A Link between Trump’s June 2018 Letters to European Allies and His July 2018 Summit with Putin: A View from Outside the Box

Posted on July 12, 2018 by greatcharlie

US President Donald Trump (right) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) at the G7 meeting in Charlevoix. Trump believes NATO should deploy a combined force under its collective security arrangement that truly has the capability and capacity to deter, and if necessary, fight and defeat attacks from all directions, but especially an attack from their most likely adversary: Russia. He believes the time to rebuild NATO is now. The degree to which the Europeans invest in the build up of their defense will impact how Trump will handle situations concerning Europe with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin.

The renowned US foreign policy scholar and former US National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, stated that sophisticated US leadership is sine qua non of a stable world order. US President Donald Trump has set forth to serve in the leadership role as prescribed. Serving that role entails meeting with Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to discuss matters concerning the world’s strongest nuclear powers and the threat posed by Russia to European security. As the leader of West, he must also serve as the steward of NATO and ensure transatlantic security is effectively maintained. On its face, there is a link between these matters as concerns of the president. However, the tie is much greater.

Trump plans to meet with Putin both one-on-one and in a formal meeting with delegations of aides in Helsinki, Finland on July 16, 2018. The meeting will be the first formal summit talks between them. They have met previously on the sidelines of conferences. They have also had a number of telephone conversations. The decision by the two leaders to have summit meeting was actually reached through phone conversations on March 20, 2018 and April 2, 2018. US National Security Adviser John Bolton explained in an televised interview, “The goal of this meeting really is for the two leaders to have a chance to sit down, not in the context of some larger multilateral meeting, but just the two of them, to go over what is on their mind about a whole range of issues.” In a conversation with reporters aboard Air Force One on June 29, 2018, Trump said that he planned to talk to Putin about everything. He further stated: “We’re going to talk about Ukraine, we’re going to be talking about Syria, we’ll be talking about elections. And we don’t want anybody tampering with elections. We’ll be talking about world events. We’ll be talking about peace. Maybe we talk about saving billions of dollars on weapons, and maybe we don’t.” (There is also a good chance that the ears of North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un will be burning once the one-on-one session is underway.) At the same time news broke about the planned summit, reports that Trump sent letters in June 2018 to several European leaders concerning NATO surfaced. The letters also arrived one month before the July 11-12, 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels. Trump purportedly explained in the letters that after more than a year of public and private complaints that allies have not done enough to share the burden of collective security. Trump hinted that in response, he might consider a significant modification in how US forces are deployed in Europe. The letters have indeed been the latest figurative ladle Trump has used to stir billows in the pot with European leaders. While most might view it as doubtful, Trump means well, and at least from his perspective, he has done everything for all the right reasons. Indeed, a closer look at the situation, or a look at the situation from outside the box, indicates that the situation is not as bad as it may seem to other European leaders and their advisers.

Trump wants to get a handle on the important matter of Europe’s defense and transatlantic collective security. He wants to actually do something about the threat that Russia poses to Europe, and contrary to everything critics have stated, make NATO a genuine defense against potential Russian aggression posed by Putin or any other leaders. Trump believes the time to rebuild NATO is now. He would like to have European leaders move away from staid thinking and somewhat superficial action on their security, and deploy a combined force under NATO’s collective security arrangement that truly has the capability and capacity to deter, and fight and win if deterrence fails. The rather restrained efforts of the Europeans so far will have a direct impact on how he might handle situations concerning Europe with Putin. Trump wants them to stop making it so difficult for him to work with them. The purpose here is to take a deeper look, from outside the box, at Trump’s approach to enhancing Europe’s defense and transatlantic security. It illustrates that main task for Trump is not simply to garner increases in spending on NATO, but encourage the Europeans to change their relatively relaxed perspectives and take more energetic approaches toward their own security. Quid ergo? non ibo per priorum vestigia? ego vero utar via vetere, sed si propiorem planioremque invenero, hanc muniam. Qui ante nos ista moverunt non domini nostri sed duces sunt. Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata; multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est. (What then? Shall I not follow in the footsteps of my predecessors? I shall indeed use the old road, but if I find one that makes a shorter cut and is smoother to travel, I shall open the new road. Men who have made these discoveries before us are not our masters, but our guides. Truth lies open for all; it has not yet been monopolized. And there is plenty of it left even for posterity to discover.)

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (above). Finding a way to establish an authentic positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would give his best effort to finding a solution. He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. Trump has already met with Putin and by Putin’s admission, he and Trump regularly discuss matters by phone. However, everything is not perfect yet; rough patches exist.

Trump-Putin Summit: A Chance to Investigate Possibilities

Finding a way to establish an authentic, positive relationship with Russia is a struggle US administrations have engaged in for a few decades. Trump said he would give his best effort to finding a solution. He does not want to settle on a long-term stand-off in which peace, particularly in Europe, is placed at risk. Trump logically concluded that accomplishing these things would first require establishing a positive relationship with Putin. Trump has already met him and so far their chemistry has been good. By Putin’s admission, he and Trump regularly discuss matters by phone. However, everything is not perfect; many rough patches exist. In assessing the possibility of improving relations with Russia, albeit in the abstract, Trump has taken a good look inside. He has not missed what has been happening there. He is aware that Russia is an authoritarian regime with all of the authoritarian tendencies at home and abroad. That authoritarianism is harnessed by a quest for economic development. Commingled with that is the politicization of local economic activity. What creates the slightest possibility that economic development may pan out in some way is the fact that Russia is oil rich. Still, that possibility has been dampened somewhat by the reality that Russia is a criminalized state. In terms of foreign policy, the goal of authoritarian Russia is to supplant Western power, diminish Western influence, and weaken stability promoted by the West. Russia has also sought to increase its influence in Eastern and Central Europe. In the previous US administration, that region was not a priority. The previous US administration introduced policy approaches such as “Pivot to Asia” and the “reset with Russia” which sent the wrong signals to Moscow. Russia had kept its sights on the region. It was have very senior leaders visit the region frequently.To the extent that it could, Russia would invest in infrastructure, provide military assistance, and support pro-Russian political parties and movements. Occasional visits from US officials supported a perception in Washington that is was engaged. The vacuum created by the delinquency of the previous US administration in the region was filled by Russia.

After Moscow grabbed Crimea and began to shape Eastern Ukraine, the US made it clear that it did not accept what occurred and set clear boundaries for Russia in Ukraine. Expectations were laid out. Still, Russia has continued to engage in aggressive behavior. Over 10,000 Ukrainians have been killed in the struggle in Donetsk and Luhansk. In the Trump administration, no doubt has been left in public statements and messaging. Sanctions remain in place. The US is willing to engage with Russia where there are shared interests. Counterterrorism and nuclear nonproliferation are examples of that. However, nefarious Russian moves, as seen in Montenegro, Moldova, Bulgaria, and threatening language toward States as Macedonia, Norway, and Finland, have drawn and will prompt harsh language from the US. Russia has even sought to antagonize Trump through efforts such as boasting about the strength of Russia’s arsenal and using computer graphics to illustrate the ability of hypersonic weapons to reach his Mar-a-Lago residence in Florida. Trump broached that matter with Putin during his phone call with him on March 20, 2018. US efforts to counter Russian moves have not only included pressing for greater burden sharing on defense, but also weakening support for Nord Stream II.

An additional factor for Trump to consider is the influence of Russia’s intelligence industry–the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) known better as the KGB—the agency responsible for intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal security from Russia’s Soviet past, the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsi (Russian Federation Federal Security Service) or FSB; the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service) or SVR; and, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel’noye Upravleniye Generalnovo Shtaba (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff-Military Intelligence) or GRU–has on the society. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia really became a criminal country. By successfully navigating through the banality, incompetence, and corruption of the Soviet government, the intelligence industry managed to stand on top of all that was good, the bad, and ugly in the new Russia. Intelligence officers have always been fully aware of what was transpiring in their country. Soviet intelligence officers recognized when the collapse of their country was underway. Yet, they viewed it as a duty to keep the truth from the people. Information control was also used as the justification for such action. Prevaricating remains part of the government’s life system and survival system. Perhaps the primary goal of such mendacity now is to “make Russia great again.” When the truth plays a role, it is misused. Facts are distorted to cloak some scheme. The truth will many times threaten Moscow’s efforts. When Russian untruthfulness is encountered by the West on issues great and minor, often the response is surprise and disappointment. Confronting Moscow on the truth will not bring a satisfactory result. There will be no admissions, no confessions, no mea culpas. That being said, Trump should still meet with the leader who sits on top of it all to find out what is happening in Russia.

As explained in a February 28, 2018 greatcharlie post entitled, “A Russian Threat on Two Fronts: A New Understanding of Putin, Not Inadequate Old Ones, Will Allow the Best Response,” Putin prepares for his meetings or any other official contacts in advance, by mining available information about his scheduled interlocutors and by considering all possible angles of how they might challenge him and how he would explain himself in a plausible, satisfying way. Such is the nature of politics as well as diplomacy. Putin is super observant. It is a quality that stirs admiration from some and or elicits terror in others. If any one could detect a hint of anger or dissention in the eyes, in mannerisms, in bearing and deportment, in the words of another, it would be Putin. Usus, magister egregius. (Experience, that excellent master.)

A long espoused, jejune criticism of Trump is that he has a self-enchantment with tyrants, strongmen, rogue leaders such as Putin. His comments about Putin have been decried by critics as being unduly pleasant and oleaginous particularly in light of reports from the US Intelligence Community that Russia interfered in the 2016 US Presidential Election. Trump dismisses the obloquy of critics. In reality, Trump, rather than finding Putin intoxicating, has developed his own reservations about him having had a number of disappointing experiences with him in the past year. Indeed, while engaged in diplomacy, the Trump administration has observed hostile Russian moves such as continued interference n US elections, as well as those of other countries, efforts to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and the effort to tighten Moscow’s grip Crimea and the Donbass. Nevertheless, with optimism spurred by having found some areas of agreement and given the degree of mutual respect between Putin and himself, Trump still seeks to engage Russia in a way that will improve relations long-term. As one cause for the summit meeting, Trump hopes he might find some touch that he could put on the situation to knock everything into the right direction. As another cause for the summit, Trump is investigating the degree to which Putin is a threat to European defense and transatlantic collective security. Much as it is the case in any legitimate investigation, Trump, is interviewing its subject: Putin. Trump also has system of evaluation people developed from his experience as a business negotiator. Trump has an understanding of human nature, and even sympathy for human frailty. One of his greatest strengths is his capacity for listening. However, when necessary, he can be stubborn and stone-hearted. After the one-on-one session, Trump will better understand Putin’s thinking and intentions from what he hears and what he does not hear. Through well-crafted questions, he should collect enough information to satisfy his own concerns. His skilled observations of Putin’s behavior will also serve to inform. Surely, Trump is fully aware the Putin will attempt to glean information from him. Res ipsa repperi facilitate nihil esse homini melius neque clementia. (I have learned by experience that nothing is more advantageous to a person than courtesy and compassion.)

Trump aboard the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier (above) To immediately field a NATO force that would be genuinely capable of deterring and if necessary fight, repel, and defeat Russian forces the US would need to cover any gaps in NATO’s strength, earmarking a sizeable portion of its forces primarily for that task. Trump cannot rightly increase US spending and invest more US troops in NATO, if the Europeans intend to simply sit back and let the US carry the load, and potentially cut back on defemsr. The Europeans can build stronger armies and field more advanced weapon systems.

Trump Sought to Energize, Not Antagonize with His Letters

The US commitment to NATO is extant. Even after all that has been said, Trump absolutely understands that NATO is essential to the defense of the US and its interests in Europe. Although Trump has not made a grand display of his concern, he actually sees Russia not only as a competitor, but as a genuine threat. The US will take the lead in handling Russia during his administration, but he wants the European to genuinely stand beside the US in its efforts. In 2017, the Trump administration explained that taking the lead internationally and advancing US military, political and economic strength is a vital US interest. To that extent, the Trump administration has promised to greatly increase the capabilities and capacity of the US military. Additionally, it has sought to bolster US power by strengthening its alliances and its partnerships with economically thriving partners. It has done so while ensuring that those alliances and partnerships are based on mutual respect and shared responsibility. In the US National Security Council’s summary under, ”Preserve Peace Through Strength”, steps the administration stated it would take were outlined as follows: “We will rebuild America’s military strength to ensure it remains second to none. America will use all of the tools of statecraft in a new era of strategic competition–diplomatic, information, military, and economic—to protect our interests. America will strengthen its capabilities across numerous domains–including space and cyber–and revitalize capabilities that have been neglected. America’s allies and partners magnify our power and protect our shared interests. We expect them to take greater responsibility for addressing common threats. We will ensure the balance of power remains in America’s favor in key regions of the world: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.” Trump’s letters to European leaders manifested his determination to get them to significantly increase their military expenditures, make NATO an authentic deterrent to potential Russian aggression, and along the way, take greater responsibility for addressing common threats. Some might find it confusing, but the letters also evinced the degree to which Trump is genuinely concerned about the well-being of Europe and NATO. According to the New York Times, the actual number of letters sent by Trump has not been revealed. The White House explained that it does not comment on presidential correspondence. Other sources apparently informed the New York Times that at least a dozen were sent. Supposedly, recipients included: Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Belgium, Norway, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.

Each letter reportedly echoed Trump’s complaint that the NATO allies are not living up to the commitment they made at their Wales summit meeting in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on national defense. US National Security Adviser John Bolton said in an televised interview on CBS’s “Face the Nation” that “The president wants a strong NATO.” He went on to state: “If you think Russia’s a threat, ask yourself this question: Why is Germany spending less than 1.2 percent of its GNP? When people talk about undermining the NATO alliance, you should look at those who are carrying out steps that make NATO less effective militarily.” However, shortly before the letters were sent, Europeans officials sought to defend their respective failures to meet the 2 percent pledge. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen, for example, said Germany will increase defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2024. She further explained that Germany and all NATO allies, however, only committed to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. In her view, there was no pledge in the text of the 2014 Wales Summit Declaration to spend at least 2 percent by 2024. At Wales, it was only agreed that NATO countries aim to move toward the 2 percent guideline within a decade. Some military analysts argue that tying defense spending to GDP makes no sense. Moreover, it leads to issues concerning changes in GDP, a country’s respective spending on defense, and how a country’s defense budget is spent. Semper autem in fide quid senseris, non quid dixens, cognitandum. (A promise must be kept not only in the letter but in the spirit.)

Excerpts of Trump’s letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel was shared with the New York Times by someone who saw it. Trump allegedly wrote to Merkel: “As we discussed during your visit in April, there is growing frustration in the United States that some allies have not stepped up as promised.” He continued: “The United States continues to devote more resources to the defense of Europe when the Continent’s economy, including Germany’s, are doing well and security challenges abound. This is no longer sustainable for us.” Regarding frustration over NATO in the US, Trump explained: “Growing frustration is not confined to our executive branch. The United States Congress is concerned, as well.” Trump also posited in the letter that Germany deserves blame for the failure of other NATO countries to spend enough, writing: “Continued German underspending on defense undermines the security of the alliance and provides validation for other allies that also do not plan to meet their military spending commitments, because others see you as a role model.” Most likely in a further effort to light a fire under the Europeans, the Trump administration made it known that the US had been analyzing a large-scale withdrawal of US forces from Germany.

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis expressed concern over the direction that the United Kingdom was moving regarding defense in his own letter to the United Kingdom’s Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson. The United Kingdom has cut defense spending over the past decade in line with an austerity program that has also seen cuts to domestic spending. London and Paris still field far and away the most powerful militaries in Europe. While Mattis noted that the United Kingdom, a NATO allies that has met the alliance’s target of 2 percent spending of GDP on the military, he insisted it was not good enough for a country of its status. Regarding the United Kingdom’s global role, Mattis proffered that it “will require a level of defense spending beyond what we would expect from allies with only regional interests.” Mattis went on to state: “I am concerned that your ability to continue to provide this critical military foundation … is at risk of erosion.” Supporting his position, Mattis explained: “The reemergence of the great power competition requires that we maintain vigilance and the ability to operate across the full combat spectrum, notably at the high end.” He continued: “While we must sustain military capabilities to deter, and win if deterrence fails . . . we must also improve and enhance those capabilities if we’re to carry out our obligations to future peace.” As part of process of turning the situation around, Mattis asked for a “clear and fully funded, forward defense blueprint” from the United Kingdom. Mattis stated that “It is in the best interest of both our nations for the UK to remain the U.S. partner of choice.” However, he noted that France was increasing its spending, and wrote: “As global actors, France and the U.S. have concluded that now is the time to significantly increase our investment in defense.” Some Members of Parliament have called for spending to increase to 2.5 or 3 percent of national output from 2 percent.

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis (left) and Gernan Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen (right). Shortly before Trump sent letters to European leaders, a number of European officials have sought to defend their respective failures to meet the 2 percent pledge. Von der Leyen, for example, said Germany will increase defense spending to 1.5 percent of GDP by 2024. She further explained that Germany and all NATO allies, however, only committed to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. In her view, there was no pledge at Wales to “spend at least 2 percent by 2024.”

An Awful Experience for the Europeans

In his first book, De Officiis (on Duties) written in 44 B.C., the renowned Roman orator and statesman of Roman Republic, Marcus Tullius Cicero explained that individuals do not exist to be in constant antagonistic contest. Instead, individuals exist to help each other in peaceful cooperation to the mutual benefit of all. He stated: “Consequently, we ought in this to follow nature as our leader, to contribute to the common stock the things that benefit everyone together and, by exchange of dutiful services, by giving and receiving effort and means, to bind fast the fellowship of men with each other.” Europeans leaders unlikely sensed from his inauguration Day on January 20, 2017, that working with Trump would not be a passeggiata. However, there appears to be more than the usual occasions of disappointment and discord with their ally across the Atlantic. Trump’s statements directed toward European leaders on NATO has resulted in an emotional mangle. Real feelings of trepidation exist among them. When national leaders are fogged in on an issue and cannot get a handle on a situation in a satisfying way, there is an anxiety, a sense of panic that ensues. Not being able to answer big questions on foreign policy, especially when they are dealing with such a powerful and influential country as the US will often obstruct, even thwart efforts to formulate and implement policies, strategies, and nuanced approaches.

The popular response of European leaders toward Trump has been to react intemperately and to figuratively march against him, banners of their countries flying. They are well-aware that by reproaching Trump, they will be feted in their respective national news media and within the public of their countries. However, the small benefits derived from pleasing crowds at home is far outweighed by the bigger picture of their countries respective relationships with the US. Many European leaders have not looked beyond the surface by trying to better discern Trump’s words and deeds, by ratcheting up diplomatic and other contacts with US, and devising fresh approaches to work better with the Trump administration. They have failed to view these quarrels as opportunities to develop new, better, enriching paths to take with the US. What they have done is create the danger of driving their countries’ relations with the US down to lower points. A notable exception to all of this has been German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Although still bearing the brunt of Trump’s admonishments of the Europeans, her approach to Trump has evolved in a very sophisticated, constructive way. She now takes a solution oriented, not a reactionary, approach to issues at hand, taking a hopeful tone with Trump and encouraging him to consider what she is relaying . On the matter of trade, she has offered thoughtful options particularly on economic issues that could mitigate an exchange of harsh tariffs. Merkel is aware that when there are confrontations between European leaders and Trump, “in the heat of battle”, a tigerish performance will be seen from him. That has only had a deleterious effect on relations with US, decelerating the process of finding solutions to issues. Merkel will very likely accomplish much as she moves in a methodical way toward the US president. Given the attitudes and behavior of some European leaders toward him, Trump undoubtedly appreciates the sangfroid and steadfastness displayed by Merkel, and the good rapport he has been developing with her.

Trump’s own responses on social media to reactions in European capitals to his admonishments, not only by letter, but via official statements and messaging, represent his immediate perceptions and his frustration that his counterparts are not seeing issues in the same way he does. At a deeper level, Trump is most likely very disappointed that such discord has been obtained as a result of his words. His goal is certainly not to defeat or lay seize to his allies on the issue of of defense spending. The European allies are definitely not his foes and not perceived as such by him in the slightest way. His actions are not part of some decision to engage in endless campaigns of finger wagging against European allies to achieve some strange, vacuous sense of superiority over them as has been suggested by some critics. Words have flown back and forth, and critics have described it as chaos. However, order could still be found in that so-called chaos. There is structure underpinning every foreign policy tack taken by Trump.

When deciding to approach European leaders on what he believes NATO must do to defeat that threat, Trump clearly did not feel the situation would allow for some longer term effort in which he would try to cultivate their affections. Trump’s letters to European leaders evince that he doubts they are ready to act on their own volition in a way that cause any real strain. Trump also apparently feels that time is the essence and that facts, not sentiment, support that view. Those NATO Members whose borders are closest to Russia sense the threat. However, it appears that the farther west NATO Members are situated from that virtual “boundary line” with Russia, the weaker their sense of immediate emergency becomes. European leaders may fulminate against Russia in public speeches, creating the optics of being resolute on defense during election campaign or otherwise. Yet, they are less energetic in using their countries’ tools of national power–military, diplomatic, economic, political, and information–to make the situation better. Trump may complain but, they will still hesitate to invest in defense. It may very well be that the alarms set off by Russia’s move into Crimea have been somewhat quieted and nerves are less frayed in capitals over what occurred. Still, Russia has not gone away.

The conceptual sixth-generation US fighter, the F-X (above). Trump has not made a grand display of his concern, but he likely sees Russia as a threat, not just a competitor. In 2017, the Trump administration explained that the US would take the lead internationally and advance US military, political and economic strength. The capabilities and capacity of the US military would be greatly increased. New fighters such as the F-X would be built. Alliances and partnerships based on mutual respect and shared responsibility would also be strengthened.

A Deeper Dive Regarding Trump’s Concerns

Quod dubites, ne feceris. (Never do a thing concerning the rectitude of which you are in doubt.) Likely uppermost in Trump’s mind is how he would ever be able to make progress on NATO when the mindset, the psyche of the allied leaders, evinces a somewhat limited interest in genuinely making the situation better. By all that is being said by national leaders, it sounds as if they want a strong defense, but they are acting quite differently. Indeed, Trump hears Europeans complain about Russian actions and potential actions in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and even the Baltic States, a fellow NATO Member. However, complaining and repositioning a modicum of forces will not allow Trump to legitimately tell Putin how energized and prepared NATO Members are ready to act against any aggression especially when its members still will not meet politically agreed goals of spending. Their will and readiness to act must real if their efforts are to have any meaning in the military sense, not the domestic political sense.

Trump is frustrated by the fact that the wrong signals are being sent to Putin by the casual attitude and relaxed behavior of the Europeans. Putin has little reason to be impressed with NATO. The Europeans can be assured that he watching events far more carefully than they would like. He has noticed the degree to which European leaders actually care for Ukraine. Perhaps European leaders would argue that they are providing arms and advisers to Ukraine and have bolstered the defense of the Baltic States and have had their armed forces participate in greater numbers in NATO exercises as well. However, looking good by doing a few good things is not the same as being good, by doing everything at the levels required. Putin may very well be wondering whether European leaders may go soft if he “supports” pro-Russian activity deeper or elsewhere in that Ukraine, if he takes more of Georgia, if he builds up its military and naval bases in Kaliningrad, or if he positions Russian ground forces in a way that threatens the Suwalki Gap. Putin has been engaged in a campaign of probes, investigating, testing the resolve of European leaders with aerial and naval intrusions into NATO airspace and waters. Such prospective moves on the ground would make the Russian threat three dimensional, and leave little doubt in the minds of NATO military analysts that his campaign of probes would best serve the purpose of preparing for military action. To field a NATO force genuinely capable of deterring and if necessary fight, repel, and defeat Russian forces, the US itself would need to cover any gaps in NATO’s strength, earmarking a sizeable portion of its forces primarily for that task.

Trump cannot rightly increase US spending, invest more US troops in NATO, if the Europeans intend to simply sit back and let the US carry the load, and potentially cut back and actually do less. That would hardly be in the interest of the US, especially when the Europeans could build stronger armies and field more advanced weapon systems and gear. What would likely happen is that the Europeans would let the US do all the heavy lifting. The US military cannot be allowed to be a surrogate army for the Europeans.

Given NATO’s current capabilities and capacity, in reality, it may not be able to successfully defend any threatened territory. Trump wants to know why any European leader would think that he should deploy US troops overseas in a somewhat likely untenable defense of countries, particularly when those countries are not fully committed to their own security. Trump wants Europeans leaders to see and understand his position. European leaders successfully transmitted the message that they want Trump and US government to be more understanding of the political considerations that has hamstrung them from taking robust action on NATO. However, they have not publicly expressed empathy or compassion for the position of the US. Recognizing the need to bolster NATO on the ground in Europe, and the great value it has placed in its ties to European allies, the US had consistently bit the bullet over many years and committed its military wherewithal to Europe knowing the Europeans would not do their fair share. Omnes sibi malle melius esse qualm alteri. (It is human nature that every individual should wish for his own advantage in preference to that of others.)

When deciding how to approach European leaders on what he believes NATO must do to defeat the threat posed by Russia, Trump apparently did not feel the situation would allow for a long term effort in which he would try to cultivate their affections. Trump’s letters to European leaders evince that he doubts they are ready act on their own volition in a way that cause any real strain. Trump seems to feel that time is of the essence and that facts, not sentiment, support his view. On a deeper level, Trump is likely disappointed that such discord was obtained as a result of his words.

Although he has not been a politician for long, Trump has discovered much since his full immersion into the world of politics. It would seem that based on what he has learned so far, which can be added to the considerable experience in human interactions that he has already acquired, he most likely has a sense that political expediency, not pragmatic thinking, not a genuine concern about national defense, could inevitably be shaping their sense of reality. Trump understands that those leaders are under pressure to find more money for health, education, the police, immigration, financial pressure created by economically weaker EU members. They will offer explanations, arguments, and occasionally nod the heads and agree that more must be done, then return to doing whatever is expedient. Therefore, Trump is pushing the Europeans hard on the matter. Trump is aware of the fact that while it is a commendable decision, it is not an easy decision for a citizen to engage in the process to become a national leader. Perhaps is could decision could be driven by a calling for some to serve the respective interest of their people and their countries. The job itself, for those who do it well, can become a living sacrifice. The business of politics can be heteroclite. Horse trading is at the very heart of interactions between politicians. If the opportunity arises, they will negotiate preferred conditions, protect and possibly improve the status of their political realms, better things for their constituents and their benefactors, secure their interests. It is often during that negotiating process that things can get mixed up. What is declared a satisfactory outcome becomes relative to the situation. This point can be sardonically illustrated as follows: Politicians may accept as true that the sum of 2 plus 2 equals 4, but after horse trading, many might be willing to agree that the sum is 5! Something that is not quite right is accepted as the new reality. During the next opportunity to negotiate, 2 plus 2 might equal 4 again! This is not corruption, it is simply nature of give and take that is part of the job. “You can’t always get what you want! Yet, given that apparent mindset, what is evinced from the decisions by European leaders on defense is more style than substance, full of sound and fury that signifies nothing to a threatening adversary. Utque in corporibus sic in imperio gravissimus est morbus, qui a capite diffunditur. (It is in the body politic, as in the natural, those disorders are most dangerous that flow from the head.)

