid curiosity and within the farthest range of their respective investigative capabilities–seeing how close lipped the Russian Federation Armed Forces are about losses during the Ukraine War or any conflict for that matter and how records of its casualties reported usually appear so out of sync–journalists and military and intelligence analysts may have already examined whether those helicopters and aircrews lost battling the Wagner Group were not already listed as lost during the Ukraine War and may have kept their discoveries confidential. (If there have been funerals for the airmen lost in late June 2023 and an error can be proved upon greatcharlie, it asks the respective families of the fallen for their forgiveness.)

Intriguingly, the Wagner Group doubly proved the concept, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already proven, that the Russian Air Force against a modern force has little to no ability to ensure the survivability of its aircraft and its aircrews. That has not been the only deficiency of the Russian Air Force. Another of many of considerable interest to greatcharlie is that both on the frontlines in Ukraine and during the Wagner Group Rebellion, the indications and implications are that the Russian Air Force planners and air operations officers have given up on, are completely distant to, or positively unaware of the airpower concept of high altitude bombing by strategic air assets to support tactical movements on the ground. That would put the Russian Air Force just short of 80 years behind the times. To that extent, one might consider how easy it should have been for competent air commanders and planners to utilize Russian Federation strategic air assets and tactical air assets to turn the route that the Wagner Group troops were traveling on toward Moscow into a “highway of death”. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops rolled on as if they had little to fear from such a threat. Readers might cast their minds back to an incident in Syria in which Wagner Group troops decided to clash with US Special Forces soldiers. The US Special Forces soldiers called in airpower to lend some support. Things did not turn well at all for the Wagner Group that day.

As aforementioned in Part 1, the Wagner Group employs a semi-international group of fighters. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. One might imagine that of the three main Wagner units, the Rusich unit led the drive eastward. Unless Russian Federation citizenship has quietly become a requirement for or privilege of Wagner Group employment, it would seem legally questionable to charge the international fighters with treason. Other criminal charges might have better fit. The Kremlin officials would know that. Putin would know that.

Even as he lent support to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s move to subordinate all militias serving in Ukraine on its side, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk Putin implied that much of Prigozhin’s criticism of the army had been correct–recognized even in the mainstream US newsmedia as a possible sign Wagner had yet to entirely lose his support. Putin stated: “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly,” He continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

If the artifice suggested by greatcharlie might have at all been possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

Prigozhin Mansion Raid

As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia, posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. One photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed Forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

Prigozhin in many disguises (above). As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia,  posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. A photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

It would appear that despite the importance of matters concerning Prigozhin–after all, according to the Western newsmedia, he led a paramilitary rebellion that knocked the Kremlin back on its heels and accelerated the Putin regime’s downward spiral–the Russian Federation security services and law enforcement organizations in particular failed to keep eye on the mansion. The indications and implications of the heavy use of manpower are that there is such a paucity of technological resources available that Prigozhin and whatever entourage of security that would likely be traveling with him could not be detected. It is very likely that trained K-9s–search dogs–have been utilized to more stealthily locate anyone present in the mansion instead of a police special weapons and tactical teams who observably in the video recording they made, moved through the residence creating a noise worthy of Bedlam. It is remarkable how closely the video and photos  provided on the raid of Prigozhin’s mansion mimicked video recordings released of the raid on the Mar-a-Largo residence of former US President Donald Trump provided by US law enforcement and. released to the newsmedia by the US Department of Justice. Many would likely chalk up the similarities to the fact that parallels exist in foundational law enforcement tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in every country. In this case, the similarity might be better chalked up to sarcasm.

It is difficult to imagine what might be referred to as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,  and in particular, the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations, are so inept that independently or in conjunction, could not keep track of Prigozhin’s location and movements. Indeed, one might have presumed that the Russian Federation Armed Forces and particularly the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations kept themselves well-aware of Prigozhin’s affairs and under current circumstances had gone so deeply into them that they at least collectively should have had a complete handle of all of its details. Nothing should have been so unknown by them respectively that their knowledge would seem at best to equal that of the far from the not so prying mainstream newsmedia in the Russian Federation. One could be convinced that everything is done in the Russian Federation in such an incompetent fashion to convince the world that within it “folly doctor-like controls skill.” How the government managed to keep perfect track of, and come down so hard upon the aforementioned Boris Nemetsov and Alexei Navalny, and other activists such as Anna Politkovskaya is a wonder. Based on newsmedia reporting, greatcharlie proffers that the US Intelligence Community surely has been monitoring Prigozhin’s movements as somewhat of a priority mission. Newsmedia reports indicate they were keeping track of how Prigozhin’s private jets were shuttling back and forth from Belarus to the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous. Dulce est desipere in loco. (It is delightful to play the fool.)

If one might exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation Armed Forces, law enforcement and security services are unable to competently monitor Prigozhin, one might turn to the idea that the raid of one of Prigozhin’s mansion and the bombardment of photos in the newsmedia of Prigozhin was designed to throw inquisitive minds and close observers off his scent for hot minute. Verily, perhaps the raid was one more step to ensure those who might have begun questioning in the aggregate whether the Wagner Group’s rebellion, the nature of the Kremlin’s response, and Prigozhin’s disappearance, were elements of some grand artifice. It all falls into place too well. For an intuitive few following it all very closely, the next set events might very well seem predictable.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous.

Prigozhin: Proceeding with Caution?

After all is said and done, greatcharlie’s recognizes that the veritable sacrificial lamb could prove to be Prigozhin, although it is unlikely. He may very well view himself, in a more dramatic and grander way, as a martyr on the altar of his country. He would forever disagree that he was a patsy. Some might insist that his exile to Belarus was likely one of many negative life ramifications of his behavior to that point. He does carry vile antecedents. Either being frugal with information or simply lacking further information on his disposition, the newsmedia to this point has convinced many that Prigozhin remains exiled in Belarus, under duress, as lonely as a cloud. Regardless of where he may be, recognizably, Prigozhin has bravely borne his fate. He does not appear to have let his nerves run away with him. He is unquestionably as strong as a lion. Leve fit, quod bene fertur, onus. (The load is light if you know how to support it.)

Surely if some artifice had been dramatically acted out the weekend of June 23, 2023 as hypothesized here, Prigozhin had to have been a willing participant in the whole cabaret. Make no mistake, Prigozhin is willing to do just about anything to assist Putin: “Papa.” It was Putin who catapulted him to the highest realms of wealth in the world. Putin has likely shielded him from very dark elements that out of envy, jealousy, ethno-racism, or madness would choose to lash out at him in the Russian Federation and outside. Prigozhin will surely never forget how Putin helped him. Outwardly, he has always demonstrated his appreciation. It would seem that Prigozhin truly dislikes Shoigu and Gerasimov. However, as suggested in Part 1, he would hardly go out of his way, waste his own money, to disrupt Putin’s government. Putin likes both Shoigu and Gerasimov and would not allow anyone to destroy them just as he would protect Prigozhin from a serious threat. Prigozhin knows that. Certainly, the last thing Prigozhin would ever want for himself would be to replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister. Given the situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Defense Minister’s post is surely a heavy yoke he would happily leave for another to bear.

If an artifice was in play, it was not apparent initially whether Prigozhin had been shielded sufficiently or at all from the law or political enemies. Shoigu and Gerasimov now seem so drenched with villainy that it is hard to imagine how they will ever be able shed it. For Putin, such issues are surely secondary, if not tertiary. Likely to him, whether he wants them to continue at their posts or not is all that matters. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that although all three put their trust in Putin, naturally but quietly, all three may be a little uncertain about whether being so trustful was justified. Prigohzin can only hope to remain free and have the opportunity to further serve “Papa.” However, Prigozhin lives by an odd code, perhaps it could be called an archaic one. He will likely take whatever comes from his boss standing upright with his eyes wide open. Perhaps a total victory in Ukraine is the only hope of redemption for Shoigu and Gerasimov. Unfortunately for them, that is very unlikely. An educated guess would be that Putin will not play any tricks with his three subordinates. Amicitia sine fraude. (Friendship without deceit.)

Based on a number newsmedia reports in July 2023, the situation appeared to change a bit faster than most would have expected for Prigozhin. On July 6, 2023, Lukashenko stated that he was not in Belarus, but was in the habit of traveling between St. Petersburg and Moscow as he wished. The Belarusian President also stated that any money and weapons that had been confiscated by Russian Federation authorities had been returned to Prigozhin. To the extent the original agreement to end the Wagner Group Rebellion was intact as it regarded Belarus, Lukashenko explained that the organization’s troops had remained in their camps in his country. According to newsmedia reports, approximately 8,000 Wagner Group troops are currently deployed in Belarus. However, the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, the senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, who was mentioned earlier, stated in an online post republished by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel that 10,000 Wagner Group troops would eventually be deployed in Belarus.

Interestingly, when Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group troops were redeployed in Belarus on June 30, 2023, he also explained that his country could make use of the experience and expertise of the organization’s members through training. By July 2023, the Ministerstva abarony Respubliki Belarus’ (Belarusian Defense Ministry) had announced that “The Armed forces of Belarus continue joint training with the fighters of the Wagner PMC (Private Military Company).” Giving what seemed to amount to a forewarning to neighboring Poland and NATO, on the week of July 20, 2023, the Belarusian Defense Ministry would announce: “During the week, special operations forces units, together with representatives of the Company will work out combat training tasks at the Brest military range.” The Brest military range is 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of the Polish border.

Very compelling is a video posted on Prigozhin’s press service on Telegram depicting the Wagner Group’s owner welcome his organization’s troops to Belarus and discussing the future of the whole enterprise, Prigozhin is heard telling the Wagner Group troops, “We fought honorably.” He goes on to say, “You have done a great deal for Russia. What is going on at the front [in Ukraine] is a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in.” Reportedly, Prigozhin tells his troops that they should behave well towards the locals and directs them to train the Belarusian Army and gather their strength for a “new journey to Africa.” The video on Telegram additionally shows Prigozhin receiving the Wagner Group black flag, decorated with the motto” Blood, Honour, Motherland, and Courage”, brought up to Belarus from the organization’s camp in the Russian Federation’s South. Clearly, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group may be a bit down, but they are not completely out, by the good grace of “Papa” one might say. 

In a most extraordinary turn of events, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.” In the third quatrain of “Sonnet 119” (1609), William Shakespeare writes what appears most apposite, mutatis mutandis, to the evolving state of the relationship between Putin and Prigozhin: “O benefit of ill! now I find true / That better is by evil still made better, / And ruin’d love, when it is built anew, / Grows fairer than first, more strong, far greater.”

Putin in Derbent, Dagestan close-up (above). Putin’s visage says it all. Looking at Putin as he met with the cheering crowd in Derbent, it is very clear that he was very pleased. So rarely has his face expressed such happiness, many were led to believe it was not Putin in photo but a body double. Such impressions were quite singular. Putin was greeted in Derbent as the Russian people’s champion. In the “struggle” with the Wagner Group, he was hands down the victor. At least, that is how the situation appeared to the Russian people. If all that transpired was actually a clever artifice executed to garner their increased political support and ratchet up his popularity, as suggested by greatcharlie–maskirovka, Putin was surely very satisfied with the outcome.

The Way Forward

Of course, greatcharlie is unable to swear by this theory that the whole Wagner Group Rebellion was a clever, well-calibrated artifice devised by Putin and what has come afterward also has been guided by his hand. What greatcharlie does believe will become more apparent as time goes on is that the Wagner Group Rebellion did not accelerate some supposed spiral downward of Putin’s regime. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that to it, the whole cabaret felt simply too contrived from the first day. It is unfortunate any lives were reportedly lost in its implementation. Such is always the risk when thousands of well-armed fighting men are moving about with different purposes and understandings of a situation, and no significant central control and communication exists. Of course, establishing such certainly would have made the hypothesized artifice far easier to detect and to deny.

Sic multa quæ honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta. (Thus many things that seem honorable by their nature are rendered dishonorable by circumstances.) As for the Putin ultra-loyalist Prigozhin, greatcharlie is not completely dismissive of assessments by some Russia scholars and policy analysts that he may still be in trouble with his dear leader and dear friend in the Russian Federation. Even Putin loyalists cannot be too sure what he thinks of them or what plans he has for them at any given time. They can only do their level best to remain in his good standing. In greatcharlie’s aforementioned June 5, 2023 post on the possibility of the Kremlin using insights from analysts outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, it noted that finding scholars and policy analysts willing to assist the regime might be difficult as there might be a tacit understanding that there is a real danger involved with serving it. The same senior officials they might work hard to assist could very well turn against them much as wild animals without rhyme or reason known to the reasonable or the rational. In a similar vein, if Prigozhin actually committed himself and the Wagner Group to some artifice for the sake of strengthening Putin’s position nationally as hypothesized here, he may have been too trusting and may have taken too great a risk. Pitfalls have been something Prigozhin has clearly been able to dodge in various endeavors tied to Putin up to this point, but fate might finally come calling. One wonders whether Prigozhin was at all uneasy when he and 34 of his Wagner Group commanders were graciously invited to the Kremlin to meet with Putin, and one and all were welcomed back into the fold by the Russian Federation President with open arms. 

There is a little more to consider in this drama as it concerns Putin and Prigozhin. As greatcharlie makes this final point–and has a little fun doing so, it hopes readers will stick around as it goes admittedly the long way–albeit maybe a bit too prolix–to provide some background on a story that best promotes discernment of ideas presented in the discussion. From what greatcharlie would usually refer to as banal amusement, a Hollywood film, a deeper understanding of Prigozhin perhaps can be drawn. In this case, greatcharlie says film is art, and art is yeast for intellect. Many readers may already know the storyline of the very intriguing 1977 blockbuster film, “Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope”, but perhaps not in the context in which it is presented here. (It was suggested by a reader that greatcharlie do more to connect with the younger generation by tying points of discussion on foreign and national security policy with popular interests of today. So, greatcharlie, being responsive, reached back to a film that premiered 46 years ago to connect with younger readers. Was kann ich sagen?)

In the film, young Luke Skywalker comes across two “droids”, C-3P0 and R2-D2 on his home planet, Tatooine, with the latter holding a hologram recording of a desperate plea from Princess Leia, a key leader of the Rebellion against the Empire that has an iron grip. Leia, who is being held captive by Darth Vader, a type of galactic Imperium, the right hand of an evil empire that had enslaved the galaxy for help from Obi-Wan Kenobi. Skywalker seeks out Old Ben Kenobi, a neighbor whose name closely resembles the name in the message and discovers they are one in the same. Due to tragic circumstances, Obi-Wan Kenobi must take Skywalker along to rescue Leia. During their time together, Obi-Wan Kenobi sets forth to teach Skywalker about the Force, a positive, spiritual energy by which all existence flows not only in the galaxy, but the universe, and how it allows those with the gift to tap into it, mystical, supernatural abilities. The duo secure the help of blackmarketer Hans Solo and his trusted co-pilot Chewbacca, with the promise of remuneration. Skillfully flying his dilapidated yet considerably advanced and agile Millennium Falcon, Solo manages to evade asteroids, Imperial TIE fighters, and Imperial Star Destroyers. The diverse band of irregulars then come upon and are pulled into the Death Star, a superweapon with a giant planet crushing laser with which the Empire intended to use in eliminating the Rebellion once and for all. It was also where Leia was being held by Vader. The small band rescues Leia and escapes but not without the painful loss of Obi-Wan Kenobi in a duel with Vader, who by the way was the embodiment of the negative side of the force. Yet, after his death, Obi-Wan Kenobi could do more to help Skywalker than ever. With the promise of great reward from Leia, Solo takes the group on to the Rebel base on Yavin IV, which is the next target of the Death Star.

On Yavin IV, information collected by R2-D2 on the Death Star’s defenses and vulnerabilities was reviewed and plans for a small group of fighters to attack and destroy it were formulated. The Rebel mission entailed firing rockets into a small vent along an equatorial trench of the Death Star. Time was of the essence as the Death Star would be moving into position to destroy Yavin IV. Skywalker would join a group of pilots flying small X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters against the Death Star. He implored Solo to join the group but Solo emphasizes that his interests from the start were solely pecuniary and he would never risk himself in a suicide mission, which aptly described the Rebel pilots plan of attack. Skywalker left Solo with Chewbacca, as they stowed in his ship the massive reward Leia promised. Flying with R2-D2, Skywalker and the relatively small group of fighters then left to engage the giant Death Star which had nearly reached Yavin IV. Their mission was monitored by the Rebel command base on the planet. Once in contact, the losses in X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters mounted rapidly as a mass of Imperial TIE fighters intercepted the group. Vader, himself, joined them. With barely a handful of Rebel fighters left, Skywalker led what would be the final assault along the trench to reach the vent. As two X-Wing fighters trying to hold Vader and two TIE fighters off him were defeated and R2-D2 was lost, Skywalker sped to the target. It was then that Skywalker through clairaudience received a message from Obi-Wan Kenobi to rely on the Force to complete the job. Leia and the commanders at the Rebel base were flummoxed as Skywalker, responsive to Obi-Wan Kenobi’s voice, disengaged his computer targeting system. As the Death Star prepared to fire on Yavin IV, and Vader closed on Skywalker, surprisingly Solo arrives with the Millennium Falcon and perfectly disrupts Vader’s pursuit of his young friend, freeing him to hit the target directly and destroy the Death Star just in time.

That moment in the film was frightfully small, but small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph. There is considerable materiality and profundity about it. Solo had often indicated in the film that his interests during the odyssey of the small band were solely pecuniary. However, whether compelled by the Force via telepathy to act in support of Skywalker or impelled by the power of friendship and a sense of responsibility, Solo acted. Risking the loss of his ship, his treasured co-pilot, his grand reward, his hopes and dreams for the future, his life, all that he had, he rushed to the Death Star. It is unclear whether Solo had already left Yavin IV in a direction away from the fighting and reversed back to join Skywalker or whether he had flown directly to the scene from the targeted planet. Solo surely would have understood that  Skywalker and the other Rebel pilots were facing trouble at the Death Star, but he could not have known just how bad the situation might have been until he arrived upon the scene. The small force of Rebel fighters may have been completely destroyed by the time he arrived. His young friend could have been lost already. He may have found himself alone, contending with a swarm of Imperial TIE fighters. Nevertheless, Solo went in. A reason for his valorous action could perhaps be found in a logic intrinsic to comradeship in war. So often, a parent may learn their child was lost in war not knowing that he or she abandoned relative safety to remain beside a friend and together they ran forward against the odds into mortal danger. It is easy and satisfying for some to ascribe a bundle of negatives to create a picture of individuals as Prigozhin. However, among such men, the mind works in mysterious ways. As long as Putin continues to stand with him, publicly or privately, he will most likely continue to stand with Putin. Indeed, no matter how bad things become for Putin, Prigozhin will most likely be there. As long as experts continue to get the relationship between the two so wrong, particularly those in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western countries and other countries interested, there will remain a gap in their understanding of certain events, which Putin, as meditated upon here, will likely seek to exploit in different ways. Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. (A certain friend is seen in an uncertain matter.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the individual at the center of the Wagner Group Rebellion (above). The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refers to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin,and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

Prigozhin arrives with guards at funeral ceremony held in the Troyekurovskoye cemetery in Moscow, Russia, April 8, 2023. In this post, greatcharlie chronicles Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

About Prigozhin

Since Prigozhin, as aforementioned, is at the center of all that has transpired, it seems appropriate to provide some background on the individual who allegedly took on Putin. An account of Prigozhin’s life has been widely circulated in the international newsmedia. Those biographies usually discuss certain elements of his life, typically offering a fragmented picture of Prigozhin story: other than average beginnings; potential as skier lost; imprisonment; release, family support and entry into food service industry; support from friends; entry into restaurant and gambling businesses; elite contacts and growth; Putin ties; catering and opportunities of a lifetime; and, business diversification to include internet business and the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s life had the least promising commencement.  He was born on June 1, 1961 in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in the Soviet Union, the son of a nurse, Violetta Prigozhina, and a mining engineer, Viktor Prigozhin. His father died when Prigozhin was a 9-year-old, leaving his mother to support him and his sick grandmother by working at a local hospital. During his school years, Prigozhin aspired to be a professional cross-country skier. He was trained by his stepfather Samuil Zharkoy, who was an instructor in the sport, and attended a prestigious athletics boarding school from which he graduated in 1977. However, due to an injury, he left the sport. Unfortunately, the criminal culture of St Petersburg drew him in.

There is an old saying directed at youth which greatcharlie paraphrases: “If one is around the wrong kind of people one will likely get involved with the wrong kind of things.” In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution. Id nobis maxime nocet, quod non ad rationis lumen sed ad similitudinem aliorum vivimus. (Is especially ruinous to us, that we shape our lives not by the light of reason, but after the fashion of others.)

In a five-page biography attached to an October 2021 email acquired by the Intercept from Capital Legal Services that appears to have been drafted by his attorneys, it was revealed that Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad, according to Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper known for its critical coverage of the Kremlin. The newspaper also reported that Prigozhin in 1990 studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

Food Service

Prigozhin would next move in a completely different direction which placed his life on an amazing trajectory. He set up a hot-dog stand in Leningrad with his mother and stepfather in the Aprashaka Flea Market. Prigozhin was essentially a street vendor, without much in the way of formal food service training or food service management. Yet, he clearly possessed a considerable knack for preparing and selling food to people. He apparently knew what they liked and knew what was right. He was quoted in an interview with the New York Times as stating: The rubles were piling up faster than his mother could count them.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Prigozhin followed the entrepreneurial spirit of the times and founded or became involved in many new businesses. Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeing that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.)

From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. 


Boris Spektor (above). From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

According to the Guardian, Prigozhin found Tony Gear, a British hotel administrator who had previously worked at the Savoy in London and was now at one of St Petersburg’s few luxury hotels. He employed Gear to manage first a wine shop, then the Old Customs House. Initially, the Old Customs House employed strippers as a way to drum up clientele, but oddly enough the restaurant’s food became the real draw for patrons and stripper operations were suspended. Gear marketed the Old Customs House as the most refined place to eat in a city that was only just discovering fine dining.

On its website, the Old Customs House is described on its website as one of the oldest restaurants in the city. Pop stars and businessmen liked to eat there, as did St Petersburg’s mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who sometimes came with his deputy, Putin. Photographs of Prigozhin in his exclusive St. Petersburg restaurants typically depict him serving the elite of the Russian Federation and standing-by dutifully in the background, ready to respond to his very important patrons’ every need. Prigozhin does not display a scintilla of shyness now, and he was hardly shy during those early years of his restaurant ventures. One might imagine that Prigozhin had a gift for repartee which was most likely greatly appreciated by patrons.

 

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush with their spouses on board the New Island Restaurant. Prigozhin is standing by dutifully, back and to the left of Putin. Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. Prigozhin assistance was clearly an integral part of whatever plan Putin had for foreign dignitaries. To that extent, Prigozhin was integral to Putin’s approach to handling foreign and national security policy issues with his visitors. The degree of Prigozhin’s connection with Putin was undeniable, frightfully apparent. Putin would go on to make use of Prigozhin’s assistance on many matters of the utmost importance to the Russian Federation and utmost importance to him. If greatcharlie is correct, he continues to do so today

During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by Novaya Gazeta that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good friendship. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story.

In 1997, Prigozhin and Ziminov, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. Inspired by waterfront restaurants on the River Seine in Paris, the two created the restaurant by spending $400,000 to remodel a rusting ferry boat on the Vyatka River. Prigozhin told the magazine Elite Society in 2008 that the new restaurant offered Russians something new and different from boring “cutlets with vodka.”

It was no mean feat to create a profitable restaurant in St. Petersburg with a potential clientele that represented a small percentage of the population and managed to get them through the doors every night, let alone open a second based on a concept alien to a good portion of that exclusive clientele. In 1998, he opened the New Island Restaurant on a boat, which one tourism website calls “St. Petersburg’s only floating luxury Restaurant-Ship.” The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city.

In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. 

Putin clearly displayed liking for Prigozhin before everyone. Meduza reported Putin welcomed him as “one of the boys.” To clarify, Prigozhin was neither Chekisty, the son or grandson of a member of the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, an iteration of the security services during World War II, as Putin is, nor was he Siloviki, someone who had served in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB as Putin and most of his close associates had. Current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev, who was an attorney in St.Petersburg when Putin met him, also falls into that “other than Chekisty or Siloviki” category. Prigozhin’s good relations with others among the Russian Federation’s elite also assisted in bring in lucrative catering contracts

Prigozhin attends to Putin during his inspection of a Concord Management and Consulting facility. By 2003, Prigozhin left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. Concord Management and Consulting, a  company founded by Prigozhin in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. He was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with him, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region.

During those early stages of his growth in the business world, Prigozhin was known for being rather strict as a manager. However, he is not remembered as being one to complain about being wronged and suffering losses. He was hardly one who could be characterized as temperamental and thin-skinned. It would appear that any behavior that resembled such was truly left behind in prison. Seemingly, he very likely would have thought dwelling on such matters would have cost him too much time and energy; on the face of it, he likely believed his time would always be best spent on pursuing new, greater ventures. The profits from them surely surpassed any prior losses. Much as water down a stream, when Prigozhin encountered an obstruction, he would work around it rapidly to reach the next profitable objective. Beyond the immediate moment, there was always the potential for more ahead. (The indications and implications from this might be that his complaints concerning the Wagner Group’s treatment in Ukraine have been fostered by the realization that there are no prospects for advancing on to some satisfying new course upon which he could greatly improve his organization’s situation.) Good fortune seemed to stick on Prigozhin’s side. He could provide his family with pleasure and affluence.

Quam sæpe forte temere eveniunt, quæ non audeas optare. (How often things occur by mere chance, for which we dared not even to hope.) Over the course of the 2000s, Prigozhin grew even closer to Putin. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. 

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90 percent of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. Leonid Teyf, former deputy general director of Voentorg (the company charged with contracting caterers for the military), assisted Prigozhin in securing the orders. of Voentorg’s assets related to food supply and army maintenance to Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract signed by Voentorg for 2013-2014 amounted to $999 million. The contract was signed by the director of Voentorg Vladimir Pavlov. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, approximately amounted to $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies.

Prigozhin (center) reaches the top! He stands close to both Putin (left) and current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev (right) During confidential conversation. In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply more than 90 percent of all food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90% of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract for 2013 to 2014 amounted to $999 million. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Defence Ministry, approximately amounted to  $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies. As discussed in Part 2, Putin would oddly lay out the tie between Concord and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry in an address following the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency.

It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

Three “cheerful” photos of Prigozhin (above) on a US Federal Bureau of Investigation “Wanted Poster”. Perhaps in the Russian underworld in which Prigozhin ostensibly has his hands somewhat dipped, the poster is a badge of honor, a sign that he had made it to the top! It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary political opponent then, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin.

Prigozhin and the Wagner Group

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St.. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present).

As explained in some detail in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations”, from the time of the organization’s inception, it was widely believed that the organization was founded, owned and led by Dmitriy Utkin. Utkin is a veteran of the First and Second Chechen Wars. Until 2013, he served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of the 700th Independent Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Detachment) of the 2nd Independent Brigade, a special forces unit of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) or GRU. However, in an August 2017, article in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, the suggestion was made that Utkin was only a figurehead for the company. Fingers pointed at Prigozhin as its true owner. Prigozhin went some distance to deny any ties to the Wagner Group. He even denied any communication with it. Prigozhin actually sued Bellingcat, Meduza, and Echo of Moscow for claiming he had links to the organization. In an interview in December 2018, Putin also denied allegations that Prigozhin had been directing the Wagner Group’s activities. However, in September 2022, Prigozhin relented and admitted to having created the group. Prigozhin claimed, “I cleaned the old weapons myself, sorted out the bulletproof vests myself and found specialists who could help me with this. From that moment, on May 1, 2014, a group of patriots was born, which later came to be called the Wagner Battalion.” As noted earlier, the Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged in the fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts. 

At the organization’s core, Wagner Group troops are predominantly retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are typically aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. However, the Wagner Group also employs an international group of fighters. There are three main fighting units of the organization. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. There is a Serbian unit built upon complement of former members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard–also known as “Arkan’s Tigers”–created by the deceased 1990s ethno-religious nationalist Serbian paramilitary warlord Zeljko Raznatovic’s–also known as Arkan. A relatively new unit in the Wagner Group consists of citizens of Scandinavian countries, particularly from Norway. It participated in the firefights on the Bakhmut front. The unit is referred to as the Níðhöggr“, sometimes also known as Nidhogg.

The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Prigozhin, in a dark blue suit (second from right) attends a meeting involving top Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff and members of Libya’s National Army in Moscow on November 7, 2018. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). The Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged. Fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts.. 

According to initial statistics available after April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As noted, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. The recruitment of prison inmates for service in the Wagner Group is nothing new. The organization reportedly recruited imprisoned UPC rebels in the Central African Republic to fight in Mali and Ukraine. They are reportedly nicknamed the “Black Russians”. It was the Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that suffered high-profile casualties. Callous Russian Federation commanders threw them into battle pell mell. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. 

It would later be revealed by the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, a senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, that  22,000 of the organization’s troops had been killed in action in Ukraine. In his statement, published by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel, Marx further explained that another 40,000 were wounded in action. Of the 78,000 Wagner Group troops who served in what Marx referred to as “the Ukrainian business trip”, 49,000 of them were convicts. The Wagner Group has reportedly halted the practice of recruiting convicts in its ranks. Former convicts in the organization that survived service in Ukraine have been released from their contracts.

Prigozhin surely recognized early on that more than simply suffering under inept leadership of Russian Federation commanders, he and his organization were being pushed toward the precipice of losing everything by individuals seemingly more skilled in finding ways to defeat him than defeating their opponent on the battlefield. He certainly was not going to countenance that. An idea perhaps alien or incomprehensible to many readers is the possibility that Prigozhin was tolerant, at least up to a point, of the unpleasant set of circumstances under which he was caused to operate in an effort to demonstrate his loyalty and support for Putin. Homo antiqua virtute ac fide? (A man of the “ancient” virtue and loyalty?)

Particularly during the months-long battle for the Ukrainian coal-mining town of Bakhmut, senior managers and troops of the Wagner Group surely felt they were being thwarted, from keeping the Russian Federation in the fight, meeting their organization’s longstanding commitment to Putin and the Russian Federation, as well as meeting their personal and emotional promise to Putin not to leave Ukraine until the Russian Federation won the war. It is all very heavy stuff for a group of individuals whose top priority most would likely argue is profit. Based on his public comments, Prigozhin appears to believe victory is still possible under the right military leadership. It was during a crucial stage in the Bakhmut fight that Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose forces the Wagner Group jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would somewhat likely say, “to rescue.” Wagner Group units apparently were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred. (In meditating on Prigozhin’s position, Putin might want take into consideration the terrible outcome of the decision by Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, to use his beloved spetsnaz units with their exquisite military capabilities to perform stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, on the frontlines in conventional roles. the specialized units were over relied upon and consequently suffered devastating losses.)

Well known is the fact that Putin prefers to take as few people as possible into his confidence. Even with those lucky few he is doubtlessly frugal with his thoughts. Conceivably, Putin had spoken quietly with Prigozhin over the very public vocalization of his rage over the fundamental failures and gross mismanagement of the special military operation by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff since its start. Whatever may have been discussed in such a meeting it hardly concerned taking steps against Shoigu and Gerasimov that Prigozhin was insisting upon, but a solution of some kind may have been voiced by Putin that manifested his unique lens on matters. Note, Prigozhin has neither expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He has always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with the most recent events most firmly in mind. 

Prigozhin in Bakhmut (above). The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Reality Check

Non mihi si linguæ centum sint oraque centum, ferrea vox, omnes scelerum comprendere formas omnia pœnarum percurrere nomina possim. (Not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, could I repeat all the types of wickedness, and run over all the names of penal woes.)  The supercharged modality of Prigozhin’s expressions concerning the performance of Shoigu and Gerasimov was by no means been within normal parameters and such reproach and obloquy from anyone toward those immensely powerful government leaders and organizations would never have been expected before the special military operation began. In the Russian Federation, “discrediting the armed forces” carries a maximum 15-year prison sentence. Many of Prigozhin’s public statements about the situation in Ukraine are now famous worldwide.

Some in the mainstream Western newsmedia would lead their audience to believe Prigozhin’s regular public ravings about how the war was being managed was an indication that he may have an unhealthy mind. Res ipsa loquitur!  Bizarre reports of Prigozhin providing information on the positions of the Russian Army in Bakhmut appear equally faulty. They have only evinced a misunderstanding of Prigozhin’s relationship to Putin and what the very active private military contractor means to the Russian Federation President personally. From the moment any claim was made of Prigozhin’s betrayal, at least on the Russian Federation side, it was doubtlessly viewed as a comical yet nonetheless apocryphal rumor ginned up by his opponents. To that extent, it was surely rejected as fast as inane suggestions meant to bias the mind back in March 2022 that the extraordinarily violent and most loyal Putin subordinate, the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, would possibly overthrow his president and take over the government and on a matter outside of the Ukraine War context, the very patriotic and extremely dangerous People’s Republic of China Vice Minister for counterintelligence of the Ministry of State Security, Dong Jingwei, had of all things defected to the US in June 2022. (The Dong Jingwei defection matter is treated in some detail in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”.) These suggests were not clever, but rather crass. One could get the impression that those responsible for the US political warfare effort against the Russian Federation have been soliciting ideas from a group of local junior high school boys for the most immature suggestions possible. Surely, that would count as a bold attempt to exploit thinking from outside the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies. Conscia mens recti famæ mendacia risit. (The mind conscious of integrity scorns the lies of rumor.)

Speaking plainly as he does, Prigozhin’s vocal expressions might at best send a clear signal to Wagner Group troops that they genuinely matter to him, but alone, his words do not appear to have accomplished too much. Prigozhin clearly recognized that as long as his organization’s troops remain in Ukraine, they will be “at the mercy” of what he clearly deems to be careless and inept top officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. That does not bode well for them. If one might toss on top of everything Prigozhin’s contentious relationship with those officials and commanders, it becomes nearly impossible to foresee anything positive coming the way of those troops in the future. Such will likely remain a constant no matter how things fall, one way or another in the midst of Moscow’s Ukraine enterprise. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Prigozhin standing before rows of Wagner Group troops killed in action in Ukraine. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing at the White House, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders.

The limited capabilities of Prigozhin’s organization as a military force also adds to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. As with everything else in which they were delinquent or deficient, the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces moved to utilize the Wagner Group as part of their combat operations during the special military operation doubtlessly with preconceptions in their minds via existing intelligence reporting on how the Ukrainians were situated to fight. To name a few of the deficiencies likely imagined in Moscow, it was surely thought to be short of weapons, short of good leadership, and short of well-trained troops. Through international newsmedia reporting, the whole world was led to believe the same. (Irony of ironies, it was the Russian Federation Armed Forces that actually had shortages of everything, including gear, troops, and especially military acumen.) The Wagner Group, loaded with veteran fighters, was expected to have a multiplier effect on the frontline. They made the questionable choice to utilize their own spetsnaz units in the same way.

Carelessly unforeseen and unimagined by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff was the massive level of assistance that the Ukrainians would eventually receive from the Western powers and other countries. (That matter is examined in some detail in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)  That assistance has made the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Ukrainian Armed Forces), even with its few remaining deficiencies, one of the more formidable military powers in Europe. Far more than just javelin and stinger shoulder fired weapons, small arms, and uniforms, the long list of assistance has included high-tech armaments as Patriot air defense systems and NASAMS (Norwegian (or National) Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) air defense systems, MLRS systems HIMARS systems, mobile and precision long-range artillery, anti-ship rockets, Abrams, Leopard, and Challenger tanks, MiG-29s, F-16s, helicopters, a variety drones, real-time intelligence, and loads of troop training. The Wagner Group could hardly have had a multiplier effect as the one dimensional force that it has been on a battlefield in which its opposition possessed such weapons and capabilities. 

For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated Russian Army trucks was not enough. Additionally, a robust, organic drone capability would be needed particularly for ISR, direct action, and psychological warfare operations to support the more effective planning and execution of missions. Given how the war in Ukraine has progressed, the new ways in which existing technologies are used and new ones are developed and introduced, new efficiencies in warfighting may render these few suggestions outdated. Still, the crux of what is presented here should be readily apparent. (Even the White Russian anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian insurgent groups–the Freedom For Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps used rather pricey Western-made military vehicles to launch their May 2023 raid into Belgorod region of Russian Federation. The vehicles were reportedly supplied by an unknown source. Images appeared on social media allegedly displaying those vehicles. Reporting on the equipment it observed, the Oryx open-source weapons tracking group, stated that the Russian Federation forces captured two International M1224 MaxxPro MRAPs, two 2 M1151 HMMWVs-, and one M1152 HMMWV that was damaged.)

