Monthly Archives: July 2013

Congressional Hurdles Lifted on Arming Syrian Rebels: Beware Assad, and Islamic Militants, Too!

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On July 22, 2013, Reuters reported in an exclusive story that Congress and the Obama administration agreed to move forward with a plan for the US to arm the struggling Syrian rebels according to officials.  The first break in the impasse came on July 12 when members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who had questioned the wisdom of arming the insurgents, decided behind closed doors to tentatively agree that the Obama administration could go ahead with its plans, but wanted updates as the covert effort proceeded.  Then on July 12th, the House Committee reached a consensus to give a cautious go-ahead after certain concerns were eased.  Under tacit rules followed by the executive branch and the Congress on intelligence matters, the White House will not send arms to the Syrian opposition if both or one of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees expressed objections.  Reuters learned from a source familiar with the administration’s thinking, speaking on the condition anonymity, that the Obama administration had been working with Congress to address some of the Members’ initial concerns, and that helped to create the opportunity for the administration to proceed.  The timeline is unclear, but it is expected by August, US arms would reach the Supreme Military Council, the military wing of the Syrian opposition, and then be distributed to appropriate groups within the Free Syrian Army.  However, the House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers told Reuters that despite the consensus to support the Obama administration’s plan, he along with some other Members, both Republican and Democrat, still had strong reservations. 

Representative Adam Schiff, a Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, was among those Members who did not hear anything strong enough to convince him the Obama administration’s plans were viable.  Reuters quoted him as stating “It’s too late to affect the outcome with a small amount of arms.”  Representative Schiff also remarked “I think we would have to provide such a massive amount of arms, and additional military support to change the balance on the battlefield, that we would inevitably be drawn deeply into the civil war.”  Representative Schiff said “I think we also have to expect that some of the weapons we provide are going to get into the hands of those who would use them against us.”  Admitting his view on the committee was in the minority, Representative Schiff still felt that among many Americans, there was “little appetite for getting involved in a third [war],” after fighting two in Iraq and Afghanistan.  

Reuters reported that the Intelligence Committee sessions on arming the rebels were classified and held in secret.  Without public reports or statements coming out of the secret hearings, knowing exactly what was said behind closed doors is nearly impossible. What most likely swayed most Members were not facts about the ongoing situation in Syria, but rather a plan of action under which the Obama administration felt its goals and Congressional goals could be accomplished in Syria.  Congressional goals in Syria are to help the opposition to President Bashar al-Assad and to place more pressure on his regime.  Congress requires that Free Syrian Army groups and members meet its criteria on human rights, terrorism, and nonproliferation of arms.  After examining the current situation in Syria, and concerns of Members such as Representative Schiff, a “guess” is made here on a plan the Obama administration very likely proposed to take on Syria before the Senate and House Intelligence Committees which led to a consensus to give the administration the green light.

The NATO’s Syria Assessment

Many military experts would agree with Representative Schiff’s statement that “It’s too late to affect the outcome with a small amount of arms.”  There is no indication that the situation on the ground in Syria has changed in favor of the Free Syrian Army.  Rather, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, fully acknowledged as recently as July 18th that “Currently the tide has shifted in his [Assad’s] favor.”  In a NATO assessment of the situation in Syria completed in July, it was determined that Assad’s forces have already ended any short-term or mid-term threat from the Syrian rebels.  It predicted that Assad’s forces, with Russian and Iranian support, would capture major Free Syrian Army strongholds with the exception of northern Syria by the end of 2013.  NATO, in consultation with US and EU intelligence services, concluded that the Free Syrian Army’s military campaign had failed over the past three months.  Officials said that the Syrian component of the Free Syrian Army had deteriorated dramatically since April and the point had been reached where it was difficult to distinguish who was determined to fight the Assad regime and who was simply out to collect a paycheck.  Moreover, NATO assessed that Syrians were not doing the bulk of the fighting against the Assad regime.  Rather, the majority of fighting was being done by foreign fighters, most of them affiliated with Al-Qaida.  It was NATO’s assessment that ostensibly resulted in a decision by several leading NATO countries to halt lethal weapons shipments for the Free Syrian Army.  In mid-July, Britain and France signaled their opposition to shipping any weapons to Syria.  Officials said that the two countries which until June were the most vocal supporters for arming the Free Syrian Army determined that any major weapons shipments would end up with Al-Qaida affiliated factions.  French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius was quoted as saying, “There are certain conditions that need to be met before eventually sending weapons.”  Under these circumstances, the US decision to withhold shipments was sound.  Conditions on the ground could not have caused a change in opinion among Committee Members.

An Assessment from the US Intelligence Community

Statements coming from officials in the US intelligence community substantiate Representative Schiff’s concerns over the size and extent of US arming and involvement in Syria.  On July 20, 2013, the New York Times reported that David R. Shedd, the deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency issued one of the strongest public warnings about how the civil war in Syria has deteriorated, and he seemed to imply that the response from the US and its allies had so far been lacking. According to the New York Times, the 31-year intelligence veteran warned at the Aspen Security Forum, an annual meeting on security issues, that the Syrian conflict could last “many, many months to multiple years,” and described a situation that would most likely worsen regardless of whether the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fell.  Shedd described two different scenarios for Syria’s future, both of which he said predicted far more violence and killing. He reportedly stated, “If Bashar [al-]Assad were to succeed, he will be a more ruthless leader who will live with a legacy of tens of thousands of his civilians killed under him.”   Shedd went on to explain that a Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict could grow if Mr. Assad’s government fell or he was killed.  The New York Times quoted Shedd as saying, “If he loses and goes to an enclave inside there, I think there will be ongoing civil war for years to come,” noting that more radical elements like the Nusra Front would fight to control parts of the country. “They will fight for that space. They’re there for the long haul.”  The New York Times noted Shedd’s assessment of the US ability to draw distinctions among an opposition that he said numbered about 1,200 groups.  Shedd was said to have suggested that modest interventions were unlikely to make a significant difference at a time when Mr. Assad’s army has been reclaiming territory on the battlefield, with the support of Iran, Russia and Hezbollah, and when the Free Syrian Army is bitterly divided   He also pointed to the resurgence of the Islamic militant factions.  Shedd also reportedly suggested that in addition to strengthening the more secular groups of the fractious Syrian opposition — which the Obama administration has promised to arm with weapons and ammunition — the West would have to directly confront more radical Islamist elements. But he did not say how that could be accomplished.  Shedd stated “The reality is that, left unchecked, they will become bigger.”  He emphasized that “Over the last two years they’ve grown in size, they’ve grown in capability, and ruthlessly have grown in effectiveness.”   Clearly, unde Shedd’s assessment, mainstream Free Syrian Army groups are not getting stronger or achieving much.  Rather, Islamic militant factions have gained the upper-hand over mainstream Syrian groups and are preparing to shape Syria’s future.  These facts could not have caused a change of thinking within the Congress to begin arms shipments.