Trump has a sense that European military commanders are well-aware that greater efforts are needed by their respective countries in order provide for an authentic defense of Europe. Moreover, they know the matter is not black and white and cannot be corrected by simply increasing spending. An approach to defense, genuinely based on the idea of deterring an opponent, and fight and defeat the opponent if deterrence fails, must exist. However, they are subordinated to civilian authority, political leadership. Defense officials and military commanders that may insist on expressing such concerns, in the past have been rebuffed, scorned, called paranoid is potentially destabilizing, creating undue uncertainty and insecurity in the minds of the public. They may also be admonished for unnecessarily creating concerns among potential enemies or direct threats to potential adversaries which leaders hope to relax by being cautious and calibrated in their decisions on defense. Denied what they need to succeed by political leaders, their civilian authorities, absent a decision to resign from their respective armed forces, military commanders have little choice but to submit to that authority and fight and likely fail with whatever is given to them. This behavior was evinced in NATO discussions on considering how to organize the NRF and smaller VJTF. In the creation of the force, the well-considered, educated assumption was made that Russia, advancing westward militarily once more, would again use the tactics seen in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk in Ukraine. In the best case scenario for NATO, it would be alerted before Russian forces rushed into a neighboring country using heavy armored and mechanized units, highly mobile infantry, combat service units, and combat service support units, by observing it painstakingly massing along the mutual border with the country or countries it threatens. However, it would be counter-intuitive for Russian military commanders to do that. It would be similarly counter-intuitive for Russia to use the hybrid warfare tactic which NATO is best organized to oppose in any future moves. In the Zapad 2017 exercises, Russian forces displayed the capability to rapidly mass and quickly and successfully engage an opposing force. If instead of a hybrid attack, Putin ordered a Russian force, truly overwhelming in size and combat power, to rapidly mass and roll into a neighboring country and quickly engage and drive through elements the VJTF on the ground, it might be futile for the VJTF or NRF fly into a non permissive environment in an attempt to reinforce those vastly outnumbered or overrun elements. The quantity of pre-positioned weapon systems and ordinance that made available to it might be of little consequence. NATO forces deployed on the ground must be of sufficient size and power that such a move by Russia would be unthinkable.

Trump is frustrated by the fact that the wrong signals are being sent to Putin by the casual attitude and relaxed behavior of the Europeans. Putin has little reason to be impressed with NATO. The Europeans can be assured that he watching events far more carefully than they would like. Putin may be wondering whether European leaders may go soft if he “supports” pro-Russian activity deeper orelsewhere in that Ukraine, if he takes more of Georgia, if he builds up military and naval bases in Kaliningrad, or if he positions ground forces in a way that threatens the Suwalki Gap.

The Europeans Must Take a Winning Perspective Regarding Their Defense

Meminimus quanto maiore animo honestatis fructus in conscientia quam in fama reponatur. Sequi enim gloria, non appeti debet (I am sensible how much nobler it is to place the reward of virtue in the silent approbation of one’s own breast than in the applause of the world. Glory ought to be the consequence, not the motive of our actions.) Trump seeks to accomplish much for Europe. Some of his goals would have been unheard of in the past. His effort to achieve them is not a mirage. Critics have so desperately tried to convince the world he seeks to do more harm than good. A common, casual, and dastardly way to take down a patriotic citizen of any country is to bring one’s loyalty into question. To the extent that the ongoing investigations into alleged collusion of the 2016 US Presidential Campaign and the Russian Federation government that impression has been created. Even if the outcome of it all goes Trump’s way, the impression of wrongdoing will likely stick to some degree in the US public.

Trump has the will to persevere, to continue until he gets the outcome he wants. Perhaps Trump’s approach is a bit unconventional. Yet, additionally,, there is also an optimism about Trump. He imagines the positive. He anticipates success in what he does. If Trump’s goals for European defense and transatlantic collective security are achieved, and it is very likely they will be, European capitals will appreciate all of it.

Trump is well-aware that being a NATO Member State does not simply mean fulfilling certain obligations of the collective security arrangement, such as: posting an ambassador to the headquarters; attending ministerial meetings; leaders summits; “paying dues” as critics purposely misconstrued his words; committing some troops to occasional military exercises; allowing officers and troops to take advantage of education programs; and other activities. NATO is considerably more than an arrangement that provides for a combined military force designed to deter, and if necessary fight and defeat its most likely adversary: Russia. NATO is an expression of European solidarity. It is essentially an expression of the ties of Western countries as a family. Indeed, the US from the beginning was colonized by many of the same Western countries it now helps to defend. There is in many cases a common history, traditions, culture and well as common values and beliefs. Unity among them in NATO is based on common values and interests. There is no rational reason turn it all asunder. The US, Canada, the European countries, and now Colombia, must stick together and work through issues together as a transatlantic family. Families can always heal over an issue. Things can always get better in a family, especially when good thinkers are engaged on a matter.

Even in family relationships, there are always irritants. Little issues can linger and nag, negative statements are magnified. The role that the US plays on the NATO family should not be minimized or taken for granted. Under U.S. leadership for nearly 70 years, the alliance has accomplished great things while regional peace and security was maintained.. Responding to US leadership certainly does not require submission, subjugation, kowtow, even simply showing deference. It also does not entail expecting the US to carry Europe, or at least it should not. Hopefully, in European capitals, a sense of being entitled to heavy US assistance does not exist. Europe has brought itself up since the end of World War II, through the Cold War, and to the present with US help. Europe now must truly stand side by side with the US, facing forward and not standing behind or in the shadow of their powerful ally. A decision to make that adjustment would truly demonstrate that US efforts on European defense and transatlantic collective security are appreciated and being built on and not simply being taken advantage of. Many leaders in European capitals have shown no indication that they understand or are even trying to understand how things look from the other side of the Atlantic. That kind of broader perspective is not apparent in the public statements and messaging. If those leaders perspectives can change a bit, and the effort is made to work alongside the US as real partners and not as dependents, the security picture will become better for everyone. Trump is likely quietly optimistic about that.

Many European leaders have provided no indication that they understand or are even trying to understand how European defense and transatlantic collective security looks from the other side of the ocean. A broader perspective is not apparent in their public statements or messaging. If those leaders perspectives can change a bit, and the effort is made to work alongside the US as real partners and not as dependents, the security picture will become better for everyone. Trump is likely quietly optimistic about that.

The Way Forward

In Act IV, Scene iii of William Shakespeare’s The Life and Death of Julius Caesar, civil war has broken out and Octavius and Mark Antony are in Rome setting forth to retaliate against all who plotted against Caesar. Brutus and Cassius, who were among Caesar’s assassins, are camped with an army away from Rome, hoping to finish their work of reclaiming the Republic. Brutus and Cassius are in their tent, formulating a strategy to defeat the army of Octavius and Antony. Cassius suggests waiting for Octavius and Antony move to nearby Philippi, hoping the march will wear out their army, making them less effective if they tried to attack their camp. out along the way. Brutus fears Octavius and Antony may gain more followers during that march and believed their own army was at its peak and needed to strike immediately to exploit that advantage. Brutus states: “Under your pardon. You must note beside, That we have tried the utmost of our friends, Our legions are brim-full, our cause is ripe: The enemy increaseth every day; We, at the height, are ready to decline. There is a tide in the affairs of men, Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries. On such a full sea are we now afloat; And we must take the current when it serves, Or lose our ventures.” On occasion, Trump will appear driven in a particular situation by the idea that bold action, when appropriate, can turn situations around. His goal is to exploit success, preserve his freedom of action on immediate matters, and reduce vulnerability from action by his competitors. He acts in a manner designed to gain advantage, surprise, and momentum over his competitors, achieving results that would normally require far more time and would be more costly to the US. This has been observed repeatedly in his interactions with foreign leaders. Trump’s discernment of events and situations as well as his planning and execution of actions against competitors greatly resembles what military thinkers define as maneuver. He rushes to place himself in superior position in order to overcome and defeat his opponents efforts. Trump wants to deal with European defense and transatlantic collective security and the Russian threat to Europe while he is president. He feels that now is the time to act. Unlike his predecessors, he does not want to pass the problem on to another president after his second term ends. He likely sensse that as time passes, the matter will only become more urgent.

For Trump, a robust military build up is the best answer to deal with the Russian threat to Europe. He is also trying his best to connect with Putin to change his perspective and establish long-term peace and stability for Europe. Putin will readily exhibit an openness to diplomacy and his words create the impression that he can be flexible, However, Trump knows that may all be lip service. Given Putin’s record of behavior even during the short span of his administration, it is difficult to trust that Putin will behave. As a next step, if diplomacy does not bring satisfactory results fast enough Trump might boldly push back on Russian advances, reclaiming territory for partners as Ukraine and Georgia. That might inform Putin that he will not be allowed to have a free hand in Europe under his watch and that his latest acquisitions in Europe are vulnerable. However, Trump would still need to wait until sufficient military power in place to thwart attempts by Russia to respond militarily before such moves could ever be executed. That brings the matter back to the Europeans. Right now, European leaders do not seem too interested in building up sufficient military power to defend themselves. Some European leaders are willing to adhere to a position on defense, even if it is wanting, and then fully accepted it as satisfactory because it was determined to be the best or only recourse available. Trump’s letters have called those leaders out on that behavior. Trump is unwilling to simply accept the status quo. In his view, the time for half-measures has come to an end. Europeans must open their minds to new facts and thoughts. New perspectives on defense must arrive in their thinking.

There is said to be a temper of the soul that wants to live in illusion. Militarily, it has accounted for the limited war in Korea, the war of attrition in Vietnam, the liberation of Iraq, and many errors in between. Some European leaders have turned the reality of what is happening concerning European defense on its head by positing that whatever they might commit to NATO is all it really needs from them. However, the danger their countries face is real. Just as Trump sees opportunity in the moment, they should discern the opportunity that Trump presents. His words may discomfit and it may feel as if he is moving the goalposts. However, he is really offering an invitation. It is an invitation to rise up, to accomplish more, to be more. Hopefully, the Europeans will be willing to accept it. Iniqua raro maximis virtutibus fortuna parcit; nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest; quem saepe transit casus, aliquando invenit. (Unrighteous fortune seldom spares the highest worth; no one with safety can long front so frequent perils. Whom calamity oft passes by she finds at last.)

Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump: But Trump Will Not Look Past Europe or NATO

Posted on June 6, 2017 by greatcharlie

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (left) made the stunning insinuation after meetings in Europe with US President Donald Trump (right) that he is not a reliable partner on which Germany and the Continent can depend. Months before, Trump’s cabinet members travelled to Europe and stress he is behind Europe and NATO and committed to Article 5, which requires all members to come to the defense of any country in the alliance that is attacked. When it comes to the trans-Atlantic relationship and NATO, any claim that the US cannot be counted upon is fallacious.

According to a May 28, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel, hailed as Europe’s most influential leader, made the stunning comment after three days of trans-Atlantic meetings that US President Donald Trump is not the reliable partner her country and the Continent can depend upon. The May 28th Times article quotes Merkel’s as stating: “The times in which we could rely fully on others — they are somewhat over,” adding, “This is what I experienced in the last few days.” Merkel went on to state: “We have to know that we must fight for our future on our own, for our destiny as Europeans.” Her strong comments represented a potentially seismic shift in trans-Atlantic relations, as she has concluded without reservation that the US is now less willing to intervene overseas. The Times article explains that Merkel was personally disappointed that Trump declined to publicly endorse NATO’s doctrine of collective defense or to agree to common European positions on global trade, dealing with Russian aggression or mitigating the effects of climate change. Supposedly, Merkel had been already somewhat unnerved as a result of her meetings in Washington with Trump March 17-18, 2017. Through her statements, which were made while on the campaign trail in Munich, Merkel seemingly called upon voters to get accustomed to Germany’s more active role in Europe and its greater involvement in crises on the Continent and global ones that can affect Europe’s future. Merkel is seeking a fourth term as Chancellor ahead of parliamentary elections in September 2017. The Times article elaborates that Trump campaigned on a platform of trade protectionism, nationalism and skepticism about multilateralism, and climate change, on which most European leaders disagree with him. The article also notes that Europeans rely upon NATO for their ultimate defense and are more concerned than Trump about an increasingly aggressive Russia.

Merkel’s comments were truly an expression of angst. Her words would lead one to believe that the current period, rather than being of change, and reinvigoration, is languid and dissolute. Yet, as a result of her statement, she may have also stirred concerns in the capitals of other NATO countries over how they will defend themselves against their most likely opponent, Russia, and handle other matters, without the US. They perhaps lack her confidence on how things will proceed. There may even be some speculation over what information Merkel really has on Trump’s commitment to Europe, thereby billowing rumors and suspicion within the alliance. As the Trump administration is still relatively new, allowance could be made for caution among Merkel and her senior advisers. The advent of misunderstandings in bilateral and regional policy approaches is a recurring motif in burgeoning relations between two countries particularly when long-standing approaches to each other might change a bit and a new political leadership in one or both countries has taken power. However, some of Trump’s officials travelled to Europe months before his visit and stressed that he is fully behind Europe, NATO and committed to Article 5, which requires all members to come to the defense of any country in the alliance that is attacked. Clearly, their efforts were not completely effective. Despite any doubts that have been expressed in Europe, when it comes to NATO and the trans-Atlantic relationship, any claims that the US can no longer be counted upon are fallacious.

Merkel should have considered waiting a moment and taking inventory of what has transpired so far instead of turning so quickly in a negative direction. Upon the “heat and flame of her distemper,” Merkel should have “sprinkled cool patience.” Indeed, what has been apparent in Merkel’s contacts with Trump, at least from what she has said, is the existence of a personal struggle between leaders. The genuine job at hand for the Chancellor is to do what best serves the interest of the German people. Berlin should reorient on the matter actually at hand which is the relationship of Germany, and to an extent Europe, with the US. What has been apparent in Merkel’s contacts with Trump, at least from what she has expressed, is the existence of a personal struggle between leaders. Ways must be found for Merkel to respond and engage her country’s most powerful ally and cope with what she may view as the current US administration’s “unconventional” approach to policy matters concerning Europe. German policymakers, foreign policy analysts, and diplomats must find an explanation for these perceived anomalies. It may seem odd to state this about such long-time allies, but confidence-building measures and other efforts to build trust are really needed at this point. Resources should be diverted to that end. There is, in reality, nothing so mysterious about Trump that should have led Merkel to make what was tantamount to a concession statement about her failed efforts to create a linkage with Trump to her satisfaction. Merkel must work with Trump. For her, that may not be easy or pleasant, but it does not have to be. It must be, however, a task performed well. Cuiusvis est errare nullius nisi insipientes, in error perseverare. (To err is inherent in every man, but to persist in error takes a fool.)

Reacting to Trump as she did in the end may not provide the satisfying experience Merkel wanted. She may have difficulty with Trump, but that does not mean other leaders might wish to work with him and might appreciate his efforts to rejuvenate NATO. Suggesting the US would no longer be part of the European security structure very likely ignited fears within some NATO countries just west of Russia’s border that interestingly enough form a type of buffer zone between Russia and Germany. They may not feel confident about making a new security arrangement under Berlin’s leadership.

Merkel’s Decision to Speak Out

It is hard to see how so much discord could have possibly developed between Trump and Merkel given that the two leaders have barely interacted. The best evidence of Merlel’s attitude toward Trump can be found in her statements. Trump has also received glares from her. For his part though, Trump has repeatedly stated that he has had good conversations with the German Chancellor. One could hardly claim such words are traces of a combative dymamic. Merkel’s reaction to Trump could very well have been influenced to some degree by the ubiquitous counter-Trump milieu. That milieu has done much to distort perspectives of many in Europe and the US on Trump. In it, self-defined experts on the US presidency preach of what should be expected from Trump, how he should perform, and why he has done practically everything wrong, everyday. Similarly, self-defined experts on Trump offer false insights concerning his private life and his life as president. Included also in the milieu are sensational stories from the US newsmedia of alleged illegal activities by Trump and almost daily predictions that his administration is on the verge of collapse. The counter-Trump milieu propagates a cult of ugliness directed at Trump and the US. It inflames passions globally, appealing to the lower nature of individuals. Admonishing and castigating Trump, to the point of self-dehumanization, has become a commonplace practice. With many in Europe subsumed by the counter-Trump milieu, it might be expected and expedient for political leaders there to use ideas from that “popular source” in speeches about the US president. However, one must take care to whom one listens. Utilizing ideas and conclusions from that milieu, patronizing and demeaning national and international audiences with that material, resultingly drawing the eye away from the truth, is wrong. Generosus equus non curat canem latrantem. (The well-educated horse ignores the barking dog.)

Certainly, Merkel’s words disappointed many in Washington, as no one there believes the situation between the US and Germany, NATO, or Europe is balanced on a knife’s edge. If Trump were asked whether he thought NATO was necessary, he would say it is. (Relatedly, 80% of the US public supports NATO.) However, if one were to ask him three additional times afterward, he would unlikely give an answer. That is Trump. When Trump offers criticism about NATO, his intent is to be constructive, not destructive; he is not at all signalling that his support for NATO has diminished. A main criticism is Trump’s belief that NATO allies have been “coddled” by the US for too long, leading leaders of some NATO countries to feel comfortable about repeatedly missing the agreed spending target of 2% GDP on defense. Progress was made on that matter by the administration of US President Barack Obama in 2016. That year, a majority of delinquent countries spent their required share. It may very well be that Trump, being cautious with NATO allies, is concerned that efforts by them to pay their fair share may have been a gesture of goodwill for the moment, and efforts might fall off. Ever the businessman, Trump is undoubtedly keeping a ledger on contributions by NATO allies, but he means well.

If Trump were asked whether he thought NATO was necessary, he would say it is. However, if one were to ask him three additional times afterward, he would unlikely give an answer. That is Trump. Trump supports NATO, but he also believes the US has “coddled” it’s allies for too long, causing some to feel comfortable about missing the agreed spending target of 2% GDP on defense. In 2016, progress was made progress on the matter. Yet, Trump may be concerned efforts by allies to pay their fair share may have been a momentary gesture of goodwill and might fall off.

Major ignotarum rerum est terror. (Apprehensions are greater in proportion as things are unknown.) In the midst of a political campaign, Merkel most likely wanted to be heard taking a strong pro-Europe stance and create the optics of being the Continent’s leader by speaking about Trump and the US in such a shocking way. However, promoting the idea that the US under Trump’s leadership is not committed to Europe was a mistake and could have dire consequences. For example, Berlin may be certain of how Germany might respond in terms of its security without the US, but other European countries may not feel as confident about creating a new security arrangement under Berlin’s leadership. Merkel may have difficulty with Trump, but they might wish to work with him and might appreciate his efforts to rejuvenate NATO and members participate fully in the collective defense of Europe with his brand of leadership. Suggesting that the US would no longer be part of the European security structure may very well have ignited fears within some European capitals over the immediate threat they feel from Russian Federation forces. NATO countries just west of Russia’s border form a de facto buffer zone between Russia and Germany. Completely unable to face a massive Russian military juggernaut alone, they want the help of the US. Leaders of those allies would not even consider risking their countries’ security over Merkel’s disappointment and disapproval of Trump. Fear is a powerful emotion. Once generated, it can lead to increased suspicion and even rampant paranoia among NATO allies over Russia’s slightest moves. In the worst case scenario, it could lead to some countries to seek bilateral arrangements with Russia to protect themselves. Hopefully, it will not lead to the militarization of any countries. Germany and those countries that might line up behind It, do not have the equivalent military power of the US and would be unable to respond to Russia. They would unlikely be able to jointly develop such a capability or be very willing to jointly finance it either. The Kremlin is well aware of this. Hopefully, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is not as certain that US support for Europe and NATO is as shaky as Merkel insists.

The Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus was quoted as saying: “Because your own strength is unequal to the task, do not assume that it is beyond the powers of man; but if anything is within the powers and province of man, believe that it is within your own compass also.” Merkel and other European leaders who are concerned about Trump’s plans and the US commitment to Europe will find that they must demand greater patience from themselves at this juncture. Merkel can still take a step back to evaluate the situation and reshape her approach. Berlin should be willing to engage in a deliberate process of developing an amicable, constructive relationship with the new US leader. Merkel and Trump never had a personal relationship before he took office. An initial effort should have been made by Merkel to get to know the new US president better. Indeed, rather than have the Chancellor run up to Trump and begin pressing her positions, she could have simply talked with him in order to understand his positions in a granular way. By doing so, she would have developed greater insight on him. In support of the Chancellor’s efforts with Trump, analysts and policy makers in Berlin must dig deeper than the surface to understand where new linkages can be established. A conscious effort should be made to stay away from distortions brewed up in the counter-Trump milieu. If the Trump administration attempts to engage in confidence-building with Berlin, Merkel and her advisers should view it as an opportunity. Those occasions would be perfect time to discuss the common ground the exists between the two countries from Berlin’s perspective. Advisers of the two leaders must have frank discussions on the timing for presenting initiatives on issues before any bilateral talks. It would be the best way for the advisers to inform their counterparts of relative, sensitive, domestic politics tied to a situation. Very importantly, discreet matters discussed, must be kept discreet. Resolutions to troubling issues are less likely be found if they are contested over publicly. Parva scintilla saepe magnam flamam excitat. (The sparkle often initiates a large flame.)

What Is on Merkel’s Mind?

There is the possibility that Merkel’s response to Trump is a manifestation of not only her disappointment, but an unconscious disapproval of him as well. Merkel apparently feels that her inability to get along with Trump, is due to some flaw in him. To her, Trump is at fault. When she met with Trump, Merkel sought a number of guarantees and held certain expectations for their discussion. Naturally, the goal would be to shape circumstances so they would best favor her positions and Germany’s interests. Merkel has a good reputation for being able to bring foreign leaders and political leaders in her own country to her position using a mix of both straight talk and congeniality. It is a reputation she can truly be proud of. When those guarantees were not received and those expectations were not met, it was likely very disappointing and somewhat hurtful to her. Merkel then rather quickly decided to publicly declare Trump was taking the US in a new direction away from Europe and NATO. With authority, and albeit some vengeance, she sounded the alarm that Europe must be prepared to find its way forward without the US. Other European leaders with a more positive assessment of Trump, or even undecided about him, would somehow need to reconcile with Merkel’s vehement statements. Pride, a sense of self-regard, of self-importance, can cause one to take counsel of the lesser angels of one’s nature. Pride can block the truth. An egocentricity stemming from pride can lead one to believe one is at the center of everyone’s cosmos. One can become bound up with oneself. Not to be impolitic, but one should not make choices using a confused ego.

Although Merkel wanted to take a strong stance and create the optics of leadership, Germany and those countries that might line up behind It, do not have the military power of the US. At best, they would be unable do much successfully against a juggernaut of Russian Federation forces. Russia is well aware of that. Hopefully, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is not as certain that US support for Europe and NATO is as shaky as Merkel insists.

The discussion of Merkel’s decisions and actions regarding Trump here relates well with scientific research on the desire of individuals to retaliate, to punish others’ bad behavior, no matter how mild, and even at personal cost. Research shows how such desires can skew decision making. Current theories suggest there are two dominant systems people use to understand and assess risk: the “analytic system” and the “experiential system.” The “analytic system” involves conscious and deliberate cognitive processes that employ various algorithms and normative rules to produce logical, reason-oriented, behavior. In contrast, the “experiential system” uses past experiences, emotion-related associations, and intuitions when making decisions. The experiential system relies more on unconscious rather than conscious processes. Images and associations, linked by experience to emotion and affect (a feeling that something is good or bad), are depended upon. The experiential system represents risk as a feeling that tells us whether it is safe to walk down this dark street or drink this strange-smelling water. The independence of cognition and emotion, and the conflict between rational and emotional reasoning is the subject of continuous debate.

Paul Slovic, President of Decision Research and Professor of Psychology at the University of Oregon, suggests that these two systems must work in collaboration in order for the decision-maker to reach a rational decision. Most models of decision-making assume the process to be rational, which would exclude the possibility of emotion playing a role, other than of a hindrance. Other models take the valence-based approach and evaluate negative and positive effects on behavior, without specifying the emotion. This has led to a limited understanding of how specific emotions, especially those present in an individual in risky and uncertain situations, contribute to the decision-making process.

Using scanning devices that measure the brain’s activity, scientists have gotten a glimpse at how the different parts of our brain collaborate and compete when we make decisions. Brian Knutson, a neuroscientist at Stanford University, used a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to watch subjects’ brains as they reacted to the prospect of receiving money in the Ultimatum game, an economic game evaluating decision-making under ambiguous circumstances In this game, two players have the task of splitting a sum of money. The first player, the “proposer”, makes an offer of how to split the money. The second player, the “responder”, accepts or rejects the offer. If the responder accepts the offer, then the money is split in accordance with the proposal. However, if the “responder” rejects the offer, then neither one wins the game and neither one gets any money. The standard economic solution is that “some money is better than no money, so one should always accept the offer.” In reality, behavioral research has shown that low offers (20% of total) have a 50% chance of being rejected. Based on participant reports, they rejected low offers because of anger (negative emotion) felt due to the unfairness of the offer, and they wanted to punish the other player in some way. The unfair offers induced conflict between the cognitive motive to accept the offer and the emotional motive to reject the offer.

When she met with Trump, Merkel sought a number of guarantees and held certain expectations for their discussion. Naturally, her goal was to shape circumstances so they would best favor her positions and Germany’s interests. When those guarantees were not received and those expectations were not met, it was likely very disappointing and somewhat hurtful to her. Merkel then rather quickly and surprisingly decided to publicly declare Trump was taking the US in a new direction away from Europe and NATO. Her move was not inn the best interests of the West.

