The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 2)

“Official” company photo of veteran Wagner Group troops in Ukraine (above). Was their rebellion about their well-being, the war’s management, or something deeper? The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only neeed to be the possibility for their wishes to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

This post should be considered a continuation of the preceding one

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refer to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

In a photo released by Prigozhin’s Press Service, the Wagner Group owner is seen recording one of several video addresses in Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

The Wagner Group Rebellion

As things moved, on the morning of June 23, 2023, Prigozhin alleged Russian Federation forces had launched a fire mission on Wagner Group troops in Ukraine causing considerable casualties. Prigozhin announced he had launched an armed effort with his Wagner Group to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. Wagner Group troops crossed from Ukraine into Russia and entered Rostov, meeting no resistance by border guards. Just after 12:00AM on June 23, 2023, it was reported in the newsmedia that the FSB issued a warrant for Prigozhin’s arrest. 

About 8 hours after that, morning newsmedia reports showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Prigozhin posts a public announcement by video on Telegram from the captured base to report events. Prigozhin stated: “We are inside the [Russian Army] headquarters, it is 7:30AM. Military sites in Rostov, including an aerodrome, are under control. Prigozhin then issued what amounted to warning and intriguingly foreshadowing certain events by saying: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads. I am asking everyone to remain calm and not succumb to provocations, stay in their homes. It is advisable not to go outside along the route of our movement.” Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee. About 2 hours after that, Putin made a national address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 6 hours after that, Prigozhin is seen in a video widely broadcasted and posted online, discussing a deal to halt the rebellion and withdraw. On the heels of that, reports from the newsmedia indicated that Belarus President, Lukashenko, brokered the deal between the Kremlin and Prigozhin to end the “mutiny”. Wagner Group troops who participated in the rebellion would not be prosecuted, while those who did not join–presumably only those operating in Ukraine and not referring at all to those operating in African countries, in Syria, or elsewhere–would be offered contracts by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would leave the Russian Federation and remain in Belarus. Prigozhin ordered his troops back to their field camps in Ukraine. About 3 hours after that, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had completely withdrawn from Rostov-on-Don. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. In Rostov-on-Don, crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on.

About 48 hours after that, Putin made a late evening address broadcasted and posted online by the Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia concerning the rebellion in which he provided “more detail” regarding his decisionmaking and the “bigger picture.” About 12 hours after that, at an afternoon event held with much fanfare at the Kremlin’s Cathedral Square with some 2,500 members of the military, the security forces, and the National Guard in attendance, Putin expresses his appreciation for the efforts of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. Lukashenko’s role did not receive mention on that occasion. He expresses sorrow and praise for the Russian Federation aircrews that lost their lives confronting the “mutineers.” About 2 hours after that, Putin in a smaller setting indoors, again addressed Defense Ministry, National Guard, FSB, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service units who reportedly “ensured law and order during the mutiny.” Putin again thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. About 48 hours later, in the evening in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan in the Russian Federation, after the totality of the weekend’s events had a chance to settle well in the minds of the Russian people, Putin is shown in a video widely broadcasted in the country’s state-run and independent newsmedia greeting a very excited, sizable cheering crowd. The sense of genuine joy on his face upon engaging with the cheering Russian Federation citizens was most apparent.

Wagner Group troops in a company truck travel from the chaos of the frontlines to the serenity of Rostov-on-Don on June 24, 2023. On the morning of June 24, 2023, newsmedia reports across the Russian Federation showed Prigozhin and his Wagner Group in Rostov-on-Don, 660 miles (over 1,000 kilometers) south of Moscow. They captured the headquarters of Southern Command of Russian Federation Armed Forces, which was directing a considerable element of Russian Federation forces fighting in Ukraine. Meanwhile, rather than behaving as an occupying, brutish force, reportedly videos posted on social media  revealed armed Wagner Group troops, although controlling traffic at key intersections much as flagmen at a construction site, were mostly milling about in the city, ordering fast food, and walking about with takeout coffee.

Relative to Euromaidan in Ukraine or the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Wagner Group Rebellion was very short in duration, something less than brief. To allow the crisis to continue beyond its day and a half to two day time span, likely would have been determined too risky. There would be the desire to prevent the slightest idea that Putin’s government could not maintain order domestically to take root in the minds of the Russian people. The mainstream Western newsmedia, as mentioned, still insists at the time of this writing that Putin is on the ropes. As noted, the perspective being offered in the mainstream Western newsmedia  of the Wagner Group Rebellion being an overly aggressive and chaotic insurrection, a near uncontrollable crisis, was developed from a biased lens.

Surely there were relatively significant attendant events in between the key events that occurred within the 24-hour news cycle. For example, the FSB seized the Wagner Group Headquarters. The Russian Federation military without fanfare established a protective posture in the southern portion of Moscow. The commander of the Southern Group of the special military operation, Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin, who was once the overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine, addressed the rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. The first deputy chief of Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU, Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev appealed to rebellious Wagner Group troops in a video message. Shoigu and Gerasimov vanished from public view during the entire period. Perhaps the most chilling moment during the rebellion was when Wagner Group troops actually advanced just 200 kilometers (120 miles) from Moscow, according to Prigozhin. A column Wagner Group troops that reportedly included mounted tanks, armored vehicles, at least one self-propelled rocket launcher and numerous personnel trucks. had reached the Lipetsk province, about 360 kilometers (225 miles) south of Moscow. The downing of six Russian Army helicopters occurred while that column was en route to Moscow and the shoot-down of a Russian Air Force surveillance plane at some point. Surely, under the circumstances, the Russian people were hungry for information on events. The beginning of the day when Prigozhin was seen and when Putin made the first of his appearances during the episode, end of the day, when Putin made second appearance are times when the majority of the Russian people receive their news. Those moments turned out to be main events that did much to signal the direction the story was taking. Yet, the many pieces in-between as the few highlighted here also fit well within what could be characterized as the complex puzzle that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Once Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops agreed on June 24, 2023 to withdraw from Rostov-on-Don, they departed immediately. Crowds of the city’s citizens cheered their erstwhile occupiers on. Units closest to Moscow quickly reversed course and speedily returned directly to their bases. Prigozhin was seen ostensibly traveling to Belarus in a black armored SUV. Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarusian President AlexanderLukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.

The Narrative Putin Wanted the Russian People To Garner Regarding the Wagner Group Rebellion

Certainly, it never would have been considered sufficient in the eyes of the senior Kremlin officials to allow the Russian people to simply receive a well-paced flow of events on the Wagner Rebellion to decipher in many ways. State-run and independent newsmedia broadcasts did the job of letting them know events were taking place concerning the Wagner Group, the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Russian Federation General Staff and the special military operation. What they needed to hear and grasp about those matters would be explained to them by the ultimate source in the country, the Russian Federation President. To that extent, Putin provided four well-crafted addresses, one during and three immediately on the heels of the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Given the nature of the lens through which Putin apparently views the world, considering past public addresses, interviews, decisions and actions, his concise and succinct addresses in addition to well-communicating the required facts to the Russian people, had to meet what were his specific priorities. To that extent they reflected his mindset, emotions, state-of-being, reasoning, and intentions. He did not exactly offer water-tight explanations, but there was probably scant concern among Putin and his advisers that the overwhelming majority in the targeted audience would dive too deeply into his explanations or energetically question any aspect of them. Indeed, it was likely expected in the Kremlin that for the audience in the Russian Federation, it would be enough just to have some answers on the rather unique development.

Putin’s First Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 24, 2023

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin emphasized that challenges to the government of any kind would not be tolerated. For the first time, he characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Putin, wearing a solid black suit and black pindot tie, stated: “Today, Russia is waging a tough struggle for its future, repelling the aggression of neo-Nazis and their patrons. The entire military, economic and informational machine of the West is directed against us. We are fighting for the lives and security of our people, for our sovereignty and independence, for the right to be and remain Russia, a state with a thousand-year history.” He added: “This battle, when the fate of our nation is being decided, requires consolidation of all forces. It requires unity, consolidation and a sense of responsibility, and everything that weakens us, any strife that our external enemies can use and do so to subvert us from within, must be discarded.” Offering a flash of his personal outrage over the rebellion, he went on to say dramatically: “Therefore, any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people.” However, far from eliminating the threat based in Kyiv, the Russian Federation Armed Forces have barely held on to initial gains made since the initial weeks of the war before Ukraine was better armed. The odds of it advancing further into Ukraine now are slim to none. Prigozhin ostensibly was acting in response to what perceived were actions by Shoigu and Gerasimov that would eventually cripple the Russian Federation’s ability to defend itself. Perhaps Putin had not been listening closely to Prigozhin’s tantrums after all.

Ever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events. Putin stated: Any actions that split our nation are essentially a betrayal of our people, of our comrades-in-arms who are now fighting at the frontline. This is a knife in the back of our country and our people. He then said: “A blow like this was dealt to Russia in 1917, when the country was fighting in World War I. But the victory was stolen from it: intrigues, squabbles and politicking behind the backs of the army and the nation turned into the greatest turmoil, the destruction of the army and the collapse of the state, and the loss of vast territories, ultimately leading to the tragedy of the civil war.” One might argue that the Russian military was a spent force by 1917 and poorly led. At the Battle of Tannenberg in World War I, the Imperial German Army and the Russian Army clashed between August 23, 1914 and August 30, 2014. Exploiting the ability to transport troops by rail and their opponent’s poor communications security, German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg rapidly fielded the German Eighth Army at Olzytyn in East Prussia and well-deployed troops in superior position to delay the oncoming Russian First Army and concentrate upon the Russian Second Army. The large Russian force found itself in a meat grinder and was completely destroyed. The Russian Army suffered between 122,000 to 170,000 casualties. The commander of the Russian Second Army, General Alexander Samsonov committed suicide. A follow-on battle known as the Masurian Lakes resulted in the destruction of the First Army as well. The country’s forces were resuscitated to some degree by the Spring of 1915. However, those huge initial  losses essentially knocked Russia out of World War I. As for the 1917 Revolution, it garnered support under the guise of offering the people a better existence, an alternative to penury. Misled and misguided, many followed the revolutionaries.

Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin stated: “The Armed Forces and other government agencies have received the necessary orders. Additional counterterrorism measures are now in effect in Moscow, the Moscow Region and several other regions. Resolute action will also be taken to stabilize the situation in Rostov-on-Don. It remains difficult; in effect, the work of civil and military authorities has been blocked.” These were certainly strong and comforting words for the Russian people. However, Putin’s government to that point had not been successful in handling very apparent threats to the country’s security. Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (the Ukrainian Armed Forces) had launched several successful drone attacks and helicopter attacks on Russian Federation targets, including on Moscow, and as aforementioned in Part 1, there had been more than one attack on Russian Federation territory by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian militant groups near the border with Ukraine. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, Putin had to emerge unconditionally victorious.

Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Putin stated: “Any internal revolt is a deadly threat to our statehood and our nation. It is a blow to Russia, to our people. Our actions to defend the Fatherland from this threat will be harsh. All those who have consciously chosen the path of betrayal, planned an armed mutiny and taken the path of blackmail and terrorism, will inevitably be punished and will answer before the law and our people.” However, Putin rather than dealing with “rebels” harshly, he directed Wagner Group troops to sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Recognizably, under that arrangement, the Wagner Group, as it once stood in Ukraine, was essentially disbanded. The organization’s troops elsewhere in the world were apparently unaffected by the ruling. Yet, the Wagner Group right before the very eyes of the Russian people were being provided ample means to avoid prosecution and all penalties.

Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits. Putin stated: “As the President of Russia and Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and as a citizen of Russia, I will take every effort to defend the country and protect the constitutional order as well as the lives, security and freedom of our citizens.” Although these remarks may not appear inordinate from Putin given inflamed sentiments of the moment and the fact that under his authoritarian regime, he had established limitless for himself. However, it also could have been something better than a warning shot that went beyond the events of June 2023 to others, “all sorts of political adventurers and foreign forces” as he remarked about players in the 1917 Revolution, seeking to benefit politically, economically, or even militarily by tearing the Russian Federation apart. Political opponents, “dangerous elements”, and foreign visitors likely have more to fear now in the Russian Federation than ever before. It would seem the world has yet to see the regime’s tyranny touch bottom.

Prigozhin went unnamed directly by Putin in his first address. Yet, presumably, even though he was not mentioned, Putin’s words in this first iteration of his addresses nevertheless may have sounded harsh enough to Prigozhin. Certainly, Prigozhin is not a fragile man. However, perhaps these initial words were spoken by Putin, an individual who he clearly holds in very high esteem pinched just a little. “Enjoy the Silence” is a song by English electronic music band Depeche Mode. Recorded in 1989, it was released on their album, Violator (1990). It is pertinent here to the extent that on June 25, 2023,  Putin moved from near complete silence on the spat between Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to a veritable roar in his address to his nation. For Prigozhin, no matter what was altogether transpiring, they must have had their impact. The lyrics of the first verse are: “Words like violence / Break the silence / Come crashing in / Into my little world / Painful to me / Pierce right through me / Can’t you understand?”

From what greatcharlie can gather, among the top five points of his first address on June 24, 2023, at 10:00AM, Putin, for the first time, characterized the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent. Putin reminded the Russian people of the necessity of the special military operation and how essential victory will be to the long term security and safety of the Russian Federation and how the actions of the “conspirators” could have put the country in jeopardy. Forever the historian, he discussed Russian history, specifically the 1917 Revolution in the middle of World War I in the context of current events.Putin assured the people that the matter was well in hand, the country was secure and the Russian Federation’s security will always be maintained. Putin also sought to leave no doubt that justice would nevertheless be served against wrong-doers. Conspicuously, a bit farther down in the address than one might have expected, Putin reminds the Russian people that he is in total control of the situation and the country in general. Rather remarkably, it seemed he consciously wanted to avoid placing himself at the center of unexpected events. He let the Russian people know that in response to any challenges of any kind he would use his full powers and those powers had no limits.

Putin’s Second Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 26, 2023

Among the top five points Putin wanted to communicate n his second address concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion, he wanted to assure the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized that departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters and handling them swiftly and diligently and all other parts continued to perform their functions without interruption. Putin, wearing a solid dark navy blue suit and solid dark navy blue tie, stated: “I will repeat–society and the executive and legislative branches of government at all levels displayed high consolidation. Public organizations, religious denominations, the leading political parties and actually all of Russian society held a firm line, taking an explicit position of supporting constitutional order. The main thing–responsibility for the destiny of the Fatherland–has united everyone, brought our people together.” He said further: “I will emphasize that all necessary decisions to neutralize the emerged threat and protect the constitutional system, the life and security of our citizens were made instantly, from the very beginning of the events.” These comments would be expected of Putin–or any leader in his situation–in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, if his government actually “had been on the case” as he suggests, the Wagner Group Rebellion hardly would have gotten off the ground. The conspirators, as he refers to the Wagner Group leadership, would presumably have been twinkled out and approached for questioning by the security services. 

In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Putin stated: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people. He continued: “It was exactly this outcome, fratricide, that the enemies of Russia–the neo-Nazis in Kiev, their Western patrons and other national traitors–wanted to see. They wanted Russian soldiers to kill each other; they wanted the military and civilians to die; they wanted Russia to lose eventually, and our society to break up and perish in a bloody feud.” All of this was said despite Prigozhin’s earlier expressions indicating the rebellion was an impromptu emotional reaction–originally understood to be the result of an attack on the organization’s camp in Ukraine by Russian Federation troops under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov–Putin in his address alters that narrative by explaining that it was the threat of the cudgel and not good brains that brought the matter to close. That his ever-vigilant government, particularly the work of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services–that allowed the Wagner Group to cross the border into the Russian Federation untouched–crushed the plot. One might consider that plots that are part of false flag operations tend to be the easiest plots to sort out. “Go figure!”

Adding to perceptions that the Wagner Group Rebellion was the opponent, yet at the same time paradoxically weakening the notion that there was anything too deep in the thinking of the “conspirators”, Putin emphasized the reckless nature of the conspirators’ undertaking. Putin stated: “An armed mutiny would have been suppressed in any event. Mutiny plotters, despite the loss of adequacy, were bound to realize that. They understood everything, including the fact that their actions were criminal in nature, aimed at polarizing people and weakening the country, which is currently countering an enormous external threat and unprecedented pressure from the outside. They did this at a time when our comrades are dying on the frontline with the words “Not a step back!” There was irony in this idea as the crux of Prigozhin’s ire for months was the reckless and incompetent manner in which his Wagner Group troops and Russian Federation troops had been used in the special military operation how ironic and bizarre it was for him to undertake such a monumentally reckless and hopeless action as to march on Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from power. If the lives of Russian Federation Armed Forces’ aircrews had not been reportedly lost in the near final stage of the impromptu rebellion, the whole enterprise could be chuckled at for being comical.

Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all Russian lives matter, the indication and implication being  that the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces, mainly “neo-Nazis in Kiev.” Still, he indicated that his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin stated: “We knew before and know now that the majority of Wagner Group soldiers and commanders are also Russian patriots, loyal to their people and their state. Their courage on the battlefield when liberating Donbass and Novorossiya proves this. An attempt was made to use them without their knowledge against their comrades-in-arms with whom they were fighting shoulder to shoulder for their country and its future.” He went on to explain: “That is why, as soon as these events started to unfold, in keeping with my direct instructions, steps were taken to avoid spilling blood. It required time, among other things, as those who made a mistake had to be given a chance to change their minds, to realize that their actions would be strongly rejected by society, to understand what tragic and devastating consequences for Russia, for our country the reckless attempt they had been drawn into, was leading to.” Despite the fact that Putin, by displaying restraint during the “crisis” did save Russian lives, ironically and incredulously, as a result of his special military operation, astronomical and abominable losses had been suffered by Russian Federation troops and contract fighters in Ukraine over 16 months to that point in time. One might suppose the careless loss of those troops could be set down as occasional mistakes.

Putin wanted to inform the Russian people about the remedy he came upon for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders. Covering what was already known through the Russian Federation’s state-run and independent newsmedia that day, he explained that those Wagner Group troops who had participated in the rebellion were free to go to Belarus. He also confirmed that those who wished to continue in the fighting in Ukraine could sign contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. However, Putin then mentioned a step that was an odd twist beyond simply signing contracts with the Defense Ministry. He invited the former Wagner Group “mutineers” to sign contracts with law enforcement or the security services. Putin stated: “I express my gratitude to those Wagner Group soldiers and commanders who had taken the right decision, the only one possible–they chose not to engage in fratricidal bloodshed and stopped before reaching the point of no return.” He then said: “Today, you have the opportunity to continue your service to Russia by signing a contract with the Defence Ministry or other law enforcement or security agency or return home.” It was a rather gracious opening of doors of the government’s defense and security services to rebels who he initially created the impression in his address of being associated with a conspiratorial and reckless leadership. Unexpectedly, Putin added to all he said on matter the statement, “I will keep my promise.” Imaginably, that was presumed. Perhaps it should not have been.

With regard to allowing the Wagner Group troops to move to Belarus, to greatcharlie that seemed a curious decision. Belarus is hands down the Russian Federation’s closest ally. One might call the relationship Putin has established between the two countries as the most successful effort in his quest to bring the former republics of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation’s fold. Putin recently placed several nuclear warheads in storage in Belarus. To that extent, many of the erstwhile Rebel Wagner Group troops possess exquisite special operations capabilities and could pose a threat in terms of potentially capturing those warheads. One might suppose the weapons are secured so well in their new homes that a build up of the Wagner Group troops was nothing to signify. Intriguingly, one might consider that Belarus borders Ukraine and a number of NATO countries. Sending the Wagner Group troops there could have been predicted to cause considerable alarm in the capitals of those bordering countries and in NATO Headquarters. (Interestingly, it is now understood that Wagner Group troops in Belarus, far from a spent force, are providing tactical training to Belarusian troops.) Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his second address.

Among the top five points Putin communicated, he assured the Russian people that his dominion over the Russian Federation had not been challenged and that he was firmly in control. He thanked the Russian people for their support. He emphasized departments of his government responsible for dealing with the Wagner Group Rebellion were always on top of matters, handling them swiftly and diligently, and all other parts continued to function without interruption. In the minds of the Russian people, Putin sought to cast the leaders of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the opponent, disloyal to the government, to them, and to him. He disturbingly characterized them as mutineers, who dared to carry out their plot at a time when the country was already facing a threat from external forces. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin seemed to insist touchingly that all the Russian people are precious to him, and preserving Russian lives has always been a priority in his decisionmaking. He claimed his desire to prevent greater bloodshed, and the fact that he held troops of the Wagner Group in high-esteem for what they had done in the past for the country, tempered his response to their drive on Moscow. Putin then informed the Russian people about his somewhat remedy for handling the Wagner Group troops and their leaders.

Putin’s Third Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Seemingly speaking to the newsmedia’s audience, not in attendance physically, Putin, wearing a solid navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: Today, standing here on the historic Cathedral Square of the Moscow Kremlin are the service personnel of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, soldiers and officers of the National Guard, the Federal Security Service, the Interior Ministry and the Federal Guard Service. They are the ones who, together with their comrades-in-arms, at a time of challenge for the country, threw themselves in the way of trouble which would have inevitably led to chaos. More directly addressing the assembled audience of some 2,500 members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard, Putin stated: “You have defended the constitutional order, as well as the life, security and freedom of our citizens, steering our Motherland clear from upheavals and de facto stopping a civil war in its tracks. He continued: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.”

Revealing what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Putin stated: “In that complicated situation, you acted in a firm and coordinated manner, proving your commitment to the people of Russia and to your military oath through your actions and showing responsibility for the destiny and future of Russia.” Pointing to exactly what was daunting about their activities that it compelled special praise, Putin explained: “Defense Ministry units, the National Guard, officers of the Interior Ministry and special services ensured reliable operation of all critical decision-making bodies, strategic facilities, including the defense ones, ensured the security of border regions, the rear lines of our Armed Forces, of all combat units which carried on with their heroic frontline operations during that time. We did not have to withdraw any combat troops from the special military operation zone.

Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. Putin stated: “Our comrades-in-arms–pilots–lost their lives while confronting the mutineers. They held their ground and fulfilled their orders and their military duty with honor. I am asking you to observe a minute of silence in tribute to their memory.” silence.” One might say Putin was making an extra effort to get a message across here that was not so easy for the Russian people to accept from him given the events in Ukraine that Russian soldiers’ lives matter.

In his first and second addresses, Putin excoriated the Wagner Group’s leaders, going as far to say in the first address: “Having betrayed their country and their people, the leaders of this mutiny also betrayed those whom they drew into their crime. They lied to them, pushed them to their death, putting them under attack, forcing them to shoot their people.” That noisome tack was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts. Putin stated: “Your resolve and courage, along with consolidation of Russian society, played an essential and decisive role in bringing the situation back to normal. Those who were drawn into the mutiny saw that the army and the people were not with them.”

Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically. Putin stated: “The swift and well-managed deployment of defense, security and law enforcement units helped prevent the situation in the country from going down a very dangerous road and ensure that there were no civilian casualties. He then remarked: “I extend my gratitude to you and all the personnel of the Armed Forces, law enforcement agencies and security services for your service, courage and valor, for your devotion to the people of Russia.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his third address.

On June 27, 2023, at 1:25PM, at an event titled by the Kremlin as an “Address to Defence Ministry, National Guard, Federal Security Service, Interior Ministry and Federal Guard Service Units which Ensured Law and Order during the Mutiny”, Putin thanked the Russian Federation Armed Forces, National Guard, and the security services for halting the Wagner Group Rebellion. The Kremlin event was frightfully well choreographed especially since it was supposed to be impromptu and on the heels of a crisis that supposedly had all energy in the Kremlin focused upon handling it. A greater audience of the Russian people was enabled to receive the address via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. Among his top five point, he revealed to the Russian people what had transpired and how exactly order was maintained with little armed struggle, Emphasizing his concern for Russian lives, Putin called attention to the fact that an unspecified number of airmen of Russian Federation Armed Forces had been killed in the action, attempting to halt the advance of Wagner Group Rebellion. His noisome tack of excoriating Wagner Group leaders was toned down quite a bit as he only gave the Wagner Group leaders in context of how well the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the security forces, and the National Guard mitigated their efforts.Displaying further concern for the lives of the Russian people from another perspective, Putin emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian civilians specifically.

Putin’s Fourth Address on the Wagner Group Rebellion, June 27, 2023

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. He ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. The address would reach the Russian people via Russian Federation state-run and independent newsmedia. This final iteration of his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses presented almost immediately following his address in Cathedral Square.

Putin was a bit less formal in thanking those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. Putin began his address by once again expressing his thanks and appreciation for the efforts of the armed forces and security services. Putin, still wearing a navy blue suit and black muted checkered tie, stated: “You and your comrades had a special part to play in this. Special words of gratitude go to you. I want us all to understand what happened and what could have happened if you hadn’t done what you did and hadn’t fulfilled your military duty and hadn’t shown loyalty to your oath and the Russian people. As is always the case during such developments – the same thing happens every time and everywhere – armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now.”

Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter”, Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. Putin stated: “As is always the case during such developments–the same thing happens every time and everywhere–armed rebellions are usually followed by total chaos and civil war. This is what you have prevented. That was your role. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I would like to express my gratitude to you. I want to make clear what it was all about and what I am talking about now. He went on: “Regrettably, you had to work in difficult circumstances in order to avoid civilian casualties, because you had to work on busy motorways.” Speaking of them and their well-being so often, it would appear that a primary takeaway from the whole episode that Putin wanted the Russian people to garner was that they were always on his mind and that they were what mattered most to him. It could not be missed by any who heard any of his four addresses.

While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Putin stated: “The fact that we have losses is even more regrettable. These are, of course, combat losses. There is no other way to put it. Our comrades died defending the Fatherland. It is not an overstatement or an exaggeration. I want to stress once again that chaos in the country would have been inevitable, and the enemy would have surely taken advantage of it. He continues: “The enemy is trying to do so anyway–I will get to that a little later–but nothing is coming out of it, and, I hope, nothing will come out of it, I am even sure of that. But it is absolutely clear that they would have taken advantage of it. No one knows what would have become of the country in the end, but all the achievements that have been made during the hostilities, many of them, anyway, would have been lost. And you prevented it.” In a way, the shift in whom Putin focused on as the opponent marked the close of the Wagner Group Rebellion as the issue of primacy. For members of the Wagner Group there may have been some sense of relief having suffered his bombardment of obloquy.