As for procurement, the Wagner Group might have effectively sought out Independent sources of military resources for the company not with regard to its service in Ukraine but more generally to supply itself as a fully autonomous, fully operational professional military contractor. It would be one more step in attenuating its reliance upon the largess of the fickle Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation Armed Forces. All of that being stated, interoperability of armaments procured with those in the Russian Federation inventory would likely be viewed as a requirement by Prigozhin, keeping in mind the possibility of needing to operate in cooperation with the country’s armed forces, especially if asked to do so by Putin. Without variance, any procurement efforts should only be made with a keen eye on working within the parameters of existing international sanctions concerning armaments and the Russian Federation. It would be useful for the Wagner Group to have its own supply of food, water, medical facilities, and petroleum and oil lubricants. As long as these relative inadequacies as well as others persisted, the Wagner Group as noted, would remain poorly situated to optimally serve in support of Russian Federation military operations in Ukraine. As long as they exist, Prigozhin’s demands for greater autonomy will remain something less than legitimate. No statements have been made or actions taken concerning the structure, strength, composition, or rearming of the organization that would indicate the situation would change anytime soon.

It is very possible–actually more likely–that Prigozhin may not have had any interest at all in making great changes to how his organization’s units were structured. To that extent, Prigozhin may have long ago accepted that there would be a strategy-resources mismatch that would prevent the Wagner Group from playing a greater and genuinely effective role in support of Russian Federation military objectives in Ukraine even if it had been given a feerer hand. Given the few actualities presented here and others, one option that evidence suggests clearly arose in the mind of Prigozhin was to mostly withdraw his organization from the field in Ukraine, while keeping a portion available in-country to serve as effectively as possible structured as it is. In that way, Prigozhin could then continue to put the Wagner Group to use elsewhere worldwide where it could serve more effectively and more successfully. Again, that is what Prigozhin appeared to have been doing or at least seemed to be what he wanted to do before the Wagner Group Rebellion “erupted.” (It is not possible for greatcharlie to confirm any of Prigozhin’s burgeoning actions were founded on reasons similar to those expressed here.)

Prigozhin assists his Wagner Group troops load up in trucks moving up to the front in Ukraine. The limited capabilities of his organization as a military force added to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. They possessed diminutive armor, mechanized, and firepower resources. For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated, second-hand, Russian Army trucks was not enough.

A Few Oscillating Ruminations on Prigozhin 

Serum est cavendi tempus in mediis malis. (The time for caution is too late when we are in the midst of evils.) It might have been plausible enough for many experts and observers to believe it would have been in the best interest of Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically to ensure that he and his unit commanders will play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities will be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. That might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. In that vein, Prigozhin ostensibly could have made a genuine go at using his considerable political influence with Putin, speak truth to power and so on, and implore him to provide the Wagner Group with a greater say in how it will execute missions in support of Russian Federation Armed Forces. Yet, such a political move would have been tricky or if not a grave blunder. Prigozhin is savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. True, despite the nature of professional relations between Putin and Prigozhin concerning the Wagner Group and military affairs, more important was their personal relationship. That relationship, recall, was at the crux and the apex of Prigozhin’s standing in the regime and in military circles as well as his sense of entitlement to issue criticism of the top military leadership of the Russian Federation and foist his cconvictionsupon everyone on how his organization could best be used in Ukraine.

Putin has shown considerable regard for Prigozhin bbutfor quite some time he has shown even greater regard for Shoigu professionally and personally (privately). Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements. Militarily, a sine qua non for Putin is to possess without doubt, to believe with comfort, that the Russian Federation has the capability to successfully attack and destroy the US and its interests with nuclear weapons.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigozhin was surely well-aware that Putin really did not need at any point, for any reason, and especially during the flailing special military operation would have been an extra problem that from one angle might simply boil down to him as mere in-house bickering between two “closely ranked” associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s preceding June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin is conceivably someone well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him on anything that is not quite an emergency. After all, in the Wagner Group, he has long-demonstrated that effectively dealing with, managing, and understanding strong-spirited and strong-willed men is his forte. A leader must be strong, but also. at the right time, compassionate.

If one might see some plausibility in greatcharlie’s discussion along this line about Prigozhin, one might be been able to accept or at least consider that on his own volition, he very unlikely would have pushed the matter of his struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov to the point where his forces amassed for days in plain view on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation–even the US had then under surveillance by satellite–would after a very public announcement of rebellion, begin a military drive toward their offices. True, that is exactly how things appeared to have happened to many. Still, it was unlikely the case.

To gnaw a bit further on this point, there can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin has greatly concern himself with what Putin has been facing in these very trying times for the Russian Federation following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. What Putin thinks is of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin is the priority. Discussing Prigozhin during an interview, political activist Aleksei Navalny stated: “[Prigozhin] didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In the old-fashioned, out-moded sense, Prigozhin is under obligation to Putin. Yet, as a knock on to all of this, greatcharlie will go out on a limb and state that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever act in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life.

The Platters was one of the most successful vocal groups of the early rock and roll era. Their distinctive sound was a bridge between the pre-rock Tin Pan Alley tradition and the growing new genre. “Only You (And You Alone)” (often shortened to “Only You”) is a pop song composed by Buck Ram. It was originally recorded by The Platters in 1955. In the first verse of this song about true devotion and love which seem to greatcharlie to be befitting Prigozhin’s “frame of mind” on Putin are the words: “Only you can make all this world seem right / Only you can make the darkness bright / Only you and you alone can thrill me like you do / And fill my heart with love for only you.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restaurateur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

One might hazard to suggest that it is Prigozhin’s nourishing side which seeks to sustain his relationship with Putin and give him the support he needs to fortify his regime’s interests abroad. It is the destructive side of Prigozhin that Putin has exploited to achieve the ends of his expressed and secretive foreign and national security policies. Expectedly, some observers might dare say that Prigozhin’s desire to undertake such a morbid venture is part and parcel of some severe pathology. (Of course, similar private military contractors “could hardly thrive” in the socially and technologically advanced industrialized countries of the West.)

Perhaps somewhere at the confluence of the two modes of thinking deep within, there is a conflict. He has stood casually among piles of Wagner Group troops he recruited, many from Russian Federation prisons, piled in bags in storage rooms and laid out in fields. He openly admitted to the loss of 40,000 of those who joined his organization. The potency of it all is readily apparent. Prigozhin is still only human. There must be moments when he wonders what it is all amounting to. The US author Megan Devine provides words that may be apposite in this context in her bestseller, It’s OK That You’re Not OK: Meeting Grief and Loss in a Culture That Doesn’t Understand (Sounds True, 2017): “There are losses that rearrange the world. Deaths that change the way you see everything, grief that tears everything down. Pain that transports you to an entirely different universe, even while everyone else thinks nothing has really changed.”

There are those who would suggest Prigozhin has become bitter and disillusioned about the world around him, the Putin regime; essentially he is feeling jaded. Of course, it was the largesse of Putin’s regime that over the years  allowed him to become a billionaire. On a more specific level, it might be posited that Prigozhin has become jaded with regard to the Ukraine War. There may very well be scope to that idea. He has talked of moving on with his Wagner Group to better things. To that extent there may also be some materiality. It would be questionable to characterize Prigozhin as a cynic who is endlessly expressing his underlying distrust of everything. Yet, far from believing the Russian Federation’s situation in Ukraine cannot become better, Prigozhin appears determined to right wrongs by those he feels have failed Putin and the Russian Federation and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat somehow.

In greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled, “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, it was noted that there have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian Federation units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it went on further to state: “It would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restauranteur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

According to Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2023, a shoot-out allegedly erupted in the settlement of Stanytsia Luhanska (Luhansk Oblast) between Russian Army soldiers and Wagner Group troops concerning which side is to blame for Russia’s failures amid the invasion of Ukraine. Those reports were not substantiated by Kyiv or confirmed by any sources in Moscow. On June 2, 2023, Prigozhin, writing on Telegram, alleged his troops had discovered 12 locations in rear areas where Russian Federation Defense Ministry officials had planted various explosive devices, including hundreds of anti-tank mines. He further reported that when he inquired with Defense Ministry officials as to why the charges had been set, they explained it was an order from their superiors. Prigozhin stated: “It was not necessary to plant these charges in order to deter the enemy, as it [the area in question] is in the rear area. Therefore, we can assume that these charges were intended to meet the advancing units of Wagner.” Prigozhin noted that none of the charges went off and no one was hurt. Still, he added: “We assume this was an attempt at a public flogging.”

The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering?

If Putin had suddenly spoken out on the matter before the rebellion and in Solomonesque fashion, directed Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to work out an amicable plan to resolve their differences on the sustentation and upkeep of the Wagner Group and present their results to him, the respective loyalty and obedience of all three would have been put to the test. Shoigu and Gerasimov pretty much control the whole show which is essentially the problem to which Prigozhin has been calling attention. Under such a scenario, they would unlikely have been willing to brook any serious discussion of making the Wagner Group a stronger and far greater force. Prigozhin would most likely have remained flawlessly obedient to Putin’s orders to hash it out but deep down would hardly have been interested in putting too much time into butting heads with the leadership of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff. Prigozhin would probably see in advance that the most trying part of such a “confrontation” would be not be contending with the disdain of Shoigu and Gerasimov toward him, but their obsolescent preconceptions of military affairs and military science in general, which he might foresee would doubtlessly have caused them to filter his new ideas for the role of his organization through their archaic and prosaic ones. (It is possible that Shoigu and Gerasimov also had viewed the relationship of the Wagner Group to their organization’s as parasitical. Their actions concerning the combat support and combat service support of Wagner give force to that idea.) The only concession Prigozhin might have made under such circumstances would be to agree to keep his Wagner Group troops in Ukraine for the duration of the conflict and maintain its presence in-country at a certain strength. Shoigu and Gerasimov would have needed to make many concessions to satisfy Prigozhin based on past behavior. Still, even if some allegedly practical plans might be worked out and presented to Putin, in this hypothetical, what would be presented might better reflect what is possible than what will be. Nous sommes reconnaissant de votre considération et croyons que vous aurez du plaisir à être partenaire avec nous. Only the emergence of some exigent circumstance could have had the effect of shifting more power to one side or another on the “control” issue. Not to get too far ahead, but it would seem the Wagner Group Rebellion provided just such an emergency.

Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Supreme Economic Eurasian Council at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, May 25, 2023. The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering? Perhaps something deeper was going in his remarkable mind.

Fun and Games, Quicks and Aberrations

As alluded to earlier, Prigozhin’s wailing has not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out. 

Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling many elites of the Russian Federation who find him to be anathema and not a forewarning of things to come. Perhaps making such nettlesome utterances helps to pass the time for those at the top of the food chain in Moscow. Prigozhin, himself, has made his thoughts on a mutual dislike between him and Russian elites living in the luxurious Moscow suburb of Rublyovka very public. Laughing off aforementioned reports that he had offered to reveal Russian troop positions to Ukrainian military intelligence in exchange for Kyiv’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated in an audio message posted on Telegram: “People from Rublyovka” could be behind the allegations.” He went on to state in his unique style: “Of course they will pour as much s*** on me as they can.” La leçon d’elegance de Yevgeny Prigozhin.

If Prigozhin’s original comments concerning a possible revolution in the Russian Federation actually was a manifestation of his brand of acidulous humor directed at antagonizing political and business elite at home, surely they were not appreciated among leaders of the FSB, especially since they came just before raids were launched along the Russian Federation’s borders by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian groups. The eyes of FSB officials should have become strained after watching Prigozhin’s every more at that point. Given their reaction to events concerning the Wagner Group later in June, they would seem to have thrown little more than a few stray glances his way.

Intriguingly, the ultranationalist political figure Igor Girkin has alleged via a string of videos that Prigozhin’s public pronouncements concerning the military campaign in Ukraine as merely “a project” created by an influential group within Putin’s inner circle. Girkin, known among associates by the cognomen “Strelkov” (Shooter) is an anti-semite, and is likely unstable. He is a former officer in Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Girkin gained notice as an operative behind the Russian Federation’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. In the aftermath of the invasion, he became a prominent player in the effort to establish Nova Rossiya (New Russia) on the sovereign territory of Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odessa. Girkin insists Prigozhin efforts are backed by Sergey Kiriyenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the President of the Russian Federation, who Putin has appointed to oversee the occupied Ukrainian lands. Girkin has been quoted as saying: “Kiriyenko is openly at war with Shoigu, which is why Prigozhin attacks the Defense Ministry.” To that extent, Girkin claims Prigozhin is “not just a man whose eyes were suddenly opened and began speaking the truth.”

Girkin asserts further that “Kiriyenko is backed by the Kovalchuk brothers, people who are part of the President’s inner circle.” Yury Kovalchuk is the chairman and the largest shareholder of Rossiya Bank. According to the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), together with his brother Mikhail Kovalchuk, as well as Mikhail Mishustin, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, Andriy Turchak, the Secretary of the General Council of United Russia–Putin’s political party, Prigozhin, and others, he formed the influential Kovalchuk-Kiriyenko group.

It is important to note that Girkin emphasizes that Prigozhin is “not Russian by nationality,” more than insinuating that just as the “majority of Bolsheviks,” he is of Jewish origin and thereby poses a considerable threat to Russia. Ultimately, Girkin and all others similar to him–and there are many similar to him in the Russian Federation–are political figures that Putin must manage, not Prigozhin. Girkin, clearly a creature of the worst kind from the Russian Federation’s Intelligence Community, appears vindictive, passionate, ill-balanced, jealous, envious. The intelligence services of many countries–especially those in the US–have their fair share of Girkins. The utmost should be done to guard against them. That is not always the case: disco inferno!

Interestingly, so intense and focused had been the internecine quarreling between elites in Moscow that rarely heard publicly from them at the time was that old chestnut that the invisible hand of the US and its Western alter egos is behind all that has gone wrong for the Russian Federation and that is all part of a long-term plan destroy their country.

Prigozhin speaking on his media service channel on Telegram. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert dedicated to Russian servicemen taking part in the military operation in Ukraine on the eve of Defender of Fatherland Day at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, February 22, 2023. There was surely great contrast between the ebullience displayed by Putin at the patriotic event and his thoughts and feelings behind the scenes about what his military commanders are doing in Ukraine and what he can expect from them as the war continues. Many decisions and actions made by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance. In examining this issue, greatcharlie seeks to reinforce somewhat likely conclusions by foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in the US and around the world not just concerning Putin’s control of Russian Federation Armed Forces, and to some degree, his security services as well, but also his culpability for crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as soldiers. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Many decisions and actions taken by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance, a perspective put in plain view during his February 24, 2022 address, broadcasted just as the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) began. With no pretension intended, greatcharlie states the Russian Federation’s handling of its wrongful invasion at all levels has been deplorable. What arouses an interest at this juncture has been Putin’s lack of control over many “big things” during the massive enterprise. Within the boundaries of its faculty, here greatcharlie humbly provides a few insights on how many things have gone wrong for Putin, the colossal issues that now beset him concerning the war, how he might seek to gain firmer control of the situation, and what that might mean going forward. Hopefully, greatcharlie provides new perspectives not just concerning Putin’s control of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces), and to some degree, his security services, but also his culpability for heinous crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as unarmed soldiers. An historic parallel to his lack of control over events in the field is presented. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC) was an Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, born in Athens. At the age of 30, Xenophon led one of the largest Greek mercenary armies of the Achaemenid Empire, the Ten Thousand, that famously attempted to seize Babylon but failed in 401 BC. As a writer, one of his works was Cynegeticus, usually translated as On Hunting or Hunting with Dogs. In discussing his wish that readers would find value in his treatise, Xenophon writes a passage which interestingly parallels greatcharlie’s desires regarding this essay. He states: ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν. οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι τὰ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι: ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὸ ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι:καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. (Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation—philosophers I will not call them —because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set, will say that what is well and methodically written is not well and methodically written—for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres, but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted.) (Regarding the presentation of the Greek text, greatcharlie asks its readers to kindly pardon its indulgence. It is presented here in “private” acknowledgement and celebration of someone of the utmost importance who will begin her undergraduate studies in the Classics in the Fall of 2023!)

I. The Magnitude of the Ukraine Disaster Begins to Take Form within Putin 

Stepping into the realm of conjecture, greatcharlie can imagine Putin, at the time of his decision to launch the special military operation was girded by the belief that his extreme action was necessary to secure a spiritual victory for mankind over the ugly evil of Nazism. However, Putin at the time of this writing may see the situation a bit differently. Clearly, he has plunged his country and the world in a challenging situation by acting on what he doubtlessly would likely still call “certainties” concerning Ukraine, NATO Expansion, and Western threat to the Russian Federation.

Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them.

Putin attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them..

II. Putin’s Actual Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

When there are missing pieces among facts collected in an investigation, a reliable imagination can be very useful. One can imagine what might be happening with another party. That supposition could become a working hypothesis. One then can act upon it, and if lucky, the investment in time and energy will prove justifiable. As alluded to earlier, the received wisdom among many Western military analysts and Russia scholars is that The Kremlin runs the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and in their view “today the Kremlin means Putin.” His military advisers are Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. Evidence offered of his control of the armed forces is the fact that “both generals serve “entirely at the pleasure of Putin” and “the respective predecessor of each was summarily dismissed.” One steps out on an attenuated thread when standing behind such evidence to support arguments regarding Putin’s control of the military. What may be perceived as simple truth, in reality is not so simple.

Over the two plus decades of Putin’s leadership, the record shows that unethical and outright criminal behavior can surely be well concealed under the Russian Federation government system. Certainly long before, in the erstwhile Soviet system, corruption in the armed forces was endemic and lucrative enough for those senior commanders engaged in such who would quietly “grease the palms” of superiors and who were not caught. The sales of military equipment to black marketers was the commonplace betrayal of some commanders. Another example that remains in greatcharlie’s memory from the days of the Cold War was learning that fighter pilots would pay commanders in order to serve in certain top tier squadrons. The military is not the only foreign and national security bureaucracy ham-strung and suffering from corruption. Unimaginable but true, even the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB Alexander Borrnikov, an irreplaceable member of Putin’s piratical crew, was shrewdly deceived by subordinates in the FSB 5th Department foreign intelligence service before the special military operation began. (The matter is discussed in further detail later in this essay. SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” for other insights shared on the matter.)

If one It has been suggested by some experrs that in Ukraine, Putin by his own hand destroyed the armed forces that built up over two decades. Looking at this supposition open-mindedly, one might added that if that is so, he certainly did not do it deliberately. However,,it is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was at the hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did a superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind. On February 24, 2022, they rolled the dice and poured their troops into Ukraine as ordered, hoping somehow that things might fall into place. Things did not go their way. Putin most likely had no idea how much damage was being done by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He could hardly admit even now that he did not know. If he did not need them now as a buffer between himself all the many failures militarily, and all the political drama, and if he had anyone else tied as closely to him that he knew as well and could turn, Putin would have likely sent them to higher service already, as is the pattern. If the Ukraine War were to end in the Russian Federation’s favor, an unlikely outcome, perhaps the two general might face trying times. Putin does not forget or forgive such betrayals. He is not the understanding type.

If one might suggest that it was all a deliberate act of subversion by one or both of the generals, the question would be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous degree in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties.

Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing flat-footed on the ground and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This averment shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round.

Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (right). It is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was atbthe hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did an superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind.

A. Delegation and Disappointment

Further to the preceding point, what did not serve Putin well was any thought that he could delegate matters concerning the special military operation that he typically would have overburdened himself with in the past. It appears to have been a matter of misplaced trust, which is very unusual for Putin. As an executive he made the proper management decision, but given the nature of his regime and its players, it was the wrong choice, at the wrong time, anc the wrong issue to do any delegating over. If Putin had been truly In control of the facts and the moving pieces, greatcharlie goes out on a limb to say he probably would have never gone into Ukraine and as it was, encountered considerable, unexpected resistance or just bad luck. However, if he would have still decided to go in knowing what he knows now, he would very likely have done his homework and to the very best of his ability developed real answers to resolve prospective problems having imagined more than enough possible failures and mishaps that could derail his plans and having most likely rehearsed over and over in his mind more than one way to resolve them. The situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would doubtlessly look a lot different than it does now. Of course, none of that happened.

Power and control are often limited for political authorities, even autocrats, during conventional military operations. That lack of control–along with US experience in Vietnam– is what in part inspired the US Congress to pass the War Powers Act in 1973. Surely, laid bare in Ukraine for Putin is his own lack of control  Certainly many may disagree with this assessment, but those who insist that Putin directly controlled events in Ukraine, even war crimes committed, should look more directly at just how poorly he has controlled aspects of his special military operation. On the four occasions presented here, Putin’s lack of control was self-evident.

1. The First Big Let Down: Russian Federation Intelligence on Ukraine

Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen in the Russian Federation. Far more than just being familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services, in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. (Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership.) In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Before becoming Russian Federation President, Putin served as Yeltsin’s Secretary of Sovet bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser. Having those experiences, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, he should have known that reporting from them must be scrutinized. In a very perplexing way, Putin felt confident enough to appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast announcing the start of the special military operation. Putin said: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” Lastly, he stated: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.”

 As the story goes, the now former head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda and his deputy as well as head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh, reportedly had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. Whatever Putin’s inner voice might have been saying about what he was being told about Ukraine, he closed his ear to it. Putin was apparently so convinced by reporting that Ukrainians were so dissatisfied with the leadership in Kyiv ready to welcome regime change, he attempted to appeal to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to acquiesce to invading Russian Federation forces. Putin seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness to self-interest and to the interest of the Russian Federation. Considering how Putin spoke so boldly in his broadcast to the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) audaciously suggesting they turn on their government, If the whole matter were not so grave, it could be viewed as Armed Forces comical.

Putin (center) Shoigu (left) and Gerasimov (right) at military exercises 2022. Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin, himself, might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was essentially recognized as a master stroke of military genius. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them.

2. A Study in Contrasts: Acumen Displayed in Zapad, Vostok, and Other Military Exercises and Poor Performance on the Battlefield

Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was a master stroke. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them. 

Despite what may have been choreographed to display a well-trained, well-equipped war machine for Putin’s unknowing eyes, the walls fell down in Ukraine. A poor strategy, faulty planning of the military operation, leaving the door open to supply and resupply of arms, equipment and sustenance, failure to decisively conquer by moving up the River Dnieper to cut off the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, reinforcing the failed operations in the Donbas, in part resulted in a stalled invasion and the epic slaughter of a modern army. Putin counted upon commanders with limited combat experience and no experience who more than anything else displayed negligence, inattentiveness to details large and small, delinquencies, and deficiencies. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. As for the concept of the Combined Arms Army, the formations raised and operated under it were as empty with troops as the concept was with promise.

3, Putin’s Faith in Spetsnaz: “A Weapon Is Only as the Man Who Wields It”

Putin has never hidden his admiration for Russian Federation Special Operations Forces. In foreign and national security policy approaches taken by the Russian Federation, special operations forces have been the go-to hammer to swing when the application of force was deemed required by the Kremlin. Such has also been the case with regard to domestic threats, particularly emanating from the Caucasus. Outside of government structures, Putin’s admiration for commando-type formations has likely played a role in his full acceptance and regular utilization of professional military contractors as the Wagner Group which are teaming with erstwhile spetsnaz members. In the opening days of the special military operation, Putin put his appreciation for the Russian Federation’s special operations forces on display by taking time on  February 27, 2022 to broadcast a message congratulating active military personnel and veterans of their formations on their professional holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day”. More than just a canned speech, Putin laid his heart out bare by stating: “You have demonstrated many times that you are prepared to act with the utmost efficiency and under the harshest conditions to precisely and professionally complete the most difficult and demanding missions. You always perform your military duty to protect your native country and citizens with honor and protect Russia’s national interests. The heroic traditions of the special forces find their roots in the centuries-long history of our army. They were fortified during the Great Patriotic War, matured and grew even stronger in Afghanistan and many hotbeds, as well as during the elimination of terrorists gangs both in the North Caucasus and in Syria. Putin said further: “I know that you undergo exactly this kind of training -comprehensive, all-encompassing and intensive, a real school of warfare. You strive to follow the best paragons of courage and bravery, true patriotism, and you set an example for new generations of defenders of the Fatherland and pass on your experience to young servicemen.” Very likely with reference to former spetsnaz serving in the Wagner Group, Putin remarked: “I want to thank the command and the personnel of the special operations forces as well as special forces veterans for their loyalty to the oath, for their impeccable service to the people of Russia and our great Motherland. My special appreciation goes to those who are performing their duty in the special operation to render assistance to the people’s republics of Donbass.”

Putin’s faith in the spetsnaz to carry out their duties to their utmost abilities was warranted, but as is the same with special operations soldiers in every country, they were only human and could only do so much. Placing them with their exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, under the control of Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, did not help. Among the classified US national security materials leaked online through the messaging platform in March 2023 were assessments of officials within the foreign and national security bureaucracies on the strength and capabilities of Russian Federation spetsnaz forces. According to those findings, there was such an overreliance on the specialized units on the frontlines that they consequently suffered atrocious losses. Behind the decision to use spetsnaz in such a role purportedly was skepticism among Russian Federation commanders that their conventional forces’ abilities could achieve objectives set in the invasion plans. Leaked documents also reportedly indicate US officials believe the high casualties of these units has rendered them less effective not only in Ukraine but also in other parts of the world where Russian Federation forces operate. Evidence of the losses in the spetsnaz units apparently was provided by satellite imagery featured among the leaked materials. Before-and-after imagery of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade’s base in southern Russia allegedly revealed that “all but one of five Russian Federation Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” Materials citing intelligence intercepts, assess the 346th brigade “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.” US intelligence analysts, who monitored the return of spetsnaz units to their respective bases, believe that extremely high losses in the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment “could explain why there is no clear [intelligence] signature of their return to garrison.” The loss of so many among the spetsnaz very likely came as a shock to Putin.

4. Hoping the Wagner Group Will Shift the Fight Moscow’s Way

As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Mentioned earlier was also that fact that Wagner Group fighters are typically retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. From the moment the situation went sour in Ukraine, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is widely known that since July 2022, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. To an extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be the saving grace of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 

However, it was not long before everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops. According to the best statistics available to greatcharlie, since April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As alluded to earlier, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner Group troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut.

In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin has expressed concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. Surely, Putin maybe somewhat concerned that the Wagner Group’s losses may eventually become so great that the organization would not be available to handle other foreign and national security policy matters for some time to come. In a pinch, perhaps the Wagner Group could recruit from among special operations veterans who served in the FSB and Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, but those former operators would for the most part lack the same level of battlefield experience spetsnaz from the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost in Ukraine possessed.

The full list of disappointments for Putin of or pertaining to the Ukraine enterprise is frightfully long and would overload and overwhelm this essay if included. Though, as aforementioned, theories of Putin’s control over the Russian Federation Armed Forces are accepted, it appears that nearly every theory confirming his alleged control cannot figuratively hold water.

Putin (left) and Gerasimov (right) holding a press conference following announcement that Gerasimov had become overall Russian Federation commander in Ukraine. Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

B. The Power to Hire and Fire Generals: What is It Worth?

Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

1. Putin Sacked a Slew of Generals in May 2022

Based on information made public by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, on May 19, 2022, Putin fired two senior commanders Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, who had commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov of the Black Sea Fleet. Osipov was reportedly fired following the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, which was a major embarrassment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Moscow-based media group, RBCreported on June 1, 2022, that on May 30, 2022, Putin issued a decree dismissing senior commanders of the security services. The list of those removed from their posts included: Major General of Police Vasily Kukushkin, who was head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir region; Major General Alexander Laas, deputy head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory; and, Major General Andrey Lipilin, head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region. Major General Alexander Udovenko of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Major General Yuri Instrankin, deputy head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were also among the dismissed. Additionally, Putin reportedly fired Police Colonel Emil Musin, who was the first deputy head of the Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Putin Fired 22 Russian Army Generals in August 2022

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence reported that General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 had been sacked. it was at that time there were the rather quiet, yet widely suspected firings of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was the senior but not overall command of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine and General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine. US officials estimated at the time of these dismissals that more than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured, which represented more than 50% of the number of troops Russia initially deployed in  the special military operation. According to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, at least 10 generals were among those killed.

3. Putin Fires Russian Army Generals for Failed Response to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in September 2022

Based on information from Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Telegraph reported on September 12, 2022 that Putin fired Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in a recent offensive in the east.

4. Putin Replaces Overall Commander in Ukraine in January 2023 and Fires Russian Army General for Vuhledar Fiasco in March 2023

A shift in command well-known among those following events in the Ukraine War was the replacement of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin by Gerasimov as overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”. On or just before March 26, 2023, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, had been removed from his post. Muradov had previously come under criticism for his failure in Vuhledar from Prigozhin who believed its capture was possible and may have had the effect of turning the war in Moscow’s favor. The Moscow Times, described as an independent English- and Russian-language online newspaper with offices in Amsterdam that is currently outlawed in Russia, also reported that Muradov had been suspended, One of the Moscow Times’ sources told the online daily, “Muradov was suspended because he was a crazy idiot who could command soldiers to die. Many complained about him.”

In February 2023, Muradov attacked Vuhledar by sending his soldiers into minefields, right under the artillery fire of the Ukrainians. As a consequence of his actions, reportedly two elite Russian Naval Infantry brigades, one presumed to be the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 103 pieces of equipment were reportedly lost in just three days. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.”

As the record indicates, on every occasion when Putin, usually via his Defense Minister, sacked a group of generals who underperformed, a month or a couple of months later, he was dismissing another group for similar, if not parallel failures. Sacking a general, more than just a punishment, is a very strong form of public embarrassment. By now, everyone interested in Putin has recognized that he rarely reverses his own decisions. (If that were the case, he surely would have reversed his decision to invade Ukraine. Declaring success early on and offering purported measurables among other things would have been the most likely off ramp.) Firing generals from commands whose records he doubtlessly reviewed and gave ultimate approval for top assignments unlikely came easy for him. Perhaps Putin may even be concerned that it reveals that he is not the best judge of people, that he has lost his touch, and worst of all, it confirms for some that he is not infallible. His mistakes with the military have very noticeably begun to pile up. Interestingly, despite being punished, the generals who were sacked will at least live to see another day. The soldiers, some incredibly young, whose lives they carelessly wasted in Ukraine will not have that chance.

There is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide an apology, legal advice, or worst, a legal defense, for Putin over war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Thoee among greatcharlie’s readers who may feel anything of the kind is being offered here to Putin, then it is respectfully suggested they stop reading the commentary at this point for it would surely be unreasonable, unconstructuve to continue with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

Alexander Gardiner’s famous photograph of US President Abraham Lincoln, and Union Army Major General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (right) and Allan Pinkerton (left) at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862. Although many readers, particularly in the US, both technically and perhaps more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America.

C. Another Leader Who Struggled To Control His Commanders During Wartime

Although many readers, particularly in the US both technically, and more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America. The author of the military law was jurist Franz Lieber, a German lawyer, political philosopher, and combat veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Lieber essentially modernized the military law of the 1806 Articles of War to ensure the Union Army could prosecute its war against the Confederate States of America with legitimacy.

However, despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the #humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

In fairness to Sherman, it must be noted that he acted in accord with the concept and intent of Lincoln’s Lieber Code when he gave explicit instructions to his troops regarding their conduct while on their march through Georgia, but there were a few deviations. In his Special Field Order No. 120, Sherman out of necessity encouraged foraging and the confiscation of livestock as he left his Army Group’s supply lines behind to travel so deep, so fast, and so furiously into Georgia. Home invasions were off limits. However, if antagonized by Confederate Army soldiers, Union Army officers were granted permission to destroy private and industrial property. Additionally, the field order permitted able-bodied Black laborers to join the march, but commanding officers were instructed to prioritize the distribution of supplies for soldiers of their Army Group. The majority of Union Army soldiers complied with Field Order No. 120, but some dubbed “bummers” roamed the countryside intentionally terrorizing civilians and looting. Although bummers were technically engaging in forbidden activities, the overall psychological impact of their actions on the local population was in sync with the purpose of the march. The greatest damage done by Sherman’s troops was the destruction of Georgia’s railroad lines, both a conveyor for industries and military transportation. Union Army soldiers would rip up and melt down tracks in full view of the demoralized populace.

Union Army troops tearing up railroad tracks in Georgia as Confederate civilians watched in horror (above). Despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

The text of the Lieber Code was arranged to create concordance with the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863) and prohibited racist discrimination against Black soldiers of the Union Army, specifically by Confederate Army troops who denied them the rights and privileges of prisoners of war. The military law clearly had little impact on the treatment of racially segregated Black soldiers of the US Colored Troops (USCT) by their White Union Army comrades in arms. At the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), incredulously, yet painfully true, White soldiers of the Union Army’s 1st Division essentially assisted soldiers of the Confederate States Army massacre Black soldiers of the 4th Division (USCT) in the midst of the fighting. (SEE the February 28, 2023 greatcharlie post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”.

On top of that, a succession of commanders failed to meet Lincoln’s expectations during the war. He could insist upon regular consultations on their battle plans, but he could not control what they actually did on the battlefield. He could only remove them. or allow them to resign, but he could not repair the damage they had done to the Union effort, or do anything about the wastage of Union Army soldiers. Very briefly, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, having previously functioned as Commander of the Army and Department of Northeastern Virginia from May 27, 1861 to July 25, 1861, served as a general in the Army of the Potomac until after the Second Battle of Bull Run when he was relieved of command at his own request on September 6, 1862. Major General George “Little Mac” McClellan was appointed Commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, and later, the Army of the Potomac (July 26, 1861 to November 9, 1862). In 1862, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign unraveled after the Seven Days Battles, and he also failed to decisively defeat the forces of General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Frustrated by McClellan’s cautious tactics, Lincoln removed him from command. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside served as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from November 9, 1862 to January 26, 1863. Following his infamous “Mud March”.and the senseless slaughter of his troops during the Union Army’s defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Joseph Hooker served as Commander of the Army and Department of the Potomac from January 26, 1863 to June 28, 1863. Concerned about Hooker were first raised when reports were made that his headquarters doubled as a combination of bar and brothel. Hooker’s timid command performance and grave defects as a commander–he lost mental control of his command in battle–were exposed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Ostensibly recognizing “faults” in his behavior and performance and reportedly sensing the distrust of Lincoln and Union Army General in Chief Major General Henry Halleck, Hooker resigned his command on June 28, 1863, on the eve of battle. Major General George Meade jumped in as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from June 28, 1863 to June 28, 1865. Meade repulsed the forces of the General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg from July 1, 1863 to July 3, 1863 with tactical adroitness; however, he was castigated by some for failing to hotly pursue the remainder of Lee’s forces. He instead allowed them to escape from his immediate reach. Lincoln in duress penned a letter to Meade dated July 14, 1863, relieving him of his command but never sent it. Success was not assured at Gettysburg, but Meade had apparently failed to keep any preconceived follow through firmly in mind in the event of victory.. Although Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, his independence of action was sharply curtailed after March 9, 1864, when General Ulysses S. Grant took control of Union  forces from Halleck and was named Commanding General of the US Army. 

Despite keeping a close eye on them to the point that he nearly micromanaged the war, Lincoln could only possess marginal control over the actions of his most senior commanders. He surely had even less of a chance to control the actions of subordinates well beneath them in the chain of command on the battlefield. A law such as theLieber Code could at best signal intent. In the end, what was done was done. If unlawful or unethical acts were witnessed, they could at best be reported and adjudicated within the system of military justice, or if egregious enough, reviewed in Congressional hearings. 

Painting of the representatives of 12 countries at the conference held in the Alabama room at Geneva’s Hotel de Ville August 22, 1864 where they adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” (above). The International Committee of the Red Cross while recognising that it is “primarily the duty and responsibility of a nation to safeguard the health and physical well-being of its own people,” knew there would always, especially in times of war, be a “need for voluntary agencies to supplement . . . the official agencies charged with these responsibilities in every country.” To ensure that its mission was widely accepted, it required a body of rules to govern its own activities and those of the involved belligerent parties. A year later, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the US Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. A total of twenty-six delegates from 16 countries came to Geneva. The meeting was presided over by Swiss General Guillaume Henri Dufour. The conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.” Representatives of 12 countries signed the convention at that time.