The Islamic Militant Threat to the US Syrian Effort

Given the present size and strength of Al-Qaida affiliated Islamic militant factions in Syria, Representative Schiff’s concerns, as well as those of US allied that Western arms would fall into the hands of Islamic militants that caused many countries to delay their arms deliveries, are legitimate.  Representative Schiff was quoted as saying “I think we also have to expect that some of the weapons we provide are going to get into the hands of those [Al-Nusra Front] who would use them against us.”  In early 2012, many Islamic militant factions, particularly the Salafist/Jihaddis, were operating underground in Syria.  Two years of arms and support flowing into opposition forces from Arab states has allowed for the growth of Jabhat Al-Nusra and similar Salafist/Jihaddi factions in Syria.  Jabhat Al-Nusra or as they are now known, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, was active in Syria under their parent group the Islamic State of Iraq (Al-Qaida in Iraq) auspices for years prior to the Syrian civil war.  Ever since the formation of Al-Qaida in Iraq, itself, the eastern region of Syria—bordering the Al-Anbar Province of Iraq—has been a hot spot for Al-Qaida activity. 

Jabhat Al-Nusra and other Salafist/Jihaddi factions working in concert with it, have been a driving force in the Free Syrian Army.  For the balance of the civil war, Jabhat Al-Nusra has led Free Syrian Army assaults on key installations, air defense bases, and coastal and highway routes.  They have also been responsible for the bulk of the suicide attacks in civilian areas and assassinations of key officials in the Assad regime.  They have become the best equipped, best-organized, and best-financed faction of the Free Syrian Army.  Yet, lately, they have been known best by their rogue acts within Free Syrian Army territory.  They include attacks upon mainstream Free Syrian Army groups, killing popular commanders and fighters.  Islamic militant factions have attempted to impose their strict conception of Islamic law, attempting to transform Syrian society, being particularly harsh with Syrian women, and sometimes even carrying out summary public executions on Syrian citizens.  Further, they have monopolized wheat and fuel supplies in towns creating even greater shortages for residents.   Clashes between the mainstream groups and the Islamic militants are intensifying day by day.  As long as Islamic militants continue to pour into Syria, their numbers and capabilities could reach a point where the mainstream forces would no longer be able to contend with them.  Although mainstream Free Syrian Army groups may want to create the basis for a transition to a democratic style government in Syria, Islamic militant factions seek to create an Islamic state.  Clashes between Islamist militant factions and Kurdish militias spread to a second Syrian province last weekend.  As infighting continues, more Islamic militants and Salafist/Jihaddis are pouring into Syria.  Under the conditions Jabhat Al-Nusra and other Islamic factions have created in Free Syrian Army territory and with their strength, it would be reckless for any country to send arms to the opposition.  As long as this situation persisted, Congress would hardly have been willing to allow any arms deliveries.

US Military Options in Syria

An unclassified assessment of military options the US could take if requested by the Obama administration are not quick and easy and would dramatically increase US costs and risk of loss in Syria.  That supports Representative Schiff’s concerns that by providing “additional military support to change the balance on the battlefield . . . we would inevitably be drawn deeply into the civil war.”  On July 22, 2013, Reuters reported that US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, in a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee outlined and assessed five options he said the US military was prepared to undertake: training and advising the opposition, conducting limited stand-off strikes, establishing a no-fly zone, establishing buffer zones and controlling chemical arms.  According to General Dempsey, the options he provided would likely further the narrow military objective of helping the opposition and placing more pressure on the regime.  However, the general explained “We have learned from the past 10 years, however, that it is not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful consideration of what is necessary in order to preserve a functioning state. We must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action.”

The US military’s current role in the conflict is limited to delivering humanitarian aid, providing security assistance to Syria’s neighbors and providing nonlethal help to the Syrian opposition. The US military has an operational headquarters unit in Jordan along with other assets, including F-16 jets.  Among the options for action provided by General Dempsey were the following: 1) US military personnel could train, advise and assist the Free Syrian Army. That mission could include weapons training, tactical planning and intelligence and logistics assistance, General Dempsey explained.  He estimated the cost at $500 million a year (General Dempsey did not indicate whether that was a figure based on very immediate action or a plan to train and equip the Free Syrian Army over a period of months); 2) the US could conduct limited stand-off strikes. General Dempsey said this option would use air and missile strikes to attack Syrian air defenses, military forces and command structure to damage the Assad government’s ability to wage war. The cost could run a billion dollars a month and risk retaliatory strikes and civilian casualties; 3) the US could establish a no-fly zone. General Dempsey said a no-fly zone would require hundreds of strike aircraft and support units. The cost could be a billion dollars a month and would risk the loss of US planes while potentially failing to reduce violence because Syria relies mainly on surface arms rather than air power; 4) the US troops  could establish buffer zones. General Dempsey said this option would use force to establish safe zones inside Syria where the opposition could train and organize while being protected from attack by government forces. He said the cost would be over a billion dollars a month and could improve opposition capabilities over time.  However, the zones could become targets for Syrian attack; and 5) General Dempsey stated lethal force could be used to prevent proliferation of chemical weapons and to destroy Syria’s “massive stockpile” of the weapons. He said the option would require hundreds of aircraft as well as personnel on the ground and could cost over a billion dollars per month.  These options for Syria accompanied by costs and risks would have likely persuaded the Members to give the administration a green light for it plans.  Rather, they would most likely cause the Members to further deliberate before taking any steps.

