The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)

“Official” company photo of veteran Wagner Group troops in Ukraine (above). Was their rebellion about their well-being, the war’s management, or something deeper? The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only neeed to be the possibility for their wishes to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

This post should be considered a continuation of the preceding one

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refer to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

In a photo released by Prigozhin’s Press Service, the Wagner Group owner is seen recording one of several video addresses in Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

The Wagner Group Rebellion

As things moved, on the morning of June 23, 2023, Prigozhin alleged Russian Federation forces had launched a fire mission on Wagner Group troops in Ukraine causing considerable casualties. Prigozhin announced he had launched an armed effort with his Wagner Group to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Wagner Group troops crossed from Ukraine into Russia and entered Rostov, meeting no resistance by border guards. Just after 12:00AM on June 23, 2023, it was reported in the newsmedia that the FSB issued a warrant for Prigozhin’s arrest. 

About 8 hours after that, morning newsmedia reports showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin posts a public announcement by video on Telegram from the captured base to report events. Prigozhin stated: “We are inside the [Russian Army] headquarters, it is 7:30AM. Military sites in Rostov, including an aerodrome, are under control. Prigozhin then issued what amounted to warning and intriguingly foreshadowing certain events by saying: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.” Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee. About 2 hours after that, Putin made a national address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 6 hours after that, Prigozhin is seen in a video widely broadcasted and posted online, discussing a deal to halt the rebellion and withdraw. On the heels of that, reports from the newsmedia indicated that Belarus President, Lukashenko, brokered the deal between the Kremlin and Prigozhin to end the “mutiny”. Wagner Group troops who participated in the rebellion would not be prosecuted, while those who did not join–presumably only those operating in Ukraine and not referring at all to those operating in African countries, in Syria, or elsewhere–would be offered contracts by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would leave the Russian Federation and remain in Belarus. Prigozhin ordered his troops back to their field camps in Ukraine. About 3 hours after that, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had completely withdrawn from Rostov-on-Don. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. In Rostov-on-Don, crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on.

About 48 hours after that, Putin made a late evening address broadcasted and posted online by the Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia concerning the rebellion in which he provided “more detail” regarding his decisionmaking and the “bigger picture.” About 12 hours after that, at an afternoon event held with much fanfare at the Kremlin’s Cathedral Square with some 2,500 members of the military, the security forces, and the National Guard in attendance, Putin expresses his appreciation for the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. Lukashenko’s role did not receive mention on that occasion. He expresses sorrow and praise for the Russian Federation aircrews that lost their lives confronting the “mutineers.” About 2 hours after that, Putin in a smaller setting indoors, again addressed Defense Ministry, National Guard, FSB, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service units who reportedly “ensured law and order during the mutiny.” Putin again thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 48 hours later, in the evening in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan in the Russian Federation, after the totality of the weekend’s events had a chance to settle well in the minds of the Russian people, Putin is shown in a video widely broadcasted in the country’s state-run and independent newsmedia greeting a very excited, sizable cheering crowd. The sense of genuine joy on his face upon engaging with the cheering Russian Federation citizens was most apparent.

Wagner Group troops in a company truck travel from the chaos of the frontlines to the serenity of Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. On the morning of June 24, 2023, newsmedia reports across the Russian Federation showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don, 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation Armed Forces, which was directing a considerable element of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee.

Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

Surely there were relatively significant attendant events in between the key events that occurred within the 24-hour news cycle. For example, the FSB seized the Wagner Group Headquarters. The Russian Federation military without fanfare established a protective posture in the southern portion of Moscow. The commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, who was once the overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine, addressed the rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. The first deputy chief of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev appealed to rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. Shoigu and Gerasimov vanished from public view during the entire period. Perhaps the most chilling moment during the rebellion was when Wagner Group troops actually advanced just 200 kilometers (120 miles) from Moscow, according to Prigozhin. A column Wagner Group troops that reportedly included mounted tanks, armored vehicles, at least one self-propelled rocket launcher and numerous personnel trucks. had reached the Lipetsk province, about 360 kilometers (225 miles) south of Moscow. The downing of six Russian Army helicopters occurred while that column was en route to Moscow and the shoot-down of a Russian Air Force surveillance plane at some point. Surely, under the circumstances, the Russian people were hungry for information on events. The beginning of the day when Prigozhin was seen and when Putin made the first of his appearances during the episode, end of the day, when Putin made second appearance are times when the majority of the Russian people receive their news. Those moments turned out to be main events that did much to signal the direction the story was taking. Yet, the many pieces in-between as the few highlighted here also fit well within what could be characterized as the complex puzzle that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Once Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops agreed on June 24, 2023 to withdraw from Rostov-on-Don, they departed immediately. Crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and speedily returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarusian President AlexanderLukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.

The Narrative Putin Wanted the Russian People To Garner Regarding the Wagner Group Rebellion

Certainly, it never would have been considered sufficient in the eyes of the senior Kremlin officials to allow the Russian people to simply receive a well-paced flow of events on the Wagner Rebellion to decipher in many ways. State-run and independent newsmedia broadcasts did the job of letting them know events were taking place concerning the Wagner Group, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff and the special military operation. What they needed to hear and grasp about those matters would be explained to them by the ultimate source in the country, the Russian Federation President. To that extent, Putin provided four well-crafted addresses, one during and three immediately on the heels of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Given the nature of the lens through which Putin apparently views the world, considering past public addresses, interviews, decisions and actions, his concise and succinct addresses in addition to well-communicating the required facts to the Russian people, had to meet what were his specific priorities. To that extent they reflected his mindset, emotions, state-of-being, reasoning, and intentions. He did not exactly offer water-tight explanations, but there was probably scant concern among Putin and his advisers that the overwhelming majority in the targeted audience would dive too deeply into his explanations or energetically question any aspect of them. Indeed, it was likely expected in the Kremlin that for the audience in the Russian Federation, it would be enough just to have some answers on the rather unique development.

Putin’s First Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 24, 2023

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin emphasized that challenges to the government of any kind would not be tolerated. For the first time, he characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Putin, wearing a solid black suit and black pindot tie, stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.” He added: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Offering a flash of his personal outrage over the rebellion, he went on to say dramatically: “Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.” However, far from eliminating the threat based in Kyiv, the Russian Federation Armed Forces have barely held on to initial gains made since the initial weeks of the war before Ukraine was better armed. The odds of it advancing further into Ukraine now are slim to none. Prigozhin ostensibly was acting in response to what perceived were actions by Shoigu and Gerasimov that would eventually cripple the Russian Federation’s ability to defend itself. Perhaps Putin had not been listening closely to Prigozhin’s tantrums after all.

Ever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events. Putin stated: Any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people. He then said: “A blow like this was dealt to Russia in 1917, when the country was fighting in World War I. But the victory was stolen from it: intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, and the loss of vast territories, ultimately leading to the tragedy of the civil war.” One might argue that the Russian military was a spent force by 1917 and poorly led. At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. The country’s forces were resuscitated to some degree by the Spring of 1915. However, those huge initial  losses essentially knocked Russia out of World War I. As for the 1917 Revolution, it garnered support under the guise of offering the people a better existence, an alternative to penury. Misled and misguided, many followed the revolutionaries.

Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin stated: “The Armed Forces and other government agencies have received the necessary orders. Additional counterterrorism measures are now in effect in Moscow, the Moscow Region and several other regions. Resolute action will also be taken to stabilize the situation in Rostov-on-Don. It remains difficult; in effect, the work of civil and military authorities has been blocked.” These were certainly strong and comforting words for the Russian people. However, Putin’s government to that point had not been successful in handling very apparent threats to the country’s security. Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) had launched several successful drone attacks and helicopter attacks on Russian Federation targets, including on Moscow, and as aforementioned in Part 1, there had been more than one attack on Russian Federation territory by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian militant groups near the border with Ukraine. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin had to emerge unconditionally victorious.

Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Putin stated: “Any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people. Our actions to defend the Fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people.” However, Putin rather than dealing with “rebels” harshly, he directed Wagner Group troops to sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Recognizably, under that arrangement, the Wagner Group, as it once stood in Ukraine, was essentially disbanded. The organization’s troops elsewhere in the world were apparently unaffected by the ruling. Yet, the Wagner Group right before the very eyes of the Russian people were being provided ample means to avoid prosecution and all penalties.

Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Although these remarks may not appear inordinate from Putin given inflamed sentiments of the moment and the fact that under his authoritarian regime, he had established limitless for himself. However, it also could have been something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to others, “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he remarked about players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. It would seem the world has yet to see the regime’s tyranny touch bottom.

Prigozhin went unnamed directly by Putin in his first address. Yet, presumably, even though he was not mentioned, Putin’s words in this first iteration of his addresses nevertheless may have sounded harsh enough to Prigozhin. Certainly, Prigozhin is not a fragile man. However, perhaps these initial words were spoken by Putin, an individual who he clearly holds in very high esteem pinched just a little. “Enjoy the Silence” is a song by English electronic music band Depeche Mode. Recorded in 1989, it was released on their album, Violator (1990). It is pertinent here to the extent that on June 25, 2023,  Putin moved from near complete silence on the spat between Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to a veritable roar in his address to his nation. For Prigozhin, no matter what was altogether transpiring, they must have had their impact. The lyrics of the first verse are: “Words like violence / Break the silence / Come crashing in / Into my little world / Painful to me / Pierce right through me / Can’t you understand?”

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin, for the first time, characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Forever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events.Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits.

Putin’s Second Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 26, 2023

Among the top five points Putin wanted to communicate n his second address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, he wanted to assure the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized that departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters and handling them swiftly and diligently and all other parts continued to perform their functions without interruption. Putin, wearing a solid dark navy blue suit and solid dark navy blue tie, stated: “I will repeat–society and the executive and legislative branches of government at all levels displayed high consolidation. Public organizations, religious denominations, the leading political parties and actually all of Russian society held a firm line, taking an explicit position of supporting constitutional order. The main thing–responsibility for the destiny of the Fatherland–has united everyone, brought our people together.” He said further: “I will emphasize that all necessary decisions to neutralize the emerged threat and protect the constitutional system, the life and security of our citizens were made instantly, from the very beginning of the events.” These comments would be expected of Putin–or any leader in his situation–in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, if his government actually “had been on the case” as he suggests, the Wagner Group Rebellion hardly would have gotten off the ground. The conspirators, as he refers to the Wagner Group leadership, would presumably have been twinkled out and approached for questioning by the security services. 

In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Putin stated: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people. He continued: “It was exactly this outcome, fratricide, that the enemies of Russia–the neo-Nazis in Kiev, their Western patrons and other national traitors–wanted to see. They wanted Russian soldiers to kill each other; they wanted the military and civilians to die; they wanted Russia to lose eventually, and our society to break up and perish in a bloody feud.” All of this was said despite Prigozhin’s earlier expressions indicating the rebellion was an impromptu emotional reaction–originally understood to be the result of an attack on the organization’s camp in Ukraine by Russian Federation troops under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov–Putin in his address alters that narrative by explaining that it was the threat of the cudgel and not good brains that brought the matter to close. That his ever-vigilant government, particularly the work of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services–that allowed the Wagner Group to cross the border into the Russian Federation untouched–crushed the plot. One might consider that plots that are part of false flag operations tend to be the easiest plots to sort out. “Go figure!”

Adding to perceptions that the Wagner Group Rebellion was the opponent, yet at the same time paradoxically weakening the notion that there was anything too deep in the thinking of the “conspirators”, Putin emphasized the reckless nature of the conspirators’ undertaking. Putin stated: “An armed mutiny would have been suppressed in any event. Mutiny plotters, despite the loss of adequacy, were bound to realize that. They understood everything, including the fact that their actions were criminal in nature, aimed at polarizing people and weakening the country, which is currently countering an enormous external threat and unprecedented pressure from the outside. They did this at a time when our comrades are dying on the frontline with the words “Not a step back!” There was irony in this idea as the crux of Prigozhin’s ire for months was the reckless and incompetent manner in which his Wagner Group troops and Russian Federation troops had been used in the special military operation how ironic and bizarre it was for him to undertake such a monumentally reckless and hopeless action as to march on Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from power. If the lives of Russian Federation Armed Forces’ aircrews had not been reportedly lost in the near final stage of the impromptu rebellion, the whole enterprise could be chuckled at for being comical.

Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all Russian lives matter, the indication and implication being  that the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Still, he indicated that his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin stated: “We knew before and know now that the majority of Wagner Group soldiers and commanders are also Russian patriots, loyal to their people and their state. Their courage on the battlefield when liberating Donbass and Novorossiya proves this. An attempt was made to use them without their knowledge against their comrades-in-arms with whom they were fighting shoulder to shoulder for their country and its future.” He went on to explain: “That is why, as soon as these events started to unfold, in keeping with my direct instructions, steps were taken to avoid spilling blood. It required time, among other things, as those who made a mistake had to be given a chance to change their minds, to realize that their actions would be strongly rejected by society, to understand what tragic and devastating consequences for Russia, for our country the reckless attempt they had been drawn into, was leading to.” Despite the fact that Putin, by displaying restraint during the “crisis” did save Russian lives, ironically and incredulously, as a result of his special military operation, astronomical and abominable losses had been suffered by Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine over 16 months to that point in time. One might suppose the careless loss of those troops could be set down as occasional mistakes.

Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

With regard to allowing the Wagner Group troops to move to Belarus, to greatcharlie that seemed a curious decision. Belarus is hands down the Russian Federation’s closest ally. One might call the relationship Putin has established between the two countries as the most successful effort in his quest to bring the former republics of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation’s fold. Putin recently placed several nuclear warheads in storage in Belarus. To that extent, many of the erstwhile Rebel Wagner Group troops possess exquisite special operations capabilities and could pose a threat in terms of potentially capturing those warheads. One might suppose the weapons are secured so well in their new homes that a build up of the Wagner Group troops was nothing to signify. Intriguingly, one might consider that Belarus borders Ukraine and a number of NATO countries. Sending the Wagner Group troops there could have been predicted to cause considerable alarm in the capitals of those bordering countries and in NATO Headquarters. (Interestingly, it is now understood that Wagner Group troops in Belarus, far from a spent force, are providing tactical training to Belarusian troops.) Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his second address.

Among the top five points Putin communicated, he assured the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters, handling them swiftly and diligently, and all other parts continued to function without interruption. In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers, who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He claimed his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin then informed the Russian people about his somewhat remedy for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders.

Putin’s Third Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Seemingly speaking to the newsmedia’s audience, not in attendance physically, Putin, wearing a solid navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: Today, standing here on the historic Cathedral Square of the Moscow Kremlin are the service personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, soldiers and officers of the National Guard, the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Guard Service. They are the ones who, together with their comrades-in-arms, at a time of challenge for the country, threw themselves in the way of trouble which would have inevitably led to chaos. More directly addressing the assembled audience of some 2,500 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard, Putin stated: “You have defended the constitutional order, as well as the life, security and freedom of our citizens, steering our Motherland clear from upheavals and de facto stopping a civil war in its tracks. He continued: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.”

Revealing what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Putin stated: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.” Pointing to exactly what was daunting about their activities that it compelled special praise, Putin explained: “Defense Ministry units, the National Guard, officers of the Interior Ministry and special services ensured reliable operation of all critical decision-making bodies, strategic facilities, including the defense ones, ensured the security of border regions, the rear lines of our Armed Forces, of all combat units which carried on with their heroic frontline operations during that time. We did not have to withdraw any combat troops from the special military operation zone.

Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. Putin stated: “Our comrades-in-arms–pilots–lost their lives while confronting the mutineers. They held their ground and fulfilled their orders and their military duty with honor. I am asking you to observe a minute of silence in tribute to their memory.” silence.” One might say Putin was making an extra effort to get a message across here that was not so easy for the Russian people to accept from him given the events in Ukraine that Russian soldiers’ lives matter.

In his first and second addresses, Putin excoriated the Wagner Group’s leaders, going as far to say in the first address: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people.” That noisome tack was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts. Putin stated: “Your resolve and courage, along with consolidation of Russian society, played an essential and decisive role in bringing the situation back to normal. Those who were drawn into the mutiny saw that the army and the people were not with them.”

Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically. Putin stated: “The swift and well-managed deployment of defense, security and law enforcement units helped prevent the situation in the country from going down a very dangerous road and ensure that there were no civilian casualties. He then remarked: “I extend my gratitude to you and all the personnel of the Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and security services for your service, courage and valor, for your devotion to the people of Russia.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his third address.

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Among his top five point, he revealed to the Russian people what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. His noisome tack of excoriating Wagner Group leaders was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts.Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically.

Putin’s Fourth Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. He ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. The address would reach the Russian people via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. This final iteration of his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses presented almost immediately following his address in Cathedral Square.

Putin was a bit less formal in thanking those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. Putin began his address by once again expressing his thanks and appreciation for the efforts of the armed forces and security services. Putin, still wearing a navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: “You and your comrades had a special part to play in this. Special words of gratitude go to you. I want us all to understand what happened and what could have happened if you hadn’t done what you did and hadn’t fulfilled your military duty and hadn’t shown loyalty to your oath and the Russian people. As is always the case during such developments – the same thing happens every time and everywhere – armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now.”

Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. Putin stated: “As is always the case during such developments–the same thing happens every time and everywhere–armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now. He went on: “Regrettably, you had to work in difficult circumstances in order to avoid civilian casualties, because you had to work on busy motorways.” Speaking of them and their well-being so often, it would appear that a primary takeaway from the whole episode that Putin wanted the Russian people to garner was that they were always on his mind and that they were what mattered most to him. It could not be missed by any who heard any of his four addresses.

While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Putin stated: “The fact that we have losses is even more regrettable. These are, of course, combat losses. There is no other way to put it. Our comrades died defending the Fatherland. It is not an overstatement or an exaggeration. I want to stress once again that chaos in the country would have been inevitable, and the enemy would have surely taken advantage of it. He continues: “The enemy is trying to do so anyway–I will get to that a little later–but nothing is coming out of it, and, I hope, nothing will come out of it, I am even sure of that. But it is absolutely clear that they would have taken advantage of it. No one knows what would have become of the country in the end, but all the achievements that have been made during the hostilities, many of them, anyway, would have been lost. And you prevented it.” In a way, the shift in whom Putin focused on as the opponent marked the close of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the issue of primacy. For members of the Wagner Group there may have been some sense of relief having suffered his bombardment of obloquy.

What started as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly appeared to become an example of why one should elegantly limit how much one should talk if the goal is to control information. Putin laid out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Perhaps he was in a very transparent way attempting to create a greater schism between the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group by disparaging the latter. Perhaps he wanted to convince members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces that although he liked the Wagner Group troops, they were his favorites. Perhaps he was having a little too much fun with it all. Perhaps Putin was concerned some in the Russian Federation might have imagined the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group colluded on the rebellion. That would be a dangerous idea that he would urgently need to knock down.

Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Surely, it was an odd set of statements to make before a group of military officers and security service members. Gone were the days of plausible deniability for the Russian Federation government with regard to the Wagner Group’s activities worldwide. Yet, more importantly, Putin admits plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord–discussed in some detail in Part 1, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot one day further. These were surely sensitive matters that Putin’s audience of individuals who had successfully moved up in their careers by avoiding did not want to hear or be involved with, especially since it concerned the highest realms of politics in the country. Putin, nevertheless, gave them the details, and likely measured their uneasiness in the process.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About his Wagner Group, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. To be certain, greatcharlie would not attempt to cast aspersions on anyone concerning who among the powerful in the Russian Federation might have been profiting from government payments to Concord or Voentorg. The better prosecutors and litigators in Western courts would surely light on Putin’s statement: “The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address.

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. Among his top five points, he ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter” Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Then Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. While clearly putting Prigozhin in the spotlight, Putin never mentioned his dear friend’s name.

The Wagner Group Rebellion: A Staged Crisis?

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Happy is the one who is able to know the causes of things.) To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in the whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions, many hardly thought through, were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that the Putin regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories, Hopefully it was done due to some internal collective cognition imperative, but possibly under official external influence. Remarkably, it was the same picture of Putin presented by national capitals and many mainstream media outlets of their respective countries that for years have defamed him as some awkward, insecure leader, a throwback from another era. Currently, the perception in the West and much of the world is that the Wagner Group Rebellion marked the beginning of the end for Putin. All of greatcharlie’s instincts are against such an explanation. 

Putin’s Priorities

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Everyone who was able in Rostov-on-Don took a photo with their Wagner Group “occupiers”. To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in a whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that Putin’s regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports from other newsmedia houses seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories.

To discerning eyes, the Wagner Group Rebellion actually had the appearance of a “controlled crash” creating the simulacrum of change without any real change at all. The situation was never so difficult that it had the potential to capsize the regime. Despite predictions have been voiced by those less than clairvoyant on Putin’s downfall, he still sits in the Senate Building of the Kremlin. His government was never genuinely in peril, neither was his person. Putin, himself, was hardly tested. In its June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, greatcharlie suggested observers might expect some recherché, outside the box move by Putin in the midst of everything. The wily and for the most part intuitive Russian Federation President might very well have demonstrated that he has.more than a few tricks to pull from his sleeve. 

Putin is first and foremost the steward of the Russian Federation. However, before Putin could begin to address vicissitudes besetting his country, first and foremost he had to stabilize his own position. That was in greatcharlie’s view the main purpose of this giant artifice perform on the international stage. Often mentioned when suggesting one first ensure their own safety and stability before helping others is the pre-flight safety directions–briefing–given by flight attendants. Among those given is, “In the case of a change in cabin pressure, be sure to place the resulting oxygen mask over your own face first before assisting anyone else, even your own children.” Surely, this runs counter to the “3M principle” of “mission, men me” for military leaders. In order of priority the mission must be the focus of efforts and all must be done to accomplish it. The well-being of one’s soldiers must be kept in mind. They must not be wasted and use them in a way to exploit their optimal effectiveness. Lastly, a leader must consider his or her well-being having covered the essentials, two other priorities. However, a leader must not carelessly place them in mortal danger knowing his or her role is to think through and direct the actions of troops to achieve the objective. (It would be interesting if Putin, having made several flights over the years, found such directions instructive. Perhaps his detractors would insist that for him self-interest has always been his priority and he would only be compelled to act by it.)

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023. During the latter, Putin was able to have a true connection with the people. The tide has begun to come back in and the waters have risen again. Soon enough skewed perspectives expressed of Putin somehow losing ground politically in the Russian Federation following the Wagner Group Rebellion will most likely disintegrate in the face of reality. Certainly, this is a hard saying for some to hear. Hopefully, polls will be conducted on the public response to the Wagner Group Rebellion by independent research groups in the Russian Federation such as the Levada Center, The Chronicle, and The Russian Field that may shed light with regard to any boom in support for Putin.

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023.

For those unfamiliar, Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of the Russian Federation’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it. Putin also served as Sekretar’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser for Yeltsin. A long-time intelligence operator and intelligence manager such as Putin knows many a dodge. To that extent, it would not be too far off to suggest if Putin has actually taken the course suggested by greatcharlie here would fall under the category of maskirovka. 

The Russian term maskirovka or masking originally had military pertinence as it regarded the use of camouflage. However, maskirovka eventually expanded in meaning to concerning battlefield masking through the utilization of smoke and other screening methods. The meaning would evolve further as a reference to the utilization of military deception against an opponent, and expand from there refer to full-scale denial and deception operations. Maskirovka would transcend military operations to refer to the use of a clever gimmick to create ambiguity and uncertainty and to give Russian Federation’s foreign and national security policy actors the freedom of action to achieve their country’s objectives in the diplomatic economic arenas. Further, maskirovka has been used to create a picture of events in the Russian Federation for the outside world.. As it appears to greatcharlie, what transpired from June 23, 2023 to June 26, 2023 resembled maskirovka, and perhaps a bit more than that. One thing for certain, the plan laid out under greatcharlie’s supposition, could not be allowed to fail. Putin’s reputation, his world, his future, hung in the balance. Part 1: The Tragedy of Birlstone in The Valley of Fear, Arthur Conan Doyle’s fourth and final Sherlock Holmes novel published by George H. Doran Company in New York in 1915, the esteemed author has Holmes in Chapter 1, The Warning deliver a notable quote, quite apposite to readers who have grasped what is being suggested about Putin’s actions here. Holmes explains: “Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius.”

Naysayers might point out that events turned out the way they did by happenstance and there was hardly any orchestration of them behind the scenes. If one might choose to stand firm on the idea that the Wagner Group Rebellion was an authentic expression of outrage by the organization and nothing more, greatcharlie says to them that the unlikely must never be confused with the impossible, and would suggest they take a second look. Once reviewed in light of the artifice hypothesized by greatcharlie, but not coloring them with its theory, events of the Wagner Group Rebellion take on greater meaning and quite on their own appropriately to fall into place. To that extent, they arouse suspicion.

For instance, it is interesting how the whole Wagner Group Rebellion went off so relatively cleanly. A starting point for examining that angle would be the Wagner Group’s marshaling of resources on the Russian Federation’s border with Ukraine for some time prior to the start of the rebellion. Reports in the Western newsmedia state the even US intelligence Community managed to collect information indicating that Prigozhin had been assembling his forces near the border with Russia over a period of time. Yet, there was no interference with the Wagner Group’s build up by the Russian Federation government. The Russian Federation Armed Forces, and the FSB, did not take serious interest in or move a jot to reign in the Wagner Group before anything got off the ground, This was the case even though there was concern over all activities on the border given the actions of pro-Ukraine, anti-Putin, ethnic-Russian militias and cross border incursions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The entire event unfolded right before the very eyes of the government. The build up on the border in preparation for the rebellion was surely out of sync with Prigozhin’s claim that the Wagner Group’s Rebellion was in response to an attack on his camps in Ukraine on June 23, 2023 by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Ibit, ibit eo quo vis qui zonam perdidit. (The one who has lost his money belt will go where you wish.) It remains fascinating to greatcharlie is that the Wagner Group troops were still receiving remuneration during their rebellious eastward march. What persistently nags at greatcharlie is how Prigozhin was allowed access to his financial assets to pay them. If the Wagner Group’s financial assets had been frozen by order of the Kremlin, Prigozhin would have found himself in a pickle with those rough men. He had to be able to pay them as guaranteed. 

During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don, were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and made certain all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord –Prigozhin’s billion dollar catering firm discussed in Part 1–has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

The troops of the Wagner Group are not international freedom fighters and revolutionary mercenaries in the mold of the 19th century Italian patriot and soldier Giuseppe Garibaldi (July 4, 1807 to June 2, 1882). They are driven by money not a desire to save the world. During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don. They were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord, which is the billion dollar catering firm owned by Prigozhin–discussed in Part 1, has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

Difficult to understand also is how the Wagner Group, which Prigozhin regularly complained was left short of resources by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, was apparently swimming in such an abundance of petroleum and oil lubricants that it could ostensibly squander those resources to move a number of the organization’s tanks and other vehicles east. 

It is hard to see how Wagner Group troops would have been able to appropriately resupply themselves if they would have become engaged with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services in Moscow even under the most favorable terms for them. If they failed to immediately seize their objective in Moscow, they eventually would have run out of steam and would have had to surrender or fight to the bitter end. Thereby, it would seem that upon all else that was inordinate about their rebellion, one is asked to believe that the Wagner Group troops, individuals who joined the organization to earn money, were knowingly participating in a kamikaze-style action. In a burst of complete illogic during his initial video address from Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin curiously uttered: “After we finish what we started, we will return to the front to defend our Motherland.” That was a moment when Prigozhin was either frighteningly detached from reality or being facetious, adding one more over-the-top absurdity to the hoax that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Reportedly, Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched by Putin. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Russian Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarus President,, Lukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.. Conveniently, Lukashenko was able to put all else aside that weekend and immerse himself in the matter.

Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB (above). Bortnikov sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no initial indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were all but branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Interestingly, only at a late hour during “the crisis” was a very visible effort made in Moscow to prepare for a visit of the Wagner Group by erecting checkpoints with armored vehicles and by positioning troops on the city’s southern edge. About 3,000 Chechen troops were reportedly pulled from fighting in Ukraine and rushed to Moscow on Saturday morning. State television in Chechnya reported that Russian Federation troops armed with machine guns had established checkpoints on Moscow’s southern outskirts, and engineers had dug up sections of highways to slow the Wagner Group’s advance.

The Chechen troops are under the control of Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov, mufti of Chechnya and a colonel general in the Russian Federation Armed Force.the, who publicly condemned the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is interesting how the Chechens, in considerable numbers, arrived in Moscow so much faster than the Wagner Group. Perhaps they used a faster route from Ukraine or special vehicles. What would be truly difficult for greatcharlie to accept is that the Chechens sped past the “rebellious” Wagner Group troops on the same road to Moscow. If there was a quicker route from Ukraine to Moscow which the Chechens were able to take advantage of, it is difficult to see why the Wagner Group, supposedly in a rush to get to Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from their respective posts, conspicuously chose not to travel on it.

The Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin declared Monday, June 26, 2023 a non-working day for most residents as part of the heightened security. Curiously, the declaration, a now seemingly superfluous measure, was allowed to remain in effect even after the total withdrawal of Wagner Group troops was completed. All in all though, there was no significant alteration in the federal government’s course. Certainly, there was an atmosphere–stimmung–in the Russian Federation of everything being under control despite what was visible. Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end )

If one were to take a second look at Putin’s four Wagner Rebellion addresses, as noted earlier, in each address one would discern how he laid out the narrative on events he wanted the Russian people to take from the whole show. Yet, in the context of the suggested artifice, it would have been of the utmost importance for Putin to provide all of the insights the Russian people would need to ruminate upon his handling of on the Wagner Group Rebellion or to exchange in their own discussions with family, friends, classmates, and colleagues on the crisis. In each well-crafted, concise address, each given at what were very likely predetermined points in time, there appeared to be specific issues that Putin wanted to reveal in digestible pieces to the Russian people. For the most part–at least until the fourth address, there was nothing so outré or too complex spoken by him that might have acted as a distraction. To that extent, this aspect of the suggested artifice could be characterized as a preconcerted, well-organized information campaign, carried out predominantly by the Russian Federation’s “Communicator-in-Chief.”