IV. Under the Geneva Convention Military Commanders Are Responsible for What Happens in Field

To the extent the political authorities cannot control events in the field, commanders take on greater responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Under Geneva Convention I , Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129; Geneva Convention  IV, Article 146; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 28; and, Geneva Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87, it is clear that commanders shalll be held criminally responsible under the law if they knew or should have known that subordinates were going to violate the law by committing a war crime, yet failed to take steps to prevent it. Further, commanders would be held liable for failing to punish or report subordinates who have already committed a war crime. To that extent, commanders are viewed as being in control of their troops and being responsible for all that transpires within their commands at all times. That rationale gains support in the following way. When the commander develops a plan of action, necessary is the requirement to assess all factors relevant at the time, such as ground and enemy forces, your own forces, logistics, courses open. (In greatcharlie’s day, it was referred to as the METT+T analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available. Yes, greatcharlie’s editor is that old!) Once the plan is decided, the commander issues orders to subordinates. The next aspect of control is the direction of the engagement, during which it is expected that the commander will take into account the law of armed conflict. 

V. Likely Big Lesson Learned by Putin Concerning Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 

Having learned a very painful lesson with his conventional forces during the special military operation, Putin will ensure that he fully controls the “crown jewels” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: the nuclear triad. That effort to establish that control has been mostly revealed with each public move he has made with regard to the supply, continual redeployments, and drilling of those forces. With regard to to those who command the nuclear forces, as explained in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: What Comes Next for Putin at Home and in Ukraine?: An Assessment One Year After the Start of His Special Military Operation”, just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, literally Strategic Purpose Rocketry Troops) which control land-based ICBMs, the strategic bombers and other nuclear capable airframes of the Voenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force), and satellites of the Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony (Russian Aerospace Defense Forces) without a shadow of doubt would go into action. In addition, commanders of the strategic submarines of the Voyenno-morskoy Flot (Russian Naval Force) in both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would execute their missions. Indeed, commanders who are in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise. Surely, there are more than enough members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces hurting over the nightmare that has befallen their comrades in Ukraine. They more than likely want to dish out some “payback” against those countries that they likely perceive–based on what they surely have been told–created circumstances there, and many can deliver payback in the extreme.

At the Battle of Camarón, an important episode of the Second French Intervention in Mexico (December 8, 1861 to June 27, 1867), the 3rd company of 62 Legionnaires and three Legion officers, led by Captain Jean Danjou was sent to reinforce a French military convoy, transporting 3 million francs in gold bullion, siege guns, and sixty wagons of ammunition. Information was received that the convoy would be ambushed. Before Danjou could reach the convoy, the led elements of a force of 3,000 Mexican Army infantry and cavalry made contact with his unit and he was forced to make a defensive stand at the Hacienda Cameron, in Camarón de Tejeda, Veracruz, Mexico. At the point when he recognized that victory would be absolutely impossible to achieve against the larger Mexican force massed around their defenses, Danjou urged his soldiers to take an oath to fight to the death rather than surrender. He made them swear their fealty on his wooden hand. Danjou then shared his bottle of wine and encouraged his men with has been called  “those noble words that warm one’s heart and makes the final sacrifice less difficult to face.”  When the French Foreign Legion moved to France, Capitain Danjou’s wooden hand was taken to Aubagne, where it remains in the Legion Museum of Memory.  The hand is the most cherished artifact in Legion history.  April 30th is celebrated as “Camerone Day,” an important day for the Legionnaires, when the wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is brought out for display. In 1892, a monument commemorating the battle was erected on the battlefield containing a plaque with the following inscription in French: Ils furent ici moins de soixante / Opposés a toute une armée / Sa masse les écrasa / La vie plutôt que le courage / Abandonna ces soldats Français / Le 30 Avril 1863 / A leur mémoire la patrie éleva ce monument. (Here there were less than sixty opposed to a whole army. Its numbers crushed them. Life rather than courage abandoned these French soldiers on April 30, 1863.  In their memory, the fatherland has erected this monument”) The railing from the Legion grave at Camarone can now be found at the village of Puyloubier near Aix-en-Provence. (The importance of the Battle of Camarón with regard to the history and culture of the French Foreign Legion is discussed in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations.”

Although perhaps willing to accept that Putin is the quintessential “bad actor”, it appears almost impossible for many to believe Putin could decide for the Russian people that as a country the Russian Federation would accept a similar fate, mutantis mutandis, rather accept what he ostensibly would perceive and envision as the nightmare of life under the thumb of Western powers and the near certain invasion of their country in the near future. Indeed, observers might try to consider a scenario in which Putin after observing the Russian Federation Armed Forces lose one decisive battle after another in rapid succession and all had unraveled in Ukraine, would make a nationwide broadcast one evening explaining to the Russian people that the Russian Federation was about to be invaded by the proxy forces of the Western powers, that the special military operation, meant as a pre-emptive action has lifted the curtain on the true nature of the Western powers’ objectives and operations in Ukraine and based on all that has been revealed concerning the actions of the Western powers and the astronomical support of the offensive military activities of their partner in Kyiv, despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin for them not to continue their aggressive activities in the Russian Federation’s near abroad, a state of total war existed between the Russian Federation and the US, its NATO allies, and the EU. He would tell the Russian people that their support, prayers, and courage were needed as his government took its next steps. Putin would likely display sangfroid and equanimity, and speak with the tone of a leader in complete command of a situation.(Readers might cast their minds back to Nazi German Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ February 18, 1943 address at the Berlin Sportpalast following the Wehrmacht’s epic loss at Stalingrad to the Soviet Army, in which he zealously implored the German people to commit anew to an all-out war effort: Totaler Krieg–Kürzester Krieg! (Total War–Shortest War!) From the point of that hypothetical broadcast, it would most likely just be a matter of time before the worst possibility would materialize.

It is greatcharlie’s contention, without pretense, some absurd desire to establish some greater sense of importance, or a ridiculous effort to claim of greater sapience, that Western diplomats would do well to reflect on this assessment and consider how responding to what they might deem as Putin’s misperceptions to open the door to great possibilities.)

The Russian Federation’s Sarmat Intercontinental ballistic missile (above) is a 115 feet (35-meters) tall and has a range of 11,185 miles (18,000km)(). Some estimate this to be higher. It can carry at least 10 multiple targetable re-entry vehicles – each with a nuclear warhead – which can each be aimed at a different target. It can also deliver hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles that can travel further and faster, flying in a variable path to overcome missile defenses. Just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad and supporting organizations would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise.

VI. The Arrest Warrant for Putin

In Paragraph 6 of  the First Oration of his Catalonia Orations, Marcus Tulius Cicero, an excoriation of rival senator Lucius Sergius Catiline, who he alleged sought to overthrow the Roman Senate, he writes: Quamdiu quisquam erit, qui te defendere audea, vives, et vives ita, ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firms praesidiis obsessed, ne commovere te contra rem publicam possis. Multorum te etiam oculi et aures non sentience, sicut adhuc fecerunt, speculabuntur atque custodient. (As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live, but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to.stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall perceive them.) Doubtlessly, with the necessary adjustments, surely this is the fate many in Western governments hope will befall Putin and he would be left in such a depleted state. However, greatcharlie suggests the satisfaction that they seek will unlikely manifest and the cost of any attempt to get their hands on Putin would be far worse than steep. Such attempts to create such a circumstance would inflame Putin’s ardor to a degree one could only reasonably expect the worst.

On March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant of arrest for Putin in the context of the situation in Ukraine. (Indicted along with Putin on that day was Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation since 2021.) As Russian Federation President, Putin has been declared allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” The Pre-Trial Chamber II also stated that “the crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory at least from February 24, 2022.” The Pre-Trial Chamber II further explained that it has reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility “(i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” The alleged war crime as outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber II is horrendous. At the nub of the matter is the issue of Putin’s level of control over the actions of all Russian Federation elements in Ukraine.

So often it has been the case with Putin’s presidency, legal action in response to his behavior on the world stage may have been warranted, but not necessarily required given the context of situations. Prioritizing the furtherance of international peace and security, the leader of Russian Federation with an enormous nuclear arsenal under his control, and members of his coterie, were hit with tongue lashings, finger-wagging, and sanctions. National governments, regional organizations, and international organizations would level economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and national legislatures would pass punishing business and financial laws designed to stifle the ability of the Russian Federation business community, particularly the country’s elite, to maintain and generate within advanced industrialized systems. The Magnitsky Law passed in the US created a considerable degree of pain and aggravation for Putin. Other than that, and a few other other coercive measures, Putin was repeatedly extended a degree of latitude. Putin was surely smart enough to recognize that. (One might posit that he flaunted that latitude allowed to him in the faces of Western powers by invading Ukraine.) In an environment in the West in which political leaders, especially among NATO and EU countries were being hounded over not doing enough to support Ukraine and not enough to decouple and lash out against Putin, the choice of the US-led international community became to exercise legal power over the Russian Federation President. Urging the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, though significant, was seemingly rather trivial in comparison with the greater task of assisting Ukraine in defeating the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, it helped set a path toward what may be a future of even more trying diplomatic efforts with Putin, which to great extent–unless the international community makes another choice, the unthinkable choice of granting Putin whatever he wishes–has put the outcome somewhat out of its rational hands.)

A. Putin Still Minimized as an “Oppositional Adolescent” by the West?

As touched upon in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post, it is difficult to see exactly what end was hoped for when the decision was made to indict Putin. There was likely some ego stroke scored as a result of sticking it to Putin, but not much more was accomplished than that. (How horrifying and disappointing it would be to discover the intent was to goad Putin to react adversely and make mistakes. If such is even remotely accurate, perhaps those who hypothetically were impelled by that thought might not have considered a big mistake Putin might have immediately made–and could still make–could have been to start a nuclear war. “Wishful thinking” is not a form of optimism, it is a euphemistic term for denial.)

Whether it was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

Maybe it would have been far more reasonable and practical to demand Putin confess irresponsibility over leading his country into war with so many criminally minded senior officials and military men unaware that he would not have genuine control of those who would eventually perpetrate heinous acts in Ukraine under orders from unstable authorities far beneath those in the Senate Building at the Kremlin as well as some sort of diabolical control from Hell. The chance of Putin cooperating in either case would doubtlessly be the same: zero! One might wonder what would be the plan of the International Criminal Court to successfully and safely take him into custody. 

Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, an arrest warrant can be issued publicly or under seal when the arrest of the person appears necessary to ensure a person’s appearance at trial. Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, the court may request the cooperation in the arrest and surrender from any State on the territory of which the person may be found. The court has no internal enforcement mechanism which would allow it to arrest persons subject to arrest warrants. In the interest of promoting good interstate relations, diplomacy, and peace and security and simply in the planetary interest, under such trying circumstances, discretion in taking such actions–at least refraining from declaring as criminal a party essential to establishing peace–would be the best choice, the better part of valor. Putin’s accountability and culpability for war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian Federation forces was something which could have been dealt with later. The priority now is ending the war if possible.

B. Actualities Concerning Intelligence and Making Claims against Putin

With regard to providing evidence of Putin’s crimes, one would need to be dismissive of the fact that the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation have sophisticated capabilities. One cannot say for certain what would happen if the Kremlin produced its own classified information confirming Putin plainly stated he would brook no behavior by Russian Federation forces in the field of the kind for which he is accused of having some responsibility. Hypothetically, the Kremlin might be able to produce transcripts of communications between errant commanders demonstrating their deliberate effort to conceal their actions from superiors, making false any suggestion that Putin controlled or ordered their illegal actions. To that extent, it might be proven with a sea of declassified official internal documents by the Kremlin that generally Putin did not impose too much on his commanders and within reason, relied on their reports and advice on the special military operation. Of course, one could expect it to possess a profusion of redactions to give them that ultra official feel and if any documents are authentic, to hide any nitty-gritty. With such evidence at hand, the Kremlin would surely insist it has no need to respond to baseless accusations about the Russian Federation President. 

One could unlikely insist as part of any fair and balanced legal process that Russian Federation classified intelligence is of less veracity and should be distrusted outrightly. Turning to the intelligence of one country–for instance the US, the United Kingdom, or Germany–that can provide information collected through electronic eavesdropping externally on the internal communications of the armed forces and security organizations of another country–for example the Russian Federation–with the aim to refute and discredit said monitored country’s own intelligence on what was being discussed among its military and security officials, would be something better than an act of bias and stand the idea of objective justice on its head. The International Criminal Court is supposed to be an objective tool for the world. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness but having stated the former, it believes that such a chauvinistic step and in the end finding Putin “unhesitatingly and with utter conviction” guilty, perhaps even in absentia, rationally imaginable given how predisposed so many that serve in regional and international bodies are to think unfavorably about him. The thinking of the court is certainly not to be judged by greatcharlie. It is only outlining what it perceives as a likely possibility. (This statement is not intended as apophasis.) If one might take into account anything about Putin’s arrest warrant written here could even remotely have some influence, it would at best be as a cautionary assessment for Western foreign and national security bureaucracies to consider before pursuing the arrest warrant matter any further.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) at the Kremlin on March 8, 2023. Whether the action was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice among powers of great influence in the West, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

VII. Energetic Diplomacy: The Best Chance of Stemming Catastrophe

In the aftermath of everything, historians would likely be forced to choose whether there really was something so peculiar about Putin that makes energetic efforts at diplomacy at this stage so taxing. It may actually be the case that the fault for ineffective diplomatic efforts with lies with the foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders of the many countries that had to deal with him. Perchance it was the fault of both parties for failing to see a true middle ground in things satisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless, it is greatcharlie’s conviction that at the present the West is in grave danger. The source of that danger in the Russian Federation. Ending the Ukraine War on favorable or acceptable terms for all parties is of the utmost importance. However, the priority is to ease the world back from an apparent slow spiral to armageddon.

In its March 30th post, greatcharlie suggested that at this point, diplomacy with the Russian Federation on Ukraine has figuratively been knocked off the rails. True, indicting Putin was a step that practically ensured his refusal to negotiate with Kyiv unless he had attained some considerable advantage in Ukraine and his negotiating position would be very strong. However, rather than draw a line there as in March and succumb to despair, here greatcharlie pulls back from the statement that the opportunity for diplomacy has been lost. 

A  Having the Right Answers

Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand, given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made. Putin shall not countenance what he may perceive as a diminution of the great dignity of the Russian Federation. 

Although all countries with an immediate stake in the Ukraine matter should be made aware of the diplomatic effort to achieve an entente with Putin, the new contact may need to be performed discreetly. Perhaps this is best that can be done at this juncture. Hope can be the only thing that comforts people in misery. For Russian people, who are the ones who will decide whether there is a need for change in the direction their country has been moving, hope for that change could be founded through contact between their president and the outside world. Paradoxically, while Putin may indeed enhance his standing among many as they will see the Russian Federation still acting as an important player on the world stage, many others may perceive such diplomacy as proof that the Russian people are viewed as far more than just potential targets for retaliatory nuclear strikes from the the US, the United Kingdom, and France, and written off as nothing to signify. It is suggested by greatcharlie in an opaque way that such a diplomatic effort could even mean far more to the right number of them. In public discussions of the new diplomacy, Western diplomats would do well to emphasize the effort has been undertaken with consideration of the well-being of the Russian people and make other statements of that nature.

There are for certain countless pitfalls that could disrupt or even destroy a new, robust diplomatic effort. What may be most important for Western capitals to recognize are the right answers that will bring a negotiated settlement and peace. There is also the issue of time available. Again, Putin has a large say in how things will turn out and surely has his own timeliness for action. To that extent, until some acceptable path to peace is found, perhaps the greatest danger will remain a decision already made by him to act in some ghastly way.

B. In the Meantime, Will the West Lose Control of Its Junior Partner in Kyiv?

The indications and implications of multiple reporting, to include the Washington Post, of alleged swift action by US foreign and national security policy officials to halt a plan by Ukraine to launch mass strikes against Moscow may be that at least the White House is aware of just how close the world in to a potential nuclear war, it does not want that, and that it now has the extra burden of monitoring the behavior of its “junior partners” in Kyiv. It is uncertain whether the Ukrainian leadership was led to take such a course as result of a lack of wisdom and experience or a complete absorption in self-interest or both. However, if newsmedia stories of this episode are accurate, it would appear that they were blind as beetles to the possibility that their planned assault could have triggered a catastrophic response from the Kremlin to the great detriment of Ukraine, but the whole wide world

If Putin already has a mind and the will to take the most drastic step possible against the West, Kyiv in planning an attack on Moscow could have supplied him with a reason better than anything he could have conjured up. The world moves closer and closer to the edge of the precipice with every errant move as this. It is wonder if there were any other planned Ukrainian actions halted by Western powers that would have brought the world the worst. One wonders how long can this balancing act without a safety net go on without catastrophe.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, (left) and U.S President Joe Biden (right) shake hands during their meeting at the Villa la Grange in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made.

The Way Forward

Putin watched his predecessors mismanage,  breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating not even a simulacrum of what came before it, despite his best efforts, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down “the wide-world and its fading sweets.” It is a wonder Putin has not gone mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him since the special military operation began and even beforehand. Standing on the precipice of losing everything, it would be best for the wide world if Putin can continue to retain his balance. The clear choice for him is either to continue forward or abandon at great personal loss, the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022, and triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West, begun during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Putin has mourned its collapse with considerable grief and disappointment.

Among those who use wisdom and logic, imagination can have value in an investigation. Imagination is a quality many lack, but many also lack wisdom and logic. Often it is the case that a lack of maturity inhibits one ability to reason matters out correctly. Just having an answer, right or wrong, based on some chain of thinking is enough for some. Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is in reality nothing so mysterious about Putin that should lead any national leader to throw the possibility of acceptable relations with the Russian Federation out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Putin’s worst critics will destroy any opportunity for a fruitful course to develop. As noted by greatcharlie here ad nauseum, those leaders must consider what their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation mean not only with regard to Ukraine, but in the bigger picture. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover possibilities for getting many things done by just doing things a bit differently. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the Russian Federation and become civilization’s dénouement. positive changes on one issue can often result in great benefits on another. Respice finem (Have regard for the end.)

Roosevelt’s December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat: Inferences from Its Text on Likely Meditations That Helped Him Create Hope for a Country on the Brink of War

US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt customarily delivered his famous Fireside Chats from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House where he is seen (above) seated at a table before seven microphones and newsreel cameras to his front. Roosevelt began broadcasting Fireside Chats during his presidency on March 12, 1933. They initially served as a means for him to inform the public of what the government was doing to resolve the Great Depression. The December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat is famously known as the “Arsenal of Democracy Speech,” for it is recognized as being the moment Roosevelt declared the US “must be the great arsenal of democracy” for countries already fending off the Axis Powers–Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. The story provides a fitting historical example of the trials and tribulations that can beset a President who must lead his country to war. As a bridge to our days, the situation for countries fighting the Axis Powers in 1940 mirrored that of Ukraine in 2022. The Ukrainians, desiring peace, were torn from it by the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation. Under US leadership, an array of support from Europe and worldwide in response to the pleas of Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelensky for help. It would be interesting not only to look at what Roosevelt sought to communicate in his address, but discern deeper meaning in what he said. Presented is greatcharlie’s interpretation of what his inner thoughts might have been.

On December 29, 1940,  Fireside Chat, the sixteenth in a series of presidential radio broadcasts in the US, as well as Europe and Japan, 32nd President of the US, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, informed the people of their government’s plans to keep the country safe and secure. This particular Fireside Chat is famously known as the “Arsenal of Democracy Speech,” for it is recognized as being the moment Roosevelt declared the US “must be the great arsenal of democracy” for countries already fending off efforts.by the Axis Powers–Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan–to conquer them. This vital part of Roosevelt’s story provides a fitting historical example of the trials and tribulations that can beset a President caused to lead his country to war, a task made more difficult when the priority of the people is maintaining the peace and avoiding overseas conflicts at almost all costs. New priorities had come to fore and had to be accepted. Dark days were ahead. Terrible challenges would need to be endured by the people. Their strength and fortitude would be tested. As a bridge to our days, the situation in 1940 mirrored that of Ukraine in 2022, mutatis mutandis. The Ukrainians, desiring peace, were torn from it by the aggressive actions of its neighbor, the Russian Federation. Under US leadership, an array of support from Europe and worldwide in response to the pleas of Ukrainian President Volodymr Zelensky for help. In Roosevelt’s case in 1940, he was relying principally on the United Kingdom to hold the line against the Axis Powers across its vast Empire and the Commonwealth. There was no country that the US to fall back on for support. The US was the final protective line of freedom, democracy, and civilization, itself.

Certainly, the December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat has been well trodden by historians and Roosevelt scholars for more than eight decades since its original broadcast. Still, greatcharlie thought it would be interesting not only to look at what Roosevelt sought to communicate in his address but what he, then age 57, pondered at the time when he was alone with his thoughts in an attempt to discern deeper meaning in what he said. In presenting its interpretation of what some of Roosevelt’s inner thoughts might have been, greatcharlie has stayed true to actual facts. Each consideration is informed by what was known to be the situation at the time in the US and rest of the world, particularly the United Kingdom. While sharing its impressions regarding Roosevelt’s complexity. greatcharlie has remained grounded in what was possible. Insights that historians and Roosevelt scholars have already presented are not regurgitated, yet support for its Inferences are drawn from historical examples provided in their works. Notions that have generally been discounted or dismissed in the context of the address are not included. Nothing is made too complex and greatcharlie does not pretend to have all of the answers. 

The text of the December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat is drawn from a transcript provided by The American Presidency Project of the University of California at Santa Barbara. Comparisons were made with the online typescript of the address published by the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum to confirm its accuracy. Here, the text is divided into 10 segments with headings to facilitate its examination.

Roosevelt’s December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat,

Roosevelt began broadcasting Fireside Chats during his presidency on March 12, 1933. The broadcasts initially served as a means for him to inform the public of what the government was doing to resolve the Great Depression. While Governor of New York State, Roosevelt had some success using Fireside Chats to inform state residents of the latest developments and steps being taken to provide some relief from the devastating effects of the crisis upon them. The first one he made as governor was on April 3, 1929. During the New Deal, Roosevelt gave a radio address around twice a year, informing the public one or two weeks beforehand with the hope of garnering a large audience. Typically, he would include in the address: aspects of government programs; criticisms of them and his responses; and, expressions of  optimism and encouragement. Roosevelt usually delivered his address from the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House. Reportedly, he would arrive 15 minutes before air time to greet members of the newsmedia, including radio and newsreel correspondents.

Despite the severe nature of the threat posed by the Axis Powers, in his December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat, Roosevelt remained a paragon of sangfroid and equanimity in the face of it all. He was a gentleman at all times publicly. One would expect by reputation that he would be on his game on that day, and show well of his presidency, his country, and his own scruple. While offering answers to the dangers he highlighted, he spoke in an informal and relaxed style, his aim being to create a tone of familiarity and sense of forthrightness among listeners. That evening, Roosevelt was speaking to everyone in the US, including officials with whom he worked and conversed daily. At 9:30PM, Roosevelt began his address. It lasted 36 minutes and 53 seconds.

1. Sentences 1 through 11: The Country Faces a New Crisis Unlike the One Discussed in the 1933 Fireside Chat: It Is a Matter of National Security

Inferences

Peior est bello timor ipse belli. (Worse than war is the very fear of war.) A primary purpose of the December 29, 1940 Fireside Chat naturally was to assuage apprehensions on the rise within the US public concerning ongoing violent events in the world. Equally naturally, more than just explaining that everything would be alright, Roosevelt sought to provide hard facts on what was exactly happening in the world and what his administration was doing in response. To the good fortune of the US, at a time of such great crisis, there was an intrepid president in office of great creativity particularly on matters concerning defense and the armed forces. Indeed, he was correct in every particular. Roosevelt did not exaggerate one jot.

The Roosevelt administration’s isolationist policy, then in effect, assured a considerable degree of non-entanglement in international politics, particularly non-involvement in ongoing and burgeoning conflicts in Europe and Asia. The US took measures to avoid political and military conflicts across the oceans, it continued to quietly manage economic interests in China and Southeast Asia and actually expanded its economic interests in Latin America.

Through the isolationist policy, US citizens who were still suffering the effects of the Great Depression, could sense it was okay to focus onward on family sustainability, employment, and community in some cases. Roosevelt’s administration worked feverishly to resolve the situation. The people needed a bit more time to heal from the Depression’s ills and the isolationist policy allowed them the psychic space to do that.

Many isolationists among political and business leaders, scholars, national and grassroots non-interventionist organizations in the US in1940 surely wanted their country to stand fast, dignified and proud, in the face of provocations by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. Aggressive external parties had a great say in how the US would act. The US could not just stand by as some impressive paragon, placid and imperturbable, while Hitler plotted its utter destruction and the enslavement of its people. Time was of the essence. By the end of 1940, for all intents and purposes, a war with the Axis Powers, for all intents and purposes, had essentially become unavoidable for the US. In 1940, that would have been a hard saying. It Is very likely that for the US, everything would have been lost if the US had failed to act as Roosevelt prescribed.

Roosevelt had to bring the people and many in the government, too, to understand not his truth but “the truth” about the situation the US was in. He had to do so realizing how difficult it was for people to unlearn what they have held true for a long time about their country being able to stay out of war abroad.

Sentences 1 through 11 of the Fireside Chat

“My friends:

This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security; because the nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you, now, and your children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the preservation of American independence and all the things that American independence means to you and to me and to ours.

Tonight, in the presence of a world crisis, my mind goes back eight years to a night in the midst of a domestic crisis. It was a time when the wheels of American industry were grinding to a full stop, when the whole banking system of our country had ceased to function.

I well remember that while I sat in my study in the White House, preparing to talk with the people of the United States, I had before my eyes the picture of all those Americans with whom I was talking. I saw the workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories; the girl behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life’s savings.

I tried to convey to the great mass of American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.

Tonight, I want to do the same thing, with the same people, in this new crisis which faces America. We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism.

We face this new crisis–this new threat to the security of our nation–with the same courage and realism.”

2. Sentences 11 through 21: The Threat

Inferences

Nazi Germany would serve as the best example to illustrate the clear and present danger the US faced. It was a danger that could not be ignored or avoided. Nazi Germany was on the rampage in the world abroad the most in the US knew or were from. It would need to be confronted. It would not be enough to dissuade or deter the Nazis. Nazi German Reichskanzler (Reich Chancellor) Adolf Hitler’s ability to make war had to be destroyed. There was no other option. No amount of coercive diplomacy would convince Hitler to dismantle his war machine. The time that idea might have had any validity as a suggestion had long since passed. France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, all under the control of the Nazis had to be freed. Hitler could not be allowed to feed off their respective resources and manpower of those countries to further build Nazi Germany’s strength and military prowess. The United Kingdom had to be protected. Surely, Roosevelt considered every possibility.

However, the situation in Europe was positively fluid. Just the year before the United Kingdom, France seemed to have answers to blocking Hitler’s plan to conquer the Continent. In the Low Countries–Netherlands, Belgium and even Luxembourg–had no intention of being open doors for a westward drive by Nazi Germany and took defensive measures. Norway was under threat but still free. By December 1940, the United Kingdom was standing alone. It had already fended off Nazi Germany in its skies, and knowing conquest was foremost on Hitler’s mind, it girded itself for an invasion that nearly everyone expected to come. All of that and more was going on at home while its armed forces were fighting furiously against the Axis Powers.

On May 22, 1932, Roosevelt, then New York Governor of New York State, received a Doctor of Laws honorary degree from Oglethorpe University in Atlanta, Georgia during a commencement ceremony. He gave a powerful address on the state of the country and the place of the youth in its future, the precepts of which founded his New Deal plan as US President. Roosevelt’s address also provides insight into his courageous approach to seemingly insurmountable problems. He explained: “The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the country demands bold, persistent experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something . . .We need enthusiasm, imagination and the ability to face facts, even unpleasant ones, bravely. . . .”

How the US could best take on the fight to defeat the respective Axis Powers while remaining neutral was the big question. In developing a concept for doing that Roosevelt seemed to find wisdom in the aphorism “an ounce of prevention would be worth a pound of cure.” Creating more time to prepare by keeping the aforementioned friendly countries, with which the US had not yet become formally allied, was the most appropriate course of action at that point. He would provide encouragement to countries fighting the Axis Powers to hold the line at all points in which the Axis Powers were active, but Roosevelt did not intend to stand by and wait to see how things would turn out. Rather than wait for what came next, he sought to influence what was transpiring to create favorable outcomes on those frontlines.

To the extent it could, the US responded to requests for weapons and resupply of equipment from “belligerents” at war with the Axis Powers. Time was of the essence. Action had to be swift. The window of opportunity to act as supportive as possible on multiple fronts while standing off from the fighting would remain open for only so long. Despite the assistance provided, many being assisted could still fall. That was the case with France.

Regarding the situation of United Kingdom specifically, in 1939, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in cooperation with his French Premier Edouard Daladier fell for a rather prosaic scheme organized by Hitler and his Nazi government, with Italian leader Benito Mussolini in tow, that evinced a frightfully transparent motive. The leaders negotiated to permit Hitler to take control of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. The government in Prague had no role in the talks. Hitler recognized how the Western powers were willing to surrender the peace and territory of others to protect their own peace and well-being. Chamberlain appeared truly naive to those within his own political party in Parliament, the Conservative Party, byname Tories, and within the loyal opposition, the Labour Party. Labour forced a vote of no confidence which ended Chamberlain’s days as Prime Minister.

Sentences 11 through 21 of the Fireside Chat

“Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now.

For, on September 27, 1940, this year, by an agreement signed in Berlin, three powerful nations, two in Europe and one in Asia, joined themselves together in the threat that if the United States of America interfered with or blocked the expansion program of these three nations–a program aimed at world control—they would unite in ultimate action against the United States.

The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.

It was only three weeks ago that their leader stated this: “There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other.” And then in defiant reply to his opponents, he said this: “Others are correct when they say: With this world we cannot ever reconcile ourselves. . . . I can beat any other power in the world.” So said the leader of the Nazis.

In other words, the Axis not merely admits, but the Axis proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their philosophy, their philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.

In view of the nature of this undeniable threat, it can be asserted, properly and categorically, that the United States has no right or reason to encourage talk of peace, until the day shall come when there is a clear intention on the part of the aggressor nations to abandon all thought of dominating or conquering the world.

At this moment, the forces of the states that are leagued against all peoples who live in freedom, are being held away from our shores. The Germans and the Italians are being blocked on the other side of the Atlantic by the British, and by the Greeks, and by thousands of soldiers and sailors who were able to escape from subjugated countries. In Asia, the Japanese are being engaged by the Chinese nation in another great defense. In the Pacific Ocean is our fleet.”

United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill at his seat in the Cabinet Room at 10 Downing Street, London, circa 1940.

3. Sentences 22 through 40: Hitler and the Axis Powers: What They Represent

Inferences

United Kingdom Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, was installed May 10, 1940. As Roosevelt correctly saw the United Kingdom as essentially the aegis of the US, he appeared to depend particularly upon Churchill to hold the line against Hitler as promised. In Churchill’s first speech before the House of Commons, three days after being installed on May 10, 1940 as Prime Minister, he powerfully stated regarding the war: “You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

Roosevelt learned that holding the line would not be a mean feat for the United Kingdom. In a May 15, 1940 cable, Churchill revealed the truth of the dire straits his country found itself in to Roosevelt. He wrote: “The scene has darkened swiftly. The enemy have a marked preponderance in the air, and their new technique is making a deep impression upon the French. I think myself the battle on land has only just begun . . . The small countries are simply smashed up, one by one, like matchwood. We must expect, though it is not yet certain, that Mussolini will hurry in to share the loot of civilization. We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and by parachute and air borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready from them. If necessary, we shall continue the war alone and we are not afraid of that. But I trust you realize, Mr. President, that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. You may have completely subjugated, Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness, and the weight may be more than we can bear.”

By providing weapons to the United Kingdom, the capabilities of its armed forces would be enhanced and the chances of it holding out would be increased. However, Churchill had to be depended upon to hold the line at home, too. Churchill determined that the United Kingdom would fight on, but there were Members in his War Cabinet willing to sign a peace agreement with Hitler. 

With the hope that three parties would work together with the common aim of defeating Nazi Germany, Churchill created a War Cabinet in which two out of five members were Labour politicians, one was National and two were Conservatives.  Yet, despite the crisis, domestic political fighting was not restrained. In the Parliament, a series of crucial, often heated, discussions and debates took place in late May 1940. If anything had suddenly happened to Churchill, politically or physically, there was the danger that those willing to strike a deal with Hitler would follow through with their wrongheaded ideas. As well as bolster the United Kingdom’s ability to fight, US military assistance would prove to Churchill and those shaky Members of Parliament that the US was standing fast with them. By working together, Roosevelt and Churchill forged a sort of entente cordiale.

Sentences 22 through 40 of the Fireside Chat

“Some of our people like to believe that wars in Europe and in Asia are of no concern to us. But it is a matter of most vital concern to us that European and Asiatic war-makers should not gain control of the oceans which lead to this hemisphere.

One hundred and seventeen years ago the Monroe Doctrine was conceived by our Government as a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an alliance in Continental Europe. Thereafter, we stood guard in the Atlantic, with the British as neighbors. There was no treaty. There was no “unwritten agreement.”

And yet, there was the feeling, proven correct by history, that we as neighbors could settle any disputes in a peaceful fashion. The fact is that during the whole of this time the Western Hemisphere has remained free from aggression from Europe or from Asia.

Does anyone seriously believe that we need to fear attack anywhere in the Americas while a free Britain remains our most powerful naval neighbor in the Atlantic? Does anyone seriously believe, on the other hand, that we could rest easy if the Axis powers were our neighbors there?

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas–and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military. [The source of the transcript of the Fireside Chat utilized here notes that although the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum online typescript of the address includes “Australia” and not “Australasia,” a close review of an authentic recording has confirmed Australasia is correct. Praeterea qui alium sequitur nihil invenit, immo nec quaerit. (Besides, he who follows another not only discovers nothing but is not even investigating.)]

We should enter upon a new and terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats of brute force. To survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.

Some of us like to believe that even if Britain falls, we are still safe, because of the broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific.

But the width of those oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less from Washington that it is from Washington to Denver, Colorado–five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the North end of the Pacific Ocean, America and Asia almost touch each other.

Why, even today we have planes that could fly from the British Isles to New England and back again without refueling. And remember that the range of the modern bomber is ever being increased.”

4. Sentences 42 through 71: What the Axis Powers Are Capable of and Plan To Do; How They Think; Areas They Threaten; The US Plan of Action

Inferences

Every step of the way, Roosevelt had to be thorough in his analysis of matters, very calculating in his choices, and very measured in his actions. Surely, he often had to show restraint, perhaps knowing that certain bold advances would likely be most helpful, yet prohibiting himself to limited moves that would be most effective. No one was allowed to get in the way of those efforts. In greatcharlie’s humble view. the following words of the renowned Irish novelist, short-story writer and poet in “Chapter 9: Scylla and Charybdis” of Ulysses (1922) are apposite to Roosevelt: “His own image to a man with that queer thing genius is the standard of all experience, material and moral.”

Roosevelt was well aware that everyone in Washington had an opinion on how to proceed with regard to Europe and Asia. Roosevelt however, had his own opinions and did not need to pollinate them with theirs. What he wanted most from others were good, solid suggestions for lines of action.

Officials in the government, business, academia, his own political party as well as the ever-present pestiferous critics who were hardly acquainted with the actual facts must have appeared truly counterintuitive to Roosevelt for believing that Hitler would somehow choose to work diplomatically with the US or ignore it on his path to world conquest. He appears to have concluded that given technological advances, the Atlantic could be easily overcome by the massive Nazi war machine whereas others still had not.

As an objective of Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat was not arouse fears within the country but rather put its people on an even keel in a time of trouble, he could hardly explain that the Axis Powers would not forever tolerate robust actions from the US to undermine their respective plans for conquest, even though he likely believed Hitler would strike with some bold violent move soon enough.

For the War Department, the US was the only priority. There, calculations were assuredly being done all the time in 1940, focusing particularly on depleted supplies, weapons and ammunition due to cash-and-carry, which in the department was seen as a virtually unlimited stream of military assistance flowing out of US arsenals and military production plants into the United Kingdom. Cash-and-Carry was a creative program implemented by Roosevelt. Under the program the US could sell countries such as the United Kingdom and France as long as they paid cash and carried the war materials on their own cargo ships. Roosevelt managed to persuade the US Congress to allow the US the flexibility to take such a step just before the passage of the Neutrality Act on August 15, 1935 which imposed strict limitations on US interactions with “belligerent” countries.