“Humanitarian Appeals” for Arming the Syrian Opposition

While Representative Schiff was correct in his view that the US public was not interested in engaging in a new war, appeals to the public and officials for the US to become more involved in Syria have been continually made by advocates for the Syrian opposition.  In a surprisingly emotional editorial in the Washington Post on July 17, 2013, journalist David Ignatius admonished the Obama administration for failing to rush arm and supplies to the Free Syrian Army and appealed for immediate assistance to be sent.  He explained how the failed to provide aid defined the US in the world as a nation unwilling to stand by its friends and fulfill its promises.  Ignatius pointed to the fact that it was nearly two years ago, on Aug. 18, 2011, when President Obama first proclaimed, “The time has come for President Assad to step aside.”  Ignatius sates that did not back up his call for regime change with any specific plan, but only furthered his position by repeating the “Assad must go” theme regularly ever since.  Ignatius noted that that the CIA began working with the Syrian opposition in 2011 and has been providing training and other assistance given some impression that greater aid was to come.  Ignatius recalled the June 13th the White House announcement that it would provide militaryaid to the Syran opposition because the Assad regime had crossed a “red line” by using chemical weapons, causing the rebels began preparing warehouses to receive the promised shipments. Ignatius asks readers “Imagine for the moment that you are a Syrian rebel fighter who has been risking his life for two years in the hope that Obama was sincere about helping a moderate opposition prevail not just against Assad but against the jihadists who want to run the country. Now you learn that Washington is having second thoughts.”  Ignatius quoted from a message sent by one opposition member: “I am about to quit, as long as there is no light in the end of the tunnel from the US government. At least if I quit, I will feel that I am not part of this silly act we are in.” Ignatius also includes an angry quote from General Salim Idriss, commander in chief of the Free Syrian Army in the Daily Telegraph, which stated, “The West promises and promises.  This is a joke now. . . . What are our friends in the West waiting for?  For Iran and Hezbollah to kill all the Syrian people?”  He states Ignatius said “What’s happening in Syria isn’t a pretty sight, as the moderates struggle to survive without the expected Western aid.”  This unusually emotional and very partisan appeal by Ignatius, and others like it, that claimed the US has abandoned the Syrian opposition fighters it promised to stand by, would very likely strike a chord among Members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.  However, with budgetary concerns and the uncertainty over the situation in Syria, such an appeal while understood and heartfelt, could not cause the Committees to enter to US into a new war with all of the consequences that would entail.

The Administration’s Likely Proposal to the Intelligence Committees: A Purge in the Free Syrian Army

What seems to stand out from all of this is that the US is really unable to do the things it wants to do in Syria.  The main stumbling block to achieving the goals of both the Obama administration and Congress is the Islamic militant groups.  That is the situation that needs change.  It is somewhat likely that a plan of action to shape events on the ground in Syria was presented to the Congress, and was given the green light.  Jabhat Al-Nusra may have done the bulk of the fighting and account for the most of the Free Syrian Army’s successes, however, the group would be unable to cooperate with mainstream Further, Islamic militant factions intensify their attacks upon mainstream Free Syrian Army groups and Kurdish groups.  As long as Islamic militants continue to pour into Syria, their numbers and capabilities will reach a point where the mainstream forces would no longer be able to contend with them.  As it was explained on greatcharlie.com in a July 11, 2013 post entitled, “Opposition in Syria continues to Fracture, Yet This May Create a New Option for Its Allies,” the Obama administration would need to do more than meet its promise to arm the Free Syrian Army with weapons and ammunition. 

Only by intervening covertly in support of mainstream elements against Islamic militant factions would mainstream Free Syrian Army groups have a remote chance of being positioned to defeat Assad’s forces.  Taking this step would enlarge the US role in the Syrian conflict.  However, it would place the US in a position to do much more on behalf of the Free Syrian Army.  By purging rogue Islamic militants factions, the US and its allies could halt the deterioration of the Free Syrian Army, properly organize its remaining groups as a military force, establish unit cohesion and coordination between units, improve their fighting capabilities, and enhancing their combat power with better arms.  This step would be in line with the statements of David Shedd of the Defense Intelligence Agency that in addition to strengthening the more secular groups of the fractious Syrian opposition, the West would have to directly confront more radical Islamist elements.  This step would also be in line with the military option outlined by General Dempsey in which US military personnel could train, advise, and “assist” the Free Syrian Army.  With about 1200 groups in the Free Syrian Army, it is conceivable that an Islamic militant faction may evade the purge and secure US arms.  However, that risk can be minimized or possibly eliminated as long as the intelligence services of the US, the EU, Arab states, and the Supreme Military Council work in unison to identify Islamic militants in the Free Syrian Army ranks.

(Once operations are underway, perhaps Hezbollah, whose military-wing was recently placed on the EU’s terrorist blacklist, might also be subjected to kinetic strikes by US, EU, and Arab state forces, with the goal of creating more favorable odds for the Free Syrian Army on the battlefield and placing pressure on the Assad regime..)

It is also somewhat likely that a follow-on plan to develop and conduct Free Syrian Army operations without the targeted Islamic militant factions would have been proposed to Congress.  Sufficient numbers of mainstream fighters would need to be trained, equipped and fielded to cover any gaps created by the purged Islamic militant groups.  US efforts could be coordinated with allied intelligence services and special operations forces to support and advise the Free Syrian Army units on the ground in Syria.  They could also support Free Syrian Army operations by instructing unit commanders and senior leaders in maneuver tactics and unconventional warfare.  When necessary, they could actually fight alongside the Free Syrian Army against Assad’s forces and allies.  At that time, the US could also engage in a rapid and robust training and equipping of the Free Syrian Army. 

As it was explained on greatcharlie.com on July 11th, with the Free Syrian Army facing the possibility of folding under the weight of the clashes caused by the Islamic militants, and civilian deaths now exceeding 100,000 as a result of the conflict, time is of the essence.  Assad has no reason to negotiate terms with an opposition he could easily defeat.  He may believe the force will soon collapse on its own.  Supporting the mainstream groups and purging undesirable factions would be a clear demonstration of the continued support of the US and the Friends of Syria for positive change in Syria.  Yet, this step would not be taken just as a matter of principle.  A purge is the best option to take if supporting and utilizing the Free Syrian Army remains the goal of the US, EU, and Arab states. The Congressional Intelligence committees needed to make a decision on Syria.  With their ovesight, the plan should succeed.  While it cannot be confirmed anything like this plan was actually proposed, it might be the very course of action the US should take.

Obama Emphasizes US Commitment to Syrian Rebels in Saudi Call, But He Can Still Change His Mind

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According to a July 12, 2013 Reuters article entitled “Obama Emphasizes US Commitment to Syrian Rebels in Saudi Call,” President Barack Obama told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia that he is committed to providing US support to Syrian rebels who have been waiting for shipments of arms that have been stalled in Washington.  Reuters indicated the quote from President Obama’s July 12th phone conversation was integrated into the text of an official statement confirming “the US continued commitment to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme Military Council and to strengthening the opposition.”  That White House statement further explained the two leaders discussed the civil war in Syria and expressed strong concerns about the impact of the conflict in the region.  The Reuters article also revealed that US arms have not reached the Syrian rebels, who are struggling to hold back an offensive by the Syrian government.  Moreover, it explained that US weapons have been caught in a Washington impasse as some members of the US Congress fear the arms will end up in the hands of Islamic militants.