With further regard to his four Wagner Group Rebellion addresses, one might discern that Putin seemed to take pains to ensure his punches at Prigozhin were very heavy even without mentioning his name. Perhaps it was a reflection of his known penchant for engaging in acidulous humor with close associates. He doubtlessly was aware that all of the bombastic rhetoric concerning Prigozhin would definitely reach the ears of his dear friend and other close associates filled in on the artifice. When the words of Putin’s fourth address captured Prigozhin’s attention, as aforementioned, he had no reason to be cheerful, but in the end the Wagner Group owner assumedly would have smiled and would have shaken his head in response to the very noisy overkill, fully understanding that Putin needed to do what he did, needed to say what he said, in accord with the aims of the artifice suggested by greatcharlie here. The greater cause was firming up public opinion about Putin’s presidency, his leadership. Prigozhin would fully recognize and accept that what is best for Putin is best for the Russian Federation and that would surely include himself as a citizen and an ultra-loyal subordinate. Perchance there would even be a considerable reward not too far down the road for his fealty.

Fascinatingly, based upon depictions in both detective fiction and spy fiction literature and film, Putin appears to mimic, mutatis mutandis, an assassin’s method of leaving three to five suicide notes to ensure the victim’s death would be accepted as suicide and not his or her murderous handiwork. Perhaps some might be willing to agree, may be with some reservations, that Putin gave all four addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion with an underlying, surreptitious purpose of furnishing a false clue. The notion may not be too way out.

It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes for use in plain sight, troop movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia. While the news cycle everywhere is 24-hours, it seemed the most important announcements were issued to best serve morning and evening newsmedia readers, listeners, and viewers. Enough time was allowed to lapse between almost everything released for the state-run newsmedia to process and parrot the Kremlin’s well-curated narrative of events and the domestic audience to absorb. That absorption rate would likely have been calculated by Kremlin public information specialists who would have been deeply immersed in the project. Enough time would also be allowed to lapse from one event to the other to convince the independent newsmedia to draw “the right conclusions” and publish surprisingly similar accounts of what was occurring and so on. The whole show was likely set up to transpire on a weekend which meant businesses did not have to be concerned over their weekday commerce being interfered with, and the Russian people generally would be better able to follow events  on what for most were days of leisure, off from work and days for associating with family and friends, and visiting dachas.

The Wagner Group troops rapidly loading up a tank in order to ride out of Rostov-on-Don (above). It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes, movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia.

The Degree to which Wagner Group Troops Were Likely Aware of the Supposed Artifice

If this scenario staked here was at all possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

It would be enough for the Wagner Group troops to follow orders to the letter as they have always done and were paid to do. To that extent, this may account for the downing of six Russian Army helicopters and an electronic warfare plane by Wagner Group troops on their march to Moscow. Those in the Russian Federation Armed Forces who sent the Russian Army helicopters would also unlikely have been aware of what was transpiring. Those aircrews that encountered the Wagner Group could not have known everything was staged and how surprising and threatening their arrival on the scene would be to the Wagner Group troops. The Wagner Group’s, no matter what they may have been told about how “safe” everything would be, were way out on a limb and necessarily quite tense and on the alert, ready to deal with any immediate danger. Prigozhin, negotiating at the time in Rostov-on-Don to end the rebellion, likely had less knowledge of his troops’ actions way up front. Perhaps he was informed about it all after the fact just as everyone else. Still, one might recall what Prigozhin specifically stated on the first video he posted from Rostov-on-Don: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads.

Far be it for greatcharlie to make light of, or denigrate the loss of a soldier in defense of his or her homeland, but it posits that while unlikely, it is possible the helicopters shot down over the Russian Federation during the rebellion were already counted among those lost in the Ukraine fight. One might imagine that far beyond morbid curiosity and within the farthest range of their respective investigative capabilities–seeing how close lipped the Russian Federation Armed Forces are about losses during the Ukraine War or any conflict for that matter and how records of its casualties reported usually appear so out of sync–journalists and military and intelligence analysts may have already examined whether those helicopters and aircrews lost battling the Wagner Group were not already listed as lost during the Ukraine War and may have kept their discoveries confidential. (If there have been funerals for the airmen lost in late June 2023 and an error can be proved upon greatcharlie, it asks the respective families of the fallen for their forgiveness.)

Intriguingly, the Wagner Group doubly proved the concept, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already proven, that the Russian Air Force against a modern force has little to no ability to ensure the survivability of its aircraft and its aircrews. That has not been the only deficiency of the Russian Air Force. Another of many of considerable interest to greatcharlie is that both on the frontlines in Ukraine and during the Wagner Group Rebellion, the indications and implications are that the Russian Air Force planners and air operations officers have given up on, are completely distant to, or positively unaware of the airpower concept of high altitude bombing by strategic air assets to support tactical movements on the ground. That would put the Russian Air Force just short of 80 years behind the times. To that extent, one might consider how easy it should have been for competent air commanders and planners to utilize Russian Federation strategic air assets and tactical air assets to turn the route that the Wagner Group troops were traveling on toward Moscow into a “highway of death”. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops rolled on as if they had little to fear from such a threat. Readers might cast their minds back to an incident in Syria in which Wagner Group troops decided to clash with US Special Forces soldiers. The US Special Forces soldiers called in airpower to lend some support. Things did not turn well at all for the Wagner Group that day.

As aforementioned in Part 1, the Wagner Group employs a semi-international group of fighters. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. One might imagine that of the three main Wagner units, the Rusich unit led the drive eastward. Unless Russian Federation citizenship has quietly become a requirement for or privilege of Wagner Group employment, it would seem legally questionable to charge the international fighters with treason. Other criminal charges might have better fit. The Kremlin officials would know that. Putin would know that.

Even as he lent support to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s move to subordinate all militias serving in Ukraine on its side, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk Putin implied that much of Prigozhin’s criticism of the army had been correct–recognized even in the mainstream US newsmedia as a possible sign Wagner had yet to entirely lose his support. Putin stated: “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly,” He continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

If the artifice suggested by greatcharlie might have at all been possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

Prigozhin Mansion Raid

As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia, posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. One photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed Forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

Prigozhin in many disguises (above). As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia,  posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. A photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

It would appear that despite the importance of matters concerning Prigozhin–after all, according to the Western newsmedia, he led a paramilitary rebellion that knocked the Kremlin back on its heels and accelerated the Putin regime’s downward spiral–the Russian Federation security services and law enforcement organizations in particular failed to keep eye on the mansion. The indications and implications of the heavy use of manpower are that there is such a paucity of technological resources available that Prigozhin and whatever entourage of security that would likely be traveling with him could not be detected. It is very likely that trained K-9s–search dogs–have been utilized to more stealthily locate anyone present in the mansion instead of a police special weapons and tactical teams who observably in the video recording they made, moved through the residence creating a noise worthy of Bedlam. It is remarkable how closely the video and photos  provided on the raid of Prigozhin’s mansion mimicked video recordings released of the raid on the Mar-a-Largo residence of former US President Donald Trump provided by US law enforcement and. released to the newsmedia by the US Department of Justice. Many would likely chalk up the similarities to the fact that parallels exist in foundational law enforcement tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in every country. In this case, the similarity might be better chalked up to sarcasm.

It is difficult to imagine what might be referred to as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,  and in particular, the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations, are so inept that independently or in conjunction, could not keep track of Prigozhin’s location and movements. Indeed, one might have presumed that the Russian Federation Armed Forces and particularly the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations kept themselves well-aware of Prigozhin’s affairs and under current circumstances had gone so deeply into them that they at least collectively should have had a complete handle of all of its details. Nothing should have been so unknown by them respectively that their knowledge would seem at best to equal that of the far from the not so prying mainstream newsmedia in the Russian Federation. One could be convinced that everything is done in the Russian Federation in such an incompetent fashion to convince the world that within it “folly doctor-like controls skill.” How the government managed to keep perfect track of, and come down so hard upon the aforementioned Boris Nemetsov and Alexei Navalny, and other activists such as Anna Politkovskaya is a wonder. Based on newsmedia reporting, greatcharlie proffers that the US Intelligence Community surely has been monitoring Prigozhin’s movements as somewhat of a priority mission. Newsmedia reports indicate they were keeping track of how Prigozhin’s private jets were shuttling back and forth from Belarus to the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous. Dulce est desipere in loco. (It is delightful to play the fool.)

If one might exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation Armed Forces, law enforcement and security services are unable to competently monitor Prigozhin, one might turn to the idea that the raid of one of Prigozhin’s mansion and the bombardment of photos in the newsmedia of Prigozhin was designed to throw inquisitive minds and close observers off his scent for hot minute. Verily, perhaps the raid was one more step to ensure those who might have begun questioning in the aggregate whether the Wagner Group’s rebellion, the nature of the Kremlin’s response, and Prigozhin’s disappearance, were elements of some grand artifice. It all falls into place too well. For an intuitive few following it all very closely, the next set events might very well seem predictable.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous.

Prigozhin: Proceeding with Caution?

After all is said and done, greatcharlie’s recognizes that the veritable sacrificial lamb could prove to be Prigozhin, although it is unlikely. He may very well view himself, in a more dramatic and grander way, as a martyr on the altar of his country. He would forever disagree that he was a patsy. Some might insist that his exile to Belarus was likely one of many negative life ramifications of his behavior to that point. He does carry vile antecedents. Either being frugal with information or simply lacking further information on his disposition, the newsmedia to this point has convinced many that Prigozhin remains exiled in Belarus, under duress, as lonely as a cloud. Regardless of where he may be, recognizably, Prigozhin has bravely borne his fate. He does not appear to have let his nerves run away with him. He is unquestionably as strong as a lion. Leve fit, quod bene fertur, onus. (The load is light if you know how to support it.)

Surely if some artifice had been dramatically acted out the weekend of June 23, 2023 as hypothesized here, Prigozhin had to have been a willing participant in the whole cabaret. Make no mistake, Prigozhin is willing to do just about anything to assist Putin: “Papa.” It was Putin who catapulted him to the highest realms of wealth in the world. Putin has likely shielded him from very dark elements that out of envy, jealousy, ethno-racism, or madness would choose to lash out at him in the Russian Federation and outside. Prigozhin will surely never forget how Putin helped him. Outwardly, he has always demonstrated his appreciation. It would seem that Prigozhin truly dislikes Shoigu and Gerasimov. However, as suggested in Part 1, he would hardly go out of his way, waste his own money, to disrupt Putin’s government. Putin likes both Shoigu and Gerasimov and would not allow anyone to destroy them just as he would protect Prigozhin from a serious threat. Prigozhin knows that. Certainly, the last thing Prigozhin would ever want for himself would be to replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister. Given the situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Defense Minister’s post is surely a heavy yoke he would happily leave for another to bear.

If an artifice was in play, it was not apparent initially whether Prigozhin had been shielded sufficiently or at all from the law or political enemies. Shoigu and Gerasimov now seem so drenched with villainy that it is hard to imagine how they will ever be able shed it. For Putin, such issues are surely secondary, if not tertiary. Likely to him, whether he wants them to continue at their posts or not is all that matters. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that although all three put their trust in Putin, naturally but quietly, all three may be a little uncertain about whether being so trustful was justified. Prigohzin can only hope to remain free and have the opportunity to further serve “Papa.” However, Prigozhin lives by an odd code, perhaps it could be called an archaic one. He will likely take whatever comes from his boss standing upright with his eyes wide open. Perhaps a total victory in Ukraine is the only hope of redemption for Shoigu and Gerasimov. Unfortunately for them, that is very unlikely. An educated guess would be that Putin will not play any tricks with his three subordinates. Amicitia sine fraude. (Friendship without deceit.)

Based on a number newsmedia reports in July 2023, the situation appeared to change a bit faster than most would have expected for Prigozhin. On July 6, 2023, Lukashenko stated that he was not in Belarus, but was in the habit of traveling between St. Petersburg and Moscow as he wished. The Belarusian President also stated that any money and weapons that had been confiscated by Russian Federation authorities had been returned to Prigozhin. To the extent the original agreement to end the Wagner Group Rebellion was intact as it regarded Belarus, Lukashenko explained that the organization’s troops had remained in their camps in his country. According to newsmedia reports, approximately 8,000 Wagner Group troops are currently deployed in Belarus. However, the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, the senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, who was mentioned earlier, stated in an online post republished by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel that 10,000 Wagner Group troops would eventually be deployed in Belarus.

Interestingly, when Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group troops were redeployed in Belarus on June 30, 2023, he also explained that his country could make use of the experience and expertise of the organization’s members through training. By July 2023, the Ministerstva abarony Respubliki Belarus’ (Belarusian Defense Ministry) had announced that “The Armed forces of Belarus continue joint training with the fighters of the Wagner PMC (Private Military Company).” Giving what seemed to amount to a forewarning to neighboring Poland and NATO, on the week of July 20, 2023, the Belarusian Defense Ministry would announce: “During the week, special operations forces units, together with representatives of the Company will work out combat training tasks at the Brest military range.” The Brest military range is 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of the Polish border.

Very compelling is a video posted on Prigozhin’s press service on Telegram depicting the Wagner Group’s owner welcome his organization’s troops to Belarus and discussing the future of the whole enterprise, Prigozhin is heard telling the Wagner Group troops, “We fought honorably.” He goes on to say, “You have done a great deal for Russia. What is going on at the front [in Ukraine] is a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in.” Reportedly, Prigozhin tells his troops that they should behave well towards the locals and directs them to train the Belarusian Army and gather their strength for a “new journey to Africa.” The video on Telegram additionally shows Prigozhin receiving the Wagner Group black flag, decorated with the motto” Blood, Honour, Motherland, and Courage”, brought up to Belarus from the organization’s camp in the Russian Federation’s South. Clearly, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group may be a bit down, but they are not completely out, by the good grace of “Papa” one might say. 

In a most extraordinary turn of events, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.” In the third quatrain of “Sonnet 119” (1609), William Shakespeare writes what appears most apposite, mutatis mutandis, to the evolving state of the relationship between Putin and Prigozhin: “O benefit of ill! now I find true / That better is by evil still made better, / And ruin’d love, when it is built anew, / Grows fairer than first, more strong, far greater.”

Putin in Derbent, Dagestan close-up (above). Putin’s visage says it all. Looking at Putin as he met with the cheering crowd in Derbent, it is very clear that he was very pleased. So rarely has his face expressed such happiness, many were led to believe it was not Putin in photo but a body double. Such impressions were quite singular. Putin was greeted in Derbent as the Russian people’s champion. In the “struggle” with the Wagner Group, he was hands down the victor. At least, that is how the situation appeared to the Russian people. If all that transpired was actually a clever artifice executed to garner their increased political support and ratchet up his popularity, as suggested by greatcharlie–maskirovka, Putin was surely very satisfied with the outcome.

The Way Forward

Of course, greatcharlie is unable to swear by this theory that the whole Wagner Group Rebellion was a clever, well-calibrated artifice devised by Putin and what has come afterward also has been guided by his hand. What greatcharlie does believe will become more apparent as time goes on is that the Wagner Group Rebellion did not accelerate some supposed spiral downward of Putin’s regime. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that to it, the whole cabaret felt simply too contrived from the first day. It is unfortunate any lives were reportedly lost in its implementation. Such is always the risk when thousands of well-armed fighting men are moving about with different purposes and understandings of a situation, and no significant central control and communication exists. Of course, establishing such certainly would have made the hypothesized artifice far easier to detect and to deny.

Sic multa quæ honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta. (Thus many things that seem honorable by their nature are rendered dishonorable by circumstances.) As for the Putin ultra-loyalist Prigozhin, greatcharlie is not completely dismissive of assessments by some Russia scholars and policy analysts that he may still be in trouble with his dear leader and dear friend in the Russian Federation. Even Putin loyalists cannot be too sure what he thinks of them or what plans he has for them at any given time. They can only do their level best to remain in his good standing. In greatcharlie’s aforementioned June 5, 2023 post on the possibility of the Kremlin using insights from analysts outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, it noted that finding scholars and policy analysts willing to assist the regime might be difficult as there might be a tacit understanding that there is a real danger involved with serving it. The same senior officials they might work hard to assist could very well turn against them much as wild animals without rhyme or reason known to the reasonable or the rational. In a similar vein, if Prigozhin actually committed himself and the Wagner Group to some artifice for the sake of strengthening Putin’s position nationally as hypothesized here, he may have been too trusting and may have taken too great a risk. Pitfalls have been something Prigozhin has clearly been able to dodge in various endeavors tied to Putin up to this point, but fate might finally come calling. One wonders whether Prigozhin was at all uneasy when he and 34 of his Wagner Group commanders were graciously invited to the Kremlin to meet with Putin, and one and all were welcomed back into the fold by the Russian Federation President with open arms. 

There is a little more to consider in this drama as it concerns Putin and Prigozhin. As greatcharlie makes this final point–and has a little fun doing so, it hopes readers will stick around as it goes admittedly the long way–albeit maybe a bit too prolix–to provide some background on a story that best promotes discernment of ideas presented in the discussion. From what greatcharlie would usually refer to as banal amusement, a Hollywood film, a deeper understanding of Prigozhin perhaps can be drawn. In this case, greatcharlie says film is art, and art is yeast for intellect. Many readers may already know the storyline of the very intriguing 1977 blockbuster film, “Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope”, but perhaps not in the context in which it is presented here. (It was suggested by a reader that greatcharlie do more to connect with the younger generation by tying points of discussion on foreign and national security policy with popular interests of today. So, greatcharlie, being responsive, reached back to a film that premiered 46 years ago to connect with younger readers. Was kann ich sagen?)

In the film, young Luke Skywalker comes across two “droids”, C-3P0 and R2-D2 on his home planet, Tatooine, with the latter holding a hologram recording of a desperate plea from Princess Leia, a key leader of the Rebellion against the Empire that has an iron grip. Leia, who is being held captive by Darth Vader, a type of galactic Imperium, the right hand of an evil empire that had enslaved the galaxy for help from Obi-Wan Kenobi. Skywalker seeks out Old Ben Kenobi, a neighbor whose name closely resembles the name in the message and discovers they are one in the same. Due to tragic circumstances, Obi-Wan Kenobi must take Skywalker along to rescue Leia. During their time together, Obi-Wan Kenobi sets forth to teach Skywalker about the Force, a positive, spiritual energy by which all existence flows not only in the galaxy, but the universe, and how it allows those with the gift to tap into it, mystical, supernatural abilities. The duo secure the help of blackmarketer Hans Solo and his trusted co-pilot Chewbacca, with the promise of remuneration. Skillfully flying his dilapidated yet considerably advanced and agile Millennium Falcon, Solo manages to evade asteroids, Imperial TIE fighters, and Imperial Star Destroyers. The diverse band of irregulars then come upon and are pulled into the Death Star, a superweapon with a giant planet crushing laser with which the Empire intended to use in eliminating the Rebellion once and for all. It was also where Leia was being held by Vader. The small band rescues Leia and escapes but not without the painful loss of Obi-Wan Kenobi in a duel with Vader, who by the way was the embodiment of the negative side of the force. Yet, after his death, Obi-Wan Kenobi could do more to help Skywalker than ever. With the promise of great reward from Leia, Solo takes the group on to the Rebel base on Yavin IV, which is the next target of the Death Star.

On Yavin IV, information collected by R2-D2 on the Death Star’s defenses and vulnerabilities was reviewed and plans for a small group of fighters to attack and destroy it were formulated. The Rebel mission entailed firing rockets into a small vent along an equatorial trench of the Death Star. Time was of the essence as the Death Star would be moving into position to destroy Yavin IV. Skywalker would join a group of pilots flying small X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters against the Death Star. He implored Solo to join the group but Solo emphasizes that his interests from the start were solely pecuniary and he would never risk himself in a suicide mission, which aptly described the Rebel pilots plan of attack. Skywalker left Solo with Chewbacca, as they stowed in his ship the massive reward Leia promised. Flying with R2-D2, Skywalker and the relatively small group of fighters then left to engage the giant Death Star which had nearly reached Yavin IV. Their mission was monitored by the Rebel command base on the planet. Once in contact, the losses in X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters mounted rapidly as a mass of Imperial TIE fighters intercepted the group. Vader, himself, joined them. With barely a handful of Rebel fighters left, Skywalker led what would be the final assault along the trench to reach the vent. As two X-Wing fighters trying to hold Vader and two TIE fighters off him were defeated and R2-D2 was lost, Skywalker sped to the target. It was then that Skywalker through clairaudience received a message from Obi-Wan Kenobi to rely on the Force to complete the job. Leia and the commanders at the Rebel base were flummoxed as Skywalker, responsive to Obi-Wan Kenobi’s voice, disengaged his computer targeting system. As the Death Star prepared to fire on Yavin IV, and Vader closed on Skywalker, surprisingly Solo arrives with the Millennium Falcon and perfectly disrupts Vader’s pursuit of his young friend, freeing him to hit the target directly and destroy the Death Star just in time.

That moment in the film was frightfully small, but small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph. There is considerable materiality and profundity about it. Solo had often indicated in the film that his interests during the odyssey of the small band were solely pecuniary. However, whether compelled by the Force via telepathy to act in support of Skywalker or impelled by the power of friendship and a sense of responsibility, Solo acted. Risking the loss of his ship, his treasured co-pilot, his grand reward, his hopes and dreams for the future, his life, all that he had, he rushed to the Death Star. It is unclear whether Solo had already left Yavin IV in a direction away from the fighting and reversed back to join Skywalker or whether he had flown directly to the scene from the targeted planet. Solo surely would have understood that  Skywalker and the other Rebel pilots were facing trouble at the Death Star, but he could not have known just how bad the situation might have been until he arrived upon the scene. The small force of Rebel fighters may have been completely destroyed by the time he arrived. His young friend could have been lost already. He may have found himself alone, contending with a swarm of Imperial TIE fighters. Nevertheless, Solo went in. A reason for his valorous action could perhaps be found in a logic intrinsic to comradeship in war. So often, a parent may learn their child was lost in war not knowing that he or she abandoned relative safety to remain beside a friend and together they ran forward against the odds into mortal danger. It is easy and satisfying for some to ascribe a bundle of negatives to create a picture of individuals as Prigozhin. However, among such men, the mind works in mysterious ways. As long as Putin continues to stand with him, publicly or privately, he will most likely continue to stand with Putin. Indeed, no matter how bad things become for Putin, Prigozhin will most likely be there. As long as experts continue to get the relationship between the two so wrong, particularly those in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western countries and other countries interested, there will remain a gap in their understanding of certain events, which Putin, as meditated upon here, will likely seek to exploit in different ways. Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. (A certain friend is seen in an uncertain matter.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the individual at the center of the Wagner Group Rebellion (above). The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refers to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin,and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

Prigozhin arrives with guards at funeral ceremony held in the Troyekurovskoye cemetery in Moscow, Russia, April 8, 2023. In this post, greatcharlie chronicles Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

About Prigozhin

Since Prigozhin, as aforementioned, is at the center of all that has transpired, it seems appropriate to provide some background on the individual who allegedly took on Putin. An account of Prigozhin’s life has been widely circulated in the international newsmedia. Those biographies usually discuss certain elements of his life, typically offering a fragmented picture of Prigozhin story: other than average beginnings; potential as skier lost; imprisonment; release, family support and entry into food service industry; support from friends; entry into restaurant and gambling businesses; elite contacts and growth; Putin ties; catering and opportunities of a lifetime; and, business diversification to include internet business and the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s life had the least promising commencement.  He was born on June 1, 1961 in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in the Soviet Union, the son of a nurse, Violetta Prigozhina, and a mining engineer, Viktor Prigozhin. His father died when Prigozhin was a 9-year-old, leaving his mother to support him and his sick grandmother by working at a local hospital. During his school years, Prigozhin aspired to be a professional cross-country skier. He was trained by his stepfather Samuil Zharkoy, who was an instructor in the sport, and attended a prestigious athletics boarding school from which he graduated in 1977. However, due to an injury, he left the sport. Unfortunately, the criminal culture of St Petersburg drew him in.

There is an old saying directed at youth which greatcharlie paraphrases: “If one is around the wrong kind of people one will likely get involved with the wrong kind of things.” In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution. Id nobis maxime nocet, quod non ad rationis lumen sed ad similitudinem aliorum vivimus. (Is especially ruinous to us, that we shape our lives not by the light of reason, but after the fashion of others.)

In a five-page biography attached to an October 2021 email acquired by the Intercept from Capital Legal Services that appears to have been drafted by his attorneys, it was revealed that Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad, according to Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper known for its critical coverage of the Kremlin. The newspaper also reported that Prigozhin in 1990 studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

Food Service

Prigozhin would next move in a completely different direction which placed his life on an amazing trajectory. He set up a hot-dog stand in Leningrad with his mother and stepfather in the Aprashaka Flea Market. Prigozhin was essentially a street vendor, without much in the way of formal food service training or food service management. Yet, he clearly possessed a considerable knack for preparing and selling food to people. He apparently knew what they liked and knew what was right. He was quoted in an interview with the New York Times as stating: The rubles were piling up faster than his mother could count them.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Prigozhin followed the entrepreneurial spirit of the times and founded or became involved in many new businesses. Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeing that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.)

From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. 


Boris Spektor (above). From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

According to the Guardian, Prigozhin found Tony Gear, a British hotel administrator who had previously worked at the Savoy in London and was now at one of St Petersburg’s few luxury hotels. He employed Gear to manage first a wine shop, then the Old Customs House. Initially, the Old Customs House employed strippers as a way to drum up clientele, but oddly enough the restaurant’s food became the real draw for patrons and stripper operations were suspended. Gear marketed the Old Customs House as the most refined place to eat in a city that was only just discovering fine dining.

On its website, the Old Customs House is described on its website as one of the oldest restaurants in the city. Pop stars and businessmen liked to eat there, as did St Petersburg’s mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who sometimes came with his deputy, Putin. Photographs of Prigozhin in his exclusive St. Petersburg restaurants typically depict him serving the elite of the Russian Federation and standing-by dutifully in the background, ready to respond to his very important patrons’ every need. Prigozhin does not display a scintilla of shyness now, and he was hardly shy during those early years of his restaurant ventures. One might imagine that Prigozhin had a gift for repartee which was most likely greatly appreciated by patrons.

 

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush with their spouses on board the New Island Restaurant. Prigozhin is standing by dutifully, back and to the left of Putin. Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. Prigozhin assistance was clearly an integral part of whatever plan Putin had for foreign dignitaries. To that extent, Prigozhin was integral to Putin’s approach to handling foreign and national security policy issues with his visitors. The degree of Prigozhin’s connection with Putin was undeniable, frightfully apparent. Putin would go on to make use of Prigozhin’s assistance on many matters of the utmost importance to the Russian Federation and utmost importance to him. If greatcharlie is correct, he continues to do so today

During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by Novaya Gazeta that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good friendship. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story.

In 1997, Prigozhin and Ziminov, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. Inspired by waterfront restaurants on the River Seine in Paris, the two created the restaurant by spending $400,000 to remodel a rusting ferry boat on the Vyatka River. Prigozhin told the magazine Elite Society in 2008 that the new restaurant offered Russians something new and different from boring “cutlets with vodka.”

It was no mean feat to create a profitable restaurant in St. Petersburg with a potential clientele that represented a small percentage of the population and managed to get them through the doors every night, let alone open a second based on a concept alien to a good portion of that exclusive clientele. In 1998, he opened the New Island Restaurant on a boat, which one tourism website calls “St. Petersburg’s only floating luxury Restaurant-Ship.” The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city.

In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. 

Putin clearly displayed liking for Prigozhin before everyone. Meduza reported Putin welcomed him as “one of the boys.” To clarify, Prigozhin was neither Chekisty, the son or grandson of a member of the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, an iteration of the security services during World War II, as Putin is, nor was he Siloviki, someone who had served in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB as Putin and most of his close associates had. Current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev, who was an attorney in St.Petersburg when Putin met him, also falls into that “other than Chekisty or Siloviki” category. Prigozhin’s good relations with others among the Russian Federation’s elite also assisted in bring in lucrative catering contracts

Prigozhin attends to Putin during his inspection of a Concord Management and Consulting facility. By 2003, Prigozhin left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. Concord Management and Consulting, a  company founded by Prigozhin in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. He was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with him, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region.

During those early stages of his growth in the business world, Prigozhin was known for being rather strict as a manager. However, he is not remembered as being one to complain about being wronged and suffering losses. He was hardly one who could be characterized as temperamental and thin-skinned. It would appear that any behavior that resembled such was truly left behind in prison. Seemingly, he very likely would have thought dwelling on such matters would have cost him too much time and energy; on the face of it, he likely believed his time would always be best spent on pursuing new, greater ventures. The profits from them surely surpassed any prior losses. Much as water down a stream, when Prigozhin encountered an obstruction, he would work around it rapidly to reach the next profitable objective. Beyond the immediate moment, there was always the potential for more ahead. (The indications and implications from this might be that his complaints concerning the Wagner Group’s treatment in Ukraine have been fostered by the realization that there are no prospects for advancing on to some satisfying new course upon which he could greatly improve his organization’s situation.) Good fortune seemed to stick on Prigozhin’s side. He could provide his family with pleasure and affluence.

Quam sæpe forte temere eveniunt, quæ non audeas optare. (How often things occur by mere chance, for which we dared not even to hope.) Over the course of the 2000s, Prigozhin grew even closer to Putin. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. 

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90 percent of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. Leonid Teyf, former deputy general director of Voentorg (the company charged with contracting caterers for the military), assisted Prigozhin in securing the orders. of Voentorg’s assets related to food supply and army maintenance to Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract signed by Voentorg for 2013-2014 amounted to $999 million. The contract was signed by the director of Voentorg Vladimir Pavlov. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, approximately amounted to $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies.