Imagining that military commanders and war planners in Roosevelt’s War Department had occasionally turned their focus to classified “map maneuvers and “chart maneuvers” concerning the situation in Europe from the position of the Nazi German Armed Forces, they may have judged that Nazi Germany would easily recognize the United Kingdom, the British Empire and its Commonwealth, stood in the way of their line of march. Churchill actually presented that position as a statement of fact in his June 4, 1940 speech before the House of Commons, saying: “The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war.” They may have concluded in the War Department that soon enough Hitler would want to mitigate that problem. Cutting the United Kingdom off from the US using U-Boats would very likely be Hitler’s solution.

Roosevelt was already keenly aware U-Boats could cause something close to insurmountable damage to merchant fleets operating in the Atlantic. Churchill once wrote that, “The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.” As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt observed how they successfully performed before the US entry into World War I. He would surely find that conclusion logical. Given what had been demonstrated by Hitler to that point, Roosevelt most likely presumed the dictator would eventually seize the opportunity before him. The question left was exactly how much longer Hitler would tolerate the resupply and support from the US that kept the United Kingdom in the fight. 

Undoubtedly concerned with the timing of such a possibility, Roosevelt appeared compelled to increase the tempo of action and do the most possible while conditions were moderately favorable on the Atlantic. As it so happened, by 1940, German U-Boats had already achieved considerable success in sinking merchant ships on the way to the United Kingdom. However, Nazi Germany had not vastly increased their U-Boat arsenal and formed a fleet in such a way to deliver a decisive blow. It is now known that Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) Karl Dōnitz, who at the start of World War II, served as the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (Commander of the Submarines), pushed for a German fleet that consisted almost entirely of U-boats. He fully believed that depriving Germany’s enemies vital supplies such as food and oil would be more effective than sinking enemy ships with the risk of combat. He claimed that given 300 of the Type VII U-boats, he could defeat the entire Royal Navy utilizing tactics that would later be named “wolfpacks”. 

Luckily, Hitler was not so clever. He gave the jobs of both Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) and Großadmiral, Oberkommando der Marine (the Naval High Command) Erich Raeder. Raeder was uninterested in Dönitz’s theories. Raeder was a traditionalist whose focus was surface warfare. Raeder also judged that Germany could not contest the Royal Navy for control of the sea. Even more, Raeder believed submarine warfare was cowardly. By 1941, although relatively small in number, U-boats under then Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral) Dőnitz were threatening Allied shipping as far as the US east coast. However, the U-Boats were never used at a level to knock the United Kingdom out of the war despite having the genuine capability to do so.

Sentences 42 through 71 of the Fireside Chat

“During the past week many people in all parts of the nation have told me what they wanted me to say tonight. Almost all of them expressed a courageous desire to hear the plain truth about the gravity of the situation. One telegram, however, expressed the attitude of the small minority who want to see no evil and hear no evil, even though they know in their hearts that evil exists. That telegram begged me not to tell again of the ease with which our American cities could be bombed by any hostile power which had gained bases in this Western Hemisphere. The gist of that telegram was: “Please, Mr. President, don’t frighten us by telling us the facts.”

Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead—danger against which we must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of danger, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.

Some nations of Europe were bound by solemn non-intervention pacts with Germany. Other nations were assured by Germany that they need never fear invasion. Non-intervention pact or not, the fact remains that they were attacked, overrun; thrown into modern slavery at an hour’s notice, or even without any notice at all. As an exiled leader of one of these nations said to me the other day—”The notice was a minus quantity. It was given to my Government two hours after German troops had poured into my country in a hundred places.”

The fate of these nations tells us what it means to live at the point of a Nazi gun.

The Nazis have justified such actions by various pious frauds. One of these frauds is the claim that they are occupying a nation for the purpose of “restoring order.” Another is that they are occupying or controlling a nation on the excuse that they are “protecting it” against the aggression of somebody else.

For example, Germany has said that she was occupying Belgium to save the Belgians from the British. Would she then hesitate to say to any South American country, “We are occupying you to protect you from aggression by the United States”?

Belgium today is being used as an invasion base against Britain, now fighting for its life. And any South American country, in Nazi hands, would always constitute a jumping-off place for German attack on any one of the other Republics of this hemisphere.

Analyze for yourselves the future of two other places even nearer to Germany if the Nazis won. Could Ireland hold out? Would Irish freedom be permitted as an amazing pet exception in an unfree world? Or the Islands of the Azores which still fly the flag of Portugal after five centuries? You and I think of Hawaii as an outpost of defense in the Pacific. And yet, the Azores are closer to our shores in the Atlantic than Hawaii is on the other side.

There are those who say that the Axis powers would never have any desire to attack the Western Hemisphere. That is the same dangerous form of wishful thinking which has destroyed the powers of resistance of so many conquered peoples. The plain facts are that the Nazis have proclaimed, time and again, that all other races are their inferiors and therefore subject to their orders. And most important of all, the vast resources and wealth of this American Hemisphere constitute the most tempting loot in all the round world.”

US M3 Grant tank being loaded onboard a cargo ship bound for a war zone overseas.

5. Sentences 72 through 108: Plans of Axis Powers to Overcome the US and Explaining Why Opponents to US Assistance Are Wrong; A Struggle for Human Liberty and Freedom Is Underway

Inferences

In Napoléon: Ses Opinions et Jugemens sur les Hommes et sur les Choses (1838) by Jean-Joseph-Stanislas-Albert Damas-Hinard, an entry under courage is Correspondance de Napoléon avec le Ministre de la Marine, Lettre du 25 Mai 1805 states: “Rien ne donne plus de courage et n’éclaircit plus les idées que de bien connaître la position de son ennemi.” (Nothing gives more courage or better clarifies ideas than knowing accurately the position of one’s enemy.) In the prewar years as well as during the war, Roosevelt seemed to have a reliable intuition which he appeared to use to its fullest. Concerning Hitler’s very likely determination to invade the US, Roosevelt did not need to read about that in an intelligence report, or rely upon his intuition. If one could forgive greatcharlie’s frankness, as Roosevelt was an experienced politician from New York State and a learned man, he understood just how monstrous and vile the thinking of individuals as Hitler could be.

Yet, Roosevelt knew the value of intelligence and surely wanted to get a leg up on the Axis Powers however he could. He wanted to know what they were doing abroad, particularly throughout the northern and southern continents, and especially in the US. Rather than wait for the veils to lift, he charged the somewhat meager intelligence resources the US had at the time to break through them.

It is uncertain whether what sufficed for foreign intelligence services for the US at that time–the Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau, of Investigation (FBI), the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division—would have been aware in 1940 of any high-tech research and development planned or underway in Germany such as long-range rocket and ballistic missile programs and jet-powered aircraft. The FBI had developed ties with the United Kingdom’s MI6 foreign intelligence service and MI5 internal security organization and learned much from them in order to work more effectively on common causes.

An Interdepartmental Information Conference in 1939 brought all elements of the burgeoning US intelligence community together for the first time, to discuss creating a structure to handle the espionage threat to the US.  Rather than fight like a sack of wildcats, new linkages were created between the FBI and the US military, and partnerships were established with foreign services such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as well as Mexican and British intelligence officials.  The FBI’s General Intelligence Division was established to manage foreign counterintelligence and other intelligence investigations.  In 1940, US President Franklin Roosevelt signed a Presidential order allowing FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, to begin wiretapping embassies and consulates.  Sizable failures, new initiatives, and the FBI’s education in managing the intricate details of counterespionage matters resulted in the surprise arrest of 33 German agents in 1941, effectively breaking the back of Abwehr (German military intelligence) in the US. To that extent, Roosevelt was made aware of Nazi Germany’s espionage activities in the US, and within certain parameters he could inform the US public of those efforts which were aimed at laying the groundwork for the conquest of their country.

Much as Churchill, Roosevelt seemed gripped by a strange fear about Hitler. He truly believed that it would be impossible to discuss anything with him. In Principalities and Powers: Spiritual Combat 1942-1943  (St. Augustine’s Press, 2013), reviewed in greatcharlie’s March 2, 2015 post, George Rutler explains that Roosevelt believed Hitler could very well have been the Devil Incarnate. Related to this Churchill recalled during a subsequent radio interview that before his discussion with Roosevelt began aboard the battleship HMS Prince of Wales at Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland on Sunday, August 10, 1941, the two leaders attended a church service on the warship’s fantail. Churchill commented regarding the church service: “I felt that this was no vain presumption, but that we had the right to feel that we are serving a cause for the sake of which a trumpet has sounded from on high.”

Sentences 72 through 108 of the Fireside Chat

“Let us no longer blind ourselves to the undeniable fact that the evil forces which have crushed and undermined and corrupted so many others are already within our own gates. Your Government knows much about them and every day is ferreting them out.

Their secret emissaries are active in our own and in neighboring countries. They seek to stir up suspicion and dissension to cause internal strife. They try to turn capital against labor, and vice versa. They try to reawaken long slumbering racial and religious enmities which should have no place in this country. They are active in every group that promotes intolerance. They exploit for their own ends our own natural abhorrence of war. These trouble-breeders have but one purpose. It is to divide our people; to divide them into hostile groups and to destroy our unity and shatter our will to defend ourselves.

There are also American citizens, many of them in high places, who, unwittingly in most cases, are aiding and abetting the work of these agents. I do not charge these American citizens with being foreign agents. But I do charge them with doing exactly the kind of work that the dictators want done in the United States.

These people not only believe that we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to the fate of other nations. Some of them go much further than that. They say that we can and should become the friends and even the partners of the Axis powers. Some of them even suggest that we should imitate the methods of the dictatorships. But Americans never can and never will do that.

The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.

Even the people of Italy have been forced to become accomplices of the Nazis; but at this moment they do not know how soon they will be embraced to death by their allies.

The American appeasers ignore the warning to be found in the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and France. They tell you that the Axis powers are going to win anyway; that all of this bloodshed in the world could be saved; that the United States might just as well throw its influence into the scale of a dictated peace, and get the best out of it that we can.

They call it a “negotiated peace.” Nonsense! Is it a negotiated peace if a gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination makes you pay tribute to save your own skins?

Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most devastating trade wars in all history. And in these contests the Americas would offer the only real resistance to the Axis powers.

With all their vaunted efficiency, with all their parade of pious purpose in this war, there are still in their background the concentration camp and the servants of God in chains.

The history of recent years proves that the shootings and the chains and the concentration camps are not simply the transient tools but the very altars of modern dictatorships. They may talk of a “new order” in the world, but what they have in mind is only a revival of the oldest and the worst tyranny. In that there is no liberty, no religion, no hope.

The proposed “new order” is the very opposite of a United States of Europe or a United States of Asia. It is not a Government based upon the consent of the governed. It is not a union of ordinary, self-respecting men and women to protect themselves and their freedom and their dignity from oppression. It is an unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race.”

Attendees of the August 22, 1940 Destroyer Conference at the White House. From left to right, US Attorney General Robert Jackson, US Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Acting US Secretary of State Sumner Welles and US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.

6. Sentences 109 through 123: The US Must Act; What the Failure to Support the United Kingdom Would Mean; Time Is of the Essence

Inferences

Given his objective of doing the most possible while conditions were moderately favorable on the Atlantic, Roosevelt likely reached the logical conclusion that many weapons still sitting in US arsenals, beyond what had already been sent abroad, would be put to far better use in the hands of the combat experienced fighting forces of countries already engaged in the struggle with the Axis Powers. He may have assessed that any additional weapons supplied to the United Kingdom and France while it was still in the fight, would have, what would decades later be dubbed, a “multiplier effect” on both the morale, capabilities, and possibilities of those forces. He clearly wanted the United Kingdom to have every chance of success.

In implementing his policy of assisting the United Kingdom with as much as the US could within safe parameters, Roosevelt had to cope with incessant virtual debates–virtual, as there was no room for a debating directly with the president on foreign and national security policy that he set in place and wanted action on–with top military officers and top bureaucrats in the War Department who believed they were presenting what could be characterized as “America First” arguments.

The US Armed Forces opposed the diversion of its military supplies to the United Kingdom. At the nub of that position was the pessimistic belief of the Chief of Staff of the US Army General George Marshall that the United Kingdom would not be able to fend off Nazi Germany. (That assessment was frightfully off the mark.) As was the case when France fell, Marshall anticipated that when the United Kingdom surrendered, all of the US war materials that were being rushed there would fall into Nazi German hands. Marshall and others argued that the US national defense would not be served by clearing out its arsenals for others’ lost causes, but rather by retaining military supplies for the protection of the Western Hemisphere.

Yet as alluded to earlier, Roosevelt understood that moment, such thinking was too pessimistic, very limited, even defeatist. It has often been the case that only after a crisis has crossed its tipping point that the great value of a creative approach is recognized. However, in this case, if Roosevelt had waited for anyone to have some epiphany, the chance to have a positive impact would likely have been lost forever. If the US failed to try all options with real potential still available, it would tragically have little say in the final outcome which likely would have been dark. To that extent, Roosevelt, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces, insisted top military and naval officers and senior bureaucrats in the War Department fix themselves to the task of finding ways to immediately implement his plans, rather than wait to simply hope they would see things his way.

While administering the Navy and working somewhat closely with the Army as Assistant Secretary of Navy during World War I, Roosevelt may have detected a parochialism among senior military and naval officers that colored thinking in planning. He may have also detected that among top commanders and planners, there was a certain piquancy in knowing all the right boxes were ticked and everything that was planned was accepted as being done in the correct way. Roosevelt understood what a liability such thinking would be in the country’s circumstances in 1940. For Roosevelt, the usual practices and perfunctory work had no place.

As noted earlier, Roosevelt would not respond to his advisers in toxic, hostile ways. He remained well-beyond that. Still, at times, senior leaders in the War Department, appearing uncertain, even distrustful of Roosevelt’s thinking, in their own way put extra pressure on him. If he reacted at all, his words would be more sardonic than cutting. In an intriguing December 29, 2015 article in Politico written on the 75th Anniversary of the Fireside Chat discussed here, historian Josh Zeitz wrote, unfortunately without citations, that Roosevelt would often brace and threaten to expel those who were hesitant to comply with his orders. This behavior was most apparent when on June 1, 1940, weeks before France fell to Nazi Germany, Roosevelt unilaterally declared enormous caches of military equipment “surplus” and ordered that they be shipped immediately to the United Kingdom. When the US Secretary of War Harry Woodring, an ardent isolationist, fired off a strong memo to the President voicing concern about the legality of the order, Roosevelt ordered him to comply or resign. (Roosevelt eventually had to demand his resignation when refused to release B-17 “Flying Fortresses” to the United Kingdom. He replaced him with a Republican from the administration of US President Howard Taft, Henry Stimson.) General Henry Arnold, Chief of the US Army Air Corps repeatedly expressed concerns that the order would have a deleterious effect upon the country’s readiness for war, Roosevelt reportedly told an aide: “If Arnold won’t comply, maybe we’ll have to move him out of town.” When the US Navy’s Judge Advocate General balked at sanctioning the transfer, Roosevelt instructed the US Secretary of the Navy, Charles Edison, to send the “sea lawyer” on a protracted vacation. Zeitz explains Edison refused, to which Roosevelt replied: “Forget it and do what I told you to do.”

A national leader must have a well-considered idea of what the objectives of a country’s military action will be and how that action should be prosecuted. Those choices are political, established in the country’s foreign and national security policy long before any choices are made, but often in history the need to fight has been existential. Top military commanders must remain obedient to the concept and intent expressed by the national leader. To that extent, war becomes a continuation of politics with other means much as the 19th military theorist, Prussian General Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz, suggested in his renowned book Vom Kriege (On War) published posthumously in 1832: “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.”

As a highly developed individual, Roosevelt seemingly was able to keep perspective on almost everything. He did not appear to truly despair or fault those in the foreign and national security bureaucracies for furnishing patent answers they were long trained to provide and patriotically as well as emotionally compelled to make. Yet, he was also likely aware, well-ahead of most, that the circumstances of war with the Axis Powers would demand that many unlearn lessons from the past and open their minds up to new thinking on a global scale, transcending anything they might have considered or dared to imagine before. Nothing said ever caused Roosevelt to halt or even slow down the export of US military resources. In truth, more often, Roosevelt would receive answers and rapid responses from advisers much as he desired.

When Churchill asked Roosevelt for the loan of “forty or fifty of your older destroyers,” and warned that without them the United Kingdom would be unable to fight the “Battle of the Atlantic” against Nazi Germany and Italy, what followed was three-and-a-half months of negotiations. There were significant issues to sort out. Roosevelt’s first response disappointed Churchill. Roosevelt truthfully responded, “a step of that kind could not be taken except with the specific authorization of Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.” Still, Churchill continued to do his part with regard to holding the line. On July 3, 1940, the Royal Navy was dispatched to bomb the French Navy at its base in northwestern Algeria with the purpose of at best destroying or at least disabling the French fleet to prevent it from being used by Nazi Germany. If the United Kingdom had even largely fallen to Nazi Germany, the naval assets of the French fleet, aggregated with Germany’s Kriegsmarine and the Italian Regia Marina (Royal Navy), the US would be left to fight an enormous armada of naval and air power. By August, talks between the US and the United Kingdom shifted from a loan or sale of the surplus destroyers to an exchange of the surplus destroyers for bases on British Territories in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean. Though he was reportedly not open to thoughts from some advisers on what should be accomplished, he was presumably open to thoughts on the best way to accomplish the “Destroyer-Bases Exchange.”

First, Roosevelt met with US Attorney General Robert Jackson to discuss the legal situation regarding his authority to provide surplus US Navy destroyers on that basis with the United Kingdom without further authorization from Congress. 

Second, on August 13, 1940, US Secretary of State Henry Stimson, US Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, US Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles and US Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, met with Roosevelt to outline the essential points of an agreement. Third, on August 15, 1940, Jackson advised Roosevelt that the Department of Justice definitely believed he did have authority to act without the consent of Congress as the destroyers to be transferred fell in the classification of obsolescent materials. All he needed was certification from naval and military authorities that the warships were not needful for the defense of the US. On September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Destroyers for Bases Agreement.

Sentences 109 through 123 of the Fireside Chat 

“The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war against this unholy alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our ability to “keep out of war” is going to be affected by that outcome.

Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United States getting into war, if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.

If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit that there is risk in any course we may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.

The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do their fighting. They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security. Emphatically we must get these weapons to them; get them to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which others have had to endure.

Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today. Certain facts are self-evident.

In a military sense Great Britain and the British Empire are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest. And they are putting up a fight which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.”

Chief of Staff of the US Army General George Catlett Marshall (seated center) with members of his general staff in November 1941.

7. Sentences 124 through 130: A No US Boots on the Ground Pledge; Addressing Naysayers; Integrating the War Needs of US and the United Kingdom

Inferences

In July 1940, the Democratic Party nominated Roosevelt for an unprecedented third term in office. His opponent, Republican nominee Wendell Willkie, agreed with Roosevelt that the US should lend active assistance to the United Kingdom. Yet, as the election drew closer, Willkie began to give speeches warning that a vote for Roosevelt was a vote for entering the war. As polls narrowed, Roosevelt sought to assure voters, stating: “We will not participate in foreign wars and we will not send our army, naval or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas except in case of attack.” Ultimately, Roosevelt won reelection, and with that behind him, he perhaps believed he had more flexibility to make more decisive moves to support countries fighting the Axis Powers and prepare the US for war

On September 16, 1940. the US Congress approved the Selective Service and Training Act. The majority of Members of Congress, despite resistance from isolationists in the body, could see the writing on the wall with regard to the Axis Powers and war. The act, which instituted the first peacetime military draft in US history, required men between the ages of 21 and 36 to register for the draft. The number of selected draftees was capped at 900,000 men, who would be enlisted for one year of training and service, and could only serve in the Western Hemisphere or in US territories. Though there were anti-draft protests on college campuses nationwide, in December 1940, 78% of US citizens polled favored the military draft. Once the Selective Service and Training Act went into effect, the requirements for more weapons and supplies in the US would sharply increase. With conscripts starting to arrive for training in the armed forces, the War Department became concerned that those conscripts would be fully equipped. 

While the situation in Europe worsened, Marshall would repeatedly convey the concerns of the uniformed services in the War Department over his foreign military assistance efforts in his meetings with Roosevelt. Surely, Marshall may have felt he was doing his job with fidelity, speaking truth to power. He, too, was part of the aforementioned “cabal” that questioned the legality and Roosevelt’s decision to declare swathes of war materials surplus and ship them off post haste to the United Kingdom. Expressing caution based on the best ways one knows how to handle a situation was logical, and somewhat understandable. The War Department did have war plans that were dependent on those military resources. Marshall’s intent was to stockpile resources for a coming fight. This certainly would have been the position of top military leaders generally as it is what they had been trained to do. Moreover, it would become nearly impossible to make adjustments and firm up war plans and strategies without knowing what would be available, or better, what would be left, after weapons, surplus and new, from US arsenals were shipped around the world.

Marshall’s reaction to the near non-stop movement of such high levels of military resources to the United Kingdom might have been expected by Roosevelt. According to an anecdote drawn from Forrest Pogue’s George C. Marshall, Vol. 2: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 (Viking, 1966), in the fall of 1938, when the threat of war loomed in Europe, Roosevelt called a White House meeting with key members of his administration in order to discuss his proposed defense plan, which primarily consisted of a rapid and dramatic expansion of US airpower. Marshall had been the Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Army for less than one month. As a new brigadier–one-star–general, he was one of the lowest ranking attendees of the meeting. During the course of the discussion, Roosevelt asked each attendee if they agreed with his proposal. All voiced agreement except Marshall who tactfully disagreed with Roosevelt’s concept. The other attendees noted that Marshall’s disagreement visibly startled Roosevelt. After the meeting adjourned, many of those present made it clear that they believed Marshall had effectively ended his career. Five months later, in a move that stunned most of Washington, Roosevelt asked Marshall to serve as the next Chief of Staff of the US Army. 

In another instance, during a meeting at the White House with Roosevelt, Marshall presented a chart that reflected the arrangement for dividing planes coming off the assembly line, particularly the US Army’s prized B-17 “Flying Fortress”, mentioned earlier, with the United Kingdom, particularly exhibiting the wide difference between orders and deliveries. Marshall reportedly asked pointedly whether the United Kingdom’s consignment should be computed as half of the planes scheduled for delivery or as half of those actually delivered. Roosevelt’s response to Marshall allegedly was: “Don’t let me see that chart again.” As the leader of the US Army, certainly, Marshall was aware of the indications and implications of that statement for him personally.

Perhaps it is bitter this but Roosevelt likely understood Marshall could hardly provide him with a forecast of what the situation would be in another year that would hold any degree of certitude. In other words, Marshall could not be certain how the world for which his planners had organized military strategic objectives, military plans, and military resources would Iook in a year. Roosevelt knew that the time to act was now. In a calibrated way, he could supply the United Kingdom and many others who were fighting the Axis Powers what they needed when they needed it the most. The US would be the one through such efforts to aggregate all of the power available for the fight immediately.

It is possible that in Roosevelt’s eyes, perhaps even for fleeting moments, he might have been irked. Roosevelt, after all, was only human.. In those imagined moments, he might have felt the attitudes and behaviors  that Marshall and other senior officials in the War Department as well as other foreign and national security bureaucracies was more akin to the type of rural or urban shopkeeper who was more focused with the fullness of the stockroom, orderly shelves, and keeping his or her portion of the sidewalk swept than selling inventory, making profits, and best serving his or her community: the recipe for ruin.

When Marshall argued against efforts to elevate the United Kingdom’s military capabilities at the expense of those of the US, perhaps he may have actually managed to create some degree of doubt, no matter how small, that the general was not the best strategic thinker and would not, as Chief of Staff of the US Army, be able to make the whole challenging and unfortunate trek he saw the country on. The general’s attempts to tactfully lobby Roosevelt perhaps would lead many today to think that every so often an afflatus would strike him. To be more frank, Marshall acted as if he viewed his president’s choices as something closer to whims than thoughtful, strategically sound decisions. Roosevelt may have held in mind, perhaps even had nightmares over the fact, that Marshall’s line of thinking somewhat resembled that of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force in France, British Army General Lord Gort. He used his troops to construct the “Gort Line,” a 45 mile defensive line comprised of bunkers, pillboxes, and anti-tank traps along the France-Belgium border rather than build up mobility assets, firepower, and air power, and train his commanders and their units to integrate combined arms warfare with air power, and to use deception, speed, maneuver, and concentrate power. That approach, seemingly not too advanced for 1940, would have been more compatible with the British Army’s offensively-minded Dyle Plan, established as a response to a possible Nazi German invasion. When the invasion of France began in the Spring of 1940, Gort was unable to act decisively. While Churchill praised Gort in his June 4, 1940 speech before the House of Commons, his remarks about the disaster in France seemed to reveal that he felt Gort’s handling of the British Expeditionary Force may have hurt its chances of achieving greater success. 

Still, Roosevelt seemed to retain enough confidence and faith in Marshall and may have believed the general would come around to looking at things with a broader view that would parallel his own. To the extent that is accurate, it would mean Marshall was an exception. Roosevelt sympathies were always with members of the armed forces knowing how indispensable and difficult their work so often was yet very distant in the thoughts of most of those they defended. Marshall would serve as Chief of Staff of the US Army throughout World War II. Gloriosum est iniurias oblivisci. (It is glorious to forget the injustice.)

Sentences 124 through 130 of the Fireside Chat 

“There is no demand for sending an American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders. There is no intention by any member of your Government to send such a force. You can, therefore, nail, nail any talk about sending armies to Europe as deliberate untruth.

Our national policy is not directed toward war. Its sole purpose is to keep war away from our country and away from our people. Democracy’s fight against world conquest is being greatly aided, and must be more greatly aided, by the rearmament of the United States and by sending every ounce and every ton of munitions and supplies that we can possibly spare to help the defenders who are in the front lines. And it is no more unneutral for us to do that than it is for Sweden, Russia and other nations near Germany, to send steel and ore and oil and other war materials into Germany every day in the week.”

US Navy and Royal Navy sailors inspect depth charges aboard Wickes-class destroyers in 1940. In the background are USS Buchanan (DD-131) and USS Crownshield (DD-134). Both surplus warships were transferred to the Royal Navy on September 9, 1940.

8. Sentences 131 through 144: Replenishing US Arsenals; Building Greater Weapons for Defense; Taking Workers into Consideration; Expectations of Industry Leaders

Inferences

Looking back, one might suggest that rather than burden the president with his concern over stockpiles, Marshall should have developed for Roosevelt plans that would allow for the replenishment of what was old with new weapon systems with the latest capabilities and identified how that replenishment could have been performed rapidly with the existing US industrial base and a recommended expanded one.

When Roosevelt spoke of counsel from the military experts, he concealed the fact that he, himself, was such an expert. Roosevelt had acquired considerable experience maintaining the readiness of the US Armed Forces and preparing them for war long before becoming US President.

As only touched upon earlier, on March 12, 1913, Roosevelt, then a two-term state New York State Senator at age 31, received the nomination to become the US Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the administration of US President Woodrow Wilson. Confirmed unanimously by the US Senate, Roosevelt was the youngest Assistant Secretary of the Navy until that date. US President Theodore Roosevelt, his fifth cousin, had held the same post. It was more than fate that caused another Roosevelt to be selected for the same position. Roosevelt’s superior, US Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels focused on policy and Congressional matters, leaving him to handle personnel matters, operations, and contracting. Although new to naval affairs, Reportedly, Roosevelt had the energy Daniels required to get things done. Fortuitously for Roosevelt, Daniels was willing to serve as a mentor, which allowed him to learn valuable lessons in politics that would be useful to him for years to come.

Even before World War I began, Roosevelt worked to prepare the US Navy for his country’s entry into it. Then, much as in his future, many in government lacked his perspective. Some officials even dismissed the idea that the US would enter the war. Wilson’s doctrine of neutrality would actually thwart many of Roosevelt’s efforts to ready the Navy. Nevertheless, observing events in Europe Roosevelt kept pushing for the Navy’s preparation. Lessons learned on navigating through the administration, particularly with Daniels and Wilson, enabled him to eventually create some movement in the right direction. In late 1915, the US invested in a $600 million program to upgrade and expand the Navy. In the meantime, German U-boats began sinking hundreds of Allied ships. When they began unrestricted warfare on the oceans, Wilson went to Congress for a declaration of war. Congress obliged on April 6, 1917. In the meantime, during the war, Roosevelt placed great focus on mitigating the U-boat threat. He advocated for a plan to lay vast anti-submarine minefields in the North Sea. The mine project was an early sign of Roosevelt’s appreciation for creative solutions. Reportedly, by February 1918, 100,000 mines were prepared for deployment, but the war ended before the system could be fully tested, but the minefield is believed to have destroyed at least four U-boats

It was surely Roosevelt’s unequivocal concept and intent in 1940 to ensure commanders and planners in the US armed forces had as many advantages as possible and enhance the chance for victory, he wanted them to have a preponderance of weapons. It was a mistake for others to think anything otherwise. The war’s outcome bears that out. With an unrivaled wealth of newly minted military resources, their capabilities would be considerable and the possibilities for action would become nearly unlimited. How well US commanders and planners would use them remained to be seen.

Sentences 131 through 144 of the Fireside Chat

“We are planning our own defense with the utmost urgency; and in its vast scale we must integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations which are resisting aggression.

This is not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion. It is a matter of realistic, practical military policy, based on the advice of our military experts who are in close touch with existing warfare. These military and naval experts and the members of the Congress and the Administration have a single-minded purpose—the defense of the United States.

This nation is making a great effort to produce everything that is necessary in this emergency—and with all possible speed. And, this great effort requires great sacrifice.

I would ask no one to defend a democracy which in turn would not defend everyone in the nation against want and privation. The strength of this nation shall not be diluted by the failure of the Government to protect the economic well-being of its citizens.

If our capacity to produce is limited by machines, it must ever be remembered that these machines are operated by the skill and the stamina of the workers. As the Government is determined to protect the rights of the workers, so the nation has a right to expect that the men who man the machines will discharge their full responsibilities to the urgent needs of defense.

The worker possesses the same human dignity and is entitled to the same security of position as the engineer or the manager or the owner. For the workers provide the human power that turns out the destroyers, and the planes and the tanks.

The nation expects our defense industries to continue operation without interruption by strikes or lock-outs. It expects and insists that management and workers will reconcile their differences by voluntary or legal means, to continue to produce the supplies that are so sorely needed.”

9. Sentences 145 through 168: Refitting Manufacturing To Meet Growing Needs Now and Imagining the Future

Inferences

Roosevelt’s interest and emphasis on workers was well-established when he implemented the New Deal. In his addresses and public and private writings, he expressed a fondness for workers in his tone. He surely was glad his efforts had many back on their feet, but likely ambivalent over the fact that a further increase in employment would be the result of preparations for war. Roosevelt’s discussion of workers here, however, may have also been a manifestation of a concern over having sufficient manpower in the armed forces while also having enough manpower available for greatly increased industrial base. Meeting manpower requirements, based on War Department plans led to the aforementioned Selective Service and Training Act.

Considerations along those lines would likely require examining the degree to which isolationist zeal would cause many able workers to refrain from working in war plants. A sort of counterbalance might be the reality that hypothetical war plant jobs would draw those more concerned about steady work and providing for their families and themselves. Perchance when Roosevelt, not having foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor and its impact on the US psyche, contemplated the possibility of being forced by circumstance to declare war on Nazi Germany or Japan, he may have felt unsure of the public response to some degree. With some many US soldiers dying in 1918 alone and the deaths of troops due to influenza–Roosevelt, himself, caught influenza while returning to the US after a visit to the front lines–it is unclear how many able men would be willing to subject themselves possibly to the same for the sake of the Europeans or the Asians.

Surely Roosevelt wanted to duplicate, at a far greater capacity, the military production underway with urgency in the United Kingdom as Churchill described in his June 4, 1940 speech in the House of Commons. Churchill indicated that in such an emergency, industry and labor can find common ground. Churchill explained: “An effort the like of which has never been seen in our records is now being made. Work is proceeding everywhere, night and day, Sundays and week days. Capital and Labor have cast aside their interests, rights, and customs and put them into the common stock.” To that extent Roosevelt would mention that there was cooperation between the government, industry, and labor. He extolled industry and labor for their dedication to the effort to build up the “Arsenal of Democracy.” However, it was hardly close to the levels he understood would be needed to defeat the Axis Powers.

Sentences 145 through 168 of the Fireside Chat

“And on the economic side of our great defense program, we are, as you know, bending every effort to maintain stability of prices and with that the stability of the cost of living.

Nine days ago I announced the setting up of a more effective organization to direct our gigantic efforts to increase the production of munitions. The appropriation of vast sums of money and a well coordinated executive direction of our defense efforts are not in themselves enough. Guns, planes, ships and many other things have to be built in the factories and the arsenals of America. They have to be produced by workers and managers and engineers with the aid of machines which in turn have to be built by hundreds of thousands of workers throughout the land.

In this great work there has been splendid cooperation between the Government and industry and labor; and I am very thankful.

American industrial genius, unmatched throughout all the world in the solution of production problems, has been called upon to bring its resources and its talents into action. Manufacturers of watches, of farm implements, of linotypes and cash registers, of automobiles and sewing machines and lawn mowers and locomotives are now making fuses, and bomb packing crates, and telescope mounts, and shells, and pistols and tanks.

But all our present efforts are not enough. We must have more ships, more guns, more planes—more of everything. And this can be accomplished only if we discard the notion of “business as usual.” This job cannot be done merely by superimposing on the existing productive facilities the added requirements of the nation for defense.

Our defense efforts must not be blocked by those who fear the future consequences of surplus plant capacity. The possible consequences of failure of our defense efforts now are much more to be feared.

And after the present needs of our defenses are past, a proper handling of the country’s peace-time needs will require all of the new productive capacity—if not still more.

No pessimistic policy about the future of America shall delay the immediate expansion of those industries essential to defense. We need them.

I want to make it clear that it is the purpose of the nation to build now with all possible speed every machine, every arsenal, every factory that we need to manufacture our defense material. We have the men- the skill- the wealth- and above all, the will.

I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials that are essential for defense purposes, then such production must yield, and will gladly yield, to our primary and compelling purpose.

So, I appeal to the owners of plants—to the managers—to the workers—to our own Government employees—to put every ounce of effort into producing these munitions swiftly and without stint. With this appeal I give you the pledge that all of us who are officers of your Government will devote ourselves to the same whole-hearted extent to the great task that lies ahead.

As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to use them to defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at home must be made on the basis of our over-all military necessities.”

10. Sentences 169 through 187: The Government Has the Matter Covered; It Is Taking Steps; and More Will Be Done

Inferences

Roosevelt committed the US in June 1940 to assisting belligerents in the fight against the Axis Powers with war material, he did so with the insistence, as required under US law, that recipients pay for purchases with cash. As aforementioned, in the summer of 1940, Churchill warned that his country would not be unable to continue paying cash for purchases. By December 1940, the worst had come to pass, and Churchill informed Roosevelt that the United Kingdom was no longer able to pay it for military supplies. Apparently prepared for such news, Roosevelt had ready a proposal for a new initiative that would be known as Lend-Lease. Under it, the US would provide or “lend” the United Kingdom with the war materials and other supplies it needed to fight Nazi Germany, and payments would be deferred. When payments were eventually made, the emphasis would not be on payment in dollars. Payments would primarily take the form of a “consideration” granted by the United Kingdom to the US.

Roosevelt reportedly garnered support for the lend-lease concept through use of the analogy of lending a neighbor your garden hose if his house was on fire and thereby keeping the fire from spreading to your own house. At a press conference held at the White House on December 17, 1940, at which he announced Lend-Lease, Roosevelt explained: “Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred feet away. If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire . . . I don’t say to him before that operation, ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it’ . . . I don’t want $15–I want my garden hose back after the fire is over. . . .”

On January 10, 1941, Roosevelt would introduce the lend-lease program to Congress. It would formally allow the US, via Congressional approval, to lend or lease war supplies to any nation deemed “vital to the defense” while keeping the country only indirectly involved in World War II. The Lend-Lease Act was passed on March 11, 1941. Roosevelt had more than sufficiently proved the concept and value of such an approach throughout 1940.

Sentences 169 through 187 of the Fireside Chat

“We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.

We have furnished the British great material support and we will furnish far more in the future.

There will be no “bottlenecks” in our determination to aid Great Britain. No dictator, no combination of dictators, will weaken that determination by threats of how they will construe that determination.

The British have received invaluable military support from the heroic Greek army, and from the forces of all the governments in exile. Their strength is growing. It is the strength of men and women who value their freedom more highly than they value their lives.