What started as a simple speech on the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in halting the Wagner Group Rebellion and some general military matters to military personnel oddly appeared to become an example of why one should elegantly limit how much one should talk if the goal is to control information. Putin laid out some facts about the Wagner Group that in the context of the event might have appeared disturbing to discerning ears. Perhaps he was in a very transparent way attempting to create a greater schism between the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group by disparaging the latter. Perhaps he wanted to convince members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces that although he liked the Wagner Group troops, they were his favorites. Perhaps he was having a little too much fun with it all. Perhaps Putin was concerned some in the Russian Federation might have imagined the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the Wagner Group colluded on the rebellion. That would be a dangerous idea that he would urgently need to knock down.

Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. In his own words, Putin stated: “I would like to point out, and I want everyone to be aware of the fact that all of the funding the Wagner Group received came from the state. It got all its funding from us, from the Defence Ministry, from the state budget. Between May 2022 and May 2023 alone, the Wagner Group received 86,262 million rubles from the state to pay military salaries and bonuses, including 70,384 million rubles for payroll and 15,877 million rubles for paying out bonuses. Insurance premiums totalled 110,179 million.” Surely, it was an odd set of statements to make before a group of military officers and security service members. Gone were the days of plausible deniability for the Russian Federation government with regard to the Wagner Group’s activities worldwide. Yet, more importantly, Putin admits plainly that all of the activities of the Wagner Group were funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, via Prigozhin and his firm Concord–discussed in some detail in Part 1, the Wagner Group Rebellion was completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, the Wagner Group was under contract and under obligation to obey the orders of the Russian Federation government, no matter how recherché those orders might be. Without funding from the steady stream of funding from the Russian Federation government, the Wagner Group could not hope to go a jot one day further. These were surely sensitive matters that Putin’s audience of individuals who had successfully moved up in their careers by avoiding did not want to hear or be involved with, especially since it concerned the highest realms of politics in the country. Putin, nevertheless, gave them the details, and likely measured their uneasiness in the process.

Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. About his Wagner Group, Putin stated: “But while the state covered all of the Wagner Group’s funding needs, the company’s owner, Concord, received from the state, or should I say earned, 80 billion rubles through Voentorg as the army’s food and canteen provider. The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time. I do hope that no one stole anything in the process or, at least, did not steal a lot. It goes without saying that we will look into all of this.” Of course, no one would know these figures better than Putin. He was the one who ultimately decided to compensate Prigozhin–pay Concord–with those massive amounts. To be certain, greatcharlie would not attempt to cast aspersions on anyone concerning who among the powerful in the Russian Federation might have been profiting from government payments to Concord or Voentorg. The better prosecutors and litigators in Western courts would surely light on Putin’s statement: “The state covered all its funding needs, while part of the group–I mean Concord–made 80 billion rubles, all at the same time.” Prigozhin was not named directly by Putin in his fourth address.

On June 27, 2023, at 3:00PM, Putin spoke to personnel of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry separately, thanking those present and their comrades serving everywhere for their loyal and dedicated service. Among his top five points, he ostensibly wanted to more directly thank those whose efforts repulsed the recent Wagner Group Rebellion and those who have served  in Ukraine. It also seemed that he did not communicate the message on the Wagner Group Rebellion to his full satisfaction. There was some nuance to his message about matters that he apparently felt compelled to transmit in a fourth round. Under the theme greatcharlie has dubbed “Russian Lives Matter” Putin again emphasized his success in preventing harm to the Russian people specifically. While continuing to speak in unfriendly terms about those who participated in the rebellion, Putin apparently decided it was time to completely mitigate talk about the Wagner Group and its leaders as mutineers and traitors. He shifts to focusing on external enemies as the opponent. Then Putin oddly explained how the Russian Federation government was always the resource–the engine–that funded, supplied, and energized the Wagner Group. Casting aspersions on Prigozhin came next. While clearly putting Prigozhin in the spotlight, Putin never mentioned his dear friend’s name.

The Wagner Group Rebellion: A Staged Crisis?

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. (Happy is the one who is able to know the causes of things.) To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in the whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions, many hardly thought through, were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that the Putin regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories, Hopefully it was done due to some internal collective cognition imperative, but possibly under official external influence. Remarkably, it was the same picture of Putin presented by national capitals and many mainstream media outlets of their respective countries that for years have defamed him as some awkward, insecure leader, a throwback from another era. Currently, the perception in the West and much of the world is that the Wagner Group Rebellion marked the beginning of the end for Putin. All of greatcharlie’s instincts are against such an explanation. 

Putin’s Priorities

The Wagner Group Rebellion may very well have been some preconceived plan of action developed by Putin and his advisers for domestic political purposes. It would not be too hard to imagine that in Putin’s Russia, a decision may have been made to stage a crisis with the objective of drawing attention away from actual events on the battlefield in Ukraine using a staged rebellion in the concerning events in Ukraine. Among its ingredients, there was the agent provocateur, the very agitated, highly-aggressive owner of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin. The threat was a very capable military force moving on Moscow of all places. The cause and target of the insurrection was not Putin, whose authority is beyond question–woe to those who would suggest it even as part of an all important artifice. The cause and targets of the uprising were Shoigu and Gerasimov, who anyone and everyone in the Russian Federation had recognized, even if just quietly with, as having dreadfully failed to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine in an effective way. Yet, even if Prigozhin and his rebellious Wagner Group troops mirrored feelings broadly felt by the Russian people and put them on the front burner, the Russian people would also expect Putin to be Putin: to flex his muscles; to demonstrate his power and control; to assert his authority; to defend the country from a threat; to establish law and order; and, to bring the wrong-doers to justice. He had the perfect and ample opportunity to do it all. Putin and advisers knew the Russian people would admire him for it. Marcet sine adversario virtus. (Valor becomes feeble without an opponent.)

Important attendant domestic political benefits of the artifice suggested would be a significant increase in Putin’s popularity among the Russian people generally; the ratcheting up of a sense among the Russian people that Putin is in complete control of the country and his authority is not subject to challenges; a reinvigoration of the Russian spirit to prevent any chance of the country sleepwalking psychically to decline; and, very importantly stemming any sense of the regime’s decline. Yet of the utmost importance, in the midst of all that was going wrong in Ukraine, on the grand stage before the Russian people and the world, Putin scored a victory. He was the champion over the rebels. That victory would be savored by Putin and his advisers and expectedly, the Russian people. Recall from his Wagner Group Rebellion addresses that he magnanimously shared credit for the accomplishment with members of the government and the Russian people.

Everyone who was able in Rostov-on-Don took a photo with their Wagner Group “occupiers”. To follow the rhythm of the multitudes of reports on the Wagner Group rebellion, one could hardly doubt Putin reached his lowest water mark. Assuredly, the situation–the rebellion–as it developed was quite an usual episode in Putin’s Russia. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops had ostensibly exposed the truth to the people of the Russian Federation. Their strength of each Wagner Group troop was the strength of ten for their hearts were pure. (Apologizes to Alfred Lord Tennyson!) Russian Federation troops, many perhaps past hope and in despair, could find relief, some satisfaction, even gain a sense of hope, as a result of Prigozhin’s action with the Wagner Group. However, the facts quickly became confused in a whirlwind of reports. Heaps of suppositions were bandied about. After initial reports from the mainstream Western newsmedia took the line that Putin’s regime was circling the drain, follow-on reports from other newsmedia houses seemed to simply mimic the pattern of those stories.

To discerning eyes, the Wagner Group Rebellion actually had the appearance of a “controlled crash” creating the simulacrum of change without any real change at all. The situation was never so difficult that it had the potential to capsize the regime. Despite predictions have been voiced by those less than clairvoyant on Putin’s downfall, he still sits in the Senate Building of the Kremlin. His government was never genuinely in peril, neither was his person. Putin, himself, was hardly tested. In its June 5, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, greatcharlie suggested observers might expect some recherché, outside the box move by Putin in the midst of everything. The wily and for the most part intuitive Russian Federation President might very well have demonstrated that he has.more than a few tricks to pull from his sleeve. 

Putin is first and foremost the steward of the Russian Federation. However, before Putin could begin to address vicissitudes besetting his country, first and foremost he had to stabilize his own position. That was in greatcharlie’s view the main purpose of this giant artifice perform on the international stage. Often mentioned when suggesting one first ensure their own safety and stability before helping others is the pre-flight safety directions–briefing–given by flight attendants. Among those given is, “In the case of a change in cabin pressure, be sure to place the resulting oxygen mask over your own face first before assisting anyone else, even your own children.” Surely, this runs counter to the “3M principle” of “mission, men me” for military leaders. In order of priority the mission must be the focus of efforts and all must be done to accomplish it. The well-being of one’s soldiers must be kept in mind. They must not be wasted and use them in a way to exploit their optimal effectiveness. Lastly, a leader must consider his or her well-being having covered the essentials, two other priorities. However, a leader must not carelessly place them in mortal danger knowing his or her role is to think through and direct the actions of troops to achieve the objective. (It would be interesting if Putin, having made several flights over the years, found such directions instructive. Perhaps his detractors would insist that for him self-interest has always been his priority and he would only be compelled to act by it.)

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023. During the latter, Putin was able to have a true connection with the people. The tide has begun to come back in and the waters have risen again. Soon enough skewed perspectives expressed of Putin somehow losing ground politically in the Russian Federation following the Wagner Group Rebellion will most likely disintegrate in the face of reality. Certainly, this is a hard saying for some to hear. Hopefully, polls will be conducted on the public response to the Wagner Group Rebellion by independent research groups in the Russian Federation such as the Levada Center, The Chronicle, and The Russian Field that may shed light with regard to any boom in support for Putin.

It seems necessary to note that what Putin needs and wants is of the utmost importance in the Russian Federation. That importance cannot be exaggerated. It can hardly be denied that in the aftermath of the Wagner Group Rebellion, the narrative in the Russian Federation on the Ukraine War has been changed, and has been reshaped. The Russian people can now better understand the challenges that have faced their president and how he has persevered in spite of it all. Polls would very likely show that his standing with the majority is greater now than when the war began, perhaps greater now than ever before. In Putin’s favor, the nub of the narrative being presented by the Kremlin, state-run and independent newsmedia outlets, and analytical organizations, is that much as a Phoenix, Putin has risen from the flames stronger than before. In the aftermath of “the crisis”, Putin appeared almost energetic and ebullient as he met with soldiers wounded in Ukraine, and again as mentioned, meeting with an excited crowd of well-wishers in the streets of Derbent, Dagestan on June 29, 2023.

For those unfamiliar, Putin is far more than just familiar with the workings of the Russian Federation’s intelligence services. It is well-known that he achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB. He was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it. Putin also served as Sekretar’ Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser for Yeltsin. A long-time intelligence operator and intelligence manager such as Putin knows many a dodge. To that extent, it would not be too far off to suggest if Putin has actually taken the course suggested by greatcharlie here would fall under the category of maskirovka. 

The Russian term maskirovka or masking originally had military pertinence as it regarded the use of camouflage. However, maskirovka eventually expanded in meaning to concerning battlefield masking through the utilization of smoke and other screening methods. The meaning would evolve further as a reference to the utilization of military deception against an opponent, and expand from there refer to full-scale denial and deception operations. Maskirovka would transcend military operations to refer to the use of a clever gimmick to create ambiguity and uncertainty and to give Russian Federation’s foreign and national security policy actors the freedom of action to achieve their country’s objectives in the diplomatic economic arenas. Further, maskirovka has been used to create a picture of events in the Russian Federation for the outside world.. As it appears to greatcharlie, what transpired from June 23, 2023 to June 26, 2023 resembled maskirovka, and perhaps a bit more than that. One thing for certain, the plan laid out under greatcharlie’s supposition, could not be allowed to fail. Putin’s reputation, his world, his future, hung in the balance. Part 1: The Tragedy of Birlstone in The Valley of Fear, Arthur Conan Doyle’s fourth and final Sherlock Holmes novel published by George H. Doran Company in New York in 1915, the esteemed author has Holmes in Chapter 1, The Warning deliver a notable quote, quite apposite to readers who have grasped what is being suggested about Putin’s actions here. Holmes explains: “Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius.”

Naysayers might point out that events turned out the way they did by happenstance and there was hardly any orchestration of them behind the scenes. If one might choose to stand firm on the idea that the Wagner Group Rebellion was an authentic expression of outrage by the organization and nothing more, greatcharlie says to them that the unlikely must never be confused with the impossible, and would suggest they take a second look. Once reviewed in light of the artifice hypothesized by greatcharlie, but not coloring them with its theory, events of the Wagner Group Rebellion take on greater meaning and quite on their own appropriately to fall into place. To that extent, they arouse suspicion.

For instance, it is interesting how the whole Wagner Group Rebellion went off so relatively cleanly. A starting point for examining that angle would be the Wagner Group’s marshaling of resources on the Russian Federation’s border with Ukraine for some time prior to the start of the rebellion. Reports in the Western newsmedia state the even US intelligence Community managed to collect information indicating that Prigozhin had been assembling his forces near the border with Russia over a period of time. Yet, there was no interference with the Wagner Group’s build up by the Russian Federation government. The Russian Federation Armed Forces, and the FSB, did not take serious interest in or move a jot to reign in the Wagner Group before anything got off the ground, This was the case even though there was concern over all activities on the border given the actions of pro-Ukraine, anti-Putin, ethnic-Russian militias and cross border incursions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The entire event unfolded right before the very eyes of the government. The build up on the border in preparation for the rebellion was surely out of sync with Prigozhin’s claim that the Wagner Group’s Rebellion was in response to an attack on his camps in Ukraine on June 23, 2023 by the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

Ibit, ibit eo quo vis qui zonam perdidit. (The one who has lost his money belt will go where you wish.) It remains fascinating to greatcharlie is that the Wagner Group troops were still receiving remuneration during their rebellious eastward march. What persistently nags at greatcharlie is how Prigozhin was allowed access to his financial assets to pay them. If the Wagner Group’s financial assets had been frozen by order of the Kremlin, Prigozhin would have found himself in a pickle with those rough men. He had to be able to pay them as guaranteed. 

During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don, were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and made certain all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord –Prigozhin’s billion dollar catering firm discussed in Part 1–has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

The troops of the Wagner Group are not international freedom fighters and revolutionary mercenaries in the mold of the 19th century Italian patriot and soldier Giuseppe Garibaldi (July 4, 1807 to June 2, 1882). They are driven by money not a desire to save the world. During the entire episode, Prigozhin made certain Wagner Group troops were fed, had money in their pockets to buy what they wanted in Rostov-on-Don. They were afforded hastily organized accommodations when possible, and all of their needs were well-provided for in bivouac when on the go. That would have conceivably meant Prigozhin had to make significant use of “his own” financial resources to fuel the rebellion. However, as Putin explained during his fourth Wagner Group Rebellion address noted here earlier, the Wagner Group’s activities have been completely funded by the Russian Federation government. To that extent, he insinuated that Concord, which is the billion dollar catering firm owned by Prigozhin–discussed in Part 1, has served as a veritable relay station for funds for the many projects of the Wagner Group globally that have furthered Russian Federation foreign and national security policy. Following that line of thinking, one might perceive that Prigozhin’s money is really the Russian Federation’s money, essentially “taxpayer rubles” passed on to his troops. (Shoigu and Gerasimov would certainly concur with that idea.) Many would surely argue that the following is a stretch, but with a bit of harmless humor greatcharlie feels compelled to state, since the Wagner Group was funded by taxpayer rubles, the Russian people funded the Wagner Group Rebellion!

Difficult to understand also is how the Wagner Group, which Prigozhin regularly complained was left short of resources by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, was apparently swimming in such an abundance of petroleum and oil lubricants that it could ostensibly squander those resources to move a number of the organization’s tanks and other vehicles east. 

It is hard to see how Wagner Group troops would have been able to appropriately resupply themselves if they would have become engaged with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and the security services in Moscow even under the most favorable terms for them. If they failed to immediately seize their objective in Moscow, they eventually would have run out of steam and would have had to surrender or fight to the bitter end. Thereby, it would seem that upon all else that was inordinate about their rebellion, one is asked to believe that the Wagner Group troops, individuals who joined the organization to earn money, were knowingly participating in a kamikaze-style action. In a burst of complete illogic during his initial video address from Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin curiously uttered: “After we finish what we started, we will return to the front to defend our Motherland.” That was a moment when Prigozhin was either frighteningly detached from reality or being facetious, adding one more over-the-top absurdity to the hoax that was the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Reportedly, Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched by Putin. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Russian Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Surely the FSB has an office in Rostov-on-Don and FSB paramilitary units could have been rushed there. Indeed, Directorate “A” of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Alpha Group) and Directorate V of the FSB Special Purpose Center (Vympel) could have been sent in by Bortnikov. Perchance, it would have been easy enough for FSB officers, working alongside Αlpha Group or Vympel, to approach Prigozhin in Rostov-on-Don in a very professional way and serve him with a warrant for his arrest or at least have him come in for questioning. Instead, Prigozhin was given time to “hash out” matters with Belarus President,, Lukashenko, and the State Secretary and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Defense, General of the Reserve Army Nikolai Pavlov, who was present at Rostov-on-Don and seen in photos and video recordings negotiating with him.. Conveniently, Lukashenko was able to put all else aside that weekend and immerse himself in the matter.

Alexander Bortnikov, the head of Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB (above). Bortnikov sent officers to take control of the Wagner Group headquarters in St. Petersburg. The FSB was on the beat, doing its job of keeping the country secure. However, the leashes on Bortnikov and his wolves were never really unlatched. If one might remain in that line of thought, one might give higher meaning to the fact that apparently none of the Russian Wagner Group’s family members were “interfered with” or approached. Apparently, none of the Wagner Group troops bank accounts were tampered with. In fact there was no initial indication that the FSB even visited the homes of Wagner Group members or particularly the homes of the Wagner Group leadership. One would only need to inquire with citizens of the Southern and South Caucasus what it means to be under the thumb of the FSB. The respective families of Boris Nemtsov and Akexei Navalny could also provide clarification. Indeed, although Wagner Group troops were all but branded as “mutineers” and “treasonous”, their “interests” as well as their personal and familial connections, were left untouched.

Interestingly, only at a late hour during “the crisis” was a very visible effort made in Moscow to prepare for a visit of the Wagner Group by erecting checkpoints with armored vehicles and by positioning troops on the city’s southern edge. About 3,000 Chechen troops were reportedly pulled from fighting in Ukraine and rushed to Moscow on Saturday morning. State television in Chechnya reported that Russian Federation troops armed with machine guns had established checkpoints on Moscow’s southern outskirts, and engineers had dug up sections of highways to slow the Wagner Group’s advance.

The Chechen troops are under the control of Putin loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov, mufti of Chechnya and a colonel general in the Russian Federation Armed Force.the, who publicly condemned the Wagner Group Rebellion. It is interesting how the Chechens, in considerable numbers, arrived in Moscow so much faster than the Wagner Group. Perhaps they used a faster route from Ukraine or special vehicles. What would be truly difficult for greatcharlie to accept is that the Chechens sped past the “rebellious” Wagner Group troops on the same road to Moscow. If there was a quicker route from Ukraine to Moscow which the Chechens were able to take advantage of, it is difficult to see why the Wagner Group, supposedly in a rush to get to Moscow to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov from their respective posts, conspicuously chose not to travel on it.

The Mayor of Moscow Sergei Sobyanin declared Monday, June 26, 2023 a non-working day for most residents as part of the heightened security. Curiously, the declaration, a now seemingly superfluous measure, was allowed to remain in effect even after the total withdrawal of Wagner Group troops was completed. All in all though, there was no significant alteration in the federal government’s course. Certainly, there was an atmosphere–stimmung–in the Russian Federation of everything being under control despite what was visible. Omnia inconsulti impetus cœpta, initiis valida, spatio languescunt. (All enterprises that are entered into with hasty zeal may be pursued with great vigor at first, but are sure to languish in the end )

If one were to take a second look at Putin’s four Wagner Rebellion addresses, as noted earlier, in each address one would discern how he laid out the narrative on events he wanted the Russian people to take from the whole show. Yet, in the context of the suggested artifice, it would have been of the utmost importance for Putin to provide all of the insights the Russian people would need to ruminate upon his handling of on the Wagner Group Rebellion or to exchange in their own discussions with family, friends, classmates, and colleagues on the crisis. In each well-crafted, concise address, each given at what were very likely predetermined points in time, there appeared to be specific issues that Putin wanted to reveal in digestible pieces to the Russian people. For the most part–at least until the fourth address, there was nothing so outré or too complex spoken by him that might have acted as a distraction. To that extent, this aspect of the suggested artifice could be characterized as a preconcerted, well-organized information campaign, carried out predominantly by the Russian Federation’s “Communicator-in-Chief.”

With further regard to his four Wagner Group Rebellion addresses, one might discern that Putin seemed to take pains to ensure his punches at Prigozhin were very heavy even without mentioning his name. Perhaps it was a reflection of his known penchant for engaging in acidulous humor with close associates. He doubtlessly was aware that all of the bombastic rhetoric concerning Prigozhin would definitely reach the ears of his dear friend and other close associates filled in on the artifice. When the words of Putin’s fourth address captured Prigozhin’s attention, as aforementioned, he had no reason to be cheerful, but in the end the Wagner Group owner assumedly would have smiled and would have shaken his head in response to the very noisy overkill, fully understanding that Putin needed to do what he did, needed to say what he said, in accord with the aims of the artifice suggested by greatcharlie here. The greater cause was firming up public opinion about Putin’s presidency, his leadership. Prigozhin would fully recognize and accept that what is best for Putin is best for the Russian Federation and that would surely include himself as a citizen and an ultra-loyal subordinate. Perchance there would even be a considerable reward not too far down the road for his fealty.

Fascinatingly, based upon depictions in both detective fiction and spy fiction literature and film, Putin appears to mimic, mutatis mutandis, an assassin’s method of leaving three to five suicide notes to ensure the victim’s death would be accepted as suicide and not his or her murderous handiwork. Perhaps some might be willing to agree, may be with some reservations, that Putin gave all four addresses on the Wagner Group Rebellion with an underlying, surreptitious purpose of furnishing a false clue. The notion may not be too way out.

It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes for use in plain sight, troop movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia. While the news cycle everywhere is 24-hours, it seemed the most important announcements were issued to best serve morning and evening newsmedia readers, listeners, and viewers. Enough time was allowed to lapse between almost everything released for the state-run newsmedia to process and parrot the Kremlin’s well-curated narrative of events and the domestic audience to absorb. That absorption rate would likely have been calculated by Kremlin public information specialists who would have been deeply immersed in the project. Enough time would also be allowed to lapse from one event to the other to convince the independent newsmedia to draw “the right conclusions” and publish surprisingly similar accounts of what was occurring and so on. The whole show was likely set up to transpire on a weekend which meant businesses did not have to be concerned over their weekday commerce being interfered with, and the Russian people generally would be better able to follow events  on what for most were days of leisure, off from work and days for associating with family and friends, and visiting dachas.

The Wagner Group troops rapidly loading up a tank in order to ride out of Rostov-on-Don (above). It may have been mere coincidence, but there appeared to be a pattern of action from one event to the other from the start of the Wagner Group Rebellion to the end. One might envision on the wall in some room in the Kremlin a flow chart plotting the goals, objectives and timing, organization (personnel, resources, management), clandestine means of communications and codes, movements, ways actions would be executed, back up plans, and anything else that would ensure the enterprise would go smoothly from escalation to de-escalation.  Official announcements and even Putin’s addresses would have been drafted before events began. There seemed to be a preset Kremlin action-reaction cycle concerning the official statements released concerning the mutiny and appearances by Putin in the newsmedia.

The Degree to which Wagner Group Troops Were Likely Aware of the Supposed Artifice

If this scenario staked here was at all possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

It would be enough for the Wagner Group troops to follow orders to the letter as they have always done and were paid to do. To that extent, this may account for the downing of six Russian Army helicopters and an electronic warfare plane by Wagner Group troops on their march to Moscow. Those in the Russian Federation Armed Forces who sent the Russian Army helicopters would also unlikely have been aware of what was transpiring. Those aircrews that encountered the Wagner Group could not have known everything was staged and how surprising and threatening their arrival on the scene would be to the Wagner Group troops. The Wagner Group’s, no matter what they may have been told about how “safe” everything would be, were way out on a limb and necessarily quite tense and on the alert, ready to deal with any immediate danger. Prigozhin, negotiating at the time in Rostov-on-Don to end the rebellion, likely had less knowledge of his troops’ actions way up front. Perhaps he was informed about it all after the fact just as everyone else. Still, one might recall what Prigozhin specifically stated on the first video he posted from Rostov-on-Don: “Everyone who will try to put up resistance . . . we will consider it a threat and destroy it immediately, including any checkpoints that will be in our way and any aircraft that we see over our heads.

Far be it for greatcharlie to make light of, or denigrate the loss of a soldier in defense of his or her homeland, but it posits that while unlikely, it is possible the helicopters shot down over the Russian Federation during the rebellion were already counted among those lost in the Ukraine fight. One might imagine that far beyond morbid curiosity and within the farthest range of their respective investigative capabilities–seeing how close lipped the Russian Federation Armed Forces are about losses during the Ukraine War or any conflict for that matter and how records of its casualties reported usually appear so out of sync–journalists and military and intelligence analysts may have already examined whether those helicopters and aircrews lost battling the Wagner Group were not already listed as lost during the Ukraine War and may have kept their discoveries confidential. (If there have been funerals for the airmen lost in late June 2023 and an error can be proved upon greatcharlie, it asks the respective families of the fallen for their forgiveness.)

Intriguingly, the Wagner Group doubly proved the concept, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces had already proven, that the Russian Air Force against a modern force has little to no ability to ensure the survivability of its aircraft and its aircrews. That has not been the only deficiency of the Russian Air Force. Another of many of considerable interest to greatcharlie is that both on the frontlines in Ukraine and during the Wagner Group Rebellion, the indications and implications are that the Russian Air Force planners and air operations officers have given up on, are completely distant to, or positively unaware of the airpower concept of high altitude bombing by strategic air assets to support tactical movements on the ground. That would put the Russian Air Force just short of 80 years behind the times. To that extent, one might consider how easy it should have been for competent air commanders and planners to utilize Russian Federation strategic air assets and tactical air assets to turn the route that the Wagner Group troops were traveling on toward Moscow into a “highway of death”. Prigozhin and his Wagner Group troops rolled on as if they had little to fear from such a threat. Readers might cast their minds back to an incident in Syria in which Wagner Group troops decided to clash with US Special Forces soldiers. The US Special Forces soldiers called in airpower to lend some support. Things did not turn well at all for the Wagner Group that day.