Prigozhin (center) reaches the top! He stands close to both Putin (left) and current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev (right) During confidential conversation. In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply more than 90 percent of all food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90% of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract for 2013 to 2014 amounted to $999 million. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Defence Ministry, approximately amounted to  $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies. As discussed in Part 2, Putin would oddly lay out the tie between Concord and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry in an address following the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency.

It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

Three “cheerful” photos of Prigozhin (above) on a US Federal Bureau of Investigation “Wanted Poster”. Perhaps in the Russian underworld in which Prigozhin ostensibly has his hands somewhat dipped, the poster is a badge of honor, a sign that he had made it to the top! It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary political opponent then, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin.

Prigozhin and the Wagner Group

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St.. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present).

As explained in some detail in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations”, from the time of the organization’s inception, it was widely believed that the organization was founded, owned and led by Dmitriy Utkin. Utkin is a veteran of the First and Second Chechen Wars. Until 2013, he served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of the 700th Independent Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Detachment) of the 2nd Independent Brigade, a special forces unit of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) or GRU. However, in an August 2017, article in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, the suggestion was made that Utkin was only a figurehead for the company. Fingers pointed at Prigozhin as its true owner. Prigozhin went some distance to deny any ties to the Wagner Group. He even denied any communication with it. Prigozhin actually sued Bellingcat, Meduza, and Echo of Moscow for claiming he had links to the organization. In an interview in December 2018, Putin also denied allegations that Prigozhin had been directing the Wagner Group’s activities. However, in September 2022, Prigozhin relented and admitted to having created the group. Prigozhin claimed, “I cleaned the old weapons myself, sorted out the bulletproof vests myself and found specialists who could help me with this. From that moment, on May 1, 2014, a group of patriots was born, which later came to be called the Wagner Battalion.” As noted earlier, the Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged in the fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts. 

At the organization’s core, Wagner Group troops are predominantly retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are typically aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. However, the Wagner Group also employs an international group of fighters. There are three main fighting units of the organization. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. There is a Serbian unit built upon complement of former members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard–also known as “Arkan’s Tigers”–created by the deceased 1990s ethno-religious nationalist Serbian paramilitary warlord Zeljko Raznatovic’s–also known as Arkan. A relatively new unit in the Wagner Group consists of citizens of Scandinavian countries, particularly from Norway. It participated in the firefights on the Bakhmut front. The unit is referred to as the Níðhöggr“, sometimes also known as Nidhogg.

The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Prigozhin, in a dark blue suit (second from right) attends a meeting involving top Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff and members of Libya’s National Army in Moscow on November 7, 2018. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). The Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged. Fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts.. 

According to initial statistics available after April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As noted, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. The recruitment of prison inmates for service in the Wagner Group is nothing new. The organization reportedly recruited imprisoned UPC rebels in the Central African Republic to fight in Mali and Ukraine. They are reportedly nicknamed the “Black Russians”. It was the Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that suffered high-profile casualties. Callous Russian Federation commanders threw them into battle pell mell. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. 

It would later be revealed by the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, a senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, that  22,000 of the organization’s troops had been killed in action in Ukraine. In his statement, published by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel, Marx further explained that another 40,000 were wounded in action. Of the 78,000 Wagner Group troops who served in what Marx referred to as “the Ukrainian business trip”, 49,000 of them were convicts. The Wagner Group has reportedly halted the practice of recruiting convicts in its ranks. Former convicts in the organization that survived service in Ukraine have been released from their contracts.

Prigozhin surely recognized early on that more than simply suffering under inept leadership of Russian Federation commanders, he and his organization were being pushed toward the precipice of losing everything by individuals seemingly more skilled in finding ways to defeat him than defeating their opponent on the battlefield. He certainly was not going to countenance that. An idea perhaps alien or incomprehensible to many readers is the possibility that Prigozhin was tolerant, at least up to a point, of the unpleasant set of circumstances under which he was caused to operate in an effort to demonstrate his loyalty and support for Putin. Homo antiqua virtute ac fide? (A man of the “ancient” virtue and loyalty?)

Particularly during the months-long battle for the Ukrainian coal-mining town of Bakhmut, senior managers and troops of the Wagner Group surely felt they were being thwarted, from keeping the Russian Federation in the fight, meeting their organization’s longstanding commitment to Putin and the Russian Federation, as well as meeting their personal and emotional promise to Putin not to leave Ukraine until the Russian Federation won the war. It is all very heavy stuff for a group of individuals whose top priority most would likely argue is profit. Based on his public comments, Prigozhin appears to believe victory is still possible under the right military leadership. It was during a crucial stage in the Bakhmut fight that Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose forces the Wagner Group jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would somewhat likely say, “to rescue.” Wagner Group units apparently were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred. (In meditating on Prigozhin’s position, Putin might want take into consideration the terrible outcome of the decision by Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, to use his beloved spetsnaz units with their exquisite military capabilities to perform stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, on the frontlines in conventional roles. the specialized units were over relied upon and consequently suffered devastating losses.)

Well known is the fact that Putin prefers to take as few people as possible into his confidence. Even with those lucky few he is doubtlessly frugal with his thoughts. Conceivably, Putin had spoken quietly with Prigozhin over the very public vocalization of his rage over the fundamental failures and gross mismanagement of the special military operation by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff since its start. Whatever may have been discussed in such a meeting it hardly concerned taking steps against Shoigu and Gerasimov that Prigozhin was insisting upon, but a solution of some kind may have been voiced by Putin that manifested his unique lens on matters. Note, Prigozhin has neither expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He has always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with the most recent events most firmly in mind. 

Prigozhin in Bakhmut (above). The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Reality Check

Non mihi si linguæ centum sint oraque centum, ferrea vox, omnes scelerum comprendere formas omnia pœnarum percurrere nomina possim. (Not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, could I repeat all the types of wickedness, and run over all the names of penal woes.)  The supercharged modality of Prigozhin’s expressions concerning the performance of Shoigu and Gerasimov was by no means been within normal parameters and such reproach and obloquy from anyone toward those immensely powerful government leaders and organizations would never have been expected before the special military operation began. In the Russian Federation, “discrediting the armed forces” carries a maximum 15-year prison sentence. Many of Prigozhin’s public statements about the situation in Ukraine are now famous worldwide.

Some in the mainstream Western newsmedia would lead their audience to believe Prigozhin’s regular public ravings about how the war was being managed was an indication that he may have an unhealthy mind. Res ipsa loquitur!  Bizarre reports of Prigozhin providing information on the positions of the Russian Army in Bakhmut appear equally faulty. They have only evinced a misunderstanding of Prigozhin’s relationship to Putin and what the very active private military contractor means to the Russian Federation President personally. From the moment any claim was made of Prigozhin’s betrayal, at least on the Russian Federation side, it was doubtlessly viewed as a comical yet nonetheless apocryphal rumor ginned up by his opponents. To that extent, it was surely rejected as fast as inane suggestions meant to bias the mind back in March 2022 that the extraordinarily violent and most loyal Putin subordinate, the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, would possibly overthrow his president and take over the government and on a matter outside of the Ukraine War context, the very patriotic and extremely dangerous People’s Republic of China Vice Minister for counterintelligence of the Ministry of State Security, Dong Jingwei, had of all things defected to the US in June 2022. (The Dong Jingwei defection matter is treated in some detail in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”.) These suggests were not clever, but rather crass. One could get the impression that those responsible for the US political warfare effort against the Russian Federation have been soliciting ideas from a group of local junior high school boys for the most immature suggestions possible. Surely, that would count as a bold attempt to exploit thinking from outside the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies. Conscia mens recti famæ mendacia risit. (The mind conscious of integrity scorns the lies of rumor.)

Speaking plainly as he does, Prigozhin’s vocal expressions might at best send a clear signal to Wagner Group troops that they genuinely matter to him, but alone, his words do not appear to have accomplished too much. Prigozhin clearly recognized that as long as his organization’s troops remain in Ukraine, they will be “at the mercy” of what he clearly deems to be careless and inept top officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. That does not bode well for them. If one might toss on top of everything Prigozhin’s contentious relationship with those officials and commanders, it becomes nearly impossible to foresee anything positive coming the way of those troops in the future. Such will likely remain a constant no matter how things fall, one way or another in the midst of Moscow’s Ukraine enterprise. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Prigozhin standing before rows of Wagner Group troops killed in action in Ukraine. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing at the White House, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders.

The limited capabilities of Prigozhin’s organization as a military force also adds to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. As with everything else in which they were delinquent or deficient, the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces moved to utilize the Wagner Group as part of their combat operations during the special military operation doubtlessly with preconceptions in their minds via existing intelligence reporting on how the Ukrainians were situated to fight. To name a few of the deficiencies likely imagined in Moscow, it was surely thought to be short of weapons, short of good leadership, and short of well-trained troops. Through international newsmedia reporting, the whole world was led to believe the same. (Irony of ironies, it was the Russian Federation Armed Forces that actually had shortages of everything, including gear, troops, and especially military acumen.) The Wagner Group, loaded with veteran fighters, was expected to have a multiplier effect on the frontline. They made the questionable choice to utilize their own spetsnaz units in the same way.

Carelessly unforeseen and unimagined by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff was the massive level of assistance that the Ukrainians would eventually receive from the Western powers and other countries. (That matter is examined in some detail in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)  That assistance has made the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Ukrainian Armed Forces), even with its few remaining deficiencies, one of the more formidable military powers in Europe. Far more than just javelin and stinger shoulder fired weapons, small arms, and uniforms, the long list of assistance has included high-tech armaments as Patriot air defense systems and NASAMS (Norwegian (or National) Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) air defense systems, MLRS systems HIMARS systems, mobile and precision long-range artillery, anti-ship rockets, Abrams, Leopard, and Challenger tanks, MiG-29s, F-16s, helicopters, a variety drones, real-time intelligence, and loads of troop training. The Wagner Group could hardly have had a multiplier effect as the one dimensional force that it has been on a battlefield in which its opposition possessed such weapons and capabilities. 

For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated Russian Army trucks was not enough. Additionally, a robust, organic drone capability would be needed particularly for ISR, direct action, and psychological warfare operations to support the more effective planning and execution of missions. Given how the war in Ukraine has progressed, the new ways in which existing technologies are used and new ones are developed and introduced, new efficiencies in warfighting may render these few suggestions outdated. Still, the crux of what is presented here should be readily apparent. (Even the White Russian anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian insurgent groups–the Freedom For Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps used rather pricey Western-made military vehicles to launch their May 2023 raid into Belgorod region of Russian Federation. The vehicles were reportedly supplied by an unknown source. Images appeared on social media allegedly displaying those vehicles. Reporting on the equipment it observed, the Oryx open-source weapons tracking group, stated that the Russian Federation forces captured two International M1224 MaxxPro MRAPs, two 2 M1151 HMMWVs-, and one M1152 HMMWV that was damaged.)

As for procurement, the Wagner Group might have effectively sought out Independent sources of military resources for the company not with regard to its service in Ukraine but more generally to supply itself as a fully autonomous, fully operational professional military contractor. It would be one more step in attenuating its reliance upon the largess of the fickle Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation Armed Forces. All of that being stated, interoperability of armaments procured with those in the Russian Federation inventory would likely be viewed as a requirement by Prigozhin, keeping in mind the possibility of needing to operate in cooperation with the country’s armed forces, especially if asked to do so by Putin. Without variance, any procurement efforts should only be made with a keen eye on working within the parameters of existing international sanctions concerning armaments and the Russian Federation. It would be useful for the Wagner Group to have its own supply of food, water, medical facilities, and petroleum and oil lubricants. As long as these relative inadequacies as well as others persisted, the Wagner Group as noted, would remain poorly situated to optimally serve in support of Russian Federation military operations in Ukraine. As long as they exist, Prigozhin’s demands for greater autonomy will remain something less than legitimate. No statements have been made or actions taken concerning the structure, strength, composition, or rearming of the organization that would indicate the situation would change anytime soon.

It is very possible–actually more likely–that Prigozhin may not have had any interest at all in making great changes to how his organization’s units were structured. To that extent, Prigozhin may have long ago accepted that there would be a strategy-resources mismatch that would prevent the Wagner Group from playing a greater and genuinely effective role in support of Russian Federation military objectives in Ukraine even if it had been given a feerer hand. Given the few actualities presented here and others, one option that evidence suggests clearly arose in the mind of Prigozhin was to mostly withdraw his organization from the field in Ukraine, while keeping a portion available in-country to serve as effectively as possible structured as it is. In that way, Prigozhin could then continue to put the Wagner Group to use elsewhere worldwide where it could serve more effectively and more successfully. Again, that is what Prigozhin appeared to have been doing or at least seemed to be what he wanted to do before the Wagner Group Rebellion “erupted.” (It is not possible for greatcharlie to confirm any of Prigozhin’s burgeoning actions were founded on reasons similar to those expressed here.)

Prigozhin assists his Wagner Group troops load up in trucks moving up to the front in Ukraine. The limited capabilities of his organization as a military force added to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. They possessed diminutive armor, mechanized, and firepower resources. For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated, second-hand, Russian Army trucks was not enough.

A Few Oscillating Ruminations on Prigozhin 

Serum est cavendi tempus in mediis malis. (The time for caution is too late when we are in the midst of evils.) It might have been plausible enough for many experts and observers to believe it would have been in the best interest of Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically to ensure that he and his unit commanders will play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities will be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. That might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. In that vein, Prigozhin ostensibly could have made a genuine go at using his considerable political influence with Putin, speak truth to power and so on, and implore him to provide the Wagner Group with a greater say in how it will execute missions in support of Russian Federation Armed Forces. Yet, such a political move would have been tricky or if not a grave blunder. Prigozhin is savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. True, despite the nature of professional relations between Putin and Prigozhin concerning the Wagner Group and military affairs, more important was their personal relationship. That relationship, recall, was at the crux and the apex of Prigozhin’s standing in the regime and in military circles as well as his sense of entitlement to issue criticism of the top military leadership of the Russian Federation and foist his cconvictionsupon everyone on how his organization could best be used in Ukraine.

Putin has shown considerable regard for Prigozhin bbutfor quite some time he has shown even greater regard for Shoigu professionally and personally (privately). Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements. Militarily, a sine qua non for Putin is to possess without doubt, to believe with comfort, that the Russian Federation has the capability to successfully attack and destroy the US and its interests with nuclear weapons.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigozhin was surely well-aware that Putin really did not need at any point, for any reason, and especially during the flailing special military operation would have been an extra problem that from one angle might simply boil down to him as mere in-house bickering between two “closely ranked” associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s preceding June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin is conceivably someone well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him on anything that is not quite an emergency. After all, in the Wagner Group, he has long-demonstrated that effectively dealing with, managing, and understanding strong-spirited and strong-willed men is his forte. A leader must be strong, but also. at the right time, compassionate.

If one might see some plausibility in greatcharlie’s discussion along this line about Prigozhin, one might be been able to accept or at least consider that on his own volition, he very unlikely would have pushed the matter of his struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov to the point where his forces amassed for days in plain view on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation–even the US had then under surveillance by satellite–would after a very public announcement of rebellion, begin a military drive toward their offices. True, that is exactly how things appeared to have happened to many. Still, it was unlikely the case.

To gnaw a bit further on this point, there can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin has greatly concern himself with what Putin has been facing in these very trying times for the Russian Federation following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. What Putin thinks is of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin is the priority. Discussing Prigozhin during an interview, political activist Aleksei Navalny stated: “[Prigozhin] didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In the old-fashioned, out-moded sense, Prigozhin is under obligation to Putin. Yet, as a knock on to all of this, greatcharlie will go out on a limb and state that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever act in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life.

The Platters was one of the most successful vocal groups of the early rock and roll era. Their distinctive sound was a bridge between the pre-rock Tin Pan Alley tradition and the growing new genre. “Only You (And You Alone)” (often shortened to “Only You”) is a pop song composed by Buck Ram. It was originally recorded by The Platters in 1955. In the first verse of this song about true devotion and love which seem to greatcharlie to be befitting Prigozhin’s “frame of mind” on Putin are the words: “Only you can make all this world seem right / Only you can make the darkness bright / Only you and you alone can thrill me like you do / And fill my heart with love for only you.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restaurateur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

One might hazard to suggest that it is Prigozhin’s nourishing side which seeks to sustain his relationship with Putin and give him the support he needs to fortify his regime’s interests abroad. It is the destructive side of Prigozhin that Putin has exploited to achieve the ends of his expressed and secretive foreign and national security policies. Expectedly, some observers might dare say that Prigozhin’s desire to undertake such a morbid venture is part and parcel of some severe pathology. (Of course, similar private military contractors “could hardly thrive” in the socially and technologically advanced industrialized countries of the West.)

Perhaps somewhere at the confluence of the two modes of thinking deep within, there is a conflict. He has stood casually among piles of Wagner Group troops he recruited, many from Russian Federation prisons, piled in bags in storage rooms and laid out in fields. He openly admitted to the loss of 40,000 of those who joined his organization. The potency of it all is readily apparent. Prigozhin is still only human. There must be moments when he wonders what it is all amounting to. The US author Megan Devine provides words that may be apposite in this context in her bestseller, It’s OK That You’re Not OK: Meeting Grief and Loss in a Culture That Doesn’t Understand (Sounds True, 2017): “There are losses that rearrange the world. Deaths that change the way you see everything, grief that tears everything down. Pain that transports you to an entirely different universe, even while everyone else thinks nothing has really changed.”

There are those who would suggest Prigozhin has become bitter and disillusioned about the world around him, the Putin regime; essentially he is feeling jaded. Of course, it was the largesse of Putin’s regime that over the years  allowed him to become a billionaire. On a more specific level, it might be posited that Prigozhin has become jaded with regard to the Ukraine War. There may very well be scope to that idea. He has talked of moving on with his Wagner Group to better things. To that extent there may also be some materiality. It would be questionable to characterize Prigozhin as a cynic who is endlessly expressing his underlying distrust of everything. Yet, far from believing the Russian Federation’s situation in Ukraine cannot become better, Prigozhin appears determined to right wrongs by those he feels have failed Putin and the Russian Federation and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat somehow.

In greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled, “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, it was noted that there have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian Federation units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it went on further to state: “It would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restauranteur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

According to Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2023, a shoot-out allegedly erupted in the settlement of Stanytsia Luhanska (Luhansk Oblast) between Russian Army soldiers and Wagner Group troops concerning which side is to blame for Russia’s failures amid the invasion of Ukraine. Those reports were not substantiated by Kyiv or confirmed by any sources in Moscow. On June 2, 2023, Prigozhin, writing on Telegram, alleged his troops had discovered 12 locations in rear areas where Russian Federation Defense Ministry officials had planted various explosive devices, including hundreds of anti-tank mines. He further reported that when he inquired with Defense Ministry officials as to why the charges had been set, they explained it was an order from their superiors. Prigozhin stated: “It was not necessary to plant these charges in order to deter the enemy, as it [the area in question] is in the rear area. Therefore, we can assume that these charges were intended to meet the advancing units of Wagner.” Prigozhin noted that none of the charges went off and no one was hurt. Still, he added: “We assume this was an attempt at a public flogging.”

The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering?

If Putin had suddenly spoken out on the matter before the rebellion and in Solomonesque fashion, directed Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to work out an amicable plan to resolve their differences on the sustentation and upkeep of the Wagner Group and present their results to him, the respective loyalty and obedience of all three would have been put to the test. Shoigu and Gerasimov pretty much control the whole show which is essentially the problem to which Prigozhin has been calling attention. Under such a scenario, they would unlikely have been willing to brook any serious discussion of making the Wagner Group a stronger and far greater force. Prigozhin would most likely have remained flawlessly obedient to Putin’s orders to hash it out but deep down would hardly have been interested in putting too much time into butting heads with the leadership of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff. Prigozhin would probably see in advance that the most trying part of such a “confrontation” would be not be contending with the disdain of Shoigu and Gerasimov toward him, but their obsolescent preconceptions of military affairs and military science in general, which he might foresee would doubtlessly have caused them to filter his new ideas for the role of his organization through their archaic and prosaic ones. (It is possible that Shoigu and Gerasimov also had viewed the relationship of the Wagner Group to their organization’s as parasitical. Their actions concerning the combat support and combat service support of Wagner give force to that idea.) The only concession Prigozhin might have made under such circumstances would be to agree to keep his Wagner Group troops in Ukraine for the duration of the conflict and maintain its presence in-country at a certain strength. Shoigu and Gerasimov would have needed to make many concessions to satisfy Prigozhin based on past behavior. Still, even if some allegedly practical plans might be worked out and presented to Putin, in this hypothetical, what would be presented might better reflect what is possible than what will be. Nous sommes reconnaissant de votre considération et croyons que vous aurez du plaisir à être partenaire avec nous. Only the emergence of some exigent circumstance could have had the effect of shifting more power to one side or another on the “control” issue. Not to get too far ahead, but it would seem the Wagner Group Rebellion provided just such an emergency.

Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Supreme Economic Eurasian Council at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, May 25, 2023. The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering? Perhaps something deeper was going in his remarkable mind.

Fun and Games, Quicks and Aberrations

As alluded to earlier, Prigozhin’s wailing has not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out. 

Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling many elites of the Russian Federation who find him to be anathema and not a forewarning of things to come. Perhaps making such nettlesome utterances helps to pass the time for those at the top of the food chain in Moscow. Prigozhin, himself, has made his thoughts on a mutual dislike between him and Russian elites living in the luxurious Moscow suburb of Rublyovka very public. Laughing off aforementioned reports that he had offered to reveal Russian troop positions to Ukrainian military intelligence in exchange for Kyiv’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated in an audio message posted on Telegram: “People from Rublyovka” could be behind the allegations.” He went on to state in his unique style: “Of course they will pour as much s*** on me as they can.” La leçon d’elegance de Yevgeny Prigozhin.

If Prigozhin’s original comments concerning a possible revolution in the Russian Federation actually was a manifestation of his brand of acidulous humor directed at antagonizing political and business elite at home, surely they were not appreciated among leaders of the FSB, especially since they came just before raids were launched along the Russian Federation’s borders by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian groups. The eyes of FSB officials should have become strained after watching Prigozhin’s every more at that point. Given their reaction to events concerning the Wagner Group later in June, they would seem to have thrown little more than a few stray glances his way.

Intriguingly, the ultranationalist political figure Igor Girkin has alleged via a string of videos that Prigozhin’s public pronouncements concerning the military campaign in Ukraine as merely “a project” created by an influential group within Putin’s inner circle. Girkin, known among associates by the cognomen “Strelkov” (Shooter) is an anti-semite, and is likely unstable. He is a former officer in Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Girkin gained notice as an operative behind the Russian Federation’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. In the aftermath of the invasion, he became a prominent player in the effort to establish Nova Rossiya (New Russia) on the sovereign territory of Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odessa. Girkin insists Prigozhin efforts are backed by Sergey Kiriyenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the President of the Russian Federation, who Putin has appointed to oversee the occupied Ukrainian lands. Girkin has been quoted as saying: “Kiriyenko is openly at war with Shoigu, which is why Prigozhin attacks the Defense Ministry.” To that extent, Girkin claims Prigozhin is “not just a man whose eyes were suddenly opened and began speaking the truth.”

Girkin asserts further that “Kiriyenko is backed by the Kovalchuk brothers, people who are part of the President’s inner circle.” Yury Kovalchuk is the chairman and the largest shareholder of Rossiya Bank. According to the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), together with his brother Mikhail Kovalchuk, as well as Mikhail Mishustin, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, Andriy Turchak, the Secretary of the General Council of United Russia–Putin’s political party, Prigozhin, and others, he formed the influential Kovalchuk-Kiriyenko group.

It is important to note that Girkin emphasizes that Prigozhin is “not Russian by nationality,” more than insinuating that just as the “majority of Bolsheviks,” he is of Jewish origin and thereby poses a considerable threat to Russia. Ultimately, Girkin and all others similar to him–and there are many similar to him in the Russian Federation–are political figures that Putin must manage, not Prigozhin. Girkin, clearly a creature of the worst kind from the Russian Federation’s Intelligence Community, appears vindictive, passionate, ill-balanced, jealous, envious. The intelligence services of many countries–especially those in the US–have their fair share of Girkins. The utmost should be done to guard against them. That is not always the case: disco inferno!

Interestingly, so intense and focused had been the internecine quarreling between elites in Moscow that rarely heard publicly from them at the time was that old chestnut that the invisible hand of the US and its Western alter egos is behind all that has gone wrong for the Russian Federation and that is all part of a long-term plan destroy their country.

Prigozhin speaking on his media service channel on Telegram. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (center), takes a moment to gather himself while seated between Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Glavnokomanduyushchiy Voyenno-morskoy Flot Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Federation Naval Force or Russian Navy) Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov (right). The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s way; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have had their impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individua he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, a lack of good solutions, options for action when trouble began was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters, his willingness to try novel ideas that make sense, may have changed. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies for insights and options and could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches. That possibility is discussed here.

The situation in Ukraine has hardly developed as expected by Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin; in fact, things have gone terribly bad for him. Events may have even had a profound impact upon his thinking. Putin, after all, is only human. To that extent, Putin should not be looked upon as the same individual he was at the start of the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation). For instance, when trouble began, a lack of good solutions, viable options for alternative actions, was likely unexpected. He has surely learned to put far less faith in the words of advisers. He has likely turned to his own faculty and what may be the most reliable part of his intuition to develop better answers. It is possible that his ways of thinking on many matters may have changed, and there might be a willingness, not to go off the rails, but to try novel ideas that make sense. Along that line, a reasonable change might be a decision to seek out advice from alternative sources at home that are outside of the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to garner ideas, insights and options that could lead to an alteration in his thinking and approaches unexpected in Western capitals. That possibility is discussed here. In Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies one might expect some well-accepted and well-used approaches to understanding Putin’s decisionmaking and rationalizing Russian Federation action based on what is known about its tactics, techniques, procedures and methods of doing things. Due to this, unexpected changes in his thinking might throw the West off-track to some degree, depending on what on-going approaches he hypothetically might change and how. The implications could be enormous. There remains a place for the bog standard analyses of Putin on some matters. However, with regard to Ukraine,  it is essential to get beyond thinking along well-worn lines and the expected and consider all possible eventualities.

For a over a decade, some of officials of the US foreign and national security policy apparatus have made their intense dislike greatcharlie and disapproval of its plainly innocuous scribblings well known to it. Nevertheless, for others, greatcharlie hopes its efforts here are not value neutral, particularly with regard to students. Although greatcharlie would be satisfied enough to have this commentary stand alone as one of its many posts on foreign and national security policy, it would be humbled to see it take its place among ideas being exchanged internationally on Ukraine and Putin through which it may eventually become part of the greater policy debate. Malim equidem indisertam prudentiam quam stultitiam loquacem. (I should prefer ineloquent good sense to loquacious folly.)

A confident Putin (above) at the February 21, 2023 Security Council meeting regarding Ukraine. Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin, expectations for future fruitful talks would be far lower now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. Facing such trying circumstances daily, Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 24, 2022. Putin has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that he, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster, at least until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

A New Putin?: Transformed by His Circumstances

Although most would be willing to dutifully make the effort, surely among the  Western political leaders and diplomats who have failed so far to get a handle on effectively negotiating with Putin. there would be far lower expectations of future fruitful talks now than they were a year ago. Indeed, a year of frustration may have led many to close their minds to investigation of his thinking to find or construct inroads to him and rather settle on defining Putin with obloquy, viewing him as a prodigy of wickedness, a far less than advanced route taken long ago by many of their journalist counterparts. They might find words from the play Henry the VIII. a collaborative effort between William Shakespeare and John Fletcher  might find most apposite concerning him. In Act IV, scene iii, Katherine, Henry VIII’s ex-wife, reduced to princess dowager, converses to her attendants about the death of Cardinal Wolsey. Wolsey, a once trusted advisor to the king, having failed to secure an annulment of Henry VIII’s first marriage, was removed from government, arrested for treason, grew ill, and died a broken man. Katharine though saying she will speak of him with charity proceeds to characterize him in the following negative way, saying: “His own opinion was his law: i’ the presence / He would say untruths; and be ever double / Both in his words and meaning: he was never, / But where he meant to ruin, pitiful.”

Western leaders and diplomats might want to consider that there has likely been some transformation in Putin’s thinking with regard to his country’s prowess and its true image and place in the world since February 2022. He has most likely been enlightened particularly with regard to the more or less substandard foreign and national security apparatus that for, if not blithely, surely fortuitously, was able to stake so much upon, while miraculously avoiding disaster until now. His luck seemed to rest much on good use of the services of a shrewd and adept senior diplomat, Ministr inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation) Sergei Lavrov. He has displayed a talent for being able to successfully promote his policies on just about everything,

It is very likely that even Putin as much as anyone else was surprised by the limited level of control he could exercise over his use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces especially once they were placed on the battlefield in great numbers. Indeed, events have been so far off from anything Putin most likely wanted or foresaw in Ukraine, that one could hardly believe genuinely that he ever had full control of the situation and reasonably make only an attenuated argument in support of that belief. The poor thinking of Russian Federation commanders and the positively horrible outcomes of their actions was most likely another eye-opener for Putin.

Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.) In its preceding post, greatcharlie stated that the Russian Federation would unlikely win the Ukraine War based on the record of performance of Russian Federation commanders to date. However, it must be explained further that the situation they face is not impossible to crack. Military commanders of other countries, such as the US for instance, would more than likely readily see the correct course of action to “breakout” of the Western and Southern fronts. One might hypothesize that a zealous emphasis on Russian military history in the course of studies in the 30 schools of Voyenny uchebno-nauchny tsentr Sukhoputnykh voysk “Obshchevoyskovaya ordenov Lenina i Oktyabr’skoy revolyutsii, Krasnoznamennaya, ordena Suvorova” (The Combined Academies Order of Lenin Order of the October Revolution Red Bannered Order of Suvorov of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation-Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Russian Ground Forces), the equivalent of Western command and general staff schools and Voyennaya akademiya General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (The Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), what suffices for Western war colleges, and an apparent failure to encourage student officers to examine in the round the strategy, tactics, and the operational art displayed by other countries armed forces in other wars, has left Russian Federation commanders without the slightest idea of how closely their current situation in Ukraine parallels that of a number of commanders in other larger conflicts of the past. Case studies of such done by student officers that would have familiarized them with those past foreign commanders’ successful combined arms actions that allowed them to maneuver their forces out of trouble and gain and retain the initiative would have likely changed the course of the current war.