Alan Sanfey, a cognitive neuroscientist at the University of Arizona, and colleagues also used fMRI scans to look into people’s brains while they played the same Ultimatum game. Sanfey’s brain scans of people feeling vengeful in these games illustrate how (at least in part) a sense of moral disgust manifests in the brain. Indeed, Sanfey mapped what appeared to be a struggle between emotion and reason as each sought to influence the players’ decisions by tracking the activity of the anterior insula and the prefrontal cortex. As offers became increasingly unfair, the anterior insula, a part of the brain involved in negative emotions including anger and disgust, became more and more active, as if registering growing outrage. Meanwhile, an area of the prefrontal cortex involved in goal orientation–in the case, making money–was also busy assessing the situation. Sanfey’s brain scans indicated that when the disgusted anterior insula was more active than the rational goal-oriented prefrontal cortex—in a sense, when it was shouting louder—the players rejected the offer. When the prefrontal cortex dominated, the players took the money.

University of Zurich researchers Dominique J.F. de Quervain, Ernst Fehr, and colleagues successfully used medical technology twice to catch an engagement between the emotional and reasoning parts of the brain. During an Ultimatum-like game, they examined subjects with a Positron Electron Tomography scanner, a device that employs a radioactive substance used by cells, usually a sugar, to image activity in the brain. The researchers found certain reward circuits in the brain’s striatum activated when players anticipated, and then actually punished, ill-behaved partners. Even more, the greater the activation of the striatum, the greater the subjects’ willingness to incur costs for the opportunity to deliver punishment. At the same time, the researchers saw activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, the deliberative part of the higher brain that is thought to weigh risks and rewards. Interestingly, these same brain regions, the reward-seeking striatum and the deliberative prefrontal cortex, both of which are activated by the pleasing possibility of revenge, also light up when people anticipate giving rewards to partners who cooperate. Though the players’ behaviors are opposite, one set bestowing a reward versus the other set exacting punishment, their brains react in the same way in eager anticipation of a satisfying social experience. Decipimur specte recti. (We are deceived by the appearance of right.)

Reportedly, during his first visit to NATO on March 30, 2017, Tillerson won applause for morning and lunchtime remarks from allied ministers about the need for strength and unity in dealing with Putin. Tillerson statements included: “The US commitment to NATO is strong and this alliance remains the bedrock for trans-Atlantic security.” He also said: “We understand that a threat against one of us is a threat against all of us, and we will respond accordingly.” He added: “The president supports NATO. The US Congress supports NATO.”

Assurances to Europe from High Places

Trump’s Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, and National Security Adviser, H. R. McMaster are undoubtedly dismayed by the expression of doubt by a close ally of the US commitment to European Security and the trans-Atlantic partnership. In only a few short months, they have made numerous statements expressing the administration’s commitment to NATO and commitment Article 5. For the majority of their adult lives, Tillerson, Mattis, and McMaster have spent countless hours considering the status of Europe either militarily or economically. Mattis and McMaster were not only concerned with NATO but worked long and hard to develop ways, and rehearsed plans, to ensure its defense and deterrence of opponents. They have worked alongside NATO allies in it’s European security zone, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan. They are all aware of the occasional need for the hand holding of allies through tough issues. As life-long leaders, they could accept that bringing allied leaders to understand, despite to the contrary, that they can remain confident over the US commitment to NATO and Article 5 might require an amount of “hand-holding.” In doing so, it can be delicately said they have displayed compassionate empathy for their allies. Training, teaching, coaching, mentoring are skills they have honed to near perfection as business and military leaders. However, as life-long managers, they are also results oriented. After providing assurances of the US commitment to Europe repeatedly over a period of time, they too may become strained by the persistent voices of leaders of a few NATO countries who question it. One must quit drilling once oil has been struck.

Reportedly, during his first visit to NATO on March 30, 2017, Tillerson won applause for lunchtime remarks about the need for strength and unity in dealing with Putin. Tillerson, ever able as a communicator, reached the European ministers, who were skeptical of US intentions beforehand, with statements in the morning session such as: “The US commitment to NATO is strong and this alliance remains the bedrock for transatlantic security.” He went on to say: “The United States is committed to ensuring NATO has the capabilities to support our collective defense.” He added: “We understand that a threat against one of us is a threat against all of us, and we will respond accordingly.” He then definitely stated: “The president supports NATO. The US Congress supports NATO.” However, it was during a lunch that Tillerson received applause. During that session, one minister suggested that a two-tier approach might be taken with Russia, adding that “it takes two to tango.” In response, Tillerson said: “Sure, you can dance with Russia and you might also gain something out of it. But for sure you cannot tango with [Sergei] Lavrov because he is not allowed to dance that one.” The ministers present understood that implied there was only one man in charge in Russia. Explaining how Tillerson was received, one European NATO ambassador said: “With an ovation, I mean it literally. This is not metaphorically speaking. He actually got applause.” NATO Secretar General Jens Stoltenberg indicated Tillerson left no doubt that ties between European NATO members and the US were “rock solid.”

In a special May 28, 2017 CBS News broadcast of “Face the Nation”, US Sevretary of Defense James Mattis (above) was asked about Trump’s thoughts on the value of NATO, Mattis explained that in his initial job interview with the president, he brought up his questions about NATO. Mattis said his response was: “if we didn’t have NATO that he would want to create it because it’s a defense of our values, it’s a defense of democracy.” Mattis said Trump nominated him almost immediately after he spoke profoundly in support of NATO.

On March 21, 2017, Mattis and Stoltenberg met at the Pentagon to discuss the key role the alliance plays in trans-Atlantic security and to review preparations for the special meeting of NATO heads of state and government in May. Before his meeting with Stoltenberg, Mattis said the trans-Atlantic bonds built on a legacy of common commitments and common defense continue to get stronger. During the meeting, Mattis and Stoltenberg reportedly discussed ways to encourage allies to assume a more equitable share of alliance security and defense responsibilities. Stoltenberg expressed his gratitude to Mattis for the secretary’s “strong support for trans-Atlantic unity and trans-Atlantic bond and the NATO alliance.” He also stated: “I think we all understand that in times of turmoil, in times of uncertainty, the need for strong international institutions like NATO is even greater.” He continued: “so therefore we need to adapt, we need to strengthen NATO in response to the challenges and the unpredictability we see surrounding us today.” In a special May 28, 2017 CBS News broadcast of “Face the Nation”, Mattis also discussed NATO. When asked about Trump’s thoughts on the value of NATO, Mattis explained that in his initial interview for his post, Trump asked questions about the alliance him about the alliance. Mattis explained his response was: “if we didn’t have NATO that he would want to create it because it’s a defense of our values, it’s a defense of democracy.” Mattis recognized that Trump was very open to that view. Mattis was intrigued by the fact and said: “Obviously, he [Trump] had to make a decision about whether or not he was going to nominate me to be the Secretary of Defense. And although I immediately showed him that my view on that was rather profoundly in support of NATO, he at that point nominated me.”

At the end of the G-7 Summit in Sicily on May 27, 2017, McMaster explained with certitude that Trump backed NATO’s mutual defense doctrine. McMaster was being pressed by journalists on matter of allied disappointment over Trump failure to make explicit reference to it during his visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The US newsmedia has emphasized that Trump, during the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, appeared to called Article 5 into question by suggesting that NATO members who did not pay their fair share for the alliance may not deserve to benefit from it. McMaster added: “I think it’s extraordinary that there would be an expectation that the president would have to say explicitly that he supports Article 5. Of course he does.” McMaster then went on to say: “He [Trump] did not make a decision not to say it.” He continued: “It was implicit in the speech. There was no decision to not put it in there. It is a matter of fact that the United States, the president, stands firmly behind our Article 5 commitments under NATO.”

At the end of the G-7 Summit in Sicily, on May 27, 2017, US National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster explained with certitude that Trump backed NATO’s mutual defense doctrine. McMaster added: “I think it’s extraordinary that there would be an expectation that the president would have to say explicitly that he supports Article 5. Of course he does.” He also said: “It is a matter of fact that the United States, the president, stands firmly behind our Article 5 commitments under NATO.”

The Way Forward

In Act 2, Scene iii of William Shakespeare’s Othello, Iago, the Venetian General Othello’s ensign, having expressed hatred for his commander over a promotion, sets out to destroy his reputation and his marriage. He has included a willing young officer, Roderigo, in his plot. Roderigo is supposed to take Othello’s wife, Desdemona, away from him, but begins to doubt his ability to perform that task. Seeking to encourage Roderigo, Iago tells him the following: “How poor are they that have not patience! What wound did ever heal but by degrees? Thou know’st we work by wit, and not by witchcraft; And wit depends on dilatory time.” While Merkel’s statement that the US can no longer be depended upon by Europe may be superficially plausible, it is completely wrong. Surely, leaders in the capitals of all NATO countries do not feel as she does about Trump or the US commitment. Offering negative perspectives and proffering hostile words about both may have served to quench excitement and spirit for some of them about his administration. That was not very sporting of Merkel. There is a long obscured road for Europe to travel between wanting go it alone without the US and actually doing so. Europe may not be able to walk that path with the assured step as Merkel says. A lot of unpredictable and unpleasant incidents in terms of working together and coping with adversaries could occur along the way. The difficulty Merkel and others are having with regard to understanding and accepting that the Trump administration is committed to Europe and NATO calls attention to need for policy statements. They create a cogency and predictability about US intentions for working with allies and its intentions for responding to certain actions by adversaries. (That is something the administration might consider.) From her prism, Merkel may observe puzzling elements of Trump’s approach that are contradictory to her logic. However, all puzzles have their solutions for they are created by man and not true mysteries. No matter what the situation, saying anything that might initiate the erosion of the decades old trans-Atlantic collective defense structure cannot be justified. Videbat esse notitia bona id temporis. (It seemed to be a good idea at the time.)

Certainly, it would have been superb if Trump and Merkel, during their first meeting, had agreed on everything, and relations between the US and Germany moved along swimmingly. However, that did not happen. Merkel must accept working with the circumstances she has and not the circumstances that she would like to have. On the path to improving ties, confidence and trust between the Trump administration and Europe must be established. That work will not require that the two countries start from scratch, but it will be a new beginning. It will be work akin to that in which a product develops over time, albeit not too much time. By adding a good dose of patience from European capitals, faith in the trans-Atlantic partnership, and friendship, success is practically assured.

A Worried Europe Finds Scant Reassurance on Trump: It May Be Provided Outside the Counter-Trump Milieu

Posted on February 28, 2017 by greatcharlie

US President Donald Trump has not projected the sort of geniality toward Europe that would relax its leaders. Insecurity over populism and Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin has overwhelmed European leaders, officials, analysts, academicians, and journalists, but Trump seems to worry them almost equally. They do not get him. Perhaps the best hope now would be for European leaders and officials to step away from the current environment and try to quietly examine Trump from a different angle for the sake of transatlantic relations.

According to a February 19, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “A Worried Europe Finds Scant Reassurance on Trump’s Plans,” diplomats, generals, policy experts, and security officials traveled to the 2017 Munich Security Conference from all over the world seeking clues to US President Donald Trump’s ideas and intentions on foreign and defense policy, but left without much reassurance. The highest ranking members of the Trump administration that attended the conference, held from February 17th to February 19th, were US Vice President Mike Pence and US Secretary of Defense James Mattis. Both addressed the conference, but reportedly adhered to prepared statements. Pence’s presentation, in particular, was eagerly awaited. In his address, he explained that he carried a direct message of reassurance from Trump, but his words received little approval from keen observers of Washington present. R. Nicholas Burns, a Harvard professor and former US Under Secretary of State gave Pence credit. Burns said, “The vice president said what he had to say, and I applauded.“ He went on to explain, “But there were very few specifics, and everyone noted that Mr. Pence did not once mention the European Union, which for most Europeans is the central institution, not NATO. Europe is going through a very tough time, and they expected a big public embrace of these institutions from the leader of the West, the United States.” Burns went on to explain, “They know that President Trump has repeatedly questioned the relevance of both NATO and the EU and has encouraged Brexit, and many Europeans fear he may work for a weakening of the EU itself.” He continued, noting, “All this ambivalence makes them very nervous, and it’s hard for Pence to overcome.” US Senator John McCain, referred to in the New York Times article as a conference regular, said that the administration was “in disarray,” and added,“The president, I think, makes statements and on other occasions contradicts himself. So we’ve learned to watch what the president does as opposed to what he says.”

Europe has managed to promote multilateral cooperation under difficult circumstances in the past 70 years. Perhaps the best example of that cooperation was the formation of NATO in 1949. There was a sense of uncertainty, a degree of instability, and a real threat from the Soviet Union. Foreign policy and global strategy were not well-coordinated among Western capitals. However, with the leadership role of the US, but also with distinctive leading roles played by European countries, what is the now well-known as the Western perspective grew. Pragmatic and patient efforts were to coordinate the policies of Western European countries together with the US and Canada until a new system of European security was developed. Currently, there is increased anxiety in European capitals with regard to EU unity, a rise in populism, and the threat posed by Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and his armed forces. Uncertain of the new US administration’s intentions and plans regarding the support of Europe, European leaders and officials have been turning left and right, asking questions, searching for useful answers. Finding genuine, constructive answers in what could called a counter-Trump milieu has proven most difficult. Indeed, with all of the news media stories, and the nonstop rebuke of Trump by political opponents at home and pundits worldwide, there hardly seems space available in the current environment to introduce into the discourse other facts or evidence about the US president other facts or evidence about the Trump administration without obstruction.

Perhaps the best hope now would be for European leaders and officials to momentarily step back from the current discourse and during that pause, try to quietly examine Trump from a different angle for the sake of Europe. That reexamination might include new research and bilateral meetings with senior US officials. Europe must bridge the growing gap in relations with the US. False appearances and errors in judgment can be dispelled by the truth. To simply take the approach du jure, engage in groupthink, or succumb to the angry mob about Trump, is a misuse of intellect, a misuse of will. Demands cannot be so great, tied so much to the dignity of a nation or movement, or their own pride and ego, that European leaders and officials would allow themselves to become the impediment to finding a way to work with Trump. Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem. (Remember when life’s path is steep to keep your mind even.)

At the 2017 Munich Security Conference, US Vice President Mike Pence’s address was eagerly awaited. He offered reassurances from Trump. However, the Europeans wanted a public embrace of their institutions by the US, but they say it was not given. There hardly seems space available in the counter-Trump milieu in Europe for anyone to introduce other facts or evidence about Trump and his administration without obstruction.

Prominent Europeans’ Responses to Trump at Munich

Animus quod perdidt optat atque in præterita se totus imagine versat. (The mind yearns for what is gone and loses itself dreaming of the past.) National leaders are expected to project a certain geniality. In democracies, that geniality can boost a candidate’s appeal to the public in elections. Once in power, that geniality makes for great optics, and to a degree may still help shape public opinion, but the main task of a leader is to perform one’s duty and responsibilities well. Trump has not projected the sort of geniality toward Europe that would relax leaders in Brussels or any of the national capitals. There has been a tumultuous clamor in Europe over him. The most apparent causality for the Europeans are the ties of a few senior members of the Trump administration might have with the Russian president. Europe’s expression of such irritation and concern exposed the considerable degree of insecurity, and to a degree, fear, that overwhelms the latest generation of European analysts, academicians, and journalists not only over populism, Putin, and Russian military power, but the US almost as much. They appear unable to read Trump and discuss him in a way that cannot seem to avoid use of obloquy. The nascent days of the Trump administration certainly contrast in this way with those of administration of US President Barack Obama. Obama seemed to specialize in studied ambiguity on foreign policy, speaking comfortable words to address urgent and important issues as well as outright provocations. It was in line with what then Vice President Joe Biden called “the new tone” of US foreign policy at the 2009 Munich Security Conference. The Obama administration held the promise of a kinder, more thoughtful US than was observed with the administration of his predecessor US President George Bush. Biden urged Europe to ramp up its efforts and partner with the US in an effort to re-establish a workable world order. Those early days with Obama in office appear sorely missed by the Europeans. However, waxing nostalgically about the Obama administration will not serve European leaders well. Moreover, with nostalgia, one more often remembers the best and filters out the worst. Some might recall that Europe voiced concern over how passively Obama responded to provocations such as Russia’s threat to deploy weapons against former Soviet republics and cut natural gas supplies to Europe, and Iran’s launch of a satellite and development enough uranium to fuel a nuclear bomb. Now, concerns are being expressed about another US president’s response concerning European security.

When he addressed the 2017 Munich Security Conference, Wolfgang Ischinger, the former German ambassador to Washington who organizes the conference, queried whether Trump would: “continue a tradition of half a century of being supportive of the project of European integration, or is he going to continue to advocate EU member countries to follow the Brexit example? If he did that, it would amount to a kind of nonmilitary declaration of war. It would mean conflict between Europe and the United States. Is that what the U.S. wants? Is that how he wishes to make America great again?” French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault expressed his displeasure with the fact that Pence had not sent a message of support for the EU, something Ischinger had suggested Pence provide before the conference. Elmar Brok, head of the foreign affairs committee of the European Parliament and a party ally of German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “Pence and Mattis and Tillerson can come here and talk about the importance of the transatlantic relationship and NATO–and that is all good.” However, Brok went on to state, “But we don’t know what’s coming on Twitter tomorrow morning.” Daniela Schwarzer, the director of the German Council on Foreign Relations stated without ornament, “People were not reassured.” She continued, “They think that Trump is erratic and incalculable. We all want to hear what we want to hear. But everyone knows that any Trump official could be gone tomorrow, or undercut in another tweet.” Still, Schwarzer intriguingly stated that words were also deeds. She explained, “What he says also changes reality.” In that vein, she proffered, “If you put NATO or the European Union into doubt, it changes their credibility and damages them.” Ulrich Speck, a foreign policy analyst at the Elcano think tank in Brussels, said the conundrum that former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger evoked when he famously asked who he should call when he wanted to talk to “Europe” seemed to have been “turned on its head.” Speck continued, “Now Europe is asking who it should call if it wants to talk to the United States.” One unnamed European diplomat reportedly likened the challenge of figuring out who to listen to in the Trump administration to the task of “Kremlinologists” during the Cold War. Major ignotarum rerum est terror. (Apprehensions are greater in proportion as things are unknown.)

US Secretary of Defense James Mattis at the 2017 Munich Security Conference (above). No benefit will be derived from undermining the US leadership when a response from the US against Russia might prove crucial to Europe’s well-being. European leaders and officials must recall that the ties between the US and Europe have a long history. It is a bond which no US administration would genuinely desire to ignore or want to break. In time, Europe will likely understand that the relationship is still of great value to the US and is appreciated.

News Media Reports and Their Possible Impact on the Matter

When one is less certain about the objective truth, the possibility that one might be drawn elsewhere for answers increases. Lacking any formal statements from the the Trump White House or State Department to analyze US policies, it appears that some in European capitals have turned to the US news media interpretations of political events and decisions of the Trump Administration. In the US, the news media serves as a watchdog over government power and political activity. It is a source from which the public can inform itself on the decisions and actions of elected leaders and appointed officials. The news media is at its best when it can provide the public with a look inside government bodies and operations. Its role in the society is sacrosanct. “Freedom of the press” is one the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments of the US Constitution listing specific prohibitions on government power. The implications of comments emanating from the Trump administration about the “fake news media” being the “enemy of the American people” are considerable. Ignoring the “fake,” Some have gone as far as to say that denunciation of the news media is the “greatest threat to democracy” they have seen. The news media, the unofficially recognized “Fourth Estate” or fourth branch of government given its importance to the democracy, is not the enemy of the US public. Such comments were unlikely fully considered before spoken, and eventually became fodder in an ongoing struggle between the Trump administration and certain US news media houses. It appears the aim of those grave words initially was to reject and certainly sting some in the news media in response to reports questioning the character of Trump administration officials, but not to be destructive, or to indict the news media as a whole. Events surrounding the Trump administration have gained increased attention. There is a reality that news media houses would like to present attention grabbing headlines to promote readership and viewership, which helps them fill advertising space and increases profit. Indeed, it must be noted that the news media, while a sentinel for democracy, is also a major industry, and managers in houses seek to satisfy the appetites of their customer base. To patronize in order to connect with the customer is a business practice. In the case of reporting on Trump, most journalists in newspapers of record, to their credit, have written articles that are often measured in composition, providing ample qualifications alongside each postulation. Due to the doubts attached, it stands to reason that information presented in this way should neither be viewed as weighty nor reliable. Others have sought to convince readers that stories are bigger than they are. Such articles exaggerate the truth to the exclusion of it subtleties. Even more, some journalists’ judgments of matters they report about the Trump administration have often insinuated themselves into their articles. That approach on occasion has very likely served to inflame passions and appeal to the lower nature of many readers and viewers, domestically and internationally. What has been stated here may appear as a foray by greatcharlie into media criticism, but actually the intent is to highlight the current environment surrounding the US news media from which many European leaders and officials may be collecting information on the administration.

Recent examples of the type of reports described, include a February 16, 2017 Wall Street Journal article entitled, “Spies Keep Intelligence From Donald Trump on Leak Concerns,” stated: “US intelligence officials have withheld sensitive intelligence from President Donald Trump because they are concerned it could be leaked or compromised, according to current and former officials familiar with the matter. The officials’ decision to keep information from Mr. Trump underscores the deep mistrust that has developed between the intelligence community and the president over his team’s contacts with the Russian government, as well as the enmity he has shown toward U.S. spy agencies.” The Wall Street Journal article further stated: “In some of these cases of withheld information, officials have decided not to show Mr. Trump the sources and methods that the intelligence agencies use to collect information, the current and former officials said. Those sources and methods could include, for instance, the means that an agency uses to spy on a foreign government.” However, within the article, the following qualification was provided: “A spokesman for the Office of Director of National Intelligence said: ‘Any suggestion that the U.S. intelligence community is withholding information and not providing the best possible intelligence to the president and his national security team is not true.’” Further clarity on the matter was provided in the article with the following: “It wasn’t clear Wednesday how many times officials have held back information from Mr. Trump. The officials emphasized that they know of no instance in which crucial information about security threats or potential plotting has been omitted.”

German soldiers in formation (above). Lacking any formal statements from the the Trump White House or State Department to analyze US policies, some in European capitals may have turned to the US news media interpretations of political events and decisions of the Trump Administration. Some of those reports may served to inflame passions and convince them that their worst fears regarding US relations were being realized. That would include facing Russia alone.

In a February 14, 2017 New York Times article entitled, “Trump Campaign Aides Had Repeated Contacts with Russian Intelligence,” stated verbatim: “Phone records and intercepted calls show that members of Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and other Trump associates had repeated contacts with senior Russian intelligence officials in the year before the election, according to four current and former American officials. The New York Times article continued: “American law enforcement and intelligence agencies intercepted the communications around the same time they were discovering evidence that Russia was trying to disrupt the presidential election by hacking into the Democratic National Committee, three of the officials said. The intelligence agencies then sought to learn whether the Trump campaign was colluding with the Russians on the hacking or other efforts to influence the election.” The article created greater intrigue with the following: “The officials said that one of the advisers picked up on the calls was Paul Manafort, who was Mr. Trump’s campaign chairman for several months last year and had worked as a political consultant in Ukraine. The officials declined to identify the other Trump associates on the calls. The article went on to explain: “The call logs and intercepted communications are part of a larger trove of information that the F.B.I. is sifting through as it investigates the links between Mr. Trump’s associates and the Russian government, as well as the hacking of the D.N.C., according to federal law enforcement officials. As part of its inquiry, the F.B.I. has obtained banking and travel records and conducted interviews, the officials said.”

In a similar way to the February 16th Wall Street Journal article, the February 14th New York Times article provided qualifications on this intriguing information, explaining: “The officials interviewed in recent weeks said that, so far, they had seen no evidence of such cooperation.” The New York Times article also disclosed: “Mr. Manafort, who has not been charged with any crimes, dismissed the officials’ accounts in a telephone interview on Tuesday. ‘This is absurd,’ he said. ‘I have no idea what this is referring to. I have never knowingly spoken to Russian intelligence officers, and I have never been involved with anything to do with the Russian government or the Putin administration or any other issues under investigation today.’ He added, ‘It’s not like these people wear badges that say, ‘I’m a Russian intelligence officer.’” Additionally on the matter of contacts, the article continued: “Several of Mr. Trump’s associates, like Mr. Manafort, have done business in Russia. And it is not unusual for American businessmen to come in contact with foreign intelligence officials, sometimes unwittingly, in countries like Russia and Ukraine, where the spy services are deeply embedded in society. Law enforcement officials did not say to what extent the contacts might have been about business.” The article added: “The officials would not disclose many details, including what was discussed on the calls, the identity of the Russian intelligence officials who participated, and how many of Mr. Trump’s advisers were talking to the Russians. It is also unclear whether the conversations had anything to do with Mr. Trump himself. There was also mention in the article of an FBI effort to assess the credibility of information contained in a dossier that was given to the bureau last year by a former intelligence operative of the United Kingdom. The New York Times article stated: “The dossier contained a raft of allegations of a broad conspiracy between Mr. Trump, his associates and the Russian government. It also included unsubstantiated claims that the Russians had embarrassing videos that could be used to blackmail Mr. Trump.” However, that information came with a qualification, which stated: “The F.B.I. has spent several months investigating the leads in the dossier, but has yet to confirm any of its most explosive claims.”

Even the February 19th New York Times article that impelled the writing of this greatcharlie post projected a negative tone. Some unfavorable judgments of the Trump administration infiltrated the article’s description of European responses to remarks made by US officials. The articled noted: “An audience anxious for signals about the Trump administration’s stances on NATO, the European Union, Germany and the Russia of President Vladimir V. Putin, whom Mr. Trump so openly admires, was only minimally soothed. It mostly heard boilerplate assurances about United States commitments of the kind that previous American administrations had rarely felt the need to give.”

A NATO meeting in Brussels (above). There are considerable incongruences between what is being assumed today about the Trump administration’s approach to Europe and what has been US policy over 70 years. Europe should be hopeful over its future with the US, not anxious or intimidated. Years of success should not be forgotten by Europe over the prospect of working with the new US president to firm up some aspects of the relationship.