As aforementioned in Part 1, the Wagner Group employs a semi-international group of fighters. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. One might imagine that of the three main Wagner units, the Rusich unit led the drive eastward. Unless Russian Federation citizenship has quietly become a requirement for or privilege of Wagner Group employment, it would seem legally questionable to charge the international fighters with treason. Other criminal charges might have better fit. The Kremlin officials would know that. Putin would know that.

Even as he lent support to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s move to subordinate all militias serving in Ukraine on its side, at the meeting in Ulyanovsk Putin implied that much of Prigozhin’s criticism of the army had been correct–recognized even in the mainstream US newsmedia as a possible sign Wagner had yet to entirely lose his support. Putin stated: “At the start of the special military operation, we quickly realized that the ‘carpet generals’ [ . . .] are not effective, to put it mildly,” He continued: “People started to come out of the shadows who we hadn’t heard or seen before, and they turned out to be very effective and made themselves useful.”

If the artifice suggested by greatcharlie might have at all been possible, it is unlikely that beyond the most senior managers and commanders of the Wagner Group, none of its troops would have been made privy to any planned artifice from above as hypothesized here. Far be it for anyone to suggest that the Wagner Group troops were asked to commit themselves to the whole cabaret. However, some may have had their suspicions. It is possible that the Wagner Group troops involved in the rebellion were assured that no violent action against the government would be undertaken as part of the venture. If they were not informed of the entire artifice, if such a plan existed, it would likely have been so because no loose thread was left hanging that could be pulled and subsequently unravel the plan. Setting limits to what those engaged in an operation could be told is referred to in the intelligence industry as compartmentalization.

Prigozhin Mansion Raid

As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia, posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. One photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed Forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

Prigozhin in many disguises (above). As events continued to develop after the heady days of the Wagner Group Rebellion, there was a video released of a raid on Prigozhin’s opulent mansion in St. Petersburg. Even more, online newspapers in the Russian Federation, Fontanka and Izvestia,  posted videos and photos of Prigozhin’s home that showed stacks of cash and gold bullion. The images appeared to be part of the authorities’ efforts to denigrate Prigozhin, who has postured himself as an enemy of corrupt elites. A photo hanging in the mansion showed a lineup of decapitated heads. In another published image, an oversized sledgehammer with the inscription “for important negotiations” was displayed. Reportedly, the sledgehammer is known to be the symbol of the Wagner Group after reports its troops used the tool to beat defectors to death. Additionally, the newsmedia in the Russian Federation published a collection of selfies that showed Prigozhin posing in various wigs, fake beards, and foreign uniforms. The uniforms were said to be from the Armed forces of Syria and the many African countries to which the Wagner Group had been deployed.

It would appear that despite the importance of matters concerning Prigozhin–after all, according to the Western newsmedia, he led a paramilitary rebellion that knocked the Kremlin back on its heels and accelerated the Putin regime’s downward spiral–the Russian Federation security services and law enforcement organizations in particular failed to keep eye on the mansion. The indications and implications of the heavy use of manpower are that there is such a paucity of technological resources available that Prigozhin and whatever entourage of security that would likely be traveling with him could not be detected. It is very likely that trained K-9s–search dogs–have been utilized to more stealthily locate anyone present in the mansion instead of a police special weapons and tactical teams who observably in the video recording they made, moved through the residence creating a noise worthy of Bedlam. It is remarkable how closely the video and photos  provided on the raid of Prigozhin’s mansion mimicked video recordings released of the raid on the Mar-a-Largo residence of former US President Donald Trump provided by US law enforcement and. released to the newsmedia by the US Department of Justice. Many would likely chalk up the similarities to the fact that parallels exist in foundational law enforcement tactics, techniques, procedures, and methods in every country. In this case, the similarity might be better chalked up to sarcasm.

It is difficult to imagine what might be referred to as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces,  and in particular, the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations, are so inept that independently or in conjunction, could not keep track of Prigozhin’s location and movements. Indeed, one might have presumed that the Russian Federation Armed Forces and particularly the intelligence services and law enforcement organizations kept themselves well-aware of Prigozhin’s affairs and under current circumstances had gone so deeply into them that they at least collectively should have had a complete handle of all of its details. Nothing should have been so unknown by them respectively that their knowledge would seem at best to equal that of the far from the not so prying mainstream newsmedia in the Russian Federation. One could be convinced that everything is done in the Russian Federation in such an incompetent fashion to convince the world that within it “folly doctor-like controls skill.” How the government managed to keep perfect track of, and come down so hard upon the aforementioned Boris Nemetsov and Alexei Navalny, and other activists such as Anna Politkovskaya is a wonder. Based on newsmedia reporting, greatcharlie proffers that the US Intelligence Community surely has been monitoring Prigozhin’s movements as somewhat of a priority mission. Newsmedia reports indicate they were keeping track of how Prigozhin’s private jets were shuttling back and forth from Belarus to the Russian Federation.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous. Dulce est desipere in loco. (It is delightful to play the fool.)

If one might exclude the possibility that the Russian Federation Armed Forces, law enforcement and security services are unable to competently monitor Prigozhin, one might turn to the idea that the raid of one of Prigozhin’s mansion and the bombardment of photos in the newsmedia of Prigozhin was designed to throw inquisitive minds and close observers off his scent for hot minute. Verily, perhaps the raid was one more step to ensure those who might have begun questioning in the aggregate whether the Wagner Group’s rebellion, the nature of the Kremlin’s response, and Prigozhin’s disappearance, were elements of some grand artifice. It all falls into place too well. For an intuitive few following it all very closely, the next set events might very well seem predictable.

Interestingly, the release of photos of Prigozhin posing in various wigs found strewn among various automatic weapons and gold bars, was explained in the Western newsmedia as an effort to embarrass him, even better to denigrate him. Much of the commentary expressed about Prigozhin after the raid video was released oddly had the ring of the same stuff typically heard from “bad girls” and “bad boys” at cafeteria tables in many a secondary school. However, Prigozhin, the gregarious, always the much anticipated amuser among associates, always ready for repartee now as during his restaurant days, has always been up for a good laugh or a joke, even at his own expense. In this way, Prigozhin is not unlike–though rarely lately–Putin, who during private moments and in a reserved way from time to time at press conferences, has been known to make amusing faces, tell jokes, as well as pose for very playful photos. What a turn events appear to have taken, from the heady to the humorous.

Prigozhin: Proceeding with Caution?

After all is said and done, greatcharlie’s recognizes that the veritable sacrificial lamb could prove to be Prigozhin, although it is unlikely. He may very well view himself, in a more dramatic and grander way, as a martyr on the altar of his country. He would forever disagree that he was a patsy. Some might insist that his exile to Belarus was likely one of many negative life ramifications of his behavior to that point. He does carry vile antecedents. Either being frugal with information or simply lacking further information on his disposition, the newsmedia to this point has convinced many that Prigozhin remains exiled in Belarus, under duress, as lonely as a cloud. Regardless of where he may be, recognizably, Prigozhin has bravely borne his fate. He does not appear to have let his nerves run away with him. He is unquestionably as strong as a lion. Leve fit, quod bene fertur, onus. (The load is light if you know how to support it.)

Surely if some artifice had been dramatically acted out the weekend of June 23, 2023 as hypothesized here, Prigozhin had to have been a willing participant in the whole cabaret. Make no mistake, Prigozhin is willing to do just about anything to assist Putin: “Papa.” It was Putin who catapulted him to the highest realms of wealth in the world. Putin has likely shielded him from very dark elements that out of envy, jealousy, ethno-racism, or madness would choose to lash out at him in the Russian Federation and outside. Prigozhin will surely never forget how Putin helped him. Outwardly, he has always demonstrated his appreciation. It would seem that Prigozhin truly dislikes Shoigu and Gerasimov. However, as suggested in Part 1, he would hardly go out of his way, waste his own money, to disrupt Putin’s government. Putin likes both Shoigu and Gerasimov and would not allow anyone to destroy them just as he would protect Prigozhin from a serious threat. Prigozhin knows that. Certainly, the last thing Prigozhin would ever want for himself would be to replace Shoigu as Russian Federation Defense Minister. Given the situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Defense Minister’s post is surely a heavy yoke he would happily leave for another to bear.

If an artifice was in play, it was not apparent initially whether Prigozhin had been shielded sufficiently or at all from the law or political enemies. Shoigu and Gerasimov now seem so drenched with villainy that it is hard to imagine how they will ever be able shed it. For Putin, such issues are surely secondary, if not tertiary. Likely to him, whether he wants them to continue at their posts or not is all that matters. It may not be too fanciful to suggest that although all three put their trust in Putin, naturally but quietly, all three may be a little uncertain about whether being so trustful was justified. Prigohzin can only hope to remain free and have the opportunity to further serve “Papa.” However, Prigozhin lives by an odd code, perhaps it could be called an archaic one. He will likely take whatever comes from his boss standing upright with his eyes wide open. Perhaps a total victory in Ukraine is the only hope of redemption for Shoigu and Gerasimov. Unfortunately for them, that is very unlikely. An educated guess would be that Putin will not play any tricks with his three subordinates. Amicitia sine fraude. (Friendship without deceit.)

Based on a number newsmedia reports in July 2023, the situation appeared to change a bit faster than most would have expected for Prigozhin. On July 6, 2023, Lukashenko stated that he was not in Belarus, but was in the habit of traveling between St. Petersburg and Moscow as he wished. The Belarusian President also stated that any money and weapons that had been confiscated by Russian Federation authorities had been returned to Prigozhin. To the extent the original agreement to end the Wagner Group Rebellion was intact as it regarded Belarus, Lukashenko explained that the organization’s troops had remained in their camps in his country. According to newsmedia reports, approximately 8,000 Wagner Group troops are currently deployed in Belarus. However, the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, the senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, who was mentioned earlier, stated in an online post republished by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel that 10,000 Wagner Group troops would eventually be deployed in Belarus.

Interestingly, when Lukashenko stated that Wagner Group troops were redeployed in Belarus on June 30, 2023, he also explained that his country could make use of the experience and expertise of the organization’s members through training. By July 2023, the Ministerstva abarony Respubliki Belarus’ (Belarusian Defense Ministry) had announced that “The Armed forces of Belarus continue joint training with the fighters of the Wagner PMC (Private Military Company).” Giving what seemed to amount to a forewarning to neighboring Poland and NATO, on the week of July 20, 2023, the Belarusian Defense Ministry would announce: “During the week, special operations forces units, together with representatives of the Company will work out combat training tasks at the Brest military range.” The Brest military range is 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of the Polish border.

Very compelling is a video posted on Prigozhin’s press service on Telegram depicting the Wagner Group’s owner welcome his organization’s troops to Belarus and discussing the future of the whole enterprise, Prigozhin is heard telling the Wagner Group troops, “We fought honorably.” He goes on to say, “You have done a great deal for Russia. What is going on at the front [in Ukraine] is a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in.” Reportedly, Prigozhin tells his troops that they should behave well towards the locals and directs them to train the Belarusian Army and gather their strength for a “new journey to Africa.” The video on Telegram additionally shows Prigozhin receiving the Wagner Group black flag, decorated with the motto” Blood, Honour, Motherland, and Courage”, brought up to Belarus from the organization’s camp in the Russian Federation’s South. Clearly, Prigozhin and his Wagner Group may be a bit down, but they are not completely out, by the good grace of “Papa” one might say. 

In a most extraordinary turn of events, Prigozhin and 34 commanders of his Wagner Group, who only a week before were dubbed mutineers and treasonous by Putin in four very public addresses, met with the Russian Federation President in the Kremlin on June 29, 2023. The Kremlin confirmed the meeting occurred. According to the French newspaper Libération, Western intelligence services were aware of the momentous occasion, but they insist the meeting transpired on July 1, 2023. Two members of the Security Council of the Russian Federation attended the meeting: the director of Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, and the director of Rosgvardiya (the National Guard of Russia) Viktor Zolotov. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters: ““The commanders themselves outlined their version of events, emphasizing that they are soldiers and staunch supporters of the head of state and the supreme commander-in-chief.” Peskov continued: “They also said that they are ready to continue fighting for the motherland.” In the third quatrain of “Sonnet 119” (1609), William Shakespeare writes what appears most apposite, mutatis mutandis, to the evolving state of the relationship between Putin and Prigozhin: “O benefit of ill! now I find true / That better is by evil still made better, / And ruin’d love, when it is built anew, / Grows fairer than first, more strong, far greater.”

Putin in Derbent, Dagestan close-up (above). Putin’s visage says it all. Looking at Putin as he met with the cheering crowd in Derbent, it is very clear that he was very pleased. So rarely has his face expressed such happiness, many were led to believe it was not Putin in photo but a body double. Such impressions were quite singular. Putin was greeted in Derbent as the Russian people’s champion. In the “struggle” with the Wagner Group, he was hands down the victor. At least, that is how the situation appeared to the Russian people. If all that transpired was actually a clever artifice executed to garner their increased political support and ratchet up his popularity, as suggested by greatcharlie–maskirovka, Putin was surely very satisfied with the outcome.

The Way Forward

Of course, greatcharlie is unable to swear by this theory that the whole Wagner Group Rebellion was a clever, well-calibrated artifice devised by Putin and what has come afterward also has been guided by his hand. What greatcharlie does believe will become more apparent as time goes on is that the Wagner Group Rebellion did not accelerate some supposed spiral downward of Putin’s regime. Without pretension, greatcharlie states that to it, the whole cabaret felt simply too contrived from the first day. It is unfortunate any lives were reportedly lost in its implementation. Such is always the risk when thousands of well-armed fighting men are moving about with different purposes and understandings of a situation, and no significant central control and communication exists. Of course, establishing such certainly would have made the hypothesized artifice far easier to detect and to deny.

Sic multa quæ honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta. (Thus many things that seem honorable by their nature are rendered dishonorable by circumstances.) As for the Putin ultra-loyalist Prigozhin, greatcharlie is not completely dismissive of assessments by some Russia scholars and policy analysts that he may still be in trouble with his dear leader and dear friend in the Russian Federation. Even Putin loyalists cannot be too sure what he thinks of them or what plans he has for them at any given time. They can only do their level best to remain in his good standing. In greatcharlie’s aforementioned June 5, 2023 post on the possibility of the Kremlin using insights from analysts outside the Russian Federation foreign and national security policy bureaucracies, it noted that finding scholars and policy analysts willing to assist the regime might be difficult as there might be a tacit understanding that there is a real danger involved with serving it. The same senior officials they might work hard to assist could very well turn against them much as wild animals without rhyme or reason known to the reasonable or the rational. In a similar vein, if Prigozhin actually committed himself and the Wagner Group to some artifice for the sake of strengthening Putin’s position nationally as hypothesized here, he may have been too trusting and may have taken too great a risk. Pitfalls have been something Prigozhin has clearly been able to dodge in various endeavors tied to Putin up to this point, but fate might finally come calling. One wonders whether Prigozhin was at all uneasy when he and 34 of his Wagner Group commanders were graciously invited to the Kremlin to meet with Putin, and one and all were welcomed back into the fold by the Russian Federation President with open arms. 

There is a little more to consider in this drama as it concerns Putin and Prigozhin. As greatcharlie makes this final point–and has a little fun doing so, it hopes readers will stick around as it goes admittedly the long way–albeit maybe a bit too prolix–to provide some background on a story that best promotes discernment of ideas presented in the discussion. From what greatcharlie would usually refer to as banal amusement, a Hollywood film, a deeper understanding of Prigozhin perhaps can be drawn. In this case, greatcharlie says film is art, and art is yeast for intellect. Many readers may already know the storyline of the very intriguing 1977 blockbuster film, “Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope”, but perhaps not in the context in which it is presented here. (It was suggested by a reader that greatcharlie do more to connect with the younger generation by tying points of discussion on foreign and national security policy with popular interests of today. So, greatcharlie, being responsive, reached back to a film that premiered 46 years ago to connect with younger readers. Was kann ich sagen?)

In the film, young Luke Skywalker comes across two “droids”, C-3P0 and R2-D2 on his home planet, Tatooine, with the latter holding a hologram recording of a desperate plea from Princess Leia, a key leader of the Rebellion against the Empire that has an iron grip. Leia, who is being held captive by Darth Vader, a type of galactic Imperium, the right hand of an evil empire that had enslaved the galaxy for help from Obi-Wan Kenobi. Skywalker seeks out Old Ben Kenobi, a neighbor whose name closely resembles the name in the message and discovers they are one in the same. Due to tragic circumstances, Obi-Wan Kenobi must take Skywalker along to rescue Leia. During their time together, Obi-Wan Kenobi sets forth to teach Skywalker about the Force, a positive, spiritual energy by which all existence flows not only in the galaxy, but the universe, and how it allows those with the gift to tap into it, mystical, supernatural abilities. The duo secure the help of blackmarketer Hans Solo and his trusted co-pilot Chewbacca, with the promise of remuneration. Skillfully flying his dilapidated yet considerably advanced and agile Millennium Falcon, Solo manages to evade asteroids, Imperial TIE fighters, and Imperial Star Destroyers. The diverse band of irregulars then come upon and are pulled into the Death Star, a superweapon with a giant planet crushing laser with which the Empire intended to use in eliminating the Rebellion once and for all. It was also where Leia was being held by Vader. The small band rescues Leia and escapes but not without the painful loss of Obi-Wan Kenobi in a duel with Vader, who by the way was the embodiment of the negative side of the force. Yet, after his death, Obi-Wan Kenobi could do more to help Skywalker than ever. With the promise of great reward from Leia, Solo takes the group on to the Rebel base on Yavin IV, which is the next target of the Death Star.

On Yavin IV, information collected by R2-D2 on the Death Star’s defenses and vulnerabilities was reviewed and plans for a small group of fighters to attack and destroy it were formulated. The Rebel mission entailed firing rockets into a small vent along an equatorial trench of the Death Star. Time was of the essence as the Death Star would be moving into position to destroy Yavin IV. Skywalker would join a group of pilots flying small X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters against the Death Star. He implored Solo to join the group but Solo emphasizes that his interests from the start were solely pecuniary and he would never risk himself in a suicide mission, which aptly described the Rebel pilots plan of attack. Skywalker left Solo with Chewbacca, as they stowed in his ship the massive reward Leia promised. Flying with R2-D2, Skywalker and the relatively small group of fighters then left to engage the giant Death Star which had nearly reached Yavin IV. Their mission was monitored by the Rebel command base on the planet. Once in contact, the losses in X-Wing and Y-Wing fighters mounted rapidly as a mass of Imperial TIE fighters intercepted the group. Vader, himself, joined them. With barely a handful of Rebel fighters left, Skywalker led what would be the final assault along the trench to reach the vent. As two X-Wing fighters trying to hold Vader and two TIE fighters off him were defeated and R2-D2 was lost, Skywalker sped to the target. It was then that Skywalker through clairaudience received a message from Obi-Wan Kenobi to rely on the Force to complete the job. Leia and the commanders at the Rebel base were flummoxed as Skywalker, responsive to Obi-Wan Kenobi’s voice, disengaged his computer targeting system. As the Death Star prepared to fire on Yavin IV, and Vader closed on Skywalker, surprisingly Solo arrives with the Millennium Falcon and perfectly disrupts Vader’s pursuit of his young friend, freeing him to hit the target directly and destroy the Death Star just in time.

That moment in the film was frightfully small, but small in the way that small movements of a needle would indicate an earthquake on a seismograph. There is considerable materiality and profundity about it. Solo had often indicated in the film that his interests during the odyssey of the small band were solely pecuniary. However, whether compelled by the Force via telepathy to act in support of Skywalker or impelled by the power of friendship and a sense of responsibility, Solo acted. Risking the loss of his ship, his treasured co-pilot, his grand reward, his hopes and dreams for the future, his life, all that he had, he rushed to the Death Star. It is unclear whether Solo had already left Yavin IV in a direction away from the fighting and reversed back to join Skywalker or whether he had flown directly to the scene from the targeted planet. Solo surely would have understood that  Skywalker and the other Rebel pilots were facing trouble at the Death Star, but he could not have known just how bad the situation might have been until he arrived upon the scene. The small force of Rebel fighters may have been completely destroyed by the time he arrived. His young friend could have been lost already. He may have found himself alone, contending with a swarm of Imperial TIE fighters. Nevertheless, Solo went in. A reason for his valorous action could perhaps be found in a logic intrinsic to comradeship in war. So often, a parent may learn their child was lost in war not knowing that he or she abandoned relative safety to remain beside a friend and together they ran forward against the odds into mortal danger. It is easy and satisfying for some to ascribe a bundle of negatives to create a picture of individuals as Prigozhin. However, among such men, the mind works in mysterious ways. As long as Putin continues to stand with him, publicly or privately, he will most likely continue to stand with Putin. Indeed, no matter how bad things become for Putin, Prigozhin will most likely be there. As long as experts continue to get the relationship between the two so wrong, particularly those in the foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in Western countries and other countries interested, there will remain a gap in their understanding of certain events, which Putin, as meditated upon here, will likely seek to exploit in different ways. Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur. (A certain friend is seen in an uncertain matter.)

The Wagner Group Rebellion: Insurrection or Staged Crisis? A Look Beyond the Common Wisdom (Part 1)

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the individual at the center of the Wagner Group Rebellion (above). The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. From the start, greatcharlie had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin, and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand.

On June 23, 2023, the government of the Russian Federation reportedly faced a crisis when what has been described as an armed insurrection was ignited by the private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). At the center of events was the owner of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin. Although an intriguing figure in his own right, Prigozhin holds a level of standing with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin which speaks volumes. Prigozhin is widely known in the Russian Federation by the cognomen “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that organized dinners Putin hosted for foreign dignitaries. Prigozhin’s Wagner Group is well-known for its global paramilitary operations, particularly those in African hotspots, under the plausibly deniable auspices of the Russian Federation government. The Wagner Group was first called into action on a large scale in March 2014 during Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Nearly 1,000 members of the Wagner Group were also sent in to support ethnic-Russian separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Provinces). However, Prigozhin’s close relationship with Putin and the Russian Federation government was ostensibly put in jeopardy, and, according to Western some newsmedia outlets, has been destroyed, given what greatcharlie will refers to here as the Wagner Group Rebellion. Some might suggest that problems really began when Prigozhin was asked to move greater numbers of Wagner Group troops into Ukraine once the Russian Federation’s Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) was launched, he complied, but right away the situation went awry.

Strategically, tactically and operationally, the special military operation was a disaster. Russian Federation commanders rarely displayed military acumen on the battlefield. Russian Federation troops and contractors as the Wagner Group regularly lacked sufficient supplies of critical gear and ammunition. The most troubling aspect was the wasteful expenditure of Russian Federation troops and contractors, but especially the lives of Wagner Group troops without accomplishing anything substantial. With graduated intensity, Prigozhin made his disappointments known publicly and exposed much of what was going wrong for the Russian Federation in Ukraine. However, there was little change or it was at best glacial. The Russian Federation Armed Forces desperately needs the help of the Wagner Group in Ukraine, but Prigozhin has had a belly full of the delinquencies, deficiencies, and ineptitude of the Russian Federation military leadership which his organization has been directed to work under. By 2023, Prigozhin unquestionably behaved as if he were frenzied, and perhaps justifiably and reasonably so, with the great injustice put upon Wagner Group troops in Ukraine as well as the troops of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

However on June 23, 2023, Prigohzin shifted from simply accusing Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov of poorly conducting the then 16th month long special military operation when events took a graver turn. Prigozhin accused forces under the direction of Shoigu and Gerasimov of attacking Wagner Group camps in Ukraine with rockets, helicopter gunships and artillery and as he stated killing “a huge number of our comrades.” The Russian Federation Defense Ministry denied attacking the camps. In an act of daylight madness, Prigozhin then drove elements of the Wagner Group into the Russian Federation from Ukraine with the purpose of removing Shoigu and Gerasimov from their posts by force. His Wagner Group troops advanced to just 120 miles (200 kilometers) from Moscow. However a deal brokered by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko was struck for the Wagner Group to halt. Prigozhin withdrew his forces to avoid “shedding Russian blood.” 

The common wisdom concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion is that it represented the biggest threat to Putin in his more than two decades in power, exposing his weakness and eroding the Kremlin’s authority. It was apparently easy to find a simple explanation when considering the facts in their true context would surely lead to a more complex one. Few experts and observers stirred controversy by contesting the conventional wisdom on the matter, For some, it may have been the case that they were uninterested in any other answer. On the matter of the Wagner Group Rebellion, as has been the case with nearly all things Putin, there only needed to be the possibility for their wishes about it to be true for them to rush to judgment. In reality the picture drawn indicating the Wagner Group’s action was designed to bring down Putin’s regime is circumstantial and thereby enough to be convincing for many. Without pretension, greatcharlie confesses that it is burdened by an inquisitive mind. From the start, it had sought to stay out of the echo chamber of reports forecasting Putin’s imminent downfall, the downward spiral of the regime, and the end of Prigozhin,and the Wagner Group. It is greatcharlie’s contention that an alternate, somewhat more complex explanation of events is at hand. In this two part discussion, the suppositions presented are not founded on wild speculation on what may have transpired but rather conclusions reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning. If greatcharlie might be allowed the liberty, it freely admits that it would hardly know with a high degree of certainty what the thinking among Putin and his advisers was before the Wagner Group Rebellion. If modesty permits, greatcharlie believes it possesses some instinct for deciphering the thinking and actions of the Kremlin on foreign and national security policy matters. At the same time it fully recognizes that one’s instinct for such given all of the nuances can occasionally play one false. 