Spectemur agendo. (Let us be judged by our acts.) Still, even if Russian Federation commanders hypothetically came upon an historical or novel way to storm through the frontlines of Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) and put themselves in a position to do some “open field running,” it is hard to conceive of what would be their follow through to exploit success. Given their aberrant moves from the first day of the special military operation, it is difficult to imagine what for them would be priority objectives they would have in mind and why, whether they would intend to conquer all of Ukraine or limit themselves to securing certain useful territory. They surely would know by experience–disco inferno–or at least intimate that the Ukrainians would never tolerate any additional territorial gains in their country and in response to such a loss, build up stronger with the support of their allies, and strike back harder than ever before. Another rapid “dagger thrust” at Kyiv would be counterintuitive. One would expect Putin would have the most say in what to do next. Under this hypothetical situation, he would likely publicly or through classified orders, express his objectives for the next phase of the war, and from that, the concept and intent for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would be established. 

Equally difficult to imagine in this hypothetical circumstance is what could potentially be planned under Putin’s concept and intent, given the likely remaining strength of units in contact with the Ukrainians, shortages in weapons systems, ammunition, other supplies, and authentic forecasts of future casualties and expenditures of military resources. All of that would likely preclude plans to do anything big. To that extent, it is hard to see even under the most favorable circumstances where this whole enterprise is going for Putin. (Discernibly, greatcharlie to a great degree here mimics the worst sort of strict (toxic) instructor. However, no lessons are being offered.)

Assuredly, Putin had influenced some decisions in the field such as the move against Kyiv early on in the invasion. In preceding posts, greatcharlie previously discussed what it felt was his likely role in that fiasco. However, Putin more than likely had no idea what in actual fact needed to be done to succeed, and worse, was completely unaware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces were to successfully perform the mission he gave them. Likely believing everything else had been planned in a proper manner and prepared in the appropriate way, he doubtlessly could not have imagined that any “minimal input” from him on taking Kyiv could have so negatively shaped the entire picture of the operation.

To gnaw a bit further, if Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Maybe Putin could have micromanaged the military if he had earnestly made the effort after becoming Russian Federation President to develop the acumen to act as a quasi strategist and tactician, at least at a level greater than Shoigu and at a proficiency somewhat better than Gerasimov. Perhaps he could have accomplished this in the model of the guerilla fighters, Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi-Minh, or build on the military or paramilitary experiences that he had in government resemblant of US President Franklin Roosevelt, who, for seven years and throughout World Wat I, was an assistant secretary of the Navy, or United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who albeit he was a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, a decorated British Army officer, twice served as First Lord of the Admiralty. However, none of that happened for Putin. (Goodness, greatcharlie can only imagine what the backlash of some readers would have been if it had suggested there was some firm comparison of Roosevelt and Churchill with Putin. Á la Berezina!)

Although it is not discussed in this manner much in the newsmedia, it possibly could have been a terrible emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when he has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine to hear that an insider, his fidus Achates Prigozhin, was ready to take his Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) out of Ukraine. The Wagner Group, Putin’s ride or die–as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. As described briefly in greatcharlie’s May 15, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister, during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries. The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

A screenshot from a video published on May 5, 2023 depicting Wagner Group owner Yevgeny Prigozhin (above) announcing the organization’s planned exit from the fierce struggle in Bakhmut, Ukraine. Although it has not been parsed in the round in the international newsmedia, it surely must have been an emotional blow for Putin to hear at this stage when has circled the political wagons to better manage impressions at home as well as abroad concerning Ukraine that Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group) was ready to leave Ukraine. The Wagner Group–Putin’s “ride or die”, as the young people say–private military contractor, has always been there for him since 2012. The organization expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose Forces it jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would surely say, “rescue.” Wagner Group units were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred.

Where Is the Good Advice?

Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual may be facing, often the presumption from the outside is that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his “trauma smile” does its job of hiding what is going inside.. Satisfied with appearances, few would investigate further into the matter with vigor, especially if what might result from that exploration would not “harmonize” with recognized perceptions of said individual at high-levels of management. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. For a deeper dive, one would only need to consider in real terms what the inner conversation must be for the individual in question. In its October 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Selection of Surovikin as Russia’s Overall Commander in Ukraine, His Capabilities, and Possibilities for His Success”, greatcharlie took a look at what Putin’s inner conversation might have been at the time examining an historical example from Antiquity. (Usually, the potency of works from Antiquity is immediately apparent.) In Book VII, Chapter 234, section 1-3 of The Histories, Herotodus of Halicarnassus (c. 484 B.C. – c. 425 B.C.), the renowned Greek historian of the Hellenic period reconstructs a hypothetical conversation between the Persian King Xerxes, and his general and uncle, Demaratus. 

Herotodus writes: “Xerxes then sent for Demaratus and questioned him, saying first, “Demaratus you are a good man. I hold that proven by the plain truth, for things have turned out no differently than you foretold. Now, tell me this: how many Lacedaemonians are left, and how many of them are warriors like these? or is it so with them all?” “My king,” said Demaratus, “the number of the Lacedaemonians is great, and so too the number of their cities. But what you would like to know, I will tell you: there is in Lacedaemon a city called Sparta, a city of about eight thousand men, all of them equal to those who have fought here; the rest of the Lacedaemonians are not equal to these, yet they are valiant men.” “And how, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, “can we overcome those men with the least trouble to ourselves?” Come, disclose that to me, for you have been their king and know the plan and order of their counsels.” This passage of The Histories underscores the reality that even in a past age when leaders were viewed as something just short of gods, or actually as gods, there was the recognition that no matter how wise, there were things they could not know, things they could not control. 

The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before. The course of the invasion of Ukraine, the result of which he was certain of, may have left less doubt, if any, on the correctness of this hypothetical hope of his. 

True, Putin could choose to stumble forward against all the odds and eke-out whatever existence life presents after the Ukraine War at great personal loss for himself and the Russian Federation. However, that appears unlikely. If the records can serve as evidence, he will likely continue on the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022. That may mean triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West–that began during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the death of which he mourned with considerable grief.

Putin (above) attends the Collective Security Treaty Organization Leaders Meeting in Yerevan, Armenia on November 23, 2022. If Putin had some idea of what the genuine situation in Ukraine was and had been aware of how unprepared the Russian Federation Armed Forces really were, he would very likely have realized there was a “strategy resources mismatch.” Possessing the ability to use an iron fist to compel his commanders to perform and even possessing a better than average level skill in the operational art, would not have had an impact on the outcome. It is greatcharlie’s contention that if Putin could have fully recognized right off all of the deficiencies, delinquencies, and. negligence of Russian Federation commanders and there is a chance that he would have acted rapidly to correct the situation before rolling his troops into Ukraine. Perchance Putin may not have gone into Ukraine at all if he had knowledge of all the realities.

Unlike the aforementioned Xerxes of Persia, for Putin there is no uncle and general as Demaratus, to put him in the full, genuine picture of what he faces and authentic possibilities for action. Perhaps even more, someone to stimulate genius. Holding its focus upon the Ancient World, greatcharlie is unaware of any equivalents of the Ephors of Sparta to whom Putin can turn. An Ephor (Overseer) discussed in intermittently–yet too often to properly cite here–in the Hellenica (c. 362 BC) by the Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC), was a member of a board of five magistrates in Sparta, annually elected by the body of eligible voting citizens. They were experienced and wise individuals whose advice was worth a king’s ransom. Ephors had an extensive range of judicial, religious, legislative, and military powers, and could shape Sparta’s domestic and foreign affairs. Their primary responsibility, however, was to oversee the actions of Spartan kings. They could critique a ruler’s plans for war,use their extra powers to reel in a ruler, and reproach them for the unsound actions. This had greater necessity and meaning due to the fact that Sparta was ruled by two hereditary kings of the Agiad and Eurypontid families, both supposedly descendants of Heracles and equal in authority, so that one could not act against the power and political enactments of his colleague. In concept, the Ephors’ purpose was akin to that of a US Congressional Oversight Committee, mutatis mutandis, for executives of foreign and national security bureaucracies who must often face withering inquiries on their policy plans or ongoing initiatives, among many other issues. In greatcharlie’s May 15. 2023 post entitled “Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow”, it was briefly mentioned that the US Congress established the War Powers Act of 1973 in the wake of the Vietnam War to gain a better handle on the ability of the US President to intervene with the armed forces. In the Congress, stronger action toward chief executives whose actions were deemed out of bounds by the majority of Representatives has included impeachment proceedings. (Recognizably, Congress unfortunately in more recent times has overreached on simple matters as simple as phone calls preferring to react upon impressions, presumptions, and political and public pressure, than actualities. Perhaps it could be chalked up to human nature, human fallibility.)

The situations presented in the two examples from past and present noted here are quite different from that of Putin. In accord with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the President is elected directly by popular vote, is head of state, and chief of a multi-party system. Executive power is exercised by the government, headed by the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President with a legislature’s approval. Legislative power is vested in the two houses of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, an upper house of appointed representatives from each of Russia’s administrative divisions, and the State Duma, a 450-member popularly elected lower house. Still, it is the President’s office and the government ministries which issue numerous legally binding by-laws. 

All of this being stated, the common wisdom is that Putin is an autocrat who holds near limitless power under the system he created. On foreign and national security policy, he faces no obstructions concerning his decisionmaking on diplomacy and war. Putin has no need to end-run the Federal Assembly, no need to heed advice as precious as that of the Ephors from Senators of the Federal Council of Representatives of the State Duma. He runs the whole show. Managing the internal affairs of the Russian Federation on its own is a colossal task, and surely as a one man show, Putin has made his share of mistakes and is bound to make more mistakes into future. He is not a deity; as aforementioned, he is only human. Taking on not only Ukraine militarily but the wherewithal of nearly every Western country and others, without relinquishing on scintilla of responsibility for normal duties, there would be the likelihood that he would drop an almighty clanger. Perhaps the Ukraine venture could best be described as a blunder of a lifetime.

Beneath the Surface

Alios ego vidi ventos, alias prospexi animo procellas. (I have seen other winds and faced other storms.) Putin may secretly worry that good answers may never be found, not even mere acceptable ones to his problems regarding Ukraine. As already hinted, everything he has, his hopes, his future, the future he has planned for his country, are under the real threat of dissolution. His imagination would not be at work overtime on these points. Indeed, such thoughts may be unfixed, moving about freely in his mind, perhaps billowing up at inconvenient moments. Among ordinary individuals, such thoughts can break through the strongest defense the mind can raise against them. Putin is not outwardly despondent, although there have been public moments when he was not exactly his usual self.

Surely, it would be one thing if Putin had brought disaster and suffering upon himself alone by his actions. That would pain him, but he would almost certainly be able to carry it well.  Casualty lists from Ukraine are likely far more difficult for him to carry. Unless one has faced similar circumstances, one might safely say it is hard to imagine–surely impossible for greatcharlie to imagine–how it all must feel. Perhaps the situation would be made far worse if the Russian people had decided to light on him over the war’s progress, but that has not happened. 

In a poll of Russian Federation citizens on the direct question of whether they supported the war conducted by the independent and well-known research group in the country, the Levada Center, it was found that respondents who said yes fluctuated between 74 and 76 percent in April 2022 and August 2022, declined to about 71 to 74 percent in September 2022 and December 2022, and climbed back to around 75 percent to 77 percent in January 2023 and February 2023. The Levada Center utilizes face-to-face polling. In a poll on support for the war conducted by The Chronicle, a one year-old polling group, it was found that support rose in the first months of the war from 59 to 66 percent. Support then declined to 51 percent, its lowest point, at the end of September 2022. Yet, by February 2023, support rose upward again to 59 percent. The Chronicle conducted its polling by telephone. The Chronicle also offered respondents the option “I do not want to answer” in addition to the usual “undecided” option, which reduced the share of both war supporters and war opponents. The recent polling start-up, The Russian Field, conducted a survey which indicated support for the war rose to nearly 60 percent at its start and then stabilized at about 66–68 percent.  The Russian Field also used the telephone survey method.

Clearly, support for the war is nowhere near overwhelming, yet given its progress it still appears rather high. Any external effort to create the impression that there is no support for the war among Russian Federation citizens or an effort to stir sentiment against Putin would most likely fall flat. There is likely no greater priority for Borrnikov than to make certain that is the case. While considering Putin’s effort to get a hold of his thinking on all that has transpired and what he must do next, the lyrics of singer-songwriter James Taylor’s 1970 hit “Fire and Rain” were brought to mind. The apposite lines are: “Been walking my mind to an easy time / My back turned towards the sun / Lord knows, when the cold wind blows / It’ll turn your head around / Well, there’s hours of time on the telephone line / To talk about things to come / Sweet dreams and flying machines in pieces on the ground.”

A somber Putin (above) attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Important to note is the actuality that despite an awareness of the monumental hardships an individual has been facing, it is often the presumption from the outside that everything is fine because of the individual’s poker face or what could be characterized as his trauma smile does its job of hiding what is going inside them. Satisfied with appearances, few would invest much more into the matter. Perhaps that is the accepted nature of human behavior in 2023. The Ukraine matter cannot be easily remedied. Putin watched his predecessors mismanage, breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside of the system. Despite his best efforts, he was unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating a stronger, greater version of the Soviet Union as he seems to have hoped. To be fair, he has produced, at least within the borders of the Russian Federation, a reasonable facsimile of what came before it. In the extreme, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down the whole tattered simulacrum of what came before.

Throwing a Curveball at the West

As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given the Kremlin’s Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. At the same time, individuals as Putin can often have unique reasons for singular choices. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might cause him to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be the state of Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing but nevertheless distressing curveball at the West. 

If only out of academic interest, greatcharlie considers how seeking answers from outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies could potentially be useful to Putin, and what the potential outcome of quietly taking such an unexpected course might assist in fostering new ideas and approaches in the Kremlin. No matter how unorthodox, disagreeable, or round the bend as they might seem, it might behoove some managers in US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies to consider it and other possible, albeit recherché, eventualities and apply them in analyzing Putin’s decisionmaking process. Doing so might serve to improve the chances at accurately predicting any “unexpected” moves. (In previous posts concerning the conundrum of the very successful and unhindered Chinese intelligence operations within the US, greatcharlie benignly made the suggestion that US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies make use of those capable of performing analyses of the situation from outside the box.)

Over the years of Putin’s leadership, a small number of organizations in the Russian Federation have been invited to share their views through studies and presentations with the government on foreign and national security policy issues. At the top of the heap are: the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the Valdai Discussion Club, the Russian International Affairs Council, and the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. Given their size, political contacts, and financial means, these organizations are able to dominate the think tank scene in the Russian Federation. As aptly put by the Atlantic Council in a November 12, 2019 report, they represent albeit from different ideological angles, the rather volatile mainstream. If novel ideas and insights are being developed those organizations, it would seem they are being put forward at glacial speed. Indeed, the indications and implications of what Moscow continues to do are that nothing Putin has received so far from what might suffice for “outside the bureaucracies advice” has had the power to moved events forward Moscow’s way in a manner befitting a power of the size, strength, and prominence in the world–at least from Putin’s lens.

Putin signing documents, including a decree recognizing two Russian-backed breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine as independent entities, during a ceremony in Moscow, Russia, February 21, 2022. As briefly mentioned earlier, a firm understanding of how foreign and national security bureaucracies within the Russian Federation “think” on issues as well as information collected via exquisite surveillance technologies of Western intelligence services, has given their Western “opponents” a leg up on what is likely being recommended in situations whether heeded by the Kremlin or not. In a possible scenario, the paucity of good, useful answers and insights emanating from the Russian Federation foreign and national security bureaucracies might lead Putin to consider soliciting thinking from outside of them. Such may be Putin’s anxiety over this grave matter that he might seek an unorthodox path to power out of the huge mess he is ultimately responsible for. Application of an inventive line of thinking, if of real value, might throw an intriguing, but nevertheless distressing, curveball at the West.

As aforementioned, greatcharlie, without pretension, states that it doubts anyone at the Kremlin is aware of, or would  have the slightest interest in, its scribblings. However, there is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide advice for Putin concerning the prosecution of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. If any readers feel that anything as such is being offered to Putin, then it would surely be unreasonable for them in particular to continue reviewing this commentary with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

A reality about analytical departments of foreign and national security bureaucracies worldwide is that certain dogma insinuates itself in work produced within them, and it can color the thinking of consumers of that product. Supervisors in the analytical departments, knowingly and occasionally unknowingly because it would only be human, may place limitations on what paths, albeit even reasonable and logical ones, that analyses can move along. By using perspectives from outside of the foreign and national security bureaucracies, one could possibly garner a fresh look at issues from other angles. New thinking might rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. Condescendingly, some from the inside Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outside of the bureaucracies thinkers as mere shots in the dark, guesswork, and suppositions, from those perceived as lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to the Ukraine issue. With no intent to offend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. 

One looking for fresh, viable solutions would expect and perhaps want “outside of the bureaucracies” thinking to move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in singular cases such as Ukraine that may be hard to crack. What the outside of the bureaucracies thinker brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies thinker. One might suppose the length and breadth of the outside of the bureaucracies thinkers’ distinctive knowledge and unique life lessons are what found their alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been acquired through personal study. Of course, bog-standard thinking would still have its place in other simpler issues.

Each reason shared here concerning a hypothetical decision by Putin to seek assistance for ideas and insights outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies is suggestive of itself. Together they have a cumulative force. At the same time, one could also conjure more than one reason to doubt this outcome. As mentioned, Putin has not as yet taken any unorthodox approaches in his handling of the Ukraine matter or any other foreign or national security policy matters. Some observers might argue that there are distinct patterns in his decisionmaking. Deviations from his standard course would be as shockingly noticeable, to steal a phrase from one of Arthur Conan Doyle’s 56 Sherlock Holmes short stories, “The Adventure of the Bruce-Partington Plans” (1917): “as if you met a tram-car coming down a country lane.” (One could easily imagine seeing such in a film created by Austrian director Marie Kreutzer.) To double-dunk on Doyle’s work, one might say that Putin has his rails and he runs on them, so to speak. However, perhaps one disappointment after another in Ukraine may not have derailed him, but may have stirred some interest in possibly switching at the points to an alternative rail untravelled by him before. What is being considered here is not just Putin’s attitudes and behaviors in spite of his experiences with Ukraine, but the possibility of some alterations in such because of those experiences. To that extent, one might also argue that the record of his two decades of leadership in the Russian Federation actually shows that Putin’s mind has its quirks, and in that respect it is as individual and curious as any other. As Maurice de Saxe (October 28, 1696-November 20, 1750) the famed military commander of the 18th century stated in the preface of his Mes Rêveries (My Reveries) (1757), “routine and prejudices are . . . a natural consequence of ignorance.”

At a time of national emergency, which the Ukraine War represents for the Russian Federation, its citizens may likely feel compelled to step forward to support their homeland. Since work as a foreign and national security policy analyst of a kind ostensibly would not include being shot at, it would seem safe enough for some to volunteer to serve. Yet, with all of that being stated, one must remain conscious of the fact that in the Russian Federation, individuals can face very difficult circumstances following even the innocuous contact with the federal government. This reality is at great variance with the general experience of individuals living in Western democracies after contact with respective governments. (Of course, in some cases, Western governments, too, can find limitless ways to betray the expectations, faith, and trust of their citizens. On this point, greatcharlie writes from experience.) 

To that extent, perhaps scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside of those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing it is possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them. 

Punishment might especially be a concern if Putin himself were to take direct interest in their efforts. If he were somehow personally disappointed by how information received negatively impacted an outcome, there would be good reason for those who supplied that information to worry. Many outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies might feel that the whole issue of Ukraine is such an emotionally charged issue among Putin and his advisers that, perchance, nothing offered would likely be deemed satisfactory. In the end, it would be enough of a tragedy to find themselves and those close to them under the radar of hostile individuals with whom anyone living in relative peace would loathe to be in contact. Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

File photo of Putin as a young KGB officer (above). At an early age, Putin revealed to his parents that he wanted to work in the security services. The genesis of the idea were books and spy movies. Putin says his mother and father, with the help of his martial arts coaches, tried to dissuade him from his career choice given the nature of the work and people within such organizations, but to no avail. A few years later, his dream became a reality. Perhaps today scholars and analysts outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would not be quick to provide any reports or interviews. There might be a morbid fear among many scholars and analysts outside those organizations to offer insights and options in such a hypothetical situation believing its possible that the failure to bring forth favorable outcomes, even if their concepts were obviously misunderstood or misapplied might only antagonize those who they earnestly sought to assist. There would be reason to fear they would be held accountable for the result and some severe punishment would be leveled against them.  Given all the imaginable pitfalls, based stories of the experiences of others, in this hypothetical situation, those who might have something of real value to contribute may decide or their respective families and friends might insist, that it would be far better and safer not to get involved.

In Part 2, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that at an early age, he wanted to serve in intelligence. His family was dismayed, but not shattered by his decision. His father, given his experience in the Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, was painfully aware of the grave nature of work in that field. However, once they became fully apprised of the extreme nature of his ambition to join the intelligence service, his parents sought to discourage him as best they could. When Putin’s martial arts coach, Anatoly Rakhlin, who he fondly called “Semyonovich”, went to see them to say that as an athlete, their son could get into an Institute practically without passing exams, that led his parents to pressure the coach to encourage him to go into an Institute. Putin, however, disagreed with the idea. Semyonovich could not fathom why Putin resisted. Another coach from Putin’s martial arts club, Leonid Ionovich, came to visit, fully informed of his decision to join the intelligence service. As Putin explained it, “He was a clever guy.” Recounting the exchange with Ionovich over his career choice, Putin said the following: “‘Well,’ he [Ionovich] said to me, ‘Where are you going?’ Of course he already knew. He was just acting sly. I said, ‘To university.’ ‘Oh, that’s great, good for you,’ he said. In what department?'” Putin says he only replied, “The law school.” Then, Ionovich roared: “What? To catch people? What are you doing? You’ll be a cop. Do you understand?” Insulted, Putin yelled back, “I’m not going to be a cop.” (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.) Putin would hardly be surprised if very few who truly had much to offer would come forward knowing they were hearing similar things about serving his government that those who cared deeply about him said concerning his interest in getting anywhere near the Soviet intelligence service

Quomodo in perpetua pace salvi et liberi esse poterimus? (How (in what way) will we be able to be safe and free in everlasting (an enduring) peace?) Returning to the idea of seeking answers from analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, on the face of it,  surely it would  be unwise for Putin not to avail himself of their services if they could be of assistance. Additionally mentioned in Book 2, Chapter 4, Section 31, Book 3, Chapter 4, Section 11, and  Book 4, Chapter 5, Section 6 of Xenophon’s Hellenica are the embassies. (The role of the embassies is also discussed in Herodotus (c. 484-c. 425 BC) The Histories (c. 426 BCE-c. 415 BCE) in Book 5, Chapter 49-51 and in Thucydides (c. 460 BC–400 BC) The History of the Peloponnesian War (c. 430 BC) Book 2, Chapter 12, Section I and Book 8, Chapter 5, Section I.)

As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracies thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than a mouse and as solid as Stonehenge. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, ideas and insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. 

Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

Again, this is all hypothetical. It is possible that defeating any hypothetical outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies approaches potentially taken by Moscow would only require the energetic preparation for such a possibility by repeatedly considering and working through all of the “what-ifs”, the possible eventualities, on an appropriate schedule.

Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov (above). As noted earlier, Putin has formidable diplomatic capability which resides in Lavrov. Perhaps the Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with the assistance of some outside of the bureaucracy thinking, might be able to give birth to something far greater than mouse and as solid as Stonehenge, that may help resolve the Ukraine conundrum. In Lavrov’s organization under this hypothetical, insights provided by analysts and scholars from outside of the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies would hardly serve to compete with or replace existing analyses within the organization. They would likely serve as a much needed supplement, a burst of energy and breath of fresh air in the effort to find the best solutions with the ultimate aim of promoting the Kremlin’s goals. Under Lavrov’s direction, one might expect veteran analysts within his ministry would be tasked with adding conceptual rigor and clarity to the work of the outsiders without discernibly altering it or weakening it. That effort would surely improve the validity and utility of what is produced from this novel approach. Lavrov, himself, would be the best judge of the quality and acceptability of what is developed and determine whether any product  should be advanced to the prime consumer in the Kremlin’s Senate Building.

The Way Forward

It remains to be seen what will come next. In Act II, scene iii of William Shakespeare’s play, All’s Well That Ends Well (1623), standing in the King’s Palace, Lafeu, an old lord at the court of France, opens the scene with the comment regard the king’s miraculous recovery: “They say miracles are past; and we have our / philosophical persons, to make modern and familiar, / things supernatural and causeless. Hence is it that / we make trifles of terrors, ensconcing ourselves / into seeming knowledge, when we should submit / ourselves to an unknown fear.” While greatcharlie has not come across a cogent argument proving that events in Ukraine represent something supernatural or that one should submit to fears of the unknown, there is pertinence in the statement that trifles should not be made of terrors, especially as they regard nuclear war or that feel assured at all about Putin’s next moves. 

What stands near certain is whatever measurable degree of peace and security existed before the invasion of Ukraine will unlikely be restored. Each side in this conflict seems bent upon ensuring the other will not find satisfaction with any agreement that would obviate complete victory. An authentic forecast for the situation could only project a situation worse than before or the worst thing imaginable. When things are very wrong, one must remember they can always be worse. One only needs to imagine the possibilities. At least, there is a clear choice for both sides: take an albeit uncomfortable step toward peace; or, let things play out as they are moving now. Neque porro quisquam est, qui dolorem ipsum, quia dolor sit, amet, consectetur, adipisci velit, sed quit non numquam eius modi tempora incidunt, ut labore et dolore magnam aliquam quaerat voluptatem. (There is no one who loves pain itself, who seeks it and wants to have it, simply because it is pain, but because sometimes circumstances arise in such a way that with effort and pain they can obtain some great pleasure.)

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Brief Meditations on Putin and Small Suggestions That May Support Achieving Peace Through Diplomacy

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). in preceding posts, greatcharlie attempted to plunge a little deeper into Putin’s mind to better understand how he thinks and offer not just insights on decisions that he has made, but foresight on decisions he might make in the immediate future and beyond concerning Ukraine. What Western decisionmakers require is some reliable foresight into Putin’s actions. This essay will be too brief to put one in the full picture, even if greatcharlie had that faculty. The hope instead is to present glimmers of light that may stimulate thinking among readers on new lines of thought and provide kernels of ideas on how to proceed for foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmaking.

On February 24, 2022, frightful predictions of a Russian invasion were realized as Russian forces moved into the country from several points, to include attacks from the territory of Belarus. So many had hoped that the possibility of war would remain just a possibility, and good minds in Western capitals would find some solution and reach an agreement with Moscow by which Ukraine, Russia, and NATO, and the West in general would be satisfied. Evidently, in Ukraine, many wanted to avoid war to the extent they acted as if it were an unlikely possibility. With the surprise and shock barely worn off most Ukrainians at the time of this writing, some have scrambled to move West in order to escape the oncoming death and destruction, and others have joined the Ukrainian Armed Forces or have simply taken up arms in order to be part of a planned insurgency. They are ready and regularly giving all in defense of their homeland.

Not unexpectedly, at the center of it all is Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and his mindset. Concerning the Ukraine crisis, the matter with Putin runs deeper, more subtle than it seems many might suppose. One might be aware of this given the multitude of reports on Putin attempting to see reason in his actions. With considerable discomposure, greatcharlie states that many one sided analyses of Putin and the current crisis continue to stifle the advancement of understanding about him. That in turn may be hampering effective action and keeping diplomacy stagnated. One sided analyses fail to genuinely consider the other party’s thoughts and needs. In preceding posts, greatcharlie attempted to plunge a little deeper into Putin’s mind to better understand how he thinks and offer not just insights on decisions he has made but foresight on decisions he might make in the immediate future and beyond. To be effective, top foreign and national security policy decisionmakers need to attain a full understanding of both Putin and new situations as they begin to develop. This essay will be too brief to put one in the full picture, even if greatcharlie had that faculty. The hope instead is to present glimmers of light that may stimulate the thinking of readers on new lines of thought and kernels of ideas on how to proceed mainly for US foreign and national security policy analysts and decisionmakers, as well as analysts and decisionmakers of other Western governments, too. The word heart-wrenching marginally describes scenes viewed worldwide on broadcast and online newsmedia of Ukrainians ruined by war. One cannot look without compassion at what is happening there. With emotions about Ukraine running high, greatcharlie approaches the subject of Ukraine with caution. What comes to mind are words of the 17th century French actor and master of comedy in Western literature, Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, known as Molière. In one of his best-known dramas, “The Misanthrope” or “Le Misanthrope ou l’Atrabilaire Amoureux”, Molière writes the sardonic advisory to which greatcharlie has always paid heed: “That any gentleman should always keep in stern control this writing itch we’re seized with; That he must hold in check the great impatience We feel to give the world these idle pastimes; For, through this eagerness to show our works, ‘Tis likely we shall cut a foolish figure’.”

Putin at press conference following bilateral meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban on February 1, 2022 (above). Putin insists that his government invaded Ukraine for the sake of the Russian people and ethnic-Russians in Ukraine. Surely, Putin doubtlessly believes that everything he does is for the sake of the Russian people. To go a step further, Putin very likely sees himself as a sort of avenger of ethnic-Russians in Ukraine, defender of the people of Russia, and protector of the Russian Orthodox Church and all else that is Russian.