Demonization and Confirmation Bias

Poenam irae saepe videmus. (We often see the penalty of anger.) In the February 19th New York Times article, Artis Pabriks, a former Latvian foreign and defense minister and now a member of the European Parliament, was quoted as saying “The Cold War was won not just by weapons but by propaganda and soft power.” Pabriks then offered the observation, “And on German television, Trump is a joke for everybody. We’re concerned also about American prestige.” In Western media, particularly social media, sites that encourage or present hostile assessments of celebrities, political figures, or those who may have drawn the spotlight to themselves for one reason or another, grab more attention than all other. The attention and approval one can gain from engaging such commentary has made it may in part help make it commonplace. Indeed, there is a tendency for many, perhaps even most, to demonize those with whom there is disagreement. Demonization has often morphed into hatred. This behavior was both very apparent and very virulent in the 2016 Presidential Campaign. Going back as far as the 18th century, many said worse. Often such hostile talk led to duels. Still, the intensity and sheer volume of exchanges and reports of exchanges that jammed social media and news media streams made what was expressed not only pervasive, but practically unavoidable. The environment has not improved, but perhaps has become worse since then. There is still the punch and counterpunch between political opponents, pundits, and the news media, itself, with the Trump administration. Disagreements seem to have become endless feuds. For European leaders and officials, the danger lies in stepping into this struggle, taking one side or another in the exchange in the US about the Trump administration because they believe the status of the US president falls with their interests and their constituencies want to know where they stand on such a popular and controversial, yet also delicate matter.

There are considerable incongruences between what is being assumed today about the Trump administration’s approach to Europe and what has been US policy over 70 years. Europe should be hopeful over its future with the US, not anxious or intimidated. Years of success should not be chucked out by Europe over the prospect of working with the US to firm up some aspects of the relationship. There are insistent efforts to advertise Trump’s perceived weaknesses. Some news media houses have approved stories that include unwarranted extrapolations. Only European leaders and officials would know what moves them to believe one thing or another about Trump. It may be experience, intuition, or mores. Despite the importance of relations with the US, it could be hypothesized that some may harbor negative beliefs in general about their ally. In any event, confirmation bias can be a result of the direct influence of desire on beliefs. Confirmation bias suggests that individuals do not perceive circumstances objectively. An individual extrapolates bits of data that are satisfying because they confirm the individual’s prejudices. Therefore, one becomes a prisoner of one’s assumptions. If European leaders and officials want certain ideas about Trump to be true, they end up believing them to be true. Such an error could have lead them to cease collecting information when the evidence gathered at a certain point confirms the prejudices they may feel are true. After developing that view, for the most part, they would embrace any information that confirms it while going as far as to ignore or reject information that makes it unlikely.

Attempting to confirm beliefs comes naturally to most individuals, while conversely it feels less desirable and counterintuitive for them to seek out evidence that contradicts their beliefs. This explains why opinions survive and spread. Disconfirming instances must be far more powerful in establishing truth. Disconfirmation requires searching for evidence to disprove a firmly held opinion. With regard to their understanding of the Trump administration, European leaders and officials must appropriately verify their conclusions. One approach is to postulate facts and then consider instances to prove they are incorrect. This has been pointed to as a true manifestation of self-confidence: the ability to look at the world without the need to look for instances that pleases one’s ego. For group decision-making, one can serve a hypothesis and then gather information from each member in a way that allows the expression of independent assessments.

United Kingdom Prime Minister Theresa May and Trump (above). Political and social pressures to conform to a counter-Trump outlook may exist in Europe, but relations with the US are too important for European capitals to allow the situation to deteriorate so acutely. European leaders must not embrace any information that confirms any individual biases or prejudices they might have about Trump. The thinking that may have caused them not to consider alternatives must be subtracted.

Groupthink in Europe on Trump

With all of the news media stories, and his nonstop rebuke by political opponents at home and pundits worldwide, an environment that would welcome an unobstructed examination or public discussion of other facts or evidence about Trump is practically nonexistent. Antipathy may strong enough in some European leaders and officials that they may be disinclined to take a second look at anything pertaining to Trump. Indeed, among them may be cynics who are uninterested in the truth. They may wrongfully view any effort rectify the situation as obsequiousness in the face of US power, placing political pressure on colleagues who may want reconsider some issues. Some may claim seeking to work with Trump would pose some moral dilemma. However, such could exist only when one knows the objective truth, disapproves of the course of events and is constrained from conforming to external demands. Enumerated here are many of the symptoms of groupthink. Groupthink occurs when a group makes faulty decisions due to group pressures lead to a deterioration of ”mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment.” The term was coined by social psychologist Irving Janis in Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Houghton Mifflin, 1972). Groups affected by groupthink will tend to ignore alternatives and take irrational actions that dehumanize other groups. Groups become especially vulnerable to groupthink when members are similar in background, the group is insulated from outside opinions, and there are no clear rules for decision making.

The eight symptoms of groupthink documented by Janis include: the illusion of invulnerability which creates excessive optimism that encourages taking extreme risks; a collective rationalization, by which group members shrug off warnings and do not reconsider their assumptions; a belief in inherent morality by which members believe in the rightness of their cause and therefore ignore the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions; stereotyped views of “out-groups” or negative views of “enemy” make effective responses to conflict seem unnecessary; direct pressure on dissenters by which group members are under pressure not to express arguments against any of the group’s views; self-censorship which thwarts the expression of doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus; the illusion of unanimity which creates the assumption that the majority view and judgments are unanimous; and, self-appointed “mindguards” who are group members that protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s cohesiveness, view, and decisions.

Decisions shaped by groupthink have a low probability of achieving successful outcomes.When the above symptoms, and such conditions by all indications exist to some degree among foreign policy officials in European capitals making decisions on the Trump administration, there is a reasonable chance that groupthink will happen. However, it does not need to be so. Groupthink occurs when groups are highly cohesive and when they are under considerable pressure to make a quality decision. Within respective capitals that might be the case, but among countries cohesion is attenuated. The political and social pressures to conform to counter-Trump outlook may exist, but relations with the US relationship is too important for too many countries to inexcusably allow the situation to deteriorate so acutely. European leaders and officials should drive themselves to realistically appraise courses of action available to them. Any carelessness and irrational thinking that led to the failure to consider all alternatives along the wrongful path to groupthink must be subtracted.

A US F-22 Raptor (above). Ensuring Europe’s well-being is in the interest of the US. If grave harm ever came to any US ally or partner in Europe, the impact in all quarters in Washington would be shattering. It would guarantee a devastating, immediate response by Trump. Europe faces no danger of abandonment by the US despite how Trump or his senior officials may sound. Trump only speaks of pruning the leaves and branches of the tree, he does not want to poison the root.

European Leaders and Officials Must Act under Pressure

Diu in ista nave fui et propter tempestatem nubesque semper mortem expectabam. (I was on board that ship for a long while, and I was constantly expecting death on account of the storms and clouds.) Among Trump’s immediate thoughts about Europe have been to make some changes with regard to security. The big issue is failure of some European countries to meet their financial commitments to NATO. In reality, some European countries have been remiss, consistently failing to meet a 2 percent GDP goal agreed to by alliance members. Trump wants to resolve that issue with the Europeans. However, Europe faces no danger of abandonment by the US despite how his words or those of his senior officials. To use a soft metaphor, Trump only speaks of pruning the leaves and branches of the tree, he does not want to poison the root. (Certainly, if Trump’s goal was to get Europe’s full attention with his statements, he has succeeded in that.) Yet, many in Europe have formed opinions that contrast with this reality. They may not be disposed to pursuing the truth, fearing what the truth may be. Worrying about US actions and intentions is a new type of stress, posing unfamiliar and unimaginable challenges.

University of Chicago Executive Vice Provost and Professor of Psychology, Sian Beilock, has spent years investigating how people perform under pressure and avoid failure. She has published more than 100 papers on the subject, and recently won the 2017 Troland Research Award from the National Academy of Sciences for her research. Her most recent book, How the Body Knows Its Mind (Simon & Schuster, 2015), discusses what scientists have learned about the influence of body movement on brain activity. It includes tips such as pacing around a room for a creativity boost. At the Human Performance Laboratory, where she is director, Beilock and her colleagues explore the physiological mechanisms by which people buckle under pressure. They have measured the amount of cortisol in a person’s saliva to gauge stress levels and have used neuroimaging to see which areas of the brain are activated during high-pressure situations. Beilock has found that individuals are capable of making just about anything become a stressful, high-stakes activity. She explained, “Some of the greatest chokes are on the Olympic stage, but they also happen when you can’t say eloquently what you want to say in a meeting.” Overthinking often trips people up. “It’s paralysis by analysis,” Beilock says. Individuals can get confused when they think too much, worry too much, about what they are doing.

Beilock also tests subjects’ reaction times and accuracy at the Human Performance Laboratory to understand performance failure. She often includes golfers in her research. Many golf pros claim the sport is 90 percent mental making it an ideal forum for her research. At the professional level, some golfers fail to perform well in front of spectators. Beilock has found golfers easily become stressed when caused to think about the technical aspects of their swing. She explained, if you really want to mess with a golfer’s game, you could just say, “That was a great shot! What were you doing with your elbow?” On her blog, Beilock calls attention to Bruce Ollstein, a former drill instructor and US Army Psychological Operations officer, who delved into the effects of stress on golfers in his book, Combat Golf: The Competitor’s Field Manual for Winning Against Any Opponent (Viking, 1996). Ollstein explains that a few choice words will typically have a deleterious effects on a golfer’s morale and performance. Among those methods, Ollstein listed: hand out some “gimmies”; plant seeds of doubt; leave them “hanging”; and, silence is golden.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and US Vice President Mike Pence (above). European leaders and officials must no longer fall prey to attention grabbing news stories about Trump, some of which have supported very wrong notions in Europe about his plans. They must be wary of experts who postulate on very important matters from the abstract. Additionally, they must guard against self-deception.

It may very well be that, albeit unintentionally, US foreign policy experts in discussing Trump with their European colleagues as well as with European leaders and officials, they may have had a deleterious effects on their perspective, morale, and performance. Leaders and officials may have been thrown a bit off-kilter, and delayed getting both involved and into a working rhythm with the Trump administration after learning of US news media reports and comments from the Obama administration in its waning days. Consider that from the start of 2016 Presidential Election, uncertainty was created about what a Trump victory would mean for Europe given some harsh campaign comments on NATO. It likely had a chilling effect on them. However, assurances also came from all quarters that former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would win the election. After the election there was more turmoil, and before the Europeans could formulate an approach to Trump, they encountered a flurry of reports detailing his inexperience and how unprepared he was to appropriately handle foreign policy decisionmaking. Doubts were expressed about his advisers perspectives and abilities. Questions were raised about Russia’s influence on the election result and Trump’s campaign. Stories were told of a war between Trump and the US Intelligence Community, and rumors swirled that Trump might face impeachment.

At Munich, US foreign policy experts were reportedly making statements that perhaps may have unwittingly done even more to plant seeds of doubt and undermine the confidence of European leaders and officials in their abilities to reach out to, or work with, Trump. Consider the comments by Julianne Smith, a former principal Director of European and NATO Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy National Security Adviser to former US Vice President Joe Biden in the February 19th New York Times. Smith reportedly explained people would be reassured “for about five hours, or maybe through the weekend.” What remains unresolved, she said, is who will come out on top in what she called a battle among the three centers of power in the White House: Trump, Bannon and White House Special Adviser Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law. On Pence, Derek Chollet, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Obama administration, who is now with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, proffered, “His [Pence’s] mission was always going to be hard, but it was made even more so by the questions about his lack of influence inside the White House.” As for beginning a story that has no end, and letting one “hang,” doubt was left by US experts at Munich left as to what lies ahead with the Trump administration. Smith went on to explain in the New York Times that Europeans were disturbed when retired US Navy Vice Admiral Robert Harward turned down an offer to replace Trump’s former National Security Adviser Michael Flynn because he would not be given autonomy over his staff. She said, “Our allies don’t know who is their interlocutor and what phone number to call.” She went on to state, “And talk of hedging NATO commitment on financial contributions did rattle the alliance,” even if European members acknowledge that they need to pay more for collective defense. As for convincing the Europeans that Trump has basically been silent on his intentions and letting them dwell on their inabilities, anxieties, US experts explained to them that they were not told enough in Munich still to understand or plan for relations with the administration. The US historian and foreign policy commentator Robert Kagan dismissed Pence’s address in Munich as a “robotic salute to the man in power.” Although Pence tried to tackle the doubts of European leaders and officials head-on by explaining at the start that he was speaking for Trump, Kagan reportedly noted disapprovingly that he went on “to mention the president 19 times in the course of the 20-minute speech.”

With a second look at Trump, European leaders and officials may recognize an intriguing duality. In business, he engaged in high stakes negotiations and hefty transactions, but also displayed talent as a builder, a man who created things. Designing and constructing buildings was an art for Trump. As a media celebrity, he lived a life of high drama while he entertained. During the 2016 US Presidential Campaign, Trump’s capabilities seemed to coalesce in an interesting and effective way.

Knowing the Real Trump

Quid enim est stultius quam incerta pro certis habere, falsa pro veris? (What, indeed, is more foolish than to consider uncertainties as certain, falsehoods as truths?) The renowned 19th century Prussian statesman, Otto von Bismarck said “Politics is the art of the possible.” To better understand Trump and improve relations with the US, European leaders and officials must set aside their personal preferences. There are some solid reports that present positive perspectives on Trump. Those reports as well as any that may even appear feeble, must be examined. The analytical process in the current environment must be akin to a crucible in which irrelevancies are burned off and result is the truth. If European leaders and officials could disassociate themselves from the mixed, very often negative, signals emanating out the political milieu in the US, they might recognize an intriguing duality about Trump. In business, Trump for decades engaged in high stakes negotiations and hefty transactions. He displayed talent as a planner, manager, and builder, a man who created things. The German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling said, “Architecture is music in space, as it were a frozen music.” The architecture of Trump’s buildings and music would have things in common such as rhythm, texture, harmony, proportion, and dynamics. For Trump, designing and constructing buildings was an art. He could become lost in it. That was Trump’s world, too. As a media celebrity, he lived a life of high drama while he entertained and bedazzled. During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, Trump’s varied capabilities and interests appeared to coalesce in an interesting and, albeit, effective way. On the surface, Trump was self-confident, audacious, brash, and bombastic–some might add boorish, yet in his planning, he was humble, meticulous, perceptive, and innovative. European political leaders might take special note of how Trump, facing constant waves of invective, even calumny, dug deep inside himself and always found a way, leaving other candidates trailing in his wake. This stands in stark contrast to the notions of Trump’s alleged vacuity, which is more often deceitfully served up by a variety angry, aggressive, envious, and ambitious sources camped in all directions. They all certainly have reasons for their positions. The presidency represents a huge change for Trump and he continues to recurvate from being a very successful businessman and celebrity known worldwide to a more potent, more formal, and in many ways, more narrow role. Regarding all of the opprobrium, Trump has seen other winds and has faced other storms. He has no reputation for faltering in adversity.

When Trump stated “America First” during his inaugural address on January 20, 2017, he was presenting the term as a concept, a guiding principle indicating that his administration would consider the interest of the US over anything else. Trump will unlikely be disposed to subordinating the interests of the US to the wishes of any country. However, ensuring Europe’s well-being is in the interest of the US. If grave harm ever came to any US ally or partner in Europe, the impact in all quarters in Washington would be shattering. It will guarantee a devastating, immediate response by Trump. The Trump administration continues to evolve. Recently, US Army Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, a renowned military strategist and national security expert, became Trump’s new National Security Adviser. Looking toward the future with optimism, the US president will most likely find his stride very soon on relations with Europe. A new balance may be observed and perhaps many European leaders and officials will appreciate Trump’s very formidable, comprehensive capabilities. After all that has been said and done, some Europeans remain optimistic. Thomas Matussek, a former German ambassador to the United Kingdom and the UN, said that “people will be reassured to some degree, because they want to be.” He contrasted Trump and White House Special Adviser Stephen Bannon: “Trump’s not an ideologue, like Bannon, but pretty pragmatic and innovative, subject to discussion.” Robin Niblett, the director of Chatham House, a London-based research institution, expressed optimism saying: “Trump does not come in with a fixed foreign-policy agenda on many issues, so there is contested space and room for influence and maneuver.” Niblett recalled Trump’s early “flip-flops” on Israel and NATO, but then explained: “Trump’s fixated on certain things, like trade and jobs and America’s place in the world, but there seems to be room for influence.” Artis Pabriks, a Latvian member of the European Parliament mentioned earlier, said that he trusted Mattis and McCain, and applauded the recent introduction of US and other NATO troops into the Baltic States and Poland. He expected Trump will keep that policy approach in place.

The Trump administration continues to evolve. Recently, US Army Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster (above), a renowned military strategist and national security expert, was named Trump’s National Security Adviser. Looking toward the future with optimism, Trump will likely find his stride soon on relations with Europe. A new balance may be observed and European leaders and officials may come to appreciate him. Many times, from bad beginnings, great friendships have sprung up.

The Way Forward

In Act I, Scene iv of William Shakespeare’s play, Measure for Measure, Lucio, a man living the “sporting life” in Vienna, was urged to speak with Isabella, a St. Clare nun, about her brother Claudio’s arrest by Angelo, the very officious, upstanding acting executive of the city. Lucio sought to convince Isabella that she could successfully use her wit and influence to have her brother released. In that effort, Lucio speaks to famous lines to Isabella: “Our doubts are traitors and make us lose the good we oft might win by fearing to attempt.” Man-made dilemmas are not mysteries, but puzzles. While one may be confused, or tested by a puzzle, they have solutions. For now, the solution to strengthening Europe’s relationship with the US is temporarily hidden, temporarily misunderstood. Talk about Trump in Europe has absorbed not only regional and national leaders and other officials, but the public’s attention in every country of the continent. Due to what will eventually be recognized as misunderstandings, there have been some bouts of words, albeit a bit attenuated, which have created some disturbance, hurt some feelings, caused some wounds, on both sides of the Atlantic, but they must be soothed and healed. European leaders and officials must act before a numbness sets in, before Europe is inured by the idea that it cannot work with the Trump administration, that it must face challenges such as a resurgent Russia alone. With obstinacy, they must seek to regularly engage with Trump and administration officials in rational, concrete discussions to find agreement or a satisfactory middle ground on issues.

The process of changing the current environment should begin with the application of the objective truth to analyses of the new US administration. Europe must reexamine what it knows about Trump. Being readily available, the US news media should naturally be seen as an open, overt source of information on Trump and his administration. However, not all news media houses produce news the same way. Mistakes are also made. While it albeit serves as a watchdog for the democracy, admittedly, some US news media have propagated very negative perspectives of the Trump administration. European leaders and officials must not fall prey to attention grabbing lines about Trump, some of which have supported very wrong notions in Europe about his plans. They must also be wary of experts who postulate on very important matters from abstractions. Additionally, they must guard against self-deception. All of the plans and actions of European leaders and officials must be directed toward benefiting the lives of their people. Certainly this prescription cannot be more grievous than the danger of poor relations with the US.

Many times, from a bad beginning, great friendships have sprung up. Until Europe sets forth to establish firm ties with the Trump administration, there is only the prospect of receding into a gloomy world, in which the potential of the transatlantic relationship will be frozen. To escape from it, some might deny reality and create a substitute reality in which they might concede that the only prospect for peace is a concordance with their most likely adversary, Russia. The idea of wanting to turn desperately to false reality reminds of the poem Ode to a Nightingale by the English poet, John Keats. In this 1819 ode, Keats emphasizes the difference between the gloomy physical world and the dreamlike, spiritual world of the nightingale. In the fifth stanza, Keats stimulates the reader’s senses by describing that very fragrant, floral, gossamer imitation of reality: “I cannot see what flowers are at my feet, / Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs, / But, in embalmed darkness, guess each sweet / Wherewith the seasonable month endows / The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild; / White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine; / Fast fading violets cover’d up in leaves; / And mid-May’s eldest child, / The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine, / The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves.”

Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?

Posted on November 21, 2016 by greatcharlie

Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin (left) with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (right). Putin wants to keep the Republic of Belarus within his country’s sphere of influence. Yet, due to regional security concerns, Belarus has gained new importance in the West. Lukashenko, once called Europe’s last dictator, is being approached by the EU and US. He has responded by trying to strengthen ties with them. Some Western analysts conclude Putin will not react well to this development. However, Belarus’s ties to the EU could actually enable its ally Russia to circumvent sanctions through a creative trade arrangement.

According to an October 29, 2016 article in the New York Times entitled, “Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters,” dozens of demonstrators held a gathering in front of the headquarters building of Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (the Committee for State Security) or KGB in Minsk to commemorate the 1937 execution of over 100 members of the Belarusian intelligentsia under the orders of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union Josef Stalin. The demonstrators also protested continuing repression in Belarus. The demonstration was not authorized, however the police did not interfere. The annual commemoration provides the Belarusian public a rare opportunity to show disapproval for the government led by President Alexander Lukashenko. Nikolai Statkevich ran against Lukashenko in the 2010 Belarusian Presidential Election and was imprisoned for five years afterward. The New York Times article quoted him as stating: The fear of repression haunts Belarus as before. Today’s authorities are ideological heirs of those times.”

The EU and US now seem to be approaching Lukashenko with outstretched arms. Lukashenko, once the target of profound obloquy in the West and whose government was called “Europe’s last dictatorship” in 2005 by then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, is now covered with good words to the extent that his past iron fisted actions have nearly been cloaked. Belarus, in response to EU and US overtures, has engaged in a vigorous effort to curry favor and strengthen ties with them. The question of whether Lukashenko can genuinely recurvate westward after being oriented so long toward Russia has been responded to by some EU leaders with rather Delphine statements.

Putin wants Belarus to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence. He wants to keep Belarus in the Central Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some Western foreign and defense policy analysts would quickly point out that Lukashenko has never been disposed to completely subordinating the interests of Belarus to that of Russia, or of the West for that matter. Pedictably, those Western analysts have concluded Putin, their bête noire, likely perceives Lukashenko as being disloyal, and suggest that he could react aggressively. Such analyses simply signal a fear of Russian military power. They also signal a fear that when the interests of any country in Russia’s sphere of interest is detectably at odds with those of the Kremlin, a “second Crimea” may be in the making. Crimea happened. Putin acted aggressively. However, Crimea should not be the baseline to gauge Putin’s thinking and actions going forward. Putin does not act impulsively; he acts with purpose. He can well-distinguish between what he wants for the moment and what he wants most. Putin does not want to have Russia defined as a rogue country with a military that is nothing more than an army of conquest. Having built solid relations with Minsk, especially with regard to security, for over a score of years, it is hard to imagine Moscow attempting to militarily intimidate or actually attack Belarus over its contacts with the EU. Extrapolations perpetuating such notions are counterintuitive. In fact, Putin has hardly reacted. He may very well recognize some potential in his ally’s new EU contacts for Russia to circumvent economic sanctions via a creative trade arrangement.

Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. When Putin took office, he viewed Russia’s relations with Belarus as unsatisfactory and improved them. Belarus’s strategic importance to Russia increased following regional events such as NATO’s creep into the post-Soviet space, and the “Color Revolutions.” Belarus and Russia have had a few political and economic rows. Still, the two countries are staunch allies.

Belarus: In Brief

The Republic of Belarus is a 207,600 square kilometer, landlocked country, bordered by the Russian Federation to the northeast, Ukraine to the south, Poland to the west, and Lithuania and Latvia to the northwest. Its capital is Minsk. While the borders of Belarus were set at the end of World War II, they were shaped mostly when some territory of the Second Polish Republic was reintegrated into them after the Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939. During World War II, Belarus lost about a third of its population and more than half of its economic resources. The Soviet Union redeveloped the republic in the post-war years. On July 27, 1990, the Parliament of the Belarus declared the republic’s sovereignty, and on August 25, 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus declared itself an independent country. Since 1994, Alexander Lukashenko has served as the President of Belarus. His leadership was widely criticized in the West. Lukashenko perpetuated a number of Soviet-era policies, to include state ownership of large sections of the economy. For years, political opposition was violently suppressed. Elections in Belarus were declared rigged by the international community. The country’s rating under The Economist’s Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index was the lowest in Europe until 2014. Freedom House assessed Belarus under Lukashenko as “not free.” It was labelled “repressed” in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. In the Press Freedom Index for 2016 of Reporters Without Borders, it was ranked 157th out of 180 countries.

Belarus’s Ties to Russia

After the Soviet Union collapsed, the newly formed Russian Federation tried to control the post-Soviet space by creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 8, 1991. However, Belarus, much as other republics in the CIS, began drifting away from Russia, which at that time was attempting to cultivate Western relations and save its broken economy. In the early 1990s, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin was concerned that his country’s involvement with Belarus might put its bridge building efforts with the West at risk. Yet, while Russia was fixed on improving relations, Western capitals discerned Russia’s inability to act effectively. NATO began to expand east. Stung and threatened by what he perceived as an effort by the West to isolate it from the European environment by grabbing up Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics, Yeltsin sought to improve ties with Belarus. Relations between the two countries became so congenial that in the mid-1990s, following Lukashenko’s rise to power, Yeltsin concluded Belarus would be an ideal candidate for integration with Russia. After signing the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation with Belarus, Yeltsin declared that “the two nations [had] shared a common historical experience over many centuries.” That, he explained, “created the basis for signing the treaty and other documents on deeper integration of our two countries. Among all CIS countries, Belarus has the greatest rights to such a relationship due to its geographical location, its contacts with Russia, our friendship and the progress of its reforms.” One year after April 2, 1996 when the integration process was launched, the Union of Belarus and Russia was established. It culminated with the founding of the Union State between Belarus and Russia on December 8, 1999. When Putin took office, he determined that the status of the relations with Belarus was unsatisfactory and criticized the Union State Treaty. He sought to put real content into it. He formulated a policy genuinely directed at realizing unification. His proposal was to complete unification either in a federation model which meant that Belarus would join the Russian Federation, or build a union which is similar to the EU. However, Belarus rejected those approaches and there was no change. Still, Putin did not abandon the idea of unification completely. The next goal became integration. The strategic importance of Belarus to Putin increased as a result of international events, to include. NATO’s activity in the post-Soviet space; the decision of many Eastern European countries to orient westward; a US plan to deploy a missile defense system in Poland or the Czech Republic; and, the “Color Revolutions.”

Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of Belarus’s purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Disagreements over profits and payments from the energy trade led to the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 row, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed Belarus owed Russia $200 million in gas arrears for that year. Belarus demanded transit fees owed by Russia. The matter was resolved and went away.