However, the timing and level of US aid to the Syrian opposition forces was not very likely the main issue on the mind of King Abdullah when he spoke to President Obama.  The entire enterprise of training, arming, and directing Syrian opposition forces to bring down the regime of President Bashar Al-Assad is in jeopardy.  As the Friends of Syria group (organized by former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2012 to support Syria’s transition to a democratic government) explained after its June 22, 2013 meeting in Doha, Qatar, a stark military imbalance exits between the Syrian opposition forces and the Syrian Armed Forces and their allies.  However, divisions and rivalries between mainstream rebel groups and Islamic militant factions have fractured and hobbled the fighting force.  Saudi Arabia and other Arab states that financially supported and armed Islamic militant factions in particular in Syria, are culpable for this predictable outcome.  They seem to be adhering to the specious argument that US military arms aid will place the situation back on track.  Yet, US military hardware will not improve the situation.  Rather, as it is feared by the US Congress, the US aid could very well make matters far worse.      

What May Trouble the Saudi King about the Syrian Enterprise

While the President Obama was explaining the US commitment to the Syrian opposition, the Saudi king was unlikely surprised by the fact that the president had to seek Congressional approval before moving forward.  King Abdullah undoubtedly understands the workings of the branches of the US government system of checks and balances.  Under tacit rules followed by the executive branch and the Congress on intelligence matters the White House will not send arms to the Syrian opposition’s military wing, the Supreme Military Council and its fighting force, the Free Syrian Army if both the Senate and House  intelligence committees or just one, expresses serious objections.  Both Democrats and Republican expressed concerns that the weapons would reach Islamic militant factions.  (Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federal Security Service have expressed similar concern that sophisticated weapons, particularly shoulder launched anti-aircraft missiles brought into Syria, will find their way into Russia and Europe.)

The matter took on another layer when both Senate and House appropriations committees which also routinely review secret intelligence or military aid programs, voiced their concerns.  The issues that have stirred concern within the Congress over sending military hardware to the Free Syrian Army are most likely what concerns King Abdullah the Saudi king over the continued participation of the US in the arming effort.  The US commitment Syrian opposition is not open-ended.  Under current circumstances, the US may eventually need to terminate it.  What the Saudi king most likely has begun thinking is what that decision, if made in the near future by President Obama, would mean for Saudi Arabia and the region.

Indeed, the Saudi king is astute enough to know as a result of rogue actions by Islamic militant factions, the entire enterprise of training, arming, and directing the Free Syrian Army in an effort to bring down the regime of Bashar Al-Assad has been put into doubt in the minds of all involved.  Those rogue acts include attacks upon mainstream Free Syrian Army groups, killing popular commanders and fighters.  Islamic militant factions have attempted to impose their strict conception of sharia or Islamic law on local residents in the territory held by the Free Syrian Army.  At times, they have even carried out summary public executions.  Further, they have monopolized wheat and fuel supplies in towns creating even greater shortages for residents.   Clashes between the mainstream groups and the Islamic militants are intensifying day by day.  As Islamic militants continue to pour into Syria, their numbers and capabilities could reach a point where the mainstream forces would no longer be able to contend with them.  At that point, the goals of the mainstream Free Syrian Army groups, to create the basis for a transition to a democratic style government in Syria, would be supplanted by the goals of the Islamic militant factions, which is to create an Islamic state there. 

All of this falls on top of the fact that the Free Syrian Army’s capabilities, under any realistic assessment, cannot be ramped up and the force cannot fight in a size and strength great enough, in any short period of time, to confront the Syrian Armed Forces and its allies, Iran, Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shi’a militia, and Russia.  Assad’s powerful allies are ready to support it with money and weapons, and commit substantial numbers of their forces to fight alongside the Syrian Armed Forces as already proven at Qusayr, Homs, and Damascus.  The promise of the Friends of Syria to shift the military balance in favor of the Free Syrian Army will not be quickly or easily realized.

The Formidable Islamic Militias in Syria

While the US and Arab states claim to have only trained, armed, and supported vetted and moderate groups in the Free Syrian Army, what is occurring on the ground in Syria contradicts that claim.  Two years of arms and support flowing into opposition forces from Arab states has allowed for the growth of Jabhat Al-Nusra and similar Salafist/Jihaddi factions in Syria.  Jabhat Al-Nusra or as they are now known, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, was active in Syria under their parent group the Islamic State of Iraq (Al-Qaida in Iraq) auspices for years prior to the Syrian civil war.  Ever since the  formation of Al-Qaida in Iraq, itself, the eastern region of Syria—bordering the Al-Anbar Province of Iraq—has been a busy beehive for Al-Qaida activity since its inception following the US-led coalition’s initiation of  Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Jabhat Al-Nusra and other Salafist/Jihaddi factions working in concert with it, have been a driving force in the Free Syrian Army.  For the balance of the civil war, Jabhat Al-Nusra has led Free Syrian Army assaults on key installations, air defense bases, and coastal and highway routes.  They have also been responsible for the bulk of the suicide attacks in civilian areas and assassinations of key officials in the Assad regime.  They have become the best equipped, best-organized, and best-financed faction of the Free Syrian Army.

Arab State Culpability For the Fracturing of the Free Syrian Army

As the civil war in Syria got underway, the US and EU involvement was very low-key.  However, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, as well as the United Arab Emirates and Jordan since 2012, enthusiastically delivered arms and support to the Free Syrian Army.  The Arab states were emboldened by their success in Libya.  Many Arab state officials suggested, even as a late as 2012, that Syria would go the way of Libya.  Qatar which took the “lead Arab role” in the NATO-led intervention, Operation Unified Protector, rushed to throw its financial wherewithal into the support of the Syrian opposition to take the lead Arab role in Syria, too.  Though this effort, Qatar was perceived as trying to use its financial power to develop loyal networks with the Free Syrian Army and set the stage to influence events in Syria after the presumed fall of the Assad regime.  Yet, the Qataris had little experience in strategic maneuvering at the level required to positively influence events of Syria’s scale.  Attempting to create loyal support was a very difficult undertaking.  Many groups in the Free Syrian Army would move from alliance to alliance in search of funding and arms.  Islamic militant factions were particularly adept at this.  In the end, Qatar’s approach to shaping events served, albeit unintentionally, to strengthen and embolden Salafist/Jihaddis among the Islamic militant factions in the Free Syrian Army.  That outcome was contrary to the goals of Qatar’s Arab neighbors in the Gulf and especially the US and EU.  Accusations began to rise that Qatar rather than supporting the formation of the Syrian National Council, divided it.  Qatar’s efforts to create unity in the Free Syrian Army were said to have led to its fracturing. 