I believe that the Axis powers are not going to win this war. I base that belief on the latest and best of information.

We have no excuse for defeatism. We have every good reason for hope—hope for peace, yes, and hope for the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better civilization in the future.

I have the profound conviction that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.

As President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.”

Roosevelt and Churchill meet face-to-face for the first time for a secret meeting aboard the battleship USS Augusta at Placentia Bay off the coast of Newfoundland August 9, 1941.

A Job Well Done

In 1940, Roosevelt and Churchill, although not having as yet met in-person, forged a personal bond, an entente cordiale, and more importantly, a bond between their countries that would further develop through the challenges of World War II into what would be called the special relationship. Such a union would have been deemed improbable 154 years before when the Founding Fathers of the US declared their country’s independence from the “United Kingdom of Great Britain”. While all things related to monarchy were surely anathema to Roosevelt given his firm adherence to the precepts of democracy and the US Constitution, yet it would seem the lyrics of George Frederick Handel’s coronation anthem “Let Thy Hand Be Strengthened” (1727) might have been quite an apropos felicitation for him as he led the US, the United Kingdom, and world forward against tyranny: “Let thy hand be strengthened and thy right hand be exalted. / Let justice and judgment be the preparation of thy seat! / Let mercy and truth go before thy face. / Let justice, judgment, mercy and truth go before thy face. / Allelujah.”

Roosevelt was a genius for his practicability, a talented leader superbly harnessed, and self-controlled. Still, taking all aspects of the crisis in daily, as he did, he must have occasionally felt a sense of vulnerability. Even if such intrusive thoughts were infrequent, they would likely have had some degree of influence on his work and his spirit. Alone in his thoughts, Roosevelt apparently was left to dig down deep and draw strength from within. He imparted that strength to the audience of his address in the US.

Roosevelt had an almost mystical, crystal clear perspective of what was happening in the world and what to do despite the atypical and overly generous appearance of his action. Too many advisors did not and seemingly could not gain that same perspective, and placed additional pressures on a President who had already been strained beyond the capacity of most around him. Fulfilling the work that he swore to do during two inaugurations, Roosevelt was faithfully executing the Office of President of the US, and will to the best of his ability, acting with the goal of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the US in the face of threat from the Axis Powers. The even harder work of leading a country engaged in what would be an horrendous and very costly war worldwide had yet to begin.

Roosevelt died during his fourth term in office on April 12,1945 and thereby did not see the results of his incredible efforts. The most important result was the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers and total victory that back in 1940 Roosevelt said would come if war came. The Roman historian Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17), known as Livy, provided in Greek, a history of Rome that begins with the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional founding in 753 B.C. through the reign of Emperor Caesar Augustus during his own lifetime. In the Preface of Book I of that history Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), Livy states about the study of history: “Hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri; inde tibi tuaeque rei publicae quod imitere capias, inde foedum inceptu, foedum exitu, quod vites.” (What chiefly makes the study of history wholesome and profitable is this, that you behold the lessons of every kind of experience set forth as on a conspicuous monument; from these you may choose for yourself and for your own state what to imitate, from these mark for avoidance what is shameful in the conception and shameful in the result.)

Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan

US airmen and marines (above) load M777 artillery pieces marked for delivery to the Ukrainian Armed Forces on an US Air Force transport plane. Many weapon systems sent into Ukraine have had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. Firepower in the form of multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled artillery, and heavy caliber guns, transported possibly along the now heavily traveled supply lines from both Poland and Romania enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to launch two highly-successful counteroffensives. Presented here are some ruminations on Russia’s failure to initially shut the door to the massive levels of military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the US, other NATO Member States and the EU via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Emphasis is placed on the likely reasons why Russia went into Ukraine militarily without addressing the potential impact of Western resupply of Ukrainian forces. To that extent, issues considered include: whether the Russian Federation General Staff was responsible for this considerable delinquency or was the Kremlin near criminally remiss for not heeding likely recommendations of the military chiefs and their war planners.

Intriguingly, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin launched the Ukraine War lacking a strategy that took into consideration of what Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) would come up against. What was seemingly completely missed or misunderstood was the degree of support from the US and NATO Member States that Kyiv would receive. No effort, that was apparent, was made to obviate the ability of the US and its NATO allies to supply Ukraine at will as part of the military strategy. From the start, conquering Kyiv was the focus as if Putin, his foreign and national security policy team at the Kremlin, and his senior commanders in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Perhaps, for Putin, the conquest of Ukraine was a dream on which he could feast his imagination. That was at least until the matter was reduced to reality. If one might think of Putin at all as a rational actor, it would seem Putin has painted himself into a corner. That is quite unlike Putin. Some might say that after all the years of accomplishments and successes, and all the experience, he was bound to make one big mistake. It is a real head rubber.

Presented here are some ruminations on Russia’s failure to initially shut the door to the massive levels of military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the US, other NATO Member States and the EU via Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. Emphasis is placed on the likely reasons why Russia went into Ukraine militarily without addressing the potential impact of Western resupply of Ukrainian forces. To that extent, issues considered include: whether the Russian Federation General Staff was responsible for this considerable delinquency or was the Kremlin near criminally remiss for not heeding the recommendations of the military chiefs and their war planners; whether the door was left wide open between Poland Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania with Ukraine because they were hamstrung by Putin’s concept that a successful “lighting strike in Ukraine” could be achieved even though the idea was apparently developed in the abstract; and, whether they had little choice but to acquiesce to the manifestations of Putin’s sense of vulnerability over Ukraine’s close ties to the US, the EU, and NATO. Unless one was actually behind closed doors of conference rooms in the Kremlin and the national security bureaucracies in Moscow, or “reading someone’s mail,” one cannot know for certain how the decision concerning resupply from western Ukraine was made or maybe not made. The best informed guess would inevitably be an interpretation. While “ruminating”, greatcharlie sought to stay grounded within the realm of what would actually be possible in Putin’s regime given what is known about it. Insights offered here are occasionally supported with historical examples of timeless relevance that immediately came to mind or actually helped to generate ruminations. Causa latet, vis est notification. (The cause is hidden, the result is obvious.)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General Colin Powell (above) at press conference at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991. When a military campaign is launched, often an objective becomes separating an opposing army from what gives it support and what allows it to continue to generate combat power. Acting in this manner against an opponent is referred to as acting decisively. During the Persian Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, the concept of separating Iraqi forces in Kuwait from resupply as well as command and control from the Iraqi military and political leadership was expressed without ambiguity by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General Colin Powell during a press conference at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991. He famously stated: “Our strategy to go after this army is very, very simple. First, we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it.”

Why Is Resupply an Issue?

When sent to war, the purpose of an army is to use its trained troops to deliver calculated lethal violence in protection of their country and its values wherever they are ordered to go. Not to be forgotten, is the necessity that the army’s troops place their very lives on the line in that pursuit. Equally important to note, not all countries have the same values. The values of the Russian Federation, particularly those that compelled the invasion of Ukraine, are quite different, for example, from those of the United Kingdom, France, or Germany. As professionals, army commanders act to the best of their knowledge and experience, use their troop in accordance with their army’s doctrine and in obedience to the concept and intent laid out by the army’s senior leadership. When it is the case, the army leadership acts in fol)owing with the concept and intent of their country’s political leadership. Such was the case when the Russian Federation Armed Forces were directed by Putin and ordered by the Russian Federation General Staff to invade Ukraine.

Today, armies can deploy with a considerable amount of supplies, but supplies begin to deplete as soon as the fight is underway. Nevertheless, to keep the army going, long before it becomes engaged, considerations and arrangements are made by planners and logistical (supply) officers to transport supplies wherever they are needed. Losing the ability to be resupplied means an army can fight only until the point when it metaphorically and literally, as one element of resupply, runs out of gas. To that extent, the most extreme of human endeavors becomes an even greater challenge for troops in that army. Whether resupply is possible can more often mean the difference between victory and defeat. 

To be a useful, effective fighting force on the battlefield, critical items such as bullets, grenades, rifles, other small arms, Kevlar vests, phones, petroleum, oil lubricants, and all and elements as replacement troops, and troop medical evacuation must get up to where the fight is. As shortages become problematic, commanders must begin to economize, their ability to act will be reduced, and subsequently their army becomes far less effective. The commander of the opposing army, if a capable commander, will discern the change, recognize the advantage presented and seek to exploit it as best as possible. The decision would need to be made on whether the army with dwindling supplies should be withdrawn. If the situation reaches the point when the commander can no longer act to alter the army’s situation, his army is being battered, or his army is cut off and has no available means of egress, he may be forced to surrender. While this description is somewhat oversimplified, it lends support for the idea that when a military campaign is launched, often an objective becomes separating an opposing army from what gives it support and what allows it to continue to generate combat power. Acting in this manner against an opponent is referred to as acting decisively.

During the Persian Gulf War, Operation Desert Storm, the concept of separating Iraqi forces in Kuwait from resupply as well as command and control from the Iraqi military and political leadership was expressed without ambiguity by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff US Army General Colin Powell during a press conference at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991 alongside the US Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. In the hour-long briefing, which detailed the first week of operations of the 28-nation coalition against Iraq, Powell famously stated: “Our strategy to go after this army is very, very simple. First, we’re going to cut it off, and then we’re going to kill it. To cut it off, that began last week when we started to go after the nerve center, the brains of the operation, the command and control of the operation, and the lines of communication that come out of Baghdad and other places in the country.”

One might have expected that Russian Federation Armed Forces top commanders and planners, in a similar vein, might have taken a similar tack toward the Ukraine Armed Forces. It might have been expected that they would have recognized that resupply not so much from Ukrainian arsenals but from those of US, other NATO Member States, and other countries in the EU would need to be blocked, cut off in some way. Yet, nothing remotely similar to what Powell expressed in 1991 was heard from theMinisterstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation) or General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), or from Putin, himself, about cutting Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) off from resupply. There were no feigned movements such as moving Russian Federation forces to points outside Ukraine from which a blocking operation could best be launched in order to signal the intention to cut the Ukrainian Armed Forces off from resupply. Nothing was done sufficiently enough to cause supporters of the government of Kyiv to second guess any planned efforts to resupply the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In view of the potential decisive impact from contributions by the 30 countries in NATO,  particularly the US with its military largess, it would seem some Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and planners thinking logically would urge the Russian Federation General Staff to suggest scrapping the operation until the problem of the Western resupply threat was resolved. 

A near endless list of situations during wars in which resupply determined the outcome of battle or even the war, itself. For example, armies have often encountered difficulties in cutting off resupply on a strategic level when fighting a determined opponent. Occasionally political leaders and army commanders have been slow in recognizing the opportunity to act decisively to mitigate resupply efforts on a strategic level. Armies have faced difficulties on the tactical level against a smaller force of well-trained, well-organized, and well-led opposing troops, even during a siege, when sufficient resupply has been made available to them

Ho Chi Minh Trail

The Ho Chi Minh Trail (Đường mòn Hồ Chí Minh) was a supply system that provided support, in the form of manpower and materiel, to the Communist insurgency, Viet Cong, and the People’s Army of Vietnam (North Vietnamese Army) during the Vietnam War. It comprised a logistical network of roads and trails that ran from North Vietnam to South Vietnam through the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia during the Vietnam War. Initially troops, pushing heavily laden bicycles, driving oxcarts, or carrying supplies on their backs, moved hundreds of tons of supplies along it. However, trucks would become the primary means of moving supplies and troops. By 1969, tgere was even a pipeline crossed the Lao frontier through the Mu Gia Pass and, by 1970, it reached the approaches to the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam. The plastic pipeline, equipped with numerous small pumping stations, managed to transfer diesel fuel, gasoline, and kerosene all through the same pipe. By the end of 1970, the number of pipelines entering Laos increased to six that year. As a whole, supply efforts through trail were quite effective, which no mean feat given US efforts to thwart effort through trail included attacks from a CIA-raised clandestine army and the most intense air interdiction campaign in history. Mitigating the effects of US operations to destroy the trail was an existential effort. One might say the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the “center of gravity” for the Communists. Its loss probably would have led to their defeat in the war. As long as supplies could get to the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, their war effort could continue with vigor which complicated US-led efforts to secure South Vietnam for the government in Saigon. South Vietnam would eventually surrender to North Vietnam.

Battle of the Atlantic 1939-1945

During World War II, Germany acted robustly to prevent merchant ships from carrying food, raw materials, troops and their equipment from North America to the United Kingdom. If they had succeeded, the outcome of war might have been radically different. The United Kingdom might have been starved into submission, which would have been complete strain on the morale. Its forces and those of its allies worldwide likely would have been deeply impacted. The supply line from the US was essentially the beating heart, the center of gravity, of the United Kingdom’s war effort. The threat to the movement of ships across the Atlantic came in the form of German submarines, the “Unterseeboot” or U-boat. United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill once wrote that, “The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.”

At the start of World War II, the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (Commander of the Submarines) was Konteradmiral (Rear Admiral) Karl Dōnitz. Dönitz pushed for a German fleet that consisted almost entirely of U-boats, claiming that depriving Germany’s enemies of vital supplies such as food and oil would be the most effective way to achieve victory. He claimed that given 300 U-Boats of the latest design, the Type VII, he could defeat the entire Royal Navy. He would utilize them in tactical formations that would later be called “wolfpacks”. Dőnitz’s  superior, Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (Commander-in-Chief of the Navy) and Großadmiral, Oberkommando der Marine (the Naval High Command) Erich Raeder, was uninterested in his theories. Raeder was a traditionalist whose focus was surface warfare. Raeder also judged that Germany could not contest the Royal Navy for control of the sea. Even more, Raeder believed submarine warfare was cowardly. By 1941, although relatively small in number, U-boats under then Vizeadmiral (Vice Admiral) Dőnitz were threatening Allied shipping as far as the US east coast. By the end of 1942, U-boat “wolfpacks” were achieving considerable success in sinking merchant ships. By early 1943, the United Kingdom’s resources, especially oil, were running out, and it became a question of whether Allied shipyards could build merchant ships fast enough to replace the tonnage that was being sunk. 

Finally recognizing the value of then Admiral Dönitz concepts on the effective conduct of submarine warfare, in January 1943, German Führer und Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler saw to it that he was advanced to the rank of Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) and replaced Großadmiral Erich Raeder as Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine and Großadmiral, Oberkommando der Marine. Interestingly, he retained his post as Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote. Dőnitz was given the authority to act as he saw fit with German naval forces too late. At that juncture, Dőnitz had 200 operational U-boats. By April 1943, his U-boats were clearly struggling to make an impact. The Allies were sinking German submarines in greater numbers, with 45 being destroyed in the months of April and May. Aggressive Allied anti-submarine tactics were aided by the introduction of new technology. Long-range aircraft were equipped with centimetric radar and directed based on Ultra intelligence from intercepts of Kriegsmarine Enigma code communications. The mass production of Liberty Ships in US shipyards would ensure that the Allies would overcome attrition rates and win the Battle of the Atlantic. Without the victory, the Allies would not have been able to land forces ashore in the Mediterranean Theater or at Normandy.

In Operation Sonnenblume, in 1941, the German Afrika Korps‘ first offensive in North Africa, it sought to advance on Alexandria and Suez. In that advance, the capture of Tobruk was a priority as it was the only deep water port in Eastern Libya and would have provided the Germans with the closest supply port to the Egypt–Libya border. Of some significance is the fact that the one the renowned military commanders to emerge from the war led the attack on Tobruk: Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Erwin Rommel. In 1940, Rommel commanded the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France where he demonstrated skill in the new tactic of blitzkrieg. He was a military officer who knew his business. When Rommel struck, he achieved complete surprise against British Army units in Libya’s eastern coastal region. The British Army was forced to retreat several hundred miles across the desert toward Tobruk. At Tobruk, the British Army and its allies held on. The Germans frequently bombarded the port. A blockade had been organized to thwart British resupply and reinforcement efforts. However, ships of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Station ran the blockade, and provided Tobruk’s defenders gunfire support, supplies, fresh troops and by ferrying out the wounded. The defenders of Tobruk received enough resources to keep up the fight. Rommel was stopped and the siege was lifted in December 1941.

Tobruk Siege 1941

In Operation Sonnenblume, from February 6, 1941 to May 25,1941, its first offensive in North Africa, the German Afrika Korps sought to advance on Alexandria and Suez in that advance, the capture of Tobruk was a main objective. Tobruk was the only deep water port in Eastern Libya and would have provided Rommel a supply port closer to the Egypt–Libya border than Benghazi, 900 kilometers or 560 miles west of the Egyptian frontier, which was within the range of Royal Air Force bombers; Tripoli was 1,500 kilometers or 930 miles to the west in Tripolitania. Of some significance is the fact that the one the renowned military commanders to emerge from the war led the attack on Tobruk: Generalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Erwin Rommel. A veteran of World War I, from 1929 through 1933, Rommel served as an instructor at the Dresden Infantry School and from 1935 at the Kriegsakademie (German War Academy) at Potsdam. In 1940, Rommel commanded the 7th Panzer Division during the invasion of France where he demonstrated skill in the new tactic of blitzkrieg. He was a military officer who knew his business. When Rommel struck, his Afrika Korps achieved complete surprise against British Army units in Libya’s eastern coastal region of Cyrenaica. The British Army was forced to retreat several hundred miles across the desert towards Tobruk.

Recognizing that he had the opportunity to capture Tobruk before the British Army and its Allies had time to organize an effective defense, Rommel advanced aggressively to exploit it. The 9th Australian Division, dubbed “The Rats of Tobruk”, supported by British Army armor and artillery, repulsed initial German assaults on April 10, 1941 to April 14, 1941, and even when the fresh 15th Panzer Division was committed to the attack on April 30, 1941, the defenders held on. The Germans frequently bombarded the port with artillery and Luftwaffe (German Air Force) dive-bombers and medium bombers. A blockade had been organized to thwart British resupply and reinforcement efforts. However, ships of the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Station–to include the Inshore Squadron–ran the blockade. Indeed, known as the “Tobruk Ferry Service”, Royal Navy and Royal Australian Navy warships provided gunfire support, supplies, fresh troops and by ferrying out the wounded. The defenders of Tobruk were provided enough resources to keep up the fight. The Royal Air Force flew defensive sorties from airfields far away in Egypt. The siege of Tobruk was the first occasion in the war that German Panzer units had been stopped. The siege was lifted in December 1941. It must be noted that via Operation Crusader, launched on November 27, 1941, Tobruk was relieved by the British Eighth Army which after September 1941, controlled British Army and other Allied ground forces in the Western Desert. It seems worthwhile to note the Fall of Tobruk occurred when Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel  commanding Panzerarmee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) which controlled the Afrika Korps and additional German units deployed to Africa as the 90th Light Infantry Division), as well as the Italian X Corps and XX Corps, attacked  on June 20, 1942 with massed air support, broke through a weak point on the eastern defensive perimeter, and captured the port. Although the garrison on the western perimeter had not been attacked, it was cut off from supplies and transport. Lacking the means to escape, the majority had to surrender; 33,000 prisoners were taken. Rommel had indeed learned lessons during the 1941 siege.

Être Voué à L’échec dès le Début

Even if everything else had been planned and arranged in the correct manner in every other aspect for the invasion, the viability of the entire plan would still rest on the ability of the Russian Federation Armed Forces to at best destroy, acceptably disrupt, or at the absolute minimum, delay resupply from the US, EU, and NATO. Without being able to control the movement of resupply in the West, the plan for the invasion should have been scrapped or the attack should have been postponed until that was nailed down. The reasoning behind such a decision has already been made abundantly clear looking at the circumstances of the handful of examples presented here already. As it was, the “special military operation” was launched, half-baked, and billions of dollars in military assistance has reached the Ukrainian Armed Forces via their country’s western border. Many weapon systems sent into Ukraine have had a multiplier effect on the battlefield. Firepower in the form of multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled artillery, and heavy caliber guns, transported possibly along the now heavily traveled supply lines from both Poland and Romania enabled the Ukrainian Armed Forces to launch two highly-successful counteroffensives. On August 29, 2022, a counteroffensive was launched to eject Russian forces occupying the Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts (provinces). On September 6, 2022, a counteroffensive was launched to eject Russian forces occupying the Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts. Given the unsatisfactory nature in which the Russian invasion was arranged and indeed, has been prosecuted, the decision to go into Ukraine was the sort that if made during an instance of saber rattling and war fever in a highly-industrialized democracy, would very likely lead to the impeachment of a national leader.

Ruminations

To set the record straight from the outset, greatcharlie believes that if Russian Federation forces were selectively positioned in Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Armed Forces would have likely used their formidable and quite impressive drone arsenal to bombard them. They might have achieved the same relative success that they have achieved with Russian Federation forces in the east and south and around Kyiv. Once aptly prepared, Ukrainian special forces would likely do their part to hunt down and displace and destroy any Russian Federation troops settled in their country’s Western region. 

Commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces would unlikely have known or believed any of that would have been possible before the invasion. One would need to consider other reasons for the omission of a mission to thwart, to an extent blockade resupply to the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the West.The Romania-Ukraine border is 649 kilometers or around 403 miles, but it is discontinuous. The. Moldova-Ukraine border is 1,222 kilometers or 759 miles. However, along the Dniester River, between Moldova and Ukraine, is the autonomous Republic of Transnistria.  Thereby, 454 kilometers or 282 miles of the Moldova-Ukraine border stand as the de factor border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

To the left of the above map are all countries situated on Ukraine’s western border. As Ukraine is looked upon in Europe as a very large country, perchance the area in western Ukraine that would need to be covered was judged by military commanders and planners in the Russian Federation General Staff as too large and deemed too difficult to control or monitor, surveil, and launch successful interdiction attacks and raids from. The Polish–Ukrainian border has a total length of 529 kilometers or 329 miles to 535 kilometers or 332 miles according to different sources. The Romania-Ukraine border is 649 kilometers or around 403 miles, but it is discontinuous. The Slovakia-Ukraine border is 97 kilometers or a bit over 60 miles. The Hungary-Ukraine border is roughly 103 kilometers or 60 miles long. It its located in Hungary’s Tisza river valley of its northeast. The Moldova-Ukraine border is 1,222 kilometers or 759 miles. However, along the Dniester River, between Moldova and Ukraine, is the autonomous Republic of Transnistria.  Thereby, 454 kilometers or 282 miles of the Moldova-Ukraine border stand as the de factor border between Transnistria and Ukraine.

Omission or De-emphasis?

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Imaginably, there is a moderately rational reason behind the decision to attack the second largest country in Europe, 603,500 square kilometers or 233,000 square miles, without being fully prepared. Ukraine is second largest in size to Russia, which is 17,098,246 square kilometers or 6,601,670 square miles. As Ukraine is looked upon in Europe as a very large country, perchance the area in Western Ukraine that would need to be covered was judged as too large by military commanders  and planners in the Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) and commanders and planners at the lower level in Yuzhnyy Voyennyy Okrug (the Southern Military District) and the Zapadnyy Voyennyy Okrug (the Western Military District) and deemed too difficult to control or monitor, surveil, and launch successful interdiction attacks and raids into. The Polish–Ukrainian border is the state border between Poland and Ukraine. It has a total length of 529 kilometers or 329 miles to 535 kilometers or 332 miles according to different sources.

Concisely and admirably described by the Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (Transfrontier Operational Mission), an association that was set up in 1997 by the government of France to resolve issues for entities concerned with cross border issues, the Poland-Ukraine border begins at the tripoint formed by the Ukrainian, Polish and Slovak borders, in the middle of the Eastern Carpathian mountains. The demarcation runs initially towards the east, arriving at the Ushok Pass and the source of the San River, whereupon it turns north-west to follow the river for around 50 kilometers or 31 miles. It subsequently leaves the river to take a north-easterly direction, crossing the region known as the “Przemyśl Gate”, where mountains meet lowlands. The border then crosses large swathes of agricultural land, to reach the Bug River, which forms the last third of its demarcation. It ends at the tripoint formed by the borders of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. Poland is a NATO Member State and an EU border state.

The Romania-Ukraine border is 649 kilometers or around 403 miles, but it is discontinuous. Again using a description from the Mission Opérationnelle TransfrontalièreThe Republic of Moldova separates the border into two segments. The first in the west, at the tripoint between the Hungarian-Romanian and Hungarian-Ukrainian borders. That segment then continues across the East Carpathian mountains and terminates at the tripoint formed by the Moldovan, Romanian and Ukrainian borders. The second segment begins at the second tripoint between the Moldovan, Romanian and Ukrainian borders, on the north bank of the Danube River, and terminates as it reaches the Black Sea. Romania is a NATO Member State and an EU border state. The Slovakia-Ukraine border is 97 kilometers or a but over 60 miles long. Slovakia is also a NATO Member State and an EU border state. The Hungary-Ukraine border is roughly 103 kilometers or 60 miles long. It is located in Hungary’s Tisza River Valley in the country’s northeast. As with the preceding three countries discussed, Hungary is a NATO Member State and an EU borderstate. The. Moldova-Ukraine border is 1,222 kilometers or 759 miles. However, along the Dniester River, between Moldova and Ukraine, is the autonomous Republic of Transnistria.  Thereby, 454 kilometers or 282 miles of the Moldova-Ukraine border stand as the de factor border between Transnistria and Ukraine. Transnistria is an autonomous republic aligned since 1992 with the Russian Federation. Russian Federation Armed Forces units have also been garrisoned there since 1992. To that extent, anyone providing military assistance to Ukraine would hardly choose to move anything through Moldova as Russian Federation intelligence services posted in Transnistria would likely be able to position themselves to monitor such resupply activities. Moving through Moldova would very likely be deemed too risky, unsafe. To an extent, one might say any effort by Russian Federation Armed Forces to monitor resupply efforts for Ukraine would indicate commanders and planners were covering the matter. Perhaps the Russian Federation General Staff sold that notion to Putin. However, while a few things could be done from Transnistria, given the sheer size of its border with Ukraine, and its position south and toward the east with respect other bordering countries, it would unlikely be enough to make a real difference. It would seem Putin did not want to stir trouble over Transnistria issue. The Russian Federation Armed Forces there have remained relatively quiet, and the West has more or less left the autonomous republic alone. If covert monitoring has been transpiring along or across the Transnistria border, it is apparently not having an impact. Thus, the focus here is on resupply from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (center), Russian Federation Defense Minister General Sergei Shoigu (right), and Chief of Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Valery Gerasimov (left). Commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces apparently “wholeheartedly” accepted the idea that the Ukrainians would acquiesce as in 2014. Despite losses inflicted upon Ukrainian defenders and territorial gains, in eastern and southern Ukraine as well as Kyiv, the mission to completely snuff out the combat power and resolve of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and force a sort of mass capitulation was not achieved. The losses of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have been exponentially higher. It seems most apparent that the Russian Federation General Staff had moved forward without a satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion. Indeed, by results alone, one might infer that there were actually no contingency plans to draw upon for the invasion of Ukraine.

Folly, Doctor-Like, Controlled Skill

Commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces apparently “wholeheartedly” accepted the idea–fiction–that the Ukrainians would roll over and play nice doggie à la 2014. Tomaten auf den augen haben. Despite losses inflicted upon the Ukrainian defenders and territorial gains, in eastern and southern Ukraine, the mission to completely snuff out the combat power and resolve of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and force a sort of mass capitulation was not achieved. In the end, the losses of the Russian Federation Armed Forces have been exponentially higher. It seems most apparent that the Russian Federation General Staff had moved forward without a satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion. Indeed, by results alone, one might infer that there were actually no contingency plans to draw upon for the invasion of Ukraine, with solutions for all conceivable challenges. Doing the “what-ifs” beforehand was probably viewed as walking out on thin ice “politically”. While the idea might be difficult for the reasonable to reconcile, it appears the massive enterprise was  truly undertaken by Moscow on the fly. 

Allowing the Russian Federation Armed Forces to perform in such a way would be very much unlike Putin given the record of his past behavior. True, over the past two decades, he has dropped some clangers. Even the most knowledgeable and experienced can make mistakes they learned to avoid long ago. That is human nature; the human element. Still, Putin’s actions are usually thoughtful, calibrated, well calculated, with the use of resources in a measured way to achieve the most favorable outcomes. Putin can surely tell the difference between real and unreal. He has not managed to stay in power since 2000 by engaging in Quixotic pursuits. This is something new. One wonders what could possibly come next for Ukraine and for the world.

Putin was oddly hooked on the idea that among the officers, men, and women of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there was a lingering sense of Soviet unity equal to his own. This in itself was quite interesting as Putin was hardly known for truly displaying brotherly love toward former Soviet republics. He would create an environment of fear in his relationship with their respective leaders. After Euromaidan, the Ukrainians did not want any part of that. In his invasion day television broadcast of February 24, 2022, Putin would go as far as to implore the Ukrainian Armed Forces to submit to his will and allow Russian troops to again simply march into their country. There appeared to be a singular emotional commitment on his part to the ideas of Russian-Ukrainian unity and the fealty of the officers, men, and women of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to Moscow, to him. Putin “appealed” to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as follows: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” If the matter were not so grave, his words might be looked upon as comical.

Putin seemed forgetful of, or totally oblivious to, the fact that he was responsible for the greatest humiliation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces when he ordered the “green men” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces into Crimea to seize Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Further, without firing a shot, the green men first corralled members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces much as sheep in their own garrison and then herded them out of Crimea. Knowing the Ukrainians as well as he claimed he did in the February 24, 2022 broadcast, Putin should have known the Ukrainians are not sheep. He should have been well-aware that there would be payback for what happened in 2014 and everything that has happened since. He surely knows that now.

In its ill-designed aspects influenced by the political leadership, the Russian Federation’s special military operation on a macro-level much resembles the failed German campaign, Operation Barbarossa, launched on June 21, 1941. Hitler provided empty assurances resulting from his baseless analyses to Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the Army) to the effect that “We have only to kick in the front door and the whole rotten edifice will come tumbling down.” Oberkommando des Heeres went along with Hitler’s concept that the campaign would be a short one, and that the Soviets would give in after suffering the shock of massive initial defeats. As a result, it did not develop a satisfactory long-term plan for the invasion.  The shock and awe of the initial Blitzkrieg was dissipated by the vast distances, Supply challenges could not be overcome. There was a lack of sufficient manpower resources. German losses could not be sustained. After initial contact, there was stiff resistance from Soviet forces. Despite the serious losses inflicted on the Soviet Army the mission to completely destroy Soviet fighting power and force a capitulation was not achieved by January 7, 1942, and the operation was terminated 20 kilometers short of Moscow. Interestingly enough,a number er of fitting comparisons between Putin and a national leader whose blunders came as a result of being closed to the recommendations and entreaties of his or her top advisers, are those made with Hitler.

Delinquency

There is the real possibility that commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces, attempting to hastily organize the massive Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) were not even aware that the opportunity to destroy and disrupt the resupply effort for Ukraine was missed. Everything truly started off on the wrong foot from the get-go. By logic, at first glance this would seem unlikely. After all, the well-trained senior officers and planners of the Russian Federation Armed Forces would not be aware of the danger posed by Ukraine’s open western border. Perhaps there may have been some understanding among military planners that the situation there would be played-down in order to line up with thinking from the Kremlin. In the realm of conjecture, anything becomes possible. If such was the case, from that point onward, they could only hope nothing bad would come of that considerable  omission.

The US educator and organizational theorist, Russell Ackoff was a pioneer in the field of operations research, systems thinking, and management science. In a research article entitled “A Major Mistake That Managers Make” in Handbook of Business Strategy, volume 7, number 1, January 2006, pages. 225-227, Ackoff wrote: “Errors of omission, lost  opportunities, are generally more critical than errors of commission. Organizations fail or decline more frequently because of what they did not do than because of what they did.” Although the December 7, 1941 surprise attack of the Imperial Japanese Navy on Pearl Harbor was a tactical victory, it was also a strategic blunder, as the Japanese failed one of their most critical objectives: destroy the US aircraft carriers. Even worse, the Japanese failed to destroy the strategic oil reserves at Oahu, and the damage to docks and yards was slight. That oil reserve fueled the US Navy through the remainder of the war against Japan.

A well-intervaled column of German vehicles moves through the Ardennes Forest in 1940 (above). At the top of the list of historical causes for military blunders has been insufficient intelligence analyses as well as the failure of consumers to include valuable forecasts in their appraisals of situations. Consider for example how the military high command of France failed their government three times in 70 years by minimizing warnings about the intentions of Prussian and German Governments. In 1870, the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army, with its attitude of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”), did not heed signaling that the Prussian Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1914, the French Grand Quartier Général (General Headquarters) did not heed indicia signaling that the Imperial German Army, to avoid French defenses on the Franco-German border, would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, relying on the defenses of the Maginot Line, did not heed indicia signaling that the German Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. Even with this history, in 1944, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe ignored idicia signaling that the German Army might attempt to move via the Ardennes Forest into Belgium in an attempt to reach Antwerp and cut Allied Forces into two pieces. The result was the Battle of the Bulge in which US forces suffered an estimated 75,000 casualties.

Was Faulty Intelligence to Blame?

Quis, quid, ubi, quibus, auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando? (Who, what, where, with what, why, how, when?) Very pertinent here is the attendant influence of faulty intelligence in understanding the situation of an opponent, strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and possibilities in the development of the concept and intent of an operation in terms of supply. It becomes a factor of some magnitude in planning support operations. It is imprudent for political leaders and top military commanders to ignore information from intelligence services that confirms some action by an adversary is very likely, imminent, or has been taken. Well at the top of historical causes for military missteps has been insufficient intelligence analyses as well as the failure of consumers to include valuable forecasts in their appraisals of situations. 

Consider for example how the military high command of France failed their government three times in 70 years by minimizing warnings about the intentions of Prussian and German Governments. In 1870, the Supreme Command of the French Imperial Army, with its attitude of debrouillez-vous (“We’ll muddle through somehow”), did not heed signaling that the Prussian Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1914, the French Grand Quartier Général (General Headquarters) did not heed indicia signaling that the Imperial German Army, to avoid French defenses on the Franco-German border, would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. In 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme War Council, relying on the defenses of the Maginot Line, did not heed indicia signaling that the German Army would move via the Ardennes Forest through Belgium into France. Even with this history, in 1944, the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe ignored idicia signaling that the German Army might attempt to move via the Ardennes Forest into Belgium in an attempt to reach Antwerp and cut Allied Forces into two pieces. The result was the Battle of the Bulge in which US forces suffered an estimated 75,000 casualties.

Referring again to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a newly discovered official US Government memorandum has revealed that intelligence collected about the activities of the Imperial Japanese Navy, led to assessments that Japan might attack the US on the West coast, the Panama Canal, and the US naval and military bases in Hawaii some time in December 1941. The Japanese Imperial Navy would eventually execute a devastating surprise, aircraft carrier-based, aerial attack and submarine attack on the US Naval Base and Headquarters of the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and aerial attacks against the US Army Base at Schofield Barracks and the US Army Air Corps Base at Hickam Field. Most US military commanders were bewildered by the successful attack which they never would have believed Japan could execute before it actually happened. By leaning into those beliefs, they were caught flat-footed by the attack. Their immediate responses were meager and ineffective.

In the case of Ukraine, it would seem Putin was provided faulty information. Some intelligence services apparently did more in the direction of providing fabrications than others.. From what can be gathered by newsmedia reports about its findings, the foreign intelligence service of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation) or FSB, known as the organization’s 5th service. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Apparently, the 5th Service laid it on thick. There were allegedly many unproven, torrid statements on the nature of Ukrainian society made concerning the destructive impact of the West on the culture, morality, spiritually, self-image of the people, ultranationalists, and the leadership in Kyiv, and the Ukrainian people’s willingness to stand fast against an invasion. 

Are Russian Federation Satellites Functioning?

One might imagine that there was a chance that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities by Russian Federation satellites could have assisted in covering the space and monitor and act against assistance efforts by supporting calibrated attacks on supply trains, especially readily observable ones  traveling along roads and rails. Intriguingly, only a few short years ago, there was great concern expressed in the US about formidable Russian Federation satellites that were interfering with US satellites. As discussed in greatcharlie’s July 6, 2017 post entitled, “Trump to Meet With Putin at G-20 Gathering: Trump Seeks an Authentic Relationship with Russia”, there was the belief that Russia was developing the ability to approach, inspect, and potentially sabotage or destroy US satellites while they orbited the Earth. 

Now, it seems, Russian Federation satellites must be able to provide a picture of the situation in Ukraine. True, as stated here, Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe, but, if many will pardon this expression, in greater terms, it is smaller than the State of Texas in the US, which has been regularly, intensely surveilled by the Russian Federation as it was before by the Soviet Union due mainly to the many massive US military and NASA bases and other facilities there. De quoi s’agit-il ici? It appears that a breakdown in Russian ISR capabilities from space much as its military, naval, and intelligence capabilities generally, had occurred long before the special military operation was launched.