Considering that integration with Belarus would be costly, it is reported that Moscow sought to maximize gains from it. Its goals became to reduce the economic burden which Belarus laid on its economy, and to take over Belarus’s energy transit infrastructure. That tack spurred many of the political and economic rows. Among those conflicts was a disagreement that arose when Lukashenko accused Russia of offering a $500 million loan to Minsk on the condition that it recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lukashenko angrily retorted that the position of Belarus was not for sale. Regarding the close military cooperation between Belarus and Russia, Lukashenko compared Belarus’s population of 10 million people as a human shield for Russia against the West. That service, he said, “was not free.” The Milk War erupted in July 2009 when Russia banned all dairy imports from Belarus, explaining that they did not comply with new regulations. Belarus accused Russia of using the ban for political reasons, but Russia denied that. In a statement presented by his press service, Lukashenko lashed out, stating: “Economy serves as the basis for our common security. But if Belarus’s closest CSTO ally is trying . . . to destroy this basis and de facto put the Belarusians on their knees, how can one talk about consolidating collective security in the CSTO space?” Lukashenko acted by refusing to attend the 2009 CSTO summit in Moscow. The CSTO, Putin’s counterweight to NATO, groups Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in a security arrangement. Shortly afterward, Russia lifted the ban and Belarus resumed importing of dairy products to Russia. Additionally, there were the Gas Wars of 2004, 2007, and 2010. In the 2010 Gas War, a dispute arose over a claim by Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev and Russian energy giant Gazprom claimed that Belarus owed $200 million in Russia gas arrears for supplies it had used that year. Belarus then demanded transit fees owed by Russia. A resolution was found and the matter quietly went away.

The EEU is an economic integration bloc of post-Soviet republics. It succeeded the erstwhile Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in January 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan joined the EEU later that year. The bloc coordinates policies of its member states in key industries. In that spirit of coordination, the argument between Belarus and Russia over the price of natural gas was resolved, although the two sides have apparently not yet reached a consensus on the scale of the price discount (if any) or the mechanism of its delivery to Belarus. Russia’s share of Belarus’s international trade is 48 percent. In 2015, $17.1 billion in Russian exports went to Belarus. More than half of its purchases from Russia are in crude oil alone–reportedly $9 billion in 2015. Of Belarus’s overall exports, 39 percent is directed to Russia. Those imports from Belarus totaled only $10.4 billion. For the most part it sells Russia value-added goods in return. Aside from trucks and industrial machines, Belarus sells processed foods. A network of Belarusian grocery stores operates in major Russian cities.

Above is an assembly line at the Minsk Motor Plant. Nearly a third of Belarus’s overall trade is with its second largest trading partner, the EU. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU has withdrawn trade preferences for Belarus, the potential to greatly expand trade exists.

The Strong Military Linkage Between Belarus and Russia

Although there have been some setbacks in the political and economic integration of Belarus and Russia, the military-integration process between them has been successful. Cooperation with Belarus fits snuggly within Putin’s vision for geopolitical order in the post–Cold War world. Putin has never accepted the expansion of the EU and NATO into Central and Eastern Europe. It was practically guaranteed that Putin would push back against what he might call an intrusion into Russia’s near abroad. The near abroad is what Moscow refers to as the territory surrounding Russia’s borders. The term was reportedly popularized by former Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in the early 1990s. For centuries, Russia has sought to ensure its physical security through its control over neighboring territory. For Putin, the term represents a concept akin to the Monroe Doctrine.

On February 14, 2013 at a conference entitled “Russia’s Military Security in the 21st Century,” the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, provided a glimpse of Russia’s official assessment of future wars it may face as outlined in the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation. The impact of Putin’s thinking on the Western threat to Russia is apparent. The Russian Federation General Staff believes future conflicts will be “Resource Wars.” Indeed, they conclude the depletion of energy resources will soon become an ultimate world crisis and overtake regions. Severe shortages of oil, gas and other natural resources would cause their prices to steeply rise. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade their country from several directions to physically grab territory and its resources. The Kremlin has accepted the threat assessment of the the Russian Federation General Staff. Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. To rehearse the defense against the West, Russian Federation Defense Minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu, announced massive strategic military exercises Zapad 2017, scheduled to take place in September 2017. He said that the joint exercise, which would include Russian and Belarusian forces, will be the “main military event of 2017.” Further, the two countries armed forces will cooperate in over 130 events and measures. Shoigu explained: “The US and NATO are actively increasing their offensive potential, building new bases and developing military infrastructure, undermining international stability, and attempting to impose their will by economic sanctions and use of military force. A propaganda information war is raging.” Shoigu further stated that Russian borders were being threatened and adequate defensive measures are being taken.

Belarus (shaded in green), Russia (shaded in violet), and their neighbors. Providing a glimpse of the top secret Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation, on February 14, 2013, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, explained the depletion of oil, gas and other natural resources will become an ultimate world crisis by 2030. Russia’s senior military leaders believe outside powers, primarily the US and its allies, may invade Russia from several directions to grab its land and resources. Lukashenko insists that Belarus will remain part of Russia’s defense.

Ubi concordia, ibi victoria! (Where there is unity, there is victory.) To a great degree, Russian and Belarusian regional security approaches have been harmonized. Lukashenko has pledged that Belarus will be an integral part of the Russian Federation’s defense. Indeed, he has gone as far as to say that the army of Belarus, the modernization of which was nearly completed, was ready to defend Russia’s western border. According to RIA Novosti, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russian western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.” Lukashenko has referred to the Belarus population as 10 million human shields in the defense of Russia. Lukashenko further stated that the Belarusian Army will be able to show resistance to any aggressor. Prior to those statements, Lukashenko told the Belarus Parliament that he would not allow the country’s opposition to depict Russia in the image of an enemy. Lukashenko declared to the Belarus Parliament: “The Russians are our brothers, with whom we have been living for a very long time.”

Putin (right) and Russian Federation Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu (left). Putin signed the Plan of Defense of the Russian Federation into law on January 29, 2013. The plan guided Russia’s defense spending in 2016 which exceeded 6 percent of Russia’s GDP, along with national security and federal law enforcement budgets totaling an additional 3 percent. The plan guided the Russian military build-up in the Arctic, the Pacific, the Baltic, in Crimea and on the Ukrainian border. The Syria expedition is also part of that picture. Shoigu announced that massive military exercises would be held by Russia and Belarus in 2017 to rehearse their joint defense against the West.

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine into law. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. It views Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

Belarusian troops (above). Following deliberations in Parliament, Lukashenko signed Belarus’s new military doctrine into law. The doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, but it is apparent that NATO is deemed the greatest military threat. Accordingly, Lukashenko declared: “We, together with the Russian people, the Russians, will defend our common homeland in the highly important for Russia western direction. We will be dying in this direction to defend Belarus and Russia.”

A New Military Doctrine for Belarus

Following deliberations in the Belarusian Parliament, Lukashenko signed a new edition of the country’s military doctrine. While the doctrine, updated for the first time since 2002, does not directly identify the countries which serve as a threat to Belarus, it is hinted in no uncertain terms that NATO is its most likely adversary. Indeed, according to Paragraph 11.3 of the doctrine, direct military threats to Belarus include “the expansion (or creation) of military-political alliances in the European region in which the Republic of Belarus is not included,” and attempts by such alliances to carry out “global functions.” Meanwhile, Paragraph 11.4 alludes to the threat posed by “the strengthening of the offensive capabilities of states (or coalitions of states), including the unilateral establishment of strategic missile defense systems, precision-guided weaponry equipped with non-nuclear warheads for attacks against the military forces and infrastructure of the Republic of Belarus,” and other measures “leading to a disruption of the existing balance of forces, as well as the building up of military infrastructure by states bordering Belarus.” There is an emphasis on the dangers of “missile defense” and cruise missiles disrupting the existing balance of forces in the region. (The new doctrine surely refers to NATO and the ongoing buildup of its’ forces in Eastern Europe, including US missile defense system deployed in Romania and Poland.) In addition to direct military threats, the new Belarusian military doctrine discusses military-political, military-strategic and military-economic threats to the country. When presenting an earlier draft of the doctrine for parliamentary deliberation, Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Andrei Ravkov explained that “a particular emphasis was placed on the negative trends associated with the development of the concept of ‘Color Revolutions,’ and mechanisms aimed at changing the constitutional order and violating state’s territorial integrity by provoking internal armed conflicts.” Those mechanisms would include the use of private military forces, and “hybrid warfare.”

Belarusian special forces in training (above). In the new Belarusian military doctrine, emphasis is placed on trends associated with the development of the concept of “Color Revolutions,” and methods aimed at provoking internal conflicts to destabilize the country and violate its territorial integrity. A year ahead of the doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko directed his government to further develop special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems: elements best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations.

Months before the new doctrine’s promulgation, Lukashenko, while discussing priorities for the armed forces on October 31, 2015, directed his government to focus on developing special operation forces, rapid response forces, intelligence and control systems. Those military elements are best equipped to defeat intelligence-gathering efforts of adversaries and fight diversionary groups and illegal armed formations both in urban areas as well as the countryside. Minsk harbors suspicions that an effort might be afoot to topple Lukashenko. Officials there view Ukraine, not Russia, as a possible hybrid warfare threat.

The EU welcomed Lukashenko’s desire to have Belarus play a constructive role in the region by hosting four-party peace negotiations on Ukraine, as well as his decision to maintain political distance from Russia over Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. EU ministers have encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They have held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Still, many wonder if Lukashenko’s efforts are authentic.

Minsk and Brussels: A Rapprochement?

Some experts have said that it was Lukashenko who began making overtures to the West following Russia’s seizure of Crimea, considerable economic troubles in Belarus, and a degree of instability in Eastern Europe. He managed to grab the attention oF EU leaders in a positive way when he decided to free a number of political prisoners and host multiparty mediations in Minsk for the cease-fire in neighboring Ukraine. EU governments, claiming that they based their decision on content and merit of Lukashenko’s efforts, suspended sanctions on Belarus’s leaders in October 2014. In February 2015, EU foreign ministers terminated sanctions, removing asset freezes and travel bans on 170 officials, including Lukashenko. Three Belarusian companies were also taken off the EU blacklist. The EU maintains an arms embargo and sanctions against four people suspected of being involved in the disappearance of dissidents in the 1990s. Lukashenko responded by intensifying fence mending efforts with the West. As of late, Belarusian diplomats have been pouring considerable energy in enhancing their country’s relations with the West, hoping to capitalize on Belarus’ newfound importance for regional stability. Their approach is bicameral. On the one hand, they seek to develop bilateral cooperation with specific EU countries. On the other hand, they want to develop cooperation with the EU as an institution focusing on the Eastern partnership, a dialogue on modernization, and visa issues. Lukashenko’s current perspective of the EU appears to be reflected in his statements in favor of dialogue with it. On March 5, 2016, Lukashenko explained: “The Europeans . . . are ready to cooperate with us, including for the sake of security in Europe. We say to them that we’re always open to [talking].” EU and US delegations continue to visit Minsk, but results have been thin. The US has expressed hope not only for improved cooperation on trade, but also on non-proliferation and combating human trafficking.

Praetio prudentia praestat. (Prudence supplies a reward.) Commenting on Belarus, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, remarked, “This is clearly not a rosy or perfect picture . . . but when we see significant, even if limited steps, in what we feel is the right direction, we feel it is right to encourage them.” German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier spoke of the “beginnings” of a thaw with Belarus, and concluded, “It’s worth testing in such a situation how much willingness and reciprocity there is on the Belarus side.” Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski told reporters, “This is an experiment.” He went on to state: “As a neighbor of Belarus, we are pleased as we hope this will improve relations with the EU and of course with Poland.” While the EU leaders allege they had no intention of prying Belarus from Putin’s hand, that nonetheless was viewed as possible. The EU called for further human-rights advances by Lukashenko. Indeed, in a statement, the EU ministers encouraged Belarus to develop a “vibrant civil society” with more freedom for the media. They held out the prospect of more trade, economic aid and fast-tracked visas for Belarusians traveling to the EU. Lukashenko will take what is offered, but what he really wants from EU countries is financial assistance. Belarus’s international reserves are at the lowest since 2011. Although there has been some direct private investment from the US in Belarus, its development has been relatively slow given the uncertain pace of reform. The US has encouraged Belarus to conclude and adhere to agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the program of macroeconomic stabilization and related reform measures. As of this writing, the International Monetary Fund is still deciding whether it should provide Belarus with a $3 billion, 10-year loan.

Above are Russian “green men” in Ukraine. In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces, has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations. Western analysts still insist that Belarus faces the threat of hybrid warfare from Russia. They conclude that Moscow will monitor Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any signs of a serious loosening of ties with Russia.

Are Problems Between Belarus and Russia Becoming Inexorable?

Ad connectendas amicitas, tenacissimum vinculum est morum similitudo. (For cementing friendship, resemblance of manners is the strongest tie.) At the Third Forum of Russian and Belarusian Regions on June 9, 2016, Putin explained: “In a collaborative effort, Russia and Belarus work to deepen integration processes in Eurasia. As members of the Union State, we are carrying out about 40 programs and are jointly developing advanced technology programmes, primarily, for the aerospace industry, satellite navigation, geological exploration, and agriculture.” Putin further stated: “We are forming the Eurasian Economic Union’s common market for goods, services, capital, and labour, thereby facilitating sustainable economic growth of the member countries and enhancing the competitiveness of our producers on domestic and foreign markets.”

Some interesting statements have been made by Belarusian officials concerning their country’s security relationship with Russia. There is the example of Belarusian Defense Minister Andrei Ravkov, who, speaking on February 23, 2016, stated that security of the country relied also on military cooperation not only with Russia and members of the CSTO. He also underlined Minsk’s “strategic” military cooperation with China and “aspiration to develop a constructive dialogue with NATO in order to strengthen international and regional security.” An interview of Belarus’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei with the Polish daily, Rzeczpospolita, on October 17, 2016, has been called significant because it was titled “We Are Not Dependents of Russia.” In the West, every new statement, every move by Minsk concerning its armed forces has taken on additional significance in the context of Belarus-Russia relations. When Shoigu announced that a “joint military organization of the Union State” would be created starting in 2016, including notional unification of the two countries’ armed forces, it appeared Belarus-Russia military ties were further strengthening. Yet, in the West, it was viewed by some analysts as a unilateral statement by Russia, and an effort to save face and show the world that the relationship was still intact. Western analysts note that there was no comment from Belarus on the joint military organization of the Union State. There is a perception in the West that Russia routinely announces joint initiatives with Belarus which have not been endorsed by Minsk. When an announcement of a joint air defence system was made in Russia, Belarus did not comment on it, at least publicly. Reportedly, that same week, Belarus TV broadcasted an extended feature on the country’s Air Defense Troops without once mentioning the new military agreement with Russia. Although the general in charge of the Belarusian Air Force has been nominated as the commander for the “joint system,” Western analysts saw the move simply as a face-saver for Minsk. The lack of reaction by Belarus was said to signal Minsk’s disapproval of the effort by Moscow to control the provision of its security. When Belarus needed to purchase modern fighter aircraft to upgrade its ageing air force, Moscow announced instead that Belarus would be hosting a Russian airbase. Western analysts insist that Moscow pressured Lukashenko for the airbase. However, he insisted upon and arranged the aircraft purchase.

Alter ipso amicus. (A friend is another self.) Some Western analysts have concluded that Russia will observe Belarus’s improving relations with the West, looking for any serious threat to its ties. Yet, that idea conflicts with the reality that Putin considers Belarus to be an integral part of Russia’s geopolitical and cultural space. Moscow has invested heavily in preserving and increasing its influence in the country. Lukashenko has no plans to have Belarus abandon Russia. If some drop in the strength of Belarus’s ties to Russia has occurred, it is negligible.From 2008 to 2010, Putin neither acted violently nor took a hostile tone toward what he perhaps regarded as a recalcitrant, yet typical Lukashenko, with his dalliance toward the West and he has no intentions of reacting aggressively toward Belarus now. Putin knows Lukashenko could never stand by wistfully in the face of Russian decisions impacting Belarus. Putin would never allow Russia to be directed by a foreign capital either. Clashing with Lukashenko is the last thing Putin would want. This may especially be true because Belarus might be able to provide Putin with the possibility to overcome EU sanctions related to Ukraine.

Moldova, just as Belarus, is not subject to EU sanctions. Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin has proposed that Moldova allow Russia to move its goods into a “European zone” in the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia as a way for Russia to circumvent EU imposed sanctions. As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have the its goods sold to the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions.

Putin’s Possible Move Regarding Belarus?

US and EU sanctions against Russia over Crimea’s annexation will not go away unless Russia returns the region to Ukraine. Russian Federation Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev remarked at a press conference on November 11, 2016, “Our position is that sanctions will remain unchanged.” Just as the Baltic States were never recognized as part of the Soviet Union by the West. Crimea will always be recognized as part of Ukraine, not Russia. As it was explained in the September 30, 2016 greatcharlie.com post entitled “Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action,” Russia is well-aware that cooperation stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of a border by improving conditions for free trade and exchange. Inter-border cooperation is understood to be a prerequisite of broader integration processes and improving relations between neighboring countries. It can serve as a mechanism for coping with the challenges and jolts resulting from the new divisions created between EU and EEU countries.

As long as Belarus is not subject to sanctions and the EU is open to trade with it, hypothetically, Russia could move its goods into Belarusian territory, and then have its goods sold in the West as Belarusian goods, thereby escaping restrictions. Much as with oil and gas pipelines, Belarus would essentially serve as a relay or refining point for Russian goods targeted for Western markets. For that to even become a possibility, it would certainly be in Russia’s interest to see Belarus improve its relations with the EU, particularly with regard to trade and investment. Belarus could be handsomely remunerated with percentages of profits made or perhaps with greater subsidies on imports of Russian resources. There are certainly limits to the level of Russian products Belarus could absorb for sale to the West. Resale of Russian goods at value added prices would murder the project. Russia certainly could not attempt to move goods into EU countries via Belarus at a level equal to anything it might achieve by trading with them directly. Moscow and Minsk would surely set parameters for the bilateral deal. However, the smallest level would surely be far more than Russia could sell as long as sanctions are in place. Trading an EEU partner’s goods externally in this manner may very well be covered in the economic bloc’s trade provisions. Beyond profit, benefits of this trade arrangement would include: the preservation of Belarus’ brotherly relationship with Russia; Lukashenko’s would have no need to be concerned that the sovereignty of Belarus and its interests were not being respected; and, collective arrangements with Russia such as EEU and CSTO will remain intact. Indeed, Belarus would remain in Russia’s sphere of interest. Note that Belarus is among the few states in Europe that has not asked for membership in the EU. While Belarus has strove for better contacts with EU lately, it has simultaneously sought to further its economic and political ties with Russia.

In many ways, this hypothetical trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia would resemble the creative arrangement Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin proposed for trade with Moldova. Moldova is not subject to EU sanctions. Thus, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via the pro-Russia autonomous regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia and avoid restrictions. A trade arrangement of this type between Belarus and Russia would also resemble the Outward Processing Trade regime that the EU introduced for Belarus. That regime raised import quota amounts for textiles and clothing manufacturers within the EU thus allowing them to produce garments in Belarus that will return to the EU after processing. Additionally, the arrangement would resemble the somewhat awkward way in which some Belarusian firms have been relabelling food from EU countries and selling them in Russia thereby avoiding Russian sanctions. Probae est in segetem sunt deteriorem datae fruges, tamen ipsae suaptae enitent. (A good seed, planted even in poor soil, will bear rich fruit by its own nature.)

What Might Encourage Putin and Lukashenko to Take This Course?

What might encourage Lukashenko and Putin to seek this arrangement is the fact that after Russia, the main trading partner of Belarus is the EU. Nearly, a third of the country’s overall trade is with the EU. That trade could most likely be expanded with a nuanced cultivation. Belarusian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels. Chemicals, agricultural products, machinery and textiles form a much lower share. While the EU withdrew its trade preferences to Belarus under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences in 2007 in response to Belarus’ violations of the core principles of the International Labour Organization, exports from Belarus to the EU did not cease. The decision only required Belarus to pay import tariffs at the standard non-preferential rate. Trade was also promoted through the Outward Processing Trade regime,which was mentioned earlier.

Lukashenko stands on terrain high enough to survey the liabilities involved in moving closer to the West. Voices in the West have indicated that not all are impressed with Lukashenko’s positive words and a perceived unwarranted rapprochement to Belarus. Even when EU ministers decided to lift most sanctions against Belarus in 2015, they said concern remained “with the situation of human rights in Belarus.” Ministers called on Minsk to abolish the death penalty and implement Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) recommendations on democracy before the 2015 Belarusian Parliamentary Elections. An OSCE report said October’s election showed Belarus had a “considerable way go to” on democratic standards, noting the absence of safeguards against multiple voting, limited choice available to voters and the uneven playing field between Lukashenko and his political opponents. The UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, Mikloś Haraszti, stated after the 2015 Belarusian Presidential Election that he had seen no changes in “the dismal human rights situation.” Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might inadvertently trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

Drawing the EU closer to improve the position of Belarus and in turn improve the trade situation for Russia, would require Minsk to engage in very nuanced interactions with Brussels and EU capitals. However, Lukashenko and Putin would also need to be concerned that in working to soothe EU concerns over human rights and good governance, they might trigger EU leaders to request that Lukashenko step down from power to ensure Belarus would be governed by an authentic pro-EU, pro-democracy leadership. That request could soon become an insistent voice for regime change.

The Way Forward

In William Shakespeare’s comedy, All’s Well That Ends Well, Helena, a physician’s daughter, chooses to marry Bertram, a man of high social position in the French court, but he rejects her love. In response, Helena engages in a plot to wed Bertram by employing what has come to be known as the “Bed Trick.” As she begins to execute her plan in Act 3, Scene 7, Helena states: “Why, then tonight, Let us assay our plot: which, if it speed, Is wicked meaning in lawful act; Where both not sin, and yet a sinful fact: But let’s about it.” A trade arrangement between Belarus and Russia as outlined here will likely cause discomfort for those who reasonably demand compliance with imposed sanctions. There is nothing inherently wrong with finding and exploiting a loophole in a regulation, business contract, or sanctions. One must have the will to seize the opportunity.

As the leader of a world power, Putin fully understands that his policies should make the Russian people hopeful for the future, not anxious or intimidated. Negative outlooks only advertise the limits one has. Reacting negatively to growing Euro-Belarus ties would not be useful. Inter-border cooperation has greatly assisted in harmonizing domestic policy priorities and international and regional security issues between Belarus and Russia. Inter-border cooperation between Belarus and Russia, albeit from different perspectives, is a prerequisite for improving the relations of both countries with the EU. (The EU is drawing closer to Belarus due to the nature of its ties to Russia. Russia may move closer to Belarus to exploit its improved ties to the EU.) Belarus is already a priority for Russia’s diplomatic, military, political, and economic resources. If Putin senses that he can, with Lukashenko’s cooperation, exploit the rapprochement between the EU and Belarus to circumvent imposed sanctions, that tack could eventually be accepted by Moscow as a mechanism for coping with problems stemming from the divisions between EU and EEU countries.

Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action

Posted on September 30, 2016 by greatcharlie

A September 16, 2016 Wall Street Journal editorial explained the West should give greater concern to Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin’s intentions in Moldova. It points to a referendum in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria calling for annexation by Russia. That referendum along with recent political unrest and mass protests (as seen above) make Moldova appear ripe for conquest. Russia is trying to create greater ties in Moldova, but its efforts should not be misconstrued as a prelude to hybrid warfare. Western analysts must overcome the predilection of viewing any Russian moves westward as a step toward war.

According to a September 13, 2016 Wall Street Journal editorial entitled “Putin’s Next Target,” while Western attention has been fixed in Ukraine as the field of Russian aggression in Europe, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin is turning its attention to Moldova, where Moscow controls a breakaway territory called Transnistria. The editorial explains that a referendum was held in Transnistria on the 10^th anniversary of its establishment in which 97.3 percent of residents demanded to be annexed by Russia. Transnistria’s president, Evgeniy Shevchuk further marked the occasion by issuing a decree asking Russia for full annexation, and announcing the formation of a committee to provide a plan for the harmonization of Transnistria law with Russian law by November. The Wall Street Journal editorial says the matter bears attention “less another Russian power play comes to pass.”

While the editorial notes Putin has been reticent about the decree, it also explains Putin has been flexing his military muscles in Transnistria. Drills were conducted by the Russian Federation’s peacekeeping force in Transnistria both in 2015 and 2016. Although Moscow promised in 2002 to remove its contingent of about 1,000 peacekeepers they remained in the territory. The Wall Street Journal surmises that those exercises and Shevchuk’s annexation decree may indicate Putin is testing the climate in the West for a potential next move. In response the Wall Street Journal says US and European leaders must telegraph that any effort to make permanent Russia’s occupation of Transnistria will be treated as an illegal encroachment on Moldovan sovereignty and trigger sanctions.

Evidence may exist within certain parameters to support the view of the Wall Street Journal that Moldova might be ripe for Putin’s taking. Western analysts, who think in line with the Wall Street Journal, have expressed concern that a prospective effort by Russia to take Moldova would come in the form of hybrid warfare—the blend of unidentified troops, propaganda and economic pressure. In addition to maintaining forces on Moldovan territory, for almost a year, pro-Russian political parties who receive support from Moscow, albeit along with considerable support from pro-EU, pro-Romanian parties, helped to organize mass anti-government protests which in 2015 and 2016 have involved tens of thousands of participants. The protests started after the three Molovan banks that had kept social security funds somehow lost $1 billion prior in November 2014. Pro-Russian political parties have also played a part in organization anti-government demonstrations, particularly in 2016. Throw on top everything the fact that Moldova as one of the poorest European countries has to deal with the pressing issues of overwhelming poverty, corruption, an inefficient legal system and widespread workforce migration to Russia and the EU. It may very well be true that Putin senses the West now lacks the determination to forcefully ensure its interests. Perhaps the West is doing less than it should to dissuade Russia from acting wherever it sees fit. Former Soviet republics and new Member States of NATO in Central and Eastern Europe fear the military might of Russia.

There are a number of analysts in the US and EU who have surmised that for the near future Russia will exercise restraint due to its weak economy, isolation from the West, and concerns that it would over-commit its military forces. Still, far more sense they have the advantage over Russia, and express a degree of certainty over what Putin’s intentions are. Concerning Moldova, that may account for what colloquially would be called a knee-jerk response to a more nuanced situation. The predilection of analysts to view any moves by Russia westward to establish greater political, economic, or military ties to a country as a prelude to war must be overcome. That will allow for more rationale policy approaches and more efficacious moves by the US, EU, and NATO. Acclinis falsis animus meliora recusat. (The mind intent upon false appearances refuses to admit better things.)
Moldova was carved from Romania’s Bessarabia Province in 1940 by the Soviet Union as a consequence of its non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. After declaring its independence from the Soviet Union, power shifted between the Communist Party which has sought a strong linkage with Russia, and pro-Romanian, pro-European parties which have advocated for EU membership. Since 2009, efforts have been made to move westward, but a final choice on which way to turn has not been made.