For Qatar, engaging in an effort to arm the Free Syrian Army without a secure, steady supply of arms meant Qatar had to scour around for light weapons such as AK-47 rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, hand grenades, and ammunition.  Qatar bought arms in Libya and Eastern European countries such as Croatia and flew them to Turkey.  In Turkey, intelligence services helped to deliver them into Syria.  Qatar worked with Turkey for a short while to identify recipients.  As Saudi Arabia joined the covert arming effort, Qatar expanded its operation to working with Lebanon, to bring weapons into Syria via the Free Syrian Army supply hub at Qusayr.  As the conflict progressed, Qatar turned to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to identify factions to support.  As a result of that effort, Qatar’s support of the Farouq brigades began.  (Later there would be violent clashes between Farouq brigade troops and fighters from Al-Sham and Jabhat Al-Nusra.)  Qatari unconventional warfare units were also tasked to go into Syria and find additional factions to arm and supply.

It was Qatar’s links to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood that led to its rift with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was adverse to anything related to that organization.  The division between Qatar and Saudi Arabia had harmful consequences on the unity of both the political and military wings of the Syrian opposition.  By September 2012, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were creating separate military alliances and structures.  It was then that the two countries were urged by the US to bring the parallel structures together under the Supreme Military Council led by General Salim Idriss.  Yet, it is being reported that Qatar and Saudi Arabia continue to work independently.

Fund raising within other Arab states for Islamic militant factions in Syria is typically conducted privately during an evening event known as diwaniya.  In Kuwait in particular, fund raising activity must be conducted under special permit.  Money received, which has been substantial, is brought into Syria by luggage.  The recipients of the funds are given freedom to spend the money as they wish.  That might include, recruiting mujahedeen to engage in jihad in Syria.  The US is greatly concerned that the money may help strengthen Islamic militant factions with links to Al-Qaida such as Jabhat Al-Nusra.  The US would prefer that this funding stream would also pass through the Supreme Military Council.  However, that would require those providing the funds to cooperate with the US, which is somewhat unlikely.

Islamic Militants Continue to Pour into Syria.

As infighting continues, more Islamic militants and Salafist/Jihaddis pour into Syria.  The latest development, likely resulting from the rapid increase in size, strength, and confidence is the decision by Pakistani Taliban to set up a base in Syria, assess the needs of the jihad in Syria, and work out joint operations with Islamic militant factions there.  The bases were allegedly set up with the assistance of former Afghan mujahedeen of Middle Eastern origin that have moved to Syria in recent years.  The cell has the approval of militant factions both within and outside of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, an umbrella organization of militant groups fighting Pakistani government forces.  In the past, Islamic militant fighters from Pakistan fought in the Balkans and Central Asia.  Between 1992 and 1995, the group Harkatul Mujahedeen sent a large number of fighters to Bosnia to support the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Between 1988 and 1994, Pakistan and Afghan Taliban fought in Nagorno-Karabakh on the side of Azerbaijan against Armenian forces.

Vetting the Islamic Militants

When Jabhat Al-Nusra, using Qatari arms and money, began gaining ground against the Syrian Armed Forces, it troubled Western governments to the extent that the US placed Jabhat Al-Nusra on the global terrorist list. The US also instituted a consultative process to reign in Qatar’s activities. Two operations rooms were set up, one in Turkey and the other in Jordan, to oversee weapons deliveries.  However, arms and money found their way to the Islamic militant factions even with the offices.  There can be no doubt that the US knows much about the Islamic militants and Salafist/Jihaddis operating in Syria.  That information would include family ties, financial networks, media sources, disgruntled employees, imminent threats, homeland plots, foreign sales, health status, financial resources tradecraft, recruiting tactics.  What they need to know is who they can rely upon in the field with sophisticated weapons, and participate in larger operations against Assad’s forces and allies. They want to know whether the factions or individual supports Syria’s transition to a democratic style of government.  The US Congress wants to require Free Syrian Army groups and members meet its criteria on human rights, terrorism, and nonproliferation of arms.  However, actions speak louder than words.  Jabhat Al-Nusra may have done the bulk of the fighting and account for the most of the Free Syrian Army’s successes.  Yet, by all accounts, the Jabhat Al-Nusra and Salafist/Jihaddi factions associated with it have engaged in ugly behavior toward the people of Syria and the mainstream Free Syrian Army groups.  Clearly, they would be unable to cooperate with mainstream Free Syrian Army groups to create a secure and sustainable peace in a post-Assad Syria.  Under any vetting process Jabhat Al-Nusra would need to be rejected for support, as would any Salafist/Jihaddi factions associated with it.  

The US possesses considerable know how when it comes to training and equipping forces to defeat rogue regimes.  However, the US does not possess magic.  Arab state leaders such as King Abdullah must understand that even with a commitment by the US on Syria, operations such as the one ongoing to support the Free Syrian Army could fail.  Similar operations have failed in the past.  Among the notable failures are Operation Haik in Indonesia in 1958, Operation Zapata in Cuba (The Bay of Pigs) in 1961, and Operations Modular and Hooper in Angola in 1987 and 1988.  The operation in Syria may eventually fall into this category.  The destruction of the Free Syrian Army’s cohesion caused by uncooperative Islamic militant factions makes it more likely the Syria operation to train and equip will fail.  Arab states, having a myopic perspective and driven by hubris resulting from success in Libya, only saw the potential of pursuing their own interests in Syria.  They ignored the interests of other powerful states supporting Assad’s regime, such as Russia, Iran, and China.  The strong ties of those states to Syria were matched by their efforts to support it.  

Rather than simply push the US to fix the situation, Arab states could look to themselves to gain control over it.  For example, Arab states could exploit the control they have over the Islamic militant factions that comes with being their main supplier of money and arms.  The fear of retribution by Islamists and Salafists/Jihaddis at home makes this an unlikely approach for Arab governments to take.  Yet, they would need to evaluate for themselves whether they were committed enough to the success in Syria to that degree.  Arab states could support, even propose, a Western-sponsored purge of Jabhat Al-Nusra and similar Salafist/Jihaddis in the Free Syrian Army.  To bolster that effort, Arab states could quietly provide granular information about the Islamic militant factions they possess.  They would be required to stand aside whenever direction might be taken.  Yet, their full support would be needed to strengthen remaining mainstream groups in the Free Syrian Army.  Arab states could commit their intelligence services and unconventional warfare units to aiding and advising the Free Syrian Army on the ground in Syria.  Just as Qatar had its unconventional warfare units in Syria seeking Free Syrian Army units to support, they could work to police the lines between disputing groups and factions, use techniques to create unit cohesion and cooperation.  They could also support Free Syrian Army operations by instructing unit commanders and senior leaders in maneuver tactics and unconventional warfare.  When necessary, they could fight alongside the Free Syrian Army against Assad’s forces and allies.