Having been responsible for the preparedness of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Russian Federation General Staff had to have known something was awry. it had to have known whether they were up to the job in Ukraine. While the Russian Federation Armed Forces’ Zapad and Vostok exercises perhaps indicated that they were ready for war, surely the Russian Federation General Staff was fully aware of how numbers of troops, actions, reports were, to be frank, falsified. The most senior commanders may not have been sure themselves what the true capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were. If they were living in an illusion about how mighty their forces were, that  Illusion was destroyed in the face of reality.

Snapshot of the initial wave of Ukrainian refugees (above). There is the possibility the commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces may have believed there was more to gain by having a great flow of refugees pouring out of Ukraine to create problems, chaos and confusion, hostile reactions from populations of countries inconvenienced by overflows of Ukrainian refugees, and frustration among NATO, EU Member State capitals. Conceivably, the thinking from the Kremlin and subsequently the Russian Federation Armed Forces that if the roads out of Ukraine to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova were clogged, potentially military assistance could not get through, at least not efficiently. By weaponizing refugee flows an invasion would cause, it may have been believed a way found to split the seam between two possibilities. However, even in the best case scenario, the refugee exodus would be a temporary problem. If Western powers could not resolve the matter, they would at least be able to mitigate its immediate effects. Once the invasion began, humanitarian and refugee organizations of almost every kind jumped in feet first. The West could do more with assistance to stem the crisis than the Russian Federation could do by creating a refugee overflow crisis. As it turned out, the refugee crisis as the Kremlin might have envisioned and hoped did not materialize.

The Pitfalls of Creative Thinking

There is the possibility the commanders and planners in the Russian Federation Armed Forces may have believed there was more to gain by having a great flow of refugees pouring out of Ukraine to create problems, chaos and confusion, hostile reactions from populations of countries inconvenienced by overflows of Ukrainian refugees, and frustration among NATO, EU Member State capitals. That belief would very likely have been in following with the concept and intent disseminated from the Kremlin. The impact of a refugee surge was witnessed while war raged in Syria. During the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis, an estimated 1.3 million refugees seeking asylum literally jammed roads leading to Europe. European countries, especially the first ones along the refugees route that encountered them, were unable to handle their numbers immediately. Some capitals panicked. Many political, social, financial, and security issues subsequently arose. The refugee flow eventually subsided. 

The Weaponization of Refugees

Conceivably, the thinking from the Kremlin and subsequently the Russian Federation Armed Forces that if the roads out of Ukraine to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova were clogged, potentially military assistance could not get through, at least not efficiently. By weaponizing refugee flows an invasion would cause, it may have been believed a way found to split the seam between two possibilities. Zwei fliegen mit einer klappe schlagen. However, even in the best case scenario, the refugee exodus would be a temporary problem. If Western powers could not resolve the matter, they would at least be able to mitigate its immediate effects. Once the invasion began, the UN with its many aid organizations as well as and other international and regional intergovernmental humanitarian and refugee organizations jumped in feet first. The US would work with capitals in Europe, especially Warsaw, and encourage through diplomacy and support with its wherewithal, a multilateral effort by government aid agencies. The EU acted in a similar way. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, CARE and other international and regional nongovernmental humanitarian and refugee organizations. Nongovernmental refugee and displaced persons organizations, and a variety of humanitarian organizations from around the world made their way to Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova to get a handle on the problem. 

As things went, the Russi­an Federation’s special military operation triggered a “regional forced displacement crisis.” By September 30, 2022, seven months after the invasion began, 7,536,433 Ukrainian refugees were registered outside of Ukraine. Reportedly, Poland and Germany received the most refugees; more than a million each. The Czech Republic took in the next highest number 438,926, followed by the US, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Italy, and Spain, each of which accepted from 100,000 to 300,000 refugees. Smaller numbers escaped to Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Moldova. 

Interestingly, and doubtlessly to the consternation of the Kremlin and Russian Federation Armed Forces, not only is military assistance flowing freely into Ukraine from Poland but so are “returnees”. Clear data that documents how many of the 7.5 million Ukrainian refugees have returned home permanently, reportedly is unavailable. However as of September 20, 2022, over 6 million cross-border movements were made back into the country. Border crossing points in Poland as well as Romania are said to be receiving most of the returnees, with nearly 4.5 million crossings from Poland and nearly 1 million from Romania. In the aggregate, one might conclude that the West could do more with assistance than Russia could do by creating a refugee overflow crisis. In the end, the refugee crisis that the Kremlin may likely have envisioned and hoped for did not materialize. Vide et credere. (See and believe.)

Where Was the GRU?

As a military matter, intelligence on the situation in Ukraine to the extent it would impact the special military operation had to be of great interest specifically to Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU  The GRU could not have missed the potential problem of resupply routes into Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania being set up. Perhaps the GRU was unable to convince the Russian Federation General Staff of the necessity to close the door to assistance from the West. Maybe there was at first a thought to use the same act twice with “green men” in the Western Ukraine. However, GRU planners may have been concerned about being unable to redeploy or evacuate troops placed perhaps at border crossings, highways, train junctions, road intersections, bridges, heights, airports, military airfields, and so on deep in Ukraine in large numbers if a major problem was encountered.

It was suggested in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, one could conceive that concerning Western military assistance, a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things: monitor the delivery, stockpiling of stinger, javelin, and other weapons systems to Ukrainian forces; maintain real-time knowledge of the distribution and location of those weapons; destroy those weapons systems; and, destroy or support actions by other Russian military units to destroy Ukrainian military units to which those weapons were distributed. That hypothetical task force would also likely be tasked to monitor–covertly monitor the intelligence activities and military operations of–Western countries as they relate to supplying Ukraine with special military capabilities. It would seem that suggestion made by greatcharlie then was well-off the mark. Maybe they were concerned about potential for great casualties and huge losses of materiel.

Where Was Spetsnaz?

Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union, are trained, and tasked as special forces units and fielded in wartime as part of the GRU. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency. The GRU may have been unable to conjure up a viable plan to use spetsnaz in western Ukraine. Again, GRU planners may have been concerned about being unable to deploy or evacuate troops placed even on raids so deep without a solid means of egress. Even if it had been possible to monitor and act in the Western region from Belarus, again, distances that needed to be traversed may have been too great.

One might wonder whether the GRU had been aware that there was someone else in Western Ukraine, covert foreign forces from governments very friendly with Kyiv, already holding the most useful entrances and exits to and from Poland, Slovakia,, Hungary,, and Romania open in case of an attack. It is the sort of thing US Special Operations Units, the Special Activities Division of the US Central Intelligence Agency, the British Army’s Special Air Service, and the United Kingdom’s Secret Intelligence Service would be very capable of doing and would likely do, covertly. Surely, this idea is drawn from the realm of conjecture, however, it would be a smart move and their hypothetical presence would hardly be reported in the Western newsmedia. If, hypothetically, such forces had been there covertly since 2014, they may have been well-engaged in successful clandestine and covert activities in the region.

Perhaps what happened in Syria may have been an issue at all in GRU Headquarters. A battle between US Special Forces and Russian private military contractors from the infamous Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group) may have had a long-lasting educational effect in Yasenevo. Present in Syria as part of the campaign to destroy the so-called Islamic Caliphate created by the Islamic jihadist terrorist organization, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) that cut across iraq and Syria, US Special Forces, in self-defense at their own base, decimated a formation of Gruppa Vagnera that attacked them. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Even if commanders and military planners had been certain that spetsnaz could well-handle any foreign forces that hypothetically might have detected in the Western region of Ukraine, there imaginably would have been a wish in the Kremlin to avoid being seen as, and being accused of, attacking those foreign troops. In dubio abstinence. (When in doubt, sustain.)

Where Were the Russian Airborne Forces?

As for the Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (Russian Airborne Forces) or VDV, surely the Ukrainians might have expected missions launched by them to hold territory in-depth. Yet, as with the GRU, commanders and planners in the VDV may have been concerned about being unable to redeploy or evacuate troops placed perhaps at border crossings, highways, train junctions, road intersections, bridges, heights, airports, military airfields, and so on deep in Ukraine in large numbers if a major problem was encountered. Maybe they were concerned about potential for great casualties and huge losses of materiel. That happened without an operation to block Western assistance coming in from the West: 50,000+ killed. 

Surely, they were made more certain that the VDV would unlikely have been able successfully operate in the Western region of Ukraine after what transpired when its units attacked Hostomel Airport in the first days of the special military operation. The VDV faced considerable troubles there. One might view the capture of an airport a sort of bread and butter target for airborne units in armies worldwide

Russian Airborne Forces landing at Hostomel Airport (above). Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and planners may have been concerned about the potential for huge losses if a blocking operation in the West were attempted. Surely, they were made more certain that the VDV would unlikely have been able successfully operate in the Western region of Ukraine after what transpired when its units attacked Hostomel Airport in the first days of the special military operation. After securing Hostomel Airport to the extent possible, the Russian Federation Army and VDV there tried to push into the nearby town and then  advance to Bucha and Irpin. Their poorly organized movement encountered ambushes in Hostomel and Bucha which resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment. Those in command of the Russian Federation Army and VDV troops, decided to hold their positions, digging in on the roadsides to defend themselves against Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. They also suffered heavy casualties from night attacks by special forces units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On March 29, 2022, the order was given for the Russian Federation forces at Hostomel to withdraw from the Kyiv oblast. Under continuous artillery fire from Ukrainian forces, the Russians damaged equipment that had to be abandoned and made a hasty retreat.

According to reports based on what was observed, the Russian Federation Armed Forces plan of attack against Hostomel Airport included its rapid occupation, with the intention of using it as an assembly area for Kyiv’s encirclement and capture. The airport is a bit over 6 miles north of Kyiv. The Initial February 24, 2022 assault on Hostomel Airport was a success, catching its Ukrainian defenders by surprise apparently due its speed. Mi-35 and Ka-52 attack helicopters operating out of Belarus struck the airport’s defenses and opened a way for helicopter-borne VDV units in Mi-8 transport helicopters that followed. However, despite being caught off guard by the initial assault by the attack helicopters, the attack itself was ineffective as the Ukrainian defenses were left largely intact.  Without any meaningful air support–it was very likely not included in formulation of the attack plan, VDV units on the ground faced counterattacks by Ukrainian forces almost immediately.

Luckily for the VDV troops struggling with Ukrainian forces for control of the airport, Russian Federation Army units originating in Belarus broke through Ukrainian defenses near Ivankiv and rapidly drove toward Hostomel. Although the advancing Russian Federation troops faced attrition from several Ukrainian ambushes en route, they reached Hostomel Airport and assisted the VDV in securing it on February 25, 2022. The Russian Federation Army units and the VDV sought to establish Hostomel into a forward operating base from which the larger push on Kyiv could be initiated. However, it was at this juncture that the special military operation began facing fierce resistance from the Ukrainians and became stalled. Logistical problems impacted operational tempo. The most visible sign was well-televised coverage of a 40-mile-long convoy that halted due to lack of fuel. Securing Hostomel Airport to the extent possible, the Russian Federation Army and VDV there tried to push into the nearby town and then  advance to Bucha and Irpin. Their poorly organized movement encountered ambushes in Hostomel and Bucha which resulted in significant losses of personnel and equipment. Those in command of the Russian Federation Army and VDV troops, decided to hold their positions, digging in on the roadsides to defend themselves against Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. They also suffered heavy casualties from night attacks by special forces units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. On March 29, 2022, the order was given for the Russian Federation forces at Hostomel to withdraw from the Kyiv oblast. Under continuous artillery fire from Ukrainian forces, the Russians damaged equipment that had to be abandoned and made a hasty retreat.

A Matter of Military Science

To the extent of everything mentioned here, perhaps a hypothetical concern over sending a relatively large sized force into Western Ukraine was a matter of Russian Federation commanders and military planners remembering what they learned while studying in military educational institutions. To that extent, they wanted to avoid the circumstance faced by Allied troops during Operation Market Garden during World War II.

The story of the Battle of Arnhem, part of Operation Market Garden, a massive Airborne ground assault in from from September 17, 1944 to September 26, 1944 during World War II. remains fairly well-known, however greatcharlie will humbly seek to recount it to the extent that is pertinent here. Under the plan proposed by British Army Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, the Airborne assault would support a single drive north over the branches of the Lower Rhine River,which would  permit the British Second Army to bypass the Siegfried Line and attack the industrial Ruhr. US Airborne troops were dropped in the Netherlands to secure bridges and towns along the line of the Allied advance. Farthest north, the British 1st Airborne Division was dropped at Arnhem to capture bridges across the Nederrijn (Lower Rhine). Their assault was supported by the Glider Pilot Regiment and the 1st Polish Parachute Brigade. The British XXX Corps were assigned to reach the British-led contingent in two to three days. The division was told to expect only limited resistance from German reserve forces. However, information collected by the British Army’s 21st Army Group in Belgium and Dutch resistance that German armor units were present around Arnhem. That intelligence was supported by aerial reconnaissance. However, the commanding officer of 21st Army Group, dismissed the information. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force was made aware that almost certainly two Panzer divisions were situated at Arnhem but received the information from Ultra intercepts so close to the Operation Market Garden’s launch that it chose to ignore it. Intriguingly, the First Allied Airborne Army was not made privy to information from Ultra.

The information was very accurate. German Army Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, the commander of Army Group B, had moved his headquarters to Arnhem and was re-establishing defenses in the area and co-ordinating the reorganization of the scattered units. Thus, at the time of Operation Market Garden’s launch, several units would be present in the vicinity of Arnhem to oppose them. Most threatening among them were the II SS Panzer Corps comprising the remains of the 9th SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and  the 10th SS Panzer Division “Frundsberg”. It was the bad luck of the airborne force that both German SS divisions, during their formation, had undergone month-long anti-airborne exercises and had also spent the last 15 months studying how best to act against a parachute assault in classroom and field exercises.

The 1st Airborne Division was dropped a distance from its objectives and encountered unexpected resistance, mainly from elements of the 9th SS Panzer Division and the 10th SS Panzer Division. A small force managed to reach the Arnhem road bridge, but the advance of the main body of the division was halted on the outskirts of the town. As for XXX Corps, it was forced into a struggle at Nijmegen, and advance north was delayed. As a result, the British airborne troops were not relieved as scheduled. After four days, the small British force at the bridge was overwhelmed and the rest of the division trapped in a small pocket north of the river. Lacking reinforcement and resupply, remnants of the 1st Airborne Division, after nine days of fighting, were withdrawn in Operation Berlin. Without secure bridges over the Nederrijn and the front line stabilized south of Arnhem, the Allies were unable to advance further. The 1st Airborne Division lost almost three quarters of its strength. Battered and tattered, the division was not sent into combat again.

Concern over a Potential Panicked Response by Ukraine’s Neighbors

The Kremlin may have been uneasy about how the US, its NATO allies, and the EU would respond militarily if Russian troops landed in Western Ukraine, “danger close” to the Polish border. Even more, it may have been the case that  they were concerned political leaders in Poland, potentially panicked at observing Russian forces landing practically on its border, might have responded first by ordering Polish Armed Forces to unilaterally drive inside Ukraine border, take positions inside its Western region, and then refer the matter to NATO. Such hypothetical unilateral action might have included an armored and mechanized drive into Ukraine to create a buffer, and landing troops on border crossings, highways, train junctions, road intersections, bridges, heights, airports, military airfields, and so on before they would all fall completely into Russian Federation hands. To that extent, they would likely go after the same targets in Ukraine that the Russian Federation Armed Forces would likely want. In the worst case scenario, Polish troops could have fired heavy artillery and launched missile attacks on targets to deter air landings by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Where Was the Russian Air Force?

Concerning Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces), particularly the Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force) element, one might have presumed commanders and planners of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces would have organized air power assets of the force to strike strategically and tactically to make a positive difference in the war effort. Strategically, disrupting its supply of weapons from external sources and destroying Ukraine’s ability to construct weapons would likely be a priority. Tactically, a priority would likely be coordinating efforts by Russian Air Force assets with ground forces as they advanced. One might have expected that with the support of the Russian Federation’s ISR capabilities, a plan would have been in prepared for the Russian Air Force to shut the door on the transport of supplies through Ukraine, interdicting supply lines as fast as they were organized. However, that has not been the case. As the situation stands in the Ukraine campaign, the Russian Air Force has been near nonexistent relative to its size, supposed power, and the expectations of military analysts worldwide. Its best fighters and fighter-bombers have been regularly blasted out of the skies by the Ukrainian Armed Forces using both pricey sophisticated air defense weapons systems provided to Kyiv by Western powers as well as javelins and stingers, shoulder fired rockets operated by individual soldiers in the field. In response to the Ukrainian air defense threat, Russian Federation warplanes are not evading by flying sorties at 15,000 to 20,000 feet as they had over Syria. Russian aircraft are often remaining above Russian airspace and firing air launched cruise missiles into Ukraine. Since aircrews cannot identify targets across the border, airstrikes are made in areas where air intelligence reports the enemy is located. In attacking urban centers, that will always result in collateral damage in the form of civilian deaths and injury and the destruction of nonmilitary structures.

The Unwillingness to Speak Truth to Power

Commanders in all branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces are surely unwilling to speak truth to power and inform Putin of what needed to be done in the West and that they were uncertain that their forces could achieve such an objective. One might imagine that suffering Putin’s coup de gueule would be the least of their worries. It has been a symptom common among those in service of authoritarian regimes throughout history. Skilled commanders are eventually bled dry of their strength to speak out about ill-laid military plans conjured in the minds of tyrannical leaders who are convinced of the certitude of their ideas. Many have been willing to bring reprisals against those commanders, even their best, who, for the sake of the forces they command and country, might step forward to disagree with them. It causes greatcharlie to cast its mind back to the 1981 pop song Der Kommisar“, essentially a scare story originally performed in both German and English by the Austrian artist Falco (Johann Hölzel). In the penultimate chorus of the English version, are the lyrics: “Don’t turn around, wa-uh-oh (yeah-yeah) / Der Kommissar’s in town, wa-uh-oh / He’s got the power and you’re so weak / And your frustration will not let you speak / La la la la la la.”

Commanders in all branches of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were surely unwilling to speak truth to power and inform Putin of what needed to be done in Western Ukraine and that they were uncertain that their forces could achieve such an objective. One might imagine that suffering Putin’s coup de gueule would be the least of their worries. This has been a symptom common among those in service of authoritarian regimes throughout history. Skilled commanders are eventually bled dry of their strength to speak out about ill-laid military plans conjured in the minds of tyrannical leaders who are convinced of the certitude of their ideas. Many of those leadsrs have been willing to bring reprisals against those commanders, even their best, who, for the sake of the forces they command and country, have stepped forward to disagree with them.

The Military Assistance Misread

On a more political level, perhaps Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff were certainly completely wrong in their most likely conclusions about the degree of assistance the West would provide, what type of weapons and the impact they would have on the battlefield. The US has committed billions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Relative to what the Ukrainians would eventually receive, what they had been provided to that point would hardly have been viewed as impressive by the Russian Federation General Staff.

Much as it had been planned by the US during the days of the Cold War, much of what would be used to repel a Warsaw Pact rampage through Western Europe would be taken from prepositioned stocks of supplies or they would be flown in and shipped in. During the Cold War, from 1969 to 1993, the annual REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) Exercises rehearsed that reinforcement and resupply to a great degree. It seems apparent now that thinking along the same vein in the Pentagon may have driven planning for the support of Ukraine in event of an attack. This idea would very likely be a kick-in-the-head to Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and planners who had not have recognized the parallels as yet, never foresaw the possibility that the US and its NATO allies would essentially come at them, via the Ukrainians, in a similar way.. How obvious it all might seem now.

A Miscalculation on the Political Will of the West

Perchance Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff miscalculated with regard to the degree of political will in the administration of US President Joe Biden and the US Congress to support Ukraine. Mixed messages regarding US commitment. The “No US boots on the ground” talk came a tad too early perhaps. It probably was music to ears in Moscow. It may have very well created the impression the US was pulling away or could potentially abandon Kyiv if Russia invaded. It may reasonably seem a bit of an overreach to impute to Putin and his acolytes, but one would only need to look at the varying degrees of overreach they have demonstrated with regard to the Ukraine matter.

Maybe Putin and his advisers concluded that European countries could become rankled enough to lend military support to Ukraine but perhaps they were a bit better than less concerned with the quality and quantity of their potential assistance and financial giving. They would expect the US to have the matter well-covered.

Perhaps they considered that Western European resolve to be engaged robustly, wholeheartedly in Ukraine would hinge on the resolve of the US to back its NATO allies. As for the US, much as alluded to earlier, its resolve would hinge on the success or failure of Russian forces in Ukraine, which really meant the capabilities demonstrated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Thereby, as long as the Russian Federation Armed Forces performed well, robust military assistance beyond javelins and stingers would not be sent into Ukraine. (Based on that suspected line of thought, one might compare how that situation for Ukraine as the invasion got underway to a degree paralleled, mutatis mutandis, the situation of the fledgling US in 1777. The decisive Battle of Saratoga in which the Continental Army defeated the British Army gave the French government the confidence to sign treaties of alliance and trade with the US government and joined its war against Great Britain.  Both countries agreed to fight the war until the US was truly independent, and neither would agree to a separate peace.)

As the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces became desultory, ineffective, and proved surprisingly lacking at Kyiv and Kharkiv, it became easier for the US to give more to an Ukrainian cause with the real potential for victory and convince other NATO Allies to do the same albeit to far lesser degree. Panicked efforts by Kyiv to muster support and acquire weapons were practically wasteful as they clearly had the matter covered.

Misperceptions on Zelensky: A Force To Be Reckoned With

Of likely concern for Putin’s advisers, if not Putin, was surely Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky who in the months before the invasion was already burning a bit brighter than the Kremlin expected. There were hints that he potentially could display all the qualities ascribed to great leaders. Doubtlessly, it was hoped in the Kremlin that Zelensky would find himself cutting a figure not unlike Felicia Hemans’ “Casabianca” (1826), crying out for an answer, in Zelensky’s case from Washington, that would never come and his world would go up in flames. As it was, Zelensky proved to be a lion of a man, stalwart of the Ukrainian cause, and a force to be reckoned with once the Russian Federation’s special military operation began. Western government officials and news media commentators alike would view Zelensky as having galvanized the Ukrainian people to resist Russia’s effort to swallow up their country. Zelensky also impressed with his entreaties to the world to come to the aid of his fellow countrymen in the best ways that they could. One might safely assume that his efforts influenced how countries with the wherewithal to respond to the Ukraine in its time of need, worked with him, and rapidly developed and implemented plans to provide considerable support for his country. Indeed, such positive perceptions of Zelensky, his impact, helped to attract aid groups, humanitarian volunteers, foreign fighters, helpful weapons, and financial resources to support Ukraine’s cause.

Ukrainian artillerymen fire US made and gifted M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) (above) at Russian Federation forces holding Ukrainian territory. On a more political level, perhaps Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff were certainly completely wrong in their most likely conclusions about the degree of assistance the West would provide, what type of weapons and the impact they would have on the battlefield. The US has committed billions of dollars in security assistance to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. Relative to what the Ukrainians would eventually receive, what they had been provided to that point could hardly have been perceived as impressive by the Russian Federation General Staff. Much as it had been planned by the US during the days of the Cold War, much of what would be used to repel a Warsaw Pact rampage through Western Europe would be taken from prepositioned stocks of supplies or would be flown in and shipped in. The annual Reforger (Return of Forces to Germany) Exercises rehearsed that reinforcement and resupply to some degree. It seems apparent now that thinking along the same vein in the Pentagon may have driven planning for the support of Ukraine in event of an attack.

The Distorting impact of Putin’s Kyiv Obsession

Surely, Putin’s singular emotional wants and wishes beyond what was militarily and strategically logical what drove the planning of the operation or was it formulated to the best of the abilities of trained, experienced, informed military officers in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. To Putin, everything about the government in Kyiv was anathema. Recall as aforementioned that in a very perplexing way, Putin stated in his appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast: “You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” He would go on to say: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.” The indication s and implications of such statement are that Kyiv was indeed an obsession. To that extent, among those wants and wishes was toppling the government in Kyiv. Accomplishing that apparently became a priority with Kyiv in the planning of the invasion or whatever sufficed for its planning that distorted the picture Putin, his Security Council, and the Russian Federation General Staff of the battlespace. When examined in the context of this situation, how apposite the second quatrain of William Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116 becomes: “What wretched errors hath my heart commited, / Whilst it had thought itself so blessed never! / How hath mine eyes out of their spheres been fitted / In the distraction of this madding fever!”

If one might imagine Putin was a bit more pragmatic in his thinking and approach on Kyiv, it might be believed Putin may have thought the quickest road to victory was to cut off the head, the government in Kyiv and the command and control Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff, from their forces in the field. If that could be achieved, Putin likely believed the mass surrender of Ukrainian troops in the field would come next. If that was the case, and what has transpired in Ukraine evinces to some degree that it was, then quite a bit of creative thinking was clearly involved in the invasion’s planning. 

However, by the time of the invasion, the government in Kyiv under Zelensky was well-tied in with its Western supporters. Thorough plans to provide escalating levels of military and financial assistance were surely already in place. Even though Zelensky initially displayed a great degree of uneasiness concerning the way in which the needs of Ukraine in the crisis would be met, it might be the case that what has come Ukraine’s way has far exceeded what he might have been reasonably expected. The shortsightedness apparent in thinking that the Kyiv government could be decapitated is stark. An informed guess is that the Ukraine enterprise was not hashed out with the best foreign and national security thinkers in Russia. One would get the idea it all was the result of the thinking of one man, certain of its roundness. Such impetuous schemes and boldness are at first sight alluring, but are difficult to handle, and in the end result in disaster.

Perhaps the real problem for Putin was not just that he relied on fortune, but was driven by blind rage and to a further extent blind ambition. Ukraine was one the bigger pieces he needed to pull together a respectable number of former republics into some simulacrum of the Soviet Union. While it may seem daylight madness for the reasonable to attempt that, for Putin, it makes perfect sense.

The Distraction of Covetous Thoughts?

As discussed in greatcharlie’s May 30, 2022 post entitled, “Putin the Protector of the Russian People or the Despoiler of Ukrainian Resources: A Look at War Causation and Russian Military Priorities in Ukraine”, long before he became the legendary Russian President that he is today, Putin was a doctoral candidate at Leningrad State University (now the University of St. Petersburg.) it was at the very end of his KGB service. (A fuller discussion of that period of Putin’s life can be found in greatcharlie’s March 31, 2017 post entitled “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)). The rector at the St. Petersburg State Mining University as of this writing, Vladimir Litvinenko, chaired the committee that awarded Russian President Vladimir Putin his doctorate in Economics in 1997. He recently stated that Putin’s thesis was titled “Strategic Planning of the Reproduction of the Mineral Resource Base of a Region Under Conditions of the Formation of Market Relations.” Putin’s economic studies, at what was then Leningrad State University, were most likely heavily doused in Marxian theory. Even more pertinent here, his research made him quite knowledgeable about the resources of countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. He would be very aware of Ukraine’s wealth in minerals, particularly in the eastern and southeastern regions. Indeed, Ukraine has a large supply of many valuable mineral and raw material resources. Ukraine in fact holds approximately 5 percent of the world’s mineral resources. Its significant mineral resources include: iron ore, coal, manganese, uranium ore, natural gas, oil, salt, sulfur, graphite, titanium, magnesium, kaolin, nickel, mercury. As for stocks of iron, manganese, titanium and uranium ore Ukraine is ranked first among European countries. As for mercury ore reserves, it is second only to Spain. Attendant to capturing sovereign territory in Ukraine, much as he grabbed Crimea eight year before, Putin may have wanted possession of its supply of many valuable mineral and raw material resources. Thinking in that direction may also have distorted his picture of what would be most important in invading Ukraine successfully. 

If this was Putin’s thinking and actions on this matter, at a more detailed level than discussed earlier, it would very much mirror that of Hitler during Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. As explained by the Imperial War Museum, industrialists in Germany most likely influenced Hitler’s decision to seize the Southern Caucasus in the Soviet Union and Stalingrad despite the concerns and entreaties of Oberkommando des Heeres with undertaking an operation of such distance from where the German Army was situated. As aforementioned, Operation Barbarossa, launched in June 1941, failed to achieve Hitler’s objective of decisively defeating the Soviet Union in a single campaign. German forces managed to occupy vast swathes of Soviet territory and industry. However, the audacious invasion finally ground to a halt in December 1941 on the forested outskirts of Moscow, the exhausted German Army stabilized its winter front in a line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. The strain of the harsh winter campaign upon the ill-prepared Wehrmacht, as well as the severe strain placed on the Luftwaffe in its prolonged efforts to air-supply the army’s string of city-bastions along the front, was tremendous. The Germans suffered a staggering 850,000 casualties. Interestingly, despite such considerable setbacks, the Germans believed the war was still going fairly well.

However, the following year, Hitler decided to go on the offensive. A decision by Hitler to launch a campaign in the Southern Caucasus region, south of the German front was spurred on by flawed information provided to him by economic advisers. They told Hitler that Germany would be incapable of sustaining the war without the resources in the Caucasus. North of the mountains was a center of agricultural production, which also held significant coal and metal reserves; to the south, was the region of Transcaucasia, a densely populated industrial center which produced some eighty percent of the Soviet Union’s annual oil production.Responsive to the wishes of the political leadership, by February 1942, the Oberkommando des Heeres was planning an offensive in the Caucasus region. 

On April 5, 1942, Hitler issued  Führerbefehle Nr. 41 (Fűhrer Directive No. 41), laying out the basic plan for the new offensive in the Soviet Union. The new plan would become known as Fall Blau (Case Blue). The main objectives were the major oilfields in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia: Maikop, Grozny and Baku. Senior German commanders were concerned about undertaking such a deep thrust into the opponent’s territory, fearing for the safety of their flank. Hitler’s remedy was to include in the plan the occupation of Stalingrad by Germany’s Italian, Hungarian and Romanian allies. The city would initially be taken by Germans. They would also establish a defensive line along the Don River and Volga River, which would be taken over by allies, too. Capturing Stalingrad would have the additional benefit of blocking all enemy traffic on the Volga, a crucial transport artery. To Hitler, the operation, which he deemed to be “of limited scope,” made perfect sense. Events proved otherwise.

A postage stamp from the erstwhile Deutsche Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, also known as the GDR or East Germany) circa 1963, that includes portraits of the Prussian military leader August Neidhardt von Gneisenau (left), Prussian field marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher (right). In war, the value of a reliable, knowledgeable, skilled, and open-minded adviser who truly understands the concept and intent of his commander, cannot be underestimated. A model for interaction between a political leader or military commander with his advisers was the one between the renowned 18th century Prussian Army Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher with his chief of staff General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau. In Clausewitz: (Scarborough, 1979), author Roger Parkinson quotes von Blücher with regard to his relationship with his brilliant chief of staff as follows: “Gneisenau, being my chief of staff and very reliable, reports to me on the manoeuvres that are to be executed and the marches that are to be performed. Once convinced that he is right, I drive my troops through hell towards the goal and never stop until the desire goal has been accomplished–yes, even though the officers trained in the old school may pout and complain and all but mutiny.” Regarding an offer for von Blücher to receive an honorary degree at Oxford University following the Napoleonic War, Parkinson quotes him as saying: “Well, if I am to become a doctor, you must at least make Gneisenau an apothecary, for we two belong together always.”

Eyes Wide Shut

“A lion does not lose sleep over the opinion of sheep. ” is a quote often attributed to others, but it is very likely the words of Abū ʿAbdullāh Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (28 August 767 — 19 January 820) was a Palestinian-Arab Muslim theologian, writer, and scholar, who was the first contributor of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-fiqh). Often referred to as ‘Shaykh al-Islām’, al-Shāfi‘ī was one of the four great Imams, whose legacy on juridical matters and teaching eventually led to the Shafi’i school of fiqh (or Madh’hab). In his thoughts, Putin is surely completely alone. He appears indifferent to whether the rest of the world sees him as a bit out of touch or strange, apart from everything else. Outside of his super fans in Russia–many of whom have been unfortunate enough to meet their end, so very young, on fields, hills, and woods in Ukraine as questionably trained conscripts–certainly does not appear gallant or chivalrous. Putin is holding the course on Ukraine, not yielding in any way that might allow for authentic and substantive negotiations to end the conflict to begin. There still does not appear to be a line of talk available to even his closest advisers that could put a different complexion on the matter.

In war, the value of a reliable, knowledgeable, skilled, and open-minded adviser who truly understands the concept and intent of his commander, cannot be underestimated. A model for interaction between a political leader or military commander with advisers was the one between the renowned 18th century Prussian Army Marshal Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher with his chief of staff Prussian Army General August Neidhardt von Gneisenau. In Clausewitz: (Scarborough, 1979), author Roger Parkinson quotes von Blücher with regard to his relationship with his brilliant chief of staff as follows: “Gneisenau, being my chief of staff and very reliable, reports to me on the manoeuvres that are to be executed and the marches that are to be performed. Once convinced that he is right, I drive my troops through hell towards the goal and never stop until the desire goal has been accomplished–yes, even though the officers trained in the old school may pout and complain and all but mutiny.” Regarding an offer for von Blücher to receive an honorary degree at Oxford University following the Napoleonic War, Parkinson quotes him as saying: “Well, if I am to become a doctor, you must at least make Gneisenau an apothecary, for we two belong together always.”

An informed guess by greatcharlie is what has likely been a reliable intuition that had served him well along the way and allowed him a leg-up in giving subjects light were darkened with regarding parsing out the many aspects of this massive enterprise in Ukraine. Imagining Putin with his mind set on invading Ukraine come hell or high-water and refusing hear any suggestion that he delay until Russian forces were fully prepared to act, maximize every advantage and exploit the liabilities of Ukrainian forces to the fullest extent, and cope with all contingencies, if one might dare discuss such with him as noted earlier. 

One can only imagine Putin’s outward attitude and behavior at that time. The thought of it all curiously reminds greatcharlie a song sung by the renowned comic, Groucho Marx in the comedy film “Horse Feathers” (1932), not that there is anything remotely humorous about any aspect of the Ukraine War. When Marx’s  character, Professor Quincy Adams Wagstaff, is made the new head of Huxley College, and asked to offer some suggestions for his administration, the first verse of his musical response was: “I don’t know what they have to say / It makes no difference anyway / Whatever it is, I’m against it / No matter what it is or who commenced it / I’m against it.”

Putin Was Blinded by Rage

A dislike of Biden administration members inflamed the ardor of Putin and closest acolytes and they became determined to hurt Kyiv for siding with them. Imagining Putin’s mindset, he likely firmly believed before the invasion of Ukraine that he had a good understanding of the way many senior foreign and national security policy officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden, many of whom had held senior posts in the Obama administration, would respond to a move toward Ukraine. As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, Putin had experienced considerable dissatisfaction and disappointment in his dealing with Obama administration officials, particularly on Ukraine. As he may have perceived their actions in the past, they found it rather piquant to interact with him as if he were a lesser party, and given his positions and concerns no consideration. He likely believed they saw him as undeserving of respect. Communications were condescending, actions were often insulting. In an explosion of aggression, in part a response to his treatment, he grabbed Crimea with military force and fomented civil war in the Donbas. He engaged in other destabilizing efforts. Apparently, he was not completely satisfied with those actions, and held in his mind the idea of doing more. Seeing the appointment of many of those same officials in even higher posts in the Biden administration, most likely inflamed his sense with ardor to lash out violently. Everything those officials did in the Biden administration, Putin surely viewed with their past actions firmly in mind.

One might theorize that although he could not conventionally strike directly at those officials, Putin could reach the Zelensky government, members of which he may view as something worse than traitorous. He could well imagine the the fall of the Zelensky government would beset the Biden administration officials that he despised with a sense of loss and failure. Secondly, he would hope to cause torment and anguish among their “Ukrainian followers”. To that extent, perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that given current attitudes and behaviors of Putin, the invasion of Ukraine may also have been in part an opportunity for Putin to have a return engagement, a rematch, with former senior Obama administration officials serving in the Biden administration and settle an old score. 