Once it reached certain suppositions, greatcharlie freely admits delayed publishing this essay for although it was confident of its findings, events were moving so fast concerning the Wagner Group Rebellion that it believed aspects of this case would likely arise that it could hardly have anticipated. (Perhaps it is a singular comfort that can best be enjoyed by those editing small, independent blogs.) The decision was then made to publish even though events were still being played out with the aim of sharing its learning process and insights with readers, especially students with the hope to evoke a desire within them to consider with reason possibilities and ignite the development of their insights on what is known and ruminate upon potentialities from what is unknown. If greatcharlie might hope have any appeal to the community of foreign and national security policy analysts, in recent times it would be satisfied to merely be a stimulus to the policy debate of the Ukraine War.Omnia non properanti clara certaque erunt; festinatio improvida est, et cæca. (All things will be clear and distinct to the man who does not hurry; haste is blind and improvident.)

Prigozhin arrives with guards at funeral ceremony held in the Troyekurovskoye cemetery in Moscow, Russia, April 8, 2023. In this post, greatcharlie chronicles Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

About Prigozhin

Since Prigozhin, as aforementioned, is at the center of all that has transpired, it seems appropriate to provide some background on the individual who allegedly took on Putin. An account of Prigozhin’s life has been widely circulated in the international newsmedia. Those biographies usually discuss certain elements of his life, typically offering a fragmented picture of Prigozhin story: other than average beginnings; potential as skier lost; imprisonment; release, family support and entry into food service industry; support from friends; entry into restaurant and gambling businesses; elite contacts and growth; Putin ties; catering and opportunities of a lifetime; and, business diversification to include internet business and the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s story–sine ira et studio–by assembling elements of various reports in a way that provides its readers with a bit of extra nuance which may appropriately give certain aspects of his past higher meaning. A few new ideas and insights are offered on his more recent statements and actions. Greater meaning is given to facts that are generally known. It is an effort to feel where Prigozhin is in his life, and understand not only what he has been doing but why. This is not intended to be some definitive examination of Prigozhin. However, it may assist many of greatcharlie’s readers in developing their own insights on the complex individual that is Prigozhin.

Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin’s life had the least promising commencement.  He was born on June 1, 1961 in Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg) in the Soviet Union, the son of a nurse, Violetta Prigozhina, and a mining engineer, Viktor Prigozhin. His father died when Prigozhin was a 9-year-old, leaving his mother to support him and his sick grandmother by working at a local hospital. During his school years, Prigozhin aspired to be a professional cross-country skier. He was trained by his stepfather Samuil Zharkoy, who was an instructor in the sport, and attended a prestigious athletics boarding school from which he graduated in 1977. However, due to an injury, he left the sport. Unfortunately, the criminal culture of St Petersburg drew him in.

There is an old saying directed at youth which greatcharlie paraphrases: “If one is around the wrong kind of people one will likely get involved with the wrong kind of things.” In November 1979, 18-year-old Prigozhin was caught stealing and given a suspended sentence. However, later in 1981, he and several accomplices, according to Meduza, were arrested for robbing apartments in upscale neighborhoods. He would be convicted on four charges to include robbery, fraud, and involving teenagers in prostitution. Id nobis maxime nocet, quod non ad rationis lumen sed ad similitudinem aliorum vivimus. (Is especially ruinous to us, that we shape our lives not by the light of reason, but after the fashion of others.)

In a five-page biography attached to an October 2021 email acquired by the Intercept from Capital Legal Services that appears to have been drafted by his attorneys, it was revealed that Prigozhin violated the terms of his confinement “on a regular basis” until 1985, when in solitary confinement, he started to “read intensely.” In 1988, the Russian Supreme Court reduced his sentence to 10 years, noting that he had “began corrective behavior.” In order to earn money, he requested to be transferred to a residential colony for timber work, which the document characterizes as “extremely hard labor.” After serving 9 years of his 13 year sentence, Prigozhin was freed in 1990. Immediately after his release, Prigozhin briefly returned to skiing, by working as a ski trainer at an athletics school in Leningrad, according to Novaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper known for its critical coverage of the Kremlin. The newspaper also reported that Prigozhin in 1990 studied at the Leningrad Chemical and Pharmaceutical Institute–now the Saint Petersburg State Chemical Pharmaceutical Academy–but was expelled.

Food Service

Prigozhin would next move in a completely different direction which placed his life on an amazing trajectory. He set up a hot-dog stand in Leningrad with his mother and stepfather in the Aprashaka Flea Market. Prigozhin was essentially a street vendor, without much in the way of formal food service training or food service management. Yet, he clearly possessed a considerable knack for preparing and selling food to people. He apparently knew what they liked and knew what was right. He was quoted in an interview with the New York Times as stating: The rubles were piling up faster than his mother could count them.” After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Prigozhin followed the entrepreneurial spirit of the times and founded or became involved in many new businesses. Isthuc est sapere non quod ante pedes modo est videre, sed etiam illa quæ futura sunt prospicere. (True wisdom consists not in seeing that which is immediately before our eyes, but in the foresight of that which may happen.)

From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. 


Boris Spektor (above). From 1991 to 1997, Prigozhin became heavily involved in the grocery store business. Eventually, he managed to become a 15 percent stakeholder and manager of Contrast, which was the first grocery store chain in St. Petersburg and founded by his former classmate Boris Spektor. In the 1990s, Prigozhin opened a fast-food cafe, which was followed by a series of food marts in the city. In 1995, when revenues of his other businesses began to fall, Prigozhin persuaded a director at Contrast, Kiril Ziminov, to open a restaurant with him. They opened their first restaurant in 1996, Staraya Tamozhnya (Old Customs House) on St Petersburg’s Vasilievsky Island. During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. 

According to the Guardian, Prigozhin found Tony Gear, a British hotel administrator who had previously worked at the Savoy in London and was now at one of St Petersburg’s few luxury hotels. He employed Gear to manage first a wine shop, then the Old Customs House. Initially, the Old Customs House employed strippers as a way to drum up clientele, but oddly enough the restaurant’s food became the real draw for patrons and stripper operations were suspended. Gear marketed the Old Customs House as the most refined place to eat in a city that was only just discovering fine dining.

On its website, the Old Customs House is described on its website as one of the oldest restaurants in the city. Pop stars and businessmen liked to eat there, as did St Petersburg’s mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who sometimes came with his deputy, Putin. Photographs of Prigozhin in his exclusive St. Petersburg restaurants typically depict him serving the elite of the Russian Federation and standing-by dutifully in the background, ready to respond to his very important patrons’ every need. Prigozhin does not display a scintilla of shyness now, and he was hardly shy during those early years of his restaurant ventures. One might imagine that Prigozhin had a gift for repartee which was most likely greatly appreciated by patrons.

 

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin and US President George W. Bush with their spouses on board the New Island Restaurant. Prigozhin is standing by dutifully, back and to the left of Putin. Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. Prigozhin assistance was clearly an integral part of whatever plan Putin had for foreign dignitaries. To that extent, Prigozhin was integral to Putin’s approach to handling foreign and national security policy issues with his visitors. The degree of Prigozhin’s connection with Putin was undeniable, frightfully apparent. Putin would go on to make use of Prigozhin’s assistance on many matters of the utmost importance to the Russian Federation and utmost importance to him. If greatcharlie is correct, he continues to do so today

During those same heady years, Prigozhin entered the gambling business. Spektor along with another hard charging entrepreneur, Igor Gorbenko, brought Prigozhin on as CEO of Spektr (Spectrum) CJSC which established the first casinos in St Petersburg. The trio would jointly start many other enterprises in diverse industries in the 1990s, including construction, marketing research, and import-export. Through his joint ownership of the gambling businesses, it has been suggested by Novaya Gazeta that Prigozhin may have first encountered Putin or at least began interacting with him on a professional level. Putin at the time had been chairman of the supervisory board for casinos and gambling since 1991. What started as a business acquaintance became a good friendship. Putin was reportedly intrigued by what could be characterized as Prigozhin’s rags-to-riches story.

In 1997, Prigozhin and Ziminov, founded a second restaurant, New Island, a floating eatery that became one of the most fashionable dining spots in the city. Inspired by waterfront restaurants on the River Seine in Paris, the two created the restaurant by spending $400,000 to remodel a rusting ferry boat on the Vyatka River. Prigozhin told the magazine Elite Society in 2008 that the new restaurant offered Russians something new and different from boring “cutlets with vodka.”

It was no mean feat to create a profitable restaurant in St. Petersburg with a potential clientele that represented a small percentage of the population and managed to get them through the doors every night, let alone open a second based on a concept alien to a good portion of that exclusive clientele. In 1998, he opened the New Island Restaurant on a boat, which one tourism website calls “St. Petersburg’s only floating luxury Restaurant-Ship.” The New Island Restaurant also became a favorite of Putin, who by then was the former deputy mayor of the city.

In Part 7, of his biography/memoir First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000), Putin explains that once his superior and political mentor, the Mayor of Leningrad Alexander Sobchak, lost his re-elect bid, he faced a lean and trying period as the erstwhile deputy mayor of the city. He was unemployed for a few months and sufficient money was not coming into the household. His mother was also in the picture. Putin was greatly concerned for his future. He was making calls, wearing out shoe leather, and knocking on all doors with the hope of securing something appropriate. As the story goes, Putin’s luck changed immensely. Putin would still visit Prigozhin’s popular St. Petersburg restaurant. That allowed Putin to keep in the mix of things, hobnobbing with elites. The gregarious Prigozhin most likely would have insisted that Putin dine “on the house”. Prigozhin was very likely a friend indeed at a time of need for Putin. If what has been surmised here truly was the case, it would do much to explain in good part why Putin was considerably generous toward Prigozhin in later years. (In its March 31, 2017 post entitled, “Book Review: Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (Public Affairs, 2000)”, greatcharlie provides a review of Putin’s memoir/biography.)

Putin’s generosity toward Prigozhin began in full-bore in 2000, when the newly minted Russian Federation President, brought the then-Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, to a professional dinner at New Island out of sheer interest. The following year, Putin brought Jacques Chirac, then former President of France, to Prigozhin’s “buoyant” restaurant. He brought US President George W. Bush to the New Island in 2002. Prigozhin personally served food to Putin’s foreign guests. Imaginably, all of his guests left the New Island with appetites “keener” for Russian cuisine afterwards. Putin hosted his own birthday party at the New Island in 2003. 

Putin clearly displayed liking for Prigozhin before everyone. Meduza reported Putin welcomed him as “one of the boys.” To clarify, Prigozhin was neither Chekisty, the son or grandson of a member of the Soviet Union’s Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) or NKVD, an iteration of the security services during World War II, as Putin is, nor was he Siloviki, someone who had served in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB as Putin and most of his close associates had. Current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev, who was an attorney in St.Petersburg when Putin met him, also falls into that “other than Chekisty or Siloviki” category. Prigozhin’s good relations with others among the Russian Federation’s elite also assisted in bring in lucrative catering contracts

Prigozhin attends to Putin during his inspection of a Concord Management and Consulting facility. By 2003, Prigozhin left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. Concord Management and Consulting, a  company founded by Prigozhin in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. He was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with him, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region.

During those early stages of his growth in the business world, Prigozhin was known for being rather strict as a manager. However, he is not remembered as being one to complain about being wronged and suffering losses. He was hardly one who could be characterized as temperamental and thin-skinned. It would appear that any behavior that resembled such was truly left behind in prison. Seemingly, he very likely would have thought dwelling on such matters would have cost him too much time and energy; on the face of it, he likely believed his time would always be best spent on pursuing new, greater ventures. The profits from them surely surpassed any prior losses. Much as water down a stream, when Prigozhin encountered an obstruction, he would work around it rapidly to reach the next profitable objective. Beyond the immediate moment, there was always the potential for more ahead. (The indications and implications from this might be that his complaints concerning the Wagner Group’s treatment in Ukraine have been fostered by the realization that there are no prospects for advancing on to some satisfying new course upon which he could greatly improve his organization’s situation.) Good fortune seemed to stick on Prigozhin’s side. He could provide his family with pleasure and affluence.

Quam sæpe forte temere eveniunt, quæ non audeas optare. (How often things occur by mere chance, for which we dared not even to hope.) Over the course of the 2000s, Prigozhin grew even closer to Putin. By 2003, he left his business partners and established his own independent restaurants. One of Prigozhin’s companies, Concord Management and Consulting, founded in 1996, was awarded numerous government contracts. 

In 2007, under the National Education Project, the Russian Federation government sought to improve catering in educational institutions in fourteen of the country’s regions. They introduced a program titled “innovative on-board lunches” for Russian schoolchildren. In April 2008, a tender to provide “on-board meals” for 85 schools that had no cafeterias of their own was announced in St. Petersburg. Сonсord received the contract and began feeding St. Petersburg school children. To perform that task, Prigozhin opened a food processing plant outside St. Petersburg. Meduza reported that Putin attended the plant’s 2010 opening. In 2011, the parents of students began to protest the factory for providing their children with processed food packed with preservatives. According to Meduza, Prigozhin rather than succumb to the scandal, turned to Moscow, where he was awarded school catering contracts worth more than $177 million. Through companies affiliated with Concord, Prigozhin eventually began supplying food to schools beyond Moscow, to include: Krasnodar, Kaliningrad, Pyatigorsk, the Khabarovsk region, Yekaterinburg, the Zabaykalsky region, and the Yaroslavl region. There were further cases of poisoning and complaints about the food. In ten years, over 1,000 lawsuits for the total amount of $43 million were filed against his affiliate companies.

In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90 percent of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. Leonid Teyf, former deputy general director of Voentorg (the company charged with contracting caterers for the military), assisted Prigozhin in securing the orders. of Voentorg’s assets related to food supply and army maintenance to Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract signed by Voentorg for 2013-2014 amounted to $999 million. The contract was signed by the director of Voentorg Vladimir Pavlov. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, approximately amounted to $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies.

Prigozhin (center) reaches the top! He stands close to both Putin (left) and current Russian Federation Vice President Dmitry Medvedev (right) During confidential conversation. In 2012, Prigozhin was awarded a two-year contract to supply more than 90 percent of all food orders for Russian Federation soldiers. It all began when he opened several catering points in the properties  of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff. However, once the decision was made to privatize the military commissary in 2012, 90% of all orders in the sector went to the companies affiliated with Prigozhin. The total sum of the contract for 2013 to 2014 amounted to $999 million. Additionally, in 2014, companies affiliated with Prigozhin began servicing military towns by providing meals, cleaning, barracks maintenance, heating, and water supply. According to media outlet The Bell, from 2014 to 2019 the alleged volume of federal government orders on meal supplies to schools and hospitals, as well as services provided to the Defence Ministry, approximately amounted to  $1.6 billion. It all went to Prigozhin’s companies. As discussed in Part 2, Putin would oddly lay out the tie between Concord and the Russian Federation Defense Ministry in an address following the Wagner Group Rebellion.

Following that, Prigozhin signed several federal government contracts totaling at least $3.1 billion. Prigozhin is linked to the oil industry as well. His companies reportedly received a percentage of Syria’s oil revenue in exchange for protecting its oil fields from the virulent Islamic terrorist organization, ISIS. A portion of the profits from his contracts with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry are alleged to have been used to start and fund the Internet Research Agency.

It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary opponent, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016. Alleged evidence of Prigozhin’s involvement in the US election meddling is his meeting with Mikhail Bystrov, the appointed head of Glavset, several times between 2015 and 2016 to discuss work being performed. Considered notable among those certain of Prigozhin’s role in the matter is the fact that Glavset’s “Project Lakhta”, known to be a disinformation campaign, received approximately $1.2 million in funding from Bystrov in 2016 alone. A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin. 

Three “cheerful” photos of Prigozhin (above) on a US Federal Bureau of Investigation “Wanted Poster”. Perhaps in the Russian underworld in which Prigozhin ostensibly has his hands somewhat dipped, the poster is a badge of honor, a sign that he had made it to the top! It has been suggested that Prigozhin was somewhat likely advised by government sources to use his funds in this manner. The Internet Resource Agency, known also as Glavset, is a St. Petersburg-based technological company seeking to promote disinformation campaigns both domestically and abroad. In its initial operations, Glavset sought to put down domestic protests by creating counterfeit social media accounts that advocated on behalf of Putin and disparaged the actions of his primary political opponent then, Aleksei Navalny. However, its operations expanded to the point of interfering with elections internationally, including those within the US in 2016A grand jury in the US federal court system, used the term “troll farm” to describe the Internet Research Agency and determined that it was used to meddle in the 2016 US Presidential Elections. A reward of up to $250,000 has been offered by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation for information leading to the arrest of Prigozhin.

Prigozhin and the Wagner Group

In 2014, Prigozhin invested a portion of his sizable wherewithal to develop a private military corporation, ChVK Vagnera, popularly known as Gruppa Vagnera (the Wagner Group). Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, the organization and others were endorsed in April 2012 by Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. Headquartered in St.. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present).

As explained in some detail in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations”, from the time of the organization’s inception, it was widely believed that the organization was founded, owned and led by Dmitriy Utkin. Utkin is a veteran of the First and Second Chechen Wars. Until 2013, he served as lieutenant colonel and brigade commander of the 700th Independent Voyská spetsiálnogo naznachéniya (‘Special Purpose Military Detachment) of the 2nd Independent Brigade, a special forces unit of Glavnoe operativnoe upravlenie General’nogo štaba Vooružёnnyh sil Rossijskoj Federacii (the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation) or GRU. However, in an August 2017, article in the Turkish newspaper Yeni Şafak, the suggestion was made that Utkin was only a figurehead for the company. Fingers pointed at Prigozhin as its true owner. Prigozhin went some distance to deny any ties to the Wagner Group. He even denied any communication with it. Prigozhin actually sued Bellingcat, Meduza, and Echo of Moscow for claiming he had links to the organization. In an interview in December 2018, Putin also denied allegations that Prigozhin had been directing the Wagner Group’s activities. However, in September 2022, Prigozhin relented and admitted to having created the group. Prigozhin claimed, “I cleaned the old weapons myself, sorted out the bulletproof vests myself and found specialists who could help me with this. From that moment, on May 1, 2014, a group of patriots was born, which later came to be called the Wagner Battalion.” As noted earlier, the Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged in the fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts. 

At the organization’s core, Wagner Group troops are predominantly retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are typically aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. However, the Wagner Group also employs an international group of fighters. There are three main fighting units of the organization. The Rusich unit is predominantly ethnic Russian with a complement of international fighters. There is a Serbian unit built upon complement of former members of the Serbian Volunteer Guard–also known as “Arkan’s Tigers”–created by the deceased 1990s ethno-religious nationalist Serbian paramilitary warlord Zeljko Raznatovic’s–also known as Arkan. A relatively new unit in the Wagner Group consists of citizens of Scandinavian countries, particularly from Norway. It participated in the firefights on the Bakhmut front. The unit is referred to as the Níðhöggr“, sometimes also known as Nidhogg.

The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Prigozhin, in a dark blue suit (second from right) attends a meeting involving top Russian Federation Defense Ministry and Russian Federation General Staff and members of Libya’s National Army in Moscow on November 7, 2018. Headquartered in St. Petersburg, the Wagner Group has engaged in actions externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). The Wagner Group was already operating in Ukraine,when the special military operation began. Wearing green uniforms without any unit patches or insignia, the received the name of “little green men” as they marched into Ukraine in 2014. In the Donbas, Wagner Group troops were directly engaged. Fighting. Prigozhin funded military bases there which greatly supported the Russian Federation’s efforts.. 

According to initial statistics available after April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As noted, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. The recruitment of prison inmates for service in the Wagner Group is nothing new. The organization reportedly recruited imprisoned UPC rebels in the Central African Republic to fight in Mali and Ukraine. They are reportedly nicknamed the “Black Russians”. It was the Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that suffered high-profile casualties. Callous Russian Federation commanders threw them into battle pell mell. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. 

It would later be revealed by the Wagner Group’s chief of staff, a senior commander known by the cognomen “Marx”, that  22,000 of the organization’s troops had been killed in action in Ukraine. In his statement, published by the Wagner Group’s Telegram channel, Marx further explained that another 40,000 were wounded in action. Of the 78,000 Wagner Group troops who served in what Marx referred to as “the Ukrainian business trip”, 49,000 of them were convicts. The Wagner Group has reportedly halted the practice of recruiting convicts in its ranks. Former convicts in the organization that survived service in Ukraine have been released from their contracts.

Prigozhin surely recognized early on that more than simply suffering under inept leadership of Russian Federation commanders, he and his organization were being pushed toward the precipice of losing everything by individuals seemingly more skilled in finding ways to defeat him than defeating their opponent on the battlefield. He certainly was not going to countenance that. An idea perhaps alien or incomprehensible to many readers is the possibility that Prigozhin was tolerant, at least up to a point, of the unpleasant set of circumstances under which he was caused to operate in an effort to demonstrate his loyalty and support for Putin. Homo antiqua virtute ac fide? (A man of the “ancient” virtue and loyalty?)

Particularly during the months-long battle for the Ukrainian coal-mining town of Bakhmut, senior managers and troops of the Wagner Group surely felt they were being thwarted, from keeping the Russian Federation in the fight, meeting their organization’s longstanding commitment to Putin and the Russian Federation, as well as meeting their personal and emotional promise to Putin not to leave Ukraine until the Russian Federation won the war. It is all very heavy stuff for a group of individuals whose top priority most would likely argue is profit. Based on his public comments, Prigozhin appears to believe victory is still possible under the right military leadership. It was during a crucial stage in the Bakhmut fight that Prigozhin expressed a desire to leave Ukraine not due to disloyalty or defeatism, but due to the attitudes and actions of the same Russian Federation Armed Forces senior commanders whose forces the Wagner Group jumped into Ukraine to support–or as Prigozhin would somewhat likely say, “to rescue.” Wagner Group units apparently were not receiving the military resources they needed to fight in a manner they preferred. (In meditating on Prigozhin’s position, Putin might want take into consideration the terrible outcome of the decision by Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, to use his beloved spetsnaz units with their exquisite military capabilities to perform stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, on the frontlines in conventional roles. the specialized units were over relied upon and consequently suffered devastating losses.)

Well known is the fact that Putin prefers to take as few people as possible into his confidence. Even with those lucky few he is doubtlessly frugal with his thoughts. Conceivably, Putin had spoken quietly with Prigozhin over the very public vocalization of his rage over the fundamental failures and gross mismanagement of the special military operation by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff since its start. Whatever may have been discussed in such a meeting it hardly concerned taking steps against Shoigu and Gerasimov that Prigozhin was insisting upon, but a solution of some kind may have been voiced by Putin that manifested his unique lens on matters. Note, Prigozhin has neither expressed dissatisfaction with Putin nor has he ever stated anything he believed deep in his heart was derogatory about him. He has always spoken of him in endearing terms. When originally coordinating the Wagner Group’s with Russian Federation Armed Forces, according to the Guardian, Prigozhin would refer to Putin in those meetings as “Papa” which served to reflect his closeness to him as well as his fealty. It is unclear how the Guardian came by this picture of Prigozhin’s meetings within the Russian Federation Defense Ministry. Prigozhin would unlikely have wished to foment dissent against “Papa,” his dear leader. That would never have been Prigozhin’s intention, nor will it ever be. This is stated by greatcharlie with the most recent events most firmly in mind. 

Prigozhin in Bakhmut (above). The delinquencies and deficiencies of the top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces assured that their campaign in Ukraine would go sour almost immediately. They would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. Ready and able, the Wagner Group went into Ukraine in greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is well-known now that since July 2022, Prigozhin began recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. However, it was not long before ratcheting up its work in Ukraine that everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same snare as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their own troops in dire circumstances, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops.

Reality Check

Non mihi si linguæ centum sint oraque centum, ferrea vox, omnes scelerum comprendere formas omnia pœnarum percurrere nomina possim. (Not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, could I repeat all the types of wickedness, and run over all the names of penal woes.)  The supercharged modality of Prigozhin’s expressions concerning the performance of Shoigu and Gerasimov was by no means been within normal parameters and such reproach and obloquy from anyone toward those immensely powerful government leaders and organizations would never have been expected before the special military operation began. In the Russian Federation, “discrediting the armed forces” carries a maximum 15-year prison sentence. Many of Prigozhin’s public statements about the situation in Ukraine are now famous worldwide.

Some in the mainstream Western newsmedia would lead their audience to believe Prigozhin’s regular public ravings about how the war was being managed was an indication that he may have an unhealthy mind. Res ipsa loquitur!  Bizarre reports of Prigozhin providing information on the positions of the Russian Army in Bakhmut appear equally faulty. They have only evinced a misunderstanding of Prigozhin’s relationship to Putin and what the very active private military contractor means to the Russian Federation President personally. From the moment any claim was made of Prigozhin’s betrayal, at least on the Russian Federation side, it was doubtlessly viewed as a comical yet nonetheless apocryphal rumor ginned up by his opponents. To that extent, it was surely rejected as fast as inane suggestions meant to bias the mind back in March 2022 that the extraordinarily violent and most loyal Putin subordinate, the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, would possibly overthrow his president and take over the government and on a matter outside of the Ukraine War context, the very patriotic and extremely dangerous People’s Republic of China Vice Minister for counterintelligence of the Ministry of State Security, Dong Jingwei, had of all things defected to the US in June 2022. (The Dong Jingwei defection matter is treated in some detail in greatcharlie’s June 30, 2021 post entitled “The Defection That Never Was: Meditations on the Dong Jingwei Defection Hoax”.) These suggests were not clever, but rather crass. One could get the impression that those responsible for the US political warfare effort against the Russian Federation have been soliciting ideas from a group of local junior high school boys for the most immature suggestions possible. Surely, that would count as a bold attempt to exploit thinking from outside the US foreign and national security policy bureaucracies. Conscia mens recti famæ mendacia risit. (The mind conscious of integrity scorns the lies of rumor.)

Speaking plainly as he does, Prigozhin’s vocal expressions might at best send a clear signal to Wagner Group troops that they genuinely matter to him, but alone, his words do not appear to have accomplished too much. Prigozhin clearly recognized that as long as his organization’s troops remain in Ukraine, they will be “at the mercy” of what he clearly deems to be careless and inept top officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and top commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. That does not bode well for them. If one might toss on top of everything Prigozhin’s contentious relationship with those officials and commanders, it becomes nearly impossible to foresee anything positive coming the way of those troops in the future. Such will likely remain a constant no matter how things fall, one way or another in the midst of Moscow’s Ukraine enterprise. Memores acti prudentes futuri. (Mindful of what has been done, aware of what will be.)

Prigozhin standing before rows of Wagner Group troops killed in action in Ukraine. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022. In a February 17, 2023 briefing at the White House, US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin began publicly expressing concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice had been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders.