Putin’s Explanation for the War

In his February 24, 2022 televised speech on Ukraine, Putin laid out the reasoning behind his decision to invade Ukraine. Outlining his authority to invade Ukraine, in his own words, Putin explained: “In accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the UN Charter, with permission of Russia’s Federation Council, and in execution of the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic, ratified by the Federal Assembly on February 22, I made a decision to carry out a special military operation.” As for his reasoning for the invasion, Putin stated: “The purpose of this operation is to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarise and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation.” As for the scope of the special military operation, Putin explained: “It is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory. We do not intend to impose anything on anyone by force. At the same time, we have been hearing an increasing number of statements coming from the West that there is no need any more to abide by the documents setting forth the outcomes of World War II, as signed by the totalitarian Soviet regime. How can we respond to that?”

Boiled down, Putin stated with conviction that his government invaded Ukraine for the sake of the Russian people and ethnic-Russians in Ukraine. Surely, Putin doubtlessly believes that everything he does is for the sake of the Russian people. To go a step further, Putin very likely sees himself as a sort of avenger for ethnic-Russians in Ukraine, defender of the people of Russia, and protector of the Russian Orthodox Church and all else that is Russia. For almost every other national leader, there is no valid argument to support his choice. Most of the world would likely agree that what he has done is brustschmerzangst, strange and just wrong. In taking this dark, murderous route of invading Ukraine, Putin has sufficiently made the case, once again, that he can be a cruel monster. Few could reasonably deny that Putin cuts the figure of an immoral and cruel ethno-religious nationalist, not exactly steered spiritually by the precepts and strictures of the Russian Orthodox Church, but seemingly by obsession with his own hatred. Hardly any newsmedia commentators in the West, just to stir debate, would go through any pains to single out the points in Putin’s favor. Given choices of whom to alienate on the world stage, Putin has made the top of list. 

In Book X, Section 38 of his Meditations (161 AD-180 AD) the Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (April 26, 121 AD-March 17, 180 AD), stated the following about the inner thinking of individuals: “Remember that what pulls the strings is the force hidden within; there lies the power to persuade, there the life,—there, if one must speak out, the real man.” In continuing its discussion on Putin, greatcharlie recognizes that many readers may not find the discussion immediately following satisfying, but it is asked that readers allow some room for maneuver on the following points.

All that has transpired in Russia since Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared the Russian Federation as a sovereign country, no longer a republic of the collapsed Soviet Union, has been the manifestation of Putin’s vigorous, and yes, masterful mind. Even the criminal mind can be regarded as masterful. Coldly exploring Putin, given his accomplishments despite his atrocious actions, it could be assessed that Putin is indeed a noteworthy individual. (The same might be said of Satan!) Perhaps some might coldly assess that Putin has been somewhat brave in the way that he spoke for what he says he believes in, brave in the way he takes on challenges presented to him and challenges he creates. He is ruled by his passions. if an Russian Orthodox Catholic priest, he would become the Primate. If a musician, he would rule the stage. None of this is not stated out of any respect or deference, but clear-headed consideration.

Within the foreign and national security bureaucracies of Western governments, formulating the best response diplomatically on Ukraine will mean better understanding Putin and how he thinks. Analyses within the US foreign and national security bureaucracies, given their access of analysts to intelligence reports, access to classified information collected by friendly foreign governments, their institutional knowledge and experience, etcetera, are understood to be a cut above that of the mainstream newsmedia. Stating this with no intention to offend, it would seem given outcomes and newsmedia reporting on the matter, that presently despite special sources, greater capabilities, and nuances, those bureaucracies are seemingly producing analyses somewhat similar to what the aforementioned newsmedia has on Putin. As a result, finding answers to cope effectively with Putin has been made far more challenging. It was once common wisdom that significant US involvement alone in earlier times would have had a steading effect. However, it does not appear to have such powers at the present. Neither promises nor “vague” threats from the US could induce Putin to pull back his forces and refrain from invading Ukraine. International law and maintaining international peace and security mean absolutely nothing to Putin any more.

The agreement Moscow signed promising not to invade Ukraine is the Budapest Memorandum. Drawn up in 1994, the Budapest Memorandum essentially states that Ukraine, having agreed to relinquish its nuclear arsenal which at the time was the third-largest in world, would be assured its sovereignty and territorial integrity by the other countries that signed the deal. Ukraine’s nuclear warheads would be transferred to Russia for decommissioning, and Ukraine would join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. Other than then Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, the memorandum was signed by then US President Bill Clinton, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, and the United Kingdom Prime Minister John Major. With regard to assuring Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Ukraine was only provided a politically binding security assurances to respect its independence and sovereignty which guaranteed its existing borders. The US was unwilling to agree to intervene then should Ukraine’s sovereignty be breached, and it clearly remains unwilling today. The government in Kyiv in 1994 very strangely put Ukraine in a wickedly precarious situation, relying too heavily on the goodwill of other countries. They did not know what the future would bring. Surely, they could not forsee or imagine the present-day Russian invasion. For Ukrainians, the deal reached in Budapest was a very bad one.

Putin interrogating the head of the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service on February 21, 2022 during a Security Council meeting the Kremlin. (above). Western analysts have created the impression that they are unable to see Putin straight. CNN on March 1, 2022 reported that the US intelligence community has made evaluating Putin’s state of mind a top priority, seeking to establish how that is affecting his handling of the rapidly escalating Ukraine crisis. Although the US intelligence community has spent many years evaluating Putin, and possesses a considerable institutional knowledge about him, CNN noted that it has “a notoriously poor view into his day-to-day decision-making. The Kremlin remains what intelligence officials call a “hard target”–incredibly difficult to penetrate through traditional espionage.”

The Hopeless Search for a ‘Good Reason” for This War

Concerning the reasons for things,, the renowned “spy novelist” John Le Carre in his blockbuster work Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy (Simon & Schuster, 1972) had his main character explain reason can be founded in three ways: “reason is logic”; “reason is motive”; and, “reason is a way of life.” Among those who examine Putin regularly, some surely would find his recent decision-making very difficult to reconcile within the settled order of nature. To that extent it is worth examining because it is inexplicable. The rational part of greatcharlie insists upon it.

A common theme heard in Western foreign policy circles and newsmedia concerning Putin’s attitude and behavior before and during the first few days of the invasion was that Putin was bent on reestablishing the Soviet Union as it existed before its collapse. Standing in the way of that expansion, was his perception of alleged expansionist aims of NATO. That perceived NATO expansion into Ukraine, which remains a real “threat,” an absolutely horrifying possibility to Putin and his advisers. Boastfully, provokingly Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky amplified the notion of Ukraine joining NATO before and more so right after the invasion. and before the invasion, his words likely stayed with Putin much as a song that would not get out of his head. In the fragile negotiations organized on the initiative of Ukraine and Russia since the invasion began, and endorsed by the US and other Western countries, Zelensky has back tracked on the matter, saying NATO membership is no longer an immutable position of Kyiv. However, that is due to the fact that far greater matters concerning Ukraine’s future, including the retention of its territory, are now at stake. Once a very weighty issue is now a simple bargaining chip of value yet to be fully determined at the negotiating table.

Intriguingly, US intelligence officials have made their assessments that Putin cannot be seen straight. CNN on March 1, 2022 reported that the US intelligence community has made evaluating Putin’s state of mind a top priority, seeking to establish how that is affecting his handling of the rapidly escalating Ukraine crisis. Although the US intelligence community has spent many years evaluating Putin, and possesses a considerable institutional knowledge about him as greatcharlie alluded to earlier when discuss the US foreign and national security bureaucracies, CNN noted that it has “a notoriously poor view into his day-to-day decision-making. The Kremlin remains what intelligence officials call a “hard target”–incredibly difficult to penetrate through traditional espionage.” In fact, CNN reported, based on information from an official source, that there has not been any new comprehensive assessment by the US Intelligence Community that indicates a particular change to Putin’s overall health. (It would appear that Gospodin Vladimir Vladimirovich has been terribly unhelpful concerning US efforts to evaluate him!) The fact that such a gap in knowledge and understanding about aspects of Putin’s life exist should not at all be satisfactory for the US Congress or for executives and managers within the Intelligence Community, itself.

Interestingly enough, there was also no serious discussion of Putin being off-key in the months leading to the invasion or even on February 24, 2022. In preceding posts on Ukraine, greatcharlie noted with curiosity that national leaders in the West, despite declaring Putin a violent, loathsome man, rarely if ever put into question his mental state. Thiere was no discussion of Putin’s mental state as he began the build up of Russian forces near Ukraine in 2021. On March 31, 2021, when the US European Command raised its awareness level to “potential imminent crisis” in response to estimates that over 100,000 Russian troops had been positioned along its border with Ukraine and within Crimea, in addition to its naval forces in the Sea of Azov. Indeed, European Command made it quite clear that there were signs of potential violence. An assessment of Putin’s mental state that greatly called into question his ostensible preparations to blindly inflict harm on the people of Ukraine may have changed everything for top decisionmakers in Western governments..

Observing how Putin was being perceived in Moscow, there was apparently no concern among political leaders about his mental state. indeed,, he was actually provided even greater powers by Russian political leaders to carry out his plans for Ukraine. On February 15, 2022, Russia’s parliament, the State Duma, voted overwhelmingly to ask Putin to formally recognize Donetskaya Narodnaya Respublika (Donetsk People’s Republic)or Donetsk and Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika (Lugansk People’s Republic or Luhansk People’s Republic) or Luhansk. Before the invasion, Donetsk and Luhansk were still inhabited by somewhat large populations despite the heavy fighting between Ukrainian forces and separatists within them. According to the World Population Review, in 2021, the population in Donetsk was 899,325 and in Luhansk was 398,505. Fighting in both areas was exceedingly heavy. Eventually both movements declared their provinces independent republics. Putin took the step authorized by the Duma. The greatest concern in the West when Hi did so was the fact that it meant a formal end to Russia’s role in maintaining the integrity of the ceasefire between Ukrainian and separatist forces constructed under the Minsk Agreements. Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin said on Telegram after the vote: “Kyiv does not comply with the Minsk agreements. Our citizens and compatriots living in Donbas need help and support,” He went on to state: “In this regard, [Duma lawmakers] believe the recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics will create grounds for guaranteeing the security and protection of their inhabitants from external threats.”

Returning more directly to the issue of Western perceptions of Putin’s mental state, surely, there are those among US foreign and national security policy analysts who conversely would assess that his recent actions are consistent with those prior. An example provided in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post entitled, Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help”, Putin would be willing to Russia to challenging and uncertain military operations. The prime example offered was the second on Chechnya by Russian forces in 1999. Russian forces went in depite having been unsuccessful in an operation there three years earlier. Speculation about Putin’s mental health became most popular after his broadcast address on his decision to order a special military operation against Ukraine. Reportedly, the most shocking aspect of the address for top officials was the justification he gave for the invasion. On February 25, 2022, US Senator Marco Rubio relayed on Twitter @marcorubio that Putin “has always been a killer, but his problem now is different & significant,” suggesting he was basing his assessment on intelligence briefings given to him as the vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He tweeted further: “I wish I could share more,but for now I can say it’s pretty obvious to many that something is off with #Putin.” Summing up all that he could say publicly what he gleaned from the briefing Rubio stated: “It would be a mistake to assume this Putin would react the same way he would have 5 years ago.”

CNN on March 1, 2022 noted that following the Congressional briefing that Rubio attended, the floodgates further opened regarding Putin’s mental state. Former US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul who served in that post during the administration of US President Barack Obama tweeted that Putin had “changed,” and sounded “completely disconnected from reality” and “unhinged.” Former Director of National Intelligence Jim Clapper, who also served under Obama, referred to Putin on CNN as “unhinged” and warned, “I worry about his acuity and balance.”

A photo from the Stasi archives in Dresden picture of Putin (second from the left) standing with a group of senior Soviet and East German military and security officers and officials. There are those who would point to Putin’s service in the Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the virtual nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership. Yet, through that service, he certainly would be aware of numerous acts of sacrifice and valor by Ukrainians in the service of the KGB. It would seem remembering those KGB comrades would cause Putin pause and compel him to reflect hard on such a decision to invade Ukraine. Fraternité! However, clearly such thoughts about his KGB service provided no barrier to his actions.

When one moves into the realm of conjecture, one guess is as good as another. What may not make sense to one, might speak volumes to another. Among other, more recherché, even outré, explanations for Putin’s behavior are the following. There are those who would point to Putin’s service in the behemoth Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the virtual nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership. Yet, that same KGB service surely had Putin working alongside Ukrainians who he appreciated and observed serving the service well in what was once East Germany. He certainly would be aware of numerous acts of sacrifice and valor by Ukrainians in the service of the KGB. It would seem remembering those KGB comrades would cause Putin pause and compel him to reflect hard on such a decision to invade Ukraine. Fraternité! However, clearly such thoughts about his KGB service provided no barrier to his actions. Interestingly, as Putin place much concern over the history of Ukraine in his calculus of how to proceed, he conversely would likely say thoughts of his KGB would not be relevant. What is most pertinent are circumstances as they exist today! Hearing his thoughts on the intersection of these matters would surely reveal an intriguing duality. 

Putin himself has played a active deliberate role in glazing over any prospective windows into him with staged scenes for worldwide newsmedia distribution. The truth of the moment is anyone’s guess. Putin likely has a near bottomless bag of tricks. The more recherché his behavior, the greater attention it gets and the greater its chances of retention. In the aforementioned CNN report of March 1, 2022, it is noted that one US official told the newsmedia house that US intelligence officials “have been on guard for the possibility that Putin’s strategy may well be to project instability, in an attempt to push the US and allies to give him what he wants for fear that he could do worse.” Still further, Putin, after all, is a fan of comedy. Supposedly, one of his films was “Ivan Vasilyevich Menyayet Professiyu” (“Ivan Vasilyevich Changes Profession”) (1973), a Soviet comedic film in which Ivan IV “The Terrible” is accidentally transported by time a machine in a apartment building to the present and the apartment building superintendent and a petty thief are sent to the 16th century a try to require themselves as Ivan the Terrible and a duke of his court. Absolute madness ensues. Russian cultural references, dry humor, and crni humor, is found in many of the characters’ lines. What may have tickled Putin about the film is not so much what was unexpected, but those things that were also outré. (When Putin is in a good mood, certainly unlikely the way he is today, one might speak figuratively that even the heavy planet Saturn which symbolizes maturity, responsibility, discipline, and stewardship, would laugh and leap with him. Yet, this is beside the question.) Surely, there is nothing humorous about anything Putin has done in Ukraine, but again concerning the diplomatic front and political warfare front, as mentioned the US Intelligence Community might agree, he is well-aware of the type of impact certain images, some possibly facetious, would most likely have upon Western observers.

Considering Putin’s recent behavior, perhaps it is not so much that Putin has changed, it may be the case that he has just gotten a little older, and that could have been expected. With age everything changes. Without any intention to appear ageist, greatcharlie suggests that this is an idea lost of many under 65. Of course, not every senior is the same. Some individuals actually shine brighter and find their true selves. Some do not change at all, either for the better or for the worse. Yet, perhaps it is very well the case that Putin, at 69, has entered a new era and has lost interest in what he might perceive as shoe-horning himself into Western constructs to gain some sense of attainment, sense of arrival, sense of assuring Russia a place on the world stage, the first tier. Knowing that Russia is a superpower, whether foreigners agree or not, may now be enough for him. Ukraine evinces this suggested mindset well.

While greatcharlie always senses it is moving out on shaky ground when suggesting medical causality for an individual’s behavior, but perchance Putin may have a B1 vitamin deficiency. As an odd symptom of B1 vitamin deficiency, one can become disconnected from reality, not rational, or reasonable. 

Surely, the notion that there may be something supernatural about Putin’s attitude and behavior at this time would offend all reason of most observers and analysts alike. Yet, perhaps Putin may have been put under the control of a dark shaman who has sinister intentions. Hopefully on this point, greatcharlie will not be accused of faulty humor. What would be most supportive of efforts to get to heart of the matter would be an explanation from disciplined reasoning that would be albeit more prosaic, not guesses that boil down to nonsense. As touched upon earlier, claiming that Putin is unstable and behaving irratically is not an answer. It is an expression of symptoms of observed, associates them with actions,  but that information does not explain their cause. To that extent, such assessments presumably unintentionally mask the failure to find real answers, develop useful information. National leaders and policymakers cannot neither develop worthwhile plans nor comfortably base decisions on such.

Watching the West interact with Ukraine since the collapse of the government led by his stern ally former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych following the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, Putin likely felt more and more that  remnants of the former Soviet Empire which he hoped to hold on to were being chipped away by the West, bit by bit. Surely, from his lens, the military dimension of the relationship remains at the forefront as he surely perceives it as an important feature of Western efforts expand eastward toward Russia’s border. Indeed, NATO forces are creeping closer to Russia’s border, and that the government in Kyiv has been pulled far from Moscow’s political reach. Putin might believe any reasonable observer would accept and agree with his thinking about a threat from the West, and that he has logically reached that conclusion. given Western actions.

With further regard to Euromaidan, since then, national administrations in Kyiv that came to power after the exit of Yanukovych have gambled on what they wanted and saw as a sure bet, partnership with the West, which attendantly meant the exclusion of nearly everything from Russia that they could exclude safely, reasonably. Kyiv believed Ukraine, its growing partnership with the West, seemingly formalized with the US-Ukraine Strategic Security Pact along with existing agreements such as the Budapest Memorandum, the Minsk Agreements, meant greater security for Ukraine. Kyiv took a considerable risk taking that approach, and it lost. Although it should not have happened, but nonetheless did happen, Putin responded. He figuratively closed the casino and all the winnings on the tables. By tethering itself to the West, Ukraine surely did not become more secure. Perhaps the real issue is that Putin sees Ukraine as a whole-minus the Luhansk People’s Republic and Donetsk People’s Republic–traitorous, since Kyiv, under its present leadership, for all intents and purposes, has turned its back to Russia immutably. Ukraine had become the object of Putin’s pain.

One might consider that Putin’s most recent behavior and choices may possibly be part of a pattern of expression and actions seemingly given too little serious attention in not just the run up to the invasion but years before. Indeed, for greatcharlie, an reliable undemanding, uncomplicated way to develop an understanding of Putin’s perspectives on Ukraine would be to thumb through his expressions on the Ukraine matter. There have been numerous reports and transcripts of chief executive level telephone conversations, speeches, statements, and declarations that should not have left anyone in doubt that he was coming for Ukraine at some point if the matter were not addressed in some fulsome way beforehand. A brief sampling of pertinent expressions by Putin, to avoid being “too prolix,” reveals his concerns, sense of vulnerability to the West and that these expressions were both persistent and consistent.

US President Barack Obama during a 90-minute phone call with Putin from Washington on March 2, 2014 (above). One might consider that Putin’s most recent behavior and choices may possibly be part of a pattern of expression and actions seemingly given too little serious attention in not just the run up to the invasion but years before. There have been numerous reports and transcripts of chief executive level telephone conversations, speeches, statements, and declarations that should not have left anyone in doubt that he was coming for Ukraine at some point if the matter were not addressed in some fulsome way beforehand. During their March 2014 call, Putin told Obama that the US-backed interim Ukraine administration was threatening “the lives and health of Russian citizens and the many compatriots” in Crimea. Putin declared, “Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas.”

2014 Telephone Conversation with Obama

Reportedly, during a 90-minute phone call with Putin from Washington on March 2, 2014, Obama warned that Russia could face “serious repercussions” unless it halted military operations in Ukraine. Obama further stated to Putin that his actions were a “clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, which is a breach of international law.” Obama additionally urged Putin to pursue “direct engagement with the government of Ukraine” and support the “dispatch of international observers under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In a reported statement from the Kremlin, Putin told Obama, bluntly, that the US-backed interim Ukraine administration was threatening “the lives and health of Russian citizens and the many compatriots” in Crimea. Putin reportedly went on to say, “In the case of any further spread of violence to eastern Ukraine and Crimea,” and he warned, “Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas.” However, in an official statement from the Kremlin concerning the telephone call Putin had Obama on March 2, 2014, it was declared that “in reply to Obama’s concern over the possibility of the use of Russian armed forces on the territory of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin drew his attention to the provocative and criminal actions on the part of ultranationalists who are in fact being supported by the current authorities in Kiev.” The Kremlin statement further noted that “The Russian President spoke of a real threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens and the many compatriots who are currently on Ukrainian territory. Vladimir Putin stressed that in case of any further spread of violence to Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, Russia retains the right to protect its interests and the Russian-speaking population of those areas.” Themes from the Russian side of that conversation still heard today were the threat of ultranationalists (neo-Nazis) and threat to the lives and health of Russian citizens and compatriots who were in Ukraine. Notably, Putin deliberately describes Ukraine, a sovereign country as a territory. It was a subtle utterance Obama might have missed the significance of.

Putin’s Speech at the State Duma on March 18, 2014

One of Putin’s greatest expressions of vulnerability in his March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In the official Kremlin transcript of that speech, Putin is quoted as stating the following on Ukraine and the rise of ultranationalists: I would like to reiterate that I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people. However, those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day. On the matter of ethnic-Russians in Ukraine, to which Putin refers directly as Russians, he stated: “The new so-called authorities began by introducing a draft law to revise the language policy, which was a direct infringement on the rights of ethnic minorities. However, they were immediately ‘disciplined’ by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians. One has to admit that the mentors of these current authorities are smart and know well what such attempts to build a purely Ukrainian state may lead to. The draft law was set aside, but clearly reserved for the future. Hardly any mention is made of this attempt now, probably on the presumption that people have a short memory. Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II.” Putin would add further in the speech: “Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea. In view of this, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov and other Ukrainian cities.” As for the legitimacy of the government in Kyiv and attendantly the sovereignty of Ukraine itself, Putin explained: “It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now, nobody to talk to. Many government agencies have been taken over by the impostors, but they do not have any control in the country, while they themselves – and I would like to stress this – are often controlled by radicals. In some cases, you need a special permit from the militants on Maidan to meet with certain ministers of the current government. This is not a joke – this is reality.” Then, declaring his authority to act of what he perceived as a dangerous situation, Putin stated: “Naturally, we could not leave this plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part.” The same the three elements were repeated in the speech as in the telephone call with tge March 2014 Obama telephone call, Ukraine was a base for neo-Nazis, ethnic-Russians lives were endangered, and Ukraine’s sovereignty was questionable.

Concerning Putin’s sense of vulnerability to the West, it was laid out in the open for all to hear. To summarize, Putin vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating Western actions that fostered his contempt. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he referred to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Doubtlessly, the aggregate of US moves eastward in Europe over time so inflamed Putin’s sense of ardor to respond militarily.

Putin’s July 2021 Essay on Ukraine

During the Summer of 2021 and more so during the run up to the invasion, many passed their eyes over Putin’s July 12, 2021 essay entitled, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” All in all, it is very interesting as a piece of history but has little to do with the present realities in the minds of reasonable thinkers and could hardly be the sort of thing that civilized, technologically advanced, industrial societies would go to war over. In greatcharlie’s view, it is essential to take note of Putin’s understanding of the matter to discern his true mindset lies, how his thinking works on the matter. It will doubtlessly have an impact on how he may settle on the matter as events take shape on the battlefield. 

Although Putin goes as far back as the odyssey of the Ancient Rus, dwells in the history of the 14th, 15th, and 16th centuries and moves more expediently through the 17th and 18th centuries, to explain the historical ties and the bond between Ukrainians and Russians, perhaps most relevant to his view of Ukraine’s place as a sovereign country starts with the Bolsheviks. Boiled down what can be gathered by greatcharlie from the essay as concisely as possible, greatcharlie recounts the following highlights from the essay. Putin explains that following the February Revolution, in March 1917, the Central Rada was established in Kiev, intended to become the organ of supreme power. In November 1917, in its Third Universal, it declared the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) as part of Russia. In December 1917, UPR representatives arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where Soviet Russia was negotiating with Germany and its allies. At a meeting on 10 January 1918, the head of the Ukrainian delegation read out a note proclaiming the independence of Ukraine. Subsequently, the Central Rada proclaimed Ukraine independent in its Fourth Universal. Putin then explains that Ukrainians after signing a separate treaty with German bloc countries  Rada delegates signed a separate treaty with the. Germany and Austria-Hungary which needed Ukrainian bread and raw materials. In order to secure large-scale supplies, they obtained consent for sending their troops and technical staff to the UPR. Putin states that in fact, this was used as a pretext for occupation, by 1918, Ukraine was in his view essentially under German protectorate. Following the revolutionary events in Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1918, Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) and, in January 1919, announced its unification with the Ukrainian People’s Republic. 

Putin goes on to explain that in July 1919, Ukrainian forces were crushed by Polish troops, and the territory of the former WUPR came under the Polish rule. According to Putin, in April 1920, Symon Petliura signed a secret conventions on behalf of the UPR Directorate, giving up–in exchange for military support–Galicia and Western Volhynia lands to Poland. In May 1920, Petliurites entered Kiev in a convoy of Polish military units. Yet, as early as November 1920, following a truce between Poland and Soviet Russia, the remnants of Petliura’s forces surrendered to those same Poles. Putin, however, also reflects back to note that in early 1918, when the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was proclaimed, it asked Moscow to incorporate it into Soviet Russia. This was met with a refusal. During a meeting with the republic’s leaders, Soviet Premier Vladimir Lenin insisted that they act as part of the pre-existing Soviet Ukraine. On 15 March 1918, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) directly ordered that delegates be sent to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, including from the Donetsk Basin, and that ”one government for all of Ukraine“ be created at the congress. The territories of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic later formed most of the regions of south-eastern Ukraine. 

Putin explains that under the 1921 Treaty of Riga, concluded between the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland, the western lands of the former Russian Empire were ceded to Poland. However, he reminds that in 1939, the USSR regained the lands earlier seized by Poland. A major portion of these became part of the Soviet Ukraine. In 1940, the Ukrainian SSR incorporated part of Bessarabia, which had been occupied by Romania since 1918, as well as Northern Bukovina. In 1948, Zmeyiniy Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea became part of Ukraine. Imaginably, poignant to Putin was relaying the fact that in 1954, the Crimean Region of the RSFSR was given to the Ukrainian SSR, in gross violation of legal norms that were in force at the time. Putin’s reality on that matter founded his action to capture Crimea in 2014. It may be enough to comment on the this part of essay by quoting the 20th century US financier and statesman, Bernard Baruch, who remarked: “Every man has a right to his opinion, but no man has a right to be wrong in his facts.”

As for the Ukrainian identity, Putin explained that “In the 1920’s-1930’s, the Bolsheviks actively promoted the ”localization policy“, which took the form of Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR. Symbolically, as part of this policy and with consent of the Soviet authorities, Mikhail Grushevskiy, former chairman of Central Rada, one of the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism, who at a certain period of time had been supported by Austria-Hungary, was returned to the USSR and was elected member of the Academy of Sciences. Putin emphasized that “The localization policy undoubtedly played a major role in the development and consolidation of the Ukrainian culture, language and identity. At the same time, under the guise of combating the so-called Russian great-power chauvinism, Ukrainization was often imposed on those who did not see themselves as Ukrainians.”

The decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I to allow a separate Ukrainian Orthodox Catholic Church from the Russian Orthodox Church for many in Russia may have oddly validated Putin’s concern that West was using its influence to pull Ukrainians away from their cultural traditions. Putin’s position on the matter has garnered support from thehead of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill. There are not too many issues that could potentially reach the majority of the Russian population on the West’s alleged intention to separate Ukraine from Russia than to create or emphasize a connection between West and the schism from Russian Othodoxy in Ukraine. On that matter, Putin declared: “Our spiritual unity has also been attacked. As in the days of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a new ecclesiastical has been initiated. The secular authorities, making no secret of their political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split, to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They have to destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs.”

Regarding his concern over the alleged welcomed and influential place of neo-Nazis hold in Ukraine, politically, militarily, and socially, Putin expressed: “I think it is also natural that the representatives of Ukraine over and over again vote against the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism. Marches and torchlit processions in honor of remaining war criminals from the SS units take place under the protection of the official authorities. Mazepa, who betrayed everyone, Petliura, who paid for Polish patronage with Ukrainian lands, and Bandera, who collaborated with the Nazis, are ranked as national heroes. Everything is being done to erase from the memory of young generations the names of genuine patriots and victors, who have always been the pride of Ukraine.”

The July 2021 essay presumably was shaped not only for the benefit of future historians but certainly for the present-day domestic audience in Russia and the people of Ukraine. What the Russian public was supposed to take away was a sense the that West was trying to destroy Russia and its actions in that direction, many disguised, have been quite sinister. Putin explained: “Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also to believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. As a result of such a harsh and artificial division of Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundreds of thousands or even millions.” As for the Ukrainians, Putin left them with a choice to atone for their error of turning westward by joining a path he prescribed or face severe consequences, invasion. Likely in his own mind, he “judiciously” stated: “Russia is open to dialogue with Ukraine and ready to discuss the most complex issues. But it is important for us to understand that our partner is defending its national interests but not serving someone else’s, and is not a tool in someone else’s hands to fight against us. We respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe and prosperous. Putin made what was a thinly veiled threat in stating: “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people.” Then given what has transpired in Ukraine since February he made a statement which now could be labelled bizarre: “Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing – Russia has never been and will never be ”anti-Ukraine“. And what Ukraine will be – it is up to its citizens to decide.”

Putin during his February 24, 2022 televised address on Ukraine (above). In his February 24, 2022 televised address, Putin put before his audience a review of his sense of threat to Russia from the West, more specifically the US, and well-serves as a fulsome expression of the accumulation of stress and his sense of vulnerability. In his own words, Putin’s contends that “over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.”