Moldova: In Brief

In 1940, Moldova was carved from Romania’s Bessarabia Province by the Soviet Union as a consequence of its non-aggression agreement with Nazi Germany, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939. Since then, Moldova has been home to three main ethnic groups, Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians. When Moldova became an independent country, power shifted between the Communist Party which has as a custom sought a strong linkage with Russia, and pro-European parties that have advocated for EU membership. In 2009, pro-European parties took firm control in Chisinau, and in 2014, Moldova signed of an Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade to deepen political ties with Brussels and gradually integrate Moldova into the European Common Market. Exports increased, the economy grew, and, in response to reforms, including improving human rights, Moldovan citizens were entitled to travel visa-free into the EU. However, corrupt politics and a confusing, mazelike, parliamentary structure made it nearly impossible for Chisinau to recurvate in order to meet the requirements of EU ascension. After those initial days of change, little was done after to open up the country’s economy and its institutions. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries. Low incomes cause hundreds of thousands of Moldovans to seek a better life abroad.

Many Moldovans still look to the EU for answers. It accounts for the fact that the majority Moldovan voters in the past three parliamentary elections since 2009 have opted for liberal, pro-Western, and albeit, pro-Romanian governments. In that vein, many officials in Chisinau see Romania as a vital counterweight to Russian influence. Bucharest is generally recognized on the international stage as a representative of Moldova’s interests in the network of international organizations, as well as a source of financial air and the know-how necessary for the implementation of reforms. However, other Moldovans instead believe prosperity lies with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union. The gap between social and political forces in the country progressively widened. Both sides seem to have temporarily united in response to the average Moldovans’ resentment toward the elite, the oil oligarchs. The disappearance of $1 billion from the country’s banks stoked that frustration. It well-illustrated the failure of Moldova’s leaders to protect their citizens’ interests. The news spread and caused the depreciation of the local currency, the leu. Price increases and soaring interest rates were accompanied by the loss of purchasing power of the local population Official sources report that in 2015, the average salary in Moldova was just $250. Public finances were battered by the bail-out required to stabilize the banks. Occasio aegre offertur, facile amittitur. (Opportunity is offered with difficulty, lost with ease.

Moldovan street vendors (above). In 2009, pro-European parties took firm control. in Chisinau, and in 2014, Moldova signed of an EU Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade to deepen ties with Brussels and integrate Moldova into the European Common Market. Exports increased, the economy grew, and, in response to reforms, including improving human rights, Moldovan citizens were able to travel visa-free into the EU. Yet, after those initial days of change, little more was done to open up the country’s economy and institutions. Moldova remains one of Europe’s poorest countries.

In the spring of 2015 citizens already fed up with the disappearance of $1 billion from Moldovan banks, corruption, poverty, and immigration problems for twenty-five years since the breakaway from the Soviet Union, engaged in large-scale protests country-wide. The protests were organized in the Dignity and Truth Platform Party that was established in February 2015, particularly in response to the theft of funds from the banks. Dignity and Truth, has been led by lawyers, journalists, and members of Moldovan civil society. It sharply has criticized the authorities and simultaneously has supported the formation of an authentic pro-EU reformist government and pushing for the country’s EU integration. One protest was attended by over 100,000 citizens. Most recently, in August 2016, tensions boiled over during Moldova’s Independence Day parade. Protesters clashed with police in the capital. One protester lamented: “We decided to celebrate this day in the manner because we do not at all feel free. People are poor, people leave the country. Those who have recently stolen a billion dollars from us, organize military parades, waste millions from the budget on it, which essentially means from our money in time crisis.” Protesters also expressed anger against oil oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc’s influence in the government and called for early elections.
Mass protest in Chisinau, September 2015 (above). In Moldova, citizens already frustrated by corruption, poverty, and immigration problems for twenty-five years since the breakaway from the Soviet Union, engaged in large-scale protests country-wide since the spring of 2015. The protests were organized in the Dignity and Truth Platform Party that was established in February 2015, particularly in response to the theft of $1 billion in funds from the banks. Protests had included as many as 100,000 citizens. Tensions boiled over recently over Moldova’s 2016 Independence Day parade.

Moldova’soon Independent Republis: Transnistria and Gagauzia

Transnistria is located on the eastern side of the Dneister River and 450 miles along the Moldova-Ukraine border. The Slavic element of Russians and Ukrainians constitute nearly 60 percent of Moldova’s population. They speak Russian or Ukrainian or both. When the Moldovan Parliament ruled in 1989 that the official language of the republic was to be Romanian (Moldovan) written in the Latin script, and gave five years for non-Romanian citizens to learn it, Russian and Ukrainian speaking population of Transnistria registered their disapproval There was a sense that pan-Romanian nationalism was on the rise. That was when Transnistria region declared its independence from Moldova. Moldova rejected that declaration and engaged in a two year campaign to retake the territory. What followed was a series of clashes between the sides, culminating with a violent armed conflict into which the Russian Federation 14^th Army, based in Moldova, was drawn in on the side of the breakaway republic. Two years later Moldova proved unable to retake the territory in a war that killed 1,500 people The number of war refugees was approximated at 120,000 and 150,000. Transnistria emerged as a pro-Russian statelet. To maintain peace and security in the territory, a joint command structure and tri-lateral peacekeeping force, comprised of Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian units were established following Transnistria peace settlement on July 21, 1992, In 1998, 10 Ukrainian observers joined the peacekeeping force. The Russia still maintains 1000 peacekeepers in the territory despite a 2002 promise by Moscow to remove them.. Since 2005, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EU, the US, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Moldova and Transnistria have been engaged in a “5+2” process aimed at bringing the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria to an understanding consistent with Moldova’s territorial integrity while providing a special status for Transnistria

In 1990, fears that Moldova might seek to unify with Romania led the region to declare its independence, calling itself the Gagauz Republic, even before the Transnistria conflict erupted. Moreover, unlike Transnistria, fighting never broke out in Gagauz. A 1994 compromise between Chisinau and authorities in the Gagauzia’s capital, Comrat, led to the creation of the autonomous region of Gagauzia within Moldova. Initially, Moldova’s law on the status of Gagauzia gave the region the right to declare independence should Moldova “lose its sovereignty,” at the same time, meaning seek unification with Romania, but a 2003 amendment to the Moldova constitution abolished that right. declaring Gagauzia a “constituent and integral” part of Moldova. The Gagauz are Orthodox Christian people of Turkic origin who settled in the region nearly 800 years ago and are linguistically, ethically, and culturally distinct from their Moldovan, Romanian, and Ukrainian neighbors. Gagauzia, along with the remaining territory known as Bessarabia, became part of the Russian Empire following the Russo-Turkish War from 1806-1812. While other parts of the eventual Soviet Union saw a decent amount of ethnic integration, over 80 percent of the territory’s population remains Gagauz. Still, it’s population of 160,000 represents about 5 percent of Moldova’s total population. Gagauzia is not actually a congruous region. It includes all areas of Moldova in which the Gaguaz are over half the population, as well as parts of the country that have joined Gagauzia by referendum. Gagauzia’s boundaries have gone through several revisions since 1994. occupying just 5 percent of Moldova’s territory.
Transnistria is an unrecognized republic which was declared in 1990. With Rusia’s assistance, it managed to prevent Moldova from reclaiming its territory in the War of Transnistria in 1992. Since the war ended, the Russian Federation has stationed 1000 peacekeepers there. Fighting never broke out in Gagauzia and Russia has no troops there. A 1994 compromise between Chisinau and local authorities in Comrat led to the creation of the autonomous of Gagauzia within Moldova. With a population of 160,000, it is a non-contiguous territory occupying 5 percent of Moldova’s territory.

Moldova’s Neighbors: Romania, Ukraine, and Russia

Since great portions of Moldova’s population are ethnically associated with its neighboring countries, neighboring governments have established lines into Moldova. Besides its traditional goals of consolidating its own position within the EU and NATO and bolstering its partnership with the US, Romania for years has declared that Moldova is a priority of its foreign policy. Romania’s policy aims toward Moldova include reinforcing its neighbor’s position within the system of Western institutions and improving its international linkages. In that vein, Romania has also tried to prevent any attempt to deepen Moldova’s integration in Russian structures, primarily the Eurasian Economic Union. That requires Bucharest to achieve its aims at the political and diplomatic levels, but also by increasing economic ties with Moldova.

Often the notion of Moldovan-Romanian unification is discussed by Romanian political leaders, However, for now, that is unrealistic for political, economic, and social reasons. In Bucharest, politicians would lose power and most would be deprived of career prospects, and established political and business interests would be jeopardized. Romanian policy towards Moldova, and by extension the two countries political relations, are most often shaped, among other factors, political pragmatism resulting from the desire to win the support of the Romanian electorate. Romania has managed to play a generally positive role in drawing Moldova toward Western structures and has been effective in its actions, its effectiveness in other areas of bilateral cooperation has been negligible. The technical support that Bucharest has provided is less than necessary, and infrastructure projects have been seriously delayed as a result of problems in coordinating actions among relevant ministries. This has led to a large breach between Bucharest’s frequent declarations of support for Moldova and actual results. Indeed, Romania has not implemented a coherent strategy toward Moldova. Its policy has essentially been a function of domestic, not foreign policy. Bucharest’s political objectives are often subordinated to rivalry among Romanian political parties.

Moldova (shaded green above) and its neighbors. Romania for years has declared that Moldova is a foreign policy priority. Its policy aims for Moldova include reinforcing its position within Western institutions and improving its international links. Ukraine and Moldova have unresolved bilateral issues include long lasting property issues related to resorts inherited from the Soviet Union, a hydroelectric station, and an issue of border demarcation. Russia views Moldova as an integral part of its geopolitical and cultural space and invests a great deal in preserving and increasing its influence in the country.

For the Ukrainian government, relations with Moldova have been overshadowed by Kiev’s relations of with the US, the EU, and Russia. Chisinau has had to repeatedly deal with Ukrainian officials and experts who have perceived Moldova as being too small to influence regional developments and too weak to shape the agenda of the bilateral relations. However, such an approach has been proven false for a number of reasons. Despite Moldova’s diminutive size, relatively weak economy, and limited influence in the region, the Moldovan government is tough in negotiations. Bilateral issues that remain unresolved between Ukraine and Moldova include long lasting property issues related to resorts inherited from the Soviet Union, a hydroelectric station, and an issue of border demarcation. Left unresolved, these issues could potentially harm joint efforts for European integration, influence the 5+2 (Talks on the Transnistria conflict settlement, and joint participation in the regional projects,

Regarding Transnistria, since 2014, Ukraine has massed heavy weapons on the border with the statelet to deter the launch of a military campaign from it. Kiev gas also imposed limits on the transit of Transnistrian nationals and citizens of Russia, 200,000 of whom currently live in Transnistria. There are 500,000 ethnic Russians in Transnistria. When appointed in June 2015, the Governor of Ukraine’s Odessa Region Mikhail Saakashvili announced plans to reinforce Ukraine’s border with Transnistria. He stated at an Odessa news conference, “We have two major tasks—to reinforce the border and curb corruption. Drugs and weapons trafficking across the border means nothing good.” He also blamed Transnistrian authorities of destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.

The Wall Street Journal’s assay of the Russian Federaton’s Moldova policy was correct to the extent that it explained Moscow wants Moldova to remain in its sphere of influence. Putin wants Moldova to join his Eurasian Economic Union and not the EU. He considers Moldova to be an integral part of Russia’s geopolitical and cultural space and has invested heavily in preserving and increasing its influence in the country. It uses elements of soft power to gain control of assets and political opinion support. Russian authorities can also manipulate Moldova through its dependence on Russian policies on gas supplies. Within the Russian speaking population of Moldova, sentiment has ostensibly been manipulated through the idea of Russkiy Mir (Russian World). True, the Moldovan heritage is not Slav. Still, Sovietization and Russification had an impact on the identity of many Moldovans.
“Green men” in Crimea (above). Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the explosion of violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk, exposed the challenge Chisinau faces in maintaining its border and interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions. The Wall Street Journal editorial noted Putin has been flexing his military muscles and testing the climate in the West for a potential next move. Considering this, it would not be completely unreasonable for Chisinau to consider that Moldova might be facing the threat from hybrid warfare.

The Hybrid Warfare “Threat” to Moldova

Accensa domo proxium, tua quoque periclitatur. (When the house of your neighbor is in flames, your own is in danger.) Moldova’s leaders do not speak to Russia with timidity, but they are realists concerning the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two counties, and signal that understanding in their measured actions. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the explosion of violence in the Donetsk and Luhansk, exposed the challenge Chisinau faces in maintaining its border and interpreting Russia’s actions and intentions. The Wall Street Journal editorial noted Putin has been flexing his military muscles and testing the climate in the West for a potential next move. Given these considerations, it would not be completely unreasonable or unwarranted for Chisinau to consider the possibility that Moldova might be facing the threat from subversion and insurgency, characteriistic of hybrid warfare. Elements of the tactic include::

A de-legitimization media campaign:

The population’s preferences are influenced by altering their perceived needs

The political subversion stage:

Front groups are created to gain public credibility
The country’s institutions—particularly military and law enforcement—are infiltrated.
Governmental power is corroded by fomenting riots, staging violent demonstrations, and generally igniting civil unrest.

The final stage:

Legitimate power is replaced by the capture of government buildings by force and local law enforcement and military units are disabled.

Moscow has already punished Moldova for seeking closer ties with the West. Import bans were placed on Moldovan wines in 2013 and agricultural products in 2014, each time over health regulations and each time close to Moldovan EU summits and accords. New restrictions on remittances that Moldovan workers in Russia send home have also hampered economic growth. Remittances represent over 30 percent of Moldova’s GDP and up to 65 percent of them come from Russia. Once the Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement were signed with the EU in June 2014, prices of imported gas from Russia rose. Moldova is heavily dependent on imported energy and the Russian state-owned Gazprom is its main supplier of gas. To reduce Moldova’s dependency on Russian gas, a pipeline was constructed between the Romanian town of Iasi and Moldova town of Ungheni. Although the pipeline was ready for use, Chisinau, seemingly concerned over displeasing Moscow, announced in November 2015 that it had extended its gas contracts with Russia for another year. There are fears that tensions between the pro-Russia population and the pro-Romania Unionist which support reunification with could also make Moldova vulnerable and could provide Russia a plausible justification to intervene. Russian media which is widely available in Moldova, serves as a soft power instrument for wider dissemination of Russian official propaganda and anti-Western messages.
Transnistrian troops on parade (above). Transnistria’s leaders in Tiraspol say Moldova and Ukraine have conspired to keep their country under an economic blockade. Russia accuses Moldova and Ukraine of squeezing Transnistria. Kiev denies any systematic actions against Moldova except suspending military cooperation after Moscow annexed Crimea and began supporting rebels in Eastern Ukraine. Still, Kiev has built up its forces on its border with Transnistria. Transnistria has mobilized its army reservists between 18 and 27. Its forces have participated in exercises with Russian Federation forces since 2015.

In his speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 13, 2016, Russian Federation Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev referred to the political crisis in Moldova as a major threat to European security. Many nfluential Western politicians are of the same opinion. On August 10, 2015, Thorbjorn Jagland, the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, referred to Moldova as “an occupied state” and pointed out that the country could become the next issue for EU security. He stated: “Many in Moldova worry that Transnistria could become the next Crimea, an anxiety that has been further fueled by appeals for Russian protection from some of the province’s civic groups.” Despite protests from Chisinau, in April 9, 2015, Russian forces conducted a drill in Transnistria. According to Russian news agencies, 400 Russian troops participated in exercises in Transnistria. They fired 100,000 rounds of ammunition. Again, on August 2016, Russian Federation forces stationed in Transnistria held a tank drill in the territory. Some Western analysts went as far as to say such exercises were intended to create the impression that Putin might take more dramatic action to subdue that defiant country. Western analysts also allege Putin was sending a warning to Moldovans to abandon their dreams of Western integration.

Russia accuses Moldova and Ukraine of squeezing Transnistria. Kiev denies any systematic actions against Tiraspol other than the suspension of military cooperation that followed Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and actions in eastern Ukraine. On June 12, 2015, Ukraine moved troops toward its border with Transnistria. Alarmed, Transnistria’s Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Ignatiev stated, “the situation here is very bad . . . Economic production is going down, foreign trade is shrinking, the security situation is equally alarming with our Moldovan partners holding military drills with NATO and the Ukrainian pressure mounting everyday.” Transnistria’s leaders believe Moldova and Ukraine have conspired to keep their country under an economic blockade and have mobilized their republic’s army reservists between 18 and 27.

If Moldova faced Russian military intervention, it would unlikely be able to successfully respond. In terms of preparations by Chisinau, Moldovan forces initially began conducting a series of exercises ostensibly to prepare for a possible Russian attempt to seize its territory following Russian actions in Crimea and Donetsk and Luhansk. Those exercises, however, convinced few in Moldova that the country was at all prepared to efficaciously defend itself against hybrid warfare or any other type of attack. Those efforts made seemed more than anything else to be examples of “pokazuhka.” In the Soviet Union, pokazuhka referred to performances by units designed by military commanders to create the appearance of troop combat readiness to impress superiors and gain commendations. Beyond such window-dressing style training, Moldovan forces lacked military hardware, spare parts, fuel, munitions, body armor, food supplies, and light anti-tank weapons. The defense budget has been kept at $30 million, hovering between 0.3 and 0.6 GDP for the last several years. What Moldovan forces need to know is how to fight in densely populated urban and rural areas, train in the calibrated use of artillery avoid the self-destructive act of demolishing their own country’s infrastructure, and train to fight in an environment in which their opponent would restablish air superiority.
To prepare for possible Russian aggression, Moldovan forces initially began conducting a series of unilateral exercises. Those exercises, however, convinced few that Moldova was at all prepared to efficaciously defend itself against hybrid warfare or any other type of attack. Moldova soon received opportunities to train with NATO troops. Still, training and assistance to Moldova will be limited because it is not a full NATO member.

To help Moldova, a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, on July 25, 2015, about 800 troops from Moldova, the US, Romania, Poland, and Georgia took part in a joint military exercise in at the Balti military base in Moldova. The aim of exercise known as Joint Effort 2015 was to test the capabilities of the countries’ armed forces to cooperate. Moldova has since hosted additional military exercises since. Indeed, as part of the on-going cooperation between US and Moldovan defense forces, US, Moldovan, and Romanian troops conducted exercise Fire Shield 2016, a combined small arns, artillery training exercise at the Bulboaca Training Area, Moldova. The purpose of the exercise is to improve interoperability, explore concurrent training opportunities, and conduct safety training. Yet, training as well as assistance to Moldova will be limited because it is not a full-fledged NATO Member State. Moldova might receive some critical non-lethal equipment such as counter-battery radar, secure communications, and tactical drones. NATO could also intensify the training of Moldovan military forces in territorial defense However, none of that will truly make Moldova capable of deterring possible Russian aggression.

Pro-Europe national leaders in Chisinau pray to be part of the EU and NATO, but that possibly will not come right away. Granting Moldova NATO membership now, albeit hardly a possibility, or in the near future, may pose a set of problems that other member states may not ever want to deal with. Some in the West may even oppose arming Moldova, calculating that doing so would only cause Russia to inject more military forces in Transnistria. All of this means Chisinau should not feel certain of the US and EU commitment to help protect Moldova’s sovereignty and rights as an independent country. The administration of US President Barack Obama has indicated that the present and future challenge of US foreign policy is no longer to isolate and defeat an existential foe as Russia. Rather, it is creating a sustainable balance of power that advances the US interests by preserving peace and security and fostering collaboration among geopolitical rivals in addressing global transnational threats. It is difficult to assess how a new US administration will respond over Moldova.

Moldova: A False Positive for Hybrid Warfare Today

A false positive is an error in an evaluation process which leads one to conclude that a given condition has been fulfilled when it actually has not been fulfilled. Russia certainly has exerted pressure on Moldova, but that may only be part of an effort to strengthen its diplomatic hand, not an overture to war. Russia is well-aware that cooperation stimulates economic growth and higher standards of living on both sides of a border by improving conditions for free trade and exchange. Russia believes that can be achieved by investment and integrating the region into the communication and transportation networks of its Eurasian Economic Union. Inter-border cooperation is understood to be a prerequisite of broader integration processes and improving relations between neighboring countries. It can serve as a mechanism for coping with the challenges and jolts resulting from the new divisions created between EU and Eurasian Economic Union countries. Domestic policy priorities and international and regional security issues can be harmonized through it. Inter-border cooperation can also serve to promote minority rights.
In July 16, 2016, Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip held important meetings with Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin in Moldova. The aim of the meeting was to tackle the bilateral cooperation agenda. Rogozin offered a proposal for invigorated contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol that would allow for normal relations, “above all in economics.” They discussed the division of Moldova into zones of influence,” one looking toward the EU, the other looking toward the Eurasian Economic Union.

Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin made a two-day visit to Moldova on July 6, 2016, during which he had important meetings in Chisinau with Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip. The aim of the meeting was to allow the two officials to tackle the latest developments concerning the main elements on the bilateral cooperation agenda. Reports indicate Rogozin came at the invitation of Filip. Filip emphasized Moldova’s interest in boosting the trade and investment relations with Russian partners and in particular, in the integration of Moldovan goods export to the Russian market. The Transnistria conflict settlement was also an important issue on the meeting agenda. Rogozin and Filip expressed support for the 5+2 talks, and welcomed the resumption of the discussion in this format. Additionally, the two officials discussed aspects of their countries’ cooperation in the migration sector, as well as in the cultural and humanitarian fields. They recognized the need to promote more governmental programs on developing ties in these cooperative areas.

Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci. ([He] has gained every point who has combined [the useful with the] agreeable.) More detailed reports of the meeting between Rogozin and Filip, however, paint a more intriguing picture Rogozin explained Russia wanted to see invigorated contacts between Chisinau and Tiraspol aimed at a return to normal relations, “above all in economics.” What the two officials most importantly discussed was the de facto division of “zones of influence” one looking toward the West and the EU and one looking toward the East and the Eurasian Economic Union. The formally unrecognized Transnistria and the autonomous Gagauzia would be part of the eastern zone. The arrangement would also allow for the free movement of people and goods between them and to the broader communities of which each is a part. Further, the division of zones of influence would ostensibly spread to all areas of life, including information policy and civic freedoms. Activities that would be perfectly legal in one zone in Moldova could possibly result in arrest in the other.
With regard to trade with Moldova, Russian Federation Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry Rogozin has presented a proposal to Moldova that would result in a creative arrangement for Russia. As Moldova is not subject to EU sanctions, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via Transnistria and Gagauzia and thus escape restrictions. Simultaneously, the territories would become points for the expansion of the Russian world. Given the need to ensure that those territories remain part of Moldova, Moscow would hardly consider annexing Transnistria or Gagauzia.

With regard to trade with Moldova, Rogozin proposed a creative arrangement. Moldova is not subject to sanctions. Thus, theoretically, Russia could move its goods into a proposed European zone in Moldova via Transnistria and Gagauzia and escape restrictions. Simultaneously, the territories would become points for the expansion of the Russian world. Since Russia would need to ensure that those territories remained part of Moldova, Moscow would hardly consider annexing Transnistria or Gagauzia. Interestingly, after meeting with Filip, Rogozin went into Tiraspol without the usual complaints from Chisinau about visits of Russian officials to Transnistria. Rogozin, for his part, did not meet with pro-Russian opposition figures or mention any broader political settlement. For some analysts, this has created the impression that in the course of preliminary meetings, Moscow and Chisinau had firmly agreed about the proposed economic arrangement

Since that visit by Rogozin to Moldova, Chisinau has implored the West to help provide relief from pressure by Moscow. Filip stated on August 16, 2016, “Through elections and international agreements, we have steadfastly chosen the Euro-Atlantic community as our inspiration and destination, and the current government is dedicated to securing our EU path. Moscow is none too pleased, and that is why we need the help of Washington and other Western capitals to solidify our transition from several decades of communism into a free-market economy.” In coming presidential elections, Moldovans will make a choice whether to stay on the pro-Western path toward the EU or more closer to Russia’s orbit

The Way Forward

In Act II, Scene ii of William Shakespeare’s comedy, Trolius and Cressida, Hector, the Prince of Troy, a fierce warrior, and leader of the Trojan armies, states: “Modest doubt is call’d The beacon of the wise, the tent that searches To the bottom of the worst.” Searching for the worst, one might consider that if things do not go Russia’s way in Moldova’s coming presidential elections, Moscow could begin to quietly provide enhanced economic support to Transnistria and Gagauzia. That aid might take the form of a considerable amount of Russian rubles to encourage greater purchases of Russian goods. That aid might initially be cloaked. It could also continue to provide humanitarian aid using truck convoys. Russia could provide financial support to pro-Russian separatist political organizations. To encourage ethnic-Russians to remain in Transnistria and Gagauzia, Russia may assist directly in the infrastructure improvements in those territories, as well as focus on the construction of new schools, churches, community centers, and infrastructure projects that meet the needs of those communities. At the same time, Russia could enable pro-Russian separatists in Transnistria and Gagauzia as a hedge against any attempts to reverse gains made. Separatists could be enabled to defend themselves with training from Russian military advisers perhaps acting covertly and they could also be provided with new Russian armaments. Russia would unlikely withdraw its forces in Transnistria and could possibly increase the measure of those forces to create the capability to rush into restive Gagauzia if any fighting began there. It is easy to postulate such theories on possible moves by Moscow, they are unlikely to be observed in Moldova. A decision against Russia’s interests in Moldova will not create an ultimate crisis for Moscow. The wisdom exists to resist war.

Nihil est incertus volgo. (Nothing is more uncertain than the favor of the crowd.) Moldova’s sovereignty is as important an issue in coming elections as the country’s economic future. Paramount in considering Rogozin’s proposal is that it would not only establish the defined interests of Moscow, but would also preserve Moldova’s unity, solvency. Despite imperfections in the proposal, it might best serve Moldova’s interests for the moment. To an extent, Rogozin’s proposal represents an effort at compromise by Moscow. Unable to bring all of Moldova into its Eurasian Economic Union, it seeks to create spheres of interest. It may very well be a signal from Moscow that it intends to stick with diplomacy to resolve its issues with Moldova. Despite veiled threats from some senior Russian Federation officials and apprehension among Moldovan officials, Chisinau signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014. Moldovan officials now appear somewhat concerned over Russia’s reaction to a possible vote by Moldovans to remain on a western track in coming presidential elections. If they vote to go West, it ironically may prove to have been Moscow’s adherence to a diplomatic tack on establishing zones of influence that created enough breathing space for them to feel unafraid to do so.