These options are among some that may reverse the downward trend for the Free Syrian Army.  Yet, again, there is no guarantee on their effectiveness.  Something must be done.  if no decision is taken, perhaps the Saudi king should keep asking President Obama about his commitment to the Syrian opposition.  Eventually he may hear a different answer.  It will be the very one the king knows he should hear.

Opposition in Syria Continues to Fracture, Yet This May Create a New Option For Its Allies

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On July 8, 2013, the New York Times reported that in Syria, deadly clashes raged between a mainstream rebel group and a radical faction, both from the Free Syrian Army.  The fighting highlighted the difficulties associated with unifying the military leadership of the Syrian opposition to the government of President Bashar Al-Assad, and even more, having them halt the recent battlefield gains made by the Syrian Armed Forces and its allies.  The clashes also bring into question whether arming Syrian opposition forces may be a viable option at all.  This problem, as well as others facing the Free Syrian Army, troubles policy makers in the capitals of the US, EU, and Arab states who support that force.  However, as the clashes among rival Free Syrian Army units intensify, a new option for supporting the hobbled force, perhaps even more in line with the national interest of its benefactors, becomes apparent.  It may very well be the last, best hope for shaping up the Free Syrian Army and getting things going on the battlefield.

Attempting to Halt the Gains the Assad regime’s Forces

On June 22, 2013, in Doha, Qatar, the Friends of Syria, a group organized by former US Secretary of State  Hillary Clinton in 2012 to support Syria’s transition to a democratic government, vowed to increase the scope and scale of assistance to the Syrian opposition’s political wing, the Syrian National Council, and its military wing, the Supreme Military Council.  The Friends of Syria includes the US, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.  US Secretary of State John Kerry stated the Friends of Syria had also concluded that the Assad regime had crossed a red-line with its reported use of chemical weapons.  He further stated that the Assad regime had already internationalized the militarization of the conflict by allowing the involvement of Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah.  Through leaks from the US officials, it was revealed that the main plan was to ramp up Free Syrian Army combat capabilities to a level at which it could launch a concerted attack Assad’s forces and allies by August.  However, bringing the Free Syrian Army, the fighting force of the Supreme Military Council, up to snuff to engage in major combat operations, has proven very difficult. The Free Syrian Army is a loose-knit, umbrella group. The recent clashes between the rival factions are made more significant since one faction is an Islamic militant group affiliated with Al-Qaida.  US, EU and Arab state intelligence and special operations forces, already engaged in supplying the Free Syrian Army with arms, military materiel, and nonlethal supplies, have more recently been struggling to determine which are members of Islamic militant groups to prevent them from receiving sophisticated Western weapons. The presence and participation of Islamic militant groups in the Free Syrian Army raised concerns, particularly in Western capitals, at the start of the civil war.  As time has passed, those concerns have not been mitigated in the slightest way.  In fact, the worst concerns about the Islamic militants are being realized.

Islamic Militant’s Destructive Presence in the Free Syrian Army

As the June 22nd New York Times article further detailed, the Islamic militants in the opposition were members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, the new Syria based affiliate of Al-Qaida which includes the well-armed Al-Nusra Front.  In a recent episodes of the struggle include the Islamist brigade of Ahrar Al-Sham, along with Al-Nusra fighters, ejected a mainstream Free Syrian Army unit, the Farouq brigade, from town of Raqqa.  The Islamists accused the Farouq brigade of had hoarded arms and refused to go to the aid of allies during the Qusayr battle.  They also alleged that some of its members of consorting with women and drinking wine. In the most recent violent incident, in Dana, members of an extremist Islamist group were accused of beheading two rival fighters and leaving their heads beside a can near the town square. On July 1, 2013, the BBC had reported Islamic militants killed a popular Catholic priest in the convent of the town of Ghassaniya.  The priest had fled to the convent after his monastery, Saint Simon, was bombed by Islamic militants. In Aleppo and Idlib provinces, Al-Qaida affiliated Islamic militant units have been accused of trying to monopolize wheat and fuel supplies creating even greater shortages for residents..  Throughout towns and villages under Free Syrian Army control, Islamic militants have attempted to impose their strict conception of Islamic law, sometimes even carrying out summary public executions.  This has created popular resentment against them among average Syrians.  According to the New York Times, foreign fighters continue to spill into Syria through its porous borders.  .

The Global War on Terror May Be Over, But Counterterrorism Is Still a Priority

On May 23, 2013, US President Barack Obama may have stated that the open-ended global war on terror had to end.  However, that did not mean that the US has in anyway halted its attacks upon Islamic militants affiliated with Al-Qaida.  The most obvious manifestation of this are the drone strikes that attack Islamic militants in Pakistan, Yemen and wherever they may be operating.  Supporting the Free Syria Army is a “cause” based on the interests of the US to bring down to regime of Bashar Al-Assad and support the establishment of a democratic government in Syria.  Islamic militant groups fighting in Syria albeit may want to remove the Assad regime.  However, it is counterintuitive to seek those goals while arming Islamic militant groups that affiliate themselves with Al-Qaida and are bent on establishing a strict conception of sharia law in Syria.  The attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, DC happened.  The March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid occurred.  The attacks on July 7, 2005 in London took place.  The attacks on November 26, 2008 in Mumbai transpired.  There were many other terrorist attacks.  Osama Bin Laden, killed by US Navy SEALS on May 2, 2011, was determined to conduct acts of terrorism against the West and Islamic states of which he disapproved.  His organization remains engaged in that effort.  The Islamic militant groups that have clashed with mainstream Free Syrian Army units are the same forces that the world sought to destroy during the global war on terror.

Syria has become a state sized version of the town of Sinjar in Iraq. Sinjar was a location determined by the US Joint Special Operations Command to be the entry point for numerous terrorist groups coming into Iraq.  Under the order of the commander Joint Special Operations Command, then Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, Sinjar was hit hard and effectively in October 2007.  The overall Sinjar effort was said by General David Petraeus, to have done more to halt the terror networks that flowed foreign fighters and suicide bombers into Iraq than any other operation.  With the help of mainstream Free Syrian Army units, US, EU, and Arab state intelligence and unconventional warfare units could defeat Islamic militant groups in Syria and remove them from the ranks of the opposition forces.  Once the Islamic militant hold in Syria and connection to the Free Syrian Army was eliminated, intelligence and special operations forces would have greater opportunities to do other things with the Syrian opposition.