Putin (seated left) during a Russian Federation Security Council meeting just days before the special military operation was launched. A dislike of senior members of the administration of US President Joe Biden likely inflamed the ardor of Putin and closest acolytes and they became determined to hurt Kyiv for siding with them. Imagining Putin’s mindset, he likely firmly believed before the invasion of Ukraine that he had a good understanding of the way many senior foreign and national security policy officials in the Biden administration, many of whom had held senior posts in the administration of US President Barack Obama, would respond to a move toward Ukraine. One might theorize that although Putin could not conventionally strike directly at those officials, he could reach the Zelensky’s government, members of which he may view as something akin to “traitorous”. He knew what anguish and loss the fall of Zelensky’s government would cause those US officials and secondly, their “Ukrainian followers”. To that extent, perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that given current attitudes and behaviors of Putin, the invasion of Ukraine may also have been in part an opportunity for Putin to have a return engagement, a rematch, with former senior Obama administration officials in the Biden administration and settle a score.

The Way Forward

It certainly appears to many reasonable people around the world since the Ukraine War began that currently there is a dearth of rational thinkers in the Kremlin. As is so often the case in the history of warfare, perception, better still, misperception, and not reality, drove the decisionmaking of Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders and war planners. Intriguingly, in parsing out the possibilities of this pivotal moment in the war’s planning, it would seem Putin’s special military operation did not necessarily have to turn out as it has.

Too many human lives have been lost in this war. The common wisdom is that the war never should have transpired, and no one should have died. No amount of gain in Ukraine would match the degree of loss in the cold terms of blood and treasure by Russia which started the war. Nevertheless, it will likely go on and plenty more dying will be done.

Conforming to the concept and intent of their political leader, Putin, senior commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces mistakenly thought that the campaign would be a short one, and that the Ukrainians would give in after suffering the shock of massive initial defeats. Being responsive to the concept and intent of their political leadership was, by their training and oath, the correct thing to do, but the very wrong thing to do at the same time. Res ipsa loquitur! Perhaps the only real hope for its end on the battlefield is Ukraine’s capture of every bit of sovereign territory, to include Crimea. As mentioned here, that is within the realm of possibility. Yet, Putin would hardly find that outcome satisfactory. If a satisfactory solution cannot be found for both sides on Ukraine, there will be good reason for the world to fear the worst from him. In the cavernous assembly halls of the Kremlin where Putin speaks before top officials of his government, the Russian Federation Duma, other key political leaders at the federal provincial and local levels–nationalists, ultranationalists, and Communists–prominent supporters of the United Russia Party, and business leaders, one will not spy happy faces, filled with optimism over the future ahead. There are mainly the morose visages of people who likely whisper among themselves that the genuine end to everything may be near. Perhaps Putin is equal to his rhetoric, and Russian Federation ICBM’s will make their way out of their kennels. His supporters would likely believe that. A solution to the Ukraine War must be found soon. Utere, non numera. (Use the hours, do not count them.)

Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success

Russian Federation General of the Army Sergei Surovikin (above). In an announcement on October 8, 2022, stated: “By the decision of the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Surovikin has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation.” At 56, Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces) in 2017. However, he has been called upon to take on further assignments to include his current one in response to the Russian Federation ever changing national security needs. He has now taken on a great challenge in Ukraine. To better understand this important change in command for Russian Federation forces in Ukraine, one must find out more about Surovikin, and even more, try to understand what is going on in the mind of the individual responsible for the invasion: Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) of 2022 was born of ill will and bad intentions. Whatever sense of certainty Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin may have held concerning the ultimate success, perhaps even expectant of lightning success by  Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii or the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces) when he green-lit the invasion has doubtlessly fizzled down from flames to cinders. Clearly, he was dreadfully incognizant of what a discordant harmony of circumstances very likely could and would do his plans and hopes. Since the early days of success after February 24, 2022, nothing has been working well for the Russian Federation Armed Forces on the battlefield. At this point, res ad triarios venit, the matter has come to triarii. Triarii were the reserve soldiers of the Roman Army. When it reached the point in a war that they were called upon, most or all the front line troops had fallen. Putin in fact, mobilized all male Russian citizens eligible to serve on the front lines in Ukraine. Their performance has been something better than terrible. 

In other countries at war, facing such circumstances, leaders and their advisers come to recognize that intractable decisions, all very difficult ones, lie ahead. Among the choices, Putin could further escalate, resolve to hold any gains while minimizing further losses, negotiate inequitable peace terms, or simply withdraw. US President Richard Nixon found himself in a similar predicament, mutantis mutandis, regarding the US military operations in Southeast Asia. In the end, his Secretary of State “managed” to negotiate what was referred to as “peace with honor” with the North Vietnamese government. Selecting from the choices mentioned would be fine for other countries, however, Putin’s Russia is not like other countries. Still, finding a solution, given how things have panned out, is not simply a matter of satisfying one man’s thinking. The Kremlin is hearing ever increasing criticism for the abominable losses in Ukraine, particularly from elites with close ties to it. Nationalist and ultranationlist political parties and personalities began reacting to the situation in Ukraine with asperity. They, too, know the truth. The change in commander was ostensibly designed to send the message both inside Russia and worldwide that Russia still intends win and will emerge victorious in Ukraine. The Kremlin might hope to convince its perceived audience that with a few adjustments, albeit major changes, everything will be on track and the Kremlin has found the commander who will make things right. The impact of the change, at least around the world, has been akin to a misspelled placard at a protest. The time and energy in the Kremlin put into appointing Sergei Surovikin to direct the war and promote the change publicly as a new beginning, may have been a wasted effort.

Surely, foreign and national security policy bureaucracies worldwide have parsed out Surovikin’s appointment in the round and using logic, have reached their respective conclusions. Yet, what seems logical is not always right. To best understand this important change in command for Russian Federation forces in Ukraine one must learn more about Surovikin, and even more, try to understand what is going on in the rather unique mind of Putin. Whatever he does he does for  his ownly reason. Whatever he has done, invading Ukraine and suffering heavy losses for example, has never troubled him. Though nearly isolated, he does not appear to beweep Russia’s outcast state. Putin’s decisionmaking and probable moves must remain the subject of indispensable speculations and the development of prospective scenarios. 

As has been the pattern with preceding posts, historical examples are used to demonstrate that no matter how recherché and bizarre events have been in this present-day episode, which hopefully will somehow end diplomatically to the satisfaction of all parties involved, humankind has been beset and strained by parallel issues. Some examples reach back to Antiquity to provide apposite examples of thinking and behavior that most resemble that of Putin and his top acolytes on the Ukraine matter. Additional supportive examples are drawn from the Napoleonic era. In his satirical monthly magazine Les Guêpes (The Wasps), the 19th century French writer Alphonse Karr expressed the apt phrase: “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” (The more things change, the more they remain the same.) How often is that the case.

Surovikin’s official Russian Federation Ministry of Defense photo (above). Surovikin has a reputation for being a hard-as-nails, no-nonsense commander who did not suffer subordinates lightly. Any feelings that he might have had, were never allowed to get in the way of his decisionmaking. In his military career, there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. In June 2021, Surovikin reached the rank of Generál Ármii (General of the Army), the second highest military rank in Russia, second only to a marshal. One year later, in June 2022, it was revealed that he was named the commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. Four months later, it was announced that he would be commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine.

Some Background on Surovikin

In an announcement on October 8, 2022, stated: “By the decision of the defense minister of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Sergei Surovikin has been appointed commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation.” Note the announcement stated the Russian Federation Minister of Defense, Sergei Shoigu, not Putin, made the decision. With the announcement, Surovikin became the first overall commander of Russian forces committed to Ukraine. With the aim of providing readers with a decent sense of Surovikin’s experience and expertise, greatcharlie has provided a tour d’horizon of his rather event filled military career.

Surovikin, age 56, was born in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk on October 11,1966. He is married and has two daughters. Reportedly, Surovikin stands about 5 feet 10 inches. While many sources state Surovikin is Orthodox Catholic, presumably meaning Russian Orthodox Catholic, the degree to which he is observant is unknown to greatcharlie. He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star, the Order of Military Merit and the Order of Courage three times. He was awarded the Hero of the Russian Federation. Surovikin had already reached what normally would have been the pinnacle of a Russian officer’s career when in 2017 he took command of Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, Rossijskoj Federacii (the Russian Federation Aerospace Defense Forces, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces). It was still a relatively new organization, established in 2015 when the decision was made by the Ministerstvo oborony Rossijskoj Federacii or Minoborony Rossii (the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense) to combine Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily Rossii, (the Russian Air Force), Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony, (the Air and Missile Defense Forces), and Kosmicheskie Voyska Rossii, (the Russian Space Forces), were placed under one command. However, he has been called upon to take on further assignments to include his current one in response to the Russian Federation ever changing national security needs.

After graduating from the Omsk Higher Military School in 1987, Surovikin began his career serving as a lieutenant in the Voyská Spetsiálnogo Naznachéniya (Special Purpose Military Units) or spetsnaz. Spetsnaz units, a carry over from the days of the Soviet Union,  have been trained, and tasked as special forces and fielded in wartime as part of the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Not much has been offered at least in the mainstream or independent newsmedia on Surovikin’s work in spetsnaz. He reportedly served in spetsnaz during last stages of the War in Afghanistan, but the specific unit he was assigned to has not been identified. As is the case with special forces in most countries, the primary missions of spetsnaz are power projection (direct action), intelligence (reconnaissance), foreign internal defense (military assistance), and counterinsurgency.

By August 1991, Surovikin was a captain in the 1st Rifle Battalion in the 2nd Guards Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division in August 1991 when the coup d’état attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was launched in Moscow by the self-proclaimed Gosudárstvenny Komitét Po Chrezvycháynomu Polozhéniyu (State Committee on the State of Emergency) or GKChP. Orders were sent down from the GKChP that would require Surovikin to send his mechanized unit into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. He drove his vehicles into barricades of a group of anti-coup protesters. A short time afterward, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of major. In 1995, he graduated from the renowned Frunze Military Academy. Surovikin participated in the Tajikistani Civil War where he commanded a motor rifle battalion. He then became chief of staff of the 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, chief of staff and commander of the 149th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment and chief of staff of the 201st Motor Rifle Division. Whether due to qualifications, politics, or whatever might possibly be a factor under the Russian Federation’s system of government, Surovikin’s superior saw enough potential in him to prepare him for flag rank. In 2002, he graduated from Voyennaya Akademiya General’nogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Federation). He became commander of the 34th Motor Rifle Division at Yekaterinburg.

By this point in Surovikin’s career, he had acquired a reputation for being a hard as nails, no nonsense commander who did suffer subordinates lightly. Any feelings that he might have had, were never allowed to get in the way of his decisionmaking. In March 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Chibizov accused Surovikin of physically assaulting him for taking leave from his post to serve as an elections observer. In April 2004, Colonel Andrei Shtakal, the 34th Motor Rifle Division deputy division commander for armaments, shot himself in the presence of Surovikin and the district deputy commander after being severely dressed-down by Surovikin. A military prosecutor found no evidence of guilt in both cases. 

In 2004, according to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’s website, Surovikin commanded the 42nd Guards Motor Rifle Division stationed in Chechnya. He was the chief of staff of the 20th Guards Army from 2005. In April 2008, he made the meteoric rise to army commander. In November 2008, Surovikin became Chief of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation), essentially the General Staff’s think tank. In January 2010, he became chief of staff of the Volga–Urals Military District, which soon became part of the Central Military District. Reportedly, from November 2011, he headed the working group charged with creation of the Military Police. The Russian newsmedia indicated that Surovikin had already been selected to head the new organization. Though delayed as a result of the intervention of Voyennoy Prokuratury Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the  Russian Federation Military Prosecutor’s Office), apparently, the discussion on the potential creation of the Military Police stirred a parochial struggle between the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Military Prosecutor’s Office, Glavnoye upravleniye voyennoy politsii Minoborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Main Directorate of the Military Police Ministry of Defense Russian Federation) with a strength of 20,000 was stood up. In October 2012, he became the chief of staff of the Eastern Military District. In October 2013, he was appointed commander of the district. On December 13, 2013, Surovikin was promoted to the rank of colonel general. 

In March 2017, Surovikin began his first of two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last about three months. It was reportedly part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian Federation Group of Forces in Syria and Syrian Arab Army forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In a June 2022 Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper article explained that Surovikin received this unofficial nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” in the fight against the Islamic terrorist group, ISIS, Surovikin is credited for directing the Syrian Arab Army when it lifted the siege of Deir al-Zour and directing the attack that recaptured Palmyra for the second and last time. On December 28, 2017 he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

While all of that was transpiring, at the end of November 2017, It was the journal of Ministerstva oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’) Krasnaya Zvezda that reported Surovikin’s appointment to Commander of the Aerospace Forces by a presidential decree of November 22, 2017. Interestingly, TASS made special note of the fact that Surovikin became the first combined-arms commander in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union to be put in charge of the Russian or Soviet Air Forces. According to a report published by RBK Group on November 2, 2017, Surovikin had been appointed Commander of the Aerospace Forces in spite of his initial objections.

From January to April 2019, Surovikin again took command of Russian military forces in Syria. It was during that period Surovikin directed the operation against Idlib which included countless air and ground attacks on civilian objects and infrastructure. A 2020 Human Rights Watch report states that Russian forces under his command struck Syrian “homes, schools, healthcare facilities, and markets – the places where people live, work, and study”.

In June 2021, Surovikin reached the rank of Generál Ármii (General of the Army), the second highest military rank in Russia, second only to a marshal. One year later, in June 2022, it was revealed that he was named the commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. On October 8, 2022, it was announced that he would be commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine.

In Surovikin’s military career there were what could delicately be called “bumps in the road”, some small, some big, some very big. In each case, fate somehow stepped in and saw Surovikin through. As aforementioned, during the 1991 Soviet coup d’état attempt in Moscow, Surovikin was ordered to send his battalion into the tunnel on the Garden Ring. As a result of his action, three anti-coup demonstrators were killed. After the defeat of the coup, Surovikin was arrested and held under investigation for seven months. The charges were dropped without trial on December 10, 1991 because Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin concluded that Surovikin was only following orders. He was promoted to the rank of major afterwards. In September 1995, while Surovikin attended the Frunze Military Academy, he was sentenced to a year of probation by the Moscow garrison’s military court for illegally selling weapons. However, allegations were made that he had been framed. After an investigation, the conviction was overturned. It was concluded that Surovikin had provided a fellow student a pistol for use in a competition, unaware of its intended purpose. One might speculate that Surovikin either had such connections in very high places who were also benefiting from his sideshow that he was allowed to avoid any severe repercussions beyond a very public arrest or he managed to convince authorities that he was cured of his covetous mind.

On dit, there are supposedly whispers in Russia that that Surovikin reportedly had some business concerning the transporting of Syrian ore to Russia on the side. To date, no such rumor, however, has been substantiated or reported on by any mainstream newsmedia source.

Surovikin is an emblem to the Russian military for its “prowess.” The same was said to be true of Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who Putin appointed commander of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on April 9, 2022. Russian commanders at different levels have often been made to sound too good to be true, only to have their “gold complexions” dimmed in Ukraine. The latest announcement did not mention Russian Federation General of the Army Aleksandr Dvornikov, who Putin appointed commander of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on April 9, 2022. While some Western newsmedia sources insist Russian Army Colonel General Gennady Zhidko.was Surovikin’s predecessor, Moscow had not publicly specified that anyone had been placed in overall control of the operation until the announcement concerning his new command.

Surovikin, much as Dvornikov, had the opportunity to become familiar in Syria with the ways in which the US provides assistance to foreign forces on the battlefield. Moscow’s likely hope in that regard would be better understand how US and other NATO military minds might have special operations forces working in Ukraine, what to expect as a result of their “suggestions to the Ukrainian Armed Forces as to planning and operations,” and how to counter their assistance operations. If that were the case at all, perhaps Dvornikov never really discerned enough in Syria to exploit. He certainly failed grasp the role deception plays in US military operations and that failure played a role in opening captured territory up to rapid liberation by Ukrainian forces via a counteroffensive. Surovikin has the opportunity to demonstrate that he learned quite a bit more.

In March 2017, Surovikin (above) began the first of his two tours in Syria. The first was supposed to last only three months and was part of an effort by Moscow to provide first-hand combat experience to as many high-ranking officers as possible. However, on June 9, 2017, Surovikin was introduced to the newsmedia as the Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces deployed to Syria. The Russian Defense Ministry repeatedly credited Surovikin with achieving critical gains in Syria, saying that Russian and Syrian forces “liberated over 98 percent” of the country under him. In a June 2022 Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper article explained that Surovikin received this unofficial nickname of “General Armageddon” from colleagues for “his ability to think outside the box and act tough.” On December 28, 2017, he was made a Hero of the Russian Federation for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria.

Surovikin’s Appointment Shows the World Moscow Has a Handle on Ukraine

Fallaces sunt rerum species. (The appearances of things are deceptive.) As alluded to initially here, one could reach the conclusion at first blush that this change in command amounts to a bromide, an unoriginal idea intended to soothe or placate and have the illusion of problem solving. On the other hand, one might imagine the wisdom in putting a former Russian Federation Aerospace Force commander in charge are that air power will be better applied in Ukraine. Many in the Western newsmedia have assessed Surovikin’s appointment may have been an effort by the Kremlin to mitigate criticism from nationalists who have accused the army of mismanaging the war in Ukraine and of failing to use Russian military power overwhelmingly to force the government in Kyiv to submit. To that extent, close Putin ally and leader of Russia’s North Caucasus region of Chechnya, Raman Kadyrov, has publicly demanded that many top generals of the Russian Federation Armed Forces be sacked. Reportedly, many pro-Russia military bloggers have harshly criticized the prosecution of the war. 

Perhaps it would be reasonable to suspect that Surovikin came highly recommended for the Ukraine job by the same sort behind the scenes that likely lended him a helping hand whenever he landed himself in trouble in the past. Among Russians who welcomed the appointment of Surovikin was Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder of Gruppa Vagnera (Wagner Group), a private military company and a vocal critic of the military leadership. According to a statement put out by Concord, Prigozhin said publicly: “Surovikin is the most able commander in the Russian army.” He called Surovikin a “legendary figure, he was born to serve his motherland faithfully.” He noted: “Having received an order [in 1991], Surovikin was that officer who without hesitation got in his tank and went forward to save his country.” His appointment was also very vocally welcomed by Kadyrov,

However, Putin’s control and his choices and the relative influence of his inner circle was put succinctly in a January 12, 2020 interview in The New Yorker magazine of Masha Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst who has written extensively on Putin’s regime. (The interview came on the heels of Putin’s proposals of Constitutional reforms that ultimately extended his years in power in Russia.) Asked about the degree of Putin’s control in Russia, Lipman responded: “The issue of control is tricky. If one talks about whether government management is efficient in Russia, then no, it is not. And Putin has repeatedly, over his very long time in office, spoken about the need to increase the productivity of labor and quite a few other very important goals. I wouldn’t say he has delivered so well on those. But, if we define control as control over the élite, over making the decisions, of course Putin’s fully in control. And the developments of the past few days are very clear and persuasive evidence of him being in control of making decisions.” Responding to a question about his moves at that time [Constitutional reforms], Lipman said; “This is a demonstration of how Putin is ultimately in charge and how he can make very important decisions by himself in an atmosphere of complete secrecy. We still do not know who was aware of what was in store for the country three or four days ago, and to what extent there is anyone who can actually challenge his decisions, even verbally.” Lipman continued: “Putin rarely consults with anyone, and, even if he does, it is done in a totally opaque way. He’s rarely explicit. Even if he consults with some people in his circle, people leave without having a clear idea of what his goal is and have to guess. Sometimes they guess right. Sometimes they guess wrong. Sometimes they try to curry favor and succeed, sometimes not. At the end of the day he is the ultimate decision-maker. And the strategy and the grand plans that he has for Russia, in their entirety, exist only in his mind.”

Given Lipman’s expert view and  the views that have been expressed by greatcharlie on Putin for quite some time–they may hold water for generous readers, it would only be reasonable to believe Putin naturally has morbid fear of anyone desiring to remove him from power. Equally naturally, he acts aggressively and often eccentricity to potential threats to his power, both real or imagined. No one should hope to get too close. Sometimes holding power too long breeds a familiarity that breeds contempt in many. Envy like fire always makes for the highest points. The Roman historian Titus Livius (59 B.C.-A.D. 17), known as Livy, provided in Greek, a history of Rome that begins with the earliest legends of Rome before the traditional founding in 753 B.C. through the reign of Emperor Caesar Augustus during his own lifetime. In Book XXXV, section 10 of that history Ad Urbe Condita (From the Founding of the City) (c. 28 B.C.), Livy discusses the campaign for consul that pitted Publius Cornelius Scipio, the son of Gnaeus, who had recently returned from Spain after performing great deeds, and his brother Lucius Quinctius Flamininus, who had commanded the fleet in Greece. Herodotus writes of the challenges facing Scipio: But the eyes of all men were turned upon Quinctius and Cornelius; for both were patricians, contending for one place, and recently-won military glory lent favor to each. But before all else, the brothers of the candidates11 increased their rivalry, since they were the two most celebrated commanders of their age. The greater fame was Scipio’s, and the greater it was, the more it was exposed to jealousy; that of Quinctius was fresher, inasmuch as he had triumphed that very year. There was also the fact that the other had been for about ten years constantly in the public eye, a fact which renders prominent men less venerated from sheer surfeit of seeing them: he had been consul for the second time after the defeat of Hannibal and censor . . . .”

Admittedly, greatcharlie went the long way about presenting this passage from Ad Urbe Condita. However, Livy admirably presents the depth of thinking that led to the challenge to the well-known, long-serving, heroic leader, Scipio, for a newcomer, who could only offer a list of promises and seem so willing, despite his record of service, to challenge the incumbent leader with no apparent reservations. Surely, if this could be used as any measure. Putin always has much to keep his eye on politically.

Putin launched the Ukraine War lacking a worthwhile strategy and recognition of what Russian Federation forces would come up against. What was seemingly completely missed or misunderstood was the degree of support from the US and NATO Member States that Kyiv would receive. No effort, that was apparent, was made to obviate the ability of the US and its NATO allies to supply Ukraine at will as part of the military strategy. From the start, conquering Kyiv was the focus as if Putin and the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces were blinded by rage. The door was left wide open between Poland and Ukraine. Such impetuous schemes and boldness are at first sight alluring, but are difficult to handle, and in the result disastrous.

Perhaps the real problem for Putin was not just that he relied on fortune, but was driven by blind ambition. What has likely been a reliable intuition that had served him well along the way and allowed him a leg-up in giving subjects light were darkened with regarding parsing out the many aspects of this massive enterprise in Ukraine. Polybius (c. 204-122 B.C.), the Greek “pragmatic historian,” and intriguingly an eyewitness to the siege and destruction of Carthage accompanying none other than Cornelius Scipio Aficanus as one of his commanders. In his noted work, The Histories, Polybius covers the period from 264 BC to 146 BC, focusing primarily on the years 220 BC to 167 BC, and detailing Ancient Rome’s conquest of Carthage, which allowed it to become the dominant force in the Mediterranean. In his discussion of the causes for the start of the Carthaginian War, the Second Punic War in Book I, section 8, Polybius cites the work of the Roman analyst Quintus Fabius Pictor (born c. 270 BC, fl. c. 215–200 BC) . Reportedly, this choice may have been based more in homage than irrefutability given concerns even in his time that his work on the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) on Carthage was highly partisan towards the Roman Republic, idealizing it as a well-ordered state loyal to its allies. Fabius was the earliest known Roman historian. His writings, presented in Greek and now mostly lost besides some surviving fragments, were highly influential on ancient writers. He participated in introducing Greek historiographical methods to the Roman world.

Polybius writes: “Fabius, the Roman annalist, says that besides the outrage on the Saguntines, a cause of the war was Hasdrubal’s ambition and love of power. He tells us how, having acquired a great dominion in Spain, he arrived in Africa and attempted to abolish the constitution of Carthage and change the form of government to a monarchy. The leading statesmen, however, got wind of his project and united to oppose him, upon which Hasdrubal, suspicious of their intentions, left Africa and in future governed Iberia as he chose, without paying any attention to the Carthaginian Senate. Hannibal from boyhood had shared and admired Hasdrubal’s principles; and on succeeding to the governor-generalship of Iberia, he had employed the same method as Hasdrubal. Consequently, he now began this war against Rome on his own initiative and in defiance of Carthaginian opinion, not a single one of the notables in Carthage approving his conduct towards Saguntum. After telling us this, Fabius says that on the capture of this city the Romans came forward demanding that the Carthaginians should either deliver Hannibal into their hands or accept war. Now if anyone were to pose the following question to this writer–how opportunity could have better favored the Carthaginians’ wishes or what could have been a juster act and more in their interest (since, as he says, they had disapproved Hannibal’s action from the outset) than to yield to the Roman demand, and by giving up the man who had caused the offense, with some show of reason to destroy by the hands of others the common enemy of their state and secure the safety of their territory, ridding themselves of the war that menaced them and accomplishing their vengeance by a simple resolution–if anyone, I say, were to ask him this, what would he have to say? Evidently nothing; for so far were they from doing any of the above things that after carrying on the war, in obedience to Hannibal’s decision, for seventeen years, they did not abandon the struggle, until finally, every resource on which they relied being now exhausted, their native city and her inhabitants stood in deadly peril.”

As an experienced judoka, Putin knows that there are occasions when one competitor is simply outmatched by another. It is hard to accept when one is the outmatched competitor or the competitor’s loyal supporter. Still, no matter how unpleasant, it is a reality that must be faced with level-headedness. It would seem Putin has not reached that conclusion yet.

(From left to right) Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the Russian Federation General Staff, Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Putin, and Surovikin at a presentation on aerospace weapon systems. On first impression, one might imagine the wisdom in putting the former Russian Federation Aerospace Force commander in charge is that air power will be better applied in Ukraine. Many in the Western newsmedia have assessed Surovikin’s appointment may have been an effort by the Kremlin to mitigate criticism from nationalists who have accused the army of mismanaging the war in Ukraine and of failing to use Russian military power overwhelmingly. In a January 2020 interview in The New Yorker magazine of Masha Lipman, a Moscow-based political analyst who has written extensively on Putin’s regime, explained: “At the end of the day he is the ultimate decision-maker. And the strategy and the grand plans that he has for Russia, in their entirety, exist only in his mind.”

Surovikin’s Appointment Provides Putin with Some Relief Personally

Choice of Surovikin may have been made simply to provide some measure of relief for Putin. By appointing an overall commander, something that most senior military and political advisers in Moscow might have urged Putin to do earlier or had begun to do once things went poorly, the move would feel something far different than a bromide. Putin would be acting proactively, putting fresh eyes on the matter and hopefully a more successful line of thinking.

Imaginably, there are many things Surovikin can now do under his new title that he could not do as Commander of the Aerospace Forces or commander of the Army Group “South” of the Russian Armed Forces engaged in the special military operation. Perhaps it might be more directly the case that they see something in the way in which Surovikin thinks. Much as with the commanders of air, ground, naval, and space components of  armed forces worldwide, one might presume in the abstract that intelligence preparation of the battlefield, providing predictive intelligence at the right time for use in planning and executing operations, has been a critical aspect of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces efforts to deliver information superiority to its chiefs, and wing and squadron commander’s operating forces over Ukraine. Perhaps in strategy sessions of the armed forces general staff on the Ukraine operation, he proved more familiar with the battlespace as it stands than his counterparts and was thereby tapped for the top Ukraine job. So, he was given the job.

Perhaps in a conversation, an opportunity as his interview with Surovikin for the Ukraine job, Putin expressed concerns about the outcome of the war and Surovikin offered words that provided some measure of relief for him. That would be the conversation leaders who were in desperate situations or facing uncertainty have had with commanders for centuries. In The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 BC-c. 425 BC), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period known for that aforementioned masterwork which mainly discusses the struggles between Greece and Persia. In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3, Herotodus reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle,  Demaratus following the king’s conversation with counselors. He writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.”

Surely, Putin is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination cannot coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply iack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Hoping Ukrainian commanders might drop some almighty clanger that will provide an advantage–friction in battle and that sort of thing–would be futile given they are doubtlessly being “advised” by the some of the best military minds that NATO’s 27 Member States can supply respectively. The assistance in terms of weapons systems, training, and gear alone from NATO Member States has been breathtaking. Putin must have accepted by now that the Russian Federation armed forces are just not good enough to successfully execute the special military operation he chose to launch on February 24, 2022. Perhaps he has muttered to himself in private that all the talent is I n the other side. The Russian Army rejoiced in reputation of the post-war and Cold War Soviet Army. it was an illusion. Putin fell for it. It is all very tragic, especially for the soldiers and civilians on both sides caught up in the fighting and dying.

An army can not change overnight. What Russian top commanders can do is ensure that the many parts of the Russian Federation’s Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, and Naval Forces work to their utmost in harmony to achieve success, but that still might not be enough to change the course of things. One should hardly expect to observe any maneuvers by Russian commanders to represent “an ingenious jesting with [the operational] art.” The Russians unit commanders in Ukraine continue to feign good intentions by ordering the use of overwhelming brute force, incredulously pretending they can muster any approximating power of that kind the field, with the respective objectives of overcoming Ukrainian strength now in what Putin has just recently declared Russian Federation territory. All those commanders are actually doing is sending their troops, the bulk of which are frightfully ill-trained and inexperienced, to near certain defeat. Numerous newsmedia reports in the West, impossible for any following the Ukraine War story to have missed, tell of field grade level commanders, gung-ho on the war and Putin, and eager to make their mark and possibly catch the attention of leaders Moscow, have sent their troops into better than questionable assault on well-armed and well-positioned Ukrainian units. Such assaults are being repulsed at the cost of extraordinarily high tallies of killed and wounded. Some Russian Army companies and battalions have been obliterated in this way. Many of those zealous commanders have ended.up on casualty.lists themselves. Surely such actions may later be found to be a main ingredient of a recipe for what may turn out to be a great military disaster. There may likely be a decisive clash ahead that will mark the end of the Russian presence in Ukraine, and end the myth that Russia is a conventional military power impossible to reckon with, a challenge to the combined forces of NATO.

The situation for Surovikin might in the end parallel that of the singular circumstances surrounding the renowned author of The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, (c. 460 BC–400 BC). Thucydides once was an Athenian general who was subsequently sacked and exiled following his failure to defend the Greek city of Amphipolis in Thrace. (During his exile, he began compiling histories and accounts of the war from various participants on all sides.) As fate would have it, Thucydides was ordered to go to Amphipolis in 424 because, by his own account in Book 4, chapter 105, section 1, of The History of the Peloponnesian War (hereinafter referred to as the Peloponnesian War):  “He possessed the right of working the gold mines in that part of Thrace, and thus had great influence with the inhabitants of the mainland” He wrote in Book I, chapter 104, section 4: “The general who had come from Athens to defend the place, sent to the other commander in Thrace, Thucydides son of Olorus, the author of this history, who was at the isle of Thasos, a Parian colony, half a day’s sail from Amphipolis” The renowned Spartan general Brasidas, aware that Thucydides was on Thasos and had established considerable influence with the people of Amphipolis, and concerned over possible reinforcements arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. Consequently, when Thucydides arrived at Amphipolis, the city had already fallen under Spartan control. As Amphipolis was of considerable strategic importance to Athens, reports were received with great alarm. Thucydides became the target popular indignation among the Athenians. As was the usual decision in such circumstances, Thucydides was exiled for his failure to “save” Amphipolis.

Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.) As it was Thucydides’ fate, one might wonder whether Surovikin has been given a fool’s errand, destined to receive a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission that had become moot before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Whatever Surovikin manages to do, he will have to cut it a bit fine given the rapid progress of Ukrainian forces in reducing Russian gains, and their well-demonstrated ability to do a lot more. Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another, withdrawing their units when conditions were most favorable more often than demanding troops hold on to untenable positions until they were forced to retreat in order to survive or surrender. The ability of Ukrainian commanders to think fast and soundly has been key to their relative success as time is always of the essence. They relentlessly seek to take ground and gain and retain the initiative. More often than not weaker Ukrainian units have been pitted against stronger Russian ones, stronger at least on paper. French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte is quoted as saying: “Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never.” With continued expert advice and robust levels of assistance from the US and NATO, Ukrainian forces could potentially displace and destroy Russian forces at many points before winter sets in proper.

Putin (right) decorating Surovikin (left) with the Hero of the Russian Federation medal for his leadership of the Group of Forces in Syria. If one might consider the role politics might have played in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation, it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. Unlikely lost on Putin is the fact Surovikin, as a captain commanding an armored unit, was a defender of his beloved Soviet state in the truest sense during the 1991 coup d’état attempt launched by Soviet hardliners, driving through barricades erected by pro-democracy protesters. As noted in the discussion here on his military career, three men were killed in the clash, including one who was crushed.

The Role Played by Political Likes and Dislikes in Surovikin’s Appointment

In greatcharlie’s humble opinion, now is certainly not the best time in Moscow for anyone but Putin to worry about image or petty politics. It is a very odd situation that this persists in the midst of calamity. Even though there is a war going on in which Russia is not performing so well as an invader, image apparently still matters in Moscow. There are ceremonies, speeches in the Kremlin, scholarly foreign and national security policy conferences still being held around Russia all attendended via special invite only. For the elites, it is all more about status than security. The elites still want to improve their relative proximity to Putin and his inner circle. They want to know, who has what title, who is in charge of this or that, who has the lead, who takes orders from whom

To that extent, if one might consider the role of politics might have played in the decision to appoint Surovikin commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the special military operation, it would seem on its face that Putin and the general should have a very harmonious relationship, hardly oil and water. Surovikin’s loyalty and reliability was apparent in his performance in Syria. Surovikin, obedient to the letter, followed through violently in Syria, getting the results that Putin demanded. Unlikely lost on Putin is the fact Surovikin, as a captain commanding an armored unit, was a defender of his beloved Soviet state in the truest sense during the 1991 coup d’état attempt launched by Soviet hardliners, driving through barricades erected by pro-democracy protesters. As noted in the discussion here on his military career, three men were killed in the clash, including one who was crushed.

Certainly Surovikin is not starting from scratch, coming in from outside the centers of power. As mentioned, he served as the Commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, a rung few have reached since, as aforementioned, the Russian Air Force, the Air and Missile Forces, and the Space Forces were placed under his responsibility. Few have demonstrated the ability to manage as many operational organizations as he has. Although one might point out that the Russian Air Force at war in Ukraine is the one for which he was responsible for many years. Perhaps its performance has been the least impressive among the armed forces.

The thought could not have escaped Russian Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov that Putin might be looking at Surovikin as his possible replacement as Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation General Staff. To find support for that idea, he would only need to look at his latest work product, the condition of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine and the less than capable force he had developed and maintained in the years before the invasion. Gerasimov could very likely have been accused criminally as having failed immensely in keeping the armed forces prepared for war.

On the eve of the special military operation’s launch, Russian Federation forces situated near Ukraine’s border were still considered quite formidable. This belief was based not just on numbers and their fierce appearance, but on the assumption that Russia had undertaken the same sort of root-and-branch military reform that the US underwent in the 18-year period between Vietnam and its victory in the first Gulf War. Not all,, but many military analysts in the West speculated that the Russian operation would be something akin to a one act drama with an early curtain. The US Intelligence Community concluded that Kyiv would fall in days. Some European officials thought it might just hold out for a few weeks. However, starting on the first day of the of the invasion of Ukraine, all of the walls came down on the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Based on their overall performance in Ukraine, the forces that Russia sent into battle seemed almost counterfeit, poorly imitating what was expected by reputation. One could reasonably suggest  that in recent years their capabilities have been subject to hyperbole. As greatcharlie has stated in preceding posts, the Russian Federation General Staff was fortunate that they are not facing US forces. Copious amounts of supporting evidence for that argument has been presented on the battlefield daily in Ukraine. How the mighty have fallen. 

Negligentia sempre habet infortunam comitem. (Negligence always has misfortune for a companion.) Russian forces were not organized for war with precision. Units were not ready for battle. Soldiers had no idea of what to expect. Ukraine was allowed to use its strengths against Russian weaknesses. Ukraine’s smaller units were able to achieve relative superiority force on force initially in the field. One might have expected that occasionally good fortune would shine upon the relatively lightly-armed Ukrainian forces, and a Russian Army or Russian Naval Troops patrol rolling around or crossing into a danger zone might face ambush, a well-organized ambush, and losses would be suffered. With so many patrol ordered in the different avenues of attack by Russian forces, the greater the chance there would be losses. However, Ukrainian forces outrightly routed Russian units over and over on the battlefield and line of successes would force Russia to adjust its strategy.. The possibility of endsieg, victory against the odds, has become all the more real for the Ukrainians.