Putin’s February 24, 2022 Televised Address on Ukraine 

While Putin’s February 24, 2022 televised address made just hours before the invasion of Ukraine was not a comprehensive expression of his ideas and theories to include subjects neo-Nazis and Ukrainian sovereignty called attention to here, although in declaring the right to move Russian forces into Ukraine, he indicates that he has does not recognize the sovereign rights of the country. Putin does, however, put before his audience a review of his sense of threat to Russia from the West and an alleged anti-Russia mindset of Western governments. Putin’s contends that “over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.” One Putin’s earliest expressions of resentment, albeit in a nuanced, subtle manner, toward the US was a 1999 essay entitled “‘Russia at the Turn of the Millennium’–A Strategy for Russia’s Revival.” In his February 24th address, he returns to that idea, far more aggressively stating: “As for our country, after the disintegration of the USSR, given the entire unprecedented openness of the new, modern Russia, its readiness to work honestly with the United States and other Western partners, and its practically unilateral disarmament, they immediately tried to put the final squeeze on us, finish us off, and utterly destroy us. This is how it was in the 1990s and the early 2000s, when the so-called collective West was actively supporting separatism and gangs of mercenaries in southern Russia. What victims, what losses we had to sustain and what trials we had to go through at that time before we broke the back of international terrorism in the Caucasus! We remember this and will never forget.” Putin went on to state on the matter: “Properly speaking, the attempts to use us in their own interests never ceased until quite recently: they sought to destroy our traditional values and force on us their false values that would erode us, our people from within, the attitudes they have been aggressively imposing on their countries, attitudes that are directly leading to degradation and degeneration, because they are contrary to human nature. This is not going to happen. No one has ever succeeded in doing this, nor will they succeed now.” 

Despite the problems Russia has encountered engaging with the West, Putin explained that Moscow tried to reason with Western powers. He noted that in December 2021: “We made yet another attempt to reach agreement with the United States and its allies on the principles of European security and NATO’s non-expansion. Our efforts were in vain. The United States has not changed its position. It does not believe it necessary to agree with Russia on a matter that is critical for us. The United States is pursuing its own objectives, while neglecting our interests.”

Putin moves on to the notion of Russia becoming in way similar to the designation in the children’s game “It” on a forever it, the forever enemy of the West, and NATO would exist as long as there was a Russia. Putin remarked: “Those who aspire to global dominance have publicly designated Russia as their enemy. They did so with impunity. Make no mistake, they had no reason to act this way. It is true that they have considerable financial, scientific, technological, and military capabilities. We are aware of this and have an objective view of the economic threats we have been hearing, just as our ability to counter this brash and never-ending blackmail. Let me reiterate that we have no illusions in this regard and are extremely realistic in our assessments.” Seemingly well-aware of the deficits in the capabilities of his conventional forces and delinquencies of Russian commanders, the consequences of which are full display in Ukraine, Putin placed emphasis Russia’s nuclear forces with regard to the countries’ defense, stating: “As for military affairs, even after the dissolution of the USSR and losing a considerable part of its capabilities, today’s Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states. Moreover, it has a certain advantage in several cutting-edge weapons. In this context, there should be no doubt for anyone that any potential aggressor will face defeat and ominous consequences should it directly attack our country.” Concerning the foreign military presence and build up on Russia’s borders, Putin noted that : “At the same time, technology, including in the defence sector, is changing rapidly. One day there is one leader, and tomorrow another, but a military presence in territories bordering on Russia, if we permit it to go ahead, will stay for decades to come or maybe forever, creating an ever mounting and totally unacceptable threat for Russia. To the extend that relates to NATO expansion, Putin explained: “Even now, with NATO’s eastward expansion the situation for Russia has been becoming worse and more dangerous by the year. Moreover, these past days NATO leadership has been blunt in its statements that they need to accelerate and step up efforts to bring the alliance’s infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders. In other words, they have been toughening their position. We cannot stay idle and passively observe these developments. This would be an absolutely irresponsible thing to do for us. Putin went on to declare: “Any further expansion of the North Atlantic alliance’s infrastructure or the ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold of the Ukrainian territory are unacceptable for us. Of course, the question is not about NATO itself. It merely serves as a tool of US foreign policy. The problem is that in territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile “anti-Russia” is taking shape. Fully controlled from the outside, it is doing everything to attract NATO armed forces and obtain cutting-edge weapons. I have already said that Russia accepted the new geopolitical reality after the dissolution of the USSR. We have been treating all new post-Soviet states with respect and will continue to act this way. We respect and will respect their sovereignty, as proven by the assistance we provided to Kazakhstan when it faced tragic events and a challenge in terms of its statehood and integrity. However, Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat from the territory of today’s Ukraine.”

Noting that his use of military power to resolve the supposed threatening situation in Ukraine was not unprecedented, Putin remarked: “Let me remind you that in 2000–2005 we used our military to push back against terrorists in the Caucasus and stood up for the integrity of our state. We preserved Russia. In 2014, we supported the people of Crimea and Sevastopol. In 2015, we used our Armed Forces to create a reliable shield that prevented terrorists from Syria from penetrating Russia. This was a matter of defending ourselves. We had no other choice.” Indulging what was long nursed reckless and dangerous eccentricity concerning the West, Putin went further to say: “The same is happening today. They did not leave us any other option for defending Russia and our people, other than the one we are forced to use today. In these circumstances, we have to take bold and immediate action. The people’s republics of Donbass have asked Russia for help.” Propter curam meam in perpetuo periculo non eritis. (Because of my care (concern), you will not be in perpetual danger.) Hey-ho!

The “Top Secret” 2013 Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation

Worthwhile to note along with these expressions is a very strong and apposite 2013 Military Statement a response to NATO expansion and Putin’s sense of vulnerability and belief that Russia stands vulnerable to the US “tricks.” In greatcharlie’s November 16, 2016 post entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?”, it was noted that on February 14, 2013 at a conference called “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. Gerasimov explained that the Russian Federation General Staff believed future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they conclude the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. He stated further that severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. To that extent, Gerasimov to the audience that Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. The Kremlin accepted the threat assessment of the the Russian Federation General Staff. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. To rehearse the defense against the West, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced massive strategic military exercises Zapad 2017, scheduled to take place in September 2017. He said the joint exercise, which would include Russian and Belarusian forces, will be the “main military event of 2017.” Further, the two countries armed forces will cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken.”

Putin (right) and Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu (left). On February 14, 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they concluded the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources.

Message from the Biden Administration to Putin on Ukraine: “To Hell with You!”

Well before the Ukraine crisis, arguably Washington did not appear willing to approach Moscow with a mind to address in some fruitful way the concerns he broached. That tack has apparently played a role in bringing parties to the conflict to the point where they are today. At the end of 2021, in the face of the aggregate of Putin’s expressed concerns about Ukraine, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba ssigned the US-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership in Washington, DC on November 10, 2021. Much of the Charter concerned countering Russian aggression, It notes that the US and Ukraine share a vital national interest in a strong, independent, and democratic Ukraine. It recognizes Ukraine’s situation vis-a-vis Russia developing into a near impossible one. “Section II: Security and Countering Russian Aggression” of the Charter explains that the US has offered Ukraine all that it can to prevent further encroachment on its territory and interference in its affairs. To that extent, the Charter says that the US is determined to gird Kyiv’s capabilities to defend itself against threats to its territorial integrity and deepening Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Both are considered “concurrent priorities.” Describing those steps, the Charter states: “The United States and Ukraine intend to continue a range of substantive measures to prevent external direct and hybrid aggression against Ukraine and hold Russia accountable for such aggression and violations of international law, including the seizure and attempted annexation of Crimea and the Russia-led armed conflict in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine, as well as its continuing malign behavior. The United States intends to support Ukraine’s efforts to counter armed aggression, economic and energy disruptions, and malicious cyber activity by Russia, including by maintaining sanctions against or related to Russia and applying other relevant measures until restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”

More specifically, on Crimea and the civil conflict in the Donbas stirred by Russia the Charter indicated that the US has no intention of backing away from its position on the matter. Apparently to avoid any ambiguities or misunderstandings in Moscow, the Charter firmly declares the US position on Crimea and the Donbas as following: “The United States does not and will never recognize Russia’s attempted annexation of Crimea and reaffirms its full support for international efforts, including in the Normandy Format, aimed at negotiating a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-led armed conflict in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine on the basis of respect for international law, including the UN Charter. The United States supports Ukraine’s efforts to use the Crimea Platform to coordinate international efforts to address the humanitarian and security costs of Russia’s occupation of Crimea, consistent with the Platform’s Joint Declaration.”

As for the way in which the US would tangibly support Ukraine’s defense, there are no warnings of intentions to take extreme measures, to include military action. However, the Charter states: “The United States and Ukraine endorse the 2021 Strategic Defense Framework as the foundation of enhanced Ukraine-US defense and security cooperation and intend to work to advance shared priorities, including implementing defense and defense industry reforms, deepening cooperation in areas such as Black Sea security, cyber defense, and intelligence sharing, and countering Russia’s aggression. The United States and Ukraine are key partners in the broader Black Sea region and will seek to deepen cooperation with Black Sea Allies and partners to ensure freedom of navigation and effectively counter external threats and challenges in all domains. Directly in terms of US military assistance, the Charter explains: “The United States remains committed to assisting Ukraine with ongoing defense and security reforms and to continuing its robust training and exercises. The United States supports Ukraine’s efforts to maximize its status as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner to promote interoperability. Ukraine intends to continue to enhance democratic civilian control of the military, reform its security service, and modernize its defense acquisition processes to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The United States and Ukraine underline the importance of close cooperation within international institutions, including the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and intend to multiply efforts in finding new approaches and developing joint actions in preventing individual states from trying to destroy the rule-based international order and forcefully to revise internationally recognized state borders.” It is precisely this section of the Charter that likely occupied Putin’s mind.

Now that Russia has invaded Ukraine, perhaps one might be better enabled to derive the sense of the vulnerability, mentioned often here, that lies within in Putin, especially toward the US and its allies and how it has been a subtle and profound undercurrent in his decisionmaking and approaches toward them. Imagining Putin’s mindset, he likely firmly believed before the invasion of Ukraine that he had a good understanding of the way many senior foreign and national security policy officials in the administration of US President Joe Biden, many of whom had held senior posts in the Obama administration, would respond to a move toward Ukraine. As discussed in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post, Putin had experienced considerable dissatisfaction and disappointment in his dealing with Obama administration officials, particularly on Ukraine. As he appeared to have perceived their actions, they found it rather piquant to interact with him as if he were a lesser party, and his positions and concerns were undeserving of consideration. Communications were condescending, actions were often insulting. In an explosion of aggression, doubtlessly in part response to his treatment, he conquered Ukraine and tormented civil war in the Donbass. He engaged in other destabilizing efforts. Apparently, he never forgot. Seeing the appointment of many of those same officials in even higher posts in the Biden administration, Putin viewed everything they did with a sense of their past actions. One might theorize that although he could not conventionally strike directly at those officials, Putin could reach the Ukrainians who, as suggested earlier, he may view as something akin to “defectors”, surely he would view them as “traitorous”. He knew what anguish and loss that would cause those officials and it would cause the same and much for the “Ukrainian followers.” To that extent, perhaps it is not too fanciful to imagine that given current attitudes and behaviors of Putin, the invasion of Ukraine may also have been in part an opportunity for Putin to have a return engaged, a rematch, with former senior Obama administration officials in the Biden administration and settle scores once and for all. (See greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post for a fuller discussion of its analysis of Putin’s view of the Biden administration officials,)

It is almost certain that Putin planned to move into Ukraine, surely into the Donbas, at some point in the first quarter of 2022. Yet, there was also the chance he would reconsider if the right type of discussions and negotiations were initiated. As it was, Moscow’s talks with Washington before the invasion had reached the doldrums. What Moscow would hear most from Washington were continual statements, alerts that Russia would invade immediately may have struck Putin curious at first, but eventually it would almost create the impression in him that he was being mocked as massed troops near Russia’s border with Ukraine. After a second round of talks with French President Emmanuel Macron, Putin green-lit Macron’s relating of a message to Washington that he was willing to meet Biden. However, he surely viewed such talks as undesirable and pointless after the precondition that he would agree not to invade Ukraine was communicated by Washington. That message from Washington, more than embarrassing, was most likely viewed by Putin as an effort to humiliate him. No one in Russia, out of self-preservation, would ever be so short-sighted as to communicate with the Russian President, particularly in what remains a very intense, highly stressful, period of uncertainty. Quite well-viewed now is the February 21, 2022 exchange at a Security Council meeting in the Kremlin between Putin and Sergei Naryshkin, head of the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR. Naryshkin, an absolute Putin loyalist, known for his aggressive anti-western statements, became visibly uncomfortable as Putin interrogated him on Ukraine. One can only imagine the gasps sounded within his foreign, national security, and economic advisers when they discovered that was the response sent to him from Washington. Among his very top advisers, there was likely a palpable sense that fiery sea of anger, rage, and hatred churned violently inside of him. In that situation, none of them could be certain of what might happen in the immediate hours after receipt of the message.

As a crucial diplomatic communique, it was oddly void of subtlety, nuance,  wisdom. It was surely the clearest way to signal one’s side was not being thoughtful. While greatcharlie does not believe this was the intention, some might believe, within a degree of reason given what is known about Putin and given the tense circumstances then, that the message was oddly enough designed to provoke or aggravate him. Looking at the message now, it is doubtful those who constructed it, would recognize thar it could have been perceived as condescending or that it was short-sighted to demand the precondition concerning invasion. One might go as far as to state that demanding Putin accept a precondition–the would fly in the face of everything that he was expressing, negate him as national leader to be reckoned with–so publicly under the circumstances was surely not the best way to respond if a resolution was authentically sought. There were other ways to communicate with the Russian President, some furtively, that more likely would have resulted in an assurance from him concerning invasion. The reply was incautious, unwarranted.

In Book I, Chapter 3, of his masterwork, On War, the renowned Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz explained: “Strength of character does not consist solely in having powerful feelings, but in maintaining one’s balance in spite of them. Even with the violence of emotion, judgment and principle must still function like a ship’s compass, which records the slightest variations however rough the sea.” (See the standard English translation from Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors, Carl Von Clausewitz On War (Princeton University Press, 1976)). Intriguingly, despite what may have been stated here on the nature actions taken toward Putin before the invasion, since it began, the Biden administration has displayed a more calibrated, more disciplined approach to Putin, making better considered decision on when to act and when to observe and evaluate. Chasing Putin up the ladder of escalation will bring nothing good. Imaginably, there is the thought among responsible decisionmakers in Washington that peace will eventually come to Ukraine in some way, likely through negotiation with Moscow. Having apparently taken this approach, the Biden administration as a result has incurred the wrath of news media commentators and political opponents alike. Though many may insist providing more advanced, heavier weapons to Ukraine will provide Ukrainian forces a real chance at endsieg, it is difficult to see how Ukrainian forces will muster power superior to that of the armed forces of Russia and eject Russian force from Ukrainian territory in way in which Moscow would continue to hold back greater, more powerful parts of its arsenal. The way in which a lasting peace might be constructed will depend upon how the environment for it is shaped.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov (right). The ongoing death and destruction in Ukraine, the smashing of any sense of international law, peace and security as of this writing, are enough of a catalyst to prompt more than urgent action to get a handle of the matter. Concerns over the likely near term deletorious impact on the global economy have served as a high intensity stimulus. Before the invasion and shortly afterward, there was such a thickness not just between the two parties, but supportive parties involved on both sides, that negotiation had appeared hopeless. It would be most beneficial and virtuous for all parties involved to work together to construct clear agreements, improve ties, and accomplish even more. Just saying there is unity but acting in independent ways obvious to the world bring into question not only unity, but respective aims.

A Glimmer of Hope: Peace through Diplomacy

Quaeritur belli exitus, non causa. (Of war men ask the outcome, not the cause.) The ongoing death and destruction in Ukraine, the smashing of any sense of international law and peace and security as of this writing, are enough of a catalyst to prompt more than urgent action to get a handle of the matter. Concerns over the likely near term deletorious impact on the global economy have also served as a considerable stimulus. Before the invasion and shortly afterward, there was such a thickness not just between the two parties, but supportive parties involved on both sides, that negotiation had appeared hopeless. Any steps in that direction could have been at best described as desultory. It would be most beneficial and virtuous for all parties involved to work together to construct clear agreements, improve ties, and accomplish even more. Just saying there is unity but acting in independent ways obvious to the world bring into question not only unity, but respective aims.

Concerning the US and the rest of the West, they must make the choice to find peace and save lives or go out to slay the dragon, Russia, and let the chips fall where they may. It is clear the West wants to avoid getting itself in a war with Russia. Western leaders say it all the time. However, some words spoken by many Western political leaders might convince observers that the West is moving closer to doing what it has already decided, for good reason, not to do so.

Now that Russian forces are in Ukraine, Putin has made slightly veiled threats concerning nuclear weapons. In response to such threats and the Ukraine crisis in general, some US political leaders have suggested that Putin must be removed from power in Russia. There has been additional talk of encouraging Russian officials and institutions, and the Russian people in general, to move against Putin could hardly be well-considered. Off-the-cuff remarks from US political leaders concerning the next moves must stop, if the US is to accomplish anything remotely leading to a desired, favorable peace. Long gone are the days of “dignified scorn”. The lack of moderation, temperance, could prove to be the source of a downfall. 

While some commentators in the US newsmedia suggest that the invasion signals Putin’s dénouement is drawing much closer, such is not actually the case. Such is the product of fertile imaginations. In point of fact, Putin will very likely manage. Conceivably, he hardly believes he is overmatched by the Ukrainians, the West, or the Russian people. To be sure, as of this writing Putin neither has displayed any apparent intentions nor has he expressed any desire to ride off. There are no big concerns at home from political leadership in power. At the moment, there is no stalking horse who possesses anything near Putin’s “popularity” that would be remotely favorable to the West and could potential displace him. 

For now it seems that Ukraine will unlikely be the issue that brings down Putin’s government. The Russian people have domestic concerns that have primacy. Surely, Putin maintains his appeal to many in Russia, and not just those those buried in the backwaters. Perhaps unimaginably to some promoting regime change is the reality that Putin to many Russians represents order, stability, and there is a certain constancy they feel from him to them through his style, image, and actions as a their leader. There is political opposition and an opposition movement that struggles against his government. There is also a burgeoning antiwar movement. However, the opposition movement, though world renowned, does not pose to great a threat at the moment that he would need to fortify the Kremlin. As for the anti-war movement, while very important, will unlikely gain momentum, size, and strength nationwide.

Interestingly enough, according to the Japan Times, polls and interviews indicate many Russians now accept Putin’s contention that their country is under siege from the West and had no choice but to attack. The Russian public’s endorsement of the war is not attendant to the patriotic groundswell that greeted the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The polls on the matter were conducted by Levada, Russia’s most respected independent pollster. In terms of numbers, its polls revealed Putin’s approval rating reached 83%, up from 69% in January 2022. Around 81% surveyed stated they supported the war, describing the need to protect Russian speakers or ethnic-Russians in Ukraine as its primary justification. (Authors of the Japan Times article cautioned that analysts note “polls in wartime have limited significance, with many Russians fearful of voicing dissent, or even their true opinion, to a stranger at a time when new censorship laws are punishing any deviation from the Kremlin narrative with as much as 15 years in prison.”)

Postea noli rogare quod inpetrare nolueris. (Don’t ask for what you’ll wish you hadn’t got.) Even if Putin were hypothetically moved from power, it is unlikely anyone among policymakers and decisionmakers in Washington would have the slightest idea of what  would likely come next in that circumstance. It is very likely that an undesirable outcome might be the result once again from US incited “regime change” in a foreign land. Indeed, those making statements concerning regime change have no idea what doors they may be opening that would have been best to have kept closed. Ignorance of subject matter does not bother many commentators. If the story of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a tragedy–it has the hallmarks–its players will indoubitably meet respectively with ill-fate. Important for the US and other Western powers, concern primarily with the interests of their countries, is to straddle the line concerning their involvement in all aspects of the conflict, but to avoid crossing over it. Crossing that line would very likely put them on a path leading to some tragic outcome, much both Russia and Ukraine are traveling now. Ce n’est pas la vache qui crie le plus fort qui fait le plus de lait.

There is no good reason to raise Putin’s ire on the “regime change” front between the US and Russia. A tacit modus vivendi, as well as clear cut international law, must be observed to prevent the US and Russia from stumbling on an oblique, tragic path to war. As is the case on many issues concerning US foreign and national security policy decisionmakers, everything must happen immediately. Of course, Ukrainian lives are at the time of this writing being destroyed every second the conflict rages on. Still, respectfully with that dreadful circumstance in mind, one might posit that many of those so willing shoot from the hip, tossing out ideas unrealistic or reckless for the most part when examined in the round one might guess apparently have not been burned or at least singed enough over time to learn how to figuratively sit on a rabbit hole. The ones from the military, intelligence services, law enforcement, and diplomatic corps who have spent considerable time in the field possess the most awareness and experience with such.

Malo indisertam prudentiam, quam loquacem stultitiam. (I prefer silent prudence to loquacious folly) No more bad seeds as these need to be planted, that has been the pattern. Enough of that has been done already. Energies should be directed at deescalating, halting, and to the greatest degree possible, reversing the terrible circumstances, working with whatever may be left to salvage and build upon.

Putin (above) at “For A World Without Nazism” rally and concert at Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium on March 18, 2022. A big issue for top officials in the Kremlin to think about in negotiations if the refuse to return territory acquires in the war, whether the fact is recognized or not, whether the situation is desired or not, is how Russia, after Putin either leaves office for good or “shuffles off this mortal coil,” will retain what it tore from Ukraine. Putin would indeed leave a huge problem behind for whoever might follow him as Russian Federation President. That would be his legacy. Just as Putin failed to recognize that the intelligence he was receiving on Ukraine was inaccurate, he may not have considered that the will may not exist to hold on to captured Ukrainian territory among a future generation or two, given the territorial gains were “ill-gotten.”

Thoughts on the Nuance of Diplomacy between the Warring Parties

Much has been torn away from the Ukrainian people, time, life, happiness, as a result of the Russian invasion. Hope to a small degree might spawn from forms of restitution and replenishment from the West. While it may make a difference, it would not make things right. However, with the coming of peace, fighting men and women on both sides will live on their days to age. Neighbors who survived and those who may return will have the chance to each other again. Families may start anew. The lives of some young family members, due to war, have sadly run full compass. Yet, those who may survive the war, albeit not as triumphantly as they might have imagined, must rebuild a new world for themselves and their posterity, stronger, far greater, than the one the lived in before. Cela requerra des efforts importants des deux.

The mounting death toll in Ukraine has forced President Volodymyr Zelensky to consider concessions to Russia in order to bring an end to the devastating conflict, but the specific elements of any peace deal his government may be discussing with Moscow remain a mystery to Western leaders, said US and European officials. At the same time, by mid-March 2022, Zelensky was claiming 14,000 Russian soldiers, naval troops, and airmen had been killed in Ukraine. While his claims if true speak well of the prowess of Ukrainian forces regular and irregular, it will surely influence negotiations for peace. Moscow will hardly be willing to surrender back territory to Ukraine if the cost of its capture was indeed so high. Any stand to retain captured territory could resultantly become an impediment to a satisfactory negotiated peace for Ukraine. In that vein, the very act itself of negotiating with their Russian counterparts is what many would rightly call an act of courage given how they must steel themselves against personal reactions to the loss of so many Ukrainians to Russian arms. The prospects for negotiated peace could be ruined with anger and grief. On the battlefield, such official Ukrainian government claims of massive numbers of Russian troops killed in action, rarely combined with wounded in action estimates and precise numbers captured troops, could very well lead to decisions by rouge Russian units or units of private military companies to take matter into their own hands in terms of settling scores. Hurt people hurt people! Additionally, hiding in almost all armed forces are individuals who capable of monstrous acts and atrocities. On first thought, greatcharlie’s mind harkens back to the series of 82 prints created by 1810 and 1820 by Spanish painter and printmaker Francisco Goya entitled “Los Desastres de la Guerra” (“The Disasters of War”). The works depicted atrocities committed during Spain’s Peninsular War (1808-1814) versus Napoleon and setbacks to the liberals after the Restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy in 1814. Atrocities of any kind would surely poison, if not kill, efforts to secure a negotiated peace by the present-day warring parties in Europe. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Speaking from the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Kuleba stated one day before the negotiations held in Turkey on March 29, 2022 that the Ukrainian negotiation delegation was given clear instructions from Zelensky on what he dubbed as the minimum program and the maximum program. The minimum program included talks concerning humanitarian questions, such the well-being of civilians (meaning noncombatants) and humanitarian corridors. The maximum program referred to talks aimed at establishing a stable ceasefire. He also noted that Zelensky gave clear instructions to the Ukrainian delegation not to trade over people, land, or sovereignty. These are not subjects for negotiation. He explained that the Ukrainian position is concrete, and is supported by international law, Ukraine’s Armed Forces, international sanctions that have been applied against Russia, and weapons that have been handed over to Ukraine to defeat Russian forces.

As for Russia, there has been a near endless chain of heavy losses of Russian troops since the invasion began–nearly every new loss being greater than the one proceeding it. If Putin has cornered himself, it may very well be due to his failure to realize that he was receiving bad intelligence on the situation in Ukraine and what to expect there, his own miscalculations, even hubris. No one is infallible. In a self-assessment, he might discover, self-diagnose, that some disturbance, rumples, have his smooth, grounded reasoning, within his normal parameters. Indeed, Putin’s energy appears to have been wrongly circuited. His talents and what has been a reliable intuition seem darkened. It is enough to say It will take having a lot of things go his way at this point for him to turn the situation on the battlefield around and spectacularly win his war. Otherwise, he must find a clean, honorable off ramp, the best being negotiations. However, if Putin might wish to engage authentically in peace negotiations on Ukraine, he must recognize that the biggest adjustments needed to allow for a fruitful process would be the ones he must make within himself. As far as greatcharlie is concerned, negotiations would be Putin’s best route out a worsening situation. 

All flowers must grow through dirt. That aphorism sounds somewhat worthless as aphorisms do under circumstances similar to the one that currently besets Ukraine. Nonetheless, up through dark and thick of sullen earth must peace be given a chance to grow and its growth must be nurtured if this present tragedy is to be brought to an end. Essential will be drawing on energizing minerals scattered in the soil, even if only present in gentle numbers. Both sides must seek an intellectual solution to the problem, not an emotional one. No party should use the negotiation as an alternative ways to settle scores. Rather than emotions, grace and inner strength should be sourced, especially on Ukraine’s side, to overcome challenges. Negotiators must be determined, focused, shrewd, innovative, mutually inspiring without theatrics. Hopefully, no party to the negotiation will have to the inclination to sit on the talks and plan surprise military moves that would doubtlessly end any chance of a negotiated peace. Russia and Ukraine must find a solution that allows both sides to feel secure and protected from attacks from the point of any agreement forward. There must also be a commitment on both sides to leave space the advancement of the societies of the other’s country in a way that allows their people to heal and get beyond the wounds of the war as best as possible. Qui se ultro morti offerant, facilius reperiuntur, quam qui dolorem patienter ferant. (It is easier to find men who will volunteer to die than men who will endure pain with patience.)

As the situation stands now and may likely pan out, “making things right” will be the task of future generations of Ukrainians and Russians. Important now is for the current generation to keep younger generations energized by their strength, positive spirit, or infuse them with the idea that Ukraine must be made whole again by using the right vibes, love and light, not hatred and anger, which could easily find a place in the psyche of those individuals so damaged by war. The younger generations must be encouraged to try working with each other to find real restorative solutions when it is their turn to lead.

Hardly with the intention of offering false praise to Putin or to offend any readers, but greatcharlie acknowledges the fact that the Russian President is a very intelligent man, not just on paper; he earned a doctorate in Economic Sciences from Leningrad State University (now St. Petersburg State University) in 1997, which was not a small academic achievement in his day. He is also a very experienced leader, thoroughly steeped in the entire post-Cold War history of interactions between East and West. Surely, he is aware that younger generations of Ukrainians would insist upon a life-style and future similar to their counterparts in Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Switzerland, than those in present-day Russia. As was alluded to in greatcharlie’s January 25, 2022 post entitled “Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help,” the same could be said of younger generations of Russians. Putin would leave a huge problem behind for whoever might follow him as Russian Federation President. That would be his legacy, the legacy of Putin’s Russia. Qui ipse si sapiens prodesse non quit, nequiquam sapit. (A wise man whose wisdom does not serve him is wise in vain.)

Thereby, after all is said and done, the big issue for top officials in the Kremlin to think about in negotiations if the refuse to return territory acquires in the war, whether the fact is recognized or not, whether the situation is desired or not, is how Russia, after Putin either leaves office for good or “shuffles off this mortal coil,” will retain what it tore from Ukraine. Just as Putin failed to recognize that the intelligence he was receiving on Ukraine was inaccurate, he may not have considered that the will may not exist to hold on by future generation or two, given the territorial gains were “ill-gotten.” Putin knows how to weaponize the internet, striking adversaries with cyberattacks, destroying networks, obliterating archives, altering data, collecting confidential information, spreading disinformation, etcetera. Yet, he is of a generation that may not fully grasp the transformative impact of the internet among the young. Using the internet, the young in Russia never needed the permission of the government to travel away from their country to observe, to take in, the world outside of Russia. They likely can do even more than that using the internet. This is not to gloss over the fact that young people in Russia have not lost more pleasure than they have been able to glean using online sites as a result of government censorship and instructions to abstain from viewing certain sites. Yet, they can still see, hear, and communicate with the outside world with a device as meager as an iPhone. The expenditure of effort to disrupt such links to the outside surely far surpasses the actual ability of the government to accomplish that. Perhaps the effort itself has created a false impression of success among those who try so hard to bust things up. Le palais de nos chimères a croulé avec mes illusions. 

Quod bellum oderunt, pro pace cum fide laborabant. (Because they hated war, they were working for peace with fidelity.) As the situation stands now and will likely pan out, making things right will be the task of future generations of Ukrainians and Russians. Important now is for the current generation to keep younger generations energized by their strength, positive spirit, or infuse them with the idea that Ukraine must be made whole again by using the right vibes, love and light, not hatred and anger, which could easily find a place in the psyche of those individuals so damaged by war. The younger generations must be encouraged to try working with each other to find real restorative solutions when it is their turn to lead.