The limited capabilities of Prigozhin’s organization as a military force also adds to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. As with everything else in which they were delinquent or deficient, the leadership of the Russian Federation Armed Forces moved to utilize the Wagner Group as part of their combat operations during the special military operation doubtlessly with preconceptions in their minds via existing intelligence reporting on how the Ukrainians were situated to fight. To name a few of the deficiencies likely imagined in Moscow, it was surely thought to be short of weapons, short of good leadership, and short of well-trained troops. Through international newsmedia reporting, the whole world was led to believe the same. (Irony of ironies, it was the Russian Federation Armed Forces that actually had shortages of everything, including gear, troops, and especially military acumen.) The Wagner Group, loaded with veteran fighters, was expected to have a multiplier effect on the frontline. They made the questionable choice to utilize their own spetsnaz units in the same way.

Carelessly unforeseen and unimagined by the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff was the massive level of assistance that the Ukrainians would eventually receive from the Western powers and other countries. (That matter is examined in some detail in greatcharlie’s November 30, 2022 post entitled “Ruminations on the Russian Federation’s Failure To Close the Door in Western Ukraine to Foreign Military Assistance as Part of Its Invasion Plan”.)  That assistance has made the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Ukrainian Armed Forces), even with its few remaining deficiencies, one of the more formidable military powers in Europe. Far more than just javelin and stinger shoulder fired weapons, small arms, and uniforms, the long list of assistance has included high-tech armaments as Patriot air defense systems and NASAMS (Norwegian (or National) Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) air defense systems, MLRS systems HIMARS systems, mobile and precision long-range artillery, anti-ship rockets, Abrams, Leopard, and Challenger tanks, MiG-29s, F-16s, helicopters, a variety drones, real-time intelligence, and loads of troop training. The Wagner Group could hardly have had a multiplier effect as the one dimensional force that it has been on a battlefield in which its opposition possessed such weapons and capabilities. 

For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated Russian Army trucks was not enough. Additionally, a robust, organic drone capability would be needed particularly for ISR, direct action, and psychological warfare operations to support the more effective planning and execution of missions. Given how the war in Ukraine has progressed, the new ways in which existing technologies are used and new ones are developed and introduced, new efficiencies in warfighting may render these few suggestions outdated. Still, the crux of what is presented here should be readily apparent. (Even the White Russian anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian insurgent groups–the Freedom For Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps used rather pricey Western-made military vehicles to launch their May 2023 raid into Belgorod region of Russian Federation. The vehicles were reportedly supplied by an unknown source. Images appeared on social media allegedly displaying those vehicles. Reporting on the equipment it observed, the Oryx open-source weapons tracking group, stated that the Russian Federation forces captured two International M1224 MaxxPro MRAPs, two 2 M1151 HMMWVs-, and one M1152 HMMWV that was damaged.)

As for procurement, the Wagner Group might have effectively sought out Independent sources of military resources for the company not with regard to its service in Ukraine but more generally to supply itself as a fully autonomous, fully operational professional military contractor. It would be one more step in attenuating its reliance upon the largess of the fickle Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation Armed Forces. All of that being stated, interoperability of armaments procured with those in the Russian Federation inventory would likely be viewed as a requirement by Prigozhin, keeping in mind the possibility of needing to operate in cooperation with the country’s armed forces, especially if asked to do so by Putin. Without variance, any procurement efforts should only be made with a keen eye on working within the parameters of existing international sanctions concerning armaments and the Russian Federation. It would be useful for the Wagner Group to have its own supply of food, water, medical facilities, and petroleum and oil lubricants. As long as these relative inadequacies as well as others persisted, the Wagner Group as noted, would remain poorly situated to optimally serve in support of Russian Federation military operations in Ukraine. As long as they exist, Prigozhin’s demands for greater autonomy will remain something less than legitimate. No statements have been made or actions taken concerning the structure, strength, composition, or rearming of the organization that would indicate the situation would change anytime soon.

It is very possible–actually more likely–that Prigozhin may not have had any interest at all in making great changes to how his organization’s units were structured. To that extent, Prigozhin may have long ago accepted that there would be a strategy-resources mismatch that would prevent the Wagner Group from playing a greater and genuinely effective role in support of Russian Federation military objectives in Ukraine even if it had been given a feerer hand. Given the few actualities presented here and others, one option that evidence suggests clearly arose in the mind of Prigozhin was to mostly withdraw his organization from the field in Ukraine, while keeping a portion available in-country to serve as effectively as possible structured as it is. In that way, Prigozhin could then continue to put the Wagner Group to use elsewhere worldwide where it could serve more effectively and more successfully. Again, that is what Prigozhin appeared to have been doing or at least seemed to be what he wanted to do before the Wagner Group Rebellion “erupted.” (It is not possible for greatcharlie to confirm any of Prigozhin’s burgeoning actions were founded on reasons similar to those expressed here.)

Prigozhin assists his Wagner Group troops load up in trucks moving up to the front in Ukraine. The limited capabilities of his organization as a military force added to his woes. Indeed, the Wagner Group is a one dimensional force: infantry with some potential to conduct special operations given the specialized military training and experience of many of its troops. They possessed diminutive armor, mechanized, and firepower resources. For situations in which the Wagner Group would be asked to assist in Ukraine, at a minimum its units would have been far better off possessing far greater organic fire support for targets its commanders would independently select to support rapid maneuver beyond the front into the opponent’s rear, cutting lines of communication and destroying or disrupting the opponent’s desperately needed combat support and combat service support. A robust organic technical means to increase survivability of its assets would also have been helpful. Rapid transport assets to support a shoot and scoot capability for its firepower assets would also have been required for maneuver as well as ensure survivability. Rolling around in refurbished, dilapidated, second-hand, Russian Army trucks was not enough.

A Few Oscillating Ruminations on Prigozhin 

Serum est cavendi tempus in mediis malis. (The time for caution is too late when we are in the midst of evils.) It might have been plausible enough for many experts and observers to believe it would have been in the best interest of Prigozhin to do the heavy lifting politically to ensure that he and his unit commanders will play a greater role in decisionmaking on how Wagner Group capabilities will be integrated into the future planning of cooperative operations with the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Ukraine. That might have included insisting that the Wagner Group would always have a say on where they would be deployed, missions it would accept, and how they would perform them. In that vein, Prigozhin ostensibly could have made a genuine go at using his considerable political influence with Putin, speak truth to power and so on, and implore him to provide the Wagner Group with a greater say in how it will execute missions in support of Russian Federation Armed Forces. Yet, such a political move would have been tricky or if not a grave blunder. Prigozhin is savvy enough to know that if he forced Putin to choose between Shoigu and himself, he would very well have lost. True, despite the nature of professional relations between Putin and Prigozhin concerning the Wagner Group and military affairs, more important was their personal relationship. That relationship, recall, was at the crux and the apex of Prigozhin’s standing in the regime and in military circles as well as his sense of entitlement to issue criticism of the top military leadership of the Russian Federation and foist his cconvictionsupon everyone on how his organization could best be used in Ukraine.

Putin has shown considerable regard for Prigozhin bbutfor quite some time he has shown even greater regard for Shoigu professionally and personally (privately). Putin at one time would make regular recreational visits to Shoigu’s place of birth, the mystical land of Tuva. He would often invite foreign guests to come along. Putin’s conversations with Shoigu have always been a bit different than those with others. Putin needs a close confidant with a firm grip on the reigns of all matters of or pertaining to defense. In fact, for him, it is a priority. Shoigu is responsible for the management not only of the Russian Federation’s conventional forces but also its all important strategic nuclear triad and all of its supporting military elements. Militarily, a sine qua non for Putin is to possess without doubt, to believe with comfort, that the Russian Federation has the capability to successfully attack and destroy the US and its interests with nuclear weapons.

Omnia sunt hominum tenui pendentia filo; et subito casu, quæ valuere, ruunt. (All things human hang by a slender thread; and that which seemed to stand strong all of a sudden falls and sinks in ruins.) Competition for Putin’s attention surely comes in from all directions, and it is likely greater now than ever. He and his staff seem to be able to handle that. Prigozhin was surely well-aware that Putin really did not need at any point, for any reason, and especially during the flailing special military operation would have been an extra problem that from one angle might simply boil down to him as mere in-house bickering between two “closely ranked” associates. As noted in greatcharlie’s preceding June 1, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: Will the Ukraine War’s Course Stir Putin to Alter His Thinking and Seek Novel Ways Either to Win or to Reach a Peace Deal?”, Prigozhin is conceivably someone well-able to discern how much pressure is being brought to bear on Putin, and see great risk in overburdening him on anything that is not quite an emergency. After all, in the Wagner Group, he has long-demonstrated that effectively dealing with, managing, and understanding strong-spirited and strong-willed men is his forte. A leader must be strong, but also. at the right time, compassionate.

If one might see some plausibility in greatcharlie’s discussion along this line about Prigozhin, one might be been able to accept or at least consider that on his own volition, he very unlikely would have pushed the matter of his struggle with Shoigu and Gerasimov to the point where his forces amassed for days in plain view on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation–even the US had then under surveillance by satellite–would after a very public announcement of rebellion, begin a military drive toward their offices. True, that is exactly how things appeared to have happened to many. Still, it was unlikely the case.

To gnaw a bit further on this point, there can be little doubt in greatcharlie’s mind that Prigozhin has greatly concern himself with what Putin has been facing in these very trying times for the Russian Federation following his decision to intervene in Ukraine. What Putin thinks is of the utmost importance to Prigozhin. For loyal subordinates such as Prigozhin, Putin is the priority. Discussing Prigozhin during an interview, political activist Aleksei Navalny stated: “[Prigozhin] didn’t invent anything, didn’t find buried treasure, didn’t win at the Olympics. He received his prize as thanks for serving the president well.” In the old-fashioned, out-moded sense, Prigozhin is under obligation to Putin. Yet, as a knock on to all of this, greatcharlie will go out on a limb and state that it is very hard to believe that Prigozhin, regardless of any likely sense of obligation, would ever act in a way to bring a shadow upon Putin’s life.

The Platters was one of the most successful vocal groups of the early rock and roll era. Their distinctive sound was a bridge between the pre-rock Tin Pan Alley tradition and the growing new genre. “Only You (And You Alone)” (often shortened to “Only You”) is a pop song composed by Buck Ram. It was originally recorded by The Platters in 1955. In the first verse of this song about true devotion and love which seem to greatcharlie to be befitting Prigozhin’s “frame of mind” on Putin are the words: “Only you can make all this world seem right / Only you can make the darkness bright / Only you and you alone can thrill me like you do / And fill my heart with love for only you.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restaurateur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

One might hazard to suggest that it is Prigozhin’s nourishing side which seeks to sustain his relationship with Putin and give him the support he needs to fortify his regime’s interests abroad. It is the destructive side of Prigozhin that Putin has exploited to achieve the ends of his expressed and secretive foreign and national security policies. Expectedly, some observers might dare say that Prigozhin’s desire to undertake such a morbid venture is part and parcel of some severe pathology. (Of course, similar private military contractors “could hardly thrive” in the socially and technologically advanced industrialized countries of the West.)

Perhaps somewhere at the confluence of the two modes of thinking deep within, there is a conflict. He has stood casually among piles of Wagner Group troops he recruited, many from Russian Federation prisons, piled in bags in storage rooms and laid out in fields. He openly admitted to the loss of 40,000 of those who joined his organization. The potency of it all is readily apparent. Prigozhin is still only human. There must be moments when he wonders what it is all amounting to. The US author Megan Devine provides words that may be apposite in this context in her bestseller, It’s OK That You’re Not OK: Meeting Grief and Loss in a Culture That Doesn’t Understand (Sounds True, 2017): “There are losses that rearrange the world. Deaths that change the way you see everything, grief that tears everything down. Pain that transports you to an entirely different universe, even while everyone else thinks nothing has really changed.”

There are those who would suggest Prigozhin has become bitter and disillusioned about the world around him, the Putin regime; essentially he is feeling jaded. Of course, it was the largesse of Putin’s regime that over the years  allowed him to become a billionaire. On a more specific level, it might be posited that Prigozhin has become jaded with regard to the Ukraine War. There may very well be scope to that idea. He has talked of moving on with his Wagner Group to better things. To that extent there may also be some materiality. It would be questionable to characterize Prigozhin as a cynic who is endlessly expressing his underlying distrust of everything. Yet, far from believing the Russian Federation’s situation in Ukraine cannot become better, Prigozhin appears determined to right wrongs by those he feels have failed Putin and the Russian Federation and snatch victory from the jaws of defeat somehow.

In greatcharlie’s January 31, 2023 post entitled, “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”, it was noted that there have been no reported incidents of members of different Russian Federation units murdering each other on the battlefield. However, it went on further to state: “It would seem joining Wagner Group troops with Russian Army troops would create an elevated risk for a blue-on-blue attacks, as Russian Federation Armed Forces commanders may be willing to do anything to thwart Wagner Group troops from showing-up their own.”

It is a wonder why Prigozhin, himself, has not gone absolutely mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him once the Wagner Group became heavily engaged in the special military operation. Outwardly, Prigozhin is a strong man, with a hardened exterior, who leaves no doubt as to where he stands among other men. Photos of him on the frontlines in Ukraine well-depict that. There is an apparent dichotomy to his persona. It is most apparent with regard to his main business ventures. On the one hand, as aforementioned, he owns a hugely successful catering business and he is a restauranteur. That culinary work more or less has required Prigozhin to display a creative hand with a mind ensuring those who dine on his food receive nourishment of life and a beautiful dining experience. On the other hand, as a private military contractor his work has entailed destroying people and property. 

According to Ukrainian Armed Forces in April 2023, a shoot-out allegedly erupted in the settlement of Stanytsia Luhanska (Luhansk Oblast) between Russian Army soldiers and Wagner Group troops concerning which side is to blame for Russia’s failures amid the invasion of Ukraine. Those reports were not substantiated by Kyiv or confirmed by any sources in Moscow. On June 2, 2023, Prigozhin, writing on Telegram, alleged his troops had discovered 12 locations in rear areas where Russian Federation Defense Ministry officials had planted various explosive devices, including hundreds of anti-tank mines. He further reported that when he inquired with Defense Ministry officials as to why the charges had been set, they explained it was an order from their superiors. Prigozhin stated: “It was not necessary to plant these charges in order to deter the enemy, as it [the area in question] is in the rear area. Therefore, we can assume that these charges were intended to meet the advancing units of Wagner.” Prigozhin noted that none of the charges went off and no one was hurt. Still, he added: “We assume this was an attempt at a public flogging.”

The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering?

If Putin had suddenly spoken out on the matter before the rebellion and in Solomonesque fashion, directed Prigozhin, Shoigu, and Gerasimov to work out an amicable plan to resolve their differences on the sustentation and upkeep of the Wagner Group and present their results to him, the respective loyalty and obedience of all three would have been put to the test. Shoigu and Gerasimov pretty much control the whole show which is essentially the problem to which Prigozhin has been calling attention. Under such a scenario, they would unlikely have been willing to brook any serious discussion of making the Wagner Group a stronger and far greater force. Prigozhin would most likely have remained flawlessly obedient to Putin’s orders to hash it out but deep down would hardly have been interested in putting too much time into butting heads with the leadership of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff. Prigozhin would probably see in advance that the most trying part of such a “confrontation” would be not be contending with the disdain of Shoigu and Gerasimov toward him, but their obsolescent preconceptions of military affairs and military science in general, which he might foresee would doubtlessly have caused them to filter his new ideas for the role of his organization through their archaic and prosaic ones. (It is possible that Shoigu and Gerasimov also had viewed the relationship of the Wagner Group to their organization’s as parasitical. Their actions concerning the combat support and combat service support of Wagner give force to that idea.) The only concession Prigozhin might have made under such circumstances would be to agree to keep his Wagner Group troops in Ukraine for the duration of the conflict and maintain its presence in-country at a certain strength. Shoigu and Gerasimov would have needed to make many concessions to satisfy Prigozhin based on past behavior. Still, even if some allegedly practical plans might be worked out and presented to Putin, in this hypothetical, what would be presented might better reflect what is possible than what will be. Nous sommes reconnaissant de votre considération et croyons que vous aurez du plaisir à être partenaire avec nous. Only the emergence of some exigent circumstance could have had the effect of shifting more power to one side or another on the “control” issue. Not to get too far ahead, but it would seem the Wagner Group Rebellion provided just such an emergency.

Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Supreme Economic Eurasian Council at the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, May 25, 2023. The long absence of some firm public comment from Putin on the feud is deafening and profound. If Putin and Prigozhin have not as yet had an in-depth conversation about these issues, it is very likely that the Russian Federation President nevertheless has been giving his attention to the matter “covertly”–with all that imaginably would entail–for some time. Perchance Putin’s refusal or delay to take swift and decisive action on the discordance between Prigozhin and the duo, Shoigu and Gerasimov–despite how relatively noisy Prigozhin became and how aggressively Shoigu and Gerasimov behaved–seemed to provide evidence of the emergence of some new aspect of his character: Putin, the long-suffering? Perhaps something deeper was going in his remarkable mind.

Fun and Games, Quicks and Aberrations

As alluded to earlier, Prigozhin’s wailing has not solely been out of concern for his troops and troops in the Russian Federation Armed Forces. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out. 

Prigozhin’s shocking talk of a possible revolution expressed in early June 2023 were more than likely than not intended scare stories aimed at rattling many elites of the Russian Federation who find him to be anathema and not a forewarning of things to come. Perhaps making such nettlesome utterances helps to pass the time for those at the top of the food chain in Moscow. Prigozhin, himself, has made his thoughts on a mutual dislike between him and Russian elites living in the luxurious Moscow suburb of Rublyovka very public. Laughing off aforementioned reports that he had offered to reveal Russian troop positions to Ukrainian military intelligence in exchange for Kyiv’s withdrawal from Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated in an audio message posted on Telegram: “People from Rublyovka” could be behind the allegations.” He went on to state in his unique style: “Of course they will pour as much s*** on me as they can.” La leçon d’elegance de Yevgeny Prigozhin.

If Prigozhin’s original comments concerning a possible revolution in the Russian Federation actually was a manifestation of his brand of acidulous humor directed at antagonizing political and business elite at home, surely they were not appreciated among leaders of the FSB, especially since they came just before raids were launched along the Russian Federation’s borders by anti-Putin, pro-Ukrainian, ethnic-Russian groups. The eyes of FSB officials should have become strained after watching Prigozhin’s every more at that point. Given their reaction to events concerning the Wagner Group later in June, they would seem to have thrown little more than a few stray glances his way.

Intriguingly, the ultranationalist political figure Igor Girkin has alleged via a string of videos that Prigozhin’s public pronouncements concerning the military campaign in Ukraine as merely “a project” created by an influential group within Putin’s inner circle. Girkin, known among associates by the cognomen “Strelkov” (Shooter) is an anti-semite, and is likely unstable. He is a former officer in Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU. Girkin gained notice as an operative behind the Russian Federation’s 2014 invasion of Crimea. In the aftermath of the invasion, he became a prominent player in the effort to establish Nova Rossiya (New Russia) on the sovereign territory of Ukraine stretching from Kharkiv to Odessa. Girkin insists Prigozhin efforts are backed by Sergey Kiriyenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the President of the Russian Federation, who Putin has appointed to oversee the occupied Ukrainian lands. Girkin has been quoted as saying: “Kiriyenko is openly at war with Shoigu, which is why Prigozhin attacks the Defense Ministry.” To that extent, Girkin claims Prigozhin is “not just a man whose eyes were suddenly opened and began speaking the truth.”

Girkin asserts further that “Kiriyenko is backed by the Kovalchuk brothers, people who are part of the President’s inner circle.” Yury Kovalchuk is the chairman and the largest shareholder of Rossiya Bank. According to the Ukrainian newspaper Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), together with his brother Mikhail Kovalchuk, as well as Mikhail Mishustin, chairman of the government of the Russian Federation, Andriy Turchak, the Secretary of the General Council of United Russia–Putin’s political party, Prigozhin, and others, he formed the influential Kovalchuk-Kiriyenko group.

It is important to note that Girkin emphasizes that Prigozhin is “not Russian by nationality,” more than insinuating that just as the “majority of Bolsheviks,” he is of Jewish origin and thereby poses a considerable threat to Russia. Ultimately, Girkin and all others similar to him–and there are many similar to him in the Russian Federation–are political figures that Putin must manage, not Prigozhin. Girkin, clearly a creature of the worst kind from the Russian Federation’s Intelligence Community, appears vindictive, passionate, ill-balanced, jealous, envious. The intelligence services of many countries–especially those in the US–have their fair share of Girkins. The utmost should be done to guard against them. That is not always the case: disco inferno!

Interestingly, so intense and focused had been the internecine quarreling between elites in Moscow that rarely heard publicly from them at the time was that old chestnut that the invisible hand of the US and its Western alter egos is behind all that has gone wrong for the Russian Federation and that is all part of a long-term plan destroy their country.

Prigozhin speaking on his media service channel on Telegram. One might speculate that Prigozhin has been vocalizing a sense of disappointment quietly and sometimes not so quietly felt among many other elites and members of Putin’s inner circle at how remarkably bad the Russian Federation Defense Ministry and the Russian Federation General Staff have served their President and their country. In effect, he may have taken on the job of being a figurative release valve for pent up steam building within many significant individuals in his country. If taking on that sort of role was not part of some plan, it appears to be how things have turned out.

Discussion will be extended in Part 2, to be published later.

Commentary: Ruminations on Putin’s Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, His Arrest Warrant, and Diplomacy with Moscow

Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a concert dedicated to Russian servicemen taking part in the military operation in Ukraine on the eve of Defender of Fatherland Day at the Luzhniki Stadium in Moscow, February 22, 2023. There was surely great contrast between the ebullience displayed by Putin at the patriotic event and his thoughts and feelings behind the scenes about what his military commanders are doing in Ukraine and what he can expect from them as the war continues. Many decisions and actions made by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance. In examining this issue, greatcharlie seeks to reinforce somewhat likely conclusions by foreign and national security policy bureaucracies in the US and around the world not just concerning Putin’s control of Russian Federation Armed Forces, and to some degree, his security services as well, but also his culpability for crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as soldiers. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Many decisions and actions taken by Russian Federation commanders in Ukraine have taken the special military operation in a direction in considerable variance with Putin’s albeit misconceived original concept of taking control of the country without stirring much resistance, a perspective put in plain view during his February 24, 2022 address, broadcasted just as the Spetsial’noy Voyennoy Operatsii (Special Military Operation) began. With no pretension intended, greatcharlie states the Russian Federation’s handling of its wrongful invasion at all levels has been deplorable. What arouses an interest at this juncture has been Putin’s lack of control over many “big things” during the massive enterprise. Within the boundaries of its faculty, here greatcharlie humbly provides a few insights on how many things have gone wrong for Putin, the colossal issues that now beset him concerning the war, how he might seek to gain firmer control of the situation, and what that might mean going forward. Hopefully, greatcharlie provides new perspectives not just concerning Putin’s control of the Vooruzhonnije Síly Rossíyskoj Federátsii (the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Russian Federation Armed Forces), and to some degree, his security services, but also his culpability for heinous crimes committed against innocent Ukrainian civilians as well as unarmed soldiers. An historic parallel to his lack of control over events in the field is presented. Lessons he has likely learned from the Ukrainian experience are hypothsized and through exploring those lessons a discussion on why that raises the bar in terms of the requirements for “safely” managing diplomacy with him and shaping the overall outcome of the Ukraine tragedy.

Xenophon of Athens (c. 430 BC–354 BC) was an Ancient Greek military leader, philosopher, and historian, born in Athens. At the age of 30, Xenophon led one of the largest Greek mercenary armies of the Achaemenid Empire, the Ten Thousand, that famously attempted to seize Babylon but failed in 401 BC. As a writer, one of his works was Cynegeticus, usually translated as On Hunting or Hunting with Dogs. In discussing his wish that readers would find value in his treatise, Xenophon writes a passage which interestingly parallels greatcharlie’s desires regarding this essay. He states: ψέγουσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ τοὺς νῦν σοφιστὰς καὶ οὐ τοὺς φιλοσόφους, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασι σοφίζονται, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς νοήμασιν. οὐ λανθάνει δέ με ὅτι τὰ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἑξῆς γεγραμμένα φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν τοιούτων οὐ καλῶς οὐδ᾽ ἑξῆς γεγράφθαι: ῥᾴδιον γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς τὸ ταχὺ μὴ ὀρθῶς μέμψασθαι:καίτοι γέγραπταί γε οὕτως, ἵνα ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καὶ μὴ σοφιστικοὺς ποιῇ ἀλλὰ σοφοὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς: οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν αὐτὰ βούλομαι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶναι χρήσιμα, ἵνα ἀνεξέλεγκτα ᾖ εἰς ἀεί. (Many others besides myself blame the sophists of our generation—philosophers I will not call them —because the wisdom they profess consists of words and not of thoughts. I am well aware that someone, perhaps one of this set, will say that what is well and methodically written is not well and methodically written—for hasty and false censure will come easily to them. But my aim in writing has been to produce sound work that will make men not wiseacres, but wise and good. For I wish my work not to seem useful, but to be so, that it may stand for all time unrefuted.) (Regarding the presentation of the Greek text, greatcharlie asks its readers to kindly pardon its indulgence. It is presented here in “private” acknowledgement and celebration of someone of the utmost importance who will begin her undergraduate studies in the Classics in the Fall of 2023!)

I. The Magnitude of the Ukraine Disaster Begins to Take Form within Putin 

Stepping into the realm of conjecture, greatcharlie can imagine Putin, at the time of his decision to launch the special military operation was girded by the belief that his extreme action was necessary to secure a spiritual victory for mankind over the ugly evil of Nazism. However, Putin at the time of this writing may see the situation a bit differently. Clearly, he has plunged his country and the world in a challenging situation by acting on what he doubtlessly would likely still call “certainties” concerning Ukraine, NATO Expansion, and Western threat to the Russian Federation.

Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them.