Exploiting the Opportunity Presented

The Central Intelligence Agency and US Special Operations Forces are said to be already working on matters concerning the Free Syrian Army.  The Los Angeles Times reported that operatives of both the Central Intelligence Agency and US Special Operations Forces have organized a secret training program for Free Syrian Army fighters with anti-tank and antiaircraft weapons since November 2012.  Iterations of the training are two-week courses conducted by US as well as Jordanian and French operatives. It  includes training with Russian-designed 14.5-millimeter antitank rifles, anti-tank missiles and 23-millimeter antiaircraft weapons.  Teams of US Special Operations Forces selected the trainees over the last year when the US military set up regional supply lines into Syria to provide the rebels with nonlethal assistance, including uniforms, radios and medical aid.  About 20 to 45 fighters are trained at a time.  Between 80 and 100 Free Syrian Army fighters from all over Syria went through the courses in May 2013 alone.  At the time the Los Angeles Times article was printed, about 100 rebels from Daraa had attended four courses, and rebels from Damascus, the Syrian capital had attended three.  While engaged in training activities, Central Intelligence Agency officers would sit and interview trainees during breaks from sessions, and afterward they would try to collect specific information on the situation in Syria based on intelligence requirements.  The Central Intelligence Agency is also engaged in an effort to eliminate the risk that more sophisticated weapons, such as man-portable, air defense systems (MANPADS), which are shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, would be given to Islamic militant groups.  It has put in place what officials have described as an “elaborate” vetting procedure for the Free Syrian Army fighters they train.  To accelerate the effort, the Central Intelligence Agency is said to be considering placing some units of US Special Operations Forces under its authority for the additional purpose of conducting some of the training. The Central Intelligence Agency is reportedly engaged in joint efforts with unconventional warfare units from Jordan and the United Arab Emirates to enhance the training effort.

To support mainstream groups of the Free Syrian Army, the Central Intelligence Agency and US Special Operations Forces could possible work under a plan that might include some of the following steps.  To begin, the Central Intelligence Agency would need to increase its intelligence collection resources in Syria.  Working with locals and insurgents to collect required intelligence concerning an opponent to be utilized in the development of an operational plan would be the standard operating procedure for Central Intelligence Agency operatives and Us Special Operations Forces.  However, having established very positive links with mainstream Free Syrian Army commanders and fighters, the process of gathering information about Islamic militants within the force would be made less complicated.  When necessary, Central Intelligence Agency operatives and special operations forces, with Free Syrian Army commanders at their side, could quietly interview locals to gain granular information on the Islamic militant groups including the size of specific units, the locations of its fighters, the backgrounds of individual fighters and commanders, unit capabilities, and its combat and nonlethal resources.  Islamic groups that seek to work with mainstream groups would be identified and an effort would be made by the Central Intelligence Agency to establish a rapport with them.  An effort would eventually be made to support those groups and place them under the leadership of the Free Syrian Army.  Islamic militant groups hostile to the concept and intent of the Syrian opposition and the Friends of Syrian, and identified as having attacked mainstream Free Syrian Army fighters, would be identified and targeted.  Special reconnaissance and electronic surveillance means would be used to monitor the locations, daily movements, and activities of the hostile Islamic militant groups.  Leaders, arms, supply lines and depots, and financial support would be targeted. All entry points of Islamic militants should be identified and placed under special reconnaissance and electronic surveillance. Penetrating the Islamic militant groups would unlikely be helpful and would place any assets engaged in that effort at risk once direct action is taken against those groups.  The Central Intelligence Agency could request to have its efforts, and those of US Special Operation Forces, supported by allied intelligence and unconventional warfare units.  A plan would be developed to conduct Free Syrian Army operations without the targeted Islamic militant groups.  Sufficient numbers of mainstream fighters must be trained, equipped and fielded to cover any gaps created by the Islamic militant groups that would be removed from Free Syrian Army controlled territory.  At that time, the Central Intelligence Agency could also engage in a rapid and robust training and equipping of the Free Syrian Army.

Assessment

New voices in the Obama administration at the White House and at the UN, viewing Syria as a humanitarian crisis worthy of some type of intervention, likely have the ear of the president.  As a result, the Central Intelligence Agency may very likely be pushed harder to work with allies and special operations forces to train and equip the Free Syrian Army as it is currently organized.  Currently, the Free Syrian Army lacks the ability to achieve success against the rejuvenated Syrian Armed Forces with its allies. There is no real cohesion within the organization.  Rivalries and divisions are more apparent.  While some type of modus vivendi may have been established among a few units of rival factions in close contact with Assad’s forces, those contacts cannot serve as the foundation of a unified fighting force.  The Assad regime, on the other hand, has very powerful allies ready to support it with money and weapons, as well as fight alongside his forces. Under the most favorable assessment, the Free Syrian Army capabilities cannot be ramped up, and the force cannot fight in concert in a size and strength great enough, in any short period of time, to confront Assad’s forces.   Doing anything too substantial with high-tech or heavy weapons shipments to the Free Syrian Army at this point would be reckless.

Supporting Islamic militants who attack mainstream Free Syrian Army fighters is not in the interest of the US or any of the “Friends of Syria.”  Creating a viable fighting force from the Free Syrian Army as it currently exists with rivalries and clashes will be impossible.  Clashes between the mainstream groups and the Islamic militants are intensifying.  The Free Syrian Army, even if lucky enough under some scenario to defeat Assad’s forces, would not be able to play a role in creating a secure and sustainable peace in Syria because its deep divisions.  As long as Islamic militants continue to pour into Syria, their numbers and capabilities will reach a point where the mainstream forces would no longer be able to contend with them.  It is clear that the more powerful Islamic militant groups as the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham, the new Syria based affiliate of Al-Qaida which includes the well-armed Al-Nusra Front, are not directed toward a transition in Syria to a democratic form of government.  Only by intervening covertly on the side of mainstream elements against Islamic militant groups adverse to the efforts of government transition supported by the Friends of Syria would the Free Syrian Army have a remote chance of being positioned to defeat Assad’s forces.  Supporting the mainstream groups and eliminating undesirable factions would be a clear demonstration of the Friends of Syria’s continued support for positive change in Syria.  Providing this “helping hand” would prove the organization to be a reliable ally of the Syrian opposition and its original goals.  With the Free Syrian Army facing the possibility of folding under the weight of these clashes, and civilian deaths now exceeding 100,000 as a result of the conflict, time is of the essence.  A decision must be made.  Assad has no reason to negotiate terms with an opposition he could easily defeat.  He may believe the force will soon collapse on its own.  The option presented here is the best option to take if supporting and utilizing the Free Syrian Army remains the goal of the US, EU, and Arab states.

Note: This post is intended as a “think piece” containing observations, ruminations, and reflections for the consideration of greatcharlie.com readers.  It is not intended as an endorsement of, or the presentation of a plan for, US and allied covert action against elements of the Free Syrian Army.