Iraq’s Premier Narrows the Divide, but Challenges Loom: Will Abadi Take a Path Being Created by Iran?

Posted on December 22, 2014 by greatcharlie

Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi (left) is pictured in an October 2014 meeting with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (right) in Tehran. Abadi has been successful in mitigating sectarian tension in Iraq. However, with some prodding from Tehran, Abadi now seems to be leaning toward Iran and challenging the administration of US President Barack Obama on its support and commitment to his government.

According to a December 15, 2014 New York Times article entitled “Iraq’s Premier Narrows the Divide, but Challenges Loom”, in nearly every way, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi has so far been a different leader than his predecessor, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, despite their common Shi’a political bloc. Although the obstacles facing his government are considerable and he faces political challenges within his own party, Abadi’s early performance has encouraged many Western officials. In his first months in office, Abadi has already appeared three times before Parliament which Maliki only did twice in eight years. Abadi has fired incompetent and corrupt military commanders appointed by Maliki and rooted out 50,000 so-called ghost soldiers; no-show troops for whom commanders nevertheless collect salaries. The December 15^th New York Times article quoted Gyorgy Busztin, the Deputy Special Representative for the United Nations in Iraq, as saying “He [Abadi] is doing all the things we feared he wouldn’t be doing.” While many officials credit Abadi’s conciliatory style for the improved political environment, they say the changes also point to a new sense of urgency in Baghdad that Iraq might finally break apart in the face of the threat from the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).

Abadi’s greatest test to date came when an Iraqi court sentenced a prominent Sunni politician to death. It was panning out to be an unmitigated disaster for the country’s new prime minister. The verdict, on capital murder charges brought by the previous government against the politician, Ahmed al-Alwani, prompted the defendant’s Alwani tribe to threaten the termination of its coordination with the Iraqi government in the fight against ISIS. However, Abadi moved quickly to mitigate the problem. He immediately contacted Sunni officials and Alwani tribe members, assuring them that there would be no execution. He urged them to solve the matter by the tribal tradition of paying “blood money” to the families of the two soldiers who were killed in a gun battle when commandos came to arrest Alwani last year.

However, the December 15^th New York Times article also explained that Abadi faces constraints from hard-line factions within his own Shi’a constituency. For example, Iraqi Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi said that even though Sunni officials were optimistic about Abadi’s intentions, they remained worried about the “old guard,” a reference to Maliki and his cronies, who many believe are working behind the scenes to undermine Abadi. Maliki had already been accused of inflaming sectarian hostility. It was a made cause for the US push for his removal. His reputation was made worse by his open opposition of a deal to share oil revenue with the Kurds. He called the fall of Mosul to ISIS in June a conspiracy orchestrated by the Kurds. It is believed that ISIS’ march over a vast swath of Iraq has been aided by sectarian hostility which Maliki’s rule inflamed. Maliki warned against arming Sunni tribes to fight ISIS. His lack of support for Abadi has also been evinced by his refusal to vacate his prime minister’s offices and palace in Baghdad’s Green Zone. There is the possibility that Maliki is driven purely by his own political objectives and the hope that he might return to power sometime in 2015.

However, it may also be that Maliki’s actions have been driven by Iran. Tehran may be using Maliki both as leverage with Abadi and as a possible replacement, should he take what Iranian leaders in Tehran might view as an overly conciliatory approach toward other sectarian groups in Iraq and move too close to the US. Part of that effort also appears to include having Maliki maintain close linkages with Iran’s Shi’a partners in the region, including groups such as Hezbollah. Abadi must remain concerned with reactions from his Shi’a political base to his bona fides as leader of Iraq’s Shi’a community upon which his political survival depended. Indeed, it appears Iran’s approach is working. True, Iraqi leaders have always visited Iran since the 2003 invasion by the US-led coalition. Yet, recent visits by Abadi and other senior Iraqi officials indicate Iran still holds considerable influence with them. There is palpable feeling in the air that renewed linkages between Iraqi Shi’a political leaders and Tehran has been created. It has been firmed by Iran’s efforts and sacrifice in defense of Iraqi cities, towns, and citizens from ISIS.

Doubts Arise about Abadi in the US

When the ISIS blitzkrieg began in Iraq on June 9, 2014, the response of the administration of the US President Barack Obama included pushing then Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to establish a representative government, to include Sunnis and Kurds. It was seen as an effort to heal the rifts being exploited by the insurgents. The militants captured large parts of the country’s western and northern provinces in their June offensive after Sunni residents threw their support to the group after the Maliki government stopped paying the Sunni tribal fighters who had earlier helped battled the ISIS’s precursor, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Obama went as far as to insist that no US military help will be forthcoming unless Iraqis make an effort to bridge their divisions. US Secretary of State John Kerry, in talks with Maliki, tried to make headway on the issue. After a protracted political crisis, the Iraqi Parliament voted to have Maliki step down in August, and Abadi took over with a mandate to establish a new government more representative of Iraq’s ethno-religious groups and gain the trust of Iraq’s disaffected Sunnis so they would fight ISIS rather than support it. His early performance encouraged many US and Iraqi officials.

In support of Abadi’s government, the US deployed 1,700 US troops to Iraq with the mission to help train and reorganize the highly fractured Iraqi Army. It had dwindled to nearly half its size from the 50 brigades it had when the US forces left in 2011. US military troops would also prepare the Iraqi Army for a ground offensive against the ISIS. A fight to retake Mosul was being planned for the spring of 2015. Obama announced in November that the US would send 1,500 additional troops as part of a $1.6 billion effort to train and equip nine Iraqi brigades and three Kurdish brigades for a renewed push against ISIS. Obama also sought to support plans to create as many as three brigades of Iraqi National Guard units drawn from members of Sunni tribes in the Anbar province to fight AQI. Those tribal militias were a vital part of the “Sunni Awakening” that began in August 2006, during which Sunni fighters turned against AQI. The tribal militias cooperated with US troops in killing large numbers of AQI militants and in pushing the group out of its longtime stronghold in Anbar province. ISIS’s June offensive was launched from Anbar, and it has been consolidating its control over the province.

Alistair Baskey, a spokesman for the US National Security Council, stated for the New York Times in an email that Abadi and the Iraqi government “have made clear that Sunni tribal forces are going to have to be a part of the effort to defeat ISIL [ISIS] and for the security of their provinces.” Baskey went on to comment on Abadi’s participation at a December 3, 2014 Counter-ISIL Coalition Ministerial in Brussels. He stated that Abadi “once again acknowledged that military action alone will not defeat ISIL [ISIS] and that positive steps toward governmental reform, national reconciliation, and economic and social reconstruction will be needed in this fight. This process will take time but it is now underway. The new government is working to integrate tribal fighters into the Iraqi Security Forces.”

However, Abadi, during a December 9, 2014 meeting with US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, reportedly made a strong push for more weapons and expressed doubts about reconciling with Sunni tribes. According to a December 14, 2014 ForeignPolicy.com article, Abadi’s approach caused US and European officials to worry whether the US-led coalition was rushing to train and rebuild Iraq’s military forces without getting a matching commitment from the Iraqi government to make peace with its Sunni tribes. Talk began of holding back the deployment of the additional 1,500 US troops as a way to indicate US displeasure at Abadi. However, it was recognized that any slowdown or hesitation on the part of the US to execute its plan to train and equip the Iraqi military as well as support for the formation of national guard units will have far-reaching consequences. An anonymous US official was quoted in the December 14^th ForeignPolicy.com. article as stating if the US waits to deploy additional forces “or if we look like we are starting to wobble in our commitment to Iraq we’ll pay for that inside the coalition and we’ll pay for that with our Arab partners.” Sedit qui timuit ne non succederet! (He who feared he would not succeed sat still!)

Iran Seeks to Guide Abadi’s Way

It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Iran would tolerate any reduction of its influence or surrender its interests in Iraq as a result of the Obama administration’s actions. Knowing that the type of representative government the US sought to construct for Iraq could not be designed easily, Iranian leaders seemed to believe the US would fail to create it. Khamenei, on June 23, 2014, stated: “We vehemently oppose and disapprove the interference of the Americans and others in Iraq’s domestic matters. We believe that Iraq’s government, people, and the senior clergy are capable of ending this sedition. God willing, they will end it.” After some political horse-trading, Maliki was pushed out and Abadi was brought in. However, Iranian leaders did not concede that the US was better able to manage Iraqi politics. In response, Iran committed itself heavily to Iraq expecting to acquire even greater influence in the country and with Abadi.

Tehran eventually expressed support for Abadi, but it was reserved. It came in the form of congratulations from the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Rear Admiral (Daryābān) Ali Shamkhani. On August 12, 2014, Shamkhani offered congratulations to the Iraqi people and their leaders for choosing Abadi as their new prime minister. He also stated that Iran supported “the legal process for choosing the new Iraqi prime minister.” Yet, the Iranian leadership’s authentic sentiments on the matter were best expressed by Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader and Head of the Expediency Discernment Council Strategic Research Center, Ali Akbar Velayati. On June 19, 2014, Velayati explained, “[Nouri Maliki] is the best figure among existing Iraqi politicians to lead. I say this because I know Iraq. I have cooperated with everyone who is managing Iraq, even before the victory of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.” In following with that sentiment, during Abadi’s first visit to Iran as prime minister on October 20, 2014, Khamenei reservedly expressed appreciation over his formation of the new Iraqi government. Khamenei stated, “Iraq is a big, important, and influential country in the region that can play a (major) role once security and conditions return to normal.” He told Abadi, “We stand by you and will defend your government just as we seriously defended the former administration.” Yet, in Abadi’s presence, Khamenei lauded the performance of Maliki in resolving the problems of the Iraqi people and maintain security in the country. It was not difficult for Abadi to perceive that in Tehran, Maliki’s standing was higher than his own. Press TV reported Khamenei heaped further praise on Maliki when he visited Tehran on November 10, 2014 by saying his approach prevented “chaos” and “instability” in the country. Khamenei rated what he called “Maliki’s approach to help the new government of [prime minister] Haider al Abadi and efforts to establish unity among different Iraqi forces” as “very good.”

By late 2014, Abadi began to publicly lean toward Iran and challenge the US regarding its level of support despite his successes in Iraq. The cause for his change in perspective may have been a combination of weariness from political infighting in Baghdad, the struggle to balance his ties to sectarian groups, pressure from his own Shi’a community, or Iran’s efforts on the battlefield. Abadi may have simply begun to question the Obama administration’s will to engage long-term in the fight against ISIS. His rebellious attitude toward the US was evinced in a December 1, 2014 interview with the Lebanese-based Al-Mayadeen Television. Abadi reportedly stated, “While the United States was hesitant to help Iraqi armed forces amid security threats to Baghdad, Iran was swift to provide assistance to its crisis-torn Arab neighbor.” Abadi went on to express his appreciation to Iran for standing with Iraq in its battle against ISIS. He also explained that Baghdad was determined to maintain friendly relations with Tehran. Abadi stated that the two neighboring nations share common interests, adding Iraq would not sever its relations with the Iran simply because others might ask Baghdad to do so. Given the views he proffered in his December 1^st interview, the approach taken by Abadi during his December 9^th meeting in Baghdad with Hagel should not have come as a surprise.

To Abadi, US officials have approached the anti-ISIS fight as a policy issue, but for him that fight is an existential issue. As a neighbor, Iran displays a mutual sense of danger, and its leaders have assured Abadi that as neighbors, they are open to helping his government face many critical issues.

Impact of Iranian Military Support

During a September 25, 2014 meeting with Abadi, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani stated, “Tehran considers Iraq’s security and stability as its own security and stability.” If the Iranians manage to shape the military situation on the ground in Iraq, they will have much to gain. Iran’s position as the dominant power in the region would be furthered. As Velyati explained, “The majority of [Shi’as and Kurds] and their leaders have very close relationships with Iran. Some Sunni Arabs have cordial relations with us as well. We can therefore make our most effort to gather the aforementioned [individuals].” Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders certainly believe they are close to achieving that goal. The Iranian Students News Agency quoted IRGC Brigadier General (Sartip-e Dovom) Yadollah Javani, the Senior Adviser to the Representative of the Supreme Leader to the IRGC as stating that the two factors in the successful liberation of Amerli and Mosul were the matjas [religious authorities]’ fatwas, especially that of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He further noted that according to his [Sistani’s] own words, “General [Qassem] Suleimani has exported the culture of the Sacred Defense [Iran-Iraq War].” Javani continued by explaining, “Today in Iraq and Syria, the great banner of General Suleimani has been installed, with the caption beneath it, ‘Savior of Iraq;’ this is a great source of pride.”

Some IRGC boasts have derided US efforts in Iraq. Senior Military Adviser to the Supreme Leader, IRGC General (Sarlashkar) Yahya Rahim Safavi explained that Iran, Syria, and Iraq make up the strongest coalition against ISIS, with millions of people willing to defend sacred shrines. He further stated the US-led anti-ISIS coalition is ineffective and has already failed.

The Way Forward

It has been proffered by US officials anonymously that the Abadi government is still in its nascent stages and the US and its coalition partners need to “resist making major assumptions about the trajectory of the situation in Iraq based on anecdotal information or a few data points.” If the decision is made to wait to see how Abadi will behave before investing further militarily in Iraq, it is believed the Iraqis will most likely delay in organizing their security forces. Soon enough, everyone will be waiting to act except ISIS. That has been referred to as “a losing proposition.” Iran heavily committed itself to Iraq with the expectation that it will acquire even greater influence over it. With greater control over the Shi’a community and increased influence with the Kurds, not through political operations, but its military efforts, it is difficult to see how Iran would not be able to shape the political, economic, and social situation in Iraq for years. As for the sectarian struggle, Iran is confident it can handle the matter.

In many places, the Iraqi people have coped with unspeakable sufferings, injustice in violent forms, and corruption among officials. Given Abadi’s progress, hope was created that the light of his success would shine amidst such darkness, and the darkness would not be able to overpower him. Yet, no matter how capable Abadi may appear to be, he cannot be expected to find his way in that darkness without help. Iran is creating a road for Abadi. It may be either a path toward a stable, secure and unified Iraq, with a representation government or a blind alley which will lead to greater sectarian violence. If Iran’s efforts concern the Obama administration, it should consider how the US can create a straight path for Abadi to travel. It is not a matter of simply pushing him from behind with demands. It means leading the way with concrete steps and working closely with Abadi, as a partner, to accomplish all things.

Merkel Says Russia Sanctions Do Not Preclude Dialogue: Such Pragmatic Thinking Could Lead to Positive Outcomes

Posted on October 17, 2014 by greatcharlie

German Chancellor Angela Merkel (above) understands that continued uncongenial relations between the EU and Russia could lead to a larger conflict involving NATO. Longstanding linkages between EU states and Russia, put at risk by mutual sanctions, could serve as the basis for an improvement in relations and positive outcomes on contentious issues such as Ukraine that will satisfy all parties involved.

According to an October 16, 2014 Reuters article entitled, “Merkel Says Russia Sanctions Do Not Preclude Dialogue” German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated in a speech in Parliament on Thursday that sanctions against Russia over Ukraine were necessary but they did not preclude dialogue with Moscow. Merkel spoke ahead of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Milan. ASEM is a summit concerning the creation of responsible partnership between Asia and Europe on sustainable economic growth and development. However, meeting Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss urgent and important issues will be high on Merkel’s agenda and the agendas other EU leaders. The German leader described the situation in Ukraine as “very difficult”. but will undoubtedly broach the matter with Putin. ASEM will be the first occasion for EU leaders to have contact with Putin in months.

EU leaders remain greatly concerned with the alarming pattern of behavior displayed by Putin. He annexed Crimea and the will unlikely be a return to status quo ante. He has supported Russian speaking compatriots throughout the former Soviet republics. Beyond Crimea, he has branded the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in eastern and southern Ukraine ” New Russia”. They have been occupied by armed separatist fighters led by Russian citizens that have managed to acquire tanks, missiles, and other heavy weapons which the Ukrainian government and the West have said could only come from Russia. They have violently clashed with the Ukraine’s armed forces. Putin’s actions have been in line with his vision of a resurgent Russia at the center of an orbit of compliant neighbors. This concept was manifested in his proposal for a “Eurasian Union,” an economic alliance that would include former Soviet republics such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and most notably Ukraine.

Putin seems determined, perhaps for political reasons or due to character, to maintain an environment of confrontation. For EU leaders, coping with a counterpart in diplomacy who is aggressive in both words and deeds makes remaining confident and resolute that a solution can be found to the current crisis more difficult. Fears likely exist among some EU leaders that Putin will pose even greater problems in the future. The weight of maintaining Europe security falls squarely on the shoulders of the EU leaders. They are the stewards of their countries. In her statement, Merkel appears to be reminding fellow EU leaders that although times are troubled, relations between the EU and Russia must exist. A positive line of communication with Russia must be maintained not as a personal matter, but as a duty. She understands that continued uncongenial relations between the EU and Russia could lead to a larger conflict involving NATO. Desired outcomes can develop from such contacts. Merkel is showing by example that EU leaders must remain strong and of good courage in the face of daunting circumstances. Audentis fortuna adiuvat! (Fortune favors the bold!)

Much needs to be discussed in meetings between EU leaders and Putin such as: the meaning of events in Ukraine with regard to long-term Russian behavior there; Putin’s plans for states along Russia’s border; and vital economic issues on which the EU and Russia must cooperate. Most likely many issues will not be covered. Nevertheless, firsthand experience speaking with Putin will be of great value. EU leaders and Putin would have the chance to “clear the air” regarding any personal concerns they have of the recent course of relations. Decisions would no longer need to be based on an understanding of Putin’s thinking in the abstract. Leaders would remove any ambiguity over where things are headed. They would better understand the risks and likely outcomes of possible diplomatic or military initiatives regarding Russia.

Hopefully, meetings between EU leaders and Putin will be successful and regular communication between them, with US President Barack Obama included, can be established soon. Finding ways to work with Putin to construct a solution on Ukraine and a variety of other issues will require a certain agility as his thinking appears somewhat different from there own. However, EU leaders must remember that they regularly display such agility jousting with political opponents in their own capitals and negotiating with each other in Brussels. If those talents could be brought to bare, much would likely be accomplished by them. Perhaps longstanding linkages between EU states and Russia, put at risk by mutual sanctions, could serve as the basis for an improvement in relations and positive outcomes on contentious issues such as Ukraine that will satisfy all parties involved.

A mantra of greatcharlie.com has been that although the title “Strongman of Russia” surely fits Putin, he is not a maniac. He would likely prefer to establish peace and security in Ukraine and in Russia’s other neighboring states without conflict and further economic, political, and military expense if possible. It is still worthwhile to seek a diplomatic solution to the current crisis. It is good to see that EU leaders have the desire, the will, to look for one.

In Syria, the US Is Bombing Friend and Foe Alike Says a Syrian Opposition Official; Action Is Needed from the Opposition, Not Complaints

Posted on October 6, 2014 by greatcharlie

These youthful fighters (above) are members of the abominable Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). ISIS poses as great a danger to its erstwhile allies, the Syrian opposition, as the Assad regime. A US-led coalition is conducting airstrikes against ISIS and other Islamic militant groups. If the Syrian opposition ever hoped to find advantage over those groups, its military leaders must find ways to capitalize on this new situation.

In an October 2, 2014, Washington Post op-ed entitled, “In Syria, the United States Is Bombing Friend and Foe Alike”, Mohammed Alaa Ghanem explained that US-led airstrikes have had an important positive impact against the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State as he refers to it. He confirmed that ISIS has suffered real losses, and there have been fewer civilian deaths now that the Syrian Armed Forces’ aerial monopoly is broken. However, Ghanem who is a senior political adviser and government relations director for the Syrian American Council, board member of the Coalition for a Democratic Syria, and fellow at the Syrian Center for Political and Strategic Studies, also claimed that substantial dangers were associated with the air campaign, pointing to a rise in anti-US sentiment in western Syria and the failure of airstrikes to halt ISIS’ movement toward Baghdad. Expressing the general sentiment of Syrian opposition members, Ghanem claimed that to preserve the viability of its strategy, the US must complement its airstrikes with firm support, in both word and deed, to “moderate anti-Islamic State Syrian opposition fighters.” Ghanem insisted that airstrikes alone will not defeat the ISIS. He stated that only close coordination with mainstream Syrian opposition forces would accomplish this. He proferred that enabling mainstream opposition fighters to escalate ground attacks on the Islamic State’s western front would force ISIS to divert resources from Baghdad. Ghanem stated that unlike the Iraqi Army, mainstream opposition forces already have a record of rolling back ISIS forces. Ghanem found fault with the US-led coalition for failing to establish any significant coordination regarding airstrikes with the opposition.

It is disappointing to learn that Syrian opposition political officials are still making churlish complaints over assistance being provided by the US and other benefactors. Their “mantra” has been a demand for more arms and supplies for their forces and for greater things to be done, such as launching airstrikes against the Syrian Armed Forces to promote their success. Complaints are also often heard from senior commanders of the Supreme Military Council, the opposition’s military wing and commanders of their forces in the field, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), as well. Their grievances belie the fact that the Syrian opposition military leaders, after three years of war, have failed to unify the many groups in the Free Syrian Army into a cohesive fighting force and have been unable, without foreign assistance, to enhance their fighters capabilities. They have been remiss in devising their own plans for the effective use of their forces against ISIS and the Syrian Armed Forces. How easy it is for the Syrian opposition to stand in judgement of the US and others, taking a position of moral superiority and declaring they are owed certain levels of assistance from them. From the beginning of their movement, Syrian opposition leaders should have been mature enough, and worldly wise enough, to understand that neither US nor any other country owed them anything. The Syrian opposition, its Supreme Military Council, and senior FSA commanders should expect more from themselves before demanding so much of others. With regard to the current situation in which a US-led coalition is hitting ISIS with airstrikes, Syrian opposition political and military leaders certainly must do more than offer lip service about their benefactors’ actions. They should consider how they might best act to capitalize on positive results with or without coordination with planners of the air campaign. If the opportunity arises, they should present proposals for coordinated action to their US government contacts. They should remain willing, even if alone, to do what is necessary to carry on their fight until final victory is achieved. Faber est suae quisque fortunae! (Every man is the artisan of his own fortunes!)

The Syrian Opposition’s Present Situation

The administration of US President Barack Obama decided to provide the Syrian opposition its support with the hope that Assad could be pressured to the negotiating table by FSA advances and eventually agree to step down under a settlement. Yet, support would be kept within limits. The impatience of FSA commanders and fighters with the Obama administration over the level of its efforts is indeed well-known. Syrian opposition political and military leaders claim the size and scope of assistance is the reason behind their lack of significant success against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s armed forces and allies—the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), IRGC Quds Force, Hezbollah, the National Defense Forces militia, and Iraqi Shi’a militia brigades. However, the real problem has been the opposition, itself. The fight for democracy in Syria was supposed to be the opposition’s fight to win alone. However, very rapidly, Syrian opposition leaders discovered the entire undertaking was enormous and they found themselves well out of their depth. Simply keeping the opposition together politically has proven very difficult. Foreign diplomats must regularly act as mediators to hold the movement’s diverse groups together. Opposition military leaders have not shown any greater acumen unifying their forces. Moreover, FSA commanders have failed to display any impressive military capabilities. Many FSA units cannot perform in a military fashion.

What ISIS and other Islamic militant groups linked to Al-Qaeda such as Jabhat al-Nusra and its offshoot Khorasan have done is find advantage in the Syrian opposition’s failings. By attacking mainstream FSA units that have been trying to defeat Assad’s troops and allies, the Islamic militants have succeeded in making the Syrian opposition’s situation far worse. On top of the damage caused by their attacks on the FSA, Islamic militant groups have also committed countless attrocities against the Syrian people. The groups are not directed toward Syria’s transition to a democratic form of government. ISIS has included territory they hold in Syria as part of a massive Islamic State, an Islamic Caliphate, crossing into Iraq that is solely under their control, ruled under Sharia law. A syncretistic merger of mainstrean opposition and Islamic militant ideas on governance will never occur. ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other Islamic militant groups were becoming stronger almost daily. Their strength had already passed the point at which mainstream Syrian oppositon forces could have contended with them.

US-led airstrikes, if unable to destroy those groups, will hopefully be able to degrade and displace them to a degree that they can no longer influence the political outcome in Syria. While FSA commanders may complain and even panic over the prospect of taking over the difficult battle lines at strategic points which ISIS and the other Islamic militant groups held, it is the only way to improve the FSA’s situation long-term. Indeed, only through on-going US-led airstrikes would the Syrian opposition ever have a chance of being positioned to succeed against the Assad regime.

What Syrian Opposition Leaders Should Be Doing

Following very public beheadings of Western citizens, ISIS was finally recognized in capitals around the world as a truly monstrous organization. It was referred to as a “death cult” by Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot. Airstrikes, to a degree, have not as yet kept ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and similar Islamic militant groups at bay. Nevertheless, in time, they will. While the air campaign is developing, FSA commanders need to reconfigurate their forces to exploit positive effects of those airstrikes. They must find ways to maneuver their units against the Islamic militant groups and Assad’s forces. Even if ideally for the FSA commanders, airstrikes reached such an intensity that some air assets could be tasked to provide air support for FSA, those units would not be able to remain hunkered down while the work was done from the sky above. Once Islamic militant groups were destroyed or displaced in some areas by airstrikes, sufficient numbers of trained and equipped FSA fighters, perhaps a mix of veteran and newly trained recruits, would still need to be made ready to move into those group’s former positions. If FSA commanders have not completed any of these tasks because they were uncertain over how to proceed, they should have sought specific assistance from the US and other benefactors in organizing FSA fighters and units.