Together, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have already shared a number of technical accomplishments to date. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Moscow had completed two prisoner exchanges with Kyiv since the invasion of Ukraine started. Humanitarian corridors have been established. They must keep trying, segment by segment, to tackle issues that will result in the construction of both a sustainable and enforceable, binding agreement that guarantees security. First, they must think what can physically be done to ensure security for both sides. Second, they must consider what can be done on paper. The scenery of this drama has been set in such a way that external parties may need to be called upon, perhaps the UN with a peacekeeping force of countries neither party may find threatening. That would likely leave the US, other Western countries, particularly EU countries, and NATO Member States out of the mix. No one benefit from an agreement that includes some military response to guarantee its enforcement. At the talks in Istanbul, the Ukrainian delegation presented their Russian counterparts with a framework for peace under which Ukraine would remain neutral and its security would be guaranteed by third-party countries, to include the US, the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Turkey, and China. There would be an arrangement similar to Article 5 of the NATO Charter, under which an attack on one would trigger a joint response by all. Yet, given the likely consequences of Western military action to enforce peace in Ukraine, a nuclear exchange, such a guarantee might end up being something akin to the one the United Kingdom and France provided Poland against possible attack from Nazi Germany in 1938. Ironically, the fear that Putin could act in a way similar to Nazi Germany is the impression, legacy the Putin has created. He actions reflect those of a leader drawn after the reviled German Chancellor Adolf Hitler, the historical nemesis of the Russian people. Putin has failed to follow his own precepts.

Together, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators have already shared a number of technical accomplishments to date. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Moscow had completed two prisoner exchanges with Kyiv since the invasion of Ukraine started. Humanitarian corridors have been established. They must keep trying, segment by segment, to tackle issues that will result in the construction of both a sustainable and enforceable, binding agreement that guarantees security.

The Way Forward

Often included in greatcharlie’s posts is a quote from the renowned theoretical physicist Albert Einstein, who said: “Probleme kann man niemals mit derselben Denkweise losen, durch die sie entstanden sind.” (We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used to create them.) Concerning future relations between the US with Russia, without flickering candlelight and romance, diplomats from both the US and Russia, must meet soon enough to establish some framework upon which can be constructed a way to ameliorate tensions between the two countries on reasonable terms. That would mean coming to agreement on issues on which relative positions were unshakable before the killing, maiming, and destruction of property began without spending too much time on finger-wagging at the negotiation table concerning Ukraine. A new way of thinking toward Putin and his government will be the only chance for anything fruitful to come from interactions between the two countries. In the past, especially before the invasion, the failure reach a positive outcome from diplomatic efforts between Washington and Moscow was less a matter of wrong intention–although an argument could be made for that–and wasting time, than it was as a matter of running out of goor ideas. Leveling everything and starting from scratch is certainly not the answer. However, an infusion of fresh perspectives, fresh ideas, to ignite thinking among the seasoned analysts might help. With no intention to hurtful by broadly accusing analysts or decisionmakers with questionable behavior, greatcharlie is aware that there are a few who simply lift new ideas by mining the writings of those outside of the foreign and national security bureaucracies. It is not just a poor solution, absolutely the wrong answer. That will at best garner bits and pieces that in many cases will be misinterpreted or misapplied. A direct dialogue with those who might display novel ways at looking at issues will better enable the astute to grasp what may on occasion be their recherché line of thinking, which may bring analysts to an understanding, a view to a matter, they had not seen before. Le meilleur moment pour planter un arbre était il y 20 ans, le deuxième meilleur moment c’est maintenant.

On this point, greatcharlie feels compelled to ingeminate the position expressed in the conclusion of its August 31, 2020 greatcharlie post US counterintelligence services should consider hiring individuals from outside the bureaucracy who are already known due to demonstrated interest in the subject matter and recognized as possessing some ability to present what may be unorthodox innovative, forward-looking perspectives. New thinkers can rejuvenate the analytical process, effectively serving to unearth directions and areas for examination and offer hypotheses, good ones, that otherwise would be ignored. In effect, surface layers could be peeled off to reveal what may have been missed for a long time. From the inside, one might characterize observations and hypotheses offered by outsiders as mere surmisals and suppositions from those perceived lacking the necessary depth of understanding that long time analysts bring to an issue. With no intent to condescend, one might assess responses of that type would be defensive and emotional, and least likely learned. The purpose of using such perspectives is to have a look at issues from other angles. Thinking outside the bureaucracy would hopefully move away from the usual track, the derivative, the predictable, especially in special cases that may be hard to crack. Indeed, what outsider brings to the analysis of an issue, through the examination of people and events and interpretation of data, is the application of different sensibilities founded on knowledge acquired after having passed through a multitude experiences that might very well have thwarted the recruitment of the outside the box thinker. One could say the length and breadth of that knowledge and experience allowed for an alternative understanding of humanity. Such an understanding also could have been sought through personal study. It may all sound like a mad-capped scheme, but it is hardly such given what is at stake. Leaders of US foreign and national security bureaucracies must turn their minds to the goal of transcending beyond the sort of analyses developed in the past and look inward, tweaking the discourse, elevating the depth of thinking, raising their expectations, and thereby transforming assessments produced into something far better. Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt. (Fate leads the willing, and drags the unwilling.)

Resolving the Ukraine Crisis: How Better Understanding Putin and the Subtle and Profound Undercurrent Influencing His Thinking on the West Might Help

Russian Federation President Vladimir (above) at the International military-technical forum “Army-2021” at the Patriot Congress and Exhibition Centre, Moscow, August 2021. Putin ostensibly wants the US and its allies to understand that their military activities in Ukraine, too near Russia’s borders, are moving very close to a red line for him. Ostensibly to achieve that, he has massively built-up Russia Federation military forces perilously close to the border with Ukraine. Some in the West believe Putin intends to do a lot more than just build up military forces defensively and negotiate. Multiple analyses of Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies have concluded that he plans to invade Ukraine. In that way, the current situation concerning Ukraine has become an inflexion point in US-Russian relations. Still, more appears to be involved here than Putin just being the Putin he has been over four US administrations. If the US is to get a real handle on relations with him, not just a perceived one, a more useful understanding of the man will be required. To that extent, what may lie beneath the surface of Putin, the person, will be briefly scratched a bit here.

Regarding the massive build-up of Russia Federation military forces perilously close to the border of its neighbor, Ukraine, and alarming activities that may indicate those forces will invade it soon, Washington and Moscow continue to wave their fists at each other. Moscow has denied having any intention to attack Ukraine and has explained away its buildup of troops as being a defensive measure. By building up military forces near Ukraine, which is all he has actually done physically at this stage, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin ostensibly would like to cause the US and its allies to understand that their military activities in Ukraine, too near the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as Russia), are moving very close to a red line for him. Putin insists that the US and its allies provide Russia with signed guarantees to refrain from expanding NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia and limiting their military activity near Russia’s borders, particularly in and around Ukraine. However, some in the West believe that Putin intends to do a lot more than just build up military forces defensively and negotiate. Reportedly, multiple analyses of Western foreign and national security policy bureaucracies have concluded that he plans to invade Ukraine. In that way, the current situation concerning Ukraine has become an inflexion point in US-Russian relations. Ukraine was a flashpoint during the administration of US President Barack Obama in February and March of 2014. It was then that Crimea, Ukraine, was quietly and orderly captured by Russian troops dubbed “the green men.” The Obama administration was similarly at odds with Russia over Syria, mutants mutandis.

Putin seems to enjoy being seen fighting the good fight against Russia’s old adversaries the US and its allies.On the other side of the coin, dealing with Russian moves, Russian aggression, has become more tiresome for US administrations and Western capitals as much as anything else. Yet, Putin has not challenged the US mainly as a result of some domestic political consideration, or even less likely boredom or some vanity. Putin did not move so many troops to Russia’s western border because that area is more commodious than the locations they were previously based. Assuredly, Putin harbors negative thoughts and feelings toward the US and choices made by decision-makers that concern Russia in a significant way. Asked to bend: retreat back away from a matter, it is unlikely that he would without acquiring “concessions” from the US and its allies. He has issued preconditions concerning an agreement on “NATO expansion” already. (Perhaps he did not issue preconditions before entering any talks because he even realized that would be going a bit too far.) One would imagine he entered into this venture thinking, hoping he could potentially get what he wanted without having Russian forces fire a shot. it does not appear that Putin and his advisers are not too far down the road to change course. However, greatcharlie agrees that he would probably go into Ukraine if at some moment he feels it is, as it likely would have been determined by him along with his advisors and war planners in advance, to be the right time to do so. One would do no more than justice to Putin by presuming he long contemplated his military moves before cutting orders to get them rolling. He is certainly not moving step by step in what might be described as a hot-headed manner. Still, the larger decision to act as he has regarding Ukraine may very well be the result of a miscalculation. It is the unsought, undesirable job of the West to help him see that.

Inquiry into the fruit of things requires consideration of how Putin may view the situation. Russia has been led by Putin and his thinking from the posts of president and prime minister since 2000. A positive relationship with Russia has not been maintained by the US. There are many patterns apparent in his repeated confrontations with the West. Some eyes in the West appear somewhat closed to what may be happening with the Russian Federation President from the inside. What currently plagues the relationship is more than Putin just being the Putin he has been over five US administrations. The threat of the use of force, even mutual destruction, underlies Washington’s diplomacy with Moscow. The idea being that a somewhat expansionist, yet plainly aggressive, Putin can be made to behave as desired by placing a club at the end of the path he is traveling. He is ostensibly put in a position to act reasonably before he reaches it. It would go a long way to explain the somewhat unbroken string of unsuccessful interactions of US administrations with him, if the problem is that no useful perspective of why Putin has responded so aggressively has been developed. If the US is to get a real handle on relations with him, not just a perceived one, a more useful understanding of the man will be required. To that extent, what may lie beneath the surface of the intractable Putin, the man, will be briefly scratched on here. New light is shed on the man by using a different lens. There may be something about his inner self repeatedly being manifested and must be looked at from the correct angle. The aim is not to shoot down other analyses, but hopefully to add to them in a way to figuratively help put the reticle of some analysts on the bulls-eye. Offering what may be a few missing links might create an improved understanding of Putin and his actions, lifting thinking on Putin, to a degree, up from the region of the commonplace. Periclum ex aliis facito tibi quod ex usu siet. (Draw from others the lesson that may profit yourself.)

The Russians are coming! A mixed formation of Russian attack and transport helicopters moving toward their target during the Zapad 2021 military exercise. (above). If Putin decides to go into Ukraine, firepower, astronomically massed, from ground, air, and possibly from sea assets, would likely be used to destroy Ukrainian forces in the field, and in depth as far back as units held in reserve or even on training bases. Relentless fire from air and ground would be utilized to support the movement of forces inside Ukraine. What might have been identified as the front line of Ukraine’s defense would figuratively become a map reference for Hell. Imaginably, the main objective of the deployment of Russian forces would be to create a sufficient buffer in Ukraine between Russian and “ever expanding NATO forces.” In performing this task, Russian forces would ensure territory and forces that might remain in Kyiv’s control would be of less utility to NATO as potential a launching pad for a ground attack on Russia and could not be used as part of a larger strategy to contain Russia at its own border.

The Situation: What Could Russian Forces Do?

From what can be gathered about the situation, the US Intelligence Community has concluded that the Kremlin could be planning a multifront offensive involving up to 175,000 troops. An estimated 100,000 Russian troops have already been deployed near the Russia-Ukraine border. Satellite imagery has revealed a buildup of Russian tanks and artillery as well as other gear near the border, too. Reportedly, online disinformation activity regarding Ukraine also has increased in the way it did in the run-up to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. According to the New York Times, the most evident scenario given the scale of troop movements on the ground is a Russian invasion of Ukraine may not be to conquer the entire country but to rush forces into the breakaway regions around the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk, or to drive all the way to the Dnieper River. Purportedly at the Pentagon, “five or six different options” for the extent of a Russian invasion are being examined. Suffice it to say, Moscow calls such assessments of Russia’s intentions slanderous ravings. Russia denies it is planning an invasion and, in turn, accused the West of plotting “provocations” in Ukraine. Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, who unfortunately does not exactly have a watertight record for tying her statements to reality, laid it on thick in the newsmedia, alleging Western and Ukrainian talk of an imminent Russian attack was a “cover for staging large-scale provocations of their own, including those of military character.” It is really disempowering to put out such a message. 

If Putin decides to go in, firepower, astronomically massed, from ground, air, and possibly the sea assets, would most likely be used to destroy Ukrainian forces in the main battle area and in depth as far back as units held in reserve or even on training bases. Relentless fire from air and ground would be utilized to support the movement of forces inside Ukraine. What might have been identified as the front line of Ukraine’s defense would figuratively become a map reference for Hell. Russian forces would most likely be deployed in a way to prevent the resurrection of Ukrainian forces in areas which Russian forces have captured. As for reinforcements or reserves, the rest of Russia’s armed forces would be right across the border in Russia. Imaginably, the main objective of the deployment of Russian forces would be to create a sufficient buffer in Ukraine between Russian and “ever expanding NATO forces.” In performing this task, Russian forces would ensure territory and forces that might remain in Kyiv’s control would be of less utility to NATO as potential a launching pad for a ground attack on Russia and could not be used as part of a larger strategy to contain Russia at its own border.

A stern fact is that the Ukrainians will hardly receive enough military aid from partners and friends, particularly Javelin handheld anti-tank rockets and Stinger handheld antiaircraft rockets, fast enough in the short-term to check a well-coordinated, rapid advance of heavy Russian forces. In the most favorable assessment, they might be able to supply them with enough to hurt Russian forces and perhaps “tear off an arm.” Having experience in contending with somewhat recent Western efforts to assist Russia’s adversaries and those its allies in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine militarily, perhaps a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things, to: monitor the delivery, stockpiling of Javelins, Stingers and other weapons systems shipped to Ukrainian forces; maintain real-time knowledge of the distribution and location of those weapons; destroy those weapons systems; and, destroy or support actions by other Russian military units to destroy Ukrainian military units to which those weapons were distributed. That hypothetical task force would also likely be tasked to monitor–covertly surveil the intelligence activities and military operations of–Western countries as they relate to supplying Ukraine with special military capabilities. As for an insurgency in captured areas after an invasion, doubtlessly Russian security services have some sinister plan to cope with that contingency that will not be speculated upon here.

Amat victoria curam. (Victory loves preparation. [Victory favors those who take pains.]) As aforementioned, Putin is hardly acting on impulse, making it up as he goes along. Evidently, Putin believed acting now militarily would best serve Russian interests as he perceives them, not knowing whether the opportunity would present itself again. His decision suggests to the mind that events have apparently moved in some way that enough boxes were ticked off to allow a well-thought out plan based on facts, calculations, possible opposition moves, and predicted outcomes, to be green-lit. To that wise, one might presume any and every coercive economic measure possibly levied against Russia by the West would doubtlessly be anticipated by him. One also might presume he has some plan, stratagem, to counter such steps short-term and long-term. Watching the West interact with Ukraine since the collapse of the government led by his stern ally former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 as a result of Euromaidan, the Revolution of Dignity, Putin likely feels more and more that he is being “rock souped.” Surely, from his lens, the military dimension of the relationship remains at the forefront of Western expansion eastward. NATO forces are creeping closer to Russia’s border, and the government in Kyiv is hopelessly pulled further away from Moscow’s reach. Putin might believe any reasonable observer would accept and agree with his thinking about a threat from the West, and that his logically reached perception has actually been fostered by Western actions.

Ukrainian troops training with the FGM-148 Javelin, a handheld, shoulder-fired precision missile system designed to destroy tanks and other armored vehicles, as well as hovering helicopters (above). The Ukrainians would hardly receive military aid from partners and friends fast enough in the short-term to check a well-coordinated, rapid advance of heavy Russian forces. In the most favorable assessment, they might be able to supply them with enough to hurt Russian forces and perhaps “tear off an arm.” Having experience in contending with somewhat recent Western efforts to assist Russia’s adversaries and those its allies in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine militarily, perhaps a special task force has been organized and assigned in advance, among other things, to handle all aspects of that matter. As for a post-invasion insurgency, surely Russian security services have some sinister plan to cope with that contingency that will not be speculated upon here.

Admittedly, it is surprising how much Putin has done to signal that he is considering a move into Ukraine. However, there is surely an art that moves Putin’s mind. One might presume that as he initially staked the situation with regard to the US, almost nothing communicated through telephone conversations or bilateral talks alone would be enough to compel the US to act as he wished. The potential use of military force could not exist as an abstraction, being left to the imagination of Western national leaders and their advisers. With a build-up military force, he could illustrate, convince US decisionmakers that the threat of military action was real.

Surely Moscow closely observed events as they developed in the border crisis between India and China. Although it has been repeated as of late that China backed down to India on the matter of the border crisis in which occasional gunfire was exchanged and lives were lost. The common wisdom is that the aggressive moves it made with ease against India placed China in a situation which in the long run would prove too consuming, too difficult to handle and contrary to national interest, particularly such an approach can have an impact economically. There was also too little gain for China both geostrategically or geopolitically as compared to the potential loss suffered from such an investment. 

An odd advantage that Putin has is that the US will act in a fairly predictable fashion. There is less for him to fear of some random, unexpected decision from the US than the US may fear about such a choice made by him. Placed in a trying position, which Putin surely hopes he has done, a certain reality would need to be faced by US decisionmakers. Conceivably, he would expect the top military officers and officials at the Pentagon (US Department of Defense) to see the situation straight. Indeed, he may be hoping the Pentagon would be the voice of reason, the source that will explain that the real possibility exists for the situation to get out of control if the US were to commit itself too heavily to Ukraine’s defense. That would seem especially true if US decisionmakers contemplated having to act if both Russia moved on Ukraine and China moved on Taiwan almost simultaneously. That is a real possibility despite how fanciful it may sound. Tremendous pressure would be placed on the available military resources of the US and its allies. It would seem unlikely to Putin that decisiommakers in Washington would sink themselves deeper into a situation in which only bad choices were left available. C’est comme ça! However, Putin still cannot be absolutely certain that Washington would parse out the situation as he has. He has the task of showing it this perspective and convincing it to acquiesce to at least most of his demands.

The clever bit for Putin would be to determine what military action by NATO, if any, would be taken to physically halt a Russian advance into Ukraine. To that extent, Putin may have assessed that with regard to Ukraine, as well with Taiwan, policies of past eras are no longer viable under current circumstances. The military forces of Russia have been transformed. Insofar as Putin is concerned, unless the US planned to transport the bulk of its armed forces into Ukraine and nearby, any challenge by the US and its allies that included military action would mean recklessly placing some small set of their forces in great peril. Russia would not back down once hostilities were initiated. Again, fighting along its own border would allow Russia countless advantages to bear on its prospective opponent. It would truly be absolute madness for Washington to commit its forces to the fight without some clear way to win or create some acceptable circumstance they could not have achieved without firing a shot. Ironically, in the name of global peace and security, to avoid a nuclear Armageddon, it would need to let its declared partners in Kyiv fall. Even though the US public today is uninterested in starting foreign wars, if the Biden administration commits the US to a fight that would have an uncertain purpose and outcome, it would garner great attention from the public, and very likely fail to get its approval. To the extent that these considerations factor in Putin’s calculus, he would most likely find Washington’s stated position on Ukraine to be unrealistic and unreasonable. It only makes sense as long as Moscow does not act.

If efforts at peace fail, it is not completely clear to greatcharlie whether Putin would want all of Ukraine or just some of it: Donetsk and Luhansk for instance. If he wants more, his plans may likely include capturing Kyiv and establishing a new Ukrainian government. That would take up an enormous amount of time, resources, effort, and political capital. Putin seems too shrewd to rush into something as colossal as administering Ukraine. Still, no one is infallible. Putin has been known to miscalculate. It was a gross miscalculation to interfere with the US elections in 2016, an action Putin has repeatedly denied despite the fact that direct proof of Russian meddling has been presented on by US intelligence and law enforcement organizations. If Putin acts militarily in Ukraine and successfully captures enough territory to his content–at least on paper he should be able to with some ease, he would again be looked upon as a shining hero among supporters. The effort by NATO and the West in general to deter him would be depicted as a debacle. If he fails to make gains against the Ukrainians and capture sufficient territory, the failure would be an enormous defeat for Putin. It is possible that the rippling effect of such a prospective defeat would lay the groundwork for his departure as Russia’s leader.

US President Joe Biden (left center) and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (right). As aforementioned, Putin is hardly acting on impulse, making it up as he goes along. Evidently, Putin believed acting now militarily would best serve Russian interests as he perceives them, not knowing whether the opportunity would present itself again. His decision suggests to the mind that events have apparently moved in some way that enough boxes were ticked off to allow a well-thought out plan based on facts, calculations, possible opposition moves, and predicted outcomes, to be green-lit. To that wise, one might presume any and every coercive economic measure possibly levied against Russia by the West would doubtlessly be anticipated by him. One also might presume he has some plan to counter such steps short-term and long-term.

The View from the US

In remarks before meeting with his Infrastructure Implementation Task Force on January 20, 2022, US President Joe Biden laid out his position on a potential invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces. Biden, who would not expect to speak idly on such a grave matter or any matter, for that case, stated: “I’ve been absolutely clear with President Putin.  He has no misunderstanding.  If any–any–assembled Russian units move across the Ukrainian border, that is an invasion.  But–and it would be met with severe and coordinated economic response that I’ve discussed in detail with our allies, as well as laid out very clearly for President Putin. But there is no doubt–let there be no doubt at all that if Putin makes this choice, Russia will pay a heavy price. It is also not the only scenario we need to be prepared for: Russia has a long history of using measures other than overt military action to carry out aggression in paramilitary tactics, so-called “gray-zone” attacks, and actions by Russian soldiers not wearing Russian uniforms. Remember when they moved into the Donbas with “Little Green Men”?  They weren’t–they were dealing with those who were Russian sympathizers and said that Russia had no–nobody in there. Well, that includes “Little Green Men” in uniforms, as well as cyberattack. We have to be ready to respond to these as well–and decisively–in a united way, with a range of tools at our disposal.” Très, très fort!

During a two hour videolink call concerning Ukraine and other disputes on December 21, 2021, Biden also warned Putin that the West would impose “strong economic and other measures” on Russia if it invades Ukraine. Putin complained NATO is attempting to “develop” Ukrainian territory. He demanded guarantees that NATO would not expand farther eastward. Although there were no breakthroughs, the two sides agreed upon continuing communications. In greatcharlie’s December 31, 2021 post entitled, “Infrequently Discussed Issues Regarding Taiwan Likely Influencing Decisions of Communist Party of China Leaders and PLA Commanders,” it was explained that from Washington’s perspective, the door must be left open to type of contrition in diplomacy. Within time perceived to be available as conflict appears to draw near, there must exist an opportunity to amend a position. In theory, there may be an epiphany within logic and reason that leads one side to align itself with a view closely matching the other. Despite expressing concerns that Putin may invade Ukraine at any moment, there may still be some in Washington who assess and intuit, correctly or incorrectly, that since action has not been taken, with all of the tactical benefits such a surprise move would garner, it may not be taken. The delay In smashing into Ukraine may be a true lack of desire on the part of Putin to bear the burden of administering more of that country. There is the off chance that Putin may have some doubts about the military capabilities of Russian forces. The capture of Ukrainian territory may be quick and dirty but may leave unexpected problems in its aftermath. Given the way in which Biden spoke of sanctions, it is possible, despite what greatcharlie has already suggested here on this matter, that Putin may be worried about economic retaliation from the West. (Russia does not have much to shield itself from economic retaliation as compared to China, bound to the West with its products and production capabilities. The energy it provides to Europe and Nord Stream 2 are the more meaningful cards for Moscow to play. With concern to that, during the administration of US President Donald Trump, the US offered Europe a fairly decent alternative source of energy worthy of consideration.)

Putin usually plays his cards close, making it difficult to know whether some resolution might be found through a more open dialogue. No doubt officials in Western capitals are mindful of being too attached to diplomacy in coping with Putin. Each is doubtlessly versed enough in history to hark back to this infamous statement which likely has an expected chilling effect on efforts to work with him: “As long as war has not begun, there is always hope. For the present I ask you to await as calmly as you can the events of the next few days. As long as war has not begun, there is always hope that it may be prevented, and you know that I am going to work for peace to the last moment.” These words were spoken by United Kingdom Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain on September 27, 1938, during an address to the British people as concerns of war rose as negotiations between German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and himself. The tragic outcome of that effort is well-known. 

For Washington, Moscow’s actions have far greater implications than the progress of US-Russian relations. As Blinken also explained during his January 8, 2022 CNN appearance: “There are large principles at stake that go to the fundamentals of international peace and security.” He went on to note that the US is joined by international partners “to make it clear to Russia that this aggression will not be accepted, will not be tolerated.” An additional step in knocking down the idea that this crisis stands as a problem between Washington and Moscow has already been taken by the US. On January 9, 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated very clearly on CNN: “It’s hard to see making actual progress, as opposed to talking, in an atmosphere of escalation with a gun to Ukraine’s head. So, if we’re actually going to make progress, we’re going to have to see de-escalation, Russia pulling back from the threat that it currently poses to Ukraine.” In effect, he expressed the view that despite intercession of the US and its allies, this matter remains Kyiv’s problem mainly. Looking at the crisis in that way makes it something akin to Ukraine’s “Reichenbach Falls”, the moment where Arthur Conan Doyle’s great fictional detective character, Sherlock Holmes, from The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, originally published as twelve short stories in the Strand Magazine (1891), was confronted by his archrival Professor James Moriarty after repeatedly disrupting his criminal schemes. As the story initially went, Holmes met his end in combat with him. It was revealed in subsequent installments of the series appearing in the Strand that Holmes survived the fight, his resurrection being demanded of Doyle by the magazine’s editors to satisfy a readership made much distraught over his demise. One might hope fate will allow Ukraine to survive this crisis intact, yet there is nothing fictional about this situation. Moreover, Putin is a far more powerful opponent for Ukraine than Moriarty was to Holmes.

Putin (right) seated in a conference room at the Kremlin during a videolink call with Biden (on screen left). During a two hour videolink concerning Ukraine and other disputes on December 21, 2021, there were no breakthroughs, but the two sides agreed to continue communicating. From Washington’s perspective, the door must be left open to type of contrition in diplomacy. Within time perceived to be available as conflict draws near, there must exist an opportunity to amend a position. In theory, there may be an epiphany within logic and reason that leads one side to align itself with a view closely matching the other. There is the off chance Putin may have some doubts as to the military capabilities of Russian forces. The capture of Ukrainian territory may be quick and dirty but may leave unexpected problems in its aftermath. Given the way in which Biden spoke of sanctions, Putin may very well be worried about economic retaliation from the West.

Some Key Issues for Negotiation as the Situation Stands

Washington wants to avoid a conflict in Ukraine. For Washington, success in resolving the Ukraine crisis for the moment would imaginably mean, in brief, crafting an agreement with Russia that will relax tensions, strengthen the sovereignty of Ukraine, enhance the security of Ukraine, and ensure Russia remains committed to whatever agreement is reached. Ukrainians must be allowed to enjoy full control and use of their own territory. Ukraine would retain self-determination as a sovereign state. If Ukraine wants to join NATO that wish will be protected. (Perhaps with some disagreeable yet necessary minor alteration in the short-term.) Russia would need to take action assented to in an agreement that would confirm it has no aggressive intention. Any action that may have prompted accusations by both sides that the other was moving back to the adversarial thinking of the Cold War and the paradigm of East-West spheres of influence of the past must be addressed. Lending some further context for Washington’s efforts to negotiate with Moscow on Ukraine, Blinken, also stated during his January 9, 2022 interview on CNN that, “It’s also not about making concessions. It’s about seeing whether, in the context of dialogue and diplomacy, there are things that both sides, all sides can do to reduce tensions.” 

Recognizably, neither the US nor any government in the West wants to jump through hoops to satisfy Russia. They would all doubtlessly agree they have no reason to give up anything they have. They are not bothering Russia and Russia should not be bothering them. Even if some agreement were constructed with Moscow that they could accept, they would want to know how Russia would be held to the terms of the signed document. They would be skeptical over Russia’s willingness to adhere with anything to which it might be remotely disagreeable in the long-run. Plus ça change! All would likely agree that force should not need to be relied upon to hold Moscow to it. There is the likelihood many NATO allies and neighboring countries to Russia might sign an agreement with Russia, but would be hesitant to do so. If the US sought some collective agreement concerning the situation with Ukraine, those countries may see it as too much to ask or a manifestation of naiveté by leading powers less threatened by Russia. Some capitals would likely respond to the suggestion with reproach. Even more, they may believe the constant struggles with Russia that have created their anxieties among them about negotiating with Moscow. US officials would be up against that sort of reception and more if it sought to create some consensus among the Europeans on constructing a comprehensive agreement with Russia. Perchance if the situation is approached with a degree of gentleness and patience–“with diplomacy”–their efforts may bear fruit.

Yet, given these and other considerations that would shape a diplomatic effort in this crisis, to get a firm handle on this matter, the primary focus, as postulated here, must be placed on Putin. All that has transpired, all of the preconceived management of this crisis from the Russian side, has been the manifestation of his vigorous and masterful mind. Formulating the best response diplomatically will mean better understanding him and how he thinks. For US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators, finding a way, within reason, within acceptable parameters of US values and interests, to satisfy Putin and themselves will be no mean feat.

Putin (center) flanked by Russian Federation Minister of Defense, General of the Army Sergey Shoigu (right) and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (left). Recognizably, neither the US nor any government in the West wants to jump through hoops to satisfy Russia regarding Ukraine. Even if some agreement were constructed with Moscow, all would remain skeptical over Russia’s willingness to adhere with anything to which it might be remotely disagreeable in the long-run. To get a handle on this matter, the primary focus, as postulated here, must be placed on Putin. All that has transpired, all of the preconceived management of this crisis from the Russian side, has been the manifestation of his vigorous and masterful mind. Formulating the best response diplomatically will mean better understanding him and how he thinks. For US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators, finding a way, within reason, within acceptable parameters of US values and interests, to satisfy Putin and themselves will be no mean feat.