The President-elect of Iran Says He Will Engage the West, But Don’t Think He Will Just Give in to Its Demands

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The New York Times reported on June 30th that Iran’s president-elect Hassan Rouhani said he will engage the West and appeal for more moderation in Iran’s foreign policy.  His statement supports the initial sense in the West following his June 14th election victory that a comprehensive compromise could be reached between the US and Iran.  However, it appears instead that US-Iran relations are headed into a dangerous and difficult period over Syria.  Iran has placed its troops in Syria and has supported Hezbollah’s operations there.  The US, EU, and Arab states have pledged to counter Iran’s presence in Syria by arming the Syrian opposition forces.  Actions by US sponsored Syrian opposition forces or any direct military action against Syria by the US, EU, and Arab states have often “subtly,” and occasionally strongly. threatened, may harm those Iranian troops. As the situation grows worse, the administration of US President Barack Obama’s chances diminish for engaging in talks with Iran’s new president to create outcomes consistent with its goals on the Iranian nuclear issue, Iran’s support of Hezbollah, security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan, or human rights issues.

As the member of greatcharlie.com who went into Iran during the period of Hassan Rouhani’s tenure as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and met with members of that organization, my colleagues urged me to weigh-in with a few insights on how Hassan Rouhani may perceive events occurring in Syria.  Profound predictions on Rouhani’s decision making will not be presented here.  Instead, some reflections are offered on Rouhani’s background that may help shed light on his thinking on the Syrian issue.

The most immediate insight that comes to mind is that Rouhani, and his advisers, will not take office with a mind to acquiesce to the wishes of foreign powers.  He and his colleagues view themselves first and foremost as Iranian patriots.  That does not mean he has a militarized worldview, as some analysts have said of Ayatollah Ali Khamanei, the supreme leader of Iran, or that his decisions will be reactionary, colored by revolutionary zeal.  As the June 30th, New York Times report confirms, Rouhani is astute enough to know he must engage with the West on a variety of issues in a pragmatic way.  He undoubtedly recognizes the dangers in doing so.  Looking at world from Tehran, it unlikely appears to Rouhani that the US government is trying to do much good for its opponents.  It would therefore be unlikely that the US would be willing to do to much for Iran.  Examples of “difficulties” opponents have faced include: the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime (albeit a sworn enemy of Iran) with Operation Iraqi Freedom as a result of a “mistaken” WMD claim; the unseemly killing of Colonel Muamar el-Qaddafi and the demise of his Libyan regime through NATO and Arab state support of rebels with Operation Unified Protector while Quaddafi was seeking ways, albeit awkwardly, to approach the West. Presently in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad is being asked, diplomatically, to negotiate the removal of his own regime even though Assad has indicated that he was to remain in power until 2014 elections.  His regimes’s removal will result in the elimination of Iran’s closest Middle East ally, and Iran would stand alone.  Indeed, Rouhani may sense that there is little hope that acting in concert with the US on Syria will lead to some beneficial outcome for Iran.

Further, Rouhani also very likely recalls that while he was secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, overtures to the US made by President Seyed Mohammad Khatami were rebuffed.  Those overtures included placing Iran’s nuclear energy program on the table for negotiation and proposing the creation of a nuclear free zone in the Middle East.  Then of course, there were statements calling Iran part of an “Axis of Evil” and threats of regime change, which likely left scar tissue on Rouhani.  Note that it was also during Rouhani’s tenure that Iranian rocket forces received a tremendous boost in capability with Russian support. Iran placed a satellite into orbit.  Iran was then reaching the point where it could launch a Shahab rocket armed with a conventional warhead as far as Paris, France.  It was Rouhani’s discussions in Moscow that eventually led to the Russian government’s statement that unless there was evidence of a military program, Iran was free to pursue a peaceful nuclear program.

Thinking on military affairs on the Supreme National Security Council, at the time of Rouhani’s tenure as secretary, was influenced by two conflicts, the Imposed War, (Iran-Iraq War) 1980-1988 and the Bosnian War, 1992-1995.  During the Imposed War, Iran’s military, crippled by sanctions that starved it of needed spare parts and upgrades, demonstrated its dedication to Holy Defense through astonishing sacrifices on the battlefield.  In Bosnia, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and other Iranian security elements such as the Quds Force and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security operated successfully and demonstrated Iran’s ability to project force away from its territory in support of its interests and work in concert with allies to airlift of arms supplies to its allies. In Syria, Iran has again projected significant force in support of an ally and its interests.  While the US, EU, and Arab states debated and hesitated on Syria from 2011 to 2013, Iran, as well as Russia, and Hezbollah, stole a march on them by providing both arms and nonlethal support of significant quality and quantity to the Assad regime which had been sanctioned and was coping with an arms embargo.  The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, Quds Force, and Ministry of Intelligence and Security personnel also went into Syria in large numbers.  It is very likely that the Bosnia experience has served to guide the current Iranian approach to Syria, and would continue to do so under Rouhani’s leadership.  Interestingly, Russian support of the Assad regime and its allies, has made Iran’s approach more viable than it would have been if Iran had acted unilaterally.  Together, Russia, Iran, and China have provided the Assad regime with over $500 million in aid.

With Iran “all in” on Syria, it will do whatever necessary to win.  If Rouhani is called upon to lead Iran to victory, he will not shy away from the task.  Rouhani’s hard-line predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, bequeathed a tense situation to his successor. Ahmadinejad’s tenure as president was marked by his extreme rhetoric concerning Iran’s nuclear program, Iraq, Afghanistan, and what many believed was Iran’s sponsorship of assassination plots worldwide.  His comments concerning Israel’s right to exist and claims that the Nazi Holocaust never occurred established him worldwide as something akin to the Paula Deen of the Iranian political leadership.  All of this was compounded by his administration’s violent crackdown political dissenters and protesters following Iran’s 2009 presidential election.

Rouhani is not being subjected to demonization by critics in Washington, Europe, and the Middle East.  Nevertheless, the continued specious portrayal of him as an Iranian leader absolutely willing to compromise on Iranian security and its right to pursue a nuclear program will not serve him well politically.  As the situation in Syria continues to ratchet up, Rouhani may need to take a hard line once in office to defeat the perception that he is too soft on the West.  That would make taking small forward steps and confidence building measures, the preferred way for the Obama administration to proceed with the incoming Iranian president, all the more difficult and less effective.  Yet, perhaps hope can be drawn from the coda of found in the statement of US Secretary of State John Kerry following the Friends of Syria meeting in Doha, Qatar.  Kerry after explaining the group vowed to end the imbalance on the ground in Syria, indicated that there was a desire to find a political settlement on Syria.  It just may be that the key to putting a new relationship Rouhani and Iran on the right track is to find a secure and sustainable peace in Syria.  There is still time for another strong push for peace.  Rouhani does not take office until August 3rd.