Putin attending a wreath-laying ceremony at the eternal flame in the Hall of Military Glory at the Battle of Stalingrad Museum, Volgograd, February 2, 2023. Putin has a history of putting himself and the Russian Federation in controversial situations on the international scene. As a political leader who has been an actor on the world stage longer than most, he has managed to use his skill at manipulating others and many a dodge to extricate himself and the Russian Federation in time and go at the world again on another day. Now it really appears that he has worked himself into a square corner. Despite a number of generous analyses made public in the West that suggest the Russian Federation can turn things around, winning the Ukraine War given the current level of thinking among commanders of the Russian Federation Armed Forces appears impossible. There may very well be authentic solutions, but they will unlikely see them..

II. Putin’s Actual Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces

When there are missing pieces among facts collected in an investigation, a reliable imagination can be very useful. One can imagine what might be happening with another party. That supposition could become a working hypothesis. One then can act upon it, and if lucky, the investment in time and energy will prove justifiable. As alluded to earlier, the received wisdom among many Western military analysts and Russia scholars is that The Kremlin runs the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and in their view “today the Kremlin means Putin.” His military advisers are Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov. Evidence offered of his control of the armed forces is the fact that “both generals serve “entirely at the pleasure of Putin” and “the respective predecessor of each was summarily dismissed.” One steps out on an attenuated thread when standing behind such evidence to support arguments regarding Putin’s control of the military. What may be perceived as simple truth, in reality is not so simple.

Over the two plus decades of Putin’s leadership, the record shows that unethical and outright criminal behavior can surely be well concealed under the Russian Federation government system. Certainly long before, in the erstwhile Soviet system, corruption in the armed forces was endemic and lucrative enough for those senior commanders engaged in such who would quietly “grease the palms” of superiors and who were not caught. The sales of military equipment to black marketers was the commonplace betrayal of some commanders. Another example that remains in greatcharlie’s memory from the days of the Cold War was learning that fighter pilots would pay commanders in order to serve in certain top tier squadrons. The military is not the only foreign and national security bureaucracy ham-strung and suffering from corruption. Unimaginable but true, even the chief of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB Alexander Borrnikov, an irreplaceable member of Putin’s piratical crew, was shrewdly deceived by subordinates in the FSB 5th Department foreign intelligence service before the special military operation began. (The matter is discussed in further detail later in this essay. SEE greatcharlie’s April 30, 2022 post entitled “Brief Meditations on the Role of Deception, Deceit, and Delinquency in the Planning, Preparations, and Prosecution of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine” for other insights shared on the matter.)

If one It has been suggested by some experrs that in Ukraine, Putin by his own hand destroyed the armed forces that built up over two decades. Looking at this supposition open-mindedly, one might added that if that is so, he certainly did not do it deliberately. However,,it is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was at the hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did a superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind. On February 24, 2022, they rolled the dice and poured their troops into Ukraine as ordered, hoping somehow that things might fall into place. Things did not go their way. Putin most likely had no idea how much damage was being done by Shoigu and Gerasimov. He could hardly admit even now that he did not know. If he did not need them now as a buffer between himself all the many failures militarily, and all the political drama, and if he had anyone else tied as closely to him that he knew as well and could turn, Putin would have likely sent them to higher service already, as is the pattern. If the Ukraine War were to end in the Russian Federation’s favor, an unlikely outcome, perhaps the two general might face trying times. Putin does not forget or forgive such betrayals. He is not the understanding type.

If one might suggest that it was all a deliberate act of subversion by one or both of the generals, the question would be to what end: cui bono? The most likely immediate guess of those eager to see regime change of any kind in the Russian Federation might be that the plan was to set up Putin in order to foster his overthrow or elimination and their rise to power. Yet, both Shoigu and Gerasimov, given all of the supportive evidence publicly available on their respective atrocious management of two huge organizations, would have a better chance of achieving a decisive victory over Ukraine than controlling the Russian Federation with a modicum of competence. Unless megalomania and self-deception are controlling elements to an enormous degree in the respective thinking of both generals, they are surely aware that ruling the Russian people would be out of their sphere, beyond their faculties.

Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness, but given that Shoigu and Gerasimov are psychologically able to remain standing flat-footed on the ground and stare calmly at a military disaster of such magnitude for their country’s armed forces, another possibility not to consider lightly is that either one or both may be psychologically unstable. This averment shall be left for mental health professionals and behavioral scientists to parse out in the round.

Ministr Oborony Rossijskoj Federacii (Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation) Russian Army General Sergei Shoigu (left) and Chief of General’nyy shtab Vooruzhonnykh sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), Russian Army General Valery Gerasimov (right). It is greatcharlie’s postulation, delicately put, that long before Ukraine was invaded, the real harm done to Russian Federation Armed Forces was atbthe hands of his trusted chief military advisers, Shoigu and Gerasimov. Shoigu and Gerasimov became a team in November 2012. They did an superb job of making the Russian Federation Armed Forces look good but had to know they were not really good at all. Thus, their claims for years that the Russian Federation Armed Forces conventional forces were a hard-hitting, highly-mobile, terrifying, sort of juggernaut, were more hyperbole than anything else. They seemed to have been quite willing to live with that. If the Russian Federation Armed Forces were called into action on some large scale–something they probably believed was unlikely–the two commanders likely decided long ago to just play it out. Dereliction of duty is a phrase that comes to mind.

A. Delegation and Disappointment

Further to the preceding point, what did not serve Putin well was any thought that he could delegate matters concerning the special military operation that he typically would have overburdened himself with in the past. It appears to have been a matter of misplaced trust, which is very unusual for Putin. As an executive he made the proper management decision, but given the nature of his regime and its players, it was the wrong choice, at the wrong time, anc the wrong issue to do any delegating over. If Putin had been truly In control of the facts and the moving pieces, greatcharlie goes out on a limb to say he probably would have never gone into Ukraine and as it was, encountered considerable, unexpected resistance or just bad luck. However, if he would have still decided to go in knowing what he knows now, he would very likely have done his homework and to the very best of his ability developed real answers to resolve prospective problems having imagined more than enough possible failures and mishaps that could derail his plans and having most likely rehearsed over and over in his mind more than one way to resolve them. The situation for the Russian Federation Armed Forces would doubtlessly look a lot different than it does now. Of course, none of that happened.

Power and control are often limited for political authorities, even autocrats, during conventional military operations. That lack of control–along with US experience in Vietnam– is what in part inspired the US Congress to pass the War Powers Act in 1973. Surely, laid bare in Ukraine for Putin is his own lack of control  Certainly many may disagree with this assessment, but those who insist that Putin directly controlled events in Ukraine, even war crimes committed, should look more directly at just how poorly he has controlled aspects of his special military operation. On the four occasions presented here, Putin’s lack of control was self-evident.

1. The First Big Let Down: Russian Federation Intelligence on Ukraine

Putin is perhaps the most prominent Russian intelligence doyen in the Russian Federation. Far more than just being familiar with the workings of Russian’s intelligence services, in the Soviet Union’s Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB, and achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. (Some commentators and analysts prefer to emphasize that his behavior is reflective of the nature of that erstwhile organization’s cold-blooded reputation, brutish methods, and the sinister mindset of its leadership.) In 1998, President Boris Yeltsin appointed him as director of the FSB, during which time he reorganized it and dismissed several top personnel. Before becoming Russian Federation President, Putin served as Yeltsin’s Secretary of Sovet bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii (the Security Council of the Russian Federation) or national security adviser. Having those experiences, knowing that problems can exist not only with the behavior of personnel as well as the leadership of the intelligence services, he should have known that reporting from them must be scrutinized. In a very perplexing way, Putin felt confident enough to appeal to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in his February 24, 2022 broadcast announcing the start of the special military operation. Putin said: “I would also like to address the military personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Comrade officers! Your fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers did not fight the Nazi occupiers and did not defend our common Motherland to allow today’s neo-Nazis to seize power in Ukraine. You swore the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people and not to the junta, the people’s adversary which is plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people.” Putin continued: “I urge you to refuse to carry out their criminal orders. I urge you to immediately lay down arms and go home. I will explain what this means: the military personnel of the Ukrainian army who do this will be able to freely leave the zone of hostilities and return to their families.” Lastly, he stated: “I want to emphasize again that all responsibility for the possible bloodshed will lie fully and wholly with the ruling Ukrainian regime.”

 As the story goes, the now former head of FSB foreign intelligence service, the organization’s 5th service, Sergey Beseda and his deputy as well as head of the operational information department, Anatoly Bolyukh, reportedly had cooked up intelligence suggesting that Ukraine was weak, riddled with neo-Nazi groups, and would give up easily if attacked. The 5th Service is a division that was established in 1998, when Putin was director of the FSB, to carry out operations in the countries that were formerly republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union. Its mission was to help ensure those countries remained within Russia’s orbit. Beseda and Boyuhk were apparently among those in the intelligence services who gambled that there would not be an invasion and lost. Whatever Putin’s inner voice might have been saying about what he was being told about Ukraine, he closed his ear to it. Putin was apparently so convinced by reporting that Ukrainians were so dissatisfied with the leadership in Kyiv ready to welcome regime change, he attempted to appeal to members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to acquiesce to invading Russian Federation forces. Putin seemed to proceed, accepting whatever was handed to him with a blindness that bordered on madness to self-interest and to the interest of the Russian Federation. Considering how Putin spoke so boldly in his broadcast to the Zbrojni syly Ukrayiny (Armed Forces of Ukraine, hereinafter referred to as the Ukrainian Armed Forces) audaciously suggesting they turn on their government, If the whole matter were not so grave, it could be viewed as Armed Forces comical.

Putin (center) Shoigu (left) and Gerasimov (right) at military exercises 2022. Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin, himself, might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was essentially recognized as a master stroke of military genius. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them.

2. A Study in Contrasts: Acumen Displayed in Zapad, Vostok, and Other Military Exercises and Poor Performance on the Battlefield

Through Zapad, Vostok, and other large scale military exercises by the Russian Federation Armed Forces, observers as Putin might have witnessed how its commanders emphasizing the use of superior firepower, would be able to capture large swaths of territory and massing on decisive points, to include some large cities, in a formidable manner. Being a bit more specific, through the exercises, Russian Federation commanders displayed an amazing awareness of what was occurring in their battle space, foresight, and agility. They could rapidly maneuver their units to block in one place, counterattack in another, and withdraw their units when conditions were most favorable. Moreover, through the exercises, one would have been led to believe that Russian Federation commanders could act fast and soundly through their system of command, control, and communications. The choice to organize combat forces under the concept of the Combined Arms Army, comprised of brigades, divisions, and supporting units that are assigned by the Military District, was a master stroke. No one could possibly doubt, at least in the Russian Federation, Thanks to the appropriation of superb military hardware by the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation forces would be able to relentlessly gain ground and retain the initiative in the face of whatever the US and its NATO allies might throw at them. 

Despite what may have been choreographed to display a well-trained, well-equipped war machine for Putin’s unknowing eyes, the walls fell down in Ukraine. A poor strategy, faulty planning of the military operation, leaving the door open to supply and resupply of arms, equipment and sustenance, failure to decisively conquer by moving up the River Dnieper to cut off the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the East, reinforcing the failed operations in the Donbas, in part resulted in a stalled invasion and the epic slaughter of a modern army. Putin counted upon commanders with limited combat experience and no experience who more than anything else displayed negligence, inattentiveness to details large and small, delinquencies, and deficiencies. The conquest of Ukraine was something Russian forces could not have accomplished, factoring in the tenacity and will of Ukrainian forces, even on their best day or should have even contemplated. As for the concept of the Combined Arms Army, the formations raised and operated under it were as empty with troops as the concept was with promise.

3, Putin’s Faith in Spetsnaz: “A Weapon Is Only as the Man Who Wields It”

Putin has never hidden his admiration for Russian Federation Special Operations Forces. In foreign and national security policy approaches taken by the Russian Federation, special operations forces have been the go-to hammer to swing when the application of force was deemed required by the Kremlin. Such has also been the case with regard to domestic threats, particularly emanating from the Caucasus. Outside of government structures, Putin’s admiration for commando-type formations has likely played a role in his full acceptance and regular utilization of professional military contractors as the Wagner Group which are teaming with erstwhile spetsnaz members. In the opening days of the special military operation, Putin put his appreciation for the Russian Federation’s special operations forces on display by taking time on  February 27, 2022 to broadcast a message congratulating active military personnel and veterans of their formations on their professional holiday, “Special Operations Forces Day”. More than just a canned speech, Putin laid his heart out bare by stating: “You have demonstrated many times that you are prepared to act with the utmost efficiency and under the harshest conditions to precisely and professionally complete the most difficult and demanding missions. You always perform your military duty to protect your native country and citizens with honor and protect Russia’s national interests. The heroic traditions of the special forces find their roots in the centuries-long history of our army. They were fortified during the Great Patriotic War, matured and grew even stronger in Afghanistan and many hotbeds, as well as during the elimination of terrorists gangs both in the North Caucasus and in Syria. Putin said further: “I know that you undergo exactly this kind of training -comprehensive, all-encompassing and intensive, a real school of warfare. You strive to follow the best paragons of courage and bravery, true patriotism, and you set an example for new generations of defenders of the Fatherland and pass on your experience to young servicemen.” Very likely with reference to former spetsnaz serving in the Wagner Group, Putin remarked: “I want to thank the command and the personnel of the special operations forces as well as special forces veterans for their loyalty to the oath, for their impeccable service to the people of Russia and our great Motherland. My special appreciation goes to those who are performing their duty in the special operation to render assistance to the people’s republics of Donbass.”

Putin’s faith in the spetsnaz to carry out their duties to their utmost abilities was warranted, but as is the same with special operations soldiers in every country, they were only human and could only do so much. Placing them with their exquisite military capabilities in stealthy hit-and-run direct actions, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, and covert operations, under the control of Russian Federation commanders who were killing off their own conventional troops due a lack of so many necessary attributes for competent, military command on the present-day battlefield, did not help. Among the classified US national security materials leaked online through the messaging platform in March 2023 were assessments of officials within the foreign and national security bureaucracies on the strength and capabilities of Russian Federation spetsnaz forces. According to those findings, there was such an overreliance on the specialized units on the frontlines that they consequently suffered atrocious losses. Behind the decision to use spetsnaz in such a role purportedly was skepticism among Russian Federation commanders that their conventional forces’ abilities could achieve objectives set in the invasion plans. Leaked documents also reportedly indicate US officials believe the high casualties of these units has rendered them less effective not only in Ukraine but also in other parts of the world where Russian Federation forces operate. Evidence of the losses in the spetsnaz units apparently was provided by satellite imagery featured among the leaked materials. Before-and-after imagery of the 22nd Separate Spetsnaz Brigade’s base in southern Russia allegedly revealed that “all but one of five Russian Federation Separate Spetsnaz Brigades that returned from combat operations in Ukraine in late summer 2022 suffered significant losses.” Materials citing intelligence intercepts, assess the 346th brigade “lost nearly the entire brigade with only 125 personnel active out of 900 deployed.” US intelligence analysts, who monitored the return of spetsnaz units to their respective bases, believe that extremely high losses in the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment “could explain why there is no clear [intelligence] signature of their return to garrison.” The loss of so many among the spetsnaz very likely came as a shock to Putin.

4. Hoping the Wagner Group Will Shift the Fight Moscow’s Way

As aforementioned, the Wagner Group is a private military contractor based in the Russian Federation. Although private military companies are not permitted under law in the Russian Federation, they were endorsed in April 2012 by none other than Putin, then Russian Federation Prime Minister during an address to the State Duma. The Wagner Group is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin is  an intriguing figure in his own right, and holds a level of standing with Putin which speaks volumes on its own. Prigozhin is widely known by the sobriquet “Putin’s chef” because of his catering businesses that hosted dinners which Putin attended with foreign dignitaries, The Wagner Group has engaged in action externally in support of the Russian Federation’s overt and covert foreign and national security objectives. The Wagner Group is known to have deployed its units in the War in Donbas (2014–2022); Syrian Civil War, (2015–2016); the South Sudanese Civil War (2013-2020); the Central African Republic Civil War (2013-2014); the Second Libyan Civil War (2014-2020); the Sudanese Revolution (2018-2019); Venezuelan presidential crisis (2019-2023); and the Mali War (2012-present). Mentioned earlier was also that fact that Wagner Group fighters are typically retired regular Russian Federation Armed Forces servicemen–veterans. They are aged between 35 and 55. Many served in the Russian Federation’s spetsnaz units, which as noted earlier, are near and dear to Putin’s heart. From the moment the situation went sour in Ukraine, Russian Federation commanders surely recognized that they would either need to find a way to save themselves or hope against hope an ally might come to their rescue. The Wagner Group, already in Ukraine, went in with greater numbers, providing additional strength and combat power on the battlefield that the Russian Federation Armed Forces could not muster. It is widely known that since July 2022, Prigozhin, has been recruiting inmates from Russian Federation prisons to increase the organization’s strength. To an extent, Wagner Group troops were supposed to be the saving grace of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 

However, it was not long before everyone realized that the Wagner Group’s troops were caught in that same circumstance as their Russian Federation Armed Forces “comrades”. That could only have been expected as the same senior Russian Federation commanders that put their troops in a predicament, controlled the placement and movements of Wagner Group troops. According to the best statistics available to greatcharlie, since April 2022 an estimated 10,000 and 20,000 mercenaries were deployed to Ukraine by the Russian Federation Armed Force, to include the Wagner Group troops in the offensive in the Donbas. As alluded to earlier, to increase the organization’s strength even further, new Wagner Group units composed mainly with violent convicts from prisons–gangsters, murderers, and rapists, were formed. However, it is those Wagner Group “penal units” in particular that have suffered high-profile casualties. According to the US, out of an initial force of nearly 50,000 Wagner Group troops, including 40,000 recruited convicts, more than 4,100 have been killed in action, and 10,000 have been wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December 2022 near Bakhmut.

In a February 17, 2023 briefing White House National Security Council (NSC) spokesman John Kirby told reporters that the Wagner Group has suffered more than 30,000 casualties since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with about 9,000 of those fighters killed in action. He further explained the US estimates that 90% of Wagner Group troops killed in Ukraine since December were convict recruits. Prigozhin has expressed concern that his troops’ display of courage, obedience to authority and acts of sacrifice have been looked upon with indifference by Russian Army commanders. Given the backgrounds of the Wagner Group prison recruits, the common wisdom is that they are desensitized to violence. They are depicted as fighting as if they have nothing left to lose. From the lens of the Kremlin, things certainly did not work out the way they were supposed to. Surely, Putin maybe somewhat concerned that the Wagner Group’s losses may eventually become so great that the organization would not be available to handle other foreign and national security policy matters for some time to come. In a pinch, perhaps the Wagner Group could recruit from among special operations veterans who served in the FSB and Ministestvo po Delam Grazhdanskoy Oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiyam i Likvidtsil Posledstviy Bedstviy (Ministry of the Russian Federation for Affairs for Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters Emergency Situations also known as the Ministry for Emergency Situations) or EMERCOM, but those former operators would for the most part lack the same level of battlefield experience spetsnaz from the Russian Federation Armed Forces lost in Ukraine possessed.

The full list of disappointments for Putin of or pertaining to the Ukraine enterprise is frightfully long and would overload and overwhelm this essay if included. Though, as aforementioned, theories of Putin’s control over the Russian Federation Armed Forces are accepted, it appears that nearly every theory confirming his alleged control cannot figuratively hold water.

Putin (left) and Gerasimov (right) holding a press conference following announcement that Gerasimov had become overall Russian Federation commander in Ukraine. Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

B. The Power to Hire and Fire Generals: What is It Worth?

Even if military analysts and Russia scholars in the West are not aware of it, Putin surely is aware that not even the threat or dismissal or assassination can coax brilliance on the battlefield from Russian Federation commanders who simply lack the faculty to do anything that could dramatically change the situation in Ukraine in Russia’s favor. Being able to fire generals that disappoint him may have confirmed that he has authority over the Russian Federation Armed Forces, but it hardly confirmed that he had absolute control of its commanders actions. Autocrats have limitations, too!

1. Putin Sacked a Slew of Generals in May 2022

Based on information made public by the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, on May 19, 2022, Putin fired two senior commanders Lieutenant General Serhiy Kisel, who had commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, and Vice Admiral Igor Osipov of the Black Sea Fleet. Osipov was reportedly fired following the sinking of the Russian flagship Moskva, which was a major embarrassment to the Russian Federation Armed Forces. The Moscow-based media group, RBCreported on June 1, 2022, that on May 30, 2022, Putin issued a decree dismissing senior commanders of the security services. The list of those removed from their posts included: Major General of Police Vasily Kukushkin, who was head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Vladimir region; Major General Alexander Laas, deputy head of the Main Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Altai Territory; and, Major General Andrey Lipilin, head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the Yaroslavl Region. Major General Alexander Udovenko of the Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Major General Yuri Instrankin, deputy head of the Department for Logistics and Medical Support of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, were also among the dismissed. Additionally, Putin reportedly fired Police Colonel Emil Musin, who was the first deputy head of the Forensic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

2. Putin Fired 22 Russian Army Generals in August 2022

The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence reported that General-Colonel Aleksandr Zhuravlev, who headed Russia’s Western Military District since 2018 had been sacked. it was at that time there were the rather quiet, yet widely suspected firings of General Aleksandr Dvornikov, who was the senior but not overall command of all of Russian Federation’s operations in Ukraine and General Gennady Valeryevich Zhidko, who commanded the Southern forces fighting in Ukraine. US officials estimated at the time of these dismissals that more than 75,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured, which represented more than 50% of the number of troops Russia initially deployed in  the special military operation. According to the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, at least 10 generals were among those killed.

3. Putin Fires Russian Army Generals for Failed Response to the Ukrainian Counteroffensive in September 2022

Based on information from Ukrainian Defense Intelligence, the Telegraph reported on September 12, 2022 that Putin fired Lieutenant General Roman Berdnikov, who commanded Russian Federation forces in the Donbas or Western Grouping. Berdnikov was held responsible for the chaos that ensued within Russian lines after Ukrainian troops recaptured swathes of territory in a recent offensive in the east.

4. Putin Replaces Overall Commander in Ukraine in January 2023 and Fires Russian Army General for Vuhledar Fiasco in March 2023

A shift in command well-known among those following events in the Ukraine War was the replacement of Russian Air Force General Sergei Surovikin by Gerasimov as overall commander of the Russian Federation’s intervention in Ukraine. In a January 11, 2023 statement from the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, it was explained that Gerasimov’s appointment constituted a “raising of the status of the leadership” of the military force in Ukraine and was implemented to “improve the quality . . . and effectiveness of the management of Russian forces”. On or just before March 26, 2023, Colonel General Rustam Muradov, who commanded Russia’s Eastern Military District, and was placed in charge of leading an offensive in the Ukrainian city of Vuhledar, in the eastern Donbas region, had been removed from his post. Muradov had previously come under criticism for his failure in Vuhledar from Prigozhin who believed its capture was possible and may have had the effect of turning the war in Moscow’s favor. The Moscow Times, described as an independent English- and Russian-language online newspaper with offices in Amsterdam that is currently outlawed in Russia, also reported that Muradov had been suspended, One of the Moscow Times’ sources told the online daily, “Muradov was suspended because he was a crazy idiot who could command soldiers to die. Many complained about him.”

In February 2023, Muradov attacked Vuhledar by sending his soldiers into minefields, right under the artillery fire of the Ukrainians. As a consequence of his actions, reportedly two elite Russian Naval Infantry brigades, one presumed to be the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade, and 103 pieces of equipment were reportedly lost in just three days. Interestingly, the Institute for the Study of War, a think tank based in Washington, D.C. reported in a March 9, 2023 assessment of the Ukraine War that Shoigu ordered Muradov to take Vuhledar “at any cost” in order “to settle widespread criticism within the Russian Ministry of Defense about the lack of progress and significant losses in the area.”

As the record indicates, on every occasion when Putin, usually via his Defense Minister, sacked a group of generals who underperformed, a month or a couple of months later, he was dismissing another group for similar, if not parallel failures. Sacking a general, more than just a punishment, is a very strong form of public embarrassment. By now, everyone interested in Putin has recognized that he rarely reverses his own decisions. (If that were the case, he surely would have reversed his decision to invade Ukraine. Declaring success early on and offering purported measurables among other things would have been the most likely off ramp.) Firing generals from commands whose records he doubtlessly reviewed and gave ultimate approval for top assignments unlikely came easy for him. Perhaps Putin may even be concerned that it reveals that he is not the best judge of people, that he has lost his touch, and worst of all, it confirms for some that he is not infallible. His mistakes with the military have very noticeably begun to pile up. Interestingly, despite being punished, the generals who were sacked will at least live to see another day. The soldiers, some incredibly young, whose lives they carelessly wasted in Ukraine will not have that chance.

There is very likely a need at this point to remind some readers that greatcharlie does not seek to offer anything that might in the slightest way support or provide an apology, legal advice, or worst, a legal defense, for Putin over war crimes committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. Thoee among greatcharlie’s readers who may feel anything of the kind is being offered here to Putin, then it is respectfully suggested they stop reading the commentary at this point for it would surely be unreasonable, unconstructuve to continue with such colored perspective. Again, the purpose of this commentary is to suggest to any Western foreign and national security policymakers and decisionmakers ways to take a broader view on Putin’s decisionmaking regarding the Ukraine issue to create opportunities for fruitful diplomacy with the Russian Federation leader despite the challenging circumstances that exist presently.

Alexander Gardiner’s famous photograph of US President Abraham Lincoln, and Union Army Major General George McClellan, Commander of the Army of the Potomac (right) and Allan Pinkerton (left) at Antietam, Maryland, October 3, 1862. Although many readers, particularly in the US, both technically and perhaps more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America.

C. Another Leader Who Struggled To Control His Commanders During Wartime

Although many readers, particularly in the US both technically, and more so emotionally, may be unwilling to accept the following as a firm point of comparison, greatcharlie suggests that they consider Putin’s difficulties with the Russian Federation Armed Forces and how US President Abraham Lincoln tried earnestly to place strictures on the behavior of Union Army forces and struggled to control Union Army commanders during the US Civil War (April 12, 1861 to April 9, 1865). On April 24, 1863, Lincoln signed General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field which was more famously known as the Lieber Code. The order, more specifically governed the wartime conduct of the Union Army by defining and describing command responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the military responsibilities of the Union Army soldier fighting against the Confederate States of America. The author of the military law was jurist Franz Lieber, a German lawyer, political philosopher, and combat veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. Lieber essentially modernized the military law of the 1806 Articles of War to ensure the Union Army could prosecute its war against the Confederate States of America with legitimacy.

However, despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the #humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

In fairness to Sherman, it must be noted that he acted in accord with the concept and intent of Lincoln’s Lieber Code when he gave explicit instructions to his troops regarding their conduct while on their march through Georgia, but there were a few deviations. In his Special Field Order No. 120, Sherman out of necessity encouraged foraging and the confiscation of livestock as he left his Army Group’s supply lines behind to travel so deep, so fast, and so furiously into Georgia. Home invasions were off limits. However, if antagonized by Confederate Army soldiers, Union Army officers were granted permission to destroy private and industrial property. Additionally, the field order permitted able-bodied Black laborers to join the march, but commanding officers were instructed to prioritize the distribution of supplies for soldiers of their Army Group. The majority of Union Army soldiers complied with Field Order No. 120, but some dubbed “bummers” roamed the countryside intentionally terrorizing civilians and looting. Although bummers were technically engaging in forbidden activities, the overall psychological impact of their actions on the local population was in sync with the purpose of the march. The greatest damage done by Sherman’s troops was the destruction of Georgia’s railroad lines, both a conveyor for industries and military transportation. Union Army soldiers would rip up and melt down tracks in full view of the demoralized populace.

Union Army troops tearing up railroad tracks in Georgia as Confederate civilians watched in horror (above). Despite signing this well-crafted code of conduct, Lincoln had little control of how Union Army soldiers, as well as their commanders, would behave on the battlefield. For example, under the Lieber Code called for the humane and ethical treatment of populations residing in occupied areas, however, the document clearly had little impact during Union Army Major General General William Tecumseh Sherman’s infamous March to the Sea (November 15, 1864 to December 21, 1864), a scorched earth campaign through Georgia. After seizing Atlanta, Sherman, green-lit by his superiors, marched 60,000 troops from three armies under his command–the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio–285 miles (458 km) east from Atlanta to the coastal town of Savannah during which they successfully disrupted the economic and industrial base of the Confederate States, particularly its war-making capacity and crushed the morale of those sympathetic to the Confederacy. 

The text of the Lieber Code was arranged to create concordance with the Emancipation Proclamation (January 1, 1863) and prohibited racist discrimination against Black soldiers of the Union Army, specifically by Confederate Army troops who denied them the rights and privileges of prisoners of war. The military law clearly had little impact on the treatment of racially segregated Black soldiers of the US Colored Troops (USCT) by their White Union Army comrades in arms. At the Battle of the Crater (July 30, 1864), incredulously, yet painfully true, White soldiers of the Union Army’s 1st Division essentially assisted soldiers of the Confederate States Army massacre Black soldiers of the 4th Division (USCT) in the midst of the fighting. (SEE the February 28, 2023 greatcharlie post entitled “Reflections on the Battle of the Crater in Relation to Russian Federation Casualties in Ukraine: Where Did All the Leaders Go?”.

On top of that, a succession of commanders failed to meet Lincoln’s expectations during the war. He could insist upon regular consultations on their battle plans, but he could not control what they actually did on the battlefield. He could only remove them. or allow them to resign, but he could not repair the damage they had done to the Union effort, or do anything about the wastage of Union Army soldiers. Very briefly, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, having previously functioned as Commander of the Army and Department of Northeastern Virginia from May 27, 1861 to July 25, 1861, served as a general in the Army of the Potomac until after the Second Battle of Bull Run when he was relieved of command at his own request on September 6, 1862. Major General George “Little Mac” McClellan was appointed Commander of the Military Division of the Potomac, and later, the Army of the Potomac (July 26, 1861 to November 9, 1862). In 1862, McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign unraveled after the Seven Days Battles, and he also failed to decisively defeat the forces of General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Antietam. Frustrated by McClellan’s cautious tactics, Lincoln removed him from command. Major General Ambrose E. Burnside served as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from November 9, 1862 to January 26, 1863. Following his infamous “Mud March”.and the senseless slaughter of his troops during the Union Army’s defeat at the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was replaced as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Major General Joseph Hooker served as Commander of the Army and Department of the Potomac from January 26, 1863 to June 28, 1863. Concerned about Hooker were first raised when reports were made that his headquarters doubled as a combination of bar and brothel. Hooker’s timid command performance and grave defects as a commander–he lost mental control of his command in battle–were exposed at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Ostensibly recognizing “faults” in his behavior and performance and reportedly sensing the distrust of Lincoln and Union Army General in Chief Major General Henry Halleck, Hooker resigned his command on June 28, 1863, on the eve of battle. Major General George Meade jumped in as Commander of the Army of the Potomac from June 28, 1863 to June 28, 1865. Meade repulsed the forces of the General in Chief of Armies of the Confederate States General Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg from July 1, 1863 to July 3, 1863 with tactical adroitness; however, he was castigated by some for failing to hotly pursue the remainder of Lee’s forces. He instead allowed them to escape from his immediate reach. Lincoln in duress penned a letter to Meade dated July 14, 1863, relieving him of his command but never sent it. Success was not assured at Gettysburg, but Meade had apparently failed to keep any preconceived follow through firmly in mind in the event of victory.. Although Meade retained command of the Army of the Potomac until the end of the war, his independence of action was sharply curtailed after March 9, 1864, when General Ulysses S. Grant took control of Union  forces from Halleck and was named Commanding General of the US Army. 

Despite keeping a close eye on them to the point that he nearly micromanaged the war, Lincoln could only possess marginal control over the actions of his most senior commanders. He surely had even less of a chance to control the actions of subordinates well beneath them in the chain of command on the battlefield. A law such as theLieber Code could at best signal intent. In the end, what was done was done. If unlawful or unethical acts were witnessed, they could at best be reported and adjudicated within the system of military justice, or if egregious enough, reviewed in Congressional hearings. 

Painting of the representatives of 12 countries at the conference held in the Alabama room at Geneva’s Hotel de Ville August 22, 1864 where they adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” (above). The International Committee of the Red Cross while recognising that it is “primarily the duty and responsibility of a nation to safeguard the health and physical well-being of its own people,” knew there would always, especially in times of war, be a “need for voluntary agencies to supplement . . . the official agencies charged with these responsibilities in every country.” To ensure that its mission was widely accepted, it required a body of rules to govern its own activities and those of the involved belligerent parties. A year later, the Swiss government invited the governments of all European countries, as well as the US Brazil, and Mexico, to attend an official diplomatic conference. A total of twenty-six delegates from 16 countries came to Geneva. The meeting was presided over by Swiss General Guillaume Henri Dufour. The conference adopted the first Geneva Convention “for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.” Representatives of 12 countries signed the convention at that time.

IV. Under the Geneva Convention Military Commanders Are Responsible for What Happens in Field

To the extent the political authorities cannot control events in the field, commanders take on greater responsibility for their actions and those of their subordinates. Under Geneva Convention I , Article 49; Geneva Convention II, Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Art. 129; Geneva Convention  IV, Article 146; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property, Article 28; and, Geneva Protocol I, Articles 86 and 87, it is clear that commanders shalll be held criminally responsible under the law if they knew or should have known that subordinates were going to violate the law by committing a war crime, yet failed to take steps to prevent it. Further, commanders would be held liable for failing to punish or report subordinates who have already committed a war crime. To that extent, commanders are viewed as being in control of their troops and being responsible for all that transpires within their commands at all times. That rationale gains support in the following way. When the commander develops a plan of action, necessary is the requirement to assess all factors relevant at the time, such as ground and enemy forces, your own forces, logistics, courses open. (In greatcharlie’s day, it was referred to as the METT+T analysis (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Time, and Troops Available. Yes, greatcharlie’s editor is that old!) Once the plan is decided, the commander issues orders to subordinates. The next aspect of control is the direction of the engagement, during which it is expected that the commander will take into account the law of armed conflict. 

V. Likely Big Lesson Learned by Putin Concerning Control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces 

Having learned a very painful lesson with his conventional forces during the special military operation, Putin will ensure that he fully controls the “crown jewels” of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: the nuclear triad. That effort to establish that control has been mostly revealed with each public move he has made with regard to the supply, continual redeployments, and drilling of those forces. With regard to to those who command the nuclear forces, as explained in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post entitled, “Commentary: What Comes Next for Putin at Home and in Ukraine?: An Assessment One Year After the Start of His Special Military Operation”, just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders of the Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Strategic Rocket Forces of the Russian Federation, literally Strategic Purpose Rocketry Troops) which control land-based ICBMs, the strategic bombers and other nuclear capable airframes of the Voenno-vozdushnye sily Rossii (Russian Air Force), and satellites of the Voyska Vozdushno-Kosmicheskoy Oborony (Russian Aerospace Defense Forces) without a shadow of doubt would go into action. In addition, commanders of the strategic submarines of the Voyenno-morskoy Flot (Russian Naval Force) in both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet would execute their missions. Indeed, commanders who are in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise. Surely, there are more than enough members of the Russian Federation Armed Forces hurting over the nightmare that has befallen their comrades in Ukraine. They more than likely want to dish out some “payback” against those countries that they likely perceive–based on what they surely have been told–created circumstances there, and many can deliver payback in the extreme.

At the Battle of Camarón, an important episode of the Second French Intervention in Mexico (December 8, 1861 to June 27, 1867), the 3rd company of 62 Legionnaires and three Legion officers, led by Captain Jean Danjou was sent to reinforce a French military convoy, transporting 3 million francs in gold bullion, siege guns, and sixty wagons of ammunition. Information was received that the convoy would be ambushed. Before Danjou could reach the convoy, the led elements of a force of 3,000 Mexican Army infantry and cavalry made contact with his unit and he was forced to make a defensive stand at the Hacienda Cameron, in Camarón de Tejeda, Veracruz, Mexico. At the point when he recognized that victory would be absolutely impossible to achieve against the larger Mexican force massed around their defenses, Danjou urged his soldiers to take an oath to fight to the death rather than surrender. He made them swear their fealty on his wooden hand. Danjou then shared his bottle of wine and encouraged his men with has been called  “those noble words that warm one’s heart and makes the final sacrifice less difficult to face.”  When the French Foreign Legion moved to France, Capitain Danjou’s wooden hand was taken to Aubagne, where it remains in the Legion Museum of Memory.  The hand is the most cherished artifact in Legion history.  April 30th is celebrated as “Camerone Day,” an important day for the Legionnaires, when the wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is brought out for display. In 1892, a monument commemorating the battle was erected on the battlefield containing a plaque with the following inscription in French: Ils furent ici moins de soixante / Opposés a toute une armée / Sa masse les écrasa / La vie plutôt que le courage / Abandonna ces soldats Français / Le 30 Avril 1863 / A leur mémoire la patrie éleva ce monument. (Here there were less than sixty opposed to a whole army. Its numbers crushed them. Life rather than courage abandoned these French soldiers on April 30, 1863.  In their memory, the fatherland has erected this monument”) The railing from the Legion grave at Camarone can now be found at the village of Puyloubier near Aix-en-Provence. (The importance of the Battle of Camarón with regard to the history and culture of the French Foreign Legion is discussed in greatcharlie’s February 28, 2023 post entitled “Commentary: The Utilization of Wagner Group Penal Units as Suicide Squads: A Callous Go-to Solution for Regimes Facing Intractable Military Situations.”

Although perhaps willing to accept that Putin is the quintessential “bad actor”, it appears almost impossible for many to believe Putin could decide for the Russian people that as a country the Russian Federation would accept a similar fate, mutantis mutandis, rather accept what he ostensibly would perceive and envision as the nightmare of life under the thumb of Western powers and the near certain invasion of their country in the near future. Indeed, observers might try to consider a scenario in which Putin after observing the Russian Federation Armed Forces lose one decisive battle after another in rapid succession and all had unraveled in Ukraine, would make a nationwide broadcast one evening explaining to the Russian people that the Russian Federation was about to be invaded by the proxy forces of the Western powers, that the special military operation, meant as a pre-emptive action has lifted the curtain on the true nature of the Western powers’ objectives and operations in Ukraine and based on all that has been revealed concerning the actions of the Western powers and the astronomical support of the offensive military activities of their partner in Kyiv, despite repeated warnings from the Kremlin for them not to continue their aggressive activities in the Russian Federation’s near abroad, a state of total war existed between the Russian Federation and the US, its NATO allies, and the EU. He would tell the Russian people that their support, prayers, and courage were needed as his government took its next steps. Putin would likely display sangfroid and equanimity, and speak with the tone of a leader in complete command of a situation.(Readers might cast their minds back to Nazi German Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels’ February 18, 1943 address at the Berlin Sportpalast following the Wehrmacht’s epic loss at Stalingrad to the Soviet Army, in which he zealously implored the German people to commit anew to an all-out war effort: Totaler Krieg–Kürzester Krieg! (Total War–Shortest War!) From the point of that hypothetical broadcast, it would most likely just be a matter of time before the worst possibility would materialize.

It is greatcharlie’s contention, without pretense, some absurd desire to establish some greater sense of importance, or a ridiculous effort to claim of greater sapience, that Western diplomats would do well to reflect on this assessment and consider how responding to what they might deem as Putin’s misperceptions to open the door to great possibilities.)

The Russian Federation’s Sarmat Intercontinental ballistic missile (above) is a 115 feet (35-meters) tall and has a range of 11,185 miles (18,000km)(). Some estimate this to be higher. It can carry at least 10 multiple targetable re-entry vehicles – each with a nuclear warhead – which can each be aimed at a different target. It can also deliver hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles that can travel further and faster, flying in a variable path to overcome missile defenses. Just as Russian Army generals and colonels were ready and willing to advance their troops into the tragedy that is the Ukraine War–some generals and colonels went as far as to sacrifice themselves on the battlefield, the commanders in control of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear triad and supporting organizations would act without question in the manner prescribed by political authorities. It would be a mistake for anyone to believe otherwise.

VI. The Arrest Warrant for Putin

In Paragraph 6 of  the First Oration of his Catalonia Orations, Marcus Tulius Cicero, an excoriation of rival senator Lucius Sergius Catiline, who he alleged sought to overthrow the Roman Senate, he writes: Quamdiu quisquam erit, qui te defendere audea, vives, et vives ita, ut nunc vivis, multis meis et firms praesidiis obsessed, ne commovere te contra rem publicam possis. Multorum te etiam oculi et aures non sentience, sicut adhuc fecerunt, speculabuntur atque custodient. (As long as one person exists who can dare to defend you, you shall live, but you shall live as you do now, surrounded by my many and trusty guards, so that you shall not be able to.stir one finger against the republic: many eyes and ears shall still observe and watch you, as they have hitherto done, though you shall perceive them.) Doubtlessly, with the necessary adjustments, surely this is the fate many in Western governments hope will befall Putin and he would be left in such a depleted state. However, greatcharlie suggests the satisfaction that they seek will unlikely manifest and the cost of any attempt to get their hands on Putin would be far worse than steep. Such attempts to create such a circumstance would inflame Putin’s ardor to a degree one could only reasonably expect the worst.

On March 17, 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued a warrant of arrest for Putin in the context of the situation in Ukraine. (Indicted along with Putin on that day was Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, the Children’s Rights Commissioner for the President of the Russian Federation since 2021.) As Russian Federation President, Putin has been declared allegedly responsible for “the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute).” The Pre-Trial Chamber II also stated that “the crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory at least from February 24, 2022.” The Pre-Trial Chamber II further explained that it has reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility “(i) for having committed the acts directly, jointly with others and/or through others (article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute), and (ii) for his failure to exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control, pursuant to superior responsibility (article 28(b) of the Rome Statute).” The alleged war crime as outlined by the Pre-Trial Chamber II is horrendous. At the nub of the matter is the issue of Putin’s level of control over the actions of all Russian Federation elements in Ukraine.

So often it has been the case with Putin’s presidency, legal action in response to his behavior on the world stage may have been warranted, but not necessarily required given the context of situations. Prioritizing the furtherance of international peace and security, the leader of Russian Federation with an enormous nuclear arsenal under his control, and members of his coterie, were hit with tongue lashings, finger-wagging, and sanctions. National governments, regional organizations, and international organizations would level economic sanctions against the Russian Federation and national legislatures would pass punishing business and financial laws designed to stifle the ability of the Russian Federation business community, particularly the country’s elite, to maintain and generate within advanced industrialized systems. The Magnitsky Law passed in the US created a considerable degree of pain and aggravation for Putin. Other than that, and a few other other coercive measures, Putin was repeatedly extended a degree of latitude. Putin was surely smart enough to recognize that. (One might posit that he flaunted that latitude allowed to him in the faces of Western powers by invading Ukraine.) In an environment in the West in which political leaders, especially among NATO and EU countries were being hounded over not doing enough to support Ukraine and not enough to decouple and lash out against Putin, the choice of the US-led international community became to exercise legal power over the Russian Federation President. Urging the International Criminal Court in The Hague to issue a warrant for Putin’s arrest, though significant, was seemingly rather trivial in comparison with the greater task of assisting Ukraine in defeating the Russian Federation. Nonetheless, it helped set a path toward what may be a future of even more trying diplomatic efforts with Putin, which to great extent–unless the international community makes another choice, the unthinkable choice of granting Putin whatever he wishes–has put the outcome somewhat out of its rational hands.)

A. Putin Still Minimized as an “Oppositional Adolescent” by the West?

As touched upon in greatcharlie’s March 30, 2023 post, it is difficult to see exactly what end was hoped for when the decision was made to indict Putin. There was likely some ego stroke scored as a result of sticking it to Putin, but not much more was accomplished than that. (How horrifying and disappointing it would be to discover the intent was to goad Putin to react adversely and make mistakes. If such is even remotely accurate, perhaps those who hypothetically were impelled by that thought might not have considered a big mistake Putin might have immediately made–and could still make–could have been to start a nuclear war. “Wishful thinking” is not a form of optimism, it is a euphemistic term for denial.)

Whether it was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

Maybe it would have been far more reasonable and practical to demand Putin confess irresponsibility over leading his country into war with so many criminally minded senior officials and military men unaware that he would not have genuine control of those who would eventually perpetrate heinous acts in Ukraine under orders from unstable authorities far beneath those in the Senate Building at the Kremlin as well as some sort of diabolical control from Hell. The chance of Putin cooperating in either case would doubtlessly be the same: zero! One might wonder what would be the plan of the International Criminal Court to successfully and safely take him into custody. 

Under Article 58 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of July 17, 1998, an arrest warrant can be issued publicly or under seal when the arrest of the person appears necessary to ensure a person’s appearance at trial. Under Article 89 of the Rome Statute, the court may request the cooperation in the arrest and surrender from any State on the territory of which the person may be found. The court has no internal enforcement mechanism which would allow it to arrest persons subject to arrest warrants. In the interest of promoting good interstate relations, diplomacy, and peace and security and simply in the planetary interest, under such trying circumstances, discretion in taking such actions–at least refraining from declaring as criminal a party essential to establishing peace–would be the best choice, the better part of valor. Putin’s accountability and culpability for war crimes committed in Ukraine by Russian Federation forces was something which could have been dealt with later. The priority now is ending the war if possible.

B. Actualities Concerning Intelligence and Making Claims against Putin

With regard to providing evidence of Putin’s crimes, one would need to be dismissive of the fact that the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation have sophisticated capabilities. One cannot say for certain what would happen if the Kremlin produced its own classified information confirming Putin plainly stated he would brook no behavior by Russian Federation forces in the field of the kind for which he is accused of having some responsibility. Hypothetically, the Kremlin might be able to produce transcripts of communications between errant commanders demonstrating their deliberate effort to conceal their actions from superiors, making false any suggestion that Putin controlled or ordered their illegal actions. To that extent, it might be proven with a sea of declassified official internal documents by the Kremlin that generally Putin did not impose too much on his commanders and within reason, relied on their reports and advice on the special military operation. Of course, one could expect it to possess a profusion of redactions to give them that ultra official feel and if any documents are authentic, to hide any nitty-gritty. With such evidence at hand, the Kremlin would surely insist it has no need to respond to baseless accusations about the Russian Federation President. 

One could unlikely insist as part of any fair and balanced legal process that Russian Federation classified intelligence is of less veracity and should be distrusted outrightly. Turning to the intelligence of one country–for instance the US, the United Kingdom, or Germany–that can provide information collected through electronic eavesdropping externally on the internal communications of the armed forces and security organizations of another country–for example the Russian Federation–with the aim to refute and discredit said monitored country’s own intelligence on what was being discussed among its military and security officials, would be something better than an act of bias and stand the idea of objective justice on its head. The International Criminal Court is supposed to be an objective tool for the world. Readers must pardon greatcharlie’s frankness but having stated the former, it believes that such a chauvinistic step and in the end finding Putin “unhesitatingly and with utter conviction” guilty, perhaps even in absentia, rationally imaginable given how predisposed so many that serve in regional and international bodies are to think unfavorably about him. The thinking of the court is certainly not to be judged by greatcharlie. It is only outlining what it perceives as a likely possibility. (This statement is not intended as apophasis.) If one might take into account anything about Putin’s arrest warrant written here could even remotely have some influence, it would at best be as a cautionary assessment for Western foreign and national security bureaucracies to consider before pursuing the arrest warrant matter any further.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above) at the Kremlin on March 8, 2023. Whether the action was not thought through or was actually a subconscious aspect of the choice among powers of great influence in the West, the most likely connotation within the Kremlin of the West’s support for the issuance of an arrest warrant for Putin was a demonstration of the many levers of power at its disposal, to hurt him on the world stage. It was an exhibition of its power relative to his. A dynamic poorly concealed throughout the years of Putin’s interaction with Western powers was the need of its national leaders to remind him of his subordinate status and his struggle to make them accept him as an equal. That dynamic was readily apparent when the Russian Federation was a member of the erstwhile “G-8”, now the G-7 Interestingly, at one point, that membership was of considerable importance to him. Surely, that is no longer the case. Perhaps he brands himself an ass now for ever thinking he or the Russian Federation would ever really receive acceptance within it.

VII. Energetic Diplomacy: The Best Chance of Stemming Catastrophe

In the aftermath of everything, historians would likely be forced to choose whether there really was something so peculiar about Putin that makes energetic efforts at diplomacy at this stage so taxing. It may actually be the case that the fault for ineffective diplomatic efforts with lies with the foreign and national security policy officials and political leaders of the many countries that had to deal with him. Perchance it was the fault of both parties for failing to see a true middle ground in things satisfactory to both sides. Nevertheless, it is greatcharlie’s conviction that at the present the West is in grave danger. The source of that danger in the Russian Federation. Ending the Ukraine War on favorable or acceptable terms for all parties is of the utmost importance. However, the priority is to ease the world back from an apparent slow spiral to armageddon.

In its March 30th post, greatcharlie suggested that at this point, diplomacy with the Russian Federation on Ukraine has figuratively been knocked off the rails. True, indicting Putin was a step that practically ensured his refusal to negotiate with Kyiv unless he had attained some considerable advantage in Ukraine and his negotiating position would be very strong. However, rather than draw a line there as in March and succumb to despair, here greatcharlie pulls back from the statement that the opportunity for diplomacy has been lost. 

A  Having the Right Answers

Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand, given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made. Putin shall not countenance what he may perceive as a diminution of the great dignity of the Russian Federation. 

Although all countries with an immediate stake in the Ukraine matter should be made aware of the diplomatic effort to achieve an entente with Putin, the new contact may need to be performed discreetly. Perhaps this is best that can be done at this juncture. Hope can be the only thing that comforts people in misery. For Russian people, who are the ones who will decide whether there is a need for change in the direction their country has been moving, hope for that change could be founded through contact between their president and the outside world. Paradoxically, while Putin may indeed enhance his standing among many as they will see the Russian Federation still acting as an important player on the world stage, many others may perceive such diplomacy as proof that the Russian people are viewed as far more than just potential targets for retaliatory nuclear strikes from the the US, the United Kingdom, and France, and written off as nothing to signify. It is suggested by greatcharlie in an opaque way that such a diplomatic effort could even mean far more to the right number of them. In public discussions of the new diplomacy, Western diplomats would do well to emphasize the effort has been undertaken with consideration of the well-being of the Russian people and make other statements of that nature.

There are for certain countless pitfalls that could disrupt or even destroy a new, robust diplomatic effort. What may be most important for Western capitals to recognize are the right answers that will bring a negotiated settlement and peace. There is also the issue of time available. Again, Putin has a large say in how things will turn out and surely has his own timeliness for action. To that extent, until some acceptable path to peace is found, perhaps the greatest danger will remain a decision already made by him to act in some ghastly way.

B. In the Meantime, Will the West Lose Control of Its Junior Partner in Kyiv?

The indications and implications of multiple reporting, to include the Washington Post, of alleged swift action by US foreign and national security policy officials to halt a plan by Ukraine to launch mass strikes against Moscow may be that at least the White House is aware of just how close the world in to a potential nuclear war, it does not want that, and that it now has the extra burden of monitoring the behavior of its “junior partners” in Kyiv. It is uncertain whether the Ukrainian leadership was led to take such a course as result of a lack of wisdom and experience or a complete absorption in self-interest or both. However, if newsmedia stories of this episode are accurate, it would appear that they were blind as beetles to the possibility that their planned assault could have triggered a catastrophic response from the Kremlin to the great detriment of Ukraine, but the whole wide world

If Putin already has a mind and the will to take the most drastic step possible against the West, Kyiv in planning an attack on Moscow could have supplied him with a reason better than anything he could have conjured up. The world moves closer and closer to the edge of the precipice with every errant move as this. It is wonder if there were any other planned Ukrainian actions halted by Western powers that would have brought the world the worst. One wonders how long can this balancing act without a safety net go on without catastrophe.

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, (left) and U.S President Joe Biden (right) shake hands during their meeting at the Villa la Grange in Geneva, Switzerland, June 16, 2021. Doubtlessly, there are more than a few Western diplomats ready and able to work on the problem and await directions for the next move by the West. Yet alas, that is hardly enough on its own to inspire confidence that the situation will be resolved. What would be crucial in launching a new diplomatic offensive would be employing an envoy who would have sufficient standing for such an errand given Putin’s animus toward, one might imagine, all things of or pertaining to the West. The selected envoy could travel to Moscow to speak with Putin about his thinking and intentions. Rather than guess at what is on his mind, it would be better to hear it firsthand and definitively. If the kernel for negotiations with Moscow can be found, then there may be a chance for further positive exchanges. If Putin makes it clear that he will not brook any talk about the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Ukraine or reasonable terms for peace negotiations, and ratchets up threats to use nuclear weapons, at least there would be greater certainty over where things stand and what preparations must be made.