Some Common Wisdom Regarding Putin

Many Western political leaders and senior foreign and national security policy officials have claimed to have the ability to look into Putin’s soul. The reviews of their skills have been mixed. US President George Bush provided the following statement on the matter on June 18, 2016: “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country. And I appreciated so very much the frank dialogue.” However, given his former work in the intelligence industry, his decades of experience in politics and as a national leader, Putin is the one who has mastered such an art. While he is never publicly vocal with his findings concerning other national leaders he meets, his conclusions are best manifested by the actions he takes as they regard their interests.

Every US official Putin meets likely for him becomes the avatar of Western duplicity. He will always be distrustful, and will simply study the individual seeking to gain a sense from his or her words, the nature of the conversation among the most senior US officials on Ukraine. To this extent, each conversation informs his next move, not due to its content, but due to what he perceives to lie behind their words. In many ways times have changed for Russia, and more dramatically for Putin. Russia can not exactly match the US as a global power. It cannot exactly match the power of the US even militarily. However, its capabilities have increased and it can do more things in the world now than a decade or two ago. It would appear that Putin so badly wants to get that point across.

It was never the case that Putin could have been shaped into the Russian leader Washington wanted. Moreover, Putin was never a man to be trifled with. However, these were among many ideas about Putin perhaps carried over from the tail-end of the Clinton administration, over two decades ago, when the then young president was establishing himself both at home and abroad. Perhaps it accounts for the manner in which those officials in the Obama administration approached Putin, dismissing him to a degree as something akin to a potentate, a footnote in their dealing with a Russia that was a shadow of its former self during the Soviet era in nearly every respect. There is a popular saying among many in the younger generation that “to compete, one must compare.” Officials in the Obama administration saw no comparison between the power Russia had maintained following the Soviet Union’s collapse, and the US which was at the time, and remains, the preeminent power in the world. Putin would likely posit that Washington has done more than enough since the Obama administration to push him to act as he has.

It remains a trend to look at Putin superficially. Interestingly, it allows everyone to have an equal shot at analyzing him and his moves. To that extent, time is spent, near idly, discussing how bad a person he is. (One very senior US official referred to Putin as “a killer” In May 2021.) At the core of even such unremarkable analyses must be something about the whole authentic enough to give it true weight. Yet, aspects of such analyses are often not quite logical. It is fascinating to see how simple facts may go some way to explain what might be recognized at best as a charitable position. As seasoned analysts would tell, if that product is simulated, conclusions that result from it will be inauthentic. What is left to examine amounts to a mere perception of what is going on in Putin’s mind and in his camp as compared to the hard facts. Using conclusions that result from such analyses will never allow policymakers and other senior officials to approach him in the right way. Even logical opinions are not the equivalent of fact. Truth is not an opinion. In the defense of some analysts, adhering to such a limited, official approach to Putin could hardly be described as neglectful. Perhaps considerations outside of what is generally accepted are avoided in fear of being castigated for devoting time and effort to trivialities. There must be something stronger that lends an understanding of his state of mind

Another problem arises when such views, despite all that is wrong about them, are adopted unconsciously by senior policy officials or worm their way into analyses, and even worse, as a possible result of that contamination, more apposite aspects may fail to receive sufficient or any treatment. It is hardly deliberate. They may appear as trifles, made imperceptible by the fact that they are notions, too commonplace in the mind to raise concern. Nonetheless, they are damaging much as the microscopic virus that can fell a world class athlete.

The West’s position on Putin as it stands today is that Putin has a mind to have Russia serve as the follow-on to the Soviet Union and claim its status and glory as a power. The enterprise has faced some rough patches over the years, but has progressed nonetheless. Putin’s actions in countries formerly aligned with the Soviet Union or were under its influence decades ago have been his targets and he has managed to get the attention and response from the West led by the US, the adversary of the erstwhile Soviet Union. It sounds bad enough for his neighbors, the West, and all others interested in maintaining stability and security in their countries, regions, and the world. Yet, in taking that tack, he has to an extent guaranteed Russia would remain stuck, limited to being a only simulacrum of the Soviet Union, a shadow of the past. Granted, Russia may be seen as possessing formidable military forces, with new weapons developments and declarations of the intention to defend its territory and its interests, but not a country that was advancing politically, economically, or socially, seeking to elevate to something better. Not to offend, but perhaps that was the best he could ever expect from his people.

Putin (right) and US President Bill Clinton (left) at the G8 Summit in Nago, Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, in July 2000. When Putin became Russian Federation President, he took the seat created for Yeltsin at the G8. Perhaps the other G8 leaders felt that it was important to keep Russia in the G8 for the same reasons it was brought in but also hoped that keeping Putin in their circle might stir and help sustain a great desire within him to make Russia a country “like to one more rich in hope.” Other national leaders of the G8 may have thought that Putin would passively acquire an appreciation of their world, imagine the potential of a rejuvenated Russia fitting into their world, and acquire similarities with them. However, their eyes appear to have been closed to what was happening with Putin and Russia and why the move was nearly doomed to fail to ameliorate East-West tension in the long run due to his personality, no offense intended.

Missteps in Responding to Putin Somewhat Downplayed

The formal inclusion of the new Russian Federation in the high realms of international politics following the collapse of the Soviet Union was nobly attempted. A seat in the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council was inherited from the erstwhile Communist state. As important, Russia began to engage in separate meetings with leaders of the intergovernmental group of the leading economic powers, the G7, in 1994 while Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was in office. Russia formally joined the group in 1997 at the invitation of US President Bill Clinton and United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair. This noble step was ostensibly taken in the name of international peace and security. Surely, inviting Russia to join the G7 was more than a friendly gesture and a fresh start. Membership would plug Russia into the international order, forestalling any burgeoning sense that if left isolated, control in Moscow might fall fully into the hands of organized crime groups, and so would Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Russia membership would more importantly plug the G7 countries vis-à-versa into Moscow in a structured way, creating an effective, stable line of communication and political and economic influence.

When Putin became Russian Federation President, he took the seat created for Yeltsin at the G8. Perhaps the other G8 leaders felt that it was important to keep Russia in the G8 for the same reasons it was brought in but also hoped that keeping Putin in their circle might stir and help sustain a great desire within him to make Russia a country “like to one more rich in hope.” Other national leaders of what became the G8 may have thought that Putin would passively acquire an appreciation of their world, imagine the potential of a rejuvenated Russia fitting into their world, and acquire similarities with them. However, their eyes appear to have been closed to what was happening with Putin and Russia and why the move was nearly doomed to fail to ameliorate East-West tension in the long run due to his personality, no offense intended.

At the G8, national leaders would come to the big table committed to having a positive impact in not only economic affairs, but world affairs in general. The existing seven members–the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, France and Italy, plus the EU–were bound by shared values as open, democratic and outward-looking societies. Russia was not a country completely devoid of desirable things, Russia possessed natural resources, particularly oil and gas which the energy industries of the other powers coveted. Certainly, Russia retained the power to destroy with its nuclear arsenal and the residue of the once powerful Soviet military. However, Russia was hardly developed enough to participate in that way as a member. 

As for Putin, he had not as yet grabbed all reins of power firmly in Russia, much as he tightly grips them today. It is not inconceivable that his political qualities were not fully scrutinized by any member state. However, more pertinently, Putin was unlikely ready to manage Russia’s stake at the G8 when first began participating in leaders’ summits. Looking into Putin’s inner-being, it is possible that Putin, while in his own way appreciating the status G8 membership bestowed Russia and him, felt well-out of his comfort zone and despite his ego, felt that the manner in which Russia acquired G8 membership was counterfeit. For Putin to be satisfied at that time, Russia would need to possess membership on his terms, legitimate terms. Within G8 meetings, Putin presented himself with grace and charm befitting his position. If Putin ever got the idea then that Western leaders enjoyed observing him outside of his comfort zone or disrespected him in any way, he would unlikely be able to hide his anger in his countenance and dwell on lashing out in some big way. Perchance at some point Putin might have imagined that the other technologically advanced countries used G8 meetings as a stage to lampoon Russia. He would be seated before them as they flaunted their economic power and progress while giving the impression in occasional off-handed comments and perhaps in unconscious condescending behavior toward him, that they imagine everything about Russia being tawdry and slipshod, particularly its goods and services, and would describe its industrial centers resembling a carnival the day after the night before. Perhaps such thinking could be said to have some validity given that such was essentially the case in early post-Soviet Russia. Putin had already brought to the table a sense within himself that Russia remained vulnerable to Western plans and intentions. That sensibility seemed to stick regardless of all else good that came his way through the G8. The G8 experience overall may have left a bad taste in his mouth. It is likely other group leaders may not have imagined that would be the outcome.

As a result of Euromaidan, power changed hands in Ukraine, and a series of measures that enhanced Western influence were taken. Putin responded robustly. The escalation of a struggle between ethnic Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk with the fledgling democratic Ukrainian government was followed by the greater step of Russia’s seizing and annexing Crimea. Crimea, at time was the sovereign territory of Ukraine, and most national capitals say it still is. Putin’s actions resulted in Russia being placed back into what was supposed to be isolation; it was put out of the G8 and hit with many punitive economic measures. Both Putin and Russia have seemingly survived it all. Although Russia was suspended from the G8–once again the G7, Russia delayed announcing a decision to permanently withdraw from the group until 2017.

Further reflecting his hot and cold impressions about the other industrial powers, although Russia was suspended from the G8, Russia delayed announcing a decision to permanently withdraw from the G8 until 2017. Surely, Putin had great concerns over the perceptions in Russia and around the world of the decision of the G7 countries. Putin appears to have had a morbid fear that the G7 countries were exercising power over Russia and himself. That would not do. By waiting, Putin retained control of that situation by choosing when Russia would depart and then exist in the substitute reality that his country had not been pushed out of the organization and marginalized. As far as he was concerned, Russia was still a member of the club of the most powerful countries. Despite everything, that recognition remained an aspiration of his. It is an apparent odd duality. Satisfying Putin’s desire for Russia to possess the ability to discuss world problems with the leaders of the most influential countries, was Russia’s continued membership in the G20–the Group of 20, in essence a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 19 of the world’s largest economies, including those of many developing nations, along with the EU. While the G7 existed for the top-tier industrialized countries, the G20, formed in 1999, provided a forum for the discussion of international financial matters that included those emerging economies which at the time began to represent a larger part of the global economy. The G20’s aim is to promote global economic growth, international trade, and regulation of financial markets. As of 2021 there are 20 members in the group to include Putin’s erstwhile G8 partners, the US, United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and the EU, and also Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey and his Russia. To all appearances, as a G20 member, Russia plausibly retains authority in world governance. 

Una idea perplexina. (The idea is strange to us.) Intriguingly,  Putin did not attend the G20 summit in Rome in October 2021, informing the organization that his decision was due to concerns about the COVID-19 pandemic. Not to take precaution in these times would be short-sighted, but for Putin to abstain from physically attending a G20 leaders summit could indicate that the organization, for at least that moment, may have less meaning for him. Putin participated in the summit in Rome via videolink, but the optics were hardly favorable. Reportedly, Putin coughed quite a bit during the meeting creating questions in the minds of others about his condition. That seemed unusual for a man who exudes strength and robustness. (Hopefully, Putin was not feeling any real discomfort.) It was a small matter, a trifle, but perhaps it will later be discovered that it was small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph.

One must add to this story the influence of the destructive impact of the West on the Russian economy and the country’s efforts to “build back better” immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union on Putin’s thinking. As discussed in the June 18, 2019 greatcharlie post entitled, “Why Putin Laments the Soviet Union’s Demise and His Renewed “Struggle” with the US: A Response to an Inquiry from Students,” Putin would doubtlessly explain that under Yeltsin, the Russian leadership made the mistake of believing Russia no longer had any enemies. Putin, while ascending to the top in the new Russian Federation, saw how mesmerizing “reforms” recommended to Yeltsin’s government by Western experts unmistakably negatively impacted Russia’s economy in a way referred to somewhat euphemistically by those experts as “shock treatment.” Yeltsin was unaware that Western experts were essentially “experimenting” with approaches to Russia’s economic problems. His rationale for opening Russia up to the resulting painful consequences was not only to fix Russia’s problems but ostensibly to establish comity with the West. The deleterious effects of reform recommended by Western experts’ could be seen not only economically, but socially.  In another statement made while he was acting President in 1999, Putin diplomatically explained the consequences of relying upon foreign experts for assistance. He stated: “The experience of the 90s demonstrates vividly that merely experimenting with abstract models and schemes taken from foreign textbooks cannot assure that our country will achieve genuine renewal without any excessive costs. The mechanical copying of other nations’ experience will not guarantee success, either.” Once fully ensconced as Russia’s leader, he would publicly state that the greatest danger to Russia comes from the West. He also brought that sensibility to the G7 table with him. 

One might go as far as to say apparently none of the negative perspectives, memories that Putin held regarding the West were revealed. He concealed them with sangfroid and equanimity. Yet, he likely thought of them by day and nursed them by night. Inclusion was not enough to stem those feelings or his responses to Western moves albeit in Russia’s direction. Once power changed hands in Ukraine, and a series of measures that enhanced US influence were taken, Putin responded robustly. The promotion of a struggle between ethnic Russians in Donetsk and Luhansk with the fledgling democratic Ukrainian government was followed by the greater step of Russia’s seizing and annexing Crimea, then the sovereign territory of Ukraine. His actions resulted in Russia being placed back into what was supposed to be isolation; it was put out of the G8–now once again the G7–and hit with many punitive economic measures. Both Putin and Russia have seemingly survived it all.

Putin (left) United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron (center) and US President Barack Obama (right) at the G8 Summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland in June 2013. Putin was unlikely ready to manage Russia’s stake at the G8 when first began participating in leaders’ summits. Looking into Putin’s inner-being, it is possible that Putin, though appreciating the status G8 membership bestowed Russia and him, he likely felt well-out of his comfort zone and despite his ego, felt somewhere inside that the manner in which Russia acquired G8 membership was counterfeit. Perchance Putin could imagine that the other technologically advanced countries used G8 meetings as a stage, and he would be seated before them as they flaunted their economic power and progress while giving the impression in occasional off-handed comments and perhaps unconscious condescending behavior toward him, He already brought to the table a sense within himself that Russia remained vulnerable to Western plans and intentions. The whole G8 experience may have left a bad taste in his mouth.

Putin from a Different Lens

What one might gather from this part of the story is that more than anxiety and dissatisfaction with US policies and moves, there is apparently a real sense of vulnerability in Putin toward the US and its allies. It has been a subtle and profound undercurrent in his decisionmaking and approaches toward them. Often, that sense of vulnerability has been exacerbated by efforts from Washington to make diplomatic inroads with countries Putin seems to feel belong to Russia. Note how every step taken eastward by the US in Europe, as innocuous as each may have appeared to Washington’s eyes, has led to hyper-vigilance–for example, increased intelligence and surveillance activity and aerial and naval incursions in the territory of NATO Members–and military action by Moscow. Though it has been listened to with skeptical ears in the West, Putin has said that US moves evoke his actions.

In a December 21, 2021 Washington Post opinion piece entitled, “Putin Wants Us To Negotiate over the Heads of Our Allies. Washington Shouldn’t Fall for It”, the former US Ambassador to the Russian Federation Michael McFaul lists what he identifies as Russian actions and policies undermining European security. McFaul included the following on that list: Russia well-maintains troops and weapons from the territory of the Republic of Moldova; Russia has recognized the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries; Russia caotured and annexed Crimea and well-supports the separatist movements in eastern Ukraine; Russia has deployed SS-26 Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad and maintains them in other deployment locations; Russia has placed tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad; Russia has engaged in assassination operations, such as those conducted in the European cities of London, Moscow, Salisbury, Berlin and Tomsk; and, Russia has aided remaining European dictators who kill and arrest Europeans exercising freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. One can only imagine Putin’s inner-dialogue as he took each step.

Cast one’s mind back to Putin’s greatest expression of vulnerability in March 18, 2014 speech declaring Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He vented his anger at the US and EU, enumerating some Western actions that fostered contempt in Moscow. He mentioned: Russia’s economic collapse, which many Russians recall was worsened by destructive advice and false philanthropy of Western business and economic experts that did more to cripple their country; the expansion of NATO to include members of the Soviet Union’s own alliance, the Warsaw Pact; the erroneous Russian decision to agree to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, which he referred to as the “colonial treaty”; the West’s dismissal of Russia’s interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and the EU; and, Western efforts to instruct Russia on how to conduct its affairs domestically and internationally. Conceivably, the aggregate of US moves eastward in Europe over time have truly rattled Putin and could potentially push him over the edge. That must always be considered. If the actual intention is to irritate Putin, then there will be no firm peace ever reached while he runs Russia.

Putin (above) in an office in the Senate Building at the Kremlin. In state-to-state talks between the US and Russia concerning Ukraine a structure has been established in which talks are held in rank order. Biden communicates with Putin, and Blinken communicates with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On both sides, the possibility exists that a set of reactions and responses to the positions and personas have already been formed. It would only be human to color anything truly novel added to the dialogue with considerations of what had already been said. Accordingly, it might be useful to enlist an envoy who could deliver the message that will end Putin’s sense of vulnerability and give immediate legitimacy to a call for multi-party negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on European security. That individual would need to have considerable standing with Putin to deliver that message.

What Might Be Done Regarding Putin To End This Crisis?

More than once has Putin associated himself with the ideas of “West German” Parliamentarian Egon Bahr on East-West competition. Discussing NATO in an interview published on January 11, 2016 in Bild, Putin provided insight into his thinking then and now. During the interview, Putin quoted Bahr who stated in 1990: “If we do not now undertake clear steps to prevent a division of Europe, this will lead to Russia’s isolation.” Putin then quoted what he considered an edifying suggestion from Bahr on how to avert a future problem in Europe. According to Putin, Bahr proffered: “the USA, the then Soviet Union and the concerned states themselves should redefine a zone in Central Europe that would not be accessible to NATO with its military structure.” Putin claimed that the former NATO Secretary General Manfred Worner had guaranteed NATO would not expand eastwards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Putin perceives the US and its allies as having broken their promises to avoid expanding further eastward, and doing only what is best for their own interest in the name of all countries. Putin told his interviewer: “NATO and the USA wanted a complete victory over the Soviet Union. They wanted to sit on the throne in Europe alone. But they are sitting there, and we are talking about all these crises we would otherwise not have.”

Vitae summa brevis spem nos vetat inchoare longam. (Life’s short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes.) Whatever it is that Putin wants to achieve, he must move faster than time wastes life. Time is not on Putin’s side. National leaders and political figures in power now in the capital of those countries of the former Eastern bloc which Putin so dearly covets to develop Russian influence are individuals of the last generation that even briefly lived while the Soviet Union had considerable influence, sway in their countries. Coming generations will only know the Soviet Union from history books. They will unlikely as a pattern, by inertia, due to insouciance  simply seek as their predecessors seek to connect with Moscow. The benefits of connection to the West will be well understood by them. Relatives who in the past decades who immigrated West would likely have some influence on their understanding of those benefits. Russia simply will not compare, offer anything they would desperately want to invest in their future. Russia itself represents the past, and how bad things were, something no one should reasonably want to be like or be part of.

As greatcharlie ruminated on in its January 18, 2018 post entitled, “Trump Wants Good Relations with Russia, But if New Options on Ukraine Develop, He May Use One,” Putin very likely has considered what Russia would be like after he, as one might presume he accepts, is “called to heaven” or perhaps elsewhere, goodness knows. It would seem that now while on Earth, he is on course regarding Ukraine to saddle future generations of Russians with a country or parts of it that are still economically, socially, and politically challenged that they will need to care for, to pay for. Future generations may not appreciate that. In Donetsk and Luhansk, future generations might abandon their homelands for “the other Ukraine” or points further West. They would unlikely pour into Russia for employment, a “better life.” In the future, a Russian leader might very well try to reverse whatever Putin seems to be attempting in Ukraine due to financial strains caused, or–not to be offensive–out of decency. Taking on Donetsk and Luhansk might very well be viewed in the future as a grave miscalculation, another step toward sealing Russia’s fate as a second tier superpower. It is greatcharlie’s assessment that future generations of Russians will not want to hold on to Ukraine as leaders of Putin’s generation, with an idea to reestablish Russia to resemble the Soviet Union. This reality may have value in negotiations with Putin. 

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (left) and Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (right) meeting at Hotel Wilson in Geneva, Switzerland on January 21, 2022. For their next diplomatic step with Moscow, US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators must find a way for the two sides to work together in similar positive ways to create an outcome in which they both have a mutual and balanced influence on the situation. For instance, perhaps ways in which Ukraine could be helped along the way by both the West and Russia in tandem through an agreement that would also promote the maintenance of good neighborly relations and support the establishment of strong, positive relationships overseas without anyone being irritated. Washington and Moscow could engage in an exploratory dialogue during which suggestions could be sought on how the two sides could get from where they are to where they want to be.

A Possible Way Ahead in Diplomacy

For their next diplomatic step with Moscow, US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators must find a way for the two sides to work together in similar positive ways to create an outcome in which they both have a mutual and balanced influence on the situation. For instance, perhaps ways in which Ukraine could be helped along the way by both the West and Russia in tandem through an agreement that would also promote the maintenance of good neighborly relations and support the establishment of strong, positive relationships overseas without anyone being irritated. Engaging in what in essence would be an exploratory dialogue, transparent and frank, between Washington and Moscow on such matters would be the first step. In that dialogue, suggestions could also be sought from Moscow on how the two sides could get from where they are to where they want to be. If the US and Russia can cooperate on matters concerning the International Space Station, surely they can cooperate on an Earthly matter as Ukraine. N’est-ce pas vrai?

In theory, enough compromise might result from the collective talks to result in an agreement that would satisfy hopes and mitigate fears on all sides. Perhaps it would become the paradigm for peace in Europe that would remain until that time a new generation of Russia leadership that would share the values of other open, democratic and outward-looking societies. After the agreement is reached, Putin would need to feel freer and be able to stand upright. The US and its allies, the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the UN, and especially Ukraine would be on a long list of those who would need to be satisfied with the plan for negotiating with Russia and the resultant argument. Creating consensus and acquiring agreement across the board on everything negotiated with Russia will take time but that course must be taken. Besides, if one is to believe Putin, and accept that he has no plans to invade Ukraine, then there is no real need to rush.

In state-to-state talks between the US and Russia concerning Ukraine a structure has been established in which talks are held in rank order. Biden communicates with Putin, and Blinken communicates with Russian Federation Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. On both sides, it is possible that a set of reactions and responses to the positions and personas have already been formed. It would only be human to color anything truly novel added to the dialogue with considerations of what had already been said. Accordingly, it might be useful to enlist an envoy who could deliver the message that will end Putin’s sense of vulnerability and give immediate legitimacy to a call for multi-party negotiations for a comprehensive agreement on European security. That individual would need to have considerable standing with Putin to deliver that message. It could be a former US President, German Chancellor, or European President or Prime Minister that Putin seemed to favor. Perhaps a small multinational delegation of doyens rather than a single doyen could meet with Putin. He may appreciate that. The immediate task of whoever meets Putin would be agreement to cease actions threatening Ukraine and publicly making demands for that would require its government to surrender self-determination and freedom to associate with other countries as Kyiv saw fit. The appropriate alternative suggested would be to discuss all issues. Putin would need to be convinced that everything Moscow, he, might deem pertinent could be hashed out at the suggested multi-party talks. The theme of the conversation would essentially be “Let us do everything the right way this time.” Again, Putin may appreciate that.

As for any agreement reached through multi-party talks, if Putin accepts that approach to diplomacy, more than simple guarantees must be insisted upon. Apparently, Lavrov presented a rather one-sided draft treaty to Blinken when they met in Geneva on January 21, 2022. That will not do. It was a rather incommesurate and hasty approach to the situation given its enormity. The effort to maintain Ukraine’s security, Russia’s security, Europe’s security must not only be comprehensive, it must be a dynamic process. Not to get into too much detail,, but as a comprehensive agreement, a new agreement would supersede the existing Minsk Agreement, although its terms could be referenced. Reasonably, terms of a new agreement could be built upon terms of the Minsk Agreement when directly related. Of course, the decision on that, as with everything else, is completely in the hands of the negotiating parties. All issues concerning Crimea and existing sanctions could be disassociated from these talks. Those talks could continue in their current venue. Again, the choice there is completely in the hands of the negotiating parties.

The negotiation process might require parties to take some the following steps, among many others: construct detailed plans of action on every key area as mutually recognized, each issue of contention, must be formulated to ensure greater clarity not confusion; create a security zone could be created within which zero tolerance of isolation of the agreement would be established; create firm timetables for actions as reducing the number of destabilizing forces near border; create a security zone could be created within which zero tolerance of isolation of the agreement would be established; create firm timetables for the suspension for refraining from existing actions such as military exercises; reduce the scope and scale of military exercises near the Russia-Ukraine border despite perceptions of whether they are threatening or benign; establish liaison offices in the security zone on both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian border could be created staffed by Russian and Ukrainian officers and military advisers if desired by either party; organize limited but comprehensive aerial surveillance over the security zone would be organized and appropriately scheduled; establish multiple military and diplomatic committees each with responsibilities in key areas of the agreement and respectively staffed with appropriate expertise and authority could be created to review plans for action in key established under the main agreement or hash out nagging issues could possibly exist; organize and schedule direct Ukraine-Russia talks, in a multiparty forum, at the ministerial level and deputies just below to include NATO Members and non-NATO Members in European countries neighboring Ukraine can be created.

It would be crucial to eliminate all ambiguities at the negotiating table through multilayered agreements if necessary as the process moves along. Pull all loose threads detected at the negotiating table may include using scenarios and hypotheticals. Whether a negotiating path as suggested will create stability in Europe right away, greatly improve Ukraine’s security and remove Russia’s fears, perhaps even through some very creative steps, remains to be seen. Nil sine magno vita labore dedit mortalibus. (Life grants nothing to us mortals without hard work.)

Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky (center) visiting his country’s eastern frontline in December 2021 (center). On January 9, 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed the view on CNN that in the end, despite the vigorous efforts of the to correct the situation, this matter is mainly Kyiv’s problem and the Ukrainians have a Russian “gun to their head.” Viewing the crisis in that way makes it something akin to Ukraine’s “Reichenbach Falls”, the moment where Arthur Conan Doyle’s great fictional detective character, Sherlock Holmes was confronted by his archrival Professor James Moriarty after repeatedly disrupting his criminal schemes. As the story initially went, Holmes met his end in combat with him. It was revealed in subsequent installments of the series appearing in the Strand Magazine that Holmes survived the fight, his resurrection being demanded of Doyle by the magazine’s editors to satisfy their readership. One might hope fate will allow Ukraine to survive this crisis intact, yet there is nothing fictional about this situation.

The Way Forward

Non enim parum cognosse, sed in parum cognito stulte et diu perseverasse turpe est, propterea quod alterum communi hominum infirmitati alterum singulari cuiusque vitio est attributum. (For it is not having insufficient knowledge, but persisting a long time in insufficient knowledge that is shameful; since the one is assumed to be a disease common to all, but the other is assumed to be a flaw to an individual.) Putin does not seek to make Russia first in Europe nor match the power and position of the US in the world. Russia lacks the wherewithal, the resources,, and a lot of other things required to accomplish such objectives. However, Putin does want to control what he claims to be in Russia’s “near abroad”: the former Soviet republics on its border. As the US and its European allies become more engaged with them, it becomes less likely that he will be able to accomplish that goal either. If the US and its allies were not enough trouble for Putin, his “friends” in Beijing have been knocking on the doors of those near abroad governments, making enticing, huge offers, which Moscow cannot match, to invest in their economies and support industrial and infrastructure development as a way to enhance ties–albeit perhaps not always in a legitimate way. Unfortunately for Putin, he was unable to shape Russia’s position in the world positively over the past two decades, by transforming the country to be a contributing member as an advanced industrialized, economic power, and present Russia as anything close to an alternative as a partner to its neighbors. Russia remained a country from which villainy of some sort was expected more than anything else. Unable to sway the capitals of bordering former Soviet republics to Russia’s camp, it would seem he made the decision a while back to use brute force. US decision-makers should not simply expect Putin to get a hold of himself, and get a grip concerning the use of greater military force in Ukraine. He already moved on Crimea, so for many, no points could be argued that would convince them that he would not do more. The capture of Crimea may have actually been only the first phase in a plan of far greater conception concerning Ukraine.

Washington wants to avoid a conflict in Ukraine. For Washington, success in resolving the Ukraine crisis would likely mean crafting a sustainable agreement with Russia, within acceptable parameters of US values and interests, and that is the rub. Some national leaders in Europe might go as far as to say aggression simply resides in Putin and it is too late for any worthwhile diplomacy with him. They may need to overcome an anxiety over the history of Russian behavior before altering their thinking on that. Still, at the same time, no responsible party involved in this matter wants war. Given how Putin thinks, more than aggression and dissatisfaction with US policies and moves inform his actions. A real sense of vulnerability in Putin toward the US and its allies has been a subtle and profound undercurrent in his decisionmaking and approaches toward them. That sense of vulnerability is intensified by Washington’s efforts to make diplomatic inroads with countries Putin seems to feel belong to Russia. Putin has actually said that US moves evoke his actions, which thereby are actually reactions. That is hardly something he, or any military commander, would want to admit or to accept.

As suggested here, US policymakers, decisionmakers and negotiators must find a way for the two sides to work together in similar positive ways to create an outcome in which they both have a mutual and balanced influence on the situation. For instance, perhaps ways in which Ukraine could be helped along the way by both the West and Russia in tandem through an agreement that would also promote the maintenance of good neighborly relations and support the establishment of strong, positive relationships overseas without anyone being irritated. Some, despite everything presented here, albeit in brief, might contend that there is little obvious room for compromise from either side. However, the referee has not yet blown the whistle for full-time. It has always been greatcharlie’s contention that smart people are usually able with the appropriate amount of effort to find answers to problems. A posse ad esse. (From possibility to actuality.)