As discussed earlier to some extent, Putin surely felt the Russian Federation Armed Forces were well-trained and well-equipped to bring swift victory. To be fair, even to Putin, in practical terms, he mainly had the well-choreographed Zapad military and naval exercises to use as a measure of the Russian Federation armed forces effectiveness. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. The scenarios rehearsed in those exercises were apparently poor preparation for the invasion at hand. There is also the issue that the Zapad exercises were not exactly all that they were made to appear to be in terms of demonstrating their actual strength and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, as well as the possibilities for their use. Imaginably, the truth was deliberately kept from Putin. No matter what was really going on at Zapad, their true value of the exercises can now be discerned by all. Military commanders simply during each exercise went through the motions with elaborate displays of firepower and mobility with little to no concern about how it would all come together in real world situations. The bigger and better Zapad exercises since 2017, lauded by the leadership of the Russian Federation armed forces, were surely “full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.” Putin, himself, had regularly observed the Zapad exercises and everything seemed fine enough.

One NATO commander caught on to what had been happening at Zapad and other Russian military and naval exercises before the invasion and could predict Russian military action in Ukraine might prove for Moscow to be catastrophic. When he was commander of US naval forces in Europe and Africa, US Navy Admiral James Foggo had the duty to plan US military exercises recognized that planning the huge Russian exercises were enormous undertakings. As Russia was planning the Vostok exercises in September 2021 in Siberia, Russian Federation Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, declared it would be the largest since the Soviet Union’s Zapad exercise of 1981. It would involve 300,000 troops, 1,000 aircraft and 80 warships. However, Foggo discovered there was quite a bit of deception involved. Rather than actually field large numbers of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, a company of troops (150 at most) at Vostok, for example, was inflated and counted as a battalion or even a regiment (closer to 1,000). Single warships were passed off as whole squadrons.

How spectacularly did the illusion created by Russian commanders disintegrate when challenged by reality! It is a sad lesson for commanders in all armies to learn from. Beyond the seemingly deliberate desire to create an illusion of capabilities, the impression left is that the Zapad hoax over the years is that a certain disinvoltura apparently plagued the Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders, that has manifested itself at the worst possible time in the worst possible way. Clearly, Gerasimov was the main one who fed Putin’s illusion concerning the capabilities and  readiness of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Maybe Putin has reached a point at which he could see some benefit in making a change. The easiest way is to bring forward other faces from the Russian Federation General Staff. It is somewhat surprising that in the West, investigative journalists have not gotten the hint that Gerasimov is being slow-walked out the door and have not tried to pick up the scent of blood. Some may have. A good guess would be that Surovikin is being advanced piecemeal by Putin to where he wants him to be. Interestingly, the indications and implications of such would also be that Putin has the sense that he has a future as leader of Russia.

Removing Gerasimov would cause some stir, perhaps both plus and minus, even among Putin’s nationalist and ultranationalist following. He has been viewed as a very loyal Putin acolyte for nearly a decade. However, if Putin is acting in that direction, it would surely be “business as usual in the Kremlin” with regard to military commanders at all levels. Putin has already replaced a number of top commanders in its armed forces. In an October 8, 2022 story, RFE/RL expressed from available public reporting, a list of prominent Russian commanders that have been sacked. Reportedly, the head of Russia’s North Caucasus region of Daghestan, Sergei Melikov, wrote on Telegram on October 7, 2022, that North Caucasus native Lieutenant-General Rustam Muradov had replaced the commander of the Eastern Military District, Colonel-General Aleksandr Chaiko. The RBK news agency on October 7, 2022 cited sources close to the Russian military as saying Muradov replaced Chaiko without giving any details. Much of the Eastern Military District’s personnel are engaged in the special military operation in Ukraine, despite the fact that the district is based in Russia’s Far East. Muradov previously led troops in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, parts of which have been under Russia-backed separatists’ control since 2014. He also commanded Russian peacekeepers in Azerbaijan’s breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

An October 3, 2022 RBK report stated that the commander of the Western Military District, Colonel-General Aleksandr Zhuravlyov, had been replaced shortly after dramatic Russian losses in northeastern Ukraine in September and the strategic city of Lyman in the Donetsk region had been recaptured by Ukrainian forces. In September 2022, Colonel General Mikhail Mizintsev replaced. General Dmitry Bulgakov as deputy defense minister in charge of logistics.  Curiously, Mizintsev is accused by the European Union of orchestrating a siege of the Ukrainian port of Mariupol early in the special military operation that reportedly killed thousands of civilians. In August 2022, state media outlets in Russia said the commander of the Black Sea fleet had been sacked after Ukraine carried out several successful attacks, including the sinking of Russia’s missile cruiser Moskva and the loss of eight warplanes in an attack on a Russian base in Crimea. As Ukraine continues to liberate settlements in its eastern region from occupying Russian troops, Moscow will likely continue to replace top commanders in its armed forces.

However, Putin apparently appreciates Gerasimov as a grand strategist, a military thinker of some talent. He has well-expressed, in military terms, the imaginings of Putin and his acolytes on the US ambition to conquer Russia for its abundant resources. Worth noting is the very strong and pertinent 2013 military statement which was noted in greatcharlie’s November 16, 2016 post entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?”. Far more than a military analysis on NATO expansion, the document which was the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, assessed that future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” The basis of that assessment was that the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believed outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. Putin accepted the threat assessment of the Russian Federation General Staff which as aforementioned essentially paralleled his own thinking, and signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The notion that Russian borders were being threatened by the US and NATO and adequate defensive measures needed to be taken has nearly controlled Russian military thinking since the plan was developed. It might be reasonable to conclude that such thinking culminated, at least so far, into Moscow’s great blunder in Ukraine.

Suggestions that Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General of the Army Sergei Shoigu has concerns over General Surovikin would be almost baseless. As Shoigu and Surovikin have interacted on countless occasions while he commanded Russian Federation Aerospace Forces. No friction between them has been publicly reported at least. Many new weapon systems critical to Russia’s strategic defense have been introduced by the Aerospace Forces under his leadership. One might in this case again harken back to 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet Union to give life to such a suggestion. At the time, Shoigu, fairly senior in the Russian Rescuers Corps, was a firm supporter of Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Republic, leading protests against the coup d’etat that forced Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev from office. However, the fact that Surovikin and Shoigu were on opposing sides at the time should not hold much significance in an analysis. It 8s very unlikely that Shoigu has borne some grudge against Surovikin over the matter. While greatcharlie cannot swear that Surovikin’s rise is nothing to signify concerning Shoigu’s perch at the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, any suggestion that Surovikin’s appointment has meaning in that direction would seem by the by. The reality is that Shoigu’s role in the rise of Putin and his place in the regime is quite firm and rather singular.

One might recall that in 1999, Yeltsin became acutely aware that he was losing power in Russia, and his supporters were shifting to the opposition. Taking steps to ensure his legacy with less than a year left in office, Yeltsin, with the help of political allies, created a new party, with a new face, loyal to him: Unity. Shoigu, who was serving as Minister of  Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, and part of Yeltsin’s successful re-election campaign in 1996, was named the leader of the pro-president party. He was partnered with Alexander Karelin. Elements of Unity’s economic policy were akin to Thatcherism. It included, for example, the promotion of low inflation, the small state and free markets via tight control of the money supply, and privatization. That said, Unity also supported the reliance on powerful police and security structures and media control. After parliamentary elections in 1999, Unity took a commanding position in the Duma. Having secured some control of the Duma, Yeltsin sought a successor for the presidency.

While Yeltsin called Shoigu “our greatest star,” he chose Putin. Yeltsin first saw promise in Putin when he selected him on July 25, 1998 to serve as head of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Federal Security Service) or FSB. At the time, Putin was an unemployed deputy-mayor from St. Petersburg. He served at the FSB until August 9, 1999, when Yeltsin called him to the post of acting prime minister. Late that same month, there was a bomb blast in a luxury shopping mall by Red Square which was the first in a series of blast resulting in casualties. In September 1999, there were apartment bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, Dagestan, and Volgodonsk, in Rostov. They collectively killed 300 Russian civilians and wounded hundreds more that were reportedly the responsibility of Chechen Islamic militants. Putin acted forcefully against the mall bombing, the apartment immolations, and a bold Islamic militant incursion from Dagestan into Chechnya, led by Shamil Basayev. The first of 100,000 troops were sent to the northern Caucasus within weeks. In a famous September 24, 1999 speech, Putin spoke with determination in explaining his approach to defeating terrorism: “We will pursue the terrorist everywhere. If they are in an airport, then, in an airport, and forgive me, if we catch them in the toilet, then we will waste them in the outhouse . . . The issue has been resolved once and for all.” Putin marked his rise in power by acting viciously against terror. Shoigu’s Unity Party then served as the instrument for Putin’s rise to the presidency. The Unity Party eventually entered into an alliance with the Fatherland-All Russia political bloc. The Party later morphed into United Russia, the country’s current ruling party that rubber stamps Putin’s initiatives in the Duma. Putin has remained in power by confounding insincerity, and he does not suffer fools lightly. Having observed him closely, Putin obviously feels Shoigu well-serves his needs. Shoigu was neither in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB nor worked in St. Petersburg with Putin. He has been able to make use of his own unique sensibilities to understand his leader’s thinking and feelings. An informed guess by greatcharlie is that Shoigu is unlikely going anywhere, anytime too soon.

As remarked earlier, it is not publicly known which particular aspects of Surovikin’s military background, as seen through the singular lenses of his superiors, took on significance in the decision to select him to tackle the “Ukraine conundrum.” Perhaps those aspects would not be those leaders of other countries might seek in an ideal overall commander of a military campaign. Recalling here how Putin acted in Chechnya when brand new to the post of Russian Federation President, it would not be difficult to understand why Surovikin, with his background, would be the commander he would want handling Ukraine.

One might wonder whether Surovikin (above) has been given a fool’s errand, destined to receive a mark of dishonor for failing to complete a mission that had become moot before he had even journeyed out to perform it. Whatever Surovikin manages to do, he will have to cut it a bit fine given the rapid progress of Ukrainian forces in reducing Russian gains, and their well-demonstrated ability to do a lot more. Ukrainian commanders have proven themselves to be formidable opponents by displaying amazing knowledge of their battle space, foresight and agility acumen, managing to block in one place, counterattack in another, They relentlessly seek to take ground and gain and retain the initiative. More often than not weaker Ukrainian units have been pitted against stronger Russian ones, stronger at least on paper.

Surovikin: The Prospective Savior of Russia?

It is very possible that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov, and the others on the Russian Federation General Staff authentically feel there is a real chance that under Surovikin’s command, Russian forces can beat back Ukrainian forces tearing through their lines, gain and retain the initiative, and somehow obviate the effects of US, NATO, and other foreign military assistance to Kyiv. The initial Western newsmedia commentaries of what Surovikin would bring to war as the new joint commander of Russian forces was that he would bring “his violent Syria playbook closer to home.” Reporting focused on a rush of heavy rocket attacks against civilian targets across Ukraine. Naturally, Surovikin’s main challenge in Ukraine, will be to solve the structural problems plaguing the Russian military as it faces fierce Ukrainian forces hell bent on liberating every speck of Ukrainian sovereign territory. Many Western Military experts have expressed that view.

Yet, equally naturally, Surovikin has the grand opportunity to apply his thinking–within the limits of the Russian government system–of what has been done wrong, what has been done right, and what can best be accomplished. As broached in-brief earlier, Surovikin may have expressed a singular interpretation of the battlespace. To be succinct and express it as it might still be taught in military educational institutions at the command and staff level, the battlespace is the mental picture a commander establishes in order to analyze and choose courses of action to apply his military assets in relation to time, tempo, and depth. Perhaps Surovikin’s superiors at this point are hoping that his way of thinking will make a difference on the battlefield and they may be turning to him as a last, best resort. Moreover, it could be that the results of the ongoing Ukrainian drive in fact proved Surovikin’s conceptual view of the situation in what was previously his southern front and his neighboring eastern front were correct. He may have expressed what turned out to be the best understanding of how factors as the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian forces to include new weapon systems being introduced via Western assistance. He may have sounded the alarm that firepower in particular would allow them “the upper hand” on the battlefield. He may have demonstrated a better understanding, reliable intimations, on how, where, and when to apply the combat power of Russian forces. He may have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces and, since their power has dwindled so dramatically, how they could be more effectively and perhaps economically mustered, how those forces could be better protected, and how they might be able to take a stab at making some respectable gains more immediately. Much as noted previously, being commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, since 2017 has perchance allowed Surovikin to gain experience, an expertise in managing multidimensional aspects of warfare to create a harmonious or synergistic whole. To that extent, he conceivably would lend an expertise applicable to managing the multidimensional aspects of air, sea, space, land, and information operations in his planning and execution of military operations.

Concerning Russian Federation Aerospace Forces specifically, more than simply contributing to the Ukraine campaign as the situation stands as of this writing, they could play an effective role, indeed have a multiplier effect. With his experience as Commander of the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, Surovikin presumably would know best how to manage all assets of the force to strike strategically and tactically to make a positive difference in the war effort. Strategically, destroying Ukraine’s ability to construct weapons and disrupting its supply of weapons from external sources would likely be a priority. Tactically, a priority would likely be coordinating efforts by Russian Federation Aerospace Force assets with ground forces currently facing great pressure or extremely challenging situations almost everywhere on the frontlines from well-armed, well-supplied, and highly-motivated Ukrainian forces.

Dediscit animus sero quod didicit diu. (The mind is slow in unlearning what it has been long learning.) For many, it might understandably be difficult to conceive exactly how under the same leadership, with an additional title, the situation could be altered for its better. With specific regard to the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces, large scale exercises of recent years appear to have been nothing more than staged acts, performances that presented illusions about the capabilities of its different branches. Indeed, those performances were full of sound and fury, but reality signified nothing. In the Ukraine campaign, the Russian Federation Aerospace Forces so far have had little impact to the degree that they were present. The Russian Federation Aerospace Forces have been near nonexistent relative to its size, supposed power, and the expectations of military analysts worldwide. Its best fighters and fighter-bombers have been regularly blasted out of the skies by Ukrainian forces using both pricey sophisticated air defense weapons systems gifted to Kyiv by Western powers and shoulder fired rockets operated by individual soldiers in the field. Russian Federation Ground Forces could be assessed as fighting much as one of a third tier power, seemingly lacking sophisticated aircraft and possessing no close air support assets, and they have resultantly suffered losses the same as an trained observer might expect of a type of third tier force against a high-tech force of a military superpower. In this case, it would appear that with the combined support of the US, the United Kingdom, EU, and NATO member countries, Ukraine, to a degree, is fighting much as that very sort of military superpower described. As greatcharlie has stated in preceding posts, one could only imagine the loss Russian Federation forces would have suffered if they had clashed directly with US forces. If any units sent into battle under that scenario would have been spared, it would have been purely a matter of happenstance.

Still, Putin would unlikely put all of his hopes in the hands of these military men. To go a bit further with the hypothetical, perhaps during one of his summit meetings and bilateral talks with Putin, People’s Republic of China President and Communist Party of China Party Secretary Xi Jinping diplomatically and encouragingly shared the suggestion that he might adopt “a new way of thinking about warfare.” Perhaps he discussed the concept of combined warfare without boundaries emphasizing that a complementary level of energy be placed on matters that could not only greatly influence, but even more, have a decisive impact on its outcome. While it may also include the use of armed force, under the concept of combined warfare without boundaries prioritizes the use of non-military forms of warfare: psychological, media, information, technology, cyber, financial, political, social, and espionage. The aim of combined warfare without boundaries is to weaken the US internally and to exploit its vulnerabilities. Since under combined warfare without boundaries the battlefield is everywhere, everything can be weaponized. On a short list of things weaponized, Xi could have told Putin in this hypothetical situation that, optimistically, there still was time to put things right, but certainly there was no time to waste. It is all hypothetical, imagined from the abstract.

In the past, the activities undertaken as part of combined warfare without boundaries would have fallen under the category of intelligence. Perhaps, they still do. Intelligence services engage in open and clandestine, and covert activities, using appropriate tools and available resources, to create or exploit opportunities to act in support of the policies and the interests of their countries. As part of those activities, the everyday can often become weaponized. Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen around today having served in the KGB and as head of the FSB. He would very likely see value and potential in that tack, and would surely have a stream of ideas on what he could do away from the battlefield in a robust way. 

Under such a scenario, one could reasonably expect his mind to harken back to the heady days of the Cold War when he served as an officer in the KGB in the former Deutsche Democratische Republik (German Democratic Republic, also known as GDR or East Germany). Putin and his KGB comrades cooperated–“oversaw”–the work of their HVA counterparts who were infiltrating West Germany and countries beyond in the West to not only collect intelligence but to a great extent prepare as best as possible for a likely conflict between Warsaw Pact forces and NATO Member States in Central Europe. For 34 years, Generaloberst Markus Wolf was the very successful head of GDR’s foreign intelligence service Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (the Main Directorate for Reconnaissance), commonly referred to as the HVA. With frightening efficiency, he developed an array of tactics, techniques, procedures and methods for operating against his Western opponents in advance of any eventual conflict in Europe between East and West, or to break down the societies of opponents of the Eastern Bloc. Throughout the Cold War, his agents poured into West Germany and when possible countries beyond, secured positions, reported about, and influenced the activities of a multitude of organizations in a broad spectrum of areas, social, political, diplomatic, military, commercial, financial, scholarly,  scientific, and informational. (For those interested in more on Wolf and the HVA, see the November 13 2019 greatcharlie post entitled Book Review: Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism’s Greatest Spymaster (Times Books, 1997) for a bit more detail on the matter.)

With a dearth of good ideas, some interest could possibly arise in mining benefit from what might seem as an outre thought on first impression. If such a hypothetical exchange on the matter of combined warfare without boundaries were at all true, and under such a scenario, Putin might have put any thought into the matter, he would likely have begun to think beyond the battlefield in a big way. Some might suggest that Putin already was engaged in such activities as observed in Russia’s hybrid warfare attacks in Europe which began in 2014.

Hybrid warfare has been associated with Gerasimov who developed what has been dubbed the Gerasimov doctrine. The Gerasimov Doctrine, an operational concept for Russia’s confrontation with the West, is also a whole-of-government concept that combines military power and soft power across many domains, transcending boundaries between peace and war. However, there is a distinction between combined warfare without boundaries and the Gerasimov Doctrine. When combined warfare without boundaries is applied, the purpose is not to prepare or support the use of force. What is accomplished by non-military means should offset the use of force. To that extent in Ukraine, what is transpiring on the battlefield should not be looked upon as determining the final outcome of the confrontation. 

In a robust application of some simulacrum of combined warfare without boundaries, alterations in a few aspects of Russia’s behavior would likely signal the change. There would likely be greater emphasis on garnering assistance from allies with the wherewithal to contribute assets of high value. That list of allies would likely include: China, Belarus, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and perhaps Cuba. Applying combined warfare without boundaries, top diplomats of Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del Rossijskoj Federacii (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation) would approach each to secure the maximum level of assistance. Reports surfaced in September 2022, that Russia was in the process of buying millions of rockets and artillery shells from North Korea to use in Ukraine. That information was reportedly sourced from the US Department of Defense. In August 2022, US officials disclosed that Russia received shipments of Iranian-produced drones. 

Top diplomats would also be tasked with keeping the negotiations door open without leaning too far that way as to encourage bolder action on the battlefield by Kyiv and its NATO backers. It may be the case that when Western representatives approach Putin about peace, he may very well get the sense that he is slowly wearing down their countries and Ukraine. Thereby, his resolve to fight on may be strengthened.

As part of Putin’s twist on an hypothetical implementation by him of a combined warfare without limits strategy similar to that of China might be to green-light direct action of a calibrated nature in a top tier Western country whose foreign and national security bureaucracies surely will not be expecting but actually should have been prepared for once the Ukraine war ignited over some preposterous reasoning began.

Russian Federation intelligence services would be called upon to collect all they can on the level of will Western countries possess on investing in the war: concerns expressed in capitals on capping assistance expenditures, Ukraine’s use of all forms of assistance, and the effects of Moscow’s nuclear threats. Sweet to the ear of Putin would surely be any true Intelligence collected that shows some decay in the united front of the NATO Member States. As the situation stands now, it would seem illusory for the Kremlin to put hope in some deterioration of Western unity or loss of will or concern over the drain funding the war has had on national budgets or an actual pull back of support for Kyiv. Further, if the Russian Federation could hastily organize and task Its respective intelligence services to impact Western countries lined against it in some significant way as to influence events in Ukraine, there would unlikely be enough time to get any operations going before events on the battlefield rendered their fruits meaningless.

As for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, they would still be implored to hold on territory gained. However, in the use of their weapon systems, they would need to be a bit more creative. In the May 30, 2022 greatcharlie post entitled, “Putin the Protector of the Russian People or the Despoiler of Ukrainian Resources: A Look at War Causation and Russian Military Priorities in Ukraine”, it was suggested that ideally for Putin, inhabitants of Ukrainian cities and towns will be displaced due to Russian attacks at such a level that the cities and towns themselves would more or less resemble the southern portion of the city of Famagusta in Cyprus or the village of Oradour-sur-Glane in France. (Given results, it almost seems as if Russian engineering officers, artillery officers, air power officers, and ordnance officers, have drawn up plans for the systematic demolition of Ukrainian cities and towns, district by district, block by block, using ordnance fired from a variety of weapon systems.) The intermittent attacks on populated areas may indeed have some psychological warfare, punitive, or perhaps even a tactical purpose. Yet, something of far greater conception may be behind them. Perchance Russian commanders, as part of a preconceived plan, seek to displace Ukrainians from their homes, out of the cities and town through “massive evacuations” to make them easier to “manage,” easier to control. Surely, Putin would appreciate having the West finance and supply for their care on the other side of the Dnieper River. Destroying certain parts of cities and towns would also make them far less desirable. At the time of this writing, UN estimates are that over 4.1 million Ukrainians have moved into other countries. When Ukrainians move west, the better things become concerning Putin’s likely plans for Ukraine. In that same May 30, 2022 post, it was imagined that following the capture of Ukrainian cities and towns, “There might be the chance that citizens of the Russian homeland would be ‘invited’ to relocate and settle in those cities and towns to participate in their reconstruction and, particularly in the southeast, reside in cities and towns in order to reconstruct and work at ports on the Azov Sea and in the many mineral mines. Veterans of the military operation who were so inclined could be invited to relocate to the cities and towns they ‘liberated,’ in effect to enjoy the spoils of the war.”

Hypothetically under an overarching combined warfare without boundaries concept insisted upon by the Kremlin, Russian forces would act more directly to break the will of the Ukrainians throughout the country. While propaganda would likely have limited effect, there would be the possibility of attempting to break the morale of the Ukrainian people and as important, their will to fight on. To that extent, Ukrainian civilian infrastructure would be targeted with the purpose of terrorism the population, albeit the of terrorizing civilians in this manner would be a war crime. As of this writing, Russian forces reportedly have been bombing Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure, to include energy facilities. As put by Amnesty International, the intent of these attacks–somewhat in line of combined warfare without boundaries–is “to undermine industrial production, disrupt transportation, sow fear and despair, and deprive civilians in Ukraine of heat, electricity and water as the cold grip of winter approaches.”

Surovikin (center), Gerasimov (left), and Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (right). It is very possible that Putin, Shoigu, Gerasimov, and the others on the Russian Federation General Staff authentically feel there is a real chance that under Surovikin’s command, Russian forces can beat back Ukrainian forces tearing through their lines, gain and retain the initiative, and somehow obviate the effects of US, NATO, and other foreign military assistance to Kyiv. It could be that the results of the ongoing Ukrainian drive in fact proved Surovikin’s conceptual view of the situation in what was previously his southern front and his neighboring eastern front were correct. He may have expressed what turned out to be the best understanding of how factors as the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian forces to include new weapon systems being introduced via Western assistance. He may have sounded the alarm that firepower in particular would allow them “the upper hand” on the battlefield. He may have demonstrated all along a better understanding, reliable intimations, on how, where, and when to apply the combat power of Russian forces. He may have assessed the strengths and weaknesses of Russian forces and, since their power has dwindled so dramatically, how they could be more effectively and perhaps economically mustered, how those forces could be better protected, and how they might be able to take a stab at making some respectable gains more immediately.

Surovikin: The Invaluable Multilateral Operations Expert

The renowned 19th century Irish poet and playwright Oscar Wilde explained: “To expect the unexpected shows a thoroughly modern intellect.” Surovikin surely gained experience with multilateral operations as a result of his experience in Syria. Ukraine has doubtlessly put him in contact with operational commanders of allies assisting Russia in various ways. Given the DPRK’s arms shipment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and persistent murmurs of its troops assisting the Russian with the deployment of their troops, the DPRK’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) General Staff, with the permission of DPRK Chairman Kim Jung-un, by now surely has observers on the ground in Ukraine, examining everyday of the conflict and gleaning every lesson possible. Surely, those lessons learned will manifest in alterations of DPRK armed forces tactics, perhaps even the configuration of certain units, and use of their weapon systems to create whatever advantages they could possibly muster as well as mitigate any apparent weaknesses across the board. That might also include any structural changes their system of government might allow. From the Russian side, the work entailed in establishing interoperability with DPRK ordnance might be developed as a foundation for further areas and levels of cooperation. 

It was suggested at the time when the situation for the Russian forces in the Donbass began to seriously deteriorate that Kim might send 100,000 troops  of the KPA to Ukraine. On first impression, one might view such talk as part of Russia’s political warfare operations. If their suggested deployment should occur, the DPRK expeditionary force could potentially accomplish enough to offset the somewhat grandiose plans of Kyiv to raise a force of 1,000,000 soldiers to eradicate Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, to include the liberation of Crimea. The DPRK’s military is reported to be the world’s fourth largest, with nearly 1.3 million active personnel, and an additional 600,000 serve as reserve soldiers. Noteworthy is the fact that the DPRK has also offered to send over 1,000 workers to assist Russia in rebuilding postwar Ukraine. It has also been reported that Moscow would provide energy and grain in return for the deployment of DPRK troops. According to UN Resolution 2375, passed in 2017, countries are prohibited from supplying the DPRK all condensates and natural gas liquids (paragraph 13). UN Resolution 2397, passed in 2017, limits the annual amount of crude and refined petroleum that can be provided to North Korea (paragraphs 4 and 5). The former resolution also precludes any joint ventures or cooperative entities with North Korea (paragraph 18). The latter resolution reiterates the prohibition of any DPRK national from earning income in other states (paragraph 8). At this point, it would be unreasonable to think that such UN Resolutions have any meaning. Russian forces in Ukraine are already receiving the DPRK weapons shipments. As for prohibitions on the DPRK regarding arms shipments, its military assistance to Russia would also violate UN resolutions. UN Resolution 1718, passed in 2006, prohibits North Korean exports of heavy weapons, such as tanks, artillery, and missiles, and requires UN member states to prevent their transfer (paragraph 8). UN Resolution 1874 (paragraph 9), passed in 2009, and UN Resolution 2270 (paragraph 6), passed in 2016, expanded the export ban to include all DPRK arms, including small arms and light weapons, as well as “technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel.” Further, under UN Resolution 2270, paragraph 8), the DPRK is also prohibited from any military exports that “support or enhance the operational capabilities of armed forces of another Member State.” Pyongyang has established a record of totally disregarding UN Resolutions.

Napoleon is quoted as saying: “Unity of command is essential to the economy of time. Warfare in the field was like a siege: by directing all one’s force to a single point a breach might be made, and the equilibrium of opposition destroyed.” If DPRK troops, conceivably a combined arms force, were deployed to Ukraine, they would likely be applied as a decisive unified force on the battlefield, rather than separating them into individual units and dole them out as replacements for battered and tattered Russian battalions  Under the latter scenario, the likely command, control, and communications problems might be enormous. Further, the fact that Russian and DPRK have not trained together, at least in recent years, in such great numbers, surely would almost immediately become apparent despite Surovikin’s best efforts. How he would manage that would likely require summoning up answers from the depths of his knowledge, experience and talent. Perhaps the common wisdom is that if Surovikin is hoping to make any decisive moves, they would be planned for the Spring of 2023. However, there is the possibility that he plans to act in the mid-to-late Winter when weather conditions might obviate advantages provided to Ukrainian forces through the use of drones. Astonishingly, Russian forces seem to lack the appropriate equipment to monitor the skies electronically or a frightful lack of competence to do so.

One might recall weather was a key factor in the planning of Germany’ Oberkommando der Wehrmacht for its Ardennes Offensive that was launched on December 16, 1944. As the attack was envisioned, a heavy winter storm would prevent Allied attempts to provide air support and resupply to beleaguered US troops caught head on in the German armored and mechanized rampage through Belgium and Luxembourg, determined to reach the sea at Antwerp. For several days during the offensive, considerable progress was made, causing a huge bulge westward on the US frontlines. The battle was thereby given the name the “Battle of the Bulge.” Eventually, the winter storm that was vital to the German advance cleared enough for Allied air assets to fly in and have a devastating impact against the German attackers. They also managed to deliver much needed supplies–manna from heaven–to US troops. Certainly, it is possible that the drone technology Ukrainian forces possess might be able to overcome any challenges caused by weather conditions. If not, such technologically equipped drones could perhaps be rapidly supplied to them by Western powers

Though DPRK troops hypothetically sent into Ukraine would certainly be prepared to do business and make a good showing on behalf of their Dear Respected Comrade [Kim], it is possible that the hypothesized DPRK force could unexpectedly find themselves caught in a situation with Ukrainian forces similar to what their Russian comrades had in Kyiv and Kharkiv. After all, this hypothetical DPRK expeditionary force, imaginably combined arms,  could hardly expect more close air support from the Russian Federation Aerospace Force than Russian troops have received. They might deploy their own fighters and attack helicopters and fly them out of Crimea or even the Donbas only to find the skies over Ukraine no safer than the Russian pilots had. A disastrous assistance effort to support an ally that comes to mind is that of the British Army which sent a force under Lieutenant-General Sir John Moore into Spain to support the United Kingdom’s Spanish allies against the forces of Napoleon in 1809 during the Peninsular War. The French campaign, initially led by Napoleon himself, defeated the Spanish armies. Moore attempted to attack the French force, a corps under Marshal of the Empire Jean de Dieu Soult with the objective of diverting it. The strength of Moore’s forces was 16,000, which included 15,000 infantry and 9 to 12 guns. Soult’s corps in near parity included 16,000 troops, of which 12,000 were infantry, 3,200 were cavalry. He also had 20 guns

When the plan as conceived failed. Moore withdrew his force, but Soult’s corps relentlessly pursued it. The British retreat, under harsh winter conditions, took Moore’s force across northern Spain while their rearguard fought off repeated French attacks. Both the British and French troops suffered from the severe weather. With the exception of the elite Light Brigade under Robert Craufurd, much of the British force suffered from a loss of order and discipline during the retreat. Having managed against tremendous odds to reach the port of Corunna on the northern coast of Galicia in Spain, a few days ahead of the French, Moore’s troops found their transport ships had not arrived. When the fleet arrived a couple of days later, Soult’s forces also arrived and launched an attack on the British who were embarking. The British had no choice but to fight another battle before leaving Spain, the Battle of Corunna. In the fight which took place on January 16, 1809. Moore’s force repeatedly repulsed attacks from Soult’s force until nightfall, when both sides disengaged. However, during the battle, Moore was mortally wounded, but he died after learning that his men had successfully repelled the French attacks. That night, British forces resumed their embarkation. The last troops sailed away in the morning under French cannon fire. Soult would capture the port cities of Corunna and Ferrol. The outcome of the withdrawal of British forces from Galicia was the fall of northern Spain to the French.

Perchance General Surovikin would also has the solution to avoid a similar catastrophe. Perhaps the hypothetical intervention by DPRK troops would more resemble that of the Prussians at the Battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815. As it is fairly well-known, during the battle, over 30,000 Prussians under General Der Infanterie Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr Graf Bulow von Dennewitz and General-Leutnant Otto Karl Lorenz von Pirch shaped the outcome at the Battle of Waterloo. The Prussians desperately sought to capture the strategic point of Plancenoit on the right flank of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Army. Much of the Prussian’s fight against the 10,000 French defenders in Plancenoit was in the streets of the town itself. Though the battle at Plancenoit was to be hard fought, the Prussians eventually overran the French right, causing the French army to turn and flee. Their success sealed the fate of Napoleon. The Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Army, Generalfeldmarschall Gerhard Leberecht von Blücher was famously to meet British Army Field Marshal The Duke of Wellington on the battlefield between 9:00PM and 10:00PM, close to the Belle-Alliance farm, where history records, the Prussian general conjured up in French: “Quelle affaire !” Given the battering the Allied army had received throughout the day, the relatively fresh Prussian troops were to take the lead in pursuing the fleeing French troops. The Prussians had neverthless lost 7,000 men. Napoleon’s carriage was to be seized by Prussian cavalry at Gemappes, and the routed French were to be given no quarter by the furious Prussian pursuit. Blücher’s advance guard was finally to reach the outskirts of Paris on June 29, 1815. With Napoleon’s abdication on June 22, 1815, the war would officially end upon the signature of the Convention of St-Cloud on July 3, 1815.  Surely, this would be the sort of outcome that Moscow and Pyongyang would be hoping for.

Surovikin (left), Shoigu (seated right), and Russian Federation Colonel General Sergei Rudskoy (center). Surovikin gained considerable experience with multilateral operations as a result of his experience in Syria. Ukraine has doubtlessly put him in contact with operational commanders of allies assisting Russia in various ways. Given the DPRK’s arms shipment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces and persistent murmurs of its troops assisting the Russian with the deployment of their troops, the DPRK General Staff, with the permission of Kim, by now surely has observers on the ground in Ukraine, examining everyday of the conflict and gleaning every lesson possible. Surely, those lessons learned would manifest in alterations of DPRK armed forces tactics, perhaps even the configuration of certain units, and use of their weapon systems to create whatever advantages they could possibly muster as well as mitigate any apparent weaknesses across the board. That might also include any structural changes their system of government might allow. From the Russian side, the work entailed in establishing interoperability with DPRK ordnance might be developed as a foundation for further areas and levels of cooperation. It was suggested at the time when the situation for the Russian forces in Ukraine began to seriously deteriorate that Kim might send 100,000 DPRK troops to Ukraine. Surely, Surovikin would be best suited to manage a multilateral effort with the DPRK.

The Way Forward

Ultimately, it was Putin who created the Ukraine War. Still, commanders are responsible for what was happening to young soldiers in the field. Surovikin expectedly understands the situation in Ukraine. He has been part of the military decisionmaking on the special military operation from its inception. The loss in troops and materiel in Ukraine even to the of top Russian Federation commanders’ eyes must also be absolutely astounding. They are after all only human. All of the ills of the forces they have led have been exposed to the world. The walls have come down. 

Included among root causes for troubles that have surfaced, with which Surovikin or anyone who might come after him must contend, are extremely poor soldier discipline and terrible fieldcraft. Training has likely been lax for decades. Leadership has likely been poor at the lower level leadership for just as long. It is unlikely that senior leaders were circulating or doing so in a meaningful way. One might presume there was a lack of standards particularly among the ground forces and very low morale. If morale was not low in the past, it is surely low now. Russian military technology appears crude as well as corroded in some cases. The world is not discovering how capable NATO has been to confront what was formally understood to be a Russian military juggernaut. Indeed, the world is seeing just how corroded the Russian system is and how that corroded system likely for years had grabbed hold of and mangled the armed forces. What has been manifested from that system in Ukraine has been a longtime in development. Weapons systems which are designed for US military and naval personnel to go to war and win must be robust. This approach is in stark contrast to that of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. An army that operates under the archaic notion that troops are expendable and can be casually sacrificed to achieve objectives will be overcome and overrun in the present era. No one should knowingly be sent to war without being given every chance with regard to their survival and the performance of their equipment.

The above are symptoms of an affliction of corruption that has beset and poisoned authoritarian regimes throughout history. Embezzlement becomes ubiquitous, the powerful feel entitled to spoils befitting their rise. And their countries are bled dry strength and wherewithal stealthily and it is all uncovered in unexpected crises. In every way, the Russian Federation Armed Forces appear to have all along been a paper tiger, emblematic of the very flawed government they serve. William Shakespeare, in Sonnet 66 (1609), provides a short list of ingredients that best describe the realities of authoritarian regimes so appropos concerning the thinly veiled current one of Russian Federation. In the third quatrain, he writes: “And art made tongue-tied by authority, / And folly, doctor-like, controlling skill, / And simple truth miscalled simplicity, / And captive good attending captain ill.”