The Way Forward

Putin watched his predecessors mismanage,  breakdown, and lose control over the Soviet Union while he was both inside and outside the system. Unable to repair the Russian Federation by replicating not even a simulacrum of what came before it, despite his best efforts, one might suggest he may have already decided to figuratively burn down “the wide-world and its fading sweets.” It is a wonder Putin has not gone mad given the extraordinary pressures that have relentlessly squeezed him since the special military operation began and even beforehand. Standing on the precipice of losing everything, it would be best for the wide world if Putin can continue to retain his balance. The clear choice for him is either to continue forward or abandon at great personal loss, the reckless and destructive path upon which he set his country on February 24, 2022, and triggering the most undesirable statistical probability his predecessors foresaw the most likely outcome: a perpetuation of the struggle long-term would be between East and West, begun during the Cold War between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union. Putin has mourned its collapse with considerable grief and disappointment.

Among those who use wisdom and logic, imagination can have value in an investigation. Imagination is a quality many lack, but many also lack wisdom and logic. Often it is the case that a lack of maturity inhibits one ability to reason matters out correctly. Just having an answer, right or wrong, based on some chain of thinking is enough for some. Smart, confident people can find a constructive solution to any problem. There is in reality nothing so mysterious about Putin that should lead any national leader to throw the possibility of acceptable relations with the Russian Federation out of the window. Welling up with the type of anger and disappointment that might cause them to find affinity with Putin’s worst critics will destroy any opportunity for a fruitful course to develop. As noted by greatcharlie here ad nauseum, those leaders must consider what their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation mean not only with regard to Ukraine, but in the bigger picture. When leaders lose sight of the multifaceted nature of their respective countries’ relationships with the Russian Federation, they create the danger of driving those relationships down to lower points. They should think about current so-called challenges as opportunities. Meditating on the matter, they may discover possibilities for getting many things done by just doing things a bit differently. Leaders should not let bad words, negative choices flashover all issues regarding the Russian Federation and become civilization’s dénouement. positive changes on one issue can often result in great benefits on another. Respice finem (Have regard for the end.)

Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?

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Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (left) with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (right). Putin wants to keep the Republic of Belarus within his country’s sphere of influence. Yet, due to regional security concerns, Belarus has gained new importance in the West. Lukashenko, once called Europe’s last dictator, is being approached by the EU and US. He has responded by trying to strengthen ties with them. Some Western analysts conclude Putin will not react well to this development. However, Belarus’s ties to the EU could actually enable its ally Russia to circumvent sanctions through a creative trade arrangement.

According to an October 29, 2016 article in the New York Times entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters,” dozens of demonstrators held a gathering in front of the headquarters building of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB in Minsk to commemorate the 1937 execution of over 100 members of the Belarusian intelligentsia under the orders of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Josef Stalin. The demonstrators also protested continuing repression in Belarus.  The demonstration was not authorized, however the police did not interfere. The annual commemoration provides the Belarusian public a rare opportunity to show disapproval for the government led by President Alexander Lukashenko. Nikolai Statkevich ran against Lukashenko in the 2010 Belarusian Presidential Election and was imprisoned for five years afterward. The New York Times article quoted him as stating: The fear of repression haunts Belarus as before. Today’s authorities are ideological heirs of those times.”

The EU and US now seem to be approaching Lukashenko with outstretched arms. Lukashenko, once the target of profound obloquy in the West and whose government was called “Europe’s last dictatorship” in 2005 by then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is now covered with good words to the extent that his past iron fisted actions have nearly been cloaked. Belarus, in response to EU and US overtures, has engaged in a vigorous effort to curry favor and strengthen ties with them. The question of whether Lukashenko can genuinely recurvate westward after being oriented so long toward Russia has been responded to by some EU leaders with rather Delphine statements.

Putin wants Belarus to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. He wants to keep Belarus in the Central Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some Western foreign and defense policy analysts would quickly point out that Lukashenko has never been disposed to completely subordinating the interests of Belarus to that of Russia, or of the West for that matter. Pedictably, those Western analysts have concluded Putin, their bête noire, likely perceives Lukashenko as being disloyal, and suggest that he could react aggressively. Such analyses simply signal a fear of Russian military power. They also signal a fear that when the interests of any country in Russia’s sphere of interest is detectably at odds with those of the Kremlin, a “second Crimea” may be in the making. Crimea happened. Putin acted aggressively. However, Crimea should not be the baseline to gauge Putin’s thinking and actions going forward. Putin does not act impulsively; he acts with purpose. He can well-distinguish between what he wants for the moment and what he wants most. Putin does not want to have Russia defined as a rogue country with a military that is nothing more than an army of conquest. Having built solid relations with Minsk, especially with regard to security, for over a score of years, it is hard to imagine Moscow attempting to militarily intimidate or actually attack Belarus over its contacts with the EU. Extrapolations perpetuating such notions are counterintuitive. In fact, Putin has hardly reacted. He may very well recognize some potential in his ally’s new EU contacts for Russia to circumvent economic sanctions via a creative trade arrangement.

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Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. When Putin took office, he viewed Russia’s relations with Belarus as unsatisfactory and improved them. Belarus’s strategic importance to Russia increased following regional events such as NATO’s creep into the post-Soviet space, and the “Color Revolutions.” Belarus and Russia have had a few political and economic rows. Still, the two countries are staunch allies.

Belarus: In Brief

The Republic of Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. Its capital is Minsk. While the borders of Belarus were set at the end of World War II, they were shaped mostly when some territory of the Second Polish Republic was reintegrated into them after the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. During World War II, Belarus lost about a third of its population and more than half of its economic resources. The Soviet Union redeveloped the republic in the post-war years. On July 27, 1990, the Parliament of the Belarus declared the republic’s sovereignty, and on August 25, 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus declared itself an independent country. Since 1994, Alexander Lukashenko has served as the President of Belarus. His leadership was widely criticized in the West. Lukashenko perpetuated a number of Soviet-era policies, to include state ownership of large sections of the economy. For years, political opposition was violently suppressed. Elections in Belarus were declared rigged by the international community.  The country’s rating under The Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index was the lowest in Europe until 2014. Freedom House assessed Belarus under Lukashenko as “not free.”  It was labelled “repressed” in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. In the Press Freedom Index for 2016 of Reporters Without Borders, it was ranked 157th out of 180 countries.

Belarus’s Ties to Russia

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly formed Russian Federation tried to control the post-Soviet space by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991. However, Belarus, much as other republics in the CIS, began drifting away from Russia, which at that time was attempting to cultivate Western relations and save its broken economy. In the early 1990s, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was concerned that his country’s involvement with Belarus might put its bridge building efforts with the West at risk. Yet, while Russia was fixed on improving relations, Western capitals discerned Russia’s inability to act effectively. NATO began to expand east. Stung and threatened by what he perceived as an effort by the West to isolate it from the European environment by grabbing up Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics, Yeltsin sought to improve ties with Belarus. Relations between the two countries became so congenial that in the mid-1990s, following Lukashenko’s rise to power, Yeltsin concluded Belarus would be an ideal candidate for integration with Russia. After signing the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation with Belarus, Yeltsin declared that “the two nations [had] shared a common historical experience over many centuries.” That, he explained, “created the basis for signing the treaty and other documents on deeper integration of our two countries. Among all CIS countries, Belarus has the greatest rights to such a relationship due to its geographical location, its contacts with Russia, our friendship and the progress of its reforms.” One year after April 2, 1996 when the integration process was launched, the Union of Belarus and Russia was established. It culminated with the founding of the Union State between Belarus and Russia on December 8, 1999. When Putin took office, he determined that the status of the relations with Belarus was unsatisfactory and criticized the Union State Treaty. He sought to put real content into it. He formulated a policy genuinely directed at realizing unification. His proposal was to complete unification either in a federation model which meant that Belarus would join the Russian Federation, or build a union which is similar to the EU. However, Belarus rejected those approaches and there was no change. Still, Putin did not abandon the idea of unification completely. The next goal became integration. The strategic importance of Belarus to Putin increased as a result of international events, to include. NATO’s activity in the post-Soviet space; the decision of many Eastern European countries to orient westward; a US plan to deploy a missile defense system in Poland or the Czech Republic; and, the “Color Revolutions.”

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Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of Belarus’s purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Disagreements over profits and payments from the energy trade led to the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 row, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed Belarus owed Russia $200 million in gas arrears for that year. Belarus demanded transit fees owed by Russia. The matter was resolved and went away.

Considering that integration with Belarus would be costly, it is reported that Moscow sought to maximize gains from it. Its goals became to reduce the economic burden which Belarus laid on its economy, and to take over Belarus’s energy transit infrastructure. That tack spurred many of the political and economic rows. Among those conflicts was a disagreement that arose when Lukashenko accused Russia of offering a $500 million loan to Minsk on the condition that it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lukashenko angrily retorted that the position of Belarus was not for sale. Regarding the close military cooperation between Belarus and Russia, Lukashenko compared Belarus’s population of 10 million people as a human shield for Russia against the West. That service, he said, “was not free.” The Milk War erupted in July 2009 when Russia banned all dairy imports from Belarus, explaining that they did not comply with new regulations. Belarus accused Russia of using the ban for political reasons, but Russia denied that. In a statement presented by his press service, Lukashenko lashed out, stating: “Economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus’s closest CSTO ally is trying . . . to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?” Lukashenko acted by refusing to attend the 2009 CSTO summit in Moscow. The CSTO, Putin’s counterweight to NATO, groups Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in a security arrangement. Shortly afterward, Russia lifted the ban and Belarus resumed importing of dairy products to Russia. Additionally, there were the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 Gas War, a dispute arose over a claim by Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed that Belarus owed $200 million in Russia gas arrears for supplies it had used that year. Belarus then demanded transit fees owed by Russia. A resolution was found and the matter quietly went away.

The EEU is an economic integration bloc of post-Soviet republics. It succeeded the erstwhile Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in January 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU later that year. The bloc coordinates policies of its member states in key industries. In that spirit of coordination, the argument between Belarus and Russia over the price of natural gas was resolved, although the two sides have apparently not yet reached a consensus on the scale of the price discount (if any) or the mechanism of its delivery to Belarus. Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of its purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Of Belarus’s overall exports, 39 percent is directed to Russia. Those imports from Belarus totaled only $10.4 billion. For the most part it sells Russia value-added goods in return. Aside from trucks and industrial machines, Belarus sells processed foods. A network of Belarusian grocery stores operates in major Russian cities.

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Above is an assembly line at the Minsk Motor Plant. Nearly a third of Belarus’s overall trade is with its second largest trading partner, the EU. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU has withdrawn trade preferences for Belarus, the potential to greatly expand trade exists.

The Strong Military Linkage Between Belarus and Russia

Although there have been some setbacks in the political and economic integration of Belarus and Russia, the military-integration process between them has been successful. Cooperation with Belarus fits snuggly within Putin’s vision for geopolitical order in the post–Cold War world. Putin has never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. It was practically guaranteed that Putin would push back against what he might call an intrusion into Russia’s near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. The term was reportedly popularized by former Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s. For centuries, Russia has sought to ensure its physical security through its control over neighboring territory. For Putin, the term represents a concept akin to the Monroe Doctrine.

On February 14, 2013 at a conference entitled “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they conclude the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. The Kremlin has accepted the threat assessment of the the Russian Federation General Staff. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. To rehearse the defense against the West, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced massive strategic military exercises Zapad 2017, scheduled to take place in September 2017. He said that the joint exercise, which would include Russian and Belarusian forces, will be the “main military event of 2017.” Further, the two countries armed forces will cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken.

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Belarus (shaded in green), Russia (shaded in violet), and their neighbors. Providing a glimpse of the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, on February 14, 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, explained the depletion of oil, gas and other natural resources will become an ultimate world crisis by 2030. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade Russia from several directions to grab its land and resources. Lukashenko insists that Belarus will remain part of Russia’s defense.

Ubi concordia, ibi victoria! (Where there is unity, there is victory.) To a great degree, Russian and Belarusian regional security approaches have been harmonized. Lukashenko has pledged that Belarus will be an integral part of the Russian Federation’s defense. Indeed, he has gone as far as to say that the army of Belarus, the modernization of which was nearly completed, was ready to defend Russia’s western border. According to RIA Novosti, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russian western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.” Lukashenko has referred to the Belarus population as 10 million human shields in the defense of Russia. Lukashenko further stated that the Belarusian Army will be able to show resistance to any aggressor.  Prior to those statements, Lukashenko told the Belarus Parliament that he would not allow the country’s opposition to depict Russia in the image of an enemy. Lukashenko declared to the Belarus Parliament: “The Russians are our brothers, with whom we have been living for a very long time.”

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Putin (right) and Russian Federation Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu (left). Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. Shoigu announced that massive military exercises would be held by Russia and Belarus in 2017 to rehearse their joint defense against the West.

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine into law. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. It views Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

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Belarusian troops (above). Following deliberations in Parliament, Lukashenko signed Belarus’s new military doctrine into law. The doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, but it is apparent that NATO is deemed the greatest military threat. Accordingly, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russia western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.”

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

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Belarusian special forces in training (above). In the new Belarusian military doctrine, emphasis is placed on trends associated with the development of the concept of “Color Revolutions,” and methods aimed at provoking internal conflicts to destabilize the country and violate its territorial integrity. A year ahead of the doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko directed his government to further develop special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems: elements best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations.

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. Officials there view Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

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The EU welcomed Lukashenko’s desire to have Belarus play a constructive role in the region by hosting four-party peace negotiations on Ukraine, as well as his decision to maintain political distance from Russia over Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. EU ministers have encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They have held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Still, many wonder if Lukashenko’s efforts are authentic.

Minsk and Brussels: A Rapprochement?

Some experts have said that it was Lukashenko who began making overtures to the West following Russia’s seizure of Crimea, considerable economic troubles in Belarus, and a degree of instability in Eastern Europe. He managed to grab the attention oF EU leaders in a positive way when he decided to free a number of political prisoners and host multiparty mediations in Minsk for the cease-fire in neighboring Ukraine. EU governments, claiming that they based their decision on content and merit of Lukashenko’s efforts, suspended sanctions on Belarus’s leaders in October 2014. In February 2015, EU foreign ministers terminated sanctions, removing asset freezes and travel bans on 170 officials, including Lukashenko. Three Belarusian companies were also taken off the EU blacklist. The EU maintains an arms embargo and sanctions against four people suspected of being involved in the disappearance of dissidents in the 1990s. Lukashenko responded by intensifying fence mending efforts with the West. As of late, Belarusian diplomats have been pouring considerable energy in enhancing their country’s relations with the West, hoping to capitalize on Belarus’ newfound importance for regional stability. Their approach is bicameral. On the one hand, they seek to develop bilateral cooperation with specific EU countries. On the other hand, they want to develop cooperation with the EU as an institution focusing on the Eastern partnership, a dialogue on modernization, and visa issues. Lukashenko’s current perspective of the EU appears to be reflected in his statements in favor of dialogue with it.  On March 5, 2016, Lukashenko explained: “The Europeans . . . are ready to cooperate with us, including for the sake of security in Europe. We say to them that we’re always open to [talking].” EU and US delegations continue to visit Minsk, but results have been thin. The US has expressed hope not only for improved cooperation on trade, but also on non-proliferation and combating human trafficking.

Praetio prudentia praestat. (Prudence supplies a reward.) Commenting on Belarus, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, remarked, “This is clearly not a rosy or perfect picture . . . but when we see significant, even if limited steps, in what we feel is the right direction, we feel it is right to encourage them.” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke of the “beginnings” of a thaw with Belarus, and concluded, “It’s worth testing in such a situation how much willingness and reciprocity there is on the Belarus side.” Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski told reporters, “This is an experiment.” He went on to state: “As a neighbor of Belarus, we are pleased as we hope this will improve relations with the EU and of course with Poland.” While the EU leaders allege they had no intention of prying Belarus from Putin’s hand, that nonetheless was viewed as possible. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. Indeed, in a statement, the EU ministers encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Lukashenko will take what is offered, but what he really wants from EU countries is financial assistance. Belarus’s international reserves are at the lowest since 2011. Although there has been some direct private investment from the US in Belarus, its development has been relatively slow given the uncertain pace of reform. The US has encouraged Belarus to conclude and adhere to agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the program of macroeconomic stabilization and related reform measures. As of this writing, the International Monetary Fund is still deciding whether it should provide Belarus with a $3 billion, 10-year loan.

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Above are Russian “green men” in Ukraine. In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces, has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations.  Western analysts still insist that Belarus faces the threat of hybrid warfare from Russia. They conclude that Moscow will monitor Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any signs of a serious loosening of ties with Russia.

Are Problems Between Belarus and Russia Becoming Inexorable?

Ad connectendas amicitas, tenacissimum vinculum est morum similitudo. (For cementing friendship, resemblance of manners is the strongest tie.) At the Third Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions on June 9, 2016, Putin explained: “In a collaborative effort, Russia and Belarus work to deepen integration processes in Eurasia. As members of the Union State, we are carrying out about 40 programs and are jointly developing advanced technology programmes, primarily, for the aerospace industry, satellite navigation, geological exploration, and agriculture.” Putin further stated: “We are forming the Eurasian Economic Union’s common market for goods, services, capital, and labour, thereby facilitating sustainable economic growth of the member countries and enhancing the competitiveness of our producers on domestic and foreign markets.”  

Some interesting statements have been made by Belarusian officials concerning their country’s security relationship with Russia. There is the example of Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov, who, speaking on February 23, 2016, stated that security of the country relied also on military cooperation not only with Russia and members of the CSTO. He also underlined Minsk’s “strategic” military cooperation with China and “aspiration to develop a constructive dialogue with NATO in order to strengthen international and regional security.” An interview of Belarus’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei with the Polish daily, Rzeczpospolita, on October 17, 2016, has been called significant because it was titled “We Are Not Dependents of Russia.” In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations. When Shoigu announced that a “joint military organization of the Union State” would be created starting in 2016, including notional unification of the two countries’ armed forces, it appeared Belarus-Russia military ties were further strengthening. Yet, in the West, it was viewed by some analysts as a unilateral statement by Russia, and an effort to save face and show the world that the relationship was still intact. Western analysts note that there was no comment from Belarus on the joint military organization of the Union State. There is a perception in the West that Russia routinely announces joint initiatives with Belarus which have not been endorsed by Minsk. When an announcement of a joint air defence system was made in Russia, Belarus did not comment on it, at least publicly. Reportedly, that same week, Belarus TV broadcasted an extended feature on the country’s Air Defense Troops without once mentioning the new military agreement with Russia. Although the general in charge of the Belarusian Air Force has been nominated as the commander for the “joint system,” Western analysts saw the move simply as a face-saver for Minsk. The lack of reaction by Belarus was said to signal Minsk’s disapproval of the effort by Moscow to control the provision of its security. When Belarus needed to purchase modern fighter aircraft to upgrade its ageing air force, Moscow announced instead that Belarus would be hosting a Russian airbase. Western analysts insist that Moscow pressured Lukashenko for the airbase. However, he insisted upon and arranged the aircraft purchase.

Alter ipso amicus. (A friend is another self.) Some Western analysts have concluded that Russia will observe Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any serious threat to its ties. Yet, that idea conflicts with the reality that Putin considers Belarus to be an integral part of Russia’s geopolitical and cultural space. Moscow has invested heavily in preserving and increasing its influence in the country. Lukashenko has no plans to have Belarus abandon Russia. If some drop in the strength of Belarus’s ties to Russia has occurred, it is negligible.From 2008 to 2010, Putin neither acted violently nor took a hostile tone toward what he perhaps regarded as a recalcitrant, yet typical Lukashenko, with his dalliance toward the West and he has no intentions of reacting aggressively toward Belarus now. Putin knows Lukashenko could never stand by wistfully in the face of Russian decisions impacting Belarus. Putin would never allow Russia to be directed by a foreign capital either. Clashing with Lukashenko is the last thing Putin would want. This may especially be true because Belarus might be able to provide Putin with the possibility to overcome EU sanctions related to Ukraine.

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Moldova, just as Belarus, is not subject to EU sanctions. Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin has proposed that Moldova allow Russia to move its goods into a “European zone” in the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia as a way for Russia to circumvent EU imposed sanctions. As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have the its goods sold to the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions.

Putin’s Possible Move Regarding Belarus?

US and EU sanctions against Russia over Crimea’s annexation will not go away unless Russia returns the region to Ukraine. Russian Federation Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev remarked at a press conference on November 11, 2016, “Our position is that sanctions will remain unchanged.” Just as the Baltic States were never recognized as part of the Soviet Union by the West. Crimea will always be recognized as part of Ukraine, not Russia. As it was explained in the September 30, 2016 greatcharlie.com post entitled “Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action,” Russia is well-aware that cooperation stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of a border by improving conditions for free trade and exchange. Inter-border cooperation is understood to be a prerequisite of broader integration processes and improving relations between neighboring countries. It can serve as a mechanism for coping with the challenges and jolts resulting from the new divisions created between EU and EEU countries.

As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have its goods sold in the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions. Much as with oil and gas pipelines, Belarus would essentially serve as a relay or refining point for Russian goods targeted for Western markets. For that to even become a possibility, it would certainly be in Russia’s interest to see Belarus improve its relations with the EU, particularly with regard to trade and investment. Belarus could be handsomely remunerated with percentages of profits made or perhaps with greater subsidies on imports of Russian resources. There are certainly limits to the level of Russian products Belarus could absorb for sale to the West. Resale of Russian goods at value added prices would murder the project. Russia certainly could not attempt to move goods into EU countries via Belarus at a level equal to anything it might achieve by trading with them directly. Moscow and Minsk would surely set parameters for the bilateral deal. However, the smallest level would surely be far more than Russia could sell as long as sanctions are in place. Trading an EEU partner’s goods externally in this manner may very well be covered in the economic bloc’s trade provisions. Beyond profit, benefits of this trade arrangement would include: the preservation of Belarus’ brotherly relationship with Russia; Lukashenko’s would have no need to be concerned that the sovereignty of Belarus and its interests were not being respected; and, collective arrangements with Russia such as EEU and CSTO will remain intact. Indeed, Belarus would remain in Russia’s sphere of interest. Note that Belarus is among the few states in Europe that has not asked for membership in the EU. While Belarus has strove for better contacts with EU lately, it has simultaneously sought to further its economic and political ties with Russia.

In many ways, this hypothetical trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia would resemble the creative arrangement Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin proposed for trade with Moldova. Moldova is not subject to EU sanctions. Thus, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia and avoid restrictions. A trade arrangement of this type between Belarus and Russia would also resemble the Outward Processing Trade regime that the EU introduced for Belarus. That regime raised import quota amounts for textiles and clothing manufacturers within the EU thus allowing them to produce garments in Belarus that will return to the EU after processing. Additionally, the arrangement would resemble the somewhat awkward way in which some Belarusian firms have been relabelling food from EU countries and selling them in Russia thereby avoiding Russian sanctions. Probae est in segetem sunt deteriorem datae fruges, tamen ipsae suaptae enitent. (A good seed, planted even in poor soil, will bear rich fruit by its own nature.)

What Might Encourage Putin and Lukashenko to Take This Course?

What might encourage Lukashenko and Putin to seek this arrangement is the fact that after Russia, the main trading partner of Belarus is the EU. Nearly, a third of the country’s overall trade is with the EU. That trade could most likely be expanded with a nuanced cultivation. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU withdrew its trade preferences to Belarus under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences in 2007 in response to Belarus’ violations of the core principles of the International Labour Organization, exports from Belarus to the EU did not cease. The decision only required Belarus to pay import tariffs at the standard non-preferential rate. Trade was also promoted through the Outward Processing Trade regime,which was mentioned earlier.

Lukashenko stands on terrain high enough to survey the liabilities involved in moving closer to the West. Voices in the West have indicated that not all are impressed with Lukashenko’s positive words and a perceived unwarranted rapprochement to Belarus. Even when EU ministers decided to lift most sanctions against Belarus in 2015, they said concern remained “with the situation of human rights in Belarus.” Ministers called on Minsk to abolish the death penalty and implement Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) recommendations on democracy before the 2015 Belarusian Parliamentary Elections. An OSCE report said October’s election showed Belarus had a “considerable way go to” on democratic standards, noting the absence of safeguards against multiple voting, limited choice available to voters and the uneven playing field between Lukashenko and his political opponents. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, Mikloś Haraszti, stated after the 2015 Belarusian Presidential Election that he had seen no changes in “the dismal human rights situation.” Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might inadvertently trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

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Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. However, Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

The Way Forward

In William Shakespeare’s comedy, All’s Well That Ends Well, Helena, a physician’s daughter, chooses to marry Bertram, a man of high social position in the French court, but he rejects her love. In response, Helena engages in a plot to wed Bertram by employing what has come to be known as the “Bed Trick.” As she begins to execute her plan in Act 3, Scene 7, Helena states: “Why, then tonight, Let us assay our plot: which, if it speed, Is wicked meaning in lawful act; Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact: But let’s about it.” A trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia as outlined here will likely cause discomfort for those who reasonably demand compliance with imposed sanctions. There is nothing inherently wrong with finding and exploiting a loophole in a regulation, business contract, or sanctions. One must have the will to seize the opportunity.

As the leader of a world power, Putin fully understands that his policies should make the Russian people hopeful for the future, not anxious or intimidated. Negative outlooks only advertise the limits one has. Reacting negatively to growing Euro-Belarus ties would not be useful. Inter-border cooperation has greatly assisted in harmonizing domestic policy priorities and international and regional security issues between Belarus and Russia. Inter-border cooperation between Belarus and Russia, albeit from different perspectives, is a prerequisite for improving the relations of both countries with the EU. (The EU is drawing closer to Belarus due to the nature of its ties to Russia. Russia may move closer to Belarus to exploit its improved ties to the EU.) Belarus is already a priority for Russia’s diplomatic, military, political, and economic resources. If Putin senses that he can, with Lukashenko’s cooperation, exploit the rapprochement between the EU and Belarus to circumvent imposed sanctions, that tack could eventually be accepted by Moscow as a mechanism for coping with problems stemming from the divisions between EU and EEU countries.