What Further US Assistance Might Look Like

As ISIS and other rogue Islamic militant groups are degraded, the US will be provided greater freedom to effectively organize FSA units as a military force, promote the development of greater cohesion and coordination among its units, improve FSA fighting capabilities, and enhance their combat power with better arms. All of these actions together will also provide FSA with a more immediate chance to position itself to defeat Assad’s forces. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is already steeped in the Syria situation as the US agency managing the training and arming of the FSA. CIA would likely be the organization tasked with any new mission to rapidly organize mainstream fighters to cover any strategic positions left open as a result of the destruction or displacement of Islamic militant groups that once held them. CIA officers already handling the stuation in Syria have a good awareness of what is happening on the ground and would able to track Islamic militant movements caused by airstrikes. With FSA support, they likely have been continuously collecting granular information on the Islamic militant groups, including the size of specific units, the locations of its fighters as they move. They likely have already gathered information on the backgrounds of individual fighters and commanders, unit capabilities, and supply depots. Data from CIA officers on the locations and activities of Islamic militant groups has undoubtedly contributed to the US-led air campaign. Important in a CIA directed effort against the Islamic militant groups would be to minimize the FSA combat power allocated to that secondary task. The bulk of FSA power would still be dedicated to fighting Assad.

Regarding possible air support for the FSA, CIA has drones available and other air assets that could be assigned to support the FSA and serve as a force multiplier. Overwatch for FSA units, as they reorganized and repositioned themselves, could be provided by drones or other CIA air assets. Whenever FSA units needed to engage ISIS and other Islamic militant groups, drones and air assets available to CIA could provide direct support. If CIA were to organize some FSA units to police ISIS and other Islamic militant fighters left in FSA territory after the collapse of their units, drones and other available CIA air assets could support that activity. Beyond human intelligence collection, the US gathers continuous signals and geospatial intelligence in Syria. Multiple streams could help CIA pinpoint and attack locations of leaders and units from ISIS and other groups even if they are dispersed by airstrikes. That information would also be very useful to CIA in providing close air support for FSA movement.

Assessment

Having discussed what Syrian opposition leaders, the Supreme Military Council, and FSA commanders might do and propose, it is important to recognize that US military and intelligence planners, using their expertise based on careers that include continuous professional education and training and considerable experience in warfighting and intelligence operations, are very capable and know how to develop effective plans for action. They are aware of the capabilities of specific FSA commanders and units, the effectiveness of their weapons systems, and what would be the real possibility for success of any FSA operation. FSA commanders, regardless of their level of understanding of military theory or strategy, are outmatched by the degree of understanding senior US military and intelligence officers possess for the planning and execution of attacks coordinated with airstrikes. If ordered by the US President to present a plan for such an operation, senior military and intelligence planners would produce something that displays a high level of acumen and creativity, utilizing advanced technologies perhaps beyond what FSA commanders and their opponents might imagine.

Until that time comes, if it ever comes, the Syrian opposition must take the initiative to reinvigorate the FSA, motivate its fighters, develop a sense of unity among units, and draw up bold new plans to engage in dynamic action in the field. Authentic military leaders should be able to accomplish these tasks. The Syrian opposition may not be certain whether US airstrikes are a stroke of good luck or mean bad luck for it. However, whether it becomes either is in the hands of the Syrian opposition, itself.

Russia Is Ousted From Group of 8 by US and Allies: Things Aren’t Improving on Ukraine, But Maybe General Dempsey Can Change That

Posted on March 27, 2014 by greatcharlie

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, is cast in the same mold of a long line of senior military leaders who have effectively advised US presidents in time of crisis.

According to a March 24, 2014, New York Times article entitled “Russia Is Ousted from Group of 8 by US and Allies,” US President Barack Obama and other leaders of the Group of 8 industrialized democracies cast Russia out of their organization to punish Russian President Vladimir Putin for his annexation of Crimea. The leaders also threatened tougher sanctions against Russian interests if Putin escalates aggression against Ukraine. When asked to discuss such efforts to compel a change in course by Russia, Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have literally shrugged their shoulders. Other Russian officials have scoffed and mocked such measures with great bluster. Where possible, Putin has taken parallel actions against US and other Western interests in Russia.

Though it seems Putin may be content with his military achievements so far, US officials, policy experts, journalists, as well as pundits outside of the policy making process, insist upon ratcheting up the situation, publicly declaring that an even greater threat exists from Putin. Indeed, they pessimistically imagine Putin engaging in further aggression, ostensibly attempting to also annex territories of various former Soviet republics in which ethnic-Russian populations dominate, using the pretext of self-determination with those groups. In doing so, they perhaps unwittingly have suggested Putin’s actions may mirror former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s efforts to grab ethnic-Serbian held territory in break-away Yugoslav republics to form a “Greater Serbia.”

Putin is astute enough to realize Crimea may be more than enough for Russia to handle. As former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage recently commented at a Center for Strategic and International Studies event, “We’re going to see if Crimea becomes a small bone in Putin’s throat.” In that vein, the US and its Western partners will have their hands full, too, trying to build Ukraine up economically, politically, socially, and militarily. Russian media reports remain rife with suspicions and accusations of US involvement in the collapse of the regime in Kiev that was friendly to Moscow. They emphasize to the Russian people that their country has an upper hand in the situation. One news anchor in Moscow reminded Russian viewers that “Russia is still the only country in the world capable of turning the U.S.A. into radioactive ash.”

On the positive side, meetings between US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who have regularly worked together on other urgent and important issues for both countries, have already begun. Every effective channel reportedly has been opened by the US to express a message to Russians of US concerns about Ukraine. However, there seems to be a notion held by Putin and Russian officials in their heightened state of alert that any efforts to find common ground with the US would amount to appeasement. Expressions of US positions have been interpreted as US demands, eliciting a reflex response by Moscow not only to reject those positions, but any proposals drawn from them. Communications are now somewhat mangled. All important telephone conversations between Obama and Putin have been reduced to bristling confrontations between the two. By all accounts, the conversations very likely would have been a finger-wagging sessions between Putin and Obama if they had taken place face to face. The situation remains tense and dangerous.

Thinking outside of the box, handling the Russians, even with very apparent political and diplomatic aspects of the problem, might be facilitated with more input from a member of the US national security team who had recent success in negotiating with senior Russian military officials on critical defense matters. That individual is US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey. In addition to knowing what the most concerning Russian military capabilities and possibilities for action might be, his professional military experience, depth of knowledge, understanding of history, insights and worldliness, make him someone Obama perhaps could rely on more heavily for advice on the Ukrainian crisis. Indeed, as a senior military officer he may possesses the capability of being effective in advising Obama in such crises in a way perhaps not possible for other presidential advisers at the moment.

Dempsey was recommended for the job of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Gates had already nominated Dempsey to be the Army Chief of Staff. In his recent book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (Knopf, 2014), Gates explains that Dempsey had commanded forces in Iraq and command in Iraq or Afghanistan was a quality he wanted in the next chairman. Gates also thought Dempsey had also performed superbly as the deputy commander and acting commander of the US Central Command. When notifying Dempsey of his decision to nominate him as chairman, Gates explained to Dempsey that he was well-equipped to face the challenges of the budget, to lead the chiefs as a team, to maintain cohesion, and to help a new secretary of defense manage the relationship between the military services and the president. Obama has clearly been very satisfied with Dempsey, selecting him twice as chairman.

Dempsey has dealt with a challenging agenda since assuming his present post. Most relevant in the Ukraine crisis has been Dempsey’s part of the process of ensuring sustained positive US-Russian relations. Dempsey recently demonstrated his ability to manage line of communication and promote constructive conversations with the Russians when he met with General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on January 21, 2014, in Brussels. In that long-scheduled meeting, Dempsey displayed solid judgment and diplomatic acumen to advance an agenda for bilateral military relations. The two generals produced a workable agreement that detailed 67 activities on which the armed forces of the US and Russia would continue to cooperate, despite pre-existing political and diplomatic problems and new concerns that arose over security assistance at the Sochi Olympic Games. Indeed, the meeting came amidst a blitz of criticism leveled against Putin and organizers of the Games by US officials. Those criticisms served to create the impression worldwide that the Games in Sochi were not safe to visit. The comments were almost perfectly designed to evoke the worst reaction possible from the Russians.

Upon seeing Gerasimov, Dempsey likely noted he was a tough general, but not totally devoid of charm. As recounted through press reports of the Moscow Times, RT, RIA Novosti, Interfax, and other Russian press offices and of the American Forces Press Service (AFPS), Reuters, and the New York Times, Dempsey sought cooperation from Gerasimov through encouraging him to consider their unique situation as commanders of the most powerful military forces in the world. Both were well aware of the esoteric, advanced, and frightening technologies that could be brought to bear in war and the need to maintain peace and stability in their nations’ relations and throughout the world. Cooperation was the best way to achieve that end. Dempsey was quoted as saying, “I think we have an opportunity to advance the relationship on areas of common interest.” Issues such as the US missile defense system, vehemently opposed by Moscow, were discussed. However, Dempsey noted to Gerasimov’s apparent appreciation that Russia was a vital partner to NATO providing supply lines for its mission in Afghanistan, agreeing to allow the movement of nonlethal material to and from the war zone through Russian territory. That rail and road network is becoming increasingly important as protests in Pakistan choke efforts to use the more convenient supply lines there. Dempsey reassured Gerasimov about US and NATO efforts to ensure stability in Afghanistan after the departure of the International Security Assistance Force at the end of 2014. Gerasimov asked for regular updates on the US and NATO effort to train, advise, and equip Afghan National Security Forces, as well as Afghanistan’s ability to maintain and control transportation lines in and out of the country. In an AFPS interview, Dempsey was quoted as stating: “We agree that a stable Afghanistan that is not a sanctuary for terrorism is in our common interests.”

By the end of the meeting, Gerasimov was comfortable enough to endorse “regular contacts” between their militaries as “quite useful.” Pointing to the less than congenial political and diplomatic relations between the US and Russia, Dempsey said it was important for the militaries “not to foreclose on conversations, even if at some points there are disagreements that prevent the forward movement” in other parts of the relationship whether political or diplomatic. There could be no better time to consider using of that effective line of communication than now.

At the same meeting, to ensure a safe and secure Olympics, Dempsey made a nearly open-ended offer to Gerasimov to provide “full assistance” from the US military, echoing an offer made to Putin by phone that same week. Gerasimov’s reaction of expressing a need for anti-IED technology was plausible to the extent that Islamic militants could have used roadside bombs against Russian government or civilian vehicle at the Games. However, Russian Islamic militants were viewed as more likely to carry out a martyrdom operation (suicide attack) than plant a roadside bomb and detonate it at a distance. If Gerasimov hoped to exploit US concerns and generosity, that all stopped with Dempsey. He understood the implications of just giving it away, nonetheless, Dempsey remained quite respectful of the Russians’ request. He understood that it was after all the job of the Russian security services to seek advantages over potential adversaries, and the effort to exploit the thinking among US political officials should have been expected. There was a guarantee that Dempsey despite Gerasimov’s push for US technology would be guided foremost by his duty to defend the US. Abiding by that, Dempsey seemingly, instinctively stood his ground against Russian appeals “in the interest of improving military cooperation and communication” while truly seeking to further military ties likely more earnestly than his Russian counterpart.

Dempsey’s insight on working with military elements of the Russian government could help his president through this crisis. Dempsey may very likely be able to demonstrate that there is a way to deal with Russians even under current conditions. He may be able to bring Russia to the diplomatic table, despite the very militaristic and aggressive mindset in which Russian leaders are currently steeped. In a pinch, he may very-well act as a brake on any possible runaway breakdown in US-Russian communications.

However, to be most effective in providing perspective and military advice from the chiefs for Obama on Ukraine, Dempsey would need to heed lessons from his experience with Obama on Syria in August 2013. From that experience, Dempsey likely foresaw difficulties advisers would have in getting Obama to rapidly come to terms with any plans or proposals offered on Ukraine. Providing a range of military option to effectively achieve objectives based on the president’s concepts, would be not be sufficient enough with Obama. On Syria, Dempsey was initially tasked with providing advice and viable options for calibrated military strikes in response to Obama’s expressed goal of deterring and degrading Assad’s ability to use chemical weapons. In his Rose Garden statement, Obama took comfort in Dempsey’s advice, stating confidently: “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has informed me that we are prepared to strike whenever we choose. Moreover, the Chairman has indicated to me that our capacity to execute this mission is not time-sensitive; it will be effective tomorrow, or next week, or one month from now.” Yet, Obama was actually driven to resolve the crisis not by military action, but in a manner that would allow his worldview—that problems can be solved at the diplomatic table using reason and logic—to win through. Unable to quickly find that handle to the situation, uncertainty and indecisiveness ultimately prevailed. Obama was apparently paralyzed by fears of a bitter scenario that would have the US and the region embroiled in a larger conflict as a result of such action. That was coupled by his concerns over the legal ramifications and international implications of military action against Assad regime. Not knowing how best to respond, Obama strayed from a path of assertive and decisive action which most likely would have achieved all military goals and had a strong educational effect on Assad. After making very shrill accusations that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had crossed his red-line by using chemical weapons, Obama made the now world renown decision not to take military action. Obama settled for a deal Russia proposed and negotiated with the US to eliminate Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile.

Seeing how wrenching and difficult the decision making process on Syria was for his president, Dempsey surely understands that to ensure advice to Obama on Ukraine would be effective, the advice of the chiefs on military aspects of the situation would need to go in tandem with helping Obama remain strong and of good courage in the face of daunting circumstances. Fears of greater problems stimulate the imagination, can lead to a pessimistic outlook on the future, and often cause a leader to deviate from a path. Remaining confident a resolute when a crisis is brewing is made more difficult in a dispute such as the one between the US and Russia on Ukraine, when party seems determined to maintain an environment unfavorble for communication. Dempsey’s advice in that respect would need to be direct and personal. An example of how Dempsey might proceed would be to first put matters in perspective by discussing Ukraine from the context of the military stalemate that has existed between the US and Russia during and since the Cold War based in part on first-hand experience as a US Army officer. Following that, Dempsey could assist Obama in understanding the calculated risks and possible outcomes of a variety of diplomatic and military initiatives with Russia given assessments made both in the past and present to make the situation more controllable for his president. Consideration of what is possible to do and what will likely be faced would also facilitate reaching decisions on options to help bring Putin and Russian officials to a point where negotiation on the issues might be possible. That is the advice Obama apparently wants foremost. Along the way, Dempsey could continually assure Obama that he has the full support of the military chiefs. He could assist Obama in mulling over possible courses of action to ensure a sharpening of his perception and clarity of direction.

Boiled down, Dempsey’s role would be that of mentor or coach for Obama, who apparently is still trying to understand how to manage US military capabilities, leveraging US strength through diplomacy and engaging in decision making on the use of force to deter and defeat opponents. Putin and Russian officials may discern “tweaks” in Obama administration’s message and communications prompted by Dempsey, and respond favorably to a request to negotiate.

The Way Forward

The US and its European partners have met to discuss and level sanctions and other economic actions against Russian interests in retribution to the Crimea-grab and to deter Russian efforts to further destabilize a weak Ukraine. However, Putin has executed plans to annex Crimea and a return to the status quo ante will not occur. For Obama’s advisers, finding ways to bring Russia to the diplomatic table, given the confrontational attitude of Putin and Russian leaders, has been challenging. However, resolving the Ukraine crisis may more importantly require bringing Obama to see and understand that it requires a certain agility to develop solutions for coping with opponents whose thinking is different from his own. “Might doesn’t make right,” an utterance recently heard from Obama, is not best philosophy to which one might subscribe when dealing with real aggression. This is particularly true for the US which predicates its ability to engage effectively in diplomacy worldwide on its capability to enforce its policies and protect its interests with considerable military power.

Advisers such as Susan Rice, Antony Blinken, Wendy Sherman, and Samantha Power, in addition to well-experience officials as Joe Biden, John Kerry, Chuck Hagel, and John Brennan, certainly have a great deal to offer to Obama. Yet, results show that they, most likely for various important reasons, have been unable able to reach Obama over the Ukraine crisis in a manner that has allowed him to appear truly in control of the situation. There is a certain “human element” to advising leaders in time of crisis. In recent history, a line of remarkable senior military officers have very effectively served their presidents in a manner described here. Included among them are: Maxwell Taylor, Brent Scowcroft, Stansfield Turner, Alexander Haig, Colin Powell, and James Jones. Dempsey was recommended as chairman based on his military experience. That same military experience made him “expert” in encouraging, advising, and coaching fellow commanders in difficult circumstances. Dempsey’s counsel would truly help his president in dealing with Putin and the Russians beyond the battlefield or even the diplomatic table. Hopefully, Obama will somehow come to understand the benefits that would come from more fully utilizing Dempsey, and seek “greater” counsel from him soon.

Russia Calls on US Military Tech to Counter Roadside Bombs at Olympics; An Act of Vigilance or Effort to Exploit? Go Figure?

Posted on February 5, 2014 by greatcharlie

Russian President Vladimir Putin sits near Sochi with good company, Russian Prime Minister Dimitry Medvedev, and good tea. Russians expect to host and enjoy the Olympic Games, violence free. Fear mongering has been left to foreign critics.

In a February 3, 2014 USA Today article entitled, “Russian FSB Has Poor Record against Terrorists,” journalist Masha Charnay discusses the view expressed by many US security experts that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which has the lead role in security for the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, has a poor track record in Russia’s fight against home-grown terrorists. For those who have dealt with the FSB, the notion that it could be considered ineffective in its security efforts would be debatable. However, in the article, Charnay cites sources such as a study by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism of the University of Maryland, which asserts the frequency of terrorist attacks in Russia has been steadily increasing over the past two decades. The National Consortium study also explains that most of the attacks have happened in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia federal republics, all of which have a significant presence of Islamic militants and are in the same region as Sochi. The article’s author also spoke to Andrew Kuchins, the director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Kuchins was quoted as saying about the Islamic militants, “They’re Muslim jihadists, taking a page from Al-Qaeda.” Kuchins’ comment, however, veils the reality that attacks from Islamic militants in Russia have been suicide attacks. An attacker who is determined to self-destruct in an effort to destroy others is perhaps the most difficult to defend against. Albeit, any individual within a society determined for whatever reason to commit suicide is very likely to succeed, unless you have prior knowledge of the attempt and the act can be pre-empted. Proactively, security services might economically deploy personnel to prevent certain sites from being used for such purposes, particullarly by terrrosts, but unless the resources exist, no security force can truly be everywhere at once.

The reports and theories of US experts on the capability of the Russian security services to protect Sochi from terrorism cited in the USA Today article added to the voices of US officials who have been highly critical of security measures taken by the Russians for the Olympic Games and the level of cooperation from Russian security service officials with their counterparts from US security organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Diplomatic Security Service. That criticism intensified one month before the Games after two December terrorist bombings occurred in Volgograd, 690 km northeast of Sochi, that killed 34 civilians and injured many others, and after Russian authorities made it known that they aware of credible threats posed to the Games by Islamic militants, including the presence of “black widow” suicide bombers in the vicinity of Sochi.

For their part, the Russians have displayed great patience in the face of nearly endless criticisms leveled against the Games’ organizers. Russian President Vladimir Putin and other authorities have confidence in the preparations made and capabilities of their security services to keep Sochi safe and secure. As scheduled, Putin made his final review of preparations for Sochi by the first week of January. It occurred just as the blitz of criticism from US officials began, very effectively creating concerns worldwide that the Games in Sochi were not safe to visit. From the Russians’ perspective, everything that could be done had been done. It seemed unlikely that the Russians would react to any events or criticism to the extent that it would divert them from their planned approach to the Games. US officials and experts appeared to have incited the Russians, not to change their plans for Sochi, but on security matters beyond the Games. By accepting the US offer for help, the Russians placed themselves in a position to potentially acquire the benefits of billions of dollars of US defense research in a secret weapons system and enhance Russia’s military capabilities without any expenditure of their own financial resources. Those financial resources have been made more limited in Russia now as a result of its huge investment in the Games. In response to the US offer to help, the Russians requested anti-improvised explosive device (IED) technology. However it was not made to US political officials, who might have rushed to provide the system to the Russians perhaps to prove a point or out of political expedience. The request was made to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who dealt effectively with the matter.

The US Offer of “Full Assistance” to Russia

According to a January 21, 2014 Moscow Times article, the Russian request for anti-IED technology came on January 21, 2014, when the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, met in Brussels with his Russian counterpart, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Valery Gerasimov. During their meeting, in the name of supporting Russian efforts to create a safe and secure Olympics, Dempsey made a nearly open-ended offer to Gerasimov to provide “full assistance” from the US military. It is difficult to know whether there was some discussion that Dempsey would make this generous offer to help during any advance meetings between US and Russian military officials before the meeting of their chiefs. If that was the case, all of the security services in Russia most likely would have come together to discuss what exactly should be requested from the US in response to its offer. When the “green light” was given to respond favorably to the US offer, it most likely initiated a type of feeding frenzy among them. Undoubtedly, FSB as well as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, the Main Intelligence Directorate from the armed forces (GRU), and even the Ministry of the Interior likely had intelligence requirements (specific information) that they were determined to collect from the US.

Some requests considered by the Russian security services may have been as simple as asking the US to cover the costs for the deployment of greater numbers of Russian security men in and around Sochi. The Russians could have asked the US to provide all of the data the US has compiled on the activities of Islamic militants operating at home and abroad that the Russians may not possess. Questionable requests may have been considered, such as obtaining the latest surveillance and encryption deciphering technology from the National Security Agency that would prevent Islamic militants from planning beyond the Russian authorities’ ability to monitor them and to increase the Russian security service capability to monitor workers and visitors in and around Sochi to better defend against attack. Unreasonable requests might have included obtaining the names and locations of US intelligence officers and their Russian agents. By providing that information, the Russian security services presumably would have released security officers from counter-intelligence activities against the US and allow them to be redeployed for protective security and intelligence gathering duties in Sochi. However, that request, as absurd as it may seem, would likely have been be off-putting enough to the US officials that it would have dissuaded them from continuing to offer assistance or offer to cooperate with the Russians on Sochi.

The Response to Gerasimov’s Request

The eventual request for anti-IED technology was plausible to the extent that Islamic militants could have used roadside bombs against Russian government or civilian vehicle at the Games. The funny thing is that Russian Islamic militants are more likely to carry out a martyrdom operation (suicide attack) than plant a roadside bomb and detonate it by remote control or cellphone. (It could very well be that Islamic militants from outside Russia who might use IEDs are considered a threat to the Games.) If the request was an attempt to exploit US concerns and generosity, that all stopped with Dempsey. Dempsey was unfazed by Gerasimov’s request, and by his actions proved he has great situational awareness not only on the battlefield but also during diplomatic talks. He knows very well that it took considerable effort and expense to the US military to develop and acquire the anti-IED technology to protect troops on patrol in Iraq and Afghanistan. He fully understands the implications of just giving it away. However, Dempsey was respectful of the Russians’ request. He understood that it was after all the job of the Russian security services to seek advantages over potential adversaries, and an effort by the Russians to exploit the thinking among US political officials was predictable. Regarding the entreaty for anti-IED technology by the Russians, Dempsey told the Armed Forces Press Service , “We would favorably consider requests from them.” However, he also pointed out the likelihood of compatibility problems between US anti-IED technology and Russian equipment, something it seems the Russian security services or Gerasimov did not fully appreciate.

US anti-IED technology, according to a January 21, 2014 New York Times article, was designed to detect and disrupt cellphone or radio signals used by militants to detonate improvised explosives from a distance. However, it also could muddle electronic signals, creating a situation where competing and overlapping systems cancelled out the effectiveness of other systems in use at the same time and in the same area. As Dempsey explained, “If you are not careful, you can actually degrade capability, not enhance it.” For that reason, Dempsey insisted on having US and Russian technical experts make certain that the US systems could be integrated into the communications networks and security systems being set in place by Russia.

After mitigating its negative connotations, Dempsey used the opportunity of the Russian request for anti-IED technology to emphasize the importance of military-to-military contacts between the US and Russia. He emphasized the value of having the military chiefs even when at some points there are disagreements, whether political or diplomatic, that could prevent the “forward movement” in other parts of the relationship. (See greatcharlie.com August 17, 2013 post entitled, “Ties Fraying, Obama Drops Putin Meeting; Cui Bono?”)

Assessment

This is greatcharlie.com’s last commentary on the 2014 Winter Olympic Games at Sochi. Instead of sparking discussion about sports, the name Sochi, itself, has been politicized. It is associated with criticisms from US officials over the inability of Putin and Russian authorities to meet the standards proffered for security. However, in the final analysis, the Russians have done whatever possible to pre-empt and stop any violence at the Games. The repeated proffering of predictions that an attack will occur and the complaints about what has been put in place to halt terrorism smacks more of fear mongering than an expression of concern or support. Putin has achieved his objective, and Sochi is safe and secure. A good bet for the Games would be that no attacks will occur and everything will go smoothly. An even better bet is that after the Closing Ceremony on February 24^th, those watching far from Sochi, those visiting the Games, and those athletes who are competing in them will be filled with the spirit of the Olympics, and anxiously awaiting the next Winter Olympic Games in four years.

www

	Obama Urges Putin to… on Ties Fraying, Obama Drops Puti…
	Russia Calls on US M… on Ties Fraying, Obama Drops Puti…
	Russia Calls on US M… on Obama, Putin Discuss Olympics…
	Obama, Putin Discuss… on Putin Vows to Annihilate Terro…
	bet365 free bet on Politics and a Ruptured Tendon…

greatcharlie

Commentary for foreign and national security policymakers, political and business leaders, and policy enthusiasts worldwide.

Category Archives: Brussels

A Link between Trump’s June 2018 Letters to European Allies and His July 2018 Summit with Putin: A View from Outside the Box

Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump: But Trump Will Not Look Past Europe or NATO

A Worried Europe Finds Scant Reassurance on Trump: It May Be Provided Outside the Counter-Trump Milieu

Belarus Allows Small Demonstrations Outside KGB Headquarters: As Belarus Curries Favor with the West, Can It Help Russia, Too?

Putin’s Next Target May Be Moldova, But His Goal Is to Increase Trade, Not Conquer via Military Action

Iraq’s Premier Narrows the Divide, but Challenges Loom: Will Abadi Take a Path Being Created by Iran?

Merkel Says Russia Sanctions Do Not Preclude Dialogue: Such Pragmatic Thinking Could Lead to Positive Outcomes

In Syria, the US Is Bombing Friend and Foe Alike Says a Syrian Opposition Official; Action Is Needed from the Opposition, Not Complaints

Russia Is Ousted From Group of 8 by US and Allies: Things Aren’t Improving on Ukraine, But Maybe General Dempsey Can Change That

Russia Calls on US Military Tech to Counter Roadside Bombs at Olympics; An Act of Vigilance or Effort to Exploit? Go Figure?